ML20117A107
| ML20117A107 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1985 |
| From: | VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20117A098 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8505080072 | |
| Download: ML20117A107 (159) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- A VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ANALYSIS April 8 , 1985 Yankee Atomic Electric Company Nuclear Services Division 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 8505080072 850424 1 PDR ADOCK 0500 F
l l FXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report provides the Vermont Yankee Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis which demonstrates that the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant will, when certain modifications are made, exemptions granted, and special procedures established, comply with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section IIIG, " Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability". The Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis (the Analysis) was performed considering Appendix R and subsequent NRC guidance, the design of the plant, the 1977 Fire Hazards Survey, and the known capabilities of plant systems. A logic sequence was developed for the Analysis as shown in Figure 1-1. Available safe shutdown systems for a fire in plant areas were determined. Specific components were identified and circuit layouts were examined for separation. Associated circuit tests were applied. Necessary modifications, exemptions and procedures were proposed to resolve any identified discrepancies. Plant walkdowns for this Analysis were conducted to verify the set of corrective actions proposed. The results of the Analysis are discussed and summarized by designated Fire Areas or Fire Zones and all necessary modifications, special procedures, and exemption request actions are discussed and summarized. Modifications required are relatively minor, consisting of fire barriers in selected cable trays, and wrapping some conduit. Special procedures are required for:
- loss of control of the two room coolers in the northeast RHR Core Spray /RHRSW Pump Rooms, due to a fire in one particular location,
- loss of control of Diesel Generator Room ventilation fans, due to a fire in one particular location, and
- loss of control of the Diesel Fuel Oil transfer pumps, due to a fire in one particular location.
Exemption Request Action resulting from the Analysis requires submittal of four new requests and modifications of several of the requests previously filed.
i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
................................................ il TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................ iii LIST OF FIGURES.................................................. v LIST OF TABLES................................................... vii LIST OF REFERENCES............................................... viii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND PURP0SE......................................... 1 2.0 ANALYSIS OF SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS................................ 2 2.1 Definitions................................................ 2 2.2 Assumptions and Basis of the Safe Shutdown Systems Analysis................................................... 5 2.3 Safe Shutdown Performance Goals............................ 12 2.4 Analysis Methodology for Safe Shutdown Systems............. 13 2.5 Determination of Safe Shutdown Systems..................... 15 2.6 Functional Capabilities of Safe Shutdown Systems........... 21 2.7 Development of Safe Shutdown Systems Equipment List and Cables Required for Operation.......................... 29 3.0 DETERMINATION OF FIRE AREAS AND FIRE ZONES....................... 32 3.1 Definitions................................................ 32 3.2 Establishment of Fire Areas and Fire Barriers.............. 33 3.3 Establishment of Fire Zones and Fire Separation Zones...... 34 3.4 Listing of Fire Areas and Fire Zones....................... 34 4.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS SEPARATION ANALYSIS BY FIRE AREA........... 40 4.1 Safe Shutdown System Separation Analysis Methodology....... 40 4.2 Reactor Building........................................... 41 4.3 Control Room, Switchgear Room, Cable Vault................. 55 4.4 Turbine Lube Oil Rooms..................................... 60 4.5 Turbine Building........................................... 61 4.6 Diesel Generator Rooms..................................... 62 4.7 Diesel Oil Day Tank Rooms.................................. 63 4.8 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Building............................ 63 4.9 Radwaste Building / Turbine Building Corridor................ 65 4.10 Intake Structure........................................... 66 4.11 West Cooling Tower - North Cell............................ 66 4.12 Condensate Storage Tank Valve and Instrument Enclosure. . . . . 67
-lii-
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page 5.0
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSION........................................... 69 5.1 Individual Summaries by Area or Zone....................... 69 5.2 Conclusion................................................. 74
-iv-
LIST OF FIGURES Number Title 1-1 Logic Sequence of the Analysis 2-1 Safe Shutdown Sequence - Off-Site Power Not Available 2-2 Required Auxiliary Support System Interaction 2-3 Minimum Safe Shutdown System Capability 2-4 Safe Shutdown Systems 2-5 All Core Makeup Sources 3-1 Plan View - Buildings, Fire Areas, ECCS, and Cooling, Equipment, and Outline of Pertinent Cable Routings 3-2 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II of RHR, RHRSW, and Service Water - Elevation 213'-9" , 3-3 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II of PHR, RHRSW, and Service Water - Elevation 232'-6" 3-4 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II of RHR, RHRSW, and Service Water - Elevation 252'-6" 3-5 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II of RHR, RHRSW, and Service Water - Elevation 280' 3-6 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II of Core Spray and ADS, RCIC and HPCI - Elevation 213'-9" 3-7 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II of Core Spray and ADS, RCIC and HPCI - Elevation 232'-6" 3-8 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II of Core Spray and ADS, RCIC and HPCI - Elevation 252'-6" 3-9 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II of Core Spray and ADS, RCIC and HPCI - Elevation 280' 3-10 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II Process Monitoring - Elevation 213'-9"
-v-
LIST OF FIGURES (Continued) Number Title 3--11 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II Process Monitoring - Elevation 232'-6" 3-12 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II Process Monitoring - Elevation 252'-6" 3-13 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II Process Monitoring - Elevation 280' 3-14 Reactor Building Raceways and Major Equipment for Division I and Division II Process Monitoring - Elevation 303'
-vi-
LIST OF TABLES Number Title Page 2-1 Principal Safe Shutdown Systems 30 2-2 Safe Shutdown Equipment List 31a-w 4-1 Safe Shutdown capability - by Area and Zone 68a-1 5-1 Modifications Required by the Safe Shutdown Systems 76 Separation Analysis 5-2 Special Procedures Required by the Safe Shutdown 77 Systems Separation Analysis 5-3 Exemption Request Action Required by the Safe Shutdown 78 Systems Separation Analysis
-vii-
LIST OF RFFERENCES (a) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, I & E Inspection Report 50-271/83-26, dated November 2, 1983. (b) Letter, USWRC to VYNPC, Generic Letter 81-12, dated February 20, 1981. (c) Letter USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 82-73, dated May 10, 1982. (d) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, Safety Evaluation Report - Alternate Shutdown System, NVY 83-05, dated January 13, 1983. (e) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, Generic Letter 83-33, dated October 19, 1983. (f) Letter USNRC to VYNPC, I&E Information Notice 84-09, dated February 13, 1984. (g) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, Enforcement Conference for I&E Inspection 50-271/83-26, dated March 13, 1984. (h) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 84-130, Meeting on Follow-up of Findings of I&E Inspection 50/271/83-26, dated June 15, 1984. (i) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, Fire Hazards Survey, dated January 31, 1977, and supplemented by letters dated March 18, 1977, July 14, 1977, August 18, 1977, September 13, 1977, and November 30, 1977. (j) Letter USNRC to VYNPC, Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, dated January 13, 1978. (k) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 84-24, Requests for Exemption, dated March 14, 1984. (1) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 84-49. Request for Exemption (Steam Tunnel), dated May 21, 1984. (m) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 84-85, Request for Exemption (24 V Battery Charger), dated July 10, 1984. (n) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 84-109, Additional Information to Support Requests for Exemption, dated September 12, 1984. (o) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 84-53, Response to I&E Inspection 50-271/83-26, dated May 21, 1984. (p) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 82-72, Alternate Shutdown System Design, dated June 16, 1982. (q) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 83-24, Alternate Safe Shutdown System, dated March 23, 1983. (r) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 84-48, Appendix R, 72-Hour Cold Shutdown Requirement, dated May 18, 1984. (s) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 84-85, Request for Exemption, dated July 10, 1984.
-vili-
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to demonstrate Vermont Yankee's compliance with the provisions of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability. This report: (1) Documents our analysis to determine safe shutdown systems and identifies plant equipment needed to be protected in the event of a postulated fire in any one area of the plant. This analysis is provided in Section 2 of this report. (2) Establishes clearly defined " fire areas" and " fire zones" for the entire plant using appropriate fire protection engineering principles. The determination of fire areas and fire zones is described in Section 3 of this report. (3) Evaluates each " fire area" (assuming a fire) to determine what equipment is affected, the availability of alternate equipment to safely shut down the plant, and assure that circuits associated with safe shutdown equipment are not adversely affected by the fire. This evaluation is provided in Section 4 of this report. Figure 1-1 illustrates the logic sequence process followed for this analysis. The results of the Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis indicate that certain conditions within the plant do not meet the specific requirements of Section III.G to Appendix R. This report includes a discussion of these deviations and proposes modifications and/or provides the technical basis for exemptions from Section III.G to Appendix R. In addition, this report provides the basis for exempting our entire Reactor Building from the comprehensive fire barrier provisions of Section III.G by the establishment of " fire areas" and
" fire zones" which are separated by existing fire protection features, plant structures (i.e., walls, ceilings, etc.), and inherent space between the defined areas or zones.
Finally, Section 5 of this report summarizes all necessary modifications as well as exemption requests for each Fire Area and Fire Zone. The completion of these modifications, coupled with the NRC's approval of our requests for exemption, will ensure that Vermont Yankee will have satisfied the provisions of Section III.G to Appendix R. Interim compensatory measures established at Vermont Yankee have been the subject of separate submittals to NRC and are not discussed within this report.
r Al'P ENDIX "R" FIRE liAZARD SURVEY SAFE SilUTDOWN PLANT ARRANGEMENT LOP -->
--> AREAS, --> SEQUENCE SYSTEM -
~" SYSTEMS DRAWINGS ARRANGEMENT ctc l
ALTERNATE OR RE DEDICATED SilUT- FI DOWN + PO NO
+
COMPONENTS LI
+
CABLE ROUTING m CllECKS (PLANT m SPEi DRAWINGS) 4 SUFFICIENT SEPARATION? (OR) FIXES OR REROUTE, NO l YE BARRIERS, ETC. 4 REDEFINE 4 l [ AS_SC",IATED CIRCU v .- - V COSLMON
-> ENCLOSURF.
jg FAIL l PA V A l V COMMON POWER SUPPLY dk FAIL l PA ELEC ENG FIX l OR "110T S110RTS" V PASS l FAI L REPORT =
> COMPLIANCE
~
FIGURE l-)
w - CUNu nuct t em o t, , EQ LOST EQ AVAIL. JL .h 7 IN'T. AVAIL. f PLJER SUPP. _EQ AVAIL. ALL AREAS ? , [ NO l YES ) YES )EFINE AREAS, y l 'ES !, IBLE - V j l, I
< m ;
l } I l I fIAL j i 1 i I l l i INTERVENING REROUTE FIXES, BARRIERS, ' ! m COMBUSTIBLES REDEFINE ZONES, etc. l l [TS TESTS _ N0/0K N0bi YES --$ 1 1 8r 1 ss , Available Oss
' perture Card /
A sS APERTURE l w CARD dk FIX
? >
~
'P 1
l 4 l ' VERMONT YANKEE ioCrR30. APPENoix R,
- L(X31C SEQUENCE OF Tile tit c l gC@@ 72-hj J ANALYSIS I - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
2.0 ANALYSIS OF SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS i This section of the report describes the methodology and gives the results of the process used in determining the safe shutdown systems necessary for ensuring that Vermont Yankee can achieve hot and cold shutdown in the event of a postulated fire. This section is divided into the following subsections: Section'2.1 provides certain definitions for terminology used in the analysis of safe shutdown systems. Section 2.2 provider various assumptions used in the analysis. Section 2.3 lists the safe shutdown performance goals used in defining systems and components requiring fire protection. Section 2.4 describes the analysis methodology used for determining safe shutdown systems. Section 2.5 describes the determination of the systems necessary to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition. Section 2.6 describes the minimum functional requirements of the principal safe shutdown systems and the necessary auxiliary support systems. 2.1 Definitions o Alternate Shutdown System An Alternate Shutdown System is defined as a system created by rerouting, relocation, or modification of existing safe shutdown system controls outside a fire area, to assure the capability of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions. o Associated Circuits of Concern Associated Circuits of Concern are defined as safety-related and nonsafety-related cables that have a separation from the fire area less than that required by 10CFR50, Appendix R. Section III.G.2 and have either: (1) Category-CPS: A common power source with the shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuit of concern by coordinated circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices; or (2) Category-SPUR: A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation could adversely effect the shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/ Nuclear Boiler isolation valves); or
i (3) Category-CE: A common enclosure with the shutdown cables, such as a raceway, panel or junction box, where the circuits are either not electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuits of concern by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or will allow propagation of fire into the common enclosure. The principal basis for this definition is a letter from Mr. D.G. Eisenhut (NRR Division of Licensing) to all power licensees with plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979, entitled " Fire Protection Rule - Generic Letter 81-12", dated February 20, 1981, (Reference (b)] and " Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12", dated May 10, 1982, [ Reference (c)]. o Fire Area Analysis A Fire Area Analysis is defined as a determination of potential fire effects on plant safe shutdown capability and is perforced on the basis of previously defined fire areas and the assumption that the fire is confined to a single fire area. Included is an assessment of the impact on required auxiliary support systems, effects of associated circuits and effects of spurious operation (s). o Isolation Device An Isolation Device is defined as a device in a circuit which prevents malfunctions in one section of an electrical circuit from causing unacceptable effects in other sections of the circuit or other circuits. Acceptable isolation devices for power circuits are single isolation devices actuated by fault currents (circuit breakers or fuses). For low energy control and instrumentation circuits, acceptable isolation devices are those actuated by fault currents (e.g., fuses or circuit breakers), or relays, control switches, transducers, isolation amplifiers, current transformers, diodes, and fiber optic couplers. o Minimum Safe Shutdown System Capability A Minimum Safe Shutdown System Capability is defined as the minimum complement of safe shutdown system equipment necessary to satisfy the performance goals required for safe shutdown. o Safe Shutdown Safe Shutdown is defined as a condition which exists when the plant is being maintained in a hot shutdown, transition to cold shutdown, or cold shutdown mode. The uefinition for safe shutdown used in this analysis envisions the plant to be in one of three states at any moment: two stable conditions (hot and cold shutdown) and a transient condition when the unit is undergoing a change of mode from hot to cold shutdown. Hot and cold shutdown conditions are defined primarily by Section III.L to Appendix R. Transition to cold shutdown includes the combination of systems necessary to maintain hot shutdown while achieving cold shutdown. Hot shutdown exists when the plant meets the following criteria: (1) The reactor is suberitical with an effective multiplication factor (k gg) e of less than or equal to 0.99; (2) The reactor coolant makeup function is capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level above the top of the active fuel; (3) Reactor decay heat is being removed at a rate approximately equal to its generation rate; (4) The primary system temperature is greater than 212 0F; and The difference between hot shutdown and transition to cold shutdown is in the relative matching of decay heat generation and removal rates. In the transition state, heat removal exceeds heat generation allowing for a cooldown of the plant. Cold shutdown differs from transition in that the reactor coolant system temperature is less than or equal to 2120F. The origin of the definitions of hot shutdown, the transition to cold shutdown, and cold shutdown lie in several documents including: (1) 10CFR50 Appendix R. Section III.L. (2) Enclosure 1 of NRC Generic Letter 81-12 (Reference (b)], which offers the following recommendations for achieving hot shutdown? (a) Using control rods for reactivity control function. (b) Using the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System or Reactor Core Isolation Coolant (RCIC) System for reactor coolant makeup function. _4_
(c) Using the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), I and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system in the torus cooling mode for reactor pressure control and decay heat removal functions. (d) Using RHR in the shutdown cooling mode or suppression pool cooling mode. (e) Using the reactor vessel level and pressure and torus temperature indicators for process monitoring function. (f) Using on-site ac and de power sources for support functions. (3) Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications o Safe Shutdown Equipment Safe Shutdown Equipment is defined as those systems, components, cables, piping, valves, etc., which may be used for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in the event of an unmitigated fire in a plant area. o Spurious Operation Spurious Operation is defined as the maloperation of electrical or electromechanical components caused by circuits energized or de-energized as a result of fire damage. This definition recognizes that electrical cables may be damaged by a fire. This cable damage may prevent operation of safe shutdown components or may result in maloperation of non-safe shutdown equipment which may preclude attaining safe shutdown. The effects of spurious operation have been analyzed as follows: (1) Maloperation of safe shutdown equipment due to control circuit interlocks between safe shutdown circuits and other circuits; and (2) Maloperation of equipment which is not defined as safe shutdown, but which could prevent the achievement of a safe shutdown function and thus has been included as required for safe shutdown. 2.2 Assumptions and Basis of the Safe Shutdown Systems Analysis This analysis considers the effects of fire on plant equipment and identifies methods for achieving safe shutdown. The fundamental assumption made in this analysis is that a single fire occurs in any plant area coincident with a complete 72-hour loss of off-site power, as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R, III.L. However, off-site power is assumed to be present for those situations where availability of off-site power could adversely impact safe
shutdown. All equipment nornally present in the plant is assumed to be functional at design capability and may be lost only as a result of fire damage. No other external events, accidents, or equipment failures are assumed to occur in connection with either the postulated fire or through achieving a stable cold shutdown condition. Other assumptions are made in the course of this analysis to ensure that the study clocely reflects the impacts of a fire. These assumptions consist of the following major categories: o Fire damage to plant equipment (electrical cable), o Fire damage to plant equipment (mechanical components), o Inerted drywell, o Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) requirements, o Manpower availability and manual operations, o Repairs, o Availability of the scram function, o Disabled motor-operated valve spurious operation, and o MSIV closure. Each of these categories is discussed in detail in the subsection that follows: 2.2.1 Fire Damage to Plant Equipment (Electrical Cable) o Assumptions The integrity of insulation and external jacket material for electrical cables is susceptible to fire damage. This analysis assumes that the functional integrity of electrical cables is lost when exposed to a postulated fire in any fire area. Electrical cable failures have the following results: (1) The fire damage results in an unusable cable with regard to proper safe shutdown function, and (2) Hot shorts occur that: (a) short a conductor to another conductor in the same cable, or (b) short a conductor to another conductor in another cable in the same enclosure, or (c) short a conductor to ground through the enclosure, or
(d) separate the conductor causing an open - circuit, or (e) short a conductor or conductors to other conductors causing a circuit to be momentarily energized, such that any i seal-in device will change state. (3) Hot shorts that are assumed not to occur. This analysis excludes the following combinations of cable-to-cable hot shorts based on the low likelihood of occurrence: (a) Three-phase ac power circuit cable energized. This would be created by a three phase cable burning open, and another three phase cable burning open and each of the three phases coming together, so that the undesired action takes place. (b) Two wire ungrounded de power or control cable energized. This would be created by both wires burning open, and two wires in another circuit burning open and contacting them continuously without grounds. (c) Circuits of current loop instrumentation (4-20 mA de or 10-50 mA de) are not capable of generating sufficient current to cause fires, o Basis (1) The loss of electrical cable integrity after exposure to any fire, regardless of its intensity, is a conservative assumption. (2) Assuming these types of hot shorts is a realistic judgement, these types of shorts could occur based on cable construction and circuit design. (3) With respect to excluded cases (3)(a) and (3)(b) discussed above, cable-to-cable connections betwoon one de-energized and one energized power circuit could cause spurious operation. In the case of the three-phase ac circuits, three electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts must occur without grounds in order to power the associated device. Similarly, for the two-wire ungrounded de circuit, two electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts without grounds must occur.
Two electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts are required for tso reasons. First, the basic 125V DC power distribution system at Vermont Yankee is ungrounded. Because of this, both wires of a two-wire de circuit are disconnected when the circuit is de-energized by opening a circuit breaker or removing fuses. This leaves the controlled device totally unconnected to the battery. This means that a spurious reconnection to the battery, which could result in actuation of the de device, requires both a positive and negative connection simultaneously. Secondly, should either the wires which remain connected to the de device or the source of the hot short become grounded before the device is activated, this ground will blow the fuse of the hot short source. This will prevent activation of the de device. With respect to excluded case (3)(c), this type of short is of concern in situations where common enclosures exist. The basis for exclusion is discussed below under Associated Circuits Concerns. o Associated Circuits of Concern The separation and protection requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R apply not only to safe shutdown circuits but also to Associated Circuits of Concern defined in Section 2.1. This criteria was applied to the network of safe shutdown circuits identified in Section 2.7 to determine those additional circuits requiring protection. The analysis of such circuits is described below. (1) Associated by Common power Source Electrical circuit fault protection was originally designed to provide protection for plant electric circuits through the use of protective relaying, circuit breakers, and fuses. This protective equipment was designed and applied to ensure adequate protection of all electrical distribution equipment from electric faults and overload conditions in the circuits. When power cables are affected by fire-induced failures, the operation of these protectivo devices will result in isolation of the affected electrical circuit and thus will prevent the propagation of the fault to other portions of the electrical system.
. - - - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l
An integral part of the original electrical system protection was the proper coordination of all these devices. Such coordination assures that the protective device nearest to the fault operates prior to the operation of any
" upstream" devices, and limits interruption of electrical service to a minimum amount of equipment. These design practices provide reasonable assurance that most circuits of concern associated with safe shutdown circuits by common power supplies be sufficiently protected to ensure that fire damage does not propagate to the safe shutdown circuit.
(2) Associated Circuits by Spurious Operations This analysis placed spurious operations into the two categories discussed below. (a) Spurious operation candidates which could affect proper safe shutdown system operation. Those spurious candidates which fall into this category were addressed by including these devices on the safe shutdown equipment list for the affected safe shutdown system. (b) Spurious operation candidates (valves) which could cause an uncontrolled loss of primary coolant. There was only one case requiring consideration for modifications. These valves are redundant to each other. This pair of valves was analyzed together and a fix provided. All other candidate valves were excluded under Section 2.2.1(3)(a) or (b) above. (3) Associated by Common Enclosure In the context of this analysis, enclosures compromise sealed fire areas, cable trays, cabinets, conduits, and other such structures which may contain electrical circuits and electromechanical devices. The fundamental concern for protecting circuits associated by common enclosure is to ensure that fire damage does not propagate into enclosures containing redundant safe shutdown divisions. _g_
such protection is provided in two ways: (1) cable separation, suppression, and fire barriers prevent propagation of fire along the insulation of cables. (2) Overcurrent devices for all cables, except for some instrument cables, interrupt power and prevent a second fire at a remote location - from being created by short circuits caused by the original fire. In order to provide the protection described in (2) above, overcurrent devices are not needed in each instrument cable for the following reasons: (1) Instrument circuits are typically 24 volt de and provide 4-20 mA signals. Instrument cable is typically constructed of multi-conductor #16 AWG wire, twisted shielded pair with drain wire and mylar shield tape. Instrumer.t circuits are routed in dedicated conduit and cable trays. In enclosures such as conduit, cable tray or remotely located devices, failure due to fire may result in an instrument circuit contacting another instrument circuit. Such a failure cannot cause fires in other areas of the plant because of the small instrument loop currents involved. For example, if ten 50 mA instrument loops fault to a single conductor so that all current flows through one conductor, the result would be 10 x 50 MA = 0.5 amp. Heat generated per foot of #16 AWG copper wire would equal at least 1.0 milliwatts. (2) In enclosures such as instrument racks and control panels, failure due to a fire within the panel may result in instrumentation cable contacting 120 volt ac power circuits due to close proximity. In some instances instrumentation and low voltage power (120 volt ac) may be contained in the same wire bundle. Creation of " hot shorts" between the instrumentation cable and the 120 volt circuit is assumed not to occur because it would require connections between the two wires in the ungrounded instrumentation circuit with the two wires in the 120 volt circuit without touching ground. Because the drain wire contained in the instrumentation cable is grounded, the chance of the above connection without touching ground is so highly unlikely that it is excluded as a possibility.
2.2.2 Fire Damage to Plant Equipment (Mechanical Components) o Assumptions Fire damage to valves, piping, and noncombustible tubing is not assumed to adversely impact their ability to function as pressure boundaries or as safe shutdown components. Therefore, a fire is not assumed to cause a valve or other mechanical component to change position unless the fire also affects the electrical equipment or circuit associated with the component. In addition, it was assumed that exposure to a fire will not prevent the manual stroking of the valve following fire extinguishment. 2.2.3 Inerted Drywell o Assumptions The Vermont Yankee drywell is inerted during power operation and therefore has not been analyzed in accordance with Section III.G.2 to Appendix R. 2.2.4 Heating. Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Requirements Heat generated by electric motor windings is removed by circulation of room air through the motors with fans in the motors. This heat is removed from the spaces in the plant by room air coolers or by forced ventilation. o Analyses Basis If the normal means of removing motor heat from the spaces is not available, sufficient cooling can be provided by opening doors and providing ventilation with portable smoke removal blowers. This has been demonstrated by scoping calculations. 2.2.5 Hanpower Availability and Manual Operation o Assumptions This analysis assumes the manual operation of some safe shutdown equipment as a part of the normal or alternate shutdown process for specific fire areas. All operators and fire brigade members are drawn from on-site personnel based on the minimum staffing level specified by technical specifications and current operating practices. Although a recall procedure can be credited for increasing the number of operators available for manual operations after a fire, this analysis does not take credit for a recall procedure for operators.
2.2.6 Repairs o Assumptions This analysis further assumes that off-site power would be restored 72 hours following fire initiation. The repair of the balance of plant (BOP) power feeds to the emergency buses, which may be affected by a fire, would be accomplished during this extended time period without specially developed procedures, equipment, and training. Repairs identified by the analysis will be performed with pre-prepared procedures. 2.2.7 Availability of the Scram Function o Assumptions The reactor scram function is designed as fail safe; therefore, it is assumed to be always available. Loss of electrical power due to fire, or other circumstances, results in the Reactor Protection System " tripping" the plant. 2.2.8 Disabled Motor-operated Valve Spurious Operation o Assumptions A motor-operated valve (MOV) that has its power supply cables dicabled during a fire will not operate spuriously during a fire. The basis for this assumption is provided in Section 2.2.1, Fire Damage to Plant Equipment (Electrical Cable), since this would require a three-phase cable-to-cable fault. 2.2.9 Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure o Assumptions This analysis assumes that MSIV closure can be accomplished prior to control Room evacuation. 2.3 Safe Shutdcwn performance Coals The safe shutdown performance goals of Section III.L to Appendix R establish the criteria for defining systems and components requiring protection. These goals are: o geactivity Control - Insert sufficient negative reactivity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions, o Reactor Coolant Makeup - Maintain the reactor vessel water above the top of the active fuel.
o Decay Heat Removal - Remove the decay heat through cold shutdown conditions. o Process Monitoring - Provide direct reading of safe shutdown process variables. i o Support Functions - Provide support to achieve all of the above performance goals. 2.4 Analysis Methodology for Safe Shutdown Systems This section documents the methodology used for this Analysis to demonstrate the safe shutdown capability of Vermont Yankee consistent with the fire protection goals of the regulations in 10CFR50 Appendix R and the Fire Protection Rule-Generic Letter 81-12 (Reference (b)]. The system requirements for the safe shutdown analysis were established from 10CFR50, Appendix R, which states that "one train of systems necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the Control Room or emergency control stations (s) must be maintained free of fire damage by a single fire...," and that " damage (to both trains of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown) nust be limited so that least one train can be repaired or made operable within 72 hours using on-site capability." Further clarification in establishing criteria was obtained from the Fire Protection Rule Generic Letter 81-12 (Reference (b)], which states the NRC Staff's position on limiting safety consequences, performance goals and equipment generally required for hot and cold shutdown for plants requiring alternate shutdown capability to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R. The following limiting safety consequences were established using as guidance the Fire Protection Rule Generic Letter 81-12 (Reference (b)] for the evaluation of the plant fire protection and safe shutdown systems: (1) No calculated fuel failure due to cladding temperature increases; (2) No primary system pressure in excess of the technical specification safety limit; and (3) No primary containment pressure in excess of design. These limiting safety consequences are consistent with the goal that no fission product boundary should be affected. Based on the limiting safety consequences, a set of functional performance goals to establish system requirements for safe shutdown with or without off-site power available were established. These functional performance goals are:
I (1) Reactor Shutdown - Insert sufficient negative reactivity to maintain the reactor in a suberitical condition in its most reactive state. (2) Coolant Inventory - Restore and maintain the reactor vessel water above the top of the reactor core. (3) Overpressure Protection - Prevent overpressurization of the reactor vessel in excess of the safety limits. (4) Decay Heat Removal - Remove the decay heat at cold shutdown conditions with sufficient capability to allow the transition from hot to cold shutdown. Decay heat removal shall be at a rate suf ficient to preclude overpressurization of the containment. The Safe Shutdown Systems Separation Analysis is based on three major factors: (1) Safe shutdown system performance; (2) Plant configuration including equipment location and cable routing; and (3) Potential for spurious operation. Identification of the safe shutdown system equipment is necessary so that it can be demonstrated that sufficient equipment is free from fire damage to safely shutdown the plant. Consideration of the plant configuration is essential in establishing the fire areas which can be defined as providing a rated fire barrier. Consideration of the potential for spurious operation is necessary so that it can be demonstrated that the effects of a fire cannot defeat the available safe shutdown systems or create new events which are beyond the safe shutdown system capabilities. All three major input factors (systems, plant configuration, and spurious operation) were combined in the fire area evaluation developed for application to Vermont Yankee. The cornerstone of the fire area evaluation is the separation analysis. In the separation analysis, all safe shutdown functions within a fire area were determined, and the impact of a postulated fire within that fire area, including spurious operation was determined. Recommendations and exemptions required to comply with 10CFR50, Appendix R. III.G were developed on the basis of the separation analysis, the fire area evaluation and existing fire barriers and other plant fire protection features (e.g. , detection, suppression, and fire hazards). The safe shutdown system selection was made through the identification of acceptable safe shutdown systems based on their ability to meet the pre-established criteria consistent with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R. The equipment, components and cabling, including associated circuits, were then coded by systems and divisions, so what their functions could be identified in the various areas.
l I' The potential for spurious operation was determined by a system I analysis of all components which have the potential through spurious operation to defeat the safe shutdown systems function or potentially lead to a significant loss of reactor coolant inventory. The spurious operation potential was then identified by fire area. 2.5 Determination of Safe Shutdown Systens Based on the set of four functional performance goals discussed in Section 2.4 above, a process was developed to identify the safe shutdown systems by a systematic analysis of the plant systems to determine those systems required to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown condition. The systematic evaluation process uses safe shutdown sequence diagrams to identify those systems which provide capability for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown by fulfilling the functional requirements for shutdown, overpressure protection of the reactor vessel, restoring and maintaining coolant inventory, and achieving and maintaining cold shutdown through maintenance of coolant inventory and decay heat removal. The safe shutdown sequence diagrams were used to identify the safe shutdown systems by tracing through, in sequence, the logic paths needed to fulfill the performance goals for each of the event trees, taking into account the likely availability of various systems given the postulated consequences of a fire. The source information included Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids) and Control Wiring Diagrams (CWDs) . By using this analysis methodology, it was feasible to identify explicitly all primary safe shutdown systems, including possible alternatives, and the required actions (automatic or manual) necessary to satisfy each of the four performance goals. In addition, all required initiating and monitoring instrumentation is identified. The actual shutdown sequence diagrams are shown on Figures 2-1 and 2-3. On these figures, the transition between hot and cold shutdown is delineated by a dashed line, which indicates depressurization to attain a stable cold shutdown condition. The expected performance of the primary safe shutdown system used in the development of the shutdown sequence diagrams is based on the plant safety analysis. These figures depict the logic sequence for determining systems and actions required to satisfy the four performance goals. The initiating event is a postulated fire in any fire area of the plant. The capability of the systems to function on both on-site and off-site power sources is considered in the evaluation. This evaluation provides a demonstration of the original defense in depth design philosophy for the plant with its original separation requirements. It is expected that for the types of fires anticipated, normal operating systems supplied by off-site power systems would be available to safely shut down the plant. Figure 2-5 depicts the multitude of sources and systems available at Vermont Yankee for reactor core makeup.
The plant design provided two independent, redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation. These redundant trains are powered by independent, redundant power sources called Division I and Division II. An explicit separation criteria of fifteen feet was applied in the plants design. For the majority of the fire areas, at least one of these divisions of protection will be available. Thus, Figures 2-2 and 2-4 were limited on this basis to provide identification of the major safe shutdown systems. Additional capability within these safe shutdown systems is discussed below. The minimum complement of equipment and required auxiliary support systems that can safely shut down the plant by meeting the pre-established performanets goals is all that is required. ( The following discussions indicate only the basic flow paths available. A lengthy discussion of all possible combinations of systems would detract from clarity and would not change the results. 2.5.1 Safe Shutdown Systems With c/f-site Power The detennination of the safe shutdown systems for a postulated fire with off-site power available is described below. The safe shutd r.c.t systems requirements are dependent on the avn11 ability of normal operating systems. When the main condenser is available, it is used to remove decay heat and depressurize the reactor vessel until pressure is below 75 psig. Below 75 psig, decay heat removal iF accomplished by the Residua). Heat Removal (RHR) System in Shutdown Cooling (SDC) mode. If SDC is not available, decay heat can be removed by using the Sup1l cession Pool Cooling (SPC) mode of the RHR System in conjunction with the Safety / Relief Valves (S/RVs). In the SPC mode, energy is transferred to the suppression pool. Water makeup is providad by the systems which maintain coolant inventory.
- If feedwater is available throughout the fire event, no reactor scram on low level may occur. It may be necessary to manually shut down or scram the reactor, unless some other system perturbation causes an automatic scram.
Feedwater will maintain the reactor coolant inventory until manual depressurization of the reactor vessel to the main condenser by use of the turbine bypass system is 'd;. . . ) .- . completed. After depressurization, coolant inventory can l h.' 9 p be maintained by the Control Rod Drive (CRD) pump flow. If fgkl. '
- the CRD pumps are not available, the Feedwater System can J. ' i. '.
be operated to maintal,n coolant inventory. h,-
.;'9.s 4 ,
l 31 ;. ; n.; w a cg i. l
- ip{..,
ge, *. = .
..;x e . .e
.ld ' #,y d.l.(g, ,1 ' ,
. .. . ;. n E
'j5 '
=-
=-
Ei If feedwater is not available, scram will occur on low a-= water level. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System auto start will occur on low-low reactor water level to maintain the coolant inventory until depressurization to the main condenser is accomplished. If the RCIC is not available, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) . System, which also starts on low-low reactor water level, will restore and maintain coolant inventory. If SDC is available, CRD pump flow is adequate to maintain inventory - and compensato for any system leakage. If SPC is used for decay heat removal or the CRD pumps are not available, one "y RHR pump in the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode or one core spray pump is capable of maintaining inventory. _ W If the main condenser is not available, a different j scenario results. Scram occurs on loss of condenser vacuum ,- or turbine stop valve closure. Reactor System - overpressurization is prevented by the S/RVs, which self . - actuate on high system pressure to relieve excess steam to _ the suppression pool. HPCI can be used for inventory _ makeup and pressure control if the full flow test line is used. The SPC is used to remove heat from the suppression pool. When the primary system is cooled and depressurized ,m to 150 psig or less, RHR is placed in Shutdown Cooling '- (SDC) mode. If SDC is not available, Core Spray or RHR pumps can be used to move decay heat from the reactor - vessel to the suppression pool via the S/RVs. SPC removes heat from the pool. 2.5.2 Safe Shutdown Systems Without Off-Site Power . The most limiting case is a fire with a shutdown based on i on-site capability (no credit taken for off-site power.) The safe shutdown systems for this case are shown in Figure 2-1. Scram would be initiated due to coastdown of the RPS _ HG sets, control valve fast closure on load rejection or reactor low water level. Vessel overpressurization is prevented by self-actuation of the S/RVs. Either RCIC or - - HPCI Systems may be used for high pressure coolant makeup. With Division I power only available, decay heat removal is gg accomplished by HPCI, or the S/RVs dumping steam to the 'T suppression pool, and the SPC mode of the RHR is used to remove heat from the suppression pool. j-x After depressurization, the RHR would be placed in SDC mode. If both the SDC and CRD pumps are available, CRD ,; pump flow is used for low pressure coolant makeup. If the -' CRD system is unavailable, coolant inventory can be S maintained by either one LPCI or core spray pump which would supply water to the reactor when the reactor low - a pressure permissive has been satisfied. h_E. 1 i __
l Four RHR pumps are available for LPCI injection with pumps , A and B powered by Division II and pumps C and D powered by ' Division I, and two completely independent core spray systems are available with system A powered by Division II and system B by Division I. If Division II power only is available, high pressure makeup is with the RCIC system. Vessel overpressure protection is identical to the case with Division I power. Following depressurization, either RHR pump A or B in the LPCI mode or core spray A may be used to maintain inventory. 2.5.3 Safe Shutdown System for Appendix R Evaluations From Figures 2-1 and 2-3, it can be seen that there are a large number of diverse system and equipment combinations which will satisfy the four functional performance goals identified in Section 2.4. Other systems and equipment which could perform some of the functions, if necessary, have not been included on these figures to retain clarity. To simplify the fire protection analysis, two groups of systems were selected based on the original plant design philosophy. To conform to the terminology of 10CFR50, Appendix R, these were designated as the principal " trains" of the safe shutdown systems. These two groups of systems conform to the two divisions of safety systems provided for in the original plant design, with their design separation requirements. These two principal trains are referred to as Division I and Division II, conforming to the plant terminology for naming the AC and DC power. The Division I train comprises the RPS, S/RVs, HPCI System, Core Spray B, and RHR-D pump operating in either LPCI, SPC, or in SDC mode. The Division II train comprises the RPS, S/RVs .RCIC System, Core Spray A, and RHR-A pump operating in either LPCI, SPC, or SDC mode. 2.5.4 Minimum Safe Shutdown Systems l Evaluation of possible combinations of systems and components was performed to determine the minimum complement of equipment within each train required to satisfy the four performance goals. This evaluation was required because it is recognized that for some fire areas of the plant, it is impractical to assure the availability of an entire principal safe shutdown systems train.
i The selection of the minimum safe shutdown systems was based on previous plant safety analyses and expected fire area evaluation results. All of these components are capable of being operated by the on-site power supplies. The transition between hot and cold shutdown is delineated
- on Figure 2-1 by a dashed line, which indicates
! depressurization to attain a stable cold shutdown condition. The minimum safe shutdown system capability in each train is indicated on Figure 2-3. To accomplish the reactor shutdown function, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) must initiate reactor scram through actuation of the control rod drive system scram function. For analysis purposes, the most severe challenge to the coolant inventory requirement is a scram on reactor low water level while early isolation of the reactor vessel maximizes its stored energy. To prevent fuel cladding failure due to overheating, the coolant inventory must be restored and maintained. The RCIC system will do this for fires in most areas or zones. For one zone (RB-4), the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) must be opened so that the necessary coolant can be provided by the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) or Core Spray System. Based on the safe shutdown sequence diagrams and plant design, it is expected that the Core Spray System will have higher availability than the LPCI in the fire area evaluation; therefore the core spray was identified with the minimum safe shutdown system for this zone. However, the LPCI can fulfill the coolant inventory function if the core spray is not available. For decay heat removal, one division of the RHR System in either the SPC or SDC mode is adequate. After depressurization, one S/RV is adequate to provide for the transfer of decay heat to the suppression pool also. Based on the safe shutdown sequence diagrams and the plant design, it is expected that the SPC will have higher availability than the SDC in the fire area evaluation; therefore, SPC was identified with the minimum safe shutdown systems. However, the SDC can fulfill the decay heat removal function if the SPC is not available in a l given fire area evaluation. Overpressure protection prior to depressurization is provided by the self-actuation of the S/RVs. The minimum required monitoring instrumentation to accomplish safe shutdown using the minimum required capability is as follows: l (1) Scram Verification; (2) Reactor Vessel Level; l j !
,-- - - - ~ - - - - - - , - - -- - -
i l (3) Reactor Vessel Pressure, i (4) Suppression Pool Temperature, and (5) Suppression Pool Level. 2.S.5 Required Auxiliary Support Systems l The effective functioning of the safe shutdown systems is dependent on the operation of the required auxiliary support systems. The required auxiliary systems were identified through a systematic evaluation of the safe shutdown systems to determine which systems are required for the functioning of the safe shutdown systems. The required auxiliary support systems identified by this process include the de power systems, on-site ac power systems, service water system, including the existing Alternate cooling capability Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) room coolers; RHR Service Water System Condensate Storage Tank, Suppression pool, and Diesel Fuel Oil System. The interactions between the required auxiliary support systems and the principal safe shutdown systems are shown on Figure 2-2. Only the RPS and scram function of the CRD systems are self-contained or fail-safe. All other safe shutdown systems require the functioning of a part of the required auxiliary support systems. The function of the individual required auxiliary support systems in relationship to the principal safe shutdown systems is described below. The required auxiliary support systems are separated into trains as indicated on Figure 2-4. The de power system supplies the power requirements necessary for the functioning of the HPCI and RCIC Systems, the solenoid valves which allow manual actuation of the S/RVs, and control power for the on-site ac power system. The on-site ac power system provides the motive power for the RHR and Core Spray systems. In addition, the on-site ac power system supplies all of the necessary ac power for ' the functioning of the other required auxiliary support ! systems. f The required Auxiliary Support Systems are redundant in nature. Redundant equipment, including electrical power supplies and instrumentation, will not be simultaneously affected by a single fire. There is only one fan for the Alternate Cooling System cell, but it has power supplies from bcth diesels. The Service Water System provides cooling water to the RHR Service Water System, the ECCS room coolers, and the diesel I generators. Room coolers are not required for HPCI or RCIC I operation.
The ECCS room coolers provide the necessary cooling to the Core Spray, RHR, and RHR Service Water Pump Rooms to maintsin the air temperature within system design limits during multiple pump operation over a long-term and are not needed for short-term operation. The RHR Service Water System transfers the decay heat from the RHR System to the ultimate heat sink. The Condensate Storage Tank is the preferred source of water for the HPCI and RCIC Systems. The suppression pool is the water source for the LPCI and Core Spray, and the backup for the HPCI and RCIC Systems. It is also the heat sink for the energy discharged via the S/RVs. The Diesel Fuel Oil System cupplies the diesel generators in the on-site ac power system. 2.5.6 Safe Shutdown System Components and Equipment once the safe shutdown systems and their auxiliary systems were identified, a systematic identification of components and equipment could be done. The systematic identification began with identifying the functional requirements for each system. When functional requirements had been identified, components and equipment in each system needed for these functions were determined. The Safe Shutdown Equipment List is a compilation of all components and equipment identified as necessary for the safe shutdown systems to fulfill functional requirements. ! 2.6 Functional Capabilities of Safe Shutdown Systems { The functional capabilities of the principal safe shutdown systems and the required auxiliary support systems are described in this section. The principal safe shutdown systems are identified in Table 2-1. 2.6.1 Reactor Shutdown The minimum systems required to enable reactor shutdown are the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System (scram function). The RPS includes the RPS motor-generated power supplies and associated control and indicating equipment, sensors, relays, bypass circuitry, and switches that initiate rapid insertion of control rods (scram) to shut down the reactor. There are two independent trip systems in the RPS. During operation, all sensor and trip contacts essential to safety are closed; trip channels, trip logics, and trip actuators are normally energized. Whenever a trip channel sensor contact opens, its auxiliary relay de-energizes, causing contacts in the trip logic to open. The opening of contacts in the trip logic de-energizes its trip actuators. When de-energized, the trip actuators open contacts in all the trip actuator logics for that trip system. This action results in de-energizing the scram pilot valve solenoids associated with that trip system (one scram pilot valve solenoid for each control rod). Unless the other scram pilot valve solenoid for each rod is de-energized, the rods are not scrammed. If a trip then occurs in any of the trip logics of the other trip system, the remaining scram pilot valve solenoid for each rod is de-energized, which causes the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System to scram the control rods. The required scram trips for the safe shutdown systems are identified below. These trips were identified as a result of the safe shutdown systems analysis. Other scram trips may precede those identified, but they are not required to satisfy the performance goals. They include: (1) Reactor High Neutron Flux Trip (2) Reactor Low Water Level (3) Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure (4) Turbine Stop Valve Closure (5) Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure The scram function of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System includes the nitrogen accumulators, scram pilot valves, scram inlet and discharge valves, the control rod drive and ! control rod, the scram discharge volumes, and the scram l discharge volumes vent and drain valves. I There are two scram pilot valves and two scram valves for each control rod. Each scram pilot valve is solenoid operated. The solenoids are normally energized. The two l scram pilot valves associated with a rod control air supply I to both scram valves for that rod. With either scram pilot valve energized, air pressure holds the scram's valves closed. The scram valves control the supply and discharge paths for CRD water. One of the scram pilot valves for each control rod is controlled by trip actuator logics A, the other valve by trip actuator logics B. There are two de solenoid-operated backup scram valves which provide a
second means of controlling the air supply to the scram valves for all control rods. The de solenoid for each backup scram valve is normally de-energized. The backup scram valves are energized (initiate scram) when both Trip System A and Trip System B are tripped. l Venting the air pressure from the scram valves allows CRD water to act on the control rod drive piston. Thus, all control rods are scrammed when both scram pilot valves on each control rod are de-energized. The water displaced by the movement of each rod piston is vented into the scram discharge volumes. When the solenoid for each backup scram valve is energized, the backup scram valves vent the air supply for the scram valves; this action initiates insertion of every control rod regardless of the action of the scram pilot valves. The Alternate Rod Insertion solenoids cause a scram by venting the air to all rods, just as the backup scram valves do. They will cause a scram if plant parameters require one. Their purpose is to protect against an Anticipated Transient Without Scram Event. 2.6.2 Maintain Coolant Inventory The complement of systems that can restore and maintain coolant inventory such that there is no fuel failure due to fuel cladding overheating is the HPCI or RCIC with the reactor pressurized or the LPCI or Core Spray following depressurization by the S/RVs. o High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System The HPCI System is designed to supply high pressure makeup water to the reactor vessel under conditions where the normal feedwater supply is not available. The HPCI System consists of a turbine-driven pump, turbine lube oil system, gland seal condenser, and associated piping, valves, and instrumentation. The HPCI turbine is driven by steam from the reactor vessel which is exhausted to the suppression pool. Water can be pumped to the reactor vessel through the feedwater line from either the condensate storage tank l or the suppression pool. The HPCI is designed to provide constant flow to the reactor vessel over a pressure range of greater than the setpoint of the S/RVs to less than the shutoff head of the low pressure core cooling systems. The HPCI System requires only de power from the plant battery system for operation. Cooling water for the gland seal condenser and lube oil coolers is provided by the HPCI pump.
9 o Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System i The RCIC System is designed to restore and maintain reactor coolant inventory under reactor isolation conditions without dependence on any normal AC power supply system. The ECIC System consists of a turbine-driven pump, turbine lube oil system, barometric condenser, and associated piping, valves and instrumentation. The RCIC turbine is driven by steam from the reactor vessel which is exhausted to the suppression pool. The
~RCIC is designed to provide constant flow to the reactor vessel over a pressure range of greater than the S/RVs setpoints to less than the shutoff head of the low pressure core cooling systems.
The RCIC System requires only de power from the plant battery system for operation. Cooling water for the barometric condenser and lubrication oil coolers is _provided by the RCIC pump. o Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System i The LPCI mode of the RHR System is designed to provide high capacity low pressure source of makeup water to the reactor vessel to restore and maintain adequate coolant inventory for a spectrum of conditions which can depressurize the reactor vessel. The LPCI System consists of four motor-driven RHR pumps and their associated piping, valves, and instrumentrtion. The suppression pool provides the guaranteed source of water for the LPCI System. Upon reactor depressurization, LPCI injection valves are opened and flow is directed to the recirculation loops, i The LPCI System requires ac power and de control power
- for operation. Power to the LPCI System can be
! supplied from the normal off-site power system or the emergency diesel generators. o Core Spray System The Core Spray System is designed to provide a high ccpacity low pressure source of spray water to the reactor vessel to assure adequate core cooling for a spectrum of conditions which can depressurize the l reactor vessel. The Core Spray System consists of two ' completely independent subsystems, each with a motor-driven pump and associated piping and valves. l l 1 1 1
, - . - - . . - - - - --- . .--n. .. - - , - - . . - . - - - -_ , - - - - - - - - . . . - - - . - -
The suppression pool provides the guaranteed source of water for the Core Spray System. Upon reactor depressurization, the core spray injection valves are i opened in each subsystem and the flow enters the l reactor vessel through the two independent spray spargers over the core. Each subsystem is capable of independently satisfying the required safe shutdown system function. The Core Spray System requires ac motive power and de control power for operation. Power to the Core Spray System can be supplied from the normal off-site power systems or the emergency diesel generators. o Safety / Relief Valves (S/2Vs) The S/RVs are designed to be capable of manual actuation to reduce reactor vessel pressure to enable the low pressure core cooling systems (LPCI and Core Spray) to function. The S/RVs include the valve, gas accumulators, and associated circuitry for manual operation. For safe shutdown system function, the valves are manually operated to depressurize the reactor vessel by transferring steam to the suppression pool. Depressurization of the reactor vessel enables the low pressure core cooling systems to effectively function for maintaining coolant inventory. The S/RVs require only de power from the plant battery system for operation. The source of nitrogen for valve operation is from the gas accumulator on each valve. The plant nitrogen system can supply gas without any electrical power, o Instrumentation In order to satisfy and maintain the coolant inventory l performance goal for the principal safe shutdown systems, the following information should be provided to the plant operator: l
- 1. Reactor Level - Water level in the reactor vessel is the primary measurement of the effectiveness of l
the various systems restoring and maintaining coolant inventory. Based on this information, the operator can select from the available system combinations to meet the safe shutdown system requirements.
. -_~ _ -_.. _ __. _
- 2. Reactor Pressure - Precsure in the reactor vessel provides the operator with the necessary information to make the transition from the high to low pressure cooling systems. Based on this information, the operator can determine when low pressure systems can effectively function.
l
- 3. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Water level in the condensate storage tank provides the operator with information on the quantity of water available for continued operation of the HPCI, RCIC, and Core Spray. This information, along with suppression pool level, provides the necessary information to allow the selection of water supply for HPCI, RCIC, and Core Spray.
- 4. Suppression Pool Level - Water level in the suppression pool provides the operator with sufficient information to determine the capability of the suppression pool to contain additional water. Based on this information, along with condensate storage tank level, the operator can select the water supply source for the safe shutdown systems.
- 5. Suppression Pool Temperature - The temperature of the suppression pool provides the operator with sufficient information to determine the capability of the pool to accept additional energy. Based on this information, the operator can determine the need to depressurize the reactor to allow operation of the low pressure cooling system.
2.6.3 Overpressure Protection The only equipment required to provide the overpressure protection function of the safe shutdown systems are the Safety Relief Valves (S/RVs). These valves are self-actuated on overpressure to perform the necessary function. There are no other automatic actions or monitoring i functions required. 2.6.4 Decay Heat Removal l o RCIC System - The RCIC turbine draws steam from a main steam line, upstream of an inboard MSIV. Turbine exhaust steam is discharged underwater in the torus. l This removes energy of decay heat from the reactor vessel and transfers it to the torus. Water pumped by the RCIC pump can be directed to the reactor vessel as j makeup, or the flow may be split between makeup requirements and the full flow test line. This will l l maximize decay heat removal.
\
l
o HPCI System - The HPCI pump turbine system functions identically to the RCIC for decay heat removal; however, it is much larger in capacity. o Safety / Relief Valves (SRVs) l The S/RVs are designed to transfer energy from the reactor vessel to the suppression pool. For this function, the S/RVs can be manually operated. o Shutdown Coolint (SDC) System The SDC mode of the RHR System is designed to remove decay heat directly from the reactor vessel .and transfer it to the RHR Service Water System. The SDC function is initiated at low reactor pressur2 and requires 1 of 4 motor-driven RHR pumps,1 of o.C RHR heat exchangers and their associated piping, valves and instrumentation. After the reactor is depressurized, the SDC suction valves connection to the Reactor Recirculation System are opened and a RHR pump circulates flow through a RHR heat exchanger and back to the Recirculation System through a LPCI injection valve. A Reactor Recirculation System valve in that loop rust be closed. RHR service water is used to remove decay heat from the SDC through the RHR heat exchanger. Service water supplies RHRSW. The SDC requires ac power and de_ control power for operation. AC power to the SDC can be supplied from the normal off-site power system or the emergency diesel generators. The system is manually initiated. o Suppression Pool Coolint (SPC) System The SPC mode of the RHR System is designed to remove l decay heat from the suppression poil and transfer it to I. the RHR Service Water system. The SPC System requires 1 of 4 motor-driven RHR pumps,1 of 2 RHR heat l I exchangers and their associated piping, valves, and instrumentation. In the SPC mode, suction is taken from the suppression pool and a RHR pump circulates flow through a RHR heat ! exchanger and back to the suppression pool through the RHR test line. The RHR Service Water System is used to remove the decay heat from the SPC through the RHR heat exchanger. l , -.
The SPC mode requires ac and de power for operation. Power to the SPC can be supplied from the normal j off-site power system or the emergency diesel ' generators. The system is manually initiated. o Instrumentation L The instrumentation required to provide the monitoring function of the decay heat removal function of the safe shutdown system are described below:
- 1. Reactor water level - Water level in the reactor vessel is used to determine the need for additional makeup water. Based on this information, the operator can select from the available systems the best source of low pressure makeup water.
- 2. Reactor pressure - Pressure in the reactor vessel provides the operator with the necessary information to initiate SDC.
- 3. Suppression pool temperature - The temperature of the suppression pool provides the operator with the necessary information to determine the effectiveness of SPC mode of the RHR System.
- 4. Suppression pool level - Pool water is being circulated through the RHR System where it is being cooled. Pool level is monitored.
2.6.5 Auxiliary Support Systems The required functions of the required auxiliary support systems are based on the requirements for the principal safe shutdown systems. The required auxiliary support functions are identified with their corresponding principal safe shutdown systems function. The required functions of the auxiliary support systems include providing the necessary ac and de power, cooling water, and water sources. The required auxiliary support systems includes all necessary pumps, piping, valves, instrumentation and controls, tanks, diesel-generators, batteries, fuel supplies, heating and ventilating equipment, and associated electrical components to permit their functioning. The active components of the required auxiliary support systems are in the same division as the systems they support. The systems are initiated when required to support a principal safe shutdown system. The monitoring information provided for the safe shutdown systems functions provides adequate j information on the performance of the required auxiliary support systems.
2.7 Development of Safe Shutdown Systems Equipment List snd Cables Required for Operation The safe shutdown equipment list is a compilation of equipment and l components which are considered essential to the functioning of the safe shutdown systems. To develop the safe shutdown equipment list, which is provided in Table 2-2, the principal safe shutdown systems and their auxiliary support systems functions were identified first. Once the system level functional requirements were established, the mechanical equipment and components including identification number, for the principal shutdown systems and auxiliary support systems were systematically identified by tracing the system level function of the applicable Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (P& ids). The instrumentation panels, power sources and the circuit breakers required for the functionin5 of the active mechanical equipment and components of the safe shutdown systems including potential associated ciccuits were identified using the plant Control Wiring Diagrams (CWDs) and one-line diagrams. From the equipment location drawings, the equipment locations were determined. The safe shutdown equipment list provides the results of the systematic identification of all required components of the safe shutdown system. The list includes the equipment, its associated number, description, power sources,
. divisions, and plant location.
Following the identification of the safe shutdown systems and the required auxiliary support systems, the cables required for the cperation of each component were identified by marking up the applicable CWDs. The cables required for the effective operation of all equipment contained in the safe shutdown equipment list were considered in the cable identification process. The plant one line and applicable CWDs for these systems were reviewed to identify the following items: (a) Cable numbers for identified safe shutdown system control cables (from CWDs). (b) Power cables for the components identified in (a). (c) Power and control cables for the components of auxiliary support systems. l (d) Instrumentation loop cables. I r. r l l
TABLE 2-1 PRINCIPAL SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS Function Division I System Division II System Reactor Shutdown CRDs (scrammed) CRDs (scrammed) Coolant Inventory HPCI RCIC Hakeup Core Spray B Core Spray A RHR C & D RHR A & B Overpressure Protection SRVs (self-activated) SRVs (self-activated) Decay Heat Removal HPCI RCIC Core Spray B Core Spray A RHR C & D RHR A & B RHR Service Water B & D RHR Service Water A & C Service Water B & D Service Water A & C l i [ _ _ . . . , _ _ _ , _ _ _ , . _ _ _ _ . , _ , . , _ , _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ , , . _ , , . _ ~ , _ _ . _ . _
TABLS 2-2 NOTES
- 1. The table lists infomation concernins all equipment whose circuits were traced. In the final analysis, some of this equipment is not taken credit for as the minimum safe shutdown equipment.
- 2. The safe shutdown equipment taken credit for is discussed area by area, zone by zone in the body of the report. These sections provide discussions of those systems used for each fire. The components of the systems are provided in this table.
t 1
VERMONT VANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION $[ s.: plant Desigj Division 1 SII = Plcrit Design Division II SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT tIST (I) = Used with Division I Table 2-2 (II) = Used uith Division II Blank - Hon-safety l 5YSTEM: ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION i SAFE I l PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLES COMPONENT DESCRIPTION REACTOR t ulLDING EL 480V AC MCC 8B Cl354A SI
- l. MCC 8E 480V AC MCC l 252*-6" l I l
! REACTOR PUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 I Cl3548 SII l MCC 9D 480v AC MCC l l l 252*-6" l
I i t REACTOR HUILDING EL ,480V AC 5WGR BUS l ClJ3508 SI l l MCC 88 480v AC MCC se i Cl33502 SI I 280*-0" t I I I l l TURBINE UUILDING EL 480V AC SWGR HUS l Cl335H $1 l MCC 8C . . 490v AC MCC I 248*-6" #8 l l l l I i 1 1 l REACTOR t'UILDING EL 480V AC SwGR BU5 i Cl335JI SIIl l MCC 98 480V AC MCC 280*-o* s9 l Cl335J2 SII l l 1 l l I TURBINE BUILDING EL l 480V AC SWGR BUS I CIJ35K SII l l MCC 9C 480v AC MCC i s9 l l l 248*-6" l - l - 1 J l l REACTON BulLDING EL ' 480V AC MCC 98 l Cl370A SI[ l l MCC 894 480v AC MCC 252*-6" AND l Cl370J SIIl l uPS 1A Cl3700 SIIi l
, REACTOR BUILDING EL 400V AC MCC 88 Cl364A SI I MCC 898 480V AC MCC l AND Cl364J SI l 252*-6" 1 'JPS IB 1 Cl364B SI i l
~
l i 1 REACTOR BUILDING EL BATTERY BANK 1A l Cl335AK $((l I uPS-IA UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY AND 400v AC SWGR l Cl370H SII 318*-8" I , BUS #9 l Cl370K SIL 1 l i i REACTOR BulLDING EL BATTERY BANK 18 l Cl335AJ SI i uPS-iB UNINTERRUGTABLE POWER SUPPLY AND 480v AC SwGR I Cl364M SI 388*-8" bus s8 I Cl364H SI l CONTROL BUILDING EMERGENCY DIESEL l l BUS NO. 3 4160v SWITCHGEAR BUS NO. 3 El 2 4 8 * - t2" GENERATOR DG I-lB l l l l 31a l l l l l l
VEIMONT VANNEE NUCLELQ POWE!t STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT 4IST Table 2-2 (Cont inueo) SYSTEM: ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued) l SAFE l COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PL A'4 T LOC A T I ON POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLES ll BUS NO. 4 4169V Sw!TCHGEAR BUS NO. 4 CONTROL AUILDING EMERGENCY Dit.SEL (11) EL 248*-6" GENERATOR DG l-1A BUS NO. 9 4BOV SWITCHGEAR BUS NO. 9 o CONTROL BUILDING dhV SwGR BUS NO. 4 (11) EL 248*-6" VIA STA SERV XFMR T-9-1A BUS NO. B 480V SWITCHGEAR BUS NO. B CONTROL ButLDING 4kV SWGR BUS NO. 3 (I) EL 248* 6" VIA STA SERV XF MR i T-8-1A l . 1 l MCC DC-1A l 125V DC MCC HPCI ROOM EL 213'-9" 425V DC DIST PNL C40bO1FD I DC-1 C40601ED 1 il MCC DC-18 h 125V DC MCC HPCI RDUM EL 283'-9" 125V DC DIST PNL 04Ub0tJD I s DC-1 C40(OlHD 1 l 1 MCC DC-2A 125V DC MCC REACTOR RUILDING 125V DC DIST PNL C40602GD 11 l , i EL 280' 0" DC-1 AND C40601LD 1 1 125V DC DIST PNL DC-2 MCC DC-28 125V DC MCC REACTOR RUILDlHG 125V DC DIST PNL C40602LD 11 EL 213'-9" DC-2 PNL-DC-1AS 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL CONTROL UUILDING 125V BATT AS-1 Clll84Q PNL DC-2 l 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL CONTHOL BUILDING 125V DC BATTERV B1 C40bu2AD 11 , I C40602BD 11 1 BATTERY B1 125V DC STATION BATTERY L(Control Building) 1(Itself) LBattery tO PaneK) l PNL DC-1 , 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL CONTROL BUILDING 125V DC BATTEHY Al C40bOIAD 1 l l C40601BD { l l BATTERY A1 125V DC STATION BATTERY (Control Building) (ItSelf) (1) 1 8 1 i Battery AS-1 l Alternate Shutdown System Battery Turbine Eldg, HVAC Room 1 (Itself) 1 (1) l 1 I 1 l l l lBatteryAS-2 i Alternate Shutdown System Battery ' Diesel Cen. lA Room I! (Itself) I (I) l a 31b
VERMONT Y',LNMEE NUCLEr.2 POWE2 STs. TION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont inued) Sv5 FEM: CR SAFE I COMPONENT DESCRIPTION ' PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHuiDOWN CABLES l l 1 MOV-3-20 CRO PRESS REGULATOR RFACTOR uu!LDlHG EL 480V AC MCC 98 CI880A I 252*-6* C18808 l C1880C CRD PRESS REGULATOR REACTOR SUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 CIB81A MOV-3-22 C18818 252*-6" C188tC REACTOR HUILDING EL 400V AC SWGR SUS CIB85A P-38-1A CRD WATER FEED PUMP CISBSD 232*-6" . 88 I l l 480V AC SWGR SU5 018844 P-38-18 CRO WATER FEED PUMP REACTOR DUILDING EL l #9 C1HH4D 232*-6* l l REACTOR SUILDING EL 52.5V DC POWER . C1887N l FCV-3-19A.B LOCAL FLOW CONTROL VALVE I 252* SUPPLY E/S-3-309 [n87A
,9 (CRP-9-L9)
.i t i 4 31c 1 i
VEIMONT YJN7EE NUCLELQ POWE3 STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont inu.on SYSTEM: CORE SPRAY h SAFE CouPONENT DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION l POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLES MOV14-78 SUCTION VALVE N.O. REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 C11 55A SI 213*-9" C111558 SI Cl1155C SI MOVl4-128 DISCHARGE VALVE H.C. REACTOR DUILDING EL $ 480V AC MCC 88 C11154A $1 296*-O- C111548 SI . Cli tS4C SI - C11:538 SI l Ci t t53C SI l I MOV14-118 DISCHARGE VALVE N.O. REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 CII153A SI 293*-6" C111538 G1 l Cl e l53C bl C1 1548 SI CII154C S1 H Pld-IB CORE SPRAY PUMP REACTOE DUILDING EL 4160V AC SWGR 3 Cl1151 A SI 213*-9" l
; MOV14-2bA TEST VALVE REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 C111694 Sll L 247*-6" C181698 $11 C11169C bli
, MOV14-7A SUCTION VALVE REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 Cll168A Sil 213*-9" Cl11688 SII I Ci t I68C Sil DISCHARGE VALVE N.C. HEACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 Citib7A SIl MOvi4-12A ' C111678 SII 296*-O" C111668 Sll Ci t :66C SIL C1116FC Sil 11 DISCHARGE VALVE N.O. REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 C18166A SIL MOV14-ilA l Ci t i668 SIl EL 293*-0" l C11866C SJ{ CIll678 511 C18 867C Sll 1 31d
; VEltMONT VENKEE NUCLEA3 P0wE3' STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont inueo)
J SYSTEM: CORE SPRAY (continued) l l SAFE l COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE l SHUTDOWN CA8LES I P14-1A CORE SPRAY PUMP REACTOR BUILDING EL 4160V AC SwGR 9 C18164A SII 213*-9* Aux Relays SYSTEM A AUXILIARY RELAYS Control Building 125 VDC DIST PNL Cll163N SII (CRP 9-32) IDC-2C CIii60A sII Ci t t608 SII Cll160C SII SYSTEM 8 AUXILIARY RELAYS (Control Building 125 VDC DIST ?NL Cli tS9a SI
Aux Relays C ' ' '598 SI
- l(CRP 9-33) %C-lc Cl1159C SI l
L Cit :50N SI I MOV14-5A PUMP MINIMUM FLOW BVPASS VALVE REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MLC 98 C111584 SII 213*-9' l CIII588 SII Cltis8C SII I MOvis-58 i PUMP MINIMUM FLOW SVPASS VALVE REACTOR SUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 Cli tS74 SI I
' 213*-9' C191578 SI 1
CI1157C SI i Movi4-268 TEST VALVE REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 CIi156A SI 213*-9" Clll50B SI i . C11156C St 1 , l l l l l l 31e
VERMONT ViNNEE NUCLEAR POWE2 51ATION St.FE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont inu.o) Sv5TEu: Ag l SAFE L COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHuiDOWN CAOLES Rv2-FtA SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE REACTOR BUILDING EL 825v DC PNL 1C Ci752A SII 271'-6" RV2-718 SAFETV/ RELIEF VALVE REACTOR BUILDING EL 125V DC PNL 1C C1753A SII 271*-6~ Rv2-7tC SAFETV/ RELIEF VALVE REACTOR SUILDING EL 125V DC PNL IC CaiS4A 311 21s -s~ RV2-71D SAFETY / RELIEF VALVE REACTOR SUILDING EL 825V DC PNL IC Cir55A SII l l 211 -s~ l i I I i I I 3 a 4 I 1 1
! I l l l l
- 1. 1 1 I 1
31f
= . -_ -
VEEMONT YANMEE NUCLEA3 PDME2 STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST' Table 2-2 (Cont inu.o) SYSTEM: DIESEL GENERATOR ll SAFE COMPONENT I DESCRIPfl0N PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLES P92-IA D/G F.O. TRANSFER PUMP (Fuel Oil Transfer 480v AC MCC 9C C11327A(II) j g PUMP Building) C',1327C Cit 3/7Q C11327K 4 l Cil327G I . 1 C1932FH l l Cl132FJ l l l P92-38 D/G F.O. TRANSFER PUMP (Fuel Oil Transfer 480v AC MCC 8C C i i328 A(I) I l Pump Building) C1932BC
- C11328E CI1328L 1 C1132BF C19328G Cit 328H l
C11328J l C18328K TEF-3 OIESEL GENERATOR 1-18 EMHAUST FAN TUR81NE BUILDING 480V AC MCC 8C C11351 A(I) 4 . l C193518 l CII351G l Cll351C
- l ,
1 C11351H l l ' TEF-2 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-1A EXHAUST FAN TURBINE BUILDING 480V AC MCC 9C C l 1350 A(II) ' C19350F l CII350C 3 4 1; C113508 l CIIJ50G l I I I I I L 4 i I l . . - S- -- 31g
VERMONT VIhKEE NUCLE 0Q P0wE2 STatt0N SATE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 IContino,oi SYSTEMA SERVICE WATER I SAFE l COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CA8LES 4 li 11 PF-18 SW PUMP l INTAME STRUCTURE 4160V AC SwGR s3 C1424A SI Cl424F SI i P4-1A , SW PUMP INTAME STRUCTURE 4160V AC SwGR s4 C1425A SII I I C1425F SII l P7-1D SW PUMP INTAKE STRUCTURE 4160V AC $wGR a3 C1426A Sl i I Ci426F SI I PF-1C SW PUMP 1 IHTAME STRUCTURE 4160V AC SwGR #4 C1427A $(( C1427F SII M0v70-isA SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BUILD- REACTOR au!LoING 400v AC MCC8E C1458AA I Ci450A8 ING ISOLATION VALVE C1450AC I l MOV70-198 SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BUILD- REACTOR HUILDING l 480V AC MCC OE Cl4580A ING ISOLATION VALVE C',"@ REACTOR HulLDING 480V AC MCC 9D C1458A MOV70-20 i SEttVICE WATEst TO TURBINE PUILD- EL 234"3- Ci 8 lINGISOLATIONVALVE il PB-18 RHR SW PUMP REACTOR pulLDING 4160V AC SwGR a3 C11304G i EL 232'-6* l Cll304A Sil 1 PS-1A i RHR Sw PUMP REACTOR BUILDING 41COV AC SwGR s4 C19305G , l h EL 232*-b" h C11305A SII I 1 P8-ID RHR Sw PUMP REACTOR BUILDING 4360V AC SwGR 83 C11306G l i l EL 232*-6* C11306A Sl 1 RHR SW PUMP REACTOR HUILDING 4160V AC SwGR #4 1 Ct130FG 1 , P8-1C C1830TA SII ' I El 232' ti" l I 4 COOLING TOWER s2 4 ROV AC MCC 582A l C1946TC SI l COOLING TOWER l C944678 l
- FAN s2-1
'. Cl146FA l Ci t467D SI l CI:467G SI I I 311
VERMONT ViNMEE NUCLEf.3 POME *! STQTION SAFE SHUTDOMN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont ino.oj Sv5 TEM: MsIV I SAFE 11 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION POMER SOURCE SHUTDOMN CABLES V2-86A MAIN STEAM VALVE (OUTBOARD) REACTOR bu!LDING EL 125V DC DIST PNL C1111tD Sll. 253* DC-2C Clll10E Sill 12Ov vlTAL AC PNL C11110F Sili VAC-A. I v2-868 MAIN STEAM VALVE (OUTBOARD) REACTOR BulLDING EL 125V DC DIST PNL ClllllE Sil 253 DC-2C CiliiOH SII . 120V VITAL AC PNL C111 TOG Sil VAC-A v2-86C MAIN STEAM VALVE (OUTBOARD) REACTOR BUILDING EL 125V DC DIST PNL C11118F SIl 253 DC-2C ClltiOL SII 120V VITAL AC PNL Cll110J Sil VAC-A v2-860 MAIN STEAM VALVE (OUTBOARD) REACTOR BUILDING EL 125V DC DIST PNL ClllllG Sll 253 DC-2C Cll110P SII 120V VITAL AC PNL Citt10M $11' I VAC-A h MAIN STEAM VALVE (INBOARD) NEACTOR BUILDING 125V DC DIST PNL CillO9E SI V2-80A , DC-lC CIll08E SI 120V AC INST Cll108F SI DIST PNL, ClllO8G Si l v2-800 MAIN STEAM VALVE (INBOARD) REACTOR BUILDING 125V DC DIST PNL C19109F S1 4 DC-IC C11108H SI 120v AC INST Cll108M S1 DIST PNL C14l08J S1 I MAIN STEAM VALVE (INBOARD) REACTOR BUILDING 125V DC DIST PNL i C11109G SI v2-80C DC-1C Cl1108L SI 120v AC INST l ClilO8N S[
. DisT PNL C11108M S1 li i
REACTOR Bill LDI NG 125V DC DIST PNL Clll09H SI V2-80D l MAIN STEAM VALVE (INBOARD) DC-1C C19108P SI l l 120v AC INST Cil DaR SI J g DIST PNL CIll080 Si l l I l I 31h
VE ResON T VfMMEE NUCLE &Q P0wE2 STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPteENT LIST Table 2-2 gContinoeo; SYSTEM: SfRVICE WATER (continued) SAFE I 11 PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLES 'I COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 1 PCV-70-73A,e Service Water Pressure Control l Diesel Ro,ns Iervice S Water o CAstg5
!DieselRooms lair - Fails Open i No CASTES ,
FCV-70-25A.B fkO 1 ol Valve, Service I I I I Water to Diesels keactor Building 213 'I Air - Fails Open l No Cables
.i PCV-70-69 A,B RHR Service Water Pressure to Diesels l l
1 I i 1 I i l I i l 1
' 1 1
D 1 l 31j l 1
VEMMONI V*.NMEE NUCLEs.3 POwE3 STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont inu.a) SYSTEM: RHR SAFE COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLE 5 Mov10-66 DISCHARGE TO RADWASTE ISOLATION Reactor Building 480V AC MCC 88 C11313A SI (IN80ARD) C3'as SI i b 13' C t 1313C SI l r I I l MOV10-57 DISCHARGE TO RADWASTE ISOLATION Reactor Building i25v DC MCC DC-2A C l i3 : 2G SII l CI 9312F SII I (OUTBOARD) hg3 / C11312A SII l l C l:312s SII ll Cl1312C SII REACTOR SHUTDOWN COOLING REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC WCC BS i C 11309 A SI MOV10-18 C e l 3098 SI ISOLA?pON VALVE (INeOARD) 270'-9" I C 11309C SI Il l C 11309E SI CII314G CI1314H l REACTOR SHUTDOWN COOLING REACTOR SUILDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-24 Cll308GSII WOV10-17 C11308A SII ISOLATION VALVE 100TBOARD) 260*-3" C113088 SIII l C1:308u SII l CII308H SIL i ,
- Cii308F SII C1:308C SII RHR PUMP REACTOR BUILDING EL 4160V AC SwGR a3 C11302A SI P10-10 233'-9*
RHR PUMP REACTOR BUILDING EL 4160V AC SwGR 84 C11301A SII P10-IA 213'-9" l RHR PUMP REACTON BUILDING EL 4160V AC SwGR #3 Cll300A SI l P10-IC 213'-9" l l REACTON BUILDING EL 4160V AC SwGR a4 CitJ03A SII l PIO-18 RHR PUMP 283'-9" h l REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 C1:2904 MOV10-184 1 EMERGENCY INTERTIE. VALVE 242*-3 1/2- Coi2908 l Ci 290C l I l 1 1 I l 480V AC MCC 8B Lil2894 EMERGENCY INTERTIE VALVE REACTOR BUILDlHG EL MOV10-183 242*-3 t/2" l l C197R98 1 l ci 2n9C l ' l __J i 1 31k
VERMONT VANiLEE NUCLEf.Q POME',2 STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Coat taued) 5YSTEM: Ry (continued) SAFE ] PLANT LOCATION POMER SOURCE SHUTDOMN CABLE 5 1 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION REACTOR SUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 Ct1287A SII asOV10-89A % SM OI5 CHARGE VALVE 234*-0" Cll2878 gIl CII287C all C1128 7Cl SII C112870 SII C1128 701 SII Cit 287E SII C11287F SII REACTOR SUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 C 286r SI I NOv10-898 RHR SW DISCHARGE VALVE Cll286s SI I 234'-0", l J Ct:206C SI I Cre286D SI i i Cl1285A SII I RE ACTOR utflLDING EL ' 480V AC MCC 9B l MOV10-65A RHR PUMPS DISCHARGE VALVE 234*-8" C112858 SII i C #285C SII c C t 1285C 1 S I L C11285E SII l 480V AC MCC 88 C11284A SI MOV10-658 RHR PUMPS DISCHARGE valve C112848 SI Ces284C SI
- 1 l
REACTOR SUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 C11283A SIII MOV10-394 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER Return 247' Ci:283s SLI I V ALVE , Upstream C :283C SII C 11283C I SII Cil283E SIL REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 Cit 282A SI MOVIO-398 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER Return 247* Ct:282s SI valve, Upstream C 1282C SI REACTOR SUILDING EL 400V AC MCC 98 C112HIA SII . Cli28:e SII l Movio-38A SUPPRESSION CHAMBER SPRAY VALVE 246*-O-C 28 C SII- l I I REACTOR bOILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 CII2HOA SI I MOV10-380 SUPPRESSION CitAMUEH SPHAY VALVE 246'-O" C112808 SI l
. Cai200C SI J
I 1 1 l. i 31L I i l
VEEMUNI VIN EE HOCLELR POwE3 STATION
\ _ _ . .
SAF E SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont inu a) Sv5 TEM: RHR (continued) l SAFE COMPONENT DESCRIRTION e PLANT LOCATION l POMER SOURCE SHUTDOMN CABLES MOV10-34A I SUPPRESSION CHAMBER SPRAY OvPASS REACTOP BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 C11279A ${I = VALVE 247*-6" CtI2798 $1T , C11279E 611 C11279C SII Ci t 279C1 SII. l MOVID-340 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER SPRAY BVPASS REACTOM BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 Ci t278A SI l VALVE 2 4 7 * - 6 "- C18 278B SI l ,. ' CilziSC SI I l 140V10-31 A CONTAINMENT SPRAY INBOARD { REACTO4 GUILDING EL 480V AC MCL 98 C t 12774 SIl INJECTION VALVE 267*-2" Cl1277B $11 C11277C 511 l l MOV10-3tB CONTAINMENT SPRAY INBOARD REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 Cll276A Si l INJECTION VALVE 282*-5 t/2" C112768 SI C t 1276C SI i MOV10-26A CONTAINMENT SPRAY OUIBOARD REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 C812754 SII INJECTION VALVE 265'-2" C112758 Sil C a l2iSC SII l . MOV10-268 CONTAINMENT SPRAY OUTBOARD REACTOR ..BullOING EL 480V AC MCC 88 C112744 SI INJECTION VALVE 269'-8" \ ' C192748 SI
' C t 12 74C SI H
i MOv10-27A OUT80ARD INJECTION VALVE REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 89A l C11273A $(( 255'-9' l Cll2738 S L L n C1:273C SII , C112718 Sll ' C19273F $1I 11 MOV10-278 OUTBOARD INJECTION VAtVE REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 898 t C19 272A S{ 255*-9"- (19 2720 SI Ci t272C SL l C18270s SI MOV10-254 INBOARD INJECTION VALVL REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 89A Cll271 A SII 260*-O* l E1:27 tB S[I l l CI 27 tC SII l l l CtI27tF Sil l l Cll2ias SII I . l l 1 I 31m
VECMONT VI.NXEE NUCLEAR POWE3 STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN EOUIPMENT LIST I Table 2-2 (Cont inu.on o sV5 TEM: Rt3 (continued) l SAFE I 1 l PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLES COMPONENT DESCRIPTION I REACTOR HUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 898 C11270A SI i l NOV10-258 INBOARD INJECTION VALVE C192708 SI ! 260'-3" l Ci1270C S1 l I I i C112728 $1 l I REACTOR DUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 C112b9A SII l MOV10-164 l" MINIMUM FLOW SVPASS VALVE 229*-9" l CI12698 S11 C11269C SII H l C11269E Sil. l l C11269F SII f REACTOR bulLDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 C41268A SI MOV10-Ib8 MINIMUM FLOW SVPA55 VALVE l C192688 S1 l 229*-9" l C11260C SI I C1126BE SI l l l C19268F S1 i l , l' l l l H REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 C19267A SIll 1 MOV10-15C . SUPPLY TO PUMP SULTION VALVE Cll2678 SIII h 213'-9" l l C18267C " g(( l l C112638 d l REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 C18266A SI MOV10-150 i SUPPLY TO PUMP SUCTION VALVE i C11266C SI l 213*-9" i
) i CII2668 SI l l Ci?2628 31 REACTOR flulLDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 CSI2654 SII MOV10-154 SUPPLY TO PUMP SUCTION VALVE 1 Cll2658 SII j 253'-9" l
l C11265C Sil C 11265C i S 11 C112618 SIL C11265D Sll l isolation Valve Control Relays Reactor Building EL .120 VAC PP-89 C11314G l Control Relays ' Cii3:4H I 280' '(MCC-9D) C1833P N l l l I REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 CI1264A SI l MOV10-15B SUPPLY TO PUMP SUCTION VALVE- Cll2648 S{ ! 233'-9" , j l Cil2600 di ii l l ! l i I REACTOR BulLDING EL l 480V AC MCC 98 l Cll2h3A SIIl l MOVIO-13C l $UPPRE5510N POOL TO PUMP SULTION l Cll2638 Sll VALvt 243'-9* l I Ci 263C SII i I l CI1767B Sill l l l l l I 31n
VERMONT VINutE NUCLELQ POwt3 STATIDN SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Llif Table 2-2 (Cont inueo) 5YSTEM: RHR (continueo) I i l SAFE I 1: COMPONENT DESCRIPTION l PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLES i I I L I MOviO-330 SUPPRESSION POOL TO PUMP SUCTION REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 C11262A ${ l l VALVE 213*-9" . Cll2628 g{ l l l C11262C oi i ! I Cil2668 Si l MOV10-13A SUPPRESSION POOL TO PUMP SUCTION REACTOR BLILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 Cll261A 311 l VALVE 213'-9" C192618 $1{ H l Cll26tD SIL f I Cl:2658 S11 I Ct:26tC SII I i 1 1 Cll26tCISIL I 480V AC MCC 88 C11260A 31 I MOV10-138 SUPPRESSION POOL TO PUMP SUCTION REACTOR BOILOlHG EL l l VALVE 213*-9* Cit 2608 g{l Cll260C a l Cll2648 Si l H t i REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 Cll406A RRU-5 RECIRCULATION UNIT (RHR Sw AREAL I i 232*-6* Cii4068 (II) jl l Cit 406E l l RRU-6 RECIRCULATION UNIT (RHP Sw AREA) REACTOR SUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 88 C18407A 232*-6* i Cit 4078 (1) i C11407D 1 1 i CII407C 4 l 1 i i i i l RE ACTOR 8't!LDING EL 480V AC MCC 98 l C11408A i RRU-7 l RECIRCULATION UNIT (RHR AND C5 I (II)ll 213'*9* I Cit 4088 l AREA) Cit 408E l I 480V AC MCC 88 ClI409A RRU-8 RECIRCULATION UNIT (RHR AND C5 REACTOR BUILDING EL l l AREA) 213*-9* CI14098 (1) l C11409C l ' C11409D h l i I I l I I I I I I l I I i i I I I I I I I 3 4 1 l l l I 31o
VEResONT YANKEE NUCLE *Q POWE2 STATION 5AFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPesENT LIST Table 2-2 (Continu.o) SYSTEM: HPCI . ll SAFE ll COMPONENT DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTOOWN CABLES 50V23-50 GLAND SEAL CONDENSATE COOLlNG HPCI Room EL 213'-9" 125v OC Dist Pn1 CII457A WATER SHUTOFF VALVE DC-lO Coi457s Cii4348 SI Cii447C Si I l Control Relays HPCs LOGIC Sv5 FEM (5H. 4) Control Building . 125V DC DIST PNL Cai449K SIX C**** (CRP9-41) DC-2C lIIPCIINSTR l HPC TURBINE CONTROL LHPCI ROOM EL 213'-9" 125V DC DIST PNL Cai452C Cai452N l lDC-lC l Cii452P l l l Cii4520 lCONTROLRELAYS HPCI LOGIC SYSTEM (SH. 3) CONTROL BUILDING L125V DC DIST PNL Cli45:e SI Cii45:R $[ I 11 l(CRP 9-39) -DC-lC l l CONTROL RELAYS , HPCI LOGIC SYSTEM (SH. 2) CONTROL BUILDING 125V DC DIST PNL Cli4508 SI l l (CRP 9-39) DC-lC ['ll $ h
!CONTROLRELAYS, l
HPC LOGIC Sv5 TEM (Sn. il CONTROL BUILDINC 125V DC DIST PNL
,.DC-IC Cii44 y {X (CRP 9-39) ci,449o 31 p'
Cai449R S1 Cai449H S[ , Cit 44aC 3 50V23-54 STEAM EXHAllST T,INE CONDENSATE .'HPCI ROOM EL 213'-9" .125V DC DIST PNL Cii44eD 1 DC-IC Cii448E I I I Cii447D SI I 50V23-47 ISOLATION VALVES AND MISCELLANkuus HPCI ROOM EL 213'-9" i lg5}CDISTPNL [sill$ $f , !50V23-43 Ci144 7G SI 1 50V23-53 l Cii447A S1 Coi44TN $1 Ci s4475 SI I SUPPRESSION POOL UPSTREAM HPCI ROOM EL 2:3*-9" 125V DC MCC DC-IA Cil446A SI
- MOv23-58 Ci 4468 SI 4 n ISOLATION VALVE Ca i446C S1 l il Cii446F SI l U I I 2_.._ _.
31p
VERMONT ViNMEE NUCLEA3 POME 2 STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont inueo) SYSTEM: HPCI (continued) l I SAFE COMPONENT l DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLES NOV23-24 REDUNDANT SHUTOFF TO CONDENSATE HPCI RDOM EL 213*-9" 125V DC MCC DC-1A Cit 445A SI STORAGE TANK VALVE Cal 4458 SI CII445C SI l C11445F SL
, i Cll445G SI I
- l MOV23-57 PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION HPCI ROOM EL 213*-9" 125V DC MCC DC-IA C11444A S1 l CHAMBER C114448 SI ll Cit 444C SI Cit 444F SI MOV23-2 TEST RETURN VALVE HPCI ROOM EL 213*-9" 125V DC MCC DC-18 C11443A SI C114438 SI Ci1443C SI CII44JG {1 CII443F 1 MOV23-25 MINIMUM FLOM BVPASS TO SUPPRESSION HPCI ROOM EL 213*-9" 125V DC MCC DC-IB CI1442A SI CHAMBER VALVE C114428 51 CIs442C SI C11442G SI Cit 442F SI 4
Cit 442E SI MOV23-2h PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE HPCI ROOM EL 213'-9" 125V DC MCC DC-18 C19441GA SI CI 144 AG8 SI Cil441A SI l C114418 $1 1
'l C18441C bl I C19441F Si CI144tH SI 1
MOV23-19 PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE REACTOR SUILDING EL 825V DC MCC DC-IA Ci t440AA SI 263'-6" Cll440AB SL C1:4408 SI C1:440C SI Ci 440F SI Cll440GA${ C19440GBSL l n L Ct:440GC Si l Ci 440Go SI l ri t 440HA SI l Ci t 440nB SI l l l I 31q
vt7MONT VINKEE NUCLEA3 POMEQ STATION SAFE SHUTDOMN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont inu.o) SYSTEM: 'HPCI (continued) t SAFE COMPONENT i DESCRIPilON PLANT LOCATION POMER SOURCE SHUTDOMN CABLES V23-84 STEAM TO TURBINE VALVE HPCI ROOM EL 283'-9" 125V DC MCC DC-18 Ctl439A ' Cil4398 l Cl1439C SI C19439F SI C11439G SI V23-17 PUMP SUCTION FROM CONDENSATE HPCI ROOM EL 213*-9" 125V DC MCC DC-15 , C194384 SI STORAGE TANK l Cil4388 SI l Cll438C SI CII438F SI I V23-16 STEAM SUPPLY LINE ISOLATION REACTOR BUILDING EL 125V DC PNL DC-l C11437A SIX (OUTBOARD) 266*-O" C19 43 7 A A31X CII4378 SIX C18437C SIX
' C19437F SIX C11437G SIX C19437u SIX V23-15 STEAM SUPPLY LINE ISOLATION REACTOR BUILDING EL 480V AC MCC 90 C18436A r'J {
(INBOARD) 266'-O" C114368 Fil Ct1436C 3#11 i GLAND SEAL CONDENSER CONDtNSATE HPCI ROOM EL 213'-9" 125V DC MCC DC-lB Cll4354 Si
- PUMP C114358 $ 1 l C11435F 0
, P85-1A AUKILIARY OIL PUMP HPCI ROOM EL 213'-9" 125V DC MCC DC-18 Cil433A SI l
l Cll4338 SI C19433C SI C19433F SI HPCI GLAND SEAL CONDENSER BLOWER HPCI ROOM EL 213'-9" 125V DC MCC DC-IS i FN-2-IA C11434A(( Cll434F C114348 SI l l l t I j - i l i1 _ __ 31r
VERa00N T YAMMEE NUCLEA2 POME 2 ST.STION SAFE 5HUTDOMN EQUIPMENT LIST Table . 2-2 (Conf ino.o n SYSTEM: HCIC l l SAFE I COMPONENT l DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION . POMER SOURCE SHUTDOuN CAsLES-1 I 11 I l ALT SHUTDOWN I CST LEVEL AND TORUS TEMPERATURE REACTOR BUILDING EL 24V DC DIST PNL B . INSTRUMENTATIOh ;213'-9" DIV 2 C i',' "#J III) ' l CI1877G l (11177H f;11177D l f CONTROL RELAYS LOG C system (sH. 4) CONTROL BUILDING 125V DC DIST PNL Cis:79AAS1Ig 11 (CRP 9-33) DC-1C C879" bi1* C11179P SIIX l C11179J SIIX
- CitiF9F SilX C11179G SIIX C11t?9M SIIX C11179L SLIX g C11179M SIf4 l Cll179C SIIX l
\
CONTROL RELAYS LOGIC SYSTEM (5H- ') CONTROL BUILDING I125V DC DIST PNL C',,eosgg{' j (CRP 9-30) DC-2C CaitsoE SII C111BoF SII C11:soG SII
; ; Cs IsoH SII CI1180C y[I Cll180J bil C111eov SII CONTROL RELAYS t OGIC system (sw. 2) CONTROL IIUILDING 125V DC DIST PNL C',51814 gj{
(CRP 9 ",0) DC-2C Ciiisi, s11 C191BlH SII CIll81J SII C1918tM SII C1ste:M SII CONTROL RELAYSI LOGIC SYSTEM (SH. 3) AND TURBINE CONTROL BUILDING 125V DC DIST PNL Clitsza SII TRIP (CRP 9-30) DC-2C [l,'laza j C1:is2C SII Cil187G SII 1 31s
- n. . _ . . - . _ -- - ._ - . _ - .
VERMONT ViNNEE NUCLEOQ POWE3 STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont inu.o)
$YSTEM: RLIC (Continued)
I . SAFE COMPONENT I DESCRIPTION
- PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLES SOV 13-32 IsOtATION vAtvEs ANo REACTOR BUILDING EL il25V DC DIST PNL CitiS3F STY SOV 13-34 MISCELLANEOUS 213'-9" IDC-2C CitiB3G SII ll C11 t B3H SII SOV 13-35 CniiB3J - '
ll C1 leap ;l, , C11183R . . . . C1 183E SII RCIC TURBINE CONTROL 125V DC DIST PNL ' CONTROL pEACTOR BUILDING EL 3 cl , ,[j,( yy ), l 213 ' -9 " iDC-1AS CniiB48-l INSTRUMENTATION CII184L C118842 C1lI84v n MOvia-i TRIP THROTTLE VALVE REACTOR SUILDING EL 125V DC MCC OC-28 Cll185J SII i l 213'-9* CI1185L SII I Cll:85Fgl{ CittB5G L l 1 Ci 185H SII l l Cll185E SII l Cs 185K SII i 1 li MOV13-15 STEAM SUPPLY LINE ISOLATION REACTOR uulLDING EL 480V AC MCC 898 Ci t I68 A Sl}Kl (INBOARD) 266'-9" CllI888 511 Al
- l C1:188J SIIXl MOVt3-16 l STEAM SUPPLV LINE ISOLATION REACTOR BUILDING EL 825V DC XFER SW C1 t l89A SII C11189F 4 (OUTBOARD) 266*-O" MIS 13-2 C111898 l
l l C l l l89J [SII
' C i t 189J 6II l
l l Clll89A $(( C1tl89L 611 PUMP SUCTION FROM CONDEN5 ATE REACTOR SUILDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-28 i Ct1190A $11 MOVI3-18 CII190F S LI STORAGE TANK 283'-9" Cl11908 SII CIII90E SII I I i Pump DISCHARGE VALVE REACTOR BUILDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-28 CllI9t A SII l MOvt3-20 262'-O* C I t 19 tF SII 1 i C118918 SII CIII9tE SII l l i 1 J I 31 t
-VE1MONT VINMEE NUCLEL3 POME 3 STATIDN SAFE SHUTDOMH EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (Cont inu.o)
SYSTEM: RCIC (continued) l SAFE I C OMPDNE NT DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION POMER SOURCE SHUTDOMN CABLES I i M0v13-21 1 PUMP OtSCHARGE valve REACTOR BUILDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-28 C111924 l 262 -o- C1:392F 1 C1sI92s SII l C11192E SII I l Novt3-27 MINIMUM FLOM BVPASS TO SUPPRESSION 'l REACTOR BUILDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-28 Ct11934 SII l l CHAMBEN VALVE 213' Clll93F Sil I
,l Clil938 C11193H 511
${I MOvl3-30 TEST 8vPA55 TO CONDENSATE STORAGE REACTOR PulLDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-28 Cit 1944 TANM VALVE l 259*-6" C11194F l C111948 $((
l l Ci1I94E bli I l MOvia-39 I Pump SUCil0N FROM SUPPRESSION l REACTOR BUILDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-28 ' C11195A $(( l CHAM 8ER VALVE 213*-9" Ct1195F bli l i C118958 SII l C11395E S11 I l M0v13-41 PUMP SUCTION FROM SUPPHESSION HEACTOR BUILDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-28 C11196A SII CHAMBER VALVE 213*-9" CIl196F SIL C111968 SII l C1ll96E SII l 1 MOV13-131 STEAM TO TURBINE VALVE REACTOR BUILDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-28 Ct1197A 11 (( 213'-9" C19197F C111978 (( C11197E 11 I l i vis-132 TURBINE CDOLING MATER SUPPLY VALVE REACTOR SUILDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-28 C11898A SII l 213 -9" C11198F SII l CI1198s SII l l Cllt98D SII i 125V DC MCC DC-28 C11186A SII l CONDENSATE PUMP GLAND SEAL VAC TANM cut 4UE NS A V E REACTOR BUILDING EL l PUMP 213'-9" C11986F Sil l l C11186G SII I I C11187A SII VACUUM PUMP GLAND SEAL VACUUM PUMP REACTOR 'tulLDING EL 125V DC MCC DC-28 I l. C18187E SII 213'-9" l
] C18187F SII i MTS-13-1 DC FEED FROM ALER5h'TE SHUT E0WN REACTOR BUILDINC' EL 125V DC DC-1AS Cl350M SII BATTERY 252', 232' , 213' I 31u
VEEasON T vat:::EE NUCLEAQ POwED ST ATIOee 4 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPe0ENT LIST Table 2-2 (continued) i Sv5TEut RCIc (continued) SAFE l cOuPOceENT DE5cRIPTION PLANT LOCATION POWER SOURCE SHUTDouwe CaetES l
'i ECCS CABINET ECCS ANALOG TRIP DIVISION II REACTOR BUILDING EL E4V DC DIST PNL B i I 25-5B RELAYS (5"- 'I I 280' cissocfH c,,l$,377 cio60s SII
< \ C1860A SLL i ECCS CABINET I Ecc5 ANAtoc TRIP olvistoN 81 tEACTOR BUILDING EL 24V DC DIST PNL B cisi7yn 25-5B RELAYS (sH. 28 280' cio6 A SII I ECCS CABINET Eccs ANatoc 3 Rip o: vision (EACTOR BUILDING EL $4V DC DIST PNL A cie6sc SI 4 1 25-6B RELAYS (sH. ) 280' ciassE SI I ciussa SI 1 l l ECC3 CABINET Ecc5 ANALOG TRIP DivtSION : LEACTOR BUILDING EL 24V DC DIST PNL A classa SI i I 25-6B RELAYS (sn. 2) 280' i i t I jMTS13-2 ~ l ALT SHUTDOWN' SYSTEM REAC10R BUILDING EL ll25V DC DIST PNL I C11189J1 SII I t MANUAL TRANSFER SWITCH 8252'-6" I DC-2 and DC-2AS I~C11189J2SIIl l ' I I Cl350PDII l I I I l ) i , I g I
'CP82-1 l ALT SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL hEAC70R BUILDING EL 24V DC DIST PNL B I' ASSOCIATED I
- I PANEL 6213'-9" ,DIV 2 VALVES AND i I INSTRUMENTS I
; l l l125V DC DC-1AS j g g l l 1 ARE LISTED l
- i g i g l l ABOVE l I I l t i
- CP82-2 i ALT SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL EACTOR BUILDING EL I120V AC PP-89 i ASSOCIATED l PANEL 80' l(MCC-9D) l VALVES AND l l
, , l l 3 l INSTRUMENTS g ! i g i I I ARE LISTED I .. ! IJBOYE. I ! 31v a 7
VEEMONT VANKEE NUCLEM POWE'3 ST2. TION SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST Table 2-2 (ConIno.e) 5V5 TEM: PROCESS MON 110 RING l l SAFE I COuPONENT DESCRIPTION PLANT LOCATION i POWER SOURCE SHUTDOWN CABLES i I l LT 16-19-104 i TORUS WATER LEVEL TRAN5MITTER REACTOR BUILDING EL 120V AC Cll232L S11 - l (LI 16-19-124) 233'-9" INST AC Ci s4J2C SII l (CRP 9-3) l l l LT 16-19-108 i TORUS WATER LEVEL TRANSMITTER REACTOR BUILDING EL 120V AC C11232F SI l (LI 16-19-128) 213' VITAL AC l (CRP 9-3) I i TE 16-19-334 TORUS WATER TEMPERATURE ELEMtHT REACTOR BUILDING EL 120V AC VITAL AC Cas2aoA I (TIS 36-i9-48) 2:3* l , (CRP 9-25) l I I l TE 16-19-33C torus WATER TEMPERATURE ELEMENT REACTOR BUILDING EL 120V AC VITAL AC Cli230C 1 (TIS 16-19-48) . 213'-9* ' l l (CRP 9-25) I I PT-6-53A . REACTOR VE5SEL PRESSURE REACTOR BUILDING EL 120V AC VITAL AC C1505F (I) l 1 n 280 -0 RACK 25-6 I' I (CRP-9-18) PT-6-53B REACTOR VESSEL PRES 5URE REACTOR BUILDING EL l 120V AC VITAL AC C1505M (II) l 200*-O* RACK 25-5
. (CRP-9-18) l l LT 2-3-69 REACTOR WATER LEVEL REACTOR SUILDING EL 120V AC INSTR AC C1777A I (LI 2-3-86) i 280*-O* RACK 25-5 l
[ (CRP 9-4) - LT 2-3-70 REACTON WATER LEVEL RE ACTOR 8ttiLDING EL 120V AC VITAL PNL1 CiSOon
- l 252 RACK 25-52 l (CRP 9-5) i I g
e I i LT-In7-5A , Condensate Storage Tank Level " l Condensnte Storage I120V AC VITAL AC I C1526T SI l
; i Tank (CRP 9-20) l l l 2
i LT-107-5B i Condensate Storage Tank Level lCondensateStorage !120VACVITALACI C1526S SI I [ I i, Tank (CRP 9-20) l C1861D SII!__,
; LT-107-12A I Condensate Storage Tank Level I Condensat e Storage i 24VDCDISTPNLBl; C11180N (SII)I i
li Tank (CRP9-30) ! : C11180Q (S71)i LT-107-12B { Condensate Storage Tank Level Condensate Storage I24V DC DIST PNL BI C1861C SII l I Tank (CRP 9-30) 3 I Cl1180M S? I LT-16-19-10C g j TORUS WATER LEVEL I REACTOR BLG El. 213'-9"l24VDCDISTPNLBl (((( % {SII 31w
VERMONT YANKEE NUCt. EAR POWER CORPORATION ' VERMONT YANKEE NUCt. EAR POWER STATION
- apetseetsa n Saet SeoutOO*res tuguales t
e "O Sa tt POust a i 8
'=s Dev . enG H 1 i 1 L 100usue 1 ' ' vtS ,
esO , 3, vs smv4 secs 'd',hs 1 Cin, thCse nas t$1 aHT 088 etmens eet at vI5 40 tuve gavI ti i f TOPOOt . j I NL l
- seCet MPCs ,
spC { attasef 04 tst aaet O*e , es tonestveti tineLtwite 588v's POOL I f 0(Pftt $$ufte F(3 I es ' Tg asp tuseT eso st9 -- -- 80.
'"O.,.9 i - !
88 '4
- LPCal f # I C810 COM $Peay /
u av ut ves /,,e N wo j =0 t , ves
- so,C -
i i ,ls s=v. I as g,,,,, s=v. SOC ! as trC8 ,Csto .sa .a . SDC uP
. . Coa.1 COOtamT Pe ttCf asSrMay as etOsv g sesventOmv -
j g \=,
\=,
/ -a, i
/ ., l a .a e
\ =gef af== /
j \ .estatO.= / COOtaMT - 1 seewt utOmv I 1
---- sesO'Caff 5 set ACTom DEPfetS$UsestatsOas 10 af Taise a SiaSLE COLD SHufDoesse CO* suet sose
- as asanust acrose i
i ! SAFE SHUTDOWN SEOUENCE FOR APPENDIX R SECTION IILG EVALUATION - . o l
' ' *+ VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT .
OFFSITE POWER NOT AVAILABLE_ FIGURE 2-1 PteF
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
,=. .
coan R C,c # #' ## SYSTEM . SYSTEM SYSTEM 7, a a a han h na a h n n h nhh n h - f i ECCS ROOM $ RVIC > $R CE SUPPRESSsOes DC POURER + D A ER WATER A E POOL SYSTEM COOLER WATER SYSTEM , SYSTEM e SYSTEM a H l $ 1 ] U } DIE SE L OtL SYSTEM l
- REQUIRED AUXILIARY SUPPORT SYSTEM INTERACTION WITH SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS i FIGURE 2-2 c,..
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION ! VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION l APPENOtX R SME SHUTDOWN i EVAL UATION
. . . 3
- 9 l
RPS gg'CR Ane Oes SMIVs i 4 e ilVALVE) j Lour w ATE R
- LEWELS es g
i I 1LPCsOft f l CORE SPRAY
! C5tO OVERPRESSURE j M C5tAes RO OS4 pAOTECitO80 Pumar
- M i
i
' MA000TA196 O COOLANT
.TE8 MBC I ftEACTOct i SeeUTDOuest 18svt MTORY I
tSAtW
- - - tesO6 CAT E S DE ACTOR DE PetE 38UneZ ATIOct TO 1
ATT A400 A 5i AStE COLD SeeJTDOueN CDeeDeitON u 88 - 8500UAL ACitose g 1
- u j 8PC ] to 4
3 MINIMUM SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CAPABILITY FORTHE APPENDIX R SECTION lli.G EVALUATION , 1 8'C"Y I FIGURE 2-3 HEAI i
' stE taOV AL C44F
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
~
.~
- ~.
f . a 7 h Oly g Div.I I r----------- 1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM CRO (SCR AM) l SYSTEM INITIATION SIGNALS SAFETY AEUEF VALVES l CORE SPRAY I CORE SPRAY l l RMR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING
- RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING
- MONITORING INSTRUMENTS MONITORING INSTRUMENTS l REOutRED AUXILIARY REOutRED AUXILIARY SUPPORT SYSTEMS SUPPORT SYSTEMS l l
I I __ _ _. J t_ _ ________ _ MPCI RCIC RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MINIMUM REQUIRED SYSTEMS l t l
' SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS FIGURE 2-4 I
cur e es *t F2 4
~ ~. A l A l sg
! A
> 4 A
A r 3 _ N. CE ' t A
\
_ - - \ .--:~_~-:---= R I CO Y SPRAY
./ 3 .
/O D
, NV V ]
RCIC llPCI
>~ y
y __ O' 4_- _
^ ^
O CONDENSATE f L, , A I
,-=
~
(3 { rm --
%)' _
%, J
- - WEST COOLING RilR SW q j q TOWER
\ /
L
~~ ~~
TI APEltTUIIE SERVICE WATER ggg Also Available Om APerture Card rIcuJX 2 VERMONT YANKEE . All Co.e Makeup Sources Including emergency river water in_1cetions l 0 0$AAA = = j
3.0 DETERMINATION OF FIRE AREAS AND FIRE ZONES This section of the report describes the criteria and methodology used. to define " fire areas" and " fire zones" at Vermont Yankee. The f methodology used to identify the fire hazards and to determine combustible loading and equivalent fire severities for the fire areas are also discussed. This section of the report is divided into the following subsections: (1) Section 3.1 provides the definitions of applicable terminology. (2) Section 3.2 describes the bases used for the establishment of " fire areas", and associated " fire barriers". (3) Section 3.3 describes the bases used for the establishment of " fire zones", and associated " fire separation zones". (4) Section 3.4 provides a list of the fire areas and zones and 4 includes a summary description of each fire area. 3.1 Definitions The following definitions of fire protection terms used in this analysis are drawn from the accepted fire protection guidelines such as the National Fire Protection Handbook and Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents: o Fire Barrier A Fire Barrier is defined as a continuous membrane that is either vertical or horizontal, such as a wall or floor / ceiling assembly, designed and constructed with a specified fire resistance rating to limit the spread of fire and restrict the movement of smoke and hot gases. o Controlled Fire Barrier A Controlled Fire Barrier is a barrier that may or may not have an assigned fire resistive rating and may or may not be continuous. However, in this analysis, controlled barriers have been credited with providing protection to safe shutdown components and, therefore, must be under a surveillance control program. o Fire Area A Fire Area is defined as that portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by fire barriers. The fire hazard in each area should be evaluated to determine fire resistive barrier requirements.
~ - . . . _ - _ . _ _ _ - - - - _ _ - - . - - -
o Fire Zone A Fire Zone is defined as that portion of a fire area that may not be separated from other plant locations by fire barriers or separation zones. Fire zones may include totally enclosed rooms of unrated construction with unprotected openings or entire building elevations with unprotected stairs, hatches, pipe chases, etc. o Fire Separation Zone A Fire Separation Zone in this Appendix R analysis is defined as the physical distance between designated redundant equipment and/or components necessary for safe shutdown of the plant. The separation zone has or will have a combination of fire protection features necessary to provide adequate fire protection against the identified fire hazard so that fire propagation across the zone will not occur. The fire protection features may include physical barriers, automatic detection, automatic suppression, limited or no intervening combustibles, and physical separation. o Intervening Combustible An Intervening Combustible is defined as a significant amount of material located between redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment that is subject to combustion. An intervening combustible does not include enclosed combustibles in the form , of oil in pumps or sealed drums or cable in conduit, as defined in NRC Generic Letter 83-33 (Reference (c)]. o Radiant Energy Shield A Radiant Energy Shield is a barrier that resists heat energy and is constructed of noncombustible material. This shield may or may not have an assigned fire resistive rating. Establishment of Fire Areas and Fire Barriers 3.2 For the purposes of this Safe Shutdown Systems Separation Analysis, 19 individual fire areas have been designated. The majority of these areas are bounded by existing outside and interior common walls and were originally established as a result of the 1977 Fire Hazards Survey (Reference (i)) and were accepted by the NRC as documented in the 1978 Fire protection Safety Evaluation Report (Reference (j)]. Since that time the interior adjacent or common walls have been maintained as fire barriers as part of the plant's ongoing Surveillance program. As discussed in Section 2 of this report, a safe shutdown model and safe shutdown equipment list were developed for the achievement and maintenance of cold shutdown in the event of a fire. This safe shutdown model was compared to the model developed for High Energy Line Breaks. Both models show the same safe shutdown modes, as they should. The fire protection requirements for the safe
chutd:wn modal wers recce:sced cnd c3 o rocult,. new firs ces:s h;vo been designated. These new fire arens wero al:o esvicw:d to cnturo they meet the concept of fire areas as defined in the Branch Technical Position (BTP) and NFPA. Figure 3-1 provides a general plant layout of the 19 designated fire areas. l l Verification of the adequacy of each fire area consisted of an extensive field walkdown to identify the functional purpose of the associated fire barriers in relation to safe shutdown systems. As discussed above, fire area barriers were defined as either exterior barriers (i.e., outside walls) or interior barriers (i.e., inside i walls that separate fire areas). As a result of this walkdawn, additional fire barriers have been identified as needed which are not part of any designated fire area, but have been credated for fire protection in support of this Analysis. These additional fire barriers are part of Fire Separation Zones. In conjunction with the absence of intervening combustibles, these barriers prevent the propagation of a fire across a Separation Zone. 3.3 Establishment of Fire Zones and Separation Zones For the purposes of the Safe Shutdown Systems Separation Analysis, the Reactor Building (with the exception of the RCIC room) was considered as a single Fire Area with seven fire zones. The RCIC room is considered a separate fire area. The Reactor Building was divided approximately into two halves: a south side containing Division I safe shutdown equipment and a north side containing Division II safe shutdown equipment. Within the north and south sides, the Reactor Building fire area was further divided into the
' seven fire zones. Each fire zone is separated by separation zones which have or will have a combination of fire protection features necessary to provide adequate protecticn against fire hazards such that a fire in one fire zone will not propagate from the north side to the south side and vice versa. These fire protection features may consist of partial fire barriers, automatic detection, automatic suppression, a minimization or absence of intervening combustibles between zones, and/or physical separation between zones.
For the purposes of this analysis, a fire is considered to engulf one Reactor Building zone at a time. A fire in the RCIC room is considered confined to that separate fire area. Figures 3-2 through 3-14 provide layouts of the Reactor Building by elevation depicting the fire zones and fire separation zones, t 3.4 Listing of Fire Areas and Fire Zones The fire areas and fire zones used in the Safe Shutdown Systems Separation Analysis are as follows: i
- - , - , , , .,.....,,---,---.v..n,--, e,----,--_-,-,.,-,----_ - . - , - - - . , , - . - - - , - - - - c - . , . . . w,--,-,-,,---,-,----
Fire Area No. Fire Area Location RB Reactor Building (Divided into Fire Zones RB-1 through RB-7) RCIC RCIC Room 1 Control Room 2 Cable Vault 3 Battery Room 4 Switchgear Room - East 5 Switchgear Room - West 6 Turbine Lube Oil Roons 7 Turbine Building 8 Diesel Generator Room A 9 Diesel Generator Room B 10 Diesel Oil Day Tank Room A 11 Diesel Oil Day Tank Room B 12 Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Room 13 Turbine Building /Radwaste Building Corridor 14 Intake Structure - Circulating Water Pumps Room 15 Intake Structure - Service Water Pump Room 16 West Cooling Tower - North cell 17 Condensate Storage Tank Valve and Instrument Enclosure Area A summary of the fire areas at Vermont Yankee is provided below. It should be noted that the discharge structure and the east cooling tower are physically isolated by distance on the site and are not considered fire areas for the purposes of our Analysis, o Reactor Building (Fire Area RB Zones 1 Through 7) The Reactor Building is East of and adjacent to the Turbine Building and south of the Control Building. Within this fire area, separation is provided horizontally by floor / ceiling assemblies which divide the building into the following elevations: 213'-9" Lievation 232'-6" Elevation 252'-6" Elevation 280' Elevation L 303' Elevation 318' Elevation l 345' Elevation i The Reactor Building consists of cne enclosed fire area with seven (7) fire zones, as detailed in Figures 3-2 through 3-14. Separation zones prote :t redundant Appendix R safe shutdown divisions on the 213'-9", 232'-6", 252'-6", and 280' elevations. These separation zones divide the building into the South (Division I power) side and the North (Division II power). The separation zones provide fire protection features that are equivalent to those required by Section III.G.2(b) to Appendix R.
-3'-
l o RCIC Room (Fire Area RCIC) f The RCIC Room is located in the northwest corner of the Reactor Building structure. The walls, floors, ceiling, doors and penetration seals of the RCIC room form fire barriers. These barriers, along with the steel plate stairway enclosure, detection, and suppression on the 232' elevation create a separate fire area. An exemption request (Table 5-3. Item 2) has been filed to establish this as a separate fire area. o Control Room (Fire Area 1) The Control Room is the top room in the Control Building complex. Walls and floor are of concrete construction. The roof is an exterior boundary. The doors and ventilation system fire dampers are three-hour fire rated. Smoke detection and portable fire extinguishers are provided. An exemption from the automatic suppression requirement of Appendix R has been granted. The Control Room was accepted as a separate fire area as documented in the NRC Fire protection Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazard Survey. o Cable Vault (Fire Area 2) The Cable Vault is the room below the Control Room. Walls, floor, and ceiling are of concrete construction. Cable penetration seals, ventilation dampers, and doors are of three-hour rated construction. Detection and an automatic CO2 suppression system is provided. This area was accepted as a separate area as documented in the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazard Survey, o Battery Room (Fire Area 3) The Battery Room is located within the Cable Vault. The north building wall forms one side and the other three sides are concrete block. The cable penetrations are sealed. The door is one-hour rated. The CO2 suppression system provided for the Cable Vault protects the batteries also. This area was accepted as a separate area as documented in the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazard Survey. o Switchrear Rooms. East and West (Fire Areas 4 and 5) The Switchgear Rooms are the ground floor rooms of the Control Building. Walls, floor, and ceiling are of concrete construction except the wall dividing east and west rooms. The division wall is of wood stud and wall board construction and is designed as a one-hour rated structure. The other walls, floor, ceiling, cable penetration seals, ventilation dampers, and doors are of three-hour rated construction.
Detection and an automatic CO2 System are provided in each room. The rooms were originally a single space, and it was accepted as a separate fire area in the Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazard Survey. The one-hour division wall was added at the time of the Alternate Shutdown System design and was accepted as documented in the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report of our Alternate Shutdown System
, design.
o Turbine Lube Oil Rooms (Fire Area 6) These rooms, one above the other, form a separate area within the Turbine Building. Walls, floors, and ceiling are of concrete construction. Doors, ventilation dampers, and cable penetrations are of three-hour rated construction. Detection and manually operated sprinkler system are provided. The Turbine Building manual foam fire-fighting system covers these rooms. These rooms were accepted as a separate area as documented in the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazards Survey. o Turbine Buildinz (Fire Area 7) The building is of concrete construction, with upper walls around the turbine operating deck of steel. The roof is of steel decking, insulated and roofed. The building encloses the Turbine Lube Oil Rooms, the Diesel Generator Rooms, and Diesel Oil Day Tank Rooms, all of which are separate fire areas. The Turbine Building also houses the boiler room, makeup demineralizer room, machine shops, storerooms, and HVAC rooms. The Turbine Building connects to the Service Building, , and Warehouse complex, which make them all part of the Turbine Building fire area, from the viewpoint of the regulations. As a practical matter, a fire could not spread from the Service Building to the Warehouse. There is no safe shutdown equipment which is needed in these spaces, so no effort to achieve regulatory separation is needed. There are many fire hazards in the building, such as the turbine lube oil system. These hazards were all addressed in the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazard Survey, which defined the building as a separate fire area. These hazards l are protected by detection, suppression, and manual fire ! fighting. o Diesel Generator Rooms A and B (Fire Areas 8 and 9) The Diesel Generator Rooms are separate rooms of concrete and concrete block construction. Detection, suppression and fire coating of structural steel are provided. Walls, doors, and cable penetrations are of three hour rated construction. The ventilation system for each room includes a separate intake and exhaust. The air-operated intake louvers fail open on loss of air. Engine air intake and exhaust are piped in from the building exterior. These rooms were accepted as separate fire areas in the Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazard Survey. l l l o' Diesel Oil Day Tank Rooms A and B (Fire Areas 10 and 11) The Diesel Oil Day Tank Rooms are separate rooms of concrete ' and concrete block construction. Walls, doors, and I . penetrations are of rated construction. Fire detection is provided. Doors are kept locked. These areas were accepted s as separate fire areas as documented in the NRC Fire ( Protection Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazard Survey. o Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Room (Fire Area 12) The Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Room is in a separate building i enclosed by the dike around the diesel oil storage tank. It l is of concrete construction. A flame detector is provided, and a manual fire extinguisher is kept outside. The door is j kept locked. Electrical equipment is of explosion proof l design. This area was not addressed in the NRC Fire i Protection' Safety Evaluation Report. The area does qualify as
.a separate fire area because it is an isolated outdoor i structure.
l o Turbine Building /Radweste Buildinz Corridor (Fire Area 13) This area is a corridor which connects the Turbine Building and Radweste Building and is adjacent to the north well of the Reactor Building. Walls, floor, and ceiling are of concrete j- construction. Doors of three-hour fire rating lead to the i Reactor Building. The hallway is open on the west end to the l Turbine Building and on the east and there is a door to the
- Radweste Building. This is not a separate fire area from the viewpoint of the regulations, but it is identified separately for this report because the Associated Circuits Analysis for the Alternate Shutdown system identified power feeds to NCCs 8B and 98 passing through this area. The power feeds, in conduit, have been wrapped with a qualified 1-hour fire wrap.
l From a practical fire protection viewpoint, no fire could j spread into this area, and no fire in this area could propagate out. A fire in this area does not impair safe shutdown, so no effort to achieve regulatory separation is warranted. o Intake Structure - Circulating Water Pumps Room (Fire Area 14) The Intake Structure is a separate concrete building, spaced i well away from other buildings. It is divided into two rooms l by a concrete wall and a fireproof door. The south, I downstream room contains the three circulating water pumps and valve operators. It was accepted as a separate fire area as j documented in the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report
.of the Fire Hazards Survey.
l o Intake Structure - Service Water Pump Room (Fire Area 15) The Intake Sttveture is a separate concrete building, spaced i well away from other buildings. It is divided into two rooms L
by a concrete wall and fireproof door. The north, upstream room, contains the four service water pumps; automatic strainers, valves, and the diesel and electric fire pumps. The diesel engine and its fuel tank are divided from the rest of the space by a fire wall. Detection and suppression are provided. This room was accepted as a separate fire area as documented in the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazards Survey. The south, downstream room contains the circulating water pumps. o West Cooling Tower - North Cell (Fire Area 16) The Cooling Towers are separate structures well removed from other buildings. They are of treated redwood construction, with PVC fill. The west tower has a basin beneath it which holds seven days water supply for cooling tower use. The north cell of the west tower is equipped with piping to the RHR Service Water System so that this cell may be used to cool RHR service water. The cell is of seismic design. That cell's fan can be powered from either diesel. This design feature was provided to provide cooling for the reactor in the event of loss of the use of the service water pumps at the intake structure. The cooling towers were discussed and accepted as a fire area as documented in the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazard Survey. Fire protection consists of three fire hydrants and hose stations. o Condensate Storate Tank (CST) - Valve and Instrument Enclosure (Fire Area 17) The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) is located to the south of the Reactor Building outside of the plant. It is surrounded by a concrete berm wall. Part of the walled in area is roofed over and enclosed. CST instruments, heating, and valves are within the enclosure. This area was identified as a separate area in the NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report of the Fire Hazards Survey. Fire protection is provided by the yard firewater loop. The enclosed area along side the tank was not i identified as containing safety related equipment in the 1977 Fire Hazard Survey. However, our Analysis identified level instruments which we have taken credit for in safe shutdown l systems. Therefore, this enclosed area has been designated as a fire area.
RADWASTE BLDG. ntrol Room SERVICC BLDC. sble Vault 1,2,3,4,5 ?ttsry Room itchgtar Room - t
- itchgrer Room -
t 6 / /
/ /
5bn Oil Rooms NOTE 1 y
' lI nrbine Building / ll ess l
[i >cael A 7
!l13l RllR i O H Sw Il C FORREACTORBTDC' OO C esel Day Tank ,. gl ZONES (SEE FIGURE .O .
g , '3.2-3.14), I csel Day Tank o g d t seel Funi 011 $ I P3 l I,! v iI . .)rridor gl l I ' 9 Pumps Area s take SW Pumps OOO ' ' s o RilR i CONDENSATE 10 is N-------- oo [en pgp3 RHRSW g CRD O, oo CS j
~
i jatCooling war g l
<D T Valvss 10 11 i"
,strumnt Area l
' ^
9 ~ 1 lx d B H
,sN l \
2 \ l \ r - E' - - - - -
" \
\ DIESEL COOLING TOWER CELL \ 0IL
' 16 l I
\
f \
- \ v j
s_ _ _ _:-8 12 1 4
~-
E T- l i 15 g SW ________._I_________ __ __ _o
^
o O _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _. -o 14 CW O O O NOTES ! 1.- No interference here.
~
,1 ,
. - - - - - - - Division I ,
I Division II e FIGURE 3 VERMONT YANKEE -
" " ' " ~ "' "** #*
DISCHARGE STRUCTURE Arcan, ECCS and Cooling Equip.
< Outline Cable Routings i
TI Aho Available On APEllTUItE Aperture Card CARD . W
V1493A
\
h d o
\
ZONE gi. lgg
*~*
ZONE 5 *
.. .. %}N;lyg5[j "'"
RQ. MM 23 .. . . ., c.> p * + /,
=
- s
}* W% pd I o P- ~
.. nHa euue i A St 34M1 nHn PuuP i.o -
VtetaA fr 64 ( N
% stains ..- l RM2M t 3.- ~ jjNP,;j
*bI
.1 my tv Cltteistviet34 m
( vio4sd
- / St .2ees tvi&is4 4 - fl 6i 41
/ ce ttese(ViotsN \
RHR HLat TxtiiECEaiT Q'. j k,
' -'tt@hq ,9 AHR HE AT EACHANC(H16 [
H2asAs ctinesA(viO4s4
/23 e -
,e $,g j
yg e g3
+g.4'TJh.jj N
g 3nn 4 COntsPHAv
~ COR[bPHJ t 128SBSit pyMP i A PUMP I 8 Ci ttase(V104sN
[ .e O
- i ZONE ZC
; RB-1 R mwa .
Cl1287A N10-494 . C11205AN10454
- BASE OE CONTAINMCNT Ct 1283A(Vt4304 Cll26tA(Vt4134 l
Ctl2etANt3s g e TOHUS Cm
\ M C11279A(V1 " 1 CLU 23 6 / -
m30a CI1287AN1048N
/
C112SSA(V10464 C19243A(V14304 g, Cit 281A(Vl&t3M .\;. >
~s C112eSA(V14184 "1, .,
" (11 -
i'? Cf1279A(V10444 y # Dk$ i, . , Ci t40sA(RN6) 14 O - b ACIC PyMP~ ' cit 40eA(R N D :. ' M7;VISN[b g *
* ?,
ANO lUA8iNE3$M*:fQfy.gp 0
*... . .dt ' ""Myp,dkrv h[
ohs Fj 9-kb s~
/
- h *O3fg?DfP
- e".A, :yn u.g.g%w.skfj/j!gy L
.h ger 25v0C
.:~m C6m -
32 C i1 .
'Ilh; "C 'C 9 l AREA ,
h( ,e NArt
"+' RCIC ' shur 6owN PANEL E NCL OSE D f $tAIRS I! ~--9 OG . .
23-6 23-6 23-6 20 8 25 2 , 8 8 8 8 8 8 ELEVATION 213' 9" _= 4-VY48 f 2
- 147 # 001 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- ~.
11x24 r:Rc art A - m M BA RI R C11302A(Pt@403 NOTES: 7 ****I 1) Drawing showdrouting of cables associated with minimum
'U o S$
equipment required for hot and cold shutdown. o ,2) Onlycr.ble no.C11289C is shown rou'ted forV10183 because l 0 - postulated fire damage to cable nos. C11289 A and C112898 I tould not spuriously open this northally closed valve. 0.***
}
q 3) Cables associated with valves V10-17 and V10-18 are used
, 8I"lES only for cold shutdown.
3 ,
- 4) On!'ycable no.C11312Cis shown routed for V10-57 because postulated fire damage to cable nos. C113128, C11312A, C11312F and C11312G could not spuriously open this nor-
- 9. mally closed valve.
7
, 5) Only cab'e no. C113138 is shown routed for V10-66 because v , postulated fire damage to cable nos. C11313 A and C11313C could nc t spuriously open this valve.
e
- 6) Raceways containing safe shutdown cables that are routed
- through separation zones will be provided with one hour bar-
* <- riers where they are located inside separation zones. >NE -
RE$l $ B-2 , cii2.eAwioe.si C11284A(Vt4458)
' C1e282A(Vi&39B) a C112s2A N14130) a C19208ANtotS0) a C112reA(Vt43401 t- , C114otA(RRu43 REFERENCE DRAWINGS:
a C114otA(RRLHg i
* , G191148 REV. 9 i i G191329 REV.11 h i
, G191330 REV.13
,G191331 REV.10 HPCICELL
. LEGENO:
AREA i
" ; REACTOR BUILDING FIRE H P-2 J .. BARRIER,3-HR RATING 1 ,_ *e* RHR. RHR SW (DIV. I) i 8 1-L; c' ', .
- 0 i !__ 1 Hoci puun .... RHR, RHR SW (DIV. II) i[
j I l ANotuHeiNE
.. gggj SEPARATION ZONE bAcs_ -
CONTAINMENT o'*H ZZNE - R2-2 - 12svoc ucc DG l A
/ & /JJoid M NNY $ &f g .e .
7 t,4 rt onscRietioN p' 7 : I
' VERMONT YANKEE NUCiE AR POWER CORPORATION re (' VERMONT YANer EE NUCLE AR POWER STATION r]
't gg% REACTOR BUILDING RACEWAYS AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. I VS. DIV.11 dvallable Og Xperture Card CMO - OF RHP, RHR SERVICEWATER, AND SenviCE WATER Engineering Planning FIGURE NO and Management. Inc. 3' 2 , l 1 85050%0072-Ut- 1
_ ZONE ZONE RB-1 RB-2 I
~
wRHR SW PMP tC
', r e gi I *
,l ,
1 . V.& u >>'
,S T AtR ,
h4y; l y w nWA et.-4A<P&t. a
. n ;;>
la. _~ RHR SW PMP 1 A L i SN . lm("m'? 8:. s ~ GiM N - ~ g N . .. ..- 112,um %%;p QJ b q@;= cn=u<P+m a131= x
/.- .. - -
Cnaruni&2 cm 4n2W y< mba%g1
,t, .
Ct12m ute, , >
.. r t,,7. -
' 8.- V10-39 A Y'&308 23 6 [ .
.. . Ci t 2158(V1426N ]>S., M+.Y,'[$d t12908 V1426 A ['N
' H 1-i I
Com8 vie .
/7- . ,.- .
. .j . -e
. ....... y,,,,, f1 vi&8u - / A.
n2 rum k ' n27 s C11279A(V1434N 11287A g zmamiroeen
/ .
11279BSE Gu ar98 en3< As e,
. n30eA ,
it 11 CSH g C11278A(V14348)
'C11218S(Vle?44
\
23 6 . . 1128F8S2 o
- Vt&34A .
Co w8 um.94 -
. ZONE + ZONE CONT AINME NT *
- O
- QQ.j W D.
. _ foRus / +
R323SN Ox . M y M CITTsB(V14344 R332SE
,,,e @ .
, R333E C1 t2878(V14694 C11285IW1
/,
- C112858(v14654 R323 M # . C112848(Vq C112838(V1439N
- Ci t 2818(Vl&694 23 6 C112828(Vii C112858 N10454 . C1 2618 (V14134 C112628(Vtj
- C11269E (V1416A) .
Ct 12838 N14394 . C112688(V1
' C112698N1016N e C11268E(V1 C112 E N101 C112798 (V14344 , C112788(Vt Cl12698(V14184 4-
- Hs .
A- , t1JO9CSI
.'2 m
,4 oy Am gg4%
Cn nao.AS sCu,4,8, o,30m Ci t301 A(Ptet A) fg
. x
-?
, , *4 (#jQ[T C11305A(P& 14 Hg K ; a ;; .>f ? ,g < (( f -
Cl13 1A(P&lQ g-
- lfS 4 ~ ' gg " p ,
N
- QQln Atj , tl W
' ' i;urg.sl\(y;}3:ly
..n w mni. .cy kk\\m mu.\ - .m h [
,, 3, .
32-0 ,
$/
4 C11302A(P1410)
"7 C11304A(PS-1m C11306A(P8-1D) ,.
.CHO Pus 4 .
..k... 4 -
OG NN I ......, C E 23 6 - 23-6 23 6 20-6 - 23 2 8 8 8 8 8 A t es ELEVATlON 232 6" a W
nHR sW PMP 1o NOTES-
- 1) Drawing shows routing of' cables associated with minimum
/ equipment required for hot and cold shutdowrt
" ST 2) Only cable no.C11289C is shown routed forV10-183 because C"( ] postulated fire damage to cable nos C11289 A and C112890 1 0 ,57Ams uma could not spuriously open this normally closed valve.
o C"N F 6'08 '
- 3) Cables associated with valves V1017 and V10-18 are used
\o0 tiso6AST Ct 1306A(PoiD only for Cold shutdowrt oN ng,,,,,,,, 4) Only cable no. C11312 C is shown touted for V10-57 because 1
{ postulated fire damage to cable nos. C113120 C11312A, r vioess C11312F and C11312G could not spuriously open this nor-
**N. mally closed valve.
o 5) Only cable no. C113138 is shown routed for V10-66 because
'.
- citassa 04see
, postulated fire damage to cable nos. C11313 A and C11313C ,.t* . 1 2e4ASt Could not spuriously open this valve.
- ct 1284A(vio4seg
\
'. , vloses
- 6) Raceways containing safe shutdown cables that are routed through separation zones will be provided with one hour bar-riers where they are located inside separation zones.
P
. . itte6Asf
( o cit 2e4A(vt&4eQ
>
- ttfe68sg
(.
- cit 2eee(vio4ess L
- R333st b # ct12ese(vioseep . REFERENCE DRAWINGS:
# cit 284a(vtossa
,[h ( Cit 2sasNto3eg b curaasonst30' C11268B(vtat64 G191148 REV. 9 >een w > ci 2assivistem G191332 REV.18 e citares(vto344 G191333 REV.14 Me*a, 41309 s 4 >si.s.m,
- R13t s!
p34gg c 1302A(P1olD) LEGEND:
*** RHR, RHR SW(DIV. I)
R235St
- ct12eeA(vtSessi **** RHR, RHR SW(DIV. II)
C11284A(viSesel citts2A(vto3em e C 1262A(V1st30) 7^ ',
- SEPARATION ZONE
~ C11268A(vtotom ci t riaA rvi&34e, CONTAINMENT C11407A(RRu e)
E.I AIRS , N SUPPRESSION e- enza CONDUIT IN TRAY
'=
a IP IO 865508007J-06 I ZONE - C:. RB 2 P W
/ Yt1r /66vu AdMMY M
, , , ay o.rc
, orscanema a ;'; "i' d""
TI- 1 venoo~rv.~ue~ucua ,0. con,o arto~
, pprgtg veauo~r va~ue sucuaa powen starion 7 REACTOR BUILDING RACEWAYS AND f
Also Available On M erture grd 'I'I MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. I VS, OlV. ll OF RHR, RHR SERVICE WATER, AND P
'APERTURIs Engineering Planning SERVICE WATER FIGURE NO CARD and uanagement. inC.
33 ' e su se. n e e um e
...m...<.,,...
l -
- ce .,. \ . - ,e
.. I \
- 3;>g,l O~
\
nam:a an.w.m m Ag n:
. . . A". . . . . . . . . . . ,y ss
- Dii290A N14184) Ie '
5 e C11277 A(Vl>31 Al j3 g 79 ,g Ct t2r6A N1426A) e +
- 4 t30sGSM
} C11to4A(VRR46) q
- C11404A(RROF) E o -s cit 300AF (Viet rl e;4 i
'8 ,
- S T As A S_
- i mMM -
w I s CWipo8(V14984) \ ._.,
- M< *
' - O~
E V' C112eoC m4184) C1128TE(V14esAl L,
\
} l n .,
Y/k T' Cil2838 N1&394 . ' S ; .' Q 8" 4 ,.: - - Cit 2etB Nto 134 11275A , e.^ .. I . . d .s Ct t 2C98(V14164 C19215A(V1&2 i i J
<- "\ m Fu. ..e C11269C N14164 et \..s1 '
s~
kI i l C112798(V1&344 C112778 N143tM 2I h 112758 C112r58 (V142686 y W
,i i)
~ - ' ~
\
C112758(V1&264 .
= -,.7 h
3
. A. N es. 4..e.**8 R2]oSE .
\
= . ..,, ,,, .
Cu2rrA NintAa . C11275AN1426A4 C11406A(RRS6) wjg3y 4 / . Cu4osA(RRuri . g
! maos 36 t \
Cl 828r 8 (VtO-e9A) e 1335J1S3 / \ C1I2838(Vt&394 - C1335Jt (MCC9m g ,
\
C1 2 14 A) p ----- WYE -- p C133N2 (MCC9m C112758(V1426Al g s ..! ............... . , ,,v .
.. p............. . ; i ( , ,,o,C 7, e, moom . ..
tiir rome.m 23 6 - ZONE :*.
' .s sa&S,Auo Ro# Z4 Cu nrC m"'"
C112658 N14454 h /.
\
bf* 4 RB
/
. '*h 8
\/. '
R233Si , R C11245C N1445A4
- i. =M f e 113o9A(V 18) /
Cure 3C m>3e* Jp _ . . Ct tsfo8 Ni&344 Cit 27eC(v1434A6 n.
' \ ' ' ; F*.*TFN' ,
.l j
p CittetC(V10134 g . . /
* .?
Cit 2TTC N1531 Al r L _ Ci t275C(Vlo2SN 1 i
. 8 * * *
- t_J t_
_t4 _C, t.8 (.me m u t y ,on
- f. _ _
,,,So m -
Ct t 406E(MCC-08) ~l ._ .N C13350f[MCC88l g, * " ,'
. Cn.oe8(uCceSi - 9 " '
C114oeE(MCC-981 ,
', L ' h - StE A- 1335015I Ct335ai(uCCam m30s C1 tteoC N14iB4)
- 'i g g g g.y^
[. {' N
. [ ..
m%%it
$ .) , .'.g' , \ '
~
C112eeC N14184 n N. \ ***.***.< t._ Cit 2eeC m essa
\+N y,
_ _ . ' ^ +' j > (+m E . ' ~' ' 31 O K ,g y .x
~
Ciiierom&esn y a Fw
- . . g ._g a g 4 : 2 2 ,g ,.,g;. m ,ge.,g n g Cua.rCm,o.w em .cN &<5~ . , _ . . . . . . . .x . . . . a . . . . . . n ...
g = ,n.~~ 3 l -.-
. - ~~m - .
%. u%.z #%3 .. . . .y Cm7eCN , .
CumC mo t~ . ........ .. ..z Cii27sCm&2sg c, :%
~,
sw.m .- - - - - - - - - , C1130sK(Vlo tF) Cu 30eC(vie t ri g %,,gy "3 -
/i 6 23 6 [e3 -6 [23 6 23'6 -
Jtasist usoeus" .
'CliaseCo wiesem Ci t 3o8K.(v t&l rl A _R341SI C11264C(Vt&45m C11262C(V1&t 3op C11282C(V103985 Cu3:38 m esas CisteeC(vtoissi R33' Cit 2rsB(vim 4m Ct12eet m otsel "**""
ELEVATION 252'-6" Ci Hoet . 1 C11274C(vi>2em Cit:74Crvi&2em Cu4oeh nne Cu arsC(vi>3t a Cl14ost CttooeC(RRuel
*"" " Ci t 407C(RR&4)
SVY4tF2 - . _ _ _ _ _ __ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
1 0 a.. . NOTES: N -
' 1) Drawing shows routing of cables associated with minimum i equipment required for hot and cold shutdowrt k "8
Q 2l Only cable no. C11289C is shown routed Ior V10-183 because postulated fire damage to cable nos. C11289 A and C112898 g could not spuriously open this normally closed valve. ( 0 Maijahje 3). Cables associated with valves V10-17 and V10-18 are used
.- Pcrturec,,g% , ' only for cold shutdown.
( 4) Only cable no. C11312C is shown routed ior V10-57 because e postulated fire damage to cable nos. C113128, C11312A, C11312F and C11312G could not spuriously open this nor-mally closed valve. n231st 5) Only cable no.C11313B is shown routed forV10-66 because s # C112868 N10-a94 . postulated fire damage to cable nos. C11312 A and C11313C q..er C112eSCNtoess could not spuriously open this valve.
/ ;I i Ct :266D (V1o 4901 Ct 12s4Ec(v104s4 6) Raceways Containing safe shutdown Cables that are routed through separation zones will be provided with one hour bar-h N#9c(v ) -
, C11276C(Vto31a, fiers where they are located inside separation zones.
- 7) Cables C11406B, C11406E, C114088, and C11408E are N shown routed through zone RB-4 because of the proposed
, MCC modification. RRUS and 7 will not be used for a fire
- ; g ,7 y affecting these cables, o C11274A(V14268) g3,g
; e ,,,,,, Cita-Nio t.)
. / e n 2 r4. Nt >2.., T.T 5 4. APERTURE g*
. ,,,m
- g Cn o..N1 1.)
)NE h. CARD
=
N R34iv B-4 D. C N." uni esA, c"' * *'*'" l , e - C11284A(V104se).
~
m l \. C NNA 3 REFERENCE DRAWINGS:
, Cit 26aA N14168)
- r o . A Ci Cit t27sA(Vios48 274A(Vio 260, G191148 REY. 9 a e***= T C11407A(RRU4) 6 . .. *
- g... .G191335 REV.24
. , r. \ C11409A(RRU4)
G191334 REV.21 9
\\ G191349 SHT1 OF3 REV.9 e . nsats o * . -1 C112668(Vlo494 ~
, e , C11286C.D N144981
, e C11284EC Nto4sGI i
C11262EC(V1439E3
\ * * =,
=
- Cit 262cNio t30, LEGEND:
- C11239C(V10 I83)
'******'7 Ctt268 Ento ts#
Y * --= C11274B(V10 26Et ,
... RHR.RHR SW(DIV. t) i i C NNh ***. RHR, RHR SW(OlV. tr)
C14075 (RRU4)
* # ^ # "3 # rN
- C1i4oe8(RR u) @
--. wie
- U .* =~ SEPARATIONZONE 2W
- \ ( STAIRSet:3o9C(vio te)
# .. e..,
'{ -
~
namin
, [// CONTAINMENT
- 2 '
CH 4 orb (RRM) SUPPRESSION C114098(RR&4) A C11309F(V1o*181
-. - - 13 6 VERMONT V ANME E NUCLE AR POWER CORPORATION c, ,
VERMONT V ANME E NUCLE AR POWER STATION 2 - . REACTOR BUILDING RACEWAYS AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. i VS. DIV. II OF RHR. RHR SERVIC6 WATER, AND SERVICE WATER Engineering Planning I YB AH 'Pn f#t*J #F F J
' h FIGURE NO eis and uanagement. inc d oatt
*V ocscasetioes 7 N' 7 r s s .. v.m . . ..
s - t ,
" ;% \
t Q ! * - s i s ' Wias0AACNt&144 , 13sTAaE/NI ,"
- s %
tlamAAE NiO444 *. p CIR U i , O-esasaAasNe&as4 - ; G E E f tastAmoNto 1344 t '
. s tateARCw16664 ; ., t s .
[ #- I 5 -
* * ,. .m s - w . a , s '. .' J(T s , - -
gggggg* nucm.au 1.STSA&ENi&384 ?. .t
* = * *
=
.~. -o == ..,b.--
4 * - e ,. ' g ii.==== =.4 ggi)g_S
,i
._ c
,l , [f gTg[, /
j r o, -
-.........:.............. n 3 gn
- .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . : ZO N E @ * ^ ^ * * * ~ * * "[ C ' * * * "" * "" ' ,
. RB 5 ~
i *w j 4 INSTRUMENTATION :* c11309E fV1418)
. RACK .5-6 ACK 25-5 \
.. p..............
. r- 1
-a \
Ny
.. ,f i; 4
.j .
j-X -]
. .- 4 I l
.- ***** I , Cit 29
- 7 @. i; y
~
E2I
- k. __
R230$N
- Cii2TTA Ni4314 V'*b dA Citao6K NipiT Ci t 275A Ni4264 lh,, Ci t 406A(RRu54 L
=
JmE
*** J .
g1 , Ct:24 A b MCC 98 Cu 2 eta Nt H9N D y e- o C112s3a Niosen _,R2p g . .-
- Ct :2eis Nimi34 Cii
. Ct:2TTe NiostN Cit D Ct :2768 Ni4264
[ 0 CONTAINMENT CH 287E Wi&694
~
MCC 6A CitasTr Nto49N h , / C1:243E N10 394 / m C11279E Nto 344 / - l Cit 2 Tee Nio 344 Ci t 2TTC Ni&3 t N e Ci t 2TSC Nt&26N
- e. R34 ggag 1-- : t. , - d _" l C1128FC Wi4464 Cii28FCi N14494 -
_ _I--I Cii24TO N14494
."mec t_
_ Ci s tof oi Ni&e94 f Ci t 2868 Ni046N - 7 g / ' C112e6C O N14454 ]
^7 Cit 263C CiN143SN Se -
& \
C112s t C CI N14134 C11279C O N1&39N hy -@uh.Wa p-G w*~ e:.yy.if@0;
> g[t+ n:
]
.pp{$$[a
- qj STAIRS CH 2798 NT4344 W( ^ *[nh[W:$D f- +v
>M s pa e
[ C112TSC N1026N Cissosc NiotT3 p. 3 g,. q m .. EL E VA TOR
' # # 'I3 *
- w ,' ~-C' '
? k..1_~ _
- 1k ~
- 23 6 : 23 6 ;- J3 6 : 23 6 W ----
8 8 8 8 ELEV 280 O" 8 vveiT2 14PO40ID '
k 6
,_ I l._ a STAIRS yOTES.-
g 1) ' Drawing shows rSuting of cables associated with minimum equipment required for hot and cold shutdown only.
- ) Only cable na C11289C is shown routed forV10-183 because <
postulated fire damage to cable nos, C11289 A and C11289 B JIPMENT HATCH could not spuriously open this normally closed valve. g 3) Cables associated with valves V10-17 and V10-18 are used as3 ige n only for cold shutdown. . , , _. c112ees Ntoeot C1120ec N1Seem ct12eso NtSeem *
- 1) Only cable na C11312C is shown routed forV10-57 because ct tassa.cNio464
- ZONE c;i2goi;g .
postulated fire damage to cable nos. C113128, C11312A, RB-6 Cii3:2F and Cii312G couid not spuriously open this not. y - maily closed valve.
* ~
k N W'g+-+-w e f ere:*?. w .-
--_r - *1 4\.
*N ^ 5) Only cable na C113138 is shown routed for V10-66 because postulated fire damage to cable nos. C11312A and C11313C
'27es Nyf p.
~
a ,
. r.l 2
could not spuriously open this valve. 6} Raceways containing safe shutdown cables that are routed BeNtostQ \ l' through separation zones will be provided with one hour bar-irreA \ L o' riers where they are located inside separation zones. M vi>3:4 is - N* ***** .. l r la tvisata
$ =
2 A
/ PERTUR11 Ic(vtoia l ?- CARD j REFERENCE ORAWINGS-
, a
*"'**'d G191149 REV.12 pc(vtota .
7 G191336 REV.18 y O w e r*-+4.,d3, K
%' ~
s uccas 1.EGEND-MCC88 s 41- cit 2ceAac.o gviosesi l I h!e h se i
.** RHR, RHR SW(DIV. I)
Also g.Adaldt U'
*A cli2s2AacNietsol
' ct12secNtote i eeee Aperture md _ e cinseracNioism RHR, RHR SW(DIV. lf)
^
2 c e "$ g SEPARATION ZONE
^ i
_ Ct t 407A(RR1}e) R i .cll,4 CONTAINMENT ' r C114 MAaC(RRuLa) l _ ctisaertviots) SUPPRESSION
' l
} .
H.
, _q '
n o l If f McGd faAAhW Y h QV oarc oescRiption e7 y' 7
' VERMONT YANKEE NUCLE AR POWER CORPORATION O f V gf VERMONT YANKEE NUCLE AR POWER STATION 23-6 : : 23-6 e REACTOR BUILDING RACEWAYS AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. I VS. DIV. ll OF RHR, RHR SERVICE WATER, AND SERVICE WATER 8e 7/
Engineering Planning FIGURE NO and Management. Inc.
- 3-5 ru so se. t s,e un
'65050 rad 72-a7
~
l oc=4
- v. r m .wearrence c.u..
I,'foug y ZONE
- -- o Z O N t: g
- nuan
\= Finj pMmd R B- 2 -9 I tiirusa RB1 81' M E
- R13053 5[N 'k 51 51
. Ci t 164. A(P .4 4151 A(P46 It4
= ,a .
1 .. . 11 - _._ gx . R ,o. . , .. g% %;w- 'p" . R ,u. . . .. g
,,A,,,
a fM/ Co.64.T. _ ,5. , B,.,y - -Co
- e,S _,aAvi~ ,1=
x u ,
.- wmy w a RNR HEAT gA:; . t J RHR HEAT V144A
- EXCHANGER 1 A }$N l @
f$=: ' .. : ;;f. EXCHANGER 16 , 27-6~ . [g(({ {-};qf % 4 v14 TA W s
. A: 5.;q.
\ COPE SPRAv _ CORE SPRhy PUMP 1 A .
! puup .g
- R332SU l R333SI CL '
- l.
C11163N (FIS14454 C11160A(PS14444 C111558(V14-Th) C111578(V14-SDs C111608(PS1444Q C111598(PS14-441
- C111588(v14-64 C11159A (PS14-44I
- C11150N(FIS144'.
C111688(v14-74 274~ g 11169 ASH e C11169A(Vis2GN 'N, e
- e. e e BASE OF CONTAINMENT -
Y h ' f. Tg5 / gi
' 060
' EDU g. ZONE ZONE M EDH 4060lJDM 21W J . RB1 i RB-2 ' '
N
- C601ED C601FD % ' R230 5 ~
p m' C601JD i C11154A(V1+64 C60tHD
' I
. C1116SA(v14 7N j-.
(sus Dc s to g, . CtitesA(v14-2sn A A uCc oc 1 A: suSoo h
, NOTE 3 i
oc. , , e m. 14 g
? f, - 40602 Lote-4 Oh $ ? ? D N S $b f'v., '
C60a0,vpw c M s M;;n& yq'
- xv ..pem ~ .
O,o v
*,em A g s! p q gw ay.
M h,9 ,r e
.s
,,g . .gpeqWy m ~! w ,
+
--s omb;;1, .
- W+ ne m 2s voc -
+
3,.y _
'J y wcc oc-te ,
E.lAREA '*
, acic
^'""^ '
' RCIC --
" . .S*J,W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * . + .
'__ ENCLOSED Q lll gig 1l,\., ,
5TAIRS -A l O, ..,, 234~ = = 2%4~ = 274- = = 27 4* - - 2s .2= I b . O O O - b b d ELEVATION 213'- 9 l
. J
, _ ~ ,
vvairs ________ i
Quadrent contenne catales associated + _ ~ .e.e _ the foto. ens recewers- [ lii$ F E / g Also AvAilable On [ =
"2%
11167851 APerture Card 1 m i t t 66Ast ' 1116sast NOTES:
,STAams
- 1) Drawing shows routing of Cables associated with minimum '
'[k equ:pment re'q uired for hot shutdown only.
N 2) RaCoways Containing safe shutdown Cables that are routed I through separation zones will be provided with one hour bar-
\ m se tiers where they are located inside separation zones.
l
' ,N 3) ThCse Cabies are used only in Case of fire in RCIC Cell (Area N vi4 7s
[F3CIC)._ _ _ _ _ _
- 4) RCIC valves V13-15, V13-16, V13 20, V13-21. V13-30 will be
; .manualiy operated, therefore Cables associated with above
, , ! valves are not shown(for Zone RB-2 fire). , _ .
. , , . 5). , Reactor water level will be available in the main Control
. room.
e sits 4Ast
. / CittseA(vt42681
/
l5 REFERENCE ORAWINGS: i . - k
- G131148 REV. 9 f -
R23sst G191329 81EV.11
# Ciiiso4(vt4-se G191330 REV.13 f/
l . Cu ts7A(v14 s# Cu t sea yi4-2em G191331 REV.10 C11438AEiLF C u "N ' Ci t 444AaF THE FOLLOWING CABLES ARE ROUTED INstoE C11434AF.B C11433AF T TF E HPCI CELL C11440AAAB C11457AB h ANC AAE NOT OF M
,C11439F.G H39 C11447CA.S.D.N Q H518 ea s e' e e HPCICELL g,o e o C11448o.E C11433C q C11449R Ci t 452N.P.QC .. AREA teceNo.
CH 435AF C114SOK l.B CH u TF.GE C11442AaF.G.E H P-2 Cnuirr.oroaN.aC l e ' - REACTOR BUILDING FIRE l0 m BARRIER,3 HR RATING 1, , *** CORE SPRAY ADS HPCI, DIV. I y' _p; - - - , *
's __
_ HPCI PUMP eeee CORE 'SPRAY ADS RCIC, DIV. ll AND TUR81NE le ( M m EQ SEPARATION ZONE 3 .' CONTAINMENT
$$ .f 1
( ell k l ZONE t 1 -- ~A - l
~
' RB- 2 l I . 12sVDC Mcc l DG t A .e
/ Yli / 6 fed $ N A fN A Y i Irsvo p cc - d "V
oats oEsCaieteoN l
-.aceta . l VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION l 1, yg WRMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR wtR STATION t [ l REACTOR BUILDING RACE 5 FAYS AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. I VS. DIV.11 APERTURf - . Or CORE SeRAY. ads, RCiC AND neCi Er$neertrq Planning CARD and Management,Inc.
FIGURE NO. l i3-6 ni.e.ee a em re maa __
~ ~'
1 : 15G505w 72-03'
l l O _ ZONE ' p.;l Ir j Q ZONE RB1 Mi g;,;f j N PsyJ " Af R B- 2
, STAIRS 214~
_, wy g n><<iclpynA igdm g a Rt30$E El ;t'g "'[..Or, y
- == 'C11164A (P46-14 :
.. mu h
3 d R131S! x OLy ', e' a il Cl t t SI A(P4618) ' e, ( R33251T _ e f %d , 8 f p , e 311163N LFx14454 [. -)d.} 111160A(PS14444 5 111608 (PS1 *c44Q ,#
.$6f;;gg,g;@D +j j *
*# g 274~
I I1588(V14 5A) y)ni f +' @ p~ O $ f $* I , $111688 N1&T4 8' IMf 40601 HDM
- 40601 FDi-2
,. 40601 EDM
,* 40601JDM OL '$ &
I C601 ED.FD C601 HD.JD i V14-26.** , (BUS DC 1 TO
. uCC DC i A 111698 N
- ZONE BUS DC1 TO MCC-DC 10)
ZONI giii698Nw26ei ~s'N k. :j R B-1 couTAinuEuT RB4 b11169 (V1 268) g
- TORUS GELL
/ 'I -
TORJS CELL I I 4 j ,
# 3 e (
,,ygggg ,
4332SII / /,y j a *... e 1140GASI p111608(PS14-44Q 11440HASI
~
e 11160A(PS1844A) 23,'0,, / j e
- I t C3N(F014 454 / / j ,
g g44ogpsi C11440HB,HAGA e \ NOTE 3
* ' GELGC,GD,F
,, N2319) e R332SE .e f C111668 Nt474 Ha
- R131E g[a s C18161A F44 14 )
$111698 N14,-26A)
* [gg-{J{f,iy f.t:W.M . . 11437ASig
$111588 N14-5A)
' 4.* .o ".., Nh peggwpMA;;&g t C11437 AAAB(V2316)
* -b . [hfghdW46437CSIX it449KSix ,
j ( gy$jy (gC31437FG(V2316) 4230SE ,
/ .
-W ,,,f C11149K(TS23-101 A)
- 111156ANM 54 HR , 1.f-1 4 ,,,
{l11SSA(V147;'$ [ ,8 g
; g g.Cl1440S $ 19)%l, g.
r'c "um
= .. ..
ll l N ,** l um W\\\ 'jMy(("'"" , ! . 32'r ' I.?Y R13t st , e i e, , C1115 t A(P46-t ai e [,. ***********
- e r CAO PUMP
. ....... * *a C602La S i t-. * * * . . .
(8U3 002 T3 ' XFEL SW) \ \\( \\\
, I. . . . . .- . k ,k
- CRO Puum
~
G ...................... \ 27-8' -
/
3-6~ gy4- - go .g= - -
\ gy.g= - -
8- 8 8 8 8 8 C11437C.U(V23-16) EMBEDDED IN s 11449KSix 11449KSix CONCRETE Ct i149K (TS23101 A) C11449K(TS23-1014 ELEVATION 232*-6"
g w~
.)
b l 1 l STAIRS NOTES: q NOTES:
, R333Sl j) grawing Shows routing of cables associated with' minimum equipment required for hot shutdown only.
C 2) Raceways centdining saf e shutdown cables that are routed C11 t 590 (Ps1444g C11159A(PS14-4483 through separation Zoneswill be provided with one hour bar. C111 SON (FIS144 sal gjers where they are located inside separation zones.
- 3) Those cables are used only in case of fire in RCIC cell (Area w' RCIC).
h ' l bo Available On APerture Card ( ' y, 4.,,, le ~ p
/
/
k REF'ERENCE D'RAWINGS:
\ ttisess!
. p Cit tses tvi4-2em G191149 REV. 9 ( ,,,seAst G191332 REV.18 L C1u sea (vi4-zes G191333 REV.14 g ,
\ R333SI
, C111ss8(Vle-74
* \ Ci t t se8(v14-264 e C11157B(V14-680 i n C11159A(Ps14-44m utit s9B(Pst4-44DI LEGEND: , ,
- 4 e
, g, { *-) C111 SON (Fist 4-454
* * *
- CORE SPRAY, ADS, HDCI DIV.1
~
* *' CORE SPRAY, ADS, RCIC DIV.11 R235st ws Ci tissA(v14 78) . SEPARATION ZONE C11157A(V14 sBI Ci u sea (v14-2es t $ 440ABSI CONTAINMENT
( 11440AASI 1 C11440AA
'TAIRS . C11440Aa SUPPRESSION (v23-19)
[.g 1440AASL ud40ABSA11440GASL11440GBSI C11440AAAEECf.GAGEGCGD(V;3-19) E122 CONDUlT IN TRAY ZONE. . 3se RD-2 .r .*j. l lb $O fdA A d N Y "j,' oatt otscnieros 7 7 7"
- 2;vy :
I % VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION rT'T i AA l VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION OTr APERTUR$ ' REACTOR BUILDING RACEWAYS AND CARD MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. I VS. DIV. ll OF CORE SPRAY, ADS, RCIC AND HPCI Engineering Planning FIGURE NO. and Management. inC. gq _t_,- _
~ -~ - - -- -- 55050Y00 %2-f)Y
H T ELD M.d G.G MCC 90 WCC69A . MCC 890 (9 ,ta.It m ., /. - m ii _m --
.cm 1 ,. . ,
1 3 m
" ', __,_,,,g~ .
4 e ,ig- STAIR: g ,St
' a t ui Q p are .
R320Sil , lg k .g. ,y . @t :431A E C(V23-153 he a kIj@; --. i S T AIRS e %-; ., # Y[e ~ f l + j. :O ~ " , - ;a OLy , l E*
- j g[.j, j ' pV.,x - '-
* "- t .a mSE_
C111698 (V14 26N _ R34oSie f # # l w d %. M ,7
. NOTE 3 l 8
g .g -[ ' M.W[ '
~'
C111648 (Y14-FM CIT 52A(RV2 71 A) # i C11968C #14-74 . 4 I C1754A (RV2-71C)
#;p '['~
Ci t t S8C (Yts-54 C11436 A.B.C tV23-15) e e , T$.- ,-(C.x. Q, , C111588(V14-5A) 27r gp _,
. r, - .
l -. i
- Ci354s L .....h6 . . *h
- MCC4810 uCC.D. t
] .
i.i
+
q
- .* ~*~ ZO N E U
@#fA Nte.$. 23r k
- RB-3 -
114 6A B W23-16) C11168A N14-74 [ .
. . R340SE /
C11168A(V14-264 R350Sil /
/ , ,,
, , , t:1116TCN14-124 /
CONTAINMENT
**g,.
.- ,ss e . .C118 69C.(V.14.-264 /
11436C (V23-15) x e p / /l l 20,
\y. ..<.
- RB
.. J. . . ............,. ,, ,
30lHD.JD.ED,FD \g * * *
; 11440s
* '33$J1SK .Cl1440AA/
US DC-t TO MCC OC 1 A 23 4- N * *d C1335J1 (MCCSal M40GASI , JS DC1 TO MCC DC 10) y . e
*L
/
H 40GBSI t y, . H440GCS g] gn ( *f* * * * *
- ghD , 1335J2SK ' 11440 GDS 3
>< '1* Ds a aa.a s.m ej C1335J2 (WCWC C11440GAua,GC.GD /
g34ogg C11T52A(RY2 7tN\ d # lf, N2349) I -
]
L, g C1754A(RV2-71Q \ Ha p p j,, 011169C(Yt4 264 I-011167CN14124 , - 14'r 7 STAIRS j k[ ,' L- ,' R3M !/ ELEVATOR a.
- l. , ,
1144egSix ' i 1436C(v23-t s) , i,,. ,
'\ -
?\*b\ N l ( 4 ~* g l
.A e * -
Y' 8 31O R330$K - v' h 1Pt eP9 ed ategeu 1 s (* TN* STEAM , e C11166C (Y14-T N f' igwi 4 . C11440BC * * [*'*' -
.' . * >* e **** ..
Ci t 166C N14-114 C11156C(V1454 N= ,. 4 t' j 7 { q--. g4 f........ - co2LD R- ' * '- - ' u 2# ~
.V- %-~4 --
sus DC-2 TO XFER SW)
;;;=fe,~
, , ,60. ,5, .
w < _s h,1 .
=
_. _ .x. _. . . . . . . . . . .a a u u . -
- m .. _ _=..
c-w_ rA=E%%MY .n -m _
= s -
= , , .I G
.. .......... .. ..; \ #
l
- 1 T55A(RV2-71D) f i f, ,
2%-4~
- ^
2%4~
/ -
- ty-s~ - -
ty e~ - gy.q-t3413[
- 1 s t eeC(V1+2681 011155CN14 74 12Y 11a j 118 toy gy
, g 11154C(V1412El INSERT 1
._ R341M $ C11188JSil -
331st C11156C N14-2est Mov13-15 1 H 59A(PS1444 @ C11156C(V14-TEI i t i5ee tr$i444Dr C11154C(v1412e H i$rC(vt e $e t Ci33sJi.J2 ELEVATION 252'-6" I1l53CN1411g SwGR9 TO MCC 08 1
" =mm
.1,, \
-- ~
L.J 1 NOTES-
- 1) Drawing shows routing of Cables assoClated with minimum equipment required for hot and Cold shutdowrL
- 2) Raceways Containing safe shutdown Cables that are routed through separation zones will be provided with one hour bar-( riors where they are located inside separation zones.
- 3) Those Cables are used only in Case of fire in RCIC Cell (Area O ~
R441Sr RCIC). CITS3A(Rv2 TIS C1755A(Rv2-F t D) A n .m '
" )- =\ -
=
\ '
R33 sr
& Available On
- i llll $* M ' 0 1 Perture Card INSERT 1
,b _ C11452N,P.C(HPCI TURS CNTL)
C11449K(Ts23101 A)
*
- C11447C(HPCICLGWTR W) l C11433ELC(HPCI Aux OfL PP)
C114358(HPCICONO PP) REFERENCE DRAWINGS: E i 6? m c**ociv28 'a
~
C11448C.D.E(v2318) [ 4 . . C1144 tCiv23-20) G191148 REV. 9 g , , . y[ , C1443C(v23 213 - s
. G191335 REV. 24 '
ps, .
. bN g Cit 4 sot K(HPCILOGIC)
G191334 REV.21 Blv2p9: [ . . . 442h,( o
- A C 5)
G191349 SHT10F3 REV. 9
, Ct 144eC(v23 se) e
- e e3 C1145o8 (HPCI siu. P.S) l , o y . C1145oJ(HPCI TuREL EXK P.&)
l . o , , C11445Civ23 24) 4 , C114348(HPCI GLD sL COOL WTR W) E C11449o(Ts2310tQ E 1 Ct1449R(Ts23101Db C *
*]( A C11451R8(H"CI LOG 8C)
, .cf ' Ct1452O(HPCI TUR1L CNTRL)
..iy,, -
.) C11449P(Ts23-1014 t> 'r C11447F.G,N. SAD.E(HPCitsoW)
- LEGEND: ,
C11439C(v2314) , e * [3 Cu43sCW2ur) 133sotst -
* *
- CORE SPRAY, ADS,HPCI DIV. I l ' e~- ?
37 " Ci33soi tuCCan ....; CORE SPRAY, ADS,RCIC DIVil 6 *
. 133502st
, g , .[ , ,
C133so2(uCCes RET SEPARATION ZONE __ j -c STAIRS y CONTAINMENT $$% _2
~
~4 , .
CtTS3A(Rv2 F14 C TSSA(Rv2-7109 gSRdf804.2-N r DOWN TO HPCt CELL (CA8 LEE L45TED i REV s ma, m n,a aWP. REV th APPR OATE DESCRIPTION gy gy gy i- 23'-6* - ON FIGURE 34)
- VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION y 7, p VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION U
'~
l Rssist / C1 1SOA(Ps14448)
' pygr M J REACTOR BUILDING RACEWAYS AND
-44 D) MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. I VS. OlV.11 Cljl l C" ' 88C N' *'" '
q , { OF CORE SPRAY, ADS RCIC AND HPCI Engineering Planning FIGURE NO. and Management. Inc. 3-8 - ~ n as a swe maa j
~
es C11188JSH [ MOvt 3-15
/
+
+
- 4^ . ,
- q, * .
y
" * # . g ,, - '.
.s 'y.
4 s *
..#*. (
' ~~ . > , p
^
5 s . e { s
+ ' t s t. .
4** 'g,
> < 6, >
5, t.
~*
' .% *Q 3,%
g
. .. . . .V
(
, t, 4 .
3 + . 3
' * ? EOL
. 1 ONE () ,
'R B-5 l* INSTRUMENTATION RACK 25 6 - INSTRU MENTATION
.aACx25s %
g ,- - I l 5
~
l I .
. 11167 0 sit
_ = _C1116 78 (vi a-12 As Q - tite 74sn
- C11167 A (v14-12 A)
_ i . Ye.. ,. I . l r l
.e
, ucC 90 ,
. ... g ...........................
+ . .
,
- CONTAIN M E NT vi 412 A
[... l,............. 4.o.*wg :
] MCC6A l vt4-1 A
! -s. :
e
/ C s 1169 e (vi a-26N l. iiiseess j Cit tsss(vt4 7A)
Ci tises tvia-i s N g C11168C (V14-74 e C11158C iV14-5 A) CI 115a B (V t 4-5Al l gg166ASE C11166A(v14-114 [<
- ==p >- - -
l r -i :. s----- N . _I
~ __
L . ...............................................................
. ns4osa s *
[. Cite 7C(via12N STAIRS C11169C(v14-264 {
= '. >
ELEVATOR .
=
n n
~
n f
/
4; /
- 23'e - : : 23 e- : : 23 4- 5 ;
23 4-C11188J91 C111840 0 u ovi3-t3 1 12svoC 1 DGaAS TO CPS 21 E L EV. 280'-O"
l
" *N \
u u a l I STAIRS NOTES: u
- 1) Drawing shows routing of cables associated with rninimum equipment required for hot and cold shutdown.
l
- 2) Raceways containing safe shutdown cables that are routed through separation zones will be providedwith one hour bar-sPMENT HATCH - riers where they are located inside separatio'n zones.
ir Lv a R331SI 1 ciiisac ui... ., Also Available On ZONE C"'"""' Aperture Card
- RB 6 y
) m k y; , rt i
'/
q,6- __ ====. ctiissA(vi4 ties _, a
' REFERENCE DRAWINGS: i l tiss3sst i n
t l ci nisas(vi4-t ies , G191149 REV.12 G191336 REV.18 tiss4Ast , STAIRS _ ct 11s4A(V14120) , 111s4BSI 6 l ctit s4 t(vt41200 , 6 rIST .I i n 11 v' 4-u -
=.
! ..... ... APERTURif e-v, 4. , 2.
i CARD )'
. r< i u kN*
e****.*. .......%..d -
. y A
LEGEND: MCC88 -* 1 **. CORE SPRAY, ADS,HPCI DIV. I
~
**** CORE SPRAY, ADS RCIC DIV.11 io
[ 6 n (G SEPARATION ZONE MCC7A g _ CONTAINMENT o e, i a I _ E "'
~
s / 'Ytt a susi A,e eu,ar mU@ 6 arv oare
- EV
- wo otscarrion ev "er "a "v o
0 WEmeeONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION N C f U HZ VER OMT YANMEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION 23'6* : ; 23'6- ; REACTOR BUILDING RACEWAYS AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. I VS. DIV.11 OF CORE SPRAY, ADS, RCIC AND HPCI az Engineering Planning FIGURE NO. and Management,Inc. ftwo. Sposa Spost FN 844 3-9 +=
E 3 I l-Eg - ZONE RB-1
- l. ZOb RB=
23*6~ _
\
T--- RHR PUMP 1 A RHR PUMP 10 e ( STAIRS , y- RHR HEAT EXCHANGER l A RHR HEAT EXCHANGsR1-0 L-23'-6~ ' CQRE SPRAY COR PUMP 1 A PUP i 23 6-ZONE R B-1 / OASE OF CONTAINMENT TORUS OK . CELL /
- R350 Sit 23' e Cli232C tLT is 19-10 A ) RB 4060?t D t t -4
- C602LO
- i. IBUS DC-2 TO _
e XFER SW) #' OHz b. L T 16-t 9- f od
' t s[yp - ,.;j Y r4 . C11ITIF(LT 16-19-10Q '
, L T 1619- 108 E"#
p . . . 16 i9MC [ OHz 0
,h . 3 $'#
.7 11230C C11230C(TE 16-19-33C) i l ih *12SV OC MCC ,
~
., -' lik . - ; OC*t B ,
lib ~ - (: . -- oc,c ALTERNATE e 32 o-g-] AREA
- Ni.ih " Saufoow~
PANEL
,1229Aosi Ct 1232F (Li 16- t 9-108) ,
- 3. !.
I I *
- _ W _ E NCL OSE D , ,
3g ' ST AIRS _ e 1 e s e f OG / 11230C s C112E ITE 16-19-33Q 20'-8' - - 23'-6* 23'6" - 23'6- : 25'2" 8 8 1917FF 8 8 8 112 '!20 X E C f i1 TIF (LT 16-1910Ci C11230 A ITE 1619-33 A) ELEVATION 213'-9"
$4 vY-Ct F2
^ --
s'
~N r;
e& J Also Available On ; \/g APerture Card O s /* NOTES: [ SPRAY '
- 1) Drawing shows routing of cables associated with minimum IP 1 a equipment required for hot and cold shutdown. !
l
- 2) Raceways containing safe shutdown cables that are routed l through separation zones will be provided with one hour bar-riers where they are located inside separation zones.
N REFERENCE DRAWINGS TORUS CELL G191148 REV. 9
- G191329 REV.11 i G191330 REV.13 4E ! G191331 REV.10
-2 D HPCI CELL T
- - REACTOR BUILDING FIRE AREA BARRIER.3-HOUR RATING H P-2 if * .. - DIV. I INSTRUMENTATION l
l
** * *** - DIV. ll INSTRUMENTATION AE'TunY"Ne -
M6 -SEPARATION ZONE gag -
- CONTAINMENT
~
? _
ZONE ' -'4_ RB-2 . 125 VD
\ M L *h nse m ner NO E #
W CI) 3 g , VERM0NT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION r O72 , g q) e VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION e T REACTOR BUILDING RACEWAY AND
'A<PERTURd , MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. I VS. DIV.11 gg PROCESS MONITORING Engineering Planning FIGURE NO.
and Management. Inc. ' " 3-10 Thr so a se t.Fre m
l etl ty s l a@p Q> ' ZOP o :' geg R B-2 3..y S%ON % W%VH R B-1 %d bh$k -
==' -
g ' Ej - 1
?lE ,
y_?
/ ?
fa _s% We9d qq powe$m.qW
\
2 3'- 6 (;Q 3:.; ,
/
23-6" ZONE R B-1 -
, CONTAINMENT o ONS ,,___ _ J OK o CELL ' 23 5~
N ZONE N m,,, R B- 2 C11232C (LT 1619-104 ru . 14'4" /
,,em i@
a IC.: - - O~ \ . *:w w wn . g'$%W{Tgf%$4CPY'
\\ y os -au m Y
~
. 11229AGS! /
32,4,
*gyV,--
C11232F (LT 1& t 9-1005 / C CRC 1 i , o 23'-6
- 23' - -
23* - 20.-8 ~ 23'2- : 8 8 8 8 8 G ELEVATION 232'-6" l 0; e4-weira . . .. j
1
!l N !
. t IE b l 2 \ suiRs j i
NOTES: , i
- 1) Drawing sh5ws routing of cables associated with minimum equipment required for hot and cold shutdowrl N 2) Raceways containing safe shutdown cables that are routed
\ through separation zones will be provided with one hour bar-riers where they are located inside separation zones. ,
I
; Also Available On i A Perture Card I
i
' REFERENCE DRAWINGS-I
' G19114~ REV. 9 g
G19133 REV.18 , i I.b G19133- REV.14 h ;
, LEGEND: ',
I'
, *** DIV. l lNSTRUMENTATION l
- t
/ , ***
- DIV lllNSTRUMENTATION
[,Ej SEPARATION ZONE CONTAINMENT STAsRS , i SUPPRESSION ! m CONDUliIN TRAY m5#&M-8 L kzons . i Q,' RB 2 l esea n _=.v_. _ _ __-_ / ff / Stefe Af ANI W p g, new apen
"' Datt oEsCkPT@ gy gy gy
- 20'<7 VERMONT Y ANKEE MUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION t
APERTURI{' REACTOR suitDiNG RAcEwAv AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT FoR DIV. I VS. DIV. ll
;, ... CARD j rRocESS uoNiToRiNG Engineering Planning FIGURE NO and Management. Inc. 3-11 n se a s== s re aan j.
*= = = = RADtCNT
.MSC E uCC 890
\ ?C22 ?SA\ HEatSHsELD \
0" n J I! IE!r!!I r I II/!IIi - A a
,1 i->e '
-.-e.
t_J -- . <m.uI
,.- E it b i_ I r n
,i 13 I
- L _J
~ f[ :fbh, 23'T :kk e),s&e^NiQ lT w g g E 4 ypp 0-]iz 3 4 e gq?% s,. l 7 - 13 { \ O / -- l
&lwYh ?YS$ w
.w ,,
5b??kks#c _ -M i' K 23'W '
\Nb; iTi ' ' \
gi ij v$$ h ' '
, g #-
I'l . O i 1
~
R350$If - C11232CILT1619-10A)' 23'6-ZONE / CONTAINMENT g RB- 3 g N ft i
\..o "
D 1745A CSooK(LT 2-3-rop
. 23'W '
/
art '
. t edssa-===-e.4ep R3%S!f 34 g gyggp3 r ELEVATOR e l -
Ha < T ANx4 - n s - y , k 4 STEAM R431 TUNNEL C11230A(TE 16 [ ,
,3. .
-n *;
% - ' Ct SOSF(PT+53 R430 -- '
, -- 4 ;
g , . C11230C(TE I619 33Q ,
-( s W C1500M(LT 24 706 . .
C1505M(PT+53Elp 32*C* I g g%_ _.
' /
- g. ,
s g % _g;-- 3 pg _
~..," *' *^M^^~- ~~
I -' 11 30C(TE 16 t 9 33Q h\ M _
+
sA x = 1 g -i. _ __ m - y . 23'-6" 23'6*
/ -
23'4- - - 23'4" - 2 3'-69 i 8- R351SI 8 8 8 8 C11232F (LT 1619108) ELEVATION 252'-6"
, . \
1
- % j .. e4 w eir2 l
Il
+&
m , STAIRS bl M " l l
. NOTES:
1)' Drawing shows routing of cables associated with minimum
'] . equipment required for hot and cold shutdowrt Q 2) Raceways containing safe shutdown cables that are routed
\ l through separation zones will be provided with one hour bar-
,, rierswhere they are located inside separation zones.
Fe e a Also Avaitable On aus - Aperture Card
. Cl$oSF(PT-6-53N REFERENCE ORAWINGS:
% /
_ G191148 REV. 9
~
- ZONE
- p -
G191 5 REV. 24 G191334 REV.21 RB-4 . l G191349 SHT 1 OF 3 REV.9 e h - Q - i _ p LEGEND:
,7; v
* * * *. - DIV. llNSTRUMENTATION f .. . .
- ar- DN. ll INSTRUMENTATION F3f4
- I 2"
, STAIRS
- SEPARATION ZONE 9 E
- CONTAINMENT a
r- +** O
" M -SUPPRESSION g4 ij 2fdFotooAF-/
ttesox m e Ct1230A(TE to to-33N { g h ,h 4 j oatt otscsuPtioN 7 7 7 I - VERMONT YANKEE NUCLE AR POWER CORPORATION VERMONT YANKEE NUCLE AR POWER STATION
/APERTM neAcrea suitoiNo nAcEwav ANo MAJOn EQUIPMENT FOR DIV.i VS.DN.Il CAllD PnOcass uCNiTORiNo Engineering Planning FIGURE NO and Management. Inc.
2 "" " " rw so a w se naa
j
)
1
- . +
REACTOR M UL.A PUMPS k \\\\ 1 {.-} t: i
,3-tj .1+ ,
' V ,.
.};:; <
I_ INSTRUMENTATION rd z "' RACK 25 6
![ INSTRU M E NTATION
, ; ' PT-se * ,
RACK 25 5 p .... ............................ v.v, a; : - _ l v
- J MCC 90
~
s
! A430 l _ g,~ C1505M (PT-6-530' ZONE 'y CON T AIN M E N T l RB-5
._ :l _ uCC 6A l.
o
,....e.. -1
'T _ . . _ _ _ _2l
~ I
~~
L [ ,1. , -
^
j- r , ST AIRS ',
- h -
{ e j ;. ' . ELEVATOR f. 23 6 : ; 23 6 ; ; 23 6- ; 23 f'
- ~ E L EV. 280'-0" t
l 84 YY4172
l
]
N
. _J L o N
]
STAIRS n EQUIPMENT HATCH _ Also Av=11ahle On n Aperture Card
'77FA NOTES:
, C1rrrA(LT 2440
/ isnw 1) Drawing shows routing of cables associated with minimum
' ciSO5F (PT 6-$3A) equipment required for hot and cold shutdowrt 7
N 2) Raceways containing safe shutdown cables that are routed
/ ,\
* - -----~~~~#
,, through separation zones will be provided with one hour bar-riers where they are located inside separation zones.
.oooe ,
'. jiT . e . . . . ._. > I LT 7 34:
PT-6-53A -l STAIRS REFERENCE ORAWINGS: l[ - C G191149 REV 12 2 G191336 REV 13 d TI g _ APERTURE CARD Cm a E ZONE - x ""
'a R B-6 -
MCC8B l g ***e - DIV. IINSTRUMENTATION
* * * * **- DfV. ll INSTRUMENTATION 1
_ g I41[ - SEPARATION ZONE
~
S - CONTAINMENT MCC 7A
"- - SUPPRESSION 1I Ha l-_ i _
l
~
e, I *lrf ISSv0 ra uAdr hf YW I h QV oarc otscaiPriose 7 E' [" VERMONT YANKEE NUCLE AR POWER CORPORATION p p p V Ogy VERMONT Y ANKEE NUCLE AR POWER STATION 23 6 : ; 23-6' - REACTOR BUILDING RACEWAY AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. I VS. DIV.ll PROCESS MONITORING 82 71 Engineermg Planning FIGURE NO l and Management,inC. 3,pg,
""* % speen 9seem 8+ew Ma
r
=~
J' U U U* l]
- N I_ tasoASlT
; c 860A(PT2-3-664 e
e e L- d 'k 24VDC DC PANEL B
~
24 VDC 24VDC g_ g
] BATTERY BATTERY 24 VDC
^
DC PANEL A 'I I i=___._- m- *,
] ._ . , ,
s ZONE ' ' RB-7 j , ] > CONT AIN MLN T
. - - = -
==_m o - - - -
= _ _ _ _ . , .
1 _ _ m _S y STAIRS C ~' _ = = - - _;= -. _2 - - _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - -- -} ELEVATOR _ _ a l [ O U 23-6 : : 23 6 : 23 6 : ; 23-6 r ; 4 EL EV. 303' J'
-t..- -
t ' F-F 4lO t 9 3
i l G ~N I L._J L a Q
=
=
STAIAS
-]
= a
= o
=_ ~
JIPMENT HATCH Also AvaHable On 1 - Aperture Card
~
n NOTES:
- 1) Drawing shows routing of cables associated with minimum equipment required for hot and colo shutdo' wrt 7 12) Raceways containing safe shutdown cables that are routed
-t n , through separation zones wi!! be provided with one hour bar-N (i_ _ _ - _ - - -
_u riers where they are located inside separation zones. 1 REFERENCE DRAWINGS: ( ' G191149 REV.12 G191337 REV.11
~
TI APERTURE LEGENDi
* * * *. - DIV.l!NSTRUMENTATION
* * * * * * - DIV. Il INSTRUMENTATION
- SEPARATION ZONE
~ h -CONTAINMENT 7Es50 fed 73/d Mihk
~
l 6 1\1*Es F*R Mf - QV oaTE otscnirnou 7 "f "f o e e VERMONT YANKEE NUCLE.AR#OwER CORPORATION VERMONT YANKEE NUdLE AR POWER STATION "I REACTOR BUILDING RACEWAY AND --- 23 6 : , 23 6
- MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR DIV. i VS. DIV. Il MSS MITORING Engineering Planning FIGURE NO 8e 7/ and Management, Inc. ;{Q no so a se t r e ua - -
k 4.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS SEPARATION ANALYSIS BY FIRE AREA This section of the report describes the methodology used for the Analysis and provides the detailed results for each of the designated fire areas. This section is divided into the following subsections: (1) Section 4.1 provides a description of the overall Analysis methodology; (2) Section 4.2 provides thc. results of the Analysis for the Iteactor Building, including the RCIC Room fire area and each of the associated Reactor Building fire zones; . I (3) Sections 4.3 through 4.12 provide the results of the Analysis for the remaining fire areas; (4) Table 4-1 summarizes results, area by area, for reference and comparison. 4.1 Safe Shutdown Systems Separation Analysis Methodology The Safe Shutdown Systems Separation was performed for each plant fire area, as well as each fire zone within the Reactor Building. The purpose of the Analysis was to evaluate the adequacy of fire protection features necessary to assure that the plant can achieve safe shutdown in the event of a postulated fire. The Analysis is a
> systematic study that considers fire protection parameters to define and postulate a fire hazard against the characteristics of a particular fire area or fire zone. The fire protection features of I the fire area or fire zone and the location of necessary safe shutdown equipment and associated cable were evaluated to insure that safe shutdown capability is maintained during and after a postulated fire.
As discussed in Section 3.0 of this report, fire areas were established such that a postulated fire would be contained within that area. For fires in the Reactor Building, established separation zones insure that either the south side (Division I power) or north side (Division II power) fire zones are protected in the event of a fire in the opposite zone. The principal safe shutdown systems associated with each Division were identified in Table 2.1 according to functional performance goals. Demonstrating the ability to limit a Reactor Building fire to one Division ensures that safe shutdown systems are available to achieve the shutdown requirements of Section III.G to Appendix R. The first step of the Safe Shutdown Systems Separation Analysis was to perform a fire area analysis to identify the safe shutdown systems lost to a postulated fire in each area. For the Reactor Building, a fire was assumed to affect all safe shutdown systems located within the fire zones of either Division I or Division II. Completion of this step resulted in the ability to determine the availability of safe shutdown systems outside of the affected fire area. This step of the Analysis also demonstrated tifat Qe power
- and control circuits for the non-affected safe shutdown systems were not affected by the fire. Finally, an associated circuits , study was performed to demonstrate that common enclosures, common power supplies, and spurious operation of safe shutdown equipment would not defeat the capability to achieve hot and cold shutdown. ~ To assist in the understanding of the methodology associated with the Analysis, Figure 1-1 Logic Sequence, is provided. This figure shows the steps of the Analysis and the various options available I to ensure compliance with the shutdown requirements of Section III.G for a postulated fire in any one fire area. The following Sections 4.2-4.12 of the report provide the detailed results of the Analysis for each fire area. Included in each section is a discussion of the fire area, the safe shutdown systems needed to meet functional performance goals, deficiencies and corrective actions (if any), and conclusions regarding each area's compliance with Section III.G separation criteria. Table 4-1 summarizes the results of the analysis for each area. Note: The systems listed as used are the minimum available that are guaranteed by this analysis to survive a fire. In an actual fire, all systems available would be used in order of preference specified by plant procedures. 4.2 Reactor BJildinR (Reactor BuildinR Fire Area and RCIC Room Fire Area) The Reactor Building is a single structure and considered as a separate fire area for the purpose of this Analysis. The RCIC Room, though located in the Reactor Building structure, is considered as a separate fire area. As discussed in Section 3.3 and shown on Figures 3-2 through 3-14, the Reactor Building has been divided into the RCIC room fire area and seven fire zones which are separated by fire separation zones. The primary containment is inerted during plant operation, and thus does not have to be addressed per the requirements of Appendix R. The procedure used for the Reactor Building structure analysis consisted of: (a) Identifying locations of equipment that could be used. (b) Dividing the Reactor Building Fire Area into Fire Zones, protected from adjacent zones by Fire Separation Zones, as justified by fire protection engineering principles. (c) Tracing the routing of all circuits to the equipment and showing them on cable tray and conduit drawings in contrasting colors. Different colors were used for different systems so that separation and interference between cables of different systems could be easily identified. l
(d) Examining the Cable Tray drawings for interferences, noting ~ the circuits and equipment involved, and determining what design changes would eliminate the interferences. 4.2.1 Detailed Discussion of Results - RCIC Room Fire Area and Reactor Building Fire Area Zones The following sections provide a detailed discussion of the RCIC Room Fire Area and each fire zone in the Reactor Building Fire Area. The Reactor Building zones, RB-1 through RB-7 depend upon separation by the floors of the building. This applies to every zone. 4.2.1.1 Area RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Room. Figures 3-2. 3-3. 3-6. 3-7. 3-10. and 3-11 o This area is the lowest level of the northwest quadrant of the Reactor Building. It contains the RCIC System and alternate shutdown panel. RCIC is Division II. If the Division II equipment is disabled by a fire, Division I, HPCI and RHR/RHRSW/SW would be used for safe shutdown. (See Table 4-1 for complete list of equipment.) o Sa_ft Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by CRD scram from the Control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the HPCI System operated from the Control Room. There are no HPCI or Division I de circuits or equipment in the RCIC Fire Area. Reactor vessel level indication is provided by LT-2-3-61. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating, until HPCI steaming rate equals decay heat rate. Reactor pressure indication is provided by PT-6-53A Decay heat removal is accomplished at high pressure by operating HPCI at full capacity. Flow not needed for makeup is recirculated to the CST tank. If a faster cooldown rate is desired, SRVs may be cycled under operator
control. Torus level is trovided by LT-16-19-10B. Tcrus temperature is provided by TE-16-19-33A. CST Level is provided by LT-107-5A. ~ HPCI operation discharges decay heat to the torus. The torus will be cooled by RHR/RHRSW/SW in SPC mode. When depressurized sufficiently, RHR will be placed in SDC modo. Auxiliaries - RRUs to cool the RHR and RHRSW pump rooms are available if needed. Power is supplied by Diesel B and Division I. o Deficiencies The steel plate enclosure sealing the stairs up to the room above was designed to prevent steam from a RCIC line break getting into the room above. It was not designed as a rated fire barrier. There is no suppression in the area. There are no deficiencies in power control or instrumentation circuits. o Corrective Actions Modifications - None proposed. Exemptionc - An exemption request for the stairwell enclosure and for suppression requirements has been filed based on the absence of combustibles and the existence of suppression on the other, non-fire (232' elevation) side of the enclosure (Table 5-3, Item 12). o Conclusion If a fire occurs in the RCIC Room, the plant can achieve safe shutdown conditions required; however, the exemption request above is necessary for compliance with Appendix R requirements. 4.2.1.2 Zone RB-1. Figures 3-2. 3-3. 3-6. 3-7. 3-10 and 3-11 This zone is the north side of the torus area at Elevations 213' and 232', and includes corner rooms at Elevations 213' and 232' in the northeast
L quadrant and the corner room with floor elevation 232' in the northwest quadrant. This zone contains Division II RHR/RHRSW/ core / spray equipment. If disabled by a fire, the m RCIC in the alternate shutdown mode and Division I equipment will be used for ~ shutdown. The northwest Quadrant Room at Elevation 232 contains Divisions I and II power cables. Detection and suppression exist in this room so that these power cables will remain undamaged by fire. o Safe Shutdown Functions "- Reactor shutdown is accomplished by CRD scram manually initiated from the Control Room. Coolant inventory is provided at high pressure by the RCIC System. Level indication is by LT-2-3-61. Overpressure protection is provided by the SRVs self-actuating. Reactor vessel pressure indication is by PT-6-53A. Decay heat removal is provided at high pressure by the RCIC and SRVs. To achieve cooldown within the required 72 hours, an SRV must be " repaired" as provided for in the Alternate Shutdown System design. Division I RHR/RHRSW/SW will remove decay heat from the to rus . When depressurized sufficiently, RHR is placed in SDC mode. Torus level is by LT-16-19-10B. Torus temperature is by TE-16-19-3A. CST level is by LT-107-5A. Valve V10-183 service water emergency fill to the vessel via RHR is of Division I and in the zone. Valve V10-66 RHR drain to radwaste is of Division I and in the zone. Fire cannot spuriously open either valve as the control circuits are outside the zone, o Deficiencies The torus region in this zone at Elevation 232' is not separated sufficiently from adjacent zones. The de Division II power feed to RCIC (needed for Decay Heat Removal) from the alternate shutdown battery is in conduit but otherwis,. unprotected in Zone RB-1. Suppression is not provided in this zone.
) o Corrective Actions Modifications - Provide fire stops in cable trays crossing proposed separation zones to ~ - establish zones of sufficient width; 20 feet east side, 20 feet northwest. Fire wrap the - RCIC alternate shutdown panel de feed with three-hour barrier. Exemptions - 1) An exemption from the requirements for suppression has been requested for the torus region (Table 5-3 Item 1). 2) An exemption from separation requirements in the Northwest Elevation 232 Room has been filed (Table 5-3 Item 3).
- 3) An exemption request has also been filed for the Northeast and Southeast corner rooms for separation, and for detection and suppression at the stairs (Table 5-3 Item 4).
o conclusion If a fire occurs in zone RB-1, the plant can achieve safe shutdown conditions required; however, the modifications and the exemption requests described above are necessary to ensure cafe shutdown and Appendix R Compliance. 4.2.1.3 Zone RB-2. FiRureF 3-2, 3-3. 3-6. 3-7. 3-10. and 3-11 This zone is the south side of the torus area at Elevations 213 and 232' and includes corner rooms in the southeast and southwest quadrants at both elevations. The zone contains Division I equipment. Division II RCIC and RHR/RHRSW equipment will be used for shutdown if Division I equipment is disabled by a fire in this zone. o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shut'down is accomplished by CRD scram manually initiated from the Control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided at high pressure by the RCIC System operated from the
. Control Room. Level indication is by LT-2-3-70.
Overpressure protection is provided by the SRVs self-actuating. Reactor vessel pressure indication is by PT-6-53B.
pecay heat removal is provided at high pressure by the RCIC and SRVs. ADS valves are used to cooldewn within 72 hours. RHR/RHRSW/SW cool the torus. When depressurized sufficiently, NHR is placed in the SDC mode. Torus level is provided by ~ LT-16-19-10C. Torus temperature is provided by TE-16-19-33C. CST level is provided by LT- 10 7-S A. l Auxiliaries - RRUs to cool RHR and RHRSW Pump Rooms are available'if needed. Power is supplied by Diesel A and Division II. The diesel is operated from the Diesel Room in Alternate Shutdown mode because a few control circuits for both diesels pass through this zone. Alternate Shutdown mode isolates these circuits. o Deficiencies This zone at Elevation 232' is not separated or protected sufficiently from adjacent zones. Division II torus level and temperature cables are routed in conduit through the separation zone and into this zone. Suppression is not provided in the torus area, o Corrective Actions Modifications - Construct separation zones as described for Zone RB-1. Wrap LT-16-19-10C and TE-16-19-33C conduit with three-hour barrier within this zone and the separation zone. Exemptions - An exemption request from the requirement of detection and suppression has been filed (Table S-3, Item 4) for the corner rooms at Elevations 213' and 232' In addit ion, an exemption request from the requirements of suppression has been filed (Table S-3, Item 1) for the torus area. o Conclusion If a fire occurs in Zone RB-2, the plant can achieve safe shutdown conditions required; however, the modifications and the exemption request described above are necessary to ensure Appendix R compliance
~46-l l
s 4.2.1.4 Zone RB-3. Figures 3-4 3-8, and 3 This zone is the north side of the Reactor r Building Elevation 252', the ground floor. It contains Division II ADS, RHR controls and instruments, and Division I HPCI and valve cables. Division II RCIC and Division I RHR/RHRSW will be used for shutdown. o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by CRD scram manually initiated from the control hoom. Coolant inventory makeup is provided at high pressure by the RCIC System operated from the alternate shutdown panel. RCIC control cables run in the zone adjacent to the separation zone, but they are isolated by the alternate shutdown panel controls. Reactor vessel level is indicated by LT-2-3-61. Overpressure protection is provided by SRV's self-actuating. Reactor vessel pressure indication is by PT-6-53A. Decay heat removal is provided by the RCIC and SRVs at high pressure. An SRV will be repaired as provided in the Alternate Shutdown System design to achieve cooldown within the required 72 hours. When sufficiently depressurized, the RHR is put in the SDC mode. This zone contains control cables, power cables for valves, MCCs, and several valves required for Division II RHR and RHR Service Water operation. The function of the Division I cables located in this zone are: (1) Valve V10-18 control, (2) Control cable for UPS-1B, inverter, (3) Valve V70-19A control and power cables, and (4) Valve V70-19B control and power cables. The above items are addressed in the following manner: (1) Valve V10-18 is one of the RHR Shutdown Cooling suction valves. Since this valve is not required until shutdown cooling (SDC) is initiated and only a control circuit is involved, it will be possible to enter the Reactor Building
s 5 following the fire and open this valve - by manually closing the motor starter contacts. It should be noted that a newly installed isolation switch located outside the Reactor Building will j prevent spurious operation of this valve for this Reactor Building fire. Safe shutdown can otherwise be maintained by the operation of RHR in the SPC mode. (2) The UPS 1-B inverter is not required. An alternate feed from MCC 8B is installed. (3) Valve V70-19A and B isolate the service water header from the service water loads in the Turbine Building. This action is not required for a fire in the Reactor Building since sufficient service water pumps will be available to provide all Turbine Building and safe shutdown cooling loads. Torus level is indicated by LT-16-19-10B. Torus temperature is indicated by TE-16-19-33A. CST level is provided by LT-107-5A. Auxiliaries - RRUs are available for RHR/RHRSW Pump Room cooling if required. Power is supplied by Diesel B, operated from the Control Room. Some Diesel A and B control circuits pass within the northwest separation zone, but the detection and suppression will protect them. If necessary, Diesel A can be operated from within its room in Alternate Shutdown mode, bypassing these circuits. Buses 3 and 4 can be cross connected by using key locked, interlock bypasses. o Deficiencies This zone is not sufficiently separated from the adjacent zones, nor sufficiently protected by suppression and detection. o Corrective Actions Modifications - A separction zone will be created on the east side petween MCC 89A and 89B by providing fire barriers in cable trays crossing through the zone. A radiant heat shield has been installed between the MCCs. l
/ The separation zone that exists in the northwest corner has been extended further by adding additional sprinkler heads, so that coverage extends to the steam tunnel shield wall and above the cable trays. s Exemptions - Exemption requests have been filed to exempt this zone from the requirements for separation, detection, and
^
suppression based on equivalent protection (Table 5-3, Items 5 and 6). o Conclusion If a fire occurs in zone RB-3, the plant can achieve safe shutdown conditions required; however, the modifications and exemption requests described above are necessary to ensure Appendix R compliance. 4.2.1.5 Zone RB-4, Figures 3-4, 3-8, and 3-12 This zone is the south side of the Reactor Building Elevation 252' (ground floor). It contains Division I equipment, RCIC cables for the steam line inboard and outboard valves, and the MCC for the steam linc poard valve. If disabled by a fire, Division II SRV's and Core Spray and RHR/RHRSW on the north side would be used for safe shutdown. o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by CRD scram, manually initiated from the Control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided by Core Spray pump A after depressurization by SRV valves; all operated from the Control Room. Reactor vessel level is indicated by LT-2-3-70. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating until depressurization by manual operation. Reactor vessel pressure is indicated by PT-6-53B. Decay heat removal is via RHR/RHRSW in SPC mode, until a decision is made to shift to SDC mode. Torus IcVel is indicated by LT-16-19-10C. Torus temperature is indicated by TE-16-19-33C. CST level is indicated by LT-10 7- 5 A . l
Auxiliaries - RRUs are available for cooling RHR/RHRSW Pump Rooms if required. The MCC starters must be operated manually by special procedure, as the RRUs 5 and 7 control circuits run throuSh this zone. Power is supplied by Diesel A, operated from the Diesel Room in Alternate Shutdown mode. This bypasses some control circuits that pass through Zone RB-4. o Deficiencies This zone is not sufficiently separated from Zone RB-3. Suppression and detection does not exist in the zone. Room coolers RRU 5 and 7 control circuits cross the separation zone into this zone. o Corrective Actions Modifications - The modifications for the separation zones between Zones RB-3 and RB-4 apply to this zone. (See Zone RB-3.) A change to fire protection procedures will be made to provide for enhancin5 room ventilation if RRus 5 and 7 are disabled. Exemptions - (See Zone RB-3). o Conclusion If a fire occurs in Zone RB-4, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved; however, the modifications and the exemption requests described above are necessary to ensure Appendix R compliance. 4.2.1.6 Zone RB-5. Figures 3-5. 3-9, and 3-13 This zone is the north side of the Elevation 280' floor of the Reactor Building. It contains Division II electrical equipment. If a fire occurs in this zone, HPCI and RHR/RHRSW Division I will be used for safe shutdown. o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by CRD scram manually initiated from the Control Room. A fire in this zone might cause a scram if it affected the RPS or ECCS instrument racks.
d Coolant inventory makeup is provided by HPCl operated from the Control Room. Vessel level is indicated by LT 3-61. - Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating. Reactor vessel pressure is - indicated by PT-6-53A. Decay heat removal is provided by RHR/RHRSW Division I in SPC mode. Two Division I cables.could be damaged by a fire in this zone. The function of the Division I cables routed through this fire zone are: (1) Control cable which operates the UPS-(IB) inverter from the Control Building; (2) V10-18 (RHR shutdown cooling suction valve) control cable routed between the MCC and the alternative shutdown panel located in this fire zone. Also the control cable routed between the alternate shutdown panel and the Control Room. The above items are addressed in the following manner: (1) The UPS inverter is not required. The maintenance tie to MCC 89B from MCC 8B will be used. (2) The design of the control circuits also includes an isolation switch outside the Reactor Building in the north hallway, Area 13. This switch is normally open such that the control circuit from the MCC in Zone 6 to the Alternate Shutdown RHR Panel CP82-2 in Zone 5 is de-energized. Thus, a fire in Zone RB-5 cannot cause a " hot short" causing V10-18 to open. Torus level is indicated by LT-16-19-10C. Torus temperature is indicated by TE-16-19-33A. CST level is indicated by LT-107-5A. Auxiliaries - RRU's for RHR/RHRSW Pump Room cooling are available if needed.
o Deficiencies The east side of this zone is not sufficiently separated from the adjacent Zone s RB-6. Suppression and detection do not exist in the
, zone (east or west).
... o Corrective Actions Modifications - Fire separation zones will be created by installing fire barriers in cable trays where they cross the separation zones on the east and west sides of the floor.
Exemptions - An exemption request from the requirements for detection and suppression has been filed for the west side of the zone based upon equivalent protection (Table 5-3, Item 8). An exemption request from the requirements for separation, suppression, and detection has been filed for the east side of this zone (Table 5-3. Item 7). o conclusion If a fire occurs in Zone RB-5, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved; however, the modifications and the exemption request described above are necessary to ensure Appendix R compliance. 4.2.1.7 Zone RB-6. Figures 3-5. 3-9, and 3-13 This zone is the south side of the Reactor Building floor at Elevation 280'. It contains Division I equipment. If a fire occurs in this zone, RCIC operated from the Control Room and RHR/RHRSW Division II will be used for safe shutdown. o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by CRD scram manually initiated from the Control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC System. Vessel level is indicated by LT-2-3-70.
overpressure protection - is provided by SRV's self-actuating. Vessel pressure is indicated by PT- 6-53P. Decay heat removal is provided by Division 11 RHR/RHRSW in SPC mode. When ready to B cooldown SRV's (Division 11) are actuated from the Control Room. Core Spray Pump B is l run circulating water through an SRV. This method might be necessary if the power cable ' to V10-18 was damaged by the fire in Zone RB-6, such that it could not be repaired. V10-18 is inside the containment which is inerted, so it is preferable to not have to make repairs to equipment for de-inerting the containment and then enter the containment to take actions to achieve cooldown within 72 hours. V-10-18 is a high pressure - low pressure interface valve. If it were to be opened by a " hot short", no problem arises, as there is another valve, V-10-17 in series. All of V-10-17's power and control circuits are outside this zone. Torus level is indicated by LT-16-19-10C. Torus temperature is indicated by TE-16-19-33C. CST level is indicated by LT-107-5A. Auxiliaries - RRUs are available for RHR/RHRSW Pump Room cooling if required. o Deficiencies This zone (east side) is not sufficiently separated from adjacent Zone RB-5. Detection and suppression is not provided throughout the zone (east or west). o Corrective Actions Modifications - Fire separation zones created under Zone RB-5 apply to this zone. Exemptions - An exemption request has been filed for exemption from the requirements for detection and suppression for the west side of this zone based on equivalent protection (Table 5-3, Item 8). An exemption request from the requirements for separation, detection, and suppression has been filed for the east side of this zone (Table 5-3, Item 7).
-. ~ -_ _
k d o Conclusion t If a fire occurs in Zone RB-6, safe shutdowr. conditions will be able to be achieved; / however, the modifications and the exemption request described above are necessary to ensure Appendix R compliance. I f ( 4.2.1.8 Zone RB-7. Figure 3.13 This zone is the entire upper part of the Reactor Building from Elevation 303' up, i.e., the second, third, and fourth floors. This zone contains the Division I and II 24 volt de batteries on Elevation 303' (i.e., the second floor). There is ( no other safe shutdown equipment on the other floors. o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by CRD manual scram from the Control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC System operated from the Control Room. Vessel level indication is by LT-2-3-70. Overpressure protection is provided by the SRVs self-ac'tuating. Vessel pressure indication is by PT-6-53A. Decay heat removal is provided by the RHR/RHRSW/SW Systems in SPC mode. When rdady to cool down, SRV valves would be opened. RHR would be shifted to the SDC mode. Torus level indication is by LT-16-19-10A. Torus temperature indication is by TE-16-19-33C. CST level indication is by LT-107-5A. If a fire occurs in this zone, both 24 volt I batteries might be disabled. This would affect low pressure interlocks in the core spray and RHR valve circuits. The low pressure interlocks affect only RHR valves ! needed for cold shutdown. There is sufficient time to " repair" these circuits by bypassing them, or operate the valves manually. Therefore, loss of these batteries is not a problem. Auxiliaries - RRUs are available for Pump Room cooling if required. _ _ . -- . _ _ __ _ _ ~ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . -
o Deficiencies - None s o Corrective Actions - Modifications - None. - Exemptions - None o Conclusion If a fire occurs in Zone RB-7, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved. 4.3 control Room Cable Vault. SwitchRear Rooms, and Battery Room (Fire Areas 1. 2. 3. 4 and 5) The original Fire Hazards Survey recommended additional protection in these areas because they contain all power and control for the plant. These fire areas (1 through 5) are discussed here as a group because the requirements of Appendix R for these areas were addressed in total by our June 16, 1982, March 23, 1983, and May 18, 1984 submittals to the NRC [ Reference (p), (q), (r), (s)]. NRC's subsequent Safety Evaluation Report, which provided a descriptien of the Alternate shutdown System and which concluded that the modifications proposed met Appendix R requirements with respect to the Control Room, Cable Vault, and the Switchgear Room, is quoted in significant part below in Section 4.3.1. 4.3.1 The following description of the Alternate Shutdown System is quoted from the Safety Evaluation Report. [ Reference d].
" SYSTEMS USED FOR POST-FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN A. Systems Required for Safe Shutdown Safe shutdown is initiated from the Control Room by a manual scram of the control rods. In order to maintain reactor coolant inventory, the RCIC System will be used to provide makeup water. For hot shutdown, decay heat removal will be accomplished by the RCIC and RHR Systems '.n conjunction with the safety relief valves. A number of other systems including HPCI, core spray, and LPCI (in conjunction with ADS valve operation) can be used for shutdown. For suppression pool cooling, the RHR System will also be used with Service Water Systems to provide cooling. For cold shutdown, the RHR System will be used in the shutdown cooling mode.
u ? The above systems will be monitored and ' controlled from the Control Room or RCIC control panel. The power sources for / operations of the above systens will be L provided by the emergency diesel generators and 125 V battery sources. I B. Areas Where Alternative Safe Shutdown is 1 Proposed T!.e NRC staff, in its fire protection SER, f requested that the Licensee provide l alternative shutdown capability for the Switchgear Room, Cable Spreading Room, and Control Room. By letter dated July 31, f 1982, the Licensee stated that alternative shutdown capability would be provided for the Control Room, Switchgear Room, and Cable Spreading Room by the use of an RCIC control panel located in the RCIC Room. C. Section III.G.2 of Appendix R Since the Licensee has proposed alternative shutdown capability for only the Control Room, Cable Spreading Room, and Switchgear Room, we are assuming that all other areas of the plant comply with the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R. These areas will be subject to a regional inspection to verify the compliance with Section III.G.2. D. Alternate Safe Shutdown System The alternate shutdown capability will be augmented by the addition of a new RCIC control panel and a power supply. The RCIC panel will be located in the RCIC Room with the necessary controls and instrumentation to allow prompt operation of the system. A l separate DC supply independent of the fire I areas will be provided for the RCIC control panel and the associated equipment. The RCIC panel and any circuit which could be affected by the fire will be isolated from the Cable Spreading Room, Switchgear Room, and Control Room. The design philosophy used will be to use transfer and isolation switches and controls which disconnect all equipment and wiring for operation of the alternate shutdown method in the affected fire area, so their damage will not affect the operation of necessary equipment. In the event of fire in the RCIC Room, only the RCIC control panel will be lost. The power source for the RCIC System is steam from the reactor itself. The control power source for the new RCIC control panel and associated equipment will be from a s battery located remote to (SIC) the Control Room, Cable Spreading Room, and the Switchgear Room. The power source for the RHR, RHR Service Water, and Service Water Systems will be emergency diesel generators. The switchgear powered by the diesels, w'.ll be in separate rooms, divided by a one-hour fire barrier and protected by fire detection and suppression systems. EVALUATION A. performance Coals For post-fire shutdown, the performance goals of the alternative safe shutdown capability will be met using the existing systems and equipment discussed in Section A, above. Reactivity control will be provided by a manual scram of the control rods from the Control Room. The reactor coolant makeup will be provided by the RCIC System. This performance goal will be accomplished by the installation of a new RCIC control panel with its own de power supply. The RCIC pump will be provided with a governor which is controllable from the RCIC control panel and which is isolated from the Control daom, Cable Spreading Room, and the Switchgear Room. Decay heat removal will be accomplished by RCIC System, safety relief valves and the RHR System. Suppression pool cooling will be provided by the RHR System and the Service Water System. For cold shutdown, the RHR is the shutdown cooling mode that will be utilized for decay heat removal. The process monitoring instruments to be used for a post fire shutdown includes reactor water level, reactor pressure, suppression pool temperature, and level. The available support systems for the post-fire safe shutdown are a diesel generator and 4160 V and 480 V and 125 de buses. I j
B. 72-Hour Requirement The alternative shutdown systems have the capability of achieving cold shutdown-within 72 hours. The alternate shutdown systems can accomplish cold shutdown using only on-site power sources. C. Repairs i The Licensee has stated that no repairs are planned in order to achieve cold shutdown conditions. (Note: Design has subsequently been modified so that repairs are needed.) D. Associated Circuits By letter dated June 16, 1982, the Licensee provided the results of their associated circuit review for the alternate shutdown systers. The results identified the associated circuits of concern in these areas and the proposed methods for protecting the safe shutdown capability from fire-induced failures of these circuits. The Licensee has taken a systems approach in the evaluation of these circuits. The proposed methods for the safe shutdown capability are discussed below:
- 1. Power Source Case - For hot shutdown, the alternative shutdown system (the RCIC control panel) is provided with a separate DC supply. All power circuits which share a common power supply with the shutdown system have
' coordinated breakers or fuses.
- 2. Spurious signal cases - The Licensee's analysis identified a number of l circuits whose fire-induced failures
- may adversely affect the safe shutdown capability. The desi5n of the l
Alternative Shutdown System provides local control stations to provide isolation and control of these i circuits. The isolation of these circuits prevents spurious operations or maloperation that would adversely l affect the safe shutdown capability. r. The Licensee's analysis identified a high/ low pressure interface where fire-induced operation of the redundant electrically controlled s valves could potentially result in a LOCA. (RHR shutdown cooling valves.) The Licensee has committed to provide an isolation switch for one of the electrically controlled valves. This switch will be normally open such that the control circuit for the valve will be inoperable. Thus, a fire-induced spurious signal will not result in a LOCA.
- 3. Common Enclosure Case - The Licensee stated during a phone conversation on August 12, 1982, that the analysis of associated circuits identified no circuits which were not electrically protected and shared a common enclosure with the safe shutdown system circuits. The shutdown system circuits located in the Control Room panels are electrically protected by isolation switches at the RCIC control panel.
E. Safe Shutdown procedures and Manpower The Licensee will develop and implement written procedures for obtaining a safe shutdown condition given a fire event. This commitment is documented in a Licensee's letter dated June 6, 1982. The Licensee also has stated that the manpower necessary for safe shutdown from either the Control Room or the Emergency Control Station is available. No fire brigade members are included in the shutdown manpower requirements. CONCLUSION Based on our review, we conclude that the proposed modification for Vermont Yankee's design meets the requirements of Appendix R to CFR Part 50, Section III.G.3 and III.L with respect to safe shutdown in the event of a fire in the Control Room, Cable Spreading room, and the Switchgear Room." 4.3.2 Findings of the Safe Shutdown Systems Separation Analysis The Alternate Shutdown System was installed and declared operational at the end of the 1984 refueling outage.
(1) The power feeds to nonvital 4 kV buses 1 and 2 from the startup transformers are separated from each other by virtue of being run in separate conduits. The conduits are embedded in the floors of the rooms and run underground to the transformers outdoors. Therefore, they are separated from each other so that fire damage to both at the same time is precluded. Circuit breakers are provided in the 115 kV yard, en the high voltage side of the startup transformer, and on the low voltage side on the 4 kV buses. A fault on the 4 kV cable from the startup transformer to either switchgear must be isolated by the 115 kV breaker. This will de-energize the feed to the other switchgear also. Therefore, a fire in one nonvital 4 kV bus, in the breaker compartment for the startup transformer feed, could cause a fault that would disable off-site power. In this situation, the diesel supplying the vital switchgear in the opposite room would be the only power source, as the fire must be assumed to disable everything in one area. (2) Circuits that use the same power supply as the Alternate Shutdown system circuits are listed in Table 1 of the June 16, 1982 submittal. The protection means are listed. The Breaker Coordination Study, done for the Alternate Shutdown System design, was reviewed. The recommendations of the study were implemented. o Safe Shutdown Systems - See above discussion. o Deficiencies - None. o Corrective Actions - None. o Conclusion - If a fire occurs in the Control Room, Cable Vault, or West Switchgear Room, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved by the Alternate Shutdown System. If a fire occurs in the East Switchgear Room, HPCI is operated from the Control Room to achieve safe shutdown conditions. 4.4 Turbine Lube Oil Rooms - Fire Area 6 Note: In the discussion of this and all following areas, no instruments will be listed. All parameters of concern are indicated by multiple channels in the Control Room. These rooms are a separate fire area, as described in Section 3. Detection and suppression is provided.
o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by manual scram from the Control Room, s Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC or HPCI System operated from the Control Room. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating. Decay heat removal is provided by RHR/RHRSW/SW in SPC mode. When ready to cool down, ADS valves are used, if RCIC is in operation. If HPCI is in operation, the test line to the CST is used to increase the amount of steam drawn by the turbine. This cools down the reactor. When depressurized, RHR is switched to SDC mode. o Deficiencies - None. o Corrective Actions - None. o Conclusion - If a fire occurs in the Turbine Lube oil Rooms, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved. 4.5 Turbine Building - Fire Area 7 The Turbine Building is a separate area as described in Section 3. Detection and Suppression is provided in certain sections of the building where hazards exist. o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by manual scram from the Control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC or HPCI System operated from the Control Room. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating. Decay heat removal is provided by RHR/RHRSW/SW in SPC mode when ready to cool down. ADS valves are used, if RCIC is in operation. If HPCI is in operation, the test line to the CST is used to increase the amount of steam drawn by the turbine. This cools down the reactor. When depressurized, RHR is switched to SDC mode. The control circuits for the fan motors for room coolers RRU 5, 6, 7, and 8 in the Reactor Building corner rooms, enter the Turbine Building and go to control switches on the HVAC panel. Fire damage to these circuits could prevent cooler operation and ultimately lead to overheating of RHR, RHRSW, and core spray pump motors. If this occurs, the RHR Pump Room door to
the torus area will be opened, creating a natural circulation ventilation path for the motors. / Control circuits for each Diesel Room's fan run together in the ( Turbine Building to the HVAC panel. A fire could damage both control circuits, preventing the fans from running which might , ultimately lead to the diesels overheating. The MCC for each l fan is in the room with the diesel it serves. If this occurs, f Diesel Room doors will be opened, after the fire is out. Engine operation with room doors open and the room ventilation fan out of service has been successfully demonstrated. Level switch circuits for both diesel oil day tanks run together in the Turbine Building. A fire could disable both circuits. insis could prevent either electric fuel oil pump from automatically making up oil to its day tank. The diesels would then run out of fuel oil after 16 hours. There would then be no power for decay heat removal equipment. The level switch circuits from a day tank connect to the controller for that engine's fuel oil pump. The MCC for the pump motor is in the room with the diesel served. If this occurs, the fuel oil transfer pumps can be run by manual operation of the MCC contactors. o Deficiencies Room coolers RUU 5, 6, 7 and 8 control circuits are together
- in this area and could be damaged by fire. Diesel Room ventilation fan control circuits are together in this area and could be damaged by fire. Diesel fuel oil transfer pump control circuits are together in this area and could be damaged by fire.
o Corrective Actions Modifications - Special operating procedures will be prepared for the three situations described above. Exemptions - None. o conclusion - If a fire occurs in the Turbine Building, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved; however, the modifications described above (special operating procedures) are necessary to j ensure safe shutdown and meet Appendix R compliance. 4.6 Diesel Cenerator Set Rooms - Fire Areas 8 and 9 [ Each Diesel Room is a separate area as described in Section 3. Detection and Suppression is provided. 1 e l o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by manual scram from the Control Room. 4 i i l 1
Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC or HPCI System operated from the Control Room. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating. s Decay Heat Removal is provided by RHR/RHRSW/SW in SPC mode when I ready to cool down. ADS valves are used, if RCIC is in operation. If HPCI is in operation, the test line to the CST is used to increase the amount of steam drawn by the turbine. This cools down the reactor. When depressurized, RHR is switched to SDC mode, o Deficiencies - None. o Corrective Actions - None. o Conclusion - If a fire occurs in either Diesel Generator Room, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved. 4.7 Diesel Oil Day Tank Rooms - Fire Areas 10 and 11 Each Diesel Oil Day Tank Room is a separate fire area, as described in Section 3. Detection is provided. Doors are kept locked. o Functions and Problems Reactor shutdown is accomplished by manual scram from the Control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC or HPCI System operated from the Control Room. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating. Decay heat removal is provided by RHR/RHRSW/SW in SPC mode when ready to cool down. ADS valves are used, if RCIC is in operation. If HPCI is in operation, the test line to the CST is used to increase the amount of steam drawn by the turbine. This cools down the reactor. When depressurized, RHR is switched to SDC mode, o Deficiencies - None. o Corrective Actions - None. o Conclusion - If a fire occurs in either Diesel Oil Day Tank Room, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved. 4.8 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Buildinn - Fire Area 12 The Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Building is a separate area, as described in Section 3. Detection is provided.
o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by manual scram from the Control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC or HPCI System operated from the Control Room. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating. Decay heat removal is provided by RHR/RHRSW/SW in SPC mode when ready to cool down. ADS valves are used, if RCIC is in operation. If HPCI is in operation, the test line to the CST is used to increase the amount of steam drawn by the turbine. This cools down the reactor. When depressurized, RHR is switched to SDC mode. The two fuel oil transfer pumps transfer fuel oil from the large storage tank to the engine day tanks. Without makeup fuel oil the engines will run out of oil in 16 hours. A fire in this building could disable both pumps. However, due to the remote location of the building, the lack of combustible material, the detection, the absence of ignition sources, the fact that the building is kept locked, and because maintenance and housekeeping do not allow accumulation of leaking fuel oil, the probability of a fire is very low. If both pumps were damaged in a fire, a tank track can be brought in to replenish the day tanks. o Deficiencies Fuel oil transfer pumps are not sufficiently separated from each other. Automatic suppression does not exist. o Corrective Actions Modifications - None. Exemptions - An exemption from the requirements for separation and suppression has been requested based on the low probability of fire, existing detection, the ability to add fuel oil to the day tanks directly from a tank truck and equivalent protection (Table 5-3, Item 10). o Conclusion If a fire occurs in the Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps Building, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved; however, the exemption request described above is necessary to meet Appendix R compliance.
4.9 Radwaste BuildinR/ Turbine Building. Hallway - Firm Arm, 13 This area is a corridor which connects the Turbine Building and Radwaste Building and is adjacent to the north wall of the Reactor Building. o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by manual scram from the control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC or HPCI System operated from the Control Room. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating. Decay heat removal is provided by RRR/RHRSW/SW in SPC mode when ready to cool down. ADS valves are used, if RCIC is in operation. If HPCI is in operation, the test line to the CST is used to increase the amount of steam drawn by the turbine. This cools down the reactor. When depressurized, RHR is switched to shutdown cooling mode. o Deficiencies - Power cables to MCC 8B and 9B were not sufficiently protected. For a fire in the hallway leading to the Radwaste Building, RHR and RHRSW Systems in the Reactor Building would be used for decay heat removal. Motor-operated valves and RRUs in the RHR and RHRSW Sys' i are powered from MCC 8B and 9B in the Reactor Building. ne 480 volt power feeds to these MCCs run in conduit, tt .2gh the hallway ceiling area. A fire could damage both feer' thereby preventing power operation of some motor-operated v- , 9. The valves are manually operable. o Corrective Actions Modifications - Conduits for MCC 8B and 9B power cables have been wrapped with one hour fire barriers. Exemptions - An exemption from the requirements of separation, detection, and suppression has been previously requested from the requirement for suppression and detection, based on the low probability of a fire (Table 5-3. Item 9). o conclusion - If a fire occurs in the Turbine Building, Radwaste Building hallway, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved; however, the modifications and the exemption request described above are necessary to ensure safe shutdown and meet Appendix R compliance.
1 4.10 Intake Structure - Fire Areas 14 and 15 l The Intake structure is a separate building, divided into two areas, as described in Section 3. Detection and suppression is t i provided over the diesel fire pump, detection over the Service Water Pumps, and nothing is provided over the Circulating Water Pumps, o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by manual scram from the control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC or HPCI System operated from the Control Room. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating. Decav heat removal is provided by RHR/RHRSW/SW in SPC mode when ready to cool down. ADS valves are used, if RCIC is in operation. If HPCI is in operation, the test line to the CST is used to increase the amount of steam drawn by the turbine. This cools down the reactor. When depressurized, RHR is switched to SDC mode. If a fire damaged the Circulating Water Pumps, there would be no affect on decay heat removal capability because Service Water Pumps are used. There are no decay heat removal circuits that run into the Circulating Water Pumps Room, nor are there any associated circuits. If a fire damaged Service Water Pumps, then RHR Service Water Pumps in the Alternate Cooling Mode, using the west cooling tower north cell as the ultimate heat sink would be used. This mode of operation is described in detail in the Final Safety Analysis Report. o Deficiencies - None. o Corrective Actions - None. o Conclusion - If a fire occurs in the Intake Structure, in either room, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved. 4.11 West Cooling Tower. North Cell - Fire Area 16 5 This cell is on the north end of the west cooling tower, outdoors, south of the plant as described in Section 3. o Safe Shutdown Functions f Reactor shutdown is accomplished by manual scram from the j Control Room. 4 1 L
Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC or HPCI System operated from the Control Room. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating. Decay heat removal is provided by RHR/RHRSW/SW in SPC mode when ready to cool down. ADS valves are used, if RCIC is in - operation. If HPCI is in operation, the test line to the CST is used to increase the amount of steam drawn by the turbine. This cools down the reactor. When depressurized, RHR is switched to SDC mode, o Deficiencies - None, o Corrective actions - None. o conclusion - If a fire occurs in the west cooling tower, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved. 4.12 Condensate Storate Tank Valve and Instrument Enclosure Area - Fire Area 17 This area is outdoors adjacent to the tank, south of the Reactor Building as described in Section 3. o Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor shutdown is accomplished by manual scram from the Control Room. Coolant inventory makeup is provided by the RCIC or HPCI System operated from the Control Room. Overpressure protection is provided by SRVs self-actuating. Decay heat removal is provided by RHR/RHRSW/SW in SPC mode when ready to cool down. ADS valves are used, if RCIC is in operation. If HPCI is in operation, the test line to the CST is used to increase the amount of steam drawn by the turbine. This cools down the reactor. When depressurized, RHR is switched to SDC mode. o Deficiencies - The two sets of CST level instruments are not sufficiently separated. No detection or suppression exists. o Corrective Actions Modifications - None. Exemptions - An exemption has been requested from requirements for separation, detection, and suppression based on the very low probability of a fire in this area and the absence of impact on safe shutdown capability (Table 5-3, Item 11).
l I i [ o Conclusion - If a fire occurs in the CST valve and instruments I enclosure, safe shutdown conditions can be achieved; however, l' the exemption request described above is necessary to meet Appendix R compliance.
~
TABL.E 4-1 SAFR SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Hot Shutdown Instrument Locations Rx Level Fir, Area / Zone Equipment Torus Level RX Press Decay Heat
'Jumb r Un=c Lost CST Level Torus Temp H.P. Makeup Dump (Division)
I (CIC MW Cornce RCIC LT- 3 -61 PT-6-53A IfPCI HPCI Elev. 213 LT-16-19-10B TE-16-19-33A (I) SRVs, Torus RCIC Recm LT-107-5A RHR/RHRSW/SW(I) B-1 tJw corner t4one LT-2-3-61 PT-6-53A RCIC in Alt. SRVs, Torus I Elev. 232 LT 16 103 TE-16-19-33A S/D Mode RHR/RHROW/L".l(I) LT-107-5A t NE Corner RifR/ LT-2-3-61 PT-6-53A RCIC in Alt. SRVs, Torus i ' Rooms FHNSW LT-16-19-10B TE-16-19-33A S/D Mode- RHR/RHRSW/SW(I) (Elev. & CS LT-107 -S A (I) 213, 232) in Room (II) Torus Arca RHR/CS/RHROW LT-2-3-61 PT-6-53A RCIC in Alt. SRVs. Torus 5 Earth Divinion IT LT-16-19-10n TE-16-19-33A S/D Modo RHR/RHRSW/SW(T) LT-10'/-SA
-2 Elev. 232 SU CHD LT 3 -70 PT-6-53B RCIC SRV3, Torus E Corner Pumps, LT-16-19-10C TE-16-19-33C RHR/RifRSW/SW(II)
Diesel LT-107-5A Controls
=
S R Co rn e r- RHR/ LT-2-3-70 PT--6 -5 3 A RCIC SRVs. Torus @ Fooms RHRSW LT-16-19-10C TE-16-19-33C (' RHR/RHRSW/SW(II) (Elev. & CS LT-107-5A 213.232) in Ecum Torus 20!H, LT-2-3-10 PT-G-53D RCIC SRV3, Torus Area RHRSW & LT-16-19-10C TE-16-19-33C ( South RHR/RHRSW/SW(II) CS Cable LT-107-5A Division I
-n -68a-
SAFE SHUTDOWN EOUIPMENT i l Operator + Location (s) (Emergency l Associated Cold Shutdown Barrier & Lighting Circuits Nest Hemoval Suppression Remarks /Procedura ~ _ Req.) Concerns Exemptions Restri.ctions ; i P l >N3</RHRSW/SW(I) Fated Control Room 'mone Stairvall Walls Enclosure, a n <1 supp ras <t ion l DIR/RHR/SW(I) Walls RCIC Room Rit:1. RIIRSW. Por Separation
.Delection Corn S,oray Suppression Power
$IRfRHRSW/UW(I) Detection RCIC Room !!cno For ac thion, Walls Det ac' .on , and Sul .ession IfR/RHRSW/SW(I) Separation . RCIC Room HHR/RHRSW/SW For Zones Core Spray separation RR/RHRSW/SW(II) Walls Control Room Diesel For Separation Use Diesel A Diesel A Room Controls' in alternate shutdown mode I (R/RHRSW/SW Detection Control Room None For Separat. ion. [I) Walls Detection, and Suppression _ - . . . ~ - _ . . - . . _. - - - . - l lRfPJ!RSW/SW Separation Control Room Dtvicion II For Separation lI) Zones Equipment circuits 1 fu. Also Available On I i TI l Aperture cara APERTURN - hhfh
~
CARD
TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd) SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Hot Shutdown Instrument Locations Rx Level EreArea/ Zone Equipment Torus Level RK Press Decay Heat Cc bber Name Lost- CST Level Torus Temp H.P. Makeup Dump (Division). Hj i HFCI.Hoom HPCI LT-2-3-70 PT-6-538 RCIC- SRVs, Torus Rh LT-16-19-33C TE-16-19-3'C RHR/RHRSW/SW(II) LT-107-5A 3 Elev. 252 None LT-2-3-61 PT-6-53A RCIC Alt. SRVs. Torus Ril NW LT-16-19-10B TE-16-19-33A S/D Mode RHR/RHRSW/SW LT-107-5A Torus (I) Elev. 25? DS LT-2-3-61 PT-6-53A RCIC Alt. SRVs Torus RF NE MCC 8 & 9D, LT-16-19-10B TE-16-19-33A S/D Mode RHR/RHESW/S*J(I) S9A LT-107-5A . 4 Elev. 252 RCIC LT-2-3-10 PT-6-53B ADS / Core SRVs Torus RH South Vnivo 23-15 LT-16-19-10C TE-16-19-33C Spray (II) RHR/RHRSW/SW(II) Co Valve 10-18 LT-107-5A
~
CRD MSIV &' LT-2-3-70 PT-6-53B ADS / Core SRVs, Torus dH R: pair Room RCIC Circuits LT-16-19-10C TE-16-19-33C Spray (II) RHR/RHRSW/SW(II) 02 tv LT-107-5A Containment V-10-16 power Steam MSIV,HPCI LT-2-3-70 PT-6-53B ADS / Core SRVs Torus itK Tunnel RCIC Steam - LT-16-19-10 C TE-16-19-33C Spray (II) RHR/RHRSW/SW(II) line & LT-107-5A Feed valves RWCU retu n F
~.,
~68c-
=
\
sa. --a i SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMEFT (Cont'd) Operator < Location (s) l (Emergency Associated Id Shutdown Barrier & Lighting Circuits Remarks / Procedural i 't Remov-1 e Suppression Rec.) concerns Exemptions Restrictions i R/RHRSW/SW(II) Walls and Door Control None None Room f R/RHRSW/SW(I) Suppression RCIC Room RSIC-TE's. For Suppression Above and Diesel A Room HPCI Below Trays Diesel Detection Controls Wall of Steam Tunnel, Containment Shield Wall R/RHRSW/SW(I) Radiant Heat RCIC Room Division II For Separation, Shield. Single Diesel A Room Detection, and Line of Suppression Sprinkler Heads, Detection. URHRSW/SW(II) Separation Control Room RRU 5 and 7 For Separation Special procedure LJ Specy Zones Diesel A Room control Zone for cooling with circuits RRU S and 7 lost. Diesel Use flow out SRV Controls (held open) for cooling. t/RHRSW/SW(II) Walls Control Room Division I For Separation Use flow out
- Sprcy Diesel A Room Equipment Zone SRV (held open) for coolin5 t/RHRSW/SW(II) Walls Control Room HSIVs, RCIC, r Diesel A Room HPCI Valves. Also Available On RWCU return Aperture Card APERTURE
(/LIII) . .t
-68d- [ ~'
TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd) SAFE SHUTDO'.o! CAPABILITY Hot Shutdown Instrument Locations Rx Level ire Area / Zone Equipment Torus Level RX Press Decay Heat CC Zber Hame Ln s t. CST Level Toruc Temp H.P. Makeup Dump (Division) g; D.HR Valva V-10-17 LT 2-3-70 PT-6-53B ADS / Core SRVs, Toru: _.
. nr j Room V-10-27 A,B LT-16-19-100 TE-16-19-33C Spray (II) RHR/RHRSW/SWUJ 252 East by V-10-25 A Es LT-107-5A Primary V-13-15 0 , Containment HCC 89D Entrance nd xtev. 280 N HCC 6A 4 f .? 3 - 61 PI-6-53A HPCI CnV Teru: ! ..
4H LT-16-19-1GC TE-16-19-33A (I) IUtM / ttu t" '.di f.E f I'is t rumen t LT-107-5A (I) Mackc i I 1' , SRVe Tutu > lf
-6 Elev. 280 S HCC TA HH LT-2-3-70 PT-6-53B uclu g LT-10-19-10 C TR-16-19-33C (II)
RHR/RHRSW/SW l~m LT-107-5A (111 Instrument Knckc I
-7 Elev. 303 24 Volt de LT-2-3-70 PT-6-53A RCIC RHR/RHRSW/Sw Ba t t eri es LT-16-19-10C TE-16-19-33C (I) p; LT-107-SA Elev. 31H PJo Saf e LT-2-3-70 PT-6-53B RCIC RHR/RHRSW/SW Shutdown LT-16-19-10C TE-16-19-33C (1) g3 Equipment LT-107-5A f
l
~
Elev. 345 PJo safe LT-2-3-10 RCIC mt!!/HHHEU/5E Ghutdown LT-16 19-10C HPCI. CRD (I) lm '" Equipment LT-107-5A ADS / Core l Spray (I)
-68e-
SAFE SHUTDOWH EQUIPMENT (Cont'd) I Operator Location (s) (Emergency Associated circuits Remarks / Procedural Td Shutdown Barrier & Lighting Exemptions Restriction: Suppression Rec.) , Concerns 3t Removal lR/RHRSW/0W(II) Walls Control Room None Control Room V-10-18 For Separation, 7./FiiR!N/SW(II) Walls .;1ccult to Detection, and
.a.iterTiate Supprc len en Shutdown East side.
Panel Detection and Suppre :icn on west side. [R/R!!2SW/SW(I) Fire Wraps. Control Room v-10-17 Same as RB-5 (Suppression Instr. Rack and detection east side exlets over MG nets) lH/MHRSW(II) Separation Control Room H2C 9B Zones on East & Wcat Side. Floor below. IR/ MitRSW/ SW(I) Floor and Control Room !!:ne Also Available On Distance Aperture Card None Detection un
!P./PJf2SW/SW(I) Floor and Control Room i g undcraide of roof Distance will sense fire APERTURE. throushout CARD , '"i di"5
-- 6602607,i9 -
. ~ . - .
TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd) SAFE SifUTDOWN CAPABILITY Hot Shutdown Instrument Locations Rx Level Ire Are-/Zune Squipment Torus Level RI Press Decay Heat ,C imber Name Lost CST Level Torus Temp H.P. Makeug Dump (Division) '1 1 Control All Al te rnate Alt ernate RCIC - SRVs K Room Controls S/D Panel: S/D Panel: ( Alternate Tn ru s-RHR / ( LI-2-3-72C PI-13-59 S/D Mode) RHRSW/SW LI-16-19-10C TI-16-19-30 (Alternate LI-107-12A S/D Me.de)
- ,3 Cable All Al ternate Alternate RCIC SRVs r; Vault Controls S/D Panel S/D Panel ( Alternate Tr..ru n-RHR / (2 S/D Hode) RHRSW/SW (Alternate S/D Mode) 1-i
.5 SUCR Room Half of Al t e rnate Alternate RCIC Altecuate SRVs jIC (East or West) Switchgear S/D Panel S/D Panel S/D - fire Torus-RHRi g ()
(West) (West) in West Room RHRSW/SW l I control Control HPCI (Contrni (Available l Roo". (Rant ) Room ftast) Room) fire Division) in Eact Room Control RCIC HPCI Ri 1 HTLO Room, MTLO Hoom Control New/Old Oil tJew/Old Oil Room Room HPCI SRVs Room Room CRD Torus, i ADS / Core RHR/RHRSW/SW Spray l - HPCI m. 1 Operating Floor Main Turbine Control Control RCIC Makeup Der.in Makaup Domin Room Room HPCI SRVs Air Comp Air Comp CRD To rus ADS / Core RMR/ HHHS9/ Sh' Spray
. - - - - - -68g-
k SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Cont'd) J Operator Location (s) J (Emergency Associated Did Shutdown Barrier & Lighting Circuits Remarks / Procedural hat Nemoval Suppression Req.) Cuncerns Exernptions Restrictions px/ RHR5'J/5W 3 hr. Walls Alt. SD Pnl 1. All RCIC III.C.3 - 1. Operators muct 31tcrnete Detection Diesel A Room System for scram and shut 3/u Mode) RHR Panel 2. RHR Cold suppression MSIVc before SWGR Room S/D valves in Control leaving. HPCI Hoom 3. MCC 8B, Room 2. SW to RJIR pump Ton.as (Access 98 feeds (granted) seals. to IIPCI Room) $/RHRSW/5W 3 irr. Walls Same as Control SAma as Same sc Centrol 1terncto Automatic Room Centrol Room Room }/DModa) J CO2 IduciW/fiW Buildins Walls Contnii Re n nn RCIC, ' RIIR. None - I hr. Fire here may allabic 1 hr. Wall (East) te!MSW (per wraps in SER cause loss of vicien) and Automatic Alternate Alternate off-site po4er CDs S/D Panel S/D design) feeder cables. (West) HPCI leaving on-site power utily. IF./RERSW/SW Walls Control Ranm Nunc None Suppression 9.5.1 SER and Detection LO Rooms R/RHRSW/SW Walls and Control Room RRif 5, 6, 7, 8 None - Special procedures Distance TEF - 2.3 Approved in SRP for local Dinsel Fuel 9.5.1 ::SR operation of 011 Transfer RRUs, TEFc. Pumps Diesel Fuel Oil Temi.f*c Pomps TI Available Osr
. APERTURE perture Card CARD .,
-68h-m
TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd) SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Hot Shutdown Instrument Locations Rx Level ire Area / Zone Equipment Torus Level RX Press Decay Heat nber Name Lost CST Level Torus Temp H.P. Hakeup Dump (Division) 7 C:ndensate Condensate Control Control HPCI HPCI Pump and Pumps Room Room RCIC SRVs SJAE Room Closed CRD Torus Closed Cooling Cooling Water ADS / Core RHR/RHRSW/SW W;ter Hachine Hachine Shop Spray Shop, etc. Boiler Rooms Boller Room HVAC Rooms i I HVAC Rooms Fced Pump Room Feed Pumps Control Control HPCI HPCI C ndenser and Condenser Room Room RCIC SRVs Hiater Bay No Heaters CRD Torus ADS / Core RHR/RHRSW/SW Spray Diesel Gen. Diesel and Control Control RCIC HPCI Riom A Auxiliaries Room Room HPCI SRVs, Torus CRD RHR/RHRSW/SW ADS / Core Spray Diesel Cen. Diesel and Control Control RCIC HPCI Room B Auxiliaries Room Room HPCI SRVs, Torus CRD RHR, RHRSW/SW ADS / Core Spray Diesel Day Day Tank Control Control RCIC, HPCI HPCI Tank Room Room Room CRD. Core SRVs Torus A Spray / ADS RHR/RHRSW/SW Diesel Day Day Tank Control Control RCIC, HPCI HPCI Tank Room Room Room CRD. Core SRVs, Torus B Spray / ADS RHR/RHRSW/SW
-681-
-w
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT (Cont'd) Operator Location (s) (Emergency Assoclated ; Cold Shutdown Barrier & Lighting Circuits Remarks /Procedura Heat Removal Suppression Req.) Concerns Exemptions Restrictions RHR/RHRSW/SW Walls and Control Room See above. None - Suppression. 9.5.1 SER Detection & Suppression in Boller Room RHR/RHRSW/SW Walls and Control Room See above. None - Suppression Implicit in in Condenser 9.5.1 SER Bay Room RHR/RHRSW/SW Walls Control Room Diesel None Suppression Circuits - Detection MCCs in Breaker Coordination Study
- Room Fans Fuel Oil Transfer Pump RHR/RHRSW/SW Walls Control Same as None Suppression Room Diesel A Detection RHR/RHRSW/SW Walls and Control None Also Available On Door Detection Room Aperture Card T1 RHR/RHRSW/SW Walls and Control None None M g Door Detection Room CAIID
-68j-g5asals7M/
r TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd) SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY I Hot Shutdown Instrument Locations Rx Level 'e Area / Zone Equipment Torus Level RI Press Decay Heat Name Lost . CST Level Torus Temp H.P. Hakeup Dump (Division) Colt ier Heat Fusi Oil Pump Both Fuel Control Control RCIC, HPCI HPCI SRVs Torus RHRs R:om 011 Pumps Room Room CRD Core Spray / ADS RHR/RHRSW/SW H:11way, Power Control Control RCIC, HPCI CRD RHRa North of feeds to Room Room ADS / Core Jpray SRVs, Torus Rxctor HCC 8B & RHR/RHRSW/SW Bldg. 98 I j Intake Structure CW Pump Room CW Pumps Control Control RCIC, HPCI SRVs Room Room Core Spray / Torus ADS CRD RHR/RHRSW/SW Intake Structure RHR. RCIC, HPCI, SRVs, Torus Alt SW Pump Room SW Pumps Control Control RHRSW Coo. i Room Room CRD ADS / Core Alternate j Spray Cooling I W3Ct Cooling Cooling Tower Control Control RCIC, HPCI SRVs, Torus ! E j Tower, North Cell Room Room ADS / Core Spray RHR/RHRSW/7 Call I C ndensate Half of Control Control RCIC, HPCI SRVs, Torus ( ADS / Core Spray RHR/RHRSW/SW RHR,
- Sterage Tank CST Level Room Room
[ Yalve and Transmitters i Instrument Area 5 o
-68k-
} t
(
~ i SAFE SHUTDOG EQUIPMENT (Cont'd)
Operator Location (s) (Emergency Associated Barrier'& Lighting Circuits Remarks / Procedural fShutdown Suppression Reg.) Concerns Exemptions Restrictions iRemoval l 'RHRSW/SW Walls and Control Fuel Oil For Separation i Door Detection Room Pumps for and Detection Both Diesels RHRSW/SW Walls and Control Room 480 V Vital For Detection MOVs are Distance Distribution and operable by hand f to MCC 8B&9B Suppression, i One Hour Wrap on Conduits for MCC 8B&9B Feeds RHRSW/SW Walls and Door Control Room None None J
'RHRSW Walls and Control Room None None Diesels and ten:to Door Torus Area alternate ,ing Detection Cooling Tower cooling per FSAR.
Wall and Suppression Around Diesel Fire Pump
'RHRSW/SW Outdoors Control Room MCCs 8C&9C None Distance
'RHRSW/SW Separation Control Room None For Detection Plus NO and Suppression Also Available On Intervening Aperture Card Combustibles TI
-APERTURE CARD hhbhhhh
5.0
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSION This section of the report summarizes, area by area and zone by zone, the items requiring corrective action. Once these corrective actions are completed, then Vermont Yankee will be in full compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section IIIG. This section includes the following tables: Table 5-1 lists Fire Protection Modifications required. Table 5-2 lists special procedures required. Table 5-3 lists exemptions requested. 5.1 Individual Summaries 5.1.1 Area RCIC Deficiency - Steel plate stairwell enclosure on Elevatior. 232 was not designed as a fire barrier. There is no suppression in the area. Corrective Action Modifications - None proposed. Exemptions - An exemption from the requirements for suppression in the area, and for the stairwell enclosure from the one-hour barrier requirement has been requested on the basis that suppression and detection exist in Elevation 232 Room and combustibles are low (Table 5-3, Item 2). 5.1.2 Zone RB-1 Deficiencies
- 1. Zone at Elevation 232' is not separated or protected sufficiently from other zones.
- 2. The de power feed to RCIC (needed for decay heat removal) from the alternate shutdown battery runs in the proposed separation zone.
- 3. Suppression is not provided.
Corrective Actions Modifications
- 1. Maintain the existing separation zone on the east side of the torus. There now exists a space twenty feet wide with no intervening combustibles.
- 2. Provide fire stops in cable trays on northwest side of torus to create a separation zone 20 feet wide. The DC power feed from the alternate shutdown battery will be wrapped with three-hour fire barrier.
Exemptions - An exemption from the requirements for suppression, with existing detection has been requested for the torus area (Table 5.3, Item 1) . The basis is that the fire separation zones and low combustible loading, with detection, provide equivalent protection. An exemption from separation, detection, and suppression requirements in the Elevation 232 Room in the northwest corner has been filed previously (Table 5-3, Item 3). 5.1.3 Zone RB Basement, South Deficiency - The zone at Elevation 232' is not separated or protected sufficiently from adjacent zones. Division II torus level and temperature cables are routed in conduit in the northwest separation zone and into this zone. Suppression is not provided. Corrective Actions Modifications - Construct separation zones RB-1 and RB-2 as described. Wrap LT-16-19-10C and TE-16-19-33C conduits with three-hour barrier. Exemption - An exemption from the requirements for detection and suppression in the zone was requested (Table 5-3, Item 4). The basis for the exemption is that detection exists, combustible loading is low, and the separation zones provide equiva'ent protection. An exemption from the requirements for suppression in the torus area has been filed (Table 5-3, Item 1). 5.1.4 Zone RB Ground Floor. North Deficiency - The zone is not sufficiently separated from the adjacent zones. It is not sufficiently protected by detection and suppression. Corrective Actions s Modifications
- 1. Create a separation zone on the east side, between MCC 89A and 89B by installing fire barriers in cable trays crossing the zone. A radiant heat shield has been installed between the MCC's.
- 2. The separation zone in the northwest corner has been enlarged by extending the sprinklers to the steam tunnel shield, and above the cable trays.
Exemptions - Requests for exemption from the requirements for separation detection and suppression have been filed (Table 5-3, Items 5 and 6). 5.1.5 Zone RB Ground Floor. South Deficiencies
- 1. The zone is not sufficiently separated from the adjacent zone on the same floor, RB-3. Detection and suppression does not exist in the . Sone.
- 2. Division II rcea coolers, RRU 5 and 7 have control circuits which cross the separation zone and run in this zone.
Corrective Actions Modifications
- 1. The modifications for the fire separation zones between Zones RB-3 and RB-4 apply to this zone.
- 2. A change to fire protection procedures will be made to provide for enhancing room ventilation if RRUs 5 and 7 are disabled. An open door to the torus area, and a smoke removal blower may be used for this purpose.
Exemptions A request for an exemption from the requirements for separation, detection, and suppression throughout the zone has been filed (Table 5-3, Items 5 and 6). The basis was that the separation zones provide equivalent protection. 5.1.6 Zone RB-S - Elevation 280. North Deficiencies This zone is not sufficiently separated from the adjacent zone, RB-6. Suppression and detection do not exist. Corrective Actions Hodifications
Fire barriers will be installed in cable trays on the east and west sides of the building creating separation zones. Exemptions - (1) An exemption request for the west side from the requirements of detection and suppression was previously filed (Table 5-3, Item 8). (2) A request for exemption from the requirements for separation, detection,
< and suppression on the east side has been filed (Table 5-3, Item 7).
5.1.7 Zone RB 280 Elevation. South Deficiencies - The zone (east side) is not sufficiently separated from adjacent Zone RB-5. Detection and suppression is not provided throughout the zone (east and west). Corrective Actions Modifications The fire separation zones created for Zone RB-5, the adjacent zone, apply to this zone. Exemptions - A request has been filed for exemption from the requirements for separation, detection, and suppression for the east side of the zone (Table 5-3. Item 7). A request for exemption from the requirements for detection and suppression on the west side has been filed (Table 5-3, Item 7). 5.1.8 Zone RB Elevations 303. 318. 345 Deficiencies - None Corrective Actions Modifications - None. Exemptions - None 5.1.9 Control Room (Area 1). Cable Vault (Area 2). Battery Rooms (Area 3). Switchgear Room East (Area 4), and Switchgear Room West (Area 5) Safe shutdown equipment separation requirements for these areas were addressed by the Alternate Shutdown System installation and approved by NRC (see Section 4.3.1). Deficiencies - None. Corrective Actions - None.
5.1.10 Area 6 - Turbine Lube Oil Rooms Deficiencies - None. Corrective Actions - None. 5.1.11 Area 7 - Turbine Building Deficiencies
~
- 1. Room Coolers RRU 5, 6, 7, and 8 control circuits are together in this zone and could be damaged by a fire. .
- 2. Diesel Room Fans TEF-2 and 3 control circuits are together in this area and could be damaged by a fire.
- 3. Diesel fuel oil transfer pump control circuits are together in this area. Both could be damaged by a fire.
Corrective Actions Modifications - Special operating procedures will be q; <-- prepared for this situation. Exemptions - None. 5.1.12 Areas 8 and 9 - Diesel Generator Roons Deficiencies - None. Corrective Actions - None. 5.1.13 Areas 10 and 11 - Diesel Oil Day Tank Roons Deficiencies - None. Corrective Actions - None. , 5.1.14 Area 12 - Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Building Deficiency - Fuel oil transfer pumps are not adequately separated, and there is no automatic suppression. Corrective Actions Modifications - None. Exemptions - A request for exemption from the requirements for separation and suppression has been filed (Table 5-3, Item 10). The basis is the existence of detection, the low probability of fire, and the ability to makeup oil from a tank truck, bypassing the pumps. The protection provided is equivalent in its fire protection effect to that u required by the regulations. F.
1 5.1.15 Area 13 - Turbine Building /Radwaste Building Corridor i Deficiency - Power cables to MCC BB and 9B are not sufficiently protected. Corrective Actions Modifications - Conduits containing these cables have been wrapped with one-hour rated fire barriers. Exemptions - A request has been filed for exemption from the requirements for detection and suppression (Table 5-3, Item 9). The basis was the one-hour barrier to be installed and the low probability of a fire in this area which provides equivalent protection. 5.1.16 Areas 14 and 15 - Intake Structure Deficiencies - None. Corrective Actions - None. 5.1.17 Area 16. West Cooling Tower. North Cell Deficiencies - None. Corrective Actions - None. 5.1.18 Area 17 - Condensate Storage Tank Valve and Instrument Enclosure Deficiencies - The two sets of CST instruments are not sufficiently separated. No detection and suppression exists. Corrective Actions Mod 8Fications - None. Exemptions - A request has been filed for exemption from the requirements for separation, detection, and suppression (Table 5-3, Item 11). The basis is the very low probability of a fire, and the absence of input on safe shutdown capability of a fire in this area. 5.2 conclusion The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant will be in compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G when all of the items summarized in Section 5.1 have been completed.
These items are: f
- 1. Modifications required by the Safe Shutdown System Separation Analysis which are identified by Area or Zone (s) in Table 5-1.
- 2. Implementation of Special Procedures required by the Safe Shutdown Separation Analysis which are identified by Fire Location in Table 5-2.
- 3. Exemption Requests - Eleven requests for exemption have been filed.
\
TABLE 5-1 l Modifications Required by the Safe Shutdown Systems Separation Analysis Area or Zone (s) Modifications RB-1/RB Reactor Building Basement, 1. Fire barriers in cable trays, North / South northwest corner. RB Reactor Building Basement, 1. Wrap alternate shutdown panel North power feed conduit with three-hour barrier. RB Reactor Building Basement, 1. Wrap LT-16-19-10C and South TE-16-19-33C conduits with three-hour barrier. RB-3/RB Reactor Building Ground 1. East side. Fire barriers in Floor, North / South cable trays.
- 2. Radiant heat shield between MCC's. (Now completed.)
- 3. Northwest corner. Extend sprinkler coverage to enlarge separation zone, and extend above cable trays. (Uow completed.)
RB-5/RB Reactor Building, 1. East side. Fire barriers in 280' Elevation, North / South cable trays.
- 2. West side. Fire barriers in cable trays.
Area 13 - Turbine Building, Radtraste 1. One hour fire wrap on conduits. Building Hallway (Now completed.) i
TABLE 5-2 Special Procedures Required by the Safe Shutdown Systems Separation Analysis Fire Location, Area or Zone (s) Procedure Objectives RB-4, Reactor Building Ground Floor, A change to fire protection South procedures to provide for enhancing room ventilation and cooling of northeast RHR-Core Spray /RHR SW Room with coolers if RRU S and 7 are disabled. Area 7 - Turbine Building Special operating procedures will be prepared for the following three situations:
- 1. Cooling of either RHR-Core Spray /RHR SW Room with coolers disabled.
- 2. Coolir.g of Diesel Room with ventilation fan disabled.
- 3. Operating fuel oil transfer pump with control circuit disabled.
t W i
TABLE 5-3 Exemption Request Action Required by the Safe Shutdown Systems Separation Analysis Area or Zone (s) Exemption Request
- 1. RB-1/RB-2, Reactor Building Suppression Torus Area
- 2. Area RCIC - RCIC Pump / Turbine Separation barrier and Room suppression
- 3. RB-1, NW 232' Room Separation
- 4. RB-1/RB-2 1. Suppression Reactor Building 2. Suppression and detection Northeast and Southeast Corner Rooms
- 5. RB-3/RB-4, Reactor Building, Separation, detection, and Elevation 252', Northeast suppression Corner, Vital MCCs
- 6. RB-3/RB-4, Reactor Building Separation Elevation 252', Northwest Corner
- 7. RB-5/RB-6, Reactor Building, Separation, detection and Elevation 280', East Side, suppression Instrument Racks
- 8. RB-5/RB-6, Reactor Building. Detection and suppression 280' Elevation, West
- 9. Area 13 - Turbine Building - Detection and suppression Radwaste Building Hallway
- 10. Area 12 - Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Separation and suppression Pump Building
- 11. Area 17 - Condensate Storage Tank Separation, detection, and i and Instrument Area suppression
l
}}