ML20204G973
| ML20204G973 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1988 |
| From: | Chan E, Lisa Clark NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#488-7323 OL, NUDOCS 8810240282 | |
| Download: ML20204G973 (97) | |
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. .;q r i i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ;
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l l
i '88 OCT 19 P3 36 j
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD -
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f , In the Matter of f i Docket Nos. 50-443 OL i PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-444 OL j NEW HAMPSHIRE, g a,1,, Off-site Emergency Planning j l
1 (SeabrookStation, Units 1and2) ) '
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) i l NRC ST AFF'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENORS CONTENTIONS ON THE GR ADED EXERCISE :
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! - Elaine I, Chan l I Counsel for N R C Staff
( l l Lisa B. Clark l i Counsel for N RC Staff 1
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
,Pg Contentioh
- 1. Mass AG EX-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2....................... 19 3....................... 24 4....................... 25 5....................... 26 6........................ 26 7........................ 33 8....................... 35 9....................... 37 10 . . . . . ................. 39 11 . . . . . ......., ........ 45 12 . . . . . ................. 13 13 . . . . . ................. 51 14 . . . . . ................. 56 15 . . . . . ................. 58 16 . . . . . ................. 59 17 . . . . . ................. 60 18 . . . . . ........ ........ 61 19
. . . . . ................. 64 20 . . . . . ................. 66 21 . . . . . ................. 68
- 2. SAPL EX-1 ........................ 69 2 ........................ 72 3 ........................ 74 4 ........................ 74 5 ........................ 75 6 ........................ 76 7 ..................... ,, 76 8 ...................,.... 77 9 ........................ 79 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . 80 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 14 . . . . . . . ................. 84
- 3. TOH/NECNP EX-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 4
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l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !
! NUCLEAR REGUt.ATORY COMMISSION l i l l BEFORE THE AT0 HIC SAFFTY AND LICENSING BOARD [
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i in the Matter of )
) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL f PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-444 OL l NEW HAMPSHIRE, el al,. Off-site Emergency Planning l (SeabrookStation, Units 1and2) f I
NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENORS !
CONTENTIONS ON THE GRADEC EXERCISE l
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, !NTRODUCTION Pursuant to the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order of August 19, ;
i r j 1988 (Order at !?) and the extension of time granted September 29, 1988 l i !
j the Staff provides its response to Intervenors' proposed contentions on the graded exercise, filed by Seacoast Anti Pol.lution League ("SAPL"), the Massachusetts Attorney General ("Mass AG"), the "eu England Coalition on ,
l Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP") and the Town of Hampton ("TOH") on j
< i l September 20 and ?1, 1988. Those contentions generally cha'lenge the l t
adequacy of the FEMA fiadings on the graded exercise of the radiological l l response plans for Seabrook Station conducted on June 28 and 29, 1988. M i
- i. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition in the bala;1ce of this l response, the Staff addresses the legal principles and precedent governing 4
the admissibility of contentions concerning a FEMA graded exercise in i
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jf Federal Emergency Management Agency Exercise Report, Seabrook Nuclear
- Power Station Sept 3mber.l. 1983 ("FEMA Exercise Report"). ,
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l 2 l Parts A-D of the Discussion which follows. The admissibility of each of the contentions filed by the Intevenors is then discussed sertatim.
DISCUSSION l
A. Standards for Admission of Contentions Concerning a FENA i Graded Exercise , j The Comission stated in CLI 86 11, that the of litigation an [
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emergency exercise was to be ..'mited to issues which are material to !
i licensing. 23 NRC at 581; see, Union of Concerned Scientists v. .NRC, 7.15 l F.2d 1437,1447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.1132 (1985) i
("UCS"). The Comission stated that review of exercise results is [,
"restricted to detemining if the exercise revealed any deficiencies which l i
preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can j and will be taken, M. , fundamental flaws in the, plan " M. I
. Accordingly, the Comission reasoned that, "[s]ince only fundamental flaws I are material licensing issues, the hear.ing may be restricted to those I
issues." M.
The purpose of litigating an emergency exercise is to detemine whether deficiencies were demonstrated which reflect fundamental flaws in i the radiological emergency response plans. CLI 86-11, 23 NRC 377, 581. j Such flaws are distinguishable from minor or ad hoc problems which only I reflect defects in the actual state of preparedness on a particular day, l
vather than. inherent problems in the emergency plan. }ef,, UCS, 735 F.2d !
at 1441, cuoting 47 Fed. Reg. 30233 (1982). Only pervasive failuNs can :
t support a dfundamental flaw" f'inding. A finding of reasonable assurance !
that protective measures can and will be taken under the plan is based, in I part, on a dete'mination of the adequacy and implementability of the plan.
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t 0 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a)(2); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-86-24, 21 NRC b9, 777 (1986). This is also made clear by the Memorandum ' .
- starding between the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Nut Regulatory Comission, 50 Fed.
Reg.15485(April 18,1985):
An interim finding on preparednes: will be based on review of currently available plans and joint exercise results and will include an assessment as to (1) whether offsite emergency plans are adequate as measured against the standard and criteria of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REF-1, and (2) whether the exercise (s) demon-strated that there is reasonable assurance that the plans can be implemented.
In limiting litigation of issm arising from emergency planning exer-cises, the Comission clearly indicated that the purpose of such exercises is to determine whether the overall finding of reasonable assurance can be made. CLI-86-13, 24 NRC at 29-30; Shearon Harris, CLI-86-24, 24 NRC at 776-77.
The Comissions's regulations at 10 C . ' . R . 5 50.47(b)(14) provide that periodic exercises are to be conducted to evaluate major energency response capabilities. Part 50, Appendix E, 6 IV.F., describing, in i general, the purpose of emergency plan exercises, states in relevant part:
Exercises shall test the adequacy of timing and content of . l implementing procedures and methods, test emergency equipment 1 and comunications networks, test the public notification system j and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar .
with their duties. -
' Appendix E, 6 !Y.F., discusses the proper training to maintain the
. response capabilities of emergency organizations and indicates that, proper implementation of the plan is an important consideration in any reasonable assurance finding regarding emergency preparedness.
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The "fundamental flaw" standard of CLI-86-11 governs the admissibility of contentions. Also applicable are the standards for admissibility of emergency exercise contentions stated in the UCS decision; that decision has been interpreted by the licensing board in Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant),
LBP-55-49, 22 NRC 899, 910 (1985), affirined, ALAB-843, 24 NRC 200 (1986),
to mean that contentions alleging minor or readily correctable problems should be rejected.
As noted above, the Comission in CLI-86-11 restricted the Board's review to determining if there were exercise ". . . deficiencies which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken." The Comission's decision in CLI-86-13 states: "The root question becomes whether the [ utility) Plan can provide for ' adequate protective measures. . ..
24 NRC at 29. The Comissica comented extensively on the meaning of "adequate protective measures." M. at 30.
Under CLI-86-13, as recently approved by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Comonwealth Ma*gchusetts v. NRC, F.2d (September 6, 1988), Boards are to assume that the State and local governments would use their "best efforts" to protect the public health and safety, and although this second presumption is rebuttable, that they would follow a utility
, plan in.the absence of a government plan. M. To determine tne adequacy of the "best-efforts" government response, the Commissio' st&ted that the focus would be on whether:
There are questions [F about the familiarit and County officials with the [ utility) plan, [?]y about how much delay can be expected in alerting the public and [3] in making decisions and recomendations on protective actions, or [4] in making decisions and recomendations 'on recovery and reentry, e
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and [5] in achieving effective access controls. The record tells us that an evacuation without traffic controls would be delayed . . . [6] but [f]or which scenarios, i f a ny, does
[ delay] eliminate evacuation as a viable protective action?
Id. at 31. While this enunciation of what constitutes "adequate protec-tive measures" was defined within the context of the Shoreham realism proceeding on the issue of a "best efforts" governmental response, the rationale is equally applicable to an analysis of whether there is a '
fundamental flaw in an emergency plan, i.e., "the lack of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken." CLI-86-11, 23 NRC at 581. -
The Commission stated in promulgating the "realism rule" that the rule "amplifies and clarifies" the guidance in CLI-86-13 in that a finding of whether a utility plan provides adequate protective measures is based I upon the same standard used +n evaluate state and local plans. The rule, therefore, indicates that a utility plan may properly be viewed under the same standard that would apply to a State or local government plan.
10 C.F.R. I 50.47(c)(1)(iii). A detennination of whether certain protec-tive measures are adequate does not depend on whether the action is taken by a utility offsite response organization rather than the State or local governments. Thus, the standard for "adequate protective measures" enunciated in CLI-86-13 applies to the Board's fundamental flaw findings in this proceeding. El ;
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In the Shoreham proceeding, the Licensing Board adopted a two-part test in determing whether a fundamental flaw has been established: 4 (FOOTNOTECONTINUEDON.NEXTPAGE) .
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Applyinn the six items enumerated in the above-cited quote from CLI-86-13 as pertinent to th.e exercise, the adequacy of the Seabrook exercise is to be judged by assessing those scencrios where (1) delay might be a factor in alerting the public and making decisions and recomendations on protective actions (including recovery and reentry) and (2) where evacuation might be eliminated as a viable protective action.
Id. at 31. Thus, the exercise is used to judge whether there is evidence that the protective actions provided in the plans could be taken.
In short, the employment of the "fundamental flaw" criterion requires that a contention raising exercise deficiencies must tend to show not only that an area of emergency planning falls short of meeting one or more of the 16 emergency planning standards in 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b), but that the exercise results therefore preclude a finding of reasonable assurance called for by section 50.47(a)(1). To prevail under an exercise contention, an applicant must establish that the deficiency either is not factually established, or that if proven, the delay resulting from a deficiency will not affect timely alert of the public, timely decisions and recomendations on protective actions and the viability of evacuation.
CLI-86-13, 24 .NRC at 29-31. Imp. licit in this standard are the. concepts (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE)
(1) the alleged flaw must be fundamental, i.e., one that would substantially affect the health and safety of the public, and (2) the problem must be systemic or pervasive, rather than an isolated problem occuring on the exercise day. LBP-80-1, 27 NRC 85, 91-93 (1908). The Board did not, however, further define the standard to apply in detemining whether the health and safety of the public would be "substantially affected," which follows from CLI-86-13. -
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that (1) readily correctable defects in the plan cannot be fundamental flaws, and (2) that plan deficiencies for which sirr.ple ' compensatory measures may be taken are also not fundamer,tal flaws 3_/
The ultimate question is not whether each aspect of regulatory compliance was af finnatively demonstrated by tl.e exercise. To the contrary, the issue is, notwithstanding expected failures in execution of the plan, whether there is adequate provision in the plan to compensate for or correct such failures so as to pennit the conclusion that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be i
taken to protect the public in the event of an emergency. An applicant is !
not required to show that the exercise, by itself, demonstrates compliance with each and every regulatory standard. Rather, an applicant must show that the exercise reveals no deficiency in the plans which precludes the ,
overall finding of reasonable assurance.
In this respect, the standard is analogous to the burden of an applicant to defeat a quality assurance contention -- to demonstrate that notwithstanding cxpected defects in construction, there ' is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will be protected.
See, Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), Al.AB-740,18 NRC 343,
, 346 (1983). Similarly, it is not reasonable to hinge the granting of a license on error-free exercises, because only exercise deficiencies (or j 3/
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Fundamental flaws may also be corrected through revisions to an emergency plan, however, if such matters are ) eft uncorrected they may af fect the public health and safety to the extent that protective measures provided by the Corrvnission's emergency planning rule cannot 4
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breakdowns) which reveal fundamental flaws in the plan would preclude an overall showing that adequate protective measures can and will be taken.
See, i.d.
d O pursuant 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a)(2), FEMA's findings in regard to a state or local offsite emergency plan "constitute a rebuttable presumption on questions of adequacy and implementation capability" of the plan.
FEMA defines Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs), and Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARFIs) as follows:
Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate mea;ures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparednese, they are required to be promptly corrected through approviate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, ',e other actions.
. Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance, and a,though their cor-rection is required, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety, in addition to these exercise inadequacies, FEMA identifies Are is RecommendeJ for Inprovement (ARFI), which are areas / issues sbserved during an exercise that are not considered to adverse'y impact public health and safety. While not required, correct'on or improve-ment of these areas / issues would enhance an organietion's level of eftergency preparedness.
- 4) Construction quality assurance litigation, for example, must estab-lish that any breakdown in QA procedures is not of sufficient dimensions to raise legit % ate doubt as to the overall integrity of '
the faciTity and its safety-related components. Id. "A demonstra- )
- tion of a pervasive f ailur.e to carry out the qualTty assurance j
- program might well stand in the way of the requisite safety finding."
Id. at 346. .Similarly, in emergency exercise litigation, a pervasive Ta'ilure to carry out an emergency planning program in the exercise might preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken in an emergency.
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FEMA Exercise Report at 3.
While the terminology of a FEMA deficiency is very similar to the definition of a fundamental flaw, a FEMA deficiency is not equivalent to a fundamental flaw. F4 st, the Coninission has defined a "fundamental flaw"
, as a matter which preJ.udes a finding of reasonable assurance while a FEMA ,
deficiency is an inadequacy that would cause a finding that preparedness was not adequate. Moreover, FEMA's evaluation of an exercise dots not go l
so far as considering whether the delays associated with the deficiencies would adversely impact the decisions and recommendations for protective measures and the viability of evacuation as required by CLI-86-13 and ,
10 C.F.R. I 50.47. It is the NRC's task under Section 50.47(c)(1)(iii) and the fundamental flaw standard to examine the ramifications of exercise events on a utility plan and determine whether* plan provisions and the underlying judgnents are fundamentally sound, insofar as exercise events !
reflect the capability to take a range of protective actions. See, Fed.
Reg. 16691, 16693 (1983); CLI-86-11, 23 NRC at 581.
Here FEMA found that the exercise did not reveal any "deficiency" in the plan. This Board must now determine whether the exercise nonetheless l l
revealed a "fundamental flaw" in the Plan. Only contentions which allege '
facts indicating that the exercise showed these "fundamental flaws" precluding a finding of ret tonable assurance that protective measures can i and will be taken," can be admitted for litigation. See, CLI-86-11, 21 NRC at 581.
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B. What Constitutes A Full Participation Exercise Under 10 C.F.R. 50,
, App. E, IV.F.1 In Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station),
ALAB-900, 27 NRC (1988), the Appeal Board observed that in order to i
allow the.NRC to determine whether deficiencies which reflect an under-lying fundamental flaw in the plan have been demonstrated, the exercise must also be comprehensive enough to test all major aspects of the emergency plan. Slip op. at 11-12. Thus, the design or scope of an exercise can be an appropriate subject for litigation. ,I_d , a t 10, 13.
The appropriate standard to apply when assessing the scope of an exercise was delineated by the Appeal Board in light of the language, structure and legislative history of the relevant regulation,10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appen-dix E, IV. F.1. In pertinent part, that regulation provides:
A full participation exercise 5/ which tests as much of the licensee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonable achiavable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located for ,
which the first operating licnese for that site is issued after :
July 13, 1982. This exercise shall be conducted within two years befve the issuance of the first operating license for full power Ma authW. zing operation above 5% of rated power) of the first readtor and shall include participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ (energency planning zone) and each State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.
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5 "Full participation" when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site mean appropriate offwite local and State authorities and licensee personnel physically and actively take part in testing their integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a concercial nuclear power plant. "Full participation" includes testing the major l observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and l mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other ;
resources in sufficient numbers to ve:ify the capability to respond I to the accident scenario.
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The Appeal Board went on to explain the requirement that a pre-license exercise be " full participation." According to the Appeal Board, This means that all 'the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plan' must be tested in that pre-license exercise; the FEMA Gbjectives can serve as guidance in determining what the major observable elements are. In addition, a pre-license exercise includes the mobilization of state, local, and licensee personnel 'in sufficient numbers' to verify their ' integrated capability' to assess and to respond to the particular accident scenario being tested.
M.at26.
While the Appeal Board ruled that a pre-license exercise must test all major observable elements of the emergency plan, it also recognized that an applicant may omit those which are not reasonable achievable.
Thus, in Shoreham, the utility was precluded from reasonably testing the broadcast of its EBS messages during the exercise, but the Appeal Board found that an activity needed to accomplish that objective need not be .
tested in a "full participation" exercise. M. at 29-30. The Appeal Board pointed out, however, that the reference to mandatory public participation in the regulatinn merely meant that emergency exercises should not involve actual participation by the general public, as in "live tests &nd drills." M.at31. Accordingly, it concluded that the phrase "reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation" in section IV.F.1 tould not properly be invoked as an affirmative defense in the case -
wh'ere there is no ccoperation by local governments and an applicant is faced with a clain that an exercise was not "full particip'ation." M. at
- 32. In such a situation, the Appeal Board observed that any decision as to whether licensing is warranted should be analyzed purssant to the e
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. o reguiation specifically addressed to that circumstance, 10 C.F.R.
50.47(c)(1). Id. at 33.
Thus, contentions challenging the scope of the pre-license exercise are admissible only to the extent they allege that the applicant did not test all the major observable elements of the emergency plan which are reasonably achievable without requiring participation by the general <
public. In response, the applicant may establish that the regulatory requirements in section IV of A'ppendix E have been met, or, if they have not, that licensing is justified under 10 C.F.R. 50.47(c)(1). Under that regulation, for example, an operating license may be issued if the applicant can demonstrate that the omission from the exercise was ' ot significant or that the omission was the result of nonparticipation of local governments despite good faith efforts on the part of the app 1';ent ,
and does not endanger the public safety.
C. The 10 C.F.R. l 2.714(b) Standards In' addition to the standards set forth supra, the well-established principles governing the admissibility of contentions under 10 C . F R .
I 2.714(b) and Comission case law, set out in the Staff's respo' ae to contentions on the Massachusetts Plan 5/ must also be satisfied for exercise contentions to be admissible in this proceeding.
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NRC Staff Response to Contentions filed by Towns of Amesbury, l Newbury, Salisbury and West Newbury, the Cities of Haverhill and Newburyport, and by the Massachusetts Attor' ley General,, NECNP and SAPL. May 27, 1988. .
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1 D. Additional Considerations Regarding Admission of Contentions As a general proposition, the Staff responses contained herein limit the contention to the facts set forth in the stated bases. The Staff's acceptance of a basis does not encompass any speculative portions of accompanying narrative. These spealations are i'npermissibly vague and cannot support the admission o# a contention.
Inte rvenors proposed contentions make numerous references to the participation of school teachers, hospital workers and administrators 9 schools and special facilities in the emergency exercise. The language of 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix E $ IV.F.1 states concerning a full participation exercise that it should "test as much of the . . . plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation."
Di~scussion supra at Part B. The Comissicn's position that there is "no mandatory public participation," 42 Fed. Reg. 36,326-28 (1977), remains l unchanged. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2), ALAB-486, 8 NRC 9, 16-17 (1978) Long Island Lighting Co.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ALAB-900 27 NRC , slip. op.
dt 30-32 (September 20,1988). This it the language in the 1980 rule and applies to both pre- and post-license xercises. See, 45 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E i IV.F.1 (1981). Schoi teachers, hospital workers and school and other special facility personnel and adminstrators are not emergency workers and are thus like other members of 'the general public, not required to participate in emergency exercise drills. !_d. . at 31; Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
. ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135, 153 n.65 (1986);. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick -
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Generating Station, Units l' and 2) LBP d5-14, 21 NRC 1219, 1308-9 (1985). U E. Staff Response to Intarvenors' Proposed General Exercise Contentions
- 1. Mass AG Energency Planning Exercise Contentions MAG EX 1: The scope of the initial full participation exercise conducted for Seabrook Station on June 27-29, 1988 was so limited that that exercise did not and could not support a finding by the NRC pursuant to 10 C.F.R. i 50.47(a)(2)(on the NHRERP) cnd .10 C.F.R.
9 50.47(c)(1)(iii)(on the SPMC) that there is reasonable assurance that the relevant plans can be implemented and that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. The limited scope represents a fundamental flaw in the exercise. As a result, the requirements set forth at 10 C.F.R. Appendix E, ' TV.F.1 for an initial full-participation exercise have not been met. See Long Island _ Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), f6 NRC 479, 488 (1987). In a case in which a significant portion of the EPZ lies within the jurisdiction of non-participating governments, the NRC will review and evaluate the level of emergency preparedness resulting from the formulation of -utility-only plans. 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(c)(1). These plans will be exercised and the results of these exercise: will be relevant to any reasonable assurance determination reached by the NRC. An exercise must be broad enough to
. test adequately the utility s capability to implement its own plan when the relevant governments have not participated in prior emergency planning. In judging whether an exercise has adequately tested the ,
utility s capacity to implement its own plan, the provisions of that plan itself should be considered. For example, if a utility (rightly or wrongly) does not assign to itself in its plan any snow removal role during an emergency, the exercise of that plan need not test the snow removal capabilities of the utility. But contrariwise, if a utility does ,
establish a role or a variety of roles for itself in its own plan then an j
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7 The Staff does not agree with the Mass AG's interpretation of tae
, weight to be accorded FEMA findings and determinations. Mass AG disregards the provisions of 10 C.F.R. l 50.47(a)(2) by stating that FEMA findings and determinations are "irrelevant to the tssues before this Board." Mass AG at % 10. There is no basis in fact or law for
, this proposition; while FEMA findings form a rebuttable presumption
- on questions of adequacy and implementation capability of off-site emergency plans, the NRC, by its own regulations, is not free to wholly ignore FEMA findings, as Mass AG would have this Board do. See l Long Island Lightin's Co. (Shcreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), 1 ALAB-900, 28 NRC _ , slip op at 24 (September- 20,1988).
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adequate initial full-participation exercise of this plan would test the' '
utility's capacity to play those roles as long as this is "reasonable l achievable without mandatory Public participation." 10 C.F.R. Part 50, I Appendix E, 1 IV.F.1.
A. NUREG-0654 ("Supp 1") establishes that an exercise of a utility-only plan must:
includeO the demonstration of off-site response organization capabilities to interface with non-participating State and local government . . . . Supp 1 at II.N.1.b.
Similarly, Supp i establishes as a requirement of an adequate utility-only plan that:
The off-site response organization shall identify liaison personnel to advise and assist State and local officials during an actual emergency D implementing those portions of the off-site plan where State or local response is identified." Supp 1 at II.C.5 (emphasis supplied).
In line with these requirements FEMA added the following objective to the ,
list of exercise objective applicable to the June 1988 exercise:
Oemonstrate the capability of utility off-site response 1 organization personnel to interface with non-participating 1 State and local governments through their mobilization and provisien of advice and assistance. FEMA Guidance Memorandt.m (GM) EX-3 Amendment (March 7,1988) at 2.
The June exercise failed to adequately test OR0 personnel's capacity to meet this objective. The exercise in no fashion called on OR0 personnel in the field to display their ability to advise and assist governmental personnel, who may be mobilized at the time of an amergency, in following the SPMC. Instead of exercising these capacities, FEMA evaluators simply asked some of the OR0 field personnel (traffic guides at ACPs and TCPs) what they would do if local officials arrived to carry out response functions. FEMA Final Report at 242. As a result, there is no basis for finding that ORO field personnel have.. demonstrated the capacity to l effectively interact with governmental personnel in the likely event that i at the time of an emergency these governmental Personnel take concrete actions, in the Massachusetts EPZ to respond to an emergency. Similarly, the capacity of the 9 ORO liaison personnel to identify the unfolding .
governmental emergency response, hannonize ORO actions with it and communicate with relevant government officials as to further actions was not tested. The FEMA Control Cell (simulating the non-participating officials) did not test the liaison personnel's capacity to comunicate the essentials or the details of the SPMC to governmental ofhcials.
B. Moreover, as FEMA has noted, there are specific exercise objectives which are "legal authority-sensitive." (GM EX-3 Amend, at 2 3 listing objectives 11-26,30,32-33).
They may be authority-sensitive because some aspect of their inriementation in an actual radiological emergency nay bc
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dependent upon the authority of the non-Participating State and local governments. Thus, the demonstration of these objects in an exercise could be dependent upon how authority- .
related issues are addressed in the utility (OR0] plan . . . .
The demonstratic'1 and evaluation of the objectives should follow the specific provisions of the plan being tested
.... If the plan requires the utility [0R03 to secure legal authority to carry out necessary functions, they should follow the procedures contained in the plan that would be used in the event of an emergency.
Id. at 2-3,4. (emphasis supplied).
The SPMC expressly identifies specific response functions which the ORO is legally prohibited from unilaterally fulfilling. The SPMC posits a range of possible combinations of response: from pure Mode 1 in which the OR0 offers assistance to the responding governments, through a "mixed delegation" Made 2 in which OR0 handles certain response areas while the governments retain control over others, to a pure Mode 2 in which all -
requisite authority is purportedly delegated to the OR0. These various modes were not exercised even though as a matter of both fact and law pure Mode 1 or "mixed-delegation" Mode 2 are far more likely to o; cur in reality that pure Mode 2. The exercise tested only ORO's capacity to. meet the "legal authority-sensitive" objectives' assuming the Commonwealth delegates all necessary authority and does not itsglf respond -- as any intelligible best-efforts assumption would mandatesf -- with . emergency response actions on the ground. .
The SPMC posits just such a range of mixed and (purportedly coordinated) government and ORO responses yet the exercise did not test the OR0 personnel's capacity to anticipate, accept, integrate, coordinate and harmonize the likely governmental responses. The exercise scenario 1/ As Public Service of New Wampshire noted in its comments to the Draft Supp 1 document: .
"A utility plan should be expected to account for varying degrees of participation in response to an actual radiological emergency."
NRC/FEFA Analysis of Comments [ received on 'Supp 1] at 11. As a corollary, an initial full-participation exercise of such a plan should test the capacity of the utility's ORO to integrate and coordinate such varying degrees of governmental best-efforts response. Failure to test adequately that capacity constitutes a fundamental flaw in the exercise.
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assumed that the Commonwealth and each community would not respond to the emergency and:
The FEMA Control Cell did not commit any State or local resources or personnel to assist in the NHY ORO response.
Legal authority was requested and received for appropriate response activities . . . . FEMA Final Report at 242.
In light of this glaring failure to test the capacity of OR0'to implement critical provisions of the utility's own plans, this exercise does not meet the legal reg {rements and its results will not support a reasonable assurance finding.
Response MAG EX 1 The NRC Staff objects to admission of this contention and its bases which essentially allege that the scope of the exercise was too limited in that it did not involve participation of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts officials. There is no requirement that the exercise demonstrate the participation of ' government officials who specifically refuse to cooperate. See, 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix E $1V.F.6, as amended effective December 3, 1987 (52 Fed. Reg. 42078, 42086 (November 3, 1987),
2/ Putting the same point a dif#erent way: no presumption will be entertained concerning the governments following the SPPC until it is established as an adequate plan. The SPMC sets forth as one possible manner in which the governments could follow the plan a mixed-delegation Mode 2. Before it could be Presumed that such a mired mode would be followed, the capacity of the ORO to implement it would have to be established. (If the ORO could not perform in this mixed l
mode then that mode would not be established as adequate and the governments would not be presumed to follow it.) But the exercise did not test the ORO's capacity in this regard at all. Because only pure Mode 2 was tested by this exercise, the results could only support a finding of reasonable assurance based on a pure Mode -~
2 1mplementation of the SPMC. Not only is the legality of such a pure Mode 2 delegation at issue in this proceeding, but the SPPC is
. not limited to that mode. Thus, the exercise was too limited in scope to test the authorit !
addressed in the utility [y-related 0RO) plan." issues FEMA as GMthose issues "areat 3.
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(the participation of state and local government is not required in an emergency exercise, to the extent the applicant has identified those governments as refusing to participate further in emergency planning activities.)
Further, to the extent the contention seeks to t st the plan, rather than its implementability, it must be rejected. Basis A does not set forth suffic.ient facts, which even if proved to be true, to establish that the exercise was not adequate to test the capability of utility personnel to interface with non-participating government personnel under the limitations in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E,61V.F.6.
Basis B should not be admitted as the non-participating governments' actions prevented the testing of more than one "Mode" and thus the testing of an additional Mode need not be part of the exercise. As stated in (IV.F.6. of Appendix E: "The participation of state and local governments in an emergency planning a.'.ercise is not required to the extent that applicant has identified those gnvernments as refusing to i
participate. . ." Thus, the complaint that the ORO assumed a greater role .
than would be likely in an actual emergency must be rejected. First, the governments would not allow testing of their cooperation. Second, proof that the ORO can perform more tasks, per force, shows that it could do less if the governments participated. There is no avennent in this
- ontention that the exercise did not test as much as possible considering the governments' non-cooperation. A participant in an NRC proceeding cannot raise itself by its own bootstraps by refusing to cooperate, and then avering that the exercise did not test that cooperation.
Additionally, a full participation exercise need not test each alternative ,
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l mode of operation in the p'lan, but need only encompass "major observable portions of the plan." See, ALAB-900, supra, at 26.
MAG EX 2: The scope of the June 28-29, 1988, exercise of the SPMC
- was so limited that it cculd not and did not yield valid or meaningful .
results on implementation capability as required by 10 C.F.R. 9 6 50.47(a)(2) and Appendix E paragraph Iv.F.1. in that it did not include demonstrations or evaluations of major portions of the SPMC and the emergency response capabilities of many Persons and entities relied upon to implement it. The data set forth in the subparts of this contention individually and collectively establish that there is r.o reasonable assurance that the SPMC can or will be implemented in critical respects.
Thus, the Exercise Precludes a finding that there is roasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken, as required by 10 C.F.R. 9 6 50.47(c)(1).
Each of the following pnrtions of the plan, or the response capability of the following ore. tations relied upon, was required to be tested for this Exercise to 4 iify as the initial full participation Exercise. For all of the plan portions and supporting organizations listed, the Exercise did not test "as much of the .. . plans as is rea-sonably achievable without mandatory public participation." 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, par. IV.F.1. -
A. The hardware involved in the VANS system was not exercised, nor was the capability of the OR0 to use this hardware in a timely and effective manner. The VANS system includes the Whelen sirens, the trucks on which they are to be mount * , and the VANS drivers. During a real emergency, the VANS trucks with their Whelen sirens are to travel from their staging areas to pre-established acoustic locations, park, deploy outriggers, and then the sirens are to be hydraulically lifted high into the air. During the Exercise, the following capabilities were not tested or demonstrated:
- a. driving times from the VANS staging areas to acoustic locations using fully equipped VANS vehicles, to determine whether
. transit , times are such that the 15-minute criterion can be met. (The i much sm811er, lighter personal cars used during the Exercise are ;
likely to be able to be driven faster to these acoustic locations.) !
- b. ability of' VANS drivers, once at the acoustic locations, to park vehicles in an appropriate location, deploy the outriggers, remove the boom strap, raise the siren to its operational height, and do all this in a short enough time to Permit the 15-minute criterion to be met,
- c. suitability of each acoustic location for the planned VANS usage, i.e., is the ground level and firm enough, even in bad weather, to provide adeavate stability to the VANS vehicles when sirens are fully lifted.
- d. familiarity of the VANS drivers with the siren system operation. .
- e. operability of sirens. ,
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All of these items could and should have been tested and were rot. A VANS siren operability test, like many other 3pects of the SPMC tested during l the Exercise, could have been held out o' sequence at a suitable location, ,
Perhaps at Seabrook Station or in an indoor location in a large garage, so as not to have disturbed the public.
B. The ability of the primary EBS radio station to promptly broadcast the EBS messages was not tested. After EBS messages were telefaxed to the station, .ne effort was made to detennine how quickly the station could review the messaga and prepare an announcer to read it over the air. This, too, is an important element in ascertaining whether the 15-minute criterion can be met. In addition, no effort was made to test how well the announcer could read the message after this very short preparatory period. Apparently, tapes were made at the station of the announcers reading the EBS messages, but this occurred out of sequence with no check on how much time was spent in preparing to read the message.
C. Only the primary EBS radio station participated in the Exercise; the secondary stations did not participate at all.
D. OR0's plans and procedures for public education and the dissemination of information to the public on a periodic basis and a demonstration of the adequacy of public education materials were excluded from the Exercise. Such materials are required by 10 C.F.R.
I i 50.47(b)(7) and Part 50, App. E., par. IV.D., and NUREG-0654 i II, G.
E. ORO's capability to implement a timely evacuation of the Mass. '
EPZ's two hospitals and all other special facilities was not tested.
Speelfically, ORO did not atterpt to demonstrate that it could muster the
. appropriate vehicles and personnel to the EPZ hospitals, nursing homes, and other special facilities in a timely fashion and did not attempt to demonstrate appropriate procedures for loading patients. (The total -
"extent of play" for testing hospital evacuation procedures was that one ambulance was assigned the task of driving to one hospital and then to a reception center.) The Exercise also failed to test the preparedness of the bus, ambulance, and wheelchair van companies being relied upon for this important function. It should 'be noted that the simulated plume released during the Exercise put both Massachusetts EPZ hospitals at risk and eventually passed over + ham both. Both should have been evacuated.
Likewise, most other special facilities in the Massachusetts EPZ were put at risk and should have been evacuated as well.
F. The ability of the Massachusetts chapters of the American Red Cross to establish and maintain, the Host Special Facility and the 26 i Congregate Care Centers was not tested or evaluated at all, and activation of none of thesa facilities occurred during the Exercise. The fact that ,
the American Red Cross has refused to participate in Massachusetts in planning and preparing for an emergency at Seabrook cannot be used to justify their absence from the Exercise. As 'a key support o;'ganizatinn, their capabilities and preparedness need to be evaluated just as the 4 capabilities of the primary EBS station or the MS-1 Hospital need to be evaluated. Since the NRC. rule change in November of 1987, the 1 participation of state and local governments is no longer required in a "full p ticipation" exercise "to the extent that the applicant has identified those governments as refusing to participate further in
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emergency planning activities." 10 C.F.R. *Part 50, App. E, par. IV.F.6.
But for this exception, however, a "full .participati.on" exercise must include "testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of state, local and licensee Personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario." 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, par. IV.F.1, n.4. The resource which NHY's ORO is relying on to establish, staff, and maintain the Host Special Facility and the Congregate Care Centers is the ARC, yet no ARC resources whatscever were tested in Massachusetts during this Exercise. This is not an excusable defect in this Exercise. While Appendix E does not require testing those parts of a plan which are not "reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation," Ld, d at IV.F.1., this is not such a part. The establishment, staffing, and maintenance of the Host Special Facility and Congregate Care Centers was clearly reasonably achieved without mandatory public participation. All that was needed was the ARC; no member of the public needed to be involved. The ARC,s absence alone constitutes a fundamental flaw in the Exercise, and it cannot qualify as a full participatier. exercise.
Furthermore, there is no reasonable assurance that in the event of an emergency at Seabrook the ARC can, without any prior planning or preparedness, mobilize the staff and resources needed to establish the Congregate Care Centers and Host Special Facility in a timely fashion.
G. During the Exercise, school administrators, special facility administrators, and hospital administrators were not evaluated at all to assess how knowledgeable and prepared they are to implement appropriate sheltering and evacuation procedures for each of their facilities. The SPMC relies primarily on these administrators to perfonn these functions, assisting only in the provision of transportatior, resources if such resources are needed. During the Exercise, these administrators were not even contacted by FEMA evaluators and questioned voluntarily regarding whether they have the knowledge, plans, and capability to implement what will be required of them and their staffs in a real emergency. By using at ler.s t a questioning / interview process, Jome voluntary essessment of their sheltering and evacuation capabilities could have been achieved.
This same questioning / interview process was used by FEMA evaluators during the Exercise to partially evaluate other important emergency responders.
For example, Traffic Guides were questioned very briefly to assess their knowledge of their procedurn. This technique would have been useful in assessing the administrators as well. Participation in answering these questions need not have been considered mandatory for the school, hospital, and other special facility administrators. While some may have refused to answer FEMA's questions regarding the state of their
, preparedness, there is every reason to believe that most would have been quite willing to speak to FEMA: Those who support Seabrook and are prepared would want FEMA's evaluators to know this just as t' hose who oppose Seabrook and are not prepared would want FEMA to note this as a deficiency. Those administrators who are neither for nor against Seabrook would have no reason not to tell FEMA about their preparedness either.
The only reason FEMA may be reluctant to voluntarily question school.,
hospital, and special facility administrators is that it senses correctly that there is a general unpr.eparedness in these facilities and does not e
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l want to document how gravely inadequate things are. This is hardly a ' l valid reason for the total lack of any evaluation of these administrators during the initial "full participation" er.ercice.
The fact that some of the school administrators work in public schools cannot justify an absence of any evaluation of them either.
First, the exemption from a full participation exercise for state and local governments is not an absolute exemption but one which' expands or contracts its coverage "to the extent that" non-participation is realistically expected. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, par. IV.F.6. As noted above, participation in a voluntary questioning / interview would have been expected. Second, public schools in Massachusetts are governed by school committees which are independent of local city and town governments except as a source of funding. Thus, in a "full participation" exercise, their participation is not excused by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, par.
IV.F.6. Third, although one need not test parts of the SPMC that are not "reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation," M. at IV.F.1, some assessment of tha preparedness of these administrators is reasonably achievable through voluntary questioning / interviewing.
Absent such an evaluation of these key administrators for schools, .
hospitals, and other special facilities, the Exercise had insufficient scope to base a finding that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for school children, hospital patients, nursing home residents, and those in other special facilites. i Response MAG EX'2 The Staff objects to this contention, except to the extent Basis E alleges' that the scope of the exercise was inadequate to demonstrate the capability to mobilize sufficient resources to evac.uate the Massachusetts' EPZ hospitals and special facilities. However, actual evacuation of these facilities including dioading of patients", is not required in an exercise I and that part of Basis E may not be admitted. 10 C.F.R. Part 50 pppendix ,
E SIV.F.1. Public participation is not required in an exercise. See,
- Shoreham, ALAB-900, at 17, 31.
The Staff objects' to the . admission of this contention grounded on Basis A concerning the VANS system, since there is no requirement that the siren system be tested in an exercise. Further, the issue of the adequacy of this . system is currently before the on-site board. The Comission in j CLI-88-08, at 3 (October 7,1988) lef c the determination of whether the l
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onsite or offsite board should try the prompt notification issues to the L
Chairman of the ASLB Panel.
The determination of which Board has' jurisdiction was made by Acting Chief ,
Administrative Judge Lazo in the Notics of Clarification issued October 12, 1988. .
The Staff also objects to Bases B and C concerning the EBS system since, as the Appeal Board found in ALAB-900, the key ingredienti for testing purposes is broadcast of the message and little information of significant independent utility would be gained where the station has no responsibility to broadcast the message conveyed to it. ALAB-900 at 1 29-30. Basis D 1s inadmissible as this issue goes to provisions of the l plan itself, rather than part of the exercise scenario.
Basis . F is also inadmissible. As the Nass AG acknowledges in the wording of the contention, the American Red Cross refused to participate in the exercise. Hence exercise of its actions was not "reasonably achievable" and need not be part of the exercise under 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, l!V.F.1 and F.6. Finally, Basis G is inadmissible as schcol, special facility and hospital administrators are not emergency worker ;
personnel and participation of the members of the general public in the '
exercise is not required by the regulations. See, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, l!V.F.1. Further, to the extent Basis G takes issue with what :
j FEMA did or did not do in the evaluation process, it does not present a litigable issue in NRC proceedings. The question here is not whether FEMA performed properly, but whether the applicant did. See, facific' Gas &ElectricCo. (Diabl.o Car. yon Nuclear Power Plant, Units.1 & .
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2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 807, rev. declined, CCI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 ;
(1983).
MAG EX 3: In the circumstances in which a significant portion of the :
EPZ lies within the jurisdiction of non-participating governments, the NRC
, will review and evaluate the level of preparedness resulting from the fomulation of utility-only plans. 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(c)(1). This retiew "may result in the Conunission declining to issue an operating license."
Id. An operating license "may be issued if the applicant demonstrates to i tee Conunission s satisfaction that:
(iii) The applicants emergency plan provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by I operation of the facility concerned. To make that finding, 2
the applicant must demonstrate that . . . adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency.
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The prospective finding that is necessary for full-power operation -- that adequate protective measures will be taken --is not supported by the June '
1988 exercise in the absence of: (1) any participation in the exercise by I the relevant governments whose necessary involvement (in one form or i another) at t time of an actual emergency is not disputed by the !
Applicants; 3 peand/or (2) any attempt to demonstrate the capacity of the non-participating governments to implement the SPMC (other than in pure .
l Mode 2) without any preplanning, training, or familiarity with that plan; i and/or (3) any attempt to demonstrate that the ORO could effectively accomodate a best efforts response by the non-participating governments which involved not mere delegation of authority but actual concrete efforts to protect the public. In the absence of any test of these capabilities -- which individually and collectively capture the essence of the Commission's "realism doctrine" --the June 1988 exercise was fundamentally flawed and its results will not support a reasonable 3/ This statement should not be misread as an impermissible challenge to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix . IV.F.6. An exercise is not flawed pn s,e
- simply because non-participating governments do not participate.
! However, when a significant portion of an EPZ has no particip'ating governments at either the local or higher level and it is undisputed that these governments as a matter of fact and law hold the key to what would_ actually occur during an emergency (because the utility is unable unilaterally to implement its own plan) then their failure to participate in that exercise makes any prospective finding about what
. protective measures will be taken too speculative to support licensing. ~
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assurance finding. Instead of testing the SPMC in pure Mode 2 (which is a planner's fiction to avoid the difficult issues of coordination and accomodation) the exercise should have recognized:
the reality that in an actual emergency, State and local government officials will exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public . . . [and]
determine [d] the adequaev of that expected response, in combination case-by-casewith basis.the. utility's
. 10 compensating C.F.R. 6 50.47 (measures, c)(1). on a Response MAG EX 3 The Staff objects to admission of this contention which on its face is an impermissible challenge to the Comission's regulation at 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E,$IV.F.6 providing that participation of state and local governments that have refused to cooperate in emergency planning is not required in an exercise.
Notwithstanding footnote 9 on page 24 which states this contention.
is not a challenge to the regulation, the same note imediately i
proceeds to state "their failure to participate in that exercise makes any prospective finding about what protective treasures will be taken too speculative to support licensing." This can be read only as an impermissible challenge to the regulation. See, 10 C.f.R. 12.758. Further, one who refuses to cooperate in emergency planning, cannot plead that the exercise did not test that cooperation. .
l MAG EX 4: The June 1988 exercise for the Massachusetts portions of the EPZ tested Mode 2 of the SPMC. As such the exercise was fundamentally l flawed because the delegation of authority by the Comonwealtn to a foreign bankrupt corporation simulated during the exercise is unlawful.
Thus, the exercise can not support the ffnding necessary for full power operation Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(c)(1).
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Response MAG EX 4 The Staff objects to admission of this contention which raises the same "legal authority" issue already admitted as JI Contention 44.A and B.
This issue should not be separately revisited as part of the general exercise litigation since it raises nothing new and merely restates the same proposition as the already admitted contention concerning the unla'wful delegation of authority.
MAG EX 5: The June 1988 exercise for the Massachusetts portions of the EPZ tested Mode 2 of the SPMC. As such the exercise was fundamentally flawed because it failed to account for the best efforts responses of State and local governments which are to be assumed under 10 C.F.R.
5 50.47(c)(10) in evaluating the SPMC. If such "expected response" is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis "in combination with the utility's ccmpensating measures", id., then an exercise that does not permit such an assessment is irrelevant to a finding pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(c)(1).
Response MAG EX 5' The Staff objects to admission of this contention as there is no requirement for the participation of the Comonwealth under 10 C.F.R.
Part, Appendix E 51V.F.6. Thus, the contention is an impermissible challenge to the regulatfon and cannot be admitted. See, 10 C.F.R.
52.758. Again, one may not allege that a "best efforts" response was not tested, when it would not let~ that response be tested.
I MAG EX 6: To the extent that FEMA has ' engaged in a review and evaluation of utility- or licensee-only emergency preparedness and has purported to make findings as to the adequacy of that preparedness, FEMA has acted outside and beyond its legal authority and any such FEMA review and evaluation and any such findings that result from or follow upon such review and eva.luation, which are represented as findings of that agency, are a legal nullity and have no legal effect or significance in this proceeding or otherwise. .
A. FEMA has reviewed the SPMC and the June 1988 exercise its regulations set forth at 44 C.F.R. 350 (the "350 Process") pursuant to However, those regulations expressly limit FEMA to the review of State and local governmental off-site emergency plans: .
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The regulation in this part [44 C.F.R. 350] does not apply to, nor will FEMA apply any criteria with respect to, any evaluation, assessment or determination regarding the NRC licensee's emergency plans or preparedness, nor shall FEMA make any similar detemination with respect to the inte-gration of off-site and NRC licensee emergency preparedness except as these assessments and deteminations affect the emergency preparedness of State and local governments. The regulation in this part applies only to State and local planning and preparedness with respect to emergencies at commercial nuclear power facilities ar.d does not apply to other facilities . . . . 10 C.F.R. 350.4 (emphasis added).
- 8. The authority cited by FEMA in support of its review of utility off-site plans is twofold:
- 1. FEMA refers to 44 C.F.R. 350.3(f) which provides:
Notwithstanding the Procedures set forth in these rules for requesting and reaching a FEMA administrative approval of State and local plans, findings and deteminations on the current status of emergency preparedness around particular sites may be requestea by the NRC and provided by FEMA for use as needed in the NRC licensing. process. These findings and deteminations may be based upon plans currently avail-able to FEMA or furnished to FEMA by the NRC through the NRC/ FEMA Steering Comittee. l This provision was part of the 44 C.F.R. 350 regulations adopted by FEMA on September 28,1983. 48 Fed. 44332, 44337 (September 28, 1983). The provision entitled "Exclusions" quoted earlier (350.4) was (and is) the imediately following regulation.
- 2. FEMA and the NRC signed a Memorandum of Understanding on April 18, 1985 ("1985 MOU") 50 Fed Reg 15485. The purpose of this MOV was to provide the "basis and conditions for interim findings" pursuant to 44 C.F.R. 350.3(f):
'Notwithstanding the procedures which are set forth in 44 C.F.R. 350 for requesting and reaching a FEMA administrative approva] of State and loca] p]ans, findings and detemina-tions on the current status of emergency planning and pre-paredness around particular sites, referred to as interim findings, will be provided by FEMA for use as needed in the NRC licensing process . . . . An interial finding provided under this arrangement will be an extension of FEMA's proc *e-dures for review and approval of eff-site radiological emergency plans and preparedness set forth~in 44 C.F.R. 350.
It will be based on the revjew of currently available plans and, if appropriate, joint exercise results related to a specific nuclear power plant site, -
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v FEMA's regulations, therefore, do permit "interim findings" (1985 MOU) which reflect its evaluation of the "current status" (44 C.F.R. 350.3(f))
of preparedness. However, the regulatory context makes clear that this additional procedure was aimed at delays in NRC licensing caused by FEMA s normal 350 review of State and local governmental plans. Section 350.3(f) and tPe 1985 MOU To IIot extend FEMA's jurisdiction to include evaluation cf util A off-site plans or otherwise modify 350.4 limitations. This conclusion follows from the following:
- a. The exclusionary language of 350.4 was adopted by FEMA at the same time that provision was mcde in 350.3(f) for findings on the "current status" of planning,
- b. The 'MOV at no point mentions or refers to utili ty off-site plans. Instead, it speaks of "plans currently available to FEMA or furnished to FEMA by the NRC/ FEMA Steering Comittee." 50 Fed Reg 15485, 15486 n.1. Thus, the MOU simply took official notice of the fact that FEMA been receivin State and local plans (from both s
utilities 4 padand governments) gfor review without following the formal request procedures set forth at 44 C.F.R. 350.7. Section 350.7(d), for example, requires a state's application for formal FEMA review to include a statement that "in the opinion of the State, (the submitted plan is]
.) The MOV adequate to protect the public health and safety . . . "
did not (and could not) extend FEMA's review to utility off-site plans in light of the exclusionary language of 350.4
- c. The language of the MOV makes clear that its focus was the procedural aspects o,f FEMA review of State and local government plans and not the substantive issue of whose plans would FEMA review:
If in FEMA.s view the plans (being reviewed pursuant to the 1935 fiOV.1 that are available are not completed or are not reac'y for review, FEMA will provide NRC with a status report delineating milestones for preparation of the plan by the offsite authorities . . . .
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4/ Utilities had prepared offsite plans on bohalf of State and local governments which these governments aTfTrmed as their own and some of these plans were submitted tu FEMA by the utilities acting for the State and local governments. As David McLoughlin explained during Congressional hearings in May 1987:
There are places in the United States where a utility has done the great bulk of the planning itself. It has the [sicl been adopted by State and local governments and there has been a lot of training to bring State and local people up to the ability to perform the operations that are outlined in the plan.
These plans were reviewed pursuant to 250.3(f) and this review did not contravene 350.4 because the State and local governments adopted these utility plans as their own. .
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. . 29 50 Fed Reg 15485, 15486.
The FEMA reports will be a part of an interim fi,nding on emergency preparedness; or will be the result of an exercise conducted pursuant -
to FEMA's review and apprnval procedures under 44 C.F.R. Part 350.
Exercise evaluations till identify one of the following conditions:
. . . (2) there are deficiencies that may adversely impact public health and safety that nost be corrected by the affected State and local governments In order to provide reasonable assurance that the plan can be implemented . . . .
In short, no legal authority supports FEMA's review of the SPMC and June 1988 exercise and its findings qua agency findings are a nullity ge j/ That FEMA ha's some concern over these issues is clear from the following:
(1)InSeptember1987,adraftproposedamendmentto44CFR 350 was circulated by FEMA to all state emergency management directors. FEMA proposed, inter alia, to amend the exclusionary language of 350.4 as fo11cws:
The regulation in this part does not apply to, nor will FEMA apply any criteria with respect to any evaluation, assessment or determinations regarding the NRC licensee's on-site emergency plans or preparedness, nor shall FEMA make any similar I determination with respect to the integr. tion of offsite and NRC licensee on site emergency preparedness except as these assessments and determinations affect the emergency pre)aredness of State and local governments. [The] This regulation lin this part) applies [only to State and local planning and preparedns:s with respect to emergencies at commercial nuclear power facilities] and does not apply to other facilities . . . .
(words added by FEMA are underlined, words delqted by FEMA are bracketed)
(2) The November.1987 Oraft ' ~4, Suop 1 at I stated:
It [Supp 1] is consistent with ta. N e ;ons of the FEMA /NRC
[1985 MOV), wherein'the parties agre6' , evaluate plans prepared by utilities on behalf of State and local governments (enphasis supplied)
The final version of this same sentence reads: ,
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUCD ON NEXT PAGE) ,
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' EMA's regulations, therefore, do permit "interim findings" (1985 MOU which reflect its evaluation of the "current status" (44 C.F.R. ) 350.3(f))
of preparedness. However, the regulatory context makes clear that this additional procedure was aimed at delays in NRC licensing caused by FEMA s nomal 350 review of State and local governmental plans. Section 350.3(f) and the 1985 M00 To not extend FEMA's jurisdiction to ire,lude evaluation of utility off-site plans or otherwise mcdify 350.4 limitations. This conclusion follows from the following:
- a. The exclusionary language of 350.4 was adopted by FEMA at the same time that provision was made in 350.3(f) for findings on the "current status" of (:lanning.
- b. The MOV at no point mentions or refers to utility off-site plans. Instead, it speaks of "plans currently available to FEMA or furnished to FEMA by the NRC/ FEMA Steering Conunittee." 50 Fed Reg 15485, 15486 n.1. Thus, the MOV simply took official notice of the fact that FEMA been receivin State and local plans (frov both utilities 6'hadand governments) gfor review without following the iemal request procedures set forth at 44 C.F.R. 350.7. Section 350.7(d), for example, requires a state's application for fomal FEMA review to in::lude a statement that "in the opinion of the State, [the submitted plan is]
adequate to protect the public health and safety . . . .)
did not (and could not) extend FEMA's review to utility off-site plans in The M00 light of the exclusionary language of 350.4.
- c. The language of the MOU makes clear that its focus was the procedural aspects of FEMA review of State and local government plans and not the substantive issue of whose plcas would FEMA review:
If in FEMA.s view the plans [being reviewed pursuant to the 1985 MOU] .
that are available are not completed or are not ready for review, FEMA will provide NRC with a status report delineating milestones for preparation of.the plan by the offsite authorities, , . . .
l/ Utilities had prepared offsite plans on behalf of State and local governments which these governments affirmed as their own and some of these plans were submitted tu FEMA by the utilities acting for the State and local governments. As David McLoughlin explained during '
- ongressional hea ings in May 1987
4 There are places in the United States where a utility has done the great bulk of the planning itself. It has the [ sic] been adopted by State and local governments and there has been a lot -
of training to bring State and local people up to the ability to perfom the operations that are outlined in the plan.
These plans were reviewed pursuant to 350.3(f).and this review did not contravene 350.4 because the State and local governments adopted these utility plans as their owr,
+ 9 6 4
e e e 4 . p 4
sv ----
m-
. . l 31 l 50 Fed Reg 15485, 15486.
The FEMA reports will be a part of an interim finding on emergency preparedness; or will be the result of an exercise conducted pursuant to FEMA's review and approval procedures under 44 C.F.R. Part 350.
Exercise evaluations will identify one of the following conditions:
. . . (2) there n e deficiencies that may adversely impact public health and safety that mast be corrected by the affected State and local governments in order to provide reasonable assurance that the ,
plan can be implemented . . . . t i
In short, no legal authority supports FEMA's review of the SPMC and t ,
June 1988 exercise and its findings qua ,ajency findings are a nullity. g ,
i 7/ That FEMA has some concern over these issues is clear from the following:
(1) In September 1987, a draft proposed amendment to 44 CFR 350 was circulated by FEMA to all state energency management l directors. FEMA proposed, inter alia, to amend the exclusionary language of 350.4 as follows:
The regulation in this part does not apply to, nor will FEMA apply any criteria with respect to any evaluation, assessment or '
determinations regarding the NRC licensee's on-site emergency . ,
1 plans or preparedness, nor shall FEMA make any similar l
- determination with respect to the integration of offsite and NRC licens
- .e on site emergency preparedness except as these
! assessments and determinations affect the emergency pre)aredness of State and local governments. [The] This regulation lin this ,
part) applies [only to State and local planning and p'reparedriess with respect to emergencies at commercial nuclear power facilities) and does not apply to other facilities . . . .
1 (words added by FEMA are underlined, words deleted by FEMA are l bracketed) i
, (2)TheNovember1987OraftNUREG-0654,Supp1at1 stated:
It[Supp1 i s consistent with the provisions of the FE W NRC
[1985 MOU)), wherein the parties agreed to evaluate plans l prepared by utilities on behalf of ' tite and local _ governments j (emphasis supplied) !
l
- The final version t f this same sentence reads
1 .
3 (FOOTNOTE CONitNilED ON NEXT PAGE)
\ . -
4 6
4
, ,_, -n - - _ , - . , - - - , . - - . . - , . - - - - . - . - - , . . - , - - - - , . , , - , - - *,, -- .. , ,. - - - -,- - - . . . . , , - , - - , - , - . - - -
.. . . - = . __ __ .
l Response MAG EX 6 I
! The Staff objects to admission of this contention which alleges that FEMA's review and evaluation of the emergency planning exercise is outside FEMA's legal authority. This legal argument does not address the exercise itself or any alleged fundamental flaws as demonstrated by the exercise.
Hence, on that ground alone it is inadmissible. Additionally, there is no basis for this contention which wholly ignores the regulations at 10 C.F.R.150.47 and the Comission's discussion in adopting the new rule at 10 C.F.R. 650.47(c)(1) that specifically addressed the rnie FEMA would play in assessing emergency plans, whether they are state, local or utility plans. See, 52 Fed. Reg. 42078, 42082 (November 3, 1987). This contention must be rejected as an attack on the NRC's regulations. ,
. Additionally, the Memorandum of Understandino between the NRC and -
4 FEMA currently in effect specifically provides in III.1 that notwithstanding the provisions of 44 C.F.R. Part 350, FEMA findirgs will also be provided to the NRC on nff-site emergency plans where requested by the fiRC. 50 Fed. Reg. 15484,15486 (April 4.1985). This amendment to l
4
) the January 24, 1980 Memorandum of Understanding plainly shows the intent -
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) . .
It [Supp 1 is consistent with the provisions of the TEMA/FPC d [1985MOU)],whereinthepartiesagreedtoevaluateplans prepared by utilities and provided to FEMA by the NRC. .
i As noted, the 1985 MOV centains not one reference to utilitv ~offsite plans.
- 0 -
1 4
9 e e
to expand FEMA's role to cover a review of off-site plens, regardless of who prcpared them.
MAG EX 7: The SPMC and the June 1988 graded exercise of the SPMC were reviewed and evaluated by FEMA. The findings of FEMA should be given no weight as agency findings in this Proceeding.
A. Unlike FEMA findings and deteminations as to the adequacy of State and local government emergncy .olans, no rebuttable presumption attachs to a FEMA review of utility offsite preparedness. Lf.
f I 50.47(a)(2) with i 50.47(c)(1).
FEMA's review of the state of preparedness for the Massachusetts EPZ was expressly based en three "assumptions." One of these assumptions
-- that the non-participating governments will follow the SPMC -- should not be made unless and until the SPMC is determined to be an adequate ,
plan. Another assumption -- that the governments will "have the resources sufficient to implement those portir, s of the utility offsite plan where l State and local response is necewary" (Supp 1 at 2) -- completely ,
undermines the integrity of any FEMA determination regarding the adequacy i of offsite preparodress. FEMA has simply assumed that the governments' resources will be adequate in the event that the SPMC is "generally followed" in accordance with Mode 1 and mixed-delegation Mode 2. Yet, on.e ,
key issue in this proceeding, at least as to the adequacy of the '
implementation of the 3PMC in any mode other than pure Mode 2 (which is unlawful), is the capacity of the povernments to implement that plan. '
FEMA has sinply assumed adequate governmental resources exist.
C. FEMA has expressly disclaimed that it is the lead agency in the review of utility offsite emergency plans. The NRC and not FEPA drafted the key assunptions in Supp 1. In a nemorandum from David McLoughlin to Victor J. Stello dated Octcber 16, 1987, McLoughlin !tated:
I wculd like to stress the importance of having written instructions prepared bY the Nuclear Regulatory Comission. .
I before beginning the project [the development of utility plan !
) criteria, i.e. Supp 1] which state specifically the j assumptions upnn which the plan review vould be conducted.
l f In respense to this request, Frank Cor.;el NRC Director of the Division of l 1 Radiation Prdtection, wrote to Richard Krim, Assistant Associate Director l l at FEMA on October 21, 1987:
- This responds to the understanding reached at the October 15, 1 1987 meeting between FEMA and NRC, and reflected in Dave McLoughlin's October 16, 1987 memorandun to Victor Stello. l We agreed that the NRC would provide written instru:tions which state specifically the assumptions upon which utility -
, offsite Plan reviews wruid be conducted by FEMA. . . .
As we further agreed, any FEMA findings on the adecuacy o' , ;
utility offsite plans will necessarily include the caveat .
1 I
0
- that FEMA was requested by the NRC to use the above assumptions in evaluating a utility offsite Plan.
Finally, in response to coments on Supp 1 filed by the Mass AG on March 3, 1988 asserting that FEMA was abdicating its function as lead agency by pemitting the NRC to draft its criteria for it, FEMA steted quite openly:
FEMA leadarship responsibilities in regard to offsite planning extends to offrite planninn of State and local governments. In the case of offsite planning by utilities, NRC has the lead cnd FEMA's role is one of cooperating with the NRC.
Thus, it is not appropriate for FEMA to appear before the NRC as an independent expert agency in this proceeding when its findings are the result of evaluative standards established by the NRC and not by it. The result is an exercise in agency ventriloquism.
D. FEMA has recognized and stated that State and local governmental
, participation is essential for an adequate level of offsite preparedness i to exist. In an internal ecmorandum commenting er the then-proposed NRC i amendments to 10 C.F.R. I 50.47, FEMA expert staff comments were explicit on this point:
FEMA has consistently and repeatedly taken the position that such participation [ state and local] is essential to a finding of adequacy of offsite preparedness . . . . Wherever the changed regulatory philosophy toward preparedness would be applied, the integrated onsite-offsite approach, which has been considered essential to adequate preparedness, would be put in jeopardy. Next in importance to State ard local onvernment cooperatioc in offsite planning and preparedness, is the interaction that must take place between the licensee and offsite authorities and the general public. This interaction is best illustratad in the required joint exercises, which would be waived under the NRC propesal.
1
] FEMA's cc,rrents fi'ed with the NRC on the then proposed rule in April 1987 I s tated: -
J - From this experien.e [ February 1986 Shorehan exercise], FEPA i eencludes that the practice of simulating goverreental a participation has several important consequences. First, the i real-time interaction between officials and other emergency responders is not realistically tested. That compromises the quality of the findings which FEMA is able to make about the preparedness of those other responders. Secondly, the preparedness of the' state and local goernments is not
. demonstrated in any meaningful sense. As a result, the '
i conclusiens that FEMA would be called on to make about the p*obable response of state erd local governments would be
! based largely on conjecturc. FEMA is very reluctant to j certify tFat adequate protective measures can be taken where
! any finding would be based on such a degree of conjecture. .
. . ,The lack of training which would in all probability, ,
g # e 9
O g
follow from holding exercises without State and lo' cal government participation would also increase the risk to the populatien of the affected emergency planning zones.
Thus, to the extent that FEMA submits findings in this proceeding certifying that offrite preparedness is adequate, those findings eithca contradict the considered position of FEMA based en its exparienco, or
l In the latter case, FEMA has simply introduced the NRC's "atsumptions" to avoid the element of conjecture concerning the probable rGsponse of State and local governments and the overall adequacy of off-site planning.
to expand FEMA's role to enver a review of off-site plans, regardless of who prepared them.
Repense MAG Contention 7, Th6 Staff objects to this contention for the same reasons as stated in objection to MAG Contention 6. Further, to the extent the contentier addresses FEMA's role in assessing "utility" plans, it does not present a litigable issue in this proceeding.
MAG EX 8: The results of the Graded Exercise reveal that there exist fundamental flaws in the Seabrook off-site emergency plans submitted by the State of New Hampshire ard the Applichnts with respect to planning ,
standards 10 C.F.R. i 50.47(b)(6) and (b)(0) and the corresponding !
requirements of NUREG 0654, Supp 1 at !!.F.1.b and c, and 2 and H.10. As ,
1 a result, exercise objective 4, which requires that the exercise
"[d]emonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field Personrel," GM EX-3 at 11, was not ret and no i finding of reasonable assurance can be made pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
I
! 50.47(a) ana (c)(1).
Exercise results which individually and/or enllectively provide basis ,
I for this contention include the following: '
j A. The ORO EOC relied on commercial telephone lines to conduct most j if not all ORO liaison activities, all of the communicat'ons between and '
- with contract service providers and their perscenel, and comuntaations i j -
with schools and other facilities. All of the telephone lines at the i 4 Selem Staging Area were creercial telephone lines. Because comercial !
telephone 1.ines should be assumed to be overloaded shortly after the onset of an accident at Seabrook, the exercise did not establish adequate means i of centunication. !
] B. The cerrnunication ret linking the ORO field personnel with the EOC and with each other was demonstrated to be completely inadecuate.
Inferration flows were delayed and accuracy was crg romised by t
vertical comrunication chain required by the SPMC. Further details in i support of this contention are set forth at MAG EX 13. ORO . field personnel including VANS drivers, traffic guides, transfer peint e
36 - !
dispatchers, route guides, radiological field tearcs and others, were using ,
hand-held, battery powered 8 chantel radios. Radio comunications were :
demonstrated to be deficient: ,
l
- 1. The EMS radio, the primary comunications link with mobile !
medical support' facilities like ambulances and vans, malfunctioned and l could transmit but not receive messages. This indicates that ORO had not ;
provided adequate inspection and inventory check for critical emergency ;
comunications equipment. No imediately accessible back-up comunica-tier.s system was cvailable at the Staging Area and portable radios had to .
be procured (from an unidentified source in an unidentified manneri end !
provided to the one ambulance and three vans involved in the Exercise, i (Obviously, had the actual emergency number nf ambulances and vans been !
involved this procurement task would have been measurably greater.) ,
Dispatch of one ambulance was delayed 20 minutes while these portable !
radios were procured. (However, this does not indicate that it took only 20 minutes to procure them.) The vans were not "delayed" only because !
they were nnt ordered out until after the substitute radios were procured. '
But one van did not establish appropriate radio contact until more than 80 minutes after it had been dispatched. That van was instead enrvrunicating i on the wrong channel with the Evacuation Suppert Dispatcher ("ESD") bue t neither the van nor the ESD notified the appropriate persons (including each other) that the comunication linkage was inappropriate. The othat two vans and the ambulance which were using the replacement radios were
.vstricted by the shorter range that these substitute radios had in comparison with the EMS that had malfunctioned. .
1
- 2. Radio comunication~ between' the ESD and tiaffic guides was ,
sporadically interrupted by breaks in reception. Cornunicetions betweer. ;
road crews and transfer points were delayed by other radio traffic. .
l Apparently, road crews could not communicate directly with the ESD and, in :
one instance, the ESD was infomed using a traffic guide's radio that an !
additional wrecker was nacessary. '
- 3. Radio comunications between ' the Staging Area and school ,
evacuation buser was limited to these periods when the buses were within '
range. Several bus yards were cut of that range and these buses could not ;
be reached for heurs. The same problem ensted in trying to comroricate with the buses for day care centers and the transit deperdent. !
4 Other ORO field personnel had only sporadic cecmunications ;
with the Staging Area because of channel overloading ,and intermittent' reception. When route giudes and bus drivers were told to ingest K! at 15:45, 4 of 11 did not ingest th 4 of 7 buses for the transit dependent did not receive this transmission.
~ C. Comunications established with the non-participating governments were also demonstrated to be inadequate:
- 1. No verification methodology was used in corrunicatina with the Governor.s p.epresentative (FEMA Control Cell). As a result', ' the exercise did not' demonstrate thet ORO could establish ccerunications with the gewarcor. .
. The exercise did not demonstrate thtt ORO could establish energei , ccmunicatirrs with non-participatirg governments ei ther by means oi emergency, telephone communicatione or any back-up systen.
Insterd of attempting to establish communications with emergency Personnel
- 9
- -_ ==-m-yww=eg, .ag rw -
- exercise fails to establish that during an actual emergency comunications can be established in the aesence of access by ORO to the energency radio i frequercies used by the non-participating governments.
- 3. Significantly, the oxercise failed to derenstrate that ORO energency cortnunications are compatible' with t.90s? systems used by the ncn participating governments. In fact, the Applicants made representations
- to the Mass AG that Massachusetts police radios and other foms of l communication might interfere with ORO consnunications. Thus, in the event that the govertr9ents respond by employing their own personnel and :
, comunications equipment, there is no reasorable assurance that any [
] integrated communications will exist or that the ORO system itself will '
centinue to be effective.
O. In further support of this contention, the following contentions and bases are referred to and incorporated by reference: 9, 10, 11, 12,
- 13. :
' Response MAG Contention 8
! The Staff does not object to this contention concerning inadequate 1
]
comunications among field personnel and the CRO, limited to Bases B and C.1 and 3. Ho w er, the Staff objects to Basis A on the grounds that it l
4 f
j is rot an exercise issue but a planning issue which bss previously been admitted as JI Contention 30. This basis shculd not be separately [
1 litigated as an exercise issue. Basis C.? is also inadmissible as there :
l is no requirement that state and local governments participate in the l emergency planning erercise as discussed supra. See, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, i t'
4 I Appendix E UV.F.6.
l j Basis D incorporating contentions 9 through'13 under this "comunica-f tion" rubric is inappropriate sinct each of those contintions deal !
individually with discreet' areas that are not related to the issue of i l
j crerunication among field personnel and the OR0, and the issues should not i 3 - ,
j be heard twice. !
! I i MAG EX 9: The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in ,
that NHY's Clio demonstrated that it did not have the~ ability to coordinate ,
r the fomulatien and dissemination of eccurate infomation crd instructions I
U 1
l to the public in a timely fashion after initial alert and notification has 1 occurred, as required by 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(5) and (6) and the guidance set forth at NUREG 0654 (Supp 1) at II . E.3-8, and F.1. As a result, exdrcise Objective 13 was not met and the exercise will not support a finding that adequate protective measures can and will te taken in the ,
event of an emergency.
The followirg bases both individually and collectively provide support for this contention:
A. The EBS nessages and the News Releases actually generated during the Exercise were confusing and centained conflicting infomatinns An average mentber of the public who had heard over the radio or on television the ORO News Releases and EBS messages in sequence would have come away with all kinds of unanswered questions. Confusion would have been generated, for examle, regarding who/what ORO was, what had happened to town police and Civil Defense, what the role of the state was, what it meant that ORO was "activated," what it rneant to leave the "beach areas"
("How far should I go?" "What if I live there?"). Puch confusion wculd have been generated about the school children, what schools were doing, and what parents should or should not do (as is more specifically described in MAG EX 10.) There was even confusion generated on Day 0 of the Exercise with respect to what people would be let into the EPZ to care for animals. Much confusion was also generated on both de," nf the Exercise due to the conflicting nature. of the ORO and New Hampshire EBS messages and news releases.
B. The EPS nessages and news releases were not accurato in many respects. For example, there was misinforination about the Newburyport schools in ORO EBS #3, as FEMA has noted. Also, there was a serious nistake in News Release AIS, which said that the overturned lumber truck (described in more detail in MAG EX 13) was blocking traffic on southbound I-95.
C. The news releases were not timely in many instances. Events vere repeatedly not reported ?t the Media Center until long af ter they had occurred, as was the case with the overturned lumber truck, which wa5 not reported until long af ter it had began blocking traffic. Messages and information were not forwarded promptly free the EOC to the Media Cceter and the Joint Telephone Infernation Center, as can be seen from the timas noted on many of the player generated material. See also FEMA repnrt at 217. In additien, and perhaps most serious. ORO generaTTy lagged behind New Hampshiro in issuing PARS tn the public, as can be seen clearly in the time lines enntained in the FEMA report. On Day 2 for example, it took a very long time after the State of New Hampshire for ORD to get er EBS nessage out 'rtgerding famers re-entering the EPZ to care for livestock.
D. The timing and content of ORO's public infomation .was not -
coordinated in any systematic way with the public inforntion beirg "elresed by New Harrpshire. This would have led to further ennfusion and mistrust. Comparison of the messages released at about the same tire Ly NH and ORO revesi numerous differences that needed to be resolved and were not. Tha process for coordinating the informatien released was shown to be Ld hoc and there'tre inadequate. .
S 9
. e 9
i Response MAG EX 9 ,
The Staff does not object to admissinn of this contention concerning i
EBS messages and news releases.
- i MAG EX 10: The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in i
' that hFsT demonstrated that it did not have the ability and resources necessary to im)1ement_ appropriate protective actions for school, and day C.F.R.
the plume EPZ, as required by 10 care children wit 11n F 50.57(b)(10) and the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, Rev.1 Supp.1, i il J.9 and J.10.g. Thus, Or.0 failed to satisfy Exercise Objective 19, and this precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that ad.couate protective ,
measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at.
Scabrook, as required by 10 C.F.R. I i 50.47(c)(1). individually and/or collectivel Exercise results which basis for this contention include the following: A. Over the course of ,
Day 1 of the Exercise, ORO demonstrated that it was unable to notify and exchange infomation with all the schools and day care centers in a timely fashion to keep pace with the changing developments of the emergency and to irplement timely protective actions. Except in one instance (see B, j
below), the hundreds of phone calls made to schools and FEMA day care centers Control Cell
' durirg the exercise were made to the FEMA Control Cell. Personnel i had to say, did not ask to have infomation repeated, infrequently asked a ;
single question or tm, and prenptly gave any information sought by th;
- School liaisons. This allowed the Liaisons to make the calls to the
~
assigned schools at an unrealistically rapid pace that could not be ,
achieved in a real emergency when real school officials would ask a great i rany more questions than FEMA Controllers did and their respenses to In thec l Liaisons cuestions would not be as readily fortheming or as brief.
r real emergarey, each o" these calls would take considerably longer.
Moreover, during the Exercise, the phone numbern used by the Liaisons to ;
call the FEMA Control Cell were rarely husy. During a real emergency it . i
! must realistically be expected that many dozens of phone calls from concerned' parents will flood phore lines to the schools making it prcbable l
liaisons will have to spend considerable time making thet School Nevertheless, even with the cboperative FEMA Control Cell and call-backs.
the absence of busy school phone lines during the Exercise, ORO.s School Liaisons were not able to make their calls and exchange infomation with j j
schools and day care centers at a rapid enough rate to keep schools ;
adequately informed in a timely fashion of changing developments and PARS. ;
The Exercise thus demonstrated that each School Licison has too many. calls to make, and too much infomation to excha'rce to keep all schools
- i
)
i adequately infomed in a tirely fashicn in a reaf e,nergency. 1 B. One real school in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ actual'y
- - was to be contacted er the Day 1 of the e'xercise and a real, rather than ?
When the Amesbury School i
simulated, exchange of infomation was to occur. -
Liaison first called this school at 11:17 a.m. to notify it of the Alert I
1 ,
40 -
and exchange infomation, the phone went unanswered. He did not call back until 1:50 p.m. when he was in the process of making his seennd round of calls to the Anesbury Schools. Again he received no answer, fio further attempts were made to call the school; no call was made to the phone company or elsewhere to confirm the accus acy of the phone number; and no route guide was dispatched to see what the problem was at the school. In the event of a real emergency, ORO needs to anticipate both that some school officials will be away from their phones momentarily and that school phones generally will often be busy. In either case call-backs need to be made prceptly to ensure that some schools do not get bypassed.
During the Exercise ORO demonstrated that it does not have a system in place for ensuring that call-backs can or will be mtde pronptly or, where schools which are expected to be in sessien have phones which go unanswered or are repeatedly busy, that timely efforts can or will be made to contact the schools using alternative means.
C. The ORO demonstrated that it could not make a ;chool PAR and communicate it to the schools in a timely fashion, thereby effectively precluding implementation of the chosen protective actions for a
'ignificant namber of schcol children. While New Hapshire was able to nake a protectivo acticn decision to have its children "stay in school at 11:52 a.M. (immediately after the SAE was declared). ORO's decisionmakers did not have a serious discussion focussing on the school PARS until 1:?5 p.m., just minutes before the General Emergency was declared. In that discussion at 1:25 tha ORO Director recognized the need to quickly come to a decision on a PAR for the schools, because he knew the schools had normal closing times which were generally between 2:15 and 3:00 p.m. Yet he decided to postponc making a PAR decision at 1:25. At 1:32 a General Alert diverted ORO's fetus on the schools. Finally, at about 2:05 p.m. , e decision on a school PAR was made: hold the children in the schools rather than releasing them at the nonral times. By 2:05 p.m. , however, ORO had left itself too little tire to notify the Merrirac schools of this PAR before it released its students at 2:15. OR0's owms actirns and celays theraby precluded it from irplementing this PAR for the Merrimac schools. So the PAR was issued only to the schools in the reraining five comunities. But, again. ORO could not act end notification was delivered too late to four I4) quickly of theenough schools in flewburyport to prevent ther from releasing their students at the nomal time. Thus, because of ORO s delays in making a school PAR ard in l comunicating it to the schools, ORO was unable to implement its recomended PAP in all of Merrinac and rest of Newburyport.
D. Thereafter, ORO's ef forts to comunicate its PAR to the schnois and parents, were uncoordinated, confusing, conflicting, and likely wou!d have resulted in chaos at the schools and day care centers. As a result, there is no reasonable assurance that OR0.5 recomended protectise actions cruld have been implenented. First, OR0.s leadership failed to explain the specifics and the logic of the "hold the students" decision to its own staff including the Scheni Coordinator, the School 1.iaisons, and CPO.s ,
personnel in the Pedia Certer. At 2:15, the School Coordinator told all !
the Schecl Liaisons (except the ene for Merrirac) to call their respective !
schools (including day care centers) and tell then "that the' children are to stay at school until parents pick ther up or we evacuate them."
l
, l
. 41 However, School Liaisons were also instructed to find out whether the schools wished to retain and use their own buses or use ORO buses later on. Thus, when the School Liaisons called the scbcols from about 2:15 to 3:15 p.m. after the declaration of the Generc1 Emergency, the message given about PARS was confusing and lacking in logic. flo instructions were given to school admiristrators about how t. irplement or whether to implement sheltering for the students. Indeed, it was not even clear whether the schools were evacuating, sheltering, or sheltering now and evacuating later. If schools indicated that they could not retain their buses, Liaisons were unable to estimate when ORO buses might be able to ,
get.to them. '
Difficulties in implementing ORO's school PAR would have resulted from these confused, illogical comunicatinns to the scheols and day care centers. For example, when the Amesbury, School liaison called the Horace .
Mann School at 2:54 p.m. and found that the school was then in the process !
of loading students onto its buses, the Liaison told schoni officials '
there to uninad the buses and get the children back into the school "due to the release going out to sea." This, of course, makes no sense. It also was not true, for at that tire the wind had begun te shift around and to come from the north, blowing the plume toward Massachusetts. If school officials sought out a weather forecast, they would have learned that the wind was socn going to swing around and blow from the east, blowing the plume right at Amesbury. They undoubtedly would have also learned that i the Town of Amesbury had been recomended to evacuate. In this situation,
! in a real emergency, there is no reasenable assurance that Amesbury school officials would have heeded the School Liaison's advice to hold the students, i To make natters worse, conflicting messages were then being given .i regarding whether parents should or could pick up their children at the
! schools and what was happening to the students. The School liaisons (except for Perrimac, which sent its student.s home) were instructed to I tell the schools that the t.nildren thould be kept in schoci until parents pick them up or ORO evacuates them. Meanwhile, OR0 issued an EPS ressage (CR0 EBS #3) at about 2:20 p.m. which advised parents:
- a. that a radioactive release had o curred;
- b. that imediate evacuation is recomended for people in Salisbury and Ar.esbury end that people in Newburyport, Newbury, West Newbury, and
'4errimac was safer if they sheltered in place imediately;
- c. that "[4]Il schools within the ccanunities directed to evacuate are being evacuated to the designated Reception Centers for the comunity in which they are located. Parents should not drive to school tn meet their children since shcools are now being evacuated and children are being taken safely by bus directly to their Peception Centers. Schon1 '
children will then be sent to The Host Facility in A [ sic] where the'y may he picked up";
- d. that schocls "In the comunities 6dvised to shelter are taHng similar sheltering actions. Officials have instructiens for protectiro <
the children or other persons in their care' until sheltering is no longai- l necessary. Perents and relatives are advised not to call the schools or 1
, other institutions, nore to drive te the schc61s to attempt to pick up -
their children. Community safety will be better protected i' the schools l
4 g 0
42 are pemitted to conduct sheltering activities # over the next several l hours"; anJ y
that 'Tp]arents with children attending school within Salisbury. I e.
Aresbury, Newbury, West Newbury and Newburyport are advised that their children are currently being safely maintained at school, where they will be kept until it is detemined that they can be safely moved.'
This message was so confusing, contradictory, and misleading that it would have torpedoed any effective implementation of OR0's PAR for the schools and dey care centers. Some, but not all, of the problens with this message are as follows:
- While ORO's School Liaisons were telling schools that ,
parents can pick up students, this message tells parents to stay away i and not even call the schools, i
- It instructs the general population ef Arasbury and Salisbury to evacuate imediately while telling parentr. in these 1 towns both (a) that Amesbury school children "are being" evacuated i and (b7 Tater in the message, that these some children are being l "kept" at school "until it is determined that they can be safely i moved."
- It instructs the general population in Newburyport,
, Newbury, and West Newbury to shelter in place imediately while
! telling parents in these towns that schools are takin similar d
sheltering actions (4) "over the next several hours" and (b)g later on :
in the message, "until it is determined that they can be safely moved." Besides being confusing, this message is erroneous in that four of the schools in rewburyport were releasing students and sending them home.
- It instructs the general populatien in Merrimac to 1 shelter in place immediately but gives parents in Merrirac no information whatsoever abouc what is happening to their children.
- For students who are being or may be evacuated, it failed to say specifically where parents may go to rneet than and pick them i up and when this can occur, j Despite the precaution in the message not to call er drive to the ;
j schaois, this EBS aessage given at about 2:20 p.m. is so cerfusing and l i inaJequate that in each of the six itassachusetts EPZ comunities, parents l would not have had sufficient infemation about what actually was happening to their child en, and most would either have attempted to call or drive to the schools. Parents' calls would undoubtedly have flooded .
.I the schools. shortly a~ter 2:20. just when the School liaisons were calling I
- i J to infom the schools dire';tly of the PAR to "hold" the students and
- inquire of their need for buses. The likely result would have been that i j CR0 would have had great difficulty fotting phone calls threugh to each of
- the schno's to infom them of the Paps. Thus irplementation of PARS for schools was likely to have been frustrated due to the confusion generated by OR0's 2
- ?0 p.n. EBS message. There is substantial uncertainty
] regarding what would have happerad next. School officials would likely !
. have hesitated, not sure what to do, causing parents, teachers, and the j
- regular bus drivers alike to each consider taking independent, ad hoc. ;
i uncoordinated action as each group saw fit, ORO's atterrt to rescTvele l l
confusion it had crented over the schon1 children cane balatedi ' in the' l i l b +
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- fonn of an EBS message at 4:03 p.m., almost 1-3/4 hours after the first message. It, too, was confusing and came too late to hav.e had any significant impact in resolving the confusion the first message would have created. These Exercise results demonstrate that ORO is urable to coordinate the tining and content of its messages to the schools (through calls fron liaisons) and parents (using the EDS system) to ensure that PAR implementation is not f rustra ted by general confusion and chaotic, independent actions, E. Events during the Exercise demonstrated that, given the absense of school-specific emergency plans, there is no reasonable assurance that school officials will take the appropriate steps to implement proper sheltering techniques in a timely fashion when it becomes necessary to do so. ORO EBS #3 inaccurately stated that school officials "have instruction for protecting the children or other persons in their care until shelterirs is no longer necessary." This sinply is not the case.
While it is true that some EPZ schools were sent a "generic" school plan which contained some very general instructions for sheltering that were not specific to any particular school, the schools have not kept this generic plan. The schools also have no plans er instructions of their own for implementing sheltering, and school officials are not knowledgable in this area. The Exercise further demonstrated that ORO does not have the capability to compensate for the lack of existing school radiological plans or infortation. School Liaisons demonstrated that in er accident like the ene simulated here, which was hardly the fastest developing accident within the planning basis of Mt! PEG-0654 advancing frem an Alert to a release of radiation in more than four (4) hours, they were pressed beyond their cbilities just to notify schools of developnents and PARS and briefly enswer a quick question or two. They were too busy with these basic functiers to take the time to assess whether in fact schcols knnw how to implement proper sheltering techniques and, if not, to offer
- detailed, adequate advice. Thus, if the Exercise had been a real emergency, the schools would not have been able to implerent proptr sheltering techniques while waiting for ORO buses to arrive. Since the simulated plume passed over many of the hstachusetts schools befnre the buses arrived, this failing would have increased desages to schoel children. !
F. If any conclusions are to be drawn from .the extrenely limited scope of the Exercise regarding ORO's busts for schools, they are: (1) '
that ORO cannot estimate accurately the arrival time ef, its buses at any given school and (2) that there is no reaseneble assurance that ORO's fleet of hired buses can get to the schools in a timely fashion. Althcugh the SPMC claims to have agreerents with private bus corpanies to provide 534 buses in a radiological emergency at Seabrook, and that 2?6 buses would be needed to evacuate the schools, for this Exercise only four (4) be as were tested by being dispatched and driving routes to schools.
(h.ree other buses were dispatched en various routes to day care centers, for which the SPMC specifies only 19 buses nay, be needed.) Femal nobilization times were not even tested as all seven buses and drivert had been pre-arrerced to be ready to go on the day of the Exercise. The .
extent of play was limited to dispatching and driving the four school j buses to four different schools and then to reception centers in the 1 l i
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"real" time sequence. The first Exercise problem ORO encountered after dispatching the buses was to generate an estimated time of arrival ("ETA")
of each bus for each target school. School officials and the public wculd demand these ETAs during an emergency, and the FEMA Control Cell sought ,
them here from the School liaisons. During the Exercise, ORO at first delayed but then finally offered e set of ETAs for tuses for each town, but these ETAs were not released publicly in a timely fashion. Events during the Exercise proved these ETAs to be significantly optimistic, and
. they had to be changed. If the Exercise had been a real en.ergency and ORO '
had dealt with the ETAs in this same fashion, it would have created futher difficulty in implementing a safe and coordinated evacuation of the ,
schools, because both schools and parents would have lost confidence in
- I ORO's ability to do what it promised it would do, i .e. , evacuate the students in a timely fashien This would have spurred parents and schools l to take ad hoc, independent, uncoordinated action regarding the students.
i TheTecond bus-related problem ORO encountered was to have the buses ,
i drive the prescribed routes on their ORO maps, locate the :arget schools, '
and do so in a timely fashion. Although only seven buses were tested (four on routes to schools; three on rcutes to day care centers), there l
- were a significant number of mistakes made. Even though each ORO bus had i i a Route Guide on board to assist the driver in following routes, in ;
several instances the drivers were unable to follow the prescribed routes.
- In une case, a bus ended up on a dead end street in such a position that
- it took 20 minutes to get out. In some cases the Route Guides made no i effort to request that the driver follow the prescribed routes. In other l
instances. Route Guides disregarded their SPMC prescribed routes and l
, improvised other routes. The buses for day care centers actually had ;
difficulty locating several day care centers, and one center was actually ;
)l missing from the SPMC map. The upshot of all these difficulties is that: l 1 'irst, ORO cannot accurately estimate the bus FTAs as they must to ensure i that parents and schools vill cooperate with evacuation plans, and, :
second, based on this very limited sample of buses and the number of L routing difficulties encountered, there is no reasontble assurance that buses fer any given school can and will' arrive in a timely 'ashien to
] adequately protect the school children. Here, during the Exercise, ,
1 because the buses were not able to arrive in a timely fashien, a large l
], number of scheni children were still waiting in schools for the arrival of !
the buses when the plume swept over them.
I At the root of these problees is the fact that: (a)ORObusdrivers i
j and Route with Guides this area and broug(ht b) theinarea from is other so towns lacking iust inare not familiar street enough signs that
. difficulties and delays of the sort displayed during the Exercise will be inevitable, ,
i G. All of the above-described Exercise Preblems, mis-steps,'de' lays, and confused and erroneous comunications preclude a finding that there is j reasonable asrurance that teachers and day care personnel in the six q Massachusetts EPZ ccerunities can be counted on to ster in schools with i the remaining children until buses arrive and then to board and ride the buses eith the studerts. If this Exercise had been a reef emergency, and i ORO had perfomed ,iust as it did during the Exercise, providing the
- information to the schools through the School liaiscos. EBS messages, and 4
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l the redia that had been provided during the Exerciso, there is no I reasonable assurance that there would have been sufficient teachers left in the schools to accompany the students on the buses, j Response MAG EX 10 The Staff does not object to admission of this contention limited to Bases B. C, and F. However, to the extent Basis A concerns FJM's perforvance at the control cell during the exercise, not the performance
- of the ORO, it does not present a litigable issue regarding the exercise e
i of the plan. Basis D raises an issue regarding the content ',7 EBS issues
)
which has already been admitted as JI Contention 35 and it should not be litigated here a . well. Basis E raises a planning issue, t.ot an exercise 1 issue concerning the absence of school-specific plans, as does Basis G ;
I regarding "role cor.flict" of teachers. Since neither Bases E nor G raise j exercisc issues in this proceeding, they sheuld not'be admitted in support I of this contention.
MAG Ex 11: The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in .
! that the NHY ORO demonstrated that it did not have the ability to reke l i appropriate protective 7.ction decisions, based on projected or actual i dosage, EFA PAG's, availet Hity of adequate shelter, evacuation time i estimates, end other relevant factors, as reouired by 10 C.F.R. i l il i 50.47(b)(10) anti the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, Rev. 1. Supp. t j 1, f 0.10.m. Thus, ORO failed to satisfy Exercise Objective 11, and this l
! precludes a finding n' reasonable assurance that adequate protective !
4 nessures can and will be taken in the event of an emercency at Seabrook, {
! as required by 10 C.F.R. I i 50.47(c)(1). t Exercise results which individually and/or collectively fore the !
basis for this contention include the following: !
i A. During the Exercise NHY ORO persnnnel did not make their em i
} independent assessments, evaluations, judgeents or determinations I 1
regarding protective action reconnendations but merely acteo as a cenduit. l
! accepting the protective action recorrendations received frem the Seabroek ^
1 Station E0F without any meaningful scrutiny being applied to assess their !
adequacy, and then simply seeking approval to implement them frm the ,
.(simulated) Massachusetts C+vernor.s representative. By acting in this '
fashion, which is contrary to the SPMC.s procedures for making protective
) action decisions at Plan i 3.4.2 end the corresponding Procedures i sectio'ns, the CEO failed to demonstrate that it has the techrical i understarding, judgrent, and ability to assess and weigh all factors
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i relevant to a protective action recomendation and to make appropriate :
I recomendations in a timely fashion on its cwn.
B. Virtually every one of the protective actions recomended by tt.e ;
i NHY's ORO were not appropriate, in light cf all relevant circumstances at i i the tim. Other protective action choices were available which were more I appropriate and could have achieved significantly greater dosa reduction.
! For Jxample: ,
- (1) Upon the declaration of the Alert at Seabrook Station, ORO !
demenstrated a fundamental flaw in the SPHC when, af ter New Hampshire :
q acted to close Hampton and Seabrook beaches, and with a wind blowing from !
west to east that was expected to shift around to come from the north and 4
! later on from the east, NHY's ORO refused to consider a precautionary i beach closing of the Selisbury beaches and actively discouraged the !
l (simulated) Governor's representative when he considered making this reccarnendation. This refusal to consider a beach closing at the Alert i turned out to be a mistake, for when the wind later shifted as expected, i
< and the plant begaa releasing a radioactiva plume, the plume drifted ,
acress the Salisbury oeach areas long before all persons there evacuated. l An earlier beach closing at the Alert stagc, rather than at the Site i 4 Area Emergency, would have been the more appropriate PAR for another l reason as well. Considerations of the "shadow" beach evacuation and the l
i traffic conditions which it will cause in Massachusetts if New Hampshire f alone were to clcse its beaches due to preblems at Seabrook, succest strongly that a beach closing in New Hampshire must be carefully l l ceerdinated with and imposed at. the same time as a beach closi'ng in ;
) Massachusetts. Because this was not done, and New Hampshire closed its ;
i beaches well before those in Massachusetts were closed, it would have been !
impossible later on for the ORO to control the traffic streaming through ;
l Itassachusetts from both the Massachusetts and New Hampshire beach areas. ;
(2) After being notified of the SAE at 11:51 a.m., ORO finally l
, made a protective action reccestandation to close the beaches but i inappropriately failed to r:ake any early PAR whatscever for the schools, !
- as New Harpshire did. An early school closirg, for example, vould havr 1 beer an appropriate PAR at this stage, at least for those schools with l j buses available, given all the circumstances known at that time. This PAR ,
would have ensured that students would not have been hit with the radio-active plume that resulted as a direct result of ORD s delcyed-scheol- i
! closirg PAR (see (4), below). l l . (3) After the General Energency was declared at 1:30 p.m., with !
{ ,
a release of radiation minutes thereafter ORO recommended that Amesbury ,
i and Salisbury be evacuated ard that the four remaining Massachusetts EPZ [
l consnunities he sheltered. This PAR, too, was inappropriate. If all l
] relevant factors had been considered and Judgment ard crmon sense ,
I applied, f!ewburyPert, with its sizeatle population, also should have been !
J given a reccerendation to evocuate. The SPhC however, locks 0F0 into l J making PARS for Newburyport cnly when the same PAR is made' for Newbury, )
4 West t'ewbury, and Parrimac. The Exercise Nmonstrates a fundarental need '
for greater flexibility in shaping appropriate PARS for the Passechusetts l
i comunities. .
J (4) Durirg the General Emergeacy, with the wind sti,11 blewing j the plume cut to sea but expected to shift arourd and blow teward ,
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Ma'ssechusetts, ORD inexplicably made a PAR to hold the school children in
- chool past the nemal closing times in all towns except Merrimac. This decisien to hold the school children was not only an inappropriate PAP; it was a disastrous one. Given ORO's knowledge of the plant conditions and weather, and all the uncertainties facing ORO at that tire, including uncertainties regarding the lack of emergency plans for each school, uncerteinties regarding whether the buses relied on by the schools would be available after nomal departure tines, and the uncertainties about how long it would tcLe OR0's buses to arrive at the schools if those buses were to be used, the appropriato protective action at that tine was to close the schools at nomal closing times and use the schools own buses to get the children home as soon as possible. The scope of the disaster created by CRO's inapprcpriate PAR to delay closing the schools was made apparent when Seabrook's radio 6ctive plume swept over many schools before ORO .
buses arrived late that afternoon or early in the evening to pick up the students. The inappropriate PAR to hold the school children r:ay have actually reximized their dose consequences, not minimized them.
(5) OR0's PAR at approximately 4:00 p.m. that afternoon was elso inapprepriate. At that point ORO recomended that the four (4) remaining towns (Newburyport NewburY West flewbury, and Merrimac) evacuate. Prior to this time residents in these towns had been advised to shelter. Given the conditinrs of the release, the weather forecasts, the ETEs, the uncertainties about how long it would take to get ORO's buses inte the towns, and other relevant factors, this PAR should have been given much sooner. As a result, many residents of these communities who could have evacuated prior to the arrival of the plune were unable to do so.
(6) When a 92-year-old bedridden person whc could not be evacuated contacted ORO regarding what to do, he was told: "Keep all your dnors and wir. dows closed." This individual PAR was totall,v inappropriate, given the person's physical condition. Assistance should heve been offered: first in the fem of an ambulance and, if that was refused, then by sending7)(help te implement proper sheltering measures for him. Traffic heeding providen with a suggested by-pass route around the EP7 which was inapprcpriate because (a) the rcute suggested consisted of a series c' highways which do not connect and, if follnwed, weuld send travelers right into the EPZ at Portsmouth; and (b) it purported to direct people to Kittery, Maine. to pick up l-95, but Kittery, a border town just across the Piscataqua River from Portsmouth, is much too close to the EPZ to be included on a safe by-pass route. Indeed, in the evening of Day 1 of the Exercise the plume, with still 9gerous concentrations of radioactive material, blew directly over isrtsmouth into Kittery. Before the,t i happened, when the wind began blowing the plume northward, ORO should have recogaized that ute of Kittery on a by-pass reute was inappropriate. But, ORO failed to change its by-pt.s s recomnendation ard directed unwary travelers to drive right into hams way.
C. During the Exercise OR0 demenstrated that it was unable tn rate
, appropriate PARS during the surrer beach season because it had no reliable method for deteminirs the size of the Passattusetts beach-araa popula-tien. ORO's method of checking on the size of the l'assachusett3 beach ;
- l. po,pulation (as was done at 011:30 a.m.) wet to dispatch a helicopter to '
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fly over and assess the size of the population on the beaches. There are numerous problems with this approach, including:
- 1. Coastal fcg was reported on the Weather Status Board. Ir such circumstances, a helicopter probably would not fly, and even if it
' did risk flying, it probably would not see all portiens of the beach area; so it would be unable to make the population assessment.
4 l
- 2. Even if the helicopter pilot flew over and observed all the beaches, he has no reliable method for quantitatively assessing the actual size of the total population in the beach areas. Yet, that is what protective action decision-makers need to know, not the number of people
- out en the sand or in the water. While a pilot may be able to fly over
- and guess roughly how many people are on a given stretch of beach, he cannot detemine how many people are inside cottages, motels, and other buildings. He could not tell ORO whether the beach areas are at 50% of 4
i capacity or 8 5 *. of capacity, a distirction one needs to know when assessing hew long the ETEs are for the beach areas that day.
i D. The process of deliberatien which finally resultei in tha i
selectico cf a PAR for school children was ud hoc and improrptu and not guided by any pre-set procedures, plans, or criteria, including i
institution-by-institution ETEs. As a result the choice that was finally nade was not made in a timely fashion, failed to take into account many I relevant fac'. ors, and turned out to be a dose-increasing rather than a dose-reducing measure for the children. Thus, the exercise reveals that the SPMC.s plans for selecting an apprcpriate PAR for schools and day care centers is fundamentally flawed in that the plans fail te document an i appropriate decision-making process end criteria for selectir; the most appropriate PAR for school children.
! Response MAG EX 11 i
f The Staff does not object generally to admission of this contention.
1 i
However, to the extent these bases taka issue with the PAR's in the plan, 4
they raise a planning issue sinilar to that previously admitted urder JI I Contentions 17, 18, and 19 and thus, it should not be revisited af part of the emergency planning exercise litigation. Matters concerning "shadow
- evacuation" in Basis it (l') were litigated and should not be relitigated'.
To the extent Basis C deals with the population of the Massachusetts beach areas it sFeuld not be relitigated, MAG EX 12: During the Exercise NHY's ORO, using the procedures set forth in the SPMC, derenstrated that it does net have the administrative, as well as the physical, meers to provide early notification and clear -
instruction to the pepulace within the Massachusetts portien of the pluma i
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exposure pathway EPZ, as reouired by 10 C.F.R. 6 i 50.47(b)(5); 10 C.F.R. '
Part 50, App. E. IV. D; NUREG 0654, Rev.1, Supp. ), il II.E E.6, E.7, and E.8. Thus, ORO failed to satisfy Exercise Objective 12, and this precludes a finding of reaserable atsurance that adeouate protective measures can and will be taken in the avent of a radiological enargency at Seabrook, as required by 10 C.F.R. I i 50.47(c)(1).
Exercise results which individually and/or collectively fom the basis for this contention include the following:
A. The only exercise objective for the initial' alert and notification system - Objective 12 -- was not met. Objective 12 required that ORO "[d]emonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and cegin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate state and/or local official (s)."
In fact, in each of the three p) instantes on Day 1 of the Exercise when ORO simulated the sounding of the alerting sirens, it failed to begin dissemination of its instructional EBS message within 15 minutes of a decision by the simulated representative of the Governor of Massachusetts.
On the first such eccasion, after a Site Area Emergency was declared (at approximately 11:46), representatives from ORO contacted a simulated Massachusetts official (the "Governor's representative A") at approximately 12:05, ard by no later than 12:07 they had received his concurrence that an EBS message should be issued which recorrended a closing nf the Massachusetts beaches. Thereafter, further discussion ensued with "A" regarding the transfer of legal authority to CP0 and the exact wording of the EBS message. A simulated scunding of the sirens w s initiated at approximately 12:22, and a simulatea broadcast of, the EBS ressage becen no sooner than 12:25. Thus, the simulated dissemination o' ORO's first EBS nessage did not begin within 15 minutes of the decisinn by "A" to issue such a message.
After the General Emergency was declared,' the OR0's seceed EBS nessage +cok longer to begin disseminating than did this first message.
After the General Emergency was declared (at approxinately 12:30),
representatieves from the ORO again contacted the itassachusetts Governor's representative "A", reaching him at approximately 13:47, fe was irrediately informed of the General Emergency and the CR0 protective action recommendations, and after 2-3 minutes, et a point prior to 13:50, "A" r,ade his decision to proceed to issue those PARS to the public.
Thereafter, however, a discussion , ensued Wth "A"' regarding the exact wording of the EBS message. A simulated sounding of the sirens was finally initiated at approxir.ately 14:17, and a simulated broadcast of the EBS message began no scener than 14:20. This was at least 50 minutes after the declaration of a General Emergency (with a release of radiation) and at least 30 minutes after a decision by 'A" to issue such a nessage.
CRO's third and last use e' the alert and notification system during Day 1 of the Exorcise occurred later that afternoon, and again the 15-minute criteria set forth in Exercise Objective 1 was ret met. The Gevernor's representative "A" agreed to ar evacuatien of the four remaining Massachusetts tchns Prior to 15:48; a simulated sounding of the '
- sirens was initiated at approximately 15:56; and a simulated broadcast of
,the EBS restage began no sooner ther 16:03.
4
l B. Even if OP.0 is found to have met exercise Objective 12, i.e., it is fcund to have demonstrated that it could "begin" dissemination of an instructional EBS messane within 15 minutes of a gcVernmental decision, it
- certainly did not demenstrate that it could "essentially complete" the ,
i initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ '
within about 15 minutes." 10 C.F.R. Part 50. Apo. E. IV. D. 3 (emphasis '
i supplied). This is the design objective set forti in the regulations. To i meet this, the initial EBS message' broadcast after each sounding of the 1 sirens on Day 1 of the Exercise had to have been read through once -- at least to the point in each message where the infonnation offered becen to
) be repeatad. The first of the three EBS messages described abote in Basis ,
1 A would have taken at least two (2) minutes tn broadost, and the secend !
and third of those messages would have taken at least five (5) minutes 1
4 each to broadcast. This means that in each instance, the time it took from the rement the decision to alert tha Public was made to the essential j completion of the initial EBS notification significantly exceeded 15
( minutes. In its Guidance Memorardum (AN-1) regarding alert and
- notification systems. FEMA Action to Qualify Alert and Notification Systems Against NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and FEMA-REP-10" FEftA states that a
l 2 [f]ailure by offsite authorities to complete the primary f 4 alert and notification process within the tire frames !
stipulated in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Appendix 3 ar.d FEMA-REP-10 should automatically result in a "deficiency" !
citation. .
FEMA Guidance Memorandum AN-3, p. 1-6 (emphasis deleted). :
1 I
C. The times it took the VANS drivers to drive during the Exercise i i frca their staging areas to their acoustic locations demonstrated that in f I r 'ast-breaking accidert which moved quickly frcm an Alert to a Site Aret t Emergency (which under the SPMC automatically warrants a beach closing), ;
t most cf the sirens cculd not ba scunded promptly enough to alert the beach "
l area populace and still have time to complete a broadcast of an EBS
! notification within the prescribed 15-minute period. Travel times fvr et least the following VANS routes were excessive: VL-1, VL-3, VL-0, VL-9, ,
YL-10. VL 11. VL-12. VL-13 and VL-163. !
D. The total length of time it took during the Exercise from the l
- declaration of the SAE and the GE to the completion of the initial notification of the protective actions recewended in direct response to i each of these ECLs was excessive and, if the Exercise had been a real ;
emergency, would have resulted in the public being placed at significantly '
1 greater risk than if the' entire peccess leading to public rotification had I been accomplished reasonably premptly. Thus, the Exercise demohstrated i .
that there is no reasonable assurance that the public will be nntified in '
a timely erough fashion to take adequate protective measures. Too nany i physical ard administrative steps exist in OR0's Publie elert and i j notificatier process for it to be completed in a timely.manrer. '
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Response MAG EX 12 The Staff objects to admission of this contention concerning early notificatien and clear instructiens to the populace within the !
Massachusetts portion of the EPZ as being without basis. Mass AG misreads {
the regulations in alleging broadcast of EBS messages was not met within 15 minutes. The regulations relating to the. alert notification system l
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refer to the siren system for prompt notification of the public (see,10 j C.F.R. P&rt 50, Appendix E l!V.D.3), and not instructional messages. The !
FD'A Post Exercise Assessment clearly shows the sirens were scunded within the 15 minutes of the decision to sound the sirens in each case. FEMA Exercise Report at 76-77. Hence, on the face of the FEMA Report there is :
no basis for the allegations set forth in Bases A and B. {
Additionally, Basis C concerning' the VAN'S system should not be' !
admitted because the adequacy of this system is before the onsite board.
See, discussion concernirs MAG Contention 2. Finally, Basis D concerning the tining of ECL's to public notification of appropriate actions hcs ro basis in the regulations which concern decision making, not the !
I declaration of classification levels. See, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendir F }
51V.D.3. ,
l MAG'EX 13. The Exercise' revealed that there is no reasonable assurtace that NHY's OR0 has the organizational ability to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered i areas, as required by 10 C.F.R. Ii50.47(b)(10) and the guidance set !
forth in NUREG-06E4, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, il J.10.J. and J.10.k. Thus, the !
ORO failed to satisfy Objective 19, and this precludes a finding of ,
reasonable assurance thet adequate protective reasures can and will be i taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook, as required by !
10 C.F.R. I i 50.47(c)(1). l Exercise results which individua11 and/or collectively fom the ;
basis for this centention include the foi owino: ,
l
. , I
,5 6
[
_ . _ _ _ _ _ , . _ 2 - - _
g
- 52 .
During the exercise NHY's ORO failed to dispatch and deploy its A.
Traffic Guides in a tirely enough fashicn after the beach closings in New Harpshire and Massachusetts for them to have arrived at key beach-road :
Traffic Control Poir.ts before the vehicles streaming from the beach areas would have filled u) both lanes of Routes 286 and 1A in Salisbury and the
. Plum Island Turnpi ce. As a result, if the Exercise had been a real i mid-day, sumertime emergency, there is no reasenable assurance that OR0 would have been ible to implement its traffic centrol strategies and actually control traffic at the time the Traffic Guides arrived at their 4 posts.
1 The basic facts are as follows: At about 11:00 a.m. New Hampthire sounded its beach sirens and announced that in response to an Alert i
' condition at Seabrook Station the Governor had ordered the closing of the I state beaches in Seabrook and Hamptor. This announcenent would i undoubtedly have generated a heavy flow of traffic out Reute 286 into 1 Salisbury, Massachusetts, and down Reute l A into Salisbury Beach (due to the delays in establishing the New Hampshire Traffic Control Point at the I
state lire and also due to a "shadow" beach closing evacuatien in .
i Salisbury prompted by the closing of the New Hampshire beaches).
Thereafter, at 12:22 p.m. OR0 sounded its sirens and announced that in j response to the declaration of Site Area Emergency the Governor was
! recomending that persens in the beach and park areas from Salisbury to
! the southern tip of Plum Island leave those areas imediately. This wculd i have very quickly added to the traffic flowing out of Salisbury on Routes l
286 and 1 A, and it would have created a heavy flew of westbound traffic en the Plum Island Turnpike. Not until almost one hour later at 1:15 p.m.,
I however, did the ORO dispatch any Traffic Guides to these areas. Thus,
' 090 Traffic Guides could not have arrived at the key TCPs for these three beach traffic egress routes until approximately 1:45 at the earliest -- <
j alrost three hours after New Hampshire had closed its beaches and almost i 1-1/2 hours after people in the l'assachusetts beach areas were dirreted to l 4
evacuate. By this time in the sumer, just a few dayt before the 4th of
! July weekend, tk seasonal, monthly, and weekly beach transient pcpulation
- is always very hight so even though the Exercise drafters may have postulated a small nerber of people on the srW and it, the water on the day of the Exercise, there is to doubt kut that there were tens of i thousands of people in the beach areas at mid-day on the day of the ,
l Exercise and that cars coming from the beach areas would have fomed i 4 lengthy queues on Route 286 Route IA, and the Plta Island Turnpike it,ng before ORO could hcVe implemented any traffic control whatsoever. The ;
coebination of any kind of an emergency at Seabrook St'ation, long traffic '
)'
- queues, and no traffic control is a prescription .for traffic disorder- !
liness, and under these circumstances it is likely that prior to the arrival of OR0's traffic control personnel, vehicles would have filled up both lanes of traffic (inbouno as well 6s cutbound) on the only three roads providing egress of'f the Passachusetts beaches. Furthennere, once ,
two-way flow had beer lost, it is highly urlikely that the Traffic Guides, dressed as they were during the Exercise in plain clothes and driving ;
j private, unmarked cars, wcula be able even to drive into the beach areas on thete roads to reach their pests, let alone to re-channel the traffic .
i back into one lane by settirig up traffic certrols that evacuees wruld i
1 i-i . , .
follow. Even stste and local police would have great difficulty doing so af ter both lanes of these roads had been converted to cutbound flow.
Thus, the Exercise reveals a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in that there is no mechanism in Place to ensure that traffic controls can and will be implemented prior to the loss of two-way flow on the key egress roads from the beaches.
B. Further indication that there is no reasonable "4:rance that the
< NHY ORO has the organizational ability to control evacuation traffic flow came during the Exercise when the ORO issued an EBS r:essage at approximately ?:20 p.m. recomending the immediate evacuatien of Salisbury and /cesbury without obtaining either (a) a grant of legal authority to direct traffic and implement their traffic management plan nr (b) an assurance from state and/or local officials that they would direct traffic in accordance with the SPhC's traffic management plan. It was not until approximately 3:19 p.m., an hour after the EBS message went out, that ORO scught and obtained legal authority to direct traffic in Massachusetts. No one was assigned to control the evacuation traffic prior to this point.
By 3:19 p.m., in the absence of traffic controls, traffic disorderliness throughout the EPZ wculd have been widespread and intractable, and there is no reasonable assurance that efforts to implement the SPMC's traffic and access control strategies at that point would have been successful, especially by non-unifomed ORO Traffic Guides, who would possess neither the traffic handling skill nor garner the respect nomally afforded by motorists to unifomed state and local police officers directirg traffic.
That CPO sought to obtain legal authority to alert and rotify the public to evacuate towns without having obtained either (a) a grant o' legal authority to ORO to direct traf'ic or (b) an assurance from state and/or local officials that they would direct traffic, indicates a fundamental flaw in the SPMC's plans for treffic control, a fundamental lack of comon sense by OR0's leadership, a fundamental flaw in OR0's training precram, and a fundamental flaw in the SPMC's legal authority delegation procesr..
C. While the SPMC itself is ambiguous on this point, the observation of the Exercise and the NHY Centroller materials fer the Exercise revealed that CRO.s Traffic Guides at Access Control Points ("ACPs") will actually attempt to stop traffic seeking to enter the EPZ as a step in the process of seeking te "discourage" all but returning comuters and appropriate emergency resrenders from entering the EPZ during an evacuation. The Exercise also revealed that NHY's ORO intends to activate ACPs during the first few hours of the evacuation Process, even on nomal workdays when
. thousards of EPZ residents would be at work outside the EPZ. In situa-tions like this, where ACPs are activated within the first few heurs of an evacoation and incoming traffic is actually stopped in the proces s , ;
i extremely lengthy queues will form en mest key routes used by returning '
comuters, and those .ccmuters will experience extremely frustrating end l J
significant delays as they attempt to rush home to gather hcusehold l nenbers and evacuate with them. As a result, not enly will the evacuatten process be unnecessarily lengthened significantly, the evacuation time estinates ("ETEs") be rendered inaccurate by many hours, ard entry into the EPZ by erergency responders be delayed long enough to irpact adversely
. on public health and safety, but high driver frustration levelt will result ir. such widespread tra'fic disorderliness at ACPs that the Traffic
- 1
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1 54 -
Guides will not be able to control traffic, either inbound or outbound, especially if, as is the case with ORO Traffic Guides, they are not uniforced in the fashion of state and local police officers in Massa-chusetts and are equipped only with the kind of traffic cones Traffic
- Guides displayed during the Exercise. These cones are not large encugh to 1 deter highly frustrated drivers from running over them, i
D. Further indication that there is no reasonable assurance that 1 NHY's CR0 has the organizational ability to control traffic flow cane
! during the Exercise when ORO ccmpletely mishandled the one (simulated)
- road impediment which blocked evacuating traffic during the Exercise. At 4
- 45 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise a Controller gave an ORO Traffic Guide
) at TCP WN-03 (the I-95 interchange with Scotland Road / South Street) a
! controller message that reed as follows:
A najor accident involving a truckload of lumber has just i
occurred. The truck which had been heading north on I-95 was making the turn onto the 1-05 South on-rarp when the load shifted. The truck rolled ento its right side and the load spilled. There are now 2x4s 1x8s and sheet rock pane]s
, strewn all over the roadway. The ramp is completely blocked.
There were no injuries, the driver is only shaken up.
1 In blocking the I-95 South on-ramp at this location, three separate lines of backed-up traffic would have been created:
i 1. Evacuation traffic from Newburyport and Newbury heading southwest on Scotland Road;
- 2. Evacuation traffic fron West Newbury heading east ;
on South Street; and [
- 3. Northbound traffic on I-95 which was being turned ,
around at this point.
j l tS The leasttasks confrenting(a)e ORO in respente to this accident included atto rercrt the e the following:
i a timely and accurate fashion; (b) to coordinate the dispatch of the l necessary assistance to rernve the *oad inpediment; (c) to implenent an ,
effective temporary detour for traffic blocked at the scene; and (d) to .
j devise, implement, and notify the public in a timely fashion of an '
evacuation re-route for evacuees who might otherwise seek to use the !
I, blocked route. Time was of the essense here, because the radioactive I -
plure was then only a short distance away, heading towerds the blockage. l OR0's actions er each of these tasks failed miserabl/ to demonstrate j lj an adequate capability to deal with road impediments 'n a sensible, i j tirely, and coerdinated fashion. First, the ORO was unable to cemnicate !
j and report the accident up the OF0 chain of comand in a timely and L
- accurate fashion. Accordino to the SPMC, Traffic Guides are to report a road impedinents to the Evacustion Support Dispatcher, who reports the i impedirent to the Staging Area Leader, who notifies the Transfer Point <
Dispatcher te dispatch the appropriate road crew (wrecker) to remove the I W
. 1
impediment. If an evacuati$n reute is biccked, the Staging Area Leader needs to advise the OR0 EOC promptly so that he can notify the public and assist in preparing a re-route. After being given to the Traffic Guide, however, the message took a full hour to reach the Staging Area leader (at approximately 5:50 p.m.), and by then the message had beoun to evolve.
Some details were missing; others were dirtorted. Inexplicably, a wrecker wat ret dispatched until 6:50, a full two hours after the simulated accident occurred. Meanwhile, the ORO EOC was not notified of the blockage .
until nearly 6 p.m., and the ressage it thought it heard was that the lumber truck had overturned and was blocking traffic on I-95 southe'ound.
It then took the EOC staff at least a full half hour to study a wall map and devise a re-routing strategy, not for all three separate lines of blocked traffic, but for only the evacuees leaving Newburyport and Newbury who would have used Scotland Road. The re-route plan they came up with uses a road, Highfield Road, which is not adequate for use as an evacuation route beetuse it is only one and a belf lanes wide, is very winding, and is going to be heavily used by OR0's Evacuation buses due to the fact that Newbury's Transfer Point is located on it. Finally, at about 7:00 p.m., two and a quarter hours after the accident ORO issued a press release intended to advise the public about the road impediment and to irstruct evacuees on ORO's reconmended re-route. The news release however, was grossly inaccurate and advised the media (and the public}
that "[a]n overturned lumber truck on Route I-95 scothbound at the junction of Scotland Road is blocking traffic flow southbound." This, of course, was sinply not true. The consequences were likely to have been serious: Thousands of evacuees heading south on I-95 would undoubtedly have heard press reports of a road blockage on I-95 and would have left I-95 seeking alternative evacuation routes. Those who got off I-95 and sought routes to the west of I-!F would have driven back into the plume, which bv 7:00 p.m. had just passed over I-95 and was heading further west.
Meanwhile .the road crew that was dispatched to the score arrived at about 7:00 p.m. enly to discover that it did not have a large ennuph wrecker to remove the lunber truck. ORO had not properly assessed the needed essistance. At 7:14 the road crew had to call for additionel assistance from a 10-ton wrecker. Then, when the road impediment was finally removed at about 7:30 p.m., no efforts were tr. ken before tha Exercise ended to quickly notify .the public that the blockage was removed and that I-95 was clear for travel.
In suanary, at each .and every step in dealing with this traffic impediment, ORO personnel bungled the task at hand: communicatiens internally were delayed and sloppy, causing OR0's perception of the event to evolve to the no ORO failed to adequately coordinate thedispatchofthe'intofdistortion.
necessary removal equipment in a timely fashion. They
- ailed to implement er effective temporary detour for the traffic backed-up at the scene, e,rd the re-route devised fer traffic heading toward the impediment was not adequate. Most importantly OP0 failed to notify the public in an accurate and timely fashlen of the existence of the blechage, and when they attenpted to de so they issued a factually incorrect location for the blockage -- on I-95 southbound -- that wodd -
have caused thcusands of evacuating drivers t'o leave I-95 and drive
'directly irto the radioactive plume. Indeed, throughout its haucling of e
this road impediment, ORO personnel acted without any regard for the plure's location.
ORO's response to this road impediment emonstrates that nuch more than additieral training is needed before it an be concluded that ORO has the organizational ability and resources to adequately assess and respond to road blockages. Even with extensive and repeated communice.tions training, a plan re-structuring is needed to streamline the process, give road-blocking impediments organizational priority, and. ensure that plume location and directicn are considered. Only a further exdreise can test whether the fundamental flaws demonstrated during this exercise are correctible or whether, as is more likely the case, a non-professional group of emergency responders can not, given the degree of skill and coordination required, ever respond adequatelv in a timely enough fashior to ad hoc problens like this that will inevitably develop during a real emergency.
Response PAG EX 13 The Staff does not object to admission of this contention, linited to the facts recited in Bases A. P and D, and not the rambling speculatiens alleged therein. For example, in Basis D the alleged fisw is that the road impediment was not prenptly responded to, but the speculation that the location of the irpediment would have led to blocking of three
- eparate areas is not a fact in contention and should be excluded as prrt of the basis.
Similarly, Beses A and C are wholly speculative as to the affects of "shadrw evacuation," the adecuacy of the evacuation tire estimates, and human behavior issues which are. planning matters admitted as 01 Contention 4 and should not be revisited here.,
MAG EX 14: The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the.SPPC in that the medical facilities, equipment, procedures, and perscrrel demonstrated in the exercise were not adequte for handling contanirated, injured er exposed individuals, as required by 10 C.F.R. I ! 50.47(b)(1?) i and the guidar.ce set forth in NUREG-06Ed. Rev. 1, Supp. 1. ! II.L 1. l Thus, CR0 failed to satisfy Fyrrcise Objective 24, and this precludes a ;
finding of reasonable assurance that adecuate protective measceas can and I will be taken in the event of a rediological energency at Seabrook, as I required by 10 C.F.R. ! l 50.47(c)(1). l e
S 9
r ._____
Exercise results which individually and/or collectively fom the basis for this contention include the following:
A. According to NUREG-0654, Rev. 1. Supp. 1, i L.1: ,
"The offsite response organization shall arrange for local and backup hospital and medical services having the capability for evaluation of radiation exposure and uptake, including assurance that persons providing these services are adequately prepared to handle contaminated individuals." ,
During the Exercise, only one hospital participated as a host I hospital for the ORO. Thus, there was no demonstration of OR0's l'
- arrangements with both a local and at least one beck-up hospital, and 4
there is no reasonable assurance that such other hospitals as are relied upon in the SPMC have the same or similar capabilities as demonstrated by the hospital which did participate. A test of only one hospital is insufficient in a full-participation exercise.
B. The one hospital which did participate in the Exercise has inadequate facilities. This hospital uses a room in the Emergarcy J Department to treat and decentaminate seriously ill or trauma patients contaminated with radioactive material. If the patient is ambulatory, '
however, and had only minor injuries, he/she is taken to the morgue for decontamination. Use of the hospital's rr.crgue for this purpose is highly !
inapprepriate. The persons taken there have already been traumatized ,
enough by being both injured and radiolegically contaminated. Taking them ;
to the morgue at this point is not in the patients' best interests. .
C. Personnel at the one hospital tested displayed serious weaknesses l as well . Incredibly, both the medical and the nursing staff did not adequately understand the biological effects radiation and the signifi-i cance of counts per minute, contamination, and millirems per hour dose rates. This is a fur.damental problem that casts serious doubt on the ability of this her one which does not do much radiological moni coring /decentamin' pital to atirr work, , perfom adec.uately in an emergency. !
- Fore training may or may not be the sclution. If these workers rarely get l te perform these procedures, occasional training may not be sufficient to
keep the staff ready. Only another exercise can adeouately assess whether I training can solve this deficiency. l Response MAG EX 14 The Staff does not obje'ct to admissinn of this contention limited to Bases /, and C. However, Basis P which alleges the hospitt.l's tre.atment facilities are inadequate simply because the Mass AG does not Me the designated facility which the h'nspital uses for this purpose does not have j any basis in the regulations, and does not rise tc the level of a 1 i .
1 l
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l
fundamental flaw in the plan. This is nothing more than Intervenor's speculation on it would like to see in the plan ard does not allege violation of any regulatory requirement and thus, this basis should be excluded from consideration in this proceeding.
MAG EX 15: The exercise revealed a fundamentai flaw in the SPMC in that THY's OR0 and the personnal of various support organizations relied i upon by NHY demonstrated a need for so much additional training that NHY's training progran itself was demonstrated to be inadequate. This failing violates 10 C.F.R. 9 950.47(b)(15) and the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Supp 1, i II.O. In a utility-sponsored emergency offsite response organization like ORO's, which utilites non-professionalr.
(typically utility workers) to staff key emergency response pesitions that are nothing like their day-to day jobs, an adequete training program is essential to ensure that personnel car. and will be able to provide -
adeouate protective measures for the public as required by 10 C.F.R.
I i 50.47(c)(1).
Under the SPMC, ORO recularly offers training and retraining for both NHY and non-NHY personnel invoi,cd in er, emergency response. Trainino has consisted of classrcem presentations, table-top sessicns, walkthroughs and drills. There are (21) modules or areas of training which are offered.
The large number of training deficiencies revealed during the Exercise demonstrates serious inadecuacies in ORO's training to date. Such a t
program fails to comply with 10 C.F.R. 9 9 50.47(b)(14) and (15) and NUREG .
1 0654, i 11.N and O.
1 In its Final Report, FEMA identifies a significant number of training inadequacies in almost all areas assessed during the Exercise. Yet OP0
] had practiced and trained extensively in each cf these areas prior to the j
Graded Exercise. Thus, the exrrcise results disclose fundamental flaws in the SFMC training progran which preclude a finding that adequate protec-tive neasures can and will be taken in an emergency.
Virtually every error made by an Or.0 player during the exercise involves, to some degree, a failure of the SPMC training program to convey basic and essential knowledge and/oi- skill. As such, each ARC A" identified by FEMA, plus each additional significant error comitted 1
during the exercise and identified in other contentions, provides. the basis for this contention that the exercise results showed a fundamental j flaw in the training program. Listed below are some of these ARCAs and
- errors
- -
A. Tne exercise demonstrat'ed that the SPMC training progran hes not successfully or effectively trained respondents to follow and implement basic plan precedures and to accurately comunicate infomation and data J essential to an integrated, cocrdinated response.
- B. The exercise demonstrated that the SFMC training pregram does not successfully or effectively train er prepare respendents to respond properly, appropriately, or e ffectively te unanticipated and unrehearsed 1
j' 1
t situations likely to arise in an emergency and tested in the Exercise by "fr ee play."
C. The exercise demonstrated that the SPMC training program has not successfully or effectively trained respondents to follow direction given by superiors during an emergency.
O. The exercise demonstrated that the SPMC training program has not successfully or effectively trained respondents to exercise independent or gooC judgment or to use comon sense in implementing the Plan and procedures. l E. The exercise demonstrated that the SPMC training program is ineffective in preparing and training respondents to provide truly, '
accurate, consistent and unconflicting information to the public through interaction with the media.
F. The exercise demonstrated that the SPMC training program fails to
~,
provide adequate training to those players who are not employed by NHY or Seabrook Station but upon whom ORO relies to implement its plen.
9 G. The exercise demenstrated that SPMC training in the areas of i dosimetry, exposure control, KI, understanding of radiation terminology l and related areas is deficient. Because the public, during an emergency !
! will seek information from ORO workers regarding these matters, it is absolutely essential that ORO understand and know how to use dosimetry equipment.
l Rescense MAG EX 15 -
j The Staff objects to admission of this contention as worded since it
! is vague and fails to cite any facts in support of the general proposition that the training is serrehow deficient. Each of the bases state that "the exercih dreonstrated the training program is ineffective" but there is !
nothing in the basis to suggest how or why this is so. Fence, the Staff l l
l
- is not put on suf ficient notice as to what the Mass AG seeks to litigate ;
in this tegard and therefore the contention shculd be excluded. , ,
f '
1 MAG EX 16: The exercise demonstrated 'undamental flaws in the SPMC l ard the stato of off-site preparedness with regard to planning standard 10 1 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(9) and the corresponding guidence set forth at NUREG 1 0654 !!.l.7 and as a result exercise Objective 10 which required the 30 to "[d]emonstrate the ability, withir the plume exposure pathway to -
project c' osage to the public via plume ) exposure, based on plant and field data" was not ret. As a consequence, no reasonable assurance finding is eupported by the exercise results.
j A. ORO had insufficient numbers o' radiological monitoriro field -
1 teams available. As a consequence, during the exercise ORO requested 60 1 i additional monitoring teams from outside sources. These teams ware not I i
l 4
available in a timely fashion and even if they had been available no prior planning existed to deploy these teams effectively and coordinate and integrate the field data they would be generating. -
B. The teams available to Ch0 were not deployed effectively around the perimeter of the plume in a timely fashion. .
C. Field data was not effectively communicated to or utilized by ORO personnel responsible for assessing and recomending appropriate PARS.
Response MAG EX 16 The Staff does not object to admission of this contention.
MAG EX 17: The exercise demonstrated that ORO was unable to establish and operate rumor control in a timely and efficient fashion.
Thus, it failed to comply with 10 C.F.R. i 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654
!!.G.4 Exercise results which individually and collectively evidence the aforementioned deficiencies preclude a finding of reasonabia assurance that adequate Protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency. The following bases support this contention:
A. The maximum number of calls able to be simultaneously handled by 1 JTIC phone staff does not demonstrate an adequate ability to handle and j control rumors for the entire EPZ and all media callers. In a radio-j logical emergency there would be many more calls and the inability to effectively deal with all or most calls in a timely manner could result in confusion and lack of communication and would effectively cancel out any benefit that may have been gained by the effective handling of a few -
calls, i l B. The constraints imposed by FEMA regarding extent of play were tno !
limiting and as a result, the ability of the ORO to meet FEMA Objective 15 1 and to comply with pertinent provisions of the SPMC were not adaquately demonstrated. FEMA limited runor control calls to a maximum of five calls
)I per hour for each player. Such a limitation is totally unrealistic and ,
does not show how those players individually or how ORO in general would t operate rumor control in a coordinated and tinely fashion under actual i
! emergency conditions. .
C. During the exercise, ORO personnel responded to various inquiries from the public. As is shown in the following examples, their responses demonstrated OR0's inability to dispel rumors, to correct misinfomation.
to provide necessary, accurate and timely information to the public and to I ensure that such infomation is coordinated and non-conflicting. These examples of re Inquiry'/ Rumor !
Menos ("IRM") loggedpeated at errorsthe demonstrate a fundamental flaw: callers:
following times with the following 4 1:30 (Brown); 2:00 (Randolph); (no time) (Clark ; '3:18 (Collins); 3:30 (Lynn); 4:22 (Crand); 1:10 (David); 2:45 (Sanders ; 3:10 (Bradshaw); 6: 12 (Frances); 7:02 (Stone); 7:10 McGuire); 16:40 (Jones),
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4 4
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i Response MAG EX 17 The Staff objects to, admission of this contention except for Basis C.
Basis A is merely speculation and does not purport to evidence a fundamental flaw in the plan. Basis B does not allege that participation i
of personnel was not in sufficient numbers (see, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, l!V.F.1, note 4) and therefore this basis does not allege any violation of a regulatory requirement which warrants litigation in connection with the emergency planning exercise.
MAG EX 18 The Exercise revealed fundamental flaws in both the SPMC
- and the NHRUP in that both NHY's ORO and the State of New Hampshire 1 failed to demonstrate the adequacy of their procedures, facilities.
l equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological munitoring, and j decontamination of evacuees, as required by 10 C.F.R. 6 i 50.47(b)(10) and j the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654 i II.J.12 ("The personne'l and ,
equipment available shall be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and trarsients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at reception centers"). Thus, ORO and the State of New Hampshire failed to satisfy Exercise Objection 19, and this precludes a finding of reasonable -
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook, as required by 10 C.F.R.
I i i 50.47(a)(1) and (c)(1).
l Exercise results which individually and/or collectively form the l basis for this contention include the following:
l A. The Exercise failed to demonstrate that in the event of an actual
) emergency at Seabrook Station, the reception centers could be timely
- activated, because for the Exercise, necessary eouipment and supplies.
l including monitoring trailers, were delivered to the reception centers !
prior to the commencement of the Exercise. In a real emergency such equipment would not be located at the reception centers prior to the i ,
emergency. '
l B. The exercise failed to demonstrate that ORO and New Hampshire had adequate staffing, procedures, facilities and equipment to il monitor within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> all evacuees who would have arrived at reception
] centers.
As required by NUREG-0654, 6 !!.J.12 neither NHY ORO ner the State i of New Hampshire demonstrated the ability to meet the SPMC's and NHRERP's i goal of monitoring evacuees at a rate of 55/ hour per monitoring station.
j In twenty minute "mini . scenarios " the State of New Hampshire averaged three minutes to process one evacuee, and NHY ORO also averaged less than
! 55 evacuees per hour for each monitoring team with the'second shif t teams .
perfonning considerably worse than the first shift teams. There is no reasonable assurance tha't even the monitoring rates that were demonstrated in the 20 minute scenarios, when personnel knew they were being tested for 1
b '
l
{
speed, could be maintained for a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period. See also Par. (g),
belnw. Moreover, the Exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the SPPC and the NHRERP in that in the event of the kind of radioactive release that occurred during the Exercise, resulting in a clock-ufse sweeping plume that hit virtually every town in the EPZ, many more persons would have been reporting to the reception centers for ncnf toring than ORO and the State of New Hampshire had the staff and eautpment to monitor within a 12-hour period, even assuming each team could nonitor at a continuous rate of 55 evacuees per hour. Morecver, in the event of an actual wide-spread contaminating release, such as occurred in the Exercise, it is likely that many persons not within the towns specifically instructed to report for monitoring would also report to the reception centers for monitoring to assure themselves that they had not been contaminated.
C. During the Exercise the State of New Hampshire and NHY's ORO also failed to demonstrate the capability to adequately monitor evacuees and vehicles and to detect radiatien. The State of New Hampshire failed during the exercise to detect increased levels of radiation in two persons, which FEPA believes was due to a lack of sufficient equipment, i.e., headsets for each monitoring team and/or faulty monitoring equipment or inadequate maintenance of monitoring equipment. In addition, NHY ORO did not use adequate or censistent procedures fer monitoring most vehicles entering the reception centers (e.g. , only the door handles and front grill were monitored on most cars) and the monitoring treiler for evacuees at the North Andover reception center was inappropriately set up in an area with a high level of background radiation which caesed the outside dosimetry to "spike real bad" according to.ORO personnel. Furthemore, the twenty-minute mini-scenarios did not appropriately test monitoring capibility in that monitoring teams knew to look for contamination in the only one 3r two places on the person where the packets of conteninated material cculd be placed, i.e., pockets, and the contaminated packets were net distributed randomly among the "evacuees," but were instead distrib-uted to every fifth persnn in line. Except for the two twenty-minute nini-scenaries, when the monitoring teams were cierted that Packets c' centaminated material were being placed on the "evacuees," no contanineted packets were placed on any persons to be monitored.
D. The Exercise revealed a fundamentr.1 flaw in that it failed to demonstrate adequate knnniedge or training and/or adequate procedures in the handling of contaminated individuals and vehicles. For example, with respect to the State of New Hampshire, FEPA .found the DPHS staff at the state EOC were not familiar with the Radiological Screening Program and who has specific duties and' responsibilities for i glementation of the program. In addition, FEPA found further training warranted for the DPHS personnel relative to providing recommendations to reception center staff pertaining to the handling of contanineted individuels and vehicles. With respect to NHY's ORO, it took over one half hour te complete monitoring of the one contaminated injured indivicual who arrived at the North Andover reception center, and et least ten minutes before any of the personnel discovered that the mtn was injured, as well as contaminated.- In addi-tion, the man was not infomed, prior te his departure in e' simulated I "ambulance," cf the radiolepical mnnitoring program. .
l
E. The Exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw because there is insufficient space at the reception centers to handle all the vehicles that would arrive there in the event of a wide-spread contaminating release like the one which was simulated for the Exercise. For example, the North Andover reception center, to which all of the Town of Amesbury was instructed to evacuate, has parking capacity in its "clean car" lot for at best 100 cars, leaving aisles between cars for them to exit. The parking lot for contaminated vehicles is considerably smaller. Many more vehicles would have needed to be parked in these lots if the Exercise had been a real emergency.
F. The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw because it did not demonstrate adequate staffing for two shifts at the reception centers.
For example, at the reception center in Dover FEMA found that "additional personnel for security, directing evacuees, and housekeeping would have to be provided to bring the facility to fully operational capacity." FEFA Exercise Report, pp 184-185. There were also insufficient personnel at the reception centers in Beverly and North Andover to staff all necessary functions, and a large percentage of the first shift persornel, especially those in supervisory positions, were noc relieved by personnel from the second shift. There is thus no assurance of a 24-hour staffing capability for these facilities.
G. The Exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw because procedures for exposure cortrol at the reception centers were inadequate.
For example, although "clean" and "dirty" areas were established and roped off at each center, procedures were insofficient and staffing inadequate to ensure that clean / dirty areas were respected by staff and evacuees; people were reutinely able to cross over these lines undetected. There was also insufficient space inside the monitoring trailer for people being monitored to consistently stay behind the "clean" line, and those found to be contaminated could not move down to the decontamination area in the trailer without brushing against those who were being monitored. -
In addition, clean / dirty procedures were not adequately maintained during the twenty-minute mini-scenarios where the goal was tc process evacuees through the trailer as rapidly as possibly. During the nini-scenarios in North Andover there was no monitoring of the evacuees' feet or hands prior to entering the trailer. As a result, people whose feet were contaminated would likely have spread the contamination to others inside the trailers. Also, no green "clean" tags were issued to those people deemed clean after monitoring. If these procedures had been in place, it would have taken significantly longer to process evacuees through the monitoring trailer.
. In addition, the Exercise demonstrated thet procedures for handling contaminated clothing are inadequate. During the Exercise evacuees who do not wish to give up their clothing were allowed to leave the reception center with the contaminated articles in hand, albeit in a plastic bag.
The Exercise revealed a fundarental flaw in that no procedures are in place for dealing with pets who may be brcught to the reception center by their owners, and who may be contam.inated. For example, staff at the reception center in North Andover seid they would not monitor pets brought to the reception center because the SPMG did not provide for that and had no idea what would be done with pets. In the event of an actual emergency
.1
T . .
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I at Seabrook Station, it must be expected that many people will arrive at the centers with their pets regardless of any instructions they may receive not to. (EBS messages given during the Exercise did not instruct ,
evacuees to leave pets at home when they left, and pre-emergency infor- ;
mation -- which people do not have -- will not be an effective way to tell people to leave pets at home.) In the event of a major contaminating release, as was simulated during the Exercise, some of these pets brought ,
to reception centers are bound to be contaminated. If these contaminated ;
pets are not monitored and allowed to leave the reception centers without decontamination, thay could contaminate clean people they subsequently come in contact with.
H. The Exercise further revealed a fundamental flav because there are insufficient procedures and equipment in place to deal with vehicle s that rnay break down while in line at the reception centers. For example, personnel at the North Andover reception center did not know what ;
to do with a special needs van that broke down in front of the monitoring trailer and was to sume extent disrupting the flow of traffic for several hours.
I. The Exercise further revealed a fundamental flaw in that most processing of evacuees prior to monitoring, including registration, occured outdoors without any covering overhead, In rainy weather, the conditions simulated on the day of the Exercise, not only would evacuses get soaked, but clean / dirty lines could not be maintained, and all papers, including the RERPS and registration material which were set out on tables outdoors would be drenched. Indoor procassing space has not been demonstrated to be available; thus thero is no reasonable assurance that these facilities are adequate.
Response MAG Ey 18 The Staff does not object to admission of this contentier. However, Basis G should be limited to monitoring and decontamination procedures for humans, and the ~ reference to pets should be deleted as there is no regulatory requirement or guidance concerning monitoring and/or decontamination of pets.
l MAG EX 19: tnt Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw ir the Seabrook Station Radiological Plan and Emergency Response Procedures in that during the Exercise the licensee's personnel did not issue appropriate protective action recommendations ("PARS) to the NHY Offsite Response Organization, the State of New Harps hi re , or the State of Maine, as required by 10 C.F.R. 1 i 50.47(b)(10) and the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, '
i II.J.7. and NUREG-0396.
This licensee failing, coupled with the high degree of reliance placed by NHY's ORD, the S, tate of New Hapshire, and the State of Haine on I
4
the PARS provided by the licensee, precludes a finding that there is reasonable assurance that protective measures for the public chii and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
Exercise results which individually or collectively form the basis *'
for this contention include the following:
A. As described in detail in MAG EX 19 (incorporated herein by reference), the PARS issued by NHY's ORO were not appropriate in numerous res pects . These PARS were exactly those which were being recomended by the licensee at that time, and the ORO relied on these licensee PARS almost totally.
B. 1he PARS issued oy the State of New Hampshire were also inappropriate in many respects, including the following:
- 1. While evacuation of Seabrook. Hampton, Hampton Falls, Kensington, South Hampton, and North Hampton was recomended to the public at about 2:30 p.m., people in ERPA F (Brentwood, East Kensington, Exeter,
." ingston, Newfields, and Newton) were not recomended to evacuate until a l h." t 5:00 p.m. Given the size of the release, the potential for increased releases of lodines and Cesium if filters degraded or failed, and the uncertain and unfavorable meteorological conditions (particularly regarding wind speeds, wind direction, and the likelihood of precipita-tion), this ERPA should have been recommended to evacuate sooner. As a result, thousands of residents in this EPPA who could have safely evacu-ated earlier were hit by the plume; and
- 2. The residents of Stratham. Greenland, New Castle, Rye, and Portsmouth were never advised to evacuate but were advised to shelter.
Unfortunately, later that evening the' plume passed over all of these comunities with the possible exception of New Castle.
As a result of these inappropriate PARS, the chances were significantly increased that people in these areas would have received dosages in excess of PAGs. These PARS issued by New Hampshire vere excctly those PARS recomended to it by the licensee at that time, and state officials placed great reliance on them.
C. The State of Maine issued no PARS to evacuate or shelter any
. of its towns during the Exercise. Indeed, because they relied totally on the licensee s PARS. Maine was unaware that an evacuation end/or sheltering PAR needed to be issued for Kittery, Maine, and perhaps other towns as well. The licensee's failure to make such a PAR for Maine --
i.e., to extend a PAR to those just beyond the northern border of the EPZ
-- had serious consequences because by about 8:20 p.m. on Day 1 of.the
. Exercise, the Plume reached Kittery and passed directly over it carrying sizeable concentrations of radioactivity. Prior to that point the same factors noted above at B should have prompted the licensee to issue at least a sheltering and probably an evacuation PAR for that ' area. The failure to do so significantly increased the likelihood that people in
! this, part of Maine would have received dosages in excess of PAGs.
NUREG-0654 does not excuse the licensee from recomending protective actions outside the EPZ when necessary. To the contrary, NVPEG-0654 .
implies that this will happen as a matter of course and uses this as a justification for requiring detailed ~ planning only out to about 10 miles.
See NUREG-0654, p. 12.
Beyond 10 miles, ad hoc protective actions can 9
% 4
perhaps be effective, but only if the state officials in charge have been advised by the licensee that such actions are recomended. .
D. In all the instances described above, the licensee's inappropriate PARS were derived from its METPAC computer rodel. It appears from what happened during the Exercise that this medel has some fundamental flaws that cause it to fail to take into proper consideration all known facts as well as existing uncertainties in the generation of PARS. It, among other things, fails to adequately consider ETEs, weather uncertainties including wind speed and directional changes, and release conditions. In recomending PARS to offtite officials, licensee personnel in the EOF merely passed en copies of the METPAC print-outs without offering any guidance on how much reliance the PARS contained therein should be given.
Response MAG EX 19 The Staff objects to this contention except for Bases B.1 and D.
Basis A which incorporates a planning contentien does not raise an exercise related issue and should not be admitted for litigation. Further it is too vague to be litigated. Bases B.? and C concern plume exposure protective actions outside of the plume expos'ure EPZ which are not required to be demonstrated as part of the plume exposure exercise. Thus, neither basis raises an issue that evidences a fundamental flaw in the plan.
MAG EX 20: The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in that NHY's ORO demonstrated that it does not have adequate facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operation!,
as required by 10 0 F.R. I i 50.47(b)(8) and the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654. Rev. 1. .,upp. 1, i II.H. Thus, ORO failed to satisfy Exercise Objective 5, and this precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook, as required by 10 C.F.R.
Ii50.47(c)(1).
, Exercise results which individually and/or collectively fom the basis for this contentien include the following: -
A. The facility in Haverhill designated in the SPMC as the Staging Area was not demonstrated because, according to the NHY s rarual for the .
1908 FNA NRC Graded Exercise (the NHY Exercise Manual) "constraints . . .
currently exist with the use of the Haverhill Staging Area." NHY Exercise Manual, p. P.3-3. ' Absent the availability of the Haverhill Staging Area, and a demonstration nf the adequacy of its f:cilities, the SPMC is 9
e
- 4
- 9 9
fundamentally flawed. Use of that facility as a staging area is impemissible under the City of Haverhill zoning ordinances, and there is
! no likelihood that Haverhill will change these ordinances to permit this use in the near future. While the utility has appealed the denial of the special use pennit to Superior Court, speculation that the court will overturn the city's decision is just that -- speculation. The "realism" doctrine does not carry such force that it must be assumed that in the ,
event of a real emergency at Seabrook, local and state lews in Massachusetts can be waived or ignored. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that the SPMC's designated facility for use as a Staging Area will ever be available for that use. The area in Salem, N.H., used during the Exercise as a substitute Stsging Area would not be a suitable perira-nent substitute for the Haverhill site. It is too far from the EPZ and does not have adequate space, facilities, or equipment.
B. During the Exercise, the Media Center was demonstrated to be .
inadequately equipped with maps and displays detailing evacuation reutes. l the plume path, relocation centers, congregate care centers and meteorological data. This constitutes a fundamantal flaw because absent these maps and displays, ORO's redia representatives, and those from New Hampshire and the utility, were unable to offer the media a clear, cencise, and readily understandable explanation of what was going on.
Confusion was generated; the media liaisons appeared to be less than knowledgable about evacuation routes, plume path, etc.; and the public was not able to gain much more information from the media than they got from sketchy EBS messages. To the extent that the redia liaisons are not clear, the public's anxiety will be heightened and spontaneous evacuation and other ad hoc actions will increase. The solution is not simply to ,
properly equip the Media Center. The staff there need to know how to use raps and displays in their presentations, and a mechanism must be in place to keep the maps and displays currunt. Only another exercise can prove with reasonable assurance that these things can be accomplished.
C. The Exercise events revealed that in the event that ORO had to call in a third shift before the Exercise ended. OR0 did not have adequate dosimetry for the third shift workers.
- D. The traffic cones displayed by ORO's Traffic Guides during the
) exercise . ire too small, ard will be too hard to see at night to function' l effectively in controlling evacuation traffic. -
Response MAG EX 20 The Staf' objer,ts to admission of this contention as not raising any issues that evidence fundamental flaws in the plan. Basis A ignores the j fact that during a best efforts respense in a actual emergency the i
Haverhill facility would be available. Further, there is no need for an
- exercise to test fa'cilities that are not available because of the leck of l
governmental cooperation. The allegations regarding Saiem are . l l
4
j conclusionary and provide no basis for litigation. Bisis B and D are ratters of ad hoc ,performance or equipment problems that are not admissible as fundamental flaws (see, Staff discussion of definition of fundamental flaws supra). Finally, Basis C does not allege violation of any regulatory requirement. While 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Staffing capability is required, there is no requirement for a "third shift" capabiltty, and hence this basis does not evidence any fundamental flaw in the plan.
MAG EX 21: The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in that NHY's ORO failed to derenstrate that it has adeouate vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for injured individuals, as requirt.d by 10 C.F.R.transporting I i 50.47(b) (12) contaminated, and the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654. Rev. 1., Supp. 1, 4 L.4 Thus, NHY's ORO failed to satisfy Exercise Objective 19, and this precludes a finding of reasonabla assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook, as required by 10 C.F.R. 5 i 50.47(c)(1). .
Exercise results which 'ndividually and collectively form th'e basis for this contention include ite following:
A. During the course of the exercise, because the ORO failed to implement traffic control in a timely fashior and then would not have been able to control traffic st all, evacuation traffic would have been so disorderly that manv accidents producing personal injuries would have occurreri, many of cnem in areas which were being or had been contaminated.
OP0 s meager ambulance rescurces, even on paper, would have been woefully inadequate to transport the number of contaminated. injured persors that would need transportation to hospitals.
B. During the Exercise, on'y one of the ambulances OR0 is relying on to transport contaminated, inju. red persons was tested. The two ambulance attendants in ths ambulance were called to a reception center and asked to deal with one single contaminated, injured person. Procedures were 1 cbserved and evaluated. By mobilizing only one ambulance and its crew and
. testing its knowledge of proper handling procedures, the Exercise failed to test thi.s major portion of OR0's plans using sufficient numbers of ambulances and crewr. to verify in any meaningful way the capability of ORO to respond to the accident scenario contained in the Exercise with an adequate rumber of ambulances and adequately trained ambulance attendants, 1 as required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, IV. F. 1., n. 4. l C. The one ambulance crew that was tested performed poorly in !
its demonstratior ef its ability to properly handle a contaminated, l injured individual. First, the attendants did net covcr the patient to I confine contamination immediately before er after loading. This exhibits a fundarental lack of understanding of the concepts involved in handlirg
- entaminated individuals. While the attendants later reali7ed their error 1
l 4
4 and then did wrap the patient, their failure to do so at the outset would have likely contaminated their vehicle. A further major mistake was made when the attendants failed to change their shoe cevers and 9 1cves at the scene, which is not only the proper technique but is set forth in their ,
procedures. When questioned where they would take the individual, the attendants noted that they would go to one of two designated hospitals listed in their procedures. In the event of a life-threatening medical problem, however, they should go to the nearest hospital, not one of the two they had listed. This, too, exhibits a fundamental failure in their knowledge and procedures. The poor perfortnance of this ambulance crew cannot be dismissed lightly. FEMA notes in its Exercise Report that this crew had received an eight-hour training course providad by NHY personnel, viewed a video on proper procedures, and was "familiar" with its written procedures (available in the ambulance). It is not at all clear that with
, a little mor training or clearer procedures, these attendants would ,
perform any better. Only another exercise will reveal whether these ,
individuals have the capability to carry out the transportation of contaminated, injured individuals in a proper manner.
D. Based on the perfornance errors exhibited by the one ambulance
- crew testeo, no valid generalizations can be made that there is "reason-able relied assurance" upon by ORO can thatperform the entire fleet of ambulatices in an adequate manner. Given and theattendants smal beir"i sarple size, there were too many errors observed to draw any such conclusion. -
Response MAG EX 21 l
l The Staff does not object to this contention limited to Bases B, C and D. However, Basis A raises humaa behavior issues that have previously been litinated and are not matters raised by the exercise ard therefore ;
are not evidence of a fundamental flaw in the plan as demonstrated 5y the 1 i exercise. Thus, this basis should not be admitted in connection with this '
i
- contention, t
- 2. SAPL Grad'ed Exercise Contentions i
, SAPL EX-1 4
, The graded exercise 'of the New Hampshire Radiolocical Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP) for Seabrook Station did nnt result in an adequate 4
demonstration that appropriate Protective Actions (PA's) can be imple- '
mented to. reasonably assure the protection of school children within the l
plunw EPZ. Therefore, the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Il50.47(a)(1),
- il 50.47(b)(10), il 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG-0654 J.9 and J 10.d., g., k. -
and m. have not been ret. .
i j
l 4
l . . . :
1
. l
Bases a) The Same Deficiency Cited by FEMA in the February 1986 Final Exercise Assessment Still Exists. :
The February 1986 FEMA Final Exercise Assessment cited as a deficiency that:
- The capability to demonstrate the organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of schools, which was an exercise objective (0.8), was hampered by the extent of simulated school participation. Since schools were not ,
in session on the day of the exercise, school notifica-
- t. ion, and requests for an activation of school bus resources could not be evaluated. (February 26, 1988 ;
Final Exercise Assessment at p. 125) ,
Schools were not in session during the June 28 and 29,1988 graded exercise either and there was again no sufficient demonstration of the organizational ability of schools to effect an orderly evacuation. No school personnel were shown to be available to supervise school children during an evacuation.
b) Protective Action Decisions Affecting School Children Were Not Effectivelv Handled.
The decision was riade not to order early dismissal of children in plume EPZ ccennities because of a concern for latchkey children. The City of Portsnouth, though inappropriately acting on its own in a ranner incongruent with the rest of the EPZ connunities, did decide upon an ,
action that would have resulted in greater dose savings to the children, '
i.e. recomending early dismissal fur children other than latchkey children and holding the latchkey children in schools until their parents cculd pick them up. [The Town of Brentwood also took an action not in
' congruence with the State of New Harpshire ard called the Swasey Schcol and told them to let children take their nomal bus routes home after the sheltering order was received.)
- The State of New Hampshire instead erdered at the Site Area Energency ECL that a prec.autionary PA be effected to hold plume EPZ children in school until 5:(0 p.m. This late dismissal decision was extended at 11:52
, a.m to keep school children in school until 7:00 p.m. Subsequently, at 2:09 p.m. , the Governor concurred in an NHY recommendation that an ,
evacuation be ordered for six towns within a 5-mile radius and that sheltering should be put i.n effect for the 5-10 mile portion of the zone.
In the shelterino tewns, children were to be, sheltered in place in* the schcols. .
At 4:26 p.m. the PA order went out to evacuate six more towns, those in ERPA F. The wrong EPS message was sent out subsequently and parents were told not to pick up their children at the schools. (See p. 198 of the FEFA Orfft Exercise Report where it nutes that. "Information abcut school children was confusing and at one point contradictory.")
O g 9 4
4 e
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j . o At 6:10 p.m., the IFO Controller in Newington calle'd the State E0C to check on whether school dismissal was still scheduled for 7 00 p.m. The IFO Controller was told not to worry. However, at 6:30 p.m. the State E00 l J
called the IF3 Controller to verify that the children were getting out.
At 6:50 p.m., ,just 10 minutos befnre the scheduled dismissal time Local Liaisons were instructed to call the tewn EOC's to ask if transportation i was needatd for school children. This confused and untimely response was l clearly not a satisfactory demonstration that effective PA's can be ;
ordered and c:,rried out for school children.
l ,
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Response SAPL EX 1:
The Staff opposes admission of this contention to the extent that it is premised on Basis A. There is no regulatory foundation for the [
]
assertion that a pre-license exercise be conducted at any particular tiine of year, such as when schec1 is in session. Furthermore, school personnel ;
4 '
need nnt be involved in such an exercise since they are not erergency workers, se Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) *ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,153 n.65 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co.
(Limerick Generating Station. Units 1 and 2) LBP-85-14, 21 NRC 1210, l 1308-9 (1985), and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, !Y.F.1 explicitly 1
provides that mandatory public earticipation is not recuired. Finally, to the extent that it is alleged that t.here was insufficient deconstration of i l the organizational ability of schools to effect an orderly evacuation, the !
contention is overly vague. SAPL articulates absolutely no basis for this ,
j; broad unclusion except for the fact that school personnel were net involved, and thus does not place the other parties er retice of any l legitimate, factual issue to litigate. l The Staff has no objection to the admission of this contention to the
{
j extent that it is premised on the facts set cut in Basis B. Hcwever, i
litigation shouid focus on'y on whether the exercire demonstrated the .
i ability of the response organization to implement PA's for school i
e-. -
l children. The fact that different PA's were adog'ed by various ,
I -
jurisdicticns is not, in itself, a legitimate basis for admission of the contention. ;
l ,
) SAPL EX 2 The graded exercise of the NMERP failed to demonstrate the ability i to provide a sufficient number of buses and ambulances with properly I trained drivers to reasonably assurc that transitdependent, special facility and special needs populations can be adequately protected. There was further not an adequate demonstration that the tuses that were employed in the exercise could be prop rly routed. Therefore, the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Il 50.47(a)(1), !! 50.47(b)(10), il 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG-0659 J. 9 and J.10.d. g and k have not been met, l j Bases:
! The February 26, 1986 FEM Final Exercise Assessment described two of l the deficiencies in the prior exercise as follows: i Serious cuestions arose at the exercise regarding the I ability of the State to provide buses for transportatien (
of special populations, including school children, mobility-iripaired, and otherwise transit-dependent .
l l populations. Driver resources were not sufficient to r
- meet the transportation requirements. (February 26, 1988 i
- Final Exercise Assessment at p. 136) ;
j Bus drivers consistently experienced preblems in getting !
to where they would have been needed. They were i
! unfamiliir with alternate routes and experienced difft- ;
l culties because of the poor quality of photocopied raps.
! One of the bus drivers made wrong turns and required 1 prompting to complete his route. One of the buse.s that '
arrived at the Rockingham County Dispatch Center was
)
- unable to continue because it was low on fuel Some of i the evacuation and other bus route maps distributed at )
l the Rockingham County Staging Area were illegible, stee provided insufficient d? tail to specify the route clearly, and some did not include adequate addresses for ,
the locations at which evicuees were to be picked up.
l (Februarf ?6 Final Exercise Assessment at
- p. 138-1391 , 1988 l
Both of those deficiencies were not shewn remedied in the current exercise. There st41 are serious questions about the ability of the state to provide buses for transportation of special pcpulations.
l 1
e j ,
, l
The majority of the bus routes run during the exercise were run out of the proper secuence that the scenario wculd have required (a good number were run on Day 2). Further, the majority of the routes were run
, in private passenger vehicles rather than in buses. This did not provide l
{ a realistic test of the capability to coordinate the running of the routes in a timely manner and it did not test the ability to provide the numbers of buses and drivers that would actually be required during an emergency at Seabrook. 1 Out of the 79 transit-dependent bus routes attempted during the !
exercise, the exercise report states that only 51 routes or 65 percent l i were completed with only "minor" problems. Routes that were not completed i were as a result mainly of drivers getting lost, though in one instance a ,
< driver retually caused an accident and forced a private passenger vehicle i nff the road. (See South Fampton Route 1 at p. 211 of the FEMA Draft Exercise Report) Further, no routes were run from South Hampton to the Salem Reception Center as was supposed to have been done.
It appears that of the 93 routes for schcols, nurseries and day care centers attempted, only 70 out of 93 of the routes were completed witbout i controller intervention. (The Draft Report stated at p. 225 that cnly 60 routes were completed with drivers needing assistance on ten. If this number is correct, it would mean that only .0 routes, or 54 percent of the l 93 routes were corpleted without controller intervention.)
During the actual course of the exercise on Day 1 of the scenario, intervenor observers noted that only six buses and drivers arrived at the
, Portsmouth Business Center (forrerly the Omne Mall) ar.d only five of those buses were dispatched to other locations. ,
I At the Rockingham County Staging Area in Brentwood, only 14 buses, i one wheelchair van and one ambulance were present. The FEltA Exercise Report states that 750 regular buses, 95 vans, 34 wheelchair vans, 32 ambulances and 55 coach buses were available (see p. 165). Those vehicles '
had to have been iraginary; the real numbers were miniscule in cerrarison. !
There was no explicit mention in the FEMA report of how nany vehicle ;
j drivers could have been made available on the day of the exercise er bow that number was verified. A total of 87 drivers from the National Guard .
and 007 were allegec to have been put on standby, but those number would !
te grossly insufficient if there were a significant shortfall of bus l l company drivers. .
1 Virtually the same problems with drivers having difficulties getting ,
i where they were needed and having difficulty with reading map 4 due to not '
I a high enough quality of map were evidenced in this exercise as in the In several cases this time, maps for special facilities j prior exercise.
had wrong -instructions or wrono addresses (See p. 231 of the FEMA Draft i Exercise Report). The FEMA Draft Exercise Report also states that: "Some
) drivers demonstrated no capability to read any map" which indicates that probltes with driver training have not been adequately addressed.
Further, the problem of refueling buses has not been adeouately addressed. On the day of the exercise, the buses that needed fuel stopped at a gas statico, which would not be possible during the course of a real -
radiological emergency as the proprietors would have evacuated. The signatory of the bus refueling le-ter of agreement in Volume 5 of Rev. 2 .
of the hbRERP has gore out of busir.ess.
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Response SAPL EX 2: '
9 The Staff does not object to the idmission of this contention, SAPL EX 3 The graded exercise of the NHRERP did not result in an adequate ,
showing that emergene'/ workers have been properl trained in the use of ;
dosimetry, as required by 10 C.F.R. Il 50.47(a)(y), 1 il 50.47(b)(11) and NUREG-0654 K.3.a and b. ,
Basest ,
The February 26, 1986 Final Exercise Assessment states as follows:
The two bus drivers of Timberlane Pus Company who were interviewed at the Seabrook EOC (where they had mis-takenly arrived--see section 2.2.9) stated that they had not been trained in the use of dosimetry. ,
The FEMA Draft Exercise Report states that though county and State :
emergency workers were well-versed in dosimetry use, most bus drivers, ambulance drivers and local town personnel and a few local police were not adequately trained in dosiretry equipment and exposure control procedures.
The emergency workers at Stratham TCP (GST-01) did not demonstrate the ability to monitor and control their exposure limits at all. Therefore, there has still not been a demonstration sufficient to provide reasonable i assurance that there has been adequate preparation for the protection of emergency workers.
Response SAPL EX 3:
The Staff does not object to the admission of this contention to the extent it is alleged that the exercise failed to dernonstrate that adecuate provisinns were made for detemining costs received by energency !
personnel. There is no regulatory recuirement, however, that such l
, provisions be made for other, individuals, such as , local townspeople.
SAPL EX-4 The appiopriate use of equipment and procedures for collection and transport of samples of food, water and other appropriate Therefore, the items was not adequately requirerents of 10 C.F.R.demor ' ated(1).
In $0.47(a b)y the exercise.
Il 50.47(b)(9), 41.50.47(b)(10), il 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG-0654 !.
7 and 8 and J-11 have not been ret. .
9 9 9 m
B 9
_ - . .- _ = . _ .
I Bases: ,
4 Only two sampling tams were inclucted in the exercise. One of two l sampling teams, or 50 percent of those exercised, perforced poorly. Team l
- 1 was unfamiliar with procedures for sample collection and with survey technioues with the assigned instruments. Both teams had trouble with i
maps and had difficulty reaching their original locations and Team #1
, actually collected its sample at the wrong location. Team #1 also used i poor technique in collecting the sample.
Response SAPL EX 4:
I !
- The Staff does not object to the admission of this contention.
SAPL EX-5 The graded exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate the adequacy
! of medcal facilities, including proper training of staff, to reasonably j i assure that treatment and decontamination of seriously ill or trauma patients contaminated with radioactive material can be carried out. l Therefore, the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Il 50.47(a)(1), il 50.47(b)(12), '
- fl 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG-0654 L. 1., 3. and 4. have not been met.
l j Rases: -
l Only two hospitals, the Elliott Hospital in Manchester, N.H. and the i Wentworth-Douglas Hospital in Dover, N.H. were included in the exercise, !
d and there was no significant test of the capability of these facilities to
! handle a maior radiation ettergency since each hospital stuulated the handling of only one patient. Further, the medical and nursing staff i rembers in both hospitals need additional training in the biolegical ;
effects cf radiation and the significance of CPM readings and mR/hr t
- readings.
Response SAPL EX 5:
The 5t'af' does not object to the admission cf this contention to the
, extent that it is premised on the fact that each of the two participating '
1 l hospitals only simulated the har.dliot of one patient. To the extent that.
it is premised on the statement tFat the staff of those herpitals need 1
i additional training, however, the cortention she'uld be rejected as overly I
I vague and without basis. SAPL provides absolutely no reason for i
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concluding that the exercise demonstrated deficient training of the staff of either hospital.
l SAPL EX 6 The graded exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate the adequacy of personnel to staff both the traffic control posts (TCP's) and access control posts (ACP's) designated in the plan to control evacuation flew and control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. Therefore, the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Il sn.47(a)(1), il 50.47(h)(10), il 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG-0654 J.10.1, J., k, and 1. have not been met.
I Bases:
i The totc1 number of state police required to provide assistance in staffing of ACP's in New Hampshiie is 26-28 state police. (NHRERP, Vol 6 at p. 9-12) An additional 40 state police are needed to stat f TCP's and provide municipal security. During the exercise, only 4 ACP/TCP locations i were staffed by N.H. State Police from Trnop A. Epping. Only 13 of the 17 local communities staffed an ACP/TCP and only one was staffed in each of those communities. There was, therefore, no adequate demonstration that there is the organizational ability or personnel and equipment resources to staff all the required traffic and access control locations in New Hampshire. One of the towns that did not staff any location at all was Hampton. Hampton is the town with the most severe evacuation problems due to its extremely large beach population. The capability to control traffic in that community is critical to an adequate radiological
- 1. emerger.cy response. Further, tne establishment of the TCP/ACP's was done out of the sequence and hence did not provide a true test of the capability to marshall state and/or local personnel and resources tv oppropriate tra f fic control locations in a timely msnner during an
- eme rgency. j l Response SAPL EX 6
- l l
i The Staff does not object to the admission of this contention. l 1
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SAPt. EX 7 i The graded exercise of the NHRERP for Seabrook Station failed to demonstrate the capability for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and facilities because the facility that is to be used under the plan was not opened up and demonstrated during the exercise. Further, there was to showing that there 15 adequate provision for disposal of wastes. Therefore, the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Il 50.47(a)(1),
l 55 50.47(b)(11), il 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG-0654 K 5.a. and D. have not been met. l 1
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- Bases
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- The Hillside Junior High School was, according to FEMA's report, ;
unavailable for purposes of dcmonstration during the course of the :
{ exercise. There was no showing that there were adequate numbers of
^
trained personnel to staff the facility and no showing that the facility .
l had been ever tested for its proposed use. The only FEMA evaluation of l the facility was a visual inspection on July 22 almost a month following
^
1 t the exercise. Further, there was no exercise of the capability to dispose l l of contaminated wastes.
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Response SAPL EX 7:
l '
f The Staff opposes the admission of this contention to the extent that j it is premised on the fact that Hillside Jnior High School was not i
i actually used as a decontamination facility during the emergency exercise. ;
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! There is no regulatory requirement that all facilities designated in the j emergency plan be used during the pre. license exercise. Instead. 10 !
l C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F.1 only requires the applicant to test the l! .
i i
l major observable portions of the emergency plan in a manner that mobilizes !
I J personnel in sufficient numbers to verUy their ability to respond to an .
1 accident. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit l f
- 1) ALAB.900, slip op. At 26 (1988).
To the extent that the contention is premised upon the allegation l
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j that the exercise did not demonstrate the (bility to dispose of J
l j contaminated wastes, the Staff does not oppose admission. :
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SAPL EX 8 The graded exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate reasonable l j assurance of adequate public protection since r.o capability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> j continuous staffing of Staging Areas and Reception Centers was demon.
Strated and continuous staffing of local and host EOC's over a continuous !
E4 hour time frame was not shown to be fully adequate in any of the local ,
or host comunities. Key positions at the IFO were not fully staffed by I
. appropriately trained indhiduals and the Governor's office was not '
l represented according to the plan. Further, the exercise did nnt 1
demonstrate that there are adequate provisions for filling the roles of ,
those personnel who are absent due to sickness, vacation or other causes, i
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1 I Therefore. the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Il 50.47(a')(1). ll 50.47(b)(1).
! Il 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG-0654 A.1. and A.4. are not e.et.
l Bases: ;
The host E0C's in Salem. Dover and Rochester did not deronstrate shift changes. The Manchtster EOC is alleged to have done so, thcugh I
outgoing staff failed to brief the incuning staff. Neither the Pockingham l County Staging Area nor tne Portsmouth Circle Business Center Staging Area attempted shift changes. The exercise ended before the shift change was '
completed at the Raception Center in Dover. Firefighters in Dover '
inter conducted a demons'.
alia, that "the ration firefighters . . .and distributed universally a statement oppose the evacuation which said, "p"lans ,
as unworkable." The proposed corrective action mentioned at p. 000 of the FEFA Exercise Report of having DPHS obtain 30 persernel from the N.H.
National Guard does not address the problen since the DPH8 fuactions i require very specialized training and expertise. Further, adding l personnel to OPHS does not address the problem of lack of Sheriffs <
Deputies to staff a second shift at the staging areas. Reference to "the i Hampton Center" in the Exercise Report makes no sense since there is no '
such location designated as either a Staging Area or Receptien Center j under the NHRERP. -
Not even one local EOC in the 17 towns deconstrated a full shift !
change. The Seabrook EOC was not even staffed in accordance with the plan l for the first shift. and the Civil Defense Director did not appear to be t trained adequately. Further.'no second shift capebility was demonstrated i for Sheriff's Nputies staffing the non partittpating comunities . !
indditionally, thite of the Local liaison Officers and a special needs liaison were not replaced on the second shift at the !F0 The second shift state police did not demonstrate appropriate knowledge and l capabilities. Ore of the Wo positions at the Joint Telephone Information Center (JTIC) was unstaffed due to illness. The axercise deronstrated no l capability to bring in trained replacement persennel for positions left '
unfilled due to illness or other causes.
Respense SAPL EX 8:
The Staff does not object to the admission of this contention.
However, the issue raised by SAPL is unrelated to the participation of firefighters in Dover or any compensatory planning actions which have been ta'an involving the Natier.a1 Guard. The questiens SAPL raists about those points in the basis for this centention >:ere encorpassed by the 11tigation of the plannir.g issues curing the New Hampshire hearings ard therefore cannot bc raised again during litigation of the emergen'cy e
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exercise. SAPL's reference to inadequate training of the Civil Defense Director in the basis is also unrelated to the issue f.iised by the contention. Furthermore, it is not set out with any specificity or basis l in fact and thus sheuld nct be considered an issue in this proceedirg.
l SAFLEXJ i The graded exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate the abilit to menitor, understand and use emergency classification levols (ECL's) y Further, it failed to demonstrate the ability to provide for emergency actions to be teken by state and local organizatio.is consistent with the emergency actions reconnended by the nuclear facility licensee, taking _
into account local offsite conditiens that exist at the tire of the emergency. Therefore, the requirements of 10 C.F.R. l! 50.47(a)(1),
il 50.47(b)( 6 ano NUREG0654 0 1, are not met.
Bases:
As tne FEMA Exercise Repert states at p. 139 the Rockingham County Dispatch Center (RCDC) is responsible for the initial notification of all 17 N.H. plume EPZ communities at each ICL. Appendix B of the procedures for the RCDC in Vol. AB of' the NHRERP shows that RCDC is to advise the towns of protective actions and as to whether or not there has bein a release of radioactivity. RCDC failed to provide this infortratinn to the towns in an appropristely prompt narner to reasonably assure adequate public protection. For example, even though the reletse of radiation occurred at Seabrook Station at 144 p.m. and the Nh IFO transmitted notification of the release to RCDC at 2:13 p.n.. the Director and other RCDC personnel were unaware that there had been a release until approximately 3:00 p.m. , approx 1rately I hour and 16 minutes after the release occurred. Further, the second NH evicuation PAR was not krown ard pested until approhirately 4:20 p.m. because the radio over which that infortnation was monitored was in a separate reer. The EOC in Seabrook.
N.H. also failed to keep its stato boards current.
Response SAFL EX 9: .
The Staff does not oppose admission of this contention to the extent that it is alleged that the exercise did not demonstrate that the Nh4ERP was able to ccerunicate ECL's to the local ccanuntttet prceptly enough for them to respond apprcpriately. However, the Staff does oppnse aMissicn to the extent that it is alleged that the NHRERP failed 19 1% W ate the l ability to ronitor, understand or use the FCL's. SAFL provides absolutely 9 9 4
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I no basis for this broad allegation nor any specificity as to how the perfomance of the reskense organization is alleged to have' been deficient. , f SAPL EX 10 l t
There is no reasonable assurance that a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> continuous response by adequate numbers of trained personnel can be maintained during a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station since there was no exercise of ;
the capability to respond to either an unannounced and/or off hours !
emergency. Therefore, the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Il 50.47(a)(!), t G 50.47(b)(1), il 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG-0654 A.4 and N.1.b are not met. ;
i Bases: i The graded exercise of the emergency response plans conducted by FEMA was a pre announced exercise which occurred largely during nomal weekday work hours. It was apparent that many of the emergency responders were ,
aware of and were poised and ready to respond during the time frame during !
which the exercist was to transpire and some even arrived at response locations before they would have known any emergency had occurred at Seabrook under real life circumstances. For example most participants arrived at the EOC in Stratham about 8:00 a.m. and roughly five New I Hampshire Yankee officials arrived at the Portsmouth Business Center !
staging area at around 9:00 a.m. The Alert declaration at Seabroor !
Station, the first ECL declare 1. did not occur until 9:09 a.m. under the -
i exercise scenario and no protective action decision was made until 10:32 a.m. There was, therefore, no test at all of the capability to staff emergency response functions during an unannounced, off hours emergency.
Response SAPL EX 10: ,
j The $taff opposes admission of this contention. There is ne l regulatory requirement or guidance that calls 'for a pre license exercise .
to be conducted unannounced or "Off-hours". l
!APL EI 11 , ,
The perfomance of emergency responders during the graded exercise of I the emergency response plans for Seabrook Station did not adequately denenstrate that "early notification" and timely protective actions can be implemented to reasonably assure the safety of the ;opulace in the plume exposure pathway EPZ.' Therefore, the requirements of 10 C.F R. 9 il 50.47(a)(1). Il 50.47(b)(4), il 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG-0754 0.4 are not met.
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l i Bases:
Tha utility made its announcement of the Alert ECL at 9:09 a.m. The i decision to order the protective action of beach closure was not arrived
- 1. at until 10:32 a.n., a full I hour and 23 minutes later. Thereafter, it
! took another 28 mir,v a before the RCDC was instructed to activate the l i sirens, which means that there was an elapsed time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 51 !
j minutes between the Alert declaration at Seabrook Station and any !
l protective action irnplementation. Had a General Emergency been the very I
] first ECL, this amount of elapsed time to recomend the first PA would l have been extremely serious. Beach closure is a protective action that is l
! supposed to occur under the NHRERP as a mattar of course durMg the sumer !
! tourist season and the decision to act according to the plan should have !
> followed promptly and imediately upon the Alert ECL having been declared. !
l Further, the General Emergency ECL was declared at Seabrook Station (
at 1:3? p.m. The decision to evacuate the 0-5 mile portion of the EPZ was ,
not made until 2:09 p.m. 37 minutes later, and the ;irens were not !
activeted until 2:18 p.m., a ft.1146 minutes af ter the General Emergency was classified.
j Additionally, the utility made the recommendation that more of the
, plume EPZ should be evacuated at about the 3:20-3:30 p.m. time frame. A l l statt. decision to evacuate additional communities in ERPA F did not follow t until 4:26 p.m. Sirens were not activated to notify the public until 4:35 l
)l p.m., approximately I bour ard 10 minutes after the action was e recomended. These undue and lengthy delays betray a fundamental problen ;
in the protective action decisionmaking and implementation process. l
! Response SAPL EX ll' i
The Staff opposes admission of this contention on the basis that the j f
facts alleged by SAPL, even if true, do not demonstrate any fundamental !
l flaw in the emergency plan. Under 10 C.F.P. Part 50 Appen6.'4 E, IV.D 3, l l the licensee must have the means to promptly alert and instruct the public within the EPZ, with the design objective of notification within about 15 mir.utes. As the regulation explicitly states, the notificetion peried begins from the time State and local goverrantal officials make a judgment whether or not to activate the public notific'ation system (i.e., i the protective action recommendation), given the fact that those officials f miy have a substantial arouht of time to reat.h that decision af ter being
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inforre'd of the ECL. In each of the examples cited in the basis of this i
, r Contention. the regulatory standard was met since the sirens were f
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1 l activated within 15 minutes free the time local officials authorized l notification of the public. As Table 7 on page 76 of the FEMA report indicates, the protective action decision made at 10:32 ' a.m. was tc
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j evacuate beaches at 11:00 a.m.; sirens were then sounded at 11:01 a.m. In l that region, t.ikewise, sirens were sounded within 15 minutes from the !
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- time authori
- ation was received to evacuate the 0-5 mis portion of the l EP2 and from the time authorization was received to evicuate an additional l
- portion of the EPI located 5-10 miles from the plant.
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'f i l j SAPL EX 12 L The adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and pe'sonnel for l 1
the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamiration of evacuees I
! was not demonstrated during the exercise. Facilities were not well
- 3rganized and not run in an adeouatel effective manner. Therefore the
! requirements of 10 C.F.R. 55 50.47(a)y(1), il 50.47(b)(10), il 50.47fb)(14)
{ and NUREG-Of54 J.12 have not been met. !
Rases:
! Only two of the host comunities opened Reception Centers durin the !
exercise: Salen and Dover. In Salem, mock evacuees were kept we ting !
outdoors from approximately 3:14 p.m. until 5: 09 r., m. when u first evacuee was monitored. Difficulties ir setting up the facility included l i
phone lires strung across a corridor, the DPHS Supervisor's radio not i i working and ten few re.'sonnel. The personnel probler.s were cerpounded I when fire personnel got called away to deal with real life situations. j j Monitoring tires were not efficient and there was a six up of the Pettags. ,
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An actual breakdown in the monitoring process occurred at 6:28 p.m. I 1 In Dover, the workers in the Reception Center seered unclear on their responsibilities and there were not enough personnel. Mock evacuees are
! not allowid into the Dover Reception Center until af ter 3:30 p.m. There l i- was a good deal of disarray in the crianization in the monitoring section l j and the process of monitoring evacuees did not begin until 4:40 p.m. Some !
of the evacuees wandered into the wrong areas. ' Not enough headsets were l i
available fnr the monitoring instrurents. !
j At the State E00, the DFHS ttaff who are to be an information ard !
referral rescurce to the personnel at the Reception Centers were not j
- j. familiar with their responsibi19 ties and duties under the Radiological ;
Hec 1th Screening Prograr. This is a ver 1 i capability for a radiological energency. y serious defect in the response .
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Response SAPL EX 12:
The Staff does not oppose admission of this contention to the extent that it is, premised on the allegation that the reception centers at Salem .
and Dover did not demonstrate the' ability to effectively manage decontamination activities. However, litigation should not encompass the activities of the DPHS staff at the State E0C. SAPL provides no support for the allegation that those individuals were unfamiliar with their responsibilities or duties. Accordingly, that basis for the contention lacks the requisite specificity and fails to place the parties on notice of what would be the subject of litigation on that point.
SAPL EX 13 The graded exercise of the NHRERP did not provide an adequate deircnstration of reasonable assurance that those persons confined to nursing hemes, hospitals and like special institutions can be adequately protected in the requirerrents event of 10 of a 55 C.F.R. radiological 50.47(a)(1), emergency
$$ 50.47(.b)(10),
Therefore, the il 50.47(b)(14) and NUREG-0654 J.9, J.10.d. , e. , f. and g, have not been met.
Bases:
There was no test of capability to transport hospital and nursing home patients to host facilities by ambulance and the plan for testing of bus bed conversion capability was severely limited. There were only two !
mini-scenarios to test the emergency bed bus capability and it is not !
clear from reviewing the Exercise Report whether or net those mini-scer.arios were carried out. Further, there is no mention of any test of the ability to make decisions regarding the administration of K! to institutionalized persons in regard to Objective #16. Finally, there was no test of host special facilities to receive special population evacuees and no test of the capability to monitor and decontaminate these special i population evacuees. Therefore, the graded exercise 'provided no reason- l able assurance that institutionalized persons can be adequately protected j in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook, 1 Response SAPL EX 13:
. The Staff does not oppose admission of this contention to the extent 1
that it is premised on the allegation that there was no test of the host i e 4
U special facilities to receive and treat special population evacuees.
However, the litigation should not encompass the other bases provided for the contention. As detailed from pages 164 to 172 of the FEMA report, the exercise did in fact test the ability of the NHRERP to mobilize and deploy resources, both vehicles and drivers, to provide transportation assistance to special populations. During the exercise, numerous vehicles coi pleted transit routes running frem nursing homes and hospitals. Actual transportation of hospital patients or nursing home residents on those routes is not required in light of the prohibition against randatory public participation in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F.1. For the same reason, the exercise need not test the ability to administer KI to institutionalized persons.
SAPL EX 14 The graded exercise of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP) for Seabrcok Station did not result in an adequate demonstration that appropriate Protective Action decisions will be trade for the plume EPZ comunities or that expansion of the response beyond ten miles can be carried out when it is prudent to carry out such an expanded response. Therefore, the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Il 50.47(a)(1),
il 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 J.10.m. have not been met.
Bases:
The exercise scenario resulted in a wind shift which brought a concentrated plume over the connunities of Portsmouth, Rye and Greenland 1
toward the end of Day 1 of the scenario, yet those comunities were never '
ordered evacuated. In view of the radi-ation levels in the plume as the wind carried it over those municipalities, the evacuation order should ,
Further, the concentration of the have been expanded to encompass ERPA G.
plume as it passed over Kittery, Maine would have warranted an evacuation of Kittery as well. NUREG-0654 states at p. 12 that the 10-mile plume EPZ planning basis is based on the consideration, inter alia, that: I detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event this proved necessary The exercise demonstrated that appropriate protective actions were
- not wholly carried out even within the boundaries of the EPZ The exercise l
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showed no capability for an expansion of the response beyond 10 miles when ,
warranted. ;
_ Response SAPL EX 14:
The Staff opposes admission of this contentien on the basis that there is no regulatory requirement that the exercise test, emergency response beyond the 10 mile EPZ. Under 10 C. F.R. 50.47(b)(10), the offsite emergency plan must provide for a range of protective actions only for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public.
Since protective actions need not be planned beyond that zone, they cannot be tested during an emergency exercise. SAPL 's complaint about the planning basis is simply an attack on the regulations.
- 3. TOH/NECNP CONTENTIONS:
i TOH/NECNP EX 1 The scope of the June 28-29, 1988 Exercise of the New Hampshire l Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP.) was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results regarding the capability -
to implement that plan, as required by 10 C.F.R. $$ 50.47(a)(1) and ,
(a)(2), in that it did not include demonstrations or evaluatiens cf '
emergency response capabilities of many persons and entities relied upon to implement the NHRERP. In addition, the exclusion of these entities from the Exercise precludes a finding that the Exercise evaluated ma.ior portions of emergency response capabilities, as required by 10 C.F.R. l il50.47(b)(14) and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E(F)(1). Other than limited participation by State of New Hampshire personnel, the majority of the ceganizations, entities, and individuals relied upon in the NHRERP for implementation of that plan did not participate in the Exercise. Thus, the Exercise did not address the willingness, availability, training, equipment, capability, or adequacy of perfortnance of the entities and individuals identified in Bases a to g below, each of which is necessary to implement the portions of the NHRERP referenced therein. Accordingly, the NHRERP is fundamentally flawed. )
BASES: -
l (a) None of the teachers relied upon under the NHRERP to implement protective actions for school children, see e.g. NHRFRP Vol. 18A, Appendix F, participated in the . Exercise. Necessarily, the Exercise failed to meet a primary objective to demonstrate the ability and
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resources necessary to adequately protect students in an emergency.
txercise Report, p. 172. Since hundreds of teachers through their
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representatives, and by petition, have already provided evidence in this l proceeding of their intent not to implement the NHRERP, failure to test for the availability and participation of New Hampshire teachers repre-sents a fundSmental flaw in the NHRERP.
Ib) Since none of the New Hampshire teachers participated in the Exercise, FEMA' could not observe any adequate demonstration of the organizational ability or resources necessary to effect an early dis-missal, sheltering, or evacuation, of the school children, even though this demonstration was one of the Exercise objectives. Exercise Report,
- p. 172. Under the NHRERP, early dismissal, sheltering and evacuation are the protective actions for school children. See (e.g.) NHRERP Vol .18A, JoniApp F. 1-3, F. 1-4. All of these protective actions assume, and rely upon, teachers for implementation. id . Failure to observe or test necessary personnel or procedures to protect students represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERP.
(c) During the sunner months, Hampton Beach is the most highly dnd densely populated area in the Seabronk EPZ, an
Philip Ahren, Esq. Calvin A. Canney Assistant Attorney General City Hall Office of the Attorney General 126 Daniel Street State House Station Portsmouth, NH 03801 Augusta, ME 04333 R. Scott Hill-Whilton Carol S. Sneider, Esq. Lagoulis, Clark, Hill-Whilton Ar.sistant Attorney Genera 1 & McGuire Office of the Attorney General 79 State Street One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Newburyport, MA 01950 Boston, MA 02108 !
Allen Lampert George Dana Bisbee, Esq. Civil Defense Director <
Assistant Attorney General Town of Brentwood Office of the Attorney General 20 Franklin ,
25 Capitol Street Exeter, NH 03833 Concord, NH 03301 William Armstrong Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq. Civil Defense Director -
Diane Curran, Esq. Town of Exeter Harmon & Weiss 10 Front Street 2001 S Street, NW Exeter, NH 03833 Suite 430 Washington, DC 20009, , Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
Holmes & Ellis Robert A. Backus, Esq. 47 Winnacunnet Road Backus, Meye- & Solomon Hampton, NH 03842 116 Lowell Street Manchester, NH 03106 J. P. Nadeau Board of Selectr.en Paul itcEachern, Esq. 10 Central Street Matthew T. Brock, Esq. Rye, NH 03870 3 Shaines & McEachern 25 Maplewood Avenue Judith H. Mizner, Esq, P.O. Box 360 Silverglate, Gertner, Baker, l Portsnouth', NH 03801 Fine, & Good i 88 Board Street Charles P. Graham, Esq. Boston, MA 02110 McKay, Murphy & Graham l
. 100 Main Street Robert Carrigg, Chairman Amesbury, MA 01913 Board of Selectmen Town Office Sandra Gavutis, Chairman Atlantic Avenue North Hampton, NH 03870 Board of Selectmen RFD #1, Box 1154 Kensington, NH 03827 l
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- William S. Lord Peter J. Matthews, Mayor i
Board of Selectmen City Hall Town Hall - Friend Street Newburyport, MN 09150 ;
- Amesbury, MA 01913
' Michael Santosuosso, Chairman i Mrs. Anne E. Goodman, Chairman Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen South Hampton, NH 03827 13-15 Newmarket Road Durham, NH 03824 Ashod N. Amirian, Esq.
Town Counsel for Morrimac Hon. Gordon J. Humphrey 376 Main Street ;
i United States Senate Haverhill, MA 08130 !
531 Hart Senate Office Building l Washington, DC 20510 Robert R. Pierce, Esq.*
Atomic Safety and Licensing Richard R. Donovan Board Panel Federal Emergency Manage.nent Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Federal Regional Center Washington, D.C. 20555 i a 130 228th Street, S.W.
Bothell, Washington 98021-9796 l 4
i Elaine I. Chan Counsel fer NRC Staff ,
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