ML20236U507

Testimony of RA Backus on Behalf of Campaign for Ratepayer Rights

ML20236U507
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Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	07/20/1998
From:	Backus R BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON
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TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR RATEPAYER'S RIGHTS )

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SUBMITTED BY ROBERT A. BACKUS, ESQ. J l

Q. Please str.te your name, business address and position with the Campaign (CRR)?

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i A. My name is Robert A. Backus. I am a lawyer and I practice in Manchester at the firm of 4

Backus, Meyer, Solomon, Rood & Branch at 116 Lowell Street, Manchester, N.H. I serve as the volunteer president of CRR. 1 I

Q. What is your background in nuclear decommissioning?

A. As most of the members of this committee will be aware, I have been involved in nuclear energy issues, mostly concerning Seabrook, since June of1972. I originally represented the Society for the Protection ofN.M. Forests before the N.H. Site Evaluation Committee in contested hearings heard in 1973-74. I also represented the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) in construction license proceedings before the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board between 1973 and 1976. In those proceedings, I raised the first contention concerning the decommissioning of Seabrook and cross examined the applicants' expert at the time, Mr William.

Manion.

Since then I have acted as an attorney for either SAPL or CRR is each of the three prior i

contested proceedings under RSA 162-F. In addition, in the last proceeding, I provided testimony l to the Committee on the basis for the 40 year term of the operating licenses issued for atomic 1

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. power reactors by the NRC (and formerly the AEC), on behalf of the OCA.

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• Finally, I have kept up with decommissioning developments before the NRC, including the promulgation of decommissioning regulations, and have been actively involved in the " working group" that was instrumental in passing Senate Bill 140 in the past session. This bill addressed the unique funding situation faced by the third largest Seabrook owner, Great Bay Power.

Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?

A. My testimony will address the issue of anticipated "useful" plant life and also discuss some reasons to believe the NAESCO position on decommissioning cost is not conservative. I also make some policy recommend,ations regarding the appropriate fund target and assurance of collectibility.

Q. Can you summarize CRR's position on the issues before the Committee?

A. Yes. As set forth in more detail below, CRR believes there is no longer any basis to believe that Seabrook will produce commercial power t'arough the year 2026, the date when its forty year license will expire. In partnership with the New England Electric System, CRR is urging that the appropriate life assumption is 25 years from licensing, or the year 2011. In addition, there are several reasons to believe that the current estimate, like the previous estimate, for total

decommissioning is understated. For these reasons, a substantial funding shortfall when Seabrook ceases commercial operation is probable. As a result, CRR believes the fund collections should be 1

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. accelerated to the maximum extent possible without jeopardizing the tax exempt status of the contributions. CRR understands, from testimony in the prior proceeding, that nominally'levelized funding would not jeopardize the tax status of the contributions. Finally, CRR believes that the best assurance of fund collectibility would be for the Committee to urge the NRC to imposejoint and several liability on the owners; in other words, by expanding on the limited liability sharing enacted in Senate Bill 140.

' Q. Can you set forth the reasons why the Committee should not assume a "useful" life extending to 20267 A. At the outset, I would note that Mr. Callendrello's testimony, in defending the NAESCO position, states: "The operating experience of the industry as a whole provides reasonable assurance that the planned thirty-six year license life for Seabrook Station is achievable." (My emphasis.) I would consider that the question is not "achievability," but whether a 36 year life is probable in light of all relevant circumstances, including especially economic factors. In other words, the question should be: is a 36 year life likely, not whether it is " achievable" Since the Commission has already found, based on my testimony in the prior contested proceeding, that the license life by itselfis not probative of actual life, the only sure guide for the Committee to address this issue is the actual experience of the industry to date.

The experience to date in this country is that nuclear plants do not achieve their licensed life. Yankee Rowe is an instructive example. It was built for a cost of only 39 million dollars and 3

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entered service in 1963. It was permanently taken out of service 30 years and 3 months later. (Mr.

Callendrello is in error in stating the operational life of Yankee Rowe was 31 years.) Thus, although it achieved the second longest service run of any plant, and was considered the first prime candidate for a license extension, it did not get close to a 40 year life. (This shows that a mere utility declaration that it intends to seek a license extension is no basis for believing a nuclear plant will operate for its original license term.) In New England, since the closure of Yankee Rowe, both Connecticut Yankee and Maine Yankee have been permanently closed, after 28 and r

i 23 years ofoperation respectively.

Meanwhile, this past Saturday, July 18, Northeast Utilities announced the permanent i closure of Millstone I. Millstone I entered commercial operation in 1971 and ceased operation in i

1995. It therefore had an operational life of 25 years.

As shown by the Comments submitted by Attorney James Anderson for the OCA, the record overall is for accelerating closures. The World Watch Institute has reported that, worldwide, the average life expectancy of nuclear power reactors is only 16 years. Worldwatch l Paper 106. December,1991, " Nuclear Waste: The Problem That Won't Go Away," p.13.

! It must be emphasized that the early shutdown of the New England reactors, and the 18 o'.hers closed around the country (see attached listing) occurred before the onset of retail competition in electric generation. Almost all industry observers believe that competition will

accelerate the closure of both nuclear and much current fossil based generation. Merrill Lynch estimated, in 1995, that competition would lead to the early closure of at least 10 reactors. Since then, NAESCO's own expert witness, Mr. LaGuardia has been quoted in the February 27,1997 issue ofNucleonics Week, as believing that competition would cause " the operators of as many 4

. as 20 U.S. plants (which he didn't identify) that could shut over the next five years because of high costs to evaluate accelerated decommissioning."

The reason that many nuclear plants are not expected to survive competition is that nuclear plante are not efficient machines. According to the Seabrook Environmental Impact Statement, the thermal efficiency of the plant is about 32%. Modern combined cycle gas turbines have efficiencies approaching 60%. Tlie result is that in a competitive market, in which inefficiencies cannot be masked by cost based regulation, nuclear plants will be at a disadvantage.

As most members of this Committee will be aware, there are very large numbers of gas projects planned in New England. In addition, should the new microturbines being developed by Allied General and Capstone achieve significant market penetration, the economic woes of the nuclear plants would be worsened.

Today, the Seabrook owners are petitioning the NRC to permit Seabrook's operational run to 'oe extended to two years before refueling. This is being done is what the licensee describes as a " series of amendment requests" to change the Technical Specifications. The current refueling is on an 18 month schedule, up from the originally licensed annual refueling. The request is being opposed by SAPL, and another organization, on safety grounds, but the fact that it is being sought is an indication of the need felt by the Seabrook owners to improve the plant's economics in the face of oncoming competition by doubling the length of the plant's operational run over that originally licensed..

Another factor that may tend to lead to the early closure of nuclear plants is the gradual loss of the infrastructure to support the nuclear system. Whereas, in 1974, the first U.S. energy l

plan, called " Project Independence," called for 1000 Seabrook size reactors to be operating in the 5

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. U'.S. by the year 2000, the nuclear high tide arrived with 113 reactors. Today,103 rt. main, several of which are vulnerable to imminent closure. With no nuclear plants ordered since 1978, I and notic since 1973 that were actually built, the inoustry is in precipitous decline. This will make the whole problem of maintaining the skilled work force and the obtaining of parts far more l

difficult than was anticipated when Seabrook was ordered, more than 25 years ago.

Mr. Caliendrello states that: "The performance of Seabrook Station to date indicates that the plant is capable of the level of performance required to maintain long-tenn: uccessful operation." (Lines 20-21, page 2). Mr. Callendrello fails to state that the NRC hrs recently found

" declining performance" at Seabrook and the plant has recently been fined $55,000 for four violations, although the fine was then suspended. This is another indication that Seabrook, like all other nuclear plants, is facing tension between the demand to cut costs to meet the competitive environment and the need for expensive repairs and maintenance. The attemp,t to extend the period for refueling by 33% is only a recent Seabrook example. Another example is the tota! two and quarter year shutdown of the three Millstone reactors. The management audit ofNortheast Utilities found that the root cause of the shutdown was significantly related to the management i

program of cost cutting in the nuclear pr'ogram. See the Final Report ofR.C. Brown &

Associates, " Focused Audit of the Connecticut Light and Power Company Nuclear Operations,"

December 31,1996.  ;

l Q; Are any other Seabrook owners advocating accelerated funding besides New England Power? j l A. Yes. Great Bay Power,in response to the enactment of SB 140, has signed an agreement with l l

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tiie other owners to complete its contributions to the fund by the year 2015. Tiius, however, does not mean that the funds to decommission Great Bay's 12% interest will be on hand at that time, but only that the collections at that time, combined with assumed earnings between 2015 and 202.6 will produce the funds necessary to take care of Great Bay's share of the cost by 2026.

Q. Are the steam generators at Seabrook an important issue in assessing likely plant life?

A. Absolutely. As the Conunittee will be aware, NAESCO itself, in the prior proceedhtg before the Committee, cited the availability of the Unit II steam generators are providing additional assarance for a 36 year plant life. Those spare pans have been sold to bolster Northeast Utilities' cash flow and are no longer available, and the need to replace steam generators, a very expensive proposition, has been instmmental in the early closing of some plants, including Trojan and Maine Yankee. (See transcript excerpt attached to NAESCO response to data request DR 4.13, p. 76).

The present lack of spare steam generators is an indication of Seabrook's vulnerability to early shutdown if major steam generator tube degradation problems emerge. This was a principal j concern of Mr. Ed Abbot of ABZ, the Committee's consultant in the last proceeding. See transcript of Day VI, pp 49-56 f i

Q. Doesn't Seabrook claim to have a better steam generator, the so called Model F with thermrdly treated Inconel 6007 l

l A. It does. But'as Mr. Ed Abbot of ABZ, told me, the reason Seabrook has a Model F is that l

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. idodels A through E have not succeeded. More to the point, however, is the fact that there is already some indication of wear problems with the Seabrook steam generator tubes. In addition, according the NRC, the time when degradation problems are most likely to emergeis after about 7 years of operation. Seabrook, which entered commercial service in August 1990, is just completing eight years. I attach to this testimony Contention I, filed with the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, which provides specific data on the history of tube wear and plugging at Seabrook.

This material indicates that the NRC does not agree with the statement made by Mr.

DeLoach in 'he last proceeding that "if AVB [antivibration bar wear] has not begun to show up at this point on tubes it is not likely that it will do so in the future." See transcript excerpt cited above, p. 78. According to the NRC, in Inspection Report 97-03 for Seabrook: "Most steam generator degradation problems have been found only after longer [than seven years] periods of operation."

Furthermore, the daia provided by NAESCO is response to data request DR 4.17, which sought information on tube problems at other plants with the Model F steam generators, indicates 1

that the oldest plant, Kori,.a Korean facility, has more tube wear than the others. Kori, according to the data response, went into operation in 1983, before any of the other four plants identified as having the same cam generators, Vogtle Units I and II, Millstone III, and Wolf Creek..

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Q. Is the current NAESCO decommissioning estimate of 489 million dollars conservative?

i A. No. The 489 million dollar figure is in fact very surprising for two reasons. The first it that, 8 4 i

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, for the first time, NAESCO is relying on the NRC's reference figure of105 million, escalated to 489 million. Never before has NAESCO suggested that Seabrook can be decomndssioned for l less than the NRC's reference figure.

2 The NRC's reference figure is found m the 1988 decommissioning regulation 10 CFR 50.75, and has, appropriately, always previously been considered to be less than thoctual figure

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because it does not require inclusion of the costs of any decommissioning not associated witn the

' minimization of the hazards of radioactivity. Thus, although Mr. LaGuardia has always recommended that all structures be removed from site, to a depth of three feet below grade, the NRC's figure does not require this for purposes of assuring financial responsibility for radioactive cleanup. In addition, the NRC's figure does not include any cost for the remeval and storage of 3 spent fuel, although the current LaGuardia site specific study concedes there will be costs.

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("Although the cost to dispose of spent fuel assemblies generated during plant operations j l

presently is not considered a decommissioning expense, the presence of those assemblies does j l

~have a bearing on the cost to decommission." Decommissioning Cost Study, March 1998, Appendix B, page x of x iii.) By comparison, the first LaGuardia estintate, accepted by the l

! Committee in 1987, was 242.4 million dollars, more than double the NRC's reference figure of ) l

! 105 million in 1986 dollars. Thus, the idea that, for the first time, the NRC's reference figure is i

assumed to be accurate is startling. .

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Q. NAESCO claims that the NRC figure is overstated because it has too high an escalation for the cost oflow level radioactive waste disposal. Does this justify the lower site specific figure of l

473.6 million?

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( I. Not in my opinion. NAESCO, through Mr. Callendrello's testimony, argues that the cost l

escalation for low level waste disposal is overstated because of competition between the two l

existing low level waste dumps, Barnwell, S.C. and Envirocare, in Utah. However, Mr Callendrello fails to mention the fact that the entire system of state " compacts" anticipated to be created by the Low Level Waste Policy Act of 1985 is in disarray and that no new low level sites ,

have been developed sinc.e the Act was passed, except for Envirocare. Thus, the anticipated wrplus of sites that was predicted has not occurred. Also, recent press reports indicate that the future of Barnwell is in ocubt because it is not generating the level of revenue to fund education in South Carolina that was anticipated. In short, just as Barnwell was once closed to N.H. and other states, it may well be closed again. As for Envirocare, it faces two problems; first, it will accept only the least radioactive waste;i.e., Class A, and no Class B, C or greater than C, and, second, it's licensins was tainted with allegations of cormption that have not yet been resolved.

The second reason that the current estimate appears to be understated is the comparison with Maine Yankee and Connecticut Yankee, and most recently, Millstone I.. Maine Yankee is currently undergoing decommissioning with the project cost at 508 million dollars. Since Maine Yankee is an 855 meg.twatt reactor, and Seabrook is an 1150 megawatt reactor, it is hard to see why it should be aasumed that the cost to decommission Seabrook would be hss than the cost for Maine Yankee. The cost for Connecticut Yankee, alse undergoing decommissioning, is 426.7 million dollars. Connecticut Yankee Is a much smaller plant than Scabrook,619 megawatts, compared to 1130. Not only is Connecticut Yankee smaller is electric capacity,it is smaller physically as w,:ll.

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I And, as of July 18, we now have an official decommissioning figure for Millstone I of 640 million dollars, as reported in the Hartford Courant. Millstone Iis a 641 megawatt reactor, compared to Seabrook at 1150 megawatts. It is also, of course, located on a site shared by two other reactors which could imply the possibility of some cost savings on decommissioning in light l

l of the NRC's recently adopted standards for cleaning up sites, which provides a somewhat more l

relaxed requirement for sites that are to continue to be used for atomic power generation. It is

! hard to understand how the 489 million estimate for Seabrook can be considered conservative in I

light o.f the cost for decommissioning for Maine Yankee, Connecticut Yankee and now Millstone l

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Q. What does this suggest about the NAESCO concern about "intergenerational equity"?

A. It suggests this concern is unfounded. "Intergenerational equity" is the name NAESCO has given to the situation that ivould exist if the decommissioning fund turned out to be too large, so that the current generation of ratepayers would end up paying more than their fair share, and the generation of future ratepayers would be in effect subsidized. But for this to occur, it must in fact be more probable than not than the current funding is excessive. This is not likely.

Q. Why?

A. Passing the unfortunate fact that no Seabrook estimate has ever been overstated, it is not likely that the ultimate decommissioning of Seabrook will be accomplished for 489 million dollars. Not l

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. only is this inconsistent with the estimates for Maine and Connecticut Yankee, and now Millstone I, assuming scaling for Seabrook's larger size, it is also inconsistent with the increasing cost estimates placed before this Committee by the Seabrook owners in past proceedings. In addition, 4

despite the optimistic predictions made by the owners in the past, the problem of disposing of

both high and so-called low level radioactive waste remain as intractable as ever In the current estimate, for first time, NAESCO is projecting the use of dry cask storage for a period of ten years. This should be contrasted with the previous projected period to complete decommissioning of five years. It should also be noted that, as the NAESCO data responses to CRR's inquiries show, there have been some very serious problems with dry cask storage. See Attachment 5 to DR 4.2, "NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-51: Problems experienced with loading and unloading spend nuclear fuel storage and transportation casks," and "INFORMATION NOTICE 96-04: Chemical, Galvanic, or other reactions in spent fuel storage and transportation casks."

Finally, to my knowledge, in every case in which the owner or owners have announced the permanent closure of a nuclear reactor, there has been a shortfall in the decommissioning funds collected by the time of the announcement of closure. This is certainly the case for the four New l- England reactors which have permanently and prematurely closed. Even Mr. LaGuardia, who prepared the current estimate on behalfofNAESCO, concedes in his March 1998 l " Decommissioning Update:""It has been TLG's experience that the results of a risk analysis, when compared with the base case estimate for decommissioning, indicate that the chances of the l base decommissioning estimate's being too high is a low probability, and the chances that the estimate is too low is a much higher probability." (Section 3, page 8 of 20.)

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. Q. Do you have an estimate of the correct cost to decommission Seabrook? 4 1

A. Unfortunately, no. The work to create an independent estimate is beyond both my capabilities and cenainly those of CRR. I can only suggest, as the Committee has done, that a very hard and critical look be taken of the escalation and contingency factors that must be applied to the chosen -

estimate. The Committee should not assume that the factors that NAESCO cites as causing a change in the trer;d of ever increasing cost, such as the prediction of a decline in the cost of {

disposing of so called low level radioactive waste, are valid.

Q. Are there any other recommendations you would make to the Committee?

A. Yes. First, I believe the Committee should demand that NAESCO provide an estimate not only for the so-called DECON alternative, but also for SAFSTOR. In the current proceeding, NAESCO has declined to do this because, "we continue to believe that the SAFSTOR option is likely to be more expensive than DECON, and that SAFSTOR continues to have the same disadvantages for which we concludeo that DECON was the favored approach to decommissioning." (Callendrello testimony, p.6). However, as the chart attached to this testimony shows, most of the plants decommissioned to date are in SAFSTOR, not DECON. In addition, if the high level waste cannot be shipped offsite, due to such events as Yucca Mountain being unlicensable, then SAFSTOR, or ENROMB, may be the only viable options. (I would add that in the original Seabrook Environmental Statement,1974, the owners projected that the plant would not be dismantled, but would be " mothballed" and that the total cost would be 20 million 13

. dollars, with an annual maintenance cost of $200,000.)

I would recall to the Committee's to attention the recommendation made by the Committee's own consultant in the first contested proceeding in 1987, Technical Analysis Corporation, that the fund should be targeted to meet the highest cost decommissioning option, not the cheapest, in order to provide the flexibility to pursue what may be the best alternative, from a health and safety standpoint, when the time comes to decommission Seabrook. I believe this recommendation was, and remains, the best policy option to carry out the declared purpose of RSA 162-F, that the public be protected from the health hazards of an inadequately decommissioned site. .

My second recommendation concerns the issue of collectibility. I would urge the Committee to recommend to the NRC that the obligation to adequately fund decommissioning should be ajoint and several obligation among the owners,just as it is with regard to a superfund site.

Q. Does this complete your testimony?

A. Yes.

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TIP:24.- Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants Page 10 of10 hennal F Reacto,r Type fg Location Shutdown Status Onsite Indian Point 1 PWR 615 MW Buchanan NY 10/31/74 SAFSTOR Yes )

Dresden 1 . BWR 700 MW Morris IL 10/31/78 SAFSTOR Yes Fermi 1 Fast Breeder 200 MW Monroe Co. MI 9/22n2 fSAFSTOR No GE VBWR BWR 50 MW Alameda Co. CA 12/9/63 SAFSTOR No Yankee Rowe i PWR 600 MW Franklin Co. MA 10/1/91 DECON Yes l CVTR '

65 MW Parr SC 1/67 SAFSTOR ' No Ha te Big Rock Point BWR 67 MW Charlevoix MI 8/97 DECON Yes l Pathfinder St.perheat BWR 190 M W Sioux Falls SD 9/16/67 C P rt 30 lHumboldt Bay 3 BWR 200 MW Eureka CA 7/02/76 SAFSTOR Yes Peach Bottom 1 HTGR 115 MW York Co. PA 10/31n4 SAFSTOR No l l San Onofre 1 PWR 1347 MW San Clemente CA 11/30/92 SAFSTOR Yes l Haddam Neck PWR 1825 MW Haddam Neck CT 7/22/96 Yes n ng l Fort St. Vrain HTGR 84.1 M W Platteville CO 8/18/89 DECON Yes 8 "

l Zion 1 PWR 325) MW Zion IL 2/98 Yes 3

Zion 2 PWR 3250 MVv Zion IL 2/98 Yes n g l Maine Yankee PWR 2772 M W Bath ME 12/96 DECON Yes l Rancho Seco PWR 2772 M W Sacramento CA 6n/89 SAFSTOR Yes I PWR 2772 MW Middletown PA 3/28n9 SAFSTOR* No d

b Shoreham BWR 2436 MW Suffolk Co. NY 6/28/89 Te naicd Trojan PWR 3411 MW Portland OR 11/9/92 DECON Yes l Lacrosse BWR 165 MW Lacrosse WI 4/30/87 SAFSTOR Yes !

• Post-defueling monitored storage (PDMS).

http://www.nrc. gov /OPA/gmo/tip/tip9824.htm 7/16/98

CONTENTION 1 The staff erred in its May 6 finding of no significant hazards consideration in regard to the request of NAESCO to change the Technical Specifications for Seabrook Station to accommodate fuel cycles of up to 24 months with respect to the allowed time between steam generator inservice inspections. Contrary to the staff's conclusion, the proposed changes may cause a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, and may involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92.

BASIS The basis for this contention is the safety consequence of reducing the required surveillance for the steam generators by twenty-five percent. It is well known that the failure of steam generator tubes can result in an accident with offsite consequences. A steam generator tube rupture event is an analyzed accident at Seabrook. A failed steam generator tube or tubes can provide a direct by pass for radionuclides from the reactor core to the environment.

In addition, it is well established that degraded steam generator tubes are a key vulnerability in pressurized water reactors. Although Seabrook claims to have an improved steam generator, kiwwn as the Model F with thermally treated Inconel 600, there have been indications of steam tube degradation at Seabrook. This history is provided in SAPL's June 5,1998 letter to the Commission. Briefly, that history reflected the fact of the plugging of some 36 tubes as of the date ofInspection Report 97-03. It also reflected the fact, acknowledged by the inspection report l that "Most steam generator degradation problems have been found only after longer [than seven l

years] periods of operation." Since the age of Seabrook is now at a point where concern about i

I , steam generator degradation should be greater, there is no basis to conclude, as staff does, that extending the period between surveillance by 25% is without safety significance. (Seabrook went into commercial operation in August,1990.)

NUREG/CR-XXXX, INEUEXT-98-00401," Rates ofInitiating Events at U.S.

Commerdial Nuclear Power Plants - 1987 through 1195" (April 1998) discusses steam generator tube rupture events. It notes that: "The last SGTR identified in the 1987-1195 experience occurred at Palo Verde 2 in 1993. Since no SGTR events were identified in the last two years of this study, the 1996 through 1997 operating experience was screened for SGTR events to determine if a trend existed. Further trend analysis of SGTR freauency using the 1985 through 1997 operatine experience showed no statistical evidence of a decreasine trend in the frecuency of SGTR." (Emohasis suoplied]

Your petitioners would also rely on the Seabrook Individual Plant Examination Report, in response to Generic Letter 88-20. This report, part of the Seabrook Station Probabalistic Risk Assessment (subsequently known as the Seabrook Station Probabalistic Safety Study), presents evaluation of various transients that could result in accidents with offsite consequences, including the so called steam generator bypass event, or steam generator tube rupture. It should be noted that the IPE specifically notes that, "Seabrook-specific data has not been included in these distributions [of accident probabilities] based on limited operation experience." NAESCO has neither updated its IPE with Seabrook specific data nor provided any such data with its license amendment request.

In licensee letter NYN-91146, September 9,1991, reporting on the first inservice steam generator inspection, it was noted "no defective tubes, that is a tube with a wall loss equal to or i

. greater than 40%, were identified." However,12 tubes were plugged with wall loses between 35% )

and 38% "for preventive maintenance." By contrast, in a licensee letter dated June 18,1997, and titled " Steam Generator Tubes Plugged During Fifth Inservice Inspection," the licensee submitted information indicating that thineen (13) tubes were plugged, and that seven of these had wall loss indications of greater than or equal to 35% (one of 35%, one at 37%, one at 39%, one at 40%,

one at 45%, one at 55%, and one at 56%). The remaining tubes did not have their wall loss values specified. Since wall loss of 40% of more defines a defective tube, the recent information indicates that Seabrook was operating with at least four defective tubes.

The reduced surveillance frequency, coupled with the 1997 inservice inspection data showing that Seabrook had operated with defective steam generator tubes, indicates that the steam generator tube rupture event frequency assumed in the IPE is non-conservative. The 1991 inservice inspection data suggests that some steam generator tubes might have crossed the line into the defective classification had the plant operated for 25% longer.

In the current license amendment request, NAESCO has apparently redefined " defective tube" from the 40% standard referenced in letter NYN-91146, cited above. The current standard claimed by NAESCO is 75% wall loss. (See the License Amendment Request, April 8,1998, page 5.) This relaxed standard for declaring a tube degraded, which is not addressed in the exemption request, would funher reduce the safety margin for the steam generator tube mpture accident.

The 75% wall loss criterion is also the subject of an unresolved Differing Professional Opinion (DPO). Joram Hopenfeld, Task Manager, Generic Safety Issues Branch, NRR, has stated that permitting plants to operate with tubes with greater than 40% wall loss represents an insufficiently analyzed safety issue. According to Hopenfeld, the alternate repair criteria, based 3-l f

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( . upon eddy current voltage signals to predict tube failure, lacks sufficient field data to be considered valid. He says there is no direct correlation between voltage readings and tube 1

leakage. Hopenfeld's position has been the subject of a hearing before the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, but remains an unresolved issue.

In raising a new generic issue, multiple steam generator leakage, Hopenfeld stated (March 1992):

"The present analysis shows that continuous operation with degraded tubes could lead to a core melt due to simultaneous leakage from many tubes following an unisolated steam line break The risk for such an event cannot reliably be estimated because of lack of data. Although a design basis multiple tube rupture could bound the above leakage, it is not practical at this time to request the industry to modify present plant designs. The available data does not support NRC position that operation with degraded tubes is safe. That position is based on ' leak before break' consideration which is acceptable for normal operation is not applicable to the SLB accident."

The staff suggests, in supporting its no significant hazards detennination, that the decreased inspection frequency can be offset by a tightening of the allowed leakage rate from 500 gallons per day (gpd) to 100 gpd. However, no analysis or rational for suggesting the more stringent leak rate is an offsetting safety benefit to the decreased inspections is provided, and the staff s determination only claims that: "The more restrictive limit for leakage through any one l

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steam generator placed in Category C-2, as well as the requirement to do an engineering  !

assessment of steam generator tube integrity, provides additional margin of ensuring safe plant operation." (63 FR page 25113). However, the determination provides no reason for a finding that leakage rates can fulfill the function that would be provided by 18 month as opposed to 24 month inspections. In fact, there can be a tube failure, or tube failures, that could occur suddenly enough to not be preceded by detectable increase in leakage rates. For example, a steam generator tube with wall thinning approaching, or perhaps even exceeding, the " defective" tube criterion might suddenly fail during a transient due to the hydrodynamic forces or the thermal effects of cold emergency feedwater injection.

In summary, there is an undeniable reduction in safety margins by extending the time between steam generator inspections by 25%. Given the limited data supporting the Seabrook IPE on the steam generator tube rupture accident scenario, and the history ofincreasing tube wear at Seabrook, all of which occurred before the time when the staff reported in Inspection Report 97-03 serious wear problems would be expected, the staffis in error in its determination that the requested exemption involves no significant hazards consideration.

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9 5 NDFC 98-01 SERVICE LIST Douglas L. Patch Chairman NH Public Utilities Commission 8 Old Suncock Road l Concord, NH 03301 John Stephen, Asst. Commissioner Dept. Of Safety i 10 Hazen Drive i Concord, NH 03301 l

Georgie A. Thomas State Treasurer State House Annex, Room 121 Concord, NH 03301 Winslow Melvin 88 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 General Counsel NH Public Utilities Commission 8 Old Suncook Road Concord,NH 03301 Robert A. Backus, Esq.

Backus Meyer Solomon Rood PO Box 516 Manchester, NH 03105-0516 Seabrook Selectmen's Office Seabrook Town Offices Seabrook, NH 03874 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Nuclear Regulatory Co;., mission Washington, DC 20555 l

Joshua L. Gordon, Esq.

26 South Main Street, #175 ]

Concord, NH 03301 i Rep. Channing Brown Appropriations Committee Room 100 State House Concord, NH 03301 l

7UL.ZU.ISSU T:OfY E 55 I.5HII HTI5 NO.5022 ?. 3 James P. Fredyma, Asst. Commissioner Health & Human Services 6 Hazen Drive Concord, NH 03301 Sen. Jack Barnes, Jr.

Room 302 State House Concord, NH 03301 Wynn E. Arnold, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General Dept. Of Justice 33 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301 Thomas B. Getz Execdive Director NH Public Utilities Commission 8 Old Suncook Road Concord, NH 03301 Edward A. Haffer SPhB+G 1000 Elm Street Manchester, NH 03105-3701 Many K Metca'f Seacoast Antipol League PO Box 1136 Podsmouth, NH 03802-1136 Robert Cushing, Jr.

395 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, NH 03842 John Crosier NHB!A 122 N. Main Street Concord, NH 03301 Lt. Col. Willard F. Boyle 463 New Zealand Road Seabrook, NH 03874 Michael Ablowich Deputy State Treasurer Room 121 State House Annex

! Concord, NH 03301 l

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St: yen V. Camerino, Esq.

McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton 900 Elm Street PO Box 326 Manchester, NH 03105-0326 B. Dickinson Henry, Jr.

President Bellwether Solutions LLC 1 South Street Concord. NH 03301 Deborah Schachter, Director Govemor's Office of Energy

& Community Services 57 Regional Drive, Suite 3 '

Concord, NH 03301-8519 Michael W. Holmes, Esq.

Office of Consumer Advocate 117 Manchester Street Concerd, NH 03301-5141 Kenneth J. Aupperle Vice President Team Associates, Inc.

,. 5935 Buford Way, Suite 200 Norcross, GA 30071 Rep. Jeb E. Bradley House Science Technology

& Energy Committee Legislative Office Building, Room 304 Concord, NH 03301 Tracy Guyette New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission 8 Old Suncook Road Concord, NH 03301 i

Alexander Kalinski, Esq.

PO Box 1136 Manchester, NH 03105-1136 l I

Kendall F. Wiggin State Librarian NH State Library 20 Park Street  ;

Concord, NH 03301-6303 '

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