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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217L8831999-10-21021 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Alternatives to Code Requirements Described in RR-V17 & RR-V18 ML20217G2041999-10-13013 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 179 to License DPR-28 ML20212C2551999-09-17017 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 175 to License DPR-28 ML20206E8741999-04-29029 April 1999 SER Determined That Flaw Evaluation Meets Rules of ASME Code & Assumed Crack Growth Rate Adequate for Application ML20205K7581999-04-0707 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposal for Reexamination of Circumferential Welds with Detected Flaw Indications in Plant RPV ML20203H9881999-02-18018 February 1999 SER Accepting Alternative to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) Augmented Reactor Vessel Exam at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.Technical Ltr Rept Encl ML20199K7151999-01-21021 January 1999 Corrected Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 Issued to FOL DPR-28.Pages 2 & 3 Required Correction & Clarification ML20199K6991999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Request to Use YAEC-1339, Yankee Atomic Electric Co Application of FIBWR2 Core Hydraulics Code to BWR Reload Analysis, at Vermont Yankee Acceptable ML20199L5951999-01-14014 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Code Requirement,Described in Rev 2 to Pump Relief Request RR-P10 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20195C4161998-11-0909 November 1998 SER Accepting Request That NRC Approve ASME Code Case N-560, Alternative Exam Requirement for Class 1,Category B-J Piping Welds ML20155B6471998-10-26026 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Jet Pump Riser Insp Results & Flaw Evaluation,Conducted During 1998 Refueling Outage ML20154B6951998-10-0101 October 1998 SER Re Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20239A1361998-09-0202 September 1998 SER Re License Request for NRC Review & Concurrence W/Changes to NRC-approved Fire Protection Program ML20216F1001998-04-15015 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting 980331 Licensee Proposal to Perform Alternative Testing for Containment Pressurization Test for Vynp ML20217F3421998-03-25025 March 1998 SER Accepting Plans for 1998 & 1999 Refueling Outages Re Reactor Vessel Internals for Plant ML20212H1521998-03-0606 March 1998 Correction to Page 7 of SE Re Relief Request for Third 10-yr Interval Pump & Valve IST Program for Plant ML20217N4911998-02-27027 February 1998 SER Pertaining to Cracking of EDG Lube Oil Piping at Vermont Yankee ML20198P9941998-01-15015 January 1998 SE Authorizing Relief Requests for Third Interval Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program ML20141A4151997-06-18018 June 1997 Revised SE Accepting Proposed Onsite Disposal of Slightly Contaminated Silt Removed from Vermont Yankee Cooling Towers ML20135E5401997-03-0303 March 1997 Safety Assessment Accepting Mod of RHR & CS Sys Containment Isolation Function Configuration ML20134N8271996-11-20020 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Scope & Insp Methods Proposed for Insp of Core Spray Internal Piping During Fall 1996 Refueling Outage at Plant ML20134F9631996-11-0505 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Re Power/Flow Exclusion Region Calculation Method Using LAPUR5 Computer Code & Implementation of Solomon Stability Monitor for Licensee Facility ML20128N3531996-10-11011 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Flaw Evaluation of Indication Found During Reactor Pressure Vessel Insp at Plant ML20129G3611996-10-0202 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Repair for Plant Core Shroud ML20057A6991993-09-0303 September 1993 Safety Evaluation of IST Program Relief Requests for Pumps & Valves for Third 10-yr Insp Interval ML20057A2791993-08-12012 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Reasons Given for Delay in Completing short-term Actions Requested in Ieb 93-003, Resolution of Issues Re to Rv Water Level Instrumentation in Bwrs ML20246D7731989-08-21021 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events. Equipment Classification Program for safety-related Components Acceptable ML20244D0311989-06-0707 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan ML20205T4181988-10-14014 October 1988 Errata to Safety Evaluation Concluding Util Submittal Re Spent Fuel Pool Expansion ML20204F7271988-10-14014 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Expansion of Spent Fuel Pool at Facility ML20236N6461987-08-0707 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Permanent Elimination of Liquid Penetrant Exam of Feedwater Nozzles at Facility.Due to Lack of Reasonable Assurance That Ultrasonic Exam Can Totally Replace Penetrant Exam,Request Unacceptable ML20214T9891987-05-28028 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Util 870112 Proposed Plans to Inspect Two Overlay Repaired Core Spray safe-ends in Lieu of Replacement During Upcoming 1987 Refueling Outage.Plans Acceptable,Providing That Insp Results Satisfactory ML20207S7801987-03-12012 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Tech Spec 4.7.A.3 on one-time Basis to Perform RHR Pump Wear Ring Replacement ML20214T4921986-11-24024 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 830511 & 860117 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-08 Re Mod of Vaccum Breakers on Mark I Containments ML20215M5871986-10-24024 October 1986 Preliminary Evaluation of Containment Study Transmitted w/860902 Ltr.Licensee Estimates Appear Optimistic Considering Uncertainties Inherent in Failure Rate Data ML20206F3651986-06-16016 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Proposed Repair of Core Spray safe- Ends,During Current Refueling Outage.Plant Can Be Safely Returned to Power Operation After Satisfactory Completion of Core Spray safe-end Repairs ML20206F0681986-06-13013 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting 850514,0710,860327,0411 & 0513 Requests for Approval to Use Pvrc Damping Values (ASME Code Case N-411) for Piping Sys Reanalysis ML20202J4211986-03-31031 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Design Mods & Tech Spec Changes Re Degraded Grid Voltage Protection for Class 1E Sys.Lll Technical Evaluation Rept Encl ML20155B8351986-03-31031 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Revised Procedure OP-3140, Providing Technically Acceptable Actions During Degraded Grid Voltage Conditions W/O LOCA to Assure Protection of Class 1E Electrical Sys & Equipment ML20140H9881986-03-25025 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Util 851008 Request to Install Carpet Over Vinyl Asbestos Tiled Control Room Floor Covering. Installation of Carpet Will Not Decrease Level of Fire Safety in Control Room & Deviation Acceptable ML20138E4201985-12-0202 December 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831107 & 840320 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,3.2.1,3.2.2 & 4.5.1 Re post-maint Testing & Reactor Trip Sys Reliability ML20136F1241985-11-18018 November 1985 Safety Evaluation Re IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design. Issues Re Arching Action Theory Resolved ML20137S7331985-09-27027 September 1985 Safety Evaluation Approving Use of Fuel Thermal Performance Code,Frosstey,For Analysis of LOCA Conditions at Low & Moderate Burnups ML20135C8921985-09-10010 September 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting 840824 Commitment to Convert Air Containment Atmosphere Dilution Sys to Nitrogen Sys,In Response to Generic Ltr 84-09 ML20135C9121985-09-10010 September 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Conclusion That Diversification of Scram Discharge Vol Level Instrumentation Not Necessary & Tech Specs,As Modified in Amend 76,resolve Staff Concerns Re Need for Instrumentation Diversity ML20134K7351985-08-19019 August 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting 831107 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.3 & 3.2.3 Re post-maint Testing ML20136G3611985-08-12012 August 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting Seismic Design Criteria Utilized for Evaluation of Modified Recirculation Sys ML20132D8971985-07-22022 July 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Use of Pvrc Damping Values (ASME Code Case N-411) for Response Spectrum Seismic Piping Analyses ML20127D8991985-05-0606 May 1985 Safety Evaluation Re 840925 & 1002 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 Concerning post-trip Review Program & Procedures.Program & Procedures Acceptable 1999-09-17
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217L8831999-10-21021 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Alternatives to Code Requirements Described in RR-V17 & RR-V18 ML20217G2041999-10-13013 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 179 to License DPR-28 BVY-99-127, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20212C2551999-09-17017 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 175 to License DPR-28 BVY-99-112, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Vermont Yankee.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Vermont Yankee.With BVY-99-109, Ro:On 990812,stack Ng Effluent Instrumentation for PAM Was Declared Oos.Caused by Instrument Drift Due to Electronic Components Based on Insps by Instrumentation & Controls Dept.Detector & Preamplifier Will Be Replaced on 9908311999-08-19019 August 1999 Ro:On 990812,stack Ng Effluent Instrumentation for PAM Was Declared Oos.Caused by Instrument Drift Due to Electronic Components Based on Insps by Instrumentation & Controls Dept.Detector & Preamplifier Will Be Replaced on 990831 BVY-99-102, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Vermont Yankee. with1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Vermont Yankee. with ML20209J0081999-07-14014 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990615,diesel Driven Fire Pump Failed to Achieve Rated Flow of 2500 Gallons Per Minute.Pump Was Inoperable for Greater than 7 Days.Corrective Maint Was Performed to Reset Pump Lift Setting BVY-99-090, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20196G5071999-06-23023 June 1999 Vynp Assessment of On-Site Disposal of Contaminated Soil by Land Spreading BVY-99-077, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With BVY-99-068, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Vynp.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Vynp.With ML20206E8741999-04-29029 April 1999 SER Determined That Flaw Evaluation Meets Rules of ASME Code & Assumed Crack Growth Rate Adequate for Application ML20206D9301999-04-27027 April 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 990427 Exercise Manual (Plume Portion) ML20205S4211999-04-16016 April 1999 Non-proprietary Version of Revised Page 4-3 of HI-981932 Technical Rept for Vermont Yankee Spent Fuel Pool Storage Expansion ML20205K7581999-04-0707 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposal for Reexamination of Circumferential Welds with Detected Flaw Indications in Plant RPV BVY-99-046, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20205F6631999-03-0404 March 1999 Jet Pump Riser Weld Leakage Evaluation BVY-99-035, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station.With ML20205P8241999-02-28028 February 1999 Rev 2 to Vermont Yankee Cycle 20 Colr ML20203H9881999-02-18018 February 1999 SER Accepting Alternative to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) Augmented Reactor Vessel Exam at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.Technical Ltr Rept Encl ML20203A6951999-02-0404 February 1999 Revised Rev 2,App B to Vermont Yankee Operational QA Manual (Voqam) ML20199K7151999-01-21021 January 1999 Corrected Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 Issued to FOL DPR-28.Pages 2 & 3 Required Correction & Clarification ML20199K6991999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Request to Use YAEC-1339, Yankee Atomic Electric Co Application of FIBWR2 Core Hydraulics Code to BWR Reload Analysis, at Vermont Yankee Acceptable ML20199L5951999-01-14014 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Code Requirement,Described in Rev 2 to Pump Relief Request RR-P10 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) BVY-99-071, Corp 1998 Annual Rept. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 Corp 1998 Annual Rept. with BVY-99-001, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20198H5481998-12-23023 December 1998 Rev 2 to Vermont Operational QA Manual,Voqam ML20196H8641998-12-0101 December 1998 Cycle 19 Operating Rept BVY-98-163, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20195C4161998-11-0909 November 1998 SER Accepting Request That NRC Approve ASME Code Case N-560, Alternative Exam Requirement for Class 1,Category B-J Piping Welds BVY-98-154, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20155B6471998-10-26026 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Jet Pump Riser Insp Results & Flaw Evaluation,Conducted During 1998 Refueling Outage ML20154N0891998-10-16016 October 1998 Rev 1 to Vermont Operational QA Program Manual (Voqam) ML20154B6951998-10-0101 October 1998 SER Re Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station BVY-98-149, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20239A1361998-09-0202 September 1998 SER Re License Request for NRC Review & Concurrence W/Changes to NRC-approved Fire Protection Program BVY-98-135, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.With ML20151U0361998-08-28028 August 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to Holtec Rept HI-981932, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Spent Storage Expansion Project ML20237E9221998-08-20020 August 1998 Vynp 1998 Form NIS-1 Owners Summary Rept for ISI, 961103-980603 BVY-98-122, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station1998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20205F6491998-07-31031 July 1998 Rev 1 to GE-NE-B13-01935-02, Jet Pump Assembly Welds Flaw Evaluation Handbook for Vermont Yankee ML20236G0011998-06-30030 June 1998 Individual Plant Exam External Events BVY-98-098, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station1998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20248C5081998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 2 to 24A5416, Supplemental Reload Licensing Rept for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Reload 19 Cycle 20 ML20248C4951998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 1 to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Cycle 20 Colr BVY-98-081, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station1998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML20247J8341998-05-31031 May 1998 Peak Suppression Pool Temp Analyses for Large Break LOCA Scenarios, for May 1998 ML20247G4001998-05-12012 May 1998 Interview Rept of Ej Massey ML20247E6351998-04-30030 April 1998 Rev 1 to GE-NE-B13-01935-LTR, Jet Pump Riser Welds Allowable Flaw Sizes Ltr Rept for Vermont Yankee 1999-09-30
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001
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- ** SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION LICENSEE RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 95-07. " PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING OF SAFETY-RELATED POWER-OPERATED GATE VALVES" VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION l DOCKET NUMBER 50-271
1.0 INTRODUCTION
j Pressure locking and thermal binding represent potential common-cause failure mechanisms that can render redundant safety systems incapable of performing their safety functions. The identification of susceptible valves and the determination of when the phenomena might occur require a thorough knowledge of components, systems, and plant operations. Pressure locking occurs in flexible-wedge and double-disk gate valves when fluid becomes pressurized inside the valve bonnet and the actuator is not capable of overcoming the additional thrust requirements resulting from the differential pressure created across both valve disks by the pressurized fluid in the valve bonnet. Thermal binding is generally associated with a wedge gate valve that is closed while the system is hot and then is allowed to cool before an attempt is made to open the valve.
Pressure locking or thermal binding occurs as a result of the valve design characteristics (wedge and valve body configuration, flexibility, and material thermal coefficients) when the valve is subjected to specific pressures and temperatures during various modes of plant operation. Operating experience indicates that these situations were not always considered in many plants as part of the design basis for valves.
2.0 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix A, General D'esign Criteria 1 and 4) and plant licensing safety analyses require or commit (or both) that licensees design and test safety-related components and systems to provide adequate assurance that those systems can perform their safety functions. Other individual criteria in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to specific systems.
In accordance with those regulations and licensing commitments, and under the additional provisions of 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix B, Criterion XVI), licensees are expected to act to ensure that safety-related power-operated gate valves susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their required safety functions.
, On August 17,1995, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 95-07, " Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," to request that licensees take certain actions to ensure that safety-related power-operated gate valves that are Enclosure F
9810050200 981001 PDR ADOCK 05000271 P PDR ,
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susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their safety functions within the current licensing bases of the facility. GL 95-07 requested that each licensee, within 180 days of the date of issuance of the generic letter (1) evaluate the operational configurations of safety-related power-operated gate valves in its plant to identify valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding, and (2) perform further analyses and take needed corrective' actions (or justify longer schedules) to ensure that the susceptible valves, identified in (1) above, are capable of performing their intended safety '
functions under all modes of plant operation, including test configuration. In addition, GL 95-07 j requested that licensees, within 180 days of the date of issuance of the generic letter, provide '
to the NRC a summary description of (1) the susceptibility evaluation used to determine that valves are or are not susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding, (2) the results of the susceptibility evaluation, including a listing of the susceptible valves identified, and (3) the corrective actions, or other dispositioning, for the valves identified as susceptible to pressure locking cr thermal binding. The NRC issued GL 95-07 as a " compliance backfit" pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i) because modification may be necessary to bring facilities into compliance with the rules of the Commission referenced above.
In a letter of February 8,1996, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNPC) submitted its 180-day response to GL 95-07 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's submittal and requested additional information in letters dated May 23,1996, and November 24,1997. In letters of June 21, and 26,1996, and January 23, and August 4,1998, the licensee provided the additional information.
3.0 STAFF EVALUATION 3.1 Scope of Licensee's Review GL 95-07 requested that licensees evaluate the operational configurations of safety-related
, power-operated gate valves in their plants to identify valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding. The VYNPC letters of February 8, and June 21, and 26,1996, and January 23, and August 4,1998, described the scope of valves evaluated in response to GL 95-07. T- NRC staff has reviewed the scope of the licensee's susceptibility evaluation performed ni , conse to GL 95-07 and found it complete and acceptable.
The licensing bases for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station is Hot Shutdown; therefore, valves that are operated during conditions below Hot Shutdown are not in the scope of l GL 95-07. The criteria for determining the scope of power-operated valves for GL 95-07 are consistent with the staffs acceptance of the scope of motor-operated valves associated with GL 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance."
3.2 Corrective Actions GL 95-07 requested that licensees, within 180 days, perform further analyses as appropriate, i
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3 and take appropriate corrective actions (or justify longer schedules), to ensure that the susceptible' valves identified are capable of performing their intended safety function under all modes of plant operation, including test configuration. The licensee's submittals discussed proposed corrective actions to address potential pressure-locking and thermal-binding problems. The staff's evaluation of the licensee's actions is discussed in the following paragraphs;
- a. The licensee stated that the following valves were modified to eliminate the potential for pressure locking:
V13-20 Reactor Core isolation Cooling (RCIC) Injection V13-21 RCIC Injection V14-11 A/B Core Spray injection j V14-12A/B Core Spray injection i V23-14 High Pressure Coolant injection Steam Admission I V23-19 High Pressure Coolant injection i V23-20 High Pressure Coolant injection The staff finds that physical modification to valves susceptible to pressure locking is an i appropriate co.Tective action to ensure operability of the valves and is thus acceptable. l
- b. During a telephone conversation on September 9,1998, the licensee clarified to the I staff its bases for assuring that V10-26A, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Drywell Spray Valve, is capable of opening during a pressure locking event. A design change was implemented to V10-26A that involved installation of an accumulator that limits the pressure in the bonnet from exceeding upstream pressure by more than 50 psig. A modified industry gate valve thrust equation (double disk area) was used to calculate the thrust required to open this double disk gate valve during pressure locking conditions when bonnet pressure is 50 psig greater than upstream pressure. The results of the calculation demonstrate that the margin between calculated pressure locking thrust and actuator capability exceed 40%. The information provided by the licensee is subject to confirmation during future NRC inspections. The staff finds that the licensee's modified industry gate valve thrust calculation / methodology provides a technically sound bases for assuring that valves susceptible to pressure locking are capable of performing their intended safety-related function.
- c. The licensee stated that procedures were revised to declare the low pressure core injection system inoperable when V10-25A/B, RHR Low Pressure Core Injection Valves, are shut during surveillance testing. The staff finds that the licensee's procedural changes provide assurance that pressure locking conditions are promptly identified, and is thus acceptable.
- d. The licensee stated that all flexible and solid wedge gate valves in the scope of GL 95-07 were evaluated for thermal binding. When evaluating whether valves were susceptible to thermal binding, the licensee assumed that thermal binding would not occur
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l below specific temperature thresholds. Valve V23-14, High Pressure Core injection Steam l Admission, is susceptible to thermal binding. As corrective action, procedures were
} revised to cycle V23-14 following every 10 *F increase in steam dome temperature. This corrective action and the screening criteria used by the licensee provide a reasonable approach to identify those valves that might be susceptible to thermal binding. Until more
! definitive industry criteria are developed, the staff concludes that the licensee's actions to l address thermal binding of gate valves are acceptable.
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4.0 CONCLUSION
! On the basis of this evaluation, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has performed appropriate evaluations of the operational configurations of safety-related power-operated gate valves to identify valves at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal b!nding. In addition, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has taken l appropriate corrective actions to ensure that these valves are capable of performing their I intended safety functions. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee has adequately
{ addressed the requested actions discussed in GL 95-07.
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Principal Contributor: S. Tingen, NRR )
Date:0ctober 1,1998 l
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