ML20248F469

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Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (Sapl) Trial Brief on Contention Ji 56 & Sapl Contentions EX-2,4,6,7,8,12,13 & 14.* Svc List Encl
ML20248F469
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/03/1989
From: Backus R
BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#289-8403 OL, NUDOCS 8904130075
Download: ML20248F469 (10)


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1*?o%i$Eh"&.d@lMV-M 4  %$VT April 3,1989'89 APR -6 A9 :52 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION hgjQ g , a .,'f-5F MD o 1 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ,]

Before Administrative Judges: 1 Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Richard F. Cole y Kenneth A. McCollom

) Docket No. 50-443-OL-1 In the Matter of )

) (Off-site Emergency PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Planning and Safety OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) Issues)

)

(Seabrook Station, Unit 1 )

)

SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE'S TRIAL BRIEF ON CONTENTION JI 56 AND SAPL CONTENTIONS EX-2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13 AND 14 The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) intends to litigate Contention JI 56-and SAFL Contentions EX-2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13 and 14.

SAPL will be bringing direct testimony only as to SAPL EX-12 and will litigate all other contentions by cross-examination and/or offers of proof.

Contention JI 56 Contention JI 56 states:

The SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate procedures, personnel, equipment and facilities for radiological monitoring and decontamination of general public evacuees, emergency workers and special facility evacuees (e.g. nursing home residents) have been established. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47 (a) (1), 55 0. 47 (b) (8) ,

S50. 47 (b ) (10) , S 50. 47 (b) (ll) and NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, 8904130075 890403 PDR G ADDCK 05000443 PDR

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4 Supp. 1 II.H.4., II.J.10.d, II.J.12, II.k.5.a. and K.5.b. have not been met.

SAPL's position on this contention is that the SPMC has failed to provide facilities of adequate number and size for monitoring and decontaminating general public and special facility evacuees and emergency workers. The monitoring trailers will not accommodate a sufficient number of people to meet the planning basis for monitoring and decontaminating 20 percent of the ,

Massachusetts general public evacuees.1/2 Cross-contamination will be an ineluctable consequence of spacing constraints.

Further, the SPMC has failed to delineate the personnel and equipment, provisions and facilities for decontaminating evacuees from special facilities.

SAPL EX-2 SAPL EX-2 states:

The graded exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate the ability to provide a sufficient number of buses and ambulances with properly trained drivers to reasonably assure that transit-dependent, special facility and special needs populations can be adequately protected. There was further not an adequate demonstration that the buses that were employed in the exercise could be property routed.

Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47 (a) (1),  ;

1/ SAPL would have challenged if not prohibited by the Board's ruling that this matter is Isa iudicata from so doing, the adequacy of this planning basis.

2/ SAPL has been informed by Attorneys from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that pursuant to a Board ruling in a teleconference, interveners are barred from litigating the insufficiency of the i showers in the trailers for decontamination of evacuees.

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S50. 47 (b) (10) , 550. 47 (b) (14 ) and NUREG-0654 J.9 and J.10.d, g and k have not been met.

SAPL intends to establish that the number of emergency vehicles and drivers used and the performance of the bus route runs in the exercise were insufficient to establish a finding of adequacy as regards transportation resources for the populations mentioned in this contention. SAPL takes the position that driving bus routes (some in private passenger vehicles) out of the proper sequence that the scenario would have required was inadequate as a demonstration of transport resources.

SAPL EX-4 SAPL EX-4 states:

The appropriate use of equipment and procedures for collection and transport of samples of food, water and other appropriate items was not adequately demonstrated by the exercise. Therefore the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47 (a) (1), 55 0. 47 (b) (9) , S5 0. 47 (b) (10) ,

S 50. 47 (b) (14 ) and NUREG-0654 I.7 and 8 and J.11.

have not been met.

SAPL is allowed by Board ruling in the Memorandum and Order of December 15, 1988 only to litigate the scope of the exercise.

SAPL's position is that exercising only two sampling teams was an inadequate test of environmental sampling capability.

4' SAPL EX-6 SAPL EX-6 states:

The. graded exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate the adequacy of personnel to staff both the traffic control posts (TCP's) '

and access control posts (ACP's) designated in the plan to control evacuation flow and control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. Therefore,'the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47 (a) (1), 55 0. 47 (b) (10) , 550. 47 (b) (14) and NUREG-0654 J.10.1., j., k. and 1. have not been met.

SAPL intends to show that the scope of the exercise and resultant low level of staffing of ACP's and TCP's by State and local police during the exercise was inadequate to support a reasonable assurance finding as to traffic control capability.

SAPL EX-7 SAPL EX-7 states:

The graded exercise of the NHRERP for Seabrook Station failed to demonstrate the capability for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and facilities because the facility that is to be used under the plan was not opened up and demonstrated during the exercise. Further, there was no showing that there is adequate provision for disposal of wastes. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47(a) (1),

55 0. 47 (b) (11) , 550.47 (b) (14) and NUREG-0654 K.5.a.

and b. have not been met.

SAPL's position is that the exercise woefully failed to demonstrate a capability for decontamination of emergency worker i and equipment because the Hillside Junior High School was not even l opened up and tested during the exercise. SAPL intends to show also that there is no adequate provision demonstrated or available for disposal of radiation contaminated wastes. These were major observable portions of the plan that were not demonstrated. A l

  1. w FEMA visual inspection of the facility almost a month later is I

insufficient to support a finding that the facility is adequate and can be opened, staffed and operated properly.

SAPL EX-8 SAPL EX-8 states:

The graded exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate reasonable assurance of adequate public protection since no capability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> continuous staffing of Staging Areas and Reception Centers was demonstrated and continuous staffing of local and host EOC's over a continuous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time frame was not shown to be fully adequate in any of the local or host communities. Key positions at the IFO were not fully staffed by appropriately trained individuals and the Governor's office was not represented according to the plan. Further, the exercise did not demonstrate that there are adequate provisions for filling the roles of those personnel who are absent due to sickness, vacation or other causes. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47 (a) (1), S5 0. 47 (b) (1) , S 50. 47 (b) (14 )

and NUREG-0654 A.1. and A.4. are not met.

SAPL intends to show that the exercise revealed that staffing levels for continuous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> operations of Staging Areas and Reception Centers'are insufficient. At the Staging Areas, the problem is lack of sufficient Rocking County Sheriffs Deputies and related personnel to coordinate transportation resources. At the Reception Centers, DPHS personnel with appropriate expertise are barely sufficient in number to cover a first shift. There is no margin for positions left unfilled due to illness or other causes.

Further, SAPL will show there are not enough firefighters at the Reception Centers to cover even a first shift (see also SAPL EX-12 testimony).

SAPL EX-12 SAPL EX-12 states:

The adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees was not demonstrated during the exercise.

Facilities were not well organized and not run in an adequately effective manner. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47 (a) (1), 550.47 (b) (10) and NUREG-0654 J.12 have not been met.

SAPL is bringing the testimony of Salem Fire Department personnel Captain Daniel Greton and Firefighter Jon Van Gelder. j Captain Breton and Fir 0 fighter Van Gelder were present at the June 28, 1988 exercise and they will testify that the procedures and personne3.for radiological monitoring and decontamination were not demonstrr.ced during the exercise and that the q

reception / decontamination facility was not run in an effective manner due to manpower insufficiencies and failure of proper coordination. They also exicess their concerns about training insufficiencies and the difficulties that were encountered in j

following procedures as demonstrated by the exercise. (See also the Summary of Testimony included with their testimony). SAPL holds the position that the Dover facility had similar failings.

SAPL EX-13 SAPL EX-13 states:

The graded exercise of the NHRERP did not provide an adequate demonstration of reasonable assurance that those persons confined to nursing homes, hospitals and like special institutions can be adequately protected in the event of a radiological i < ..

emergency. Therefore the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47 (a) (1), 55 0. 47 (b) (10) , 550. 47 (b) (14) and NUREG-0654 J.9, J.10.d., e., f. and g.

have not been met.

SAPL's position is that since there was no test of the capabilities of host special facilities to receive special facility evacuees from hospitals and nursing homes and to provide monitoring and decontamination services for those evacuees, the exercise was not of sufficient scope. Further, there was no test of the capability to transport special facility evacuees by ambulance. Additionally, the procedures for making decisions about administration of KI to populations confined to institutions was not tested. For all these reasons, the scope of the exercise was not adequate.

SAPL EX-14 SAPL EX-14 states:

The graded exercise of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP) for Seabrook Station did not result in an adequate demonstration that appropriate Protective Action decisions will be-made for the plume EPZ communities or that expansion of the response beyond ten miles can be carried out when it is prudent'to carry out such an expanded response. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47 (a) (1), S5 0. 47 (b) (10) and NUREG-0654 J.10.m have not been met.

SAPL holds the position that the failure to order an evacuation of ERPA G communities following a wind shift constituted a failure of the exercise to demonstrate the 1

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capability to-order and carry out appropriate protective actions

' in the EPZ.

Respectfully submitted, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League By its Attorneys, BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON By: . NN Robert' A. Backus, Esquire 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Manchester, NH 03105 (603) 668-7272 DATED: April 3, 1989 I-hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Trial Brief have been forwarded this day by first-class mail, postage prepaid to all parties on the attached service list and copies have been hand served on the major parties at the licensing hearings.

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l k-4t6bert A. Backus

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ivinU'. Smith, Chairman Suzanne Breisoth Lomas Dignin, Esquira Atomic Safety and Board of Selectmen Ropes & Gray. y , p Licensing Board Town Hall OneInternationab: Place US NRC One Drinkwater Road Boston, FA 02110-2624 Weehington, DC 20555 Hampton Falls, NH 03844

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l7 Kenneth A. McCollom Docketing & Service Sec. JaneDougb hNE!?

Atomic Safety and Office of the Secretary SAPL Licensing Board US NRC 5 Market Street US NRC Washington, DC 20555 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Wzshington, DC 20555 Office of Selectmen Richard F. Cole Geoffrey Huntington, Esquire Town of Hampton Falls Atomic Safety and Licensing Attorney General's Office Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Bcard State House Annex US NRC Concord, NH 03301 Washington, DC 20555 Ashod N. Amirian, Esquire Joseph Flynn, Asst. Gen. Cnsl. Sandra Cavutis 145 South Main Street Federal Emergency Town of Kensington P.O. Box 38 Management Agency Box 1154 Bradford, MA 01835 500 C Street SW East Kensington, NH 03827 Washington, DC 20555 John'Traficonte, Esquire Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Charles P. Graham, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of Exec. Legal Dr. McKay, Murphy and Graham One Ashburton Place US NRC 100 Main Street 19th Floor Washington, DC 20555 Amesbury, MA 01913 Boston, MA 02108 R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esq. Judith H. Mizner, Esquire William S. Lord 79 State Street 79 State Street office of Selectmen Newburyport, MA 01950 Newburyport, MA 01950 Town Hall ,

Friend Street l Amesbury, MA 01913 1

Diane Curran, Esquire Paul McEachern, Esquire Senator Gordon J. Humphrey l Harmon, Curran & Tousley Shaines & McEachern US Senate 1 20001 S Street NW 25 Maplewood Avenue Washington, DC 20510 See 430 P.O. Box 360 Attn: Janet Coit Washington, DC 20009 Portsmouth, NH 03801

J. P. Nidnzu

- Town of Rye' 155 Washington Road l

t Rye, NH- 03870' l

Adjudicatory File. .

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ~ Panel-US NRC Washington, DC 20555

. Richard R. Donovan FEMA Federal Registry Center 130 228th Street, SW Bothell, WA 98021-9796 Robert R. Pierce, Esquire.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Panel US NRC Washington, DC 20555

'Jemes H. Carpenter, Alt. _

Tech. Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board US NRC Washington, DC 20555

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