ML20205E001

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Reply of Commonwealth of Ma Atty General to Responses of NRC Staff & Applicant to Commonwealth of Ma Atty General Exercise Contentions.* Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20205E001
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/24/1988
From: Fierce A
MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#488-7359 OL, NUDOCS 8810270277
Download: ML20205E001 (62)


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'M ET 25 P5 :49 UllITED STATES OF AMERICA 11UCLEAP. REGULATORY COMMISSIO!1 n,

Daci ATOMIC SAFETY A!1D LICEt1SI!1G BOARD Before the Administrative Judges:

Ivan W.

Smith, Chairman Gustave A.

Linenburger, Jr.

Dr. Jerry Harbour

)

In the !4atter of

)

Docket tios.

)

50-443-OL,50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPA!1Y

)

(Off-Site EP)

OF !!EN HAMPSHIRE, EI E.

)

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2))

October 24, 1988

)

REPLY OF Tile MASSACHUSETTS ATTORt1EY GE!1ERAL TO THE RESPollSES OF THE 11RC STAFF At1D THE APPLICAt1TS TO Tli fdmES AC liMSEIT_S__ATIDRt1EY_GEILERAL ' ElXE R C I SE_C9 tlTEt1II O !3 S JAMES M.

SHA?1110!1 ATTOR!1EY GE!1ERAL CCMMO!1 WEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS By:

Allan R.

Fierce John Traficonte Assistant Attorneys General fluclear Safety Unit 8010270277 001024 PDR ADOCK 05000443 A

G PDR

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1

TABLE OF CONTENTS tagg Introduction 1

Applicant's Position 1

Staff's Position 5

Reply to Specific Responses 6

MAG EX-1 6

MAG EX-0 7

MAG SX-3 18 MAG EX-4 18 MAG EX-5 18 MAG EX-6 19 MAG EX-7 20 MAG EX-8 20 MAG EX-9 21 MAG EX-10 21 MAG EX-ll 26 MAG EX-12 28 39 MAG EX-13 MAG EX-14 44 MAG EX-15 46 MAG EX-16 18 MAG EX-17 49 MAG EX-18 51 MAG EX-19 52 MAG EX-20 55 MAG EX-21 57

- i -

Ut1ITED STATES OF AMERICA 11UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY'AND LICENSI!1G BOARD Before the Administrative Judges:

Ivan W.

Smith, Chairman Gustave A.

Linenburger, Jr.

Dr. Jerry Harbour

)

In the Matter of

)

Docket Nos.

)

50-443-OL, 50-444-OL PUBI,IC SERVICE CCMPANY

)

(Off-Site EP)

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, El AL.

)

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2))

October 24, 1988

)

REPLY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE RESPO!1SES OF THE 11RC STAFF AND THE APPLICANTS TO IJIE_MAESAC11MSFTTS ATIORNEY GENERAL ',S EXERCISE CQRTERIIDllS.

IllTRODilCILQlll/

APELICM'"9 ' POSITIO!1 The Applicants in the introductory section of their response to the Intervenors' Exercise Contentions (dated September 28, 1988) make two arguments.

First, they argue

t. hat the fact that FEMA has found no "deficiencies" in the exercise 1/

Although originally to be served on October 21, 1988, this Reply is served on October 24, 1988 with the permission of the Licensing Board reflecting the fact that the Staff on October 13, 1988 filed its Response by regular mail and not Federal Express and it was received by the Mass AG on October 17, 1988.

The additional time was needed to review the Staff's submittal.

1 O

is grounds in itself for rejecting all submitted exercise contentions except those addressing the scope of the exercise.

Second, they argue that if the Mass AG is correct in his arguments about the status of FEMA'S findings, then the exercise need no longer play any role in this Seabrook licensing proceeding.

The Applicants' first argument is essentially as follows:

1) an exercise contention must identify exercise results that point up "fundamental flaws"; 2)

FEMA deficiencies are equal to "fundamental flaws"; 3)

FEMA has found no deficiencies; 4) a rebuttable presumption attaches to FEMA's findings at the contention admission stage; therefore no exercise contentions should be admitted.

In response, it should be noted that 1)

One Licensing Board has stated that:

"[I]t appears that the situation described by a FEMA deficiency is more serious than that described by an llRC fundamental flaw."

hong Island._ Lighting _CL. (Shoreham Nuclear power Station, Unit 1) 27 tlRC 85, 92 (1988).

Further, on page 9 of the Staff's Response to Intervenors' Exercise Contentions the Staff asserts:

"a 2/

Curiously, the Applicants have structured their argument as if they believe these two distinct points are mutually supportive.

On page 4, Applicants assert that the "logical extension of the (Macs AG's) argument would fully suppott Applicants' view that the FEMA finding of no deficiencies precludes litigation of any exercise contentions."

The Mass AG confesses that no amount of reading and rereading of the Applicants' analysis has revealed its "sense".

The Mass AG, instead, has separated what appear to be two very different arguments and has treated them sellatim.

In doing so, the Mass AG has attempted to reconstruct the logic of these two separate arguments.

-2

FEMA deficiency is not equivalent to a fundamental flaw."

Thus, premise 2 above is open to debate.

2)

A rebuttable presumption simply does not attach to a FEMA finding on a utility plan.

The regulations are unambiguous on this point.

3)

The only case cited in support of the proposition that FEMA's rebuttable presumption should be given some weight at this stage is a licensing board opinion from 1985 which concerns Etate plans and which predates the controlling Commission precedent on admissibility of exercise contentions.

See Siw2_ cham, CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577 (1986).

4)

Even if this Board were to give some deference at this point to FEMA'S finding of no deficicencies, the Applicants offer no argument as to why the result should be that no exercise contentions at all (other than those running to scope) should be admitted.

Even if the premis3s of the Applicants' first argument were not suspect, the conclusion simply would not follow.

The Applicants' second argument is not as easily reconstructed and set out in a coherent order.

In general terms, however, it clear that the Applicants believe that the "Mass AG's argument (concerning FEMA) proves too much."

(Response at 4) In detail, the argument appears to be as follows:

1)

FEMA can not evaluate and make findings concerning utility offsite r!.ans according to the Mass AG; 2)

-3

if this is true, then "the NRC need not, and indeed could not" make its reasonable assurance finding based on the performance of an exercise (p.4); 3) exercise results need not be considered anyway (p.4, citing Susquehanna); 4) in light of the Mass AG's position, "evaluation of the exercise no longer lends itself to the hearing process" (p. 7) ; thetaf are no exercise contentions should be admitted.

The short answer to this is that the Applicants have failed to grasp the Mass AG's argument about FEMA.

FEMA "findings" as agency. f.indinas are o legal nullity and should be given no weight.

This is by no means a claim that FEMA observers and their observations can not be relied upon in drafting contentions or as evidence in the hearing process.

FEMA as an agency is not properly making "findings" about utility offsite planning and has itself claimed that it is not the lead agency in that regard.

But nothing prevents the NRC or the Intervenors from using FEMA observers to support their respective positions on exercise adequacy.

STAEE ' S_EQSlILQ11 In the first part1' of its response to the Intervenors' exercise contentions (section A, pages 2-9), the Staff offers its views on the general standards for the admission of exercise contentions.

3/

The other sections of the Staff's introduction are dealt with below in the context of specitic contentions.

-4

To the extent that the Staff's discussion repeats the analysis of "fundamental flaws" set forth in the introduction to the Mass AG's exercise contentions, it presents no difficulties.

However, the Staff attempts to limit the planning areas in which a fundamental flaw cquid be established.

The Staff imports into its analysis of fundamental flaws, the Commission's discussion in CLI-86-13 concerning the standard of adequacy for utility plans.

Focusing on the issues remanded by the Commission to the ShatRllam licensing board, the Staff argues that these issues are the sum and substance of adequate protection when evaluating utility-only planning, and, therefore, fundamental flaws in that planning must concern these issues.

In response, the Mass AG notes the following:

1)

CLI-86-13 was a Commission remand limited to certain issues in light of the prior extensive litigation on the adequacy of the LILCO utility plan.

Here, this Board has held that before the governments are presumed to follow the SPMC, it must be found to be an adequate plan.

Thus, key planning (unctions that are to be performed by the utility must be found adequate and the utility must establish that it can implement these functions.

2)

The February 1, 1988 Shataham exercise opinion, 27 tiRC 85, 87-88, makes clear that the issues on remand from the Commission in the plan litigation are not to be read as limitations on the scope of the nxercise litigation even in the Shoreham casa.

Obviously, if such a limitation did not apply in Ebateham, it is even less persuasive in a case which is at a very different stage in the litigation of the utility plan as a plan.

REPLY TO SPECIFIC RESPONSES MAG _EK-1 App _LLcants Applicants' initial response is to the form of the contention.

However, the Mass AG has made clear that the exercise did not test the ORO personnel's capacity to effectively interact with government personnel and did not test ORO's ability to respond effectively in Mode 1 or in mixed Mode 2.

Both these modes involved a state response which the ORO would have to anticipate, assess, integrate, coordinate and harmonize.

The "interface" between the ORO and state was simply not tested.

For this reason, the Applicants' second point, that this contention alleges that there was a defect in the scope because the Commonwealth did not participate, is a misreading of the contention.

The exercise should have tested the capacity of ORQ to respond at the time of an emergency to a

best-efforts response by the relevant governments.

Sta(C Similarly, the Staff's reading of this contention is wrong.

Failure to fully test ORO's response capabilities and not the absence of the relevant governments is the specific defect in scope alleged here.

Further, it is the exercise of the various modes in the SpMC that is at issue and, therefore, this is an exercise contention.

Basis A does set forth facts sufficient to support a finding of inadequate scope.

Finally, the Staff is wrong when it asserts that:

proof that the ORO can perform more tasks, pat fo_Isn, shows that it could do less if the governments participated.

(page 18)

As a matter of fact and logic, testing the ORO's capacity to implement a full Mode 2 response is not support for a finding that it could implement a partial Mode 2 which would require that it coordinate ad interface effectivelv with the state

response, t%G_EX-2

[re the scope of the Exercise]

This contention asserts that in seven respects (paragraphs A through G) the scope of the Exercise was too limited to meet the requirements of 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2) and Appendix E, S IV.F.1.

The Applicants, except for two sentences in Basis G, do not object to the admission of 'his contention.

However the Staff objects to every basis exceat a portion of Basis E.

Basis A asserts that "the hardware involved in the VAtiS system was not exercised, nor was the capability of the ORO to use this hardware in a timely fashion."

Staff's first objection is that "there is no requirement that the siren system be tested in an exercise."

The Mass. AG disagrees.

-7

In ALAB-900 the Appeal Board in the Shoreham case c: eiully analyzed the key regulation governing pre-licensing "full-participation" exercises, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S

IV.F.1, and held that this reg'ilation requires that all the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans must be tested in that pre-license exercice.

Long_laland Lighting _.fsmaany. ( noreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB 900 (slip op. dated Sept. 20, 1988) at 26.

In that opinion the Appeal Board states that S IV.F.1 of Appendix E "makes clear that '[e]xercises shall test the public notification system,' and FEMA includes this as an exercise objective."

lit at 28.

This public notification system includes two major elements:

the siren system and the EBS message broadcast mechanism.

Id. at 29-30.

Ege detailed discussion of the prompt notification system elements herein at MAG-EX 12, Basis B.

The integral components of the public notificution system "otdinarily should be tested in a full participation 1

a exerciss.

the cuaf 4

wrong; there is regulati-g

+

a stral system be tested in a pre-licens participa This bas, sho~ld r.et be rejected for

'.s.) s r ea son.

's,'setion to Basis A is that the issue The Staff s

s

.iystem is currently before the of the adequacy of ths' onsite board.

The simple rea onse to this objection is that r

the contention before the onsite board is a plan contention which challenges the adequacy of the VANS design, plans and procedures.

Implementation of that system in many respects remains to be tested in an exercise.

This exercise contention asserts that this exercise was too narrow in scope, and failed to meet the regulatory requirements cited in the prior 4/

The Appeal Board used the term "ordinarily" hete not to indicate that there were one or more recognized exceptions to this rule that the public notification system should be tested in a full participation exercise.

Indeed, there do not appear to be any recognized exceptions.

The term "ordinarily" was used because of the specific posture of the case before it.

The Licensing Board had ruled that the sounding of sirens and broadcast of an EBS message were "not reasonably achievable,"

but that there should have been test of communications with the primary EBS station, 1d. at 27a-28.

When LILCO appealed, only the issue of the radio station communication was before the Appeal Board, and even though the Appeal Board noted that it disagreed with the Licensing Board's understanding of and use of the "reasonably achievable" standard, Ld. at 30-33, it noted that it was compelled to assume the correctness of the Licensing Board's decision regarding the sounding of sirens and broadcast of EDS messages.

Id. at 30.

Its decision on the EDS radio station issue was thus thrust into an unusual context:

the Appeal Board had to assume the opposite of what "ordinarily" would be the case, i.e.,

that the siren system component of the public notification system was required to be tested in a full participation exercise.

9

G paragraph, because a series of critical implementation capabilities necessary to demonstrate an adequate public notification system were not tested.

The Mass. AG has stated repeatedly that it has no desire to re-litigate factual disputes twice.

We repeat that sentiment here.

If by any chance any factual issue regarding what happened at the Exercise regarding the VANS do get addressed on their merits by the onsite Board, those prior findings should become the law of the case for the subsequent litigation of the Exercise.

With that understanding, this basis should be admitted.

Dasis B asserts that the ability (capability) of the primary EDS radio station to promptly broadcast the EBS message was not tested.

While the Applicants have no objection, the Staff again objects, arguing that "the key ingredient for testing purposes is broadcast of the message and little information of significant independent utility would be gained where the station has no responsibility to broadcast the message conve' ed to it.

ALAB-900 at 29-30."

The Staff has misread ALAD-900.

As noted in the discussion of Basis A above, it holds that the public notification system ordinarily should be tested in a full participation exercise.

It then goes on to explain why, given the unusual factual and appellate posture of the issues before it (especially an uttapn2Aled board ruling that the siren system need not have been tested) that it was ruling that LILCO was not required to make contact with the EDS station -- absent siren system testing the activity was "largely meaningless."

ALAB-900 at 29 n.19.

Here, however, we are in a completely different and ordinary posture.

Siren sounding was simulated, and the exercise apparently included telefaxing EBS messages to the primary EBS station -- contact was made.

But after EBS messages were telefaxed to the station, no effort was made to determine how quickly the station announcer could review the message and prepare to read it, This is not to say that the announcer necessarily had to read it over the air.

In fact, this was not necessary, as apparently tapes were made at the station of the announcers reading the EDS messages.

But this occurred out of sequence, with no check on how much time was spent at the station in preparing to read the message.

This preparation time is a crucial element of the sequence of public notification events that are required to meet the 15-minute criterion.

(See detailed discussion herein at MAG-EX 12.)

It would have been very easy to have had the EBS station receive the telefax message, then quickly run through all its preparatory steps, and then read the message into a tape recorder -- all in sequence -- so that all this could have been timed in assessing the 15-minute criterion.

In addition, because the announcer could take as long as he wanted to look over the message and prepare to read it into a tape recorder, the Exercise failed to test how well the EDS announcer could perform under stressful 11

circumstances which demanded that the message be read accurately with as little preparation time as the Exercise events demanded.

If the prep time available to the announcer was too short, as it may well have been, it could have resulted in the announcer making mis-statements or otherwise mis-reading the EBS message.

Serious consequences could have resulted for the public.

Absent a test, in sequence, of an EDS announcer receiving a telefaxed EBS message, quickly preparing to read it, and reading it promptly into the tape reco' der, the announcer's ability to accurately read EBS messages has not been tested.

This is an important issue of exercise scope for both of these reasons.

Basis C contends that the scope of the exercise was too narrow because only the primary EBS radio station participated in the Exercise while the secondary stations did not participate at all.

Again the Applicants do not object but the Staff dues.

Staff's objection is the same that it offered for Basis B, and it is just as unpersuasive here as it was there.

Unquestionably the public alert and notification process is a major element of emergency planning.

S_cc 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5),

6; ALAB-900 at 28.

And Section IV.F. of Appendix E makes clear that "exercises shall test the public notification system."

According to the SpMC the primary and secondary EDS stations, working together, ensure that EDS messages are broadcast on enot'gh stations to provide reasonable assurance 12

that the public receives the messages in a timely fashion.

Therefore, while it is necessary to test the capability of the primary EBS station, 4& ia not sufricient to do only that.

The capabilities of the other stations to receive, prepare to broadcast, and broadcast the messages at the appropriate time also could have and should have been tested during the Exercise.

As was done with the primary EDS station, the messages themselves need not have been transmitted to the public.

Capabilities could have been tested through observations and timing of the process of receipt, review, preparation to broadcast, and reading the message (or playing the recorded message) into a tape recorder.

During the Exercise, however, the capabilities of the secondary EBS stations were not tested at all.

Basis D asserts that ORO's plans and procedures for public education and the dissemination of information to the public were not examined during the Exercise, nor was there a demonstration of the adequacy of public education materials.

Once again the Applicants do not object but the Staff does.

Staff's objection is that "this issue goes to provisions of the plan itself."

Again, the Staff has missed the point.

This contention seeks not to litigate the public education portion of the SPMC area plans.

Instead, it asserts that the implementation capability of those plans was not tested during th? Exercise.

The ORO's public education materials themselves 13 -

are not included in the SPMC.

They should have been produced and examined.

The detailed implementing plans for distributing these materials to the public are not part of the SPMC..

They too should have been produced.

For example, a very critical issue is how the ORO actually intends to distribute pre-emergency public information materials to transients on the Massachusetts beaches.

The plans say this will be done but does not specifiy how.

Without such information, many transients, perhaps thousands of people, may not know, what the sirens mean or what response is called for.

Unquestionably, pre-emergency information which informs the public "how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency" is a major element of emergency planning.

10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7).

Thus, there is no excuse for limiting the scope of the Exercise to exclude public education materials and their distribution from any scrutiny at all.

Neither the Applicants nor the Staff objects to Basis E.

As to Basis F, the Applicants do not object but the Staff does.

Basis F alleges that the ability of the Massachusetts chapters of the American Red Cross ("ARC") to establish and maintain the Host Special Facility and the 26 Congregate Cate Centers was not tested or evaluated at all, and activation of none of these facilities occurred during the Exercise.

The Staff argues that because the ARC refused to participate in the exercise, its participation was "not reasonably achievable" 14

and, therefore, is not required under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F.1 and F.6.

The Staff, however, is misreading these rules.

Section IV.F.6 has nothing to do with the ARC.

It excuses the participation in exercises of state and local governments "to the extent that the applicant has identified those governments as refusing to participate further in emergency planning activities."

10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, 5

IV.F.6.

This section does not excuse the participation of any private agencies or organizations being relied upon by the plans for key support services.

Section IV.F.1 does not support the Staff's position either.

That section requires that there be a "full participation exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation."

Staf f seeks to apply the 'iords "reasonably achievable" out of context, without connecting it to the rest of the phrase --

"without mandatory public participation."

As the Appeal Board noted in ALAB-900, the proper understanding of this language requires consideration of the entirety of the phrase as one i.e.,

"as much of the plans as is complete thought reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation."

l ALAD-900-30.

properly interpreted, all this phrase means is that emergency exercises should not involve actual participation by the general public.

Id. at 31.

Footnote 4 to I

S IV.F.1 serves to define what organizations must participate i

1 15 -

l

in a full participation exercise.

Id.

That footnote states:

"Full participation" includes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and p_that Iesonrses in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario.

10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F.] n.4 (cmphasis supplied).

Thus, the Exercise is deficient because the capabilities of a crucial resource organization were not tested at all.

Basis G asserts that the scope of the Exercise was too narrow because school administrators, special facility ad.ministrators, and hospital administrators were not evaluated at all to assess how knowledgeable and prepared they are to implement appropriate sheltering and evacuation procedures for each of their facilities.

Applicants object only to the last two sentences of the first paragraph of Basis G.

The Mass. AG hereby withdraws those two sentences.

The Staff, however, objects to the entire basis.

Staff asserts first that school, special facility, and hospital administrators "are not emergency worker personnel" but are members of the general public and, therefore, need not participate.

To the contrary, however, it does appeat that school, special facility, and hospital administrators are being relied upon by the SpMC to receive phone calls from the ORO liaisons and then to direct the implementation of ORO's PARS at each of their respective facilities.

As key resource persons, their participation is required to some extent in a full 16 -

\\

e participation exercise.

Egg 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, S

IV.F.1 n.4.

In ALAB-900, the Appeal Board held that a sufficient number of school and related personnel "must" participate in a full participation exercise "so as to permit verification of their integrated capability to respond to the accident scenario."

ALAD-900 at 34-35.

As to the participation in exercises of personnel in the non-school special facilities, ALAB-900 held as follows:

the participation of special facilities is a major observable portion of the offsite emergency plan and, thus, the Commission's regulations require contact with a sufficient number so as to verify their integrated capability to respond to an accident.

ALAB-900 at 41.

tio such contacts happened during the June 28-29, 1988 Exercise.

Staff's second objection to Basis G is that "to the extent that Basis G takes issue with what FEMA did or did not do,"

it does not present a litigable issue.

This basis does not take issue with what FEMA did or did not do.

While perhaps there would be no litigable issue if the Exercise had been designed by the Applicants to have FEMA evaluate the school, hospital, and other special facility personnel and then FEMA failed to carry out this evaluation, this is not the case here.

It was the Applicants who had the responsibility for analyzing the commission's regulations and determining its obligations thereunder, ALAD-900 at 39, and it was the Applicants who designed the Exercise, not FEMA.

So the fact that the scope of O

O' the Exercise was too narrow cannot be blamed on FEMA at all.

The responsibility for designing an exercise which sufficiently tested the capabilities of school and other special facilities administrators belongs to the Applicants.

tWG_EX-1 Apol.icants_and _S.t a(f.

Again, the Applicants and Staff have misread this contention.

The Mass AG is not asserting that the non-participation of the relevant governments in the exercise makes that exercise defective.

Instead, the Mass AG is alleging that no reasonable assurance finding can be based on an exercise which does not test the capacity of the ORO to effectively accommodate the best efforts response by the relevant governments.

MAG _EXrt Aap.1 Lcants_anLStaLC Mag Ex-4 was intended as a placeholder in the exercise litigation in the event that the Intervenors prevail on the legal authority issues presently part of the SPMC litigation.

As such, it should be admitted de bana.

IMG_EX-5 Applicants lind_ Staff See Reply to MAG EX-3 above.

- 18

fMG_EX _6 Applicants First, as noted above, Applicants have ignored the actual focus of this contention:

FEMA findings on utility offsite preparedness are suspect as agency Lindings.

Second, it is perfectly appropriate to raise the issue of FEMA's status at this juncture because FEMA and its observers were and are the primary source of information about the exercise and because it was easily anticipated that the Applicants would argue that

[

FEMA's "no deficiency" finding on the exercise should raise the procedural barrier to the admission of exercise contentions.

The issue of FEMA's role and the impact of any FEMA rebuttable presumption in the exercise litigation, therefore, is before this Board prior to that issue being joined in the SpMC litigetion.

In fact, FEMA's evaluation of the SpMC was only completed and served on October 14, 1988.

Stall First, the Staff argues that EX-6 does not address the exercise itself and "on that ground alone" is inadmissible.

The Staff is putting form over substance.

The contention does identify a significant issue before this Board that must be resolved in the course of the exercise litigation.

Submitting it as a contention gives all parties ample notice and opportunity to respond.

Admitting the issue as a contention helps shape this proceeding.

Second, EX-6 does not ignore the Commission's regulations but instead is based on them, specifically the language in S 50.47(c)(1) as compared to S 50.47 (a)(2).

Finally, the Staff reaches the merits in arguing that the 1985 MOU expanded FEMA's role.

As noted in EX-6, the MOU by its clear language concerned procedural and not substantive aspects of FEMA review.

j MAG _EX-1 hvultranLa l

Again, the Applicants simply assert that this contention is l

l "incorrect legal argument."

But this is simply conclusory language and the Applicants' fail to state why in light of the Bases stated in EX-7 the Mass AG is "incorrect".

It should be noted that this contention involves mutters of fact for which some discovery is appropriate and necessary.

Again, this contention presents an issue before this Board in the exercise l

proceeding and should be admitted.

1 l

Staff l

See reply to Staff's response to EX-6.

MAG _EX-B I

Apalicants Basis A should be admitted as a placeholder in the event that the Intervenors prevail on JI 30.

The exercise did not.

reveal any alternative to commercial telephone for core commmunications.

Basis D does not evidence impermissible repetition.

The Mass AG has been specifically instructed by this Board not to be overly repetitive in setting forth bases.

The procedural solution chosen was to make reference to other contentions and bases instead of setting forth the same allegations again and again.

stall In addition to the points made by the Applicants, Staff misreads Basis C.2.

The ORO did not establish that it can i

establish actual emergency communications with the non-participating governments.

Even if the governments are non-participating, ORO could exercise its c'pacity to reach these governments instead of simply contacting the FEMA Control Cell.

tWLEX.-1 r

tio obj ect i.ons.

l ItAG_EX-10 (to protective actions for schools and daycare l

children]

i The Applicants object only to Basis G, while the Staff l

objects to Bases A, D,

E, and G.

As to Basis A, Staff objects "to the extent Basis A 1

concerns FEHA's performance at the control cell, not the 21 -

performance of the ORO."

Basis A asserts that the Exercise demonstrated that the School Liaisons have too many calls to make, and too much information to exchange, to keep all schools (and day care /nursety schoo1*) adequately informed in a timely manner As support for th':3 assertion, the basis notes that even under the optimum..iriumstances of the Exercise -- where each call to simulatec School officials at the Control Cell was made and 'oncluded in an unrealistically rapid manner -- the School Liaisons wers not able to make all their calls and exchange information at a rapid enough pace to keep all the schools adequately informed in a timely fashion.

This basis, therefore, contains no FEMA issue at all.

FEMA did just what the Exercise called for.

True, those in the contro'. cell were unrealistically compliant, cooperative, and brief in answering and responding to calls, but this was not the source of the l

fundamental problem that ORO's School Liaisons confronted.

The l

problem is that the Liaisons have too many calls to make and

[

i too much information to exchange to keep all the schools l

r adequately informed in a timely fashion.

Even when those in i

i the control cell allowed each call to be made easily and l

l quickly, ORO's liaisons could not complete all necessary calls in a timely fashion.

Applicar.ts did not object to the reference to FEMA in this basis.

This may be because in defending this contention / basis Applicants may wish to claim e

that ORO could have completed its calls faste. if the Control '

Cell had been more cooperativo.

If the Applicants wer>

ling to stig ulate that the phone calls made during the Exercise were handled by t.he Control Cell in the most expeditious way possible, then neither side need meniion FEMA here at all.

But in the absence of such a stipulat'.on,. whether each of the Liaisons' calls was unrealistically short or long remains a live issue in this basis.

Staff also objects to Basis D on the ground that "it raises 1

an issue regarding the content of EBS issues [ sic] which has j

already been admitted as JI Contention 35 and it should not be litigated here as well."

Staff does not state with any specificity what that issue is.

If Staff is suggesting simply that a plan contention which challenges plans and procedures on l

a given topic (here EBS messages) preemptr any further inquiry l

into how those plans and procedures were implemented during an l

Exercise, there is absolutely no legal support for this suggestion.

This basis alleges essentially that during the Exercian ORO's efforts to communicate its PAR to schools and parents were so uncoordinated, confusing, and conflicting that PAR implementation would likely have been frustrated by general f

confusion and chaotic, independent actions.

The content of the EBS ruessages at 2:20 p.m.

and 4:03 p.m.

are an integral part of this basis.

While they may have been based on a generic pre-scripted mecsages, they contain many elements which were scripted during the Exercise to address specific events _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _

occurring then.

These messages, the context of this Exercise, were confusing and conflicting and were likely to have had serious adverse consequences.

All of Basis D is admissible.

Basis E is also objected to by Staff but not the Applicants.

Basis E asserts essentially that the Exercise demonstrated that the ORO's School Liaisons do not have the time to assess whether schools know how to implement proper sheltering and offer advice how to do it.

Basis E further asserts that this a serious defect in implementation capability, given that the SpMC contains no school-specific emergency plans and that schools have no plans or instructions of their own for implementing sheltering.

Staff claims that Basis E "raises a planning issue, not an exercise issue concerning the absence of school specific plans."

The Mass. AG admits that the lack of school-specific plans has been raised and admitted as a plan contention, but that is not the focus of Basis E and the Mass AG has no intention cf re-litigating that issue here.

The central factual allegation in Basis B, however, is that the Exerc!se demonstrated that ORO's School Liaisons do not have the time to advise the schools on how to implement sheltering.

Granted, if the Board finds in the plan litigation that the schools do have school-specific emergency plans which include plans, procedures, and personnel assignments which provide

<csonable assurance that sheltering o

can be adequately implemented by the schools themselves, then the need to have ORO's School Liaisons instruct the schools regarding sheltering will be obviated.

Basis E should be admitted conditionally with this understanding.

Basis G is objected to by both the Applicants and Staff.

Both misread Basis G to be a generic teacher role conflict contention, which it is not.

Basis G is specifically designed not be a direct challenge to the generic "realism" argument for teachers, but it does assert that in the specific titcumstances that existed during the Exercise -- especially ORO's mis-steps, delays, and confused and erroneous messages -- the realism argument fails, tio one in previous litigation of the teacher role conflict issue has contended that there are absolutely no 1

limits on the teacher "realism" doctrine, i.e.,

that teachers will stay at the schools with the students no matter whe:.

happens, no matter how ill-informed the schools are, no matter J

how confusing and inaccurate the EBS messages are, no matter i

which way the plume is blowing, and no matter how delayed the i

buses are in arriving at the schools.

This contention asserts that during this Exercise ORO's performance was so poor in

(

numerous respects regarding the schools that, in the context posited in this Exercise (e.g.,

a plume of radiation known to 1

be heading right at the Mass. EpZ towns), there is no reasonable assurance that there would have been sufficient teachers left in the schools to accompany the students on the

(

r

! I I

buses.

The basis does not assert that teachers would abandon the children altogether.

Perhaps they would have loaded the children into cats and fled.

The point is, however, that there is no reasonable assurance that ORO's PAR for the schools -- to have the teachers hold the students in schools until ORO's buses arrived to evacuate them -- could have been in.plemented.

This basis should not be rejected.

The issues it raises have not been previously litigated.

MAG _EK-11 (re ORO's ability to make appropriate PARS]

The Applicants have no objections.

The Staff does not object generally to the contenton or any of the bases, but they do raise a few caveats.

First, the Staff asserts that "PARS in

[

the plan" should not be litigated as part of the Exercise

(

litigation.

The Mass. A.G.

is not at all sure what "PARS in the plan" the Staff is referring to.

The PARS in the plan are j

l not pre-determined.

ORO must exercise substantial discretion in each instance, weighing such factors as plant parameters, projected plant deterioration / improvement, wind speed / direction both current and projected, other weather factors, readinoss of I

evacuation support personnel, and what the State

! New f

Hampshire is doing.

What appears to be somewhat f

pre-determined, and may be what the staff is referring to, is i

the precautionary beach closing, which according to the plans will not be recommended prior to the declaration of an SAE.

! l i

l

o j

Basis B(1) asserts that events during the Exercise revealed that the SPMC is fundamentally flawed due to its failure to permit ORO to consider a precautionary beach closing at the Alert stage.

This is an ordinary and prop ~' Exercise contention / basis.

The focus is whether events during the j

Exercise did or did not demonstrate this part of the plan to be fundamentally flawed.

Staff also asserts that matters concerning "shadow evacuation" in Basis B(1) were previously litigated.

The Mass. A.G.

disagrees.

Shadow evacuation is a term that has been applied to describe various concepts.

Basis B(1) refers to a "shadow" beach evacuation in the Massachusetts beach areas if New Hampshire closes its beaches at the Alert stage and Massachusetts dot not.

This "shadow" concept has not been previously litigated.

In the New Hampshire hearings, the "shadow" cocnepts considered -- concentric and keyhole evacuation "shadows" -- focussed on the percentage of the permanent resident population that would evacuate after a beach closing (of both Mass, and N.H.

beaches) and also after an order to evacuate a given ERPA.

The issue of what percentage of the Mass, beach population would leave the Mass, beach areas after a closing of the N.H.

beaches was not presiously litigated.

The focus here is completely different, on transients rather thaa permanent residents; so the percentages would likely be higher than those for permanent residents o

(which the experts agreed could reach 50% or higher).

Furthermore, the ETE study litigated in the NHRERP hearings assumed that the beaches in Mass. would be closed simultaneously with those in N.H.; so this issue never arose there.

Finally, Staff's last caveat is that to the extent that Dasis C "deals with" the population of the Massachusetts beaches, it should not be relitigated.

"Deals with" is a fairly ambiguous phrase in this context.

Basis C challenges ORO's method during the Exercise of checking on the size of the Mass, beach population.

That method was to dispatch a helicopter to fly over and assess the size of the beach population that day.

This contention / basis "deals with" that method of checking the size of what we all know to be a highly variable beach population.

Unless the Staff seriously wishes to challenge the notion that the beach population is highly variable in the summertime, the Mass. A.G.

does not intend to resurrect this issue.

Also the size of the beach population on the day of the Exercise, or any other day, is not put in issue by this contention / basis.

BAG _EL-12 (Regarding early notification and instruction to the public)

Applicants do not object to this contention so long as Dases C and D are rejected.

The Staff objects to each of the bases.

Basis A alleges that NHY's ORO failed to meet Exercise objective 12 in that it did not alert the public and begin dissemination of its instructional messages within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate state officials.

The Staff argues 4

that the FEMA Exercise Report at pages 76-77 "clearly shows" that the sirens were sounded within 15 minutes of the decision to sound the sirens in each case.

Not only is this an improper attempt to argue the factual merits at the contention stage, the FEMA Exercise Report is not cear on this point at all.

The FEMA Exercise Report pages referred to give a "pA Decision Time" of 1210 for ORO's first public notification, but when one reads FEVA's discussion of Objective 12 at pages 214-215 of the report, it is hardly clear when the "decision to sound the siten," was made.

This more detailed discussion indicates only that at 1210 a draft instructional (presumably EBS) message was faxed to the Governor's representative.

The Mass. A.G.

intends to prove that the decision to alert the public by sounding the sirens occurred prior to 1210.

Furthermore, the Staff reveals that it has fundamentally misapprehended Objective 12 when it argues that the objective was met because FEMA's Exercise Report clearly shows "the sirens were sounded" within the 15 minute time period.

Objective 12 on its face sets forth a 15 minute period which ends not when the sirens were first sounded but some minutes later when the dissemination of an instructional message (an EBS message) begins.

The Mass.

A.G. 3

l j

contends that this 15 minute period was exceeded by the OPO during the Exercise.

The Staff objections to this Basis have no merit.

Basis D alleges that even if ORO is found to have met Exercise Objective 12 (that it could "begin" dissemination of an instructional EBS message within 15 minutes of a governmental decision to alert and notify the public), it did not demonstrate that it could "essentially complete" the l

l initial notification of the public within 15 minutes as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, SIV.D.3 (emphasis e

supplied).

The Basis alleges that a regulatory 15-minute i

criterion for alert and notification systems set forth in Appendix E requires that the public actually he giycn the instructional EBS message within the 15 minute period, not just i

that the message begi.n.

Basis B alleges that if one includes the time needed to read the EDS messages through once -- at least to the point in each where the information offered begins to be repeated -- for each occasion on Day 1 of the Exercise when the alert and notification system was utilized, the 15 minuto criterion set forth in the regulations was exceeded.

The Staff charges that the Mass. A.G.

has misread the regulation, which Staff claims refers only to the siten system and not instructional messages.

The fact is that the Mass.

A.G.

has not misread the regulation the Staff has, The regulation states, in relevant part, as follows:

3.

By February 1, 1982, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing pIompt insituctions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EpZ.

. n.

The design objective of the prompt public notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EpZ within about 15 minutes.

The use of this notification capability will range from immediate notification of the public (within 15 i

minutes of the time that state and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the state and local governmental officials to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public notification system.

i 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,

$IV.D.3 (emphasis supplied).

In the context of the entire regulation, the only logical i

interpretation of the "prompt public notification system" is that it has two components" (1) "alerting" (i.e., sirens) and (2) prompt instructions to the public" (i.e., EDS messages).

This view -- that there are two components to the "public notification system -- is supported not only by a logical l

reading of the regulation itself; it is supported by each and every other regulation or guidance document which concerns this subject.

First, there is the applicable 550.47(b) planning standard, Section 50.47(b)(5), which requires, intcl Al.ia, that r

31 -

O e

there be a "means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace".

There is no doubt that this planning standard encompasses "instruction to the populace."

NUREG-0654, Rev.

1, Supp.

1, sets forth the following "Evaluation Criteria" for this portion of the $50.47(b)(5) planning standard:

4.

The offsite response organization shall establish administrative and physical means, and the time required for notifying and providing pLomp1_init.Luctions to thc. publiC within the plume exposure pathway Emergency planning Zone (see Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-rep-1, Rev. 1).

It shall be the licensee's responsibility to demonstrate that such means exist, regardless of who implements this requirement.

The offsite response organization shall have the administrative and physical means to activate the system.

NUREG-0654, Rev.

1, Supp.

1, at 11 (emphasis supplied).

When one refers to Appendix 3, as this evaluation criteria suggests, one finds the following "Criteria for Acceptance" of the prompt notification system:

1.

Within the plume exposure EpZ the system s h a ll _p tnri de_an..alu rling_s i g naLand not i f.i_tition_hy_conne tciALD LQAdCa S t._12 ug u ERS1 plus special systems such as NOAA radio.

A system which expects the recipient to turn on a radio receiver without being alerted by an acoustic alerting signal or some other manner is not acceptable.

2.

The minimum acceptable design objectives for coverage by the system are:

a)

Capability f or providing hath_An a lett _119n alan d_ a n. _infmma t inna Lo t initLuctional. message to the population on an area wide basis throughout the 10 mile EpZ, within 15 minutes.

i i

NUREG-0654, Rev, l.,

Supp.

1, Appendix 3 at 3-3 (emphasis supplied).

Further support for the conclusion that the 15-minute regulatory criterion encompasses both an alerting signal (sirens) and an EBS instructional message is found by examining FEMA's guidance document for alert and notification systems:

FEMA-REP-10, entitled "Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants."

It repeats, word for word, the NUREG planning standard and criteria for acceptance set forth above.

FEMA-rep-10 at E-3 and E-5.

FEMA also has are informative Guidance Memorandum (AN-1) which describes the policy and procedures to be followed by FEMA in assessing and making findings and determinations on the adequacy of alert and notification systems installed around nuclear power plants.

This Guidance Memorandum, dated April i

21, 1987, states that it was issued "subsequent to review and i

concurrence by NRC staff who have determined that it provides clarification and interpretation of existing NUREG-0654/ FEMA-rep-1, Revision 1, criteria applicable to the revie4 of alert and notifiation systems."

FEMA Guidance l

Memorandum AH-1 at 8. to AN-1 is entitled "Alert i

and Notification Time Requirements," and it states that its piirpose is to "elaborate upon the accepted FEMA interpretation of alert and notification system design objectives outlined in i

i 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Appendix 3, and l

t t

t t l r

i r

FEMA-rep-10 that relate to alert and notification system activation and timing."

AN-1, Appendix 1 at I-1.

Among the background information and interpretations contained in Appendix 1 of AN-1 are the following:

i "The alert is considered to be the warning signal and the notification is considered to be the issuance of public instructions via the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) or other systems.

Id2 at I-2.

A very important aspect of the formal FEMA process for reviewing and approving alert and notification systems is confirming that the design objectives and requirements outlined above have been met.

In confirming alert and notification sytem capability, FEMA must consider a conservative scenario, i.e, the condition requiring system activation and issuance of an instructional message by offsite authorities within 15 minutes of notification by the licensee that immediate protective actions are required.

NRC Rule 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requires that licensees have the capability to notify responsible offsite officials within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency.

Similarly offsite, in extreme situations with no decision-making time available, the capability must exist to activate the system and broadcast an instructional message within 15 minutes of notification by the licensee; or if decision-making time is available, the capability must exist to activate the system and broadcast an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by the responsible official to warn the population.

While FEMA and HPC require that this 15 minute capability exist, it is recognized that not all emergency conditions will necessitate offsite notification within as short a time as 15 minutes."

Id.

Except for "extremely rural, low populaton areas beyond 5 miles" (which do not exist in the Massachusetts EPZ), "[a}lert and notification systems must be capable of

- 34

providing an alert signal and an instructional message wittiin__15_ minute,n Ld.

(emphasis in original).

In all situations the time frames for activating the alert and notification system are measured from the point at which the designated official, or offical if two or more jurisdictions are involved, reaches a decision which necessitates the activation of the alert and notification system.

As indicated in the chart below, there is decision-making time availaole to offsite officials that should not be calculated in the 15 or 45 minutes, a

The following chart illustrates the key steps in the alert and notification pro:ess:

IlMING_CliARI Alert Signal Authorized Public Activated and Official Reaches Instructional Licensee Decision Which Re-Message Issued Emergency Notifies quires Activating via Emergency Declaration Public the Alert and Moti-Broadcast at by a Utility Officials fication System Other Systems

-- 15 M i nu t e s ---

Varies

--- 15 ( o r 4 5 ) Mi nu t es -

u a

ir 1r t

Decision-making Time for public Officials Varies From Virtually No Time Available In A Fast-Breahing Accident To Substantial Time In A Slowly Evolving Accident Id. at I-3.

In summary, an evaluation of the applicable regulations and all relevant guidance documents reveals that in timing activities to determine whether the 15-minute criterion has been met, the stopwatch is not to be stopped until an instructional message is issued via the Emergency Broadcast System.

Basis B properly alleges that the alere and notificaton activities that the regulations require to be completed in 15 minutes took longer to complete during the Exercise.

Basis C alleges that the excessive times it took the VANS drivers to drive during the Exercise from their staging areas b

to their acoustic locations demonstrated that in a fast breaking accident most of the sirens could not be sounded promptly enough to issue an EBS message within the prescribed 15-minute period.

Both the Applicants and the Staff object to Basis C on the grounds that the adequacy of the VANS, including travel times for VANS routes, is currently being litigated before the onsite Licensing Board.

The contention before the onsite board is a plan contention, one which challenges the adequacy of the VANS plans qua plans.

This contention is an exercise contention, one which alleges that events during the exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the plans.

Even if portions of plans are found to be adequate on their face, exercises are important for the very reasoa that they can reveal that portions of plans cannot be implemented in the real world.

Nevertheless, having said this, the Mass. A.G. does admit that it is conceivable that in the course of litigation of the VANS contention by the on-site Board, the merits of the VANS drivers' performance during the Exercise may be addressed.

In that event, the Mass. A.G. will not seek to re-litigate this issue here.

This basis should be conditionally admitted with this understanding.

Basis D alleges that an excessive length of time occurred during the Exercise from the declaration of the SAE and GE to the completion of the public notification of the protective actions recommended in response to each of these ECLs.

Both the Applicants and the Staff object claiming that there is no regulatory basis (Staff) or criteria (Applicants) for judging whether these times were excessive.

While it is true that no specific quantitative time criterion exists in the regulations to assess this entire process (from ECL dolcaraton through issuance of an EDS message in response to the ECL), the regulations do express an important qualitative standard that this whole process be completed "early" or "promptly".

0 Planning standard (b)(5) requires that there be the means '

to provide "early notification and clear instruction to the populace."

10 CFR $50.47(b)(5).

In addition, Appendix E,Section IV.D.1 repeats this general standard:

the plans must describe "(aldministrative and physical means for the prompt notification of the public."

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 5/

NUREG-0654, Rev.

1.

Supp. 1 makes clear that the term "means" here includes both the "administrative and the physical means."

NUREG-0654, Rev.

1, Supp.

1, SII.E.4 at 11.

O E, SIV.D.l.

This is meant to be a broad qualitative standard, as all the general planning standards are.

Appendix E, SIV.D ther goes on in 13 to break the entire prompt notification process into three phases and establishes a more specific standard for each one:

1.

From ECL declaration to the point where public officials are notified:

"A licensee shall have the capacity to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency."

10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, SIV.D.3.

2.

From the notification of public officials to the point at which they make a decision which necessitates the activation of the public alert and notification system: "The licensee shall demonstrate that state / local officials have the capability to mahe a public notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition."

id.

3.

From the decision which requires the activation of the public notification system to the point at which the issuance of the EDS nassage has been completed:

"The design objective of the prompt public notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notifical. ion of the public within the plume exposure pathway EpZ within about 15 minutes."

Id.

The third of these 3 Section IV.D.3 standards is alleged in Basis B not to have been met.

This basis (Basis C), in l

challenging that the total length of time from ECL to EBS completion (i.e.,

all three phases in the process) was excessive, essentially seeks to apply the more general standard of 50.47(b)(5) and SIV.D.1 -- that the whole process is too l l

slow to provide "early" or "prompt" notification to the populace.

Thus, even if the third phase standard (the 15-minute public notification criterion) were met, the time consumed during the first two phases was too long for the whole process to be found to provide "early" or "prompt" notification.

Similarly, if the third phase standard (the 15-minute public notification criterion) were not met, the times for the first two phases were not sufficiently short for the whole process to be found to provide "prompt" or "early" notification.

In summary, Basis D alleges that an extremely impoitant qualitative regulatory standard was not met.

As FEMA states in its guidance memorendum (GM AN-1) for alert and notification systems:

"The provisions of timely and appropriate alerting and notification could be one of the most critical aspects of protecting the public in the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant."

AN-1 at I-1.

blAG _EX - 13.

(re ORO's ability to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access)

The contention sets forth four bases (paragraphs A through D).

Applicants object generally to the entire contention, and to certain aspects of Bases A, B and C.

Staff objects only to Basis C, but would only admit the facts recited in Beses A, B

and D.

The general objections the Applicants raise are not all specific enough to terpond to directly, but one objection _

a appears to be that this contention and its bases do not allege f und ainent a l flaws.

There can be no doubt, however, that an exercise which demonstrates an inability to control evacuation traffic flow or to implement adequate access control has demonstrated a fundamental flaw.

See Long_IslanLLight.ing Comnany (Shorcham fluclear power Station, Unit 1), LBp-87-88-2, 27 flRC 85, 131 (1988).

Also, in their always entertaining sesquipedalian way, the Applicants object on the grounds that the contention / bases exhibit "superfluity."

If a contention can be rejected because the basis and snecificity requirements have been over-met, this is a new one on us.

If what the Applicants really seek is a shortened re-draft of the contention -- just as the parties have cooperated in daing with the SPMC contentions -- the Mass AG would be happy to oblige.

Applicants' more serious objections, and those of the Staff, are that the various bases raise issues of human behavior and ETEs already litigated or admitted for litigation in the SPMC "plan" case before this Board.

We wish that Applicants and Staff had identified the specific sub-issues of human behavior and ETEs raised in this contention to which they object.

We sincerely do not know what facets of the bases are the targets of their objections.

For this reason, we ask the ficard to impose the same kind of "specificity" requirement on objections to contentions that licensing boards apply to contentions themselves:

if the objection does not put the l

['

opposing party on fair notice of what exactly is being objected to, the objection should be disregarded.

A patty seeking to reply to objections to contentions should not have to guess at l

l what specific parts of the contention are being objected to.

That is the case here, as to both the Applicants' and the Staff's objections, and we hereby move that these generalized, i

vague, unspecific objections be disregarded.

In the event that the Board denies this motion, however, the Mass AG offers these comments regarding some of the aspects of the bases which are, braodly speaking, human behavior issues.

We are guessing that these may be the focus of the j

generalized, vague objection that the bases raise issues of l

human behavior and ETEs already litigated or currently admitted l

l for litigation before this Board.

l l

Basis A asserts that during the Exercise NHY's ORO feiled l

l to dispatch and deploy its Traffic Guides in a timely enough fashion after the beach closings in New Hampshire and Massachusetts for them to arrived at key beach-road TCPs before vehicles streaming from the beach areas would have filled ur both lanes of Route 286 and 1A in Salisbury and the Plum Island Turnpike.

While Chief Olivera and other NHRERP witnesses may have discussed how evacuating beschgoers would fill up both lanes of the two-lane egress roads, the assumption for this discussion was that Traffic Guides were in place at each of the beach egress road TCPs.

Here. Basis A asserts something entirely l

l different:

that with no traffir guidos in place at all, l

evacuating beach area vehicles would fill up both lanes of l

traffic on the key beach egress roads.

This issue has not been previously litigated.

Another driver behavior issue is found in Basis B, which asserts that during the Exercise the evacuation was well underway throughout the EPZ before attempts were made to institute traffic control.

In the absence of traffic control prior to that point, traffic disorderliness throughout the EPZ would have become widespread and intractable.

Again, what would happen to traffic if there were no traffic Cantini for an hour or so after an evacuation PAR was issued was not an issue previously litigated.

Basis B further asserts that once traffic disorderliness had become widespread, there is no reasonable assurance that efforts to implement the SPMC's traffic control strategies would have been successful, especially by non-uniformed ORO Traffic Guides.

No prior litigrtion in this case has addressed the issue whether non-uniformed traffic guides can control traffic once widespread traffic disorderliness occurs, Nor is this issue presently pending before this Board in an SPMC "plan" contention, Basis C asserts that the Exercise revealed that ORO's Traffic Guides at ACP's will actually attempt to XLop t r a f f ic seeking to enter the EPZ as a step in the process of seeking to,

l l

l

1 "discourage" all but returning commuters and appropriate emergency responders from entering the EPZ.

Basis C then explains why stopping vehicles at ACPs is an extremely bad idea in the early stages of an evacuation.

The litigation of the i

NHRERP did touch on problems involved in implementing access control in New Hampshire, but that litigation did not focus on situations where traffic was actually being stopped upon entry.

The NHRERP called for traffic to be "discouraged," not stopped.

What "discouraged" meant was explored, but no witness said it meant that traffic would be stopped and warned.

This issue of stopping inbound vehicles at ACPs has not been directly and fully addressed.

As to Basis D, the Staff does have one specific objection:

that the basis contains "speculation" that the impediment "would have led to blocking of three separate area."

First, we are not aware of the rule that prohibits the pleader of an exercise contention from seeking to explain why a performance problem identified in an exercise was significant, serious, and/or fundamental by alleging what would likely have happened as a consequence if the problems had occurred during a real l

l radiological emergency.

Second, what lines of traffic would have been blocked by this road impediment is not pure "speculation" anyway, as the eveidence we intend to present will show.

It is a logical, reasoned inference, supported by the facts.

- 43

MAG _EX-14:

tre medical facilities, equipment and procedures.)

The Applicants correctly describe Basis A as alleging that the scope of the Exercise was insufficient, and they apparently have no objection to its admission so long as it is litigated under other "scope" contentions.

The Mass AG replies that this basis is in its proper place.

It is one of three factors (Bases A, B and C) which collective)y prove this fundamental flaw which is the contention: that there is no reasonabic assurance that there are adequate medical facilities, equipment, procedures and personnel for holding contaminated, injured or exposed individuals.

Both the Applicants and the Staff object to Basis B on the grounds that tnis basia does not assert a fundamental flaw.

There is no requirement, however, that each and every basis in an exetcise contention allege a fundamental flaw.

Contentions cust allege fundamental flaws, not each separate basis in a multiple basis contention; and this contention unquestionably alleges a fundamental flaw -- the inadequacy of medical facilities, equipment, procedures and personnel.

Moreover, the contention states: "Exercise results which individually and/or collectively form the basis for thic contention include the following: (followed by paragraphs A, B and C.)"

Thus, the intent here is to look at the collective weight of all three patagraphs in judging whether the fundamental flaw test is

- 44

l l

met.

While paragraph B may not be as weighty as A or C, it clearly adds some weight to support the overall proposition that medical facilities, equipment and procedures are inadequate.

Basis B is also objected to on the grounds that it simply expresses the Mass AG's more dislike for using a morgue as a decontamination facility.

The Mass AG replies that it intends to present expert testimony on this issue; our expressions of liku or dislike are not material here.

We ask to Board to reserve final judgement on this issue until it has reviewed this testimony, and that presented by our opponents, and then j

evaluated whether this morgue is an appropriate decontamination l

l facility.

The Applicants object to Basis C, while the Staff does l

not.

Basis C ausetts that both the medical and nursing staff 1

l at the one hospital tested did not adequately understand the biological effects of radiation and the significance of counts per minute, contamination, and millirems of does rates.

Staff argues that this does not rise to the status of a fundamental flaw.

As noted above, however, this paragraph alone does not have to allege a fundamental flaw; the contention itself doen.

1 Nevertheless, we contend that where the personnel in the only hoscital tested display a lack of understanding of some of the most basic concepts needed to treat contaminated persons, a fundamental flaw does exist: there is no reasonable assurance that contaminated individuals will be adequately handled.

It is not as if theco personnel were caught by surprise on a bad day using their back-up medical team.

They knew about the Exercise in advance, had an opportunity to prepare for it, and this is how they performed.

Basis C clearly adds weight to the overall significance of the matters raised in MAG EX-14.

1 MAG _EX-li:

(re training)

The Applicants have no objection other than their "nullity" argument (previously described).

The Staff objects generally, however, arguing that the contention is vague and fails to cite l

any facts to support the general proposition that training is l

l deficient.

The Mass. AG disagrees.

This contention meets all pleading requirements.

A recent 1988 Appeal Board decision confirmed that the following Appeal Board language in a 1987 Comanche _Ecah decision still dqscribes the proper standard:

The base; requirement is merely a pleading requirement designed to make certain that a proffered issue is sufficiently articulated to provide the other parties with its broad outlines and to provide the Licensing Board with enough information for determining whether the issue is appropriately litigable in the instant proceeding.

The requirement generally is fulfilled when the sponsor of an otherwise acceptable contention provides a brief recitation of the factors underlying the contention or references to documents and texts that provide such rea ons.

But the fact that a contention complies with the baues requirement of section 2.714(b) does not mean that the issue is destined to go to hearing -- such a cot.tention is subject to being rejected on the merits prio to trial under the summary disposition provisions of the Rules of Practice.

l Elorida_ tower _&_ Lighting _ company (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-893, 27 HRC 627, 630 (1988) cLLing Texas titLllLies_IlictLLc_Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), AI.A D-8 6 8, 25 NRC 912, 930 (1987)(footnotes omitted).

This contention meets that standard.

Each of the fattors underlying the contention is briefly recited and there are references to documents (the FEMA Exercise Report and the other MAG Exercise contentions themselves) that provide further support for the factors recited.

By way of additional reply, the Mass AG notes that in the litigation of the exercise conducted at Shoreham in 1986 a training contention (EX-50) very similar to this one was admitted.

It had nine subparts (A-1) which alleged, based on references to the FEMA Report and to other contentions, that the Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO plan in that LERO personnel were unable to carry out the Plan effectively or accurately because they had been inadequately trained.

S ite L ong_Lil_a nd_L ig h ting _Com a rny (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-2, 27 NRC 85, 174 (1988).

After this LILCO training contention was litigated, the Board found a number of serious deficiencies in LILCO's training program which, together, precluded a finding of reasonable assurance and therefore constituted a fundamental flaw.

Id. at 212.

As a practical matter, the Mass. A.G. notes that it has no desire to litigate any factual matter a second time in the course of litigating this training contention.

In the Shoreham proceedingr,, the ASLB emphasized when it admitted the training contention that it would hear evidence only once on each admitted factual matter in dispute regardless of whether it pertained to the training contention or some other referenced contention.

S e e Lo o g__I sland_.Ida hting_Compa ny, (Shoreham Nuclear power Station, Unit 1), ASLBP No. 86-533-01-OL (unpublished Prehearing Conference Order), October 3, 1986, at 30.

That appears to be the logical way to proceed here too.

MAG _EK-16 :

(re field monitoring and projecting dosage to the public]

l The Staff has no objection.

The Applicants object to Basis l

C, first by asserting that even if it were true it does not I

support the contention, which they claim alleges merely a 1

failure to adequately project doses.

Applicants read the contention too narrowly, however.

It asserts that the Exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the SPMC and the ORO's preparedness with regard to the 50.47(b)(9) Planning Standard and an accompanying NUREG-0654 evaluation criteria and that, as a result, Exercise Objective 10 (to protect dosage based, intet alia, on field data) was not met.

The (b)(9) standard requires:

"[aldequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency."

Among those methods and systems should be the ability to _

i effectively communicate field data to personnel responsiale for assessing and recommending PARS.

See NUREG-0654, Rev.

1, Supp.

1, S II.I.8.

The ability to utilize this data is obviously necessary to adequately project doses, as Objective 10 i

requires.

This basis should be admitted.

FIAG_EX-LI:

(re rumor c,ntrol at the JTIC)

The contention alleges three bases (A-C).

The Applicants object to Basis A while the Staff objects to A and B.

]

Basis A asserts that the Exercise demonstrated that the e

l JTIC rumor control staff cannot handle enough calls simultaneously to adequately control rumors.

Applicants assert that this basis "does not appear to have any basis even remotely related to thu exercise."

Staff asserts that A is mere speculation and does not evidence a fundamental flaw.

Not so.

Observations of the rumor control staff made during the l

Exercise, by FEMA and by Intervenors' observers, are che i

i foundation for this basis.

The problem observed is that (.ven l

the length of time an average call took to handle and the I

number of rumor control personnel who could work simultaneously j

j on calls (given that each one had to spend time aLL the phones J

J (1) learning what was happening Lt the Seabrook Station, what

!]

all response organizatior.s were doing, and what pars were in effect; and (2) taking breaks), the maximum number of calls the l

rumor control staff demonstrated that it can handle per hour is

) I i

t inadequate.

The rumor control staff simply does not have the i

ability to handle enough calls to adequately control rumors, given the large volume of calls that must realistically be f

expected.

As to the "fundamental flaw" concern, we again

)

reiterate that this is a contention standard, not a basis i

standard.

Staff and the Applicants agree that the contention in admissible because of other bases; therefore they have conceded that the contention (supported by those bases) alleges I

a fundamental flaw.

Basis A adds substantial weight to the I

i seriousness of the flaws which support this contention.

i

)

Moreover, we would argue that an inability to control rumors i

would be a fundamental flaw were it to be pleaded as a separate

[

l contention, i

j Staff objects to Basis B, apparently on the grounds that it l

is not a proper "scope of the exercise" issue.

The basis l

asserts that the Exercise was designed (by the Applicants) such

{

i I

that the JTIC rumor control staff received phone calls from the I

FEMA control call at the very leisurely pace of only five calls i

per hour.

Thus, the personnel did not demonstrate that they I

could operate an effective rumor control system in a l

coordinated and timely fashion under conditions which would likely exist during a real emergency, 12m., many more calls.

Appendix E.

Section IV.F requires that exercises "shall test f

the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures I

l and methods."

This basis asserts that the JTIC's procedures i

1 I

I 4 1

and methods for handling a high vo'ume of calls was not adequately tested.

Staff's reference to the definition of "full participation" in note 4 of S IV.F.1 is not relevant to this discussion.

No one is claiming that insufficient rumor I

control staff were tested.

MAQ_EK-13:

(re monitoring and decontaminating evacuees]

1 Both the Applicants and the staff object only to the reference to pets

's Basis G.

Although there is no specific requirement under NRC regulations for monitoring of pets, the public health and safety does require that this issue of pets be dealt with before any "reasonable assurance" finding can be made.

In the event of a contaminating release, some procedures must be in place to detect contamination on animals who may be brought to the reception centers.

Otherwise, a puolic health hazard would be created by those pets which are contaminated leaving the reception centers wiF their contamination undetected.

These contaminated pets would be a health hazard to all those who thereafter came in contact with them.

In addition, a further I

hazard to public health will be created if people are told they l

l are not to bring their pets with them to the reception centers.

This may disco:irage many put owners who should themselves be monitored for contamination from coming to t reception centers.. - - -

e (MG_EX_ll:

[re the licensee's PARS]

This contention asserts that those implementing the Geabrook Station Radiological Plan did not issue appropriate PARS to the offsite response organizations.

There are four supporting bases (A-D).

The Applicants object to Bases A, C

and D.

The Staff objects to Bases A, B(2) and C.

Basis A contains a typographical error in the first line.

The reference should have been to MAG EX-11, not EX-19.

We apologize for the confuson this may have caused, although we think that a fair-minded reader wold have realized this to be an error and that the reference was meant to be to EX-11, the only contention incorporated therein which directly challenges the appropriateness of the ORO's PARS.

In the event that confusion may have nevertheless resulted, the Mass AG has no objection if either the Staff or the Applicants wish to file a supplemental objection to Basis A as corrected.

Applicants stated objection to Basis A is apparently that, even if it were true, it does not support the contention.

We disagree.

The contention asserts that during the Exercise the licensee issued inappropriate pars.

Basis A incorporates MAG EX-11, which details why those very PARS for Massachusetts (which were adopted by ORO) were inadequate.

The focus here in on the licensee's pars for Massachusetts (wer; they adequate PARS or not), not whether ORO did or did not follow them.

For

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this same reason, the Staff's objection that Basis A fails to raise an exercise related issue is without merit.

Staff's complaint that the basis is vague is meritless as well given the reference to MAG EX-11.

Staff objects to Basis B.2 on the grounds that is concerns protective actions outaide the plume exposure EPZ.

Bais B.2 refers to the PARS for Stratham, Greenland, New Castle, Rye and Portsmouth -- all of which are cities and towns inside the plume exposure EPZ in New Hampshire.

The Applicants and Staff object to Basis C on the Grounds that it concerns protective action recommendations for Kittery, Maine, which is outside the plume exposure EPZ.

Staff and Applcants both assert that there is no requirement that ad hac protecti actions beyond the plume exposure EPZ be exercised.

This misses the point.

Bcsis C does not allege that Maine's ability to implement ad ho.c protective actions was not exercised.

It asserts simply that the licensee should have issued a PAR for Kittery, Maine, and that it did not do so.

As Basis C states, NUREG-0654 does not excuse the licensee from issuing PARS to areas outside the EPZ when information available to the licensee (and not available to the out-of-EPZ officials) indicates a need to do so.

To the contrary, HUREG-0654 implies that this will happen -- otherwise, how would those out-of-EPZ officials know that ad h_oc protective actions need to be taken.

S_ce NUREG--654, Rev.

1, S I.D.2 at 11 ("On the other hand, for the worst possible accidents, protective action would need to be taken outside the planning zones.") and at 12 ("d.

detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary.")

Basis C actually alleges a defect in the "detailed emergency planning within 10 miles" that precludes an "expansion of response efforts" into Maine, Lte.,

the Seabrook Station plan fails to ensure that Maine will be notified of projected movements into Maine of plumes that have the potential of exceeding PAGs.

This is an extremely important issue, and it has been properly raised.

The Applicants object to Besis D on the grounds that becau:e the METpAC computer model has been part of the onsite plan and the NHRERp and has gone unchallenged, this asis is an unwarranted attempt to reopen a closed record.

We disagree.

This is an exercise contention alleging that the June 28-29, 1988, full participation e::ercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the licensee's radiological emergency response plan, Lee,

that its plans and procedures for issuing offsite pars are not adequate.

Fundamental flaws revealed by the Exercise are clearly litigable here.

By indicating that this contention should be admitted in any fashion, the Applicants have conceded that the contention sets forth a fundamental flaw.

The reference to the METFAC computer model in Basis D is an attempt to identify one of the sources of the problem.

It is just as..

much subject to exercise litigation as any other part of the plans, procedures, personnel or exercise capability regardless of the issues raised or not raised in any prior phase of the case:

if the Exercise has revealed a fundamental flaw, the matter is now ripe for litigation.

The record is not closed on fundamental flaws revealed by this Exercise.

MAG _EX-20

[re facilitiec, equipment, and displays)

This contention has four bases (A-D).

Both the Applicant and Staff object to all four bases.

Basis A asserts that a key SPMC facility, the Staging Area in Haverhill, was nat demonstrated during the Exercise.

The discuscion engaged in by all parties regarding whether the Haverhill facility will be available in a real emergency is important and interesting, but it is irrelevant to the admission of the Basis A.

A full-participation exercise must test "as much of the licensee, state and local emergency plans as is reasonable achievable without mandatory public participation."

10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F.1.

The Staging Area in Haverhill is a major facility relied upon in the SPMC.

There is no excuse set forth in the regulations for I

not tes' ing such a major plan f acility.

Keeping in mind that the phrase "reasonably achievaole without mandatory public participation" is to be read as one complete thought, see ALAD-900 at 30 (slip op.), it is improper to excuse the use of 1

this facility during the exercise on the grounds that its use was not "reasonable achievable."

In this situation, ALAB-900 compels that this contention / basis be admitted.

It further suggests that if the Board subsequently finds that this failure to exercise the flaverhill facility is a deficiency, either in the scope of the Exercise or otherwise, the Applicants will have an opportunity to claim that it was not possible to test this key element of the plans under the standards set forth in 10 C.F.R S 50.47 (c)(1) and 10 C.F.R.

part 50, Appendix E, S

IV.F.G.

See ALAD-900 at 33.

We are not at this stage now, however.

Basis B alleges that the Media Center was demonstrated to be inadequately equipped with certain maps and displays.

Staff and Applicants both assert that the matters raised are readily corrected and do not rise to the level of a fundamental flaw.

The Mass AG incorporates here its repeated statements regarding the applicability of the fundamental flaw standard to contentions only, not bases.

tievertheless, we believe that the matters raised are fundamental flaws, for all the reasons set forth in Basis B.

Applicants' statement that these defects are "readily corrected" is self-serving.

Assuming that the displays can "readily" be installed, however, there is no assurance that the media center personnel will know how to use them in their presentations, and a mechanism must be put in place to keep the maps and displays current.

Only another exercise can prove with reasonable assurance that these things can be accomplished.

The Mass AG withd ows Basis C.

Basis D asserts that the traffic cones displayed by ORO's Traffic Guides during the;!xercise were too small, and will be too hard to see at night, to function effectively in controlling evacuation traffic.

Both the Staff and Applicants assert that this does not taise a fundamental flaw.

Apart from the fact that that standard applies only to contentions and not bases, the Mass AG responds by saying that this is a very serious issue.

If the traffic cones are too small to adequately control traffic, and too hard to be seen at night, then ORO's ability to control evacuation traffic flow is not reasonable assured.

Applicants look at a single cone and say humorously "it is too small" to litigate.

The Mass AG replies that having the tools necessary to control evacuation traffic is no small laughing matter.

And the Exercise demonstrated that the Applicants do not have the appropriate tools.

A traffic disaster could well result if these are the kinds of traffic cones the ORO intends to use.

MAG _EX-21 (re transporting contaminated, injured individuals]

This contention contains four bases (A-D).

The Applicants and Staff both object only to Basis A.

Basis A asserts that in the context of this exercise scenario, given the uncontrolled traffic conditions that would have existed, ORO's ambulance resources would not have been adequate to transport the number of contaminated injured persons that would have needed transportation to hospitals.

Both the Applicants and the Staff object that the basis raises "human behavior issues" previously litigated, but they fail to state specifically what those issues are.

Again, the Mass AG moves to strike these vague objections which force the contention drafter to guess at tho specific target of the objection.

Clearly, all human oehavior issues that could possibly arise during a radialogical emergency have not been previously litigated.

As noted earlier in this Reply, one issue not previm; sly litigated is how traffic would behave in the Shsence of traffic controls.

Another is the rate at which accidents would occur under such circumstances, i.e.,

no traffic control.

The obvious "human behavior" issues raised by this cont antion have not been previously litigated.

Respectfully submitted, f

JAMES M.

SHAtit10!1 ATTORt1EY GE!!ERAL COMMO!1 WEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS By:

Allan R.

Fierce John Traficonte Assistant Attorneys General tiuclear Safety Unit One Ashburton place Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2200 Dated:

October 24, 1988 C X M,p. tit:

g.

c U!!ITED STATES OF AMERICA tlUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO!1 Orm D U C a s a.<

bEA:

)

In the Matter of

)

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPA!1Y OF

)

Docket 110.(s) flew liAMPSHIRE, ET AL.

)

50-443/444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)

)

(Off-site EP)

)

)

CERTIFICATE _Df_SERELCE I,

Allan R.

Fierce, hereby certify that on October 24, 1988 I made service of the within REPLY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ATTORt1EY GEllERAL TO THE RESPONSES OF THE NRC STAFF AllD THE APPLICAt1TS TO THE MASSACilUSETTS ATTORilEY GEllERAL' S EXERCISE CO!1TEllTIO!15, by First Class Mail, by hand-delivery as indicated by [*] or by Federal Express as indicated by

[**)

to the following parties:

    • Sherwin E.

Turk, Esq.

    • Docketing and Service U.S.

tJuclear Regulatory Commission U.S.

11uclear Regulatory Commission Office of General Counsel Washington, DC 20555 15th Floor 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

    • Ivan Smith, Chairman aaGustave A.

Linenberger, Jr.

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Atomic Safety L Licensing Board U.S.

fluclea r Regulatory U.S.

11uclear Regulatory Commission Commission East West Towers Building East West Towers Dc11 ding 4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Dethesda, MD 20814

    • Dr.

Jerry Harbour

    • Robert R.

Pierce, Esq.

Atomic Safety 6 Licensing Board Atomic Safety L Licensing Board U.S.

tJuclea r Regulator y U.S.

Iluclear Regulatory Commission Commission East West Towers Building East West Towers Building 4350 East West liighway 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20014

c H. Joseph Flynn, Esq.

Stephen E. Merrill Assistant General Counsel Attorney General Office of General Counsel George Dana Bisbee Federal Emergency Management Assistant Attorney General Agency Office of the Attorney General 500 C Street, S.W.

25 Capitol Street Washington, DC 20472 Concord, NH 03301

    • Docketing and Service Paul A.

Fritzsche, Esq.

U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Office of the Public Advocate Commission State House Station 112 Washington, DC.

20555 Augusta, ME 04333 Roberta C.

Pevear Diana P.

Randall State Representative 70 Collins Street Town of Hampton Falls Seabrook, NH 03874 Drinkwater Road Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Atomic Safety & Licensing Robert A.

Backus, Esq.

Appeal Board Panel Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 116 Lowell Street Commission P.O.

Box 516 Washington, DC 20555 Manchester, NH 03106 Atomic Safety & Licensing Jane Doughty Board Panel Seacoast Anti-Pollution League U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory 5 Market Street Commission Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, DC 20555 Matthew T.

Drock. Esq.

J.

P.

Nadeau Shaines & McEachern Board of Selectmen 25 Maplewood Avenue 10 Central Road P.O.

Box 360 Rye, NH 03870 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Sandra Gavutis, Chairperson Calvin A. Canney Board of Selectmen City Manager RFD 1, Box 1154 City Hall Rte. 107 126 Daniel Street Kensington, NH 03827 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Senator Gordon J.

Humphrey Angelo Machiros, Chairman U.S.

Senate Boatd of Selectmen Washington, DC 20510 25 High Road (Attn: Tom Burack)

Newbury, MA 10950 Senator Gordon J.

Humphrey Edward G.

Molin 1 Eagle Square, Suite 507 Mayor Concord, NH 03301 City Hall (Attn: Herb Boynton) tiewburyport, MA 01950 Donald E.

Chick William Lord Town Manager Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Town Hall 10 Front Street Friend Street Exeter, NH 03833 Amesbury, MA 01913 Brentwood Board of Selectmen Gary W.

Ilo lme s, Esq.

RFD Dalton Road Holmes & Ellis Brentwood, t1H 03833 47 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, 11H 03841 philip Ahrens, Esq.

Ellyn Weiss, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General liarmon & Weiss Department of the Attorney Suite 430 General 2001 S Street, 11. W.

State House Station #6 Washington, DC 20009 Augusta, ME 04333

    • Thomas G.

Dignan, Esq.

Richard A.

Hampe, Esq.

Ropes & Gray Hampe & McNicholas 225 Franklin Street 35 pleasant Street Boston, MA 02110 Concord, 11H 03301 Beverly Hollingworth Ashod N.

Amirian, Esq.

209 Winnacunnet Road 376 Main Street flampton, till 03842 Ilaverhill, MA 01830 William Armstrong Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Civil Defense Director Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Jewell Street, RFD 2 10 Front Street South flampton, NH 03827 Exeter, 11H 03833 Robert Carrigg, Chairman Anne E. Goodman, Chairperson Board of Eulectmen Board of Selectmen Town Office 13-15 11ewmarket Road Atlantic Avenue Durham, 11H 03824 tio r t h fl a m p t o n, 11H 038f2 Allen Lampert Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairperson Civil Defense Director 1110 Wimbledon Drive Town of Brentwood McLean, VA 22101 20 Franklin Street Exeter, 11J 03833

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  • e 't 4

Charles P. Graham, Esq.

Barbara St. Andre,-Esq.

Murphy & Graham Kopelman & Paige, P.C.

33 Low Street 77 Franklin Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Boston, MA 02110 Judith H. Mizner, Esq.

.R.

Scott Hill-Whilton, Esq.

Lagoulis, Clark, Hill-Whilton Lagoulis, Clark, Hill-Whilton

& McGuire

& McGuire 79 State Street 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Newburyport, MA 01950 Fiercel Allan R.

Assistant Attorney General Nuclear Safety Unit Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02103-1698 (617) 727-2200 f

DATED:

October 24, 1988 l

a A.

1 4

l 1

-4 L