ML20216J657
| ML20216J657 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1987 |
| From: | VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216J651 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8707060252 | |
| Download: ML20216J657 (119) | |
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VnawONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION
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DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REPORT
SUMMARY
REPORT SUPPLEMEilT FOR VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-271 DPR 28 870706025p DR 979$g5 ADOCK 05000271 PDR
i ENCLOSURE II DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REPORT
SUMMARY
REPORT SUPPLEMENT FOR VERMONT YANKEE NUCLER POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-271 DPR 28 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169, Ferry Road Brattleborn, Vermont 05301 a
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VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION DCRDR Sumary Report Supplement
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Vermont Yankee submitted a DCRDR Summary Report on July 1,1985 which then represented an accurate status of the VYNPP DCRDR activities. Additional information was transmitted on September 16, 1985 in response to a DCRDR In-Progress aLdit performed by members of the NRC staff and two staff con-sultants.
o Work continued on the DCRDR through March 31, 1986 when a list of planned j modifications, a schedule, and disposition of previously unresolved study areas were submitted. On August 11, 1986 another submittal was made to document completed DCRDR activities and implementation design changes made since the earlier correspondence. The August 1986 submittal comprised two volumes and contained an updated implementation schedule, the previous and current HED status, a listing of all DCRDR findings and other related r information requested by the commission during a Pre-Implementation Audit.
The latter was intended to take precidence over all previous correspondence.
Work has continued on the DCRDR and this Sumary Report Supplement provides a comprehensive status of DCRDR Implementation tasks and schedules and confirms completion of the Vermont Yankee DCRDR.
2.0 MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAM A multidisciplinary team consisting of a Program Manager, an Operations Specialist, an I&C Engineer, a Staff Engineer, and a Human Factors Consultant reviewed and evaluated each of the approximately 800 DCRDR findings.
Resumes of the team members were submittted earlier via References (e) and (h).
The team evaluated each finding based upon individu '1 merit and using every available resource, including Vermont Yankee Control Room Vermont Yankee Training Simulator Detailed Control Panel Photographs Station Operating Procedures Operator Interviews DCRDR Source Documents Improvement Mockups Simulator Experiments Engineering Analysis Consultant Assistance As the DCRDR evalution progressed, it became apparent that responsible plant managers and operators at mature plants like Vermont Yankee had previously acted to correct deficiencies which could contribute to operator error or which had a significant impact on safety. Vermont Yankee stated in Reference (i) our belief that the HED modifications proposed from the DCRDR effort were of relatively minor operational significance and generally related to modifications necessary to conform to specific human factors criteria. The results of our Control Room Dynamic Evaluation and our con-tinuing Operator Simulator Training Programs further substantiate this belief.
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As a result, the design changes for correcting the HEDs have been based upon the staff recommendation to avoid " piecemeal corrections" and our desire to coordinate and integrate design changes into the most desirable and efficient implementation schedule. All HEDs were considered to have equal significance enabling like changes to be coordinated with other related changes and with full recognition of installation prerequisite requirements.
3.0 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE The schedule for implementing all DCRDR modifications is prior to startup for Cycle 15 which the staff has previously found to be acceptable. Enclosures I and II illustrate how the design changes have been coordinated and integrated into the most efficient implementation schedule.
4.0 DYNAMIC E0P EVALUATION On August 26, 1986, a normal shif t complement of trained operators, participated in a series of complicated core threatening exercise scenarios on the Vermont Yankee Training Simulator. The purpose of these exercises was to test the effectiveness and workability of the E0Ps in a real time environ-ment. The operator actions were videotaped and evaluated by seven (7) obser- l vers repreisenting operational and human f actors disciplines. }
Three prepared casualty scenarios were utilized for the evaluations:
o Total loss of off-site power (LNP) with a stuck open relief valve. l l
o A drywell steam line rupture with loss of off-site power and sub-sequent HPCI failure.
o A turbine trip with bypass failure und failure to scram (ATWS).
Following the completion of each exercise scenario, the operators and eva-luators were extensiv"ly debriefed to determine missing control room infor-mation needs, technic 31 correctness of the E0Ps, usability / workability of the E0Ps, and any previously unidentified simulator versus control room instrumentation or functional differences.
The operating crew involvement in the evaluation existed only for the dura-tion of the exercises themselves. There were no prerehersals and no before-hand knowledge of the specific content of the exercise scenarios. This was considered to yield the fairest assessment. The operating crew was clearly an important element of the evaluation team and, the information gathered from their post-accident debriefings provided valuable input to the evaluation. The reuslts of the Dynamic E0P Evaluation have been included as Enclosure III.
All data collected from the evaluation was then reviewed in detail by the multidiscipline team. Findings and recommendations were prepared by the team and can be found in Enclosure IV.
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5.0 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL TASK ANALYSIS Function and task analyses were prepared to identify and describe those tasks which operators must perform for each step of the Vermont Yankee spe-cific E0P's. These E0P's are based upon Revision 3 of the BWROG Emergency Procedure Guidelines. The information and control capabilites necessary to perform those tasks were then determined and compared with the existing control room instrumentation. The I&C comparison included type, range, set-point, accuracy, units, response requirements, feedback information and operator experiences and has been previously submitted and found acceptable to the staff for the following E0P's; OE-3100, Reactor Scram OE-3101, Reactivity Control 0E-3102, RPV Level Control 0E-3103, Drywell Pressure and Temperature Control OE-3104, Torus Temperature and Level Control Enclosure V provides this same information for the most recent and remaining VY E0P, OE-3105 Secondary Containment Control. The recommen-dations of the review team can be found in Enclosure IV. This concludes the function and task analyses element of the DCRDR.
6.0 PROPOSED CONTROL ROOM MODIFICATIONS Much work on the Vermont Yankee DCRDR has continued since the original Summary Report on July 1,1985. Several additional NRC submittals have been made, findings have been corrected and new findings have been identified.
Enclosure VI presents a current description of all HEDs and proposed or ,
completed resolutions. It remains our intention to complete these modifi- {
cations during the two refueling outages prior to startup for Cycles 14 and 15, subject to no unforseen difficulties in design, procurement and installation efforts associated with each of the respective modifications.
7.0 CONCLUSION
With this Sumary Report Supplement the Vermont Yankee DCRDR is complete.
All anticipated activities and staff concerns previously identified have been addressed. For convenience, a current summary of i.11 HEDs and design ,
changes resulting from the DCRDR has been prepared and enclosed. Many of the DCRDR recommendations have already been implemented, including proce- l' dural changes and standardization, torus pressure and level indicators, feed pump trip annunciator, control room carpeting, dedicated com-munications channel, operator training accreditation and as-built drawing mark-ups. Upon completion of the remaining control room modifications the review team will reassemble and conduct a final walkdown verification.
The administrative controls and programmatic reviews associated with design development process are expected to provide the primary verification that the station operators can efficiently use the DCRDR corrections and that the corrections themselves have not introduced new HEDs. ,
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With this Sumary Report Supplement the Vermont Yankee Detailed Control Room Design Review is complete. Vermont Yankee sincerely appreciates the comments and assistance provided by the staff throughout the DCRDR. We are confident that'the DCRDR has accomplished its purpose and will make the Vermont Yankee control room a better place to work.
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REFERENCE DOCUMENTS I
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i a) License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271) b) Letter, VYt'DC to USNRC, FVY 84-64, dated 6/19/84 (Program Plan) c) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 95-124, dated 6/7/85 (In Progress Audit) d) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 85-61, dated 7/1/85 (Summary 1 Report) e) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 85-87, dated 9/16/85 (In Progress Audit Reponse) f) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 86-30, dated 3/31/86 (Summary Report Supplement) }
g) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 86-67, dated 7/30/86 (SPDS SAR) J h) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 86-71, dated 8/11/86 (Pre-Implementation Audit Submittal) i) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 86-122, dated 12/19/86 (Request to Modify Order) l j) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 87-31, dated 2/18/87 (Approval }
to Modify Order) '
k) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 87-36, dated 3/4/87 (DCRDR SER)
Sumary Report Supplement Enclosure I DCRDR Modifications Prior to Cycle 14 Startup l 1
Description HED Relocate Condenser. Vacuum Isolation Switches on CRP 9-15, 9-17 0102 i Revise Keylock Switch Directions (6 Total) 05E0 l Rewire CWB Pump Bypass Gates and Cond Flood Valve Switches 05C0 1 Remove Head Spray Valve Control Switches 0601 l
Rearrange Components on CRP 9-2 0200 Relocate Hogger Control Switch to CRP 9-2 1406 Relocate 516 VLV Resets, 0G Recorder Selector, FCV-05 Indicators 1406 i l
Eliminate FCV-11 ' Indicators 1406 Rearrange SJAE Switches 1406 ;
Revise AP 0157, 0162 0700/1000 Revise Alarm Lights on CRP 9-10 Rad Monitors 0200 Revise Indicators on CRP 9-23 0200 Relocate 345KV Digital Voltmeter From 9-8 to 9-7 0200 Rearrange Rosemounts and Recorder Inputs on CRP 9-5 0200 Relocate / Split Annunciator Controls Into 4 Zones 0601 Relocate Vital AC Transfer Switch From 9-5 to 9-8 0203 Fix EPR/MPR Findings 1402 Add Scram Lights to CP 9-5 1405 Add Diesel Generator VAR Meters on CRP 9-8 1405 Add Indication of HPCI Initiation Blocked 0602 Add MTS-2 Trip Indication to CRP 9-7 05B0 Seal All Openings in Control Panels 1403 Relabel Switch Escutchlon Plates 05C0 Repaint Control Panels Where Needed N/A Add Lines of Demarcation / Hierarchical Labels 0206/0203 Replace all Mimics 02A0/0201/0300 Replace all Nameplates .
0201/0400 Paint / Replace Control Switches for Color Standard 0300
r Summary Report Supplement Enclosure II l
DCRDR Modifications Prior to Cycle 15 Startup Description HED Flip HPCI/RCIC RPM Meters 05E3 Scale Change on Coolidge Line Voltage 0200 Repaint Indicator Scales (add Units, Change Divisions, etc.) 05E1/05E2 Add Zone Coding to Indicator Scales 0500 Rewire Annunciator System (Segregate, Prioritize add new Panalarms)0600 Eliminate Unnecessary Alarms 0602 Add Annunciation of RX/CTMT RAD Monitor Flow / Filter Fault 05B0 Replace Annunciator Windows 0600 Revise Alarm Response Sheets 0603 Replace Turbine Acceleration Meter 0200 Fix Lighting /HVAC Replace Control Room Ceiling 0800/0901/0902/0904/1409 Upgrade Control Room Consoles (ERFIS Project) 0900 Add Reactor Building Water Level Indication 1410 J Expand Reactor Building Temperature Indication 1411 ,
1 Change Containment Presure Indicators from PSIA to PSIG 1413 1
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l ENCLOSURE III
SUMMARY
REPORT SUPPLEMENT Dynamic E0P Evaluation d
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DYNAMIC EOP EVALUATION I Prepared for .
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation j Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Vernon, Vermont I
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FOREWORD This report represents work performed by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power l
Corporation. Yankee Atomic Electric Company, and General Physics Corporation, to assess the performance of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) for the l l
1 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.
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CONTRIBUTORS The following individuals, as participants in the dynamic'EOP evaluation, were contributors to this report:
A. R. Chesley, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation C. R. Harley, General Physics Corporation
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.G. Johnson, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation.
M. R. Krider Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation D. Labarge, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation W. A. Martin, General Physics Corporation R. E. Sojka, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation R. E, Swenson, Yankee Atomic Electric Company j D. E. Tuttle, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
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TABLE OF CONTENTS ]
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F0 REWORD......................................................... 11 CONTRIBUTORS..................................................... iii ;
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
..................................................... 1 l 1.1 Objectives................................................. 1 1.2 0verview....... ........................................... 1 2.0- METHODOLOGY...................................................... 3 2.1 Preparation Ph.4se.......................................... 3 2.1.1 Representative Scenarios........................... 3 2.1.2 ]
Differences Between Simulator and Control Room..... 4 '
2.1.3 Text and Flow Chart E0P Technical Differences...... 4 2.1.4 Dynamic E0P Evaluation Team........................ 5 2.2 Assessment Phase.........................................:. 6 2.2.1 Conduct of Simulator Real Time Scenarios........... 6 2.2.2 Operator Debriefing................................ 7 2.2.3 Videotipe Analysis................................. 8 2.3 Resolution Phase..............................c............ 8 2.3.1 Classification of Discrepancies.................... 8 2.3.2 Resolution of Discrepancies........................ 9 ,
1 3.0 EVALUATION RESULTS............................................... 12 3.1 Discrepancies / Recommendations.............................. 12 1 3.2 Other Observations / Recommendations for Enhancements........ 14 :
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4.0 CONCLUSION
S...................................................... 16 APPENDIX A - SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS..................................... A-1 l APPENDIX B - DEBRIEFING F0RMS.......................................... B-1 l
APPENDIX C - LINK ANALYSIS............................................. C-1
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
( 1.1 Objectives The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) states in NUREG-0900,
" Guidelines for the Preparation of Emergency Operating Procedures," that a dynamic E0P evaluation effort should be conducted and address the following objectives:
( A. The language and level of information presented in the E0Ps are compatible with the qualification, training, and experience of the
[ operating crew.
L r B. The E0Ps are usable; i.e., they can be understood and followed without confusion, delays, or errors.
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[ C. There is a correspondance between the procedures and the Control Room / plant hardware; i.e., controls, equipment, and indications
[ referenced are available, use the same designation, use the same L
units of measurement, and operate as specified in the procedures.
D. There is a high level of assurance the procedures will work; i.e., the procedure guides the operator in mitigating transients.
The evaluation methodology used encompassed these four NRC objectives.
l 1.2 Overview I
On August 26, 1986, a normal shift complement of trained operators, Operations Crew "B", participated in a series of complicated core threatening exercise scenarios on the Vermont Yankee simulator.
i The purpose of the exercise was to test the effectiveness and workability of the E0Ps in a real time environment.
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6 The operator actions were evaluated by seven (7) observers representing operational and human factors disciplines. The evolutions were videotaped for subsequent analysis.
Three prepared casualty scenarios were utilized for the evaluation, and consisted of the following:
- 1. Total loss of off-site power (I.NP) with a stuck open relief valve.
- 2. A drywell steam line rupture with loss of off-site power and subsequent HPCI failure.
- 3. A turbine trip with bypass failure and failure to scram (ATWS).
Following the completion of each exercise scenario, the operators and evaluators were extensively debriefed to determine:
- 1. Missing Control Room information needs.
- 2. Technical correctness of the E0Ps.
- 3. Usability / workability of the E0Ps.
4 Any previously unidentified simulator versus Control Room instrumentation or functional differences.
The operating crew involvement in the evaluation was only for the duration of the exercises themselves, there were no prerehersals and no beforehand knowledge of the specific content of the exercise scenarios as this would yield the fairest assessment of the E0Ps.
The operating crew was clearly to be an important element of the evaluation team, and the information gathered from their post-accident debriefings would provide a valuable input to Une evaluation.
All data collected from the evaluation was then reviewed in detail to identify any discrepancies and a potential resolution for each.
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( 2.0 METHODOLOGY I
E The methodology used to prepare and conduct the dynamic E0P evaluation :
L i for Vermont Yankee was modeled af ter INPO Guidelines83-006. Figure 1
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7 presents this methodology in a logical format.
L 2.1 Preparation Phase As shown in Figure 1, the key steps-involved in preparing the dynamic
( E0P evaluation in the simulator were:
o Defining representative scenarios.
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o Determining differences between the simulator and the Control Room that may impact the conduct of the scenarios.
(. o Determining text and flow chart E0P differences.
o Preparing the simulator validation team, c Each of these steps is discussed in the following partgraphs.-
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2.1.1 Representative Scenarios A scenario is a collection of selected preplanned events used as a framework in which to evaluate E0Ps and instrumentation and controls. A scenario includes.the initial plant conditions, action sequences, and expected
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1 outcome for a hypothetical plant emergency. To the extent possible, each scenario was planned to include a unique set of paths.through the E0Ps in order to exercise as much of the procedures as possible. A list of Vermont Yankee safety systema was used to define a set of scenarios which adequately sampled various emergency conditions and the plant systems used in those conditions. Table 1 shows the relationship between the safety systems and the scenarios.
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To implement the exercise, a brief narrative description of each scenario was prepared by and for the use of the evaluation team and simulator 5081R l
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operating staff.
These scenario descriptions established the limits and conditions of the events to be analyzed.
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Appendix A includes the scenario descriptions used for the si dynamic E0P evaluation exercises. mulator 2.1.2 Differences Between Simulator and Control Room Prior to conducting the simulator real time scenarios
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[ major differences between the Vermont Yankee simulator oom obtained.
andwasControl R The objective of this review was to determine if any signifi cant
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differences existed that would affect the conduct os. of Oncethe scenari identified, the appropriate adjustments were made to the sc consideration of these differences. enario exercises in The following differences were identified:
o Mimic colors
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I o Torus temperature meter -
on front panel in Control Room
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- on back panel in simulator o Torus pressure meter -
on front panel in Control Room on back panel in simulator o
E0P flow charts -
paper copies in Control Foom
- laminated hard back copies in simulator 2.1.3 Text and Flow Chart EOP Technical Differences An earlier evaluation of the text E0Ps was conducted eal time at in r the Dresden simulator and in slow time in theeeVermont Control Room. A Yank product of this earlier evaluation was the DCRDR Instrumentation n ontrol adC Needs Worksheets that addressed availability of suitable Inst rumentation and 5081R _ _ _ _ - _ _
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Controls (f&C) to exercise the E0Ps. fn order to document that the conclusions drawn from the earlier effort apply to the new flow chart E0Ps, Vermont Yankee confirmed that the flow chart E0Ps contained no functional changes from the text E0?s.
E 2.1.4 Dynamic E0P Evaluation Team l
L A team of individuals was appointed to conduct the evaluation, and consisted of:
I o Subject matter experts o Human factors specialists
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l o Simult. tor instructors o Operating crew o Camera operators The subject matter experts from Vermont Yankee's Training and L Operations Departments were familiar with the procedures and the design and operation of the simulator and Control Room. The simulator instructors understood the hardware design, software programming capabilities, and operation of the simulator. A typical complement of operating personnel for the unit was used to follow the procedures during the scenarios. The Control Room manning during the real time scenarios was identical to the manning under J normal plant operating conditions.
Preparation of the validation team, except the operating crew, included collecting and reviewing supporting documentation which consisted of the following:
o Copies of the current revision of the E0P.s.
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o Differences noted between the simulator and the Vermont Yankee Control Room.
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o Exercise evaluation criteria (debriefing guidelines - Appendix B). -
F Preparation of the operating crew consisted of familiarization training L
in use of the E0Ps accomplished as part of routine operator training.
2.2 Assessment Phase r
[ This phase focused on collecting information during the real time scenarios and reviewing the results of these exercises to identify performance
( discrepancies. This process included the following steps (see Figure 1):
r o Conduct simulator scenarios.
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o Debrief operators following each scenario.
o Analyze videotapes of scenarios, if necessary.
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2.2.1 Conduct of Simulator Real Time Scenarios The scenarios provided an objective context in which to evaluate the usability, compatibility, and effectiveness of the procedures, and instrumentation and controls. In contrast to walking through the precedures in a static environment in which oversights may continue to be overlooked, the simulator environment mimicked the operating conditions for a more objective challenge to the procedures. The simulator also provided a setting in which the operators were faced with a reasonably realistic emergency situation for which they must diagnose the symptoms and proceed accordingly using the new procedures.
The representative operating crew selected for participation in this evaluation had been familiarized with use of the new flow chart format E0Ps during operator training.
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The operating crew was briefed beforehand that the sole purpose of this series of exercises was to evaluate the efficacy of the E0Ps and related
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Control Room features. It was made clear that this was not an evaluation of operator performance.
The specific content of the scenarios was not disclosed to the
( operators prior to the exercises in order to eliminate the opportunity for any preplanning that could bias the evaluation results. In this way, a more rigorous evaluation could be performed.
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Each scenario was simulated separately with a debriefing session
[ immediately following each scenario. During the scenarios, evaluation team members Training / Operations personnel, and two human factors specialists
[ participated. Notes were taken on copies of the debriefing form during the performance of the scenarios. However, excessive note taking was avoided so
( that the evaluation team members were free to observe. The videotape record of each scenario permitted the observers to further analyze occurrences later if needed.
It was intended that, during the scenarios, if the operating crew momentarily took an unexpected alternate path that was incorrect, and were able to get back on the correct path using the procedure within a reasonable amount of time, the simulation would continue undisturbed. If, however, the crew took an unexpected alternate path that was incorrect, and showed no sign !
of recovering, the simulation would be stopped. These situations never occurred.
2.2.2 Operator Debriefing f An operator debriefing session was conducted immediately following each scenario. The cournents of the operators who participated in the exercise provided one of the most important sources of information for evaluating the procedures exercised. Debriefing guidelines (Appendix B) were used to structure the, interviews, permitting consistent focus on key questions of usability, understandability, correctness, and compatibility of the EOPs and Control Room instrumentation. Videotape recordings of each exercise were also 5081R
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L available for use during the debriefings to clarify any questions concerning
[ actions taken during the exercises.
A human factors specialist explained the debriefing process and its ,
L purpose to the operators and elicited f rom them general consnents on the impact of the procedures on their performance and any procedure-related problems they encountered during the scenario. These comments were recorded. The operators
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were asked to identify possible reasons for any procedure-related problems they encountered and to present any potential solutions to alleviate those
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Concerns.
[ The evaluation team members then presented observations and potential discrepancies they identified during the scenario. The operators were asked
[ again to identify possible reasons for procedure-related problems and !
potential solutions to these problems. All discrepancies and potential solutions identified during the debriefings were documented.
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p 2.2.3 Analyze Videotapes l
The videotapes of the scenarios were reviewed later to perform link L analyses (see Appendix C), which trace the movement patterns of the operating crew in the Control Room. These were prepared to assess whether the Control Room layout hinders operator movement while performing actions required by the
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events. Any dynamic performance problems that were uncovered during this analysis were documented and are contained in Section 3.1.
2.3 Resolution Phase In the resolution phase, the observations and findings identified during assessment were evaluated. Upon completion of the evaluation, reconsnendations for each discrepancy were discussed.
2.3.1 Classification of Discrepancies The purpose of analyzing the discrepancies was to identify potential ,
shortcomings in the procedures. Each observation identified during the debriefing was analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine if it was an l
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error or if it was an acceptable discrepancy and should be given further I'
. consideration.
L The validation team used the evaluation criteria presented in
( Appendix B to assist them in determining whether an error was due to a procedural problem or other causes such as Control Room hardware, training, or manpower.
2.3.2 Resolution of Discrepancies The final product of the analysis was a compilation of discrepancies and recommendations. These are presented in Section 3.0.
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Table 1 Comperison of Systems Exercised by Scenario Scenario il - Loss of Off-Site Power Scenario 02 - Small Break LOCA Scenario 93 - Turbine Trip with ATWS System Scenario el Scenario 02 Scenario 03
, HPCI X X X ROIC X X l l
LPCI X l
! CS X X ,
I RPS X -X t
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' Define Representative Scenarios I'
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PREPARATIN Determine Simulator and PHASE Control Room Differences
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L p Determine Text and Flowchart E0P Technical Differences h
Prepare Simulator Evaluation Team l P
Conduct Simulator Real Time Scenarlos U
ASSESSMENT Debrief Operators j PHASE J
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u Review Videotapes l f-L f
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] Classify Discrepancies r FESOI.UTION
[ PGASE ,
Identify Resolutions I
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l l Figure 1 Dynamic EOP Evaluation Process
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3.0 EVAI.UATION RESULTS 3.1 Discrepancies / Recommendations The following are the discrepancies noted during the dynamic _E0P evaluation performed at the Vermont Yankee simulator on August 26, 1986, and the subsequent recommendations:
o The Vermont Yankee simulator, only recently having been delivered, lags the Control Room in instrument / control modifications. [See Appendix A, Debriefing Guidelines, Attribute 1.2.2(13).]
[ Typically, changes as a result of the DCRDR or equipment modification packages are made in the Vermont Yankee Control Room
( first. These changes listed in Section 2.1.2 are scheduled for the simulator, following the simulator warranty period.
o The operators did not have enough table top space to lay out the flow charts without overlapping so they can all be seen at once.
[ [See Appendix A Debriefing Guidelines, Attribute 1.2.2.(8).] They need to see all of the flow charts so they can continuously check
( entry conditions. A larger flow chart laydown space is needed.
The operators suggested that the table near the shift supervisor's desk would be appropriate if the two printers and chart recorder could be relocated. This needed table top space will be factored into the new workstation layout as part of the SPDS project.
[This discrepancy was also identified in the previous DCRDR (HED 0900) and is addressed in more detail in the Vermont Yankee ECRDR Implementation Task Team Final Report.] j 1
o The new SIGMA reactor water level indication meters (e.g., those on the HPCI panel) are too small, have less contrast, and are hard for the operators to read. Replacement meters with improved readability in accordance with NUREG-0700 guidelines should be ,
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l o The procedure steps do not always reference the instrument or control to be used to perform the step (e.g., OE-3102, lef t column, - 1st step, "Drywell RRU Average Return Air Temperature 160 F."
There is not an instrument that measures averante return air temperature. [See Appendix A, Debriefing Guidelines, h Attribute 1.1.1(3). ] The operators use Recceder TR-16-19-45 because further on in the procedure, right eciumn, 5th step, the
{ use of this recorder is referenced). It was the consensus of the operators participating in this evaluation that the addition of specific instrument references would be a useful enhancement.
Since the addition of this information will not degrade the procedures nor create a space problem, consideration should be given to incorporating this enhancement where appropriate.
o The operators have expressed a difficulty in using the table in the lower lef t-hand corner of Procedure OE-3105. Additional operator training should be provided or the table redesigned with operator input on how to improve its usability.
o The operators observed an inconsistency when dealing with the figures (i.e., graphs) on the flow charts. [See Appendix A, Debriefing Guidelines, Attribute 1.1.2(3).] Sometimes the safe region is below the curve and other times above the curve. This inconsistency was of concern to the operators because of the potential of misreading under stress. A solution to this would be t'o color code the regions, e.g., all safe regions would be green and all unsafe regions would be red. Color coding EOP entry conditions and curves is planned for SPDS displays.
o Only wide-range drywell pressure indication is available on the front panel making it necessary for the operators to go to the back panel to get drywell pressure narrow-range information. (See Appendix A, Debriefing Guidelines, Attribute 1.1.2(13).] Since the narrow-range meter is used more often than the wide-range meter, j narrow-range indication should be made available on the front !
panel. The addition of a comrauter-driven digital display presently 5081R
under consideration within the plant computer replacement project may resolve this item.
o All containment pressure instrumentation in the Control Room is in units of psia, while the EOPs call for units of psig. [See Appendix A, Debriefing Guidelines, Attribute 1.2.2(6).] This inconsistency shouId be eliminated to avoid the necesvity for an operator calculation.
o Emergency lighting in the back panel area and at the procedures
{
desk is unsatisfactory. Operators could not read instrumentation in the back panel area and have to strain to read the flow charts at the procedures desk. Emergency lighting should be improved in the back panel area and workstation areas that require reading.
(This discrepancy was also identified in the previous DCRDR
(, (HED 0902 and 1409), and has been addressed and scheduled in the Vermont Yankee DCRDR Implementation Task Team Final Report.]
3.2 Other Observations / Recommendations for Enhancements The following observations noted during the dynamic EOP evaluations at Vermont Yankee on August 26, 1986, and subsequent recommendations, are included below. They are not categorized as discrepancies because they are judged not to impact the efficacy of the E0Ps.
o During the exercise scenarios, the operators were quickly able to focus an appropriate mitigating actions. In several instances, they were able to diagnose and inmediately establish the root cause and forecast the sequence of actions that would bring the event to
( a rapid conclusion. They felt constrained, however, to rigorously follow the stepwise format of the E0Ps until the predicted action was reached.
The operators expressed a desire for more explicit guidance regarding circumstances and authority to deviate from the EOPs.
5081R
L' l
o .The operators also expressed a desire to have other parts of the flow charts color coded. They suggested the borders of each flow chart, about 1/4 to 1/2 inch border, be colored a separate distinctive color and the entry and exit arrows color and shape coded. The color of the arrow would correspond to the referenced flow charts color, and the shape code would reference the specific
[ entry or exit point so as not to be confused with multiple arrows of the same color.
Color coding E0P entry conditions and curves was suggested for E0P flow chart enhancement.
[
o The operators expressed concern over the limits indicated in two graphs. [See Appendix A, Debrief'ing Guidelines, Attribute 1.1.2(4).] On Flow Chart OE-3104 (Figure T/L-2), the curve shows
( 6.5 feet as a safe level in the torus for the lower limit; however, the T-quenchers were thought to be at 7.5 feet on center and, thus, would not condense steam in the torus with water level below 7.5 feet.
Also, on Flow Chart OE-3104 the upper lef t-hand , portion of the Figure T/T-1 curve goes vertical at about 110 psig. The far right-hand portion of the curve similarly gnes vertical at 1080 psig.
Operators suggested setpoints and calculations used to develop these curves be reviewed for correctness.
l !
5081R
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4.0 CONCLUSION
S The following general conclusions can be drawn regarding the dynamic E0P evaluation:
[
o The training, knowledge level, and responsiveness of the operators greatly complemented the language and level of information presentr.d in the EOP flow charts.
o The flow charts are usable, and.this format well accepted by station operators.
o The flow charts work, o There is a correspondence between the flow charts and the Control Room / plant hardware.
[
By turning their EOPs into flow charts, Vermont-Yankee has increased
( EOP readability, understandability, and level of detail by shape-coding action and decision steps, highlighting cautions and notes, and improving transitions to references or branched procedures. The operators' feel the use of flow charts has greatly enhanced their ability to respond to any emergency situation and return the plant to a safe condition.
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APPENDIX A SCENAPJO OESOP;PTIONS r
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S5379 l e Page ! of 3
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VERM WT YANKEE NUC:. EAR F06R CORD P ATI M SIM'J ATOR SCENARIO .
[
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Loss of Off-Site Power n TITLEt !
55379 b Nu fER__ .
Rev. O, May 1986 REVI5! > NU 4ER _
.. %~E SIGNATU2.E_
gooRyAL Vermon: Yankee , . '
, 1 - ,i faf
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SS379 F Page 2 of 4 L
VERMONT YANKEE M.C. EAR POWER CORPORATION
[
SIMU ATOR SCENARIO
[.. TITLE: Less of Off-site Power NU66EA SS 379 OESO918 TION e' Malfunctions / Type: ADC2 Relief Valve Stuck Open (RV-71A-0)/Ceneric (A,*,C,0)
{ !
ED17 Less of Off-site Power /Ois::ste
[ Cause ADC2 Sele:ted relief valve mechanically tincs in the caen position ED17 Multiple Faults on Switchyard due to severe st::m
[
Recomenced Plant Conditions ;
( Reacto: Operating at Power 53 - 103 i
S:enario Sumary: Insert malfun: tion ADC2 A Relief Valve Stu:k Open. Inser;
( malfun: tion E 17 Loss of Off-Site Power. Tnis will cause a total 1 css of off-site power resulting in a rea:ter s::am, tu sine ::ip, genera::: lockout and ?;IS isolations. Relief
[ valves win lift at tne app:cpriate setpoin with "A" relief
'alve v sti: king cren.
All A0 power sou :es win de-energize except th:se wni:n a:e
[ alternately supplied from the DC cattery systems.
Tns energency ciesel gene a:::s win auto sta:t a .: ci:se er.
busses 3 and A.
Doe:ation of emergency core cooling systems win be
,[ ne assary to maintain R*V level.
At the dis: etion of- the ins: u::c: malfun:: ion ADC2A may. de e removed to cause "A" relief valve to oe:ome tnstuck an: to elese.
Removal of Malfun:-ion D17 will :: store the swit:nyard off-site power sour:es to n:: mal, permitting ne:essary ele::-i-f cal operations to re:over from :ne LN*.
1
'5379 I Page 3 of 4 VERMONT YANKEE MJ1 EAR POWER CORPORATION SIMULATOR SCENARIO I
References P+ID G-192128 1, 2
[ G-191299 CwD's 32437 GEK 32437
[ OT 3122 VYtPC Simulate: Malfunction Cause and Effects
[
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[
ss m Page 4 of a p-INSTRUCTOR NOTES:
FUNCTION ESCRIPTICN AP.IFYING INFORMATION-
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Pago I of A
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L ERM34T YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CNPCRATION p
L '
. > . L './ SIMULATCR SCENARIO
[. TITLE: Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident NUGER: 55399 REVISI34 N'J4ER _ Rev. O, April 1986
[
g::caygt SIONATUS.E E Vermont Yankee Simulate: AD/j ,
.ga // I9%.-
[ Insuu:te: _
.es c.J '
V
- o. 5:.auen< nite
-#1 mJM,,
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l'nLis"*' e,4/r.
[ E. 8.inc.amcod Operations Training S mervise: b, > _
(o//r [R 6
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S5399 Pag? 2 of 4 j r 1 l l u
VERM:NT YANKEE NU:1. EAR POWER CPPCRATION P
1_ SIMULAT m SCENARIO ;
TITLE: Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident NLMBER: SS399 TStRICTICN:
Malfun:tions/ Type. H506 Main Steam Line "A" Rupture in Drywell/ Variable (100% = comlete pice degradation) ,
Hool FPOI Turtine Trio / Discrete
[ ED02 Less of Startup Transfc:me 3A, 3B/0eneri: A,B Cause, MSD6 Pipe Failure between R*V and Flow Restrict =
[ FP01 Failure of PS-23-97A, FPCI Turtine Exnaust Pressce High Failce of Transfc me +3A = +3B Succen P:essee Relay
[ 63FF-A,B Re:or:rnenced Plant Canditions.
Reactc: Operating at Power 1% - 100%
[ Scenario Sur.ary 1. Insert malfunction MS06 Main Steam Line Re:tr e in cywell at 4% severity a 'a 300 se:. rams ra e.
Tnis will cause a small treak icss of :::lan a=1-
[ cent. i
- 2. Tne inss of invent =y to the cywell will cause =y ell
[ tempera:ce and press e e to rise.
~
- 3. Malfun: tion saverity may need to be in= eased to get the
[
L oesired results.
- 4. C ywell presses snould in:: ease to the scam sen:in:
and a s=am should oc c.
(
- 5. When rea:tc; s=am occu s, insen malfun:ti:r.s EDC2A and EDC23. The PCI system snould star; and su=1y PJ.;n
{ press C e makego wa:e to **1e E*V.
- 6. Wnen the W"I system starts, insert malfun= ion f 1 tunine ::ip.
- 7. Graoually in= ease the severity of tne malfun:: ion to cause a further coo in R*V level and an in= ease in cywell temperatce and pressure.
_ I SS399
' Page 3 of 4 b VERMCNT YANKEE NU 1 EAR POWER C mP mATICN SIM'J ATm SCENARIO
[ 8. Drywell temperature and pressure may increase to the point that RPV Emergency Depressurization and fico::ing !
are recuired.
[
- 9. Removal of the re: ire rupture malfunction will re ui;e reinitialization of the simulate:.
{
EK 9613
(
References:
FSAR 14.6.3 Less of Cociant A::ioent CWD B-191301 sh. 1450 VYNDC Simulator Halfun: tion Cause and Effects
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u 55399 P2g3 4 of 4 L
r INSTRUCT @ NOTESt_
L ESCRIPTICN AMPLIFYING INF@ HATICN FUNCTICN
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SS 56N2B'.5
- -* SS370C r -
Pege 1 of 4 l L - -
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' YERMONT YANKEE N'JC. EAR POWER CORPORATION E- ~: -
7
,'i SIM'JLATGt SCENARIO TITLE, Turbine Trip with ATWS NU4ER, SS3700
[. Rev. O, May 1986 REVISICN NU4ER
[
[
CATE a==RW:L 5:CCTU:E
[
Vermont Yankee ,
a
[ Simulate Instru:ter i , f., [
/
[b D. Slauenwhi e Senic: Simulate: ( 9 rZ -
2ns::u: c: . ws ,n ?d E. u n:m= cod VL5 4 [e ll h D.C _
6 1
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SS370C Page 2 of 4 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION SIMULATOR SCENARIO TITLE: Tu: Dine Trip with ATWS HusER _ 553700 TS RISTION:
Malfun:tions/ Type: R 01 Failure to Auto S =am TC01 Turbine Trio I/O 03A351-B "A" RDS S::am pushbutton (False) l I/O C3A352-3 "B" RDS S :am pushbutton (False) l I/O 03A2529-0 Rx Hooe Switch (False)
I/O C2A2501 ARIAST trip (False)
I/O 02A2503 ARI/ APT trip (False)
I/O C2A25% ARI/Roi ::1p (False)
I/O C2A2506 ARI/RST trip (False)
I/O 14A3SC2-3 RoS K3 Set Power (True) l I/O 15AA502-B R S M3 Set Power (True) l I/O 14A3501 RSS H3 Set Power (True)
I/O 15:4501 RDS M3 Set Power (True)
Ro01 Sha ' a'-~d' on all R S 10;i:
Cause:
TC01 Emergen:y govern : trip valve latch failure Re:cmmenced Plant Condit. ions:
Rea:te: Doe:ating at :ower, 50% - 10'N l Scenario Sur.ary: Insert r:alfun::lon Rool, failu e to auto s::am. Using I instru::= cve--ices, remove all means of canually s: a : ing the rea::=.
I/O C3A3SI-B "A" RoS Scam pushbutton (False)
I/O 03A352-B " " Ros S: am pushbutton (False)
I/O 03A2529-0 Rx Moce Swit:n (False)
I/O C2A2501 ARI/ rot trip (False)
I/O C2A2SC3 ARI/ rot trip (False)
I/O C2A2S3t AoI/M:7 trip (False) 1/0 C2A2SO6 AD1/RST rip (False)
I/O IAA35.:2-3 R S H3 Se: Power (True) 1/015AASC2-B R S H3 Set Pows- (True)
I/O 1AA3501 Ros K3 Set Power (True) 1/015A4501 RSS M3 Set Power (True)
SS370C Page 2 of 4
{
VERMONT YANKEE NU1 EAR POWER CORPORATION SIMULATOR SCENARIO TITLE: Turbine Trip with ATWS NU4ER: SS370C i
ES-RIDTIW:
l Malfun:: ions / Type: R*01 Failure to Auto S::am TC01 Turbine Trip I/O 03A351-B "A" RDS S::am pushbutton (False)
( I/O C3A352-8 "B" RoS S :am pushbutton (False) 1/0 03A2529-0 Rx Hooe Swit:n (False)
I/O C2A2501 ARIAST trip (False)
[ I/O 02A2503 ARIA *T trip (False)
I/O C2A2504 ARIA:T ::1p (False)
I/O C2A2506 ARI/R2T trio (False) 1/014A3SC2-B R S m Set Power (True)
[ '
I/O 15AA502-B RoS < Set Power (True)
I/O 14A3501 RSS C Set Power (True)
I/O 15A4501 R*S m Set Power (True)
{
Cause:
Ro01 Sha-' ** *~ on all R*S legi:
TC01 Emergency governor trip valve latch failure Re:or.nended Plant Conditions:
[
Rea:ter Coe: sting at Sower, 5:3 - 10'N S:enario Sumary: Insert calfun: tion R 01, failure to a'rto s: am. Lting instru:::: ove.--ions, remove all means of canually s: a=ing the rea::::. l I/O C3A351-B "A" RoS S::am pushbutton (False)
I/O 03A352-B "B" RoS S :am pushbutton (False)
I/O C3A2S29-D Rx Hode Swit::h (False)
I/O C2A2501 ARI/R=T trip (False)
I/O C2A25::3 ARI/R:7 trip (False)
I/O C2A2534 ARI/R:7 trio (False)
I/O C2A2506 A:l/RST ::1p (False)
I/O laA35':2-3 2 S >G Se: Pows: (True) 1/0 15AASC2-B RoS m Set Powe- (True) 1/01AA3501 R*S HG Set Power (True)
I/O 15A4501 RSS C Set Power (True)
l L-553700 F Pago 3 of a L
r VERK:NT YANKEE ffJ1 EAR POWER CCRPTATICN SIMULATOR SCENARIO 1
1 l
i Insert malfunction TC01, turbine trio. This will cause a turbine stop valve closure and turoine control valve fast closure, A scram signal will be generated but
[ control ro:s will remain at their present position.
All manual attempts to scram the cont cl rods will be unsuccessful.
{
Control rod insertion will be possible using the manual Icd cont cl system.
[ Removal of malfun: tion R,201 will restere the autor.ati:
s::am fun:: ions.
References VYNSO Simulat : Malfun: tion Cause and Effects i
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1
Pagte 4 of 4 I
L TNSTRUCTOR NOTES:
F L W .IFYING INFORMATION ESCRIPTION FUNMION
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[ CRP 9 4 CRP 9 3
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( e n DESK r e L &
N l e m
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Operator I -
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Operator 13
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aa CRP 9 4 g g CRP 9 3 g@/ l l
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Scenario 3 111 Operator
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[ CRP 9 4 CRP 9 3
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DESK
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O A X = At this location except where noted E
O Scenario 3 Operator IV i
t I
) CRP 9-4 CRP 9 3 i
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[ @= At this location except where noted l =
0 Scenario 3 Operator V
ll i
F 1
L Page 1 of 4 Scenstic:fj) l.o p af CGC 5,h., hwes Date r/26/ rc .
Emergency Operating Procedure Validation Guidelines for Debriefing
'?he following validation criteria are presently in the fo:n of questions and l are to be used by the validation team as guidelines only; they p: ovide structure to the debriefing process.
Ivaluators should check whether a criterion has been met or indicate N/A if Procedure-related the criterion could not be evaluated or was not applicable.
"N", can be documented in greater detail using the problems, indicated by an atta:hed c=nsents (e.g. , whethe: it is a generic p:cble: or e::urs at ene step in a procede:e). i 1.1 Useability.
1.1.1 Level o' Detail J43 1. Was there sufficient information to pe: form the specified
' a:ticas at each step?
- s (3_ 2. Were all alternatives explicit at each de:ision point?
- 3. Could the operato: use labe31ng, abbreviations, and n6 lo:ation information as provided in the IC?s to find the s 6. .s snarb needed equip =ent?
f v- 4. Were the E0?s missing information needed to r.anage the e=e:gency conditions?
f V ts 5. We:e the contingency actions as stated in the IC?s suffi: Lent?
- Jts E. Could the cperate use titles and n:-be:s to find
- ref eren:ed or b:an:hed p:oced::es? 7 1.1.2 Understandability i
ss 1. Was the typef ace easy to, read? ;
4 sh3 2. We:e the e=phasized ite=s noticed? :
( *
- 3. Were the figures and tables easily and a::c: ate y read?
A/-
Sis temmJ U tems neted with asterisk fe us en procedu:e transition issues. f' 4
I
1 1
Page 2 of 4 1 j
its 4. Was interpolation of values on figures and charts 1 3,, ,,- .;b difficult?
1:3 5. Were caution and note statements understood?
l vts 6. Was the organization of the EOPs understood? i 1
- 7. Was the E0P step understood?
a(S 6
a.s B. Were the step seeuences understood?
T set of l
- jc> 9. Could the operator find the particular step c: '
t steps when required?
)
- Joy 10. Could the operator return to the procedure exit point j without omitting steps when :equired? <
- J45 11. Could the operato: ente the branched p:ocedure at the i correct point?
- atS 12. Could the operator exit from a given ICP at the correct i branch?
1.2 operational Correctness 1.2.1 Technical Correctness \
Js> 1. Were the instructions app:cpriate do: the e=ergen:y-t condition?
- Jth 2. Were the p:ocedure actions able to be perfor=ed on the.
plant in the designated sequence?
- 3. rid the operate: find alternate success paths act in the
- (6 E3Ps?
s rs 4. Was the p:ocednre action able to be performed en the
' plant at the designated ti=e intervals?
g 5. Ceuld the operator obtain the necessary infer:atice d:c:
' designated plant instru=entation when :equired by the p:oced::e?
- 45 f. Did the plant sy=pte:s direct the cperater to the t
' applicable IC? by its entry conditic.s?
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c Page 2 of 4 c
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1.2.2 Compatability ash 1. Were the ECP instructions compatible with the operating h shift sanning?
ass 2. Were the procedure actions able to be performed by the I
L s operating shift?
ad 3. Did the ECPs help coordinate the actions of the operating 7 \ shift?
L
/ 4 Did the operator have to use responses or other equipment 4e not specified in the ECPs to acco=plish his task?
I L
u :s _ 5. Did the plant conditions seen by the cpe:ator cc espond
' to what was in the EDP7 E.
Were the inst:crent readings and tolerances consistent de g e..h with the instrument values stated in the IOP? ,
- veS */ .
We:e the cperators able to distinguish the IDP f ce other
(
procede:es in the cont:o1 :oom?
- 8. Were the IO?s physically ec:patible with the work
//
,J situation (too bulky to hold, binding wouldn't allow them to lay flat in verk space, no place to lay the ICPs doc f to use)?
L iJ t i 9. Was the plant conditions cc:patible with the acticn which r \
the ICP directed to be perforced at a ti e interval or L specified time?
46 10. Was the operating shift able to fcilow the designated r a: tion step sequences.
t
[
J r3 11. Did the plant conditions allow the operator to corre:Cy i
follow the action step?
Whi=h procedure for:st h ow:ht h o: text) is better f:==
f!M 12.
e.: cperaters stanfpcint?
.J r i 13. Were the:e any si:21 ter-centrol roc: diffe:ences that i ,
hinde:ed the peric :ance cf the scenario?
7
- n)
L 51bl/ b D //
Sitt. F...e of Irt. att:
Page 4 of 4 I
1 1
1 1
l Plant E:tergency Operating Prodedures validation Corsent Form This f orm is to be used to provide additional corsents, inferrr.ation, The er qualifying statements associated with the EOP validation guidelines.
( guideline item nur.ber should be entered here along with the apprepriate co : rent.
Cor:: rent Iter
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Scenario:(2,) Q d 3r d kO( k Date: T $l.
Emergency Operating Procedure Validation Guidelines for Debriefing The following validation criteria are presently in the form of questions and are to be used by the validation team as guidelines only; they provide structure to the debriefing process.
[
Ivaluators should check whether a criterion has the criterien could not be evaluated or was not applicable. detail using the been met or indicate Procedure-related
[ *N",
i problems, can be indicated documented by anwhether (e.g., in greatt:atta:hed it is a generic problem cc er:ents occurs at ene step in a procedure).
1.1 Useability 1.1.1 Level of Detail
- 1. Was there sufficient info.~ation to perform the spe:ified R$ actions at each step?
- 2.
We:e all alte: natives explicit.at ea:t de:ision point?
.(S.
- 3. Cocid the operator use labeling, abb:eristions, and M: location information as provided in the IOPs to find the g 3ug g needed equip =ent?
I 4. Were the EOPs z.issing information needed to =anage the Ae emergency conditiens?
- 5. Were the contingency actions as stated in the IOPs JJ sufficient?
l
- 6. Cotid the cpe:ato: use titles and nu.bers to find ;
d e_5 refe:enced c: b:an:hed proced:res? i i
1.1.2 Understandability
- 1. Was the typeface easy to read?
Jc3 4(3 2. We:e the emphasized ite=s noticed?
e
- 3. We:e the figu:es and tahles easily and a::cra e_y read? ..i L
5" how.b(i)
Ite s noted with asterisk feces on procedure transition issues.
Page 2 of 4
/ph 4. Was interpolation of values on figures and charts s.. w , n N difficult?
Jr3 5. Were caution and note statements understood? ,
- 6. Was the organization of the EOPs understood? f sns i I
v ry 7. Was the EOP-step understood?
ses 8, Were the step sequences understood? !
- see 9. Could the operator find the particular step or set of i steps when required?
- vrt 10. Could the ope:ator return to the procedure exit point a
without omitting steps when required?
Could the eperato: enter the b:anched procedure at the
- sgj 11.
/
cc::ect point?
- 12. Cocid the operato exit fro a given ECP at the ::: rect v(3 I b:an:b?
1.2 operational Correctness 1.2.1 Technical Cor:ectness J (s 1. Were the instructions app:=priate for the eme:gency
' condition?
- 2. Were the procedure actions able to be pe:for=ed on the
- J cj,
' plant in the designated sequence?
- /b 2. tid the ope:ater dind alternate s ::ess paths not in the ,
Ic?s? /
vis 4. Was the procedere action able to be perfor:ed on the
' plast at the designated time intervals?
Jf3 5 Co *.d the ope: ster obtain the necessary infor ation f::= J
{ ' designated plant inst:==entation when required by the procedure?
- v, r E. Did the plant ry :pto:s direct the operator to the
- applicable E::? by its est y conditions?
1 l'
L I
L Page 3 of 4 F
L 1.2.2 Compatability 1.
Were the EOP instructions compatible with the operating Jr5 shift manning?
the
- 2. Were the procedure actions able to be performed by .
4 t3
- operating shift?
3.
Did the EOPs help coordinate the actions of the operating
,2,a[,1
' shift?
4.
Did the operator have to use responses or other equipment
- Ah not specified in the EDPs to a :o=plish his task?
5.
Did the plant conditions seen by the operator correspond aci
~~T~~~ to what was in the EDP?
readings and tolerances consistent A E. Were the inst c=ent
,, , ,g . ,o (9 with the inst cment values stated in the IO7?
ether Were the operators able to distinguish the E0P f:::
- JcJ_ 7.
p:ocedu:es in the centrol roc ?
E.
Were the EDPs physically ec patible with the work 4(
u..<.,(9 situation (too bulky to hold, binding wouldn't allow them 3 to lay flat in verk space, no place to lay the EDPs down to use)?
9.
Was the plant conditions cenpatible with the action which
.re s the IOP directed to be perfor=ed at a ti=e interval c:
spe:ified tice?
de; 10.
Was the operating shif t able to fcilow the designated action step sequences.
to ec::ect~y stj 11. Did the plant conditions allow the operato:
- follow the action step?
IIM 12. Which p meed::e f:::st (ov:har) : text) is better fro:-
an cperat :s stanfpcint?
s,f 13. Were the:e any si=clater-cent::1 roo: diffe:ences that l hindered the performance of the scenarie?
s* < s u - L t.3 wh/ kNk h6 J /
Signa:::e cf Ev .uate I
l I
l Page 4 of 4 Plant:
Emergency Operating Prodedures validation ;
Comment Form i
( I l
This form is to be used to provide additional co=ents, information, The or
[ qualifying statements associated with the ECP validation guidelines.
L guideline item number should be entered here along with the appropriate cement.
[ Coment
(
( __
l l
w-Page 1 of 4 Scenario: 3) A 7 d 5 I
Date: 7j;/yg I
E:tergency operating Procedure validation Guidelines for Debriefing The following validation criteria are presently in the form of questions and are to be used by the validation team as guidelines only; they provide structure to the debriefing process.
Ivaluaters should check whether a criterion hasProcedure-related the crite: ion could not be evaluated or was not applicable.
been cet or indicate N/A
- N", can be documented in greater detail using the f problems, indicated(e.g. by an , whether it is a generic proble or o::::s at one step attached co :ents in a procedure).
1.1 Useability 1.1.1 1,evel of Detail f Was the:e sufficient infor=ation to pe:for= the specified Jc5 1.
actions at each step?
- sg(
i 2. Were all alternatives explicit at each decision peint?
- 2. Could the operator use labeling, abbreviations, and **e Ah location infor:ation as provided in the IOPs to -"
m . c .) needed equip ent?
/ 4. Were the ICPs missing info::ation needed to za:tage the A.
emergency conditions?
,l d 5. Were the contingency actions as stated in the ID?s s sufficient?
- E. Could the operat : use tit ~ es and n==.bers to find J c3_ ,
4 referen:ed or branched proced:res?
!?. 2 Dnderstandatility
- 1. Was the typeface easy to read?
,n Were the e=ptasi:ed ite=s noticed?
.n> 2.
/
- 2. Ke:e the figures and tat"es easily and a::::ately read?
4: __
p n.,41
- 1:e s n:ted with asterick focus on procedure tre.nsition issues.
l
N r
Page 2 ef 4 P
L h[ 4. Was interpolation of values on figures and charts 3 , ,,, c ,y difficult?
L Vis 5. Were caution and note statements understood?
i ses 6. Was the organization of the IOPs understood?
( I s,3_ 7. Was the Io? step understood?
< JtJ 8. Were the step sequences understood?
I sn 9. Could the operator find the particular step or. set of i steps when required?
- vg. 10. Could the operator return to the procedure exit peint
- without emitting steps when required?
(
- J,s 11. Could the eperato enter the bran:hed p:c:edure at the i cc::ect peint?
- t /(3 12. Could the operator exit fro: a given It? at the correct
' branch? .
1.2 Operational Correctness 1.2.1 Technical Correctness ya 1. We:e the inst c:tiens apprepriat'e fe: the e=ergency
$ conditien?
7 l
l
- Je 2. Were the procedure actions able to be perfer:ed en the
- plant in the designated sequence?
r 1
l * //- 3. tid the operater find alternate success paths n:t in the ID?s?
l
.is , 4. Was the procedure action atie to be perfor:ed on the l
- plant at the designated ti=e intervals?
Ju 5. C=:1d the cperator ebtain the necessary 1.fer ztien f:::
a designated plant instru=entation when requi:ed by the proced::e?
- 00 E. tid the plant sy=pte._s direct the eperater to the i applicable IUP by its entry cenditions?
m Page 3 cf 4 L
1.2.2 Compatability
- 1. Were the EOP instructions compatible with the operating Vis
[ shift manning?
2.
Were the procedure actions able to be performed by the g Jes_
[
L 4 operating shift?
3.
Did the EDPs help coordinate the actions of the operating Jef r ' shift?
[ I 4.
Did the operator have to use responses or other equipment f A(. not specified in the ECPs to accomplish his task?
5 Did the plant conditions seen by the operator eo::espond Jo
' to what was in the ECP7 6.
Were the inst:crent readings and tolerances consistent l Ab y , .. .,l d with the inst::=ent values stated in the E0P?
7.
We:e the ope: ate:s able to distinctish the EOF f rem ether l
- s,s procedures in the control roo ? s Were the ECPs physically ec=patible with the work
)
4(- 2.
situation (too bulky to hold, binding wouldn't allow them 3.~vo el to lay flat in w :k space, no place to lay the ECPs down r to use)?
l 9.
Was the plant eenditiens co:patible with the action which Je( the ECP di:ected to be performed at a time interval c:
6 specified time?
10.
Was the operating shif t able to follow the designated ese a
a: tion step sequences.
to cerrectly
- 11. Did the plant conditions allow the operato:
Jr3 follow the action step?
Which proced::e for:at . flow: hart or text) is better fro:
(W *2.
an cperate:s standpcint?
Yes 12. Were there any si=:lator-control roc: differences that tinde:ed the performance of the scenario?
3, yg,c,j :
! ' b , f.i:v) a signate:e cf I*.s sleat ::
A l
^
Page 4 of 4 1
Plant:
Emergency Operating Prodedures validation Comment Form This form is to be used to provide additional comments, information, The or qualifying statements asso:iated with the ECP validation guidelines.
guideline iten number should be entered here along with the appropriate c =ent.
Cc=ent Itee L.
1 I
r l
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l APPE!CIX C 1,:NK M;.CYSES l
6 L
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SCENARIO 1 I
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Scenario 1 Operator Il i.
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r 3 r
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L
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CRP 9-4 CRP 9-3 ;
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-- DESK l 2 .- @
a.
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6 z
o
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Scenario 111 Operator
[
[-
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m CRP 9 4 CRP 9 3
( /
l DESK e "
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I u
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u l
e
' E X = At this location except where noted l 5
1 Scenario Operator IV
b e
r L
i L
f L
f L
t CRP 9-4 CRP 9 3 m ,, ., m l
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Scenario 1 Operator V
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l SCENARIO 2
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d a CRP 9 4 CRP 9 3 g gg op (p/ 'l tIR HJlIto T
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Scenario 2 Operator I
1 I
a a non l
CRP 9-4 CRP 9 3 1
@a @ l g__e i w n o- o .-
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cf ;/ 7 et _ .
,' == = ; - .
it uo !
DESK O e H
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Scenario 2 Operator - II
L-I L
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l CRP 9 4 CRP 9 3 g g g d'g h iU { -
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CRP 9 4 CRP 9 3 d*,, ;
1 DESK g n CL i l
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e 0 @= At this location except where noted.
I u
Scenario 2 Operator IV
l CRP 9-4 CRP 9 3 l
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=
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m o l Scenario 2 Operator V l
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ENCLOSURE IV
SUMMARY
REPORT SUPPLEMENT OCRDR Meeting Minutes 1/12/87 l
[
' c'- .
1 ENCLOSURE IV
SUMMARY
REPORT SUPPLEMENT DCRDR Meeting Minutes 1/12/87
References:
(1) R.E. Sojka memo to R.D. Pagodin/J.T. Herron, dated December 15, 1986 (2) L.D. Marsolais memo to R.L. Smith, ENG-SRV-210/86, dated November 20, 1986 (3) R.L. Smith memo to R.J. Lodwick, OPVY 848/86, dated !'
November 10, 1986 (4) L.D. Marsolais memo to R.E. Sojka, ENG-SRV-141/86, dated July 2, 1986 ,
(5) R.E. Sojka memo to'R.J. Lodwick, dated October 8, 1986 l Attendees: R.D. Pagodin R.G. January L.D. Marsolais J.T. Herron R.E. Sojka DISCUSSION:
On January 12 and 13, 1987 members of the Implementation Task Team met .j in Brattleboro to review findings of the two remaining DCRDR tasks; the 1
[
Dynamic E0P Evaluation and the Secondary Containment E0P Task Analysis, l References (2) and (3). A total of twenty-four findings, discrepancies, or observations were reviewed by the Implementation Task Team. Of these, six ,
c were determined to be repeat findings which had been previously addressed. !
l No further changes were considered necessary (for findings # 2,8,9,12,14 and
- 21. Nine other new findings were judged " acceptable, no change required" (eg. findings # 1,3,4,5,6,10,13,19 and 23).
Five firidings were judged to be most effectively' resolved by training or administrative policy (eg. findings # 15,16,17,18,22 and 24).
Four remaining findings will require hardware changes (eg. findings
- 7,11,15 and 20). The following pages provide more detailed information concerning the disposition of each finding.
i i
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p td e osa P 3a iT eS .
ren m re l R e0t r h[2 osere PreoCl 3n t n t ceuol usr b e o 1 n h qf p l t et nadm ti s .
iTe m oah not nu nt gse stI rrt o ar aa ant _
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wt n ei e t Cel omt8i tl i u 2 ame ,
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[ ENCLOSURE V
SUMMARY
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( ENCLOSURE VI
SUMMARY
REPORT SUPPLEMENT Summary of All DCRDR HED's
( 1
\ ..._ _ _ _ -- - _ --
h l I
ENCLOSURE VI 1.
Summary of all DCRDR HED's HED 0100 HED 0100 consists of 44 findings concerning anthropometrics. While it is true that mature plants such as Vermont Yankee may have many controls which are located at or beyond present day anthropometric limits, our operating j history and extensive operator discussions have indicated that the controls !
identified in this HED present no operating problems. Many of these controls are outside the limits because of the guard rail on the control room front panels. All are components which do not require precise readings or frequent or rapid manipulation. The multidisciplinary team has evaluated each finding in this category individually and dynamically, and can confirm there are no switches, controls, indicators or other devices which warrant relocation beyond those proposed in other HEDs. Additionally, the control room dynamic evaluation and our continuing operator requalification training programs discussed in the summary report supplement further demonstrate that there is no instance where the control location would preclude proper operator action l or jeopardize plant safety. No further action need be taken.
HED 0101 A DCRDR evaluation of the Vermont Yankee Emergency Operating Procedures (E0P) was initially conducted by the review team to assess the need to relo-cate the torus pressure and level recorders from control room back panel 9-25. These indications are required by the E0P procedures. Subsequent to this review, design changes EDCR 84-429 and 84-430 have implemented redundant indication of torus pressure to CRP 9-3 directly above the RHR controls (with a range of 0-80 psia), have expanded the existing level indicators to a range of 0-25 ft. and have added torus air temperature (50-300 degrees F). Based on this new instrumentation implemented for for Regulatory Guide 1.97, the i
- operator will no longer depend on the rear panel recorders for these parame- ;
l ters and no further DCRDR action need be taken.
HED 0102 The same DCRDR evaluation of E0P procedures determined that only the con- ;
denser vacuum isolation bypass switches presently located on CRP 9-15 and '
9-17 should be relocated within anthropometric limits. These switches will remain on these panels, but will be physically lowered on the panel.
For all remaining switches, information regarding switch positions will be duplicated on a new nameplate located directly below the switch and implemented as part of HED 0400. This method of labeling will allow the operator to read the switch positions even though the engraving on the backing plate may be obscured by the keylock switch. The method of labeling has been included in the labeling standard for all keylock switches asso- i
( ciated with HED 0400.
HED 0200 HED 0200 is divided into three areas; one which will result in hardware changes; one that requires no action; and one where the findings were
[
reassigned and evaluated in another HED. The findings for each of these l three areas are discussed below.
2.
The turbine acceleration meter (Findings 0693, 0668, 0553) will be replaced with a digital display component of our ERFIS project described in References (g) and (j). The main steam line radiation meters (Finding 0407) will be revised such that the upscale light will be on the right and downscale on the left. Additionally, all twelve radiation meters will have red lights 1 l installed for the upsceie HI-HI and white lights for downscale (Finding 0400).
CRP 9-2 will be completely rearranged such that each meter can be correlated with it's associated recorder. The 3 sets of indications where standard arrangements are not presently used will be changed (Finding 0435). The 345KV digital volt meter presently on CRP 9-8 will be relocated to CRP 9-7 (Findings 0551. 0705 and 0090). The existing Rosemount dual indicators for level / pressure will be separated such that only one parameter.per meter will remain. Further, the existing meters and recorders will be rewired such that pressure will be on the left, steam flow / feed in the middle, and level on the right (Finding 0548).
Grease pencil labels will be corrected under HED 0400 (Finding 0155) and mimics will be corrected under HED 02A0 (Finding 0575).
Turbine Building / Reactor Building HVAC status lights are in mixed order (Finding 0235). However rearrangement of these HVAC indicating lights would not enhance the operators ability to identify individual sets of indicating lights nor are these lights used for any emergency operation.
They only allow the operator to review the HVAC lineup. No action need be taken. The area radiation monitors on CRP 9-11 are not used for comparative readings. Each meter stands alone with respect to alarm set-points, scale ranges and indication. Thus no action need be taken (Finding 0414). The RHR valves are arranged on CRP 9-3 within -a mimic, and the relief valves are arranged such that opening the valves in order will assist the operator in adding heat evenly to the torus. No confusion will result from the existing arrangement. Thus, the arrangement of valves on CRP 9-3 is logical, functional and acceptable. No action need be taken (Finding 0005).
HED 0201 This HED concerns findings associated with the A0G control panel, CRP 9-50.
Each of the findings was reviewed in detail and potential improvements were evaluated. The labeling on this panel will be upgraded in HED 0400 such that the association of controls and feedback will be readily visible. Such measures as coding, hierarchial labeling, and demarcation will be implemented to assist the operator in his understanding and ease of operation of the system. In addition, the mimic will be completely replaced and all non-essentail mimic lines will be deleted. The location of all instrumentation within the mimic will be denoted by nameplates matching the color of the main indicator nameplate. All control switches will have a descriptor added to aid in correlating the control switch with the appropriate indication within the mimic.
I I
3.
The two findings considered most significant by the DCRDR review team were the.(1) location of controls verses the associated feedback indication, and (2) monitors located below anthropometric limits. The control switches for A0G valves are located to the right and left of the mimic. Thus, the valve indication is not directly correlated with the control switch. The operation of this system is, however, almost always automatic. Valve position is not dependent on control switch position and valves open or close depending on which mode of operation is selected. Manual control switches are provided only for the rare occurrence of manual operation of the system and for ini-tial system alignment. Relocation of these control switches within the mimic would not improve control / feedback association due to the large density uf indications presently located on the panel.
The radiation monitors and H2 indicators on CRP 9-50 are located below the recommended height. However, recorders display the same information and are located higher on this same panel. Annunciation of these parameters is ,
also provided on CRP 9-50. Therefore, there is no reason to relocate these j indicators because of the redundant instrumentation. l Many of the remaining findings had to do with the unfamiliarity most ,
operators feel regarding this system. The operators understanding of this j system has been greatly enhanced with the now operational Vermont Yankee spe- '
cific simulator which fully duplicates the operation of this panel. Use of the simulator is allowing the operators to become familiar and comfortable with this panel.
There were 4 findings which suggest that the A0G panel should be moved te the primary operating area. This finding is totally unrealistic and wiil not be further addressed.
I HED 0202 This HED consisted of a single finding stating that the torus level indica-tors on CRP 9-3 are separated from the RHR pump controls by six feet. Thus, !
the operator could not read the meters while stationed at the controls.
There is no need to simultaneously open the controls and monitor the indica-tions. No immediate operator action is required which would require constant monitoring of the indicator.
1 Torus wide-range level and pressure indications are correctly located for j the application of containment venting and relocating this indication would itself create a problem. Thus, no change need be made for HED 0202.
l HED 0203 The findings that comprise the HED describe areas of the main control board !
l where demarcation is needed to combine control groups and displays.
Hierachial labelling and demarcation will be applied. In addition, one hard-ware change will also be made. The vital AC manual transfer switch presently l
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- 4. I located on CRP 9-5 will be relocated to CRP 9-8. This change is required in order to properly demarcate the feedwater controls and indications. The type of demarcation selected will provide sufficient visual separation while not creating a confusing, cluttered appearance to the control panels. In deter-mining the required areas, each finding associated with this.HED was eva-luated and a decision made regarding the best possible areas to demarcate q while minimizing the application of multiple zones. Note that much of the demarcation will actually be implemented via the color standard described in ,
j HED 0300. Separation of controls in different systems will also be enhanced by the use of colored mimics and switch handles such as currently applied to 1 the simulator.
HED 0204 Two findings associated with this HED, 0686 & 0583 state that the recirc MG speed / speed demand meters on CRP 9-4 are too small, poorly located and hard to read. The DCRDR review team has investigated the use of these meters and found that they are rarely used by operators. By procedure, these meters are only used when and if it becomes necessary to take local manual control of the recirc scoop tube positioners. This mode of operation is not desireable and is provided only as a possible abnormal mode of operation. If this mode were used, the subject meters would only be used as a reference point.
This would be a carefully controlled operation which is addressed in OP 2110 and which requires additional instrumentation to be temporarily installed.
Based on this evaluation, there is no reason to replace these meters.
HED 0205 The annunciator response controls will be relocated as described in HED 0601.
HED 0206 i
This HED addresses the need for demarcation and hierarchical labeling of ;
the service water pumps. Hierarchical labeling and demarcation will be I j
added in concert with HED 0203.
l HED 02A0 HED 02A0 concerns findings with the existing mimic. The Vermont Yankee simu- 4 lator was used as a mockup to develop a color standard which with minor changes will meet the intent of NUREG 0700. This standard will be applied to the plant in concert with HED 0300 and 0400. Low contrast mimic (Finding 0108) and the A0G. mimic will be replaced (Finding 0308). The symbol for the feedwater regulating valve will be made the same as that used in the primary containment isolation mimic (Finding 0065). Two new labels will be added 1
l
5.
"From Serv Wtr Header" & "To Serv Wtr Discharge" for the RHR ALT S/D panel (Finding 0641). Two new end point labels will be added to the generator mimic ;
(Finding 0037). Both will read "To 345 KV Switchyard." Labels have been determined to be acceptable alternatives to mimic endpoints. As a result, no further change need be made for (Finding 0024).
Reviews of the RCIC and HPCI mimics have concluded that they are acceptable as is. The gland seal and vacuum pumps are not in the mimic, but adding them would be impossible due to switch density. The existing arrangement has not caused any errors or confusion. Thus, no changes need be made.
Valve V-10-85 is currently pencilled on the control board and will be removed. There is no need for a permanent mimic of this valve (Finding 0003).
The condensate mimic starts at a labeled component (eg. hotwell) which is an approved method of identifying mimic startpoints. As a result, no change need be made (Finding 0064). The SJAE mimic is made of label tape (Finding 0063) which will be replaced with a permanent mimic as part of HED 0300 and HED 1406.
HED 0300 The findings associated with HED 0300 concern color coding of control room switch handles, mimics, dymo tape, labels and indicating lenses. Switch handles, micmic's and indicating lamps will be corrected by this HED. Labels i and dymo tape will be corrected by HED 0400. Details of our implementation plans were submited earlier in Reference (h).
HED 0400 A labeling standard will be implemented and all control room labels will be made to comply with this standard. The draft standard was submitted earlier in Reference (h).
The color of demarcation has been included in the color standard described in HED 0300. Separation of controls in different systems will also be accomplished by the use of colored mimics and switch handles. In order to properly demarcate the feedwater system controls and indications, the vital AC manual transfer switch presently located on CRP 9-5 will be relocated to CRP 9-8 as discussed in HED 0203.
HED 0401 This HED addresses the fact that little use is made of warning labels.
Vermont Yankee does not use warning labels to identify limits or warnings.
Temporary dymo tape labels will be removed. The addition of these labels clutter the control panels and adequate warning instructions are contained in the operating procedures which the operator has readily available. Where it y is appropriate for operating limits to be readily available to the. operators, zone coding will be used on scale faces as stated in HED 0500.
6.
HED 05A0 Recorders with more than nine intermediate markings between major divisions {
are addressed in the evaluation performed for HED 05El and appropriate i corrections will be made. Recorders with incorrect or missing engineering units are addressed in the evaluation performed for HED 05E2 and will be !
corrected.
HED 05A1 After careful consideration of the three findings associated with this HED, a f decision was made to not develop a color standard for pen color in recorders, j Each recorder will however, be provided with a new label installed by HED 0400 l directly on the front of the recorders that will clearly identify each pen, provide a description of the recorder, and contain the recorder and instru-ment number.
i HED 05B0 1 l
The methodology used to address HED 05B0 consisted of conducting a survey to identify those normally deenergized indicating lights in the control room which must energize to indicate an off-normal condition. The concern, of course, is that should the bulb burn out, the condition could go unnoticed.
To ensure that this situation does not occur, every indicating light was eva-luated to ensure that any light which serves as an indication of an off-normal conditon has (1) backup alarms or (2) that the condition of the indicator is checked during normal operation or surveillance. The following criteria were used:
- 1) Indicating lights defining abnormal conditions which are normally off should have a lamp test feature or other means of alerting the operator to an off normal condition.
- 2) If the abnormal condition identified by the indicating j light is alarmed in the control room, no lamp test feature )
is required. l
- 3) Valve position and breaker position indication do not require a lamp test feature since a burned out bulb would be obvious and would not affect operation of components.
The results of the evaluation show that only two indications required an independent means of verifying lamp status. Since there were so few indica-tions where this was a concern, a lamp test feature was not felt to be the best option. Instead, both cases will have additional indication installed as follows:
o A separate normally energized -light will be added for MTS-2 tripped indication on CRP 9-7, similar to the arrangement for MTS-1 & MTS-3.
7.
o The reactor building radiation monitor Flow Fault and Filter Fault indications will be wired into an existing trouble annunciator.
All other indications were determined by the review team to be acceptable and will not require a lamp test feature.
HED 05C0 The following is a summary of all related findings comprising HED 05C0; Finding 0219-Emergency bearing oil pump switch will be painted yellow as stated in the color standard for HED 0300 Finding 0841-The control of the A0G panel switches of these components is generally automatic. There have been no errors com-mitted due to switch shapes, and there is adequate time for the operator to perform the appropriate switch manipulations. As stated in our response to HED 0201, new labeling, switch handle color coding and nameplates will be applied to CRP 9-50. No other changes need be made.
Finding 0371-This finding refers to the reactor mode switch. This particular switch is unique to all other controls and receives particular attention in operating procedures and operator training. It also is fully modeled on our training simulator. The legend can be seen with slight change of operator position. No change need be made.
Finding 0370-This finding addresses instances in the control room where the existing switch positions are not correct for the type of control utilized by the switch. All incorrect positions will be replaced with the correct positions as stated in the evaluation submitted in Reference (h).
Finding 0412-This finding refers to the gaitronics alarm controls on CRP 9-10. The temporary tape labels will be replaced by HED 0400.
Finding 0549-All GEMAC controllers are labelled open/close. This does not create confusion for the operators since they receive particular training on GEMAC devices and are familiar with this type controller. These also are fully modeled on our training simulator. No change need be made.
Finding 0789-The existing valve switch positions are correct. These valves are either opened manually or allowed to open automatically. No change need be made.
Finding 0476-Pump control switches will be painted yellow in accor-dance with HED 0300.
T l
8.
i HED 0500 This HED addresses instruments where the normal, abnormal and/or alarm set-points are not marked. At present, temporar'y tape labels are used to denote these setpoints. All tape labels will be removed and color banding (zone coding) will be applied to the scale face to indicate these setpoints/ ranges.
Zone coding will be done with the following colors of "Prestape" applied directly on the scale face.
RED - To indicate trip points or danger zones AMBER - To indicate regions where increased operator awareness is required GREEN - To indicate normal operating zones The zones are not intended to provide exact alarm or trip points nor to require operation within a particular zone or to prohibit operation outside a normal zone. They are simply a ready reference for the operator. The general approach taken in determining which, if any, colors should be applied was two-fold; (1) to limit the use of zones to those determined to provide the most useful information to the operators; and (2) to use the fewest possible zones on a single scale face. For example, on a level meter with multiple alarm or trip points, only a normal range was spe-cified. On scales where most of the scale is the normal range, only caution or trip zones were specified. This results in most of the scale being clear of the color banding while still providing the operator with needed information. Further, not all scales will have a zone coding applied.
The extent of zone coding was evaluated by determining the normal, abnormal, and/or alarm setpoints or ranges applicable to each meter. The range of color application was specified to include the appropriate value and to j ensure visibility of the color band. This visibility requirement was the primary reason for selecting zones vs. exact setpoints. In addition, tolerances associated with all setpoints requires a more flexible con- j notation. In all cases, the operator must be aware that the zone coding is to be used for informational purposes only. Details of zone coding were i I
provided earlier by Reference (h).
HED 05E0 ;
This HED describes six findings where control movement was reversed on controllers, keylock switches, and one meter. There were three findings j regarding controllers where the control movement appears to be reversed for the setpoint thumbwheel. When the wheel is a teed from bottom to top, the adjacent scale rotates fr om top to bottoms if one were looking at the pointer on the indicator, it would move to a higher value from bottom to j top. The operators are familia with this mode of operation and there is i no confusion created by these controllers. Additionally, the Vermont Yankee ,
simulator now provides the operators extensive training using these l 1
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controllers. A change to the controllers is not warranted since any change would create another operational problem. (i.e. if the scale moved from bottom to top, the pointer would appear to move from top to bottom). Also for this change to be made, the scale on the controller would have to be changed such that the numerical value would increase from top to bottom j which is unacceptable. Based on this, no changes will be made to the i controllers.
There were also findings associated with keylock switch rotation. These switches will be replaced so that the normal position will always be to the left and the test or bypass position will always be to the right. The affected switches are as follows:
RHRSW Pump A/C auto stop manual override switches on CRP 9-3 RHRSW Pump B/D auto stop manual override switches on CRP 9-3 CORE SPRAY SYS 1/2 drywell pressure test switches on CRP 9-3 DIESEL GENERATOR A/B test status switches on CRP 9-8 There was one finding associated with the PCV-102-35 valve position indicator on CRP 9-6. The indicator increases from top to bottom.
This meter will be rearranged such that it will increase from left to right.
HED 05El There were two concerns identified in HED 05E1: 1) poor contrast between i scale and pointer, and 2) more than 9 intermediate markings on meters covered by this HED.
There was only one finding relative to poor contrast (0363). It had to do with the percent power meters on the four rod display on CRP 9-5. These meters are not used for direct readings. They merely indicate a trend and )
are used for comparison during control rod movement . The DCRDR team l reviewed these meters and found them to be adequate for their intended func- 1 tion. No change need be made.
Other findings of HED 05El addressed instrument scales with greater than nine graduations between numerals. A survey was conducted which evaluated every instrument on the control panels to determine which instruments fell into this category. Once identified, each instrument was further evaluated to determine the required operating range of the instrument, how the operator uses the instrument, and possible enhancements to improve operator perfor-mance. The findings and evaluation results of this survey were submitted in Reference (h). As specifically delineated in the survey results, appropriate corrections will be made.
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HED 05E2 There were four concerns identified by this HED. A discussion of each is included below.
o Pointers Obscure Graduations - This item refers to the use of tem- ,
porary red label tape on the meter faces which obscures the graduations. 1 This tape is used to indicate full load amps on ammeters and will be removed.
o Instrument Failure Mode Not Evident - There are no related findings 'j associated with " instrument failure mode not evident." A document search was conducted to determine how this item was included in this HED, and the item was found to cover the alternate shutdown panel indicators. Since this panel is not normally energized, it appeared that there was no way to tell if the meters were operable from obser- ;
vation. However, once the panel is energized, there is no difficulty '
determining instrument failure mode. For this reason, the finding l was discarded. j o Scales in Odd Multiples - This concern was included in the evaluation conducted for HED 05E1. j o Process Units Not Identified - An evaluation of meter and recorder scales for which the process units were not identified was provided in Reference (h). In all cases, missing or incorrect units will be corrected.
HED 05E3 The HPCI and RCIC turbine tachometers are mounted upsidedown and will be rotated 180 to provide the proper movement. This, however, will necessitate ordering and installing a replacement scale of 0 to 6 for the turbine speed pointer.
HED 05E4-The off gas rad monitor (flux tilt monitor) was determined by the review team not to be confusing to the operators. The meter can be read in any decade from 10E-9 to 10E-0, with two possible scales: 0-40 or 0-125. The lines on the selector switch show which scale is in use. The longer L-shaped line indica-tes that the outer 0-125 scale is used, while the shorter line indicates that the inner 0-40 scale is used. In both cases, it is the scale reading times the multiplier for the decade selected that gives the final reading.
Operators are trained in the use of this meter and can practice using it on the Vermont Yankee simulator.
HED 0600 I HED 0600 consists of the following related findings and resolutions: i o Inconsistent in use of acronyms / abbreviations - All labels will be -
I reviewed and replaced where required. The Vermont Yankee acronyms / abbreviation standard was provided earlier as HED 0400.
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o High use of common alarms /no reflash for 2nd alarm input - A complete evaluation of each annunciator window was conducted to ;
determine the need to separate alarms. Due to the volume of this i evaluation, it is included in two separate volumes which have been reviewed during the pre-implementation audit. There are no current 1 alarms which need to be split nor any which require reflash l capability.
I o No first out feature provided - A first out feature is currently I installed at VY for all autoiaatic scram signals. When the first signal is received, it flashes in a distinct pattern: three fast pulses, pause, three fast, pause, etc. the second alarm received flashes at the normal fast steady rate. When the acknowledge but-ton is hit, the first alarm flashes at a slow steady rate while all successive alarms come in solid. The alarm that is still flashing is the first scram signal that was received, once the reset button ;
is depressed, all alarm windows come in solid, thus the operator '
must take care not hit both the acknowledge and reset buttons simultaneously or he will clear the first out indication.
(Reference FSAR Section 7.2.3.5)
No first out feature is available for turbine trips - but none is required. l The turbine trip procedures do not depend on the cause of the trip being l identified to determine operator action. No change need be made.
l 0 Letter size not controlled - A lettering standard has been developed )
in HED 0400. !
l o No segration/prioritizing of alarms - A complete set of annunciator window l engraving lists showing the existing arrangement and the revised arrange-ment of annunciator windows has been prepared. This list also shows the revised wording to ensure consistency in meaning, abbreviations, and acronyms. These alarms have been segragated by system and prioritized from top to bottom. The rearrangement and relettering will be done simultaneously, o Set point information not provided - This item was considered in the !
annunciator label standard that was developed and a determination made that alarm setpoints will not be included on the annunciator windows. The basis for this is the fact that there exists administrative setpoints, the Tech.
Spec. setpoints, the actual setpoints and set point changes that occur throughout the life of the plant. Setpoint information is more appropriately included in the alarm response procedure.
HED 0601 A component of HED 0601 addresses findings which assume the annunciator response controls cover too large an area. The existing annunciator system is currently split into two response zones, one for NSSS and one for B0P.
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A detailed review of possible locations and acceptabic zones was completed and several changes will be made. The annunciator response controls will be split into four zones: One for CRP 9-8, one for CRP 9-7 & 9-6, one for CRP 9-5 & 9-4, and one for CRP 9-3. This arrangement will ensure that an operator will be able to read each annunciator window while acknowledging the al arm. The annunciator controls will be arranged in a standard configuration j at each response location so that the operator can identify each control pushbutton by it's relative position on the panel. The annunciator controls will also be located at the same relative position on each control panel such that the operator can quickly locate these controls 'and not have to reach across the control panels in order to use the controls.
Another component of HED 0601 proposed that a separate silence control be !
provided that allows operators to turn the audible signal off while leaving l the visual lights flashing. During multiple alarm events the audible signal may be on continuously because of successively occurring and clearing alarms.
A silence control could be implemented in two ways; 1) a global silenece switch which would disconnect the horn (s) for all incomming and clearing alarms or 2) a separate silence pushbutton that would clear the horn each time an alarm is received, but subsequent alarms whould reactivate the horn.
For the first case (global silence) if the silence control is used, each alarm would continue to flash Subsequent alarms coming in would not be noticed since they would be just one more alarm in an existing field of flashing lights. The only way the operator could distinguish subsequent alarms in a multiple alarm ovent event is to use the acknowledge pushbutton which silences the alarms as well as creating a solid light whereby subsequent alarms could be readily distinguished. Additionally, if the silence and acknowledge were used, newly occurring alarms would remain unnoticed since ,
there would be no horn to alert the operator.
The second case (individual alarm silence) also has major shortcomings.
Consider again' the case of multiple alarm events. Even with a silence control, the horn will be on continuously due to subsequent alarms and clearing alarms. The operator is still faced with the horn as well as an ever growing field of flashing lights which he has no hope of assimulating unless he uses the acknowledge control. Neither alternative was considered acceptable or superior to the existing system. Basea on the above, no separate silence control will be installed.
The combination of changes described above will ensure the best'possible combination of operator convenience and adequate ensurance that all alarms will be properly acknowledged. In addition, the following changes will be made to accomodate the annunciator improvements; o Eliminate the retired RHR head spray valve control switches and indicators. Seal all openings.
o Replace RHR Mimic o Complete modifications described in HED 1406.
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HED 0602 The findings associated with HED 0602 suggest additional annunciators be considered for addition to the annunciator system. During the evaluation of this HED, the team evaluated existing alarms for possible deletion as well as the specific findings of HED 0602 for additional alarms. The results are as follows.
o Annunciation of feedwater pump trip on high water level has already been installed at VY (PAR 83-02). Annunciation of feedwater pump l auto start would be redundant to the feed water pump trip alarm added 1 previously. The only time an pump can auto start is if a running pump trips with its control switch in AUTO. Therefore, the addition of the FW pump trip alarm makes this alarm unnecessary.
o The level control system at Vermont Yankee utilizes feed and steam flow as system inputs. If there were a mismatch in these inputs, it would be readily seen as a level perturbation and either a high or low level alarm. A feed flow / steam flow mistatch would be a i nuisance alarm during startup or shutdown. HED 0200 will relocate steam flow and feed flow to the same recorder, thus any mismatch will be obvious.
o A normally lit white indicating light will be added directly above the reset pushbutton to provide annunciation of HPCI high drywell pressure initiation blocked. This light will remain lit as long as the LO-L0 level and HI drywell pressure initiation signals are clear. If an initiation signal is received, the light will go out and remain out until the signal is cleared by depressing the push-button.
o HPCI initiates on LO-L0 level or HI drywell pressure. RCIC ini-tiates on LO-LO level. Both of these conditions are indicted and alarmed in the control room. If either of these signals is received, there are many automatic actions that occur. Adding an additional alarm for HPCI/RCIC auto start would not enhance the operators ability to deter mine the status of these systems due to
( the large number of incoming and clearing alarms. The white light being installed for HPCI/RCIC HI drywell pressure initiation blocked will provide indication of auto start since, if the ini- <
tiating condition occurs, the light will go out. !
HED 0603 The alarm response procedure will be reformatted and tabbed following completion of HED 0600. The existing convention of each annunciator being labeled separately will be discontinued. For example, currently an alarm is identified as CRP 9-3 annunciator A-2 window 3-D. The new system will identify alarms as CRP 9-3 window 3-H. Separate tabs will be provided for each panel with subtabs for each column. Further, only one window will appear on a single page in the alarm response. The response time with this revised system will be greatly improved.
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HED 0700 The findings that comprise this HED describe how the use of temporary labels j is 1) not controlled, 2) not periodically reviewed, 3) not accurate, and 4) i not consistent. Procedure DP-0162 has been revised to address these problems and to establish requirements for the use of temporary labels. l HED 0800 The architectural firm of Alderman & MacNeish evaluated several aspects of 4 the existing control room for possible improvements. In particular, they assessed normal lighting levels, glare problems, emergency lighting levels, noise levels, and HVAC system improvements. As a result of this work several HED's have been coordinated to resolve these findings; Normal Lighting - The existing luminous ceiling tiles will be replaced with 3/4" x 3/4" x 3/4" metal parabolic louver with 43 degree cut-off in silver finish. The existing lenses will be replaced with 3/4" x 3/4" x 3/4" framed metal parabolic louver with 45 degree cut-off in silver finish. This will eliminate glare problems. In addition, the parabolic louver actually increases available lighting due to its excellent reflective quality while reducing sound levels by not providing a direct reflective surface as does-the existing ceiling lenses. This modification will also increase the available lighting at the operators desk.
Emergency Lighting - New battery powered lights will be added. The new lights ]
will have an eight hour battery capacity and will be j seismically mounted. These additional lights in con. l junction with the existing DC lights and the new ceiling'. )
louvers will provide sufficient emergency lighting. i HVAC/ Draft Problems - The draft is due to the fact that there presently; '
exists only a single return air duct located within the ,
luminous ceiling area. Two new return points will be )
installed in the back panel area and all return air j paths rebalanced to minimize the air flow in the main i operating area while ensuring proper ventilation of all j areas of the panel. )
i Ceiling Tiles - The entire existing control room ceiling tiles will be 4 replaced to greatly enhance the appearance of the control '
room. The new tiles will also provide increased noise j reduction, facilitate future maintenance efforts and will '
allow the individual tiles to be replaced if damaged. l Noise Levels - The noise level in the main operating area of the control room ;
is within the 65 DBA maximum recommended by NUREG 0700.' '
Details of the noise survey may be found under HED 0901. The.
recent installation of carpet in the control room (r.ow comple-ted) coupled with new ceiling tiles and removal of the flat l reflective light lenses will provide sufficient noise reduc ~ i tion to make the control room more comfortable for the operators. l 1
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HED 0900 i
HED 0900 currently states that the control room operator at CRP 9-5 needs 1 desk space to perform for the administrative responsibilities of this posi-tion. Although not identifiad by the DCRDR program this, same operator also requires frequent ect:ess to the plant process computer. As stated in Reference (i), Vermont Yankee has committed to having the replacement com-
- puter system, called ERFIS, functional and the operators trained during Cycle 14. That work has already begun. The following exerpt is from the vendor contract workscope which relates to the operator workstations; ,
Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is a necessary ingredient in the successful development of the ERFIS. The support will include preparation of Vermont Yankee specific human factors plan, man- !
machine interface (s) design, graphic display design, control room and simulator work station design, and functional validation of the system. The work will be undertaken with close interactions between Vermont Yankee personnel and vendors staff, and the Vendor i shall provide technical guidance to support the operating personnel in execution of the Human Factors Plan.
Development of the control room and Simulator workstation designs into the existing plant instrumentation and control room layout and removal of equipment shall be done by the Vendor. Layout requirements for console furniture and communication facilities !
(e.g., Gai-Trorn es, telephones, NRC phone, Orange phone, etc. ) l shall be the responsibility of the vendor and include design, !
construction and installation of these consoles. The Vendor shall l build a scale model of the proposed control room layout.
At the present time, we anticipate several console type structures I with adequate knee-space, laydown space and ERFIS display screens. Of 1 course, duplicate structures will also be provided at our training simulator. 1 In the interim, there currently exists a portable rolling cart in the control l room that operators use for additional work space. This cart is satisfactory to ensure the operator has adequate writing space as well as room to lay down procedures.
HED 0901, 0902, 0903, and 0904 The findings associated with HED's 0901, 0902, 0903, and 0904 will be resolved in concert with HED 0800. Additional information regarding the noise survey (repeated during the week of 1/14/85) is presented below:
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LOCATION DBA 1 El 2 51 3 53 4 53 5 53 6 57 7 55 8 53 9 56 10 60 11 63 12 62 13 68 14 61 15 60 16 59 17 60 18 64 Noise levels were measured with a Bruel and Kjaer precision intagrating sounS level meter, Model 2218 at 18 different locations in the control room and were taken prior to the installation of carpet in this area. The data indicate that at all but one location the noise level was below the recom-mended 65 DBA maximum.
The noise levels in the main operating area of the control room are within the guidelines of NUREG 0700. The actual noise level at the location of the re'ay panels (noise source) is 68 DBA, only 3 DB above the maximum recom-g!
mended by 0700. Installation of carpet in the control room which has now been completed has further reduced sound levels.
f Installation of new lighting and sound absorbing ceiling tiles in HED 0800 will conclude our corrective action.
HED 0905
) AP-0150 provides the Shif t Supervisor with the necessary authority to control the number of people in the control room. No further change is required.
HED 0906 The control room annunciator system presently can easily be heard above background. HED 0800 will further reduce background noise levels making the annunciators even more apparent. No additonal changes are required.
HED 0907 A portable rolling cart has been provided in the control room which operators can use for additional work space. Permanent operator workstations will be provided as a part of our ERFIS project discussed under HED 0900.
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HED 1000 In order to prevent the interchanging of indicating light lenses administra-tive controls covering the replacement of indicator light bulbs have been implemented. These controls have been incorporated into AP 0157.
The review team has recently reaccessed the need to include certain types of indicator lenses in the administrative procedure and has concluded that addi-tional controls are not required. In the instance of annunciator tiles, removal of the lenses is performed by removing a group of three covers simultaneously. These three windows are captive in the cover for the group.
Each annunciator window has two bulbs which are tested each shift and replaced when a bulb expires (generally only one expires at a time). Removal of a single group cover exposes 6 bulbs. Thus there is little need for an operator to remove a second group of three windows. Further, documentation is readily available to the operators in the form of annunciator maps and alarm response procedure in the event two groups of three lenses became interchanged.
The square indicators referred to in HED 1000 on CRP 9-7 are for turbine stop valve, control valve and bypass valve positions. The staff concern appears to be that the indicator covers could be interchanged which could mislead the operator to believing that SV-3 has opened, when it was SV-2 (the valve identification is engraved on the indicator lense). In reality, the stop valves and control valves are either all open or all closed. It is this information which is important to the control room operators. Bypass valves open in order from left to right and have redundant indication located elsewhere on the control panel. Even if all of these lenses were scrambled or replaced at random, the operator would still have the status information he needs.
HED 1001 HED 1001 consists of five findings associated with administrative procedures.
The individual findings and their resolutions are summarized below.
Finding 0566 - Procedures have inconsistent limits. There was only one instance of this problem and Procedure 2160 has been corrected.
Finding 0605 - Procedures that require operator action do not provide physical panel locations. Vermont Yankee procedures typically reference panel locations only when the device is not located on the same panel as all other devices for that system.
Finding 0603 - There is no administrative procedure that covers designations for components, systems, and process units. AP 0155 lists the standard for system designations. Process units are self explanatory and no standard is required.
Finding 0602 - There is no administrative procedure that covers type size and style to ensure standardization. Type size and style has been standardized by typing all procedures on a CPT word pro-cessor.
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Finding 0604 - Administrative procedures do not cover step or paragraph spacing. Spacing has been made consistent by typing all pro-cedures on a CPT word processor.
HED 1200 This HED summarizes four findings which imply that the gaitronics is not available to the operators on a priority basis and that there should be a dedicated operator channel. It has always been the policy at VY that channel four is reserved for operator use. This policy is stressed in all indoctri-nation training and labels have been recently added to on all gaitronics stations in the plant. During normal operations, there is no problem with availability of the gaitronics for the operators.
During outages, when a significant number of contractors are on site, the gaitronics system can become abused. Station operators recognize this and make use of alternate communications. If an emergency communication were required, the operator could page directly over any busy channel, or he could request that the line be cleared for emergency use. There are also telepho-nes, sound-powered phones and radios available to the station operators.
Due to the critical communications link needed between the control room and the refuel floor, Vermont Yankee has installed a dedicated channel between these two locations. This channel (Five) can not be accessed by any other personnel and is always available on a priority basis.
Nevertheless, Vermont Yankee has applied a distinctive label on each gaitro-nics station to alert all potential users that station operators have a priority channel (#4). The training department will continue to stress the importance of leaving channel four available for operator use and management will continue to direct their contractors not to use this line.
HED 1300 The eight findings associated with HED 1300 deal with specific training issues where additional training needs were identified. Since the original survey was completed, Vermont Yankee has acquired and made operable a full scope plant specific training simulator and has accredited the operator training programs. As part of the accreditation process, a detailed task analysis of all operator training requirements was completed during the accredition process. Generally, the findings associated with this HED were from operator surveys which have been resolved through the accreditation pro-Cess.
In additon, each operator training session allows for participant comments, suggestions, and/or complaints. This feedback is documented, evaluated and incorporated into the training lesson as appropriate. Comments generated are reviewed with the commentor and documented.
With respect to Finding 0623 which relates specifically to the process com-puter, station operators will receive this training as a part of our ERFIS Project and is further discused in References (g) and (k).
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HED 1401 HED 1401 consists of a single finding (0403) which addresses the off-gas ,
isolation valve and indication located on Panel 9-2. This valve controls the output of the A0G System to the vent stack. The most important function of this valve is to close on indication of a release. The stack monitoring indication is also located on Panel 9-2. Therefore, the correct location for the isolation valve control and indication is on Panel 9-2, near the stack' monitors.
HED 1402 HED 1402 concerns the EPR and MPR indications in the control room. At normal operating pressure with the turbine on EPR control, the EPR pressure indicator reads higher than the MPR pressure indicator. In reality, the MPR should indicate a higher pressure setpoint. The MPR pressure indicator will be recalibrated such that it indicates a control pressure higher than the EPR pressure indicator. These meters are not indicating actual pressure but simply the pressure that the device would create if it were in control.
The recalibration is relatively simple since a variable resistor adjustment is all that is required.
Also addressed in this HED is the fact that the EPR/MPR can be confusing to the operators. The change described above will reduce this confusion. Use of the training simulator will further allow the operators to practice on the operation of the EPR and MPR.
HED 1403 The findings which comprise this HED discuss areas where openings have been left on the control board from previous modifications. These unused openings on the control board will be closed as discussed in Reference (h).
HED 1404 HED 1404 consisted of a single finding which stated that drawings were slow to be changed. Plant administrative procedures now require the design change Congnizant Engineer to provide as-built markups of drawings to the control room upon returning the system / component / circuit to service.
HED 1405 HED 1405 consists of several findings which were developed from the Emergency Operating Procedures OE 3100 through OE 3104. Each finding was individually evaluated by the review team and resolved in the following manner.
Findings 0848, 0801 and 0786 have been corrected by design change EDCR 84-429 which added wide range torus pressure indication to control room panel CRP 9-3.
Finding 0827 has been corrected by design change EDCR 84-430 which added torus temperature indication to control room panel CRP 9-3.
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Finding 0558 will be corrected by the addition of scram group indicating lights to control room panel CRP 9-5.
Finding 0555 will be corrected by the addition of two diesel generator VAR meters on control room panel CRP 9-8.
Finding 0557 will be corrected by the ERFIS Project which will replace or add a total of six digital displays to existing control room panels.
Findings 0800, 0806, 0775, 0776, 0777, 0731, 0826, 0850, 0854, 0856, 0862, 0752 and 0760, all address situations where the controls or indica-tors are not found in the control room (eg. radwaste collector tank level, local manual valves, SLC test tank level, etc.). In all cases the procedure assumes normal controls are unavailable and extreme measures must be taken. It was never the intent to provide controls and indications in the control room necessary to perform every imaginable facet of the E0PS. Thus, the instrumentation described in these findings was never intended and is not required to exist in the control room.
Finding 0793 - RHR heat exchangers outlet indication is provided on control room panel CRP 9-21.
Finding 0741 - Group six isolation indication is currently provided in the control room by position indication of the RCIC steam isolation valves. It will also be indicated on the SPDS displays provided by the ERFIS project.
Findings 0664 and 0665 address indications which operators stated would be desireable on the alternate shutdown panels. These panels were designed to contain the minimum acceptable instrumentation in order to bring the plant to safe shutdown during the unlikely event the control room became uninhabitable due to an all encompassing fire.
The panels were not designed for operator convenience. They have however, been included in the scope of the training simulator to ensure that operators can accomplish these assigned functions.
Finding 0727 stated that no indication of MSIV position less than 90% open was provided. The MSIV position indication is such that this indication is provided. Both the red and green lights are lit if the MSIV is less than 90% open.
Finding 0782 assumed E0P 3102 requires indication of a full reactor vessel.
The procedure was specifically written for instances where level indication was unavailable and provided a means to determine full vessel conditions.
Finding 0816 incorrectly assumed that SRM shorting links should be identified by function. The shorting links are only removed by qualified I&C technicians and are adequately identified by terminal points on the associated wiring drawings.
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Finding 0829 EDCR 87-403 will add the necessary reference leg temperature indication.
Finding 0825 requires verification of power available to MSIV reset relay.
This step occurs late in the performance of the E0P 3102 when leads are being lifted by I&C technicians. These same technicians would be available to verify power is available. Similarly, the actions described in Findings 0820, 0823, 0822, and 0824 are now included in the operator training program. At the time these steps would occur, I&C technicians who are more familiar with these tasks would be available to perform these tasks.
HED 1406 Finding 0543 is the only finding associated with this HED. It correctly states that the SJAE mimic is confusing and that the hogger control switch is hard to locate relative to other valves on. CRP 9-6. The hogger control switch will be relocated to CRP 9-2 where the hogger valve controller is located and the mimic will be corrected via HED 0300.
In concert with this change, other controls will be relocated to ensure consistency and aid in locating controls. These additional changes which are not the subject of existing findings are as follows:
516 valve reset pushbuttons will be relocated to just below the SJAE mimic.
The off gas recorder selector switch will be relocated to the vertical section just to the right of the off gas recorder.
The EVC-102-35 indicator lights will be relocated to CRP 9-2 (This is the hogger suction valve)
The unused indicating lights on the vertical portion of CRP 9-7 below the filter indicators will be eliminated. This space will be used for the recorder selector switch described above. ,
The area vacated by these modifications will be used for the annunciator controls being relocated as described in HED 0205.
The SJAE control switches will be rearranged to facilitate a new mimic arrangement.
HED 1407 i
HED 1407 was comprised of the following fourteen findings which have been individually reviewed and resolved.
Finding 0748 - The Reactivity Control E0P entry condition has been changed to
" Scram condition and power remains above 2% or unknown." It can be determined by the control room average power range monitors (APRM) and the APRM downscale lights on CRP 9-5. .
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Finding 0797 - Table T/L-1 of OE 3104 has units of drywell/ torus differential pressure in .2 PSID increments while the CRP 9-5 indicator has increments of .5 psia. Although this difference has not caused operator confusion, the scale on the ERFIS display will be made consistent with Table T/L-1.
Findings 0726 and 0759 - DE 3100 and 3101 instruct the operators to control reactor pressure below the nominal high pressure scram set-point of 1055 psig. To accomplish this the operators have a variety of wide range pressure indicators. In addition,.
there is an annunciator to specifically alarm at 1055 psig.
This diverse indication is completely adequate to allow the operators to accomplish this function.
Finding 0765 - OE 3100 instructs the operators to reposition the mode switch when steam flow is less than 40% of rated, (ie. 64 Mlb/hr).
For conservation and simplicity, the actual instrumentation setpoint and operator response occurs at .60 MLbs/hr which can easily be read from the CRP 9-5 indicators (0-2 MLb/hr with .05 MLb/hr increments).
Findings 0790 and 0738 - OE 3104 requires torus level to be within a spe-cified band of cubic feet while the control room indicators measure torus level in feet. The same procedures also provides Table T/L-1 from which allows the operator to quickly deter-mine if torus level is within the acceptable band. In addi-tion, our ERFIS system will graphic 11y and automatically make this same determination.
Finding 0818 - Tech Spec setpoints are typically listed in procedures by their nominal, or Tech. Spec. values to avoid operator (
confusion and to present the information in terms which the operators are familiar. In every case, the actual instrument setpoint is set more conservative than the Tech. Spec. value and is accompanied by a visual indicator such as a meter, annunciator, indicating lamp, etc.
As in the case of Findings 0765, 0726, and 0759, DE 3100 also specifies the tech spec value of 3X background for main steam line isolation while the indicating meter reads 1-106 mr/hr. The monitoring instrument has a redundant high-high indicating lamp and an annunciator to clearly alert the operator of the 3X background condition. In addition, the operators are familiar with the actual background levels and have the setpoint information in mr/hr available to them.
Findings 0805, 0728, 0634 - As noted in the preceeding paragraph, the proce-dures reflect the nominal or Tech. Spec. values. These three findings correctly pont out the control room tank level indication in percent vrs, the procedural requirements of gallons. Although it would be relatively trivial to change the control room meter faces, the operators expressed a strong preference for the existing indicators. In response to their desires, no change will be made.
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Finding 0739 - E0P 3100 defines MSIV isolation at 120% (Now 140%) steam flow The existing steam flow meters would be pegged high at these flows. An exact value of steam flow is not required, only a determination of a steam line break. Isolation is automatic.
There is also an annunciator for high steam flow as well as other indication of a steam line break (eg. temperature alarms). Thus, the E0P can be performed with existing instru-mentaiton and no change need be made.
Finding 0744 - E0P 3100 requires use of RWCU for pressure control. The i reviewer suggested the E0P procedure should clarify the expected method of use. The RWCU operating procedure OP 2112 provides adequate instructions for any intended operating mode, No change will be made.
Finding 0809 - E0P 3104 directs HPCI/RCIC suction valve leads to be lif ted.
This finding suggests that leads should be clearly identified.
Resolution of this finding is identical to Findings 0816, 0820, 0823, 0822, 0824 and 0825 discussed in HED 1405.
HED 1409 This HED consists of a single finding which identifies that lighting at the operator's desk is below minimum acceptable levels. This problem will be coordinated and corrected with HED 0800.
HED 1410 One entry condition of the Secondary Containment Control Procedure requires determination of Reactor Building water level above the maximum normal water level. No such indication exists in the Control Room or locally. No maximum normal level is defined. Any increase in water level on the floor must be accompanied continuous operation of the reactor building floor drain sumps, which necessitates operator response to the sump area. This, however is insufficient to determine if the maximum safe operating level is in fact reached, and to make the crucial determination of whether or not reactor blowdown is appropriate. Therefore, a more positive method of determining Reactor Building floor water level will be provided.
Level indication of maximum safe and maximum normal water level will be added for each of 5 areas:
- 1. HPCI
- 2. RCIC
- 3. RHR NE Corner Rm
- 5. Torus Area
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HED 1411 The Secondary Containment Control Procedure employs a table limiting area temperatures to define E0P entry conditions. Generally, these area tem-peratures are monitored in the station control room by the Chromalox Card File Instrument on CRP 9-21. However, eight areas (eg. reactor building elevations 252, 280, and 303) have no corresponding remote temperature instrumentation. Remote temperature indication will be provided for these areas.
HED 1412 The new Sigma reactor water level indication meters (eg., those on the HPCI panel) are too small, have less contrast and are difficult for the operators to read. Replacement meters should be investigated to improve readability in accordance with NUREG-0700 guidelines.
All sigma indicators have been reviewed and confirmed that they do infact meet the requirements of NUREG 0700 Guidelines. Never-the-less Vermont Yankee will attempt to identify replacement indicators that more closely re-semble the original GE meters. If superior substitute indicators are identified they will be replaced.
HED 1413 All containment pressure instrumentation in the Control Room is in units of psia, while the E0Ps call for units of psig. This inconsistency will be eli-minated to avoid the necessity for an operator calculation. The appropriate containment pressure indicators will be changed to read out in units of psig.