ML20215D629

Supplemental Contentions on Rev 2 of State of Nh & Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20215D629
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	12/10/1986
From:	Curran D HARMON & WEISS, PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20215D598	List: ML20215D596 ML20215D629
References
OL, NUDOCS 8612160429
Download: ML20215D629 (31)

Text

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December 10, 1986 DOLKETED USNiiC UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARQ;FMCE C HC 's GOCatilMa a ~ . 0.

PRn >

)

In the Ma tter of )

)

Public Service Company of )

New Hampshire, et al. ) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL

) 50-444 OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2) ) OFFSITE EMERGENCY

) PLANNING

)

NECNP SUPPLEMENTAL CONTENTIONS ON REVISION 2 OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS

-Introduction The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP")

submits the following supplement to its contentions on Revision 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan ("Rev.

2"), which NECNP filed on November 26, 1986. In that filing, NECNP discussed the ways in which its contentions on Revision 2 satisfy the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ( "NRC's" or "Commis-sion's") late-filed contention standard. Fo r the most part, those arguments also apply to this supplemental filing. Ra ther than repeat them, NECNP incorporates them by reference into this filing. In addition, we add the following information that is relevant to the late-filed contention standard.

First, NECNP has good cause to file this supplemental filing late in relation to the Board's December 1 deadline for conten-tions on Rev. 2. 'For the reasons discussed in NECNP's Motion for Reconsideration and Response to Licensing Board's Memorandum and 8612160429 861210 PDR ADOCK 05000443 G PDR

I 3 Board's Order of November 4,1986, dated November 21, 1986, at 3-

4. NECNP had insufficient time to thoroughly review and file contentions on Rev. 2 before December 1. NECNP filed as many contentions as it was able to prepare before December 1, and diligently attempted to finish its contentions as quickly as pos-sible. During the week in which these supplemental contentions were prepared, NECNP was also required to spend a substantial amount of time preparing a filing in the onsite emergence plan-ning and technical proceeding.1 This filing is submitted as promptly as possible, only nine days after the Board's deadline.

Second, this supplemental filing includes two contentions which are not solely based on matters arising in Rev. 2. See Contentions RERP-15 and RERP-16. These contentions raise dif-ferent issues with respect to the late-filed contention standard.

NECNP will address those issues in connection with the specific contentions.

Finally, NECNP wishes to correct an error in its November 26 filing. In footnote 2 on page 5, NECNP stated that during the 1983 hearings, both the Applicants and the NRC Staf f asserted that Applicants' license application was complete and adequate 1 On December 4, 1986, NECNP filed a Response to the NPC Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Ap-plicants' Reply to NECNP's Proposed Findings of Fact and Con-clusions of Law. Although this filing was not required by the Licensing Board, NECNP considered it necessary to address new technical and legal arguments raised by the NRC Staf f and Ap-plicants.

b

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with respect to the issues of emergency action levels ("EALs")

an'd environmental qualification. This was based on counsel's best recollection. Upon re-examination of the record, we found that the NRC Staff testified that the EALs were not complete.

Testimony of John B. Sears, dated July 15, 1983. The staff testified that Applicants had specified the times to which it would qualify equipment, but that the staff had not completed its review of Applicants' equipment qualification program. Testimony c f Robert G. LaGrange and Harold Walker, dated July 15, 1983.

Applicants also testified that they had not completed their sub-rittals with respect to the E ALs , but vouched for the adequacy of the overall program. Applicants' Direct Testimony, dated July 15, 1983, at 14-17. Applicants also testified that their en-tircnmental qualification program met or exceeded the relevant I.RC standard. NRC Direct Test. at 12.

CONTENTIONS I. Amendment to Contention NHLP-6.

The following bases are added to bases a-e, specified in NECNP's November 26 filing at 13-17.

f. Although Volume 5 of Rev. 2 provides signed letters of agreement with bus companies who promise buses and drivers, there is no assurance that the bus drivers have agreed to or will agree to participate in an emergency evacuation. We spoke to a bus driver for Timberlane in Portsmouth, where drivers for all the buses have been promised. She was not aware that she personally was committed to drive. When she asked her supervisor, he told

o her he had only committed the buses and not the drivers. The letter of agreement clearly indicates that this is not the case.

The driver we spoke to also reported that many of the drivers are young raothers, who ride with their own children on the buses, and that obtaining commitments from all of these drivers on an indi-v cual basis would be nearly impossible. There is thus no rea-sonable assurance that bus drivers will be available during an emergency.

g. Bus drivers have not received emergency response train-ing. The bus driver we spoke to has received no training and thinks that none of the drivers have received training. There is thus no reasonable assurance that they can and will competently execute their responsibilities in a radio 3cgical emergency.

II. New Contentions Contention RERP-13. The evacuation time estimates prepared by the State of New Hampshire ("KLD study," Volume 6 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan) do not provide a reliable basis for protective action decisionmaking because they are inaccurate. Thus, they violate 10 CFR S 50.47(b) (10) and NUREG-0654, S II.J. l .

Basis: a. Revision 2 of the KLD estimates that within one l

hour, half of the available buses could be put into service, and that all would be in service after three hours. Vol. 6 at 11-18

19. The basis for this study is a phone survey of the bus owners. The KLD study notes that there was a fairly wide vari-ance of time estimates among the transportation providers. Id.

l The extrapolation of estimates from a phone survey is not an adequately accurate means of determining the times in which buses will be available, and does not provide an adequate basis for the KLD's predictions. The study demonstrates no consideration of the varying availability of buses at different times of the day.

For instance, after delivering children to school in the morning, buses of ten leave the EPZ on other errands and do not have radios by which they can be contacted. The time estimates should be based on careful consideration of the scheduling and bus storage practices of each company, and not on an informal survey.

b. Revision 2 of the KLD study estimates that passengers at special facilities can be loaded in 10 minutes per bus, taking 15 seconds for each person to load the bus, including time to ap-proach the bus. Volume 6 at 11-21. This estimate is based on an arbitrary doubling of the 2-4 seconds time it ordinarily takes to board a bus. The estimate grossly underestimates the needs of elcatly or disabled people, who may have various medication or equipment that must go with them, and who may not be mobilized quickly and safely by an unf amiliar assistant. Moreover, the KLD study'shows no consideration of the additional time needed to load non-ambulatory people, and no estimate of the number of these people outside of special facilities who will need as-sistance.

c. The KLD study assumes that each evacuee takes the most efficient route available to her or him. Th is is an unreasonable a ssump tion. The KLD s tudy should account for time consumed by

evac ~ees who take less efficient evacuation routes; evacuees who are lost; and evacuees who choose their own evacuation destina-tions and thereby go against traf fic, clogging the highways.

d. The KLD report estimates the time it will take residents to return to their homes from work by questioning these residents as to their normal commu ting time, and assuming the same time would apply during a radiological emergency. Volume 6 a t 4-10.

This assumption is irrational, considering that the time needed to commute home will be extended by the congestion caused by evacuation traffic,

e. The KLD s tudy does not account for time consumed by evacuees who attempt to retrieve their children from school after being notified of a radiological emergency. In particular, the study does not reflect consideration of time consumed in driving or walking to schools; time consumed in attempting to gain access to schools whose driveways or parking lots are congested by buses and other cars attempting to retrieve children; time consumed in searching for children at schools; or time consumed in fighting the congestion to leave school driveways or parking lots.

f. The KLD report calculates evacuation times based on the assumption that evacuation staf f, including traffic control, will be in place before the evacuation begins. Volume 6 at 10-70; Ap-pendix I. This assumption ignores the time consumed in the pro-cess of mobilizing emergency workers, particularly in towns that are not participating and will require state workers to staff the evacuation. The report should account for the time consumed by

evacuation staff trying to reach their posts against the flow of a temporarily unstaffed evacuation,

g. The KLD report assumes that in an evacuation, the beach population will be given a head start of 25 minutes, during which time they will be the only people in the EPZ evacuating. Volume 6 at 4-17. It is wholly unrealistic to think that the general population will not respond to an order to evacuate the beach population by leaving on their own, rather than waiting for an .

instruction to evacuate. Their is no basis for the KLD to count on time to evacuate just the beaches.

Contention RERP-14. The RERP does not provide a reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event that local governments fail to carry out their responsibilities during a radiological emergency. 10 C FR S 50.47(a).

Basis: A number of New Hampshire towns have refused to par-ticipate in the emergency planning process for Seabrook, includ-ing training and exercises and an emergency response if a radiological accident should occur. The State of New Hampshire has prepared a compensatory plan for implementation in the event that local governments do not participate in an emergency response. Volume 2, Appendix G. The plan is only five pages in length,

a. The compensatory plan does not demonstrate that there will be adequate state personnel or equipment to implement an evacuation without municipal resources. Although Vol. 2, Appen-

1 dix C, lists equipment available to the State, the plan gives no indication of whether the equipment is sufficient to support the emergency response. Moreover, the plan does not state how many state personnel are available or required for any particular function; what equipment they need; or how they will get that equipment, which is apparently stored at different locations in the state. See Vol, 2, App. C.

b. The compensatory plan also relies to some extent on municipal resources, and thus does not adequately assure that the State can and will carry out the entire emergency response. Fo r oxample, the compensatory plan instructs the IFO Resource Coor-dinator to " ensure that emergency workers in affected towns are notified of status changes and Protective Action Recommendation."

App. C a t G- 2. In addition, the School Superintendent and the school principals are expected to implement their responses as if the municipality were participating. Id, . To the extent that the compensatory plan relies on officials or employees of non-participating communities to supplement the State's emergency response, that reliance is misplaced and unreasonable. The towns have refused to participate in an emergency response. Even if they were to decide at the last moment to give some assistance in an emergency, the emergency response staff would not be adequate-ly trained and would not have the experience of having exercised the plans.

Contention RERP-15. The New Hampshire RERP does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR S 50.49(b)(12) or the Commission's

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Statement of Policy on Emergency Planning Standard 10 CFR S

50. 4 9( b) (12) , 51 Fed. Reg. 3 2,904 (September 17, 1986).

Basis: a. The FEMA Guidance Memorandum MS-1 ( "GM MS-1") call for written agreements with all the listed facilities, that con-tain simple assurances that the providers have adequate technical information, such as treatment protocols. GM MS-1 A.3. Al thoug h some of the letters of agreement with these facilities have such assurances, others do not.

b. GM MS-1, S 0, calls for a training program for instruct-ing and qualifying all personnel who will implement the RERP. No schedule or content of a training program is evident in the Emer-gency Plans for medical facility personnel.

c. FEMA requires that periodic exercises are to be con-ducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabil-ties. GM MS-1, S M. No exercise of medical facilities was pro-vided for in the Exercise Manual for the 1986 Graded Exercise, dated January 9, 1986. No schedule or plan for the exercise of medical treatment capability has been shown in the RERP. Without an evaluation of actual capabilities, deficiencies cannot be identified and corrected, as required by GM MS-1, S M.

d. The FEMA guidelines call for drills that test the capa-bilities of relocation centers to direct contaminated members of the general public to appropriate hospitals. There is no provi-sion in the plans for the conduct of these drills, or study of the capabilities of the relocation centers to perform this responsibility.

Additional Information Regarding Satisfaction of Late-filed Contention standard Good Cause. This contention is not solely based on matters aris-ing in Rev. 2. However, NECNP has good cause for the late filing of this contention because it is based on newly issued regulatory guidance for interpretation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b) (12) . On Septem-ber 17, 1986, the Commission issued a Statement of Policy on l

Emergency Planning Standard 10 CFR 50.49(b) (12), 51 Fed. Reg.

32,904. The Policy Statement was the Commission's recponse to l the U.S. Court of Appeals' decision in GUARD v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which vacated and remanded the Commis-sion's previous interpretation of 10 CFR S 50. 4 7( b) (12) . As sum-marized by the Commission, that previous interpretation " required only the development and maintenance of a list of treatment f acilities on which post-event, ad hoc arrangements could be based." 51 Fed. Re g. at 3 2,904 Col. 2.

The Policy Statement briefly outlines the " minimally neces-sary arrangements" for medical care that the Commission now re-cuires. Id. at 3 2,905, Col. 2. It also directs the NRC Staff to icsue by November 17, 1986, " appropriate detailed guidance on the exact contours of the necessary arrangements" for medical care."

M. at 32,905, Co l . 3.

That guidance has not yet been issued. However, NECNP was informed on December 5, 1986, by Edward Podolack of the Of fice of General Counsel that the NRC Staf f now plans to adopt guidance issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (" FEMA") . See Memorandum from Dave McLoughlin, FEMA Deputy Assistant Director,

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to FEMA Regional Directors, dated November 13, 1986, enclosing

" Guidance Memorandum MS-1, Medical Services." A copy is attached as Exhibit 1. Although the NRC has not of ficially adopted the FEMA guidance, it now appears reasonable to assume that the FEMA standard will be applied by the NRC. In an effort to make as timely a filing as possible, NECNP is now submitting a contention regarding the State of New Hampshire's compliance with the Policy Statement and the FEMA standard. If the NRC ultimately should issue guidance that differs from the FEMA standard, NECNP will amend its contention.

We note that in filing these contentions, NECNP does not endorse the adequacy of the Policy Statement or the FEMA guidance

n interpreting the requirements of 10 CFR S 50.4 7(b) (12) . NECNP continues to assert that the medical facilities identified by the itate of New Hampshire are inadequate to care for the thousands cf people who may be contaminated and injured during a radiologi-cal emergency. See NECNP Contentions RERP-ll, filed February 24, 1986. In order to preserve its rights of appeal, NECNP hereby realleges Contention RERP-ll.

Contention REPP-16. The New Hampshire RERP does not comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b) (10) in that it does not contain reliable guidelines for the choice of protective actions. In particular, the models of atmospheric dispersion, precipitation washout and plume rise that are used to project radiation doses have not been validated and may be inappropriate, unreliable or inaccurate.

Thus, the use of these models may produce incorrect dose projec-tions.

Basis: In a recent report on the effects of budget cuts on NRC research programs, the NRC Staff made the following state-ments:

The currently available real-time atmospheric dispersion, precipitation washout and plume rise models for dose projec-tions in emergency response situations have not been ade-quately validated. Accordingly, there is the potential for an inappropriate, unreliable or inaccurate model being used in an emergency response situation and which would produce incorrect dose projections. Washout of radionuclides due to precipitation falling through the plume and carried to the ground has not been accurately quantified. Risk assessments and other licensing evaluations in which the models are used have large uncertainties.

'temorandum f rom Victor Stello, Jr. to Samuel J. Ch ilk , dated April 30, 1986, re: Report Requested By Coumissioner Asselstine and Bernthal, at 36. Relevant pages are attached as Exhibit 2.

According to the NRC, research on this issue has been deferred.

Ad*

The NRC states that it compensates for the potential inac-curacy by using conservative dose assumptions. Id . Conservative dose assumptions cannot correct for this uncertainty, however, because such assumptions necessarily involve the critical, un-certain f actor of plume behavior. Because the choices between protective actions depend so much on the timing of releases and f

! fallout, it is simply not possible to make " conservative" choices l

between sheltering and evacuation, the two principal protective measures identified by New Hamphire. During an accident, if de-cisionmakers " conservatively" assume that fallout will occur rapidly (with the resulting conclusion that sheltering will achieve greater dose savings than evacuation), an erroneous deci-

sion to shelter the population may result. On the other hand, if decisionmakers " conservatively" assume that fallout will be delayed, (with the resulting conclusion that evacuation will

- achieve greater dose reductions than sheltering), an erroneous decision to evacuate may result. Thus, not only are conservative assumptions unhelpful in correcting uncertainties in dose cal-culation methods, they may also contribute to incorrect choices of protective actions.

6dditional Information Regarding Satisfaction of Late-filed Con-tention Standard

>: cod Cause. NECNP learned of this issue from the Union of Con-cerned Scientists during the first week of December. UCS con-tacted NECNP about this issue af ter UCS attempted unsuccessfully

~o persuade the Atomic Sa fety and Licensing Appeal Board to serve cperating license participants with the memorandum, which con-cerns the impact of federal budget cuts on numerous research pro-grams on issues relating to nuclear power plant licensing. In filing this contention as soon as it became aware of the problem, NECNP demonstrates good cause for this late filing.

Extent to which other parties will protect NECNP's interests.

NECNP is aware of no other party that has filed a contention regarding this issue.

Extent to which NECNP can contribute to the development of a sound record. NECNP intends to contribute to the development of a sound and complete hearing record by obtaining and reviewing i

all documents relevant to the NRC's conclusions and examining the cesponsible NRC Staf f members regarding the basis and ef fects of

their findings. In order to develop its understanding of this issue, NECNP has filed a Freedom of Information Act request seek-ing access to documents supporting this conclusion and the iden-tification of NRC Staf f members whose opinions the conclusions are based on. A copy is attached as Exhibit 3.

We note that the significance of a contended issue is an im-portant consideration in weighing the late-filed contention criteria. Commonwealth Edison Co. ((Braidwood Nuclear Power Sta-tion, Units 1 ano 2), CLI-86-6, 23 NRC 241, 248 (1986). NECNP considers that all of the contentions it has filed have important significance with respect to the adequacy of an emergency response at Seabrook. In this particular case, we consider that the NRC Staff's revelation regarding the lack of a reliable basis for determining which protective actions will provide the greatest dose savings to the public during a radiological emer-gency presents an extraordinarily serious problem. By using un-reliable methods, decisionmakers may choose options that result in greater fatalities and illnesses as a result of radiation ex-posure. This is not the opinion of an outside expert but the conclusion of the agency that is responsible for reviewing the adequacy of protective action decisionmaking criteria, and on whose expert opinions the Licensing Board must depend to a great extent. The basis for the NRC Staf f's conclusion that dose cal-culation methods are unreliable to support protective action de-cisionmaking, as well as the consequences of that unreliability, demand further inquiry before a finding of reasonable assurance

can be made with respect to emergency planning for Seabrook.

NECNP seeks the opportunity to cross-examine' the NRC Staff on the basis for and significance of its opinion.

Cpntention RERP-17. The State of New Hampshire has failed to conduct an exercise of Revision 2, in violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and Appendix E to Part 50.

Basis: The only emergency planning exercise that the State has conducted so far was conducted in February of 1986. Th e ex-ercise plan was prepared in January of 1986, and was based on Fev. O of the plan. See "Seabrook Station Graded Exercise Febru-ary 1986 Exercise Manual," transmitted by letter f rom PSNH to NRC (SBN-922), dated January 6, 1986. As s umma rized in the Mo tion by' the Federal Emergency Management Agency for Continuation of Hear-ing on Emergency Planning Contentions, filed June 30, 1986, the l Jew Hampshire RERP has been substantially revised and supple-monted since then. FEMA reports that in February of 1986, the State submitted Supplement 1 to Rev. O, which contained "ex-tensive changes" to the RERP. FEMA Mo tion at 1. Those changes included elements relevant to an exercise such as revised proce-dures for the New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Developnent and a compensatory plan. Id . at 2. FEMA and the Regional Advisory Committee ("RAC") " identified significant areas needing improvement in the December, 1985 version and the Febru-ary, 1986 changes." Id. at 3. In April of 1986, the State filed Supplement 2 to Rev. O, including revised procedures for the De-partment of Public Health and new procedures for the Rockingham

County nursing home, jail, and dispatch center; and decontamina-tion procedures for the Manchester Decontamination Center. Id.

at 2. On June 3, 1986, the State filed Revision 1 to the New Hampshire plans, and Revision 2 was filed in the fall of 1986.

As can be seen by the large number of contentions filed on the new information in these plans, these revisions also make ex-tensive changes to the New Hampshire RERP. Mo st notably , the RERP places an increase responsibility on the State of New Hampshire for an emergency response. This shift in responsibility has changed many important aspects of the plan,

ncluding communication channels, personnel and agency responsibilities, transportation arrangements, and arrangements f or use of equipment. The currently operable plan must be tested in order to evaluate major portions of the emergency response ca-j pabilities outlined in the RERP and to identify deficiencies that must be corrected.

III. Adoption of other parties ' contentions NECNP hereby adopts the contentions of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, filed November 26, 1986. NECNP has also adopted the contentions filed by the Town of Hampton. As dis-cussed in NECNP's November 26 filing at 23-24, NECNP shares the concerns expressed by SAPL's and Hampton's contentions. The other parties may not ultimately pursue the same interests as NECNP, however, and NECNP must protect its own interest in the issues by adopting the contentions as its own. As discussed in NECNP's November 26 filing, NECNP intends to coordinate its ef-1 l

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forts with the other parties to avoid dup;ication of effort-and time consumed in the hearings. NECNP intends to file testimony and conduct cross-examination of witnesses on issues that other parties may not pursue.

We note that the Commission has recently proposed to preclude intervenors from filing proposed findings or appeals on other parties' contentions. Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings-Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,365 at 24,368 July 3, 1986. Thus, it appears that in order to preserve its right to participate in licensing hearings on other intervenors' contentions, NECNP must adopt them as its own.

Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Licensing Board should admit the supplemental contentions submitted by NECNP regarding the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

Respectfully submitted, b.

Diane Curran HARMON & WEISS 2001 "S" Street N.W. Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 t

' (202) 328-3500 December 10, 1986 l

EXHIBIT 1

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hh Federal Emergency Management Agency J Waahington, D.C. 20472

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.T C.'.'. W . POR: Tbgicn11 Direetcra Acting T*2 icr,s1 Directors @ l3 FTC4: .

'#' *pio.nhlin s@aty AaWate Director Stato ard Irr 21 Prtgre.-u and S@ poet.

SWM8 Guidance Ft.corrda: (C4) PE-1, Aedical Services

':' - attached 04 MS-1, 'bdical servicss, is forMod fbe ycur use in p~nidirq qaidance to S*a*e ard 1xal of ficials in devolcping their ra::C1cqteal e. er;ency tostrx.e.s plans and in avaleatirq the Mical se: tices capecilities of State and local govermes.

crigins of this 04 arri its'n.is de'.wicryant ard at:.reval hsvg toen semdut O. 04 vas daveicped aa a arrait of a series d;;'orent fece ccer m's.

of . gal decislans iruciving lac v.ich dater .ined that the existirq i: .arpretaticn of the repaired pre-accident -edical arrarge ents fbr c mt..-l. rated injured irdivid aIn wa not mafficient. ':hooe deciedaus led l

NA'. to issae a colicy statrent (Atta. crc:ent D) on Septcherd17, 1986, d deveIcp 1.:icatirx3 that the NM staf f (in ecnsaltaticn with TD'A) d4_ided guidsnce on the nect:sar/ Irt-accident arrargy.enta Ibr endical oc.vicea by Ibis ber 17, 1986.

g3 ya.te worked cicsely with NBC in recent vteks in the pewparation of Unfortrately, the :Rort 62ndline did cot per-tit our tn.s 7.:idance.

us ni per.edare of cetainirq Regicr.a1 and other occrants befbru issuing sn.s final qJidance.

IH5-2808.

f y:u have any qxsticos about MS-1, ycu nay ccntact Ja: nsa Ox2 as atA lis

cvided fbr your infbreation.

K NM42CS t-A. 04 MS-1, Medical Services B. Dmrgency Piarning - Podical Services, septeder 17,19 86, 51 ra 329 04 3 C. List of operative Q4's (po+ swe.lsa, cs ) .

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- - 2-_-__________ _ :_ ___ _ _ _ _ _ n.

I GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM MS-1 MEDICAL SERVICES Purpose This Guidance Memorandum (GM) provides interpretation and clarification of requirements contained in the Nuclear Regulatory Ccnmission rule,10 CfR 50.47 (b)(12) and the associated guidance in NUREG-0554/ FEMA-REF-1, Revision 1, re-

!ated to the provision of msdical services for'cembers of the general public.

Fackground

'he teckground is contained in a policy statement from the Nuclear Pegulatory C:,-is sion 'NRC) titled " Emergency Planning - Medica l Services" (51 FP 32904).

In this policy statement, NRC states its belief that 10 CFR 50.47(b)[I2)

'"3rrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured

'-dividuals") reau t res pre-accident arrangements for medical services (beyond

• e rainterance of a list of trea trent facilities) 'or individuals who might be

,+ vereiv exacsed to dangerous levels of of fsite radia tion folicwing an accident

~

at a nuclear ocwer plant.

As used in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12) and plannirg Standard

" of NUPEG-0554/ FEMA-REP-1, Pevision 1, the term " contaminated in;ured" means I contaminated and otherwise chysically injured; 2) ccntaminated and exposed to c _ .gerous levels of radia tion; or 3) exposed to dangerous levels of radia tion.

guidance 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(12) requires that " Arrangements are made for contaninated injured individuals." In its policy statement the NRC determined that this standard recuires pre-accident arrangements for medical services for offsite irdividuals who might be exposed to dangerous levels of radiation fo11cwirg an accident at a nuclear pcwer plant. The folicwing guidance applies to the eval-uation of the medical services aspects of State and local emergency plans under the criteria in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1.

Standards, Evaluatiens Criteria, Areas of Reviews and Acceptance Criteria A. Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control) l Planning Standard Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee, and by State and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various sup-porting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.

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• e 3-Arnas for Fev'iew and Acceptance Criteria T1 ire should be one primary local hospital and one backup hospital for each site for the evaluation and emergency treatment of " contamination injured"

o. -bers of the general public. Hospitals are generally distributed proportional tc the popula tion. Thus, at sites with icw population and few hospitals, the p Hmary 1ccal and backup ho.;pitals for eerbers of the general public could be the same as those for the utility encloyees and emergency workers.

L . '. E'.alua tion Criterion E r 3 State shall develop lists indicating the location of public, private ar.c rilitary hospitals and other emergency medical services facilities within t > :: ate or contiguous States considered capable of providing redical su port f- iny contaminated injured individual. The listing shall include the rame, stion, type of 'acility and capacity and any special radiological cacabili-t .s . These energency nedical sarvices should be able to radiologically r(-itor contaminated personnel, and have facilities and trained personnel able tc care for contaminated injured persons.

A es 'or :eview and sccettance Criteria TF - lis ts should be annota ted to indica te the ambulatory /ncn-arbulatory capaci-t :s for providing nedical support for "contarinated injured" merbers of the ge aral public and any special radiological capabilities. This will enable state ar: iccal officials to direct members of the ger.eral public to those institutions ca:3ble of handling " contaminated injured" patients. In the event that local anc egional medical resources need to be supplemented, additional redical re-scarces would be available through the Federal Radiological Emergency Cesponse Pian. These resources would include the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center /

Training Site at Oak Ridge, Tennessee and the National Disaster Medical System -

wit" headquarters in Rockvil!e, Maryland.

L.{. Evaluation Criterion Each organization shall arrange for transporting victims of radiological acci-deats to medical support facilities.

- Ara 3s for Review and Acceptance Criteria Eecause the early symptoms of persons exposed to dangerous levels of radiation are usually limited to nausea and vomiting, ambulances may not be required to transport such persons to medical facilities. Rather, non-specialized public and private vehicles can be used, supported, if necessary, with agreements in l

accordance with A.3. above. For other types of contaminated injured individ-uals, specialized transportation resources (e.g. , ambulances) would be necessary and should be assured by agreements, if necessary, in accordance with A.3. above.

Provisions should be made for the use of contamination control in transporting contaminated persons to medical facilities.

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Planning Standard O. Fadiological Energency Pesponse Training .

F 3diological emergency response training is provided to those who r.ay be called on to assist in an energency.

0.4 Evaluation Criterion Each organization shall establish a training program for instructing and quali-

, ir.g personnel who will inclement radiclogical emergency respense plans.

The

, ecialized initial training and periodic retraining prtgrams (including the

s. spe, nature and frecuency) shall be provided in the fc11owing categories:

h. Medical support persennel a-aes <cr Review and sccectance Criteria Each bespital listed under Evaluation Criteria L.I and L.3. shall have at least c.r e chysician and one eurse on ca ll within about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> who can supervise the

.o iluatien and treatrert of radicieg'cally "cortanirated irjured" ne-ters of t? 3 genera' public. There are several sources for this training including NRC licensee sponsored training. Transportation providers should have basic training tr centa..ination control. Examples include but are not limited to:

1. FEM.A 'ardbook, videctape, slides and instruction manual titled "Fospital Emergency Cepartment Management of Radiation Accidents," SM 80/1984

2. Courses from The :adiation Emergency assistance Center / Training Site (PEAC/TS) at Oak Ridge Associated Universities.

3. Audiccassette and tert course, " Radiation Accident Preparedness: Medical and Managerial Aspects" by Science-Thru-Media Inc., 303 Fifth Avenue, Suite 803, New York, NY 10016.

R. Exercises and Drills Planning Standard Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emer-gency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.

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M.2. Evaluation criterion

-A drill is a supervised instruction period aired at testing, developing and naintaining skills in a particular operation. A drill is often a component of an exercise. A drill shall be supervised and evaluated by a qualified drill irstructor. Each organization shall conduct drills, in addition to the biennial <

an=3ai* exercise at the frecuencies indicated belcw: j

c. Medical energency drills A edical er.ergency drill involving a sinulated centamir.ated individual which cc-tairs provisiens for participation by the local suppsrt services agencies (i.e. , 3rbulance and of fsite medical trea trent f acility) shall be conducted ar vally. The offsite portions of the nedical drill F.ay be performed as part of *."e required biennial aaavat* exercise.

Ar+ s 'cr Review and Acceptance Criteria sti .e or local governments should provide for the conduct of apprceriate drills arc exercises which include " contaminated injured" individuals. These redical ere ger.cy. drills involving the prinary local (L.1.) hospital for state and local g;. r.ments should be conducted annually. These drills should also test the car tbility of relocation centers to direct "contanirated injured" members of the gereral public to the appropri~ ate hospital. If State er local governments cannot pr:/ide for the corduct of the drills, the licensee shall provide for the con-duct of such drills. If good faith efforts are not successful in a particular Case. the licensee shall provide or arrange for adequate compensatory reasures.

Im;'e entation State and local emergency response plans should reflect the provisions of this CE at the next annual update following 9 nonths from the effective date of this GM. .

Plans for plants that do not have a full power operating license should reflect the provisions of this GM within 9 nonths of the effective date o' this GM. The first medical drill reflecting the provisions of this GM should be cczducted by the end of the next biennial exercise following 1 year fran the effect'72 date o f thi s GM. ---

+ Changes reflect language incorporated into GM PR-1.

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%:C Coordination

- This Guidance Menorandum has been prepared in ccordination with the NRC staff.

As noted in the referenced hRC Policy Statement, the Comission has determined that 'these modifications fall under the backfit rule's exception as necessary to bring facilities into compliance with a rJ1e of the Comission.

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')  %,*...a y p 30 g MEMORANDUM FOR: Samuel J. Chilk Secretary FROM: Victor Stello, Jr.

Ewm;Hve P!restar for Opentf %s SU2 JECT: REFORT REQUESTED BY COMMISSIONERS ASSELSTINE AND BERNTHAL In response to your memorandum of November 20, 1985, enclosed is a report as rc<:uested by Comissioners Asselstine and Bernthal on research projects which for budgetary reasons were deferred or could not be accomplished. This report al;o addresses the irnpact of the deferred and cancelled research projects.

In prioritizing research activities, the staff has attempted to provide for a '

sticle, prcperly balanced research program focused on supporting regulatory ac .:vities to ensure safety at operating facilities. There is clear re :gnition in this prioritization that industry must assume the burden of furcing research where industry is the primary benefactor. I do not anticipate that the deferred or cancelled projects will have an adverse impact en the health and safety of the public. However, the effect of the erosion of ro:earch capabilities and the resultant inabilities to provide necessary ir creation to answer safety questions cannot be und2tes.timated for the future.

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etor Stello, Jr./

Executive DirectoF for Operations Er.clo sure:

I pact of Budget Cuts on NRC's Acility to Assure Safety j

cc: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal Comissioner Zech OGC OPE i

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i IMPACTS (CONT'D) integral experimental facilities in the United States will have been shut down by the end of 1986. Although studies have been made of ways of providing cor.tinuing experimental capability, plans for such capability have been i frustrated by budget reductions. The NRC cooperates with Germany, Japan and other countries in integral testing as a means of reducing funding requirements

.and sharing safety research information. This allows access to results from foreign experimental facilities; however, it docs not prccidc the ability to perform experiments the NRC deems necessary, particularly on a expeditious time scale. U.S. industry people have taken the attitude that the plants are safe enough and industry has shut down or plans to shut down its integral test facilities. This inability to conduct experiments to examine the safety imolications of important plant transients, which typically occur at the rate of cne or so per year, may present real problems. Reductions in the safety research budget are expected to have intermediate and long term implications that will be detrimental to public health and safety and more costly to the tne cc.ntry because of extended shutdowns than the money saved in the short term by their elimination.

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IMPACTS OF BUDGET CUTS ON NRC'S ABILITY TO ASSURE SAFETY (OVERVIEW)

NRC has reduced its research program significantly in the last five years partly because of completion of some major projects like LOFT but also to conform to the declining budget. The effect of some of the specific actions is cutlined in the attached sheets. These are just a few of the larger programs that have been reduced, eliminated or delayed (probably indefinitely if the Gramm-Rudman required budget levels are realized). Many smaller programs have teen also eliminated gr delayed, As the NRC faces safety issues now before it, the effect of erosion of research capabilities and resultant inabilities to meet the need for new safety information to be used to help resolve these and other regulatory problems can already begin to be seen. T,he reduction in safety research information resources (scientific and engineering expertise, verified computer codes with kncwledgeabla support personnel, and experimental facilities) is already resulting in requests from the regulatcry staff having to be denied or delayed v or intolerable periods of time.

For example, the regulatory staff has asked ar a series of operational transient tests in a facility to simulate accidents in reactors built by Babcock and Wilcox to follow on behind current tests of cmall break loss of coolant accidents. They also asked for extensive tests of

%ecwater and steam line breaks in Westinghcuse and Combustion Engineering .

reactors. In the former case the tests have been celayed at least two years until funding is found. In the latter the tests were reduced from 14 to 5.

Currently NRC is in the final two ye3rs of a six year program of evaluating its regulatory approach to severe accidents in nuclear pcwer plants. The NRC staff is in the process of summing up the investigation in a series of reports which involve reassessment of the radioactive source tern from severe accidents, the risk and consequences of such accidents, the implementation of what has been learned into the regulatory process and the evaluation of rules and regulatory instruments such as the siting and the emergency planning rules for the need for revision. In evaluating the various technical issues that must be resolved to provide a basis for these actions, it is becoming apparent that 'm of the uncertainties may be so large, even with knowledge gained from 't. ears of intense focused research to date, that NRC may not be able to prc< iue a satisfactory reduction of these uncertainties with existing resources. This is at least partly due to program reductions in this area over the past years.

Scme of these issues may be the chemical and physical forms of radioactive iodine and cesium and their mutual interaction, the degree of direct containment heating from the expulsion of molten reactor core materials, hydrogen generation and loads and containment performance in resisting these and other loads placed upon it from a severe accident. Current reduced research programs are addressing these and other severe accident inves, however some issues may not be resolved in the remaining two years af research because the programs have been cut. The program is now at the point where the most serious issues have been identified, but the ability to solve them has been reduced.

The NRC research program addresses the ability to understand and. predict the behavior of power plants as a result of transients and accidents. This information is used to help reduce the potential for accidents. The focus of thic research is the understanding and modeling of thermal hydraulics. All 1

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s Real-Time Atmospheric Dispersion, Plume Rise and Washout Model Evaluation (Frogram Terminated in FY 1984 with a recuction of 5900X. The out year p.ojections had been $350K for each of FY 1985, 1986, and 1987.)

1. Safety Issue: The currently available real-time atmospheric dispersion, ,

precipitation washout and plume rise models for dose projections in l emergency response situations have not been adequately validated.

Accordingly, there is the potential for an inappropriate, unreliable or inaccurate model being used in an emergency response situation and wnicn would produce incorrect dose projections. Wasnout of radionuclides due to ,

precipitation falling through the plume and carried to the ground has not l been accurately quantified, Risk assessments and other licensing evaluations in which the models are used have large uncertainties.

2. Current Treatment by NRC: The currently available models are necessarily usea for emergency response dose projections by licensees and the NRC, pending further information on their performance under different meteorological and other terrain conditions and their accuracy and i reliability. NRC staff risk assessments involving plume washout continue to have large uncertainties in a scenario that contributes significantly to calculated potential orcmpt fatalities. Conservative assumotions are -

used to compensate for uncertainties in licensing evaluations using those l models.

3. Role of Ceferred Research: The deferred research was to validate models used for emergency response dose projections and other licensing actions to ensure that they are reliable and accurate under all meteorological and terrain situations in wnich they will be applied. This validation can be accomplished only by comparing model results from data collected during field tests.

4 Prosoect of Work Being Performed by Industry: Essentially none.

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EXHIBIT 3 HARMON & WEISS 2004 S STREET.N.W.

SUITE 430 WASIUNGToN, D.C. 2oooo-nes GAe6 McGREEvY H ARMON TELEPHONE ELLYN R, WEISS (2023328-3500 DI ANC CURR AN DE A a. M. TOU S LE Y AnoaEa c. rcRsicR October 21, 1986 HAND DELIVERED Connie H. Grimsley, Director Division of Rules and Records Of fice of Adn inistration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland Oear Mr. Grimsley:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. S 552,

$ seo., the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP")

tequests that you make available the following documents that re-late to statements made on page 36 of a memorandum from Victor S tello, Jr. to Samuel J. Ch ilk , re: " Report Requested by Commis-

ioners Asselstine and Be rnthal. " Copies of the relevant pages of the memorandum are attached.

For each document identified in response to this request, please identify the title and date of the document, the author, the author's title, and the recipient of the document.

1. Please identify and release all documents which form the basis for the the statements made in paragraph (1.3 on page 36.

2. Please identify and release the " currently available models" for dose projections to which paragraph (2) refers, and release any documents that indicate at what nuclear power plants those models are used.

3. Please identify and release all NRC staff risk assess-l ments involving plume washout, as described in paragraph (2).

4. Please identify and release all documents reflecting the way in which conservative assumptions used to compensate for un-certainties in licensing evaluations are developed and used, as described in paragraph (2).

l S. Please identify and release all documents which describe the research described in paragraph (3), all results of that re-l -

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HAHMON & WEISS Donnie H. Grimsley December 10, 1986 Page 2 search, and any documents which describe the current status of the research.

NECNP is an intervenor in the Seabrook operating license proceeding. The organization intends to use this information in the licensing hearings to further the public's interest in the safety of operation of the Seabrook plant. Therefore we request that you waive any copying and search fees pursuant to 10 C . P.R.

9.14(c).

I look forward to receiving your response within ten working days, as required by the Freedom of Information Act.

Sincerely,

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n. 5-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on December 10, 1986, copies of NECNP'S SUP-PLEMENTAL CONTENTIONS ON REVISION 2 OF THE NEW HAMPHIRE STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS and a mo*S6o4EEd5 P2 :10 leave to file the above were served on the follow .ng by first-d class mail or as otherwise indicated: gg g , , ,

• Helen F. Hoyt, Chairman 80CKEi;hG A i F.Cf.

Rep. Rober ta C . PevearKa Alumic Safety and Licensing Board Drinkwater Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hamp ton, Falls, NH 03844 Washington, D.C. 20555 Phillip Ah rens, Es q .

• Dr. Jerry Harbour Assistant At torney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board State House, Station 4 6 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Augusta, ME 04333 Washington, D.C. 20555

• • Thomas G. Dignan, Es q .

• Dr. Emmeth A. Lu ebke R.K. Gad II, Es q .

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Ropes & Gray U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 225 Franklin Street Washington, D. C. 20555 Boston, MA 02110 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Robert A. Ba ck us , Es q .

Panel Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 111 Lowell Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Manchester, NH 03105 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal *Fobert G. Perlis, Es q .

Board Panel Sherwin E. Tu r k , Es q .

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Of fice of the Executive Legal hashington, D.C. 20555 Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docketing and Service Washington, D. C . 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Angie Machiros, Chairman Board of Selectmen Mrs. Anne E. Goodman Newbury, MA 01950 Board of Selectmen 13-15 New Market Road H. Joseph Flynn, Es q .

Durham, NH 03842 Of fice of General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency William S. Lord, Selectman 500 C Street S.W.

Town Hall -- Friend Street Washington, D.C. 20472 Amesbury, MA 01913 George Dana Bisbee, Es q .

Jane Doughty Stephen E. Merrill, Es q .

SAPL Of fice of the At torney General 5 Market Street State House Annex Portsmouth, NH 03801 Concord, NH 03301

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Carol S. Sneider, Es quire Allen Lampert Assistant Attorney General Civil Defense Director Department of the Attorney General Town of Brentowood 1 Ashburton Place,19th Floor Exeter, NH 03833 Boston, MA 02108 Richard A. Hamp e , Es q .

Stanley W. Knowles Hampe and McNicholas Board of Selectmen' 35 Pleasant Street P.O. Box 710 Concord, NH 03301 North Hampton, NH 03826 Gary W. Holmes, Es q .

J.P. Nadeau, Selectman Holmes & Ellis Town of Ryo 47 Winnacunnent Road 155 Washington Road Hampton, NH 03842 Rye, New Hampshire 03870 William Armstrong Richard E. Sullivan, Mayor Civil Defense Director City Hall 10 Front Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Exeter, NH 03833 Alfred V. Sargent, Chairman Calvin A. Ca nney board of Selectmen City Manager Town of Salisbury, MA 01950 City Hall 126 Daniel Street Senator Gordon J. Hump h rey Portsmouth, NH 03801 U.S. Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 Matthew T. Brock, Es q.

(Attn. Tom Burack) Shaines & McEachern P.O. Bo x 3 60 Selectmen of Northampton Maplewood Ave.

Northampton, New Hampshire 03826 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Edward A. Th oma s 1 Pillsbury Street Federal Emergency Management Concord, NH 03301 Agency 442 J.W. McCo rmack (POCH)

Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Boston, MA 02109 Board of Selectmen Jewell Str'eet, RFD # 2 Sandra Gavutis South Hampton, NH 03842 Town of Kensington RFD 1 Box 1154 Judith H. Mizner, Esq. East Kensington, NH 03827 Silverglate, Gertner, et al.

88 Broad Street Boston, MA 02110 7

Di'ane Curran

• By hand

• By Federal Express