ML20235B578

Applicant Direct Testimony 7 (Evacuation Time Estimate & Human Behavior in Emergencies).* Testimony Addresses Contentions Re Evacuation Time Estimate of State of Nh Radiological Emergency Response Plan.Related Correspondence

ML20235B578
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	09/12/1987
From:	PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:
Shared Package
ML20235B348	List: ML20235B346 ML20235B421 ML20235B449 ML20235B469 ML20235B499 ML20235B519 ML20235B566 ML20235B578 ML20235B601 ML20235B621 ML20235B643
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OL, NUDOCS 8709240151
Download: ML20235B578 (326)

Text

Dated: September 12, 1987

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

before the i

h ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) 50-444-OL

) Off-site Emergency (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) Planning Issues

)

) I APPLICANTS' DIRECT TESTIMONY NO. 7 (EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE AND ,

HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN EMERGENCIES) l Panel Members: Anthony M. Callendrello, Manager, Emergency Planning, New Hampshire Yankee Gordon Derman, President, Avis Airmap Company Paul R. Frechette, Jr., Senior Emergency Planner, New Hampshire Yankee Edward B. Lieberman, KLD Associates Dennis S. Mileti, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Hazards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University I. CONTENTIONS ADDRESSED This testimony addresses contentions regarding the Esacuation Time Estimate (ETE) of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP) Revision 2, 8709240151 870912 PDR ADDCK 050004A3 T PDR

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and Human Behavior in Emergencies, including Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) Contention No. 34, Town of Hampton (TOH) Contention No. III, SAPL Contention No. 31, and elements of TOH Contention No. IV, TOH Contention No. VI, SAPL Contention No. 8A, 18 and 37.

SAPL Contention No. 34 reads as follows:

"The New Hampshire State and local plans do not meet the requirement that there be maps showing the population distribution around the facility as required at NUREG-0654 J.10.b and Appendix 4. Therefore, there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10)."

As its basis for this contention, SAPL asserted that NHRERP Revision 2 erroneously reduced the peak populations in the EPZ and that the population maps are not accurate.

The revised TOH Contention III, filed on 10/31/86, asserted:

"The Evacuation Time' Estimate Study (ETE) prepared by KLD Associates, Inc., Revision 2, Volume 6, is based upon inaccurate biased factual data and unreasonable or misleading assumptions, fails to comply with NRC regulations, and fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate i protective measures can and will be taken, or that adequate facilities, equipment, or personnel will be provided to the Town of Hampton, in the event of radiological emergency. 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1),

(b)(1)(10); NUREG-0654, Appendix 4."2 4

1 TOH revised Contention III to Revision 2 was admitted on .

j February 18, 1987, limited only to the bases expressed l on 10/31/86 and 11/19/86. The Memorandum and Order of f May 18, 1987, however, admitted TOH III limitec to the f .

l i

As bases for this contention, TOH asserted:

(a) ETE lacks adequate data to compute permanent and transient pcpulation estimates.

(b)-ETE inadequately compensates for adverse inclement weather conditions.

(c) ETE employs unsupported assumptions when computing road network capacity concerning impediments to traffic, insufficient traffic control, point control, through traffic, highway accessible capabilities, spontaneous evacuations, local weekend work schedules, disabled vehicles.

(d) ETE employs unsupported assumptions for ETE preparation time (notification times, beach to car times, staging area preparation time, understatement of impact of workers returning home).

(e) Growth of EPZ population and vehicles, population distribution will soon be outdated.

.(f) ETE assumes evacuees will go to designated host communities.

The revised TOH Contention III, filed on May 23, 1986, and admitted on May 18, 1987, reads essentially identically bases offered on 10/31/86. A subsequent ruling on July 16, 1987 admitted the bases to TOH III offered on its pleading dated May 23, 1986 as limited to matters preserved in NHRERP Revision 2.

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as the revised TOH Contention III filed on October 31, 1986.

The bases for this version of this contention were limited by the admitting order to matters preserved in NHRERP Revision 2. As applicable bases for this contention, TOH asserted:

1. ETE unreasonably estimates vehicle counts using limited data, and therefore, ETE projections are unreasonably low.

2. ETE unreasonably relies upon an inadequate factual base, i.e., telephone survey to estimate time required for notification, trip commencement, and total population evacuation.

3. ETE fails to account for traffic traveling through beach areas during the summer.

4. ETE fails to provide reasonable assurance adequate personnel are available to implement ETE; local area traffic problems and bottlenecks may not be apparent to State personnel.

5. ETE unreasonably assumes traffic guides will be available to implement traffic control procedures.

6. ETE unreasonably assumes adequate equipment and personnel will be available to assure evacuation routes remain passable during a snow storm.

7. ETE unreasonably assumes buses will encounter "little impedance" when entering the EPZ; fails to account for impact of entering emergency vehicles in delaying .

t  !

overall evacuation of vehicles; assumes buses may travel at 40 to 50 mph; bus loading times of 40 minutes are unrealistic.

8. ETE relies on inadequate data to compute population l

estimates; no determination if telephone survey, used to compute residents and transients without transportation, is representative; ETE concedes it has no computation regarding special facilities or private citizens with medical needs; ETE fails to include through traffic.

NOTE: The basis that a " compromise estimate" of 2.8 <

persons per vehicle was not preserved in Revision 2, and is not therefore, applicable. >

SAPL Contention No. 31 as revised and dated November 26, 1986 reads as follows:

"The evacuation time estimate report, as  !

described in Volume 6 of NHRERP Rev. 2 does not 1 meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1),

50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J.2, II.J.10 i, L 10 h and 10 1, and Appendix 4 because it fails to '

account properly for the number of vehicles that would be evacuating the EPZ; relies in part upon unsupported assumptions; relies in part upon potentially biased input data; does not rely upon extensive enough empirical base; relies upon traffic control personnel not shown to be available; does not appropriately account for travel impediments such as flooding, snow, fog and icing of roadways; does not account for the effect of drive disobedience on evacuation time estimates j (ETEs); does not appropriately deal with '

topographical features; does not deal realistically with the transport of transit dependent persons; in some instances overestimates roadway capacity and, for all of these reasons, underestimates the amounts of time it would take to evacuate the EPZ and its subparts (" Regions")

undur the various scenarios analyzed. "

t________ _ __ _ J

l As bases for its contention, SAPL asserted: l

1. KLD estimates of 3,000 "through" vehicles on highway inadequate, unclear if 3,000 vehicles factored into time estimate calculations;.when and by whom aerial photos of Hampton Beach showing 300 vehicles on roadway taken unstated.

2. Use of figures from Kaltman, 1981 report unreliable due to area growth (vehicle / dwelling for seasonal units, vehicles at campgrounds, vehicles for overnight accommodations).

3. Resident and employee population growth not provided for over the term of the plant's life span.

4. Unrealistic to assume traffic control measures will be in effect during evacuation; state resources would not be mobilized quickly enough; assumptions used by KLD that ETE would be extended only 20-30 minutes with immediate General l

Emergency "are not carefully elucidated."

5. KLD estimate fails to account empirically for 25%

spontaneous evacuation rate, or account for traffic outside of EPZ spontaneously evacuating.

6. Due to low telephone survey call completion rate, no valid basis for notification times, commencement of l evacuation trips, average vehicle occupancy. i

7. Assumes workers can return home in normal time frames. l I

6-s,. . . .

8. Total of 146 traffic guides are needed for TCPs and ACPs; NHRERP does not support adequate numbers.

9. KLD estimate assumes no effect of stalled vehicles, recommendation for placement of two trucks not indicated in NIIRERP , only two of the tow truck locations are within EPZ, no indication given for how long a tow truck would take to respond.

11. No account for topographical features.

12. Mobilization times for buses are not reasonable, particularly during off-business hours. Survey and replies not in appendices.

13. Number of transit-dependents underestimated.

14. Loading-times for boarding special facilities too short; loading nonambulatory persons omitted, no estimate of noninstitutionalized, nonambulatory persons.

15. Collected data re: road geometrics should confirm roadway widths equal to or greater than assumed.

16. Calculation of transit dependent based directly on percent of time average vehicle is inoperable incorrect.

17. Unclear how traffic control information is handled in simulation; loading procedures not described in sufficient detail; substantial amount of passing assumed; unclear how light traffic patterns are treated.

18. Estimate of 2.6 persons / vehicle for residents i

unrealistic, not supported by August, 1985, and July 4, 1986 actual vehicle counts.

1 u____._______.

19. Insufficient empirical base of transient population inferring from beach blankets and parking spaces.

The original SAPL Contention No. 31 was filed on May 15, 1986 as " SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE'S FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE." The Board's Memorandum and Order of February 18, 1987 did not consider further that May 15, 1986 filing with the admission of November 26, 1986 revision, detailed immediately above. The November 26, 1986 revision was admitted, excepting bases 10 and 16. The Board's Memorandum and Order of July 16, 1987, however, reconsidered and admitted that portion of the first paragraph of page 11 of the May 15, 1986 filing which alleged " overestimated capacities of certain roads and intersections." Specifically, this basis cites Route 1A N/S as being overestimated as a " Medium" design road (Volume 6,

p. 3-7); SAPL contends that this road should be treated as a low design road, as it is very narrow in places and "has at i

least two points almost right angle turns."

{

TOH Contention No. IV as revised reads as follows:

" Revision 2 fails to provide for adequate l emergency equipment, fails to demonstrate that adequate protective responses can be implemented in the event of radiological emergency, and fails to correct deficiencies in emergency response capabilities apparent from the emergency exercise." 10 CFR 50.47(1)(8)(20)(14).

I TOH IV, Basis E-, dated April 14, 1987 assert that the l

Hampton RERP fails to assure prompt access for emergency

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( vehicles to the EPZ-. Included under Basis 2 of its contention, TOH asserted:

"(B)us-and-driver availability would be substantially less than as specified in the Letter Agreements (due to) drivers . . . who may become imbedded in outgoing evacuation traffic thereby substantially delaying or prohibiting a driver from timely reaching the EPZ. RAC Review, Au gu st ,

1986,Section VI, p. 12."

TOH Contention No. VI reads as follows:

"The Hampton RERP fails to demonstrate that local personnel are available to respond and to augment their initial response on a continuous basis in the event of radiological emergency.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(1)."

Basis A as submitted on February 21, 1986 TOH filing holds in applicable part:

The Hampton RERP relies on a peak season population computed using secondhand information prepared by nonlocal sources.

Estimate of Hampton peak population of 110,000 (figure from earlier NHRERP revisions) is less than one-half of estimate Hampton Chamber of Commerce, using parking spaces, business receipts and shifts in municipal services.

Basic C.2 of this contention maintains in part that the Hampton RERP fails to account for " driver disobedience, panic," therefore, fails to provide assurance available Public Works Department personnel can ensure all evacuation routes are serviceable.

} Basis G of this contention maintains in part that it is unreasonable to assume that officials will be available to evacuate Hampton school children.

Basis H of this contention maintains that the " State acknowledges that Hampton may have an ' upper peak seasonal population of 110,000' revised Hampton Plan I-II."

Contention SAPL-8A reads as follows:

"The New Hampshire Compensatory Plan fails to meet the requirements that there be adequate manpower and 24-hour per day emergency response including 24-hour per day manning of communications links, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1), NUREG-0654, II.A.1.e, II.A.4, and II.F.1.a.

Additional bases under this contention and filed by SAPL holds in part that individual drivers of the Teamsters Local No. 633 "have in no way shown their willingness to drive into the EPZ."

SAPL Contention No. 18 as revised reads as follows:

"The NHRERP Rev. 2 significantly miscalculates the numbers of non-auto owning population for the 17 New Hampshire local communities. No buses are provided in the plans for the individuals who are not accounted for due to these miscalculations.

Therefore, these plans fails (sic) to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(8),

NUREG-0654 II.J.10.g and NUREG-0654 Appendix 4,

p. 4-3."

In relevant part, the basis to this contention holds that:

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1. The NHRERP Rev. 2 erroneously assumes an EPZ-wide nonauto owning population percentage of 2.5 percent; it is based on this percentage that bus needs are assessed, and

2. The population on which the percentage calculation is made has been underestimated by a very significant margin.

SAPL Contention No. 37 reads at follows:

"The NHRERP Rev. 2 fails to provide reasonable assurance of adequate public protection because an a dequate number of emergency vehicles are not provided for in the plans and further there is no assurance that effective use of these vehicles will be possible in view of a potential outgoing flow of evacuating traffic and a significant lack of drivers therefore, these plans do not meet the requirement of 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(3),

50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J 10.g and II.J.10.k."

The basis to this contention, in relevant part, holds that:

1. The KLD Study shows traffic congestion in the City of Portsmouth throughout the evacuation process; transportation resources must be requested from the State, there could be significant degrees of difficulty in getting buses through traffic.

2. Portsmouth is the location of one of the transportation staging areas (at OMNE Mall). The Towns of Seabrook and Hampton Falls are among the towns to be served by busec from that staging area (Vol. 4, p. 1-10).

I Portsmouth is in the northernmost section of the New

Hampshire portion of the EPZ. Hampton Falls and Seabrook are at the southernmost section of the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ. It is therefore held by SAPL that buses will need to travel through congested traffic conditions over considerable distances, that adequate traffic control measures will not likely be in effect due to local and State Police personnel and resource constraints, and that nothing will constrain evacuees from using those lanes needed for inbound emergency vehicles.

II. PLANNING BASIS A. Evacuation Time Estimates

1. Introduction Volume 6 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan, "Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Study," was developed in accordance with the guidance provided by NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." l Appendix 4 of this document, " Evacuation Time Estimates Within the Plume Exposure Pathway for Emergency Planning Zone," provides specific guidance for the development of the  ;

Evacuation Time Estimate for Seabrook Station. In addition, NUREG CR-1745 entitled " Analysis of Techniques for l Estimating Evacuation Time for Emergency Planning Zones" was used as a basic reference.

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The section of this testimony which presents the-population estimates discusses those elements of Volume 6 which have come under scrutiny as a result of filed and admitted contentions. Following this discussion, we will review activities which have been pursued since the Revision 2 publication in an attempt to gather and. maintain accurate, current data relating to the ETE.

All page references in Section A of this testimony entitled " Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE)" refer to State of New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP),

Volume 6, "Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Study,"

Revision 2, unless otherwise indicated.

As documented by Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654, "the evacuation time estimate will be used by those emergency response personnel charged with recommending and deciding on protective actions during an emergency." This ETE provides information regarding the anticipated time required to evacuate specific regions of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), under various scenarios. This information, in turn, is to be utilized as one criterion by emergency response decision-makers in reaching protective action decisions.

2. Population Estimates: Volume 6 l

a. General Volume 6 of the NHRERP details the sources of population and vehicle estimates utilized within the ETE. All of the 13 -

l

sources'are empirical, arising from direct observation, from extensive survey results, or from the files of the 23 town clerks, These estimates of current resident population, as found in Table 1 of Volumes 16 through 32 of the NHRERP, and as updated within Section A.3, " Surveys and Analyses Subsequent to Publication of Revision 2, NHRERP," of this testimony, are independent of prior ETE estimates.

b. Permanent and Peak Population Estimates Estimates of permanent (resident) population utilized by the ETE were derived from information from Town Clerk estimates in early 1985 based on local census activities.

Compounded annual rates of growth for each EPZ town were calculated using State census data for the year 1980 and for the year 1985; these estimated rates of growth, and the resultant projected 1986 population and vehicle estimates are listed at p. 2-9, Volume 6. To confirm the validity of those population estimates provided by local sources, the 1984 population estimates of the New Hampshire towns as provided by the New Hampshire Office of State Planning were also projected to 1986 using the most recent annual growth rate for each town. These estimates, listed on p. E-11, demonstrate very close comparison of the local and state derived estimates.

Peak population estimates utilized in the ETE represent the total peak population which may reasonably be within a particular town at any one time, for each of 10 " scenarios."

l These scenarios, . defined in Table 10-1, consider different times of the year and of the day, as well as different weather cord A tions. These population estimates which are i relevant to the calculation of the ETE differ considerably from cumulative (e.g., 24-hour) traffic counts and suggested unsubstantiated estimates inferred from local business figures. It is noted that KLD sought information regarding any local " traffic counts and local business figures of peak population or vehicles" from the Town of Hampton and Chamber of Commerce of Hampton Beach; KLD was informed that no such traffic counts or person counts existed.

Table 1 in each of the local community RERPs is entitled

" Population of Municipalities Wholly or Partially Within 10 Miles of Seabrook Station." It provides a listing of estimates of resident and peak summer weekend and midweek populations by municipality. These estimates were prepared using information contained in Sections 2, 5 and 6 of Volume 6 of the NHRERP. The table estimates the peak summer weekend population for the Town of Hampton as 36,635. The table estimates the peak summer weekend population for all of the New Hampshire towns at 142,569, the peak summer midweek population for the New Hampshire towns at 139,929, the peak summer weekend for the entire EPZ population at 228,292, and the peak summer midweek EPZ population at 223,726. (Note that peak weekend population estimates within the seacoast EPZ towns have been reevaluated

[ "'

k4.

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e

~following analysis of aerial photographs taken on July 18,

. 1987. .This' analysis is discussed in Sections A.3 and A.4 of this te'stimony.)

(The listed figure within Table 1, Rev. 2, indicating the estimated peak summer midweek population for the Town of Hampton was mistyped in Volume 18. This estimate of population should read "34,337" not "31,337.")

c. Surveys and Analyses Supporting Population Estimates In arriving at these population estimates used in the ETE, a multitude of detailed and varying surveys and analyses were conducted. These activities include, but are not limited to, the following surveys, counts, and observations.

1. On page E-6, Volume 6, it is shown that detailed examination.of large-scale photos taken on July 4, 1983 consisted of a " count of people" [ emphasis added] on the most crowded portion of the beach which is opposite the Hampton " Casino," close to the sanitary-facilities maintained by the State of New Hampshire. This count included the entire beach area extending into the water. It was noted that virtually all blankets were on dry sand above the high tide line. This dry beach area was measured and ,

used to calculate person density, not capacity. (Note that if the beach area had been measured to the low tide area, the value of density would have been commensurately lower.)

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2.

To estimate the maximum number of vehicles (and people) that could occupy the beach areas, the ETE " relied on empirical examination of the number of vehicles which can physically be accommodated within the beach area," Volume 6,

p. 2-1. Also, parked vehicles (see pp. E-4, E-5 and 2-10) and vehicles in transit (see p. 10-16) werc counted. The phrase "which can be physically accommodated" (Volume 6,

p. 2-1) was stated in the context of reasonable expectation.

The intent of the phrase was to relate the observed unused parking space to what would be reasonably used, based on the prevalent usage in each area as viewed on the aerial film.

An extensive number of photographs of specified date and time were used within the ETE in estimating reasonable parking capacity along the beaches. Nine sets of color slides of the entire coastal area were examined with each set consisting of about 55 slides (p. E-4). The data representing the most crowded situation was that "on Sunday, Augu st 11, 1985 [taken] in the early afternoon" (p. E-5, Volume 6).

3. Thirty-six surveys to determine vehicle occupancy rates in the beach areas were conducted, as listed on

p. 4-7, Volume 6. These counts were taken of travellers in the beach area and do not represent household populations.

The estimate of 2.4 persons per vehicle was based upon the 6 surveys totalling over 5,000 vehicles taken during fair weather and on crowded beaches during July 4th and the

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f. morning of the 5th, 1986 (p. 4-8, Volume 6). The counts taken during rainy weather in late 1985 which led to an average occupancy rate of about 2.2 persons (p. 4-6) were discarded.

Furthermore, during 1983, which may be considered one of the best tourist seasons in recent years for the New Hampshire coastal area (meteorological data gathered at the Seabrook Station meteorological tower indicate that 1983 had the second highest average summer weekend midday temperatures over the past seven years), traffic counts were taken with automatic traffic recorders (ATRs) along all major beach access roads. These data were collected 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, 7 days a week throughout the entire summer season. Table 2-3 on p. 2-13 documents counts of traffic entering and exiting the Seabrook and Hampton beach areas on the most crowded day of this 1983 season, As indicated there, the peak net July 16th influx of about 5,600 vehicles took place at 2:00 p.m. This count is consistent with the j i

data for Hampton and Seabrook beaches which were obtained using the 1985 aerial film. Refer to the discussion on pp. 2-8 through 2-13, Volume 6.

4. The ETE empirically observes that beach population varies widely from day to day, depends most strongly on weather conditions and also varies with time of day (p. 2-10, Volume 6). It is noted in this section that, "on a sunny day it (beach population) generally peaks about 2

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l p.m.," which is about the time the 1985 aerial photos used ir. the Revision 2 parking analysis were taken.

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5. The analysis which develops the estimate of average L

1 person occupancy of evacuating vehicles used by permanent residents is detailed in Exhibit 2-1, p. 2-5, Volume 6. l Information employed for this purpose was obtained from a i

l telephone survey of EPZ residents. Supporting data for this survey are presented in Figures 2-2 and 2-3 and Appendix G.

This estimate equals 2.6 persons per evacuating vehicle and is applied only to the permanent resident population; it does not apply to those people returning home to pick up family members.

d. Estimated Number of Transportation Dependent The ETE estimates that 4,495 people within New Hampshire will require transportation assistance (see NHRERP, Volume 6, Table 11-6). This estimate of 4,495 people with no car available constitutes approximately 5% of the total resident population within the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ. This estimate was determined by applying a statistical analysis to the empirical base obtained by the KLD telephone survey.

In response to concerns expressed by FEMA that the plan should take into account the high probability that ride sharing would provide transportation for most of these people (RAC Review of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans,Section VI, A.1.), an estimate of 50% has

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l been applied to indicate ' Nose transportation dependent evacuees who will ride-share. This estimate of 50% was based on the Mississauga experience (see p. 11-8, Volume 6) and on the suggestion of Mr. Edward Thomas, Region 1, FEMA, that for planning purposes, 70% of transit dependent persons would rideshare. Volume 6 utilized a lower figure of 50% to estimate the number of buses needed so as to ensure adequate bus resources. Thus, the estimate of 2,249 people requiring transit are those persons who do not have access to a vehicle and who also do not have access to ride-sharing.

Volume 6, pp. 11-9, 11-10 and Table 11-6, This estimate of 2,249 agrees favorably with the results of the NHCDA Special Needs Survey which identified a total of 2,106 people who do not have access to a private vehicle for evacuation.

The survey conducted by KLD in August 1985 which is described in Volume 6, pp. 11-1 through 11-11, and Section 5.i of this testimony was based on a sample of the EPZ population. One of its objectives was to estimate the number of persons within the EPZ requiring transit assistance (exclusive of those residing in special facilities) so that the number of buses required to accommodate them could be calculated. The March 1986 NHCDA survey, on the other hand, was conducted to identify those persons with special needs as well as those requiring transit assistance.

1 Finally, conclusions about the behavior of people in emergencies are supportive of a greater percentage estimate of ride-sharing. A closer inspection of this work provides a more detailed reflection of general behavior in emergency i

situations. (See Section B.1.b entitled " Ride Sharing.") e.

Out-of-Service Vehicles To estimate the number of vehicles which could be out of service (i.e. inoperable) at any given time due to mechanical problems, a telephone survey was undertaken of fleet operators on Long Island, New York. The respondent was asked to estimate how many days per year the average fleet vehicle was inoperable, or alternatively, the number of miles driven before a vehicle became inoperable. The answers varied widely. One owner maintained that vehicles remained in service, except for preventative maintenance, for 100,000 miles before breakdown; another indicated a figure of 50,000 miles. We adopted the most pessimistic response which was an estimate of four days per year; or 1.1 percent of the time.

Thus, the probability that a household which owns a single car, will have that car out-of-service at any time, is 0.011. For a household with two cars, the probability that both cars are out-of-service is 0.00012. It is now possible, usinr1 the survey data of Figures 2-2 and 2-3, to estimate the number of people with out-of-service vehicles, we calculated:

I

Percent of households with one car:

(0.14 x 0.79 + 0.35 x 0.35 + 0.19 x 0.19 + 0.19 x 0.19 +

0.08 x 0.14 + 0.05 x 0-.22) x 100 = 32.75%

Percent of households with two cars:

(O.14 x 0.79 + 0.35 x 0.55 + 0.19 x 0.54 + 0.19 x 0.52 +

0.08 x 0.51 + 0.05 x 0.28) x 100 = 45.85%

Total number of households: 142,194/2.87 = 49,545.

The average size of householde that own one car is:

(1 x 0.79 x 0.14 + 2 x 0.35 x 0.35 + 3 x 0.19 + 4 x 0.19 x 0.19 + 5 x 0.08 x 0.14 + 7.2 x 0.05 x 0.22) /0.3275 =

2.27 The average size of households that own two cars is:

(1 x 0.14 x 0.07 + 2 x 0.35 x 0.35'+ 3 x 0.19 x 0.54 + 4 x 0.19 x 0.52 + 5 x 0.08 x 0.51 + 7.2 x 0.05 x 0.28)

/0.4585 = 2.75 Estimated number of people whose cars are out-of-service:

(0.011 x 0.3275 x 2.27 + 0.00012 x 0.4585 x 2.75) 49,545

= 413 people We wished to avoid the documentation of this arithmetic in Volume 6. The procedure outlined on p. 11-9 calculated the number of transit-dependent persons. Within the context of this procedure, we determined that the multiplicative factor of 1.06, applied to this estimate of transit dependent persons, would yield a value approximating the 413 calculated above. That is (see Table 11-6),

7458/1.06 x 0.06 = 422, which approximates 413.

f. Estimates of Employee Population Section 5 of Volume 6 is devoted to the " Estimation of Employee Population." Within the Town of Hampton, the 1

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number of employees who work at the beach area during the summer' season was estimated to be 25 percent of the total number of employees in Hampton.

This percentage is based on the seasonal employment picture shown in Table 5-2 which documents the significant summer employment in Hampton. As shown in Table 5-2, there are some 2,000 more employees within Hampton in the summer than in-the off-season. If all of these summer emplo3aea worked at the beach then about 38 percent of the total employee population in Hampton would work at the beach.

Clearly, this estimate represents an upper bound. There are many inland establishments serving seasonal' traffic (restaurants, motels, retail stores) that either close off-season or which depend primarily on seasonal trade.

These establishments, by definition, provide a basis for seasonal employment. The ETE provides for these seasonal employees within Hampton, but away from the beach. The estimate of 25 percent for beach employment is equivalent to the assumption that about one of three summer employees works away from the beach which we have considered to be a reasonable expectation.

The following sensitivity study demonstrates that any uncertainty in this estimate has a miniscule effect on the ETE. Suppose that instead of 25 percent, only 15 percent of summer employees are on the beach -- this would increase the i

number of evacuation vehicles by about 100. That is: l f

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i m____________.__.__.-.... '

I

-(706-0.75) (0.25-0.15)=94. If, on the other hand, 35 percent are on the beach, (close to the upper bound of 38%), a decrease of some 100 evacuating vehicles would result.

Note that this consideration is limited to the summer scenarios. In the first and last columns of Table 5-4 the off-beach (i.e., inland) employees are estimated for the summer scenarios. These estimates are computed taking into account that an estimated 25% of employees work at the beach for Hampton and Rye, and 10% for Seabrook, Salisbury and Newbury. The vehicles observed in the aerial photographs, which belong to employees at the beach, are indistinguishable from those belonging to tourists there, who will also be evacuating. In the off-season.(next-to last column), all evacuating employees are treated as such, since there are few tourists at that time.

g. Population Growth

1. Population projections.

There exists no current regulatory requirement to project into the future when formulating ETE. In accordance with NUREG-0654, Appendix 4 which states that the

" evacuation time estimates should be updated as local conditions change", the ETE will be subject to the continuous planning process.

2. Employment growth.

i

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It has'been contended that the ETE has failed to account for the " reasonably" anticipated and substantial growth in population and motor vehicles within the EPZ due to employment growth. This, however, is not the case. NHRERP, Volume 6, Table 5-1 projects the historical growth of total employment from 1980 to 1984, as determined by the NH Labor Services and Employment Bureau, forward to 1986. h.

Seasonal housing and overni,ght accommodations.

Pagen 2-14 and 2-17, Volume 6 provide discussion regarding the estimates of Seasonal Housing Residents and Overnight Accommodations. NRC figures as prepared by Kaltman in 1981, were used as baseline information sources in the preparation of these two population estimates, as they were the most up-to-date figures available at the time of ETE development. However, it is necessary to estimate the number of vehicles in the EPZ belonging to transients at overnight accommodations which are not at the beach when the beaches are most crowded. The figures provided by the NRC via the Kaltman Report are therefore used with the following exceptions:

1. In order to avoid double counting, those vehicles at

)

the beach which originated at seasonal housing away from the beach were excluded, as these vehicles are included in the count of beach vehicles.

l 2. Discussions with managers of tourist f acilities indicated an estimated 74% of visitors at off-beach 1

k' facilities travel to the beach and park their vehicles there during mid-day weekend conditions. A factor of 50% was adopted by the ETE, i.e.,'that half of the tourists lodging at inland facilities will drive to the beach on a sunny day with the other half remaining within the EPZ but not at the beach.

l The aerial photographs provided the ETE with an estimate of vehicles along the beaches. The NRC data in the Kaltman l

Report, together with a survey which established the 74%

figure above, provides the basis for estimating the number of tourists lodged at inland facilities that are not at the beach. [ Note where Kaltman estimates weekend vehicle demand for beach area seasonal residents at 10,449 vehicles ( Figure 2-4), Volume 6 estimates total beach parking capacity at 25,470 (p. E-5).]

Volume 6 does not depend solely on the NRC estimate of 2.5 vehicles per dwelling at seasonal houuing units. On

p. E-lO it is stated: "KLD's on-foot survey recorded an average value of 2.6 vehicles per dwelling."

Estimates of vehicles associated with overnight accommodations, i.e., hotels, motels and guest houses, considered the same exceptions as noted for seasonal housing residents, as well as the following:

Arrival times at many overnight accommodations will be after 2:00 p.m. after the beach population has dropped below l peak; l

j _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

l Departure times are usually before peak population conditions at the beach:

Many, if not most, patrons remaining for several days will leave the facility to go to the beach, or. shopping or go to some recreational attraction; The number of vehicles per housing unit may be less than one as: (a) family / friends arriving in one car may occupy more than one unit, and (b) bus travelers will occupy many units.

Several larger motels indicated they set acide blocks of rooms on weekends for tour buses, at a rate of 20 units per bus. Estimates ranged from 5 to 40% with regard to those guests utilizing more than one unit per car; thus, an estimate of 0.85 vehicles per unit was adopted.

1. Campgrounds.

Page 2-20, Volume 6 discusses the manner in which vehicles at campgrounds within the EPZ were estimated.

Again, the NRC base data was considered, with the exception that double-counting was avoided as with overnight accommodations (see Section A.g.3 above). Also, campground operators estimated that 75% of campground sites are unoccupied during peak beach hours.

It is noted that NRC's figures estimated a total of 3,147 vehicles at EPZ campgrounds (Figure 2-8, Volume 6).

Current campground managers' estimates of maximum numbers of vehicles (see " Campground Maximum Capacities," an NHCDA l

I

.on-going survey), including capacity overflow areas total to 2,938 vehicles, close to the number of vehicles estimated by the NRC's 1981 report.

3. Surveys _and Analyses Performed Subsequent to Publication of Revisio.n 2,_NHRERP Since Revision 2 of the NHRERP was submitted, additional surveys and studies were conducted for the purpose of obtaining a broader data base and an updating of estimates.

These included:

a. Aerial Surveys. On July 18, 1987 Avis Airmap of Braintree, Massachusetts took aerial photographs of the Massachusetts and New Hampshire seacoast region extending from the southern tip of Plum Island, Massachusetts northward to Odiorne Point, New Hampshire. This >

photog aphed section of coastline extends from approximately 15 miles south to 12 h miles north of Seabrook Station and i

approximately 1 mile inland from the shoreline. The weather conditions on the day of the flight were ideal for beachgoers: sunny, warm and in the mid-80s. This weather J l

attracted an attendance at the beach which was comparable to l I

that on the peak day in the summer of 1983, July 16th.

]

From an altitude of approximately 3,000' an RC10-A camera with a 6" lens was utilized to take each photograph, producing contact prints with a scale of 1" = 600' or l

1:7200. The fly-over began promptly at noon and a complete I set of 1.87 black and white 9" x 9" contact prints were I

I l

I l

l l

l i

provided for review and for the selection of individual enlargements. A series of 58 enlargements with an enlargement ratio of 12.5 (1" = 50') were provided covering a continuous strip from Plum Island, Massachusetts to Odiorne's Point, New Hampshire. An enlargement ratio of 12.5 was selected because it represents the largest mr. unification consistent with visual clarity. Because the photographs were taken stereoscopically (with the exception j i

of Flight 10 which is monoscopic) there is approximately a 60% overlap on adjacent prints. Therefore, only half of the contact prints were needed to produce the photo enlargements k

as there was sufficient overlap to ensure continuous  !

coverage of the study area.

The data reduction activities using the enlarged 1

photographs to estimate the vehicular and beach-going population were also performed by Avis Airmap. The 3 i

following step-by-step procedure was undertaken: {

Enlargements were labeled to correspond to the contact print numbering system.

Mylar acetate overlays were placed over the enlargements. Register marks were drawn on the i

photographs and on the mylar so that if the overlay I were detached from the photo, it could be repositioned exactly as when the data were l recorded.

1

Municipal boundaries were_ inked onto the photo enlargements so that counts were totaleo on a town-by-town basis.

A grid comprised of 2" x 2" squares was drawn on the mylar over the beach area. Grid squares were assigned a unique code by using numbers on the horizontal axis and the Arabic alphabet on the vertical axis (A1, A2, etc.).

For vehicular parking areas, parking lots and residential areas were demarcated and assigned specific numbers.

Applicants' Exhibit 3 is a group of six 9" x 9" color '

contact prints labeled 6-3, 6-5, 6-7, 6-9, 6-11 and 9-1 of the area photographed.

1. Beach Population Two categories of people were counted:

People on the beach (on the sand and in the water); _j t

and I 1

People occupying both sidewalks and parking lots abutting Route 1A or the beaches.

The beach population within each cell of the grid was counted by connecting each individual observed on the photographs with a continuous line drawn with a permanent l ink marking pen. The lines were drawn from top to bottom of l l

each square and are not of a consistent length. Rather than having one long line, several shorter, non-intersecting

)

lines are contained in each square. The number of these lines connecting observed persons varied according to the density of the persons in each grid. This method of connecting observed persons with continuous lines was selected as it ensures that all " outlier" persons who have not been counted will be detected during visual inspection and therefore not excluded in the final count.

Tallies for each grid square were then placed on a tally sheet and totaled at the bottom of each sheet. In many  !

instances, several tally sheets were used for each photo  !

enlargement, l

2. Vehicular Counts Four categories of vehicles / vehicle-spaces were counted and include:

a filled parking spaces, i.e. all parked vehicles not l

along curbs e

unfilled delineated parking spaces filled curbside spaces .

l vehicles in transit on the roadways  !

l A grid pattern forming sub-areas was used to count vehicles. This grid pattern differs from that used to count people in that the vehicular grid cells demarcate separate parking lots and areas which may be irregularly shaped.

This method was selected so that land use, e.g.,

residential, beach-front, motels, would be grouped together. 1 1

l i

i

Vehicle counts were recorded by category on tally sheets and sums recorded by each photo enlargement. As was the case with the beach population counts, one enlargement may have several pages of data depending on the number of parking areas. All counts were ulti.aately totaled by town.

Parked cars in four areas west of the beach (and west of Route 1A as well) were counted by using the color contact prints rather than the photo enlargements. A stereoscope i was used to count the cars in these four areas.

Subsequently, enlargements of these areas'were obtained and the counts were re-checked for numerical accuracy. Tallies for these areas were recorded in the same manner described above.

The beach population for the seacoast had previously been determined to peak at 2:00 p.m. on summer weekends (see the Beach Area Traffic Count Program, performed in 1983 by HMM Associates, pp. 2-12, 13 of Volume 6). The 1987 aerial photographs were taken by Avis between 12:00 noon and i 1:20 p.m. To obtain a reasonchle estimate of peak vehicle population on the beaches, it is necessary to project the observed estimates of the number of vehicles counted on the photo enlargements forward to 9: 00 p.m.

The procedure used to project these counts to 2:00 p.m.

applied the data in NHRERP Volume 6, Table 2-3 as follows:

Determine the total number of vehicles observed on 1

the photo enlargements for Seabrook and Hampton

f l

beaches (south of Route 51). This total count at i

12:15 p.m. on July 18,.1987 was 11,889 vehicles, j Determine the net influx of vehicles (i.e.,

entering minus exiting) onto these beaches between noon and 2:00 p.m. on the day exhibiting the peak population in 1983, on July 16th, as shown in NHRERP Volume 6, Table 2-3:

Net Influx Time (Vehicles) 12:00-1:00 p.m. 881 1:00-2:00 p.m. 426 Using the net influx data above, the percent increase in vehicle population over the time frame in which the photos were taken was projected to 2:00 p.m. The results of these calculations are presented below, i

Photo Projected Net Projected Percent Set / Influx to Increase in l Flight Time Photos 2:00 p.m. Vehicle Population Number Taken (EDTl (Vehicles) to 2:00 p.m.

1 12:50 573 4.62 d 2 12:00 1,307 11.20 l 3 12:45 646 5.24 i 4 12:05 1,234 10.51 I 5 12:40 720 5.88 4

6 12:15 1,087 9.14 7 12:30 867 7.16 8 12:25 940 7.81 9 12:20 1,013 8.48 The data in the first two columns of the above table were provided by Avis. The de.ta in the third column were obtained by interpolation from the data in Table 2-3, 1 l l

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. 1 l

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J

Volume 6. The final column is obtained by dividing the respective data in the third column by the imputed count of vehicles on Seabrook and Hampton beaches at the indicated times.

To illustrate the procedure, take for example Hampton and Seabrook beaches (Flight Number 6) which were photographed at 12:15 p.m. We expect an additional 1,087 vehicles would park on these beaches between the time the photos were taken, and when the peak condition is attained at 2:00 p.m. This is equivalent to stating that the number of vehicles on these beaches will increase by 9.14%

(1087/11889 x 100) from.11,889 to 12,976 if all photos covering this area were taken on flight number 6. The vehicle counts from all photos in Set 6 would therefore be increased by 9.14%, on this basis.

To calculate the percent increases in vehicle population for the other times, it is necessary to estimate the vehicle population on these beaches at these other times, using the data of NHRERP, Volume 6, Table 2-3. For example, the estimate of vehicle population at 12:45 is:

11,889 (at 12:15) + 1/2 x 881 = 12,330 Thus, the percent increase in population between 12:45 and 2:00 p.m. i s:

(12,976 4 12,330)/12,330 x 100 = 5.24 This approach implies the assumption that the rate of net influx of vehicles onto the beaches on July 18, 1987 is

i comparable to that recorded by HMM on July 16, 1983. While '

the data gathered on July 18, 1987 does not permit a direct comparison of net influx between noon and 2:00 p.m., we can compare the number of entering vehicles on these-days, on two approaches to the beaches for which data exist.

i VOR Survey HMM ATR Counts 6 11:30-12:30 11:30-12:30 Entering Vehicles July 18, 1987 July 16, 1983 Route 286 975 856 Route 51 869 998  :

TOTAL: 1,844 1,854 The close agreement in the number of entering vehicles for.the indicated days lends support for this procedure which estimates the increase in vehicle populations from the time the photos were taken, to the peak condition at 2:00 p.m.

The following numbers represent the total number of j i

)

l i

i

l observed parked vehicles, projected to 2:00 p.m.

Plum Island South 1.Ipswich, Rowley, Newbury) l Projected l Projected Increase Parked l Number of Parked of Parked Vehicles Vehicles l Enla_rg_ement # Vehicic s Observed to 2:00 p.m. at 2:00 p.m. l 2-2S 28 3 31 2-3 24 3 27 l

2-5 14 '2 36  !

2-7S 24 3 27 1 2-7N 7 1 '8 2-11 2 0 2 4-5S 21 2 23 4-5N 256 27 283 1 4-7 788 83 871 I 4-8 553 58 611 l E = 1,717 E = 1,899 i Plum Island North (Newburyport1 1 1

Projected I Projected Increase Parked l Number of Parked of Parked Vehicles Vehicles Enlargement # Vehicles Observed to 2:00 p.m. at 2:00 p.m.

4-9 367 39 406  !

4-9W 182 19 201 i 4-10 533 56 589 l E = 1,082 E = 1,196 i

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Salisbury Projected Projected Increase Parked Number of Parked of Parked Vehicles Vehicles Enlargement # ' Vehicles Observed to 2:00 p.m. at 2:00 p.m.

4-12W 354 37 391 4-12E 1,036 109 1.145 4-14S 208 22 230 4-14N 822 86 908 4-16S 1,397 147 1,544 4-16N 483 51 534 4-18 352 37 389 6-3S 503 46 549 6-3N 393 36 429 E = 5,548 E = 6,119 4 Seabrook i

Projected )

Projected Increase Parked Number of Parked of Parked Vehicles Vehicles {

Enlargement # Vehicles Observed to 2:00 p.m. at 2:00 p.m. j I

6-3N 593 54 647 6-5S (

326 30 356 l

6-5N 411 l 38 449 l 6-7S 1,455 133 1,588 i I

E = 2,785 E = 3,040 Hampton Beach (south of Route 51)

Projected Increase Projected Parked

)

j Number of Parked of Parked Vehicles Vehicles )

Enlargement # Vehicles Observed to 2:00 p.m. at 2:00 p.m. l l

6-7N 1,054 96 1,150 6-9S 2,617 239 2,856 6-9N 2,928 268 3,196 6-9SW 132 12 144 6-9NW 80 7 87 8-2 2,293 179 2,472 l E = 9,104 E = 9,905 l

l t _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ -

Hamp_ ton Beach (north of Route 511 Projected l

Projected Increase Parked Number of Parked of Parked Vehicles Vehicles En_i_argement 4 Vehicles Observed to 2:00 p.m. at 2:00 p.m.

8-4 809 63 872 8-6S 659 )

51 710 8-6N 647 51 698 8-8S' 340 27 367 '

8-8N 107 8 115 '

9-2 544 46 590 j l

E = 3,106 E = 3,352 North Hampton i '

Projected (

Projected Increase Parked j Number of Parked of Parked Vehicles Vehicles '

Enlargement # Vehicles observed to 2:00 p.m. at 2:00_p_.m.

8-8N 41 3 44 8-10s 189 15 204-8-10N 44 3 47 8-12S 12 1 13 E= 286 E= 308

R_yp Projected Projected Increase Parked Number of Parked of Parked Vehicles Vehicles Enlargement # Vehicles Observed to 2_:00 p.m. at 2:00 p.m.

8-12N 55 4 59 8-14S 59 5 64 8-14N 414 32 446 8-16S 509 40 549 8-16N 125 10 135 8-18S 240 19 259 8-18N 182 14 196 8-20S 141 11 152 8-20N 87 7 94 8-22S 359 28 387 8-22N 664 52 716 8-24S 210 16 226 8-24N 83 7 90 8-26 94 7 101 E = 3,222 E = 3,474

SUMMARY

Observed Projected Parked Parked Town Vehicles Vehicles Plum Island South 1,717 1,899 Plum Island North 1,082 1,196 '

Salisbury 5,548 6,119 Seabrook 2,785 3,040 Hampton Beach South 9,104 9,905 Hampton Beach North 3,106 3,352 ,

North Hampton 286 308  !

Rye 3,222 3,474 3 E = 29,293 These estimates of peak beach area vehicles which are used as subjects to the IDYNEV model for calculating ETE, l

may be compared with the listing of " Estimate of Parking Capacity" on page E-5 of Volume 6. As indicated, the sum of new estimates are approximately 15% higher than the above l l

1 39 -

l l

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i total, and amounts to a 4% increase, relative to the entire vehicle population of the EPZ.

b. 1987 Veh_icle Occupancy Rate Surveys Comprehensive vehicle occupancy rate surveys taken at selected EPZ beach area roadway points were conducted on July 11 and 18, 1987. Over 24,000 vehicles were counted, containing a total of approximately 56,000 individually counted occupants. The mean occupancy rate of the vehicles surveyed was 2.274 occupants per vehicle, about the same as the 2.335 estimate obtained in July 1986. An estimate of 2.4 persons per vehicle was utilized in the ETE in estimating this population segment. (See Applicants' Exhibit 4: " Report on the Vehicle Occupancy Rate (VOR)

Survey Process.")

c. New Hampshire Office of State Planning _ Populations Estimates The New Hampshire Office of State Planning has released f

(

its current New Hampshire population estimates in a pub]ication dated August 1987, entitled, "1986 Population Estimates of New Hampshire Cities and Towns." These most recent estimates compare well, overall, with the 1985 estimated permanent population figures utilized in the ETE.

In fact, comparing these NHOSP estimates (89,619) with the l resident population estimates found in Table 1 of the local I RERPs (91,601) indicates that the ETE differs by a total of ,

I l

l 1,982 persons in excess of NHOSP estimates. The largest numerical differences between the estimates are found in the listings for Hampton and Seabrook which are, respectively, 1,157 and 1,463 persons in excess of the NHOSP estimates.

See Attachment 2 hereto, "1986 Population Estimates of New Hampshire Cities and Towns".

I

d. Ramp _ Capacities Upon further survey of highway ramps and review of the Highway Capacity Manual below, it was determined that the initial ramp capacity was underestimated. (The Highway Capacity Manual (HCM), Special Report 209, Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, Washington, D.C.

1985. This is the most recent authoritative manual for estimating highway capacity, as organized through the Transportation Research Board, with contributions by the Federal Highway Administration, National Cooperative Highway Research Program, individual states through the American Association of State Highway and Transportation officials, as well as many other National and International supporting  !

projects and individuals). i Consequently, the nominal capacities of the ramps for undersaturated flow conditions is now estimated at I approximately 1,330 vehicles per hour; under congested conditions, the estimated ramp capacity is approximately 1130 vehicles per hour. These ramp capacities may be i

further reduced due to the frictional effects of ramp

/

t________________.c_

traffic merging into the traffic on the main lines. This potential reduction in capacity is handled internally by the IDYNEV simulation model,

e. Voluntary Public Evacuation As a result of recent evaluations by Dr. Mileti, updated representations of voluntary evacuations were considered.

Section B.3. of this testimony discusses voluntary public evacuation in detail.

f. Through Traffic Within the EPZ A more accurate representation of through traffic (that is, external-external trips) along the Interstate Highways within the EPZ has been introduced into the input streams for the IDYNEV M del. A detailed discussion of this topic appears in Section 4.K. of this testimony.

g. Additional Analysis Regions It was decided to add three keyhole configurations which are defined by a central area, approximately 5 miles in radius, with separate quadrant sectors, extending to the EPZ boundary. Specifically, the following additional EPZ I Regions are considered:

Region Spatial Extant ERPA Classification 11 To EPZ B' dry. A, B, C, D, G, '

Outer North Region 12 To EPZ B' dry. A, B, C, D, F, Outer West Region 13 To EPZ B' dry. A-E Outer South Region l

h. Updated ETE studies As a result of these considerations, additional ETE calculations were performed using the IDYNEV model, applied to the summer weekend scenarios 1 and 2.

The results of these ETE studies are presented below. i All ETEs are referenced to the Order to Evacuate.

1. Evacuation Time (Hour: Minutes) from within 2 Miles Region Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1

6:25 6:25 6:10 6:10 6:10 6:10 6:00 6:00 6:00 2

7:40 7:35 7:20 7:20 7:35 7:35 7:25 7:25 7:25 Region 11 12 13 1 6:25 6:15 6:15 2 7:35 7:35 7:35 l

2. Evacuation Time (Hour: Minutes) from within 5 Miles Begion Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 g 9 1

6:45 6:45 6:35 6:35 6:35 6:35 6:20 6:20 6:20 2 8:05 8:05 7:45 7:40 8:05 8.:05 7:45 7:45 7:45 Region 11 12 13 1 6:45 6:35 6:35 2 8:05 8:05 8:05

3. Evacuation Time (Hours: Minutes) from within 10 Miles Region Scenario ,1_ 2 3 4 5 6 7 g 9 1 7:05 6:50 6:40 6:40 6:40 6:40 6:35 6:35 6:35 2 9:55 9:50 8:05 8:05 8:10 8:10 8:05 8:05 8:05 Region 11 12 13 1 6:50 6:40 6:40 2 9:50 8:10 8:10 l

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4.

Evacuation Time (Hours: Minutes) from within the EPZ Bouncia ry Region Scenario 1 2 3 4 .5 6 7 8 9 1 7:05 7:05 6:40 6:40 6:40 6:40 6:35 6:35 6:35 2 10:05 10:05 8:05 8:05 8:15 8:15 8:05 8:05 8:05 Region 11 12 13 1 7:05 6:45 6:50 2 10:05 8:20 8:20 l

As noted on p. 10-20 and Figure 10-29 in Volume 6 of NHRERP, the population of Seabrook Beach was the last to clear from the EPZ. On the basis of updated estimates obtained from the July 1987 photographs, the population of Hampton Beach will clear at a later time. As a result, the evacuation of the entire EPZ for the summer weekend scenario has increased approximately thirteen percent.

The new regions 11, 12 and 13 exhibit ETE which in general parallel -- and exceed somewhat those Regions 2, 3 and 4, respectively For these three regions, voluntary evacuation is specified as 50 percent of the population within the EPZ, but external to the region.

i. Sensitivity Runs Manning of Control Points.

Several sensitivity runs were executed, using vehicle populations which include the new peak estimates of beach area vehicles. Certain of these runs were conducted to quantify the results of different arrival times of personnel at control points. The results of these runs are described below:

1. Sensitivity Run #1 Sensitivity Run to Quantify the Effect on ETE of the Late Arrival of Some Traffic Guides at Control Points during the Summer Season. Based on information provided by the New Hampshire State Police, it is expected that four State 46 -

Police will report to the assigned control points within 15 minutes of the Beach Closure. Three more will report to their respective control points within the following 45 minutes; and six additional police will arrive within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of Beach Closure. This assumed manning schedule will have the following impacts on highway capacity relative to that used for the Planning Basis:

The Route 51 overpass of I95 will service only one lane of westbound flow for a period of one hour following the beach closure. Thereafter, two lanes will be established to service westbound evacuating flow.

The intersection of Routes 1 and 101C will not be manned until two hours after beach closing. It is assumed that evacuees will respond to existing signal control even in the presence of no competing traffic flow.

During the first two hours, evacuees from Hampton Beach will not be discouraged from travelling south over the Hampton Harbor Bridge into Salisbury.

Subsequently, all Hampton Beach evacuees will travel north and west, only.

2. Sensitivity Run #2 The purpose of this run was to examine the sensitivity j 1

of ETE with respect to any possible further delay in manning l l

the Route 51 overpass of I-95. Specifically, it is assumed i

4

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for this run that the State Police established the TCP there two hours after the beach closing.

3. Sensitivity Run #3 The purpose of this run was to examine the impact on ETE if none of the capacity-enhancing TCPs in Massachusetts were established.

The intersections of Routes 1 and 286, and of Routes 1 and 1A, both in Salisbury, were assumed to service evacuating flow with the existing signal control policy. It is assumed that evacuees would not violate this policy even in the absence of competing traffic flow.

Only one ramp will service westbound evacuating traffic along Route 110, onto Southbound I-95.

j. Analysis The ETE for these three sensitivity tests are given below, followed by a brief discussion of these results:

ETE (Hours: Minutes) for Vehicles Within the Indicated Distances from Seabrook Station Run 2-mile 5-mile 10-mile EPZ

1. 1 6:20 6:35 6:40 6:45

1. 2 6:35 7:05 7:05 7:10

1. 3 8:40 8:50 8:55 9:05 As noted in Sensitivity Run 1 above, evacuees from Hampton Beach will travel south across the bridge into Seabrook, to the extent that traffic congestion will ;rrmit, until the TCP which routes traffic toward the north is I

established. It is assumed that up to 900 vehicles will travel south by the time TCP A-HB-01 is manned; thereafter all traffic moves north.

Since Hampton Beach traffic now (using the Avis data) constitutes the critical path under the Planning Basis, any movement south over the bridge could expedite evacuation.

(Of course, those travelling south from Hampton Beach move somewhat closer to Seabrook Station, which may be undesirable if a release has taken place.) The results of Run #1 confirm this expectation; the ETE of 7:05 corresponding to the Planning Basis is reduced somewhat to 6:45.

The ETE expands somewhat if the Hampton Interchange is manned after two hours instead of one hour. In this case, Run #2 indicates that the ETE lengthens by 25 minutes, relative to Run #1.

For Run #3, we take a pessimistic view of the consequences of no TCPs being manned in Massachusetts. In prior runs of " uncontrolled" scenarios, we assumed full (or nearly full) utilization of intersection capacity. Here, we assume that evacuees will heed the signals even if there is no competing traffic flow, thus utilizing only a portion of .

available capacity.

Under these circumstances, the evacuation paths from Seabrook and Salisbury beaches become critical, replacing

Hampton Beach in this respect, with a concomitant increase in ETE.

The results of Run #3 show that the ETE will increase by two hours relative to the Planning Basis for Region 1, Scenario 1, if the TCPs in Massachusetts remain unmanned throughout the evacuation. (Of course, if these TCPs are established, even with a delay, the ETEs will be greatly reduced. These ETEs will approach those for the Planning Basis if this delay in establishing these TCPs is moderate).

k. External Shadow Evacuation Time Estimates Additional sensitivity tests were conducted to assess the impact on ETE, if any, of anticipated voluntary evacuation by persons outside the EPZ, up to a distance of 20 miles from Seabrook Station. To conduct these runs, it was necessary to create an analysis network representing the highway system extending from just within the EPZ to a distance of 20 miles or so from the Station. Estimates of population during the summer were obtained from data obtained from State and Federal Agencies.

The IDYNEV model was executed as follows:

Evacuation traffic leaving the EPZ entered this network within the region outside the EPZ. The l J

rates at which the EPZ traffic enter this outer 1

network were computed by IDYNEV during the Region 1, Scenario 1 Study. These rates of traffic

{

entering the outer network are specified as inputs 50 -

- _ _ _ - - - b

to IDYNEV for these sensitivity runs. Note that this outer network overlaps the EPZ network at the latter's outer extent.

Evacuation traffic originating within the outer network originates at centroids established for that purpose, as was done for the EPZ network.

The output was examined to determine the ETE for traffic evacuating the EPZ.

Two sensitivity runs were conducted, each assuming a uniform rate of voluntary evacuation within the area outside the EPZ. In the first, it is assumed that 10 percent of this population voluntarily evacuates; in the second, a 20 percent figure is assumed. The results are presented below, together with a comparison with the Planning Basis which does not consider any external shadow effect.

ETE for Evacuees From Percent of External Within EPZ Population that Evacuates (Reg. 1, Scen. 1 O (Planning Basis) 7:05

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10 7:05 20 7:05 As indicated, voluntary evacuation from the area outside the EPZ, at the indicated levels, does not influence the ETE for those evacuating from within the EPZ.

j 1. Effect of Slower Accident Escalation Rates 1

51 - )

1 l

This subject was discussed on pages 10-17 and 10-18 of Volume 6, NHRERP. These sensitivity runs were updated with the recent input resulting from the 1987 Aerial photos. The associated results follow:

Elapsed Time from ETE for Evacuation from within the the Alert Level to Indicated Areas around Seabrook Station the Order to Evacuate Referenced to the Order to Evacuate 2 mi. 5 mi. 10 mi. EPZ b' dry 0:25 (Plan Basis) 6:25 6:45 7:05 7:05 1:05 5:40 6:00 6:20 6:25 2:05 4:10 4:50 4:55 4:55 2:50- 3:30 3:50 4:20 4:45 The data, like those on page 10-18, also display the sensitivity of ETE with the rate of accident escalation.

4. Highway Capacity

a. General As put forth on Page 3-1, Volume 6, NHRERP, the ability of the road network to accommodate demand is a major f actor in determining how rapidly an evacuation can be completed.

Highway capacity, in general, may be defined as the " maximum hourly rate at which persons or vehicles can reasonably be expected to traverse a point or uniform section of a lane or i J

roadway during a given time period under prevailing roadway, I

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traffic, and control conditions." (Highway Capacity Manual,

p. 1-3.) Section 3, Volume 6, NHRERP, presents a discussion i

of some of the major factors which influence capacity, l i

Factors which contribute to capacity include 1) on the approach to intersections: geometry, channelization of traffic, composition of traffic, competing traffic streams, turning movements, type of control device and signal timing;

2) along sections of roadway: roadway geometrics, traffic composition and motorist behavior; and 3) general considerations: weather and pavement conditions.

b. Link capacities Appendix N, Volume 6, NHRERP provides a detailed listing of estimated network link capacities and turn movements. It has been suggested that the data in Appendix N implien that 1500 cars can entec node number 1 from "each of 3 directions." No such implication is intended. The actual capacity of a link (as compared with its theoretical capacity) depends on the role it fulfills within the structure of the highway network. For example, the actual discharge rate through node 1, aggregated over all approaches, as calculated by the IDYNEV simulator, ranges from approximately 800-900 vehicles per hour, depending on the scenario.

c. Loading Procedures It has been stated that loading procedures are not

. described in much detail within Volume 6. In fact, the trip

l generation rates are given in great detail in Appendix M. j For the representative summer scenarios and off-season scenarios considered and for all centroids, these data indicate the variation of loading rates over time. These nominal loading rates are upper bounds which can be reduced by congestion on the evacuation network. The actual loading rates are computed internally by the IDYNEV simulation model and are not provided as output.

d. Traffic Directional Distribution In response to a contention regarding traffic directional distribution, it must be noted that the value of fd as indicated on p. 3-9 of Volume 6 and as is also stated in the HCM in Table 8-4, is 0.75, not 0.675 as has been alleged. It is also noted that the value of fd is independent of passing rate. Page 3-7, Volume 6, NHRERP defines the term fd as an adjustment factor for directional distribution of traffic, obtained from HCM, Table 8-4.

Volume 6, p. 3-9 assumes a directional split of traffic (averaged over the evacuation time frame) of 0.9 on all two-way road sections. That is, 90% of all traffic is outbound and 10% is inbound; the outbound traffic is evacuating while the inbound traffic is the " light" counterblow traffic. Columns A and B, Table 4-2 of Volume 6, demonstrate that beyond the first hour of the evacuation, very little counterblow traffic exists. Thus, the overall estimate of 90% directional split, and use of 0.75 as

1 i

l recommended by the HCM as the value of fd, is supported by l

these statistics. (While the directional split of traffic over the first hour will be somewhat more balanced than 90:10, the outbound capacity will remain at about the same level, according to HCM procedures.)

e. Light Traffic Patterns A contention has been raised which questions how light traffic patterns which are indicated in Appendix I had been treated in the simulation model.

Appendix I, Volume 6, NHRERP, Rev. 2, provides detailed descriptions of traffic management and control tactics for traffic control posts, developed in cooperation with most Police Chiefs. Light traffic patterns included in Appendix I represent traffic which is moving in directions which are generally counterblow to those of evacuating traffic.

Therefore, while the simulation model does not explicitly consider this inbound traffic (and, to our knowledge, l 1

I neither do simulation studies conducted for any other ETE I studies), the effects of the inbound flow on the ETE is i

included in the ETE calculations through the capacity 1 calculation of two-lane highways. That is, the presence of inbound flow tends to reduce the capacity of the outbound highway lane, for 2-way roads,

f. Weather Weather is one of the many major factors which influence highway capacity. Each type of influencing weather i

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condition is addressed separately within the ETE. Highway capacity reductions of 20 and 25 percent for rain and snow respectively were utilized in the ETE. These figures are responsive to the guidelines established by the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual. See p. 3-11, Volume 6, NHRERP.

Corresponding with a reduction in capacity, the calculations of ETE reveal that rain and snow increase ETE relative to clear weather (compare the ETE for Scenario 2 with those of Scenario 1, and the ETE of Scenarios 6 and 7 .;ith those of Scenario 5),

1. Snow It has been contended that the reduction in capacity used with Volume 6 to account for snow is inadequate.

Necessary to the understanding of capacity reduction due to snow is the correct understanding of the term

" water-equivalent snowfall". The ratio of

" water-equivalent" to " depth of snow" is commonly termed

" snow-density".

Average snow densities generally range from 0.05 to 0.3 with the higher figure applicable for late-winter snow (with i a high moisture content). The average figure for freshly fallen snow is 0.1, which we will use. (See Appendix H of l l

National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report i No. 127).

Applying this figure, a fall of 6 inches over 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> l

(as suggested by contention) is equivalent to 0.075 in./hr.

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water equivalent snowfall. On this basis, the associated percent capacity reduction using the 2.8 percent model (again as cited by contention) is:

8 + 0.075 x 2.8/0.01 = 29 percent This estimate of capacity reduction for the indicated severe snowfall, which only applies to conditions at the end of the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> snowfall, compares with the representative figure of 25 percent in the ETE study, which was applied 1 l

throughout the 8-hour evacuation period.

Other studies offer evidence that capacity reduction due to snow is less pronounced. Using data from Appendix E of l NCHRP Report 127, capacity is reduced by 25 percent whenever

" snowstorm speed factor" is about 0.55. This value corresponds to a condition of 1 inch per hour of snowfall l l

over 5 or more hours.

Note that the EPZ is subject to an average of 12-16 inches of snowfall per winter month, as shown in Table 1-1 of Volume 6. Thus, the suggested example of 6 inches of snow within only eight hours given above represents a little less than half of a month's average snowfall. Even so, the 25 percent capacity reduction figure is applicable.

2. Fog Volume 6, page 3-11 addresses the issues of both ocean and inland fog as they relate to highway capacity.

Discussions held with public officials indicate that low-lying ocean fog which can affect travel conditions is an

unusual occurrence during the summer months, and when it does appear, generally dissipates by 9:00 to 10:00 a.m. or may appear after sunset, both times of the day when beach population is significantly below peak levels. Thus, the conditions of Scenario 2 (sudden rain occurring with beach population at capacity) are more severe than a scenario with early morning or late evening fog. Furthermore, the ETE obtained for the inclement weather scenario for rain can be used for widespread foggy conditions. 3. Flooding Consultation with FEMA, Region 1, indicates that flooding is a hazard which may impact EPZ land areas in one of two manners: tidal flooding or riverine ficoding.

Tidal flooding is generally associated with high winds which raise the level of the tide along the coastal areas.

(Of course, the level of the tide still responds to the lunar cycle.) It was estimated by FEMA that for the 50-year storm (a storm of particular severity with a one in 50 chance of occurring in any one year), it was possible for parts of Salisbury beach to remain under water for as long l 1

as 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at high tide, at a depth which would make vehicle passage impossible and with no alternative roads available.

Such an event, if synchronous with the Order to Evacuate, could delay some permanent residents up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. (Note that such severe storms do not, in general, 1

l occur during the tourist season.) Since the ETE l l

substantially exceeds 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, this extension in trip L1_______ __ - - - -- - -- j

generation time does not necessarily imply an extension in ETE -- certainly not an extension of as much as two hours, in any case. (It must also be considered that foreknowledge of the approach of such a severe storm may well lead to the beach area being evacuated prior to the accident.)

Riverine flooding is associated with rainwater and/or melting snow run-off, and generally occurs in the Spring.

Riverine flooding could also occur during heavy rains produced by hurricanes in Autumn. (As tabulated on p. 1-9, Volume 6, the maximum rainfall in the months of July or August over a 30 year period was less than 7 inches.) The Town of Exeter is most vulnerable to such flooding in that one, and possibly two, evacuation routes for Exeter evacuees could be severed. Specifically, Route 108 south of the village is a potential flood area, as well as Route 150 in northern Kensington.

There are five other evacuation routes from Exeter to {

the north and west. Calculations indicate that the ETE for {

residents of the Town of Exeter are less than those for residents in the towns in the coastal region; therefore, any incremental delays experienced in Exeter due to the loss of a flooded road should not extend the overall travel time for the residents in the EPZ beyond the ETE. 4. Ice

]

The effect of ice storms on the ETE can vary widely l

depending on the extent and physical condition of ice on the pavement, and on the temperature. The friction factor

offered by an icy surface varies with temperature, increasing as temperature decreases below freezing. In the temperature range between 28 and 32 degrees F, the heated tire surface can ride on a thin film of water and traction is at.a minimum. Under these weather circumstances, travel would be most affected.

An exhaustive literature search has revealed no estimate of the effect of ice on highway capacity. In the absence of such data, application of the ETE for snow conditions (which includes a 25 percent reduction in capacity) appears acceptable for the following reasons:

o Highway capacity during an ice storm may be less than that during a snowfall, thus tending to increase travel time relative to snow. Note, however, that sanding operations would restore capacity of icy pavements to a significant extent.

o In general, there is no need to shovel a driveway in an ice storm, as is assumed within the ETE to be required for a snowstorm, thus tending to reduce trip generation time, relative to snow. A reduction in trip generation time tends to reduce ETE.

While we are aware of no data to quantify these opposing trade-offs, it is reasonable to expect that the net effect is limited and that applying the ETE for the snow scenario 7 or 10 (see page 10-2) is a proper response. Note, however, that under severe ice conditions, in the absence of sanding, some highway sections with extended upgrades may become virtually impassable. Thus, sanding may be necessary to assure adequate traction on such highway sections. Sanding l

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with sand, salt, or a combination of the two, is a prevalent procedure in the area.

g. Disabled Vehicles It has been suggested that cars could break down on bridges and "other choke points" within the EPZ which could lead to one vehicle totally obstructing the road.

It must be pointed out that all bridges of significant length within the EPZ are designed so that there is some shoulder space available to store disabled vehicles.

Narrow, short bridges do exist on some two-lane roads. If a car should stall on such a bridge (which is a low probability event), it can be pushed along the bridge onto the shoulder immediately ahead. Furthermore, even if a vehicle is stalled at a point on a highway where there is little or no shoulder room, there is still sufficient room for the traffic to move around the disabled vehicle even if it means encroaching, somewhat, into the incoming lane of travel on a two-lane road. In situations like this, the dominant flow of evacuating traffic whch would be in the outbound direction would effectively "take over" that " choke point" and traffic would move past the obstruction. The

" minor" traffic flow in the inbound direction would take advantage of any gaps in the evacuation traffic. In any event, tow vehicles will be dispatched to remove impediments, as discussed later.

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The suggestion that the Highway Capacity Manual (HCM) estimates that capacity is reduced by 1/3 "because the roadway's perceived width is reduced" is simply incorrect.

The referenced passage on p. 6-10 in the HCM cites one study (by Coolsby, M.) 'which describes an " incident removed to the shoulders" which reduced capacity by one-third on a three-lane (in one direction) freeway. The Goolsby paper specifies that this incident was actually un accident and 1

that capacity reduction was caused by the " gapers-block" l 1

phenomenon. That is, the drivers along the freeway slowed i

their cars to observe the activities associated with the processing of the vehicle involved in the accident. There l

is no mention of a perceived reduction in width. Goolsby i l

then indicates that capacity returns to normal when the i [ accident] investigation is complete.

Thus, a car parked on a shoulder, with no associated activity, would have a negligible effect on traffic flow.

For example, the narrowing of a lane, due to maintenance or construction purposes, to 10 or 11 feet widths, provides a capacity per-lane of about 1800 vph on a highway section as described on page 6-13 of the HCM. This figure compares with the value of 1728 vph estimated within Volume 6 (see

p. 3-10).

In the HCM chapter on Intersection capacity, the impact of a lane of parked, motionless cars can reduce capacity by i

i up to 10 percent (Table 9-8 in HCM); a single parked car should produce a lesser effect.

The estimates of highway capacity contained in Volume 6 (see discussion in Section 3), take into account uncertainty in driver responses. The ETE has reasonable expectations that under emergency conditions, there could arise somewhat uncertain responses on the part of the evacuating public.

For example, it must be anticipated that some vehicles will exhaust their fuel supply and will have to be pushed to a j shoulder or driveway. Such short-term disruptions also serve to reduce capacity for short periods of time, and justify the conservative posture we have adopted. We believe that this posture is prudent and responsive to the intent of NUREG-0654.

As noted on p. 3-4, the calculation of ETE asserts that capacity of a highway section (or link) is reduced by 15 percent when congestion (i.e., Level of Service F) prevails there. The following appears in Chapter 6, Freeway Systems, of the Highway Capacity Manual (HCM):

In many cases, vehicles are unable to depart a standing queue at the normal capacity rate of 2,000 pephpl. In their studies of uninterrupted flow characteristics, Edie and others (30) have noted that the relationships among speed, density, and flow may be discontinuous at the point of capacity, and that the maximum rate of flow of vehicles departing a queue may be less than capacity under stable flow. Various observations of a freeway queue departure rates range from as low as 1,500 pcphpl to as high as 2,000 pcphpl. Local driving characteristics have a major influence on this effect, .

which ranges from a significant reduction in capacity 63 -

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l (compared to 2,000 pcphpl) of up to 25 percent to cases l

in which there is virtually no reduction.

The above citation applies to an " uninterrupted traffic stream" on freeways. We have applied a capacity reduction

! on all roads. The justification for such reduction on non-freeway segments is based on the reasonable expectation that driver uncertainty during an evacuation and short term disruptions can reduce capacity.

Since capacity reduction during congestion can range from zero to 25 percent, our adoption of a 15 percent reduction overall is reasonable.

In the event that vehicles are incapacitated on the highways, the NHCDA has. entered into Letters of Agreement with multiple tow truck operators located, for the most part, along the periphery of the 10-mile EPZ. A number of these tow truck operators are located within approximately.

1-3 miles of the " pre-staged" locations suggested in Table 12-1, Volume 6. (See Attachment 1 hereto, " Planning Memorandum Re: Tow Truck Assignments".) In lieu of tow truck " pre-staging," the NHCDA has elected to utilize routine, existing procedures for activating these vehicles, i.e., through the NH State Police Dispatcher, to facilitate mobilization of these services. Note also that once activated, tow vehicles equipped with radio dispatch will enable the drivers to move from one incident directly to the j next.

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A series of sensitivity tests were undertaken to quantify the effect on ETE of highway impediments which extend over substantial periods of time. Four runs were executed for each series; each run simulated the effect of 10 accidents of varying durations occuring on different randomly-selected high volume evacuation roadway links within the EPZ. All cases assumed that these accidents impede evacuation traffic and considered the case study, Region 1, Scenario 1, as reported in the ETE (the evacuation of the entire EPZ). Results of these sensitivity tests, which were conducted prior to the incorporation of the August, 1987 beach data, are shown below:

Range of Increase Series Scenario Duration of Impedances in ETE over 4 runs 1 1 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 0-10 minutes 2 5 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 15-20 minutes 3 1 2 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 30-60 minutes 4 5 2 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 15-40 minutes Ten accidents were simulated in each run since this number represents the anticipated number of accidents from defined statistics, based on the vehicle miles of travel expended during the evacuation. These data indicate that if impedances are removed by tow vehicles in a timely manner, one can expect a small effect on ETE. If the responses are less timely, then more pronounced extension of EiE will occur. Note that the ETE is not extended the same amount as the longest impediment since traffic is free to redistribute 1

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on alternative outbound routes, if one route in the area is experiencing some loss of capacity.

Even in the event that tow vehicles are not immediately available, the public is not helpless in emergencies as would be cuggested by the thesis underlying " myths" about emergency behavior. In-fact, the public is an actual resource in. emergencies. The public often gives rise to

" emergent work groups" in emergencies which form temporarily I and on the spot to do what needs to be done. A detailed discussion of public behavior in emergencies is found at Section B.l.d, " Evacuation Impediments," of this direct testimony.

h. Topographical features The evacuation time estimate also accounts for  !

l topographical features. As indicated by the discussion on page 3-8 all two-lane roads within the EPZ are classified as

" rolling terrain." Note that the vast majority of congested highways are east of I-95. As a result, the estimates of capacity for these roads are roughly 10 percent lower than if level terrain were represented. The terrain in this area is relatively flat with elevations rarely exceeding 100 feet above sea level.

i. Road Types It is suggested that the roads were classified into i "only 4 crude groups" and that the detailed data collected should confirm that the minimum width of each roadway i

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I section should be greater or equal to those values which are defined in these groups. The measurements that were taken in the field were taken at representative sections. It is .

{

neither practical nor feasible to take width measurements at closely spaced intervals along the highway nor is it necessary. The discussion on p. 8-8 of the Highway Capacity Manual does not stipulate that such detailed measurements need to be taken and furthermore indicates that "the impact of narrow lanes restricted shoulder widths is less deleterious if vehicles are already traveling at reduced 1 l

speeds which prevail under capacity operations." The classifications used in the ETE are consistent with those used in Table 8-5 of the Highway Capacity Manual.

The classification of roads within the EPZ was j J

accomplished by way of capacity estimations based on j i

physical surveys. The uxamples of the four general types of l l

rural roads found in page 3-7, Volume 6, were intended to '

give a " general impression of road type within each j i

i category; it was not intended for example, to imply that the j l

entire length of Route 1A is classified as a " medium" derign )

I road. Route 1A, north of node 22 in the Town of Rye, where )

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the road is winding and exhibits sharp turns, is classified 1 as a " low" design road for the purpose of the ETE (see Figu re 1-3, p. N-1).

j. Traffic Control Measures 67 -

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The ETE assumes as one planning basis that certain traffic control measures are in effect. This assumption is based on the high probability that there will be sufficient time between official notification to man Traf fic Control Points (TCPs) and the public Order to Evacuate to allow for traffic control personnel to be mobilized and positioned.

The NHRERP provides for the notification to emergency response groups and to supplemental State resources under the Alert classification, providing ample lead time for resource notification and dispatch prior to the ,

recommendation of protective actions.

The staffing of traffic control positions associated with an offsite response to an accident at Seabrook Station are outlined in the ETE and Traffic Management Manual (Draft). The State of New Hampshire has sufficient personnel resources to perform its assigned responsibilities of fully staffing all evacuation-related traffic management points. See Applicants' Exhibit 1 to the testimony of the Personnel Resources Panel.

Current State procedures call for NH State Police Troop A to man access control points with back-up personnel available from Troops from other points of the State;  !

additional assistance is available through other State 1

resources. The National Guard, for example, is available to i supplement access control or traffic control points within the communities. The extensive manpower of the National 68 -

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Guard could essentially provide the bulk of second shift personnel requirements in this area. Also, once local jurisdictions are evacuated these local police may be asked to assist with perimeter access control.

In addition, each traffic control point (TCP) has been assigned a priority, while priority 1 TCPs have also been assigned a sequence in which they are to be manned. The most important TCPs are considered to be those which have the most potential for expediting the movement of traffic.

Those TCPs which are assigned lower priority are considered less important, although they are helpful in expediting traffic movements and in reassuring the public that the evacuation is under control. Even if lower priority TCPs were not manned, the effect on ETE overall would be negligible, under the assumption that there be no  !

significant inflow of traffic into the EPZ from outlying areas.

Sensitivity runs have been performed to quantify the f effects on ETE of most traffic control measures not being in effect. To understand the rationale underlying the sensitivity runs relating ETE to the manning of TCPs, however, it is necessary to delineate the various functions i

of traffic control. These functions, in decreasing importance, include:

Enhance roadway capacity; Guide evacuees along recommeded routes; l

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Expedite traffic movement; Provide assurance to the public; Surveillance.

In general, a TCP performs more than one of these functions. Some TCPs, however, are designed primarily to perform one of the two most important functions. The first function, enhancing roadway capacity, can have a pronounced influence on ETE. Such tactics are applied sparingly during an evacuation since they can be resource intensive. These tactics, however, can be effective in reducing ETE when effectively and strategically applied. The most recent analysis performed with respect to this matter reveals that three TCP locations within the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ have been designed primarily as capacity enhancing:

A-HB-03, A-HB-04 and D-HA-02. These TCPs will serve to expedite the traffic movement from within the town of Hampton, including Hampton Beach.

The public information program and the EBS messages encourage evacuees to travel along the recommended routes in directions away from Seabrook Station. Nevertheless, some TCPs in New Hampshire are designed expressly to restrict travel in directions which are commonly used during normal times in order to expedite movement along the recommended j routes. Of these, TCP A-HB-05 and A-HB-01 serve to direct 3

traffic on Hampton Beach northward, away from Seabrook Station, and toward the recommended evacuation routes.

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l There are, of course, other TCPs which fulfill this function; .the ones specified here reflect the need for State police under the conjecture that Hampton town police will 1

not participate in the evacuation. This function, to a f

lesser extent than capacity enhancement, could influence evacuation time.

By definition, all police personnel will act to expedite traffic movement so that the available roadway capacity will be fully utilized. The ETE, however, did not depend on full utilization of available capacity; as noted previously, capacity was reduced by 15 percent under congested conditions to represent driver uncertainty under emergency conditions. Thus, no capacity adjustment was made for the TCP " expediting" function in the ETE calculations. Thus, with respect to this function, and to the " provide assurance" function, there would be no change in ETE due to the absence of guides at most TCPs.  ;

The surveillance function is discussed on pp. 12-1 and 12-3, Volume 6.

In summary, then, it is seen that the higher priority TCPs are those which enhance capacity. Discussions with representatives from the New Hampshire State Police indicate 4 that the manning of State-assigned TCPs will be a function of trooper availability and will occur in a consecutive fashion as statewide troopers are called to respond.

Estimated time frames for manning these posts range from an i

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approximate 15 minutes for the first 4 TCPs to a span of 3 1

to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for a complement of 100 troopers. See Section

^

A.3.i to this testimony for a detailed description of sensitivity runs conducted to determine the effect of this 1

g partial'non-compliance with traffic control tactics, i It(has.beensuggestedthatemergencyworkers, traffic control p9 Esonnel ircluded, may abandon their ascigned

r. ,

emergency duties. ,yection B.2 to this testimony, "?.mergency j i . '

ns L

Wer ker Rol'e Ibandona;ent , " provides an examination of the '

lack of role $b'andonment id historical record.

l "k. TArough Vehicles" s

l

'NHREkP, Volume 66 p. 2-27, estimates "through" vehicles

'\

stesnutsber 3,000 additional' cars. ^ These vehicles are assumed s

to be traveling through the EPZ (external-external trips) and are assumed to b'e already on the highways at the time of the accident. Pag'e:10-3notesthakthen$vehiclesarenot I I i otherwise counted. rC'earification is hereby provided ccncerning tFeidi stinction between " peak hourly flow", . and

\ tha estimated nusber of through vehicles on the n6twerk at s

the time of tho' order to evacuate. (Note that this estimate is not "at the time of notification of an emergency.") l LPeak hourly flow is the maximun n';nber of vehicles that can . reasonably be expected to traverse a point (or uniform section o') a lane or roadway, over an hour, under 1

g ,

pre 9 Ailing roadway traffic and control conditions, and has p

.y tha? units vehicEes per hour. On the ocher hand, the 5 i i vi I t,

, , t-

\

3

I y

I estimate of 3000 vehicles as used within the ETE is the l total number of through vehicles on the highway system at a specified point in time, and has the units vehicles. There is no relation between " peak hourly flow", or for that i

matter, " peak daily flow", and this estimate of through vehicles at a certain point in time.

The primary routes servicing external-external trips '

through the Seabrook Station EPZ are the Interstate Routes 95 and 495. All other routes within the EPZ, which could be interpreted as through routes (e.g., Route 1, 107, 108), are f two-lane roads which are not relatively attractive to through travelers. About 230 lane-miles are provided by these express routes:

I-495: 2 miles @ 4 lanes; 5 miles @ 6 lanes

- I-95: 21 miles @ 8 lanes; 4 miles @ 6 lanes i

The calculations of ETE for the summer scenarios assume I that the accident takes place when the beaches are.at maximum usage, at 2 :00 p.m. When developing the inputs to the IDYNEV model, it was estimated that about 3000 vehicles, not otherwise counted, would be on the network at this time.

This estimate was based on observations made while traveling the network.

Specifically, it appeared that traffic on I-95 and on I-495 was traveling at Levels of Service (LOS) that did not exceed LOS B or C. The associated range of density is 13-30 l

passenger cars per mile per lane. Thus, the total number of t 1

73 -

l vehicles on these highways is between 2990 and 6900, many of which are not through vehicles.

(The concept of " Levels of Service" is a qualitative measure which describes operational conditions within a traffic stream, and generally implies perceived condition in such terms as speed, freedom to maneuver, comfort, convenience, and safety. Six levels of service are given letter designations, with LOS A representing the best operating conditions, and LOS F the worst. More detailed definitions are found at pages E-2 and E-3, Volume 6, and on pages 1-3, 1-4 of the 1985 HCM.)

The NHRERP calls for access control points to be established at the periphery of the EPZ which will discourage traffic from entering the EPZ from points outside except, of course, those vehicles which will participate in the evacuation (Vol. 1, 2.6-16).

This estimate of 3000 through vehicles represents those who entered the EPZ prior to the implementation of access control and have not as yet completed their travel through the EPZ by the time the Order to Evacuate (OTE) is given.

At the OTE, the number of through vehicles within the network could be substantia.ly less than the number which occupy the network at the time the access controls are applied. This reduction in vehicles reflects the fact that many of these vehicles will have exited the EPZ between the l

time the access control was applied and the time the OTE is

j announced. Thus, it is.seen that the number of l

external-external vehicles on the EPZ network at the OTE should not exceed the 3000 estimate, and may be i

substantially less. I subsequent to the calculation of the ETE study, direct observations of traffic flow on these major routes provided by aerial films taken on July 4 and 5, 1986 at approximately 2:00 p.m. indicated that traffic volume is very low - LOS A j and B. The associated range of traffic density is less than 20 passenger cars per mile in each lane.

Thus, based on these later observations, the total number of vehicles on these highways at this time is less than or equal to approximately 4600 passenger cars (20 x 230). Many of these cars, of course, belong to EPZ residents, tourists and employees who have already been counted. It is seen, therefore, that the estimate of 3,000 through vehicles -- not already counted -- is realistic.

Traffic on these highways during the off-season generally does not exceed the volume associated with LOS C, regardless of time of day. Thus, the estimate of 3,000 through vehicles is applicable throughout the year.

The 3000 vehicles estimated as thrcugh travelers are included in the ETE calculation. For example, the computer analysis for Region 1, Scenario 1 indicated a total of 99,398 trips. This figure compares with the total number of 96,524 in Figure 10-lle.

I

___--________-_a

L

1. Light Traffic on Hampton Beach The ETE estimates 300 cars on the highway in Hampton Beach from vehicle counts of aerial films, Volume 6,

p. 10-16. Page 10-16 indicates the source of this count when referencing Appendix E, Item 7, which states that aerial photos used to determine estimates of parking capacity and vehicle counts were taken on Sunday, August 11, 1985. Page 10-16 states the following: "at the time of maximum parking occupancy (about 2 p.m.), however, moving vehicles are few in number relative to those parked. For example: a total of 300 moving cars were counted in Hampton Beach from the aerial films..."

It must be emphasized that few, if any, of these 300 cars are "through" vehicles. It is highly unlikely that any vehicles moving through the area would leave an Interstate Highway such as I-95 to travel along the coastal roads which would significantly increase their travel time. Thus, these 300 vehicles are most likely either in the process of leaving or are destined for parking locations along the coast. Since our estimate of vehicle population along the coast is based on reasonably available parking capacity, these vehicles have already been included in that count.

This approach is in consonance with NUREG-0654, p. 4-2 which cautions that " Care should be taken to avoid double

_ _ J

counting." m. Evacuation Capacity per Hour: Tables 10-10 Volume 6, p. 10-70 includes a description of how capacity values as listed in Table 10-10 were computed.

These tables, which include Column 6 of Tables 10-10,

" Evacuation Capacity per Hour", were developed in the format recommended in Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654. The entries are largely of general interest only, and are not used in the calculation of the ETE. Specifically, these entries of capacity in Tables 10-10 indicate the potential aggregate capacities of all outward-bound highways which are intersected by arcs of 2, 5, and 10-mile radii, respectively, centered at Seabrook Station. This potential capacity can only be partially exploited, since network topological constraints limit the access of traffic to some of these routes. It is primarily for this reason that these entries are of limited interest. (Note that the statement that " estimates of available capacity may overstate the actual accessible capacity" refers only to the entries in Column 6 of Tables 10-10.)

In contrast, the calculations of ETE are based upon a rigorous analysis of traffic demand interacting with the estimated link specific capacity constraints, using the IDYNEV model developed for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. These calculations do not utilize the aggregate potential capacity values entered in Tables 10-10. 5. ETE Preparation / Trip Generation Times

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ 1

J l

a. Notification Time Appendix 3, NUREG-0654 provides, as the initial minimum acceptable design objective for coverage by the public notification system the capability for providing an alert signal "throughout the lO-mile EPZ Within 15 minutes." This design criteria provides basis for the 90 percent plume 222 population notification within 15 minutes.

b. Beach to Vehicle Time Estimate  !

Page 4-12, Volume 6, NHRERP, estimates that all day-trippers in the beach area were within 30 minutes of their cars. Asserting the reasonable estimate of 2 mph walking speed implies a walking distance in excess of one mile for beach-goers. Since the width of the beach parking areas are under one-half mile, this estimate of 30 minutes is clearly reasonable. Volume 6, p. 4-11 reads in pertinent part, "While we have no empirical data to support this distribution, we do know the physical domain of the beach area and the activities involved." Further, this section of the ETE reads that "since we know that congestion will occur on the beach areas during the summer and that evacuation time will exceed Trip Generation time, any inaccuracies in trip distribution will not influence the ETE. Thus, an approximate, reasonable distribution will satisfy our needs."

c. Transportation Staging Area Preparation Times

A delay of 15 minutes preparation time at the transportation staging area was assumed for the movement of transit vehicles in and out of the areas. (Volume 6, p.

11-20.) The ETE allows for a one hour preparation time for the transportation staging areas to be ready to receive vehicles,

d. Commuter Return / Emergency Vehicle Entrance Time Volume 6, p. 4-9, provides a distribution entitled

" Distribution No. 2, Time to Prepare to Leave Work." This distribution has been suggested to indicate a percentage of workers returning home following notice of a " radiological emergency." The horizontal axis of Figure 11-1 on p. 11-17 entitled " Time Distribution of Arrival Home" is improperly labeled. Where it now reads " Elapsed Time From Order to Evacuate," it should read: " Elapsed Time from Start of Notification" (Table 4-2 on p. 4-16 is referenced from the start of notification. Figure 11-1 is a plot of Distribution B from Table 4-2.) Figure 11-1 and Table 4-2, Distribution B, indicate that about 88% of commuterF would arrive home within one hour of the evacuation order (which is assumed to occur 25 minutes after the start of notification). That is, the 88% figure corresponds to 1:25 after the start of notification. (Because of the improper labeling of Figure 11-1, the value of 70%, which corresponds to one hour after the start of notification, was previously

inadvertently attributed to-one hour after the order to evacuate.)

The rate of returning vehicles is about one-third the figure cited by contention, i.e., 95% of workers within 30 minutes. Commuters returning home against the flow of evacuating traffic will experience little traffic impedence on the major highways since it is reasonable to expect the most, if not all, unnecessary trips toward the EPZ will be deferred or cancelled. Some commuters will encounter delays within the EPZ which will extend, somewhat, their trip generation time. However, the net effect on the ETE would be minimal, since the ETE for most scenarios are insensitive to moderate changes in trip generation times.

Pages 11-19 and 11-20 of Volume 6 of the NHRERP provide a detailed description of inbound travel time. This section indicates that little impedence to vehicles in general entering the EPZ following an order to evacuate would be anticipated due to the following reasons:

1. The first buses will not depart their respective points of origin until approximately 30 minutes following the evacuation order;

2. Those same 88% of returning commuters as noted above will be reaching their homes within the EPZ one hour l

following the evacuation order, and therefore, will not be contributing to inbound traffic flow over the time frame

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______-________a

j that authorized incoming vehicles (for example, buses, ambulances,' police vehicles) would be_ traveling to the EPZ;

3. Inbound traf fic would be limited due to discouraged entry via EBS and other media messages, and by people's concern over the potential risk to their health and safety; and

4. Inbound traffic would also be limited by access control points established at the perimeter of the evacuated I area which would disc.aurage non-essential inbound traffic.

The use of estimated return times for commuters under

" normal circumstances" represents peak hour conditions when other commuters are occupying the roadways over the same time frame as those who are returning to their homes within the EPZ. The very existence of a peak period of traffic '

during normal circumstances in the late afternoon reflects the fact that the majority of workers leave their places of work and enter the highway system within a narrow time frame. If an order to evacuate occurs prior to the normal p.m. peak period then those returning home to the EPZ will be occupying the roadways while workers who live elsewhere remain on their jobs. Consequently, under those circumstances, the trip home should take somewhat less time than during the " normal" peak traffic period. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that other travelers, who might normally be traveling toward the EPZ, would actually make their trips under emergency conditions. This reduction in i

i i

other trip-making also tends to shorten work-to-home travel time relative to the normal afternoon peak period.

Travel against the direction of evacuating traffic will not have an effect on major highways such as I-95 and I-495 since the two directions of traffic are physically separated and traffic in one direction has no impact on the other. On surface roads inbound traffic could encounter frictional effects but these would be counterbalanced to some extent by the anticipated lighter inbound traffic volumes due to the factors discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Traffic cones at TCPs would not physically block desired turning movements in any direction, thereby impeding counter flow traffic. As noted on page 7-1; "There are always legitimate reasons for a driver to prefer a direction other than that indicated. For example: He/she may be traveling home from work or from another location, to join other family members l preliminary to evacuating." Later, the plan states, "The implementation of a plan must provide room for the application of sound judgment. The traffic cones and barriers are deployed as indicated in the sketches of Appendix I, so that there remains room for vehicles to maneuever through these guides. That is, cones and barriers will not physically obstruct passage." Thus, it is seen that the plan is designed to accommodate commuters who will be returning home and incoming emergency vehicles during the initial stages of an evacuation.

I

( l l _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _a

For these reasons, it is reasonable to anticipate that incoming vehicles, including buses traveling along at-grade primary highways (e.g., Route 1) may average 40 mph and those that travel along access-controlled highways may average 50 mph.

(It has been argued that buses will travel at high speeds, and that an accident at these speeds could disable a car. The higher speed vehicles, however, are traveling counterblow to the evacuating traffic and are on Interstate highways, or the major highways traveling toward the EPZ.

These major highways are designed to safely accomodate much higher speeds than the average speed cited above. The majority of vehicles on the road within the EPZ are evacuating from the EPZ at low speed.)

e. Bus Mobilization Times A telephone survey was conducted in early 1987 by the NHCDA in order to verify the mobilization times for bus company vehicles under letter of agreement. The mobilization times requested were based on unscheduled activation of the buses. The times included how long the bus companies estim: ted it would take to notify drivers, have drivers go to their bases, fuel the buses and be ready I

to drive as well as the travel times to the state staging i areas. This survey indicated tacec approximately 25 to 30%

of needed vehicles could report to State staging areas l

Within one hour, and that the remaining needed buses could I

83 -

j

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i report within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of notification. (See " Estimate of Bus Mobilization and Travel Times for Bus Companies to State Transportation to Staging Areas".) These data compare well with the results of mobilization survey conducted in ,

1 preparation of the ETE, which lead to an estimated 80 l

percent mobilization within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of notification i

(p. 11-18, 19, Volume 6). This small difference wil] not impact the ETE when the ETE exceeds transit times since all evacuating buses will merge with the evacuating traffic.

Some small beneficial effect on ETE associated with this later survey data may be experienced only for some off-season scenarios where evacuation time for evacuating private vehicles is somewhat less than that for buses, i It has been contended that individual drivers of Teamsters Local No. 633 "have in no way shown their

. willingness to drive into the EPZ." However, the Teamsters Local No. 633 represents only a small portion of drivers within the overall driving pool, as discussed in the direct testimony of the Special Needs/ Transportation Panel,

f. Bus Loading Times The ETE has estimated the time for loading a bus with members of the population from special facilities using a 15 second mean boarding headway. In Table 12-33 in the Highway Oapacity Manual, empirical data has led to the estimate of boarding time per passenger equal to 2.6 seconds which  ;

i includes the payment of a fare with a single coin. Other l

I l

l 1

______._______________J

figures are 3.0 seconds for exact fare and 3.5 seconds for passenghrs who are standees on a bus. It is seen that the 4 ETE estimate for boarding people from special facilities onto buses is approximately 5 times that documented in the Highway Capacity Manual. Also, the figure of 15 seconds is reasonable as an average boarding time, balancing shorter boarding times for ambulatory persons with potentially longer boarding times required by non-ambulatory persons.

While the total time to load passengers, which consists of travel from the local transportation center to the special facility plus the time for passengers to board the bus, was estimated at 40 minutes (0.67 hour7.75463e-4 days <br />0.0186 hours <br />1.107804e-4 weeks <br />2.54935e-5 months <br />) in Progress Report No. 7, the current estimate is 45 minutes (0.75 hour8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br />), as documented on page 11-21.

The number of non-ambulatory persons outside of special facilities who are in need of special transportation assistance has been determined by way of the NHCDA special needs survey, and has been included in the local RERPs.

(See testimony of the Special Needs Transportation Panel.)

g. Transit Dependent ETE Pages 11-16 through 11-27 discuss evacuation time j

estimates for transit dependent and special needs persons.

A table is provided on page 11-26 which estimates the " total elapsed time, at worst, from notification to the arrival of an EMS vehicle within the EPZ" to be 3.30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. In calculating ETE for transit dependent persons it is noted 85 -

-)

that in-coming emergency vehicles can be expected to enter the EPZ prior to the complete evacuation of an area; as such, these vehicles after picking up evacuees will become an element of the same outbound traffic stream and will not be distinguished from the other evacuating traffic.

h. Impact to ETE of "Immediate" General Emergency.

Argument has been presented that an immediate general emergency would extend the ETE by more than 20 or 30 minutes. However, analysis of this type of scenario demonstrates no support for this argument. For example, a reduction in the elapsed time of 25 minutes (assumed as the Planning Basis) between the Alert stage and the Order to Evacuate, could occur under the presumed scenario of an immediate general emergency. If this 25 minutes were reduced to zero, it could increase the ETE by no more than that amount of 25 minutes. In this scenario, the Order to 1 Evacuate, which is the starting point which defines the ETE, is advanced by 25 minutes. Since the highway system in the beach areas and their service roads are operating at capacity very quickly after the Alert stage due to precautionary beach closings (for the summer scenarios), it therefore follows the total elapsed time to clear the area from the start of the alert is relatively insensitive to the extent of the elapsed time between the Alert and the Order to Evacuate. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the ETE would increase by the amount of time that the starting 86 -

l l

i

- - - . - _ - - - _ - _ h

(i.e., the Order to Evacuate) point is moved forward (namely, i.e., by 25 minutes). Sensitivity studies have confirmed this expectation. See Volume 6, pages 10-16 and 10-17 for a detailed discussion of the results of sensitivity tests for an "immediate" General Emergency compared to the results of the Planning Basis,

i. Telephone Survey of EPZ Residents

• A portion of the information used within the ETE in support of trip generation times was gathered by way of a telephone survey of residents of the Seabrook EPZ. The First Market Research Corporation of Boston conducted the study based on a survey instrument drafted by KLD and subsequently refined by First Market Research Corp. This organization has over 10 years experience in conducting this type of telephone survey; their interviews are carefully l l

selected and supervised during the implementation of the '

survey. Each survey interviewer was instructed to adhere to i

the final form of the survey instrument as developed by I First Market Research. The sampling procedure used automatic, random telephone dialing equipment. The number of calls is documented below.

A total of 10,587 random dialings were made using the random dialing equipment. Most of these dialings generated numbers which were not assigned to any telephone. A total I of 3,582 connections were made of which 562 were ineligible I I

i

i since the households were located outside the EPZ. Of the remaining 3,020 calls, 769 respondents refused to participate, 51 calls were terminated before the survey was completed, 818- calls were answered by persons other than head of household (mostly children), and 1,382 interviews were completed.

Thus, only 2,202 were connected to adults in households within the EPZ, of which 1,382 calls, however, led to completed interviews, representing a 63 percent completion rate. This sample of 1,382 responses is extcemely robust for this population size. For example, a somewhat similar survey was conducted throughout New York State in 1983.

This random sample telephone survey interviewed 1,503 state residents out of a total population of approximately 17.8  ;

l million, compared with our 1,300 responses for a resident population of under 150,000. (Ref.: Byunso , J. and Hartgen, D., "An Update on Household-Reported Trip-Generation Rates" in Transportation Research Record 987, 1984.)

In assessing the validity of a survey, there are two forms of errors: sampling and response. Sampling errors arise from the fact that only a portion of the underlying population is being surveyed. Response errors may be due to many factors including inaccuracies or outright guesses on l

the part of the respondant, ambiguous questions, improper 88 -

]

interviewing protocol, or deliberate falsehood by the respondents. In either case, error may be random with (approximate) zero mean, o r sys tenta_t_i_c .

Bias, or systematic error can result from one of two sources: sampling errors or response errors.

The former deals with " external validity" -- the ability to generalize from the sample to the underlying population.

The latter deals with " internal validity", which means getting unbiased answers to the questions. If either or

-both forms of this bias were offsetting then the survey results could not be generalized to the population.

Surveys must be designed to consider all forms of error with a view toward minimizing the total error. In particular, the systematic error is of far greater concern i since it is this bias which can compromise the efficacy of a survey.

In designing the survey, it was decided to inform the respondent of the purpose of the survey in the interest of j

candor. The introductory statement concluded with "the information contained will be used . . . in connection with t preparedness plans for Seabrook Station." k

]

One factor that was considered was the prospect that the strong feelings on this subject by some members of the sample could provoke responses which were deliberately designed to bias the survey results. Specifically, we were concerned of an organized effort by opponents of Seabrook

)

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Station to orchestrate responses which furthered their point of view. (Mr. Lieberman was informed by an assistant Mass.

A.G. attorney that a few respondents did provide false information; thus, our concern was justified). We decided that the best way to contend with such a possibility was to complete the survey as rapidly as possible. This decision precluded call-backs to non-responding phone calls.

There is a potential for bias (which is indigenous to all surveys) associated with nonrespondants. The extent of any such bias depends on the context of the survey, the sampling procedure and the sampling frame.

In assessing this potential for bias, it is instructive to examine the available statistics:

Of the unanswered random dialings:

Some 16 percent (562/3582) were outside the EPZ About 26 percent of all phone lines within the EPZ are leased to business firms, according to a response to an inquiry from New England Telephone.

Since the survey telephone calls were made in the evening (on a weekday) and on the weekend, in the off-season, it is certainly reasonable to expect that a higher percentage (than 26) of the unanswered calls were business lines. Business personnel are excluded from the sampling frame; such unanswered calls are of no concern. It is therefore reasonable to expect that more than half of all unanswered calls were either outside the EPZ or were l

w _ -_ - _ - - - - l

businesa firms, and thus did not contribute to the potential for bias.

Anot:ter approach to assess whether the potential for bias is actually manifested as real, significant bias, is to compare the data obtained by the survey, with the same, or cimilar, data obtained from other sources. If there is essential agreement between elements of the survey data set and those of other sources, then the prospect of systematic bias of significant extent can be dismissed,

j. Mean Household Size According to the N.H. State Planning Office, the population of Rockingham County in 1985 was 220,466 persons in 77,629 households, in 1985. These data yield a mean of 2.84 persons per household. According to our survey, the mean persons per household in the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ we= 2.85, in very close agreement with the county data. T) t ; close agreement implies that the household demograp" .s of the nonrespondents are no different, statistically, than those sampled.

k. Mean Travel Time It is of i erest to compare the mean travel times obtained from the survey conducted in 1985, with those obtained in the 1980 census (see page H-2, Vol. 6 of the NHRERP). As noted on page 5-1 and documented in Table S-1, employment within the EPZ has grown significantly in this 1

time frame. Consequently, with increased employee traf fic

i volume, one must expect increased travel times to work. The survey data confirms this expectation; all towns display a consistent trend of increased travel time relative to that in 1980, as shown below:

Mean Travel Times to Work (min.]

1980 1985 Community Page H-2, Vol. 6) Survey Amesbury 20.6 24.1 Merrimac 22.5 25.1 '

Newbury 25.6 28.3 Newburyport 22.4 26.7 Salisbury 20.7 19.5 W. Newbury 26.8 35.3 Exeter 20.2 23.2 Hampton 22.5 26.0 Kingstcn 24.5 30.9 Portsmouth 14.5 16.5 Rye 21.0 22.0 The consistent relationship between these two columns of data, in the context of increasing population and traffic density over the intervening time, again suggests that the survey data replicates the travel experience of the underlying population.

l

1. Snow Removal Times '

The discussion on page 4-20 of Vol. 6 of the NHRERP addressed the need to estimate the time associated with the need for evacuees to clear their driveways of snow to the extent necessary for their respective vehicles to gain access to the street system. It is assumed, as a l

l

i conservative approach, that snow has already fallen and will continue to fall after the Order to Evacuate (OTE).

Conf,iStent with current practice in the area, plowing of the public street system and of driveways begins as soon as sufficient accumulation makes the effort productive, and continues, as needed, to maintain passage. This planning basis assumes that the roads will remain passable throughout the evacuation time frame subsequent to the OTE, but at lower levels of free-flow speed and capacity. This assumption is consistent with the ptotective action decision criteria of NHRERP, which consider off-site constraints such as roadways not being passable due to snow. (Nowhere is it assumed that equipment will continue to plow the roads or driveways after the OTE).

Subsequent to the OTE, it is reasonable to assume that driveways will have to be cleared. The estimate of this clearance time, given in the distribution on page 4-20, is based on direct observation by Mr. Lieberman and on discussions with persons living in the EPZ. It is our view that these estimates are reasonable and properly account for the conditions described above.

6. Host Locations It has been suggested that the ETE assumes evacuees will choose to evacuate to assigned host communities, which is I

i

particularly insupportable due to the large numbers of beachgoers and transients during the summer months who may be unfamiliar with host communities. Several elements within the ETE and NHRERP in general must be raised in response to this claim.

The precautionary early closing of the beaches does not consider the immediate opening of reception and mass care centers for this population segment. The EBS message for beach closing directs these persons to leave the area immediately (Vol. 4, p. G-13).

There is no reason for this population segment to report to host communities until and unless the order to evacuate is given. At that time, EBS messages will provide direction for all evacuees to travel to the appropriate reception centers; and TCPs throughout the EPZ will be manned to provide route guidance.

Public Information flyers and supplemental materials are to be provided to restaurants, i

hotels, motels, rooming houses, schools, camps, health care facilities, parks and state forests (Vol. 1, p. 2.3-2). This material will contain information regarding the location of reception centers and evacuation route descriptions.

l

)

The NH public information program also includes posters prepared by NHCDA for display in public places and state lands (Vol. 1, p. 2.3-2).

• Emergency public information will be contained on j dedicated pagen in telephone books which will be distributed in the EPZ (Vol. 1, p. 2.3-2). These pages will provide general instructions on what to do following notification of an emergency at Seabrook Station, and specifically list the ,

i Reception Center assigned to each EPZ community.

Tourists that enter an area with which they are particularly unfamiliar will, in all likelihood, have in their possession maps of the area to avoid getting lost during their vacation.

• The traffic control points are established to

"(f)acilitate evacuating traffic movements which serve to expedite travel out of the EPZ along i

routes, which the analysis has found to be most effective." (Vol. 6, p. 7-1). Hence, direction is provided throughout the EPZ along designated routes.

There is no requirement that an individual report to a host community. Reception centers are established for the evacuating public to provide j 1

" services for any evacuated population in need of  !

public assistance" (Vol. 1, p. 1.6-6). The EBS 95 -

l messages provide information as to what services are available at the reception centers (Vol. 4,

p. G-31 and p. G-37). However, it is an option for evacuating persons to refer to reception centers for assistance.

The NHRERP calls for strip maps to be available to all' transportation drivers in reaching their designated destinations.

! It is reasonable, based on the foregoing ETE and other NHRERP elements, to assume that both permanent resident and transient populations will have adequate access to information regarding appropriate evacuation routes.

B. Human Behavior in Emergencies

1. General Character of Public Behavior in Emergencies

! a. General Public Resoonse Principles Human response to emergencies has been a topic of investigation by social scientists for approximately three decades. Many studies have been performed in a variety of emergencies stemming from geological, climatological, and technological phenomena, and has been documented in a vast

! body of emergency literature. This research history has covered many aspects of human behavior in emergencies; and $

)

there have been several attempts to summarize the findings j of the hundreds of existing studies (see, fcr example, l Thomas E. Drabek, 1986. Human System Responses to  !

j Disaster: An Inventory of Sociological Findings. New I I

l l

York: Springer-Verlag; Dennis S. Mileti, Thomas E. Drabek and J. Eugene Haas, 1975. Human Systems in Extreme Environments. Boulder: University of Colorado). An 1

important component of this work has been to investigate the

)

behavior of people within the community at risk in response f' to an emergency. Although additional research will '

continue, the record is clear with respect to the response of members of the public at risk in times of emergency. The principles of public response discussed below - ,vell established through decades of research and investigation -- {

a would be applicable in the event of an emergency at a l nuclear facility such as the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant. ,,

f1 Emergencies are by definition, anci in reference to human 1

behavior, unique situations. Emergencies analogous to one ,

~

at Seabrook which pose a collective threat to an entire fx, '[, j;

]

community are, behaviorally, in a class by themselves. Mass emergencies such as these transform communities behaviorally at both the group and individual levels. Priorities of g ongoing social life shift, goals and objectives are ,

transformed, and identifications change. The first priority l

for virtually all people who find themselves in such a collective threat situation becomes the collective safety of  !

people and the community at large. People abandon personal forms of identification and personal interests, and they

./

identify with the entire human collective or community that is threatened. This " shift" in the human character has come

-e,-

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i i

to be known by many-names, for example, the " therapeutic. 1 community" (see Alan H. Barton, 1969. Communities in 1

Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress

{

't, Situations. Garden City, New York: Doubleday). ,

i The change or " shift" in the social psychological I

I complexion of social life and human behavior results in a I variety of principles that emerge to document the character 1

of emergency behavior. This includes, for example, a dramatic decline in activities and behavior that run counter j to the good of the collective and those that are based in

!t individual or personal interests, and a dramatic increase in 1

., acts and behavior that bring people together and help one

'l another. This " shift" would undoubtedly occur in an

'\

.f emergency at the Seabrook Plant; it has occurred in every mass emergency of this sort studied by social scientists where it has been a topic of investigation (and has been evidenced even in emergencies where it war not formally a topic of investigation). This general. shift in human behavior in emergencies should be considered in planning for emergencies since it will characterize the basis for human behavior in future emergencies.

The results of actual empirical research on human behavior in mass emergencies provides clear guidelines for planning for future emergencies. Public behavior is rational, and the emergency goals of helping themselves as well as others take precedence over almost all else; the

character of human spirit is strong when faced with mass emergencies and most people rise to the occasion. In simple terms, the " thin-veneer of civilization" is not stripped from humanity when mass emergencies are experienced (as one would conclude from observing disaster movies); it is in fact strengthened.

b. Ride Sharing People in emergencies become altruistic and concerned about the safety of others. Consequently, people check on the safety of others; communicate with friends, neighbors and intimates; and offer help and provide assistance to each other. Further, evacuation can be generally characterized  !

as a group behavior, rather than a behavior in which people engage as individuals. People generally exhibit -- as a consequence of becoming altruistic and concerned about the safety of others -- a tendency to form into groups prior to and for the purpose of evacuation.

Historically, in emergencies where evacuation has been recommended, people without transportation have obtained evacuation transportation from friends, neighbors and relatives. This is the case because of the natural tendency of people in emergencies to check on the safety of others, to become altruistic and offer help to those who need it, and to form groups for evacuation. Therefore, in the event l

i of an emergency at Seabrook necessitating evacuation, regardless of the reason for lack of personal private

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+ 34 1

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p; y

,J, 3 /transportatic::, ; thy vast. thajority of evacueos without their y q-i, L  :

d t own transportation would receive transp:>rtation from other n.

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', oevqcuees. !This v M d likely be particurgrly true for' people

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,.', whom others ( e . g . ,- i'riends, neighbors end r%1atives) klow do a

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not own a car or have a car which is out e.f..the EPZ - icr 4

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example bqcaupe of ;4 wMking spouse. '

Thus, the number of p persons, 5.fo'would need officist transportation assistance l durffig an emargency can be expected to be well below:the

-j {

.' T 1 x nurna cf;persons withs.'sut transportation in. non-eme rgency

> ' ,; y i .! y9 1

- '[( f[' j/ times The ;as sump _tibn er.sployed for the Seabrook emergency ya

) plar.riing zone for planning pufposes (i.e.,

t that

( ap/t;oximat:e'.y 50*', of those who do not have perscutil private transportation vogld receide thansp;orPah on from other i

evacuees)"in fery.ccpservati"e and reasonable, based on principles of behavior established through the study of-

';, , (,

3g5 g emergencies. ._

p .i' ,

3 (

I Thiis nPtion, O[1 tIIe average, SJ;p4L*iences at 1e097 one

/ , Y evacuation; a-daf Seine of these involve major events in f

• ,, \

). '

y 4 which a ,large number of propie eva.euate Despit,t the volume of the research rtcord, je know of no emergency evacuation i r e

( J l cast.'i).n wl.ich the-lack ci trarnportation has ever been a

\ .,

(\problhm in constraining the act of evacuation for pers::ns u

3 whe)wish to evacuate. This, of course, should not suggest

.I

.tM t st # sportetion needs fcir ovacuation should be excluded f l ..

froa emergency planning for nue.', ear power plants. It does,

., '/ h h te v e r , suggest that the planning assumption that"SO% of f

t .'

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/  ;, i 0 -

,; a , ,

Ii ',

s

'(.:, '

y

,e

( .

k \ \

\

v h t,

(

3$

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,\

w those without their own transportation would receive rides from other evacuees is a very conservative assumption. In fact, unless there were something very unique about the population in question (for example, if many belonged to a religious group whose beliefs kept them from ownin.g motor vehicles), 70% or 80% would be a conservative plannir.g assumption.

In summary, an extensive history of human behavior in emergencies leads one to be confident that -- in the event of an evacuation due to an emergency at the Seabrook Plant the vast majority of evacuees without their own transportation would receive transportation from other evacuees.

c. Spontaneous Sheltering The general principles of human behavior in emergencies which have already been discussed are applicable to all types of analogous mass emergencies, and have been observed in climatological, geological and technological emergencies I

including the Three Mile Island accident. Interestingly, another frequent research finding is that many people are surprised, as they reflect back on their emergency experience, that they did not observe what they might have j I

expected to observe, for example, panic, hysteria, selfish acts, conflicts over scarce resources, and so on.  ;

Expectations about human behavior in emergencies by most Americans are quite consistent and even the antitheses of

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i

actual human emergency behavior. The " myths" which permeate our society about emergency behavior are strong and likely explain why most people who experience an emergency are surprised to learn that "when the chips were down in our community people really pitched in to do their part and help one another." More often than not, locals attribute this inconsistency between what they would have expected and what they experienced to the " unique" character of their community's citizens. In fact, it is the general universal character of social life which leads to what is observed.

One consequence of the existence of strong myths in American culture about emergency behavior is that these myths can manifest themselves in a variety of specific concerns as planning occurs for future emergencies. The j l

underlying and incorrect thesis on which these specific concerns rests is typically that emergencies bring out the

" worst" in people who become more irrational, selfish, 1

aberrant, helpless and so on. The empirical facts are that l

emergencies bring out the "best" in people who become more l rational, altruistic, compassionate, helpful and so on.

The notion that strangers would be left outside in an emergency at Seabrook in which she]tering were the advised protective action is a concern that illustrates how particular " problems" are imagined in future emergencies because those raising the concern are basing their view on 102 -

American " myths" about behavior in mass emergencies instead of empirical fact.

We do not fault Americans for subscribing to the incorrect thesis about emergency behavior. Hollywood movies

+

.and script writers have done little to dispel myths about such behavior,'and, in fact, are a likely cause.of.their reinforcement. Nevertheless, emergency planning should be based on fact and not fiction.

It is inconceivable that people (be they shopkeepers, hotel operators, theater managers or merely citizens in their homes) would lock people out were a sheltering advisory issued at Seabrook and people were " stranded" outside. The reverse would occur as people would encourage those outside to seek shelter in the buildings which they occupied. It is equally inconceivable that persons outside would engage in aberrant behavior in an attempt to get inside. The only behavior that could be reasonably hypothesized in such a circumstance would be on the part of those inside encouraging those outside to share their shelter.

Unfortunately, we know of no specific studies to cite that would empirically document this phenomenon. The reason no studies on this specific issue exist, however, is that it has never been identified as a problem in the hundreds of I

emergencies researched. There are, however, dozens upon dozens of studies which illustrate the generic principle of

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l l

! I

how people help one another in emergencies and share the resources available with those who need them. The prototypical conclusions are illustrated as follows:

"as a specialized aspect of the overall community. response pattern, heightened levels of solidarity,have been reported repeatedly" (cf.

Thomas ~E. Drabek, 1986, Human System Responses to Disasters: An Inventory of Sociological Findings.

New York: Springer-Verlag).

" Previous intergroup differences are lessened, cooperation and social solidarity are heightened..." (cf. Nicholas J. Demerath and Anthony J.C. Wallace, 1957, " Human Adaptation to Disaster" Human Organization 16, Summer: 1-2).

"... disasters create unity rather than disorganization...a set of norms which encourages and reinforces community members to act in an altruistic fashion develops; also, a disaster minimizes conflict...(Russell R. Dynes, 1970 a.

Organized Behavior in Disaster. Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath Loxington Books, page 98).

These conclusions about altruism are prototypical of many others. Individually and collectively they suggest that it is beyond the realm of human possibility to conceive of an emergency at Seabrook in which anyone would be " locked out" when sheltering was advised.

d. Evacuation Impediments We have already addressed a general description of human response to emergencies as well as provided some thoughts about how American myths about emergency behavior are quite at odds with empirical scientific fact. We have also illustrated how the " facts" of behavior in emergencies would likely manifest themselves in terms of ride sharing and

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spontaneous sheltering were there an emergency at Seabrook Station. In this section of testimony, we will address the concern that evacuees would not be able to' deal with evacuation impediments, such as stalled cars on the highways or accidents.

We shall not be repetitive. The same theory about human  !

response in emergencies which we have already elaborated upon is quite applicable to this concern.

The public is not helpless in emergencies as would be suggested by the thesis underlying " myths" about emergency behavior. In fact, the public is an actual resource in i

emergencies. It is the case in most emergencies, for example, that most search and rescue activities to help victims are actually carried out by other victims, j i

"... studies have consistently shown that initial search and rescue work is carried out by persons who are in the-impact area and that formal rescue organizations become involved at a later point..." (cf. Dennis S. Mileti, 1985, Disaster

]

1 Relief and Rehabilitation in the United States. A Research Assessment. Boulder: University of Colorado, page 9).

The point is a simple one. The public in an emergency  ;

4 is not helpless, awaiting for a formal organization to solve the problems which are presented by the emergency. In fact, most emergency problems are solved by the public. Search and rescue is an example of this principle. Pushing l

1 I

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1

incapacitated vehicles off the road would be another.

Dozens of other examples could be offered.

The public is a resource in emergencies, it is not the problem. The public often gives rise to " emergent work groups" in emergencies which form temporarily and on the spot to do what needs to be done. The importance of this phenomenon has already been put well in terms of emergency planning application. "...too few emergency officials really grasp or understand the range of important contributions made by such groups: (Thomas E. Drabek, 1986, page 154).

Emergency plans for Seabrook Station provide for the removal of traffic impediments along EPZ evacuation routes through the dispatch of tow vehicles as identified through established Letters of Agreement. If, however, emergency plans for Seabrook also assume that an evacuating public would push vehicle impediments out of the way, then the plans are based on a very accurate impression of public behavior in emergencies; for this is precisely what would occur.

We should also add one more thought to evacuation and road impediments caused by accidents during emergencies.

The evidence regarding accidents during emergency evacuation suggests that they were no more frequent than during non-emergency times. For example, in a study done by Dennis S. Mileti, Donald M. Hartsough, Patti Madson and Rick

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Hufnagel entitled "The Three Mile Island Incident: A Study of Behavioral Indicators of Human Stress," 1984 (Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 2,1:89-114) data were examined that included the frequency of accident rates before, during and after the TMI accident. There was no evidence to suggest that accidents increased during the evacuation, despite the fact that commutation in the area was likely up because of evacuation.

The conclusion about the TMI accident is supported by other evacuation studies. In an extensive review of evacuation behavior, E.L. Quarantelli notes "A strong theme is that withdrawal movement is almost always orderly in getting people away from an actual or potentially dangerous location. This runs counter to widely held views among some disaster planners and emergency organization personnel that there is a need to be concerned about evacuation turning into disorderly flight if not wild panic" (Evacuation Behavior and Problems: Findings and Implications from the Research Literature. Columbus: Ohio State University, Disaster Research Center, 109).

It has also been noted that accidents and traffic jams I l

are not problems in vehicular evacuations. (H.E. Moore, et )

al., Before the Wind. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1963) specifically I investigated accidents and auto breakdowns in the evacuation of over one-half million people because of Hurricane Carla.

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Only .6% of the sampled evacuees reported they had even seen or were in an accident or breakdown (note that all .6% may have witnessed the same accident.)

e. Conclusions An elaborate body of empirical research accumulated over the last three decades exists regarding public emergency behavior in the United States in reference to geological, climatological and technological emergencies. This research base also includes many studies about public response to the 1979 emergency and evacuation at Three Mile Island. This record provides a clear basis for the conclusion that mass community-wide emergencies (the sort of emergency of concern in these hearings regarding the Seabrook Station) elicit altruistic public behavior. In such a circumstance the public would clearly share rides with other evacuees without transportation, share shelter with those in need of it, and help themselves and others to solve " problems" (such as pushing evacuation impediments like disabled cars out of the way) encountered during the emergency.

2. Emergency Worker Role Abandonment

a. Introduction. The research history of human response to emergencies has covered many aspects of human behavior; an important component of this work has been to investigate the behavior of people with roles of responsibility in emergency response, as well as the behavior of emergency organizations, and both informed 1

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w-__--__-_-_-____-____..._ _J

emergency planning efforts in the nation. The research record.has grown over time. Although additional research will continue, the record is clear with respect to the response of emergency organizations and emergency workers in times of emergency. We are confident that the principles of emergency organization and emergency worker response disussed below -- well-established through decades of research and investigation -- would be applicable in the event of an emergency at a nuclear power plant such as the Seabrook Station.

b. Emergency Role Abandonment by Workers The notion of " role conflict" is a concept in the social sciences based on the following ideas. Individuals in society play many different roles, and each role has certain rights and obligations in particular social relationships.

Because each person plays many different roles, the rights and obligations of one role may be consistent with those of another role, or irrelevant to or in " conflict" with another role. The concept of role " conflict" is generally used uncritically, as an either/or matter in which a person is forced to choose between two or more roles (cf., Lewis Killi an'. 1952. "The Significance of Multigroup Membership in Disaster" American Journal of Sociology January:

309-314). Conflict implies equally weighted contradictory l

l alternatives, requiring a person to choose one role to play while abandoning another. This condition is rarely, if

- 109 -

i ever, found in actual social life. A more accurate term is role " strain," which denotes the difficulty of role obligations at the same time. Role " strain" is preferable j i

because it describes more accurately the actual conditions that people experience in all of social life, not just those of emergencies. Role " strain" is something with which people cope in most social situations and is a permanent feature of social life.

It is important to distinguish between role strain, which is a mental state (a feeling of concern and unease),

and role abandonment, which is a type of behavior. Thus, while it is to be expected that emergency workers would experience some role strain during an emergency at Seabrook, this does not mean that they would abandon their emergency roles because of it.

Research conducted on the actual behavior of people with defined organizational responsibilities in emergencies has established that emergency workers who have a clear idea of their emergency roles do their emergency jobs. This research record stretches back over the last three decades.

1. The Prevailing Image It was in the specialized research literature of disasters and emergencies that the concept of role conflict was first conceptualized in sociological terms. This was accomplished by Lewis Killian (1952) who sought to develop a typology for role conflict types. That is, Killian did not

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l seek to document the occurrence of role conflict in a set of particular disaster' situations, but rather to describe a l concept he thought important to the general sociological enterprise. Killian described the concept well, and his original article has become a classic but abused work. The classic " cell" in Killian's typology has become role conflict that is experienced by emergency workers who are torn between conflicting loyalties to family and work groups when disaster strikes. Disasters provided the discipline of sociology with a good example situation in which to illustrate to students role conflict of this type. It is easy to be able to imagine role conflict by thinking about having a family at home in a disaster-striken area when an emergency begins while being at work and having an emergency job that must be performed.

Killian's original work, however, seemingly went beyond defining a concept. He also reported on what appears to be a conclusion from empirical evidence about how emergency workers resolved their family-work role conflict. He states: "The great majority of persons interviewed who were involved in such dilemmas resolved them in favor of the family, or, in some cases, to friendship groups. Much of the initial confusion, disorder and semmingly complete i

disorganization reported in disaster communities was the j result of families to find and rejoin their families" (1952:311). Other early disaster studies offered similar 111 -

conclusions. For example, a study of the 1953 Holland flood disaster (cf., Instituut_Voor Sociaal Onderzock Van Het 1

)

i Nederlandse Volk Amsterdam. 1955. Studies in Holland Floor  !

Disaster 1953. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Volume IV, p. 11) concluded that "The choice of most men was to be with their-families rather than fulfilling the tasks which they should

.have done in their positions as members of another group;"

and "The number of men in rescue increased, if they knew that their wives and children were safe."

Other studies, apparently, followed which provided additional " evidence" that role conflict in disasters was resolved by the abandonment of emergency worker roles in favor of performing family roles. Moore (cf. Harry C. Moore 1958. Tornadoes Over Texas. Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 245), in a study of a disastrous tornado, concluded that " Efforts to reunite the family were the first thing done in many cases. Until this was done everything else was postponed and reported to have been insignificant."

Moore also provided three case examples to illustrate the general conclusion. First, the mayor, on becoming aware of the disaster while driving home went home first, picked up his wife, and then started out to see what had happened.

Second, the civil defense director was at the scene when the impact occurred, and after making calls to alert several disaster agencies, he then telephoned his family and went

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4

home. Third, the city manager, who was also close to the scene of the disaster, checked with his wife in the course of his official activities to see if she was injured; he was able to do this because he was at police headquarters which had special lines.

Accounts of findings of role abandonment by emergency workers due to role conflict in disasters continued to mount. For example, Foglemra (cf., Charles W. Fogleman.

1958. " Family and Commu.ity Disaster Upon Individuals and Groups." Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, p. 343) concluded that the roles of husband and father were primarily in structuring activity in the period of disaster impact. Then, in 1958, Form and Nosow (cf., William H. Form and Sigmund Nosow. 1958.

Community in Disaster. New York: Harper and Brothers) provided several generalizations based on accumulated evidence: " Help for family members, close friends, and neighbors comes first; then, but apparently only then, other victims can be looked after" (p. 66): "Only half of those persons (belonging to disaster oriented organizations)... sought to relate their activities to occupational organizational statuses" (pp. 114-115);

... greater conflict exists for those who have injured family members than for those who do not" (p. 102); and

"...those who experienced... conflict showed a greater concern for family, neighbors and friends" (p. 109).

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- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ l

Finally, Moore et al. (cf., Harry E. Moore et al. 1983.

Before the Wind: A Study of Response to Hurricane Carla.

Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council) conducted a major hurricane disaster study and concluded that the presence of conflicting role obligations was an important factor in directing the behavior of some persons in disasters. These studies, and perhaps a few others, provided " evidence" that role conflict in disasters is resolved in favor of primary family roles at the expense of emergency work roles.

The portrait of role conflict and abandoment in disasters and emergencies provided by these studies has been summarized in several texts on disaster (cf. Allen H.

Barton. 1969. Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations. Garden City, New 1

l York: Doubleday; Dennis S. Mileti, Thomas E. Drabek and J. Eugene Haas. 1975. Human Systems in Extreme Environments Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado) and is typically and unquestioningly referenced in most freshman textbooks. The implied social process is: (1) disasters produce role conflict in emergency workers, (2) role conflict elicits abandonment of emergency worker roles, and (3) abandonment of emergency worker roles contributes, at least initially, to the social disorganization imposed on human communities by disasters. This is, indeed, the conventional " wisdom" or

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l l

l l

image of the determinants and consequences of role conflict in disasters and emergencies, 1

2. Additional Research Evidence Several questions must be formulated and then answered before we conclude that a tornado, earthquake, chemical spill, nuclear power plant accident and other forms of natural and technological calamities mean the breakdown in normative structures for emergency response that society has erected to combat disaster when it strikes. Who, for )

example, " abandons" emergency roles in favor of family obligations during disaster? Are they people who know that they have an emergency job, or are they people who do not perceive themselves to be part of emergency response, but who outside observers judge should have thought one up during the emergency? Outside observers could be sociologists or anyone else expecting to find " social disorganization". Is role conflict something that results in playing one versus another role in an emergency, or can it and is it resolved by doing both? If there are cases where people who knew they had an emergency job left that job, did they leave without regard for whether or not the emergency work could get done, or was it clear before they left that others staying on the job would be able to handle it? The answers to questions like these would help us understand if role conflict results in role abandonment in emergencies (and if early accounts of role abandonment were, 115 -

l l

for example, merely based on some researchers observing a person who did not know he had an emergency job not doing that emergency job); why it occurs if it does; the theoretical character of how role conflict is resolved or played out in emergencies; and if it is a problem, how it can be managed by those who would use sociological knowledge to prepare their communities for disasters.

It is interesting that the scholar who gave us the concept of role conflict in disaster was the first to step forward to begin a clarification. Killian (cf., Lewis M.

Killian. 1954. "Some Accomplishments and Some Needs in Disaster Study." The Journal of Social Issues x: 66-72) provided the field with some important but too often overlooked insights only two years after his initial publication. He suggested (1954:60) that "The possession by the individual of a clear conception of a role which he can or should play seems to be conducive to organized adaptive i

behavior." Killian was suggesting that disasters are not social disorganization, and that role conflict does not result in role abandonment in disasters, if emergency workers are provided -- before an emergency -- with a clear idea of what would be their emergency role. If Killian were correct, it would be quite inappropriate to observe the )

behavior of a "would-be" emergency worker without a l pre-emergency idea of his/her emergency role not doing  !

emergency work in a disaster, and then conclude that role

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conflict led to role abandonment and social disorganization.

Such observations would not be role abandonment since it is difficult to see how a person could " abandon" a role if they did not know that they had it. Killian (1954) went on to also suggest that role conflict can contribute to " personal disorganization" or " anxiety" while emergency workers do their work. On the basis of this view, therefore, one would suspect that role conflict is a mental phenonenon that describes an emergency worker's need to know that loved ones are safe rather than behavioral phenomenon that could result in emergency role abandonment and consequent social disorganization.

This alternative (psychological rather than behavioral) view of role conflict (for emergency workers who know they have an emergency role rather than those who are unsure or do not know about an emergency role for themselves) rests on more than Killian's (1954) second article. For example, Fritz (cf., Charles E. Fritz. 1961." Disaster." pp. 651-694 in Merton and Nisbet (eds.), Contemporary Social Problems.

New York: Harcourt) attempted to provide an overview of how families, people with emergency roles, and people without )

J emergency roles all relate when disaster strikes. In essence, an informed reading of Fritz would lead a reader to hypothesize the following: (1) all people are concerned for l

loved ones in disaster, (2) most people do not have l

l emergency roles, and these folks are torn between loyalty to

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I intimates versus the community when disaster strikec -- most of these people tend to their intimates first and only then volunteer for emergency work, (3) people with clearly defined emergency jobs perform their emergency roles, but

! under personal stress until they are assured of the safety of intimates, (4) provisions can be improvised, or planned for, to assure emergency workers of family and intimate scfety and remove this stress for them during the initial aftermath or disaster, and (5) finally, that role conflict for emergency workers who have a clear pre-emergency notion of their emergency role is a mental and not behavioral phenomenon. Another study (cf., Fred L. Bates et al. 1963.

The Social and Psychological Consequences of a Natural Disaster. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences -

National Research Council) investigating the impact of a hurricane on impacted communities reported no role conflict in emergency workers; everyone opted for family instead of work roles. However, there was no emergency plan in the community studied -- no one had a pre-emergency notion about their emergency role. The picture presented thus far did offer some insights about role conflict and for whom it might mean psychological stress while doing emergency work versus doing emergency work only after intimates were attended. However, these conclusions were still somewhat hypotheses, and no one had as yet offered a clear theoretical explanation as to why.

118 -

An answer to this question was provided by White (cf.

White. 3962. " Role Conflict in Disasters: Not Family but Familiarity First." Unpublished MA Thesis. Chit ..go :

University of Chicago Press) is an unpublished MA thesis at the University of Chicago. White investigated data on emergency role performance in three different emergencies.

The findings were that 82% of the emergency work forco contributed to disaster response activity first -- over family roles; and that this figure rose to 89% after the first four hours from disaster impact had elapsed. She concluded the " role-certainty" was the key factor that explained what emergency workers do in reference to emergency roles when disasters strike. That is, if an emergency work role is " uncertain" to a worker when an emergency begins, that worker will opt for other roles --

like family roles -- that are more clearly known and "certain." However, for emergency workers who have clear and certain notions about their emergency worker role, emergency work role performances take precedence over other roles including family roles. White (1982), therefore, 1

provided a theoretical rationale and explanation for the

.l I

performance of roles in disasters; role confict exists in emergencies, role certainty in emergency work roles yields performing emergency roles over family roles and family l

l

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l l

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _. 1

i l

roles over emergency roles when emergency work roles are not clear and certain. This explanation could account for why research had sometimes found emergency worker " role abandonment" and sometimes not.

Finally, perhaps the most all-inclusive work on role conflict / abandonment in emergency workers performed to date was by E L. Quarantelli (cf., E.L. Quarantelli. No date.

~

" Structured Factors in the Minimization of Role Conflict: A Re-Examination of the Significance of Multiple Group Membership in Disasters." Working Paper. Columbus, Ohio:

The Disaster Research Center at the Ohio State University). l l

This work looked at 150 different disaster events and the I

behavior of over 6000 emergency workers. The conclusion was (cf., page 3) that role conflict was not a serious problem in the loss of manpower in emergency situations. Six emergency events were examined in more detail. No one at work when the emergency began abandoned their emergency job.

A dozen people, however, left their job temporarily; they were not needed for the organization to do its work. The general conclusion of this work was that role abandoment is absent in emergencies because of social changes that occur in communities when emergencies begin; for example, other family members pick up internal delegations to the family, kin, neighbors and so on which allows the family member to participate in emergency roles.

3. Conclusions from the Research Base

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The conclusions that can be reached regarding the role conflict and abandonment on the part of emergency workers are straightforward. First, when emergency work roles are "cortain" -- perhaps through training and planning -- for emergency workers, role conflict in emergencies does not result in the abandonment of emergency work roles. Second, when emergency work roles are not clear or "certain" --perhaps through a lack of training or planning -- for emergency workers, role conflict in emergencies can result in seeing would-be workers play more certain roles toward intimates before attending to emergency work. Third, role conflict for emergency workers on-the-job during an emergency can elicit psychological stress or at least concern about the safety of intimates; and workers can improvise or emergency plans can formalize ways that emergency workers can check on the safety of intimates.

Conclusions such as these suggest that if emergency workers -- before disaster strikes -- have a clear (Killian, 1954:60; Fritz, 1961; Bates et al., 1963) and certain (White, 1962) image of their emergency role which can be achieved through planning and training (cf., Russell Dynes.

1970. Organized Behavior in Disaster. Lexington, Mass.:

D.C. Health, p. 155), that emergency workers resolve role conflict in emergencies in favor of emergency work roles while improvising ways to check on the safety of intimates (Quarantelli, no date) unless formalized ways to accomplish

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this same objective are drafted into emergency pinns. This conclusion would certainly explain why researchers (cf.,

Killian, 1952; Instituut Voor Sociaal onderzoek Van Het Nederlandse Volk Amsterdam, 1955:IV-ll; Moore, 1958:66; Moore et al., 1963, and others) reported role conflict in emergencies resulting in role abandonment during times when emergency planning and training -- and consequent low levels of emergency worker role certainty -- were slight in American communities. It would also explain why other researchers (for example, Quarantelli, no date) found so little role abandonment resulting from role conflict in more contemporary emergencies where emergency workers could have had more certain (cf. White, 1962), pre-emergency notions about their emergency roles. It seems, therefore, that the abandonment of emergency work roles by emergency workers is not a problem in disasters if emergencies are prefaced by emergency worker training. It is, however, one very real reason among others why emergency planning and emergency worker training is essential.

4. Discussion The virtual lack of evidence of persons abandoning known emergency roles over a wide range of emergency events in the past illustrates that there are certain structural changes l in the community during emergencies that reduce role strain.

1 I Role obligations are based on values and, during non-emergency " normal" times, people expend efforts on achieving'many different values, some potentially I

contradictory. An emergency changes this process

-122-

dramatically. Some values become clearly more important than others, and people experiencing the emergency generally agree on the few that take precedence over all others. This phenomenon is the development of what has been called the

" emergency consensus." In this consensus, people become altruistic, and protection of the community becomes the highest priority. Other values become drastically less important. This temporary shift in values simplifies the role obligations of people, and greatly reduces the potential for role strain. People are " released" to concentrate on the critical tasks of the emergency. The value priorities in an emergency thus simplify, rather than aggravate, role strain for community members. Those with identified emergency roles are therefore able to fulfill them, rather than ignore the emergency in order to tend to the obligations of other roles.

People who know in advance of an emergency that they have emergency roles to play (should one ever occur) are able to make informal family contingency plans in advance of the emergency. For example, families can make plans in I

advance of an emergency to ensure that -- in an emergency -- i the non-emergency-worker spouse (or other appropriate person) will take the appropriate measures to protect the family unit in the absence of the emergency worker. Similar pre-emergency plans can be made to provide for the continuation throughout an emergency of child care

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i i

I

arrangements in. place at the time any emergency occurs.

Such pre-emergency planning can also provide for the 3 i

assumption by relatives, friends or-neighbors of other usual I i

responsibilities of the emergency worker. Indeed,.in past emergencies, even'in the absence of such contingency plans, lI

, the role obligations of emergency workers toward intimates (including family) have generally been shifted and assumed by other non-emergency-worker members of the intimate group, thereby freeing the emergency worker to fulfill assigned emergency roles.

As discussed above, role strain in emergency workers during emergencies between emergency role obligations and family (or intimate group) obligations is not an either/or situation. That is, emergency workers are not required to choose between mutually exclusive roles. Role strain between family and organizational responsibilities would be a mental process in an emergency; it would not result in role abandonment or interfere with the ability of emergency organizations to do their emergency work. Emergency workers would need to feel assured that their families can tend to their own safety. However, historically, in pact emergencies, emergency workers have performed their emergency roles at the same time they have sought assurance of the safety of their families through ad hoc, informal channels.

i l

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I

, ,J /

1 i

There is little difference between trained full-time j emergency workers and trained part-time or volunteer emergency workers, for example volunteer fire departments, 1 on this issue. The reason is that the number of hours typically worked and the rate of pay, if any, are not relevant factors in determining the performance of emergency ~!

roles by emergency workers.

One relevant behavioral differenc~e between classes of emergency workers is whether they are at work or somewhere  !

else, for example at home, when emergoney mobilization begins. In this way, volunteer emergency workers could be i

different from other kinds of emergency workers only because they are more likely to not be at their emergency job when the emergency begins.

Emergency workers who are at home when an emergency begins will likely continue to play the roles they are performing at the time (for example, father, husband, wife, mother, and so on) for a brief period of time. These roles are played at the same time that decisions are made that enable them to feel free about separating family members so that emergency roles can be performed. What might seem to be a potential for delay in reporting for duty is not, in operation, a real problem because (a) most emergencies do not begin with the need for immediate and dramatic actions like evacuation; emergency organizations can be mobilized in stages while families complete decision-making, with other 125 -

_ __ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - = _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -

M-

![

g lfI Z 1

.. s family members or intimates' assuming the potential family role obligations of the emergency worker who has reported for work; (b) most families include at least one other M

member who is c'mpetent o (i.e., able to drive, listen to emergency information, and make decisions) and able to 7

assume the potential family role responsibilities of the absent emergency worker; and (c) workers are typically L, anxious to resolve other responsibilities and report to their emergency work stations. Workers away from home when an emergency begins typically improvise ways to assure themselves of the safety of intimates while tending to their emergency job duties at the same time.

<{ Finally, emergency workers fulfill their role ob.,dgations in emergencies because of the cohesiveness of the work group. People with knowledge of their role do not II wish to let their co-workers down. In emergencies, the need l

to have emergency work performed is obvious, and the emergency rolen take on added importance. The sense of

~ e' obligation to perform that role is strengthened, and the 1 G l sense of obligation to the community as a whole is strengthened. And, since part of the traditional image of

/ it spouse and parent includes the obligation to perform t' > -

, adequately the necessary work-related emergency roles, the C traditional role reinforces (rather than conflicts with) the jsmorgency roles of the emergency worker.

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t .

---

_ __ _- _ _ _ ; I .

(

The potential of role strain'for reducing the effectiveness of emergency response is minimized by the organizational and occupational assignment of emergency responsibility. Assigning clear responsibility creates clear direction for behavior and ensures that the work of emergency. response organizations is fulfilled. In addition, advance knowledge of ones emergency role allows the emergency worker to arrange to avoid role " conflict" and indeed to fill the role of family member more effectively I than if he or she were not an emergency worker. The worker can preplan for family safety in an emergency. Also,.

because of organizational ties, the emergency worker is more likely to receive information about the nature of the emergency and the nature of the risk, which allows the worker to fulfill family obligations more effectively.

Emergency worker performance levels are ensured by training. Training provides the context for those individuals'to preplan activities that allow them to implement their emergency roles, such as providing back-up and supplementary options for continuing family responsibility. In particular: J (1) Training gives the emergency worker a clear understanding of what is expected of him or her -- of what his or her emergency role is.

l

- 127 -

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[, ~ t l' (2 l ! Training taakf n, thc , prker awake of cds adysntacbs 1 i n  ; i

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)of'makifthfamily, don?,c.ngenby p]:pns in .4dvance of an y

,) ) , , emergency.

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T (3) ;Ttnining makes.the worker awtsre'tLit'..the commun,ity

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vdd the emurgency worker's co-w6 der s3epend ad him or her.

/. . i

$) Failing to{reportothr wdrk vc.12d increase the burden on

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,i others. )t',sa; E 5  !'

,,p,,, t' z, ,, t r

S, '[ , s(4) b Tf: . tnina 'in[orma the worker M/ cut the nature of the

.., s \+ .

f *) , radi ation g t.4 ak and abcut the procedure 9 to :se used in m p D ,

1ealing with thdt ri sk ', such as dositnotry and,

/ radloprotective drugs. ,

y

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1, l ', In sum, emerv:nMp vorkers who know of their emerOency 3  ;- <s I

/ r 6les ,in aGSnce ;of .a*; emergency perform their energancy U ' fynctions in the event: of . an emergericy. We do.not know of g

/ ,

t

, even 4 sf.ng:.e case in thi history of' emergencies in . thi e nation wher e the ability of ' .an emergency resp 6.v,e .

organiz3 tion tg functior,. was impaired by a failuta of personnel to report fer duty. There.aie, hcvever, many a <

case's where people who were not acivised,of their roles in advance of an emergency carz t'ad out other dyies before volunteering for emergency w. ark. 'ThisE aimply underscores the importance of advi. sing emergency workers of their relas in advance of an Amer goney. s In conclusion, a large body 'of historical evidence showa" the functioning of emergoney crqanizations ir not hw.pered by failure of emergmicy workere to perform their: jobs. In s

4.. v d>

F b* ~

[c, . . -  :

, ' .g jf y ,

i spite of role " strain," such workers perform effectively. ,

Moreover, training for emergency work can reduce role strain l l

and enhance the effective performance of emergency workers. I While role abandonment may be theoretically possible, it is certainly extremely rare, and consequently it does not i

reduce organizational effectiveness. Indeed, the typical problem in emergencies is not that too few workers report dior duty, but rather that too many persons volunteer. (In some cases -- most notably those involving response organizations which do not require multiple shifts -- the management of excess personnel has had to be addressed.)

c. Emergency Role Abandonment by School Workers Regarding their behavior in an emergency, school organizations and teachers are not unique. Their behavior in an emergency would not differ in any way from the behavior of others with known emergency roles. Indeed, the research record strongly supports the ascription to teachers and other school persor.nel of responsibility for supervision of students in an emergency. Emergency response is facilitated when plans are predicated on pre-existing roles, rather than on artificial social structures constructed solely for emergency response use. (This does not mean that non-school personnel could not care for students in an emergency; good planning and some training in the supervision of students would ensure the efficacy of the use of such personnel in such a role.) Because school personnel 129 -

who would accompany students on buses, for example, would be exposed to no greater radiological risk than the evacuating general public, and because school personnel are accustomed to supervising students and dealing with students in the routine of their day-to-day work, school personnel need not receive the detailed training to be provided to other emergency workers, It is necessary only that such personnel be informed of their emergency duties in advance of an actual emergency -- for example, in the orientation program i

for school personnel at the beginning of each academic year.

Like other workers, the key to the response of teachers and other school personnel in any emergency (nuclear or non-nuclear) is their awareness of their role with respect to the students in that emergency. We have no doubt that some school teachers (and other school personnel) might be found who would swear in advance that they will desert their students in a radiological emergency. (This would also be the case in the vicinity of any nuclear plant, including Seabrook, we are sure.) We also have no doubt that in a real radiological emergency, teachers and other school personnel would generally remain with their students as long as necessary -- at least long enough to see them safely onto evacuation buses, particularly if those charges were small children. Similarly, we are confident that sufficient numbers of school personnel will be available to supervise

'4

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l i

l students on buses. It is not necessary that each class be accompanied by its teacher.

d. Emergency Role Abandonment During Three Mile Island As far as we know, there is no rigorous study of the phenomenon of role strain or role conflict in emergency workers during the Three Mile Island accident. Remember that these concepts refer to mental " feelings" about concern for doing one's job and concern for intimates (for example, family members). No one knows what was in emergency workers' minds during the accident.

Information is available about how emergency workers actually behaved during the emergency (that is, information about role abandonment), but even this information is i

sparse, because apparently no one conducted a full-scale study of role abandonment per se. There is a short passage in the Report of the President's Commission on Three Mile Island (the Kemeny Report) that apparently reflects claims that some hospital workers left their jobs. This passage reads:

"A substantial number of other persons that is, other than pregnant women and preschool children, including health professionals, voluntarily left the area around the plant during the weekend of March 30 through April 1." (J.G. Kemeny et al., Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, 41 17 (Oct. 1979)).

This passage likely rests on what has been written about hospital workers in two medical publications. This

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information is discussed in a following section of this testimony.

The only other information about role abandonment at Three Mile Island that we are aware of is the result of an assessment Dr. Dennis Mileti of this panel conducted in 1983. Dr. Mileti realized that very little information had ever been gathered about emergency workers and role abandor. ment during the Three Mile Island accident. He also recalled that on several of his trips to Three Mile Island in 1979 and 1980 he had had informal conversations with all l sorts of people about a variety of topics. On occasion, he asked people if emergency workers had showed up for work during the accident. As Dr. Mileti recalls these conversations, all the people queried said that as far as they knew, emergency workers had done their jobs. These conversations were hardly a " study." Because of their limited usefulness, Dr. Mileti decided that it would be more helpful if someone simply phoned a variety of emergency organizations in Pennsylvania that would have had emergency responsibilities during the Three Mile Island accident and ask whether role abandonment occurred or not. Luckily, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology at Colorado State University was interested enoagh in the idea to call  ;

and talk to several emergency organizations in Pennsylvania.

This student had helped Dr. Mileti do other work on Three l

1 132 -

l l

l  ;

Mile Island and was familiar with the accident, its timing, and.the Three Mile Island research that has-been done.

Dr. Mileti's instructions to this Ph.D. candidate were simple: (1) call a variety or organizations that would have had emergency responsibilities of some sort during the Three Mile Island accident in the O- to 5-mile ring around Three Mile Island; (2) be sure to include some local schools to find out about the behavior of teachers, bus drivers, and other school personnel before the schools were closed; (3) speak to someone high enough up in the' organization to know about all the parts of the organization, but not so high up that he would not know about workers; (4) make sure that the organizational respondent had actually been present during the accident; and (5) ask if " role abandonment" had occurred in the organization, how many people it had involved, the total number of emergency workers in the organization (so we could get an idea about what proportion of each organization abandoned their roles) and why individuals abandoned their emergency jobs.

This student phoned and questioned about a dozen organizations of his own choosing. These included five police departments, a spokesperson for a LOO-plus-man l

volunteer fire force, a representative of the Middletown 1

inclusive school district (who was asked about both teachers and bus drivers), Civil Defense, the State Troopers, the National Guard, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management

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t

_ _ _ _ - _ - - - - . _ _ _ . _ . . - - ~ . . . _ . -

-l Agency, and the Personnel' Department for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Not one case of role abandonment was reported by any i organizational respondent in reference to teachers, bus drivers, the police, Civil Defense, the State Troopers, the National Guard, or the Pennsylvania Emergency Management l Agency. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did report a 12-13% absentee rate on the Friday and Monday of the "TMI weekend",; however, they also reported that a 10% absentee rate is normal before and after any weekend. (In any event, general state employees are hardly " emergency workers.").

Also, the spokesperson for the volunteer fire department reported that "a few (firemen) who wanted to leave the area did." These few evacuating volunteer firemen cannot be characterized as having " abandoned their roles"; there is no reason to believe they were called upon to fight fire during the Three Mile Island accident or that their presence was crucial to the functioning of local fire units.

Even this assessment cannot be called an elaborate one.

iloweve r , it does provide some information about role abandonment -- or rather the lack of it -- among trained emergency workers, teachers, and school bus drivers during the Three Mile Island accident.

Two papers, both written by hospital personnel, exist in l

which the authors catalogue their perceptions about staffing i

in hospitals in the area around Three Mile Island. One was

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written by Christopher Maxwell, " Hospital Organization Response to the Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island:

Implications of Future Orientated Disaster Planning,"

American Journal of Public Health, Vclume 72, 1982, pp.

275-279. The other was by J. Stanley Smith and J. H.

Fischer, "Special Communications: TMI: The Silent k Disaster," Journal of the American Medical Association, Volume 245, April 24, 1983, pp. 1656-59. These two articles are personal accounts by administrators who worked at hospitals in the area around Three Mile Island and were at work during the Three Mile Island accident. These articles describe the effects of the confused and often conflicting information given to the public following the Three Mile Island accident, but they do not support the proposition that role abandonment was a problem among emergency workers during the Three Mile Island accident.

Several cautions should be kept in mind before reading these articles. First, in all emergencies -- including the accident at Three Mile Island -- large numbers of people abandon their jobs. But it is important not to confuse the behavior of non-emergency workers with the behavior of emergency workers. " Routine" jobs are typically performed.

The assumption should not be made that the behavior of workers described in these publications was the behavior of emergency workers. At no time was there a medical emergency at Three Mile Island. Second, the aftermath of an emergency

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is always fdlied with stories that often become incorporated

.into folklore. That these stories exist does not mean that the events or interpretations of the events that they portray are true. Stories such as these are based on the interpretations by untrained lay observers of phenomena that may or may not be consistent with-the way they are labeled.

For example, the abandonment of factory work roles by workers in an emergency could be seen as " role conflict" and abandonment by some, but not be seen in the same way by appropriately trained researchers seeking to examine the behavior of emergency workers in an emergency.

Stories.about other unreal emergency behavior -- for example, panic, looting, and so forth - often are told by the untrained observer after an emergency. The more informed observer, however, is rarely as biased in interpreting the behavior that underlines these myths. For example, a man arrested for " looting" while sifting through the rubble of his own house for personal objects may be seized because the police expect to find looters. Onlookers who observe the arrests are quick to spread the myth that looting is going on. Their interpretations of the arrest --

erroneous on many fronts -- could well end up in the written record about what happened during the emergency. The written record and oral stories about looking, then,

perpetuate the myth, alter the expectations of others about future emergencies, and result (in the example just cited)

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in still more erroneous expectations and arrests in subsequent emergencies.

Third, the published stories about " role abandonment" of medical personnel that have been provided us give little if any background-with which to interpret their descriptions of the behavior of medical personnel. Suppose, for example, that a flood were coming, that there were a hospital situated in the flood plain, and that evacuation advisements were issued for people in the flood plain. Under these

[ circumstances, would evacuating medical personnel be

" abandoning roles" or would they be engaging in perfectly reasonable and appropriate behavior? We can answer this questions only if we first know what circumstances prevailed when they left. " Role abandonment" would correctly characterize their leaving if they did so while knowing that their assigned role was to help evacuate patients and if they also knew that co-workers left behind would be incapable of performing the emergency duties that had to get done. But leaving could hardly be considered role abandonment if it were done without knowledge that they had an emergency role.

Fourth, the published stories about " role abandonment" of medical personnel in hospitals should not be interpreted in the absence of knowledge about the role of emergency information in determining the behavior of people in emergencies. The importance of information is addressed

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within.this written testimony on " voluntary evacustion," but it is relevant to " role abandonment" as well. For exa.mle, the uninformed may wonder why people who were not pregnant or young (the two groups advised to leave during Three Mile Island) also evacuated. The answer is simply that the public is not the military and cannot be expected'to obey instructions blindly if a different course of action appears more rational in light of their situational perceptions of the risk. The advisement that some selected subpopulations should leave a definitive geographical area was also news to others in that area that they could be exposed to some risk.

Those who would have us use a military paradigm with which to evaluate public responses at Three Mile Island would conclude that there was " overresponse" because more than-the young and the pregnant left. Those who understand that-people respond in emergencies on the basis of situational perceptions of risk, on the other hand, would understand that evacuation advisements were a source of risk information for everyone in the area that was to be evacuated and not only for workers doing routine hospital work as it would be for anyone else.

Fifth, one should also keep in mind, before turning to these published comments, that descriptive evidence of any 1

sort is not a good predictor of future events unless it j takes into account the determinants of these events. For example, the fact that a particular airliner has crashed in

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the past does not mean that others will crash. Rather, one i

has to investigate why the airliner crashed -- and why 1

others do not -- and generalize to the future only on the basis of the determinants of successful versus unsuccessful flights. That is, one needs to determine that when x, y, and z exist, then an airliner can crash. One should never speculate about future events without once considering the established, valid predictors of those events, because the determinants of what one is speculating about could well be different from one event to another.

With these thoughts in mind, we interpret the two articles on role abandonment by medical workers during Three Mile Island as follows. The two articles are personal .

accounts by people who worked in local hospitals in the area around Three Mile Island and who were there during the accident. These accounts have been read carefully and also a research assistant of Dr. Mileti's has called Dr. Smith and Mr. Maxwell to ask some questions. Neither of these articles suggest that trained emergency workers did not do their emergency jobs during the Three Mile Island accident.

There are several reasons why we hold this opinion.

These hospitals were not in che 0-5 mile Three Mile Island planning zone. For that reason, none of them had a radiological emergency plan that clearly specified emergency roles for workers. At the same time, the public information at the time suggested that " risk" did exist at the location

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---__-a______-_________ _ r

'of the hospitals. Dr. Smith reported that about 50% of the staff left who were specialists and not in a role of responsibility for activities that would include, for example, patient evacuation. Also, division chiefs and other higher authorities stayed to oversee evacuation work that was likewise clearly part of their job. Put simply, the people who left did so because they had no emergency role. In addition, week-end staffing is only one-third of regular staffing anyway. Dr. Smith reported that the evacuation weekend coincided with a national physicians' meeting in another state, and many people were away attending the meeting. Mr. Maxwell reported that his hospital had no radiological emergency plan, that few workers knew if they had a role or not, and that the normal reduction in staffing for weekends largely affected how many people were at work in these hospitals.

What we conclude from these publications and conversations with their authors is that hospitals can have a hard time performing an emergency act like evacuation if they do not have an emergency plan assigning emergency roles to would-be emergency response hospital staff persons; the incident at TMI occurred when normal staffing was down to one-third and another two-thirds of the staff were somewhere else (a convention, at home, or evacuating themselves) and l

did not perceive themselves as having an emergency role I

! because no plan ever gave them one. Since they knew that

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~ _ _

they-had no emergency roles'and perceived their routine place of routine work to be an "evacaution area," they cannot be faulted for not going to their routine jobs on Monday morning. These cases showed no incidents of role abandonment; they do, however, document a lack of planning and its consequences.

e. The " Uniqueness" of Radiation The ability to transfer the principles of human behavior in emergencies is questioned by some as not being applicable in emergencies that involve nuclear power plants. There are two forms of the argument. The first (more extreme) position is simply that radiation is so unique that it produces its own unique set of laws of human behavior. The claim is that radiation is different enough from the risks posed in other types of emergencies that human behavior would also be different.

The determinants of human behavior in emergencies in contemporary America are, however, transferable across emergency types. This is not to say that the descriptive accounts of how people respond to emergencies will be the same from one emergency to another but the reasons why people respond in different ways to emergencies -- the determinants of behavior -- are consistent across emergency types. The position that radiological events are unique argu'es against the basic premise on which the social sciences rest: that there are knowable reasons and patterns

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in human behavior that are discoverable through systematic scientific inquiry. The position is also contradicted by empirical evidence.

Another, equally untenable, position taken by some is that they agree that there are determinants of human behavior in emergencies and that these are knowable. But they argue that people are fearful enough of radiation because of its " unique" characteristics that, while ordinary principles that explain human behavior will still apply, the behavior itself will be different from behavior in nonnuclear emergencies. This proposition has some elements of truth. It is true, for example, that radiation is invisible, unlike tornadoes and hurricanes. It also may well be that public understanding of the risks associated with emergencies that involve nuclear power plants may differ from the risks associated with, for example, floods.

The potential list of " differences" that could be developed is quite long. However long the list, it is not true that the " qualities" of the determinants of behavior in the human response equation are different for nuclear plant emergencies as opposed to other types. For example, the

" unique invisible character of the radiation hazard" is not unique in terms of explaining human response in radiological emergencies. The " character of the hazard" has long been 1 l l included in the catalog of factors taken into account to j undertand human behavior in emergencies. It is a l

142 -

1

l L__-_____-

E l'

well-established determinant of human response. On this factor, nuclear reactor accidents are something like a flash flood that occurs on a sunny day. If radiological emergencies are unique, it is only because the " values" or I " quantities" that the determinants of human response can take are unique -- or further from the mean -- and not because the list of relevant determinants is unique.

What is important for preparedness to ensure public safety in emergencies of all sorts -- including anticipating the response of emergency workers -- is that the factors that determine behavior are known and transferable across emergency types. Put simply, the "what," "how," "when,"

"where," and "why" of emergency preparedness are known, and planners can take into account variation in the " quantity" of each determinant across different types of emergencies to draft sound plans for response in nuclear power plant emergencies. All types of emergency workers -- including those who have unique jobs and those who do not, those who work in shifts and those who do not, etc. -- will be able to get the necessary emergency jobs done in a nuclear power plant emergency if plans adequately address the important factors.

Once again, the key factors of determinants that, if adequately addressed in a plan, will lead to emergency workers performing their emergency jobs in a nuclear power plant emergency are (1) adequate training so that the 143 -

L workers clearly understand that they have an emergency job _

and' what that- j ob requires them to do and so that they develop an understanding of the importance of their jobs for overall community safety and to their work group; (2) enabling workers to understand what risks they are'and are not taking while doing their work (for example, providing pre-emergency education about radiation, the use of dosimeters, or other ways to achieve this same objective);

and (3) recognizing that workers will be concerned about the safety of their families and will want to be able to check on them and, thereby, feel comforted as they do their jobs.

f. Workers' Fear for Their Own Safety The supposition that emergency workers would not do their emergency jobs because they would rather "save" themselves is unfounded. This is not to say that emergency workers ordinarily will remain in buildings that are, for example, under flood waters or' demolished by an earthquake.

At the same time, the history of emergencies catale,gues many acts of bravery where both trained and volunteer emergency workers have put themselves in extreme jeopardy in order to help others. It would be foolhardy to plan for emergency workers to do work that would result in their death or other extreme personal consequences; but it is a fact that in an emergency some few would almost certainly step forward to volunteer for such duty.

\

- 144 -

I l

l

Particular concern has been expressed that trained volunteer emergency workers who live or work outside the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) whose emergency job would require that they'go into the EPZ could be less likely to perform their emergency jobs.than those already in the EPZ.

The obvious thesis underlying this concern is that this subset of emergency workers would be reluctant to leave a

'" safe" area to enter an " unsafe" area.

The general, emergency planning can take steps to prevent circumstances from arising in which emergency workers would fail to perform out of fear for their own safety. For example, they can take into account the factors that ensure that emergency workers do their emergency jobs, and they can take care to understand the circumstances under which it would be imprudent to assure that emergency workers would pStform-(even though some workers would undoubtedly perform even then).

The record is clear that emergency workers do their jobs when they understand that they have an emergency job to do, when they understand what that job requires of them, and when they have a sense of the importance of their job for overall community safety and to their work group. The understandings can be produced in different ways. For example, people who hold jobs that are in the routine of everyday life comparable to their emergency roles -- for

example. policemen - bring these understandings to the

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L_________-__-____________

emergency setting. But these understandings can also be developed, for those whose emergency roles are different from their daily ones, for example, volunteer emergency )

workers who live and/or work outside an EPZ, threvgh training. Adequate preparedness with emergency workers of the latter type.is not impossible, but it is more demanding of those who would develop plans and be prepared.

Also, the. behavior of trained emergency workers (be they full-timers or volunteers, inside or outside an area of risk when the emergency begins), like that of people generally, depends on their situational perception of " risk" or

- " hazard." It is quite possible that an emergency worker would not perform a certain act if he believed that l

performing it would result in his own death. It is also the case that radiation is invisible (emergency workers cannot see the hazard) unlike, for example, fires, where people can see the location and intensity of the flames. Thi s difference between radiation and fire does not, however,  !

mean that emergency workers would assume the wo*st about the hazard, come to believe that it would result in their own death, and flee their posts or not enter an EPZ to protect themselves. The reason is that emergency workers of all sorts can be trained and equipped to accurately assess the l

l risk. Emergency workers can be trained about radiation 1

(they need not be kept ignorant of it); emergency workers can be provided dosimeters (a way can be provided for them

- 146 -

E__________.___.__.- __ _ _ _-- _ _ _ _ _ _ }

to "see" the hazard); and emergency workers are able to hear emergency information that will keep them informed about the situation.

An emergency at Seabrook Station, therefore, would not provide the context in which imaginations about an unknown risk cculd run wild, leading emergency workers to conclude that doomsday was upon them. The hazard would be both knowable and known. Emergency workers would therefore behave in rational and orderly ways (as they do in other emergencies) and perform their jobs not without regard for personal safety, but rather with information about it.

g. Workers Intentions Versus Actual Behavior No doubt emergency workers could be found who might profess that they would likely be more concerned about other roles (for example, family member) in a future emergency than they would their work role; and that they might envision evacuating with their family before reporting for emergency work. In the prior section of this testimony, we explained why such role abandonment does not occur in actual emergencies. In this section, we will explain why such speculation about future behavior bears little weight.

Social scientists have long questioned the validity of inferring behavior in the future from notions about how people think they would behave in a future circumstance, for j example, in an emergency.

l

- 147 -

l L____---_-_.

Since the time the first work was done on how well what people think or say their behavior will be and actual behavior related to one another (see, R.T. LaPierre,

" Attitudes Versus Actions," Social Forces, 13:230-237, 1934), the great majority of investigators who have looked at the question have concluded that there is only a weak relationship, if any, between how people think they might behave and actual human behavior (see, A.W. Wicker,"

Attitudes versus Actions: The Relationship to Attitude Objects," Journal of Social Issues 25:44-78, 1969). A few scholars recently have suggested that the failure of this research to illustrate that anticipated behavior and behavior covary is not because there is not a theoretical relationship between the two, but rather because researchers have measured the anticipated behavior and the behavior which they seek to compare in an inappropriate way. (See C.A. Kiesler and P. Munson, " Attitudes and Opinions," Annual Review of Psychology 28:887-891, 1973; C.A. Kiesler, B.

Collins and N. Miller, Attitude Change: A Critical Analysis of Theoretical Approaches, New York: Wiley, 1969). These more recent papers suggest that there is a relationship between anticipated oehavior and behavior, but that it does not appear in the studies because researchers have not done quality research and have not measured reliability, category I

148 -

w____-____-______

S width, change in attitude object, item difficulty, factor structure of attitude and behavioral syndromes, the effect of non-additional contributions to answers to questions about attitudes, and so on.

But while most social scientists are of the opinion that anticipated behavior (or intentions to behave) do play some sort of role in shaping behavior because it makes

" theoretical" sanse, they do not think that anticipated behavior and behavior covary, based upon 50 years of empirical evidence to the contrary.

The minority of scholars who profess that behavioral intentions and behavior would eventually be shown to empirically covary if only researchers would stop doing bad research, still await empirical proof of their belief.

Interestingly, even these scholars begin with the admission that "a host of 'other factors' can influence a person's behavior to make it inconsistent with a reported attitude" (see, M. Rokeach and P. Kliejunas, " Behavior as a Function of Attitude Toward Object and Object Toward Attitude,"

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972; A.W.

Wicker, "An Examination of the "Others Variables' Explanation of Attitude-Behavior Inconsistency," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 19:18-30, 1971). They claim that one might be able to increase the chances that a l

behavioral intention or an attitude will correspond in some empirical way to behavior if, perhaps, verbal measures were l - 149 -

l l

l

taken'that tried to take these other factors into account.

The'latter. approach, it is claimed, allows the respondent to be able to "take the other non-attitudinal things into account" when coming up with.the answer since "other factors" and the attitude or intended behavior are considered at once. Some who advocate this method of "let the respondent do the measuring of sets of factors" hope that this method might show covariation of answers to questions with actual real-world behavior.

This method, and several varieties of it, go by many names. One name is " intentions-to-behave" (see, M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen, Belief, Attitudes and Behavior. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). The " behavioral intentions" method of attempting to find attitudinal / behavioral covariation is straight forward in logic: "Ask someone if they would do something, and if they do not change their mind,. then you will find that they may do what they said they would do." The method may work, but only for familiar behaviors (like buying peanut butter). Underlying the method is the supposition that the respondent can take all "other factors" into account when coming up with a guessed-at future behavior. When the respondent does not know what the "other factors" are that he might take into account, the result is a wrong guess -- the result that has l

been found in studies over the last 50 years -- and the answers to questions do not correspond to actual behavior.

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L

Another set of researchers (M. Sn'yder and W.B. Swann, "When Actions Reflect Attitudes: Politics of Impression Management," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976) go one step further that Fishbein and Ajzen. They suggest -- perhaps because the respondent may not know all the "other factors" to consider -- that the researcher provide the respondent with what are all the "other factors." Yet another pair of researchers (see, J.M.

Piccolo and J. Louvier, "Information Integration Theory Applied to Real-World Choice Behavior," Great Plains-Rocky Mountain Geographical Journal 6:49-63, 1977) go even further l

and suggest that respondents should be asked to engage in information-integration tasks that more closely resemble the real world. None of this minority of scholars claim that l

l attitudes (regardless of what label -- including behavioral intentions -- is currently being used) and behavior covary.

This minority of scholars who maintain that answers to questions will someday covary with actual behavior persist in thinking that one can provide a way to allow a respondent to take all "other factors" into account before he guesses at his future behavior. "Other factors" can be taken into account by respondents on familiar behaviors for which the respondent knows what are all the other factors. This is why voting polls sometimes are used to accurately predict future behavior. The "other factors" typically have their i effect on voting long before a pollster calls or a voter

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I

goes into a voting booth. Last minute changes-of-mind usually are random enough to cancel themselves out, and the prediction.by the pollster prevails. But where the respondent is inexperienced with the behavior being asked about, and have no notion of how relatively important all those "other factors" are (or even what they are), he cannot take them into account in predicting his future behavior.

As a result, his prediction will be inaccurate.

The point of this review of the research record regarding the relationship between attitudes and/or behavioral intentions and actual behavior was to illustrate that pre-emergency notions about what a person thinks they would do or not do in a future emergency (for example, evacuate with one's family versus do their emergency job) have little predictive value for actual future emergencies.

Emergency situations, by definition, are quite different from the routines of everyday life. In addition, they are socially complex situations in which human behavior results from a social process. For example, the public behaves in ways determined by the social character of the communications of emergency information which they hear (it must be confirmed, for example). Emergency workers' own behavior is affected by, for example, group cohesion (who they are with), and so on. Factors such as these -- which are the actual determinants of human emergency behavior --

are not likely known to people before they enter an emergency situation. They certainly cannot be part of people's own verbal predictions of future emergency behavior

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t\ r and are not based in the social reality of an actual emergency.

Behavioral intentions by emergency workers during routing times will bear little weight in determining their actual behavior in an actual emergency. The factors reviewed in the prior section of this testimony will be the-actual determinants of the behavior of emergency workern in actual future emergencies; and these factors operate in emergencies in ways that lead emergency workers to do their emergency jobs.

3. Voluntary,Public Evacuation

a. Introduction In recent yearn, an issue has been raised that emergency planning efforts for nuclear power plants take insufficient account of the numbar of evacuees that may leave the area despite the fact they are not " ordered" to evacuate. This issue seems to have surfaced in light of the evacuation phenomena witnessed during the days following the 1979 Three Mile Islanc (TMI) accident. Available research indicates that some voluntary evacuation from among a population outside an official evacuation zone can be expected in emergencies. This circumstance would be especially anticipated in cases where emergency information systems are absent or poor, or the public risk information itself is of low quality (for example, inconsistent, imprecise, untimely, I

etc.). The expectation for some voluntary evacuation should l

i

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l l

1 L_-------------------_

I be considered in emergency planning for nuclear power plants. In inar judgment, a reasonable planning assumption i

would be to expect that up to 25% of the population living 10-20 miles from,the boundary of an official evacuation zone would voluntarily evacuate if evacuation of the population within the official zone is advised.

The basis for why, in our judgment, this 0 to 25%

estimate of expected voluntary evacuation is cautious and conservative is described, in some detail, in the sections of this testimony which follow. Additionally, we also offer judgment about voluntary evacuation in an emergency planning zona (EPZ) that is oldy partially evacuated,

b. Determinants of Public Behavior in Emergencies Empirical research on the behavior of publics in emergencies has been performed by social scientists for over three decades, addressing public behavior in response tc climatological, geological and technological hazards. The conclusion resulting from well over one hundred empirical studies of actual pub 1ic hohavior in actual emergencies is consistent and clear regarding why members of the public behave as they do in emergencies. The following text provides a brief summary and overview of what has been learned.

Most members of the publ'ic in emergencies behave in ways t .

l relatively consistent with their situational perceptions of I risk and what to do about it. These situational perceptions I

t j

154 -

L. -

are largely formed during the emergency as it is being experienced. Hearing that an emergency is underway rarely leads to an immediate protective action response. Instead, hearing initiates a' sequential process in most members of the public which is: hear-understand-believe-personalize-decide-respond. In simple terms, people do not have a knee-jerk response in emergencies. Response comes after people have formed an understanding of the situation, formed belief based on alternative information to which they are exposed, personalized or not personalized the risk, and made

. decisions about what to do, if anything. These situationally determined perceptions (what people come to l

understand, what people end up believing and their belief in emergency information, how they do or do not personalize risk, what they decide to do) are the result of two sets of factors and how they interact as the emergency is being experienced.

Research findings accumulated over the last 30 years from approximately 100 empirical studies when synthesized l clearly illustrate that two sets of factors influence public response to emergency warnings and/or information. These are receiver characteristics (which profile characteristics of people who receive emergency information and warnings and include factors such as sex, age, pre-emergency fear of a particular emergency), and sender characteristics (which include factors such as information clarity, consistency,

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, ,j 7 , ,

,f ,

r -%,

A. ,' ,

S' 4

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a frequency and many otn.prn). Additionally, e*at rge5cf i  !

"i f.;nformation and warnine;s, if well-configured regarding p ;factorj such as frequency,Lconsintency and so or'can largely r q 3

" overcome raany of thc' :ondtraints to forming sound

.g 4

.f' situational g!drceptions of risk and then behayior thac can

.. ; , o be imposed'b.y receiver characteristics. For example,, 4 holding -!nformation or sender characteristics consNaM? and r

,7 ,

at a less-than-desirable. level, women are more'likely to

,3 -

perceive risk to be highsr than: men and, : consequently, a r e i more likely to engage in/ protective actions than men; '

! . x however, with " good" emerigency information both me'2 and a:

F women iare equally likely to fora more accurate situational

\

perceptions and, therefore, both sexes are equall: A.likely to

, make more accurate decisicns'about how to behave during an I l\  ; .\ T emergency. /  !'l! '( ,

.J y Interesting.sf however, pre-emergency judgemcInts about -

/

~7 .

f what[ f, behavior of the public is thought to be likel,y in a  ; (

futire unexperienced emergency (for example, like answers to 4 questions about intended future smergency 19htlvior ascertained through a poll or survey) abuld undoubtedly i

detect different answers from men'and women. Were a fut o j emergency to occur that was characterized by " poor" emergency 1

information, actual response differences between men and women wiuld be, observed. Were a future emergency to, occur

(

.that we.r charteterized by " good" emerc ency information, 3

little or no responce differences;would be observed between

, l I 1

] j

- 1W --

i

men and women. " Good" emergency information, therefore, can help overcome the constraints to sound emergency public response imposed by the heterogenous differences between members of any public as people in that public seek to form situational perceptions fo risk and then engage in a behavioral response to the situation being experienced.

The Mix of Public Information in Emergencies A fact of emergency warning settings in an open society like the United States is that public information flows from more than the " official" warning system. Sources are varied; variation exists in viewpoints about the risk and what people should do about it; local as well as sometimes national media can become involved; warnings and information often reach the public from friends, neighbors and relatives as well as from " official" sources; and so on. It is almost inevitable, therefore, that the public will be exposed to different interpretations and inconsistent emergency information considering all the potential information sources involved (these range from " official" warnings to advice from intimates). This inevitability is further compounded by the tendency of the American news media to report "both sides" of a story, and the fact that different media organizations have different " styles" that can also carry into how they report on emergency situations (see, for example, Dan Nimmo, 1984. "TV Network News Coverage of Three Mile Islano: Reporting Disastere as Technological

- 1S7 -

l L____ -_--- I

Fables," Mass Emergencies and Disasters 2:1:115-146; and Don M. Hartsough and Dennis S. 121 3 Mileti, 1985. The Media in Disaster." Pp. 282-294 in Jerri Laube and Shirley A. Murphy (Eds.) Perspectives on Disaster Recovery.

Norwalk, Conn.: Appleton-Century-Crafts.

This means that the public in any emergency warning situation could and is often immersed in a sea of conflicting and contradictory information. This tendency does not mean that an emergency warning system cannot provide a public with consistent information on which that i

public can form its situational risk perception. Instead, it means that good public emergency warning system preparedness should presume that conflicting information will exist in the emergency warning setting, and then take steps to assure that " official" warnings (presumed to be the best warnings) stand out and become the focus of the public rather than to have the public focus on information of lesser quality with content somewhat randomly determined.

The elaborate body of public warning response research which has already been mentioned suggests how to help a public focus on " official" warnings in an emergency setting, as opposed to other information in the information " soup" in which they could likely be immersed. This is accomplished, for the most part, by seeking to achieve the same attributes t of the emergency information checklist presented within the next seciton of t?'.s testimony.

l 1

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4 What all this means,- therefore, is that the most important aspect of an emergency warning system for a nuclear power plant becomes the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages because it is here that warning system l

preparedness can seek to achieve the type of emergency information characteristics for the " official" public warning is needed in order to have these warnings and this information " stand out" for-the public.

This reduces to a status of lesser importance the role of secondary and tertiary public information sources, for example, press releases, emergency news center (ENC) presentations, media interviews, rumor control, and other vehicles for public information. This does not suggest that these secondary and tertiary public information sources are not relatively important, nor that they should not be part of emergency planning and operations. Instead, we only mean to suggest that they are of lesser importance when " good" emergency planning has taken the necessary steps to focus public attention on the EBS system on the somewhat accurate presumption that other public information sources (for example, friends, relatives, editorials, parking lot interviews with " experts" and so on) could likely contain misinformation or at least alternative contradictory information.

We have provided all this background in order to explain why it is the case that public response to a future 159 -

emergency (should there ever be one) at Seabrook would largely be a function of the information characteristics of the~EBS system. Criteria for evaluating the information characteristics of EBS messages are provided in the next L section followed by our evaluation of EBS messages det.;gned for the Seabrook emergency plan.c. Evaluation of Seabrook EBS Messages

1. Evaluation Criteria The research record, when synthesized, provides a checklist of what constitutes the type of emergency public information that helps most members of a public perceive risk more accurately in an emergency. That is, the following ideal emergency information characteristics can help men and women, young and old, people with high pre-emergency fear of a particular hazard, as well as low pre-emergency fear perceptions, and so on, all form more realistic situational risk perceptions and make response decisisons consistent with those situational perceptions.

This checklist can be briefly summarized as follows.

Whenever possible, emergency information should be: (1) message attributes: specific, consistent, accurate, certain and clear in reference to the risk, its location, what people should do and how much time they have before they should do it; (2) channel attributes: distributed over diverse channels of communication; (3) frequency attributes:

repeated frequently and in a clear pattern; and (4) source

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t

. attributes: the source of the information is best if it can be a set of-people with organizational affiliations to enhance officialness, credibility (scientists and engineers usually have the most), and familiarity.

2. Evaluation Results The messages, channel, frequency and source attributes of emergency public information and warnings listed in the last section of this testimony constitute an " ideal type."

That.is, these emergency information characteristics are those which represent, collectively, all that has been l empirically documented to enhance accurate public situational perceptions and subsequent behavior in emergencies. We have read each of the Seabrook EBS messages contained in Appendix G, Volume 4, Rev. 2 (8/86) with these criteria in mind, and find that these EBS messages in many aspects advocate the " ideal type" characteristics already presented.

A few examples will serve to illustrate how these EBS messages adhere in many ways to the characteristics of the

" ideal type." Risk location is specific, certain and clear, for example in Message G, since the specific towns for which evacuation is advised are names; additionally, people are informed that there is no reason to evacuate or take any action if they do not live in those named towns.

Additionally, guidance is, in several ways, certain, clear and specific concerning evacuation, and the time factor is

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as'well: " evacuate as soon as possible." The frequency l elements of emergency public warning message is outstanding.

i The EBS system will repeat messages every fifteen minutes.

This is frequent and in a' predictable pattern. This pattern, "until new information is available," would also help members of the public focus upon the EBS system and its messages, as opposed to other random "non-official" communications.

Also, the messages are, overall, internally consistent.

For example, people at risk are not told: a release of radiation'has occurred, your town is at risk but don't worry. Instead people are told what to do about the risk.

The criteria we would use to judge emergency public information l!ke these EBS messages amount to about two dozen factors to consider. These messages are outstanding on many but not all of these factors. For example, the source of emergency public emergency warnings is important to helping.the public form sound perceptions during an emergency and, in turn, making sound decisions about what to do or not do in response to the situation. The source of the information contained in these messages is not clear.

Warning sources are best when they can be attributed to multiple persons and/or organizations that would include, for example, government officials, utility officials, scientists and/or engineers.

162 -

L_ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Also, for example, the language within the EBS message might provide the public with more active and directed l

courses of action. Rather than passively suggesting that more information is available in pre-distributed public information brochures, the messages might more actively direct persons to get their brochures, and explain why they i need them.

The EBS messages found within the NHRERP, Revision 2 are currently undergoing review in light of the above characteristics which may be viewed as indicative of the

" ideal" message type. This review is being undertaken in order to highlight and underscore these particular attributes which the EBS messages now reflect to some degree. Once honed to more closely follow these ideal, prototypic attributes, the EBS messages for Seabrook Station will provide the listening public a most solid footing from which to base sound decision-making.

d. Voluntary Evacuation in Emergencies Voluntary evacuation by persons not advised to evacuate has not been explicity studied as a phenomenon separate from evacuation in general. Voluntary Evacuation as a phenomenon which mas or may not be applicable to emergency planning at a nuclear poser plant could take two forms.  ;

The first of these we refer to as concentric voluntary evacuation. This form of voluntary evacuation is <

1 1

! theoretically possible in the concentric ring which j l i 163 -

I

surrounds the area in which evacuation has been advised in cases in which the area is a circle; for example, the concentric ring outside the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) in a scenario in which evacuation ~of the entire EPZ is advised (see Figure 1).

! The second form of voluntary evacuation we refer to as keyhole voluntary evacuation. This form of voluntary evacuation is theoretically possible in a scenario in which evacuation is advised for only a sub-population of an EPZ.

1 In such a scenario voluntary evacuation could occur in those  ;

portions of the EPZ not advised to engage in protective actions. We refer to this as keyhole voluntary evacuation only since, in its most prototypical form, it would resemble the following scenarios: advised evacuation would occur for everyone within two miles of the plant plus a subsegment of the EPZ beyond that two mile ring in the downwind direction (see Figure 1 of this testimony).

Two evacuation cases exist which provide the most detailed data regarding concentric and keyhole voluntary evacuation. Both of these cases involved advised evacuation and provide evidence of voluntary evacuation. These evacuations occurred in 1979 as a result of accidents at the '

Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant, and a hazardous '

materials release and explosion resulting from a train derailment at Mississauga, Ontario. I

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These specific cases, along with general knowledge regarding the determinants of public evacuation behavior, were used as a basis to inform our estimates of the level of voluntary evacuation (concentric and keyhole) in future nuclear power plant emergencies in the United States. Also taken into account was the current regulatory context for nuclear power plant emergency planning in the U.S., which requires rigorous planning for emergencies.

1. TMI and Concentric Voluntary Evacuation.

In order to examine the issue of concentric voluntary evacuation to estimate its likelihood and expected incidence at Seabrook, the extensive body of research and information regarding evacuation behavior in the aftermath of the accident at TMI were reviewed. This experience is a particularly useful event for this purpose for several reasons. First, the event occurred in response to a nuclear power plant accident. Second, there is an extensive body of available literature, including several studies of evacuation behavior. Third (and to a lesser extent analogous, as will be described later in this section),

there was never issued an order or official advisory that the general population should evacuate. Consequently, many researchers interpret all evacuation that occurred at TMI (except for pregnant women and pre-school children) as l voluntary evacuation.

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t

During the emergency period,.no public evacuation was ordered. However, the following advisories were issued by the Governor. At a mid-morning news. briefing on Friday, a-prepared' statement from the Governor advised all persons living within a 10-mile radius of TMI to remain indoors with their windows closed. Later that day the Governor issued another advisory that pregnant women and pre-school children within a 5-mile radius of the plant should leave the area.

On Saturday.the Governor. announced that his advisory regarding pregnant women and pre-school children would be in effect for at least another night.

Aside from the Governor's advisory for pregnant women and pre-school children to leave, two other public announcements related to evacuation were made. During a radio broadcast on Friday a local emergency preparedness director mentioned an evacuation order may be forthcoming shortly. There were several reports of the detailed evacuation planning that was taking place and official recommendations for individuals to make preparations for a l

possible evacuation.

a) Estimates of Evacuation at TMI.

l It has been estimated that approximately 150,000 persons left the area surrounding the Three Mile Island power plant (cf. Robert A. Stallings. 1984 " Evacuation Behavior at Three Mile Island" International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 2:1:11-26). Of those who evacuated, all but

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four percent were located within 15 miles of the plant; within 15 miles of the plant, 39% of the population or -#

144,000 people were estimated to.have evacuated (cf. C.B.

Flynn and J.A. Chalmers, 1980, The Social and Economic Effects of the Accident'at Three Mile Island. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, p. 22). In an effort to address voluntary evacuation and the reasons for it, it is useful to focus on the distribution of evacuated population by distance from the power plant, itself. Table 1 provides such data for evacuees from within 15 miles of

the plant.

TABLE 1 PERCENT EVACUATION BY DISTANCE FROM TMI' Distance Data Source From TMI (miles) Al A2 B C 0-5 60 66 NA 48 0-6 NA NA 55 NA O-12 NA NA 53 NA 0-15 39 41 NA 35a 5-10 44 49 NA 45 10-15 32 33 NA 27 5-15 37a 39a NA 34a Al Flynn and Chalmers, 190, p. 22 (population)

A2 Flynn and Chalmers, 1980, p. 47 (household)

B Brunn et at, 1979, p. 47 (household)

C Cutter and Barnes, 1982, p. 120 (household) 1-167 -

l l

l l

L_____--_-_____--_.--_----

1

a. Flynn and Chalmers, 1980, p. 10 household estimates used for reanalysis of data NA Not Available l

l Evacuation estimates from all studies were provided for geographic areas that represented concentric rings centered l on the TMI plant site. Estimates were given for varying numbers of miles distant from the plant. In the area closest to the plant (0-5 miles) household evacuation estimates ranges from 48 to 66 percent. From the area 0-6 miles, 55% were estimated to have evacuated.

The overriding finding from these data is that voluntary evacuation coincided with distance from the TMI plant site.

In all, 35-39% of the population within 15 miles of TMI evacuated (cf. Susan Cutter and Kent Barnes, 1982,

" Evacuation Behavior and Three Mile Island," Disasters 6:2,

p. 120; and Flynn and Chalmers, p.22). Of the total number of households that left, 28% contained pre-school childeren (Cutter and Barnes, 1982, p. 118). The particular concern for children is also revealed by the study of Brunn et al (cf. Stanley D. Brunn, James Johnson Jr., and Donald J.

Zeigler, 1979, Final Report on a Social Survey of the Three Mile Island Area Residents, East Lansing, Michigan:

Department of Geography, Michigan State University, p. 54) that found those with children under five remained out of the area for a longer period of time. For evacuees from within 3 miles of TMI 58% stayed away 3-6 days and none of these households contained children under five years.

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Forty-two percent of those evacuated from this area stayed away 9-13 days. Of those who stayed away the longest time, all but one family had children under five years (Brunn et al 1979, p. 54).

b) Data Equivalency: TMI and Seabrook.

For purposes of estimating incidence of voluntary evacuation at Seabrook based on estimated evacuation rates at TMI, it is necessary to lay some groundwork in order to focus the examination on the TMI data set that would be most equivalent to the area of interest for voluntary concentric evacuation incidence estimates at Seabrook.

Current regulations guiding emergency planning efforts at Seabrook call for planning attention to the area that has a 10 mile radius from the plant site. Known as the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), this area considers the population that is located within a 10-mile circle around the plant.

It is in the ring around this circle (from miles 10-20 from the plant site) that is the study area of interest for voluntary concentric evacuation. For planning purposes, the EPZ would be subject of an official evacuation advisement, with 100% population evacuation advisory possible.

Population in the area beyond 20 miles from the plant site is not expected to voluntarily evacuate in appreciable numbers, so for emergency evacuation purposes the area can be ignored. This expectation is readily supported by the

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data from TMI studies that estimated evacuation beyond 15 miles as 4 and 9 percent (Flynn and Chalmers, 1980, p. 22 l

and Brunn, et al, 1979, p. 47, respectively). -

In the case of the TMI experience, we have conservatively assumed that the evacuation area that is 0-5 miles from the plant is equivalent to Seabrook's EPZ of 0-10 miles. Similarly, we have concentrated our data examination on the evacuation rates provided in TMI studies for the ring shaped area that is 10 miles beyond the 0-5 area (in that case, from miles 5-15).

Hence, we have examined the TMI data as equivalent to Seabrook by using the following construct.

Study Area for Concentric Voluntary Evacuation TMI 5-15 miles Seabrook 10-20 miles This is a conservative construct, mainly because of the expected decay effects of voluntary evacuation with distance from the plant site. The Seabrook study area is literally 5 miles further away from the potential source of threat.

Furthermore, and more importantly, the equivalency construct is conservative because at TMI the Governor issued an advisory that persons within 0-10 miles of TMI should shelter (i.e., stay indoors with windows closed).

Consequently, we expect that the TMI evacuation rate for

( 5-10 miles is larger than would be expected for a more strictly voluntary evacuation effect at Seabrook. l

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1  !

J i

l I

One further note about equivalency of the TMI data as a )

basis for estimating the incidence of concentric voluntary evacuation at Seabrook. The data obtained from survey 1

instruments in the two mailed questionnaire surveys resulted i

from survey response rates that were quite low, as shown:

[

Mailed Survey Response Number of

' Data Source Rate Respondents Brunn et al, 1979, )

p. 23 56 150 Cutter and Barnes, 1982,

p. 116 39 359 i

1 In this case, we believe the consequence of these low response rates is that evacuation rates are overreported, i.e., persons who took an active role in the emergency by actually evacuating should be expected to have been more likely to have responded to a mailed questionnaire that asked about evacu; tion in the TMI accident. Unfortunately, we have no way to specifically quantify this effect on reported evacuation rates. We expect the effect would be that evacuation rate data overestimate actual evacuation.

The following section of this testimony describes the bases on which we estimate concentric voluntary evacuation at Seabrook from the date reporting evacuation rates in the ring-shaped area that resided 5-15 miles from TMI. From Table 1, the percent of households that evacuated are reported to have been 39% and 34%. We will examine the conditions that influenced these evacuation rates as a basis

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l l

for estimating whether or not and to what extent voluntary evacuation can be expected in the ring-shaped zone that is 10-20 miles from the Seabrook plant site.

c) Estimating Concentric Voluntary Evacuation in a Future Accident at the Seabrook Station.

Two reasons loom forth to suggest that the amount of 10 to 20 mile concentric voluntary evacuation to be expected in an accident at Seabrook could not likely begin to approximate the 34 to 39% equivalent concentric voluntary evacuation to observed during the accident at Three Mile Island. Both factors focus on the character of emergency public information during TMI versus the emergency public information that would characterize an emergency at Seabrook. The first of these reasons is that voluntary evacuation during TMI has and continues to be unquestioningly and unfairly computed on the basis of only one public advisory instead of all public information during the accident. The second reason is the contradictory and confusing nature of emergency information that characterized the TMI emergency versus what would occur in an emergency at Seabrook.

1) The Basis for Defining Concentric Voluntary Evacuation During TMI, Voluntary evacuation in the concentric ring surrounding TMI has always been computed on the basis of the Governor's advisory. That advisory defined the evacuation area as the 5-mile circle surrounding the 172 -

)

plant; thereby setting the standard.that evacuees living L greater than 5 miles from the plant would automatically be L categorized as concentric voluntary evacuees. However, this approach to defining concentric voluntary evacuation is l

l grossly inaccurate and_ unfair. There are many reasons why,  !

l i but the most significant reason is a simple one. The 1

evacuees during the TMI accident were not responding to only l that information which was contained in the Governor's advisory, and other significant information was the likely cause of the observed 34-39% concentric voluntary evacuation. Cutter and Barnes (cf. Susan Cutter and Kent Barnes, 1982, " Evacuation Bahavior and the Three Mile Island" Disaster 6, 2:116-124) have summarized this fact well on page 19 of their article.

Extensions of the emergency evacuation zone from 5 to 20 miles also contributed to the confucion. Emergency management officials had been assured by the NRC that their 5-mile plans were sufficient, but on Friday morning, 30th March (day 3), the NRC told state and local officials to extend the radius to 10 miles; later they ordered the zone extended to 20 miles from the plant ... Within hours the number of potential evacuees rose from 27,000 to 700,000, and this caught emergency management officials without satisfactory emergency response plans.

It is unfair, therefore, to judge voluntary evacuation during TMI in light of one public announcement alone. In

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fact, many of the' evacuees during the TMI accident perceived-the zone of likely evacuation advisement to larger than the 5 miles referenced in the Governor's advisory. For example, among all evacuees approximately 75 percent cited "to avoid forced evacuation" as.one reason for their leaving the area (cf-. Peter S. Houts et al, 1984, "The Protective Action Decision Model Applied to Evacuation During the Three Mile Island Crisis" Mass Emergencies and Disasters 2:1, at

p. 36).

The emergency information during TMI was not at all consistent in terms of the area at risks. On one hand it was the 5-mile zone, on another it was the 10-mile zone, and on yet another it was the 20-mile zone. In our opinion, it is methodologically unsound to focus solely on one piece of 1

information'as a standard by which to measure concentric voluntary evacuation since more than one standard operated during the accident.

l ii) The Contradictory and Confusing Character of Emergency Public Information During TMI. Most if not all researchers who studied evacuation at TMI have concluded that one of the most profound reasons why peopld evacuated (including the 34-39% concentric voluntary evacuees) was because of the confused emergency information made public during the accident. For example, Houts et al, op cit, p.

]

1

36) concluded that 80 percent of those who evacuated said i that confusing information was one factor in their decision 174 -

i

to leave. Brunn, Johnson Jr. and Zeigler (cf. Stanley D.

Brunn, James Johnson Jr.,and Donald J. Zeigler, 1979, Final Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Ilsnad Area Rcsidents, Michigan State University: Department of l Geography, p. 49) concluded that "Everyone who evacuated indict;ed one of these two' reasons (safety or conflicting reports) and 61% indicated both." In fact, Dr. Zeigler l

l along with his two colleagues concludes that both conflicting information and talk by government of other evacuation alternatives were major reasons for the voluntary evacuation observed during TMI.

The shadow cast by the evacuation order was intense and widespread in the case of TMI for two basic reasons: First, the peculiar nature of a nuclear disaster makes it impossible for people to evaulate the danger to which they are exposed which, when combined with conflicti_ng information from all sources, leads them to add a geographical margin of safety to the government's proclaimed radius of danger.

Second, serious talk of a full scale evacuation continued ever after a. limited evacuation had been ordered. This discussion prompted more families to leave than if the government.had acted confidently about the outcome of the accident, dropped talk of any further evacuation measures, and offered a strong rationale for the extent of the partial evacuation which was ordered (Brunn, Johnson Jr., and Zeigler, op cit., p. 49). (emphasis added)

The conclusion that the confused character of public emergency information was a profound determinant of evacuation observed during TMI was even reached by the i

I

Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) special inquiry into l

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_--mm_.u-_.-_ .___.

the accident. The Rogovin Special Inquiry was instituted by the NRC within weeks of the March 28, 1979 accident to determine what happened and why, to assess the actions of utility and NRC personnel before and during the accident, an'd to identify deficiencies in the system and areas where further investigation might be warranted. The inquiry resulted in a two volume report Three Mile Island, A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public, and it was issued by the Rogovin Special Inquiry Group in January of 1980.

(NUREG/CR-1250). The Rogovin Inquiry (Vol. I at ix) concluded that the character of the information available to the public on the accident was a major determinant of evacuation behavior and the public's perception of danger from TMI-2.

To a considerable extent, information available through the media was confusing and frequently conflicting. Met Ed, the basic source of information on the status of the plant, quickly lost credibility. The NRC was a source of contradictory and, upon several occasions, alarming information. Whereas the local media tended to be restrained and non-speculative in its coverage of the accident, the national media and the-media outside the area tended to be more speculative. (Rogovin inquiry, Vo. II, Part 2 at p. 620; see also Rogovin Inquiry, Vol.

II, Part 3 at 1073).

Consequently then, the TMI accident may be evaluated as one of the worst public emergency information events in our nation's history. Appended to this testimony as Appendix one is a brief thumb-nail sketch of the contradictory and conflicting character of some of the emergency information

( made public during the accident.

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l

i L

'{

Without reviewing the complete chronology of the accident, a summary of the key statements made to the public during the emergency period follows. It makes apparent the causes of'the confusion and uncertainty and resultant evacuation by members of the public during TMI.

The first public awareness of the TMI-2 accident was at 8:25 a.m., Wednesday, March 28, at which time a local radio station announced an accident at.TMI. At 9 a.m., an AP national news bulletin was issued. A survey to the.TMI-area population (25 mile radius) by the Michigan State University Department of Geography shortly after the accident (Brunn et al., op cit.) indicated that 35% of the respondents first heard of the accident on Wednesday morning; 62% had heard by Wednesday night, and all had heard by Friday, March 30-(including 17% who had not heard until the 30th).

During the morning of March 28, because of contradictory statements about radiation releases attributable to the delay in information received by Met Ed officials who were issuing statements from various locales, and because of lack of an explanation of the general emergency status, the Kemeny Commission concluded that the utility's credibility, at least in the eyes of several reporters and public

, officials, was damaged beyond repair (Kemeny, Report of the l

Public's Right to Information Task Force, p. 97). The confluence of the perceived lack of utility credibility with the seeming inconsistency between information reports issued i

177 -

by the Governor of Pennsylvania's Office and Met Ed immediately produced uncertainty if not apprehension in the public's mind. This situation culminated in Lieutenant Governor Scranton's statement, at a 4:30 p.m. press conference on March 28, based on a misunderstanding of what I

was going on at TMI, that " Metropolitan Edison has given you and us conflicting information . . . There has been a release of radioactivity into the environment. The magnitude of the release is still being determined, but there is no evidence yet that it has resulted in dangerous levels." (Kemeny, Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force, p. 100.) Further distrust, confusion and apprehension in the public's mind was created by inconsistent reports from the NRC and from the Governor's office during the evening of March 28 concerning the source of low levels of radiation measured offsite.

On March 29, the public was informed of discharges by Metropolitan Edison of industrial waste water into the Susquehanna River. The releases were necessitated by the buildup of waste water on site ordinarily routinely released. Although not harmful, the releases did contain small concentrations of noble gases (below maximum permissible concentrations). Nevertheless, public announcement of the discharges probably misled and alarmed some individuals, who mistakenly believed highly l contaminated water was being dumped into the river. On this

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)

day local farmers and the Department of Agriculture began to tesi milk for radioactivity and outdoor feeding of cows stopped. This measure, while perfectly reasonable, was probably anxiety-provoking for the public. As a result of these actions, milk sales dropped. Also occurring on March 29 was Dr. Ernest Sternglass' alarming radio interview during which Dr. Sternglass recommended evacuation of pregnant women and preschoolers, a recommendation that the radio announcer mistakenly called an order to evacuate.

(Kemeny, Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force, p. 223.) While this statement was denied and corrected by a representative of the Pennsylvania Department of Health during the same afternoon, minimally, the misinformation created confusion and uncertainty among the local citizenry.

On the morning of Friday, March 30, a helicopter hovering over the TMI-2 stack measured a 1,200 millirem release spike as a result of the transfer of noncondensible gases between primary coolant system makeup tanks. This measurement was reported to the NRC, the State and the press, dramatically altering perception of the seriousness of the accident. The director of emergency preparedness for Dauphin County went on the radio announcing the possibility of protective evacuation. NRC headquarters misinterpreted the information about the release, initially believing it represented a radiation level monitored at the site l - 179 -

l -

L_ -_

boundary, and consequently advised the Governor of

-Pennsylvania that people within five miles of the plant in the downwind direction should be told to stay. indoors. The Governor made this announcement in a live broadcast at 10:25 a.m., altering Chairman Hendrie's recommendation and suggesting that people within a 10-mile radius stay indoors and keep their windows closed. The stress produced by_this information was probably exacerbated by a Met Ed press conference half an hour later at which, in response to a question, a Met Ed representative stated that he had not heard about, although he did not dispute, the 1,200 millirem reading.

At about 12:30 p.m., Governor Thornburgh, after conferring again with Chairman Hendrie, held a press conference at which he announced that he had been in contact with the President of the United States and with the Chairman of the NRC. He stated that the President concurred  ;

i in the Governor's views that there was no reason for panic l or implementation of emergency measures, and that Harold Denton would be dispatched to the site as the President's personal representative. The Governor also announced that, based on the advice of the NRC Chairman and in the interest of taking every precaution, he was advising that pregnant women and preschool-age children within five miles of the plant leave the area. He also ordered the closing of l schools within the 5-mile radius.

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l

1 7

t Contemporaneous with the evacuation advisory, an NRC staff. member, in response to a reporter's question, ,

suggested that, although there was no imminent possibility of a meltdown,-it could happen if conditions worsened. This highly alarming information was carried as.the. lead in many .

national _ stories, often neither qualified nor put in its '

1 )

proper context. Not uhtil 6:30 p.mi did the NRC publicly state that there was no imminent danger of a core melt -- j reassuring but, probably, confusing information. In an 8:30 p.m. press conference, Governor Thornburgh and Harold Denton' indicated that an evacuation order was.not necessary; however, the earlier advisory would remain in effect at least until Saturday -- also reassuring, but not anxiety-preventing information. (Rogovin Inquiry,.Vol. II, Part 3, p. 1064-65.)

The issue of core melt was precipitated largely by the fact.that a steam bubble inside the reactor. led some NRC

. ,(p j

e officials,. erroneously, to balieve that the bubble could j

'f a explode. A news release was issued by UPI at 4 p.m/ on ,

?

sI Friday, March 30, reporting a senior NRC-staff official's concern about the bubble and "the ultimate risk of a

r. i meltdown." (Kemeny, Report of the Public's Right to e

Information Task Force, p. 145-146.) As a result of continued confusion among NRC staff as to the significan'ce t s' I

of-the reactor vessel hydrogen bubble, an NRC-confirmed AP story was released at 9 p.m. on Saturday which stated the.,

! - 181 -

L. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - I

,I

" Federal officials said Satd:e day night that the gas bubble inside the crippled nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island is showing signs of pecoming.potentially explosive . . . One

.t NRC sourco; whe asked not to be identified, said that

!v crit? cal point could be reached within two days." (Kemeny,

' b.> - ' l Report of tNe Public's Right to Information Task Force, p.

'153.) According to the Rogovin Special Inquiry, the AP

., \.

story created a "nearj phnic" in the Harrisburg area. State Police officers were deluged with calls, as was the NRC.

(Rogovin Inquiry, Vol. II, Part 3, p. 1067-68.) Later that even ng, Met Ed, the! Governor's office and Harold Denton publicly disagreed with the views of the NRC in Washington, describing'the explosion' reports as erroneous or distorted.

Denton stated that there was no near term possiblity of a hydrogenexplosion/ineitherthecontainmentorthereactor vessel. Neve r thele sri, one poignant indicator of the resultant level of public anxiety was the local churches' grant of general, absolution of sins to the citizenry. (Kent Barnes, et al., Rtsponse of Impacted Populations to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor Accident: An Initial Assest. ment, October 1979, Rutgers University Department of Geography, Discussion Paper, p. 6.)

On Sunday, April 1, Governor Thornburgh issued a press i

j release'which was reassuring in that it directed State

(:

, offices to open as usual on Monday, April 2; however, the evacuation advisory was not rescinded, and it was {

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b __-_ __- ___ _

l recommended that schools within five miles of the plant remain closed until further notice. By Monday, April 2, with the news conference by Denton announcing that the bubble had reduced in size sufficiently to no longer be a problem, the crisis at TMI was over. However, the public was not told that the NRC had been wrong in its assumptions about the hydrogen bubble. (Denton simply said the Staff had been very conservative in their calculations.) (Rogovin Inquiry, Vol. II, Part 3, p. 1068.)

In summary, then, it is apparent from a simple chronology of the TMI-2 accident that misinformation, inconsistencies, and confusion in information flowing to the public not only directly precipitated alarm and associated distress, particularly for those who were identified as being especially vulnerable to radiation, but also produced the circumstances which were most distressful and contributed to evacuation. Specifically, the misinformation about a high level of radiation at the site boundary, the possibility that highly contaminated water was released into the Susquehanna River, and faulty information about an explosive hydrogen bubble were the most alarming pieces of information communicated to the public. The other primary i

stress-producing factor was the evacuation advisory, which '

was the result of misinformation.

l One TMI' evacuation study (cf. Peter C. Houts, Robert W.

Miller, Goerge K. Tokuhata and Kim Skik Ham, 1980, Health 1

183 - l 4

1 l

. - - _ - - - - - - _ - - l

l '

l d ) ~

Related Behavioral Impact of the Three Mile Islard Nuclear

).' '

Incident, Parts I and II. Report submitted to the TMI ,

q ,

e Advisory Panel on Health Related Studies of the Pennsylvania *

)+ 1 4 ) Der artment of Health: The Pennsylvania State University College of Medicine, Part I, pp. 4-5) reports on the sl ,' y

,j findings of in-depth interviews and emphasizes the e

importanca of the role that incorrect and confusing ir. formation had on determining public evacuation, one respondent, for example, stated that she left because of "that bubble." Anotht) individual stated, "Everything was so conflicting in the news reports. You'd hear one (local)

,.O report (saying) ther.e's nothing to forry aboug; you hear tlA't national (nras), the place is blowing 'up."' (Houtri, Part I,f t ,

p. 4.) The Houts et al., Report reached the following conclusions about evacuation:

By and large, these (evacuation] decisions seem to have ,

been made in a generally reasonable way. The absence oQ reliable infonnation did not lead to mass panic, nor to a widespread denial that-any threat existed. Those who left did so primarily because of a desire to protect t family members who seemed to be unusually vulnerable (e.g., pregnant women and small children), and beca'ane of a general feeling that, given the lack of information, a conservative approach would probably be best. Those who stayed were aware of the possibility of danger, but seem to have concluded that the possiblity of genuine harm was outweighed by the costs of leaving.

and the benefits of staying (Part I, Chapter 4, p. 10 ) '. '

i Houts et al 4 (l' art II, Chapter 7, p. 2) also found the following generalizations relevant for public policy purposes: ()

! /  ;  ;

1 1

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l

1. Information conveyed by the media was the main

,0,.s for decision to evacuate. Two aspects of Aus information were especially important in the e ision to. evacuate: ,

a. information about possible danger

b. inconsistencies and/or contradictions in information.

2. There was considerable variability among residents in how information was. interpreted resulting in:

a. evacuation and returning being spread over a considerable period of time which contributed

-to the efficiency with which the large number of people evacuated the area

b. a substantial percentage of the population electing not to evacuate at all.

'In' summary, one can conclude with reasonable certainty that the evacuation performed by TMI residents during the TMI-2 accident was based largely on the nature and quality of the information relayed to the public during the uccident. Much of this information was faulty. In fact, the most alarming reports were based on misinformation.

Exacerbating the already stressful situation was the fact that the public frequently heard conflicting reports from the same or different sources that ordinarily would be relied-upon for accurate and consistent information.

iii) Conclusion Concerning Concentric Voluntary l

l Evacuation. Concentric voluntary evacuation during TMI has l been estimated at 34 to 39% by different researchers in l reference to the logically equivalent 10-20 mile concentric ring around the EPZ for Seabrook Station. It is

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L_________-___________

l inconceivable that such voluntary evacuation rates could occur wereithere to be an evacuation of the Seabrook EPZ.

First, the hypothesized Seabrook evacuation'would not likely contain different information regarding larger evacuation zones than the 10-mile EPZ. This was the case during TMI.

Second, the existence of plans to facilitate the existence of consistent and nonconfusing public' emergency information is the hypothesized Seabrook evacuation (including, for example, an EBS system, appropriate EBS message, an emergency news center, and so on)' insure that the character of public emergency information would be sound and not even remotely resemble the poor quality information made public during the TMI accident.

On these grounds it is inconceivable that concentric voluntary evacuation during an emergecy at the Seabrook Station would come close to that which occurred during TMI.

However, it is equally inconceivable that it would be zero.

In our judgment, and with the quality of emergency public information promised by the emergency planning at the Seabrook Station, estimating a 0-25% concentric voluntary evacuation in the 10-20 mile zone, we would expect concentric voluntary evacuation to vary inversely with distance from the plant.

2. Mississauga and Keyhole Voluntary Evacuation. j 4

I

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L________________.___

One of'the largest public evacuations in the history of North America was successfully conducted in 1979 in Mississauga, Ontario, Canada.

Estimates indicate that approximately 226,000 residents were systematically evacuated in the aftermath of a train derailment at about midnight on November 10, 1979. Of the 106 train. cars derailed, 38 contained hazardous materials, including chlorine, liquid petroleum products and caustic soda.

Within minutes of the derailment an initial "BLEVE" (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) occurred, starting a series of explosions. The area in the immediate vicinity of the explosions was evacuated starting less than two-hours after the derailment. During the ensuing 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, changing risk assessments by officials resulted in a series of staged evacuations that eventually encompassed the entire city of Mississauga. An estimated 98% of the population of the official evacuation zone left the area.

Evacuation orders were given and evacuation occurred in phases that were sequenced by 15 official evacuation zones over a 21-hour period. The differential timing of evacuation orders coincided with changes in risk assessments made by the officials-in-ch'.rge that were made in response to events onsite (new leaks, new explosions, etc.) and ever-variable wind direction. Evacuation orders were issued and implemented in accordance with the following timing:

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Zone Period of Day 1-7 early morning 8-11 late morning to early afternoon 12-15 late afternoon to early evening The majority of residents left their homes after 9 a.m.

on Sunday.

a) Estimates of Evacuation at Mississauga.

A comprehensive behavioral study of this evacuation was performed within the months following this event (cf. Ian Burton et al., 1981, The Mississauga Evacuation, Toronoto:

University of Toronto, the Institute for Environmental Studies). The following observations regarding this evacuation are derived from an analysis of data collected for the Burton study. Two data sets detail the evacuation experiences of persons living in the official evacuation zone. A third data set provides information from residents of three areas outside the official evacuation zone. This latter data set provides a particularly good basis for examining the influences on keyhole voluntary evacuation in the Mississauga emergency.

In the case of Mississauga, a specific evacuation zone was defined. The evacuation boundary ran down the center of a roadway. In addition, evacuation areas were identified by officials in a serial fashion over a 24-hour period. The 7

Y-t

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1

i direction of evacuation progressed steadily toward what ultimately became the final perimeter area boundary Throughout the evacuation experience, some persons who lived across the road from one of the ultimate boundaries of the official evacuation zone were, in effect, put on alert that they may have to evacuate soon.

Persons in'Etobicoche and Oaleville, just outside one area of the evacuation zone boundaries were not particularly i responsive to the evacuation in that relatively few of them voluntarily evacuated (Burton 1981, p. 6-23). However, residents in one of the areas outside the official evacuation zone (Burnhamthorpe, to the north of the accident site), were particularly responsive to the emergency situation. In this area, 60% of the families voluntarily evacuated their full household and another 4% of households partially evacuated. Apparently these departures occurred after it was known that chlorine gas was involved and after the announcement was made that a nearby shopping center, Square One (being used as an evacuation center) had been closed and evacuated.

l Respondents in the Burnhamthorpe area reported they left i

l Sunday and expected to return by that night. The researchers asked a sample of these persons why they left.

Their responses were as follows (Burton, et al., 1981, p.

6-25):

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1. ~ evacuated ~due to danger or family health concerns (48%);

2. evacuated because they believed they were told to evacuate.(14%);

3. evacuated because they lived near the evacuation zone (11%);

4. evacuated because they saw others leave (9%)

In addition, 18% indicated reasons other than those above and likely included people that were leaving for the day or found it. convenient to do so. The researchers

. pointed out that many of these evacuees attempted to return that evening but were not allowed because of police roadblocks.

b) Data Equivalency: Mississauga and Seabrook.

There are two primary reasons that the available data from the Mississauga evacuation shed light on the idea of keyhole voluntary evacuation. First, Burton and his colleagues conducted telephone interviews with a sample of the population for which an official evacuation order was never issued. The sample population all resided within 4-8 km of the derailment site. These distances from the source of threat are within the distances inherent in the definition of keyhole voluntary evacuation. That is, consideration of keyhole voluntary evacuation involves evacuation of the population within the 0-10 mile EPZ not advised to evacuate, at the same time that other portions of

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I i

- - - _ _ - - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ h

the population in the EPZ (at the same distance to the plant site) are advised to evacuate.

It is likely that numerous voluntary " keyhole" evacuees during Mississauga were aware that their distance from the derailment site was the same as (and in some cases less than) some zones that were officially evacuated. This is particularly true for those who were located across the road from zone 8 and within a short distance from the Square One Center. Unfortunately, there are no available data in the Burton report to quantify the number of evacuees this information reached or its influence on evacuation rates.

Sixty percent of this " keyhole" population evacuated voluntarily at Mississauga.

Nevertheless, this data set does provide some basis for making a judgment regarding the expected incidence of keyhole evacuation at Seabrook should a partial official evacuation of the EPZ ever be issued.

c) Estimating Keyhole Voluntary Evacuation in a Future Accident at the Seabrook Station.

The amount of keyhole voluntary evacuation at Mississauga data base likely over-estimates keyhole evacuation since a major public issue in the period in which this study was conducted was potentially reactive with survey questions about evacuation. That issue was one of receiving compensation for the costs associated with having l evacuated (cf. Burton et al., 1981, p. 6-26). This issue I

l 191 -

1

i 1

could have entised some study respondent to report evacuation not actually performed.

Coincidentally, the equivalent of keyhole voluntary evacuation observed at Three Mile Island was also sixty percent. It was observed that sixty percent (cf. Flynn and Chalmers, 1980, p. 22) of people in the 0-5 mile area who were not advised to evacuate did voluntarily leave. These evacuees are equivalent to keyhole voluntary evacuees since they were at a like distance from the plant as persons actually advised to evacuate. The TMI data base likely over-estimates keyhole evacuation since there was other significant information in the public domain at the time supporting that everyone in the 0-5 mile area could soon be asked to evacuate (cf. Brunn, Johnson Jr., and Zeigler, op.

cit., p. 49).

The data on keyhole evacuation during TMI and Mississauga lead to the following conclusions. First, it is very likely that keyhole voluntary evacuation rates would be higher than concentric voluntary evacuation rates in an emergency at Seabrook Station. This conclusion is consistent with the TMI and Mississauga casen as well as accumulated knowledge about how the public responds to emergency risk information. Second, it seems clear that l

l voluntary keyhole evacuation would likely be less than those rates observed during TMI (public information in an accident at Seabrook would be better than that which occurred during

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l l

TMI), and less than those rates observed at Mississauga (the straight boundary used to define the evacuation versus non-evacuation zones during Mississauga and therefore, creating a mixed set of relationships between distance from the risk and evacuate /not-evacuate population would not exist at Seabrook).

e) Conclusions Regarding Voluntary Evacuation.

Emergency planning for an emergency at the Seabrook Station, in our judgment, would be very conservative were it to be based on the assumption of the O to 25% concentric voluntary evacuation, and a higher probability for keyhole voluntary evacuation.

Several major factors that are known from the emergency evacuation literature to create evacuation-prone behavior were operating at both TMI and Mississauga. These included the following:

Evacuation occurred on the weekend. This meant that families were more likely to be together (a very important influence on evacuation behavior). Evacuees did not anticipate loosing work or missing school. At TMI, most evacuation occurred on a Friday afternoon after area schools had been closed. Employees at schools, at the TMI plant and State employees had been allowed to leave work early.

A second phenomenon operating at both locations was that numerous evacuees reported they left in anticipation of being officially advised to evacuate. At Mississauga, the

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ordered evacuation occurred in sequence throughout a 21-hour period. The ultimate evacuation boundary was a roadway that bordered the population study area for voluntary evacuation.

At TMI, there were numerous reports of possible evacuation, evacuation plans being readied and in some cases evacuees had been advised by the Governor to take protective actions.

That is pregnant women and pre-school aged children were advised to evacuate from the 0-5 mile zone and the entire population in the 0-10 mile zone were advised by the Governor to stay indoors with the windows closed.

The coincidence of the operation of these evacuation prone conditions at TMI and Mississauga further support our judgment that these cases offer reasonable planning bases for considering voluntary evacuation in an emergency at Seabrook.

i i l i 1

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i 4

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ATTACHMENT 1 _____

1986. Population Estimates of New Hampshire Cities and Towns Prepared by The .

NEW HAMPSHIRE OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING Date of Publication: August, 1987 .

The Office of State Plarming is required by Law (RSA 78-A:25) to estimate the population of the State's municipalities on an =====1 basis. The law stipulates-that the estimates be certified to the State Treasurer by August 19th and that they reflect population levels of the preceding year. Further, the law required that the definition of. resident be the same as that of the U.S. Decennini Census.

The accompanying figures are ESTIMATES and are so labeled. Users of these figures should hold!.in mind,- that all the data used to calculate the estimates were collect-ed by local governmental units or scho'1 o districts for purposes other than account-ing for' population change. .The methods which convert these dat'a such as school enrollments, building permits, sad resident taxpayers into estimated population have been developed to reflect true population. insofar as possible.

The OSP must use uniform and objective procedures to estimate the population of all 234 communities. This is due to the fact that state monies are involved and so fairness and equity of procedures are as important as tachaie=1 accurancy.

It is likely that. if OSP staff were to estimate any one =micipality on an .

individual basis, the resulting estimate would be different than the one contained herein.

In communities with a 1980 population of 5,000 persons or more, a dwelling unit method is used. In all other communities, a composite type method is used.

Detailed step by step examples of these methods are contained in this report.

. Insofar as possible, the estimates reflect population as of the middle of the respective estimate year.

The portion of the estimate that consists of a special population (Dora, Nursing Bone, etc.) is shown under the heading " Institutional Population". The City of Portsmouth's figure includes 4,494 spersons living on Pease Air Force Base.

Anyone wishing further information regarding these estimates should. contact the Office of State Planning, 235 Beacon Street, Concord, New Hampshire 03301 -

telephone (603) 271-2155.

C________________.____________ _ . . _ . _ _

ATTACHMENT 1 (2 of 4)

COUNTY: 19861 1986 1986 ROCKINGHAM 0.S.P. U.S. CENSUS - HOUSEHOLD. INSTITUTIONAL EST 1980 1970 POPULATION POPULATION I--------------I ---------- ----------

ATKINSON 4762 4397 2291 4762 0 AUBURN 4022 2883 2035 4022 0  ;

BRENTWOOD 2382- 2004 1468 2084 298 l CANDIA 3706 2989 1997 3706 0 i CHESTER 2291 2006 1382 2256 35 DANVILLE 1913 1318 924 1913 0

'DEERFIELD 2343 1979 1178 2311 32 DERRY i4165 18875 11712 23986 179 E KINGSTON 1326 1135 838 1326 0 EPPING 4147 3460 2356 4086 61 EXETER 11846 11024 8892 11632 214  ;

FREMONT 1802 1333 993 1749 53  :

OREENLAND 2234 2129 1784. 2234 0 HAMPSTEAD 5575 3785 2401 5563 12 HAMPTON 12077 10493 8011 12039 38 HAMPTON FALLS 1469 1372 1254 1469 0 KENSINGTON 1327 1322 1044 1327 0 l

KINGSTON' 5065 4111 2882 5063 2 LONDONDERRY 16191 13598 5346 16191 0 NEW CASTLE 933 936 975 787 146 NEWFIELDS 846 817 843 846 0 NEWINGTON 798 716 798. 763 35

, NEWMARKET .6497 4290 3361 6486 11 NEWTON -3471 3068 1920 3471 0 NORTH HAMPTON 3635 3425 3259 3621 14 NORTHWOOD 2679 2175 1526 2679 0 l NOTTINGHAH 2509 1952 952 2509 0 ,

PLAISTOW 6730 5609 4712 6730 0  :

PORTSMOUTH 27295 26254 25717 26948 347 RAYMOND 7167 5453 3003 7154 13 RYE 4843 4508 4083 4831 12 SALEh 25115 24124 20142 24964 151 SANDOWN 3017 2057 741 3017 0 SEABROOK 6695 5917 3053 6692 3 SoHAMPTON 655 660 558 655 0 STRATHAM 3520 2507 1512 3509 11 WINDHAM 7494 5664 3008 7414 80 -

j J

COUNTY TOTAL 222542 190345 138951 220795 1747 l I

L-_____--_-__--- 1

OSP ESTIMATING METHODOLOGY ATTACHMEMT 1 (3 of 4)!

1. Composite natio Method - 1982 Example ,

y.

"" ~ ~ In places with a 1980 population below 5,000'pe'rsons, a method called the

" Composite satio" is employed. This method estimeks the household popula-tion of three separate age groups; these componwnes'are then suunned to yield a total esciented population.

The 1980 dec=aa1=1 census serves as a banch=mek to adjust se::endary source data and also to provide ratios between known and unknown age groups.

1 The age group birth to 17 is estimated through the use of school enrollmeAc' data; these data theoretically give the "known" population aged 6-17 for'the

• estimate year. Below are the enlea1=tions for estimating the population 3-17 for the Town of Alton in 1982: ,

1980 Pop 5-17 = 628; 1980 Pop 6-17 = 473 (U.S. Census) 1980 Enroll 6-17 = 457; 1982 hro11 6-17 = 435 .  ;

The 1982 school enrollment has to be adjusted to reflect total population in the 6 to 17 age group. This is done using the proportional relationship;i: ]

- Pop.6-17 (1980) ,

Pop 6-17 (1982I f Enroll. 6-17 (1980 Enroll. 6-17 (1982)  !

Pop 6-17 1982 = (473/457 x 435) = 450 Then using a second proportion, the total number of persons birth through 17 is estimated for 1982 as follows: ,

Pop 5-17 (1980)_ ,

Pop B-17 (1982)_

Pop 6-17 (1980) Pop 6-17 (1982) 1 ' '

Pop B-17 (1982) = ((628/473) + .031424 ) x 450 = 613 l

The age group 18-641's estimated via town resident taxes and the dec=an4=1 1 census; below are the e= leal =tions for Alton:

1980 Pop 18-64 yrs. (U.S. Census) = 1,408 1980 Average Resident Tax = 1,550 1982 Res. Tax - 1,568 Pop 18-64 (1982)= Avg Res. Tax l

j The age group 65+ is estimated by using Medicare enrollments available Cor che )

county and allocating to component towns based om 1980 shares.

Alton's share of Belknap County elderly populattsan was .0712 in 1980, thus the 1982 Pop 65+ = 6090 x .0712 = 434 Change of Alton's institutional pop = 0 .

Est. of B-17

• 612 + Est. of 18-64 = 1416 & Est. of Pop 65+ = 434 Unadj. Total = 2462 All to Total. p The are unadjusted adjusted upward orfor State total downward to conformthe N.E. was 961,948.for toyear a pre-determined 1982. Sta Unad1. Tot Town 2.462 Unadj. Tot State " 941,948 = .0026138 x 951,000'> Mj. Total = 2,486 1

.r ATTACHMENT 1 (4 of 4)

2. Dwelling Unic Method _ 1982 F.xamples ,

,, ;y

!- In the 37 communities with a 1980 population 5.'000 or greater, the dwelling unit method is employed. These places comprise 63 percent of the State's 1980 popu-lation. M is method attempts to convert a estimated number of dwelling units i f population. , Benchmark data taken from the 1980 decennial

.into an esc nate ocensus include the number of dwelling units by type, occupancy and vac t

e occupancy rates are modified through the decada according to national trends.

The calculations of the dwelling unit method for the Town of Bedford appear below:

Added 1982 4 1980 (census) vacancy occupied total Units

'81 + '82 rate units

. units 132 .9788 2.765 single family 2.693 145 19 1,0000 164 multi-family 14 14 0 1.0000 mobile home ,

i

population j per 1981 est.

' household population 8,923 single family 3.227 511 l

aulti-family 3.118  !

• 15 mobile home 1.070 .

300 institutional pop i 94 State control adj.2 9.843 1982 Estimated Population.

l l adjusme fator to acmt for dM4aks h1 age popdation -

l Source: U.S. Bu'reau of the Census *  !

l The pre-determined State total is prepared by theFor Federal-State ljt84j this Cooperative estimate was Program for Yopulation Estimates (F.S.C.P.-E).

9771000 persons. The estimate is prepared with the State as a single statistical entity; it is not the result of summation of sub-divisions of the state.

The estimate was adjusted to conform to a national total. ,

l t .

l 4

9

ATTACHMENT 2

)

Planning Memorandum RE: TowTruck aWgnments.

Using the listing in Volume 6, ETE, Table 12-1 (Page 12-5), the suggested I match-up of existing Tow Truck operators with the " pre-staged" locations identified by the KLD study is as follows: (In mostinstances, the towing companies are located within 1-3 miles of the suggested ETE location.)

Location: Provider (g):

1. Newington Mitchell's Exxon Service, Newington

2. Kittery, Maine O'Brien's Truck and Tractor, Portsmouth National Wrecker Service, Greenland *

3. Newmarket Durham Mobil, Durham Armands Auto Body, Newfields

4. Epping McCoy's Alignment Service, Ezeter Al's Automotive Service Center, Ezeter

5. Plaistow Jack's Towing Service, Plaistow Russel K. Thomas & Sons, Plaistow Estabrook's Garage, Newton

10. Portsmouth O'Brien's Truck & Tractor, Portsmouth Bob's of Portsmouth, Portsmouth National Wrecker Service, Greenland *

12. North Hampton Circle Motors, Seabrook Frank's Garage, Hampton

• National Wrecker has five tow trucks located on Portsmouth Avenue just over the Portsmouth town line in Greenland with direct access to Routes 101 and I-95, about one mile south of the Portsmouth traffic circle. If directed, National Wrecker could assign one unit to each of the Portsmouth and Kittery, Maine locations and still have three units available for additional assignments in the area.

MCS/ 8/10/87 l____________________

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APPLICANTS' EXHIBIT 4 e

KLD: TR-208 REPORT ON THE VEHICLE OCCUPANCY RATE (VOR)

SURVEY PROCESS Prepared for New Hampshire Yankee

• Seabrook Station Seabrook, NH 03874 .

Prepared by KLD Associates, Inc.

300 Broadway Huntington Station, NY 11746 M w+W Edward Lieberman, P.E.

President August 1987

. . ___ J

e O.

l ABSTRACT j Two large-scale surveys were undertaken on the main access roads to Plum Island and Salisbury Beach, Mass. and to Seabrook and Hampton Beaches, N.H. These surveys, conducted on July 11, 1987 and July 18, 1987, both Saturdays, obtained data for the primary purpose of estimating mean vehi'cle person occupancy. The survey methodology consisted of observers standing at the edge of selected roads, peering into the interior of passing vehicles and announcing the number of persons observed. This announcement was -

recorded on audio tape and was also recorded, in writing, by a second observer, on a form prepared for that purpose.

Over the two days of data collection, a total of 56,040 persons were observed in 24,637 vehicles, to yield a mean occupancy of 2.275 persons. This figure is in essential agreement with the.results of a similar smaller-scale, survey, conducted a year earlier, on July 4th and 5th, 1986.

e l

)

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_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ J

d

1. 1HTRODUCTION In order to estimate the population in the beach areas along the New Hampshire coast, a series of data collection activities were undertaken:

o In August, 1985 o On July 4th and 5th, 1986 o On July lith and 18th, 1987.

The primary purpose of these surveys was to establish the distribution of vehicle occupancies in vehicles travelling toward the beach areas. The mean value of vehicle occupancy is applied to the estimate of the maximum number of vehicles parked in the beach areas, to yield the maximum number of people who occupy the l

beach area, at a point in time.

l The survey conducted in late August, 1985 was undertaken on days when the weather conditions were less than appealing to beach-goers. As a result, the mean vehicle occupancy of under 2.2 persons was regarded as suspect.

I Consequently, a second survey was conducted on the July 4th '

weekend in 1986, under generally good weather conditions. This survey yielded a mean vehicle occupancy of 2.338 persons, based '

on a total sample size of 5,165 vehicles. For planning purposes, then, a mean occupancy value of 2.4 persons was applied to the estimated vehicle population to obtain estimates of beach population. The results were documented in Volume 6 of the NHRERP, on pages 4-6, 4-7 and 4-8.

It was decided to update this data with even more extensive surveys in 1987 during the heat wave in mid-July. This report documents the 1987 surveys.

1

2. OVERVIEW OF THE SURVEY A comprehensive effort was undertaken to update the existing data quantifying the peak transient and permanent population of the larger beach areas in the vicinity of Seabrook Station. This effort consisted of close-up vehicle and occupancy counts by j trained observers at all major approaches to the beaches along l the beach access roadways. This effort, called the Vehicle ,

Occupancy Rate (VOR) survey, was conducted by planning personnel assigned to Seabrook Station. Guidance was provided throughout )

the VOR survey process by KLD Associates, a consulting firm which I developed an update to the Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) for the f Seabrook Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

The purpose of the VOR survey was to obtain a mean occupancy rate for all the vehicles counted. This value was needed as a check on the current estimate of 2.4 persons per vehicle, documented in Volume 6 of the NHRERP. This mean occupancy rate multiplies the number of estimated parking spaces obtained from aerial photographs taken on July 18, 1987 to provide emergency planners with a factual and carefully documented planning base for estimating peak weekend beach populations.

The results of the VOR survey are as follows: a combined total of 24,637 vehicles (including buses) were counted on July lith and 18th, both Saturdays. These vehicles contained a total of 56,040 occupants. The mean occupancy rate of the vehicles surveyed was 2.274 occupants per vehicle. This figure differs from the result of a similar survey taken on July 4th and 5th, 1986, by approximately 0.06, or 2.6 percent.

The following is a chronological summary of the entire VOR survey process. It will be divided into three sections: a description of the preparatory steps taken prior to the actual survey periods; an explanation of the survey procedures; and a description of the survey data analysis.

1 I

2

- - - - - - - - - - - - J

I i

3. PREPARATION OF THE SURVEY On July 2, 1987, an instructional meeting was held for all the VOR observers by the senior consultants coordinating the operation. This meeting immediately preceded the first scheduled survey period of Friday and Saturday, July 3 and 4. (NOTE: Due a to inclement weather on both days, it was decided to defer the l survey to a weekend where hot weather would attract a high beach population.) The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the VOR l Survey Instructions to Observers, a step-by-step guide developed I' to ensure that all data was recorded in a uniform manner (see Attachment 1), and to issue any equipment necessary to conduct the survey. Each item on the instruction outline was discussed in detail, with ample time allotted for all participants to ask questions and/or make suggestions for improvement in the survey process. Equipment was then issued (including portable recording devices with back-up power sources) and tested to ensure j trouble-free operation in the field. 4 Immediately following this meeting, observer teams were i dispatched to their assigned VOR locations to conduct a trial survey run. Teams were instructed to follow all procedures .

exactly as they would during the actual survey periods. During the trial run, " rover" teams comprised of survey coordinators J visited all the VOR locations to observe team activities and '

{

generally be available to respond to questions, provide back-up l equipment or provide any other assistance as needed. The trial l

run afforded an opportunity to determine if the survey logistics I were workable and manageable under actual field conditions.

As was the case throughout the survey preparation phase, observers' opinions and/or suggestions were again solicited after the trial run was completed.

Conductina the survey The VOR survey was conducted on two successive Saturdays, July 11 and 18. During the July 11 survey, observers manned all six VOR locations depicted on the VOR Observer Location Mao (see Attachment 2). A more detailed depiction of each location is provided by Attachments c through H of Attachment 1. These locations were carefully selected to ensure the widest possible sampling of traffic ingress to the Hampton (NH), Seabrook (NH),

plum Island (MA) and Salisbury (MA) beach areas. On July 28, observers were located at VOR Locations 2, 3A and 5 only. The July 11 survey commenced at 9:00 AM and ended at 1:00 PM. The July 18 sampling ran from 9:30 AM to 12:30 PM. Personnel assignments for both survey dates can be found on the attached  ;

VOR Assianment Sheet (7/11) and the 7/16 Memorandum (see j Attachment 3),

k There are several factors which led to the decision to conduct a supplemental survey on July 18. Foremost was the desire to obtain traffic data to coincide with the aerial 3

J

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l.

l photography effort taking place at the same tPae. (NOTE: Aerial photographs of all'the coastal areas within the EPZ were taken between 12 Noon and 1:20 PM on July 18.) This desire was L partially motivated by past complaints from interveners in-the

! Seabrook Station licensing process. .These' complaints allege that l information gleaned from previous aerial photographs (taken July 4, 1986)'was rendered invalid because a very limited sampling of

, vehicle occupancy data, gathered via a field survey of narrower p scope, was obtained during the corresponding period.

Another factor was the desire to expand the'overall VOR l-database with the additional data gathered on July 18.

Obviously,.the' survey results and any assumptions based on them i will be more conclusive if they are substantiated by a large and varied data base, provided in this case by an expanded sampling period.

The three.VOR locations used for the July 18 survey were chosen based on the results of the previous week's sampling.

These three locations consistently displayed the highest mean occupancy rates and, in most cases, experienced the heaviest traffic volume (see Vehicle'Occucancy Rate Surveys for Maior .

Beach Access Roads, Attachment 4 for a detailed account of the

• results for both VOR surveys).

.On both survey dates, the prevailing weather conditions were noted by each observation team at all locations. The weather conditions were both recorded verbally on tape and noted in j writing on the VOR tally sheets. Further documentation on the (

weather conditions was.obtained from the National Weather Service h for both survey periods (see Attachment 5). Conditions were {'

periodically updated for the duration of the survey. Similarly, each observation team periodically noted the time on the tape recorders and on paper. This was done to simplify the tallying process and to facilitate an hourly breakdown of the results.

As described in the VOR survey instructions (Attachment 1),

the procedures for recording both vehicular volume and occupancy were simple and straightforward. Each observer team was supplied with a tape recorder and printed tally sheets tc record the required data. Documenting the information using these two distinct recording modes was done to provide a cross-reference capability when the data was eventually tabulated. By employing two separate methods of recording (oral and written), each method ,

could be used to substantiate and augment the other during the tabulation phase.

Item number 4 on the instruction sheets (Attachment 1) lists the four classes of information needed for each vehicle counted.

They are in order of priority: number of persons (in vehicle);

vehicle type; turn movement and license plate. In the vast majority of cases, both the oral and written recorders were able to document all four classes of information. During periods of heaviest traffic volume, however, recording of all four data 4

Items sometimes proved difficult. At.these times, the prioritization system was employed to ensure that the two most critical pieces of information, occupancy and vehicle type, were always recorded. This information was, in. fact, recorded for every vehicle.

Tabulatina the' Survey Data After.the field survey was completed, each observation team was responsible for reviewing their own recorded tapes and data sheets. The primary purpose of the review was to ensure consistency between both methods of recording. To this end, each team played back.the audio tape while following along line by line on the tally sheets. If any inconsistencies were discovered between the two data sources, they were notad in the appropriate place on the tally sheets.

Given the extensive scope of the survey and the large amount of information recorded, there were relatively few instances of inconsistencies of any type. The most common ones discovered in the review were cases where theLtally sheet recorder was having difficulty keeping pace with the tape recorder observer. -In .

these cases, the data which was present on the tape and not found

• on the tally sheets was inserted where it belonged. For example, if the data recorded on tape for four. vehicles was *

"PC-2-right-NH, PC-3-left-MASS, Truck-2-left-MASS, VAN-5-right-MASS" and the data data recorded on the tally sheets for the: corresponding time frame read "PC-2-right-NH, PC-3-left-MASS, Van-5-right-MASS", it was concluded that the tally. sheet recorder was unable te note the third entry on the tape recorder (Truck-2-left-MASS) because of the rapidity of the dictation. To rectify the inconsistency, the observer / reviewer then inserted " Truck-2-left-MASS" between "PC-3-left-MASS" and

'! Van-5-right-MASS" . on the tally sheet. When the tape recording obviously reflected periods of heavy traffic (i.e. the speaker's rate of speech increased), reviewers were automatically alerted to the possibility of inconsistencies of this nature.

Conversely, there were a few cases where information on the tally sheets was not avidenced on the tape. In these instances, this information was deleted from the tally sheet, since the writer was instructed to tally only the data dictated by the tape recording observer.

HIn addition to periodically noting the time on the audio tape, each such observation was also noted on the tally sheets.

This was done to provide a common point of reference for review purposes and to enable the data to be tabulated on an hourly basis.

After the data review process was completed, the reviewers entered the data on the Summary Sheet for VOR Tally Sheets (see Attachment I of Attachment 1). These summary sheets wara used to determine a mean vehicle occupancy rate for each hour of the 5

l J

l:

survey, and to tally the total vehicle number ~by type. .The methodology for these calculations is indicated on the sheets themselves.

The bus data observed on both survey dates were treated

' differently from those for other vehicle types. Although the number of buses counted was entered in the appropriate space on i the Summary Sheet for VOR Tally Sheets, the number of passengers l on each bus is not reflected in the. occupancy section. This is so because the number of. passengers per bus varied greatly (from empty to apparently. filled to capacity) and because an accurate head count on such a large vehicle was nearly impossible to

.obtain. The relatively small number of buses (a total of 30 or' i approximately 0.1 percent) did not have a significant. impact on the mean. occupancy rate figures.

The final step in the data tabulation process was the development of Vehicle OccuDancy Rate Surveys for Maior Beach Access Roads (Attachment 4) which summarizes in detail the results of both survey dates. The summary provides an hourly breakdown on vehicle occupancy for each of the VOR locations

, manned. It also provides an hourly mean occupancy rate for each.

location. Using the summary, one can easily extract any information they require and do so for any hour of the survey. ,

l 6

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, e. ,

t ATTACHMENT 1 4,

July 1-. 1987 Vehicle Occupancy Rate (VOR) Survey INSTRUCTIONS TO OBSERVERS The' vehicle occupancy rate survey is intended to establish a.first-hand 7 accurate account-_of occupancy data over the course of the survey time frames.

The information obtained during this survey will supplement data previously obtained for the Seabrook area.

1. A Vehicle Occupancy Rate observation team will be assigned to specific-major intersections as indicated on the attached assignment sheet (Attachment A). Each team will consist of two members; one member will. record on-going observations of vehicle occupancy on a dic -

taphone, while the second member records the information on formal tally sheets-(Attachment'B).

2. Each team should establish itself at the appropriate locations as indi-cated on the VOR Location Diagrams (Attachment C through H). These locations have been selected to assist the teams in viewing as many; .

Incoming vehicles as possible. Many cars at these locations will be

• traveling at a reduced rate of speed, which will also facilitate observations of vehicle occupants. Observation teams should stand as close to the edge of the road as is necessary to ensure clear visibi-lity of vehicle occupants.

3. To begin each recording session, record your name, affiliation, date/ time, specifically where you are located (both VOR number and Street names), and a brief description of current weather conditions.

.Be sure to hold the microphone close to your mouth in order to limit interfering traffic sounds. Talk clearly and distinctly.

4. There are four (4) classes of information needed for each vehicle counted. These classes, and the associated recorded information, are listed below.

Information Spoken / Recorded Needed Data a) Vehicle Type "PC" (Passenger Car)

" Pick-up" (Truck)

" Van" "RV"

" Truck"

" Bus"

" Cycle"

" Bike" b) Number of Persons 1"

.". 2 "

"3" g, "4"

( etc.

l' l .

l C/LK1711

e

9. Schedule - Pre-Survey Sample. A pre-survey meeting and sample run has been scheduled for July 2nd, 1987. The pre-survey meeting will begin in the Red Room at 1:30: all teams will be provided equipment and further instructions at that time. Teams will then be dispatched to their respective intersections in order to record a sample run of activity at these sites. This sample run will allow you to famil-larize yourself with your location and the procedures detailed above.

If your team is not provided with mechanical recording devices until Friday, mimic the use of this machinery during the trial run, ar.d practice completing the tally sheets. A coordinating " Rover" team will observe your trial set-up procedures at your intersection; the Rovers will begin at VOR Observer Location No. 1, and move south to Observer Location No. 15. Please remain at your designated location until you are observed by the Roving Team.

Survey. The Survey itself is scheduled to be conducted on July 3 and July 4, 1987. However, in the case of inclement weather, the survey may have to be delayed until the following weekend for more. attractive weather conditions.

Friday, July 3, 1987: All survey members should report to the Red Room at 7:30 AM. Outstanding equipment will be distributed at that time and any questions raised by the trial run conducted the previous day will be answered. Any decision to cancel the July 3 activities -

due to inclement weather will be made at that time. .

Saturday, July 4, 1987: All survey members should again report to tt:

Red Room at 7:30 AM. Cancellation due to inclement weather will be made at that time, if necessary.

During the survey, the " Rover" team will again be observing team acti-vities, and will thereby be available to respond to any questions team members may have, provide backup tapes, sheets, etc, or to assist in any way.

Post

• Survey. Team members should review all recorded tapes and data sheets for consistency of recorded information, and complete the VOR Summary Sheets (Attachment I) by July 10, 1987. Once this is complete, return all recorders, tapes, and data sheets to Karen Larson.

"Thenk Yeu fer yer suppurt!"

w. C/LK1711.2

~ - * '

.-- .i- en -r- .< ,

Information Needed Spoken / Recorded Data c) Turn Movement "Through" "Right" "Left" d) License Plate "New Hampshire"

" Massachusetts" "Other" The above information should be recorded in the order listed as a vehicle approaches and passes the observer. An example of recorded data, then, may sound somewhat as follows:

"PC.. 3...Right.... Mass;... Van.. 1...through.... 0ther;

... Cycle.. 2...Left...New Hampshire;..." Note, however that the primary purpose of the survey is to record data regarding vehicle occupancy rates. As such, should traffic become too heavy to record all of the above information for each vehicle, ensure at a minimum that data re-garding the number of persons is always recorded. Vehicle type, turn movement, and license plate origin are of decreasing priority for the .

purposes of this survey, but should be recorded if at all possible. *

5. During times of heavy traffic, record the current time on the tape at

• approximately 10 minute intervals. This will provide an indication of the " running time" of the tape. If a long " lull" in the traffic should occur, you may not wish to continue running the tape needlessly; instead place the recorder on pause until traffic resumes. Be sure to note the time when the recorder is turned back on! If weather should change significantly, record the time and nature of the change.

6. The traffic entering the coast area is expected to be the heaviest between 9:30.and 11:00. In order to ensure as complete coverage of incoming vehicles as is possible, teams will record continuously from 9:04 AM to 11:00 AM; please note the time at 10:00 AM to assist with complication of the data following the survey. A fifteen-minute break will be taken at 11:00 am. Please record the time on both the tape and the tally sheets when recording resumes at 11:15 AM. All tapes should be labeled on both sides regarding times and VOR Location Number, as appropriate.

7. It is not anticipated that our field activities during this survey will attract undue attention from civil or legal authorities. If however, you are questioned as to the nature of your activities, simply reply that you are an observer for a local vehicle survey.

Remain cordial and friendly at all times. Should any situation arise which is beyon'd your capability to control, remove yourself from the location and report by phone to the designated contact person.

I

8. If the weather is pleasant and hot, you may wish to bring some refreshments with you to your site. Under no circumstances should alcoholic beverages be brought to the intersection or ingested during the course of the survey, C/LK1711.1

_ ___-__ __-_- - - J

., y i

ATTACHMENT B j VOR TALLY SHEET i

TYPE VEHICLE NO. PERSONS- TURN LICENSE T C R 0 r y B T i L M t '

P V u B c i h g e A h u a R c u 1 k P r h f N S e 1

_Timet _c n V k s e e C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ u t t H S r Page No.: i P V R T B C K C 1 .2 3 4 5.6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T-R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 .

- 1 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B .C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 y ,, P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 P V R T B C K C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 T R L N M 0 VOR Location Date F/IV17td 0 j

ATTACHMc c :

VOR OBSERVER LOCATICN NO.1 TWN: HAMPION LOCATION: Rt. IA and Rt. 101E TCP NO: D-HA-04 WINNACUNNET Rd.

(Rt. 101 t)

(N)- y (CONDOS) f KING'S HIGHWAY ,

, (STORES)

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i 7 g Rt.1A

, ( // ]

OCEAN Blvd. (Rt. lA) d

)

@ VOR OBSERVER LOCATION M TRAFFIC DIRECTION to be OBSERVED l

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, VOR OBSERVER LOCATION NO. 2

'IDWN: HAMPION (HAMPTON BEACH)

LOCATION: HIGHLAND AVE. and Rt. 51 EAST at BROWN AVENUE TCP NO: A-HB-03 d

(N)'

Rt. 51 WEST

' CHURCH St.

( ( -

Rt. 51 EAST

(

s s i r.

HIGHLAND AVE.

BROWN AVE.

l h VOR OBSERVER LOCATION M TRAFFIC DIRECTION to be observed rv e

ATTACHMENT E

, VOR OBSERVER LOCATION NO: 3A TOWN: SEABROOK l

LOCATION: OCEAN Blvd. (Rt. lA)and Rt.286 l TCP No: A-SE-06 l

h (N)

ROUTE 286 .

r A

OCEAN Blvd.

(ROUTE 1A) h VOR OBSERVER LOCATION H TRAFFIC DIRECTION to be OBSERVED

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4 ATIACliLM E VOR OBSERVER LOCATION PO: 33 KMN: SEABROOK LOCATION: OCEAN Blvd. (Rt. lA)and Rt.286 TCP No: A-SE-06 h -

(N)

ROUTE 286 -

ss OCEAN Blvd.

(ROUTE 1A) h VOR OBSERVCR LOCATION H TRAFFIC DIRECTION to be OBSERVED w/

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8 ATTACHMEttr ; G VOR OBSERVER LOCATION tO.'4 .; P TOWN: SALISBURY LOCATION: ROUTE 1A and NORTH'BOULEVADD ~ N TCP to: B-SA-04 (N)

ROUTE lA CEtfrRAL AVE.

40RTH Blvd.

(

ROUTE lA (BEACH Rd) ,

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VOR OBSERVER LOCATION NO. 5 9 :.

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ATTACHMENT 3 l

1 VOR ASSIGNMENT SHEET JULY 11, 1987 VOR Cbserver Assigned Locetion Number Observers N.9. 1 Hampton Joe Enoch Route 1A and Route 101E Marilyn Sullivan (Winnicunnet)

No. 2 Hampton Beach Karen Larson Highland Avenue and Route 51 Lesley Tilston ,

No. 3A '

Seabrook John Spead -

Route 1A and Route 2o6 Bill Kollar

, ;.: No. 3B Seabrook Bill Thorpe Route 1A and Route 286 Kathy VonWald No. 4 Salisbury Cathy Frank Route 1A and North Boulevaro Bruce Musico NM Newbury Craig Starkman Plus Island Tnpk. and Old Pt. Road Neal Boucher

. Rovers John Hart John Baer i Ed Lieberman Back-ups Loretta Garcia Ken O'Gara I

HELP LINE: 474-9521, x2762 i L/280CC.1

ATTACHMENT 3 (Cont'd)

MEMORANDUM TO: KATHY FRANK, ED HARTNETT, BILL KOLLAR, KAREN LARSON, JOHN SPEED, LESLEY TILS ON/ '

FROM: JOHN HART DATE: JULY 16, 87

SUBJECT:

VOR SURVEY REVISITED As you know we will be conducting a " mini" VOR Survay on Saturday July 18,1987 between the hours of 9:30 an and 12:30 pm. '

Thanks once again for your continuing support in this activity. No survey acti ' -

vities are planned for the following day, Sunday, regardless of weather.

This survey will include only three locations:

Rt. 51 and Rt. 1A (John Speed, Bill Kollar)  !

Rt. 286 and Rt. 1A (Lesley Tilston, Karen Larson)

Beach Road and Rt. 1A (Ed Hartnett, Kathy Frank)Plac) ,5 3 , _')

I will be moving between sites to assist as necescary.

Please meet in the Red Room by 8:30 Saturday morning. Equipment will be distri-buted at that time.

i i

'I s-M/LK1809 l

Vehicle Occupancy Rate Surveys Major Beach Access Roads i

' July 11, 1987 Vehicles Occupied by Indicated # of persons Mean Location Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ Occupancy Route 101E 9:00-10:00 172 182 54 40 16 6 1 2.03 Rt. 51 9:00-10:00 190 382 162 132 36 6 6 2.44 l Rt. 286 (A) 9:00-10:00 213 307 91 63 22 5 6 2.15 l Rt. 286 (8) 9:00-10:00 148 213 71 45 12 3 2 2.13 l N. Boulevard 9:00-10:00 179 182 83 57 27 8 4 1.92 L

Plus Is. Tnpk 9:00-10:00 142 115 25 20 8 4 2 1.91 l

I Rt. 101E 10:00-11:00 198 276 60 57 21 8 2 2.16 Rt. 51 10:00-11:00 166 -373 155 128 34 12 6 2.49

,- Rt. 286 (A) 10:00-11:00 196 282 108 59 19 6 4 2.18

'j Rt. 286 (B) 10:00-11:00 172 303 89 44 22 5 3 2.15 l

N. Boulevard 10:00-11:00. 199 358 126 69 32 13 4 2.24 Plus Is. Tnpk 10:00-11:00 177 265 45 23 10 -- 1 1.94 Rt. 101E 11415-12:00 188 310 85 61 15 6 2 2,14 Rt. 51 11:05-12:00 162 361 159 117 38 11 4 2.46

• Rt. 286 (A) 11:00-11:55 258 365 104 74 17 7 2 2.09

, Rt. 286 (B) 11:15-12:00 115 219 67 36 16 4 3 2.23 .

N. Bculevard 11:00-12:00 224 375 105 84 46 13 4 2.66 Plum Is. Tnpk 11:00-12:00 142 137- 36 27 12 2 5 2.05 Rt. 101E 12:00- 1:00 213 338 90 76 20 4 2 2.14

' Rt. 51 12:00- 1:00 164 357 136 101 41 12 5 2.45 l Rt. 286 (A) 12:05- 1:00 231 337 116 72 26 11 4 2.21 Rt. 286 (B) 12:00- 1:00 172 276 82 49 15 3 4 2.12 N. Boulevard 12:00- 1:00 228 400 162 103 35 7 8 2.34 l

1 Plum Is. Tnpk 12:00- 1:00 178 203 69 28 16 7 1 2.04 i July 18, 1987

$ Mean l Location Time 1 2 3 1 5 6 7+ Occupancy l

Rt. 51 9:30-10:30 132 420 114 90 52 13 6 2.48 Rt. 286 (A) 9:30-10:30 280 463 156 93 33 7 1 2.18 N. Boulevard 9:30-10:30 223 423 131 80 35 7 8 2.26 Rt. 51 10:30-11:30 167 473 168 163 69 20 9 2.62 Rt. 286 (A) 10:30-11:30 265 407 134 94 23 11 4 2.21 N. Boulevard 10:30-11:30 247 481 140 108 51 13 5 2.29 Rt. 51 11:30-12:30 148 383 142 122 49 12 7 2.53 Rt. 286 (A) 11:30-12:30 269 428 127 106 26 10 9 2.24 H. Boulevard 11:30-12:30 240 416 168 94 38 10 7 2.31 h NOTE: A total of 30 buses were observed; the number of persons on buses ranged from apparent capacity to no passengers. These vehicles were not included in mean occupancy figures as numbers of passengers could not be accurately perceived from a curbside survey.

J 0/JK1805

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3 ATTACHMENT 5 (Cont'd) 8 I

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l CALLENDRELLO. ANTHONY M.

f EDUCATION  ;

Stevens Institute of Technology - Bachelor of Engineering 1973 Stevens Institute of Technology - Master of Mechanical Engineering 1980 Harvard School of Public Health - Planning for Nuclear Emergencies 1983 LICENSES AND REG!STRATION Professional Engineer - New Jersey Professional Engineer - New Hampshire EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

Mr. Callendrello has a wide variety of experience in all aspects of onsite and offsite radiological emergency planning. Currently. he is responsible for all Seabrook Station offsite radiological emergency response.pianning work involving state and local plan development and implementation. In prior positions at Seabrook Station he has been responsible for prompt notification system procurement and installation, onsite procedure develop-ment and scenario development. -

Prior to his current employment. he was with Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation. There his onsite planning experience included leading the radiological emergency planning effort for a boiling water reactor generating station. There he was responsible for directing the revision of the station's emergency plan, i=plementing procedures, and emergency action levels in response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission emergency preparedness appraisal findings. He also has prepared a comprehensive audit of onsite emergency preparedness for a boiling water reactor generating station currently under construction. Based on the audit results. he worked with the utility's management to develop a comprehensive emergency planning strategy to support the licensing of the station.

Mr. Callendrello's offsite experience involves all aspects of radiological emergency planning. He had lead an effort to prepare an emergency plan and implementing procedures for a utility-implemented offsite emergency plan.

In addition, he has provided technical support of the ASLB licensing hearing for this same station through the preparation of discovery respen-ses as well as written testimony.

Prior to this effort, he has led five offsite emergency planning projects.

These projects have involved the preparation of 35 State and local radiolo-gical emergency response plans and associated implementing and standard l

! operating procedures.

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1 Of these projects. three have involved the preparation of exercise scen-

} arios and support for practice and federally witnessed exercises. Three projects have also involved the training of offsite emergency response per-sonnel. This required the preparation of all training and drill materials.

One of these efforts involved an intensive training program for all person-nel in four counties prior to their successful performance in a federally witnessed exercise.

Mr. Callendrello has served as an observer in nineteen full-scale practice and federally-witnessed exercises. He also has be*n involved in the pre-paration of ALSB hearing support material, the design of prorpt notifica-tion systems, and the preparation of evacuation time estimates.

Before joining Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation. Mr. Callendrello provided acoustical consulting services regarding the noise impact of pro-posed nuclear generating facilities. Interior and exterior noise analysis, and control of fossil fuel generating stations as well as a variety of pro-cess industries.

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS American Nuclear Society l

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DETA! LED EXPERIENCE RECORD CALLENDRELLO. ANTHONY M.

NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE DIVISION, PUBLIC SERVICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE (Jan 1984 - Present)

Appointments:

Emergency Planning Manager - 1986 Emergency Preparedness Supervisor - September 1985 Senior Emergency Planner - January 1984 Mr. Callendrello is currently supervising the offsite emergency prepared-ness efforts for Seabrook Station. He has direct responsibility for the direction of Massachusetts. New Hampshire and Maine state and local planning and training.

Prior, he was responsible for the development of onsite emergency response procedures and prompt' notification system procurement and installation and scenario preparation.

STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION. NEW YORK, NY (Apr. 1980 to Dec. 1983)

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Long Island Lighting Company (Mar. 1983 to Dec. 1983)

Mr. Callendrello supervised a group of planners providing technical support for offsite radiological emergency planning. Principally this involved the preparation of an emergency response plan and implementing procedures for the first utility implemented offsite plan developed in the country. His responsibilities also include the support of the ASLB licensing hearings through the preparation of discovery responses and written testimony .

Ovster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. General Public Utilities (Oct. 1980 to June 1983)

Mr. Callendrello supervised the development of Radiological Emergency Plans (REPS) for the county and municipalities within the Emergency Planning Zone of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. This involved the following principal efforts: the preparation of individual REPS for the county and twenty municipalities: the preparation of implementing and stan-dard operating procedures: the preparation of the scenario for the FEKA witnessed exercise: the training of offsite emergency response personnel in the specifics of radiological duties: and the direct support of FEKA exer-cise activities through the provtsion of field radiological data and field

' team referees / evaluators.

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l AMC This planning process involved extensive interviews and meetings with various officials of the State, county, and municipalities, utility manage-ment and site operating personnel the FEMA regional representative. and local news media.

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, power Authority of the State of New York (Mar. 1982 to July 1982)

Mr. Callendrello supervised the onsite radiological emergency planning effort for the J..A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This effort involves the modification of the emergency plan, implementing procedures, and Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in accordance with the latest Federal guidance. The preparation of these documents was in support of the 1982 NRC/ FEMA graded exercise and the NRC appraisal.

Indian point Nuclear Power Station - Unit 3. Power Authority of the State of New York (Jan. 1982 to Mar. 1982)

Mr. Callendrello supervised the support of offsite radiological emergency response planning for the four counties within the Emergency Planning Zone of Indian Point Unit 3. This support involved the training of county exe-cutiven and agency heads in their role in a radiological emergency response, and the training of personnel responsible for decontamination center operation, dose assessment, field monitoring, reception center operations, and emergency operations center activation and operations.

In addition, support material for this effort was prepared including an emergency worker's training manual: standard operating procedures for field l monitoring and dose assessment personnel; and materials and suggested layouts for emergency operations centers.

Finally. he supervised the support of the successful 1982 FEMA witnessed l exercise. This included the preparation of the offsite scenario: the pro-vision of observers / evaluators at offsite locations: and the collection.

evaluation, and provision of evaluator critique comments. I Salem Generating Station Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Aug. 1980 to May 1981)

Mr. Callendrello directed the development of Radiological Emergency Plans (REPS) for the State of New Jersey and the counties and municipalities in l the Emergency Planning Zone of the Salen Generating Station. This work l included the preparation of REPS for the State, two counties, and six munt-  !

Cipalities: the development of implementing and standard operating proce- l dures: the development of training materials; and support in the staging of l the 1982 FEMA observed exercise.

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J' AMC Wo. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (May 1960 to Aug. 1980)

Mr. Callendrello was responsible for the coordination and technical review of efforts to design an integrated prompt public warning system for the 4

area near the Zimmer Station to support radiological emergency planning. 1 During this period he participated in the preparation of evacuation time estimates for the area near the Zimmer Station in response to NRC require-ments. He has assisted in the preparation of the Radiological Emergency Plans for the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the counties within the Emergency Planning zone. Also he has assisted in the preparation of writ-ten testimony for the Atomic Safety Licensing Board licensing hearings.

DONLEY. MILLER & NOWIKAS, INCORPORATED (1976 to 1980)

He was responsible for Industrial and environmental noise control projects.

Industrial projects rbquired compliance with OSHA noise standards for many industries including power generating stations, papermaking, food pro-cessing, and metal fabricating. Environmental projects dealt with the control of noise from large rotating equipment in order to comply with State and local codes.

LEWIS 5. GOODFRIEND & ASSOCIATES (1973 to 1976)

Mr. Callendrello directed projects involving industrial noise control and the prediction, assessment, and control of environmental noise. Typical in-plant equipment analyzed including fans, pumps. crushing and mixing mills, and power station equipment. Environmental projects on which he worked dealt with a variety of power station equipment. highways, and com-munity annoyance studies. In particular, he assessed the environmental impact of the noise from four 1000 MW nuclear generating plants on a single site for the New York State Atomic and Space Development Authority.

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Paul R. Frechette Jr. l 74 B Esker Road Hampton, NH 03872 Telephone (603) 929-0044 EDUCATION University of New Hampshire Graduate Courses in Biology - 1975 B.A. Biology University of New Hampshire PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 05/1987 - Present New Hampshire Yankee Division, Public Service Company of New Hampshire Senior Planner - Responsibilities include oversight of contract planner activities, hearing preparation and general project management.

03/1980 - 05/1987 EDS NUCLEAR /IMPELL CORPORATION 01/1987 - 05/1987 Manager, Emergency Planning, North East Region. Project Manager for New Hampshire offsite planning program.

01/1985 - 01/1987 Supervisor, Emergency Planning, Mid-West Region. Project Manager for the offsite Emergency Planning Programs at seven nuclear facilities in Illinois.

Supervisor of a twenty-three (23) person planning team contracted by Commonwealth Edison for LaSalle, Braidwood, Dresden, Zion, Byron and Quad Cities to develop the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA); as well as, contracted by Illinois Power Company for development of the IPRA plan for the Clinton Power Station. Responsibilities include overseeing all normal day to day activities of the planning team members, budget and schedule management, interface with upper level management on marketing prospects and contractual commitments.

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07/1984 - 01/1985 Project Engineer, Clinton Power Station, offsite emergency plan, procedure and training development.

Manager of a six (6) person Planning Team contracted to develop the Illinois plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA) for the Clinton site. This project included development of Standard Operating Procedures, Offsite Agency Training Programs, drills and exercise programs, and offsite scenario development. Responsibilities included budget and schedule management.

02/1984 - 07/1984 Project Engineer, Fermi II - Detroit Edison, onsite health physics support Provided consultant services to Detroit Edison Corporate Health Physics Department in preparation for Fermex 84 (Annual Exercise). Responsibilities included scenario development, training, review and update of plans and procedures.

05/1983 - 02/1984 Project Engineer for all offsite Emergency Preparedness Activities at the Dresden and LaSalle Nuclear Power Stations.

Prepared scenarios for all participating State, County and Municipal agencies in conjunction with the Utility scenario.

Provided pre-exercise training to State, County and Municipal agencies in preparation for the FEMA annual emergency preparedness exercise.

Prepared Controller / Evaluator instructions, and trained controllers.

Responsible as lead controller for coordinating all offsite response activities.

Responsible for current annual update of the State of Illinois Emergency Plans for the Dresden and LaSalle Nuclear j Power Stations.

02/1983 - 05/1983 Lead Senior Engineer for the Byron Nuclear Power Station offsite emergency planning effort.

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Developed Standard Operating Procedures

-for Traffic and Access Control and Evacuation of General Population.

'Provided' training to all'offsite agencies.in the areas of notification,

' traffic and access control and-evacuation.

Developed all State, County and.

Municipal scenarios, scenario messages, --

free play items and controller messages for the initial annual Emergency.

Preparedness Exercise.

Developed exercise notebooks and provided training to all controller / evaluators involved in the exercise.

Developed testimony for presentation at the ASLB hearings relative to licensing

-issues for the Byron Station.

09/1982 - 02/1983 Onsite Emergency Planning Engineer -

Georgia Power.

Revised Station EPIP's in response to both an internal Q.A.~ audit and.N.R.C.

appraisal open items'from the previous annual exercise.

Provided training to all control room operators, an internal and external survey teams with regards to the recent procedure revisions.

Lead controller for all offsite monitoring activities during the 1982 N.R.C. appraisal.

04/1982 - 09/1982 Project Engineer for the State of Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan for Nuclear Power Plants revisions project.

Responsible for the complete revision of the State and County plans for the Turkey Point, Crystal River, St. Lucie and Farley Nuclear Stations. This work l was in response to NUREG-0654, and FEMA

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comments-arising from exercises conducted at these plants.  ;

01/1982 - 04/1982 Senior Engineer for the Florida Power and. Light Emergency Preparedness Project.

Developed offsite monitoring procedures and trained offsite field teams.

Assisted in the development of offsite dose calculation procedures and training;' schematics for the classification of emergencies based on radiological parameters, and the associated Protective Action Recommendations.

Developed several radiological scenarios involving plant specific parameters and new TMI required instrumentation to be used in preparation for the annual exercise.

06/1981 - 01/1982 Principal Engineer for the Baltimore Gas and Electric Training Project.

Assisted in the development of lesson plans, and visual aids used to train Health Physics, Radiation, and Chemistry Technicians.

02/1981 - 06/1981 Provided onsite assistance to Georgia Power to accomplish system seismic analysis. (79-14) 03/1980 - 02/1981 Principal Engineer on Equipment Qualifications Projects. (79-01B)

Responsible for calculation of doses to equipment from recirculating fluids after a LOCA. Use of QAD-PSA and ORIGEN programs to perform integrated exposure l calculations for seven stations.

Provided training in all regional offices with regards to the application and use of computer codes in the calculation of integrated exposure to equipment.  !

09/1978 - 03/1980 Saint Thomas Aquinas High School

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-Instructor of college preparatory courses.in Biology, Chemistry and Introductory Physics. Responsible for development of new curriculum.

Basketball coach.

09/1977 - 09/1978 Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation Boston, Massachusetts Assisted-in the design of plant radiation shielding and maintaining occupational radiation exposure ALARA.

Provide assistance in marketing engineering services with regards to mini-computer applications in the areas oof effluent dose assessment, health physics exposure management, and waste management. Traveled with PDP-11/03 system to demonstrate capabilities ~in these areas.

01/1975 - 09/1977 CIS Radiopharmaceuticals Incorporated Bedford, Massachusetts Production Manager responsible for production of diagnostic radioisotopes, scheduling of employees and evaluation of employee performance.

Promoted to Research and Development Department. Responsible for developing and refining radioimmune assay testing techniques.

08/1967 - 01/1971 United States Navy l

Completed Polaris Electronics "A" School I (26 weeks), and Missile Technician "C" School (37 weeks). Served as a Missile Technician on board a Nuclear Submarine.

Responsibilities included: Operations, ,

testing and repair of missile guidance computer systems, and related environmental systems.

REGISTRATIONS State of New Hampshire certification to instruct Secondary Sciences.

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r}J SHORT BIOGRAPHY RICHARD H. STROME CURRENT: Director of the New Hampshire Office of Emergency j Management since January,1983 i PAST: Senior Administrative Assistant to the President of the New Hampshire Senate in charge of operations. Science Advisor to the New Hampshire Senate.

Retired Military Officer (USAF) with broad experience while-on active duty in command responsibilities, research and development, aircraft and missile operations, as well as maintenance staff functions. Member of Disaster Practice Evaluation team at Pease Air Force Base and graduate of the Air Force Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Hazard School.

EDUCATION: Bachelor of Science, Cum Laude, U.N.H. with majors in che-mistry and biological sciences. Graduate studies in phy-siology, anatomy, histology, as well as graduate studies in industrial management.

PUBLICATIONS: Classified operations manuals and research plans.

AWARDS & CITATIONS: Distinguished. Flying Cross, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal (7), etc.

SECURITY: Top Secret, cryptographic.

AVOCATIONS: Fish and wildlife management.

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s RESUME MICHAEL C. SINCLAIR ,

Aidikoff Associates j 107 Barry Lane Syosset, NY Professional Experience:

l Emergency Management and Planning  !

Government Administration Community Relations Journalism Public Relations and Media Communications Politics Photography i

Employments.

MARCH 1987- Emergency planning specialist, Aidikoff Present Associates, Inc. Subcontractor for off-site emergency response plan development at New Hampshire Yankee's Seabrook Station. Specific activities relating to: design of implementing procedures and the development of resources for the evacuation transportation component; coordination of notification procedures for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing; development of letters of agreement; and coordination of supporting roles of various state government agencies.

December 1985 Emergency Planning Consultant, HMM Associates, March 1987 Concord, MA. Specialist in developing implementing procedures for state and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans. Project assignments include NH Yankee's Seabrook Station.

Boston Edison's Pilgrim Station, and Georgia Power's Vogtle Plant. Work has involved off-site response plan development with state and local governments in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maine, Georgia and South Carolina; trainina program design and instruction; and drill support, controller activities and post-drill plan revisions.

June 1984- Director of Agency Coordination, New Hampshire Job December 1985 Training Coordinating Council, Manchester, NH.

Responsible for manacement oversight of various activities under the federal Job Training Partnership Act (providing employment training opportunities for the economically disadvantaged and handicapped) and acting as liaison between government agencies and private sector employers.

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Sinclair, Michael December 1982- Graystone Associates: Self-employed emergency Present management planning consultant, assisting private industry in the development of emergency operations and disaster contingency plans, providing administrative-level disaster management training. Developed a comprehensive emergency management plan for a maior defense contractor with facilities at seven locations in southern New Hampshire, Rhode Island'and New York.

April 1983- Emergency Planning Specialist, Federal Emergency

. June, 1984: Management Agency, Region I, Boston, MA.

Assistant to the Regional Director, assigned to develop-and promote FEMA's Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) concept of an all-hazards approach to community-based emergency planning in the six New England states.

December 1982- Consultant to the Vermont Department of Public April, 1983: Safety, Office of Civil Defense.

Analyzed deficiencies in the state's Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

Developed and secured legislative support for a program to train state and local emergency response personnel involved in handling hazardous materials transportation accidents.

August, 1980- Secretary of Civil and Military Affairs and Press November, 1982: Secretary to the Governor, State of Vermont. One of six members of Governor Richard A. Snelling's personal staff and a cabinet-level administrator.

Responsible for management oversight of the Vermont National Guard and Office of Civil Defense and Emergency Management; state extradition L officer and executive pardon screening officer.

Media contact for the Governor's office and supervisor of overall state government public relations activities. Liaison to state departments of Education, Public Safety, Public Service, Corrections, Welfare, Social Services and others on specific issues. Governor's Legislative liaison with the 1981 Vermont General Assembly.

Intergovernmental relations contact with the New l England Governor's Conference and the National Governors Association during the Governor's terms as chairman of both groups.

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Sinclair, Michael 1973-1980: Statehouse Correspondent for WCAX-TV, Burlington, VT. Senior statehouse journalist responsible for daily coverage of state government activities, the state legislature and statewide politics.

1966-1973: Supervising editor, writer, and photographer: The Associated Press, Montpelier, Vermont; Albany, NY; and Hartford, Connecticut. Supervised daily production by staffs of reporters, writers and photographers delivering news material for newspapers and broadcast outlets throughout the northeastern states.

1961-1966: Radio and television news positions in Rhode Island. New York, Massachusetts, Tennessee and Vermont.

Outside Activities:

Elected member of the Barre City (VT) Board of School Commissioners, 1977-1981; Board Chairman, 1981. Labor contract negotiator, 1979-1981 contracts with teachers, para-professionals and custodial employees. Chairman of the board's committees on Policy, Budget, and Facilities.

Vermont School Boards Association, Area Chairman, Washington-Orange, 1980-1981; Association Treasurer, 1980.

Member, Vermont Chapter, Nationa] Alliance of Business Advisory Board, appointed by the Governor, 1979-1981.

President, Vermont Protection and Advocacy, Inc.,

a federally-funded program of legal counseling and other support services for the handicapped, 1978-1981.

Member, Vermont College of Nursing Advisory Board, 1979-1982.

Member, Board of Directors, Merrimack Adult Communty Center, Merrimack, NH (Fund-raising and public relations).

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.Sinclair, Michael Free-lance writer; lecturer on journalism and the media in secondary and post-secondary schools, for civic organizations and private industry groups; public relations and media consultant for political and community-based organizations; professional photographer with experience in 35mm stil]'and 16 mm SOF film and 1/2" and 3/4" videotape field production.

Proficient in use of personal computers / word processing equipment, including Wang, DEC, IBM-PC, and Apple Macintosh. Typing speed: 60 wpm.

Personal:

Married; two grown sons; two step-daughters.

References availabic upon request.

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John D. Bonds 21 Shaker Rd.

Concord, NH 03301 l

EDUCATION 1970-1973 American International College; Springfield, MA BA with High Honors, Political Science 1973-1974 University of New Hampshire; Durham, NH Graduate Study, Political Science and International Relations EXPERIENCE 1975-1978 Public Information/ Education Coordinator, Alcohol Safety Action Project, Division of Public Health Services 1978-1981 Program Manager, Supplemental Food Program, Division of Public Health Services 1981- Present Assistant Director for Planning, Division of Public Health Services MILITARY EXPERIENCE 1965-1970 Senior Analyst, (Communications Security)

U. S. Army Security Agency 1965-1966 - Fort Devens, MA 1967-1968 - Canal Zone, Panama 1968-1970 - Viet Nam OTHER EXPERIENCE 1972-1973 Undergraduate Assistant, Political Science Department, i American International College Researcher / Intern, History Department, American f International College l 1

1 1973 I.enislative Intern, General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts l l

1973 Member, Board of Directors Hampshire County (MA) ACLU 1978-1979 Member, Concord (NH) United Way Funding Review Panel 1984-1986 President, Concord Chapter, Audobon Society of New Hampshire l

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RESUME WILLIAM F. RENZ 22 Spartan Arrow Road Littleton, Massachusetts 01460 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Affiliated with Aldikoff Associates since January, 1987:

Emergency Planning Specialist Present Assignment: New Hampshire Yankee, Seabrook Station, presently assigned to the Licensing and Hearing Support Group. While located at the Seabrook Station, I have been responsible for several special assignments. These include supporting the development of a summary of personnel resources available to State and local emergency response organizations resulting from an ongoing personnel resource assessment program; participating in the development of various licensing and planning efforts; participating in precedure development and revision as part of the NHRERP Rev. 2 process; providing technical review of various technical and legal papers; and participating in the develop-ment of a strategy for a utility-sponsored offsite emergency response capability.

With HMM Associates May 1986 - December 1986:

Project Manager and Senior Planner Directed and participated in projects involving emergency response plans, procedures, exercises, drills and training activities.

Principle assignment was providing technical support to the Seabrook Station emergency planning effort.

With the Long Island Lighting Company 1978 - 1986:

Manager, Technical Support and Eculpment & Facilities Division, Local Emergency Response Implementing Organization (Special Assignment January 1984 - May 1986)

I supervised 14 professional personnel who were responsible for the development and implementation of a Local Emergency Response Plan.

This is a unique planning situation. Due to County and State non-participation in emergency preparedness for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, utility personnel perform functions that would otherwise be i

performed by County and State agencies.

4 Manager, Equipment & Facilities Division, Local Emergency Response Implementing Organization (Special Assignment May 1983 - January 1984)

I supervised a staff of 10 and administered a budget of 1.3 million dollars. Under my supervision, this division established five offsite emergency response facilities and equipped each facility with com- i munications, radiological monitoring, traffic guidance. and other equipment.

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WILLIAM F. RENZ Professional Experience (continued)

Offsite Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (February 1983 - May 1986)

Supervisor, Offs}te Emergency Preparedness, Nuclear Operations Support Department (February 1985 - May 1986)

Concurrent with the above special assignments, I supervised the Offsite Emergency Preparedness Section of the Nuclear Operations Support Department and administered a budget of $3.2 million. I have provided expert testimony on all emergency notification and communication related contentions and have supervised discovery in LILCO's recent Atomic Safety & Licensing Board hearings on emergency planning for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. I was responsible for emergency noti-fication and communication systems and for directing and coordinating support from other company departments. I served as the Emergency Planning Advisor #1 in the onsite response organization. I was also responsible for negotiations with outside organizations, such as New York State, U.S. Coast Guard, State of Connecticut, etc.

Environmental Scientist - Licensing (November 1980 - February 1983)

I drafted the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan. The onsite emergency communication and notification systems and the Prompt Notification System were designed and installed under my supervision.

In addition, I later developed or directed the development of approxi-mately 60% of the onsite emergency plan implementing procedures and assisted in the development and implementing of the onsite emergency plan training program. While reporting directly to the Manager of the Nuclear Licensing Division, I was responsible for miscellaneous licensing issues.

Field Inspector - Underground Lines Department (July 1979 - November 1980)

System Mapper - System Engineering Department (December 1978 - July 1979)

EDUCATION l Polytechnic Institute of New York, Brooklyn, New York Master of Science Degree, Technology Management and Business Administration,

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l August 1984 j The George Washington University, Washington. D.C.

! Bachelor of Science, Oceanography, May 1977 l C/CC2086.1 1

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PROFESSIONAL TRAJNING

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Harvard University School of Public Health, Boston, MA ';

Environmental Radiological Surveillance, July 1983 Niagara Mohawk Corporation, NY Transportation of Radiological Materials, February 1983 I

Federal. Emergency Management Agency Emmitsburg, MD e Radiological Emergency Planning Seminar, June 1981 General Physics Corporation, Pottstown, PA Boiling Water Reactor Technology Course. February 1981 <

COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES e

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Member of Glen Cove Board of Zoning Appeals, Glen Cove, New York, 1985-1986. i Member of the LILCO Speaker's Bureau, 1983-1986.

TESTIMONY PROVIDED Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board - United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission; in the Matter of Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1):

1. Emergency Notification; Contentions EP 26A, C, D and E. (3/20/84)

2. Notification to Public; Contentions EP 55, 56, 57 and 59. (3/27/84)

3. Loss of Offsite Power; Contentions 98, 94 and 95. (4/3/84)

4. EmergencyCoAmunications;ContedtjonsEP 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and St.

(4/3/84) '

5. Emergency Plan Training; contentions EP 39.A. .B. 40, 41, 44.D. .E. .F.

98, 99.C. .G, 100.B. .D. .G, . H. .N. (6/14/84)

6. U.S. Department of Energy Communications: Contention EP'33. (7/20/84) J

7. Letter of Agreement with Connecticut - Supplemental Testimony; Contention 24.R. (7/20/84)

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CURRICULUM VITAE - 1987 NAME: William T. Wallace, Jr., M.D., M.P.H. NH License #5537 4 ADDRESS: RFD 2 Box 270, Contoocook, NH 03229

]U ' TEL. No. (603) 746-3831 NATIONALITY: United States Citizen A DATE OF BIRTH: May 17, 1935

,HARITAL STATUS: Married with three children, ages 20, 23, 26

• • 7 EDUCATION:

-l Qualification Date School High School 1953 Littleton High School Littleton, NH A.B. 1957 Boston Univ. College

"" of Liberal Arts Boston, MA

3. [

t M.D. 1961 Univ. of Vermont College of Medicine Burlington, VT D.T.M. & H. 1965 London Univ.

School of Tropical Medicine London England M.P.H. 1969 Johns Hopkins Univ.

School of Public Health & Hygiene Baltimore, MD EXPERIENCE Internship 1961-1962 Methodist Hospital of Indiana Indianapolis, IN Military 1962-1964 U.S.P.H.S. Div. of Indian Health Hastings Hospital Tahlequah, OK n

Missionary Medicine 1965-1968 General Medicine &

Public Health Ganta United Methodist Hosp.

Ganta, Liberia j

1969-1972 Medical Director Ganta United Methodist Hosp.

Ganta, Liberia I

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!-/ Public Health 1969-1972 County Public Health Officer -Ministry of Health, Republic of Liberia 1972-1973 Centers for Disease Control Atlanta, GA (informal study) 1973-1976 (Seconded to)

Ministry of Health &

Social Welfare Monrovia, Liberia Postion: Director of Medical Services July 1976- Director Boreau January 1978 of Crippled Children's Services Div. of Public Health Concord , NH January 1978- Deputy Health Officer February 1981 Div. of Public Health Se rvic e s-De pt . of Health & Welfare Concord, NH l

February 1981- Acting Director July 1981 Div. of Public Health Services - Dept. of Health & Welfare Concord, NH August 1981- Director of Public Present Health Services Dept. of Health &

Welfare Concord, NH 1

1 PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS:

American College of Preventive Medicine - 1973 Election as Fellow American Public Health Association Liberian Medical Association

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• NH Medical Society )

.i National Council for International Health j l

New England Public Health Association- Officer OTHER,ASSOCIAT10NS:-1984 Board of Directors- NH Lung Association Manchester, NH Board of Directors- Concord Regional Visiting Nurse Association Concord , NH Professional Advisory Easter Seals, Rehabilitation Center Commit tee Manchester, NH Covernor's Commission New Hampshire for the Handicapped Acid Rain Coordinating New Hampshire Committee ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS Adjunct Associate Professor Health Administration and Planning School of Health Studies University of New Hampshire Adjunct Professor Community & Family Medicine Dartmouth Medical School WTW:p

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FSAR April 1986 l i

l JAMES A. MacDONALD RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSME.VI MANAGER Mr. tiarDonald received his Associate in Nuclear Engineering from Uentworth Institute in 1965, his Bachelor of Science in Nuclear Engineering from Lowell .

Technological Institute in 1968, and his Master of Science in Radiological Health from Harvard University in 1970. In the summer of 1969 he completed the Health Physics Training Program sponsored by Brookhaven National Laboratory and the USAEC.

While completing the last three years of his undergraduate studies, Mr.

MacDonald worked for Sanders Nuclear Corporation in Nashua, New Hamsphire as an Engineering Assistant. {

His time was devoted to performing analytical design of various syste=s employing radioisotopes as heat sources. This work included the feasibility evaluation of the application of radioisotopes for these systems and devices by analytically designing and ootimizing fuel capsules, energy conversion systems, and shielding.

In addition, Mr. MacDonald worked on establishing and implementing a facility radiation safety program. This included work on the design and licensing of a remote-handling hot cell and a radiochemistry laboratory.

. Mr. MacDonald joined Yankee-Westboro in May of 1970 as an engineer within the Radiation Protection Section. In this capacity, Mr. hacDonald assisted in obtaining plant operating licenses in the artas of radioactivity source term analysis and dose evaluations, environmental radiological monitoring emergency planning, and in-plant radiation protection programs.

In September of 1972, Mr. MacDonald transferred to the Safety Analysis Section where he worked in the tource term and dose evaluation areas. These evaluations were perform > d for radioactivity releases associated with normal plant operation and for releases associated with accident conditions.

In October of 1973, Mr. MacDonald was aepointed to the position of Manager of the Radiation Protection Group. In this capacity, Mr. MacDonald directed the activities of the group which include both licensing assistance in the radiation protection area for plants under design and construction and oper-ational health physics assistance for operating plants.

Mr. MacDonald joined Public Service Company of New Hampshire in August of 1983 as Radiological Assessuent Manager with the responsibility for implementation of the Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan.

Mr. MacDonald is a national and New England chapter member of the Health Physics Society and is certified in the field of health physics by the American Board of Health Physics.

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'f Resume of Work Experience and Educational Background i

William N. Colburn 200 Boyce Road Canterbury, NH 03224 Work Experience 6/22/84-present Coordinator of Emergency Services New Hampshire Division of Human Services (DHS)

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)

Develop / maintain plans for several emergency services functions assigned to the DHHS; train volunteer staff to carry out specific tasks related to these services; manage staff during exercises and implementation of these programs.

5/12/75-6/22/84 Staff Development / Training Specialist New Hampshire Division of Human Services /DHHS g

Responsible for development and implementation of training programs for agency staff.

3/6/70-5/12/75 Assistant Director of Assistance Payments New Hampshire Division of Welfare (now Human Services)

Responsible for administering the program for eligibility determinations for financial and medical assistance under the State public assis'tance programs.

NOTE: Other work experience includes:

Supervisor of Work Experience / Training Program Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor Disability Determination Adjudicator Occupational Therapist i

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William N. Colburn Page 2

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Educational Backaround Northeastern University Graduated 6/58 Boston, Massachusetts School of Liberal Arts (Sociology major; Psychology minor)

Northeastern University Graduate School of Education Boston, Massachusetts 12 Sem. Hours - 1958-1959 Boston University Graduate School of Education Boston, Massachusetts 9 Sem. Hours - 1960-1963 University of New Hampshire " Individual Testing" 4 Sem. Hours - 1962-1963 Durham, New Hampshire Northeastern University Graduate School of Education Boston, Massachusetts " Group Development" 3 Sem. Hours - 1964-1965

( Special Seminars:

" Individual / Family Grant Workshops" - 1984 and 1987 National Emergency Training Center Emmitsbury, Maryland NOTE: Numerous other work-related seminars and courses not listed here.

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. ), y Wanda E. Biser 73 Intervale Road Wilton, N.H. 03086 Experiences 1985-present ' Granite State Independent Deaf Services Living Foundation Coordinator Concord, N.H.

1983-1985 Macomb Oakland Region Ctr. Sign Language Pontiac, Michigan Instructor 1979-1982 West Hills Jr. High School Paraprofessional West Bloomfield, Michigan Teacher for Hearing Impaired 1974-1979 Waterford Adult Education Sign Language Troy. Adult Education Instructor Pontiac, Michigan 1969-1973 Lap Value Enterprises, Inc. Key Punch Dayton, Ohio Operator

- 1967-1969 National Geographic Society Key Punch Washington, D. C. Operator Education:

1965 Graduate, Colonel White H.S.

Dayton, Ohio 1965-1966 Gallaudet University - 1 year Washington, D. C.

1966 Graduate, Business Institute Sch.

Dayton, Ohio Skills: Work with deaf people, typing, set up sign language classes, and experience writing reports Community ~

Services:

2 years Chairperson of Community Services for the-Hearing Impaired (Advisory Board), Pontiac, Michigan l:

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Y i-p 4 years Member of this service 6 years Active member of Parents Group and Southeast Michigan Association of Parents of the Deaf Presently:

• Board of N..H. Association of the Deaf (NHAD)

• Member of National Association of the Deaf (NAD)

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Member of Consumer Advisory Committee, N.H.

• Member of New Hampshire Registry of Interpreter for the Deaf (NHRID)

• Chairperson of Advisory Committee on Deafness, New Hampshire

• Board of Gallaudet University Regional Ctr., in Haverhill, Massachusetts, for eight states.

• Member of G.S.I.L.F.

• Member of Self Help for Hard of Hearing (SHHH)

• Ifwas first deaf juror on a murder case in Michigan for threeLweeks.

• - Judge for Miss Deaf Michigan Pageant, 1985-87

• Judge for Miss Deaf Mass. Pageant, 1987-89 1

• Judge for Miss Deaf Maine Pageant, 1987-89 l

• I was delegate for N. H. at National Association of the Deaf Convention, Salt Lake City, Utah, (1986) for one 1 week 1

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M Professional Qualifications of Gary J. Catapano President, A11comm Inc.

My name is Gat y J. Catapano and my business address is A11Comm Inc.,

Rt. 32, 381 Old Homestead Highway, North Swanzey, NH 03431. I am the Presi-dent of A11Comm Inc., a company specializing in design of emergency communi-cations systems founded by me in July of 1984.

I am certified by the National Association of Radio and Telecommunica-tions Engineers (NARTE) as Communications Engineer with special skill endorse-ments in three areas: Land Mobile Systems, Land Mobile Interference and Analysis and Suppression, and Inside Plant Telephone Engineering. I am also a senior member of NARTE.

I hold a " Lifetime" FCC General Class Radiotelephone Engineering license and I am certified as an R.F. Engineering Technician by the National Associa-tion of Business and Educational Radio (NAEER). I am also a member of NABERS Professional Mobile Radio Service Section.

I have studied electrical engineering at Suffolk Community College and other related curriculum at Keene State College and Nathaniel Hawthorne College.

I am a 1970 graduate of L.A. Wilson Tech where I studied Radio and Television Elec.ronic Communications.

I have additional special education in the following areas: microwave fI radio system design, telephone systems, telephone systems traffic theory and l network design. I have also participated in 14 special training seminars covering all aspects of the land mobile communications field. I have deve-loped engineering programs to aid in the prediction and elimination of the harmful interference caused by undesired radio transmissions.

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~4 Since July of 1985 my company has been employed by New Hampshire Yankee to conduct an evaluation of the communications networks utilized by the communities involved with the Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Response Plan. I assumed the lead responsibility for this project which consisted of four phases. The objectives of Phase 1 were to study and identify the types of systems currently in place and identify existing problem areas.

This first phase involved extensive field work and interviews with public safety officials of the states, counties, and local municipalities. Phase 2 involved the analysis of this information in order to determine the effect that the additional RERP communications would have on the existing systems and to formulate the engineering changes. Subsequent meetings were held again with pubite safety officials to review the recommendations. Phase 3 involved the installation test and debug of all of the equipment. Phase 4 will 1nvolve further refinement of these systems, documentation and training.

Prior to my beginning this project my firm assisted Vermont Yankee in the relocction of their Emergency Operations Facility to its new location.

My responsibility was for the design and installation of the radio communica-tions systems for this facility and to minimize and eliminate any inte'rference that resulted from the co-location of communications facilities. We also performed this same function for Yankee Atomic Electric Company's emergency operations facility for the Rowe, MA Nuclear Power Plant. As part of this current project I have assisted'the utility and the State of New Hampshire with design and installation of the commu'nications networks for the emergency operations facility and the State's Incident Field Uffice. We also provided the same assistance to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Prior to my founding A11Comm Inc. I was employed as the General Manager 4

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of HEW Communications, Inc; as part of my duties while at HEW April of 1981 to the August of 1982 I was the project manager and engineer for the design and installation of the emergency communications systems that form the back-bone of the public notification system and emergency communications networks for 34 municipalities and 3 state civil defense agencies involved with the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant and Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Rowe, MA Nuclear Power Plant. This project involved an assessment of the existing communications capabilities, extensive interviews with local public safety officials, the design of new communications systems and integration with exist-ing' systems. I had the lead responsibility for the entire project including l

L the training and documentation which included two comprehensive technical manuals which provide the foundation for the utilities FEMA-43 submittals.

During the initial phase of this project much of the existing guidance for.

the design of public notification systems and emergency communications systems did not exist. I provided technical support to Yankee Atomic Electric Company in drafting comments to FEMA's proposed guidance for the acceptance of alert and notification systems.

As part of this project I also designed a special system in cooperation with NOAA (National Weather Service) which links vital information from the .

National Weather Service offices in Burlington, Vermont to over 8,000 Alert

. receivers located approximately 100 miles away in some of the residences within

- the Emergency Planning Zones of both plants. This system operates 24. hours, 365 days a year.

My firm currently has the responsibility for the surveillance and main-f_

tenance programs for these systems. Since early,1982 they have been in opera-tion functioning with a very high percentage of operability (over 99%).

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I have also participated in six full scale federally witnessed emergency l

exercises and many numerous full scale drills providing communications support (troubleshooting, diagnosis and emer8ency repair) to the utilities and state agencies. My firm currently provides these emergency communications support services to three nuclear power facilities in New England.

Prior to the Seabrook project, while at A11Comm and HEW, I had been called in as an expert to " debug" many types of communications systems that were not functioning as intended. Also during this time I designed and in-stalled many types of electronic communications systems. This work included local projects for state agencies, electric utilities, county governments, public safety agencies and regional fire mutual aid compacts, business and industrial concerns. With divestiture of the Bell System this work grew to include the design and installation of telephone networks and increasing liaison work with the Bell Operation Company (NYNEX). I currently hold tech-nical certifications for four different manufacturers of telephone systems including two sophisticated PABX systems.

From 1977 to 1979 while at HEW, I was the senior communications technician with the lead responsibility for the maintenance and preventative maintenance and system debug for a public safety communications network that spanned portions of three states and encompassed three counties and included 52 muni -

cipalities. l 1

All of my prior employment dating back to 1965 include positions of increasing responsibility in the electronics field. The study of electronic communications has been a lifelong pursuit for me dating back to early child-hood.

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i GORDON R. DERMAN j Education:

U.S. Army Correspondence Courses, 1953 Babson College B.S. 1958, M.B.A. 1963 Massachusetts Assessors School-Instructor j Maine Assessors Mapping Course-Lecturer Rhode Island Assessors Mapping Course-Lecturer  ;

New Hampshire Assessors Mapping Course-Lecturer I Several I.A.A.0. Courses and Seminars - Qualified as an Instructor -

Massachusetts Appraisal Professional Affiliation:

American Society of Photogrammetry American Congress of Surveying and Mapping Societte Nationale de Photogrammetrie Comite International de Photogrammetrie Architectural  ;

National Executive Committee of the Legislative Council for '

Photogrammetry (former) Chairman - Ethics Commission Close Range Photogrammetry Committee of the American Society of Photogrammetry National Association of Environmental Professionals Massachusetts Association of Assessing Officers Northeast Regional Association of Assessing Officers International Association of Assessing Officers Professional Experience: (30 Years)

Mr. Derman was the first practicing photogranmetrist in New England to become a Crtified Professional Photogrammetrist (Certificate #340).

He has det- d3d and wpervised thousands of mapping projects throughout the U.S. an'd abroad. He compiled the first " Aerial Mapping Guide" for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Bureau of Local Assessment and has received several awards including special Commendations fro.m General H.C. Coverdale for the U.S. Government and the Honorable Yoshikazo Imai for the Japanese Ministry of Finance. He was awarded the "Most Noble Order of the Crown" by General Vichit Ranjva, Director of the Royal Thai Survey Department, and special Commendations from the Government of Korea.

In 1983 he was elected Assessor in Braintree and has since been appointed Chairman of the Braintree Board. He also was elected to the Executive Committee of the Norfolk-Suffolk County Assessors Association. In Feoruary of 1986, he was appointed to the Mapping Task Force of the IAA0. Mr. rerman has qualified to testify before the Superior Courts in Massachusetts as an expert witness in Photogrammetry and in Photo Interpretation. He holds the designation M. A. A.

(Massachusetts Accredited Assessor)

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JOHN W. BAER 1

Experience March 1987 to Present- Affiliated with.Aidikoff' Associates, Syosset, New York Present Assignment: New-Hampshire Yankee, Seabrook Station. Responsibilities:

Participate in development of New Hampshire's radiological emergency response program for.Seabrook Station and provide technical assistance related to licensing / hearing proceedings.

1981 to March 1987 Schneider/EC Planning & Management Services Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Senior Consultant. Responsible for providing program supervision and technical assistance to project staff.

Assigned responsibility for emergency preparedness planning, procedure preparation, personnel training, drill / exercise preparation, licensing support, and scheduling and coordinating project work with the client. Recent project assignments have included:

managing project team efforts in development of New Hampshire's radiological emergency response program in support of Seabrook Station and providing technical assistance in support of licensing proceedings.

managing New Hampshire RERP project j team efforts in preparation for the 1986 Seabrook Station graded exercise:

managing the offsite radiological I emergency preparedness programs for the Counties of Ashtabula, Geauga and Lake (Ohio) to support response to incidents at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant including establishing operational readiness of county emergency

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• 4 John W. Baer Page 2 operations centers, offsite drill and exercise preparation and ASLB hearing support; managing the offsite radiological emergency preparedness re-training program to support response to incidents at the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station; coordinating the radiological emergency preparedness program to support response to incidents at the Callaway Plant including direct responsibility for revision of-the Missouri State Nuclear Accident Plan and associated local radiological emergency response plans, preparation of affidavits to support motions for summary disposition of licensing contentions, development of local RERP implementing procedures, establishing operational readiness of local emergency operations centers, development of emergency response training programs for local EOC staff officers and' emergency workers, and development / conduct of the offsite drill and exercise program; evaluating and preparing revisionc to the station and offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans in support of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; development of the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness implementing procedures in support of the Waterford 3 Steam electric Station; and preparation of lesson plans and conduct of training pr, grams for state, county and local emergency response personnel in support of the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Station.

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John W. Baer Page.3 1973 to 1980 Southcentral Regional Planning Council Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Director. Responsible for administration of an eight-county planning and evaluation program for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Assisted local governments in planning a development of criminal justice / emergency response communications and, automated information systems.

Developed and reviled training courses in data' analysis for use by planning and operational personnel at the state and local. government level. Assisted with delivery of six 35-hour training sessions for criminal justice personnel within a ten-state region. Developed and conducted practical group exercises for course participants.

Planner (1973 to 1978). Assisted local governments in planning and development of a range of criminal justice programs, criminal justice system communications and automated information, systems.

1971 to 1973 Lord Fairfax Planning District Commission Front Royal, Virginia Planner. Performed general planning tasks, including criminal justice and emergency response planning for a five-county region of Northern Virginia.

1966 to 1968 U.S. Department of Defense Fort Meade, Maryland Security Specialist. Evaluated security measures for a federal security agency.

Provided recommendations for security requirements. Top secret / crypto security clearance.

Education 1970 Post Graduate Study - Public Administration American University Washington, D.C.

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John W. Baer Page 4 l 1

1966 B.A., Political Science l Western Maryland College Westminster, Maryland ,

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ij March 1987 BELL, DONALD W. SENIOR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY ENGINEER NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND LICENSING DIVISION EDUCATION University of Massachusetts - Bachelor of Science, Chemical Engineering 1954 Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology 1956 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute - Master of Science, Mechanical Engineering (minor in Management) 1960 Fourteen Graduate Courses beyond M.S.

MIT Reactor Safety Course 1982 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) Engineering and Management Courses:

• Health Physics Certification Review Course - Spring 1982

• Basic Radiological Safety - March 1982

• CRAC2 Computer Program Workshop - January 1983

• Making Effective Presentations - May 1983

• Introduction to Network-Based Planning and Scheduling - August 1983

• Project Simulation Workshop - November 1983 LICENSES AND REGISTRATIONS Professional Engineer (Nuclear) - Massachusetts Teaching Certificate (Mathematics, Chemistry and Physics) - Massachusetts EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

Mr. Bell has 18 years of experience in the nuclear industry and 15 years of teaching experience. Presently, as Senior Engineer in the Radiological Engineering Group of the Nuclear Technology and Licensing Division, he is providing training and other emergency planning services to utilities.

Prior to this assignment, he has worked on post-TMI syistems and severe accident consequence studies as a Senior Scientist in the Nuclear Safety and Upgrading Group.

Mr. Bell's prior industrial experience includes engineering of nuclear outer space power systems and plasma physics research on thermionic converters for United Aircraf t Research Laboratories and supervisor of thermal and hydrau-lic design of military and commercial nuclear reactors for Combustion Engineering. He alrr. performed experimental design work for Pratt & Whitney aircraft on the nuclear powered airplane project and performed reactor component tests at the Savannah River Project.

Additionally, ." r . Bell served for six years as the Deputy Director of Civil Defense in the town of Yarmouth and was qualified as its Radiological Defense Officer.

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PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS American Nuclear Society - Member National Education Association - Life Member Toastmasters International - Charter Member, Sk'EC Toastmasters Massachusetts Radiological Defense Officers Society PUBLICATIONS "Offsite Emergency Plan Development and Maintenance Considerations" (March 1987)

" Emergency Planning Considerations for "pecialty Chemical Plants" (August 1986)

" Post-Accident Sampling System Dilution Loop Studies" (November 1984)

" Correlation of Burnout Heat-Flux Data at 2000 psia" "An Evaluation of the In-Radiator Approach to Nuclear-Thermionic Space q Power Systems"

" Spectroscopic Observations of an Arc-Mode Cesium Thermionic Converter"

" Effects of Inert Gas Overpressure on Arc Characteristics" "The Relationship Between the Output Characteristics of an Arc-Mode Thermionic Converter and the Properties of the Neutralization Plasma" PATENT U.S. Patent No. 3,376,437 -

Thermionic Conversion Means -

April 2, 1968 i

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DETAILED EXPERIENCE RECORD BELL, DONALD W. 05823 STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION, BOSTON, MA (Dec 1981 to Present)

Appointments Senior Nuclear Technology Engineer - Feb 1984 Senior Nuclear Technology Scientist - Dec 1981 Nuclear Technology and Licensing Division Staff (Dec 1981 to Present)

As SENIOR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY ENGINEER in the Radiological Engineering Group, provided offsite emergency planning services to Northeast Utilities in the

-areas of training and emergency plan revision for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station and the Haddam Neck Plant. Trained emergency workers located in the 10-mile EPZ Communities in the basics of radiation, use of radiation equipment, decontamination, and record keeping. Provided assistance in the scheduling of training sessions and refinement of training program content.

Also provided procedure development and review training in the operation of l the Public Alerting System siren encoder to appropriate officials in the EPZ Communities and in five Regional Activation Centers. Assisted EPZ communi- I ties in developing procedures for their personnel and vehicle decontamina-tion centers. Also provided assistance in the revision of Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the State of Connecticut, 28 EPZ Communities and seven Host Communities.

Recently, for New Hampshire Yankee, performed a study to identify potential shelters in the beach areas near the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.

Currently performing a similar study for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

Also provided emergency planning assistance to DOE's Savannah River Plant including participation as a controller in the March 12, 1987 exercise.

In the area of chemical emergency planning, assisting BP Oil in emergency plan evaluation for their Marcus Hook refinery in Pennsylvania, following state and federal legislative requirements, and- assisted in an AICh E-sponsored course on emergency response planning for fixed chemical facilities.

As SENIOR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY SCIENTIST in the Nuclear Safety and Upgrading Group, concerned with post-TMI systems such as post-accident s ampling systems and other topics related to NUREG-0737 and Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2. Also, worked on various studies of effects of reduced accident source terms, including coordinator of severe accident health consequence study for Florida Power & Light Co. In addition, assisted in coordination efforts for the SWEC in-house Problem Report System and SWEC participation in the INPO Nuclear NOTEPAD Computer Conferencing System.

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! DENNIS YARMOUTH REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, SOUTH YARMOUTH, MA l (Sept 1966-Dec 1981) l As PHYSICS TEACHER, class enrollment was more than three times the national overage.

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A UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION RESEARCH LABORATORIES, EAST HARTFORD, CT (1961-1966)

Plasma Physics Group (1963-1966)

As - RESEARCH SCIENTIST, performed experimental and design work related to thermionic converters, particularly spec,troscopic measurements and analysis of cesium plasma in arc-mode thermionic converters. Developed;a patent for-. '

the improvement of thermionic converter efficiency.

Research Engineering _ Group (1961-1963)

As RESEARCH ENGINEER, performed engineering parametric studies of nuclear-thermionic space power systems.

COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC., NUCLEAR DIVISION, WINDSOR, CT (1957-1961)

. Advanced Design and Development Department (1959-1961)

As SUPERVISOR in the THERMAL and HYDRAULIC DESIGN GROUP, responsible for thermal and hydraulic design of advanced pressurized water reactors and liaison between nuclear and mechanical design groups.

SIC Project (1957-1959)

As NUCLEAR ENGINEER, performed transient thermal and hydraulic analyses of the SIC submarine reactor. Also participated on the Joint KAPL-Bettis-CE Task Force on Thermal and Hydraulic Criteria for Naval Re % rs.

PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT, CANEL, MIDDLETOWN, CT (1955 1957)

As SUPERVISOR in the NUCLEAR ANALYSIS GROUP, respon sible for it.'tegration of all phases of core design for reactor in clos e .i-cycle nuc' ear ' powered airplane concept. Also conducted loop tests on various liqu!d metals to determine mass transfer, corrosion and thermal cycling behaviors and per-formed feasibility studies on various liquid and solid fualed reactor concepts for nuclear propulsion of aircraft. Spent one and ene-half years in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, including attendance at the Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology.

E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO., SAVANNAH RIVER PROJECT, AIKEN. SC (1954-1955)

As NUCLEAR ENGINEER, performed light water hydraulic tests on uranium slug-type fuel elements and associated components for the plutonium produc-tion reactors.

TOWN OF YARMOUTH, MA (Aug 1979-Aug 1985)

As DEPUTY DIRECTOR of CIVIL DEFENSE, assisted the Civil Defense Director and attended meetings and workshops, especially those related to nuclear radia-tion. Also, RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OFFICER (Civil Defense RDO Course, May, 1980) 08317-7SW48-B3 2 ,

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ACADEMIC VITAE OF DENNIS S. MILETI September, 1987 PERSONAL Office:

Department of Sociology Hazards Assessment Laboratory Colorado State University Aylesworth Hall Fort Collins, Colorado 80523 Colorado State University (303) 491-5951 or 6045 Fort Collins, Colorado 80523 EDUCATION University of Colorado, Boulder: PhD, Sociology, 1974 California State University, Los Angeles: MA, Sociology, 1971 University of California, Los Angeles: BA, Sociology, 1968 SPECIALIZATIONS Complex Organizations, Applied (Hazards and Policy), Methods APPOINTMENTS 1974-date Faculty, Department of Sociology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins (1985-date, Professor; 1978-1985, Associate Professor; 1974-1978, Assistant Professor).

1984-date Director, Hazards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University, Fort Collins.

1986-date Adjunct Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

1981-year Policy Analyst, Seismic Safety Commission, State of California,-

Sacramento (on leave from university).

1978-1979 Invited Instructor, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chautauqua Short Course Program.

1975-year Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Southern California, Graduate School of Public Administration, Intensive Seminar Program. I 1971-1972 Instructor, Department of Sociology, University of Colorado, Boulder.

AWARDS 1983-1984 Alumni Honor Faculty Award, Colorado State University Alumni Association for excellence in teaching, research and service 1981-year Cited in outstanding Young Men in America

7 1978-1977 Cited for excellence in teaching, research and service by the Dean, College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences MEMBERSHIPS American Sociological Association, International Sociological Association, Pacific Sociological Association, Midwest Sociological Society, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management.

, RESEARCH GRANTS AND CONTRACTS l

1986-1987 Coprincipal Investigator, " Warning Systems: A State of the Art Review,"

subcontract from Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1984-1985 Associate Investigator, " Evacuation Liability Issues," subcontract from Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the U.S.

Department of Energy.

1984-1985 Principal Investigator, " Assessment of Human Stress Impacts from the Livingston Train Derailment and Chemical Emergency," contract for Illinois Central Gulf Railroad.

1984-1985 Associate Investigator,

" State-of-the-Art Assessment:

Evacuation," subcontract from Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1984-1985 Associate Investigator, " International Study of Disaster Impact on Domestic Assets," subcontract from the University of Georgia for the National Science Foundation.

1983-1984 Principal Investigator, "Research and Applications for Emergency Preparedness," contract for Long Island Lighting Company.

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1983-1984 Principal Investigator, " Intended and Forgotten Audiences for Emergency Warnings," quick-response grant from.the Natural Hazards Research Applications and.Information Center.

1982-1983- Associate Investigator, " Organizational Interface for Nuclear Reactor Emergency Preparedness," subcontract from Oak Ridge National Laboratories for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

1981-year Principal Investigator, " Nuclear Hazard Warnings and Emergency Evacuation Preparedness," contract for' Pacific Gas and Electric Company.

1980-1983 ' Principal Investigator, " Local Land Use Policy Decisions," Colorado State University Experiment Station.

1979-1982 Principal Investigator, " Local Land Use Policy Decisions," Colorado State University Experiment Station.

1979-1982 Principal Investigator, " Behavioral Aspects of the Three Mile Island Incident and Re-start," contract for General Public Utilities via Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge.

1977-1980 Principal Investigator, " Migration Impacts of Non-metropolitan Areas in the West", Colorado State University Experiment Station.

1977-1979 Principal Investigator, " Adoption and Organizational Implementation of Policy for Land Use Regulations," grant from the National Science Foundation.

1975-1977 Coprincipal Investigator, Socioeconomic, Organizational and Political Consequences of Earthquake Prediction,"

grant from the National Science Foundation.

1972-1974 Research Sociologist, " Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards," grant from the National Science Foundation.

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COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIPS 1984-1988 National Academy of Science, National Research Council, Commission.on Engineering'and Technical Systems, Committee on Natural Disasters.

1984-1988 National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources, Board on Earth Sciences, Subcommittee on Earthquake Research.

1984-date National Institute of Mental Health, Public Health Service, Center for Mental Health Studies of Emergencies, Advisory.

1983-year National Science Foundation, U.S.

Delegate on Earthquake Prediction Research to Japan, International Scientific Exchange Section.

1983-date Front Range Consortium on Natural Hazards-Studies, Colorado State University, University of Colorado, University of Denver.

1983-date' International Sociological Association, Reseach Committee on Disasters.

1982-1983 Pacific Sociological Association, Nominations Committee for the Standing Committees for 1983.

1982-date Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Chair, Committee on Social Science Research, Berkeley.

1981-1983 U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Advisory Panel on the Earthquake Studies Program.

1981-1982 Pacific Sociological Association, Program Committee for the 1982 Annual Meetings in San Diego.

1981-1982 Governor's Emergency Task Force on Earthquakes, Threat and Reconstruction Committees, State of California, Sacramento.

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o-1980-1981 Governor's Science and Technology Advisory Council, Committee on the Relocation of Uranium Mill Tailings, State of Colorado.

.1979-year American Association for the Advancement of Science, Committee on Intergovernmental.Research and i

Development on Fire Safety and Disaster Preparedness, Washington, D.C.

1976-1978 National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission on Sociotechnical Systems, Committee on Socioeconomic Effects of Earthquake Prediction, Washington, D.C.

BOOKS, MONOGRAPHS AND CHAPTERS Mileti,. Dennis S. 1987. " Stress from Risk Uncertainties,"

Pp. 123-128 in Vincent T. Covello, Lester A. Lane, Alan Moghissi and V.R.R. Uppuluri -(Eds. ) Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and Decision Making. New York: Plenum Press.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1987. " Sociological Methods and Disaster Research." Pp. 57-70 in Russell R. Dynes, B.

de Marchi and C. Pelanda (Eds.) Sociology of Disasters:

Contributions of Sociology to Disaster Research.

Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli Libri.

Sorensen, John H., and Mileti, Dennis S. 1987.

" Programs That Encourage the Adoption of Precautions Against Natural Hazards: Review and Evaluation." Pp.

208-230 in Neil D. Weinstein (Ed.) Taking Care:

Understanding and Encouraging Self-Protective Behavior.

New York: Cambridge.

Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen. 1987. " Natural Hazards and Precautionary Behavior." Pp. 189-207 in Neil D. Weinstein (Ed.) Taking Care: Understanding and Encouraging Self-Protective Behavior. New York:

Cambridge.

Cochrane, Hal, and Dennis S. Mileti. 1986. "The Consequences of Nuclear War: An Economic and Social Perspective." Pp. 381-409 In F. Solomn and R.Q.

Martson (Eds.) The Medical Implication of Nuclear War.

Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

l l

,0 Mileti, Dennis S., and Joanne Nigg. 1986. " Social Science Earthquake Investigations." Pp. 167-188 in' Roger Scholl (Ed.) Lessons Learned from Recent Earthquakes. Berkeley: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute.

Williams, Gary, and' Dennis S. Mileti. 1986. " Inclusion of. Social Variables in Models of Risk Assessment." Pp.

375-379 in-Geotechnical and Geohydrological Aspects of-Waste Management. Boston: Rotterdam.

Harwell, Christine C. (Ed.) 1985. " Experiences and

< Extrapolations from Hiroshima and Nagasaki." ~ Pp .

427-467 in M.A. Harwell and T.C. Hutchinson (Eds.)

Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War Volume II:

Ecological and Agricultural Effects. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Hartsough, Donald M., and Dennis S. Mileti 1985. "The Media in Disasters." Pp. 282-294 in J. Laube and S.

Murphy (Eds.), Perspectives in Disaster Recovery.

Norwalk, Connecticut: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Sorenson, John, Janice Hutton and Dennis S. Mileti 1984.

" Institutional Management of Risk Information Following Earthquake Predictions." Pp. 913-924 in K. Oshida (Ed.), Earthquake Prediction. Tokyo: Terra Scientific Publishers for UNESCO. Reprinted in Song Shouquan and Li Huaying (Eds.) A Collection of Papers on World Seismo-Sociology. Beijing, China: Institute of Geophysics, State Seismological Bureau, pp. 119-126.

Mileti, Dennis S., Janice Hutton and John Sorensen 1984.

" Social Factors Affecting the Response of Groups to Earthquake Prediction." Pp. 649-658 in K. Oshida (Ed.), Earthquake Prediction. Tokyo: Terra Scientific Publishers for UNESCO. Reprinted in Song Shouguan and Li Huaying (Eds.) A Collection of Papers on World Seismo-Sociology - Beijing, China: Institute of Geophysics, State Seismological Bureau, pp. 17-22.

Hutton, Janice, Dennis S. Mileti and John Sorensen 1984.

" Factors Affecting Earthquake Warning System Effectiveness." Pp. 947-956 in K. Oshida (Ed.),

Earthquake Prediction. Tokyo: Terra Scientific Publishers Publishers for UNESCO. Reprinted in Song Shouquan and Li Huaying (Eds.) A Collection of Papers on World Seismo-Sociology. Beijing, China: Institute of Geophysics, State Seismological Bureau, pp. 139-143.

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, 8 Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. "A Bibliography for  ?-

Graduate Research Kethods." Pp. 249-255 in Russel Schutt, Alan Orenstein and Theodore C. Wagenaar (Eds.)

Research Methods Courses: Syllabi, Assignments and Projects. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association.

Mileti, Dennis S., Janice Hutton and John Sorensen 1981.

Earthquake Prediction Response and Options for Public Policy. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.

i l Hutton, Janice, John Sorenson and Dennis S. Mileti 1981.

l " Earthquake Prediction and Public Reaction." Pp.

l 129-166 in T. Rik1take (Ed.) Current Research in

, Earthquake Prediction. Boston: Reidel Publishing Company, Tokyo: Center for Academic Publications.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1981. " Planning Initiatives for Seismic H.nzard Mitigation." Pp. 44-53 in J. Tsenberg (Ed.). Social and Economic Impact of Earthquakes on Utility Lifelines,. New York: American Society of Civil Engineers.

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1979.

Technostructures and Interorganizational Relations.

Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.

Committee on Socioeconomic Effects of Barthquake Prediction 1979. A Program of Studies on_the Socioeconomic Effects of Earthquake Prediction. Washington, D.C.:

National Academie of Sciences-National Research Council.

Gillespie, David F., Dennis S. Mileti and Ronald Perry 1976.

Organizational Response to Changing Community Systems Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press.

Mileti, Dennis, S., Thomas E. Drabek And J. Eugene Hass 1975. Human 'Jystems in Extremp_ Environments: A Sociological Perspective. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1975. Natural Hazard Warning Systems in the United States. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science, Monograph 12. Portions reprinted in Joseph Perry and Meredith Pugh, Collective Behavior: Response to Stress, 1978.t Erickson, Neil, John'Sorensen and Dennis S. Mileti 1975.

Landslide Hazards in the United States: A Research Assessment. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.  !

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lf 6

.;r Mil'e ti , Dhnnis S.- 1975. Disaster Relief and Rehabili-

$f M tation in the United States. Boulder: Institute of N'(([M , '

Behavioral Science.

l 7 ' Ayre, Robert, Dennis S. Mileti and Patricia Trainer 1975.

17 Earthquake and Tsunami Hazards in the United States: A l

Y Research Assessment. Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science.

ARTICLES Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen. . 1987;

" Determinants of~ Organizational Effectiveness in Responding to. Low ~ Probability Catastrophic Events,"

Columbia Journal of World Business (accepted and

, forthcoming). ,

Sorensen, John H., and Dennis S. Mileti.~1986.

n n, " Decision Making Uncertainty in Warning System 4 >~ Organizations," Mass Emergencies and Disasters f '(accepted and forthcoming).

3 i' W

Miletiii Dennis S. ,. tand David'F. Gillespie 1985.

.; "The Effects of Legitimacy'on Goal Change and

/ Formalization in Organizations," Journal of Contemporary Sociology 22 .(1,2): 33-53.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1985. "The Human Equation in Earthquake Prediction and Warning," Policy Studies Review 4(4): 725-733.

Sorensen, John H., Dennis S. Mileti and Emily

'Copenhaver. 1985. " Inter'and Intracrganizational Cohesion in Emergen:1es," Mass Emergencies and Disaster. 3(3): 27-52. 'i Mileti, Dennis S. 1985. " Emergency. Role Performance in Disaster Response Organizations,"

Environmental Sociology (42): 6-10.

Mileti, Dennis S., Donald Hartsongh, Patti Madson 1

and Rick Hufnagel. 1984. ."The Three Mile Island Incident: A Study of Behavioral Indicators of Human Stress," Mass Emergencies and Disasters 2(1): 89-114.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1984. " Role Conflict and Abandonment in Emergency Workers,"

Emergency Management Review 2(1): 20-22.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1984. " Earthquakes and Human Behavior," Earthquake Spectra 1(1): 89-106.

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Mileti, Dennis S. 1983. " Societal Comparisons of Organizational Response.to. Earthquake Prediction: Japan vs. the United States." Mass Emergencies and Disasters 1(3): 399-414.

!- Mileti, Dennis S. 1983. "Public Perceptions L of Seismic Hazards.and Critical Facilities," Bulletin i of the Seismological Society of America 72(6): 13-18.

l Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1982.

l

" Differentiation in Organizations," Social Forces l 60(4): 1172-1175.

f Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. " Structure and Process in the Implementation of Public Policy,"

Political Science Review 21(1): 1-34.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1982. "A Review of Research on Public Policy Adoption," Public Administration Review (accepted and forthcoming). 1 Mileti, Dennis S., Doug Timmer and David F. Gillespie 1982. " Intra and Interorganizational Determinants of Decentralization," Pacific Sociological Review 25(2): 163-183.

Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and Stan Eitzen 1981. "The Multidimensionality of Organizational Size," Sociology and Social Research 65(4): 400-414.

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1981. " Heterogenous Samples in Organizational Research," Sociological Methods and Research 9(3): 327-388.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1980. " Human Adjustment to the Risk of Environmental Extremes,"

Sociology and Social Research 64(3): 327-347.

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S.

Mileti 1981. " Heterogenous Samples in Organizational Size," Sociology'and Social Research 64(3): 327-347.

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S.

Mileti 1980. " Determinants of Planning in Organizations," Administrative Science Review 10(3):

21-32 l

_g.

16 Mileti, Dennis-S.,vand David F.' j

.Gillespie _1980 - " Organizational ~and Technological Interdependencies," Journal of Contemporary Sociology 17(3-4): 132-158. l 1

'Gillespie,' David F., Ronald Perry and-

. Dennis S. Mileti' 1980. " Stress and Transformation,"

Journal of Social Research 21(2): 139-147.

Mileti, Dennis S., David F. 3 Gillespie and,Stan Eitzen 1979. " Structure and Decision Making in Corporate Organizations," Sociology  ;

and Social Research 63(4): 723-744- .

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti- 1979.

" Action and Contingency Postu1.ates in Organization-Environment Relations," Human Relations 32(3): 261-271.

Mileti, Dennis S., and Patricia Harvey 1978.

l " Correcting for the Human Factor in-Tornado Warnings,"

L Disaster Preparedness 2(February): 5-9.

Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and Elizabeth Morissey 1978. " Technology and Organizations: Methodological Deficiencies and Lucunae," Technology and Culture 19(1): 83-92.

Gillespie, David'F., and Dennis.S. Mileti 1978.

" Organizational Technology and~ Environment Adaptation-Manipulation," Scottish Jouroal1of Sociology 2(2): 205-219. ,

Haas, J. Eugene,.and Dennis S. Mileti 1977.

" Socioeconomic and Political Consequences of Earthquake Prediction," Journal of the Physical Earth 25(4):

283-293.

Haas, J._ Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti 1977.

" Earthquake Prediction and Its Consequences,"

Calitornia Geology 30(7): 147-157, 1977. Revised and reprinted in San Francisco 2O(4): 60-68, 1978.

Mileti, Dennis S., David F. Gillespie and J. Eugene Haas 1977. " Size and Structure in Complex Organizations," Social Forces 56(1): 208-217.

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Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1977.

l " Technology and the Study of Organizations: An Overview and Appraisal," Academy of Management Review 2(1): 6-19. Reprinted in Readings on How Managers Manage. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1982.

Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1976.

"An Integrated Formalization of organization-Environment Interdependencies," Human Relations 29(1): 80-100.

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1976.

" Organizational Adaptations to Changing Cultural Contingencies," Sociological Inquiry 46(2): 135-141.

Gillespie, David F., Roy Lotz, Dennis S.

Mileti and Ronald Perry 1976. " Historical and Paradigmatic Differences in the Use of the Goal Concept," International Review of History and Political Science 8(30): 1-14.

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1976.

"A Refined Model of Differentiation in Organizations,"

Sociology and Social Research 60(3): 263-278.

Haas, J., Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti 1976.

" Earthquake Prediction and Other Adjustments to Earthquakes," Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering 9(4): 183-194.

Perry, Ronald, David F. Gillespie, Roy Lotz and Dennis S. Mileti 1976. "Attiudinal Variables as Estimates of Behavior," European Journal of Social Psychology 6(1): 74-90.

Mileti, Dennis S., Ronald Perry and David F. Gillespie 1975. "The Analytical Use of Case Study Materials in the Study of Organizations," Sociological Inquiry 45(4): 72-50.

Mileti, Dennis S., and Elwood M. Beck 1975.

" Explaining Evacuation Symbolically: Communication in Crisis," Communication Research 2(1): 24-49.

Gillespie, David F., Ronald Perry, Dennis S.

Mileti and Roy Lotz 1975. " Organizational Tensions and Decentralization: the Interactive Effect on Member Commitment," International Journal of Group Tensions 5(2): 26-37.

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i 4 i Ferry, Ronald, David F. Gillespie and l Dennis S. Mileti 1974. " Collective Stress and i Community Transformation," Human Relations 27(8):

767-788.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1974. " Change Ratios in Age-Specific Percent Contriductions to Fertility: A New Method with Applications to the United States,"

Pacific Sociological Review 17(1): 3-26. First Prize, student paper competition, Pacific Sociological Association, 1974.

Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1974.

"An Integrative Approach to the Study of Organizational Technology, Structure and Behavior," Current Sociology 23(1): 189-200.

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1974.

" System Stress and the Persistence of Emergent Organizations," Sociological Inquiry 44(2): 111-119.

Mileti, Dennis S., and Larry Barnett 1972.

"Nine Demographic Factors and Their Relationship Toward Abortion Legalization," Social Biology 19(2): 43-50.

TECHNICAL REPORTS Mileti, Dennis S., and James R. Hutton. 1987.

Initial Public Response to the 5 April 1985 Parkfield Earthquake Prediction. Boulder: Natural Hazards Research Applications and Information Center, University of Colorado.

Mileti, Dennis S., Randal G. Updike, Patricia A. Bolton and Gabriel Fernandey. 1986. Recommendations for Improving the Existing Warning System for Possible Nevado del Ruiz Volcanic Eruption, Colombia, South America. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.

Mileti, Dennis S., John H. Sorenson and William Bogard.

1975. Evacuation Decision Making Process and Uncertainty. Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Report TM-9692.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1985.

Stress Impacts of a Technological Emergency: An Unobtrusive Indicators Study of Livingston Train Derailment. New Orleans: Lemle, Kelleher.

Popkin, Roy, Dennis S.-Mileti, Barbara Farhar-Pilgrim and John Sefner. 1985. Unmet Needs of Disaster Victims'in the United States. Fort Collins:

Hazards Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University.

Review Panel of the' National' Earthquake Hazards Reduction Plan'1984. National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program: Five Year Program Plan.

Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Sorensen, J., E. Copenhaver, D. Mileti and M. Adler 1984. Organizational Interface in Reactor Emergency Planning and Response. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG No. CR-3524.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1983.

Human Response Scenarios: Law Enforcement Applications' and Media Implications. Sacramento: California Division of Mines and Geology.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1982.

Organizational Behavior and Interorganizational Relations: Implications for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies and Preparedness. Oak Ridge, Tennessee:

Oak Ridge National Laboratories.

Mileti,' Dennis S., Donald M. Hartsough and Patti Madson 1982. The Three Mile Island Incident: A Study of Behavioral Indicators of Human Stress.

Washington, D.C.: Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge.

Mileti, Dennis S., and Arthur Svenson 1981.

Earthquake Prediction-Warning Response For Emergency Organizations to the-Prediction Terminology. Van Nuys:

Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project.

Santopolo, Frank, and Dennis S. Mileti 1980.

Impacts of Population Growth In-Agricultural Colorado Committees. Fort Collins: Colorado State University Experiment Station Bulletin.

Committee on Fire Safety and Disaster Preparedness 1979.

Fire Safety and Disaster Preparedness. Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Hutton, Janice, and Dennis S. Mileti 1979.

Analysis of Adoption and Implementation of Community Land Use Regulations and Floodplains. San Francisco:

Woodward-Clyde.

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Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti 1976.

Socioeconomic Impact of Earthquake Prediction on Government, Business and Community. Boulder:

Institute of Behavioral Science.

Mileti, Dennis, S., and David F. Gillespie 1976.

Interorganizational Relations and Community Service Delivery Systems. Boulder: Center for Action Research.

I BOOK REVIEWS Mileti, Dennis S. 1984.

"A Review of Social and Economic Aspects of Earthquakes by Barclay G. Jones and Miha Tomazevic (Eds.) Ithaca:

Program in Urban and Regional Studies, 1983." Mass Emergencies and Disasters (forthcoming).

Mileti, Dennis S. 1982.

"A Review of Unequal Care: Interorganizational Relations in Health Care by M. Milner, Jr. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1980 " Social Forces 60(3):

943-944.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1982.

"A Review of Whistle Blowing: Loyalty and Dissent in the Corporation by Alan Westin (Ed.). New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1981." Sociology: A Review of New Books.

7(2).

Mileti, Dennis S. 1980.

"A Review of Aftermath: Communities After Natural Disasters by H. Paul Friesema et al. Beverly Hills:

Sage Publications, 1979 and After the Clean-up: Long Range Effects of Natural Disasters by James Wright and Peter Rossi et al. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979." Journal of the American Planning Association (October): 484-485.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1976.

"A Review of A Sociology of Organizations by J.

Eldridge and A. Crombie. New York: International Publications, 1975." Contemporary Sociology 5(6) 784.

PROCEEDINGS Sorensen, John H. 1987.

"Public Warning Needs." Pp. 9-75. In Paula Gori and Walter Hays (Eds.) Procedings of Conference on the U.S.

Geological Survey's Role in Hazards Warnings. Reston:

U.S. Geological Survey. Paper presented at the February, 1987 Conference on Hazard Warnings, Denver.

l Mileti,. Dennis S. '1980.

" Human Response to Earthquake Prediction." Pp. 36-56 in Walter Hays (Ed.). Proceedings of the Conferences on Earthquake Prediction Information. Menlo Park:

U.S. Geological Survey. Paper presented at the January, 1980 Conference on Earthquake Prediction Information, Los Angeles.

Mileti, Dennis S., und Janice Hutton 1978.

" Social Aspects of Earthquakes." Pp. 179-192 in Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Microzonation. San Francisco: National Science Foundation. Paper presented at the November, 1978 Conference on the State of the Art in Mircozonation for Earthquake Hazards Reduction, San Francisco.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1978.

" Socioeconomic. Effects of Earthquake Prediction on State Policy." Pp. in Proceedings of the National Conference on Earthquake Related Hazards. Lexington, Kentucky: Council of State Governments. Speech presented at the November, 1977 Conference on State Policy for Earthquake Prediction Technology, Boulder.

OTHER PUBLISHED COMMENTS Mileti, Dennis S. 1987.

"The Fatal Flaw in Flight 51-L: Events Leading to the Ill-Fated Challenger Launch," Spectrum 24(2): 36-51.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1986.

" Disaster Survival," Alumnus Quarterly 62(1): 6-7, 20.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1984.

"The Character of Traffic in an Emergency," Bulletin 6(1): 4-5.

1 i ,

Mileti, Dennis S. 1983.

"Disasterous Warnings," Omni (March): 24, 44, 152. ,

l Mileti, Dennis S. 1982.

" Hazards Reduction Work: the Next Era," National Hazards Observer 6(4): 1-2. Reprinted in Earthquake Information Bulletin 14(2): 60, 1982.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1982.

" Sociological Aspects of Earthquake Prediction,"

Earthquake Information Bulletin 11(3): 102-105.

Hass,'J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti 1977.

" Earthquake Prediction Response," Time (January 24):

83.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1977

" Earthquake Prediction: Is It Better Not to Know?"

Mosaic 8(2): 8-14.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1977.

" Social Hazards of Earthquake Prediction," Science News 111(2): 20-21.

Hass, J. Eugene, Thomas Drabek and Dennis S. Mileti 1976.

" Individual and Organizational Response to Threat."

Mass Emergencies 1(4): 247.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1976.

" Social Scientists and Applied Research," The American Sociologist 11(4): 220-221.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1974.

" Response to.Research and National Needs," Footnotes 2(October): 6.

CONFERENCE PAPERS Mileti, Dennis S., and Joanne Nigg 1987.

" Adjustment to Natural Hazards and Disasters," paper presented to the Section on Environmental Sociology, Roundtable Discussions of the American Sociological Association, Chicago: Augu st.

Mileti, Dennis S., and John H. Sorensen 1986.

" Determinants of Organizational Effectiveness in Responding to Low Probability Catastrophic Events,"

paper presented to the Crisis Analysis Models Session, I International Conference on Industrial Crisis Management, New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York City: September.

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Mileti, Dennis S., and James Goltz 1986.

" Social Response to the Parkfield Prediction," paper l presented to the Parkfield: Prediction Experiment 4 Session of the American Association for the Advancement of. Science, Philadelphia: May.

Cochrane, Hal, and Dennis S. Mileti, 1985.

" Vulnerabilities.of medical / health care systems to the effect of nuclear war," paper presented at the Symposium on the Medical Implications of Nuclear War, National Academy.of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Session on Medical Resource Needs_and Availability.

Washington, D.C.: September.

Mileti, Dennis S., and R. Gary Williams 1985.

"A Sociological Perspective on the Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities," paper presented to the Social and Economic Effects of Public Perceptions Session of-the Symposium on Waste Management, Tucson: March.

Mileti, Dennis S., Rick Hufnagel and David Gillespie 1984.

" Regulation of the Firm: Toward a Theory of Consequences," paper presented to the Complex Organizations Session of the American Sociological Association, San Antonio: August.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1984.

" Stress From Risk Uncertainties," invited paper presented to the Social Aspects of Risk Uncertainties Session of the Society for Risk Analysis, Knoxville:

October.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1984

" Social and political obstacles to the use of nonstructural flood loss mitigation measures," paper presented to the American Society of Civil Engineers, San Francisco: October.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1984 "Why people take precautions against natural hazards,"

paper presented to the Conference on Encouraging Self-Protection Behavior, Rutgers University: July.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1984

" Sociology in litigation: applications of disaster research," paper presented to the Sociology of Disasters Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Seattle: April.

i-Mileti, Dennis.S. 1983 "Sociallimpact'and use of earthquake o prediction-warnings," paper presented to the US-Japan Seminar on Practical Approaches to Earthquake Prediction'and Warning, Tokyo: November.

.Frey, R. Scott, Thomas Dietz, Dennis S. Mileti, and Debra Cornelius 1983

" Structural determinants of community adoption of the National Flood Insurance Program," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society, Lexington: July.

Mileti, Dennis S., Donald M. Hartsough, Patti Madson and Rick'Hufnagel 1983

, "The Three Mile Island incident: a study of unobtrusive indicators of human stress," paper presented to the Disasters and Hazards Research Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Kansas City:

April.

Hufnagel,. Rick, and Dennis S. Mileti 1983

" Organizational and environmental catastrophe: factors affecting organizational response to a predicted earthquake," paper presented to the Disasters and Hazards Research-Session of the Western Social Science Association,'Alburquque: April.

! Mileti, Dennis S. 1982

" Earthquake prediction response: cultural comparisons between Japan and the United States," paper presented to the Disaster Research Session of the International Sociological Association, Mexico City: August.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1982 l " Influencing corporate decisions on the use of microzonation information," paper presented to the Third International Conference on Microzonation, Seattle: June.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1982

" Earthquake prediction and warnings: the human equation," paper presented to the Conference on Hazards l

Research, Policy Development, and Implementation Focus on Urban Earthquakes, Policy Incentives:

Research Center at the University of Redlands, Redlands: June.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1982 "Public perception of seismic hazards," paper presented to the Seismological Society of America, Anaheim:

April.

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Williams,. Gary, Frank Santopolo and Dennis S~ Mileti 1980 .

" Perception of growth impacts;in' energy impacted-communities," paper' presented-to the Rural Sociological Society, Ithaca: Augu st.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1980

" Planning initiatives'for seismic hazard mitigation,"

paper presented to the Conference on Social and Economic Impacts of Earthquakes on Critical Lifelines of the American Society of Civil Engineers,. San Francisco: May.

Timmer,.Doug, and Dennis S. Mileti 1980 "Interorganizational and structural determinants of-decision making," paper presented to the Session on Complex Organizations of the Midwest Sociological Society, Milwaukee.

Williams, Gary, Dennis S. Mileti 1980

" Community growth'and impacts," paper presented to the Western Social Science Association, Albuquerque.:

April.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1980

" Human response to earthquake prediction," paper presented to the Status of Knowledge Session of'the Conference on Earthquake Prediction Information, Los Angeles: January.

I Williams, Gary, and Dennis S. Mileti 1979

" Perceptions of growth impacts in non-metropolitan Colorado," paper presented to the Impacts Session of the Conference on Regional Migration Trends, St. Louis:

October.

Mileti, Dennis S., and Gary Williams 1979

" Resident perceptions in growth impacted western agricultural communities," paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society, Vermont: August.

Gillespie, David F., Dennis S. Mileti and Stan Eitzen 1979 ,

"The epihenominality of organizational size," paper i presented to the Session on Complex Organizations of the Midwest Sociological Society, Milwaukee: April.

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~Mileti, Dennis S., Janice R. Hutton and John Sorensen 1979  ?

" Social-factors and response to earthquake prediction,"

paper' presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake' Prediction, UNESCO, Paris: . April.

Hutton, Janice R.,' Dennis'S. Mileti, and John Sorensen 1979

" Factors affecting earthquake warning system effectiveness," paper presented to the International Symposium on'Ehrthquake Prediction, UNESCO, Paris:

April.

Sorensen, John, Janice R. Hutton and Dennie C. Mileti. 1979

" Institutional management of risx information following earthquake predictions," paper presented to the International Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, UNESCO, Paris: April.

Mileti, Dennis S., and Janice Hutton 1978

" Social aspects of earthquakes," paper presented to the State of the Art Session of the Second International Conference cn1 Micronization, San Francisco: November.

Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1978

" Organizational size, complexity and decision making,"

paper presented to the Organizations Session'of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco:

September.

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1978

" Corporate size as work," paper presented to the Organization of Work Session of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco: September.

Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1978

" Action postulates in organization-environment relations," paper presented to the Organizations-Environment Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Omaha: April.

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1978

" Size and organizational differentiation," paper presented to the Formal and Complex Organizations Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Spokane: April.

L

e Mileti, Dennis S., and Patricia Harvey 1977

" Correcting for the human factor in tornado warnings,"

paper presented to the Conference on Severe Local Storms of the American Meteorological Society, Omaha:

October.

Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1977

" Organization and environment adaptation-manipulation,"

paper presented to the Organizational Relations Session of the American Sociological Association, Chicago:

September.

Hutton, Janice R., and Dennis S. Mileti 1977 "The uses and abuses of scenarios in policy research,"

paper presented to the Social Policy Session of the American Sociological Association, Chicago: September.

Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1977

" Organization growth and managerial efficiency," paper presented to the Social Organization / Formal / Complex Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Sacramento: April.

Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1977

" Organizational manipulation and adaptation to complex environments," paper presented to the Complex Organizations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Minneapolis: April.

Gillespie, David F., Dennis S. Mileti and J. Eugene Haas 1976 " Size and Structure in complex organizations,"

paper presented to the Organizational Change Session of the American Sociological Association, New York City:

August.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1976

" Learning theory and disaster warning response," paper presented to the Issues in Environmental Analysis Sepsion to the American Sociological Association, New York City: Au gu s t .

Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti 1976

" Consequences of earthquake prediction on other adjustments to earthquakes," paper presented to the Australian Academy of Science, Canberra: May.

Mileti, Dennis S., and J. Eugene Haas 1976 "A methodology for future collective events," paper j presented to the Collective Behavior Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, St. Louis: April.

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Gillespie, David F., and Dennis S. Mileti 1976

" Operations technology and organizational structure,"

paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session.of  !

the' Midwest. Sociological Society, St. Louis: April.

Haas, J. Eugene, and Dennis S. Mileti 197f

" Assessing the consequences of earthq2ake prediction,"

paper presented to the Social Risk-Session of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boston: February.

Mileti, Dennis S , and David F. Gillespie 1975

" Technological uncertainty in organization-environment

_ relations," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the American Sociological Association, San Franciso: August.

Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1975 "A resolution of inconsistencies between size, complexity and the administrative component in organizations," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Midwest Sociological Cociety, Chicago: April.

Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1975

" Technology and the study of organizations," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, Victoria: April.

Mileti, Dennis S., and David S. Gillespie 1975 "An interaction model for organization-environment relations," paper presented to the Interorganizational Relations Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Omaha: April.

Mileti, Dennis S., and David F. Gillespie 1974 "A formalization of organization-excJironment dependencies," paper presented to the Formal Organizations Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, San Jose: March.

Farhar, Barbara, and Dennis S. Mileti 1974 "Value and role issues for the involved social scientist," paper presented to the Applied Session of the Pacific Sociological Association, San Jose: March.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1973 "Drowing: a communications disease," paper presented to the Mass Communications and Public Opinion Session of the American Sociological Association, New York City:

Au gu st.

Mileti, Dennis S., and Sigmund Krane 1973

" Response to impending system stress," paper presented to the What Do We Know Session on Human Behavior in l Disaster of the American Sociological Association, New l York City: August.

l l Mileti, Dennis S. 1973 "A paradigm and sociology of knowledge for theories of natural law," paper presented to the Theory Session of the Midwest Sociological Society, Milwaukee: April.

Mileti, Dennis S. 1972

" Response to hazards warnings," paper presented to the Organizational and Community Response to Disaster Seminar at the Disaster Research Center of the Ohio State University, Columbus: July.

SPEECHES AND GUEST LECTURES "Have we gotten any better at informing and educating the public about risks?" Hazards Research and Application Workshop, Boulder: July, 1987.

" Overview of current knowledge about communicating hazards and risk information," Workshop on the U.S. Geological Survey's Role in Hazard Warnings, Golden, Colorado:

February, 1987.

" Industrial Crisis Response," Fluid Mechanics and Wind Enginering Program, College of Engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins: November, 1986.

" Emergency Preparedness and Mitigation. Measures: the November 1985 Columbia Nevada del Ruiz Volcanic Eruption,"

Committee on Natural Disaster, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.: October, 1986.

" Social and Economic Impacts of Earthquake Predictions," Los Angeles City Earthquake Prediction Workshop, Asilomar, California: October, 1986.

"Armero, Columbia: What are the Lessons for Hazards Management in the United States," Plenary Session, Hazards Research and Applications Workshopf Boulder, Colorado:

July, 1986.

"Public Response Elements for Flood Warning Emergency Preparedness," Plenary Session, Conference on What Have We Learned Since the Big Thompson Flood, Boulder, Colorado:

July, 1986.

" Social Aspects of Risk Communication," Conference on Communications in Emergencies, Wyoming Disaster and Civil Defense Division, Cheyenne: April, 1986.

" Earthquake Prediction: A General Overviaw," Emergency Preparedness Commission for the Cities and Cotnty of Los Angeles, Carson, California: April, 1986.

"What Do We Know About Human Behavior and Earthquakes,"

Annual Meeting of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute,-San Francisco: February, 1986.

" Social Aspects of the Parkfield, California Earthquake Prediction," Annual Meeting of the American Geophysical Union, Session on Parkfield Earthquake Studies, San Francisco: December, 1985.

" Social Impacts and Lessons from the Parkfield Earthquake Prediction," Earthquake Prediction Warning and Response System Workshop, Governor's Office of Emergency Services, Asilomar, California: July, 1985.

"How Well Do Traditional Warning System Strategies Deal With Today's Natural and Technological Hazards?," Plenary Session, Invitational Workshop on Hazards Research and Application, Boulder, Colorado: July, 1985.

" Human Response to Emergencies," Emergency Preparedness Executive Seminar, General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation, Middleton, Pennsylvania: May, 1985.

" Social aspects of risk," Risk Analysis Seminar, Department of Industrial Engineering, Stanford University: February, 1985.

" Communicating engineering .information to public officials,"

Social Applications Session, Earthquake Engineering Research i Institute, Seattle: February, 1985.

" Social and political obstacles to the use of nonstructural flood loss mitigation measures," American Society for Civil Engineers, San Francisco: October, 1984.

" Warnings: applying research in the private sector," Plenary Session on Hazards Research and Management: Assessments of a Maturing Field, Natural Hazards Research Application  ;

Workshop, Boulder: July, 1984.

" Human response to emergencies," Emergency Preparedness Executive Seminar for County Commissioners of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, GPU Nuclear Corporation, Harrisburg: March, 1984.

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"The uses of earthquake prediction-warnings," Colloquium on Earthquake Prediction Research in the U.S., Earthquake Research Institute,' University of Tokyo: November,~1983.

" Human response in disasters," American Red Cross, Mile High Chapter, Boulder Region, Boulder: July, 1983.

" Integrated' emergency management: challenges and opportunities," Plenary Session of the Natural Hazards Research: Applications Workshop, Boulder: July, 1983.

"Public response to flood disasters," Conference on the Need for Teamwork in Managing Flood Hazards, Association of State Floodplain Manager, Sacramento: April, 1983.

" Natural hazards, disasters and public policy,"

Environmental Management Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles: April, 1982.

" Myths of disaster response," Earthquake Planning Conference for Business and Industry, Los~ Angeles: May, 1982.

" Communicating lessons learned from social science research on earthquakes," Workshop of Identifying and Disseminating Lessons Learned from Recent Earthquakes," Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Los Altos: December, 1982.

" Social causes of earthquake prediction-warning response:

implications for the design'of California's warning system and information dissemination," Southern California

-Earthquake Preparedness Project, Van Nuys: October, 1981.

" Assessment of research on natural hazards: what have we learned and what problems demand further attention," Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder: July, 1981.  !

" Disaster reconstruction: patterns to guide planning,"

Governor's Task Force for. Earthquake Emergency Preparedness, Committee on Long Range Reconstruction, Sacramento, July, 4 1981.

"Socio-cultural dimensions of earthquake risk," Governor's Emergency Task Force on Earthquakes, General Assembly, Sacramento: May, 1981.

"Interorganizational relations and service delivery y systems," Health Sciences Center, University of Colorado, Denver: October, 1980.

i

" Social response to earthquake prediction: local policy j issues," Southern California Emergency Services Association, I Montebello: February, 1980.

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" Human response to weather-borne hazards warnings,"

Department of Atmospheric Sciences, Colorado State University: October, 1979.

" Natural hazards, disasters and social research," Department of Sociology, University of Denver: December, 1980, 1979.

" Measuring implementation of public policy for floodplain land use controls," Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder: August, 1978.

" Socioeconomic effects of earthquake prediction and state policy," Conference on State Policy for Earthquake Prediction Technology, Boulder: November, 1977.

" Population, resources and policy for social change,"

College of Natural Resources, Colorado State University:

September, 1977; February, 1978; February, 1980.

"The behavior of government and corporate organizations in an earthquake prediction," American Society for Public Administration, Colorado Chapter, Denver: April, 1976.

"The social and economic aspects of scientifically credible earthquake predictions," California State Seminar on Emergency Preparedness and Earthquake Prediction, Palm Springs: June, 1976.

" Preparing to make use of earthquake predictions," Emergency Preparedness Commission for the County and Cities of Los Angeles, Montebello: February, 1976.

"The social organization of hazard warning systems,"

Engineering Foundation Conference on Decision Making for Natural Hazards, Pacific Grove: March, 1976.

" Briefing on the likely social and economic impacts of earthquake prediction," Governor's Conference Room, Sacramento: May, 1975; Mayor's Conference Room, Los Angeles: October, 1975.

" Social, economic and legal aspects of earthquake prediction," General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, Granoble: September, 1975.

" Earthquake prediction and its implications for emergency preparedness," Center for Community Studies, Tokyo:

September, 1975.

1 l

" Social impacts of earthquake prediction: implications for policy," California Water and Power Earthquake Engineering Forum, San Francisco: April, 1975.

OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE Organizer and Presider Sessions on the Sociology of Disaster, Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York City: August, 1986; Session on Nuclear Power, Third International Congress on Emergencies, Washington, D.C.: May, 1985; Session on Applied Sociology, Pacific Sociological Association, Seattle: April, 1984; Session on Theoretical Assessments, Western Social Science Association, San Diego: April, 1984; Session on Methodological Approaches in the Study of Health Care Delivery Systems, Western Social Science Association, San Diego: April, 1984; Session on Earthquake Hazard Reduction: Is the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program Meeting its Congressional Mandate, Seventh Annual Workshop on Natural Hazards Research Applications, Boulder:

July, 1982; Session on Disasters and Cataclysms: Can Sociology Help, Pacific Sociological Association, San Diego:

April, 1982; Session on Collective Behavior, American Sociological Association, New York: August, 1980; Session on Complex Organizations, Pacific Sociological Association, San Francisco: April, 1980; Session on Complex Organizations, Western Social Science Association, Tempe, 1976.

Discussant Session on Theoretical Assessments, Western Social Science Association, San Diego: April, 1984, Session on Societal Response to Hazards, American Sociological Association, San Antonio: August, 1984; Session on Public Response to Earth Science Information, Natural Hazards Research Applications Workshop, Boulder: July, 1980; Session on Warning Systems, National Conference on Natural Hazards, Boulder: June, 1976; Session on Warning Systems, National Conference on Natural Hazards, Boulder: July, 1975; Session on Disaster Relief and Warning Systems, National Conference on Natural Hazards, Estes Park: June, 1973.

Participant Review Panel on Disaster Research and Planning, National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, State University of New York at Buffalo: August, 1987; Use of the Crisis Response Conclusion Retrieval System, University of Pittsburg Center for Social and Urban Research, Pittsburg:

December, 1985; Panel on Disaster Research, Its Funding and

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Future, Ainerican Sociological Association, San Antonio: f

-August, 1984; Review Panel, Corresponding Member, Task Group on Social and Economic Aspects of Earthquakes, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission on Sociotechnical Systems, Washington, D.C.: 1982; Workshop on Disseminating Lessons Learned from Recent Earthquakes, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Los Altos:  :

December, 1982; Tennessee Valley Authority Flood Plain 1 Evaluation Panel, Boulder: November, 1982; Earthquake Prediction Warning Task Force Workshop,. Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project, Asilomar: December, 1981; Symposium on Earthquake Prediction, Preparedness and Human Response, San Fernando: June, 1976; Seminar on Disaster Research, Colorado State University, Fort Collins:

February,'1975; Symposium on Complex Organizations:

Research and Applications, Western Social Science Association, El Paso: April, 1974.

Editorships Member of the Editorial Advisory Board for Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 1986-date; Associate Editor for social science, Earthquake Spectrum, Journal of the Earthquake Engineering I Research Institute, 1984-date; Corresponding Editor, Organization and Occupation, Newsletter of the American Sociological Association, Western Region 1984-1985; Corresponding Editor on Hazards and Disaster, Environmental Sociology, Newsletter of the Section on Environmental Sociology of the American Sociological Association, 1981-1985; Guest editor, special issue on Environmental Stress, Threat and Social System Response, Mass Emergencies 1(4):247-346, 1976.

Testimony Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Shoreham nuclear reactor, Suffolk: May through July, 1987; December, 1983 through June 1984; Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency l planning at the Shearon-Harris nuclear power plant, Raleigh:

June and November, 1985; Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Wolf Creek generating station, Burlington, Kansas: January, 1984; Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of pre-emergency public education and information for emergency planning at the Waterford Three nuclear reactor, New Orleans: February, 1983; Suffolk County Legislature, State of New York, in the .

i matter of emergency planning at the Shoreham nuclear rea c t o r., Suffolk: January, 1983; Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of emergency planning at the Diablo Canyon nuclear reactor, San Luis Obisbo: January, 1982; Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space in the

4 matter'of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction'Act, Washington, D.C.: ; April, 1980; Nuclear Regulatory Commissi'on in the matter of the' impact of floating nuclear plants.on tourist behavior, Bethesda: May, 1977 and July, 1978'.

Legislative and Program Reviews Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, U.S. Congressional l Panel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1983-82; Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program of the U.S. Geological-Survey, 1982; Final Regulations forl Floodplain Management and Protection of Wetlands, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Register 176(45):59520-59538, 1980; Applied Research Program Evaluation, National Science Foundation, 1979-78.

}

i i

PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS EDWARD B. LIEBERMAN

} Vice President KLD ASSOCIATES, INC.

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My name is Edward B. Lieberman and my business address is KLD Associates, Inc., 300 Broadway, Huntington Station, New York 11746. I am presently Vice President of KLD Associates, Inc.

I received the Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering in 1951 from Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn.

I was awarded the Master of Science degree in Civil Engineering in 1954 from Columbia University and in Aeronautical Engineering in 1967 from Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn. I am currently working on a Doctorate degree in Transportation Planning at the Polytechnic University. I am a member of the Chi Epsilon Honorary Fraternity.

With almost 30 years of professional experience, I have managed a number of major projects. I pioneered the development and application of traffic simulation models, making major state-of-the-art innovations in the traffic engineering profession. I have also been responsible for many engineering studies involving data collection and analysis and design of traffic control systems to expedite traffic flow and relieve congestion.

I have developed simulation models to study traffic performance on urban networks, freeways, freeway corridors

• and two-lane, two-way rural roads. These programs include consideration of pedestrians, interaction with vehicular traffic, truck and bus operations, special turning lanes, and vehicle fuel consumption and emissions; both pretimed and actuated traffic signal controls are represented.

I was the Principal Investigator for the development of traffic signal control strategies for congested conditions in mid-Manhattan. These strategies were implemented and evaluated in the field. Field tests indicated substantial reductions in delay combined with increased vehicle throughput.

I was the Principal Investigator in the development of an interactive computer graphics (ICG) software system for displaying traffic simulation results generated by the NETSIM model. I designed the overall structure of the software for implementation on PC AT computers and, subsequently, on larger ICG work stations. This work was I sponsored by FHWA.

I was responsible to a large extent for the theoretical development of DYNEV, a Dynamic Network Evacuation model.

The DYNEV model consists of two major components: an equilibrium traffic assignment model and a macroscopic dynamic traffic simulation model designed for all types of roadway facilities (urban streets, freeways, rural roads).

DYNEV is designed to be used as a tool to develop and l organized evacuation plans needed as part of general l

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e disaster preparedness planning. DYNEV was used to analyze an existing evacuation scenario at the Con Edison Indian Point Nuclear Power Station and is currently being used to develop an extensive evacuation plan for the LILCO Shoreham Nuclear Power Station on Long Island, New York.

In developing this evacuation plan for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station, my activities include definition of evacuation scenarios, definition of the evacuation network, development of traffic control treatments and of traffic '

routing patterns, analysis of trip tables, analysis of simulation results, optimization of evacuation strategies and the preparation of formal documentation.

I was responsible for the development of the I-DYNEV model, an interactive version and enhancement of the DYNEV model, under contract with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). I-DYNEV, in turn, was integrated into the Integrated Emergency Management Information System (IEMIS),

developed by FEMA. I-DYNEV was applied to estimate the evacuation times for the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) for eight nuclear power stations.

I developed course material and conducted training for emergency planning personnel at the National Emergency Training Center (NECTC) in Emmittsburgh, Maryland.

I was also responsible for the designs of the NESIM

, microscopic urban traffic simulation model (formerly UTCS-1) and of the SCOT freeway traffic simulation model. The

-3 -

'*' NETSIM microscopic traffic simulation model developed for the Federal Highway Administration, enables agencies to evaluate traffic operations in urban environments. The SCOT model was developed for the Transportation Systems Center of the Department of Transportation. This program includes a dynamic traffic assignment-algorithm which routes traffic over a network in response to changing traffic flow characteristics to satisfy a specified origin-destination table. In addition, I have developed advanced traffic control policies for urban traffic for the FHWA-sponsored UTSC Project, as well as a bus preemption policy to enhance the performance of mass transit operations within urban environs.

I designed and programmed the advanced " Third generation" area-wide, cycle-free control policies for moderate and congested traffic flow for computer-monitored real-time systems. I also developed a cycle-based, off-line computational procedure named SIGOP-II, to optimize traffic signal timing patterns to minimize system "disutility."

I led a group of traffic engineers and systems analysts j in developing a system of macroscopic traffic simulation models designed to evaluate Transportation Systems Management (TSM) strategies. This software system, named TRAFLO, also includes an equilibrium traffic assignment .

l' model. This model has been distributed to other agencies I

including FEMA.

_4 G__-________ _ _ _

v,

• I designed an " Integrated Traffic Simulation System,"

named TRAF, which will eventually incorporate all the best l-i traffic. simulation models available. Using structured programming techniques, TRAF integrates: NETSIM, TRAFLO, and ROADSIM, a microscopic rural-road simulation model.

I served as Principal Investigator on NCHRP Project 3-20 entitled, " Traffic Signal Warrants." This project involved both field data collection and the application of the NETSIM model to study intersection delay as a function of traffic volume, a type of control and geometrics. In turn, I developed and documented new signal warrants, some of which will be incorporated in the next version of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD).

Under NHTSA sponsorship, I directed a research study to evaluate a Driver Vehicle Evaluation Model named DTRVEM.

This model simulates the response of motorists to hazardous events. This effort included analysis of the model formulation and software and sensitivity testing. A workship was designed, organized, scheduled and conducted by myself and other KLD professionals; experts from all over the U.S. were invited to recommend specific NHTSA research activities for the further development of the model. A recommended research program constituted the major output of the contract.

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Over the years I have been involved in a number of othe'r <,

I studies to evaluate traffic operations on large-scale road

~

networks, using one or more of the models described above.

! Prior to 1960 I applied my skills to the areas of stress analysis, vibrations, fluid dynamics and numerical analysis of-differential equations. These analyses were programmed i

for the IBM 7090 and System 360, CDC 6600 and 7600, G.E. 625 1 and UNIVAC IIOB digital computers in assembly languate, j1

{

FORTRAN and PLI. I also designed the logic and real-time i

programming for a sonar simulator built for the Department e

i of Navy and monitored by a PDP:8 progess-control digital (,1 N

computer.

I am a member of the American Society of Civil-

)

Engineers, the Institute of Transportation' Engineers, the f-Association of Computin'g Machinery and the Transportation ResearchLBoard (TRB). I am also a member.of the Traffic Flow Theory and Characteristics Committee of the TRB. I-am a licensed Professional Engineer in New York, Maryland, and Florida.

The following list comprises selected publications of my j studies and findings:  ;

"DYNET - A Dynamic Network Simulation of Urban Traffic Flcw," Proceedings, Third Annual Simulation Symposium, 1970.

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' simulation of Traffic Flowthe at SURF Si9ns.17. zed Intersections:

System," Proceedings, 1970 Summer Computer Simulation Conference, 1970.

"Dy'n amic Analysis of Freeway Corridor <

I Traffic," SME paper, Trans. 70-42.

" Simulation ef Corridor Traffic: The SCOT Model'," " Highway Research Record' JJo . 409, 1972.

" Logical Desiijn and Demonstration of UTCS-1 Network Simulation Model," i y Highway Research Record No. 409 , 1972 p, ,;with R. D. Worrall and J. M.

4 ) Bruggerman) .

4' qhariableCycleSignalTimingProgram:

) Volumes 31-4," Final Report of Oontract

' COT- FH-1'l- 7 92 4, June, 1974.

v s .$,.

"Tra'fidf Signal _ Warrants," KLD TR-51, Final Report on NCHRP Project 3-20/1,

~ December 1976 (with G. F. King and R.

Goldblatt).

" Rapid Signal Transition Algorithm," Transportation Research Record No. 509_ , 1974 (with D. Wicks).

'"Subnetwork Structuring and Interfacing for UTCS Project-Program of Simulation Studies," KLD TR-5, January, 1972.

O " Development of a Bus Signal Preemption Policy and a System Analysis of Bus "AJ ,

Operations," KLD TR-11, April, 1973.

"SIGOP-II - Program to Calculate Optimal, Cycle-Based Traffic Signal

\. Report, Timing Patters, Volumes 1 and 2," Final Contract DOT-FH-11-7924, KLD TR-29 and TR-30, December, 1974.

Summary report irSransportation Research Record 596, 1976-(with J. Woo).

~

" Developing a Predictor for Highly Responsive System-Based Contro,"

Transportation Research Record 596, 1976 (with W. McShane and R. Goldblatt). i s;

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t N se _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

. .r. '.

"A New Approach for Specifying Delay-Based Traffic Signal Warrants,"

-Transportation Research Special Report 153 - Better Use ofExisting Transportation Facilities, 1976.

" Network Flow Simulation for Urban Traffic Control Systems," Vols. 1-5, PB230-760, PB230-761, PB230-762, PB230-763, PB230-764, 1974 (with R.

Worrall), Vols.'2-4 updated 1977, KLD TR-60, IR-61,.TR-62 (with D. Wicks and J. Woo).

" Extension of the UTCS-1 Traffic Simulation Program to Incorporate Computation of Vehicular Fuel Consumption and Emissions," KLD TR-63, 1976 (with N. Rosenfield).

" Analysis and Comparison of the UTCS Second- and Third-Generation Predictor Models," KLD TR-35, 1975.

" Urban Traffic Control. System (UTCS) ,

Third Generation Control (3-GC) Policy,"

Vol. 1, 1976 (with A. Liff).

"Deaign of TRAFIC Operating System (TOS), KLD TR-57, 1977.

" Revisions to the UTCS-1 Traffic Simulation Model to Enhance Operational Efficiency," KLD TR-59, 1977 (with A. d Wu).

"The Role of Capacity in Computer Traffic Control," in Research Directions <

in Computer Control of Urban Traffic Systems, ASCE, 1979.

" Traffic Simulation: Past, Present and Potential," in Hamburger, W.S. and Steinman, L., eds., Proceedings of the

]

International Symposium of Traffic Control Systems, University of California, Berkeley, 1979.

"TRAFLO: A New Tool to Evaluate I

Transportation System Management Strategies," presented at the 59th 1

i i

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Annual Meeting of the Transportation Re s e a rc'1 Board, 1980 (with B. Andrews).

" Determination of the Lateral Deployment of Traffic on an Approach to an Intersection," presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, 1980.

"Scrvice Rates of Mixed Traffic on the Left-Most Lane of an Approach,"

presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, 1980 (with W. R. McShane).

" Development of a TRANSYT-Based Traffic Simulation Model," presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, 1980 (with M. Yedlin).

" Hybrid Macroscopic-Microscopic Traffic Simulation Model," presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, 1980 (with M. C.

Davila).

"A Model for Calculating Safe Passing Distance on Two Lane Rural Road,"

presented at the 60th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, 1981.

"The TRAF System - Anayltic Formulation and Logical Design of the Roadsim Model," KLD TR-129, June, 1983.

"PREDYN User's Guide," KLD TR-131, June, 1983.

"The TRAF System - Technical Report,"

KLD TR-136, August, 1983 (with M.

Yedlin, B. Andrew and K. Sheridan).

" Application of the I-DYNEV System to Compute Estimates of Evacuation Travel Time at Nuclear Power Stations -- Four Demonstration Case Studies," KLD TR-142, December, 1983.

" Users Manual for the Interactive

, Dynamic Network Evacuation Model:

l I-DYNEV,"KLD TR-144, February, 1984.

_g.

" Formulations of the DYNEV and I-DYNEV Traffic Simulation Models Used in EESF,"

l KLD TR-154, March, 1984.

"PREDYN/IDYNEV Training Guide," KLD TR-155, April, 1984 (with R. Goldblatt).

" Specifications of Recommended Interactive Graphics Hardware Configuration and Graphics Support Software for the Netsim Graphics Display Package," KLD TM-93, July, 1985.

" Metering of High-Density Sectors Comparison of Traffic Operations Along Fifth Avenue in Mid-Manhattan: Metering Control vs. Existing Control," KLD TM-94, July, 1985.

" Description of an integrated Traffic Assignment and Distribution Model (TRAD) for the IDYNEV System," KLD TR-187, April, 1986.

" Evacuation Plan Update (Robert G. Ginna Nuclear Power Station)," KLD TR-189, May, 1986 (with R. Goldblatt).

" Evacuation Plan Update (Davis Besse),"

KLD TR-190, July, 1986 (with R.

Goldblatt).

"Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Estimates and Traffic Management Plan Update," KLD TR-174, August, 1986.

" Reducing Traffic Congestion at Herald Square," ITE Journal, September, 1986, pp. 27-31 (with A. K. Rathi).

" Congestion Baced Traffic Control Scheme for High Traffic Density Sectors,"

Transportation Research Record No. 1057, TRB, National Research Council, Washington, D.C., 1986, pp. 49-57 (with A. K. Rathi and G. F. King).

" Overview of the Evacuation Plan and of the Evacuation Time Estimtaes for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station," KLD TM-98, October, 1986.

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" Overview of the Evacuation Plan and of the Evacuation Time Estimates of the Ginna Nuclear Power Station," KLD TM-99, November, 1986 (with R. Goldblatt).

" Overview of the Coastal Region within the Pilgrim Station Emergency Planning Zone," KLD TM-100, November, 1986.

" Enhanced Freflo Program: Simulation of Congested Environments," paper submitted for presentation at Transportation Research Board's 66th Annual Meeting, January, 1987 (with A. K. Rathi and M.

Yedlin).

"The Netsim Graphics System," paper submitted for presentation at Transportation Research Board's 66th Annual Meeting, January, 1987 (with B.

Andrews and A. Santiago).

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