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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217L8831999-10-21021 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Alternatives to Code Requirements Described in RR-V17 & RR-V18 ML20217G2041999-10-13013 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 179 to License DPR-28 ML20212C2551999-09-17017 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 175 to License DPR-28 ML20206E8741999-04-29029 April 1999 SER Determined That Flaw Evaluation Meets Rules of ASME Code & Assumed Crack Growth Rate Adequate for Application ML20205K7581999-04-0707 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposal for Reexamination of Circumferential Welds with Detected Flaw Indications in Plant RPV ML20203H9881999-02-18018 February 1999 SER Accepting Alternative to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) Augmented Reactor Vessel Exam at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.Technical Ltr Rept Encl ML20199K7151999-01-21021 January 1999 Corrected Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 Issued to FOL DPR-28.Pages 2 & 3 Required Correction & Clarification ML20199K6991999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Request to Use YAEC-1339, Yankee Atomic Electric Co Application of FIBWR2 Core Hydraulics Code to BWR Reload Analysis, at Vermont Yankee Acceptable ML20199L5951999-01-14014 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Code Requirement,Described in Rev 2 to Pump Relief Request RR-P10 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20195C4161998-11-0909 November 1998 SER Accepting Request That NRC Approve ASME Code Case N-560, Alternative Exam Requirement for Class 1,Category B-J Piping Welds ML20155B6471998-10-26026 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Jet Pump Riser Insp Results & Flaw Evaluation,Conducted During 1998 Refueling Outage ML20154B6951998-10-0101 October 1998 SER Re Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20239A1361998-09-0202 September 1998 SER Re License Request for NRC Review & Concurrence W/Changes to NRC-approved Fire Protection Program ML20216F1001998-04-15015 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting 980331 Licensee Proposal to Perform Alternative Testing for Containment Pressurization Test for Vynp ML20217F3421998-03-25025 March 1998 SER Accepting Plans for 1998 & 1999 Refueling Outages Re Reactor Vessel Internals for Plant ML20212H1521998-03-0606 March 1998 Correction to Page 7 of SE Re Relief Request for Third 10-yr Interval Pump & Valve IST Program for Plant ML20217N4911998-02-27027 February 1998 SER Pertaining to Cracking of EDG Lube Oil Piping at Vermont Yankee ML20198P9941998-01-15015 January 1998 SE Authorizing Relief Requests for Third Interval Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program ML20141A4151997-06-18018 June 1997 Revised SE Accepting Proposed Onsite Disposal of Slightly Contaminated Silt Removed from Vermont Yankee Cooling Towers ML20135E5401997-03-0303 March 1997 Safety Assessment Accepting Mod of RHR & CS Sys Containment Isolation Function Configuration ML20134N8271996-11-20020 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Scope & Insp Methods Proposed for Insp of Core Spray Internal Piping During Fall 1996 Refueling Outage at Plant ML20134F9631996-11-0505 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Re Power/Flow Exclusion Region Calculation Method Using LAPUR5 Computer Code & Implementation of Solomon Stability Monitor for Licensee Facility ML20128N3531996-10-11011 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Flaw Evaluation of Indication Found During Reactor Pressure Vessel Insp at Plant ML20129G3611996-10-0202 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Repair for Plant Core Shroud ML20057A6991993-09-0303 September 1993 Safety Evaluation of IST Program Relief Requests for Pumps & Valves for Third 10-yr Insp Interval ML20057A2791993-08-12012 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Reasons Given for Delay in Completing short-term Actions Requested in Ieb 93-003, Resolution of Issues Re to Rv Water Level Instrumentation in Bwrs ML20246D7731989-08-21021 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events. Equipment Classification Program for safety-related Components Acceptable ML20244D0311989-06-0707 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan ML20205T4181988-10-14014 October 1988 Errata to Safety Evaluation Concluding Util Submittal Re Spent Fuel Pool Expansion ML20204F7271988-10-14014 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Expansion of Spent Fuel Pool at Facility ML20236N6461987-08-0707 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Permanent Elimination of Liquid Penetrant Exam of Feedwater Nozzles at Facility.Due to Lack of Reasonable Assurance That Ultrasonic Exam Can Totally Replace Penetrant Exam,Request Unacceptable ML20214T9891987-05-28028 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Util 870112 Proposed Plans to Inspect Two Overlay Repaired Core Spray safe-ends in Lieu of Replacement During Upcoming 1987 Refueling Outage.Plans Acceptable,Providing That Insp Results Satisfactory ML20207S7801987-03-12012 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Tech Spec 4.7.A.3 on one-time Basis to Perform RHR Pump Wear Ring Replacement ML20214T4921986-11-24024 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 830511 & 860117 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-08 Re Mod of Vaccum Breakers on Mark I Containments ML20215M5871986-10-24024 October 1986 Preliminary Evaluation of Containment Study Transmitted w/860902 Ltr.Licensee Estimates Appear Optimistic Considering Uncertainties Inherent in Failure Rate Data ML20206F3651986-06-16016 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Proposed Repair of Core Spray safe- Ends,During Current Refueling Outage.Plant Can Be Safely Returned to Power Operation After Satisfactory Completion of Core Spray safe-end Repairs ML20206F0681986-06-13013 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting 850514,0710,860327,0411 & 0513 Requests for Approval to Use Pvrc Damping Values (ASME Code Case N-411) for Piping Sys Reanalysis ML20202J4211986-03-31031 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Design Mods & Tech Spec Changes Re Degraded Grid Voltage Protection for Class 1E Sys.Lll Technical Evaluation Rept Encl ML20155B8351986-03-31031 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Revised Procedure OP-3140, Providing Technically Acceptable Actions During Degraded Grid Voltage Conditions W/O LOCA to Assure Protection of Class 1E Electrical Sys & Equipment ML20140H9881986-03-25025 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Util 851008 Request to Install Carpet Over Vinyl Asbestos Tiled Control Room Floor Covering. Installation of Carpet Will Not Decrease Level of Fire Safety in Control Room & Deviation Acceptable ML20138E4201985-12-0202 December 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831107 & 840320 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,3.2.1,3.2.2 & 4.5.1 Re post-maint Testing & Reactor Trip Sys Reliability ML20136F1241985-11-18018 November 1985 Safety Evaluation Re IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design. Issues Re Arching Action Theory Resolved ML20137S7331985-09-27027 September 1985 Safety Evaluation Approving Use of Fuel Thermal Performance Code,Frosstey,For Analysis of LOCA Conditions at Low & Moderate Burnups ML20135C8921985-09-10010 September 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting 840824 Commitment to Convert Air Containment Atmosphere Dilution Sys to Nitrogen Sys,In Response to Generic Ltr 84-09 ML20135C9121985-09-10010 September 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Conclusion That Diversification of Scram Discharge Vol Level Instrumentation Not Necessary & Tech Specs,As Modified in Amend 76,resolve Staff Concerns Re Need for Instrumentation Diversity ML20134K7351985-08-19019 August 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting 831107 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.3 & 3.2.3 Re post-maint Testing ML20136G3611985-08-12012 August 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting Seismic Design Criteria Utilized for Evaluation of Modified Recirculation Sys ML20132D8971985-07-22022 July 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Use of Pvrc Damping Values (ASME Code Case N-411) for Response Spectrum Seismic Piping Analyses ML20127D8991985-05-0606 May 1985 Safety Evaluation Re 840925 & 1002 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 Concerning post-trip Review Program & Procedures.Program & Procedures Acceptable 1999-09-17
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217L8831999-10-21021 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Alternatives to Code Requirements Described in RR-V17 & RR-V18 ML20217G2041999-10-13013 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 179 to License DPR-28 BVY-99-127, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20212C2551999-09-17017 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 175 to License DPR-28 BVY-99-112, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Vermont Yankee.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Vermont Yankee.With BVY-99-109, Ro:On 990812,stack Ng Effluent Instrumentation for PAM Was Declared Oos.Caused by Instrument Drift Due to Electronic Components Based on Insps by Instrumentation & Controls Dept.Detector & Preamplifier Will Be Replaced on 9908311999-08-19019 August 1999 Ro:On 990812,stack Ng Effluent Instrumentation for PAM Was Declared Oos.Caused by Instrument Drift Due to Electronic Components Based on Insps by Instrumentation & Controls Dept.Detector & Preamplifier Will Be Replaced on 990831 BVY-99-102, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Vermont Yankee. with1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Vermont Yankee. with ML20209J0081999-07-14014 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990615,diesel Driven Fire Pump Failed to Achieve Rated Flow of 2500 Gallons Per Minute.Pump Was Inoperable for Greater than 7 Days.Corrective Maint Was Performed to Reset Pump Lift Setting BVY-99-090, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20196G5071999-06-23023 June 1999 Vynp Assessment of On-Site Disposal of Contaminated Soil by Land Spreading BVY-99-077, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With BVY-99-068, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Vynp.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Vynp.With ML20206E8741999-04-29029 April 1999 SER Determined That Flaw Evaluation Meets Rules of ASME Code & Assumed Crack Growth Rate Adequate for Application ML20206D9301999-04-27027 April 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 990427 Exercise Manual (Plume Portion) ML20205S4211999-04-16016 April 1999 Non-proprietary Version of Revised Page 4-3 of HI-981932 Technical Rept for Vermont Yankee Spent Fuel Pool Storage Expansion ML20205K7581999-04-0707 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposal for Reexamination of Circumferential Welds with Detected Flaw Indications in Plant RPV BVY-99-046, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20205F6631999-03-0404 March 1999 Jet Pump Riser Weld Leakage Evaluation BVY-99-035, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station.With ML20205P8241999-02-28028 February 1999 Rev 2 to Vermont Yankee Cycle 20 Colr ML20203H9881999-02-18018 February 1999 SER Accepting Alternative to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) Augmented Reactor Vessel Exam at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.Technical Ltr Rept Encl ML20203A6951999-02-0404 February 1999 Revised Rev 2,App B to Vermont Yankee Operational QA Manual (Voqam) ML20199K7151999-01-21021 January 1999 Corrected Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 Issued to FOL DPR-28.Pages 2 & 3 Required Correction & Clarification ML20199K6991999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Request to Use YAEC-1339, Yankee Atomic Electric Co Application of FIBWR2 Core Hydraulics Code to BWR Reload Analysis, at Vermont Yankee Acceptable ML20199L5951999-01-14014 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Code Requirement,Described in Rev 2 to Pump Relief Request RR-P10 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) BVY-99-071, Corp 1998 Annual Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 Corp 1998 Annual Rept. with BVY-99-001, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20198H5481998-12-23023 December 1998 Rev 2 to Vermont Operational QA Manual,Voqam ML20196H8641998-12-0101 December 1998 Cycle 19 Operating Rept BVY-98-163, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20195C4161998-11-0909 November 1998 SER Accepting Request That NRC Approve ASME Code Case N-560, Alternative Exam Requirement for Class 1,Category B-J Piping Welds BVY-98-154, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20155B6471998-10-26026 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Jet Pump Riser Insp Results & Flaw Evaluation,Conducted During 1998 Refueling Outage ML20154N0891998-10-16016 October 1998 Rev 1 to Vermont Operational QA Program Manual (Voqam) ML20154B6951998-10-0101 October 1998 SER Re Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station BVY-98-149, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20239A1361998-09-0202 September 1998 SER Re License Request for NRC Review & Concurrence W/Changes to NRC-approved Fire Protection Program BVY-98-135, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20151U0361998-08-28028 August 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to Holtec Rept HI-981932, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Spent Storage Expansion Project ML20237E9221998-08-20020 August 1998 Vynp 1998 Form NIS-1 Owners Summary Rept for ISI, 961103-980603 BVY-98-122, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station1998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20205F6491998-07-31031 July 1998 Rev 1 to GE-NE-B13-01935-02, Jet Pump Assembly Welds Flaw Evaluation Handbook for Vermont Yankee ML20236G0011998-06-30030 June 1998 Individual Plant Exam External Events BVY-98-098, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station1998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20248C5081998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 2 to 24A5416, Supplemental Reload Licensing Rept for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Reload 19 Cycle 20 ML20248C4951998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 1 to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Cycle 20 Colr BVY-98-081, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station1998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20247J8341998-05-31031 May 1998 Peak Suppression Pool Temp Analyses for Large Break LOCA Scenarios, for May 1998 ML20247G4001998-05-12012 May 1998 Interview Rept of Ej Massey ML20247E6351998-04-30030 April 1998 Rev 1 to GE-NE-B13-01935-LTR, Jet Pump Riser Welds Allowable Flaw Sizes Ltr Rept for Vermont Yankee 1999-09-30
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l l 2.0 EVALUATION As a basis for the temperature limit on torus water temperature the licensee stated that a suppression pool temperature of 90 'F was used as an input for the containment analyses with l acceptable results. An initial suppression pool temperature of 90 'F results in a peak post l accident torus water temperature of less than 185 'F. The containment analyses were done for l loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCAs) and events involving safety relief valve (SRV) discharges to the suppression pool. The licensee stated that environmentally qualified electrical equipment was determined to be qualified for the expected temperatures, including 185 *F for the torus i
temperature. In addition, instrument accuracy and ECCS pipe stress were also evaluated for the effect of a 185 'F torus temperature with no adverse effects. The licensee stated that all safety analysis requirements are met with a normal operating limit of 90 'F.
The licensee's analysis described the methodology used to calculate the maximum suppression pool temperature during the analyzed accident scenarios which reject heat to the suppression pool. The TS suppression pool temperature limits were derived from RELAP5YA-B1 A and GOTHIC 5.0e accident analysis of the suppression pool heatup following various heat rejection load accident scenarios. These scenarios used conservative assumptions and methods for a design basis accident LOCA (DBA-LOCA) with limiting single failures to maximize the heat rejection load to the suppression pool following the accident. Additionally, individual sensitivity runs to increase the short- and long-term peak pool temperature were performed. These sensitivity studies utilized case-specific conservative assumptions to investigate the effect of varying different parameters during the limiting single failure cases. The new DBA-LOCA analysis performed to determine pool heatup incorporated the ANS 5.1 1979 decay heat model, increased residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger fouling in the RHR model, and included additional heat addition from the feedwater system. The ANS 5.1 1979 decay heat model has been found to be acceptably conservative when used with a 2 sigma adder. The two other models added additional conservatism to the analysis in comparison to the assumptions used in the original design basis by increasing the heat addition to the pool and decreasing the heat removal rate by the RHR. The most limiting short- and long-term peak pool temperatures were obtained from the RHR heat exchanger failure in combination with maximum ECCS injection flow or increased feed flow rate sensitivi'y studies, respectively.
NRC review of the proposed change focused on the containment response methodology, codes used, benchmarking of the computer codes, resulting containment response, effect on fuel clad integrity, and adequacy of net positive suction head (NPSH) for appropriate pumps.
2.1. Methodoloov. Codes. Benchmarkina. and Resultina Containment Response The licensee performed a detailed validation and benchmarking of the two computer codes to demonstrate the applicability of the approach. The containment response methodology consists of two distinct elements identifiable by the two computer codes used. They are:
l a. LOCA mass and energy calculations using RELAP5YA-B1 A code. A plant model was derived from the current NRC-approved 10 CFR 50 Appendix K LOCA licensing analysis. This calculation modified the NRC-approved VY LOCA Appendix K model with inputs chosen to conservatively calculate suppression pool temperature and wet-l well pressure and meets many of the requirements detailed in the SRP. Changes from r
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3 the Appendix K analyses include maximizing the vsssel inventory by bounding the initial water level in the downcomer to the maximum expected normal operating level, setting '
the power level at 1625 Mwt, basing the mass and energy release on 107 percent flow, l performing a sensitivity study to assure that all ECCS flows are conservatively established, and the use of the ANS 5.1 1979 decay heat model with a 2 sigma adder.
The staff has reviewed this methodology and agrees with the licensee that performing the mass and energy releases in this way is appropriate for containment analyses. The l staff has concluded that the methodology as proposed for establishing the mass and energy release profiles to support the proposed TS changes is acceptable with feedwater addition considered in a conservative manner as 6scussed below,
- b. Containment calculation using the GOTHIC 5.0e code. GOTHIC is used in this calculation to perform the dynamic mass and energy balance on the containment. It.
has been validated against a selected matrix of separate effects and integral tests to evaluate the available modeling choices. More importantly, benchmarking is included in this calculation for the purpose of demonstrating a direct comparison of results to similar results previously found to be acceptable by the NRC.
The NRC concluded that the basic methodology was reasonable based on its use of a modified Appendix K methodology and the benchmarking described later in this evaluation.
The overall shutdown process was also reviewed. It was found that the consideration of feedwater addition was essential in establishing a conservative analysis. A review found that after a large-break LOCA or main steamline break, the operators were likely to use continued feedwater in order to assist in mitigation and recovery of the accident. As a result, the developed methodology used in the calculations assumes conservative feedwater injection from the perspective of maximizing suppression pool temperature. Continued feedwater addition until the incoming water temperature is less than the expected peak suppression pool temperature is considered conservative. For this purpose a 175 *F value was picked to terminate feedwater flow. The selection of 175 *F was based on the assumption that this represents the approximate peak suppression pool temperature. However, the most recent reanalyses were showing results higher than the 175 *F selected value. Therefore, a sensitivity study was performed. It showed that an increase above 175 *F, but below 185 *F, would have a negligible impact on the resulting peak suppression pool maximum temperature. Based on this result, the licensee concluded that an iteration was unnecessary and that the 175 *F value remained an adequate feedwater shutoff temperature for analytical purposes. The staff agrees with this assessment since it results in a negligible impact on the resulting peak suppression pool maximum temperature.
The initial mass and energy release profile was mechanistically calculated using a detailed RELAP5YA model of the reactor vessel with a coupled feedwater system model for the initial
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