ML20245L592
| ML20245L592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1989 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1751, NUDOCS 8908220180 | |
| Download: ML20245L592 (280) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EEACTOR SAFEGUARDS I k MEETING CE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ) 1 ON SEABROOK +) f
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O Pages: 1 through 198 Place: Bethesda, Maryland Date: August 17, 198
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1- PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE
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' kd 2 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S 3 ' ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4 August 17, 1989 5
6-i 7 The contents of this stenographic transcript of 8 the proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 9 Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 10 - (ACRS) , ' as reported ~ herein, is.an uncorrected record of the
- 11. discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above date.
12 No member of the ACRS staff and no participant at b 13 .this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or 14 inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this 15 transcript.
16 17' 18 19 20-21 22 23 24 25 Heritage heporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR'REGUIATORY COMMISSION i ADVISORY-COMMITTEE ON' REACTOR SAFEGUARDS )
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. MEETING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE' .).
.ON SEABROOK )
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' Thursday, .
'l August 17, 1989 l Room P-110 7920 Norfolk Avenue 'l Bethesda, Maryland. !
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The above-entitled matter came on'for hearing,- J
-: pursuant to' notice,.at 8:30 a.m. j l
5 .BEFORE: DR. WILLIAM KERR l Chairman, ACRS Subcommittee on Seabrook- i
.;. - Professor of Nuclear Engineering. l' Director, Office of Energy Research University of. Michigan
-Ann Arbor, Michigan
'l ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT:
'MR.-CHARLES J..WYLIE Retired Chief Engineer Electrical Division Duke Power Company Charlotte, North Carolina MR. JAMES CARROLL Retired Manager, Nuclear Operations Support
' Pacific Gas'& Electric Company
' San Francisco, California
- u. CONSULTANTS PRESENT:
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M. BENDER T. KEVERN D. DRUM' 1
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U. ACRS COGNIZANT STAFF MEMBER:
AL IGNE Peoresentino the New Enoland Coalition on Nuclear Pollution:
DIANE CURRAN Representing _Public Service Company of New' Hampshire, (Seabrook Station Units 1 & 2):
TED FEIGENBAUM GEORGE GRAM ANTHONY CALLENDRELLO PETER STROUP-EDWARD DESMARAIS TERRY HARPSTER ltiPX RAU Jo$ GPA LO CE N00DY Representing Nuclear Reculatory Commission:
VICTOR NERSES
/ EDWARD J. REIS k BILL TRAVERS TOM URBANIK Representing the Federal Emeroency Manacement Acency:
RICHARD DONOVAN l
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' 1 E B Q .Q E E D I E G H 2 DR. KERR: The meeting will come to order. This 3 is a meeting of the ACRS subcommittee on the Seabrook 4 Nuclear Power Station.
.5 My name is William Kerr, I'm Chairman of this 6 subcommittee. Other ACRS members here today are:
7 Mr. Carroll and Mr. Wylie.
8 We also have as consultants: Mr. Bender; 9 Mr. Kevern; and Mr. Drum who will arrive shortly.
10 Mr. Igne is the cognizant ACRS staff member for 11 today's meeting.
12 Rules for participation in the meeting were 13 announced as part of the notice of the meeting published in
(} 14 the Federal Register of August 7, 1989.
15 The meeting is being conducted in accordance with 16 provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the 17 Government in the Sunshine Act.
18 We have received a letter from the Essex Board of 19 Selectmen, that's Essex, Massachusetts. And we also expect 20 to receive in today's mail, according to a telephone 21 conversation, comments from the Attorney General's Office of 22 the State of Massachusetts; comments on the emergency plans 23 for Seabrook.
24 We have also received a request from Ms. Diane 25 Curran who represents the Joint Interveners to make an oral Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 j
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$- 1 statement, and because of her schedule I'm going to ask that 2 she make the statement rather shortly after we conclude the 3 opening remarks.
4 In the course of the meeting I ask that each 5 speaker identify himself or herself and use a microphone so 6 that the audience can hear and the recorder can record 7 accurately.
8 Are there any comments that subcommittee members 9 or consultants have at this point?
10 (No response) 11 DR. KERR: In it's letter report of April 19, 1983 12 the ACRS reported on the application for a license to engage 13 in low power testing of the Seabrook plant. The committee
{J 14 specifically did not comment on operation at power because 15 the emergency plan for Seabrook had not been fully developed 16 at that time.
17 Several years have passed since then; I will not 18 attempt to review all that has occurred in the interim.
19 It's enough to say that the NRC Staff, FEMA, and the 20 Licensing Board all appear to have reached a conclusion in 21 the interim that the plant, its management, its staffing, 22 and its emergency plan have achieved a level of performance 23 adequate to operation of the plant with no undue risk to the 24 health.and safety of the public.
25 The NRC Staff will comment more specifically. But l
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\/ 1- it' appears from the documentation I have, at least, that it 2 is prepared to recommend that an operating license be 3 granted. If there are caveats to that I'm sure the NRC 4 Staff will make them clear.
5 It's no news to anyone that there is intense local 6 opposition to the plant. Those who oppose the plant have my 7 sympathy. Life in a society such as ours with a government 8 of the kind we have which places great emphasis on freedom 9 of the individual has, nevertheless, many frustrations.
10' And on occasion all of us feel powerless in the 11 face of what we see as a relentless juggernaut against whom 12 the individual is powerless.
13 As an example of that, perhaps, the ACRS received 14 the letter to which I referred earlier from the Board of
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15 Selectmen of Essex, Massachusetts. A letter which pleads 16 with the committee to intervene to prevent operation of this 17 plant. Copies of the letter, as I indicated, will be made 18 available to each member of the committee. And I would ask 19 at the meeting of the full committee which will occur in 20 September that the NRC Staff be prepared to respond to 21 questions that may be raised about the letter.
22 However, although this may be a small comfort to 23 those who oppose operation of the plant, I think it is our 24 responsibility to remind those involved that it is not the 25 NRC nor this committee that determines national policy on
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L 6 1 nuclear power. That responsibility zests in Congress; and-2 Congress has adopted a policy that nuc.' ear power should be a l-H 3 part of the mix of energy resources used to generate 4 electricity in the United States.
l 5 Furthermore, Congress has not decreed that this 6' activity be free of public risk, rather it established a 7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an agency with the y 8 responsibility to formulate and to maintain an appropriate l
9 balance between risks and benefits.
10 The ACRS -- and again, I remind those of you who 11 may not be familiar with our operations -- is an Advisory 12 Group, attempts to give advice to the Commission that will 13 be useful to its deliberations. So that this subcommittee
(} 14 today is making an effort to gather information, and later 15 on the full committee will consider our recommendations and 16 information that will be developed during the course of a 17 full committee meeting. And having that we will try to give 18 advice to the Commission to assist it in reaching an 19 appropriate balance between risks and benefits. Let us 20 hope, all of us, that we're successful in this effort; it's 21 an important activity.
22 The agenda that we have today indicates that we 23 may finish sometime during mid-afternoon; I would hope that 24 we could stick fairly close to that schedule for those of 25 you who may have problems with the logistics. It has been
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7 J 1 revised' fairly recently to reflect some additional input 2 from members of the public, although-it was not available at 3 the time that the agenda was originally put together.
4 At this point to accommodate Ms. Curran who says 5 her schedule will not permit her to be here all day I want' 6 to give her an opportunity for what she says can be a short 7- statement.
8- Mrs. Curran, if you don't mind.
9 MS. CURRAN: Can I go to the podium?
10 DR. KERR: Yes, that's fine. I was just looking 11 for a convenient microphone.
12 MS. CURRAN: Good morning, members of the 13 subcommittee, my name is Diane Curran, I represent the New
(). 14 England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, an Intervenor in the l 15 Seabrook Licensing case. And I've also been asked to speak 16 for the other Interveners in the Seabrook case who didn't 17 learn of this meeting until yesterday.
18 A notice went out in the Federal Register on 19 August 7, but no notice was sent to any of the Interveners, 20 in spite of the fact that NRC regulations require at least 21 15 days notice in the Federal Register and an effort to 22 contact individuals who may be interested in the meeting.
23 I really cannot understand why not a single 24 Intervenor was contacted about this meeting. It's obvious i 25 that the Utility and the NRC and FEMA are well represented
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.l'. -here,.and it's' difficult for'me to believe:that they learned
[ <2' of this meeting in the Federal Register notice,-given the
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3 fact that they-hadlto bring so many experts to the meeting.
7-4- We wouldLiike to have an' opportunity to have our' 5 attorneys and our' experts address this group'and be 6 available'to'the subcommittee tofanswer questions. We think--
7 that.your deliberations are extremely important. ..We value l'
L 8 the opportunity to brief.you on what we think is the single b :9 most important issue in the Seabrook' Licensing case.
u 10- I don't'have a presentation here about emergency 11 . planning at Seabrook, I didn't have the time to prepare one.
12 And,I would like this. Board to give us another opportunity 13 -to address the subcommittee on the issues that are raised 14 here today.
15: DR. KERR: Well, the subcommittee will not meet 16 again, but you do have the opportunity to appear at the. full 17 committee meeting which will be in September.
18 MS.-CURRAN: Will we have an opportunity to write 19 in to the subcommittee on issues that we've -- apparently 20 there will be a transcript of this meeting; is that correct?
21 DR. KERR: You have an opportunity to submit o 22- written.information at any time; in order that it be 23 considered by the committee it should be available at least
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24 a week before the full committee meeting which will be in 25 the first week of September.
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! N^ 1 MS. CURRAN: I would like some assurance that this 2 subcommittee will consider what we have to say, because 3 apparently you will be making a recommendation to the l
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5 DR. KERR: Well, the subcommittee'is part of the 6 committee and in the sense that these people are part of the 7 committee everybody will have the information.
8 MS. CURRAN: Well, we feel that there has been --
9 that this is really an unconscionable lack of notice to one 10 of the major groups that has a very strong interest in the 11 outcome of this case. As you were saying, there is very 12 strong differences of opinion here.
13 There's a question -- we think the central TN 14 question is one of, what is the correct interpretation of
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15 the adequate protection standard in NRC regulations and we 16 would like an opportunity to address that standard and how 17 it applies to these facts.
18 I would just urge you to look carefully at the 19 record of this licensing case, especially the briefs that 20- have been filed with the Appeal Board on the New Hampshire 21 Emergency Planning case; the video tape, I think that would 22 be extremely helpful to view, the video tape that was shown 23 at the Appeal Board Oral Argument. It gives you a very 24 clear picture of the evacuation conditions at Seabrook.
25 I also recommend that you look at the proposed ;
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i- J- 1L findings that were filed by the Commonwealth of 2 Massachusetts and the Seacoast Antipollution case regarding 3 the Seabrook plant for the Massachusetts communities.
4 And finally, that you consult again the testimony 5 that was filed by FEMA in June of ' 87 before the Licensing 6 Board which is, that given the conditions at Seabrook during 7 an evacuation on a summer day that thousands of people may 8 be trapped in their cars without any way of exiting the 9 beach in a' reasonable time. And that factual information 10 has never been changed and never been refuted.
11 The only thing that has been challenged there and 12 changed by FEMA is their interpretation of the legal 13 standard.
(} 14 Thank you.
15 DR. KERR: Thank you, Ms. Curran.
16 I should add that I, of course, do not know why 17 the Federal Register notice did not reach you, but the 18 committee is, of course, not responsible for seeing that the 19 Federal Register notices get to where they are supposed to 20 get.
21 This brings us then to opening --
22 MR. CARROLL: We might mention the dates of the 23 full committee meeting, they are 9-7 through 9-9.
24 MS. CURRAN: Thank you.
25 DR. KERR: And the opening presentation by the
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11 fq k2 ili committee will be at least' introduced.by Mr. Vic'Nerses of
- 2. the'NRC Staff.-
23 Mr. Nerses.
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'4 .(Slides.being shown.)
5 MR. NERSES: Good morning, my name is Victor 16- Nerses and I'm the Seabrook Project Manager from project 7 . directorate 13, the' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- 18. My project directorate- was responsible - for.
9 : coordinating the efforts for this presentation. And today's,
'10 presentation will be made on the emergency. preparedness of L 11 the Seabrook Station.
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? 1:2 The purpose.of this presentation is to. provide the-13: subcommittee information needed to complete the review ~of
-14 the. emergency plans.. And along.the way, hopefully, to 15 update the-ACRS subcommittee on the-Seabrook status.
16 Today's presentation will cover an introduction by-17 me followed by.the Utility's presentation which will cover
.18 Utility introduction and overview of the site; history of 19- the Seabrook emergency planning;.the emergency. planning 20 capabilities at the Seabrook site; emergency planning 21 exercises; the outstanding emergency planning issues 122' remaining; and the Utility's summary.
23 -Followed by that FEMA will provide an evaluation
~24 of offsite emergency planning and preparedness. And then 25 the Emergency Preparedness Branch of the Office of Nuclear
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k/ 1 Reactor Regulation will provide its evaluation of onsite 2 emergency planning and preparedness.
3 Dr. Kerr, did mention some of the background. I 4 just want to touch upon it before going any further.
5 Perhaps it would be to go on and speak about it in a little 6 more detail.
7 In April 1983 the ACRS provided the Commission its 8 report on low power operation of the Seabrook Station. In 9 that report the ACRS noted that it was unable to review the 10 Seabrook emergency plan because it was not fully developed.
11 The ACRS recommended at that time that other open 12 issues at Seabrook be resolved in a manner satisfactory to 13 the NRC Staff, and I can say that has happened. The ACRS 14 concluded that subject to resolution of items contained in
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15 its April 19, 1983 letter there_was reasonable assurance 16 .that Seabrook can be operated at core power levels up to 17 five percent without undue risk to the public.
18 The NRC Staff published in Supplement No. 2 its 19 commitment to meet with the ACRS on Seabrook emergency
-20 planning when Staff and FEMA review had been fairly 21 complete. And that has been done and a safety evaluation 22 has been issued and I understand that the members of the 23 subcommittee have copies of that.
24 The Seabrook facility is located in the Township 25 of Seabrook, New Hampshire approximately 11 miles south of
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13 n 4 i A/ 1 Portsmouth, New Hampshire and 40 miles north of Boston, 2 Massachusetts. Seabrook is a Westinghouse 4-loop PWR with a
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3 rated core power of 3,411 megawatts thermal.
4 The containment is a steel lined reinforced 5 structure which is surrounded by reinforced concrete 6 containment enclosure.
7 I would like now to take a moment to say a few 8 words about the facility milestones and the present status.
9 As I pointed out the ACRS low power report was 10 issued April 19, 1983. A fuel load license was issued on 11 October 17, 1986. A full scale emergency preparedness 12 graded exercise was performed in June of'1988. And a low 13 power license was issued on May 26, 1989. And initial "T 14 criticality was June 13, 1989.
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15 The status of the plant today that it is in cold i
16 shutdown. Low power testing has been completed. The Staff I i
17 and licensee are now evaluating circumstances surrounding a 18 reactor trip that occurred on June 22nd, 1989. ;
19 The licensee expects to be ready for full power j 20 license -- and I say this in the slide, it says November.
21 Our latest information -- I'm sorry, the slide says October 22 and our latest information is that it's in November. ;
1 23' The licensee recently made several management q 24 changes; that I won't go into, I expect that the Utility 1 I
25 will cover that in their presentation.
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l L N /: 1 In January 1988 the Public Service of New 2 Hampshire, the major joint owner for Seabrook filed for
,3 bankruptcy. That bankruptcy action is still pending in U.S.
'4 Bankruptcy Court in Manchester, New Hampshire.
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! 5 MR. CARROLL: Is it quite true that the low power 1.
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6 testing has been completed. Don't they still have to run a
, natural circulation test?
8: MR. NERSES: .That natural circulation test can be 9 run in the power ascension program when they get the full l
10 power license.
11 MR. CARROLL: But it was originally part of the 12 low power testing?
13 MR. NERSES: They had identified it to be part of 14 the low power testing program. I think -- in my l( }
15 conversations with them they had decided that it was 16 opportune-to save themselves some time to do it during the 17 low pcwer testing activities, but they are now also 18 considering the possibility of deferring that until they get 19 the full power license. They can speak more to that in more 20 detail.
21 MR. CARROLL: Thank you.
'22 MR. NERSES: On the matter of the regulatory 23 status there are two areas to consider.: litigation and 24 licensing.
25 In the litigation area the hearing on the New
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1 Hampshire Emergency Preparedness Pl.an, and that is the State 2 of New Hampshire Emergency. Preparedness Plan, it has been 3 complete. The Board ruled in favor of the licensee. The 4 Board has required verification items to be completed. An 5 appeal is pending with the Appeal Board.
6 The hearings on the Utility prepared plans for:
g 7 Massachusetts, and that's typically called the SPMC or the 8 Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities, and the 9 hearings on the exercise which was concluded -- which was 10 performed in June of 1988 -- those hearing concluded on June
'11 30, 1989. A Board decision is expected in November of 1989.
12 The hearings on the vehicle Alert Notification 13 System commonly called VANS is the mobile system that's used
(} 14 for the notification of the public in the Massachusetts 15 communities of the Seabrook EPZ. Those hearings were 16 completed in May. The decision rendered in favor of the 17 licensee and it was received in June of 1989. A notice of 18 appeal has been filed.
19 Other litigative actions involve financial 20 qualification, onsite emergency preparedness issues, and low 21 power testing.
22 In the licensing area there is a Staff review of a 23 recent FSAR update and a review of routine technical issues 24 that are in progress.
25 There are some facility modifications that are
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16 ll ongoing and outage items being accomplished by the licensee, p.
2 .and the Staff reviewed these'or inspect as appropriate.
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3 NRR is preparing for issuance of a full-power 4 license in late 1989. The issuance of the license is
'5- dependent on the outcome of the. litigation issues.- A Staff 6 finding that the licensee is ready to receive a full power 7 license. And, of course, the ACRS committee recommendation.
8 And a decision by the Commission that licensing is 9 appropriate.
10 Before I turn this over to Mr. Feigenbaum of New 11 Hampshire Yankee to provide the' Utility presentation on the 12 AP, are there any other questions?
13 MR. CARROLL: In the category of litigation, I
() 14 guess the December 30th ASLB decision left open the issue of 15- commuters; has that now been resolved or is that still an 16 issue that the ASLB needs more information on?
17 MR. NERSES: Could I hold on that.
18 I also wanted to add that we do have some 19 expertise on specific questions. In this case we have Mr.
20 Reis from the Office of General Counsel to answer some 21 questions on the litigation matters.
22 Ed.
23 MR. REIS: I'm Edwin J. Reis, Office of General 24 Counsel.
25 That issue is still pending before the Licensing
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(/ .1 Board. They are considering how you factor in commuter 2 traffic. It will be in the decision that is upcoming from 3 them that deals with the Massachusetts portion of the plan 4 and the evacuation exercise.
5 MR. CARROLL: So this is the deci~s ion expected in 6 November of ' 89?
7 MR. REIS: Yes, it will be part of that decision.
8 MR. CARROLL: All right.
9 MR. REIS: That's where the Interveners have their 10 major input.
11 MR. CARROLL: Okay. And I guess I would have 12 expected under litigation to see litigation beyond the NRC.
13 There is some litigation pending in the D.C. Circuit Court
/G 14 of Appeals, is there?
U 15 MR. REIS: I don't recall any at the present time 16 specifically pending. Perhaps Ms. Curran might contradict 17 me if I'm wrong. But I don't remember any specifically 18 occurring. The First Circuit Court of Appeals -- I expect 19 litigation after the decision of the Commission, certainly.
20 But at this point I don't know of litigation pending.
21 Now, the First Circuit Court of Appeals did find 22 the Commission's Emergency Planning Rule and particularly l
23 how utility plans are handled within the authority of the 24 Commission to be issue -- to issue.
25 MS. CURRAN: I think technically the appeals of 1-Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1'
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1 the Siren Rule and the low power license are still pending.
2 And I'm not sure what the future of those cases is. I think i
3 the siren appeal is going to be dismissed.
4 MR. REIS: I'm not sure either of the exact status 5 of those cases. However, they're not something that the 6 Commission -- that is before the Commission contrast to the 7 Courts.
8 DR. KERR: Is that enough information on that?
9- MR. CARROLL: Yes. I would just suggest'for the 10 full committee meeting you' update this so that it includes
-11 all the pending litigation.
12 DR. KERR: Further questions, Mr. Carroll?:
13 MR. CARROLL: No.
-[~h 14 DR. KERR: Mr. Wylie?
NJ 15 MR. WYLIE: No.
16 DR. KERR: Mr. Bender?
-17 MR. BENDER: No.
18 DR. KERR: Mr. Kevern?
19 MR. KEVERN: No.
20 DR. KERR: Mr. Nerses, what is the likelihood that 21 one will have to use the emergency plan in a serious 22 accident?
23 MR. NERSES: Could I defer that to the Utility.
24 DR. KERR: Well, I would like to know the NRC's 25- opinion on the question as well.
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s/ 1 MR. NERSES: Fine.
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2 DR. KERR: If it has one.
3 MR. NERSES: Yes.
4 Mr. Travers.
5 MR. TRAVERS: My name is Bill Travers and I'm 6 Chief of the Emergency Preparedness Branch of the Office of 7 Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC.
8 While I'm responsible for reviewing the 9 development of emergency plans I think I can state that the 10 NRC Staff review of the likelihood of accidents is very 11 small. With the PRA number that's been developed for 12 Seabrook indicates, I'm not sure, but typically on the order 13 of 10 to the minus 6, 10 to the minus 5th.
' %) f'3 14- But the likelihood of having to use the Seabrook 15 emergency plan for a very serious accident is quite small.
16 Nevertheless, it's --
17 DR. KERR: You can't be more specific than quite 18 small?
19 MR. TRAVERS: I'm afraid that doesn't fall in my 20 area of responsibility, but we can provide an answer and 21 perhaps the Utility can provide an answer for that during 22 their presentation. We can get some numbers if you're 23 interested.
24 DR. KERR: Well, I would think that you would be 25 interested because that has some influence on how you do
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2 MR. TRAVERS: Well, the basis for planning really 3 recognizes that there are a spectrum of accidents that could 4 occur.
5 DR. KERR: No , I'm talking about those accidents 6 that would bring into operation the emergency plan in a 7 significant way.
8- MR. TRAVERS: Emergency planning per se really 9 assumes the possibility of an accident occurring versus any
" 10 consideration -- any significant consideration of the-11 likelihood of that kind of an accident.
12 The basis for emergency planning really 13 encompasses a spectrum of accidents that could occur and
{ 14 attempts to plan such that you can mitigate the consequences 15 to the maximum extent from a whole spectrum of accidents.
16 DR. KERR: What would you say is the weakest link 17 in the existing emergency plan?
18 MR. TRAVERS: We don't -- we have looked at the 19 emergency plan vis-a-vis the regulations, the planning ;
20 basis, and right now with the exception of a couple of 21 caveats in the offsite area we are prepared to tell you 22 today that those plans are satisfactory to meet the 23 regulations that have been set up by NRC to determine 24 adequacy.
25 So we don't have and we haven't identified a r~
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(~} 1 significant weak link in the Seabrook emergency plan.
2 DR. KERR: I didn't ask for a weak link; I asked 3 for the weakest link. But if you have not identified a 4 weakest link then that's -- I guess that's an appropriate 5 answer. I would assume that in the courae of your 6 investigation you might have found some things that perhaps 7~ are more difficult than others and perhaps not.
8 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Mr. Kerr, from the Utility Ted 9 Feigenbaum. We have some individuals here who can speak --
10 DR. KERR: I'm going to ask you the same question.
11 I'm interested in the NRC's view.
12 MR. REIS: Dr. Kerr, in the litigation the 13- Interveners have claimed -- in the litigation that is
(} 14 ongoing that is before the Licensing' Board and will be 15 before the Appeal Board and before the Commission -- the 16 Interveners have claimed there are weak links because of the 17 siting of the facility, particularly in relation to 18 evacuation.
19 That is a matter that is in litigation. The Staff 20 does not feel that this plant is much different than any 21 other plants either in times or difficulties of evacuation.
22 DR. KERR: Mr. Reis, I recognize the need for 23 litigation and for rules to be followed. I'm also
- 24 interested in what I would call a physical situation, which 25 may or may not be related to the litigation and I was just
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22 k' 1 curious as to whether the Staff in its review had identified 6 ,2 anything that was, in it view, was particularly difficult.
3 It would seem to me there might be~ things
, 4- different from site to site.
5 MR. REIS: The answer to your question, Dr. Kerr, 6 is, no.
7 DR..KERR: Thank you.
8 Mr. Bender?
9 MR. BENDER: I just wanted to get a little 10 clarification. The question associated with the commuter 11 ' vulnerability in an emergency, what's the issue of that?
12 MR. REIS: The issue is the effect of commuter' 13 traffic and people returning home on the overall estimate of 14 evacuation times and whether it has a substantial effect on
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15 the evacuation times that were put in. And that is an issue 16 that is still open.
17 The Board particularly asked for more information 18 in the area, I believe, in the area of commuters who lived 19 in the Seabrook site, within the Seabrook EPZ and their 20 returning home. And that is a matter that is still to be 21 decided by the Licensing Board.
22 MR. BENDER: And that has to do with if there is 23 an accident and I guess commuters in this case are people on 24 the beaches.
25 MR. REIS: No.
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23 1- MR. BENDER: What kind of people are they?
2 MR. REIS: They are people who work at other 3 locations who are returning home or maybe crossing the EPZ 4 at that time.
5 MR. TRAVERS: More specifically, the effect, if 6 any, of commuters returning into the EPZ is not a part of 7 the model that has gone into the evacuation time estimate 8 and that's the challenge, how significant a factor could 9 that be.
10 MR. BENDER: Well, are there a lot of people in 11 the state -- what is the commuter problem?
12 MR. URBANIK: I'm Tom Urbanik, I'm an NRC 13 consultant on evacuation.
() 14 I guess it depends how you define whether the 15 commuters are or aren't modeled. One could argue that 16 they're modeled in a fashion, but they're not explicitly 17 modeled for that portion of their trip when they' re 18 returning back to their homes to then evacuate. There's a 19 time allowance built into the modeling for that, but it's 20 not explicitly modeled in a way that everyone is modeled as 21 they're leaving the EPZ.
22 MR. BENDER: I'm not interested in the model 23' itself, but just to understand how many people are moving 24 back and forth across the highway have to be considered with 25 such an event.
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1 MR. URBANIK: It's a subset of the permanent 2 residents that are outside of the EPZ. In some scenarios it 3 is a very small almost insignificant number. We're only 4 talking about circumstances -then an evacuation were to take 5 place at a time when people were, in fact, at work.
6 So, for example, in the summer scenario which is a 7 weekend scenario the number of people that are away at work l 8 is relatively small. I don't have all of the numbers in 9 front of me in terms of --
10 MR. BENDER: On Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, ;
11 Thursday and Friday there are some people going back and 12 forth from Boston, I guess, or somewhere else.
~13 MR. URBANIK: Right.
(} 14 MR. BENDER: That's like a thousand or a couple 15 thousand or what?
16 MR. URBANIK: Well, it would be in the thousands 17 in terms of numbers I believe.
18 MR. BENDER: Thank you.
)
19 DR. KERR: Further questions on this issue?
20 Gio response) 21 DR. KERR: Mr. Nerses, in the eighth SER 22 supplement, I believe it is, a reference was made to post-23 accident monitoring instrumentation; can you remind me for 24 what class of accidents this post-accident monitoring system i
25 is expected to provide useful information? Is it required l J
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25 1 to provide useful information, for example, for accidents 2 beyond a design basis accident category?
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3 MR. NERSES: I don't have that information but l
4 will get that. l 5 DR. KERR: Okay, I would appreciate your getting 6~ it for me, please.
7 And there is discussion in the same supplement of j i
8 the interaction between the SPDS system and other class 1-E l
9 systems, and there has to be feed through of information I
10 from one to the other, j l
11 Is it the view of the Staff that the SPDS system i.
12 is significantly less reliable than class 1-E systems? I {
l 13 ask because one could get the impression that the SPDS is' ;
i
() 14 expected to have many more failures and therefore might l 15 interfere with the reliability of the class 1-E systems. l l
16 NEL . NERSES: The SPDS system is a non-safety class 17 system.
18 DR. KERR: I recognize that. I'm more interested 19 in physical reality here, because it seems to me the q l
20 relative reliability of the two systems is more likely to l
21 influence interactions than whether one is class 1-E or not. j l 1 22 MR. NERSES: Are you speaking that without the 23 SPDS system being a non-safety class system, you suspect 24 that perhaps it's less reliable would have an interaction on 25 class 1-E systems.
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'JL 1 DR. KERR: Well, one seemed to be trying to 2 protect the class 1-E systems from the SPDS. That could 3 lead one to think, perhaps erroneously, that the Staff L 4 expected the class 1-E systems to be considerably more l
5 reliable.
6 On the other hand litigation led to an agreement 7 that the SPDS system, I believe, would be the information 8' therefrom would be continuously displayed. And if something 9 is to be continuously displayed that might lead one to 10 believe it was fairly highly reliable.
11 MR. NERSES: Could I pursue that a little further 12 in the sense to ask, I'm not sure how you arrived that it L 13 would be less reliable.
14 DR. KERR: I didn't arrive at it being less -- oh,
.f )
15 well, if its failure is likely to interact unfavorably on 16 the 1-E systems I did not see any concern that the 1-E 17 systems failure would interact unfavorably o.T it. And that 18 sort of led me to believe that the Staff might consider the 19 SPDS system much less reliable than class 1-E systecs. I 20 may have drawn the wrong conclusion and that's the reaeon 21 I'm asking the question.
22 Does the Staff have some idea of the relative p 23 reliability of these two systems?
l l 24 HR. NERSES: My recollection in regarding the SPDS 25 system they have gone to great length, the Staff has, to Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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27 l 1 assure that the iuolation between the non-class 1-E systems 2 that the SPDS is protected with devicts. I took away from 3 that that the Staff considered that the in points of the 4 SPD3 system to be such that it should be protected. I don't 5 recall that it's -- I don't remember reading of anything in 6 the SPDS system to give me that sense of reliability; and 7 that's the reason why I was pursuing that.
8 And I don't really-have an answer for you and I 9 guess what we'll have to do is try to get that answer for 10 you at the full' committee meeting.
11 DR. KERR: I would appreciate that.
12 Perhaps I should ask this question of the 13 licensee, so whoever is best prepared to a.sswer. This is
() 14 just a matter of curiosity: mention was mado of a boron 15 concentration measuring system that was apparently new and 16 more reliable than those that had been available in the 17 past.
18 Can somebody tell me how that works?
19 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Mr. Vargas.
20 DR. KERR: Is Mr. Vargas present?
21 I will be glad to repeat the question, if that 1
22 will be helpful.
23 MR. GRILLO: This is Joe Grillo from our 24 operations department, Operations Manager.
25 DR. KERR: Did you understand the question?
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> 1 MR. GRILLO: I believe I understood it. You're l
2- asking the operation of the boron concentration monitoring 3 system?
4 DR. KERR: Yes, sir.
5 MR. GRILLO: What we have is a tank that has a 6 heat exchanger in-it that allows a let-down path from the 7 reactor coolant system. This let-down is cooled down to 8 about 100 degrees and it floss through the tank that has a.
9 neutron source in it and we have neutron measuring 10 instruments.
11 DR. KERR: Okay, so you measure the neutron 12 absorption --
13 MR. GRILLO: Yes.
~
14 DR. KERR: -- in some known volume.
..(}
15 MR. GRILLO: Yes.
16 DR. KERR: Okay, thank you.
17 Any further questions before we go to the 18 Applicant?
19 Thank you, Mr. Nerses. Oh, excuse me.
(O MR. CARROLL: I guess I heard the statement made 21 that existing emergency plans at other nuclear power plants 22 should of envelope the situation that we have at Seabrook.
23 I guess I would like to hear the Staff expound a bit on 24 that.
25 Where, for example, do you have a comparable beach Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 620-4888
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-J 1 evacuation' situation? Or did I mischaracterize what you 2 said.
I 3 MR. TRAVERS: There are a number of plants that 4 are situated such that beaches fall within the plume 5 exporura of pathway emergency zone; San Onofre is one.
6 But I think what we were trying to say in response 7 to the question was that, the Seabrook emergency plan, in i
8 our view, doesn't pose a substantially unique circumstances.
9 That if you look across the country at the kinds of 10 considerations that go into emergency planning, those same j 11 kinds of things are embodied in plans at other plants, other 12 facilities. So that's the message we were trying to get.
13 Certainly, the Seabrook Station emergency planning 14 is unique in a number of respects. Offsite planning, for
(( }
I 15 example, in this case -- at least for Massachusetts -- has 16 been prepared by the Utility. That's not ideal. NRC 17 regulations recognize that that's not the ideal. The ideals l l
18 certainly would be full cooperation by the local and state '
19 authorities; in this case it doesn't exist.
20 However, when we and FEMA have looked at the plans j
I 21 and what they encompass the plans address very similar 22 things that are covered and considered in plants across the 23 country. By necessity they have to do so and we haven't i 1
24 found in our reviews anything that we could point to that 25 throws up a tremendous red flag, certainly in the context of Heritage Reporting Corporation I (202) 620-4888
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L. 'A- ,1- ~ our' licensing responsibility.
2- DR. KERR:. Remind me,-the State of Massachusetts I does now cooperate in.the emergency plan for Pilgrim,~does~.
, .3.
1 4 it.not?
L s 5 .MR. TRAVERS: Yes, it does.
R 16 ; .MR. CARROLL: And Yankee Rowe?
i.
7 MR. TRAVERS: Yes.
! 8 MR. NERSES: And Vermont Yankee.
'9- DR. KERR: Any further questions or comments?-
i' 10 (No response)
- 11 DR.-KERR: -Thank you, Mr. Nerses.
12 MR. NERSES: Thank you.
13 DR.' KERR: We turn now to Mr. Feigenbaum.
. 14 - (Slides being shown. )
- 15. MR. FEIGENBAUM: Good morning, members of the 16 subcommittee, NRC Staff, ladies and gentlemen. My name is
- 17 .Ted Feigenbaum, and I'm the' Senior Vice' President and Chief
' 18- Operating Officer of New-Hampshire Yankee. New Hampshire 19 Yankee is_the operating company for Seabrook Station..
20 Joining me today are members of the New Hampshire.
21 Yankee team who will brief the subcommittee on key aspects l
22 and unique features of our emorgency plans for Seabrook that 23 we believe will be of interest to the subcommittee members.
24 Let me just say, a great deal of effort has taken j 25 place in the past few years by New Hampshire Yankee together Beritage Reporting Corporation l
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^-} . 1 with the States of New Hampshire and Maine and many local 2 communities as well to develop excellent emergency plans for 3 Seabrook Station. In fact, as a point of interest New 4 Hampshire Yankee alone has expended in excess of $70 million 5' to satisfy NRC requirements for emergency planning. And we 6 have an annual emergency planning budget of approximately 7 $13 million.
8 During this effort we've encountered significant 9 political, legal, and technical challenges in Massachusetts, 10 especially, and those have been well publicized end I'm sure 11 the committee is fe.miliar with much of it.
'12 In spite of these obstacles our team has been 13 successful in developing excellent emergency response plans 14 with the cooperation of New Hampshire, with Maine, and a
((
15 majority of the local towns. We're confident that these 16 plans meet all NRC requirements and will protect the public 17- health and safety.
18 Regarding our agenda today, George Gram our 19 Executive Director of Emergency Preparedness and Community 20 Relations will talk a bit about the evolution of our 21 emergency plans and the planning history that has gone on 22 since we last met with the subcommittee.
23 He will also talk about the onsite radiological 24 emergency plans that have been in place and operable since 25 late 1985.
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1 Next, Tony Callendrello our Emergency Preparedness I 2 Licensing Manager will focus on the State of New Hampshire 3 radiological emergency response plans for the New Hampshire 4 communities.
5 He will concentrate and discuss the special 6 precautions and protective actions for nearby beach 7 populations which are of interest to the subcommittee and 8 will discuss state compensatory plans for the four New 9 Hampshire towns that are not currently participating in 10 emergency planning.
11 Peter Stroup the Director of Emergency Response b
12 and Implementation will discuss key points of the Seabrook 13 plan for Massachusetts communities which was developed for
(} 14 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the six communities in 15 the Seabrook EPZ that reside within the Commonwealth's 16 borders. These plans.were developed following the Governor 17 of Massachusetts decision to stop further emergency 18 planning for Seabrook following the Chernobyl accident in 19 the spring of 1986.
20 Following Pete will be Ed Desmarais our Project 21 Manager for the Vehicular Alert Notification System which we 22 shorten and call VANS. He will describe the mobile 23 transport system and the acoustical features of our siren 24 system for Massachusetts. This was a special system that 25 was required following legal action forcing New Hampshire
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A-- .1 Yankee to remove an in place and fully functional fixed pole 2 system.
- 3. Incidentally, the same fixed pole system was 4 challenged by a couple of towns in the State of New 5 Hampshire and the question of the pole legality went all the 6 -way up to the New Hampshire Supreme Court which found the 7 pole permits valid. So the system is a fixed pole in New
- 8. Hampshire and stands and was found legal by the highest 9 Court.
10 Next, George Gram will again come up and he will 11 describe how we demonstrated the adequacy of our plans 12 through onsite and offsite graded exercises.
13 He will also discuss remaining open implementation 14 items that we plan to close before full power ascension.
.( }
15 And if there is time I'll have some brief closing 16 remarks to discuss and summarize the strengths of our 17 . emergency plans.
18 There are other members of our New Hampshire 19 Yankee team present that have expertise in various aspects 20 of emergency planning snd they're here to assist me and 21 answer questions, if necessary, on emergency response for
'22 Seabrook.
23 Let me just take a brief moment to outline our 24 organization and give the subcommittee an idea where 25 emergency planning fits into our company structure.
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/ 1 I would like the committee to note that the entire
- 2. New Hampshire Yankee organization is located at the site, at 3 Seabrook Station. As Chief Operating Office I report to Ed
-4 Brown who is the President and Chief Executive Officer. And 5 Ed is also Chairman and CEO of Yankee Atomic Electric 6 Corporation that operates Yankee Rowe in Massachusetts, the
- 7. oldest operating commercial plant in this ccuntry. And 8 Yankee also provides services to other New England 9 utilities. Ed, as well, is located at the Seabrook site.
10 Under me a number of subdivisions report 11 representing key business functions. Two of a particular 12 interest today and those are shown in green and purple on 13 the slide. First, the Emergency Preparedness and Community 14 Relation Organization headed by George Gram consists of
[')/
s-15 approximately 60 people. And George's staff develops and 16 maintains plans. They maintain and develop facilities 17 necessary for emergency planning. They assure that the 18 human resources are available; that they are trained and 19 they coordinate the training. That sceptrios are developed 20 for drills and exercises. And they interface with the 21 communities on a day-to-day basis: the civil defense people; 22 police; fire protection companies in the various l< , cal 23 communities.
24 And we have generated a separate organization at 25 the subdivision level, which is unusual I think for a Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
I ;-4 35 1 utility but at Seabrook emergency planning is a major 2 function at the plant, so we have a separate subdivision L
L 3. that handles that work reporting directly to me.
4 In addition, as-you see in the purple area we have 5 a separate group to handle the extensive and complex
~
~6 litigation that we go through on emergency planning. And 7- this group varies in size depending on what is going on in 8 the adjudicatory process and it's varied from four people to 9 12 people and right now it's decreasing because essentially 10 the litigation is coming to a close, we hope.
11 We've set up the separate group to avoid dilution 12 of our. emergency planning group under George Gram, so 13 they're not bothered day-to-day with the legal type
() 14 questions and responses to interrogatories and the like.
15 Next slide, please.
16 I'm not going to take the subcommittee's time on 17 this information because I think it was adequately discussed 18 and handled by Mr. Nerses. But I will say-that the unit-2, 19 just for the subcommittee's information, has been canceled 20 and its construction permit expired last October and was not 21 reauthorized.
22 Next slide, please.
23 Regarding the site, Seabrook is located at the 24 northern part of the Town of Seabrook on the seacoast area 25 of New Hampshire and Rockingham County. The center of Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) G28-4888
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(..) 1; Boston is about 40 miles-south' southwest. The Commonwealth 2 of Massachusetts border is just slightly over two miles away 3 from the unit-1 center line.
4 There are 17 towns in New Hampshire in the 5 Seabrook EPZ and-those are shown in the light green shaded 6 area. And six towns in Massachusetts shown in the yellow 7 area.
8 The major. transportation routes that run through 9 the EPZ are-Interstate 95 which is an eight-lane 10 superhighway in the vicinity of the plant. Route 495 is
- L1 another interstate which runs east-west; 95, of course, runs 12 north-south; and 495 is a six-lane interstate.
13 Then we have major state roads, Route 1 and Route 14 51-101 which run east-west.-
-{ }
15 MR. CARROLL: What kind of roads are they?
16 MR. FEIGENBAUM: They're state roads.
17 MR. CARROLL: Lanes?
18 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Well, Route 1 is in many sections 19 a three-lane highway around the EPZ and Route 51-101 is a 20 two-lane highway. In the major portion of the EPZ it does 21 expand out to four-lanes further on out, Route 101-51.
22 MR. CARROLL: And one other point of i 23 clarification. I guess I had the impression there were six 24 communities in New Hampshire that were not supporting the 25 emergency plan, that has now become four?
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Q A JlE MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yes. $here:are a couple'of d2 -communities'that have.recently decided to plan.
b 13 ~. MR. CARROLL: So which'are the four.that'are not?-
.4. MR. FEIGENBAUM: Okay,.the four that are not are:
- /g [5_. South
- Hampton,.Kensingt'on, Rye, and Hampton.
6L MR. CARROLL: .Just. plain Hampton?
7 , 1MR. FEIGENBAUM: JustLplain'Hampton, yes.
'8. MR. CARROLL: Okay.
9 NR. FEIGENBAUM: North Hampton was one of-the non-i L10. participating towns that has decided to participate.
11' A fuller map of New England shows that there'are 12 Leight operating-commercial nuclear' power. plants'that. exist in- five 'of the six New Eng3 and states. As I said,.. including,
}F
, t l4 Yankee Rowe the oldest operating plant in the nation.
. %)U 1 15 The circles. represent.the.10 mile EPZ area.
- 16f Emergency planning is not',a new concept. All six states
' 17 .have emergency' plans. ' Massachusetts has developed and 18 periodically test plans for Pilgrim, Rowe and' Vermont. As 19 you1can see, Vermont has a three state interface in its 10 20 : mile radius and therefore the interface is between the states: Massachusetts; New Hampshire; and Vermont are tested 22 during those drills.
23 Next slide, please.
24 The State of Maine, as you can see, in the 50 mile
- 25. radius circle is encompassed in the ingestion pathway.
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.12 ' Maine ldoes participate and has exercised their ingestion'
' 2' pathway; plan extensively,-not only.forLSeabrook but also for 5
[ 3 their own. Maine' Yankee plant.-
, MR. CARROLL: Some place-in your presentation.do 5( you have~anueven more detailed map? I' guess in reading the
- j. " 6) :ASLB findings they suggest that if you're going to.
e
- 7. understand the emergency planning situation you've got to 8 :get:down to-looking at the beach, beach areas.and --
9 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yes, we will be' discussing the.
h
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10 = beach'and we-have Nr. Ed Lieberman who can discuss emergency 11 . time evacuation estimates in quite detail.
12' MR. CARROLL: And you have a map that supports.
' 13 : that discussion?. I don't'see'one in your package here.
$ '14 ,
MR. FEIGENBAUM: Is there another map here.
15 MR.-BARR: 'We-have'a closeup of a portion of that 16 -which-details the beaches, yes.
17 MR .' CARROLL: Okay.
18 MR. FEIGENBAUM:, We can get additional maps if 19 that's necessary after lunch.
F 20. Well, I won't spend a great deal of time talking 21 about these milestones, and Mr. Nerses did'go into it 22 briefly.. But I just will say that we-did get a construction
~23 permit in 1976 and 10 years later construction was completed 24 in 1986.
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October of 1986 and a. low power license -- testing license 2 did : come in May of ' ' 0 9, and the plant did go critical 3 initially in June of this year.
'4 I was' going to introduce Mr. Gram but, Mr. Kerr, I 5 know you had some questions regarding the returning 6 commuters. If I'might just ask Mr. Lieberman to discuss
-7 that.in a little more detail, would that be beneficial to 8 the subcommittee?
9 DR. KERR: .You said I had some questions 10 concerning what?
11 MR. CARROLL: No , I did.
12 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Excuse me.
13 MR. CARROLL: That I did on returning commuters.
14 DR. KERR: Oh.
15 MR. FEIGENBAUM: On returning commuters?
16 MR. CARROLL: I just wondered what the litigation 17 status of it was. I don't think we need it at this point.
18 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Okay, fine.
19 DR. KERR: I have some questions that you perhaps 20 will want someone to answer, some of the same ones I asked 21 the Staff. For example, what do you think is the likelihood 22 that the emergency plan will need to be exercised for 23 serious radiological emergency?
24 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Well, we think that the 25 likelihood is very, very low, but I would like to have our
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\/ 1 problemistic risk assessment staff discuss that.
2 Mr. Rau?
3 MR. RAU: I'm Larry Rau, I'm the Manager of 4 Reliability and Safety Engineering for New Hampshire Yankee.
5 Could I have the question again, please.
6 DR. KERR: What-do you think is the likelihood-7 that your emergency system will need to be exercised or 8 brought into play, however you want to describe it, in a 9 serious radiological emergency?
10 MR. RAU: For Seabrook Station we have estimated 11 the mean frequency of a serious event to be approximately 10 12 to the minus 6 per year.
13 DR. KERR: Now, I'm not sure whether that's the 14 answer to my question or not because I don't know what you
()
15 mean by " serious event."
16- I'm talking about an event that would cause you to 17 -- what is the word -- recommend because that's all you can 18 do I guess'of evacuation?.
19 MR. RAU: I'm not the one, I don't think, to speak
.20 to the emergency plan and its activation.
21 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Terry, would you address that.
22 MR. HARPSTER: I'm Terry Harpster the Director of 23 Licensing Services.
24 We have looked at that and we have the numbers.
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4 A/ 1 assessment. I would have to ask our engineers what the 2- exact number is, but of the serious events it's far below 3 the NRC safety _ goal and we have looked at it with regard to 4 making decisions in emergency planning.
5 We're prepared to address it, I just have to get 6 the right people to address it.
'7 DR. KERR: You can address it at the full 8 committee caeting if you want to. I would be interested --
9 I'm as much $nterested in whether you have actually looked 10 at this number as I am in what the number is.
11 MR. HARPSTER: We have looked at it, Dr. Kerr, 12 yes.
13 DR. KERR: Okay.
. s.).
(7 14 Excuse ,rme, go ahead, Jay.
15 MR. CARROLL: .What's the status of your PRA; it 16 was done several years ago and is it being updated or has 17 the Staff reviewed it and said it's great or just where is 18 it?
19 MR. RAU: We have done an extensive amount of 20 study on the plant regarding problemistic risk assessment.
21 We have a program for continuously updating the FRA and it 22 has been reviewed in most all of its facets by Brookhaven 23 for the Staff.
24 MR. CARROLL: Does it explicitly include non-power 25 operation events? Is mid-loop operation included in it, for Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 620-4000
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-(i 'l 1' example?
12 MR. RAU: We have extended our original
- 3. problemistic safety assessment to do a full level-III 4- evaluation of operations at shutdown which encompasses modes 5- 4, 5, and 6.
6 MR. CARROLL: That hasn't been done as yet?
7 MR. RAU: No, sir r .we-have completed that and 8 internally published the results of-that.
9 MR. CARROLL: You say you have completed it?
10 MR. RAU: Yes, sir, we did.
11 MR. CARROLL: And how doec-the risk of core damage 12 in those modes compare with mode l? ,
13 MR. RAU: It's about an order of magnitude less,
(} 14; sir.
15 MR. CARROLL: There are some who argue that it's 16 about comparable.
17 MR. RAU: Well, we did identify several changes to 18 procedures and to policies during the refueling and some 19 additional changes to instrumentation. j 20 MR. CARROLL: Do you keep the containment closed 21 during refueling -- I mean, during mid-loop operation? ,
22 MR. RAU: Yes, sir, we do.
23 MR. CARROLL: Totally closed and sealed?
12 4 MR. RAU: Yes, sir, the major equipment hatch is j I
25 in place during times where we would be at any mid-loop D
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2 : MR'. CARROLL: I don't have anymore questions at 3' this' time.
L4' D R .' KERR: The second' question: have you or.~your.
5' emergency planning people identified what you might ca11'the-P 6 weakest. link in the-emergency plan?-
l' 7 MR..FEIGENBAUM: I would have t'o agree first with 8 the NRC Staff that in terms of weak links, there are no' weak.
f 9, 9 links at Seabrook in terms of the emergency response plans.
10 We meet.all the URC's^ planning standards and FEMA
' 11; planning standards as well. but if I were to characterize 12 the weakest that there might exist in the chain, I would 13 have to;say.it would be the lack of preplanning on the.part
.. . 14. of'the State of Massachusetts. We have a very excellent
'15 - plan. We'think it could be better if they drilled'with.us L
.16 and exercised with us and strengthen those interfaces.
17 We believe ,that the plan.is adequate'because 18' Massachusetts has tremendous resources available to it to 19- respond in an emergency. We believe they will respond to
=20 protect their citizenry in an emergency. They're required 21 to do so and it doesn't make any sense to think that they 22 wouldn't.
23 And they have expertise because they do plan for
-24 Pilgrim, Rowe, and Vermont and drill those resources 25 periodically.
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s> - 1- So I.think we certainly have a strong plan, but if l
p 2 there was one place that we can make it stronger it would be j i
3' participation by the communities in Massachusetts and the p 4- government of Massachusetts.
5 'MR. CARROLL: Do you --
6 DR. KERR: Excuse me, just a minute.
7 I-think that was a good answer to a question I 8 didn't ask. I would be interested in whether you have 9 identified something that you think might be a weakest link.
10~ This doesn't mean that the plan is no good or that 11 it is illegal; it just seems to me that it may say, here is 12 the part on which we need to focus most.
13 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Okay. What I guess I didn't make I'l 14 myself clear. I guess the lack of being able to drill the U
15 interfaces with the Massachusetts public health and safety
.16 officials is the weakest link.
17 DR. KERR: And it doesn't have anything to do with 18 the evacuation of people off the beach or people off the 19 highways or anything of that sort that is --
20 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Well, when we originally looked 21 at emergency planning of the Seabrook area we were concerned 22 about the beach population and that's why we made special 23 precautionary measures. And now with those precautionary 24 measures for the beach population, which Mr. Callendrello 25 will talk about, instituted I think it's no longer a weak O
(-) IIeritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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2' 'DR. KERR: Okay. What is the likelihood, if you 3 can predict this, of people in Massachusetts who will 4 purchase or whoever supplies the electricity to 5 Massachusetts will purchase any of the electrical energy L 6 generated at Seabrook?
7 MR. FEIGENBAUM: What the likelihood is?
8 DR. KERR: Yes.
-9 MR. FEIGENBAUM: It's 100 percent. They will 10 purchase power from Seabrook. All the New England states, 11 except perhaps Rhode Island, will be receiving power from 12 Seabrook Station.
13 DR. KERR: So if and when it does go into
() 14 operation it will supply some electricity to Massachusetts?
15 HR. FEIGENBAUM: Oh, absolutely. One of our major
.16 owners, New England Electric, has a subdivision 17 Massachusetts Electric that is located in Massachusetts.
18 The Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company is a 19 major owner of Seabrook and they also supply the 20 municipalities in Massachusetts as well. And there are 21 other owners as well.
22 DR. KERR: Thank you.
23' Mr. Bender.
24 MR. BENDER: This may sound like a naive question 25 to the listener. Some of the things I've heard are a little
/\
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What's'the nature of the accident that causes 3_ ' iimplementation of the emergency plan?
-4 .MR. FEIGENBAUM: The' nature of the accident?
.5 'MR. BENDER:- .Yes.
ll '6 'MR. FEIGENBAUM: Well, it's -- what we planned for 7 is.~a: range of-accidents that go all the way from an unusual o
-8 event ~where something is spilled'or dropped to a general O .9' emergency, to what'would be a' double-ended reactor coolant i l .. system break. .It's a. range of.--
.11 MR. BENDER: I know all this, but if it's a minor
- 12. . accident then the questions having to do with whether the "13L . plant isieffective or not is sort of academic.
114l What kind _3f accidents really create concern for
.15 -' the movement of the commuters and getting the people out of-
.16 the area; what is it for those? -And do we know them?
17 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yes, we do.
- 18. Mr. Gram will address that.
19 MR. BENDER: Where are they identified, I don't 20- need a litany right here.
'21' MR. GRAM: My name is George Gram, I'm Executive 22 Director of Emergency Preparedness for Seabrook.
23 Emergency actions on the part of the plant onsite
-24 . organization and the associated states are based on 25 emergency classification levels, all right, unusual event, Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
, , ..,' 47 11' -an al'ert,nsite_ area' emergency,.or. general emergency.
. _2 - Various stages of those organizations - those /
1.
3- response' organizations: activate at those different emergency 4 classification. levels. Those emergency.classifica' tion k .S - = levels are based'on plant parameters called " emergency 6 .. - action _ levels." 'And it depends on -- there's a range of 20 7 emergency: action' levels built-into the plant that range from 8 loss.of power to meteorological tower all the way_to double-9 ended break.
- l'O Depending on where you reach that in the plant 11 decision-makers on the state level make-decisions to do 12 protective' actions-for people.
- 13. MR. BENDER: ~ A double-end break is unlikely to 14 .cause much, radioactivity.
db . '
15~ DR. KERR: Mr. Bender, if those historical words 16- are going to be recorded you have to get closer to that
'17 mike.-
J 18 ' 'MR.' BENDER: I'm.sorry it's hard to talk to this.
.19 'DR. KERR: I recognize the problem.
l 20 MR. BMIDER: I've never been very expert at that h 21 u'se of microphones.
22- MR. BENDER: The question is --
.23. DR. KERR: Mr. Kevern, since he won't do it, will l 24 you push that mike over.
- 25. MR. BENDER: -- has more to do with what kind of Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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1 AM1 17 LreleasesLcause.the evacuation.or thefemergency plan to 2 Lrequire some; kind lof. action -on the part of the officials?
c37 Are you concernedLabout. radioactivity getting'out of 4.' containment, and that's.ansignal whichEisl going'to make n5 . things happen.or.isLit just'that,'here is'a. condition in the -
6 Lplant1that may or may not release something which causes the 7J emergency organization.to become aware that an accident 8' condition' exists?.
9_ - MR. GRAM: It's the latter. It's not necessarily 10' 'the release of radiation; it could be a plant condition that 11' is not; stable, that's degrading and state officials have.
-12; automatic trip' points where they would order even evacuation 13 or consideration for sheltering for the general public.
L 1'4 MR.1 BENDER: .Well, do those evacuation and shelter
}l 15- conditions ~ relate to'the announcement of'a double-ended pipe
.16- break or the announcement that something:is getting out'of 17- the reactor system that causes the evacuation action?
.18 ' MR.' . GRAM: It depends -- it's either ona of those.
.19 , situations. .I could not even be-as serious as a double-20: ended pipe break; it could-just'be degrading plant 21 conditions'that cause the utility to declare a general 22 emergency and then the state has an automatic trip where 23 they consider evacuation of the population.
1
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24 MR. FEIGENBAUM: George, would it help if we
- 25. provided the subcommittee with our classification scheme for Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
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[ - ('h E -- /L 1 the different events that would cause the different 2 emergency action levels.
L 3' DR. KERR: Are we to get this in the 4 presentations? If we're going to hear them later, we might
-5 as well just do it --
- 6. MR. FEIGENBAUM: I don't think we were going to 7 touch'on it in any great detail. But we do have copies of 8 it,'Mr. Grillo, behind you, if you want to leave it with the 9 subcommittee. If you would like us to address it, we can 10 address it.
11 DR. KEIMR: Why don't you make a copy available to 12 Mr. Bender and if that doesn't answer his question he can 13 pursue it.further.
/'T 14 MR. BENDER: I'll just make one observation and
\m/
15 quit. Just reflecting on the situation at Three Mile Island 16 in which nothing came out of the plant, the question of how 17 to decide about evacuation and such was clearly related to
'18 what was in the containment and where it was going.
19 And I'm having some difficulty right now in
-20 ' understanding that there's any criteria set up in the 21 evacuation plan that relates to that part of the event.
22 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Decision-making, you really are 23 talking about decision-making for protective actions.
24 MR. BENDER: I think that's what the emergency 25 plan ought to be all about.
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4 - -1 MR. FEIGENBAUM: It is and we will be discussing
'2 that at length. So why don't we -- if there are no further 3- questions for me.
4 DR. KERR: Well, I have one additional question.
5 In an emergency who's in charge?
'6 MR. FEIGENBAUM: In an emergency who's in charge?
7 DR. KERR: Yes.
8 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Okay. We have a --
9 DR. KERR: Well, let me separate: who is in charge 10 as far as the plant is concerned? I recognize that people 11- outside of the organization have to be in charge of the 12 evacuation and so on.
13 MR. FEIGENBAUM: There is a site emergency
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14 director.
15 George, do you want to address that, please.
16 MR. GRAM: Yes.
17 Are you talking about the onsite utility 18 organization?
19 DR. KERR: I'm talking about who in the 20 organization has the ultimate authority to make things 21 develop -- make decisions?
22 MR. GRAM: All right. There is a respon'se manage 23 designated for the utility organization that mans the
' 24 utility response organization. He interfaces on a state 25 level with the emergency director for the' State of New Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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's -) - 1 Hampshire, as an example, but ultimately the governor of New 2 Hampshire is in charge of decision for the public and the 3- governor of Massachusetts.
4- DR. KERR: Where does Mr. Feigenbaum enter this 5 chain?.
6 MR. GRAM: Mr. Feigenbaum is the news media 7 representative for New Hampshire Yankee at.our joint media 8 center.
9 DR. KERR: He doesn't get involved in the 10 decision-making process in an emergency at all, he just 11 works with the media?.
12 MR. GRAM: Yes.
13 DR. KERR: Mr. Feigenbaum, is that true?
( ') . 14 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Let me clarify that.
15 (Laughter) 16 MR. FEIGENBAUM: We have, as Mr. Gram said, a 17 response manager who has the responsibility and authority to 18 make protective action recommendations to the state. We 19 have an emergency director on site which is the plant 20 manager who calls the shots in the control room and 21 technical support center. I have an emergency role myself 22 as spokesperson for the utility. But ultimately Mr. Brown, 23 the Chief Executive Officer of the company, will make 24 decisions. As the response manager feels he needs to refer 25 to Mr. Brown for any actions that would require the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 620-4880 1
.c 52 K/ 1 ' president's authority.
2 DR. KERR: Okay. So the responsibility is in the 3 Chief Executive Officer?
4 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Absolutely.
5 DR. KERR: How does he make certain that he is in 6 a position to make good decisions in a severe emergency?
7 MR. FEIGENBAUM: That he's in the position to be 8 available?
9 DR. KERR:. Well, not only to be available, but 10 when he is available to know enough to make good decisions?
11 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Well, Mr. Brown has gone through 12 emergency training. He is, as a matter of fact, I think he 13 even went through a course on the reactor as well, as far as
("N . 14 what goes on in an emergency and has gone through all that
%-)
15 training.
16 It is understood and is in our procedures that Mr.
17 Brown-has the ultimate responsibility for the organization.
18 DR. KERR: I recognize that, I just wondered what 19 he does to make certain in a serious emergency which has a 20 chance of something like one in a million maybe of occurring 21 that he is prepared to make decisions or does he have people 22 working with him who are so good that he can just turn to 23 them and shy, what should I do?
24 MR. FEIGENBAUM: No, he's kept fully informed 25 during the emergency. We have people in our emergency i
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.2 ' owners including Mr. Brown as Chief Executive Officer are 3 informed continuously of the events that are going on.
4 DR. KERR: Does Mr. Brown -- excuse me.
5 MR. FEIGENBAUM: He's in contact with the response 6 manager as/well as the, control room.
7- ,
DR. KERR: 'Does Mr. Brown thoroughly understand 8 the Chernobyl accident and its implications?
9 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yes. Yes, he does. As a matter 10 of fac't, we set up U.fter the Chernobyl accident a special 11 group that collecte.: information regarding the Chernobyl 12 accident and we've bi:en following it very closely through 13 its closure.
14 In fact, I believe Mr. Brown was in the Soviet
.{)
15 Union in the past year to attend the WANO Conference, and I 16 believe many members of that WANO Conference did visit the 17 Chernobyl-site'and-did get a complete thorough briefing of.
18 it.
19 DR. KERR: In your view, what was the most 20 significant lesson that you learned from Chernobyl as far as 21 operation of Seabrook is concerned?
22 MR. FEIGENBAUM: The most significant lesson that 23 I would have to say about Chernobyl is that you can't allow 24 your plant staff or anybody working in a nuclear power 25 facility to become complacent regarding the technology. You Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4080 l
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w/. I have to have a healthy respect for the technology and always 2- be sharp and follow your procedures.
3 DR. KERR: Thank you.
4 Any questions?
5 MR. CARROLL: I guess I'm a little troubled, at 6 least in my concept of how an emergency plan ought to work.
7 I'm used to calling them the " recovering manager;" what do 8 you call him?
9 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Response manager.
10 MR. CARROLL: Besponse manager. That the response 1 11 manager, as you've portrayed it, decides a certain thing but 12 then has to check with Mr. Brown. I think that's fine in 13 the normal situation where there is time-to get additional 14 opinions.
. ()
15 But does the response manager have in his charter 16 if a decision is needed instantaneously that he can make it?
17 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yes, the response manager has 18 certain responsibilities and he can go ahead and make 19 protective action recommendations to the state and make 20 recommendations to the site emergency vehicle without 21 contacting Mr. Brown if it's within his authority.
22 However, Mr. Brown is being kept informed through 23 the emergency operations facility of whe.t's going on and 24 there's a concurrence taking place.
25 MR. CARROLL: You're still giving me some Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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(/ 1' ' problems. If it's within his authority?
2- MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yes.
3 MR. CARROLL: What is his authority?
4 MR. FEIGENBAUM: His authority is to manage the 5 response.
6 MR. CARROLL: And do whatever is necessary?
7 MR;.FEIGENBAUM: That's correct. But the 8 oversight, id you will, is Mr. Brown that is aware of what's 9 going on. If'he disagrees with an action being taken by the 10 response manager he has the ultimate authority to advise the 11- response manager of his displeasure with a recommendation.
12 MR. GRAM: Excuse me, Ted, that's a little 13 misleading. I'm sorry to interrupt.
14 But if the response manager makes a protective-
. ( )'-
15' action to the state I can't conceive that Ed Brown ever 16 interceding and going against that decision. He's just not 17 trained well enough to understand the situation that's going 18 on.
19- MR. CARROLL: Okay. I like that answer better.
20 MR. GRAM: Mr. Brown is involved in commercial 21- decisions such as taking care of insurance requirements and 22- things like that. In a real emergency the response manager 23 takes care of the onsite protective action decisions and 1
( 24 mitigation of the accident.
25 MR. CARROLL: And one other question: you Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
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O) 4 k/ 1 indicated the weakest link, if you will, your inability to 2 drill with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Do you avail
.3 yourself of the opportunity to at least have observers from 4 your organization participate in the drills that are done at 5 Vermont Yankee or Yankee Rowe or whatever to get a feel of 6 how Massachusetts is set up and what capabilities they have?
7 MR. FEIGENBAUM: That's really one of the 8 strengths of our organization. Yankee Atomic is a sister 9 organization to New Hampshire Yankee, As I indicated, Mr.
10 Brown as well as being the President of our conpany is the 11 CEO of Yankee Atomic. Yankee Atomic operates Yankee Rowe in 12 western Massachusetts and also provides emergency plan 13 support to Vermont Yankee and other plants.
(l 14 So we are through that connection involved in U
15 those drills as well. Some of our experts that are here in 16 tuis audience today work on the Vermont Yankee ene gency 17 plans and the Yankee Rows emergency response plans and also 18 support our emergency response.
19 Mf. . CARROLL; Okay. So the short answer is that 20 your people +-
21 MR. TEIGCHLADMr Ate involved.
22 MR. CM2OLL: - at 5esoreck have a good feel for 23 what Massachusetts 3 cspitilit.y is' !
24 MR. P5,IGEN3AUM: Absolutely.
25 MR. CARRCLL: Okay.
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(.,) 1 DR. KERR: Further' questions?
'2 (No response) 3 DR. KERR: Thank you, Mr. -- oh, Mr. Kevern.
4 'MR. KEVERN: One question please, the follow-on on fi the weakest link item there. Since I'm not intimately 6 familiar with the history there involving Massachusetts, do 7 you envision a likelihood that at some future date 8 Massachusetts may participate in the emergency planning '
9 process?
10 MR. FEIGENBAUM: I really couldn't predict that.
11 I would have to.say you have to ask the governor of 12 Massachusetts that question. We certainly hope and pray
'13 that when the plant is fully licensed that Massachusetts
<~3 14 will participate.
NJ 15 DR. KERR: How strr>ngly do you --
16 MR. FEIGENBAUM: I can't venture a guess.
17 DR. KERR: How strongly do you believe in the 18 efficacy of prayer?
19 (Laughter) 20 MR. FEIGENBAUM: No comment.
21 DR. KEER: Tennison, you remember, had some rather 22 s+.rong things to say about that; he did believe it.
23 (Slides being shown.)
t 24 MR. GRAM: Thank you, Ted.
25 Good morning.
e
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'- l' Emergency preparedness at Seabrook Station has a 2 long.and varied history that spans almost 15 years. A 3 detailed review of that history would no doubt and in short 4 order put'the entire room to sleep. However, I hope that a 5 brief review of the major milestones of that history will be 6' helpful to the subcommittee and place our present status in I
7 a better perspective.
8- As part of the siting process in 1973 a 1.5 mile 9- low population. zone, LPZ, was established for emergency i
10 planning around Seabrook Station. It is interesting to note 11 that the first mile of that requirement was covered almost !
12 entirely by plant property. The remaining half-mile 13 encompassed approximately 2,000 permanent residents and did
(} 14 not include the so-called beach population.
15 In 1980 as a result of TMI requirements were i 16 established superceding the low population zone and 17 requiring a 10 mile emergency planning zone e.nd 50 mile !
18 ingestion pathway rone. ;
i 19 In December of 1981 planning to meet NUREG-0654 j 20 began in New Hampshire and hapsachusetts. This planning j 21 which spanned five years included development of state and ]
22 local plans and over $5 million of equipusnt and facilicy 23 upgrading in both asetec. 1 1
24 In December of 1985 the governor of 1!ew Hampshire
- 25. submitted state and local plans to FEMA requesting formal Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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.! 59 pg ih-[ l' review'and evaluation. _
~2- .The~first onsite and offsite evaluated exercise 7
- 3 ~ .for SeabrookLStation was held in February of.1986. The
- 4 State of'New-Hampshire,'11'of 17' local' communities, and New d
5- . Hampshire Yankee participated. Massachusetts!did not' participate because their plans hadLjust been submitted to 17 FEMA requesting a technical assistance review.
8 In" April of 1986 just after the'Chernobyl accident
.9 the governor of Massachusetts' ordered an independent study
- 10. of emergency, planning for Seabrook and the viability of 11 ' beach evacuation. lNo study has'ever been published.'
12 However, base'd'on his conclusion that the beaches could not 13 be evacuated Massachusetts stopped all o srgency planning 14 for Seabrook' Station-in September of 1986.
15L As Ted Feigenbaum has already mentioned, 16 construction of unit-1 was completed in July of '86 and we
.17 formally requested an operating license.
18 And in October of ' 86 we did receive a zero power 19 license, loaded fue1~into the reactor, and became-subject to 20' FSAR and technical specification operating requirements.
21 In December of 1986 we petitioned the NRC to 22: reduce . our 10 mile plumc exposure enttergency planning zone to 10 2A one mile. The ASLB denied the petition ruling that op
', 24 insufficient showing had been cada to justify a waiver of .
-)
L2E the regulations. At that point we decided to pursue a Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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1(d d ill utility prepared plan as the most probable' shortest path to-2- a' full power license.
'3' MR. CARROLL: What;was your basis for petitioning
- 4
- forqthe. reduced EPZ?
.5 MR. GRAM: It'was a' submittal: of a new' s 16 ~ problemistic risk' assessment in comparison to' WASH-1400; 'I r 7' think Mr. Rau could answer questions on that better than I
! 8' 'sure can.
- 91 The Commission in-June of 1987 clarified what a I
10 bona-fide utility plan must' entail; and also, that such a
[
- 11. plan must be~ submitted prior.to the' issuance of a five .
.12 percent license.
13 DR. KERR: Excuse me, what is the difference 14 .between a bona' fide utility plan and a utility plan?
'15I MR. GRAM: Well, I believe --
16 .- MR. CARROLL: Clarify it or not.
17 MR. GRAM: Yes. ' We originally in April of ' 87 18 . submitted.the plan that was prepared by the State of
- 19 Massachusetts, but never formally submitted it as proof'that 20 planning was within the realm of tne possible.
21' DR. KERR: Oh, okay.
-22 MK. GRAM: In June they came out with their CLI--
23 87.03 that clarified that it really had to be a legitimate
-1 24- utility plan that met all the regulation.9 of 0654, NUREG-25 0654. And at that point we went into the development cf the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
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, L1 SPMC.'
'2 MR. BENDER: Excuse me.
3 MR. GRAM: Yes.
4 MR. BENDER: Did the Chernoby1' accident affect the p
5 emergency plan in any way that you previously devised?
6 MR. GRAM: 'I can't say. I believe that NUREG-0654 7' was'aiready in. existence and.that's the planning basis for l
8 -our plan, the State of: New Hampshire's plan, and;just about~
9 every other emergency plan in the country.
10 ' MR. BENDER: So things were the same a'fter the i
- (
.11 accident as they,were before..that accident occurred?
12 MR. GRAM: .Yes.
13- MR.. BENDER: -Thank you.
l'4 MR. GRAM: I can't speak-for FEMA or the NRC, but 15- I believe the basis for that is the containment designs H16 required in the United Scates versus the Soviet Union..
17' MR. BENDER: Okay.
'18 MR. GRAM: In September of 1987 New Hampshire 19 Yankee submitted the Seabrook plan for Massachusetts 20- .~ communities, the SFMC, and began development of the 21: . resources and organization required to implement that plan.
22 The NRC Comr.insion in November of 1987 issued h 23- rule amendment to 10 CPR 50.47C providing criteria for the c
- 24- .evalurtion of utility prepared emergency plans in situations 25- . where state and/or local' governments declined to participate I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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i1 .in' emergency planning. The so-called " Realism Rule."
2 As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix lE,~ New-
- 3. Hampshire ~ Yankee conducted its second annual onsite i
4 evaluated exercise in December of 1987. :
E .
K 5 -In- April of ' 88 New Hampshire - Yankee submitted . to - 1 6- FEMA a design'reportfon public alerting and' notification
. . R Ju 7; systems which included in the Vehicular Alert Notification J E 8- ' System, so-called VANS, for Massachusetts. The history and
-9 details of VANS'will be covered by Ed Desmarais as part of Il0L .our,presentat' ion. ,l t
11 The next' major milestone in Seabrook' emergency :
12 . planning > history,-and in my. mind a watershed event, was the- j 13' ' June of 1988 initial qualifying onsite and offsite graded -l J
j ][. L14' exercise, which I'll cover in-more detail-'later.
- 15. In. December of 1988 the ASLB. issued a partial l i
16- 'initial decision finding that the State of New Hampshire and 1
' 1*/ local New Hampshire community plans provided reasonable 181 assurance to' pro *;.ect1the health and safety of the public.
19- In the same month FEMA issued an. integrated plan i -20 and capabilities tc'implemeat review of all plans, 5 l
-:21 ; organizations, resources, and facilities. The review found
'22 reasonable. assurance to protect the baalth and safety of'the j 23 -public in offsite emergency preparedness for Seabrook 24L Station with only implementation of the public alerting and 25 notification as an open issue. ;
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'/ 1- As Vic Nerses has already covered, this past June 2 the'ASLB hearings on the adequacy of the SPMC plan and )
! 3 performance and scope of the 1988 graded exercise closed 4 after 57 days of hearings and 15,000 pages of transcript.
5 The ASLB has notified the Commission that a decision can be 6 expected this November.
7 And finally, the NRC Staff, as has already been 8 mentioned, this past month issued a safety evaluation report 9 concluding onsite and offsite emergency preparedness 10 provides reasonable assurance and adequate protective
'll measures'can and will be taken once FEMA verifies offsite 12 alert and notification capabilities are in place.
13 I hope this trip down memory lane has been
() 14 15 helpful. As you can tell, the history of emergency preparedness at Seabrook Station has been long and 16 challenging. We feel New Hampshire Yankee has met all of 17 those challenges and is ready to receive a full power 18 license.
19 Any questions before I move on?
20 MR. CARROLL: On the low population tone question, 21 what -- I guess I would like to have a more detailed close-22 in map. But you're telling me that the site boundary is 23 about a mile from the reactor center line?
24 MR. GRAM: Yes, sir. In some cases it actually 25 goes beyond a mile.
( Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4000
64 p.
1 MR. CARROLL: Okay. How about in the first two 2 miles, how many people live?
3 MR. GRAM: I don't have those figures with me, but 11 I could find out for you before the session is over.
'S .MR CARROLL: And then in the 10 miles it's how 6 many?
~
7 MR. GRAM: Total 10 mile EPZ?
8 Tony, do you have those numbers with you?
.9 Permanent and transient.
10 MR. CALLENDRELLO: The resident population is 11 about 140,000 and the peak summer population is about 12, 230,000; that's within the total emergency planning zone 13 which extends beyond 10 miles in some cases.
14 MR. CARROLL: And that's to accommodate --
15 MR. GRAM: Geographic boundaries.
16 MR. CARROLL: -- towns that straddle the --
17 MR. GRAM: Right.
18 MR. CALLENDRELLO: Political boundaries, yee.
- 9 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
20 DR. KERR: Further questions?
21 (No response) 22 DR. KERR: Please (,on'cinue, Mr. Gram.
23 MR. GRAM: The next portinn of our presentation l-24 covers onsite and offsite emergency planning capabilities 25- and will cover offsite planning in some detail.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 I.
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Y} /"~] 1 -As part of that I.would like to provide.an-l-
2 - overview of the onsite. plan and quickly cover concept of.
J operation, facilities and resources, and'several 4 -characteristics unique to Seabrook's present~ status.
5 Seabrook's onsite concept of' operation is typical-16 of the rest of the industry in that'it.is based on.four u,
7 emergency. classification levels or ECLs: unusual event; 87 . alert;' site area emergency; and general emergency.
-9 This' slide demonstrates the onsite identification, 10 notification, and activation process. And I think it would. v 1 10 - be: helpful.toLwalk.through the process.
Tli2 .Once an incident is recognized and'the shift ~
13; superintendentLnotified the incident is'then classified by
[ 14~ ' the. shift superintendent who at that point becomes the 15 short-term emergency director.
16 If an incident is designated as one of the four 17- emergency. classification levels the notification process of 18 offsite agencies and onsite responders begins.
19 Offsite agencies are notified by a dedicated 12 0 nuclear alert phone system to 24-hour manned contact points.
- 21' Primary responders in the onsite organization are 22 . notified by VHF pagers and report to the control room at an 23- unusual event.
24- Secondary responders in the organization are
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2 Also at an' alert or higher all responders report 3 to their emergency duty stations and all emergency response 1
4 facilities are activated.
5 Seabrook's onsite plan also includes the 6- traditional response facilities. The technical support 7 center is adjacent to the control room and has the
! Leapability to access and display station parameters 9 independent from the control room. Initially, the TSC-10 provides short-term overall emergency management. Once the 11 EOF is declared operational the TSC becomes the base of 12 operations for overall technical data and onsite emergency.
13 management.
14 The operational support center, OSC, is located in
)
15 the administration service building adjacent to the 16 radiation controlled area and provides general assembly 17 dispatch for manpower to effect protective and corrective 18 actions in support of the emergency situation.
19 The emergency operations facility, EOF, is located-20 approximately 17 miles from the site in Newington, New 21 Hampshire and serves as a base of operations for 22 radiological assessment, overall emergency response 23 management, and recovery activities.
24 The joint media center is located in Newington, 25 New Hampshire's town hall and provides centralized --
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~67 ry 3si/ ' li 'provides alcentralizedLlocation for holding joint emergency 2z news briefings: New Hampshire. Yankee;1the State of New 3b ' Hampshire;.and'the offsite response organization.for
'4 MassachusettsJuse this' facility as their media center.
5 "All of.the resources are and have'been;in' place to
~6 respond to'an event -- in the event'of an emergency-I
'7 classification' level-is declared.at Seabrook Station.
.8 Presently there are 547. trained and qualified:
9 responders. The. plan requires'242 responders to provide two
'10 ~ shift-24-hour. continuous emergency response.
ei 11' MR. CARROLL:- Help me out on the responders:'you 12- ? segregated them.into'the primary. responders and secondary 13 responders. 'Give me some. examples of each?
?14. MR.. GRAM: Well, primary responders -- actually I 15 have.a list in.my briefcase if I could get it for you real 16 ' quick. There are actually --
17 (Pause)
- 18; MR. GRAM
- Joe, can you' rattle off.the primary 19 responders.
20 MR. GRILLO: There are a total --
21- MR. GRAM: There are seven primary responders and 22- Joe'Grillo can give you the-list.
23 MR. GRILLC: I was going to say there's a total of 24 seven primary responders including the site emergency 25: ' director; the emergency operations manager; the emergency Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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- i/ 1 offsite facility manager; joint media; the radiological 2 health' physicist. I can't recall the exact --
3 MR. GRAM: Did you mention communications officer?
4 MR. GRILLO: Yes.
5 MR. CARROLL: Now, each of those positions has how 6 many backups?
7 MR. GRILLO: In the emergency operations manager,
, 8- I'm one of four. We staff at least three.
9 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
10 MR. GRILLO: In the operations manager --
11 emergency operations manager all are senior operating 12 licensed.
13 MR. CARROLL: How about drills, do you make an 14 effort to --
15 MR. GRILLO: We just had one. yesterday.
16 MR. CARROLL: -- to get everybody involved or does 17 just the primary guy --
18 MR. GRILLO: Well, only --
19 MR. CARROLL: -
guy participate in the drills 20 because you want to look good.
21 MR. GRILLO: All the emergency operations managers 22 have senior operating licenses and as such on a regular _
i 23 basis when they go to simulator training they respond to the 24 short-term emergency director duties. As far as the 25 amergency drills, of course, I get the most training, but Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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I N~J _1 everybody else does get training.
2 MR. CARROLL: So do each of these three or four 3 people actually fill his position during a drill among the 4 primary responders?
5 MR. GRILLO: Well, this last drill that George had 6 mentioned, the full participation, we had two shift 7 coverage. We actually turned over to the second group and 8 the_other operations managers have trained.
9 MR. GRAM: Yes, I might add, I don't believe all 10 four of those positions or in each of the primary responders 11 that's three deep, not all of those have participated in an 12 evaluated exercise -- onsite evaluated exercise, but they 13 all go through what we call " combined functiotal or dress 14 rehearsal drills" throughout a given year. They're training
(}
15 schedule requires them to go through an exercise.
16 MR. CARROLL: Okay. And how about secondary 17 responders, just an example of the kind of --
18 MR. GRILLO: They're activated at the alert level.
19 That would include all your technical expertise; your I&C 20 supervisors; your electrical supervisors; maintenance; 21 engineering. I don't have the numbers for that, George.
22 MR. GRAM: It's the administrative staff that man 23 all of the different response facilities, the EOF.
24 MR. BENDER: Does the training involve educating 25 people as to the nature of these 20 miscellaneous emergency
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'v' ' 1 conditions?
2 MR. GRILLO: Yes, sir. That we do. We go to 3 simulating training at'least five weeks every year; each 4 licensed operator does. And as part of'their going through 5 the scenarios the shift superintendent practices on the 6 emergency classification levels and they do drill a good
'7 majority of them.
8 And we do have annual classroom sessions on each 9 EAL. There's a background document that goes to that or an J 10 upfront classification that in-depth goes through what each 11 one of those classifications are.
12 MR. BENDER: I had in mind really how far out is 13- information spread about these 20 emergency -- does it go 14' beyond the operating staff?
hv) 15 MR. GRILLO: Yes. It goes through I believe --
16 MR. BENDER: And do the police know something 17 about this or are they --
18 MR. GRILLO: We have given them training on what 19 goes into classifying an unusual event or an alert, a site 20 area emergency. They wouldn't be able to take an event and 21 classify it, but they've had training on just what goes into 22 the different Jevels.
23 MR. BENDER: If there were an event would you be 24 telling them, hey,. we've just had a class 12 accident or 25 would 7~ aay you had a loss of cooling accident; what would l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l-
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'v' l' you tell them?
'2 !{R . GRILLO: The way we've classified the events, 3- we say we've had an unusual event based on a 6-A. And they 4' do have this classification scheme in their emergency 5 response manual and if they choose to look at it they could
'6 very well. But I don't think they would get very much 7 information out of it. They're more concerned at what level 8 they're at, the unusual event alert.
~9 As part of my report, I give out a report within H10 15 minutes to the state; and then I prepare a follow-up 11 report. And in that report I determine whether or not the 12 plant is in a stable condition or the condition is 13 degrading. Then the people in the emergency offsite
() 14 facility would take that information and make protective 15 action recommendations.
16 MR. BENDER: Thank you.
17 MR. CARROLL: I guess I would extend your question 18 to: what is the governor of New Hampshire know about this?
19 Bas he been trained on what these classifications mean?
20 MR. GRAM: Yes, maybe 1 could respond to that, j 21 New Hampchine Office of Emergency Management has 22 been trained in reactor operacionn and the emergency action 23 levels so that they h' Ave an understanding of what's going on 24 in the plant, so that they can nake an independent 25 evaluation of a protective action that's made by the onsite l3
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- .3 . . 1,- . organization, h 2 'I don't think the governor himself has that' direct h-3 . knowledge, but he has his emergency management staff trained to make those recommendations.
5 .MR. CARROLL: I. guess one other curiosity 6 ; question: hbw:do you use your simulator in your exercises?
'7 MR. GRAM: The simulator is used fort all. exercises 8 for the initi'ating' event; we'actually'run'the exercise from 9' the' simulator.
10 MR.. CARROLL: How.far does it go into some of
- 11. these-degraded events?
E 12 MR .- GRAM: Joe can respond to:that.
MR. GRILLO: In the event we had yesterday we
~141 started the simulator at about 8 o' clock in the morning; we
- 15 . terminated the event at 3:15. It'was going through'the 11 6 whole thing. We went from a small break into a. major break 17 where we had a safety injection pump breaker explode and 18 lo'ss of' power; it handled the whole thing.
19 .In other words, the softwaro:didn't blow up on'it.
20 MR. CARROLL: It certainly has its limitations.
- 21. You can't do direct containment' heating, you know.
~22 MR. GRILLO: Right. You have to throw in
- 23. artificial numbers to get the high leve 1 - of e vents that you 24- need at times.
25 MR. BENDER: Do you get to the level of fuel I s (202) 628-4888
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!1' .fallure?
'2 MR.4 GRILLO: ;We do'that, not:on the simulator, we L.
3 have numbers that are generated,' just: radiation levels .)
> 4' incide' containment that'are handed to us.
L5- MR. GRAM: Right. That's all done through.the
- 61 . scenario development. organization, what we call the " control
/
7- . organization." We have.to develop dummy numbers for 8 containment 1 radiation' monitoring, for reactor coolant.
~9 . sampling, and all.that' stuff is fed into the operators or-
, :10 fed'into the simulator if it can display it.
11' _MR.-GRILLO: -In~other words, we speed up the
,12- process.
.13 MR '. CARROLL: Have you had any or have you had a
~
L14 back-shift? exercise, and have you had an unannounced
- 15 ' exercise?
16 MR. GRAM: No, we've not had an off-shift
'17 unannounced exercise yet.
'18 .DR. KERR: -Further ydestions?
19 -Mr. Kevern.
20 MR. KEVERNr Tf I understand your resource numbers 21 ~ correctly you have 121 in the size of the onsite emergency 22 response organization?
23 MR. GRAM: To man all the response facilities, 24 yes.
'25 MR. KEVERef: That includes the control room and Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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74 i L 1( 'T l T Vs' 1 shift staffing? {
2 MR. GRAM: It includes the TSC and-it would be the 3 short-term -- include the short-term emergency director. It i 4 does not include the control room staff.
5 MR. KEVERN: How did you arrive at the requisite 6 size of that organization? Did you do a study?
7 MR. GRAM: It's based on all the procedures that 8 are generated and what it takes to fully staff the technical 9 support center and the operation support center, the EOF.
10 And it also includes maintenance and I&C and 11 electrical mechanics as part of the response organization to 12 try to intercede to stop events.
13 MR. KEVERN: Thank you.
() 14 DR. KERR: Mr. Gram, we're scheduled to take a 15 break at about this point, can we count on about a 15 minute 16 break here?
17 MR. GRAM: Sure, this would be a good time to 18 break if you would like.
19 DR. KERR: Okay.
20 MR. CARROLL: You got one more s) ids.
21 MR. GRAM: ~' ll do one more slide ann we'll just a 4
22 wrap up.
23 DR. KERR: Yes, sir.
24 MR. GRAM: Because of the licensing process that 25 Seabrook has been caught up in, one cf the unique features fs A Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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of emergency preparedness at Seabrook Station is that the 2 onsite organization and facilities have been in a state of.
F 33: readiness since 1986. In fact,. key response positions;have
-4 -been filled by the same individuals for three years.on 5- average.
L )6' Also'because of our licensing delays the same 7- organization ~has been through three NRC onsite evaluated 8' exercises.
- 9. With the receipt of a zero power license in 10 October of 1986 the plant has been formally.under FSAR and
~11- . tech' spec requirements. Because of'these requirements and'
- 1:21 our.. licensing. delays the organization has had to identify,
. 13 classify,'and respond to two unusual events prior-to initial 14 ~ criticality.
15~ I think you will agree that these are unique-and 16 unusual circumstances for an applicant seeking a full power 17: license.
13 NR. CARROLL: Could you describo the unusual f, - 19' svents?
12 0 MP. . GRAM: Yas.
.? 1 The first unusual event was in February of 1987 l
2.2 and it-had to do with a personnel air lock on the 23 containment equipment hatch. There's an interlocking set of 24 ball valves that through linkage allow you to equalize 25 pressure in the inner chamber of the personnel hatch; that
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A/ 1 linkage came undone and it was an open flow path through --
4
.2 from the containment to the outside.
3- The second unusual event was in December of ' 88 4 and that had to do with loss of power to the meteorological 5 tower. That event was actually declared and undeclared in 6 the same phone call.
7 MR. CARROLL: Have you fixed-the interlock on --
8 MR. GRAM: Yes, sir.
9 MR. CARROLL: How did you do it?
10 MR. GRAM: Actually there was a carter pin that 11 was not installed or had come loose in the actual operation 12 of people going in and out and that since has been welded 13 on.
14 MR. CARROLL: And you've had no more air lock
[]
15 problems.
16 MR. GRAM: No more air lock problems, no, sir.
17 MR. CARROLL: Wait until your first refueling 18 outage.
19 MR. GRAM: Any other questions?
L10 MR. KEVERN: To what extent did you implement the i I
21 emergency plan during those two unusual events?
'22 MR. GRAM: As I went through with the onsite 23 organization and once the emergency classification leval was j 1
24 identified through an emergency action level, one <f the 20 f f
25 emergency action levels they began the notification process O
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. - 'l- to-offsiteLagencies.and the primary responders were 12 : activated. .So.they went through the'whole process until the.
3 event was terminated -- both events were terminated.
_- 4 . DR. KERR:' Mr.. Bender.
5 MR , BENDER: Reflecting back on the Three. Mile 6 . Island accident when the containment was not. completely
'7 closed,. what's the presumption here in the emergency plan 8 that:the containment is effective or that there might be-9 some' deficiency in the containment? What's the' logic behind-
'10 that?.
11 MR .' GRAM: The logic.is a conservative logic and
'12 it does:not wait for breach of the containment. It is based 13 on plant conditions being stabilized or degrading.or not-
'14 knowing. That's protective actions from the onsite 15 organization.
'16 The interfacing state organizations, the State of 17 New/Hanpshire etnd the offsite responce organization for 10 Massachusetts-have an even higher 2evel of conservati.em 19 where they have _ protective action decisions that are .
M '20 automatic bssed on the declar:ation of an emergency 21 classification level independent of plant condit, ions.
p 22 MR. DElfDER: So thr emergency goes on without {
23 really tat:ing into considerate:m. very much inat the state of
-24 the ucntainment -- 1
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J 1 at'most utilities today there would be evacuation 2 considerations and maybe automatic evacuation actions would 3 take place for the public based on the way plans have been 4 Edeveloped, even though TMI did not have any uncontrolled 5 releases.
- 6. MR. BENDER: Thank you.
7 DR. KERR: Is this an appropriate place.
8 MR. GRAM: To take a break.
9 DR. KERR: We will reconvene at 10:35 by that 10 clock.
11 (Whereupon, at 10:20 a.m. a break was taken.)
12 DR. KERR: Gentlemen, let's reconvene.
13 (Slides'being shown.)
(} 14 MR._CALLENDRELLO: Good morning, members of the 15 committee. My name is Tony Callendrello. As Mr. Feigenbaum 16 ' indicated I am the Manager of Emergency Preparedness 17 Licensing.
I 18 Our presentation will briefly discuss the concept 19 of operations of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency
]
-20 Response Plan. The challenges faced during its preparation.
21 And the special plan provisionn developed in response to 22 those challenges. .j 23 The plan is a traditional one and is haced on the 24 concept of operations that the state and the communities use 25 in response to other types of emergencies, as well as to the
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.1 emergencies at Vermont Yankee and the successful exercising 2 of those plants.
s.
'3 Plants and procedures have been developed for each-
'4 of the state agencies; 17 emergency planning. zone 5, communities; and four host communities. In total'the plan 6' is contained in 31 volumes and-represents:nearly eight years 7 of development and refinement.
8 Geographically the New Hampshire portion of the 9' Seabrook Station emergency planning zone includes all of the 10 New Hampshire communities that are either partially.or 11 completely-within a 10-mile radius and is completely within 12 Rockingham County,,New Hampshire.
13 'Approximately two-thirds of the total EPZ 1and j 14' area and all of the land within two miles is contained 15 'within New Hampshire.
16 One of the committee members had a question 17 regarding the population within that two mile area; the 18: resident population withir, two miles is approximately 9500.
19 And the peak population apperixiraately 37,000; that's summer 20 weekend peak population.
21 The resident population of the total New Hampshire 22 postion qf the emergency planning zone is approximately 23 92,000. And the summer peak population appro7dme.tely c
24 154,000.
25 In-describing the plan let me first describe the
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\,,) - 1 organization. The total New Hampshire response organization 2 includes nearly 1500 state and local responders which
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.3 provide for round-the-clock operations. In addition, 4 arrangements have been made with ever 1100 persons to drive 5 evacuation vehicles.
6 Looking at the state organization, the governor
- 7. provides overall command of the state's emergency response.
8 Directly reporting to the governor are the other 9 state agencies that compromise the emergency response 10 organization. Principally that includes the New Hampshire 11 Office of Emergency Management who provides operational, 12 coordination of the state's response; and the New Hampshire 13 Division of Public Health Services who provides the
'14 technical assessment of the accident and its consequences.
(V~g 15 Thirteen other state agencies also have roles in responding 11 6 to the emergency.
17 At the local level Rockingham County provides for 18 notification of the local organizations and also activation 19 of the siren systera located within New hampshire. Tne 17 20 EPZ communities provide for traffic control and for the l
21 coordination of transportation within their boundaries. l 22 Finally, the four hest communities provide ,
l 23 monitoring and congregate care services for evacueos. ]a 1
24 Tc pick up where Mr. Gram left -- l 25 MR. CARROLL: I'm used to a county concept where
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s l' the county plays the lead role and the community sort of a 2- secondary role; is that true in New Hampshire? Is there a l 3 strong central county government with a County Board of
(
I 4' Supervisors or whatever it's called or is it a more 5 community oriented?
6 MR. CALLENDRELLO: In New England in general and 7 specifically in New Hampshire it's more community oriented.
.8 The county does have a role, as I indicated, because they 9 have a round-a-clock local dispatch center and they 10 routinely dispatch or make notification to the communities 11 for other types of events that affect more than one 12 community. So they do have a role in that regard.
13 Operationally they are not as strong as they are 14 in some other parts of the country.
15 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
16 MR. CALLENDRELLO. Again, to pick up where Mr. i 17 Gram left off'on notification. Once the einergency is 18 classified in the Seabrook Station control roors. initial i
.19 notification is made to the New Hampshire State Police at 20 their 24-hour contact point. They in turn notify the No.w l
21 Hampshire Office of Emergency Management, the New Hampshire 1 22 Di rision cf Public Health Services, and Rockingha;n County.
23 The New Hampshire Office of Energency Management -
24 in turn notifies the gov'erncr's office and the other state I
25 agencies, while Rockingham Country relays the notification !
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82 l 'j I to the EPZ communities.
2 Once the state is notified it will begin the 3 activation of its emergency facilities. There are two 4 principal state facilities: the emergency operation center 5' or EOC; and the incident field office, the IFO, both of 6 which have been used by the state for responding to other 7 types of emergencies.
8 The EOC located in the State' Capitol at Concord, 9 New Hampshire is where the governor and senior agency 10 mane.gers will direct the umergency response.
11 The incident field office is located in the same.
12 building as the Utility's emergency operations facility and 13 the New Hampshire Yankee offsite response organization or 14 ORO, and Pete Stroup will be talking about that organization
()'
15 in. detail later on. It's where the ORO has their emergency 16 operation center as well. This fostern coordination among 17 the offsite response organizations.
18 At the incident field office the state wijl 19 coordinate the field activities of both the state agencies 20 and will maintain direct contact with the local communities.
21 It is in effect a forward command post.
22 In addition te f,hene two principal f acilitie.s the 23 stato will staff the media center and participate in joint (
24 utility, ORO, and federe.1 agency media briefings, as well as 25 two transportation staging areas which are located on the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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\/ 1 periphery of the EPZ and where buses and ambulances will be 2 staged in advance of an evacuation; and then once an 3 evacuation is ordered they will be deployed from those 4- locations.
5 At the host communities the reception centers will 6 provide the registration monitoring and referral to a 7 congregate care facility for those persons who need a place 8 to stay.
9 And then finally looking at the local level, each 10 community has an emergency operation center where they in 11 turn will manage their local emergency response.
12 Once activated the state organization focuses on 13 the assessment of the accident and the recommendation of
(} 14 protective actions. Protective action recommendation will 15 be provided by the utility based on emergency 16 classification; plant conditions; or offsite doses.
17 At the emergency operations facility and the 18 incident rie.td office, again they are located in the same f 19 building, the state, the onsite personnel, and the ORO 20 personr el will have operational and radiological data 21 available. Will diectss the recommendation and ensure that 2 ?. it is understood.
23 The state representatives 12t the incident fielo 24 office will then determine the operational readiness of the l 25 organizations and conduct an independent assessment of the l
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l I 84 l rh Is- l' 1 recommendation. 'This information is then transmitted to the 1
2 state decision-makers at the emergency operation center.
- 3. At the emergency operation center the governor 4 with'the advice of the New Hampshire Office of Emergency 5 Management regarding operational readiness --
l:
I 6 DR. KERR: Excuse me, Mr. Callendrello, are there i:
! 7 people in the state organization who have enough training 8 that they understand in a general way, at least, the 9 condition of a reactor when it's in an abnormal situation?
10 MR. CALLENDRELLO: They have received training.
11 DR. KERR: That isn't my question. Are there 1:2 people with the background so that they are likely to 13 understand what you're talking about? Given what their
(' 14. backgrounds is and what their training has been, in your
(>)
15 view, are they likely to be able to -- I know they can 16 transmit what you tell them, but are they likely to
'17 understand, at least in a general way, what it is you're 18 talking about?
19 MR. CALLENDRELLO: Yes, there are two 20 organizations who are t: principal advisors to the 21 governor, as I indicate.. One, the Division of Public
'22 Health Services has individuals who are experienced and 23 trained in radiological health aspects.
24 And, in fact, one of the early calls they make 25 when they are notified is back into the control room to l
(--)
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It): 1 receive follow-up information from the short-term emergency l 2 . director to assess both the radiological conditions; and 4
'3 also, the prognosis for worsening of the event based on 4 plant conditions.
5 MR. GRAM: Excuse me, this is George Gram.
6 If 1 might add, I would go along with your 7 characterization. They've been trained to understand the 8 meaning of a small reactor coolant -- loss of reactor 9 coolant or a major loss of reactor coolant, containment 10 radiation readings, site boundary radiation readings.
11 As an' example, Joe Grillo mentioned we had an 12 onsite exercise yesterday that was very, very complicated 13 with a loss of bus 5 through a major breaker grounding and a 14 loss of a lot of onsite communications equipment, the
. J( g; 15 computer -- reactor computer indications, radiation 16 monitoring indications, site pager communications; they 17 would.not be tuned in and understand all of those 18 intervening bits.
19 But from a major overview sense they're trained to 20 understand what the major degradation.s in the plant mean in 21 relation to emergency response.
22 DR. KERR: Do you know these people?
23 MR. GRAM: Yes, sir, work with them every day.
24 DR. KERR: All right.
25 Thank you.
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s 86 fy O> 1 MR. CAPROLL: When you had your air lock emergency
'2 unusual' event what kind of questions did they ask you?
hi 3 MR. GRAM: You mean actually during the event when 4: .they were notified? I don't know, I would have to go back 5 and look at the control room logs of what was actually 6 I happening. I don't think I ever read those to be able to 1
7 ' answer that question.
8 I know after the fact we went into detail on 9 exactly what happened, what the mechanics were involved, how 10 we were going to fix it so that it wouldn't happen in the 11' future with the state and all of the local community 12 ' officials.
13 MR. FEIGENBAUM: This was also -- this is Ted 14 Feigenbaum -- before the reactor had gone critical, so they f'JT w
15 were aware.that there were no fission products and no danger 16 of any releases.
17 DR. K3RR: Yes, I thought they probably were going 18 to ask you if you really had been operating that reactor and 19 they didn't know about it, but they didn't ask that.
20 MR. CALLENDRELLO: I think we left off at the 21 recommendation reaching the state emergency operation 22 center. It's at that point the governor with the advice of 23 New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management and the 24 technical advisors from the Division of Public Health will 25 approve a protective action. And at this point the New
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s 1 Hampshire-Office of Emergency Management would go into the 2 implementation of that action.
p 3 The issue of coordination has been raised and the 4 actions taken by the State of New Hampshire will be 5 coordinated with those of Massachusetts and the New 6 Hampshire Yankee offsite response organization. New 7 Hampshire has demonstrated a long-standing relationship with 8 Massachusetts.
9 As the slide that Mr. Feigenbaum put up indicated 10 .both states are within the 10 mile emergency planning zone 11 of Vermont Yankee, and have participated in joint exercises.
12 Further, both states belong to the radiological, state 13 police, and civil defense compacts that further enhance the
,- 14 coordination.
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15 Regarding coordination with the offsite response 16 organization'the state has signed a letter of agreement that 17 specifies all of the areas of coordination between New
~18 Hampshire and the offsite response organization.
19 In addition, the State of New Hampshire personnel 20 and New Hampshire Yankee personnel and the ORO have 21 participated in numerous joint drills as well as the graded 22 exercise.
23 in developing the radiological emergency response 24 plans for Seabrook Station emergency planners for the State 25 of New Hampshire face two major challenges. One, the non-() Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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\~/ i 1 participation of some EPZ communities. And two, the nearby 2- beach population. Planners responded to both of these 3 challenges by developing special plan provisions.
4 While local government opposition to Seabrook 5 Station has existed for several years the state continued 6 and continues to this day to work with those communities to 7 develop local emergency plans.
8 In 1986 seven of the 17 EPZ communities indicated 9 that they would not participate in the development, training 10 for or testing of the plans. This number is now four.
11 As a result of the non-cooperation of those 12 communities the state developed a compensatory response plan 13 that could be used to assist any EPZ community. The
(} 14 compensatory plan was a specific application of the normal 15 state procedure of supplementing local resources at the time 16 of an emergency. Since in this case the communities had 17 indicated in advance that they were; unwilling to participate 1
18 in the response the state preplanned the application of its 19 resources. ,
i 20 The New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management; i
21 New Hampshire State Police, and county Sheriff's departments 22 have developed procedures to perform the activities that 23 would normally be performed by the community. These ,
24 activities are the verification of transportation needs, 25 coordination of transportation resources, and traffic and
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'\/ 1 access control.
2 The other challenge is one that's been the subject 3 of considerable discussion -- and, in fact, it has been 4 raised already here today -- and that is the nearby beach 5 popul.ition. Planners from both states, FEMA, and New 6 Hampshire Yankee have worked extensively to develop the best' 7 plans possible to protect this population in the event of an 8 emergency'at Seabrook Station.
9 Specifically, there were four characteristics of 10 the beach area near Seabrook Station which were paid 11 particular attention in the development of special plan 12 considerations. .
13 I put a map of the emergency planning zone here l
14 and you can see that there are beaches along the coastline, l' }
15 the entire coastline of New Hampshire. And, in fact, extend 16 into Massachusetts to the south of Seabrook Station.
17 Many of these beaches attract seasonal transients.
18 However, some also attract large numbers of daily and weekly 19 transients, specifically Hampton Beach which is in this i 20 area; and Salisbury Beach which is down in here.
21 A principal concern to planners were the near-22 plant beaches. Those are shown in red on this slide. And 23 are the beaches that are within about two miles within 24 Seabrook Station. In fact, the northern point of this Great
' 25 Boreshead is about two and a half miles as is the I
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4/ 1 Massachusetts-New Hampshire border.
2 MR. CARROLL: What's the southerly beach in red; f
3 what's it called?
4 MR. CALLENDRELLO: This is Seabrook Beach.
5 MR. CARROLL: And the northern one is Boreshead 6 Beach?
7 MR. CALLENDRELLO: This is Hampton Beach. Hampton 8 Beach is really in two components: one is a north beach and 9 a south beach and they're divided by a point known as 10 Boreshead.
11 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
12 MR. BENDER: Are the actions controlled in any way 13 by the environmental conditions whether there's a tornado or 14 serious weather condition that might influence the movement?
(}
15 MR. CALLENDRELLO: The precautionary actions taken 16- by the state -- and I'll get into those in some detail later 17 on -- are primarily driven by plant condition and emergency 18 classification. There is an assessment made of local 19 conditions as far as evacuation, route availability, 20 availability of resources to implement the evacuation; and 21 that is a consideration that is built into their protective ;
22 action recommendation process but precautionary actions. l 23 Those actions taken early to remove the beach population are
-24 driven by classification and plant conditions.
25 MR. BENDER: They wouldn't change no matter 1
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'l - 1~ whether there's a tornado or'the sun was shining brightly, 2 the same action would be taken?
3 MR. CALLENDRELLO: Again, the early actions, yes, 4 that would be -- those actions would be recommended.
5 Obviously, if there was a tornado the size of the beach 6 population would be reduced. You would not expect to have 7 as msny people on the beach looking to enjoy their day 8 there. So the severity of the problem may be less so that, 9 say, an alert classification there may not be a need to 10 reduce the beach population as much as if you had a bright 11 sunny day, high humidity.
12 MR. BENDER: Thank you.
13 MR. CARROLL: Now, these beaches in general are on 14 a chain of islands that are offshore?
()'
15 MR. CALLENDRELLO: It varies. In this area it is 16 a barrier type beach. However, the beaches on here are all 17 part of the mainland.
18 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
19 MR. CALLENDRELLO: There is a marshy area in here 20 which separates the beach from the mainland.
21 I would like to just point out that the areas of 22 primary concern were the near plant beach areas. Again, 23 those areas within about two miles. Also, all of those 24 areas are within the jurisdiction of the State of New l
25 Hampshire. All of the Massachusetts beaches are beyond two l
) Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
92 p( ) 1 miles from Seabrook Station.
2 MR. CARROLL: And why is two miles important?
3 MR. CALLENDRELLO: The state initially chose its 4 actions to be taken out to two miles to be consistent with 5 FEMA and NRC guidance on the concepts of protective actions, 6 and that is, take immediate actions within about two miles.
7 If you look back to NUREG-0654 and the suggested 8 actions they included precautionary evacuations out to two 9 miles. The state has taken this one step more 10 ' conservatively and that is, implementing actions out to two 11 miles at an emergency specification even earlier than a 12 general emergency.
13 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
~ 14 MR. CALLENDRELLO: The second characteristic is 15 that the planners knew that there was a nearby beach 16 population present during good weather. In fact, there had 17 been unsupported population estimates of up to 250,000
-18 people on those beaches.
19 lbwever, during the development of the evacuation 20 time estimate the size of the beach population was studied 21 in detail: high quality stereoscopic aerial photographs were 22 taken during weather conditions and at midafternoon when the L
23 beach population was expected to be at its peak. The photos 24 were enlarged and the number of people observed and cars 25 parked along the beach areas were counted.
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\s 1 At-the same time the occupancy of individual l
2 vehicles was determined through field surveys. From these s
3 two pieces of information an estimate of the population has 4 been made.. And just to run down the results, the total 5 near plant beach population, that is that population within 6 about two miles of Seabrook Station -- again, it extends 7 somewhat to the north of that and somewhat to the south ~of 8 two miles -- is 31,000. Again, this is peak population.
9 Total New Hampshire beach population -- that's all 10 of the New Hampshire beaches in the emergency planning EPZ 11 -- 49,000 people.
12 Total Massachusetts beach population -- in the EPZ 13' -- 22,000. For a total beach population, peak beach I"T 14 population in the EPZ of 71,000 individuals.
U 15 The third characteristic examined was that there 16 was a detailed survey of the buildings at the beach, which 17 showed that there's a mix of construction types. However.
18 the buildings are predominately of wood frame construction 19 and without basements. Given these types of buildings the 20 state has decided to plan early beach closure or 21 precautionary evacuation to maximize protection for the 22 beach population. While its use is not precluded sheltering 23 is a protective action for the beach population is limited.
24 Finally, the evacuation time estimates for 160 25 sets of conditions have been calculated. While these Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4088
94~
f' s Jsf 11' calculations included the entire EPZ particular attention l2 ' was paid'to the beach population.
e 32 Calculation showed that the time to evacuate:the
- 4' entire emergency planning zone -- and'that is both.
5 : Massachusetts and New Hampshire out to.the edge of the 6 emergency planning zone -- is estimated to be seven hours 7 and~-five minutes.
8 Dave, next slide.
9 Given these characteristics the state has included 10 tin its radiological emergency response plan four special 11 provisions for the protection of the beach population. One, 12 the state's procedures include the implementation of
- 13 precautionary actions for the beach population at the alert 14
- and site area emergency classifications.
15 Two,'the state has a siren system that will be 16 used to deliver prerecorded announcements using its public
.17 addressLfunction.
E18 Three, traffic and access control is established
~19 at an early stage to assist the exiting beach population and 20 to limit the incoming visitors.
21 And four, signs will be posted at state parks and 22' beaches to provide instructions to the public regarding 23 emergency actions. In addition to the signs public 24 information such as flyers and posters will be provided to 25 places that visitors would frequent such as: hotels; motels;
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\^ 1 campgrounds; and parks.
2 Dh. KERR: Excuse me, what is meant by 3 " precautionary actions" in that last slide, first bullet?
- 4. MR. CALLENDRELLO: Precautionary actions are -- in 5 fact, when we.get to the next slide you will see the intent 6 and purpose of the precautionary actions.
7 DR. KERR: Okay.
8' MR. CALLENDRELLO: But in general, the state calls 9 an action a precautionary action if it is taking in advance 10 of the need to take an action. It's an early protective 11 action.
12 DR. KERR: Okay, it's going to explain in the next 13 slide, I'll wait.
f~h 14 MR. CALLENDRELLO: Yes. It's a conservative s_J 15 approach to taking a protective action.
16 MR. WYLIE: Question: how is the prerecorded 17 public address message delivered?
18 MR. CALLENDRELLO: The sirens that are located in 19 the New Hampshire portion of the emergency planning zone all 20 have the ability to deliver a public address message.
21 MR. WYLIE: Oh, I see.
22 MR. CALLENDRELLO: And these messages are 23 maintained in a recorded fashion at the activation point for 24 the sirens, and when an emergency is declared and the State 25 Office of Emergency Management makes the decision to notify
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L 96 I[h A>~ l~ the public a cassette tape is inserted into the control unit 2- and the mensage is broadcast over the public address 3 function of the sirens.
! 4 DR. KERR: So the sirens aren't really sirens, !
5 they're recorded sirens that go over a PA system?
6 MR. CALLENDRELLO: They're large electronic
~
7 loudspeakers that broadcast either siren tones or can 8 troadcast public address messages.
9 MR. CARROLL: And those messages are bilingual, 10 they're in French, also?
11 MR. CALLENDRELLO: That's correct.
12 MR. CARROLL: Is there that large of uniquely or 13 French speaking population that doesn't understand English
.14 in that area?
15 MR. CALLENDRELLO: There is a population that 16 visits the area from Canada. At least it had baen 17 identified as a concern by FEMA and also recognized by the 18 State of New Hampshire that a number of those people speak 19 French. Now whether they speak French exclusively it's 20 difficult to tell. They seem to do pretty well in other 21 aspects of the emergency planning zone. But to be extra 22 careful the state requested and we agreed to implement a 23 program whereby the public address messages are recorded in 24 French, like they were recorded in a studio in Canada to 25 make sure that the dialect was correct, and those messages
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DR. KERR: You don't need many French words for
- l. .
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- 3. - "get.out."
i:
4- (Laughter) 5 MR. CARROLL: In reading the ASLB decision:all:of
- i _ 6 ?this sounded good up to the point.of,;part of the message is L- 7- '" listen touthe radio." Are there
- also French radio stations
'8 in the area or French speaking radio stations? How.does p; 9 .this person that' speaks only French, once he gets that L10 message, find out what he-is! supposed to find out on the 11 ~ radio?
12 MR. CALLENDRELLO: There are prerecorded messages
(.
13 in'both French and English at the. radio station. The L14 prescripted EBS messages,'again, are a longer term event; 15 those are in English only. But the prerecorded messages are
'16 bilingual.
lL7 MR. WYLIE: So with this particular system then 18 .you don't get into the problem, some other utilities have is -'where they get inadvertent operation of siren; is that
- 20. correct?
21 MR. CALLENDRELLO: No , I think --
22 MR. WYLIE: It takes a deliberate action to 1
23 initiate this system; is that correct?
24- DR. KERR: I believe I could answer that: if F< 25 they'velgot no sirens they don't get any inadvertent
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i i < 1- : activation'of'it.
2' MRJ WYLIE: .I. was - just confirming that's the case, n
3- MR. CALLENDRELLO:- No, the control system for the 4 siren 1 system isJsimilar to'the ones used:in other' sites.
5 -However, we have worked with the manufacturer and have a
- 6 code, a~ dual tone multi-frequency activation: code that the
- 7. ' manufacturer,'at least, tells'us is more immune to 18: " inadvertent activations.
9 MR. .WYLIE: So you can get inadvertent operation.
L 10' of these then?
L 11 MR. CALLENDRELLO: It is possible, yes, 12 MR. GRAM: Tony, if I might add -- this is Mr.
T 13 Gram again. I don't think we could preclude the inadvertent
( 14 activation of one of the sirens, you know, in any'of'the 15 .EPZ. IHowever,.we do have an in-house program that's 16' ' communicated with all the local communities that if a siren 17 does go,off how-do we notify all..the people and'how do we 18 get that out that it is"an inadvertent activation and not a b 19 real emergency.
20~ MR. WYLIE: How do you do that?
21 MR. GRAM: The response organization goes from, if 22 a local community-resident hears a siren go off they're
'23 going to either call their local police or their fire
'24 department, wherever some place is manned 24-hours a day, 25 and then they're going to call back in --
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99 (j 1. MR. WYLIE: 'How do they know to do that?
2 MR. GRAM: It's through a public information
- 3 program.
4 MR. WYLIE: Okay, you tell them to do that?
5 MR. GRAM: Yes.
6 MR. WYLIE: You give them the number to call?
7 MR. GRAM: Right. If the local police department 8 or civil defense agency hasn't been alerted through the 9 notification network and they know that it's really an 10 emergency then they are directed to call into our control 11 room; and the control room actually has activation 12 indication in the control room of all the sirens.
13 MR. WYLIE: Thank you.
ew- 14 MR. CARROLL: I'm still having problems with my Nsl 15' French visitor. He hears this message that says, attention, 16 attention, in French, because of a problem at Seabrook 17 Station the beaches are now closed, please leave the beach 18 'immediately, listen to a local radio station for more 19 information.
20 And my question is: what radio station does my 21 Frenchman listen to where he can get more information in the 22 French language?
23 MR. CALLENDRELLO: He would be directed -- as he 24' left the beach there are beach signs -- there will be beach l 25 signs posted in both, again, French and English that would Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 L _ _ _ _ _ -_
100 3m,) l' direct the reader to, tune to an emergency broadcast system 2 station. And as indicated, the emergency broadcast system I.
3 prerecorded messages are in French. If for some reason that 4 message is not available there is public information 5 material available in the beach areas that is, again, 6 printed bilingually in both French and English.
7 MR. CARROLL: What would this prerecorded message 8 tell him in French if something bad has happened?
9 MR. CALLENDRELLO: Say that there has been an 10 accident at Seabrook Station, the governor had recommended 11 that the beaches be closed. Leave the beach areas. And to 12 stay tuned for further information.
13 MR. CARROLL: Does it tell him how to evacuate?
/~} 14 What road to take?
_ ()
15 MR. CALLENDRELLO: That information is contained 16 in the public information materials that, again, are 17 available in the beach area and that is bilingual. It tells 18 them what roads to take. Where there are congregate care 19 centers. Where there are -- excuse me, where there are 20 reception centers. Where they can go to be monitored and if l
21 they need a place to stay. It also tells them what the 22 different classifications mean. What to take with them.
23 MR. CARROLL: And somebody checks that material to 24 see that some bad guy hasn't stolen it all or something like 25 this to mess up your plan?
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.- . MR.! CALLENDRELLO: .We have made a commitment to.
)y , '
2 --annually provide thatsmaterial, although we.do have a v..
3 ' community relations program.thattdoes' work;with hotels, 41 ' motels, business. owners.
MR. CARROLL:- I'm' talking about the information' H
l 6= available on the beach to my Frenchman.
'7' 'MR.'CALLENDRELLO': We'have made provisions to give 81 business' owners along with the public information materials 9' cards that they.can use to' request additional information.
10 MR. CARROLL: No , I thought you said on the-beach
'll' 'this Frenchman hears the announcement and he has noticed as 12L , place as he came to the beach where there were a' leaflet to 13 . read or something. Are you periodically checking:that q 14 . supply ~is. maintained or have I got the wrong concept here?
- 15 MR. CALLENDRELLO: No, you don't'have'the wrong 16 concept. There's an intermediate step. There is also the 17 beach sign which would get -- assuming that the, visitor had' 18- not read any of the public'information material the beach
. 19~ sign will get the visitor to listen to the emergency 20' broadcast system radio station where they will receive 21 information at the time of an emergency.
22 In addition, there are the pre-emergency 23' information materials which are being made available to 24 numerous locations in the beach area, as well as the
-25 posters, flyers, l
1 l ) Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l l
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1; -MR. CARROLL: And'that's the only~-- the French' J2 lare the only' ethnic group.that there's a concern about?-
'3~ There's.not:a Spanish problem?.
.o 4.
MR. CALLENDRELLO: . No,-there's not been'one 5 identified. In fact, even the French population I don'ti
- 6. - ..thinbl meets.the minimum criteria that FEMA sets for the need 7- for-bilingual inf'ormation.- It'was a concern-that'was
- 8. identified.in the! state and we; responded to it.
9 'MR. CARROLL: You're just doing what' San Onofre 10 did-for the Spanish population.
11' ~ MR.'CALLENDRELLO: I think in that case they 12 actually' met or above the minimum --
-13 MR. CARROLL: Yes, that's a problem down' there.
- . 14 One other question
- how is all-this dealt with in
- 15. Maasechusetts; are we going to-learn.that in'another 16- presentation?
17 .MR. CALLENDRELLO: Mr. Stroup will deal with the 18 ' Massachusetts offsite response organization.
19 MR. CARROLL: I'm talking about- the beaches.
20 MR. CALLENDRELLO: I will be dealing with what we 21 would recommend to the Commonwealth for precautionary
.- 22 actions and protective actions for the beaches in'my 23- presentation.
' 24 MR. CARROLL: But there is no PA siren system on
' 25 those beaches; right?
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.1: MR."CALLENDRELLO: There-will be-a' siren system.
I2! .The: Vehicular Alert No'tification System. We do not utilize .
- 3. its public. address function for the Massachusetts beaches.- a 4' Again, the focus'is on those near plant beaches,
'5. the beaches within about two miles. Massachusetts'is beyond' 6 two miles in this case.
-7 MR. CARROLL: ;Okay.
8 MR. WYLIE: Your pre-emergency information to the 9 public is mailed out; is that correct?
10 MR. CALLENDRELLO: It is mailed to the public. We
- 11. do' handle --
12 MR. WYLIE: Property owners?
13 MR. CALLENDRELLO: I'm sorry.
14 '. MR. WYLIE: To property owners?
.15'- MR. GRAM: If I might add. This is George Gram.
16' .The mailing list'is -- we mail out public information 17 calendars to all known residents'whether they're property 18 owners.or just live in a hotel.
19 MR. CALLENDRELLO: It's resident or box holder.-
- 20. MR. GRAM: Or an apartment. That's the public-information calendar. The flyers and brochures are hand 22 delivered by our community relations organization to all of 23 the businesses with over 50 employees, hotels, motels,
-24 stores within the 10 mile EPZ.
25'- MR. CALLENDRELLO: Based on recommendations from Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 c_-_ - _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -
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! ..(Q / ~1 FEMA the' State of New Hampshire has established procedures L. '2 to implement early precautionary actions for the beach V
3 population. These actions would be recommended for the 4 near-plant beaches, that is again those beaches within two 5 miles, during the period of May 15th to September 15th.
6- Recommendations will be made on-emergency 7 classification and plant conditions as reported by'Seabrook 8 Station.
9- Actions will consist of closure of the beaches, 10 that is directing people without a resident to leave the 11 beach area and evacuation which directs all persons to clear 12 the area.
13 There are two reasons for making early 14 precautionary actions. First, the actions would remove a
{',T s /
15 large portion of the beach population from the area near the 16 plant prior to reaching conditions that would result in 17 exposures that could exceed EPA's protective action guides.
18 And second, these actions serve to reduce the 19 beach population which would expedite later protective 20 actions.
21 At the alert classification with degrading plant 22 conditions or a site area emergency with stable plant 23 conditions the state will sound the sirens and broadcast the 24 public address message. Broadcast public instructions over 25 commercial radio. Close the near plant beaches and j () Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
jj ,, I 'h 105 i -l " establish traffic'and access: control.
'2 At a-site. area emergency with degrading l plant.
Si conditions the state will recommend the1 evacuation of'all h 4 . persons from._the near plant beaches. As with the beach l s 51 . closure the sirens will sound and.there will befa public 6 ' address; message broadcast. The emergency broadcast system
- 7' :will'be activated and traffic and access control =will be.
8; 1 established.
- 9. hit's under these conditions ~that New Hampshire
.10 nYankee'offsiteLresponse organization would recommend to the 11 Commonwealth of Massachusetts that they close all beaches in
- 12 Massachusetts.
13 At a general emergency.the' state will immediately
'14 . recommend evacuation for the public, and that's all the 15 public,.within the communities bordering Seabrook Station, 11 6 .as well as-the near-plant beaches and that would include:
17- Seabrook; and'Hampton Falls,'again which is all of the area 11 8 within two miles. This immediate evacuation would be 19; followed by an expansion of the. protective actions if 20- appropriate. At this stage the ORO would recommend the 21 closure of Massachusetts beaches or if warranted by accident H22 conditions, protective actions for the general public 2
.3 including the beach population.
24 The State of New Hampshire and New Hampshire
~25 Yankee believe that appropriate plans have been developed to Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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7 106 k
y- g dJ .I protect the: beach population. 'This is supported by the NRC
-: 2 ^ wholin their_ June 41987 review of the New' Hampshire emergency 13 - plans-for-the beachipopulation'provided:the'following-AL .assessmentjto the' FEMA Regional Assistance 1 Committee,.and g '5 : that's quote: "The New-Hampshire provisions.for these n
6 individuals'near Seab' rook' site. appears to be well. advanced
< 7 in' comparison with those at other applicable' sites."
8: I would just like to summarize that plans have 9 =been developed for the state and local. response organization-10 and they're based on.the concept of operations.that are used n- 11 ~in response to other emergencies and also to those of 12- Vermont Yankee. The organization and' resources exist for 13 round-the-clock operation. Provisions exist for a prompt f 14 ' coordinated-recommendation of protective actions. And
)
15 :special planned provisions have-been developed to respond to' 16 the need for local compensatory measures and the nearby
- 17. beach population.
18 That concludes my presentation. I will be glad to
~19 ' answer any questions.
20 DR. KERR: Do I understand from the previous slide 21 that FEMA recommends that if there is evidence that would 22 lead one to believe that the PAGS will be exceeded that one 23 should start moving people out early?
24" MR. CALLENDRELLO: Their recommendation was 25' consideration of early actions prior to the need to take fhh Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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>Af 1. protective actions. cIn other words, prior to exceeding --
i 2' . prior.to.beinglin conditions thatLwould-exceed the l
- /3
- protective action guides. And that is at the alert level,.
~4- for' example, by definition releases'would'be a'small
.5 fractionaof the' protective action guides. Yet, at that 16' level ~the state does close the beaches and begin to move
~7 people off the beach.
8- Similarly, at the' site area emergency you wouldn't
- 9 : expect to exceed the protective action guides beyond'the 10 area near the site. boundary.
'll DR. KERR: Okay. Thank you.
J12- 'Other questions?
- L3 MR. CARROLL: I guess the protective' actions for'
. '14 the area within two miles make. sense, " remove beach-
- 15 population prior to reaching conditions that could exceed
~16- PAGS." However, that doesn't recognize from a PRA point of
'17 view that there are some accident -- severe accident 18 sequences.that can very early cause major releases.
-19 Of the 10 to the minus 6 kind of number that we 20 heard about on your PRA, your level 3 PRA, what fraction of 21 those are early release sequences?
22 MR. CALLENDRELLO: You're beyond my level of 23 expertise.
24~ MR. CARROLL: I think I know who supposed to 25 answer that.
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, ~3 MR. CALLENDRELLO: There is somebody in the lx i '1 2 audience who can answer that question, though.
3 DR. KERR: Is there someone who can respond to the 4 question or did you understand the question?
5 Does that complete your presentation?
6 MR. CALLENDRELLO: Yes, it does.
7 DR. KERR: Are there other questions of Mr.
8 Callendrello?
9 While they are caucusing why don't you --
10 MR. KEVERN: All right.
11 'On an earlier slide you had a discussion about 12 'that protective action decision-making process. A question:
13 is it necessary for the governor of New Hampshire to approve f- _14 the protective action recommendation before it's N-)f 15 implemented?
16 MR. CALLENDRELLO: No , it is not. What you've see 17 on the slide is one where the facilities are completely 18 activated. The state does have provisions to make a 19 protective action recommendation in a fast-breaking 20 accident. In that case they would rely on the 21 recommendation that came from the utility. The state police 22 has_the authority to activate the proper notification system 23 and to provide the emergency broadcast system message to 24 implement the protective action recommendation.
25 MR. KEVERN: So none of the precautionary actions f ^)
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\_./ ' 1. that you were referring to in your presentation then are 2- dependent upon activation of the state organization?
3 MR. CALLENDRELLO: The precautionary action at the 4 alert level is one that is predicated on the activation of 5- the state response organization. At the alert level, again, 6 we' re way ahead of conditions that would ncrmally drive you 7 to a protective action. In that case the state would wait 8 until its organization is activated and can assess the plant 9 conditions and has discussed them with the onsite 10 organization and then would make the recommendation.
11 MR. KEVERN: I'm confused. My question is on the 12 precautionary actions that you referred to at the end of the 13 presentation, who makes that decision within the local or 14 state organization to implement those precautionary actions?
f')h 15 MR. CALLENDRELLO: That's made by the same -- the 16 governor would approve it. Again, Division of Public Health 17 would provide the technical assessment and Office of 18 Emergency Management would assess the operational readiness 19 of the' organization.
20 MR. KEVERN: So the recommendation has to go to 21 the governor for a decision?
22 MR. CALLENDRELLO: The mechanism exists to go 23_ beyond the governor. In a traditional sense, if the 24 facilities are activated and the decision-making 25 organization is in place, yes, they would go to the
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\ /' 1 governor. But provisions do exist in the plan for those 2 recommendations to be made without the governor having to 3 approve them. That authority does rest with the state 4- police.
5 MR. GRAM: Excuse me, this is George Gram again.
6 I think the confusion is, Tony keeps using the word 7 " recommendation." They are automatic actions built into the 8 state plan.
9 MR. KEVERN: Okay.
10 DR. KERR: Did you have a question?
11 MR. DRUM: Yes. I'm worried, or have you had any 12 concerns that you're putting the governor in a difficult 13 position. For example, can the public really distinguish
)
[G 14 between precautionary measures and a full scale need to 15 evacuate or he is recommending evacuate the beaches but not 16 pregnant women who are inside buildings. It seems, unless 17 you have really good relations with the state you're putting 18 them in a very tough position.
19 DR. KERR: No , I thought he said this 20 recommendation came from FEMA.
21 MR. CALLENDRELLO: The concept -- the concept of 22 the early precautionary actions for the near-plant beach 23 area did come from FEMA in one of their technical reviews of 24 the Nets Hampshire plan, yes.
25 MR. DRUM: But ultimately it's the governor or the 1
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- .\~) - 1 state who has to order evacuation, is it not?
2 DR. KERR: Yes.
t 3 MR. DRUM: Or recommend?
4 HR. CALLENDRELLO: That's correct.
5 MR. DRUM: So he's the one who is on the spot.
6 HR. CALLENDRELLO: That's right.
7 HR. DRUM: And he can handle this?
8 MR. CALLENDRELLO: He is assisted by, as.I said, 9 two types of advisors: one on operational conditions, the 10 Office of Emergency Management; and one on radiological 11 health conditions. And it is that technical advice coming 12 from the division of public health services that would 13 address concerns such as evacuation of selected populations f' 14 -- in this case the beach population -- versus general b) 15 public evacuation. And they would be talking to plant 16 personnel about plant conditions, radiological conditions, 17 and prognosis for the worseniz;g or improvement of the 18 accident.
19 DR. KERR: Mr. Bender.
20 MR. BENDER: Well, I'll take another pass at 21 trying to understand how to trigger this emergency action.
22 Would the Three Mile Island accident trigger the emergency 23 action?
24 DR. KERR: You heard a previous speaker say he 25 . thought it would.
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i is 1 MR. BENDER: I didn't hear him say that.
2 DR. KERR: Yes.
3 MR. BENDER: But this is just -- the answer is, 4 yes, it would.
5 MR. CALLENDRELLO: I'm not certain of the 6 technical aspects of the Three Mile Island accident. My )
7 belief is it would, and maybe I could just describe what the 8 state would do.
9 -MR. BENDER: If you don't know, just say you don't 10 know. .The next question may be even more difficult to 11 answer, 12 If there were a Browns Ferry fire, would that 13 trigger the emergency action?
14 MR. CALLENDRELLO: If it resulted in the
(' }
15 declaration of a general emergency or site area emergency or 16 an alert it would, yes.
17 MR. CARROLL: And it would, wouldn't it.
18 MR. CALLENDRELLO: I'm not sure which 19 classification it would fall in.
20 MR. BENDER: I don't think the answer can be 21 devcloped right here, we need historical reference. I think 22 it would be a good idea to look at theso interesting events 23 that have created controversy in the nuclear industry and 24 see what kind of emergency action would be triggered by 25 them.
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O..- 11 . DR.~ KERR: Excuse me, Mr. Benders, I.mean these-
- 2. . words.are"so important.
L 3l MR. BENDER: Do you want me to try again. I Ls- ^
. 4L iforget that we're' talking to the reporter and not to people.-
.5- It's my belief that to have some understanding of 6 whether the. emergency action is effective and whether it 7 relates to real. accidents that it would be a good idea to 8 look at the events that have been considered really of 9 significance in the U.S. nuclear power industry and see how 10 they would? influence the' emergency planning accident..
11 And I cite a couple, Three Mile Island which you 12 say probably will take out; the Browns Ferry fire which I 13 consider a pretty important event that could have.been a 14; really serious accident and turned out to be mostly an
-15' expensive one; and there's probably some others around that
-16 I-won't bother to cite.
- 17 MR. CARROLL: Well, just moving down the spectrum, 18 I always like the Diablo Canyon'mid-loop situation; would 19' that have triggered what you're talking about?
20 MR. BENDER: Yes. Well, I think that for an 21- understanding I think it would be helpful to do that. I 22 don't know that it has any influence on the licensing 23 business-itself, but I think it would be helpful.
24- MR. CALLENDRELLO: As I recall, I think at least 25- some of those events were looked at in NUREG-0818 -- and
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114 t)' 1 I'll defer to the NRC on the specifics of the document --
2 but I believe that they were examined in light of the 3 classification system that was developed as part of NUREG-4- 0654.
5 MR. GRAM: If I might respond -- this is George 6 Gram again. I think the problem here has to do with our 7 detailed knowledge of the facts that happened at Browns 8 Ferry and all the facts that happened at TMI. What I know 9 that happened at Browns Ferry it would have definitely been 10 a site area emergency and intervening emergency actions for 11 the public would have occurred.
12 What I know about TMI is that would have been a 13 general emergency and there would have been evacuation of
<T 14 the public at almost any given nuclear site in the country, LJ 15 even though there was no uncontrolled release.
16 MR. BENDER: I have never made a judgment about 17 this and I'm not qualified to. It seems to be more of an 18 industry kind of thing that ought to be done, something that 19 ought to be related to this particular likes. But 20 nevertheless, I'm surprised that there is not some kind of 21 analysis.
22 MR. TRAVERS: Maybe I should add a word, this is 23 Bill Travers of the NRC Staff.
24 Part of our review actually encompasses a review 25 of the licensees, of the applicant's emergency
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- f K7 1 classification scheme and I can say that we have determined 2 that the kind of events that you're speaking of are, in 3 fact, encompassed within that scheme. There is a rather 4 detailed emergency classification level scheme put together; 5 we review it. And the kinds of events that you're talking 6 about are actually recognized and would be -- and the 7 emergency plan would be implemented at varying levels 8 depending on the severity of the accident.
9 MR. BENDER: Well, I believe that. I think what 10 I'm trying to say is that it would be useful to see what l 11 kind of actions they really trigger. Where do you get --
12 where do the responses come from? How much of it is in 13 plant and how much of it would draw in the external part of J
14 the governmental functions that you have to deal with?
}
15' MR. TRAVERS: If you look at the classification 16 scheme itself it offers a general description of what the 17 various levels are. For example, if you look at TMI where 18 fuel was damaged, where radioactive materials were 19 introduced in the containment, that would clearly be a 20 general emergency.
21 Even before you recognize, for example, that 22 releases were occurring from the containment you've 23 challenged the containment.
24 So this kind of guidance is offered up in NUREG-25 0654 and the classification schemes that we review -- in our
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_ _ -_. _ _ _ .______--____--___________________________-_________-_____a
-116 ns [ l' .reviewito look to see that that kind of guidance is actually
< ;2 ' implemented and that the emergency plan would be implemented h ll at an appropriate level for a whole host of accidents that
~
L 4" -you can envision.
5 MR. BENDER: I think'-- I-may not be make the 16: ; point in the right way. I'm more concerned with what the 7 action really consists of. When do you decide that you need t
8- to have'a technical staff there at the site that is 9 competent.to evaluate the' accident? When do you decide that you need'to have an elaboration of the information that
' 11. 'you're going-to. provide to the governor as a basis for his 12- decisions-and advice to the public?
13 .It seems to me~that's a part'and parcel of the 14 emergency plan.
(
15 DR. KERR: It's all in this chart.
16 MR. CARROLL: The unusual event triggers certain 17 actions; alert triggers certain actions; and on up.
18 MR. BENDER: I've said my say.
19 MR. CARROLL: Well, I think, for' example, reading 20 _0654-would help you or reading real world emergency plan _
21 would help you because it describes exactly what is done, 22 what people are convened, who --
23 DR. KERR: I'm going to cut short this self-24 education part of the subcommittee activity for a while.
25- Mr. Reis, you were looking a bit pained at some l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 L___ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ - . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
117 7
. \_'- 1 point in this discussion, did you want to add something?
'2 MR. REIS: No, it was just that I did not 3- understand it.
4 DR. KERR: Oh, okay.
5- There was an answer available now to an earlier 6 question.
7 MR. RAU: I'm Larry Rau again, and my department 8 maintains and applies the risk assessment at the plant.
-9 Do ycu want to repeat the question again; the 10 earlier questions on --
11' DR. KERR: It was your --
12 MR. CARROLL: On early release sequences. It was 13 my quest ;on.
() 14 MR. RAU: For large early releases we've estimated that- that's 10 to the minus 6th or less per year. We did 15 16 evaluate or provide some guidance and some additional looks 17 at looking at some of the emergency plan actions and options 18 that were available early on and did conclude that more than 19 95 percent of the benefits of an evacuation realized with a 20 two mile evacuation.
21- To an earlier question, if I could, on when did we 22 think we might activate the plan for something, we have 23 estimated that on a frequency of about 10 to the minus 5th 24- we may exceed a protective action guideline.
25 DR. KERR: Thank you.
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H 2(~/<h 1L MR. CARROLL: For example, I'm concerned about
, , 2 interfacing system LOCAs which can give you an early' release s
[ -3 and the Staff is concerned about it -- more concerned than 4 .they have been in the past.
5- Does Seabrook have~any special provisions to 61 prevent these beyond what the standard Westinghouse plant 7 has given-your beach-population' problem and so forth?
8' .MR..RNU: We.did evaluate that specifically and 9 looked particularly.at the release categories that had.the 10 shortest' release times, the half-hoitr categories that WASH-
' ll-- 1400 referred to as PWR-8.- And we did particularly look at 12 'an interfacing systems LOCA which basically might result in 13 an inadequate containment isolation and a release.
14 Those categories release a small fraction of the 15- inventory and we did evaluate those effects on the beach 16 populations. I'll defer that to Jim Moody who did the bulk 17 of detailed work on that.
18 MR.. MOODY: My.name is Jim Moody, I'm a consultant 19 now but I was at Seabrook for the last four or five years R20 working on the PRA.
- 21. On the interfacing LOCA there was a detailed 22 reanalysis of that done by Pickett, Lowe and Garrett where
- 23 we looked at the capacity of the RHR system, the operator 24- actions to isolate the event, the more likely scenario of
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119 u) 1 seals. And the pumps are down in the bottom of a deep 2 vault.
1 3 So when we reanalyzed interfacing LOCA the results 4 were significantly less than what had been previously
'5 analyzed, in fact, since WASH-1400.
6 MR. CARROLL: So are these early release sequences 7 important-in the total risk picture?
8 MR. MOODY: Interfacing LOCA is no longer driving 9 the results.'
10' MR.. CARROLL: How about other early release 11 sequences?
12 MR. MOODY: I believe there's some contribution 13 from shutdown events. Now, there's also seismic events with
(~T 14 valves being left open where there is no credit for operator
%/
15 actions, but they are very low frequency.
16 MR. CARROLL: So you would say that the ones with 17 very early release, releases before you could evacuate the 18 beaches are a small fraction of the total risk?
19 MR. MOODY: Yes. Yes.
20 MR. CARROLL: I bet there's probably other 21 committee members at the full committee that want to ask 22 more questions on this subject; you should be forewarned.
23 MR. MOODY: Thank you.
24 DR. KERR: Any further questions?
25 Otto response)
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l DR. KERR: Thank you, Mr. Callendrello.
2 Excuse me. Mr. Reis, while we are almost in 3 between. The statement was made earlier that Ms. Curran did 4 not receive a copy of the Federal Register notice; should 5 she have in her position with the intervening group or would.
6 she normally have?
7 MR. REIS: I don't believe that she would normally 8 receive it other than the publication of the Federal 9 Register.
10 DR. KERR: I do not know what her official 11 function is.
12 MR. REIS: She's an Intervenor in the proceeding.
13 They have raised matters before you, as you realize, and
{} 14 before the Licensing Board. That is the place where we look 15 for -- you unload information where people might get --
16 DR. KERR: My question is: would she in the normal 17 course of events have been expected to get a Federal 18 -Register notice directed to her?
19 MR. REIS: Other than her reading of the Federal 20 Register, no, but these groups do read the Federal Register 21 on a regular basis.
22 DR. KERR: So there isn't any mechanism which 23 would see that a formal Intervenor gets Federal Register
- l. 24 notices automatically other than as they refer to the 25 Federal Register.
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, r-5 D 11 MR'. .REIS: I believe, and I am not absolutely
, :2 - positive,-but being on the service. list for the. facility ~
L' 3 theyfget the-Federal Register notices because there are-
~
? .4 . documents that go out to.the public.- Now, whether there is.
'5 direct interface.with~the ACRS committee --
, :6 DR. KERR: No, I'm not trying to get'-- what I'm 7 -trying to find out is whether -- the implication was --
8 MR. REIS:: l[ don't know whether she received it 9- separately'than being published in the. Federal Register.
T10, DR. KERR:- Well, she said.she did'not. I wonder 11 'if one would have expected her to or she would have expected
'1:2 - to.
13 MR. REIS: In the ordinary course lE don't see why 14 except that she is on the document distribution list for all
(
15 Seabrook related matters, and that way I would have expected 16 it to be filed that way, but I'm not sure.
'17 DR. KERR: Is there any way we can find out. It 18 would be nice to know whether -- I don't mean today, but I 19 would like.to.know if she was on the distribution list and
- 20 somehow --
21 MR. NERSES: This is Vic Nerses.
22 Dr. Kerr, when'you speak on being on a
.23 distribution list, do you mean specifically on the 24 distribution list for that Federal Register notice?
25 DR. KERR: Well, for any Federal Register notice Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
122 j
. j~c I- 1 that had to do with Seabrook.
2 MR. NERSES: Okay, we'll have to explore that to .
I 3 see whether or not she is. Like Mr. Reis has said, they 4 typically would be in the business of receiving the Federal 5 Register. Maybe not Diane Curran, but I expect that that 6 office probably would be reviewing those things and looking 7 .at those things. Whether or not Diane Curran specifically 8 is earmarked to receive something on Seabrook from the 9 Federal Register people, I can't even answer that question.
10 MR.1REIS: Let me say this, too, whether she 11 receives ACRS notices I can't directly, but I know, for 12 instance, if we have a meeting with the applicant all the 13 interveners get notice of that.
14 MR. CARROLL: Now, is she --
15 MR. REIS: Now, whether the ACRS is incorporated 16 in that,'the Staff vis-a-vis applicant meetings there are 17 policy statements published in the Federal Register, but we 18 have to notify all applicants. Whether the ACRS as being 19 somewhat independent -- being very independent from the 20 Staff, whether we also give them notice of an ACRS meeting, 21 I don't know.
22 DR. KERR: I see, okay.
23 MR. REIS: That is what I'm saying.
24 Now, when we meet with the applicant, though, they 25 sit there and they give similar statement to what they gave Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
r 123 1 here in the sense that they're allowed to, not participate l-
[ )-
,. 2 in the give-and-take of the proceeding but to make I
3- statements -- conclusionary statements of what they think 4 was there, the same way when we meet with the interveners 5 the applicants are allowed to be there.
6 MR. NERSES: This is Vic Nerses again.
7 To add to that, Dr. Kerr, when I have a meeting 8 with-the applicant or the interveners, but that's seldom, 9 and it's a public meeting and I make a notification of that 10 public meeting, when we call the meeting I may put out a 11 notification to which notice and I take additional steps to 12 make some calls to the parties to this proceeding.
13 In this instance, this is your meeting and you 14 people indicated in the Federal Register notice as a 0 15 standard practice to put it in the Federal Register notice, 16 and I suspect that that was done, like you pointed out, two 17 weeks prior to the actual meeting.
18 DR. KERR: Thank you.
19 MR. CARROLL: I guess I still have one residual 20 question: is Ms. Curran by name on the service list for 21 Seabrook?
22 MR. NERSES: Yes.
23 MR. REIS: Her law firm is by name on the service 24 list for all Seaurook documents, all meetings called by the 25 Staff.
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124 j k.-) 1 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
2 MR. REIS: Her firm and about an estimate of over 1
3 eight other interveners.
4 MR. . CARROLL: Okay.
5 DR. KERR: Please proceed.
6 (Slides being shown.)
7 MR. STROUP: Thank you and good morning. I'm 8 Peter Stroup and I'll present an overview of the concept of 9 operations, resource requirements, and special challenges 10- associated with the Seabrook Station plan for the non-11 participating Massachusetts state agencies and six local 12 communities.
13 Although the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has I'h -14 prepared an exercise to emergency response plans for the
.V 15 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; the Yankee Nuclear Power 16 Station; and the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station; the 17 Commonwealth officials have refused to continue 18 participation in planning for Seabrook Station.
19 Seabrook Station is located approximately two 20 miles from the Massachusetts state border. The planning 21 basis encompasses six communities and a Department of 22 Interior wildlife refuge extending out beyond the 10 mile 23 planning zone.
24- The resident population is about 51,000; and the 25 summer peak population is approximately 89,000.
i l
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, L il .The offsite response organization is defined in.
F
[ 2 ,five major. elements: radiological health consisting of 3 accident assessment, monitoring, sampling, emergency worker 4- exposure control;3and decontamination.
5 The-primary. coordination will occur with the-6 Massachusetts Department 1 of Public Health.
7 Support'~ liaison which administers'the state and 8 local liaison personnel,and acts as their conduit to ORO 9 ' resources.
10 ' Response and implementation orchestrating all 11 evacuation activities from traffic guides and buses to 12 evacuee and the American Red Cross.
13- All this while interfacing with the Massachusetts
'14 Civil Defense Agency.
(
115 Public notification dealing solely with siren 11 6- sounding and emergency' broadcast messages.
17 And finally, public information providing for 18 media and rumor control activities collaborating with the 19 governor's spokesperson or media staff.
- 20. The SPMC is implemented by the utility offsite 21 response organization commonly referred to as the ORO. The 22 -plan initiates with notification from the control room of an 23 emergency classification, be it dedicated open phone line, 24 the nuclear alert system. This notification is to a 24-hour 25 contact established by the ORO in the emergency operation
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_ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . - __ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
A 0 l t 1
\_/ .1 center.
-2 .The contact point is responsible for originating i-3 notifications to ORO personnel.
4 The offsite response organization director is 5 notified at an unusual event. When initial discussions take 6 place with Massachusetts Department of Public Health and 7 Civil Defense officials. These discussions include the 8 details, surrounding the initiating incident and explanation 9 of the ORO capabilities and the expected Commonwealth 10 response should the event escalate.
11 The SPMC is based upon three modes of operation.
12 First, the ORO will respond and remain on standby at their 13 reporting locations.
14 Second, the Commonwealth will request resources
('~~}
s.
15 from the ORO but remain in charge of the emergency response.
16 And lastly, the ORO could be called upon to 17 implement the SPMC.
18 The SPMC is founded upon the basis of realism or 19 better stated, the fact that the Commonwealth will respond.
20 The uncertainty exists in determining prior to the time of 21 an emergency how the Commonwealth will respond and with what 22 resources.
23 The modes of operation provide for a planned 24 series of ORO status that will coincide with any of these l
25 variations.
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\~/ 1 Supporting decision-makers and facility managers 2 are contacted and required to report at the alert t
3 classification. And the balance of the ORO emergency 4 workers are notified at the site area emergency to report to 5 their facilities.
6 The SPMC has made' provision for ORO liaisons to 7 interface with the Massachusetts Department of Public Health 8 and Civil Defense Agency at both the state EOC and the state 9 forward command post just outside the Seabrook EPZ.
10 In addition, six ORO liaisons are provided for i 11 interface at the local civil defense director level.
12 Liaisons report at the alert classification and are prepared 13 with copies of the SPMC planning documents, maps, cellular 14 phones, and in cases of local liaisons, dosimetry for local
}
15 government emergency workers.
16 At the alert stage the ORO begins accident 17 assessment by reviewing plant conditions; weather ;
18 conditions; and projected doses. Parameters are discussed 19 with Commonwealth officials and precautionary actions such j 20 as school cancellation are contemplated should conditions 21 degrade.
22 The joint media information center is established 23 and press releases and briefings commence from the ORO as 24 well as the State of New Hampshire and the onsite emergency 25 response organization.
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128 7f'). 1 At the site area emergency field workers such as v
2 traffic guides and monitoring personnel'are required to 3 . report. 'As.the-field workers report they are briefed and 4 dispatched to their final reporting locations.
5 In addition, transportation resources are summoned 6 and staged in preparation for an evacuation.
7 Protective action decisions by Commonwealth 8 officials as well as the ORO respond mode will dictate 9 further ORO activities. At this point the ORO stands ready.
10 Shown here are the locations of the ORO emergency 11 ' facilities. Reception centers located in Beverly and North 12 And.over, Massachusetts contain evacuee monitoring, 13 decontamination, registration, and referral to temporary
,_ 14 shelters where lodging, food, and the American Red Cross are 15 available. The SPMC refers to these shelters as congregate 16 care facilitics.
17 The staging area located in Haverhill, 18 Massachusetts is the focal point for field workers to 19 report, get briefed on conditions and their assignments, and 20 obtaining. equipment All radio communications with field 21 workers take place in the staging area.
22 The' emergency worker monitoring and 23 decontamination facility is also located at the station.
24 The joint media information center is located in the Town of 25 Newington, New Hampshire, and the ORO emergency operation
(
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~M 1 center!is in.another area'of Newington, New Hampshire; it 2; happens_to,be'co-located in a 10,000 square foot facility 3-Q,
! -3l .with the emergency operations facility, EOF, from the onsite
- 4; Lemergencyrresponse group and the-New Hampshire Office of
!5) Emergency Management forward ~ command post referred to as the l64 incident field office.
7 --
MR. CARROLL: Now, in real life what are these
'8 . reception centers or is'that their only function?
9 MR. STROUP:. The reception centers are.not a.
10 dedicated facility;.the. reception centers are owned by one.
'll- of our joint ~ owners as utility property. They are,'in fact, 12 .
districts-where normal utility operations take place out of
- 13. district' offices.
.- : 14 - MR . CARROLL: Okay.
15 MR.1 STROUP: The ORO emergency operation center is 16 a dedicated: facility that includes capabilities for face-to-ll;7 face coordination with co-responding organizations. Two-way.
18- radio communications with state and local safety officials l'9 and provisions for Commonwealth officials to establish a 20 . command coordination post. The ORO EOC houses command and 21 control personnel.
22- The ORO maintains interfaces with other-emergency 23~ organizations in an emergency such as the onsite emergency 24c response organization or ERO; the Massachusetts Civil 25 Defense Agency; the Massachusetts Department of Public Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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.j~J b- 'll iHealth; , officials from each of the six EPZ towns; the 2F 'American Red Cross;.the New Hampshire Office of Emergency 3' ' Management; the.U.S. Department of the Interior in reference 4 to the Parker River ~ wildlife refuge at Plum: Island; FEMA; 15 and'the U.S. Department of Energy in relation to a federal 6 ~ radiological response plan activation.
p.
7- The ORO is comprised of more than 950 emergency 8 workers recruited from four major area utilities as well as
.9 '200 workers recruited from. contractors doing routine 10 business'with New Hampshire Yankee, and more than 1100' F 11 transportation drivers bringing the ORO personnel total to' 12 .over 2200 people.
13 Beyond the ORO members New Hampshire Yankee has 14 made arrangements for access to additional personnel through
' 15 . mutual assistance agreements.
16 New Hampshire Yankee maintains a strict annual 17' training requirement and an annual drill requirement for 18 each element of the organization.
19 In addition to the ORO facilities described 20 .previously New Eampshire Yankee has contracted for the use 21 Hof more than 30 facilities as temporary shelters or 22- congregate care centers. These facilities were obtained-23 after inspection to verify conformance with American Red 24 Cross standards.
25 The ORO is self-sufficient in terms of required
( Eeritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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- ~h 1 ' equipment. New Hampshire Yankee has purchased dosimetry, 2 monitoring, and decontamination equipment, communication-r 3 equipment including portable radios, fax machines, cellular 4 phones, field worker supplies such as traffic cones, safety 5- vests,-ID badges and administrative supplies.
6 Personnel recruitment required a substantial 7, commitment on the part of organizations to permit their 8 ecployees to be removed from their daily-requirements to 9 participate.in ORO training, drills, and exercises.
10 The recruitment process began with the development 11 of the SPMC in July of 1987. As candidates responded to the 12 more than 20: recruiting sessions conducted backgrounds and 13 qualifications were matched with SPMC requirements, and 14 personnel were assigned positions in the ORO.
}
15 To properly acquaint responders to their expected 16 roles 69 training modules have been developed for 17 instruction and numerous drills held simulating emergency 18 conditions.
19 For scheduling and logistics reasons utility 20 . personnel.were chosen as the ORO core of responders under 21 the belief that they would be more accessible.
22 New Hampshire Yankee set out on a course of action 23 to obtain completely independent facilities from those 24' normally planned for by participating government. Regional 25 public schools and state facilities were not considered l
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[:^ . '
!1 available,-and New Hampshire Yankee reached-out into the 2 business' community. .Some businesses were reluctant to-13f . participate.because of the position of-the Commonwealth.
4: Resources were further restricted by existing.
5 agreements with the State'of'New Hampshire for their planned 16' response-to.a<Seabrook Station emergency.
- 7 Although.the foundation of the SPMC is'that the t
a : 8- Commonwealth will', in fact, respond to;a real emergency:at 9 Seabrook 1 Station, the ORO is designed to be a completely 10 self-sufficient organization in terms of personnel, n
- 11. contractor resources, and equipment.
12 This independence from state resources requires 13 that New Hampshire Yankee develop programs and procedures
(} 14 normally associated with state and local response readiness 15 that address inventories; rosters; training; equipment 16- tests; preventive maintenance; and replacements.
- 17. The Commonwealth has,.in fact, stated as part'of' 18 the:SPMC litigation that they will respond to an emergency 19 at Seabrook Station. That response will require a unique 20 coordination efforts to brief officials on the specific 21 attributes of the SPMC and the ORO resources. We feel that 22 the establishment of liaison positions enhances that 23 expected coordination as well as the strategic location of 24 the ORO EOC.
'25 Nonetheless, training liaisons in all aspects of Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
3 133 1- the SPMC and acquainting key ORO personnel in the
[s)i 2 Commonwealth' response organization mechanics, as well as the 3 added steps necessary to obtain Commonwealth approval of 4 proposed actions affecting the public present unusual 5 -circumstances to be addressed. Each of these special 6 challenges have been addressed and are completed.
7 Despite the position taken by the Commonwealth and 8 local communities we have attempted to provide existing 9 plans and procedures to Massachusetts Department of Public 10 Health, Civil Defense, local governments, schools, nursery 11 schools, day cares, nursing homes, and hospitals.
12 MR. CARROLL: You've attempted to provide?
13 MR. STROUP: That's correct.
-s 14 MR. CARROLL: Now, what's been the result of that?
()
15 MR. STROUP: The result has been that some 16 information has been returned unopene..; some information has 17 been accepted, and I don't have the statistics on the status 18 of each. We recently received a letter from the 19 Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Health 20 requesting updated FSARs and copies of our Seabrook plan for 21 Massachusetts communities.
22 As a part of the annual plan procedure review 23 process the most current census data for each of these 24 organizations is solicited and factored into procedures.
25 Formal training or an overview of the SPMC concept
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N> 1 of operations, anticipated interfaces, and ORO resources 2- have been offered to state and local emergency' responders.
3 MR. CARROLL: Same question, what's been the 4 response?
5 MR. STROUP: In that case we had a private fire 6 department in one of the six EPZ towns that responded 7 favorably and they have participated in training with us and 8 invited to quarterly meetings that we have with local civil 9 -defense directors.
10 MR. CARROLL: But that's the rare exception?
11 RMR. STROUP: I believe that's true.
12 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
13 MR. STROUP: In conjunction with census data 14 collection and the offering of overview and specific
'{
15 training, New Hampshire Yankee continues to solicit planning 16 input from agencies, governments, and affected groups such l
17 as schools and day cares.
a 18 Some successes have been realized in determining i 19 transportation needs in the event of a decision to evacuate j 20 and confirmation of phone numbers which authorities could be 1 I
21 reached during an emergency.
22 As a result of stipulations established as a part ,
i 23 of litigation the Massachusetts Attorney General Staff and {
I 24 New Hampshire Yankee have come to an agreement on several I 25 issues contended by Interveners including special ORO ,
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N/ -1 transportation for Commonwealth officials via contracted 2 helicopter service; the content of pre-emergency public l-3 education materials; the requirements of field sampling and 4 monitoring teams; and the coordination of federal assistance 5 resources.
6 In conclusion, the New Hampshire Yankee offsite 7 response organization stands ready to respond to an 8 emergency at Seabrook Station with plans, procedures, 9 personnel, equipment and facilities. New Hampshire Yankee 10 will preserve the state of readiness through ongoing 11 maintenance and update programs until such time ac the 12 Commonwealth of Massachusetts completes emergency response 13 plans for Seabrook Station.
(} 14 15 questions?
That concludes my presentation; are there any 16 DR. KERR: Are there questions?
17 (No response) 18 DR. KERR: When was the last time that there was a 19 major evacuation because of toxic materials or whatever that 20 involve cooperative activity between New Hampshire and 21 Massachusetts?
22 MR. STROUP: I don't know.
23 DR. KERR: Has there been one that you know of?
24 MR. GRAM: Yes. This is George Gram.
25 1 believe within the last eight months there was a
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136 A/ 1 chemical release in Nashua, New Hampshire that involved 2 mutual aid evacuation because New Hampshire and 3 Massachusetts. Nashua is right on the border between New
'4 Hampshire and Massachusetts. Grace Chemical -- W.R. Grace, 5 that's it.
6 DR. KERR: Was there any difficulty in that 7' activityfor have you checked to see how it worked?
8 MR. GRNH: It went very well as a matter of fact.
9 DR. KERR: So there is liaison between the groups 10 that are responsible for this sort of thing?
11 MR. GRAM: Yes.
12 DR. KERR: And it's a workable liaison, as 13 indicated by experience?
14 MR. GRAM: Yes.
15 MR. STROUP: Dr. Kerr, I might add that as 16 recently as this month the State of New Hampshire and 17 Massachusetts have participated in a drill for Vermont 18 Yankee Nuclear Power Station as well.
19 DR. KERR: Thank you.
20 Other questions?
21 Mr. Kevern.
22 MR. KEVERN: A question similar to Dr. Kerr's on 23 different hazards, other than nuclear have the local 24 communities in Massachusetts and the state complied with the 25 SARA Title III requirements on local community planning for l
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-k T/ 1 further hazards?
2 MR. STROUP: I honestly can't answer that 3 question.
4 MR. GRAM: I know that all of the local six 5 communities are working on SARA Title III plans, whether or 6 not they've formally submitted them or not, I'm not sure.
- 7. MR. HARPSTER: They delayed it until after the 8' litigation so that we would'not take credit for it during 9 the litigation process.
10 MR. DRUM: May_I ask a couple, also?
11 DR..KERR: Please.
12 MR. DRUM: In the six communities of Massachusetts 13 is not participating, who has the authority to recommend or 14 order evacuation?
[}
15 MR. STROUP: The utility organization provides 16 recommendations for a protective action evacuation. The ORO 17 provides an independent assessment from the onsite utility 18 group for protective action recommendations. And the 19 Commonwealth Department of Public Health and Civil Defense 20 Agency receive each of those recommendations and they make 21 the final decision.
22 MR. DRUM: So even though they are in a senso not 23 participating, they have the ultimate decision vis-a-vis 24 evacuating population?
25 MR. STROUP: That's correct.
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- - 'l MR. TRAVERS: 'Maybe I could help just a bit. My
'2' name-is Bill Travers with the NRC Staff.
3 -NRC regulations which were amended to recognize.
4 cases where state or local governments' chose not'to S ' participate 1are based on an assumption that in an actual 6 . emergency that the state and local governments will, in 7 fact,_' react positively to protect their citizens.
8 So the assumption that is embodied in the NRC 9 regulations includes an assumption that when called upon the 10 governor or'any authority who is responsible for making 11 those kinds of decisions would, in fact, make them.
l 12- MR. DRUM: Would they be based on the same 13 .criter~a that is used in New Hampshire vis-a-vis alert,
(}; 14 general emergency, et cetera?
15 MR. STROUP: Yes, it would, as well as it would be 16 based on the'same criteria associated with the other three 17 plants for which they plan for in the Commonwealth.
1 18 MR. DRUM: I had one other question related: you 19 said that Massachusetts civil defense says they will 20 participate if there is an actual emergency. How do you 21 reconcile the activities then of-the ORO offsite emergency 22 response and Massachusetts civil defense?
23 MR. STROUD: Well, prior to the governor's 24 decision not to continue planning in Massachusetts the
.25 Commonwealth had developed a comprehensive emergency
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1 response plan for Seabrook Station. The SPMC was founded 2 upon that comprehensive emergency response plan, so the 3 characteristics are very similar.
4 The response expected will be coordinated through 5 the liaison as we described: three at the state level; and 6 six at the local level. In addition, we have done a 7 research of the comprehensive emergency response plan as.of 8 its status in 1986 versus the SPMC today and developed those 9 specific differences which we could discuss at the time of 10 an emergency and point out where there are differences which 11 primarily are in facility locations.
12 The mode of operation is determined by the 13 Commonwealth, whether the ORO remains on standby or supplies
~h 14 resources or implements the SPMC.
(G 15 DR. KERR: Further questions?
16 (tha response) 17 DR. KERR: Thank you, sir.
10 We are only some one-hour or so behind schedule.
19 our plans call for a lunch break about noon. Is there any 20 particular reason that we shouldn't take a break at this 21 point and come back at about 1 o' clock.
22 Let's reconvene at 1:00 p.m.
23 (Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m. the meeting was recessed 24 to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day, Thursday, 25 August 17, 1989.)
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' "}'v} 1 AElEBEQQH EEEE1QH 2 DR. KERR: We shall proceed when the speaker gets 3 his harness on.
4 (Slides being shown.)
5 MR. DESMARAIS: Good afternven, members of the 6 Committee, NRC, FEMA Staff, members of the public. I'm Ed 7 Desmarais and this afternoon I wl11 provide an overview of 8 the Vehicular Alert Notification System or VANS which is the 9 New Hampshire Yankee compensatory siren system for the six 10 Massachusetts communities in the Seabrook emergency planning 11 eone.
12 However, before discussing this unique system I 13 would emphasize that the State of New Hampshire system 14 ccueists of the conventional pole mounted siren system.
}
.15 To present the VANS overview I'll discuss the 16 history of the VANS, the system overview, the concept of 17 operation, and a description of the vehicle.
18 The original siren system for Massachusetts and 19 New Hampshire was authorized in 1984 and the installation 20 completed in 1986. In early 1987 the citizens of l
l l
21 Massachusetts challenged the permitting process for the 1
22 siren poles and through the litigatory process ultimately l 23 forced us to abandon the exist-ing conventional pole mounted 24 sirens in each of the Massachusetts communities in the last 25 week of December 1987.
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) .1 Each of/the communities refused our offer-to turn
~2; over-the sirens to the towns and subsequently requested c .. .
13- immediate removal of the poles and sirens. This left us in L
- 4- a-position with no effective means to provide the alerting 5' function in Massachusetts.
p 6 In early 1988 we prepared and submitted the FEMA
[L 7 required design report which describes the New Hampshire 8 . Yankee public alert notification system, built and tested a 9 prototype VANS vehicle, field tested and rated the VANS dual 10 siren, identified and qualified the six staging areas in 16 11 unique acoustical locations.
12 Conducted over 1200 timed transit runs from the 13 staging areas to the acoustic locations and tested each physical component and function required in the concept of
(}114' 15 operation.
'16 This. slide lists the primary components of the
~
17 system which I will briefly review.
18 Next slide, Dave.
19 There are 22 identical and interchangeable 20 vehicles: 16 of these vehicles are located at the six normal 21 staging areas; four backup vehicles are located on site and L 22 are available to replace a primary VANS vehicle; and two of 23 the 22 vehicles are soon to be in the maintenance and p 24 surveillance cycle which occurs every two weeks for each b
I 25 vehicle. The truck, boom, siren have been extensively Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
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~1 tested by each of.the manufacturers for extreme weather-2- conditions of heat, cold,='and humidity.
3 Each vehicle-is equipped with dual-wail'and 4,000
-4' sirens which have.been field tested on site at Seabrook and 5' rated at'134 dbc:at 100-feet along the main axis of the 6 ' siren. Although the dual appearing. concept makes this siren 7 configuration unique, in the event that the Massachusetts 8 communities reverse their current position the VANS sirens 9 are capable of being separated and individually mounted on E10 poles.. In fact, 14 single-wailing 4,000 sirens are 11 currently mounted'on poles in Massachusetts.
12 MR. WYLIE: Question: now these are strictly 13'
. sirens, they're not the PA system that you described for the f([ 14' 15.
New Hampshire plan; is that correct?
MR. DESMARAIS: Although I refer to these as 16 sirens, in fact,.each of these are loudspeakers and have 17 five functional capacities.
18 MR. WYLIE: Okay. So they basically perform the 19 same function as the pole mounted units would then?
20 MR. DESMARAIS: Yes, they do.
21 MR. WYLIE: Thank you.
22 MR. DESMARAIS: The six staging areas for the VANS 23 are located along the New Hampshire border and in 24 Massachusetts to enable the VANS to travel to the acoustic 25 locations. Their function is similar to those of a fire
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- 2. The, VANS ~are manned.on a 24-hour per day V
3 continuous basis'with 16 primary drivers located at:the 4 staging areas and backup drivers lccated on site at
.5 Seabrook. One driver from each staging area.is designated 6- as a1 working foreman; and the six working foremen in turns 7 report to a supervisor.
8 The' extra drivers on site provide for periodic 9 route verification for obstacle, for road maintenance, 10 rotating the vehicles to Seabrook'for maintenance or 11 surveillance,-and to provide coverage in the event of 12 illnesses, vacation and training.
13' 'This slide provides an overview.of the concept of-14 operation for the-activation of the New Hampshire Yankee 15 public alert-notification system. The first block on the 16 left begins the process with the classification of an
- 17. emergency in the control' room at Seabrook Station using-'the 18 nuclear alert system which has been previously described the 19 control' room simultaneously notifies the State of New 20 ' Hampshire, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the ORO, EOC 21 contact to inform them of an emergency at Seabrook Station.
22 At an unusual event the EOC contact simultaneously 123 notifies all VANS staging areas to place them on a standby 24 status. For all other emergencies the EOC contact and 25 immediately dispatches the VANS along preselected routes to
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-1L their acoustic' locations.
f 2: Upon arriving atLthe' acoustic locations the VANS e
L 3 vehicle is. fully deployed'and acts as a fixed pole siren-4 system until recalled.
5 The activation of the siren system is then 6 contingent upon the decision by the CommonwealthLof 7 Massachusetts, the central path indicated on.this slide, to
.8. actually sound theJsirens.
9 In a fast-breaking scenario the control' room acts-10 as the focal point for the' Commonwealth to~ authorize.the 11- sounding of the sirens.
12 In an escalating scenario where there would be 13- more time for this time -- more time, this function is 14- transferred to the'offsite response organization when the t
15 emergency response center is fully activated.
16' In either scenario the EOC contact remotely
.18 in'Newington.
19 Two additional important features regarding the 20 VANS siren activation include the ability of the VANS to 21 store a siren activation signal while in transit which would
. 2:2 ' permit'immediate siren activation when the sirens are raised 23 to their full height of 51-feet.
24 And secondly, the ability of the VANS drivers to 25 activate the sirens individually at each vehicle.
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\_- 1 There are two or three VANS at each staging area I
2 and the VANS sirens provide complete acoustic coverage 3 required by the regulations and provide greater than 70 dbc 4 to more than 85 percent of the Massachusetts EPZ. l 5 This-slide is of a completed vehicle. And the 6 tarpaulin cover has been removed to reveal key features such-7 as the on-board generator and the battery cabinets for 8 extended siren sounding; the outriggers here for stability 9 under high wind conditions; and the rotor and siren assembly 10 which has been tested up to 120 mile -- for 120 mile per 11 hour winds.
12 The video which we are about to show simulates the 13 function which I just recently discussed and include the
[~T 14 control room initiating simultaneous communications to the s_J 15 EOC contact in both states. The EOC dispatch of the VANS 16 vehicle. The transit of the vehicle over a preselected 17 route. And setup of the vehicle upon arrival at the 18 acoustic location.
19 (A video tape being shown.)
20 MR. DESMARAIS: Can everyone see the television.
21 The VANS activation begins with the classification 22 of the emergency and notification in the control room.
23 The orange phone that the operator picked up is 24 the nuclear alert system phone and he is communicating 25 simultaneously to both states in the EOC contact.
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\_J 1 The EOC contact receives the notification, logs it
- 2 on the notification fact sheet. And in an alert or' higher v.
?3 ' emergency which is simulated in this video presentation, the 4- EOC contact:immediately and simultaneously dispatches the 5' VANS at all six staging areas by coding in a specific 6 ' message.
7 At each staging area there are audib3e and visual-8 alarms signaling the need for immediate dispatch. The VANS 9 vehicle leaves the staging area and drives along a
-10 preselected route to a designated acoustic location.
11 And as you can see in this video, the tarpaulin
'12 cover is present.
13 MR. BENDER: He's on his way to a spot?
14 MR. DESMARAIS: Yes.
l')N L
- 15. MR. BENDER: Where he is going to turn on the
'16 sound?
17 MR. DESMARAIS: Yes, he is. Well, the only 18- instance in where the siren would begin immediate sounding 19- is when the governor has authorized immediate activation of 20- the system and the EOC contact has activated the sirens and 21 the signal stored while the vehicle is in transit. Under 22 those circumstances as soon as the siren is raised to its 23 full operational height of 51-feet it would immediately 24 begin siren -- the siren would begin sounding.
25 MR. BENDER: If he has an accident along the way (n)
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[ :1 .what is-the contingent plan?
2: MR. DESMARAIS: We.have the four backup vehicles
-3 that'are located on site. And if we can continue'with.the 4 balance of this video which'is just a few more seconds I'll 5 be able to address that question more fully.
6 This is an' actual acoustic location. And upon
~
7 arrival the VANS are set up by removal of the boom strap, 8 which is done through an opening in the cover right here.
9 It's a very simple process.. By lowering the front and rear 10 stabilizers which I pointed out earlier, but which are 11 ' located here and you'll see it right here. And it raises 12 the vehicle up so that it's resting on the four stabilizers.
13 And raising the siren to its operable height of 51-feet.
Now, if the signal had been sent while the VANS
/")T:.
q ' 14
- 15. was in transit you will see that we have simulated that here 16 .in this video. You'll see that the siren immediately begins 17 to rotate. And we continue for three minute siren 18 activation.
19 After the VANS have been set up the driver contact 20 or radior, into the EOC and confirms full deployment and then 21 subsequently the EOC contact, logs in the status and fully 22 deployment of each VANS location to confirm that the VANS is
.23 in a full deployed capacity and ready for siren activation.
24 And when authorized the EOC contact from this 25 station right here would actually begin the sounding of the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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' 4
\ - 1 sirens and coordinate the siren sounding with the EBS i l
2 broadcast. J 3 And as you can see the siren rotates through a 4 full 360 degree cycle and continues in that mode until three 5 minutes have been completed.
6 P2. . CARROLL: Are the drivers employees of the 7 utility or is that a contract?
8 MR. DESMARAIS: The drivers will be hired through 9 the union halls, and we have completed an agreement that's 10 under the Nuclear Stabilization Pact with the International 11 Unions and will consist of a mix of Teamsters and Laborers.
12 In conclusion, New Hampshire Yankee has built, 13 tested, and requires the VANS driver training scheduled for f')
v 14 this October to complete full implementation of the VANS.
15 -The current schedule is to have this system ready for full 1/> deployment by the end of this November.
17 This system costs more than $2 million to design 18 and build and will cost more than $4 million per year to 19 operate. The system has been fully tested and demonstrated 20 to FEMA, the NRC, and the Massachusetts Attorney General.
21 And finally, the design of the system has been 22 found adequate by FEMA in their December letter to the --
23 December 1988 letter to the NRC. The NRC's recent safety 24 evaluation report and by the Licensing Board of June of this 25 past year or June of this year.
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- 1. ~ 1' This;' concludes my presentation and I'll.be glad to 2 ' answer questions.at this time..
.3'- DR.1KERR: Are there questions?
J4 ' MR '. CARROLL: Just to make sure I understand.-
-5 Some of these are deployed along the beach area in 6l Massachusetts'and serve essentially the same function-we l7 . heard described in the earlier presentation.-
Ii 8- 'MR. DESMARAIS: Dave, can you bring up.the slide 9- for Massachusetts,_please.
10 There are several VANS locations which -- acoustic
- 11. -locations which provide acoustic coverage for the 12 Commonwealth of Massachusetts. One VANS location is located b 13: approximate 1y'right there. A second one is down here in-14 . Salisbury, right along the barrier beach. The third one is 15- located approximately there down in Newburyport. And
.16 ' .another VANS.is located down here, and it also provides
-17 coverage out through the bottom of Plum Island.
-18 ' MR . CARROLL: Okay.
19- MR. BENDER: When you did your graded test did all 20 the drivers get to the right place?
21 MR. DESMARAIS: Yes, they did.
22 DR. .KERR: Any other questions?
23 (No response)
. 24 DR. KERR: Thank you, Mr. Desmarais.
25 (Slides being shown.)
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, . - j~j 1 isJi 1 MR. GRAM: Thank you, Ed.
2' Can.I;have the next~ slide, Dave.
t-3 As.I' mentioned earlier, the June of 1988 graded 4 ' exercise was a major milestone in emergency preparedness for.
5 Seabrook Station.. We believe it was the largest 6 radiological emergency preparedness exercise ever held in 7 association with commercial nuclear power.
8 The exercise was designed to fulfill the 9 requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E which required that-a
-10 full participation exercise be one that exercises as much as 11 is reasonably achievable all of the plans, procedures, 12 facilities, equipment, and personnel in order for federal 13 evaluators to determine if an appropriate -- to determine if
(} 14 15 appropriate protective measures can and will be implemented.
A comprehensive scenario simulated every phase of
. 16 a real radiological emergency, from identification and 17 classification of an event through protective action 18- decisions and implementation, to recovery and reentry. The 19 scenario covered the entire 10 mile EPZ and 50 mile IPZ 20 spanning three states, and required 24-hours of 21' participation by responders evaluated over a two day period.
22 119 individuni organization with personnel in 23 literally hundreds of locatitis were activated and 24 coordinated activities during the drill.
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ss' 1 participated in a two-day exercise.
2 Next slide.
3 This drill was the verification that over 15 years 4 of planning, training, drilling, and equipment upgrading 5 have resulted in the ability to protect the health and 6 safety of the public around Seabrook Station. There is no 7 doubt in my mind that that ability was proven.
8 The NRC's onsite evaluation had no violations.
9 And four open items which have since been closed. FEMA' s 10 evaluation report found no deficiencies. The report did 11 identify areas requiring corrective actions for ACRAs most 12 of which have already been corrected and verified by FEMA.
13 Any questions about the drill before I move on?
I'T 14 DR. KERR: I see none, please continue.
V 15 MR. GRAM: The last portion of our presentation 16 today is a review of the remaining emergency preparedness 17 related items which we must have completed prior to the 18 receipt of a full power license.
19 As Ed Desmarais has already covered, 20 implementation of the VANS system in Massachusetts is in 21 progress and will be completed and ready to be fully manned 22 by November 30th of this year. Upgrades to the pole mounted 23 siren system in New Hampshire have already been completed.
24 There are also several Licensing Board conditions 25 as a result of the New Hampshire plan litigation which have
<~
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V 1' been or.will-be'~ completed by. September 30th.of this year.
.U 2; Pending any unanticipated Board conditions as a result'of
.3 'the'SPMC.and exercise.-litigation, New Hampshire Yankee will
~
l4 be ready to receive a full power license by the end of
!r < 5 November of this year.
.6' Any.' questions ? _-
.., 7 (No response) 8 MR.-GRAM: Thank you very much.
9 Ted Feigenbaum has a brief summary.
10 (Slides ~being shown.)
11 MR. .FEIGENBAUM: Thank you, George.
12 -I hope that we have.given the subcommittee members 13- the-necessary information'to make a judgment regarding our 14 emergency preparedn"ess at Seabrook. As you can see we've
[~)l 115 worked very hard with the States of New Hampshire, Maine, 16 and the. local communities to achieve a first rate plan that 17 ~we believe meets all the NRC and FEMA' requirements for 18 .public safety.
19- 'While we are disappointed that Massachusetts 20 communities have chosen not to participate in emergency 21 planning at this time, we're confident that responsible 22 public officials will respond should the need arise and will 23- cooperate to protect their citizens in an emergency.
24 We at New Hampshire Yankee will continue to strive 25 for. greater cooperation and hope the non participating Heritage Reporting Corporation p (202) 628-4888 1
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153 3t _/ 1 communities and governments will join us.in making an 2 already excellent plan even better.
i 3 We know that our emergency plans can be 4 successfully implemented because of their many strengths.
5 These strengths include the following: first, the State of 6 .New Hampshire and the State of Maine have been and are 7 continuing as full participants in our emergency p?anning 8 for Seabrook.
9 The State of New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts 10 are experienced in radiological emergency planning through 11' existing plans for existing nuclear power plants that
- 12. already exist and are operating in New England.
13 The Seabrook plan for Massachusetts communities 14 are flexible in that any degree of Massachusetts response
(')>
15 can be accommodated.
16 Massachusetts has identified extensive emergency 17 response resources, people, equipment, et cetera, training 18 which could be used in a radiological emergency. However, 19 the SPMCs are not dependent on the deployment of these state 20 resources.
21 The emergency plans include precautionary actions 22 that Mr. Callendrello went through with the nearby beaches 23 including early closure of the beaches.
24 Also, New Hampshire Yankee is party to the Yankee 25 Mutual Assistance Pact ur. der which Yankee companies would l
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[1 4-sq-.
s -1: assist one another in a radiological emergency.
2' The emergency operations facility co-locates 3- -utility personnel, Massachusetts offsite response personnel, 4 the State of New Hampshire people, and federal responders,
!5 and we think that's a strength as well.
6 Of course, FEMA and the NRC Staff have extensively 7 reviewed'the emergency plans and the exercise and have found 8 they provide reasonable assurance that the public will be 9 protected.
10 'And most important of all is the confidence that 11 we-have in our people who have been trained extensively to 12 carry out their emergency functions and who have already
- 13. demonstrated their ability to do that.
14 It is these attributes that will help assure the
,( }
15 success of our plan.
16 At this point I would'like to thank the members of 17 the subcommittee for giving us the opportunity to present 18 this information and we would be happy to answer any 19- questions you might'have.
.20 DR. KERR: Are there questions?
-21 MR. CARROLL: I guess on the beach evacuation 22 issue.I have a little problem believing that -- what is it, 23 seven hours -- it takes seven hours and five minutes to
- 24 evacuate the beach. How come anybody comes to the beach if 25 it takes them that long to get there and get home? Is that Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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M 1 really a-realistic estimate?
, 2 .MR. FEIGENBAUM:- No, that's;Itot the normal-3 situation.
4 Mr. Callendrello, do you want to get up to the 3
5 microphone and address the scenario for the seven hour time 6 estimate.
7 MR. CALLENDRELLO: That seven hour and five minute 8 evacuation time is for the simultaneous evacuation of the 9 ' entire emergency planning zone on a summer weekend 10 condition.
11 The time for evacuating just the beach area,.
12 again, that's'everybody, day-trippers, weekend visitors, 13 seasonal visitors, and residents is less than that, although 14 I don't recall those numbers off the top of my head.
15 MR. CARROLL: Okay. So the seven hours and five 16 minutes is everybody in the EPZ?
17 MR. CALLENDRELLO: _ That's right, peak summer 18 population.
19 MR. CARROLL: The 10 mile EPZ?
20 MR. CALLENDRELLO: Yes.
21 MR. CARROLL: Okay, I was confused on that point.
22 I guess I would be interested at the full committee meeting 23- as to the time to take this precautionary action of 24 evacuating the beaches within two miles and nothing else.
25 I guess the other thing I'm curious about is, Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4886 9
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[ . 1' there.must be situations where the beach is loaded with L2' . people and a storm comes up or --
c
-3' MR. FEIGENBAUM: A nor' easter.
4' MR. CARROLL: What?
m 5 MR. FEIGENBAUM: They call them nor' easters.
6 MR. CARROLL: Yes, you do back there, I guess.
7 How quickly do people get off the beach in those 8 kind of conditions?
9' MR. FEIGENBAUM: Normally -- well, I used to live 10 in the Hampton area right near the beach.and'I've been on 11 .the beach when a nor' easter thunderstorm came up in the 12 summertime and I think people get out of there in 20 minutes 13 to two hours, depending ~on the particular situation and the
~ 14 amount of people on the beach. It is not -- it's fairly 15 unusual, in my experience of living in the area, of having
.16 long delays in getting off the beach.
-17 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
18 DR. KERR: Other questions?
19 (No response) 20 DR. KERR: Mr. Feigenbaum, this plant has been a 21 long time in gestation and it would seem to me that there 22 may have been personnel turnovers and going through
.23 bankruptcy morale problems. Are you confident that your 24 staff has weathered the storms up to now and will be capable 25 of operating this plant in a manner which will be conducive Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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, '1l to long-term safety?
2 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yes, I do absolutely, Mr. Kerr.
m 3 We've'had a fairly stable work force. You would think that 4 with all the ups and downs of Seabrook and-the bankruptcy 5' that there would have been a lot of moving around and 6- ' terminations and resignations and things like that; that has
-7 not occurred at Seabrook. As a matter of fact, our 8 attrition rate for' licensed operators is very, very low. I 9 think we've only lost two or three operators in the past 10 three or four years and it hasn't affected.our ability to 11 carry on our emergency response or our normal operations.
12 Anybody that was going to leave Seabrook would 13 have left in the years when it was stopped and slowed down 14 and the bankruptcy occurred. And we have right now a very
}
15- stable work force. And that is characteristic of New
-16 England. People in New England like to stay in New England 17 and the team is there for the duration at this point.
18 DR. KERR: Thank you.
19 Any further questions?
20 (No response) 21 DR. KERR: Thank you very much, Mr. Feigenbaum.
I 22 MR. CARROLL: I guess, Bill, consistent with my I 23 usual policy of asking the last question.
24 Can you tell us where the issue of the procedures 25- violation review by the Staff stands during the natural ,
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\-) 1 circulation testing? Have they come to some conclusions 2 about that?
3 MR FEIGENBAUM: Well, we did our own extensive 4 analysis and did submit that. I think the subcommittee has 5 copies of that.
6 MR. CARROLL: Yes.
7 MR. FEIGENBAUM: The NRC, of course -- and Mr.
8 Nerses could address this -- did comment with an augmented 9 inspection team for a period of time and interviewed people 10 and collected a lot of data and came back to the region to 11 analyze that.
12 I understand that the augmented inspection team 13 report is out today. I have not read it, although I 14 understand we are now in receipt of it.
}
15 So I'm a little bit at a disadvantage to summarize 16 what they said in their conclusions, but perhaps the NRC 17 would like to address that further.
18 We certainly, as I understand it, will be meeting 19 in a public forum in New Hampshire on September 6th to 20 discuss both our corrective action plan and the NRC's 21 augmented inspection team report. And then I understand we 22 will also be meeting the next day in region headquarters for 23 an enforcement conference. And I'm sure the NRC's views 24 will be made clear to us at those meetings.
25 MR. CARROLL: Okay.
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[, 159 1- DR. KERR: Further questions, comments?
2 (No response)
L 3 -DR. KERR: Thank you, Mr. Feigenbaum.
4 HR. NERSES: Dr. Kerr, I have a copy of.that 5
report,,I just got it, if you would like we will leave a
-6 copy.
7 MR. CARROLL: All right, I would like to read it.
8 DR. KERR: Thank you, Mr. Nerses.
9 And you're ready for your-presentation at this 10 point or whoever.
11 (Slides being shown. )
-12 _MR. TRAVERS: Good afternoon. Again, my name is 13 Bill Travers and I'm the Chief of the Emergency Preparedness 14- Branch in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
(
15 -This afternoon together with Mr. Richard Donovan 16 of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, I'm here to 17 present the subcommittee with a summary.of our evaluation or-18 our respective evaluations of the status of emergency 19 preparedness for the Seabrook Station.
20 We're going to change the agenda just slightly, if 21 you don't have an objection, and present the offsite summary 22 in advance of presenting the NRC Staff onsite summary.
23 DR. KERR: No problem.
24 MR. TRAVERS: And together with the NRC's onsite 25 summary I'll detail the Staff's overall --
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() 1 DR. KERR: You see what happens anytime we deviate 2 from our agenda, but other than that.
3 NR. TRAVERS: We have a plan that describes what 4 we' re supposed to do.
5 But before I introduce Mr. Donovan I thought I 6 would take just a minute of the subcommittee's time to 7 describe what FEMA and NRC's respective roles are, since we 8 both evaluate emergency preparedness it might be helpful as 9 background to get just a minute on what our roles are and 10 what we do and how the mechanism works.
11 NRC regulations specify the roles that FEMA and 12 NRC play in the evaluation for licensing of nuclear power 13 reactor emergency plans.
~h 14 FEF%!s role is to evaluate - primary role is to
[O 15 evaluate offsite emergency preparedness and to provide NRC 16 with findings on both the adequacy and the capability to 17 implement offsite emergency response plans. And again, 18 typically these plans are prepared by the state and local 19 governments. In this case one aspect or one portion of the 20 offsite plans has been prepared by the utility.
21 For its part NRC evaluates the adequacy of onsite 22 emergency preparedness including the imp *ementability of the 23 onsite plans. Our final responsibility is to assess and 24 conclude on the adequacy of overall emergency preparedness.
25 In that respect we consider the findings that we receive
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(~'i l ks' 1 from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and make an 2 overall conclusion on the status of emergency preparedness.
3 If I can, I would be happy to try to answer any 4 queetions you might have. It sounds like you got a fair 5 idea of how we work, but if I can answer any questions on 6 those roles respective to.NRC and FEMA participation I would 7 be glad to do it now before introducing Mr. Donovan.
8 DR. KERR: What happens if you disagree?
9
- MR. TRKVERS: We meet and work it out. Basically, 10 NRC has final responsibility of coming to a conclusion on 11 emergency response preparedness capability. But there 12 haven't been very many instances where we have come to any 13 dramatic loggerheads on these issues.
14 MR. CARROLL: Surely, you know, Bill, that
(')N q
15 reasonable people always can eventually come to an agreement 16 on things.
17 (Laughter) 18 MR. TRAVERS: If there aren't any further 19 questions, I'll introduce Mr. Donovan and I'll follow-up 20 after him.
21 (Slides being shown.)
22 MR. DONOVAN: Thank you, Bill, and welcome. I 23 appreciate the opportunity to be here. I hope I can 24 illustrate the process that FEMA followed in developing its 25 findings and determinations and bring you current with cur p)
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(-) 1 status. as of today and answer any questions that you may 2 have.
t 3 FEMA provides -- first of all, before I begin 4 FEMA's process. FEMA is organized into region and 5 headquarters. I am a regional employee. My responsibility 6 as a regional employee was to prepare the work products that 7 constituted the supporting documents for FEMA's finding.
8 The FEMA finding is made by FEMA headquarters. Sometimes 9 I'm referred to in documentation as the Regional Assistance 10 Committee Chairman as well. They're really two separate 11 distinct functions. FEMA works with a number of federal 12 agencies that is sometimes referred to as the Regional 13 Assistance Committee. Among those agencies are
[} 14 representatives from the field establishments of the Nuclear 15 Regulatory Commission; Environmental Protection Agency; the 16 U.S. Department of Energy; the Department of Transportation; 17 the Department of Interior; Department of Commerce; 18 Department of Defense, if appropriate. And we seek advice 19 and input from these agencies in assisting FEMA in doing its 20 job both in reviewing plans and reviewing preparedness.
21 So to say that I'm a Regional Assistance Committee 22 Chairman designates my role in working with those other 23 agencies and also understand the perspective of my role is 24 producing the work products to the agency.
25 As Mr. Travers outlined FEMA provides findings and
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l~ determinations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on 2 offsite planning which is plans, preparedness programs, 3 equipment, facilities, et cetera, and preparedness which is 4 their capability'to implement their plans.
5 FEMA has provided findings and determinations of 6 the Seabrook site to the NRC on December 14, 1988. FEMA' s 7 Seabrook findings and determinations covered the planning 8 and_ preparedness of the States of Maine and New Hampshire 9 and New Hampshire Yankee -- for the New Hampshire Yankee 10 offsite organization that prepared the plan referred to )
11 earlier in a presentation as the Seabrook Plan for.
'12 Massachusetts Communities. >
- 13. FEMA utilizes standards that are contained in the
{ }.
14 Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules. There are 16 planning ]
15 standards in those rules; 15 planning standards refer to j 16 offsite organizations and onsite organization, and there is
-17 one standard that refers to onsite organizations only. In ,
18 applying FEMA's review of plans, preparedness, and response 19 capabilities we utilized two documents, one of which has j
?
20 been out since 1980, sometimes referred to as NUREG-0654 i
21 which is the review and evaluation of plans and preparedness 22 of state and local governments. This document was used in 23 our review and evaluation of the State of Maine and the 24 State of New Hampshire's plans in preparedness.
~25 As an interim document and as a final document
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-( / 1 last fall it was a Supp. 1 to NUREG-0654 which applied to 2 those situations where state and local governments refused 3 to participate in the planning process; and therefore, 4 necessitating a situation for the utility to prepare an 5 offsite response plan.
6 These two documents were the basis for FEMA's 7 review. If you're familiar with these documents you know 8 they contain a number of review criteria, and in some cases 9 our agency has expanded upon those review criteria and other 10 REP documents, as we refer to them, or guidance memorandum.
11 As I indicated FEMA's findings and determinations 12 to the NRC are based on separate reviews and evaluations.
13 One of those is the review of the offsite plans and
['N 14 procedures.
%)
15 As Mr. Callendrello mentioned, the State of New 16 Hampshire's plan constitutes some 31 volumes. New Hampshire 17 Yankee offsite response plan constitutes between volumes and
-18 appendices a number between 12 and 15. The State of Maine 19 has three separate volumes for its plans. So we reviewed 20 all of those documents.
21 We reviewed the preparedness programs, that is 22 starting with programs such as Mr. Desmarais referred to you 23 on the VANS alerting system. It includes a public education 24 program. It includes the training programs. It includes 25 programs to brief and train the media on an annual basis.
-() Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
'165 q~s 4,,sf ' "1 To verify that the resources, equipment, 2- facilities, et cetera, staffing levels are specified in the 3 plans and procedures actually exist and are in the state of 4 condition and readiness as indicated by their plans. And we 5 verify that the staff has been trained.
-6 And finally, we do an evaluation of a preparedness
-7 exercise. In this case, well documented in Mr. Gram's-8 presentation,.the size, complexity and scope.
9 FEMA's findings and determinations documented and 10 supported as followed: finding in the record is the referred 11 to December 14, 1988 letter from our agency to the Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission. Supporting that document was a 13 number of other documents which it's my understanding that 14 you've been provided, but briefly I would>1ike to just go
-( }
15 over them in some minor fashion.
16 We have a findings and determinations document.
17 For each of the three principal offsite response 18 organizations this is a statement on whether their plans and 19 preparedness meet the intent of the 15 planning standards.
20 Someone asked earlier about maps and population, I 21 want to point out at least our document contains both the 22 permanent populations and the transient population peaks for
'23 summertime by community and one can deduce from the maps 24 there what's the population within the two, five and ten 25 mile areas for both wintertime and summertime.
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( J' 1 MR. CARROLL: I'll find that in the findings and 2 determination document?
3 MR. DONOVAN: Yes. There's several tables, we 4 have a --
5 MR. CARROLL: I guess my problem was, they didn't 6 seem to square with what I was finding in the ASLB decision.
7 MR. DONOVAN: Well, they are the populations that 8 are contained in the offsite plans. And the offsite plans 9 are updated annually, and our documents reference the latest 10 statement of those plans which in the SPMC was amendment 6 11 which is September of 1988. The New Hampshire plan was 12 updated in November of 1988. And the Maine plan was issued 13 in the spring of 1988. And, of course, in Maine's case f}
V 14 there's no population in the plume EPZ or 10 mile planning 15 zone. So the nurabers are as contained in those 16 organizations' plans and obviously if the numbers change we 17 look to those organization to inform us of the change in 18 populations. But they are the numbers that are contained in 19 their plans and procedures.
20 We have three documents that address the review of 21 the plans, and these are titled " Review and Evaluations."
22 of the State of Maine's ingestion pathway plan of the 23 Seabrook plan for Massachusetts communities; and of the New 24 Hampshire plan for Seabrook Station.
25 These documents contain not only a review against
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- 1 all of the appropriate criteria that fits to each of the 2 plans. And the determination of adequate or inadequate and 3 references to where you can find those issues dealt with and 4 the appropriate plans and procedures.
5 FEMA's process calls for FEMA to conduct a public 6 meeting as part of our findings and determination process.
7 We did conduct a public meeting with the participation of 8 New Hampshire Yankee, State of New Hampchire, and the State 9 of Maine. This meeting was conducted on July 2nd, 1988.
10 The platform of the meeting was to brief the 11 communities and public who chose to attend on the status of 12 planning and on the status of preparedness. And since this 13 meeting followed the approval exercise that was discussed
[^)
'w) 14 earlier, both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and I also 15 gave a preliminary finding on the status of the exercise at 16 that time.
17 The meeting was noticed through our process and a 18 number of newspapers a month in advance, a week in advance 19 of the public meeting. And as a result of that public 20 meeting we have published a report of that meeting as 21 required by our process.
22 With regards to the exercise Mr. Gram described 23 and as Mr. Travers pointed out, FEMA reviews offsito 24 preparedness. So we produce an exercise report based on the 25 offsite preparedness. It's a document that is rather large,
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1 because as Mr. Gram pointed out it was extremely. complex and
'2 . extremely complicated exercise and this contains evaluation 3 of the three offsite response organizations.
4 In addition, as Mr. Gram pointed out, we identify 15 exercise issues, in this case, classified as areas requiring
.6- corrective action. -We dealt with the offsite participants 7- to schedule milestones and commitments for corrective 8 ' actions and items for corrective actions. So we-have a
'9 report giving you the status of those corrective actions.
10 As has been mentioned by several of the licensee 11- spokesmen today, most of the corrective actions are now 12 complete, as indicated. However, this report because it 13 contains the date of 12-88 still shows a number of them 14 open.-
(}
15 MR. CARROLL: A minor suggestion on your reports.
16 I guess I've looked at the ones on Seabrook and a couple of 117 other plants and I guess what you call " review and 18 evaluation" of emergency response plans is typically a big 19 thick guy. And I guess I'm used to going into it and 20 reading an executive summary that tells me what the problems l
21- are. Instead, you have a habit of burying a chart way in 22 the back of the book that lists each element and whether 23 it's acceptable or not acceptable.
24 I guess to the caussi readsr you would make life 25 easier i.f some place up front you would say, hey, everything Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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2- I1 is great except.
2< MR. DONOVAN: I'll accept your advice. Our 3' process for preparing our report is, of course,.in order to 4 'be uniform between the regions we have an outline to follow.
5- The reg j <.ns are expected to maintain --
6 MR. CARROLL: You don't have to tell me all thic.
7 (Laughter) 1.
8 MR. DONOVAN: I just wanted to point out,-we're 9 expected to maintain a status of each item indicated by the 10 . review criteria-on a constant basis and when-we publish a 11 report or update a report, of course, that's obviously done 12 on a constant basis.
'13 In addition to the issues already discussed, as 14 indicated by several of the spokespersons, specifically
}
15 'mostly Mr. Stroup in his presentation on the New Hampshire 16 Yankee offsite response organization, FEMA reviewed the plan 17 and preparedness and the exercise from the perspective that 18 the State of Massachusetts would delegate the legal 19 authority and legal authority only to the New Hampshire 20 Yankee offsite response organization to implement the plan.
21 As you know, the other assumptions contained in 22 the NRC rule can't cross over into whether state or local 23 governments commit resources on their own. From our 24 perspective we reviewed the plan as a stand-alone plan as it 25 was prepared, that it was capable of implementing all Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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/^ 's
() 1- actions necessary to protect the public health and safety.
2 In summary, with regard to FEMA's findings, it's 3 been indicated earlier, with regard to the State of Maine 4 who has only ingestion pathway responsibilities we found 5 their plans adequate to protect the public health and safety 6 of the public living in the Seabrook ingestion pathway.
7 The State of New Hampshire's portion of the alert 8 notification system is operational. As someone has 9 indicated earlier, the system is installed, the State of New 10 Hampshire has to inform us when it's operational. We will 11 then consider the plans and preparedness for the citizens of 12 the State of New Hampshire to be adequate.
13 A similar statement for the New Hampshire Yankee 14 organization, when 11:30 or thereabout arrives I'm sure the
(^)N 15 New Hampshire Yankee organization will notify FEMA that 16 their system is operational and manned as indicated in their 17 plans and procedures. Following notification from both 18 State of New Hampshire and New Hampshire Yankee organization l
19 and our verification of these issues we will then prepare an 20 updated finding and deliver it to the Nuclear Regulatory 21 Commission so indicating that two conditions illustrated in 22 our December '88 finding have now been met and that planning 23 and preparedness is adequate for all the citizens involved 24 at the Seabrook site from all the organizations.
25 I'll be happy to entertain any questions.
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) 1 DR. KERR: Mr. Bender.
2 MR. BENDER: ,Is 0654 the main basis for evaluating 3 the plans?
4 MR. DONOVAN: 0654 has 16 planning standards of 5 which 15 apply to offsite organizations. Under each of 6 those planning standards are review criteria, some of which 7 apply to plans; some of which apply to other documents other 8 than plans. But, yes, it is the main basis that we use to 9 review a plan.
10 In some cases such as the alert notification 11' system we have published expansion of the review criteria in 12 other REP documents.
13 Another example is the public education documents.
14 In this case both the State of New Hampshire and New 15 Hampshire Yankee have chosen to utilize a calendar format to 16 distribute to the citizens on an annual basis, emergency 17 plan information. So we have a separate proceduralized 18 document. And again, those reviews are contained in our 19 review and evaluation document as an appendices because it's 20 a 51 step structured review of a document to see that it 21 provides in a meaningful and readable and organized fashion 22 information that the public can read to become informed.
23 MR. BENDER: When you evaluate the plan, does it 24 include an examination of the technical competence of the 25 organization that is responsible for implementing the plan?
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- 1' .MR. DONOVAN
- We look at two aspects to' determine 2 competence. First of all, from FEMA's perspective an 3 exercise is'a. test of the plan, is a test of the ability of.
4 the organization'to implement'the plan, and in doing so
- 5. they're demonstrating their competence.
6 We review their training program from two aspects:
J 7- one, we review the modules, as one gentleman referred to, t
8 but the lesson plans'that are set up for each category of l'
9 . emergency responders identified in the plan and we look to 10' -that to see that it accurately covers the functions and 11 responsibilities assigned to that person. We look to the 12 training results.
13 In this case as in every case we ask~all offsite 14 response organizations to report to us on an annual basis.
{
15 A' number of what I call " preparedness program initiatives."
'16 One of those issues is training of emergency responders.
17 'And.they. report to us, in this case, New Hampshire Yankee 18 identified first, second, and third shift, how many people 19 have been trained and matriculated by-classes. Likewise, we 20 got a similar documentation from the State of New Hampshire.
21 So we get at least three separate levels of 22 verification. When we do an exercise, in some cases, some 23 of the functions are -- because of the type of function, for 24- example, actually stopping traffic we don't -- as you know, 25 the NRC rules contains a provision, we shall not impede upon h Heritage Reporting (202) 628-4888 Corporation
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(_) 1 a normal public activity, so we don't ask traffic control to 2 be established. .
3 But we interview the people t;. see that they're 4 knowledgeable of the procedures and they're knowledgeable of 5 the other issues that they're responsible for, and that they 6 have the plans, procedures, and equipment necessary to 7 implement their function.
8 MR. BENDER: Well, how about the front-end, the 9 accident assessment side of the picture, where is that 10 responsibility assigned and who evaluates that skill?
11 MR. DONOVAN: We evaluate the offsite response 12 organization's capability to assess an accident. Obviously, 13 each plan delegates those responsibilities to individuals
(~N 14 and outline those responsibilities in procedures.
\.-]
15 So we review the procedures as a static review.
16 We look to see that the procedures address the criteria that 17 EPA and NRC have identified in their documents with regard 18 to either protective actions driven by plant status issues 19 or protective actions driven by probable dose assessments 20 from radiological releases or the threat of radiological 21 releases.
22 In an exercise mode, obviously, from FEMA's 23 perspective as this particular exercise dealt with and most 24 exercises dealt with, we look to see that the scenario 25 challenges the accident assessment staff two aspects. One, (f )j Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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M ~1I to.me the principal of federal regulations ~following Three 2 Mile Island, will remove response to the situation where we 3 anticipate events. -We don't wait for events to occur.
4 4 So the NRC regulations and the NRC criteria.that
^
5 was discussed earlier, and someone passed out a' chart for
>6 you that linked what I call emergency action levels to 7 emergency classification levels, and to preplanned or pre-8 thought protective action recommendations or protective actions,-we look to see that the scenario tests that
~
9 10 decision, assessment, implementation process.
11 We also look to see that a scenario provides an
- 12. opportunity'to see if the decisions made on plant status can 13 be verified or. tested by actual dose assessment.
1('N 14 In this particular exercise both major response x) 15 organizations during what I call the emergency phase, the 16' few hours following a declaration of an emergency, were 17 faced with the situation not only implementing protective
-18 actions based on plant status, implementing precautionary 19 protective actions based on ECL status, but they're also 20 faced with verifying whether releases that they were 21 measuring in the environment and measuring through plant 22 status parameters provided by the onsite folks produced dose 23 assessments that caused them to revise their protective 24 action decisions.
25 In this case both the State of New Hampshire and
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1 New Hampshire Yankee changed their protective action 2 decisions based on their assessment of radiological material 3 that they were able to simulate in the exercise through the 4 use of controllers with field teams and through the use of 5 plant status parameter information was provided through the 6 accident assessment staff to use in dose codes, et cetera.
7 So we t2st all components. In this particular 8 case they not only had to test that issue for the emergency 9 phase, as Mr. Gram indicated, we went on to recover and 10 reentry where we skipped, to me, an important perspective, 11 that's the ingestion pathway issue. What's the level of 12 deposition of materials on the ground? This is affected 13 food chain and the water chain. What actions did the states 14 need to take to implement protective actions and advise the 15 public. We tested that.
16 We also presented a situation with them with some 17 hot spots on the ground, could we let people back in. If 18 so, at what time do we need to implement decontamination 19 campaigns or access control issues. So they had to test all 20 three areas.
21 The latter two areas, specifically, put them 22 dealing with measurements of radioactivity in the 23 environment. We had drills at all three labs; the two state 24 labs, Maine and New Hampshire. And part of our drill 25 component covered a lab that New Hampshire Yankee has for
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2: And so we looked at food samples, air samples, 3 particular filter samples, ground. shine numbers, and related l 4 dose estimates, and all those aspects were covered in our 5 evaluation.
MR.' BENDER:
6 Most of the things you described are 7 post-accident circumstances.
8 MR. DONOVAN: Not necessarily. The emergency 9 phase was right in.the middle of the emergency. I mean, it 10 was the -- the exercise report I think-outlines it well, if 11 .you look at objectives 10 and 11 for both New Hampshire 12 Yankee offsite response organization and the State of New 13 Hampshire, you'll see where they had to deal with issues 14 based on dose assessment, measuring real-time releases
-( )
15 through the-use of controllers and scenario information, and 16 assessing the impact of those releases in terms of projected 17 doses both for whole body and thyroid exposure, and 18 developing recommendations and decision-makers being 19 briefed. And in the case of New Hampshire Yankee offsite 20 response organization having to deal with a FEMA contrcl 21 cell that represented a non participating governments, to 22 brief the FEMA co:strol cell on a rationale for this new 23- protective action recommendation and walk them through to 24 the point that they gave --
25 MR. BENDER: Let me just try an example.
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_ 1 One of the things that's listed in this 20 items 2 is a double-ended pipe break, how do you decide from that 3 point what the threat is of a radioactive release? Where is 4 -the responsibility for doing that lie?
5 MR. DONOVAN: That's an onsite issue and I would i
6 defer to the NRC. The offsite organizations by design need 7 to understand the principles behind plant status and plant.
8 prognosis driven protective action recommendations. It is 9 not their role to assess what's going on inside a reactor or 10 a component of a reactor safety system, that's an onsite 11 responsibility. And FEMA's evaluation would not enter into 12 that arena.
13 Again, we deal with offsite issues. If the
(')
\_/
14 offsite organizations didn't understand --
15 MR. BENDER: That's a line of demarcation between 16 FEMA and the NRC.
17 MR. DONOVAN: Yes, sir.
18 MR. BENDER: Where does the -- how does the NRC 19 deal with that side of it?
20 MR. TRAVERS: Let me make sure I understand your 21 question. Is it who is responsible for --
22 MR. BENDER: You've had this alert that says we 23 had a double-ended pipe break, now I want to come to a 24 position that says, this is an emergency which might involve 25 release of radioactive materials. Where is the --
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. 1 MR. TRAVERS: That's the onsite --
2 MR. BENDER:- -- assessment of.the capability to,do o .
3 that --
4 MR. TRAVERS: Oh, assessment of the --
l5 MR. BENDER: -- who's evaluating whether'the
.6- -licensee has.the skill'to understand the progression of the 7 accident from that stage?
L 8 MR. TRAVERS: That's.an assessment that's' carried
'9' out in connection with our review, onsite review of the '
10- . licensee. emergency preparedness capability. It's done on a-11 number ofcfronts, similar to what Mr. Donovan,just 12 mentioned, it's'done in'looking.at their planning, their 13 emergency classification scheme, for example. It's done-in 14 connection with evaluating'their conduct during the
])
15 exercise. And the exercise is designed to challenge that 16 kind of decision-making responsibility.
17 So it's something that's done in connection with 18 our review of planning and their capability to implement the 19 plan as well.
20 MR. BENDER: Where would I see that in the report?
21 MR. TRAVERS: You would see it in the inspection 22 report on the full participation exercise that discusses 23- licensee success or failure in connection with coping with 24 the accident and carrying out, implementing their emergency 251 plan.
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179 111 MR. BENDER: . Thank you.
l L, :2; 'DR. KERR: .Other questions?
y D 3 (No response) 4- DR. .KERR:. Thank you, Mr. Donovan.
- MR. DONOVAN: Thank you.
6 ~ (Slides being shown.)
7' MR. TRAVERS: The objectives of my presentation n.
p 8- 'are to. provide'the subcommittee with an overview of a number.
- 9. of' subjects related to our onsite review of the Seabrook-10 Station emergency preparedness plan and our.overall
- .11; . conclusion on the. status of emergency preparedness overall.
12 I'd like to touch on the regulations and' guidance
-13 that we use in governing our reviews; the scope of our f(~ ' 14 ' onsite reviews; the status of both onsite'and offsite
.15 emergency-preparedness. Ultimately, our EP conclusions.
16 And I'd like to touch -on some of the future activities that-
- 17. we see coming up.
18 The regulations and guidance which have governed 19 our NRC Staff review include Section 13.3 of the Emergency 20 Preparedness or rather the Emergency Preparedness Standard 21 Review Plan in NUREG-0800, and that review stems from our 22 regulations at 10 CFR 50.47 and in Appendix E. 10 CFR 23 50.47, as you've already heard, contains 16 planning 24 standards which are applicable to onsite and/or offsite 25 aspects of emergency response planning.
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(/ 1 Several examples of the kinds of things that are 2 contained in those 16 planning standards include things like 3 designation of emergency response organizations and 4 specification of specific responsibilities within those 5 organizations; the establishment of radiological monitoring 6 capabilities; the establishment of protective action 7 strategies, both for onsite workers and for the public in 8 the 10 mile EPZ.
9 You've already heard about NUREG-0654 and its 10 supplement. The only difference between 0654 and Supplement 11 1 being that the guidance in Supplement 1 was amended to 12 recognize that in some instances the licensee might be 13 responsible for preparing certain aspects of offsite
(~\ 14 . planning.
LJ 15 The scope of the NRC Staff review includes our 16 reviews of onsite plans. A number of inspection reports 17 that have been conducted through the years and our onsite i
18 and offsite or rather our onsite and FEMA's offsite exercise 19 evaluations.
20 A number of safety evaluation reports which 21 document our findings with regard to emergency plan reviews 22 have been published starting in March of '83 and running as 23 recently as July of 1989, and I believe the subcommittee has 24 been provided with each of these safety evaluation reports.
25 There have been 14 inspections since 1985 ;
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(-) 1 including assessment of organization and a number of things 2 that are presented on this slide. One of the more 3 substantial inspections that we conduct in a pre-licensing 4 mode is the conduct of an emergency preparedness appraisal 5 which generally runs a couple of weeks and involves a team 6 of from five to seven people.
7 And basically what we're looking for in these 8 appraisals is an assessment of the capabilities of the 9 licensee to implement the onsite plan. It includes, 10 applicable to a question that was raised earlier, interviews 11 with the key individuals responsible for responding to 12 emergencies in the onsite organization. So there's an 13 interchange that's carried on to assess the knowledge that
.(~)
%J 14 these key individuals have for actually implementing the 15 plan in the event of an emergency 16 DR. KERR: Who does the NRC Staff have who can 17 interpret those responses?
18 MR. TRAVERS: We have inspection personnel in all 19 five regions who are capable of doing that. And on occasion 20 they're assisted by people in my organization as well.
21 DR. KERR: So this requires somebody that has had 22 a great deal of experience with severe accidents and have 23 some idea of how to respond?
24 MR. TRAVERS: I don't think -- well, it requires a 25 number of different types of people, but someone who has had
() Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
f.
182 1 a lot of experience with emergency preparedness, the p 2 development.and' implementation of emergency classification p
3 schemes, some operations experience is helpful, those kinds 4 of things. Severe accidents per se, we have some people who 5 have some degree of experience in that area. But often 6' times we'll rely on assistance from-branches within other 7 organizations, either in the regions or in headquarters.
8- There have been three exercises and they've 9 already been mentioned. Two of which involve some aspects 10 of offsite response; and one of them was the June 1988 full 11 participation exercise that's already been mentioned.
12- With regard to our overall EP conclusions the 13 scope of our review also includes necessarily, as I
{} 14 mentioned earlier, FEMA. findings on the capabilities to --
15 well, on the adequacy of the offsite plans and the 16 capabilities of the offsite organizations to implement those 17 plans.
18 Regarding the status of onsite emergency 19 preparedness we initially concluded, the NRC Staff did in 20 May of 1986, that the adequacy of the onsite program had 21 been verified and that was documented in a safety evaluation 22 report and has been recently reverified in subsequent 23 reports. The most recent one which has been provided to the 24 subcommittee dated July 27, 1989.
25 Earlier we had verified in a safety evaluation Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
h 183 L ;(~i
-s/- l' report, Supplement 8, that the onsite plan met the 2 requirements for fuel loading and low power operations 3 consistent with the amended rule dated October 1988.
4 Again, our review or the findings of our reviews 5 are based on the reviews of the technical plans, the 6~ emergency plans, inspection, as well as exercise 7 evaluations.
8 I'm not going to repeat what Mr. Donovan said, but 9 I did. mention that one of the things that we take into 10 consideration in making our overall conclusion is the 11 findings that have been provided by FEMA, and you've just 12- heard a summary from Mr. Donovan of what we have received-l13 - from FEMA in that regard.
14 f{} The NRC Staff EP conclusions then are that onsite 15- emergency plans continue to provide an adequate planning 16 basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency 17 preparedness. And with regard to offsite emergency plans 18 that adequacy will be complete upon implementation of VANS 19 and PANS. These again,'the findings that have been provided 20 by FEMA.
21 And our overall summary is that the state of L
22 onsite and offsite' emergency preparedness is adequate to 23 provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective 24 measures can and will be taken in the event of a 25 radiological emergency at Seabrook.
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., 1- This; finding essentially confirms our view that.
2 the emergency planning aspects of the Seabrook licensing
- 3 application:are adequate-to support a full power; license and 4 full power operation.
5 The only. caveat to this, again, is the
- 6. . verification of.the-adequacy of the VANS and PANS systems 7 that you've.been hearing about during the' course.of'the day.
'8 With regard to future activities then, 9 verificat'on i of VANS and PANS, review by NRC Staff of the 10- final FEMA findings that'will be provided subsequent to 11 their verification of these items.
12 We expect to evaluate the September 1989 licensee 13 only EP exercise.
(}.14- I'should probably note though that recently, 15 Friday to be exact, we received an exemption request from 16 the licensee for that exercise. We're currently evaluating 17 'that exemption request; we haven't made any judgment on it 18 to date.
19 MR. CARROLL: What was their basis for requesting 20 an exemption?
1 21 MR. TRAVERS: There are a number of things that 22 ' bear on their exemption request. The basis is that the rule 23 which requires this one year exercise or the exercise one l' 24 year prior to receipt of a full power operating license, 25 envisions in the normal mode, a turnover from construction O e ieeee egerei , cereeratie-(202) 628-4888 E
185 7
(- 1- related activities.to operational.- Normally within'12 to'18 2 months or so.
3 And the argument is that, at Seabrook this is a 4 far different case and, in fact,.the operational staff.has 5 been in place for a number of years, has participated in L 6 -three exercises already of which they've received passing 7 grades, certainly, from both NRC and FEMA.
8 MR. CARROLL: But isn't it true for an operating i 9 plant an annual exercise is a requirement?
10 MR.' TRAVERS: That's correct. Annual exercises or-11 annual onsite exercises continue to be the requirement, 12 biannually -- biennial exercises with participation of 13 offsite authorities are also a requirement.
./ 14 MR.' CARROLL: Yes.
15 MR. TRAVERS: So there's a lot of information for 16 us to digest and we're looking at it expeditiously given the 17 time frame over which they now plan to conduct the onsite 18 exercise in September.
19 We also expect to evaluate the Board's final 20 concluding decisions on Seabrook emergency preparedness.
21 And we'll prepare a final supplement to our safety 22 evaluation reports to verify our, if applicable, our onsite 23' and offsite conclusions.
- 24. One thing that I should point out with regard to 25 future activities is that, the items that I've listed on the O rie 9- a rorei=9 cereer tio-(202) 628-4888 u _ _ _--. -- ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
186 1 slide really bear on our licensing activities. And, of 2' course, in addition to those, we've just talked about the 3 role of our continuing regulatory oversight, both NRC's and 4 FEMA' s . It comes in the form of exercises; it comes in the 5 . form of continuing reviews of emergency plan revisions as 6 they.are made, if they are made. Continued inspections to 7 assess the capability to implement those plans.
8 So it's really -- while we've been focused today 9 on the licensing aspects of the Seabrook emergency 10 preparedness situation there is certainly in terms of future 11 activities a continuing mode that both NRC and FEMA will be
.12 in to continue-to assess the capabilities, the adequacy of 13 plans and the capabilities of both the onsite and offsite
'14 organizations.
{
15 And if I can answer any further questions, I would 16 be glad to try.
17 DR. KERR: Are there questions?
18 MR. CARROLL: A comment at least. I guess I'm 19 still trying to get calibrated as to the extent of the 20 problem at Seabrook.
21 Bill, could you or could New Hampshire Yankee or 22 somebody for the full committee meeting prepare something 23 comparing the population both permanent and transient as a 24 function of distance in the EPZ --
25 HR. TRAVERS: Oh, sure.
~
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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, T
(_) 1 MR. CARROLL: --
or sector or something.
2 MR. TRAVERS: Yes, we can do that.
3 MR. CARnOLL: And relate it the best sites around
'4 and the worse sites that are already licensed.
5 MR. TRAVERS: Of course, we don't have best and 6 worse sites classified that way.
7 MR. CARROLL: I know.
8 MR. TRAVERS: But I understand what you want.
9 MR. CARROLL: Off the top of your head, is this 10 worse than the worse sites in terms of the number of people 11 that have to be moved?
12 MR. TRAVERS: In terms of population density, 13 clearly, it's not -- there are sites that contain much more 14 dense populations than Seabrook.
~}
15 MR. CARROLL: Within two miles, say?
16 MR. TRAVERS: Sure. Zion, what else, Indian 17 Point.
18 So as I mentioned earlier, the considerations that 19 have gone into emergency planning at Seabrook, while in some 20 cases there may be unique aspects associated with them, 21 they're generally the same kinds of considerations that go 22 into and need to be resolved, worked out in terms of 23 preplanning for other sites as well.
24 Sometimes they're more difficult elsewhere and in 25 cases I'm sure they've been, you know, a little bit more
() Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 I
188 A ~"
[(_). 1 difficult, a relative scale here.
2 DR. KERR: Other questions?
3 Mr. Bender.
4 MR. . BENDER: I'd like to understand a little 5' better how.you establish the accident scenarios .for these 6 , emergency response tests. Do you give those to the 7 licensee? What happens? How do they get created?
i~
'8L MR. TRAVERS: The licensees develop them or have
!. ~
9- them developed for their specific plant. The design -- the 10 overall objective, of course, is to challenge the emergency 11 response. organizations, to train them if it's an ongoing 12 kind of thing,' or allow the utility or the -- well, the .
t
.13 utility or the offsite organizations to assess themselves.
14 It's a big part of emergency exercise is the continuing 15 .self-assessment that goes along with identifying strengths 16 and; weaknesses in a program and going about fixing or 17 fostering the strengths.
18 But the scenarios, I've never prepared one, but 19 the scenarios-are generally prepared'by utilities, in many 20 cases, with support from their operations staff so that they 21 have a good basis in> reality-for that specific plant. So 22 that they' re not -- so that they' re providing a challenge 23 that can be relatable to the people who are involved in the
-24 exercise.
12 5 MR. BENDER: Do you see the scenarios that are Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 j; .
189 ;
!j v .{
5(_)
- 1- -prescribed in advance?
2 MR. TRAVERS: Yes. They're generally submitted j i -
3 for NRC review.' l 4' MR. CARROLL: But an important point, Bill,-is 5' typically the scenario people work-off by themselves and do 6' not share this with the people that are going to be players 7- in the exercise.
8 MR. TRAVERS: Yes. When I mentioned operation E" 9 . input --
10 MR. CARROLL: Those guys used to work for me and-11L they would never tell me what it was going to be about even 12 though I. threatened not to give them a pay raise next year.
13 (Laughter)
'(] 14 MR. TRAVERS: Yes.
V 15 MR. REIS: That's essentially the point.
16 MR. TRAVERS: Oh. That's obviously a very 17 important point.
18- DR. KERR: Are there further questions?
-19 (No response) 20 DR. KERR: Mr. Travers, in this August 17th letter 21 to Public Service Company of New Hampshire which Mr. Nerses 22 was kind enough to let us have, I note in one of the 23 sentences and the letter is signed by Mr. Rosa, the 24 statement that: "We remain concerned with the lack of action 25 by managers in the control room during the five minutes of l
h Heritage Reporting (202) 628-4888 Corporation
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- n. --
, ..Is) 11 testferiteria and was exceeded, particularly since this f
.2 condition was identified to licensee management by an NRC 3' . representative."
4 This leads me to a concern I have, it may not be a 5 serious one, suppose that a serious accident is on the way 6 and there certainly will be one or more'NRC representatives 7 present'in the control room, is it expected that they.will 8 give advice to a licensee personnel as to how the emergency 9 actions will be formulated and carried out?
.10 MR. TRAVERS: It's expected that generally they-11 would not. . But maybe I haven't let you finish. But if 12 you're asking whether, if an NRC employee were in the 13 control room or anywhere else and noted something of
(~}- 14 significance that could influence the outcome of an accident
. v 15 or the mitigation strategy being employed, I think -- I've 1 16 never gotten any particular guidance on this, but I think 17 what we would have is a clear duty to bring that to the 18 attention of the people who are primarily responsible at the
.19 utility, the licensed operators or whoever is in charge of 20 responding to the accident.
21 DR. KERR: Well, I hope you never do have to make 22 that decision, but if you -- since sometime you may, it
-23 seems to me the organization ought to give that some thought 24 for a number of reasons. In the first place, it would 25 appear to me that a good operating organization would have
-O aerie 9e aegerti e cereer tie-(202) 628-4888
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L /s_) 1 people veryLhighly qualified to make decisions and very well 2 familiar with the plant. And that.an NRC representative, 3 even if he were someone who had been~a resident at the plant E 4 might.not have nearly that background.
5- And also, conditions being what they are, I think 6 uit's difficult for a licensee, maybe not in an emergency but:
'7 in a normal situation, to take an NRC comment as a 8; recommendation. It can appear much more nearly like an 9 order.
10' And.if I were the NRC I wouldn't want to be
~
11 saddled with that responsibility. It concerns me -- this is
- 12. -a concern of mine which I hope never has to be confirmed or 13- denied,-because I hope we don't have no more serious
('Y 14 accidents. But I see it happening enough -- often enough in
\_/
15 normal operation nowadays that I wonder if it would happen 16 in an emergency situation.
17 This is not a question, I guess, it is a concern.
18 MR. TRAVERS: Well, I mentioned guidance earlier, 19 we do have guidance, as a matter of fact, that speaks to 20 NRC's role during the course of an emergency and that is to 21 monitor licensee performance, not to take over, recognizing 22 that that's not our role; that the licensees have primary 23 responsibility for reacting and mitigating any consequences 24 from an accident.
25 That's our primary role. And you're right, Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
g 192 c <%
I ds l- 1 there's a balance though that'-- a line that people walk 2 when they're'in the control room or the incident response K
3 center,-when they're interacting with people who are there 4 and dealing with an accident.
5 lHR. NERSES: Dr. Kerr, could I-ask a clarification 6 of the statement you made. Are you indicating that if an 7 NRC person.was in the control room and was aware that a test 8- criterion was beingfexceeded, that he should not make a-9 comment?
10 DR. KERR: I am simply saying - giving this as another example of situations in which it seems to me NRC 12 people.are becoming more than observers. Whether this is.
13 good or bad, I'm not sure yet. I'm just a little concerned,
- 14 however,. because it appears to me from a number'of things 15; that I see happening that NRC with all good intentions, I 16 think, is moving'more and more from what I would call a 17 regulatory mode to a managerial mode, and it bothers me a 18 little.
19 .I may be misinterpreting what's going on; I hope I 20 am. But I see it in a number of -- I see things in a number 21 of situations which cause me some concern. I may be 22 misplaced.
23 MR. NERSES: In this instance, you unoerstcod that 24 the person was just asking a question about something that 25 he knew about which was a criterion that had been exceeded.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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193
'\
(.,/ 1 And in the act of asking it you're saying that perhaps i
2 that's getting to be misinterpreted as a role that NRC is 3 taking?
4 DR. KERR: To me it is an example of what I would 5 call an active role by NRC people in what's going on during i 6 a test. Whether this is intentional or unintentional, 7 whether it's good or bad, I retain an open mind; I just 8 observed it.
9 MR. NERSES: Thank you.
10 DR. KERR: Mr. Feigenbaum, maybe I can ask you an 11 embarrassing question: suppose an NRC representative in a
-12 serious emergency suggested you do something which was 13 against your better judgment; what would you or what would 14 you want your employee to do under those circumstances?
{
15 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Well, we have the ultimate 16 . responsibility; we're the licensee and we hope the license 17 and we're responsible for operating the plant.
18 I think in a case like that we would explain to 19 the NRC person, resident inspector, why we felt that his 20 recommendation was inappropriate and we would continue to 21 function in accordance with our operating procedures.
22 If the NRC person, inspector, cared to raise it 23 higher with our management --
24 DR. KERR: No, I'm talking about an emergency 25 situation -- and again, let's hope they don't happen -- but li
[) Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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g k . , 194 7
(,- 1. if.--
2 MR..FEIGENBAUM: We do not blindly follow an
- 3. NRC --
4 1MR. KERR: If they occur they are very likely to 5 get one into a situation which has not been covered by u
6 emergency procedures or any other procedures because we've 7 already thought of those things. And it's not those that 8 I'm concerned about; it's those areas in which one's 9 judgment and' perception and intuition has to come into play.
- 10. MR. FEIGENBAUM: Our operators are trained to use 11 their judgment and if they felt that they were doing 12 something that.was inappropriate and might endanger the 13- safety of the public or damage major equipment or endanger
( 14 lives, they would not follow it; and that would be the
- 15. policy of the company. If it was inappropriate --
16 DR. KERR: Do you think your operating personnel 17 .are aware of this as the company policy?
18 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Yes, I think they are.
19 In the instance that we're talking about here I 20 think what upset the NRC --
21 DR. KERR: Please don't, I was using this as just 22 a very --
23 MR. FEIGENBAUM: I just wanted to explain that I 24- think what happened here in this particular case, and I 25 think it might help enlighten the situation a little bit is O rit ee eerei-e cerrer eie-(202) 628-4888
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195
(-c 1 that, the NRC residents inspectors in the control room at 2 the time didn't feel like they were getting an appropriate 3 response; that they were being somewhat ignored, if you 4 will. In fact, they weren't being ignored, but that was the 5 perception that they had, and there wasn't adequate feedback 6 to the NRC which I think there should always be in an 7 instance where an NRC person brings something to our 8 attention that may be a deviation from our procedure. There 9 should be an adequate response as to why we are proceeding 10 the way we are proceeding. I think that's appropriate and 11 right.
12 DR. KERR: Thank you.
13 MR. CARROLL: Is it always practical, though, in a 14 four minute transient where you're trying to recover you
}
15 don't have a lot of time to go into a long winded 16 explanation.
17 MR. TRAVERS: If I can just add another sentence.
18 One of the things that NRC inspectors are trained on and 19 instructed on in the course of their resident inspector 20 qualifications is that they don't do things like go into the 21 control room and give directives to licensed operators.
22 So if there's a grey line here and you're 23 concerned, it's probably right to be concerned. But one of 24 the things, I don't know that I've ever run into a 25 situation, maybe the others have, at least knowledge of an i Heritage Reporting Corporation l (202) 628-4888
196 1nm) ~ 1 NRC inspector in the-control room telling a' licensed g -g ww-
-2 operator that-they've got to do something.
- 3 MR. CARROLL
- It's a fine line.
1_
4- DR. KERR: Does that' conclude NRC's presentation?
5 MR.-TRAVERS: Yes, it does.
g 6 DR..KERR: Do you have any further comments?
7 MR. NERSES: At this moment, Dr. Kerr, that 8 concludes our presentation.
h, 9 DR. KERR:' Okay. I want to thank the Staff for a L 10 Every well organized presentation and response to our ill- questions.even in some cases in which they may not have been 12 all together' understandable.
13 - Does the licensee or do the licensee 14 representatives have any further comments?
15- Mr. Feigenbaum.
16f MR. FEIGENBAUM: I have one to help elaborate on a 17 question that Mr. Carroll asked regarding the onsite 18' exercise and the exemption request that we recently made.
19 Mr. Travers did explain that we have made the 20 transition from construction to operations over a three and 21 a half year period and we've drilled the onsite a number of f
12 2 -times, not only in graded exercise but in other drills as p 23' we31.
24- One of the key reasons which Mr. Travers didn't 25 mention is the reason that we're requesting this exemption l
l
( Beritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
I-197 1 for the onsite, the annual onsite this year, is the fact 2 that we get into a situation where there is the possibility 3 of an endless loop of litigation on these exercises.
4 We held a qualifying onsite/offsite exercise in 5 June of 1988, this is the one that's been extensively 6 litigated in Massachusetts, in Boston over a many month 7 period, and we have to run another one within two years.
8 Now, we could get into a situation if we ran an 9 exercise in September of 1989, next month, and the 10 Massachusetts Attorney General has already informed us that 11 he intends to try to litigate that exercise. That exercise 12 when it was held and the report came out and litigated could 13 extend to the point where we would have to invalidate the 14 two year onsite/offsite exercise. So we would be in an
(}
15 endless loop, so to speak, because of the NRC regulations.
16 So we pointed that out to the Commission and asked 17 them for the exemption from the requirement to hold the 18 exercise. We may very well go ahead and hold a drill in 19 September of 1989, but we're asking for an exemption from 20 the requirement.
21 MR. CARROLL: I sort of guessed that was the case.
22 However, if you do a perfect exercise there wouldn't be a
.23 basis for litigation.
24 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Well, that's not been our 25 experience.
() Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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l' 198 h es '
- N [ 1. ;(Laughter)
F- .j b 2 .MR.'FEIGENBAUM: No,.all kidding aside, an. i n .
.' 3 intervening party can make a contention - . write a good H
.4 contention that can be admitted for litigation and doesn't
? 5__ necessarily:have to be true, but it has to be well written.
6- And that's been our experience. i
'7 MR '. CARROLL: I know the problem well. ,
(
'8 DR. KERR: Any further comments? i
, 9 -(No response) l 10 MR. FEIGENBAUM: Thank you. I
'11 DR. KERR: Well, again, thank you, gentlemen,.and j i
12- your staff for your presentation today.
13 That ends the part of the meeting that needs to be l 14 recorded..
.15 (Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the meeting was !
I 16 adjourned.) i l
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l( f 1 CERTIFICATE 2
3 'This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter-5 of: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON-REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 6 ,. Name-MEETING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEABROOK L 7 8 Docket Number:
9 Place: Bethesda, Maryland 10 Date:
11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of ths United States Nuclear t
13 ReTulatory Commission taken stenographically by me and,
)' 14 thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the 15 direction of the court reporting company, and-that the 16 transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing 17 proceedings.
18 /s/ DA L A 19 (Signature typed) : JOAN ROSE 20 Official Reporter 21 Heritage Reporting Corporation 22 23-24 25 O- Reporting Corporation Beritage (202) 628-4888
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.n
'V INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEABROOK, AUGUST.17, 1989-BETHESDA, MARYLAND THIS MEETING WILL NOW COME TO ORDER. THIS IS A MEETING OF.THE ACRS SEABROOK SUBCOMMITTEE.
I AM W. KERR, CHAIRMAN OF THE AB0VE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE. THE OTHER ACRS MEMBERS IN ATTENDANCE ARE J. CARROLL, H. LEWIS AND.C. WYLIE. THE ACRS CONSULTANTS IN ATTENDANCE ARE M. BENDER, D. DRUM AND T. KEVERN.
-THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL REVIEW EMERGENCY PLANS FOR FULL POWER OPERATION.
E. IGNE IS'THE COGNIZANT ACRS STAFF MEMBER FOR TODAY'S MEETING.
9 -
THE' RULES FOR PARTICIPATING IN TODAY'S MEETING HAVE BEEN ANN 0UNCED AS PART OF THE. NOTICE OF THIS MEETING THAT WAS PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER ON AUGUST 7, 1989.
THIS MEETING IS BEING CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY.COMM TTEE ACT AND THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT.
FROM THE PUBLIC: A. WE HAVE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE ESSEX BOARD OF SELECTMAN. THIS LETTER WAS SENT TO THE COMMITTEE.
I
, B. WE HAVE ALSO RECEIVED OR WILL RECEIVE FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE OF THE STATE OF O
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, MASSACHUSETTS LlRllTEN' COMMENTS ON THE EMERGENCY L
ll PLANS OF SEABROOK huCLEAR POWER PLAN 1S. THESE l COR'ENTS ULRE Si!;T LY OVERNIGHT Mall AND WILL -
BE RECEIVED TODAY.
E. : -
1.4 *t e .' . ' 1\TD A REQUEST 10 MAKE AN ORAL it ii ':G r: LELARDING LF.ERGENCY PLANS FOR P1 '
!(L'CLLAR lUWLR PLANT. THE CPEAKER WILL L' L F,S . L . T CUPRAN REPRESENTMG THE JOINT.
su c E. >
. lime Will BE MAhl FOR HER PRE' EN-T ia " ' " cRL THE ENU OF 10 DAY'S MEETING.
IT IS REQUESTED THAT EACH SPEAKER flRST It'EWiiFY HIMSELF OR HERSELF /ND
'5 PEAK WITH SUH TEin!T CLENT" 7', '!OLUME 50 THAT l'E OR SHE CAN DE READILY HEARD.
DO ANY SUECF- . ; : ,_ LO !N % !I.L COLNIS AT THis T)ME ?
(CHAIR-
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New Hampshire Yankee presentation to ACRS Subcommittee Au.c u~s': :i7, ' S 8E O I
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{}' New Hampshire Yankee Agenda e introduction /0verview Ted Feigenbaum Senior Vice President & Chief Operating Officer e Emergency Planning History George Gram Executive Director of Emergency Preparedness &
Community Relations e Onsite Plan (SSRERP) George Gram l
- e. New Hampshire Plan (NHRERP) Anthony Callendrello Emergency Preparedness Licensing Manager 9 Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Peter Stroup Director of Emergency Response & Implementation l Communities (SPMC) e Vehicular Alert and Notification Edward Desmarais VANS Project Manager System (VANS)
- 9. Exercises and Remaining George Gram Full-Power items e Closing Remarks Ted Feigenbaum 4
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Other Management Attendees:
Bruce Drawbridge Executive Director Nuclear Production Jeb DeLoach - Executive Director Engineering & Licensing Terry Harpster Director of Li.:ensing Services Joe Vargas Managerof Erigineering Joe Grillo Operations Manager.
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PRESIDENT & CEO -
NHY INTERNAL AUDIT DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAfRS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER 1
1 I I I I I DIRECTOR OF DIRECTOR OF EXEC DIR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CONTROLLER , EXEC DlR DIRECTOR OF ~
ADMIN SERVICES QUAllTY PROGRAMS EMER PREP NUCLEAR PRODUCTION ENG & LICENSING CORP COMM
& COMM REL DIRECTOR OF E - P PERFORMANCE COMM REL MANAGER DIRECTOR OF EMER RESPONSE SERVICES SUPVR MANAGER OF ENG LICENSING SERVICES
& IMPLEMENTATION .
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O Selected Milestones Construction Permit Application (Docketed) .7/73
- Construction Permit Issued 7/76 Operating License A'pplication (Docketed) 10/81 ACRS (Sub./ Full) Low Power 4/83
. Construction Complete 7/86 Operating License (0%) Issued and Fuel ~ Loaded 10/86 Full Participation Graded Exercise 6/88 Operating License (5%) 5/89 O ,
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Seabrook Station Emergency Preparedness History George R. Gram Executive Director of Emergency Preparedness &
Community Relations O
i
__.________.____.-.__.__________.__m_ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _
Seabrook Station Emergency Preparedness History 9 1973 -
Low Population Zone (LPZ) of 1.5 Miles 0 1980 -
10CFR 50.47 Required 10 Mile /50 Mile Planning 0 Dec.1981 -
Planning Began-in Both States e Dec.1985 -
New Hampshire Governor Submitted Plans to FEMA O :
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O Seabrook Station Emergency Preparedness History e Feb.1986 -
First Graded Exercise e April 1986 -
Chernobyl Accident' Massachusetts Governor Ordered independent Study 9 July 1986 -
Unit 1 Construction Completed and License Requested e Oct.1986 -
NHY Received Zero Power License and Loaded Fuel O Dec.1986 -
Petition for Reduced EPZ i
O O
. )
O Seabrook Station ;
Emergency Preparedness History e June 1987 -
Commission Clarified "Bonafide" Utility Plan e Sept.1987 -
Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities -
(SPMC) Submitted e Nov.1987- -
Commission Amended 50.47C e Dec.1987 -
Second Annual Onsite Exercise e April 1988 -
VANS Design Submitted O
O
1 O
Seabrook Station Emergency Preparedness History e June 1988 -
Initial Qualifying " Full Participation" Graded Exercise o Dec.1988 -
ASLB Found New Hampshire Plans Provide Reasonable Assurance FEMA Found All Plans and Performance Provide Reasonable Assurance o June 1989 -
ASLB Hearing on SPMC and 1988 Exercise Closed- Decision Expected November,1989 o o July 1989 -
NRC Staff Issued SER Finding Reasonable U
Assurance O
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Seabro'ok: Station Onsite Emergency Planning Capabilities
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George R. Gram Executive Director of Emergency." Preparedness &
Community Relations 2
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Onsite Emergency Planning I Capabilities e Concept of Operation e Facilities and Resources e Unique Characteristics O
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D O- concept or operations STATE POLICE NOTIFYSTATE(*) AUTHORITIES AND l (2 STATES)(*) IMPLEMENT STATE (*) EMERGENCY PLAT, gypggyhg
/ ORO - 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION OF ORO RESPONDERS RECOGNIZEINCIDENT AND NOTIFY V CLASSIFY SHIFT INCIDENT PAGER SYSTEM . PRIMARY SUPERINTENDENT AND NOTIFY 47 ~ RESPONDERS
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UNU SUAL EVENT - PRIMARY RESPONDERS REPORT TO CONTROL ROOM
- ALL OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS COMPLETED ALERT OR ABOVE - PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RESPONDERS
- s REPORT AND ALL FACILITIES ACTIVATED '
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O Facilities and Resources Traditional Facilities e Technical Support Center (TSC) e Operational Support Center (0SC) e Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) e Joint Media Center (JMC)
Resources e Responders
- 242 Required
- 547 Trained and Qualified O
O
O Seabrook Emergency Response Plan Unique Characteristics e Plan, Organization, Facilities in Place Since Early 1986 e Three Onsite NRC Evaluated Exercises e Responded to Two Unusual Events O
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New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan.
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Anthony M. Callendrello Emergency Preparedness Licensing Manager -
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N _J New Hampshire Emergency Response Organization Governofs Office Command Other State Agencies NHOEM NHDPHS Implementation Operational Coordination Technical Assessment O l Rockingham 17 EPZ 4 Host County Communities Communities i Local Notification Local Response Action Reception Cente,rs Siren Activation - Traffic Control ;
- Transportation Assistance 1
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[/^w 13- Seabrook Station Emergency Notification Procedure DPHS h
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- DETERMINES EOC OPERATIONAL GOVERNOR EOF READINESS EOC REVIEWS PAR SS ERO PAR PAR WITH GOVERNOR MAKES * - DIRECTOR - APPROVES PAR NHOEM PROTECTIVE
- DIRECTOR ACTION NHDPHS NHDPHS
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ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT
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O Challenges O Nonparticipating Towns Response: State Compensatory Actions O Beach Population Within 2 miles Response: Special Provisions for Beach Population O
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O-Compensatory Plan 9 Developed in 1986 O Purpose is to compensate for communities needing support O Expansion of normal State support to local towns 9 State provides compensating staff to iniplement RERP O
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O l Special Provisions for Beach Populations in NHRERP i O Precautionary actions taken at Alert and Site Area Emergency 9 Prerecorded siren public address messages 0 Traffic and access control e Instructional signs, posters and flyers O
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NH Precautionary Actions 0 Used for Seabrook Beach and the portion of Hampton Beach within about 2 miles e Used during beach season (May 15 to September 15) e Purpose Remove beach population prior to reaching conditions that could exceed PAGs
- Reduce beach population to expedite later actions e Actions recommended based on emergency classification and plant conditions O
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O Precautionary Actions for the Near-Plant Beach Population Alert with degrading conditions Close beaches within 2 miles Site Area Emergency with stable conditions Close beaches within 2 miles Site Area Emergency with degrading conditions Evacuation of NH beaches within 2 miles General Emergency Evacuation of general public and NH beaches within 2 miles NOTE: Massachusetts has no beaches within 2 miles O
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Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities
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Peter J. Stroup ,
Director of Emergency Response &
Implementation O
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Offsite Response Organization Major Functions NHY OFFSITE
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Vehicular Alert & Notification Systems Edward W. Desmarais VANS Project Manager .
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O l Seabrook Station Siren System History e 1984 -
133 Pole Mounted Sirens Authorized by States and Local Communities in Massachusetts and New Hampshire 0 1985/86 -
Pole Mounted Sirens Installed e May 87 -
Mass. EPZ Communities Initiate Court Action to Remove Poles e Dec.87 -
NHY Agrees to Remove Mass. Poles and Sirens A
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O VANS Design Process e Design Report O Prototype Vehicle o SirenTesting O Staging Areas and Acoustic Locations e TransitTests e FunctionalTests O
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g VANS System Components e 16 Primary Vehicles,4 Back-up Vehicles,2 in Maint/ Surveillance 9 6 Staging Areas -
9 1 Summer Satellite Staging Area e Continuous 24 Hour Manning e Remote and Manual VANS Activation O
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VANS Sirens VANS NHY Activation ORO > NHY' Contact ORO L
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Seabrook Station Emergency Planning Exercise George R. Gram Executive Director of Emergency Preparedness &
Community Relations O
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June 1988 Graded Exercise e Largest Ever Held e Initial Qualifying " Full Participation" Exercise e Comprehensive Scenario 0 119 Organizations O 2900 Responders-Controllers-Evaluators O
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Seabrook Station Remaining Full-Power items '
George R. Gram Executive Director of Emergency Preparedness &
Community Relations O
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- 9. Public Alert and Notification
- 9. Licensing Board Conditions ,
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Closing Remarks Ted Feigenbaum '
Senior Vice President & Cliei Operating Officer O
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O Strengths e NH/ Maine Full Cooperation e NH, Maine and Mass. Experienced in RERP 4 SPMC's Flexible Response e Mass. Response Capabilities O Precautionary Actions for Nearby Beaches e Mutual Assistance Agreements O Co-Location of Utility, ORO and NH 9 FEMA /NRC Review 0 Highly Skilled Team O
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