ML20210S239

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High Risk:Ge Mark I Pressure-Suppression Design. Public Citizen Press Release Re Natl Coalition of Citizen Groups Petitions NRC to Revoke CPs for New Nuclear Plants Encl
ML20210S239
Person / Time
Site: Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/1986
From: Coates J
VERMONT PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP
To:
Shared Package
ML20209C518 List:
References
FOIA-86-586 NUDOCS 8610080054
Download: ML20210S239 (21)
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CE PJJLK 1 FRESSURE-SUPPRESSION Dl: SIGN -t. B c-n>ce- n. y u

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Jacqueline Coates

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$ c' Montpelier, Vermont 85652 ii. 802/223-5221 ,

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?one of the beste purposes of the primary containmaat  !@

. system is to provide a minimum of one protective barrier .I TI

  • be' tween the reactor eere and the environmental surround- *B ings...To fulti.11 its role as an insurance' barrier, the primary containment is designed to remain intact before, .

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... . .. during and. subsequent to any design basis accident." -

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" Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications'  !. .

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-). ~  !]h h e .. INTRODUCTION .q , p 5

$f.hh he consequences of the dis.astrous Chernobyl nuclear t. . . .

fh; eccident in the Soviet Union compelled the Vermont Public 8 2  ;

Interest Research Group (VPIRC) to examine the especity of the # E

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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant to contain radioactivW x

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. material during a serious transient. the result of WPIRG,'s study ,. *M'M

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-hcs led to the conclusion that Vermont Yankee's General Electric -

4 Company (GE) designed Mark I pressure-suppression containment cystem would probably fall in the event of a reactor core melt h occident. ,

6 F.

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EARLY AEC INVESTIGAT10M_OF_ PRE _SOURE-SUPPP.ESSICIf_CONTAIMMENT t, 2 .. :.  :'

s..k . 25 1971, while vermont Yankee's operating license was 3

.e .r WE

{ "pending', serious ques'tions respecting safety inherent to GE,8 s M

$. _.'. boiling water reactor (BWR) pressure-suppression containment .-

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1- ,f.fi.W gg,d: sign were studied within the Atomic Energy Commission (ARC) .

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',g Q(the ; ASC atsf f conel'uded in a

  • Pressure-Suppression containment" 3ng T rcpert (Appendix A' 2-4) that GE BWR containment was to inherently * '#

flawed:by safety problems that the AEC should ' . . . .' adopt a pol-icy'

- cf discouraging further use;of pressure-suppression containments,- [

. cndi thAt such Eesign not be accepted for constr.uction permits.. .

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GU254 996 13:57 UT D5PT OF MTIN UENICMS

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' gy.y h l (Empha'ala added.) Af ter weighing safety advantages (none eeu14 ... ' g'T i i 4- ':.

'be documented) and disadvantages of pressure-suppression,, the- J.

i

'tg.t report % author, Stephen R. Manauer, stated *...on belence I..

\ **S:s it believe'the disadvantages are proponderant.' ec l

these " safety disadvantages
  • of concern to ABC r.evolvee l -

. .k q, arounh the small, low pressure rated containments used by CE, and f .{,Q ;

the real and potential danger of a pressure-suppression syntest .

I fatture. The report also stated that bypass steam leakages,

. enreliable valves and faulty valve position indicators leading to h, .-

.i &

.k;.i,V)..}pressurizationofthecentainmentand/orahydrogea

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T5'dxplosion could result in containstant f ailure. ABC staff eles  ;.[:NJ )i f

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expressed eencern that the smaller sine of pressure-suppressten . ' .-

s.

~ ~ l'oontainment and the division of the primary system had led to

- "'k[4 "over-crowding" and a " limitation of access to reactor and t... '

E f primary system components for surveillance and in-service 4 b

l' . testing." . 4 Fi .SN$. I$

Pressure-suppression and a small, low pressure rated g, g,.,g .. ~ g' 3 .r c ,. , g, e

' Z .a. pontainment had been CE's answer to the problem of making BWR's wym.oonomloelly gospetitive.with other reactor types. Because n'

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~*"N"s* ' Sting water reactors contain inore energy in the form of het 5% - ,

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((weter and steam than kestinghouse pressurised water reactors 2_5d$pMR) of the samp megawatt rating, a SWR dry containment design e--

uldQhave to be larger and capable of withstanding higher -

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$ ._-3 . . . .

i U"' '"hatiernal :pressure than the containment for a PWR of the sans

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5' W'" line. $ut this approach would. not have been marketable.

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'a ...Ia. s t e'a d , through the use'of a design that suppressed the steam, 9 . s. *  ;

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SE425/1986 13:58 VT DEPT CF PCTCR IAHIO.55 W

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pressura, Ca presented safety and accident data to the A5C in'the

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' ,196s's(justifying the use of an economic,'small oontainstanti built .

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+; .. to withstand low internal pressure -- all at' a lower oest, .

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F. . . ' . - .

g casential to SWR marketability. (Appendis 5), . .y

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~; In 1971, t.he ABC *pressura-Suppression Containment" . report 7"-

'. . . -. ' staff simultaneously re-evaluated and rejected those ten-year old

.ir. ' .'.5 Ed

- Os test results, as *using dat.a from testa not applicable to l

b Wi- .. J IS*r':EM 7secident conditions . (Appendix A 2-3) ." In a personal interview

@[h -

'Sn. Washing ton , D.C. on June 6, 1986, Union of Concerned .

a M im a y w .: ~

Q~ lentists (UCS) Senior Nuclear Engineer Robert pollard (who was ', de '

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@Ieed:g'etaf f at AEC in 1971) explained to Vp1R0 th'at,t.he origint!

d DfMImputer codes used by GE in its safety / accident data were scale pi.[4 F i flawe.d, and failed to accurately predict forces on the -

h (See page 8-18 of containment in a pressure-suppression system.

this report.)

On November 9 and December 1,1971, an ABC Task Force E 4

q reviewing " Bypass Ef fects in GE Pressure-Suppression Containment * -

~

(Appendix A 5-8) rejected GE's position that an accident.is "too hu. . . .

h-

&)qi,Wrtimprobable to ' worry about," and, agreed that since small primary ;g hka were 'rather probable * , the ABC must 'get a commitment to.

a .

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,Y[fMudy l u. and iin the problem in whatever way is found.' Task Force

'eg 97-

~ 2. mecords reveal that in response to the comment that *GE wants us i /;;

%- a. c They are afraid of '

EI. # :and ACRs not to mention the problem publicly.  !

..u_a delaying hearings in progress.* The Task Force decision was that.*

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"all'safsty evaluations issued from now on for plants affected

,f-I.L. ,, w!11 have to discuss the problem. In any event, this-is .

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VT EFT OF PEUT WHKuS

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potentiel trouble for the Vermont Yankee and Pilgri.s hearinges it , 2.

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4 3 j will have ta be faced and e real solution found,' -(taphosis

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In' conclusion, the Task Force recomma ended that estab1'ishing '

. o' program to res'olve the technical question of bypass leakage '

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. taa necessary. They deelded tes al) Talk to C4.right

-}; m bway... review must include re' solution of this probles... 2) tall

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-DE *and applicants that our SE,'s (safety evaluations) must mention 5' i- . , . #

s' 'the problem. 3) Make decision on requirements for... Vermont ,

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' h.. . .d M ee as soon as possible.*  ;,.: .F,y a[;}

' . W ."t N .t W : .

. 3.- , -y, On Se p t embe r 25, 1972, ABC Aeasarch Director Banauer sent J. , .,

L, ". A . . .. . - . p' m, e1

E.;V.,i?

.. yss M preneure-suppression research to Joseph M. Wendrie, a senior < . , .s. c . ,

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=6 HEC, official and later Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory . c .~

'kI commission (NRC), with a note saying "Here is an idea to kick around. Please let me know your reaction." (Appendix A 1)

Five days later Hendrie sent a note to AEC Director of g 7 54 l -*/e +y k,1 censing John F. 0,' Leary ( Appendix C 1), saying - 'to han :g

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~~' #' prs'ssure-suppression containa'ent schemes is an attractive one la a b k ways. ,Drycontainments-(M)tR) have the notable advantage of wem.

!Ep swiiste simplicity in dealing.with a primary blowdown

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J t geocident) ... free of the perils of bypass leakage. Bowever, the g.g a pr; w:s n.

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. Fe-h;3f.4ieesytance of pressure-suppression...is firmly imbedded -lh the (g ea - .. et 9 'q 'avantional wisdom.

Reversal of this hallowed polley...could -P '

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11 be the end of nuclea; power. It would make unlicensable the . - "'

N. :t 'r. ,

if ' BE... plants now in review, and would generally create mo're 7

.. . turmoil than I can stand to think about.* ' (Emphasis added.)  !

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,.; - 0' Leary would late'r say, *The frequency of serious and ' , . .:

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, potentially satastrophic aucle'ar incidaats supports the

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thht sooner, er later a major disaster will occur at a

';g.r6S t itestear genetating imeitlity. The tec...hne 'taas ausu1111ag to i

_, [a -

~-

ility

,. _. ,,geoe og to the policy consequemicos of assigning high prehab

  • to a serthus muelea'r moeident... successive Cossainsteam sisply
  • m retened te accept the possibility of a serious moeident as a '% .

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. plasstag parameter.* (Appenddia D)

.' 1 The question of pressure-suppression design safety was .

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  • potential trouble for Verment Tankee* was not

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a. m. 3.4 o[-e 8, her was a 'real solution found.' . Verment Yankee's .
,l.,

. .. b leal. Specifications, Primary containment Characteristie's m

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pij..".3 page S.3-1), state *1t is ' 9

' ' inia Reactor Blowdown (Appendix considered that circumferential f ailure of a recirculation pipe g or reactor vessel f ailure of this magnitude to be of such low pegbability as to be considered incredible.' .

44.. ..j

.__ .- i ANALYSIS OF MhatR I CONTAIMME3fT INTSCRITY -

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, According to OSC's Robert pollard, (5/6/86), any ABC er NRC . , ..

s on pressure-suppression since tendrie's warning "not to h

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to turno11,* have been,

  • unrelated to the real problems =

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$., rest te small, low pressurin rated containment. These systems -

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la pt,ane to bypass steam leakage and are dependent upon g.3

- 5" t.' 19es, valve breakers and positten indicators that can and do fall. It steam bypasses the pressure-suppression geheme, the Open doors, bad

"$beteased load could rupture the containment. '

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' welds', creeks, atuck valves, and. numerous other'sechanteel . G.g,u,

. . . wvdafseta, . or human error, can cre' ate a path fet bypesa leakege.

o  :. v .....

~ [Os bd me bdsta for saying the ebenoes of hypdes leakage . ped, , .,

i

> cver-press'urisation leading to an accident are low. There l's as - mpf,

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  • fIs' for this safety problem - it la tehorest la 'the. 'y .

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>q . .h n (sophast.e added.) -

f. ,w x d s.ign itself."

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e. .l .,3.s. ', , , . .?o l la rd also spoke at length en *another major. disadvan y..y y

'the risk of a  ;;

" i it")WR pressure-suppression containment -1 3; y,'ta m.r+ (Chernoby1 was a.tesh

+] 8 -. , .tyydrogen explosion sistlar to Chernobyl."

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$ .1).*50.2.;*.

(.;...,,..:prassure-suppression plant, not unlike US. Plants

.. * *- is saay wayedW.i -

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. .0 '. :lC s, 9e make matters worse,* pollard emplained, 'MRC sidea with .': Ltha 't l ,,.. . ..

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.. ;c. sealear . industry's desire to acenosise by 411ewlag plants to . . . .4. a.

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f ., j .',,

E ".  %,5 "e' . 'moe drywell nitrogen with air prior to shutdown and af ter a o -a 'I

' " ' ctartup, instead of requiring the plant to remain inert unless i

~

h completely shutdown. The introduction of air while the plant is running is extremely dangerous, since the smallest spark can '

.h, h:8'4Nipet off a hydrogen explosion. We knew that Chernoby1's y Ngen explosion occurred as the plant'was starting up.*. ', . .

,  ; ,t ,..: -

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Q[%s.[ Pollard is notIn alone =; s; .

ita June 9, in'19d6 his issue criticisma of Inside senc, of mark ,. ; . .

,p,s.*

I thR

' M_: mgrissure-suppression.

a, .

3 N' 6faw Will's opening story was . entitled *Denton Urges Ind'uatty . ,

~ p.& ~E .,

(Ap3endia i 3) Sarold. q . ". .

66*eestle

  • ; Doubtsm; about Mark 1 Containment.' ',
NME e, director of NIIC's Office of Wuolear Reactor Regulatlee, . .

3 g.~.l . .

R4 the US. nuclear industry to give top priority to settling _

p" 9 .: .

3 - 4. 3.. ,,, $hgering uncertainties about the ability of GE Mark In a I -

.oontainment to withstand a severe core melt accident.

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8 V & 1986 14883 UT DEPT OF t@gtM)'CL35 h 33 ,gg .h .E.

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sp'eech .to industry leaders at 'an Electrical power:Assearch . ...w t .

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. Institute conference, Danten gueted the NRC's 1974 Reacter safety .

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., , ~f.St.edy (,WASM 1458 ) as,predisting . a 94 peroemt . probability 4f Wrk . x u Z

.--1, containment failure. *1 urge yes. to thtak'serieasly shout'yout

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.. s-ope with. h e if st r. t. 2 g'#h.,g' pty t.

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  • .-..,' Denton said. (Raphasis edded.) N. J

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?.n*nsty - b t herk I containment  ; g.

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.m, fe. b@. nton stated that quest cas a ou . ..

7.7

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ilur$ have taken on new importance following Chernobyl, 'and ] (~

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and the IntC should focus on the integrity of hath 1 .

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Anment, rather than enerely debate aeoident prehehility. .

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y2f.?*k77Peepit are willing to concede that maybe they (severs accidents)w'!.k

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WWt'iETI1' happen now and then at U.S. plants...But they want te knew Cy'$.' i-mw=.q ;C. (Emphasis added.) e , }.f.g SW%%q0a'.t turn into the Chernobyl-type event."

.fsenton concluded by saying that questions of Mark I containment  :

(

ntegrity and ways to prevent early containment failure due to x

ever-pressurization should be top NRC priorities. c

.p u w. .  ;

V i? A July 1985 NRC publication, IfUREG-8956 ' Reassessment of the. }

  • g&:,'&;itchnical gqglg

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h:. Basta for Estimating Source Teru 1 ,a J.

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g41ses potential accident scenarios for :sta nuclear reactor ,

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the report's findings en Mark I pressure-suppression n 4

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Q.#. " g&. -l ,ainment confirm that pollard's and DantoA's concerne?qare well ...
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ad and provide an invaluable backgt.tw for evaluating .

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.J phtBib Yankee's containment and Vermont's evacuati'on $ plan. ..

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%Ekf[ Vermont Yankee's primary containment is'aomposed ef steel a e h

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, eith reinforced concrete, according to its 'er}gineering

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. . . . A. 4pecifications (Appendix c). "The -drywell is desi'gned for an LW9fdtre '

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.4, - T i-internal pressure of 61 pelg (pressure equare' fach gduge) .

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..' 'deincident with a' temperatura of 281 degrees F, plus.the dead,

. i T'3 'Enfand seismic los.de imposed on the ahe11. .Thus, in soeerdanap

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. Sid. the AEh8 S&PV Code, Section '115, tihe drywell dealgn pressure i.;1 . .v

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' " ~ b.~56 (psig . Thermal stress in the ste,e1 shell due to temperature

=:.:. ..

Adding 14.7 to ' fg h.

, ,]t{a%1ents age taken into account in the design.' .

mig to get tho' absolute pressure, Vermont Yankee has a psia .? :.; 4

.: fF[ g=. .ww. .,p ;jpressure square inch absolute) of 78.7.

@ The specifications . . .

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I sJF6=Etf2*** (Page S.2-19) .that during a recirculation line breake.

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. _ iippression chamber water temperatura will approac hm , 2.47 - _: g.p. .%. g f.e- l

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s y and the maximum primary containment system pre)psure....:.. . 4glh p ,9 y$.

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' gM -eaches about 43.5 psig... stream flow would be neglible...' . .g.;.:M3 ,"Q@ ; . .,

lb?

E%*fM9 .

Yankee calculates 'a peak accident pressure of 4d peig*

1 .5  ; q,3

?g < a The plant's secondary containment consists of a g (St.7 psia). s. %

! reactor building with little or no pressure or heat resistance. g@'

According to NRC documents supplied to Congress by WRC M

..n - -

. [

" 7'4emmissioner James Anselstine (Appendix N), Chernobyl had two p

.p" ' r. , '

. y vf.. concrete containments within the reactor building, an inner E y,3,. ,', I

... . j.

?:

W ; M k!th six-inch diameter pipes at a. pressure of 27 paig and e

'm .fane at $7 psig with threeJfoot diameter. piping. t,^

.. u l ?Yl-e.c.truR&G-etS6 results indicate that because of the relatively e

'e . .... .;

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Date _ b N SN *!.

MESSAGE TO: GuOe nacknG )

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NUMBER OF PAGES: [ scnuomsuQWnFom ,

MESSAGE FROM: ___ QV _ GV J U.S.N.R.C. REGION I K UG OF FRUSSIA, PUNA.

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Ruhf{ccCINzen Congress Watch Crecal Mass Energy Project . HeeMb Reneerch Group . Wm Gro@ . Tax Reform Group

(

For Release: Tuesday May 20, 1986

Contact:

Joseph Kriesberg 5:00 pm ~

202-546-4996 NATIONAL COALITION OF CITIZEN GROUPS PETITIONS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO REVOKE CONSTRUCTION PERMITS FOR NEW NUCLEAR PLANTS PUBLIC CITIZEN SUBMI'IS REPORT THAT SHOWS CANCELING PLANTS IS ECONOMICAL In resp.onse to the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union, Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project today along 25 other citizen groups from across the country submitted a legal petition requesting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to cancel construction of all commercial nuclear power ~ plants in the United States which are not yet operating.

Along with the petition, Public Citizen also provided the NRC with a copy of a new report, The Least-Cost Solution t_o Nuclear Pollution, which shows how these plants can be cancelled t

l in a way that will save both utilities and ratepayers money.'-

The petition submitted by the groups requests the NRC to

" revoke the construction permits'for all commercial nuclear power plants in 'the United States which have not yet received f ull -

power licenses." (See attached copy of the petition for a list of those plants affected by the petition.) The citizen organizations asked the NRC to respond within thirty da.ys. ,

~

"The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the Soviet .

Union makes it all too clear that a catastrophic accident can happen here," said Ken Bossong, director of Public Citizen's -

PubGc Cezan . 215 Penns/ vane Avenue S.E.

  • Weehrigion, D.C. 20003 n

Critical Mass Energy Project. Thousands of mishaps occur annually at the nuclear plants already operating and the NRC itself estimates that there is almost a 50:50 chance of a major nuclear accident within the next twenty years. " Opening new plants will only increase the odds that we will ultimately lose this deadly game of nuclear russian roullette," according to Mr.

Bossong.

But the U.S. does not have to take this gamble. According to the report released today by Public Citizen, both utilities and ratepayers can save money if nuclear plants still under construction are cancelled and replaced by less expensive conservation program's. According to the report, it is cheaper to save electricity than it is to produce it, even from existing plants. Conservation programs can provide enormous savings which can pay for the money already invested in partially completed plants while simultaneously lowering electric bills. The petition noted that many alternative sources of energy are readily available at a reasonable cost. These include cogeneration, solar, hydro, geothermal, wind, biomass and purchased power.

"There is ,ru) justification'for completing nuclear plants which will seriously threaten our health, safety and environment when it is cheaper to simply use electricity more efficiently,"

said Joseph Kriesberg, the author of the report.

In their petition to the NRC, the citizen organizations also ,

cited the mounting problem of nuclear waste disposal. -~There is ,

no viable method for disposing of these wastes and no one knows how much it will ultimately cost to do so. Opening more plants, which will create even more waste, is a short-sighted policy.

. . a .

l By cancelling these plants bef ore they go on-line, utilities can save millions of dollars which would otherwise be necessary

~

to decommission or close down these f acilities at the end of their operating lives. Since no large nuclear plants have ever been decommissioned in the United States, the actual cost for doing so is unknown. According to the, report, however, some studies suggest that decommissioning could cost as much as it did to build the plants in the first place - possibly $3 billion or more per plant.

Groups signing onto the petition include Public Citizen, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, intervenors at many plants, state safe energy and environmental groups and other individuals. (See attached copy of the petition for a list of these groups.)

"The tragic accident in the Soviet Union has served to reactivate the safe energy movement," according to Mr. Kriesberg,

" Federal and state officials, the NRC and the utility industry

, should heed the message carried in this petition: The American people do not want or need more nuclear power plants."

Critical Mass Energy Project is the energy research and advocacy arm of Public Citizen. Critical Mass was founded in 1974 by Ralph Nader promotes safe energy alternatives to nuclear power. Copies of the report, The Least-Cost Solution to Nuclear Polution are available from Critical Mass for $1.00 prepaid. ,,

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RATIONALE FOR CANCELING PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION Beaver Valley 2 The current price tag for Beaver Valley is if the plant comes on line two years from now as scheduled,

$3.9 billionit and will raise electric rates by at least 15%. Further, Dusquesne Light has capacity.

a reserve margin of over 40% and does not need additional Dusquene if Perry 1 comes Light on line willyear.

this have even greater excess capacity Bellefonte 1 and 2:

While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has closed all five of TVA's operating nuclear plants, the utility still intends to finish its two Bellefonte units. The management and safety concerns cited by the NRC in closing TVA's Browns Ferry and Sequoyah plants raise serious questions concerning the safety of the Bellefonte plants. Further, TVA has been able to meet demand without its five nuclear plants and does not need additional capacity.

Braidwood 1 & 2:

Quality assurance inspectors at the Braidwood nuclear plants have complained about being harassed and pressured from plant managers to meet inspecticn quotas. This raises serious questions concerning the safety and quality of construction work at the plant. Further, the plant is not needed and low cost alternatives, future demand.

in particular conservation, could easily meet Byron 2 Commonwealth Edison have failed to assure the quality of construction at the plant and several contractors have been cited for fraudulent performance by the NBC Licensing Board. The utility was fined $241,000 by the NRC in the first year of operation of Byron 1, while the plant experienced 137 mishaps (accordfng tc NRC documents). Extremely poor operating performance at unit 1 and sericus questions about the qualtiy of construction at unit 2 cast grave doubts about safely operating Byron 2. '

Catawba 2:

There is considerable evidence of pressure on workers at the Catawba plant to cut corners on safety during construction and there is f urther evidence that this has led to poor construction.

Another problem is the use of Transamerica Delaval Diesel Generators, which have experienced high f ailure rates... Further, the containment dome at the plant can withstand less than half the pressure which the Chernobyl plant could withstand.

. . .,e_ , . , . . .

f Clinton 1:

There have been numerous delays and cost overuns at the plant which has led Wall Street to lower Illinois Power Co.'s stock rating. These delays are the result of poor labor relations which have also led to construction. defects that call

, into question the basic structure of the plant.

l Comanche Peak 1 & 2 Comanche Peak is the most investigated nuclear project under construction. Over 100 whistleblowers have reported to authorities regarding serious safety problems. The plant .

managers, Texas Utilities, have been fined S370,000 for quality contro.1 violations. Serious questions exist about the adequacy of the design of the entire plant, according to the NRC's Licensing Board. Texas Utilities has recently admitted the need to replace at least 30% of the pipe supports in the plant. These dif ficulties have forced numerous cost overruns and the f acility could cost over $7 billion to complete, nearly ten times the original cost estimate.

4 Grand Gulf 2:

Grand Gulf 2 will not be needed to meet electrical demand according to state officials in Arkansas, Louisiana andJ Mississippi. As with Grand Gulf 1, which cost 300% more than originally expected, the cost of Grand Gulf 2 will likely be much greater than readily available alternatives.

Hope Creek The most recent NRC inspection report severly criticized the plant managers for failing to adequately conduct the necessary post-construction tests. Without such testing, safe plant operation cannot be assured.

Limerick 2:

Limerick 2 is located just twenty-one miles from the city of Philadelphia and a major accident could kill and injure thousands of people. The plant will also require enormous amounts of water to be pumped, at great cost, from the Delaware River. This, in '

turn, will significantly harm the river and the environment in the region. Further, Limerick 2 is not needed. In July 1985 an administrative law judge for the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission recommended that Limerick 2 be canceled. The PUC, however, is allowing PECO to complete the project under a $3.2 billion cost cap.

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Nine Mile Point 2:

The Nine Mile Point 2 plant, with a current cost estimate of SS.3 billion, is.the most expensive nuclear plant in the country.

The state currently has a reserve margin of 4 0% and does not need power from the plant. Niagara Mohawk has also received numerous fines from the NRC, and serious management questions have been raised at both units 1 and 2.

Palo Verde 3:

Palo Verde 3 will provide excess capacity for most utilities participating in the project ,throughout this century. By needlessly concentrating the Southwest's resources on a single nuclear power complex, unit 3 will reduce system reliability and increase reserve requirements. The pocr performance of plant managers for. Arizona Public Service has culminated in S150,000 in fines by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and raises serious questions concerning management competence. Finally, several design problems have been identified including structurally 1

deficient control room walls at Unit 3.

Perry 1 and 2 The Perry nuclear plants are sited within 10 miles of an active earthquake fault; however, the maximum earthquake i potential of the fault has never been determined. Thus, the seismic design of the plant is indeterminant. On January 31, 1986, the f ault experienced an earthquake of 5.0 on the Richter scale. These plants will nct be needed tc meet future demand since there is excess capacity.

Seabrook 1 & 2:

There have been numerous construction problems at the Seabrook plants and in the event of a major accident it will be

. virtually impossible to safely evacuate nearby residents and vacationers. The plant cculd potentially contaminate the fragile Seacoast estuary. Finally, the power generated by Seabrook will be extremely expensive and is net needed to meet demand.

j Shearon Harris 2:

The state capitol of North Carolina, Raleigh, is within 20 miles of the Shearon Harris plant and is downwind from the i facility. The plant is located in one of the states fastest growing regions and thousands of people could be injured or killed in the event of an accident. Finally, the lead utility for the project, Carolina Power and Light, has a terrible record for safety at its other nuclear plants. .. ,

r a

w-.---_.._- .

Shoreham:

Power supplied by Shoreham will be very expensive and could easily be replaced by less expensive resources according to New York State officials. Serious questions have been raised over LILco's ability to manage a nuclear f acility and the New York State Public Service Commission has ruled that $1.4 million

. construction custs were imprudent. The plant is located in a densely populated area and the only way of f Long Island is through New York City. If a major accident were to occur it would be impossible to safely evacuate pecple from the area.

South Texas Nuclear Project 1. & 2:

STNP is built near three earthquake faults and the plants are not built to withstand hurricane force winds that often occur in the area. In addition, the foundation of the plaat has atready shifted, and clear evidence exists which indicates the managing utility lacks the character and competence to operate a nuclear plant.

Vogtle 1 & 2:

Whistleblowers at the Vogtle nuclear plants have reported faulty construction of the containment walls. In addition, documentation about the settling rates of the buildings has been f alsified and buildings are settling at different rates. Many drug problems have also been discovered among workers at the plant.

Watts Bar 1 and 2:

TVA hopes to cocplete two nuclear plants located,in Tennes-see. As with the Bellefonte plants there are serious questions concerning TVA's ability to safely manage these f acilities. The Watts Bar units have an additional problem. The containment

, structures sva designed to withstand pressure up to just 12 pcunds per square inch (psi) --

less than half that which the containment structure at the Chernobyl plant could withstand.

Washington Public Power Supply 1 & 3:

Unit I has been mothballed.since 1982 and unit 3 has been' mothba~11ed since 1983. The region has tremendous excess capacity i and these facilities will not be needed to meet future electrical demand. If demand does grow substantially and new capacity is nceded, then there are alternatives to WNP 1 & 3 which are less expensive.

7

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