ML20246P204
| ML20246P204 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/05/1989 |
| From: | PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246P075 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8907200131 | |
| Download: ML20246P204 (129) | |
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i Ihhff l '89 JLL 10 P6 :25 I L Drait of July 5, 1989 I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD I
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In the Matter of PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. 50-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-site Emergency
) Planning Issues)
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I JOINT INTERVENOR (JI) CONTENTIONS ON THE
- g. SEABROOK PIAN FOR MASSACHUSE'ITS COMMUNITIES g (SPMC) AND THE JUNE 1988 GRADED EXERCISE I
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I E-TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EVACUATION PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 I ~
A. Inaccurate and Unrealistic ETEs JI 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
JI 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 1 1
2 JI 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 B. Traffic Management Plan . . . . . . . . . . . 6 JI 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s JI 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 I C.
JI 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Transit Dependent . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11 11 11 JI 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 II. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 :
JI 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 I JI 10 , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24 24 25 JI 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I JI 13 JI 14 JI 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27 28 28 III. PAR GENERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 JI 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 JI 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 I JI 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30 32 33 I JI 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 22 . . . . . . . . .
JI 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35 35 36 37 I JI 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . 37 37 I IV. COMMUNICATIONS / NOTIFICATION . . . . . . . . .
JI 27 . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . 37 37 40 l JI 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5 JI 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 JI 31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 JI 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 I JI 33 JI 34 41 41 JI 35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 JI 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 JI 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 I -l
I JI 38 JI 39 44 44 JI 40 44 I V. LEGAL ISSUES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 1
I JI 41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 I '
JI 42 JI 43 JI 44A .
45 46 47 JI 44B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 l l VI. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR PARTICULAR POPULATIONS . . . 48 '
JI 45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 I JI 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53 58 59 l I JI'49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61 64 VII. EVACUATION EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES . 70 I JI JI 51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70 75 JI 53 [ MAG 67; SAPL 2] . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 I JI JI JI 54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77 77 83 85 I JI JI JI 57 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
58 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
86 87 JI 60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 VIII. COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCES AND RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 I JI 61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JI 63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87 88 90 IX. EXERCISE CONTENTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 MAG EX-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 MAG EX-4 . . & . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 I MAG EX-8 . . . . .
MAG EX-9 . . . . .
MAG EX-10 95 96 98 l
MAG EX-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 l i MAG EX-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 l MAG EX-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 3 MAG EX-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 MAG EX-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 E 114 MAG EX-21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SAPL EX-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 SAPL EX-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 .
SAPL EX-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 f I i l
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B SAPL EX-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 SAPL EX-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 I SAPL EX-12 SAPL EX-13 SAPL EX-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
120 121 122 TOH/NECNP EX-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 TOH/NECNP EX-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 l
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______________________J
I. EVACUATION PROCESS t A. Inaccurate and Unrealistic ETEs l
JI 1 FMAG 321
'l Participating Party: MAG !
Contention
}
l No evacuation time astimate study has been done to assess what the realistic evacuation times would be in the 3
Massachusetts portion of the EPZ in light of the special !
l difficulties, circumstances, and delays in conducting an i
evacuation in Massachusetts under the SPMC. The Final Report of.the.KLD Evacuation Time Estimate Study and Traffic Management ?lan Update, completed in August 1986, did not j
take into account these special circumstances, difficulties and delays. A new evacuation time estimate study needs to be conducted before the SPMC can meet the requirements of 10
} C.F.R. 50.47 (a) (1) , 50.47 (b) (10) , NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp.
1,Section II.J.10.e, and Appendix 4 of NUREG 0654, Rev. 1.
I Basis
)
A. [ MAG 32A]
). While reference is made at various points in the SPMC to the KLD Evacuation Time Study of August 12, 1986, there is no specific averment that the evacuation times listed in the SPMC came from the report. See Pro-2.5, Attachment 4. In
)
fact, the actual ETEs listed in Pro-2.5, Attachment 4, are not listed in the KLD study. It may be that further ETE analyses were done. If so, this additional work and the assumptions and methods of calculation used have not been described. Such work needs to be disclosed and assessed to determine whether it qualifies as an ETE study for the SPMC
! and adequately takes into account all the relevant conditions affecting ETEs in the context of the SPMC and the expected response of state and local officials when an evacuation is selected as a protective action for some or all of the six (6) Massachusetts communities.
B. [ MAG 32C]
The old KLD ETE study simply did not take into account
) the many effects that result from an evacuation conducted l under the SPMC. For example, the KLD study utilized a
" planning basis" which assumed that as a precautionary action the public would be notified by loud speakers to clear the beaches at the Alert Level and that an order to evacuate
- would be transmitted to the public 25 minutes later. NHRERP, W i- i -r. i- is r i i
I ,
Vol. 6, 4-1. Given that the SPMC does not utilize early beach closing, that there are no longer any pole-mounted loud speakers or sirens in the six Massachusetts communities, and I that communication delays will inevitably result as ORO communicates a PAR to Massachusetts officials and waits for the response, this " planning basis" is inappropriate for l I generating realistic ETEs for Massachusetts. The KLD study also assumed use of a specific traffic management plan, but Massachusetts officials have rejected the use of that plan.
In Amendment 3, almost all the TCP and ACP diagrams have been I withdrawn from the SPMC. p_f. Amendment 2, App. J with Amend. 3, App. J. Any changes in the configuration of these posts will result in different ETEs. The KLD study also I. assumed that all traffic control posts would be immediately staffed at the time of an evacuation. This assumption is not realistic for a fast-breaking accident under the SPMC. The I SPMC fails to meet the requirement that an evacuation time study be done on a case-by-case basis and that the study consider all relevant conditions. Piggybacking on the old KLD study is not sufficient to meet that requirement in light I of the changed circumstances. A new study needs to be conducted.
JI 2 IMAG 39; TOA 4K; MAG 47T1 W i.cipating Party: MAG Contention The evacuation time estimates contained in the SPMC, Pro-2.5 at Attachment 4, are too unrealistic to form the i basis of adequate protective action decision-making.
Re611stic ETEs would be much longer. The SPMC, therefore, I does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR S 50.47(a) (1),
5 50.47 (b) (10) , NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.J.10.1, and NUREG 0654, Appendix 4.
Basis A. IMAG 39C, D. I, N, O. P1 Orderly and efficient traffic flow will not be maintained due to the inadequacies in planning for the use of I traffic control personnel and for the remmtai of road blockages by tow trucks.
B. IMAG 39J. FF, K1 The ETEs are based on incorrect assumptions concerning the number of cars that will flow through roads, intersections and ramps in Massachusetts.
I I
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h C. IMAG 39S1 The ETEs fail to account for the delays that will result l 'from the confusion among the public caused by hearing i i.
different emergency messages from different sources. l D. TMAG 39U; TOA 4K)
The ETEs are based on a traffic management plan that L overestimates the traffic flow rate through the intersection
} at Route 110/I-95/ Elm Street in Amesbury.
E. fMAG 39W. X. Y1 The ETEs are based on an undercount of the numbcr of vehicles evacuating from and through the Massachusetts i portion of the EPZ.
F. IMAG 39AA1 The.ETEs are based on the implicit assumption that in implementing the traffic management plan the placement of cones and barricades will not actually b3nck vehicles with legitimate reasons to travel against or a ross the flow of I
evacuation traffic. In fact, if the traft.c management plan is implemented according to the diagrams in Appendix J and I cones and barricades are placed as shown, these vehicles will I be blocked at many intersections.
G. fMAG 39BB1 The ETEs were calculated using an irrelevant " planning basis" which assumed that the public is notified to clear the beaches at the Alert level, that a General Emergency occurs 15 minutes later, and that the order to evacuate is transmitted to the public 10 minutes after the General Emergency is declared. This " planning basis" has no I
relationship to the SPMC.
y H. IDismissed by Board order of May 23, 1989]
I. IMAG 39EE; MAG 47T1 i Because there are no special population evacuation times in the SPMC, the ETEs in the SPMC appear to be based on the t unrealistic assumption that the evacuation of the transport
! dependent population and those in special facilities and schools will take no longer than the evacuation times calculated for evacuees using private automobiles.
)
l
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
" Bases I.l., I.2. . . . have been litigated before . . .
and are therefore rejected. We reject Basis I.3. for that reason also . . . Basis I.4. has no foundation and is rejected." Order I at 63.
"Therefore, MAG Contention 39 is accepted, except for Bases . . . I.1, I.2., I.3., I.4., the human-factors aspect
" Order I at i of I.5 (rejected gua soonte by Board) . . . .
}
64.
" Basis M is a spontaneous-evacuation allegation. . . .
f [This basis is] rejected." order I at 62 - 63. ;
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"The parties agreed to confer on whether the issue that would be raised by Basis M, spontaneous evacuation, has already been litigated." Order (08-19-88) at 4.
"The Staff has mischaracterized [ MAG Contention 39]
Basis O which does not allege a regulatory requirement, but i challenges the reliability fo the ETEs." Order I at 63.
. " Basis O to [ MAG) Contention 39 does not raise an issue of differing public perceptions of uniformed and non-uniformed traffic guides." Order (08-19-88) at 4.
T
) "To the extent not already litigated in the NHRERP phase of this proceeding, Basis 4.K to this contention [TOA 4) is admitted." order II at 14.
I JI 3 FMAG 421 l
Participating Party: MAG Contention l
The SPMC does not provide protective action decision-makers with sufficiently realistic ETEs for the Massachusetts l EPZ population for a wide range of times and conditions in the summer months. Only one pre-determined ETE is provided for a summer weekend with good weather, despite the fact that ETEs for such occasions vary dramatically as the size of the i beach population (a factor to which the ETEs are highly sensitive) rises and falls. These beach population changes e are substantial and occur from hour to hour, day to day, and
[ week to week. Absent a real-time, computer-based system to monitor the size of the beach population and compute real-time ETEs, the SPMC is deficient, because there is no I
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a) (1) .
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1-Basis l
l A. (MAG 42, Basis $1)
A "real-time" computer-based data collection /ETE
- calculation system should be installed by linking a series of roadway traffic counters that form a cordon around the Massachusetts beach areas with a small computer programmed to compute ETEs instantaneously. This system would enable PAR decision-makers to have realistic ETEs at the moment a
)
decision must be made without having to make wildly uncertain l
extrapolations, as the SPMC now requires, from a single pre-determined ETE in a table which assumes a given fixed ,
population at mid-day. The SPMC contains no guidance whatsoever on how these extrapolations are to be made, and L even-if there were such guidance, there is no real-time date collection system to enable that extrapolation to be made in a manner that produces evacuation time estimates of
! reasonable accuracy for the conditions at hand. Thus, for i example, using the SPMC a decision-maker can only guess what the realistic ETE is for 4:00 p.m. on a Saturday in mid-August when many of the beach-goers who were there at 1:00 i p.m. have left and the beaches at mid-day were somewhat crowded but not at capacity. Similarly, a decision-maker cannot know, with any reasonable assurance, what the
! realistic ETE is at 2:00 a.m. on a Thursday in late July, I when relatively few day-trippers are present but an unknown number of seasonal, weekly, and overnight visitors are staying in rental units, beach cottages, motels, and campgrounds in the area. The population in the beach area
}
fluctuates so dramatically (by tens of thousands of people) over the course of only a few hours that having a single ETE, as the SPMC does, for a summer weekend (good weather) leaves I
protective action decision-makers ill-equipped to make the calculations needed for protective action decisions.
f Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"The Board accepts [ MAG) Contention 42 on the following j basis. First we recognize that there is no specific regulatory requirement for real-time monitoring as the Applicants and Staff point out, and accepting Contention 42 does not suggest that there is. Through contention 42 and l
I other ETE contentions the Attorney General is free to attack the adequacy of tha SPMC and reliability of the ETEs. The basis for the contention does not satisfy significant doubts harbored by the Board that such a system would be practical and useful. Therefore, with respect to the proposed real-time, computer-based, data-collection, ETE-calculation system, the Attorney General has the burden of proceeding
I I with evidence that such a system has material benefit and is practical." order I at 65 - 67.
B. Traffic Management Plan JI 4 [ MAG 37; MAG 38; TON 1.j CON 1; CON 2; I TOA 4B (1) , (2) ; TOA 4J; TOA 40; TOS 6 ; TOS 9 ;
TOS 17; TOWN 7.2C; TOWN 8.3. .4. .5. .61 Participating Parties: MAG, CON, TOA, TON, TOS, TOWN Contention The evacuation plan contained in the SPMC is so poorly designed and so inadequately staffed that, even if state and local officials are assumed to make a best efforts response, I there is no reasonable assurance that either the permanent residents or the transients can or will be evacuated as efficiently as possible, therefore, the SPMC does not provide I
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken, and it fails to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47 (a) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (10) , 50. 47 (c) (1) , and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1,Section II.J.
Basis I A. The number of traffic control personnel rel:.ed upon by the SPMC is inadequate.
B. Insufficient capacity-enhancing measures and other poorly conceived traffic control strategies are utilized by I the SPMC's traffic management plan. The SPMC has not adequately addressed the problems that will occur during an evacuation in the event that the Gillis Bridge is closed to traffic in order to facilitate t.s b passage of boats.
g C. The traffic control diagrams contained in the SPMC 3 are not sufficiently clear to allow the SPMC's traffic management plan to be implemented.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"The portion of MAG Contention 37 which would require a I comparison of the SPMC to a hypothetical plan with state and local government participation is rejected." Order I at 60.
"[W]e reject . . . the basis [ MAG Contention 37)
I alleging erratic driver behavior . . .
litigated in the New Hampshire phase of the proceeding."
(which] has been Order I at 61.
I I
"[C]ertain bases we reject because they treat topics previously litigated for which we are not given acceptable reasons as to why the previous litigation is inadequate. j There are three such topics: human behavior, amount of !
travel speed reduction to accommodate adverse weather, and (
stalled vehicles . . . [ TON] Contention 1, with its complex i of bases, is accepted with the exception of those bases i dealing with the three topics identified above." Order II at l
- 32. i
" Counsel for the Town of Newbury and counsel for Applicants agreed to a modification of TON Contention 1. Tr.
14572. Counsel also requested the Board to reread some of the bases for Contention 1 to infer that they allege that
)
non-uniformed traffic guides will not succeed as well as uniformed guides. Tr. 14576, 14585, 14625. We have examined
[ counsel's citations and do not agree that they raise an issue of the comparative effectiveness of uniformed and non-uniformed traffic guides." Order (08/19/88) at 6.
)
[ "[ CON] Contention 1 is accepted, limited to the three intersections identified." Order II at 24.
"[ CON] Contention 2 is accepted as limited to the three TCP locations identified in the contention and to those established by the SPMC." Order II at 25.
I "[T]he town [of Amesbury's] claim that more intersections need to be staffed . . . does not provide adequate specificity." Order II at 11.
"We agree with the Staff and admit the portion of [TOA Contention] Basis 4.J which concerns the Traffic Management Plan for the Town of Amesbury to the extent that it relies on bottlenecks, chokepoints, and the need for additional traffic management identified in the basis statement." Order II at 14.
"Except for the considerations noted by Applicants, the Board finds [TOS 6) to be too vague and speculative for litigation. We accepted the contention reworded and restricted in accordance with Applicants' proposed modification, namely, "the SPMC assigns too few traffic guides and insufficient equipment to the Salisbury Transfer Point and to those points along Beach Road where travel lane reductions occur." Order II at 44.
"The Staff objects to that portion of [ TOWN Contention 7] Basis 2.C. which does not specify the unidentified critical intersections except for those along the evacuation I
route for the northern part of the town. We agree with the I
. ~ . _
Staff, but the town's prompt reply specifies the routes.1 Contention 7 with all bases is accepted." Order II at 58 - i
- 59.
"[ TOWN Contention 8] Bases 3 through 6 lack s West Newbury offers some specificity in its reply.gecificity.
As specified in the reply these four bases are accepted." order II at 60.
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I 1 "[T]he Town would clarify that basis as follows:
Those intersections include the intersections of the Page School driveways and Route 113, Stewart St. and Route 113, the Children's Castle driveway and Route 113, Bridge St. and Route 113, Coffin St. and Route 113, Garden St. and Route 113 and Crane Neck St. and Route 113." Reply of the Town of West Newbury to Responses of the Applicant and the NRC Staff to Interveners' Contentions Concerning the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities, dated June 17, 1988, at 4.
2 "As to bases 3, 4, 5, and 6: Critical traffic areas and critical points and intersections include the intersections of the Page School driveways and Route 113, Stewart St. and Route 113, the Children's Castle driveway and Route 113, Bridge St. and Route 113, Coffin St. and Route 113, Garden St. and Route 113 and Crane Neck St. and Route 113. Traffic sensitive areas include the above-mentioned areas and the six traffic control points in West Newbury delineated in the plan. Roads in West Newbury include the above-mentioned roads." Reply of the Town of West Newbury to Responses of the Applicant and the NRC Staff to Interveners' Contentions Concerning the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities, dated June 17, 1988, at 4 - 6.
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i JI 5 FMAG 73D. E; TOWN 8.2: TON 51 Participating Party: MAG Contention The method utilized by the SPMC for surveillance and removal of road blockages is not Ldequate to ensure that road blockages will be identified and removed promptly enough and the communications procedures for dispatching tow vehicles once blockages have been spotted are too cumbersome and ineffective.
Basis
. A. [ MAG 73D]
The method utilized by the SPMC for surveillance for road blockages is not adequate to ensure that road blockages will be identified promptly enough to dispatch tow trucks to remove them in a timely fashion. Route Guides assigned to buses are to " report any obstacles, stalled cars or other impediments by radio." Pro. 2.10, Attachment 3. Route Guides for the hearing impaired are to report " obstacles, stalled cars or other impediments to traffic flow." Pro.
2.11, Attachments 3. Also, Traffic Guides are to report "if traffic is blocked or if there is no evacuating traffic."
App. J, p. J-3. Route Guides in buses, however, will not arrive for many hours into an evacuation, and when they do arrive their routes do not take them along all the key evacuation links. Indeed, bus routes seek to avoid the most heavily traveled evacuation routes. So Route Guides in buses will not provide an effective means of surveillance for road blockages. Route Guides for the hearing impaired, similarly, will likely avoid travel along major evacuation links, and they are not out in sufficient numbers nor throughout the full durat3on of an emergency. Stationary Traffic Guides are even less effective. Most of the many miles of key evacuation roads will not be visible to them, especially at night.
B. [ MAG 73E]
The communications procedures for dispatching tow vehicles from the " transfer points" once road blockages have been spotted by Route Guides or Traffic Guides is too cumbersome to provide reasonable assurance of a timely response. Route Guides for the hearing impaired report blockages to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher. Pro. 2.11, Attachment 3. Route Guides in buses going to schools and special facilities report blockages to the Staging Area Leader, but Route Guides in buses assigned to " transfer
points" report blockages to the Transfer Point Dispatcher.
Pro. 2.10, Attachment 3. Traffic Guides report blockages to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher. App. J, p. J-3. Thus, three separate ORO personnel receive reports of road I blockages. Only the Transfer Point Dispatcher, however, is authorized to dispatch tow trucks to an impediment. Pro.
2.10, Attachment 8. Thus, unnecessary communication is I generated which impairs an efficient dispatch of tow trucks.
C. [ TOWN 8.2]
The plan fails to identify an adequate means of dealing with disabled vehicles or those which are inoperable due to fuel exhaustion or accidents. It simply provides for tow I facilities at some unidentified site in Groveland with access to Route 113.
D. [ TON 5, Basis 1]
The SPMC fails to adequately identify how impediments to I the use of evacuation routes will realistically be corrected or addressed. Snowfan-wnF-eause-mayer-disruptions-be-the use -e f -evacu at hen -reubes -but -snew -remevah-i-s -inadequ ateky add ressed r --The -SPMe -dees -net -ident hy -the eea nen -er I avanabHity -of-adequate-enew -removaF-equipment-er-personnet to -m aintain -the -reubes -in -a -passable-state . Ner-dees-the SPMe -iden tify -adequ ate -eentingent -measu ree -te -be -emplo yed -i-n I the -event -o f -the -impass abihty -e f -evaeuati-en -rou tes -due -te snew ,--fkeed ing -e r -e bher -petential-imped hments -de -traveFr Enadequate-onew -remevah-equipment-exi-sts-within -Newbury-be main tain-the-readways -in -a -passabbe -eenditien r--Persens dependen t -upen -ethers - for -snew -remevah -wnk -in -al-1-MkeHheed Faek -their-services-due -to-the -unw uMngness -er-inabiHby-ef these -prev iders -be -gain -aeeess -to -evacuated -areas r--Bi-sable I vehicles-w uk-Mkewi-se -eensMbute-eentinuing -imped hmente -es bew -veh iel-es ;--H -ava nabFe -for -entry -inte -eveeuated -areas-w kh -be -un able -to -g ain -aeeess -because -o f -ea tbeund -tra f fic I andfor-seasonaF-impediments.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"[ TOWN Contention 8] Basis 2 is the generi::
broken-down-car issue, previously litigated. Applicants and I Staff correctly agree to litigate the contention as one alleging that there are insufficient towing vehicles under the Letters of Agreement. As proposed by Applicants and Staff, the basis is accepted." Order II at 59.
"[ TON] Contention 5 is accepted but limited to tow truck availability." Order II at 34.
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/ JI 6 ITOS 131 Withdrawn by stipulation dated February 22, 1989.
C. Transit Dependent 1
JI 7 [ CON 3; CON 4; CON 7; TON 1; TVWN 7.2A, B, D; I TOWN 8.1: Stimulation dated February 22, 19891 Participating Parties: CON, TON, TOWN contention
},
p' No adequate planning has been done for the transit depenJent population because the bus routes proposed for Newbury, Newburyport, [and) West Newbury and-Salisbury will not expedite the evacuation of this population.
Basis A. [ TON 1.a] ;
, The SPMC, Appendix D-5, relies on the Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Estimate Study in projecting the capability of evacuation routes. The time study recognizes that control at critical intersections, to a large extent, determines the capacity of a roadway (Time Study, 3-1). The SPMC prcvides
) for the control of one intersection on Plum Island, i.e.,
Plum Island Turnpike and Sunset Drive. A second major t
intersection, Plum Island Boulevard and Northern Boulevard, l is uncontrolled. Approximately 60% of the traffic evacuating Plum Island would converge at the second intersection and would result in a significant bottleneck and impediment to l
timely evacuation. The SPMC accordingly does not provide a l reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures regarding relocating and traffic capabilities exist.
B. [ TON 1.b) l The-SPMe-dees-net-adequ a tely-addrese -the-seasenet j ispassabihity -e f-reads -as -requ ired -by -NEREG-9&&+ r-Rev r-17 Sepp r -F r m} rF& rk r--The -time -study - t&-F,--&-FFF -statee -that -rain w kFF-reduce -flew -speeds -en -ev aen a d ien -reu bes -by -1& b -and without-adequ ate -bases -elaime -tha t-enew faFF-wiFF-reebriet l
I flew -epeeds -by -a -me re -add it ion aF -5 b r --Wh ile -the -bise -study t+-a&P-diseessee-enew-remevaF,--ib,--and-the-SPMe r -faike-te
- previde-a -reasonable -asseranee-that-adequa te-meane -exist -te l deal-with -se amen ah-impaesabiFity-e f-reade cand -te-identify -e eentingency -measure -te-deaf-whieh -seeh -13pedimente r-Mereever,--the -SPMe -f a lks -to -identify -a n -adequate -seans -ef deaking -with -disabled -vehicles -e r-these -whieh -are-ineperable f
i E
due -de -feek-exhausbita r-mechanical--dif fieuhies -er-aecidents e r -access -te -bew -vehicles -the re ber C. [ TON 1.c)
The-SPMe -unreaFiet heaHy-assumes-that-vehi-eFes I evaen a ting -Pham -Eshnd -w nk -utiMee -enl-y -ene -Fane -o f -the -two-Fane -readw ay -wh ieh -p revides -the -sele -me ans -e f -ing ress -te -and eg ress -from -Plum -Es tand r --The -ethe r -kne -i-s -assumed -by -the S PMe - fAppend ix -J r -N-6 F r -to -be -epen -for -evace abien -beses -er I emergeney -vehicles -to -traveF-en te -Phm -EsFand -be -pick -up evaenees -and -fer -res i den ts -to -retu rn -heme -fer -bheir -f am i Fies r-Sim narly r-the-SPMe- fid rP-unreaFichicany-neserbe-thab-ene I hne -e f-eM -Peinb-Read-and -ef-Northern-Beulevard-fevacu abien rou tes F -w in -Mkewise -be -avai-hble -for -ing ress -to -Phm -EsFand evacu atien -reutee r--Buring -an-emergency -evacuabien -o f-the I ishnd r-it -is -manifeebly-unreabietie-de -assume -bh ab-drivers w in -u t ihre -enly -their -nera al -traveF -Fane -a nd -such assump t iens -are -based -en -no -empiricab -er -obieebive -shad ies r-The-evaen a tion -reu tes -and -SPMe -identify -no -me ans -o f -deahng I with -eatbeund -tra ffie-flows-whieh -ubkhre -inbeund-hnes -even if -such -use -is -necessary -d ue -to -fueh -exh austien r -bre akdewns er-aecidenter D. [ TON 1.d]
I 1. Appendix J, p. N-6 depicts Newbury Bus Route #1.
That route provides for buses to travel onto Plum Island via the Plum Island Turnpike and then turn left (north) on Old Point Road. Following that road to its end, the bus is then I to turn 360 degrees and return via Old Point Road.
- a. Old Point Road is narrow. It actually is I approximately 1-1/2 lanes in width with narrow or no shoulders. The SPMC unrealistically assumes that outflowing traffic will not impede the ingress of vehicles into the I evacuation zone. At the terminus of Old Point Road there is insufficient room for the bus to turn around as is provided in the route map.
I 2. The-SPMe -provides-th ab-the-evace ablen -bee r-a f ter traveHng - the-length -e f -shd -Peich-Read -a nd -returning r -w nt turn -le f b - teest F-enbe -PFum -Island -Tu rapihefBeulevard -and -then I lef 6-fnerthP-ente-Northern-Beulevard r-fehlewing-thab-letter re ad -fo r-approximately -ene-miler a r--Wh i le -Nerbhern -Blvd r-is -approximately -twe -Fanes I in -w id th r-ib -has -no -shoulders r--Fb -le -unreal-iebie -to -assumer as -the -SPMe -dees r -tha b -tra f fie -attempting -to -ex ib -the nerbhe rn -end -e f -PI um -Es Fand -win -merely -etiMee -the needhbou nd -lane -and -perm it -the -northbeund -Fane-to-ope n -for I- traveF -by -a -bas r --The -SPMe -further-f ai-le -de -add ress -hew I I
impediments -to -southbound -travel-wiFF-be -eleared-in -a -timely fashien -se -thab-seuthbeund-traffie-wikk-net-ubikire-bhe nerthbound-laner j
- 3. (Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.]
- 4. The SPMC provides that the bus, upon returning to Northern Blvd. will turn right (north) and follow that road to its end, turn around and reverse its course back to Plum Island Turnpike / Boulevard and off Plum Island.
- a. The SPMC fails to provide for bus evacuation of any portion of Plum Island south of Plum Island I
Turnpike / Boulevard despite the location of numerous streets I
and dwellings south of that street. The SPMC wholly fails to provide for the evacuation of those residents or transients without transportation on that portion of Plum Island.
- 5. Once the bus is on Plum Island Turnpike, it follows 1 that road to Rolfe's Lane (aka Ocean Ave.) where it turns left (southeasterly). Rolfe's Lane intersects Route 1A when one has traveled about 3/4 mile.
- a. Reube-1A-ie-a-maier-trasfie-artery-fer-traffic braveling -seuth-frem-Newburyperb -and -e-s igni ficand-traf fic prebbem -a t -th at -interseebien -w kFF -eeeu r r - 4he -SPMe fAppendiw 4 r-p r-N-+)--provides -thab -ee nthbound -tra f fie -frem
) Newbu rypert -wi-FF -be -reubed -ente -G reen -Streeb -and -then -H anever S t reeb -where -it -w ikk -me rge -with -tra f fic -fekkew ing -Bus -Reute 7
- t r - 4he -SPMe -f ai-Fa -to -add ress -hew -tra f fie -en -Route -1A -which j does -neb -heed -the -direettiens -o f-the -route -guides r-and -instead ee n tinues -sea th -en -Reute -FA r -w hFF -imp ae b -the -in terseeb ien -ef thab-streeb-with-Rehfe's-Laner l b. While traffic on Rolfe's Lane apparently has the option of turning left (south) onto Route 1A or of I proceeding straight to Hanover Street, the SPMC fails to l provide any information as to which route will be chosen by most drivers or what criteria, if any, the drivers should consider in making that choice. Drivers familiar with the l area will probably proceed straight to Hanover Street as that road provides relatively straight access to Route 1 and brings one closer to I-95.
- c. At the three-way intersection of Route 1A, Parker Street and Green Street (providing egress from Newburyport), traffic is discouraged from turning right onto Parker Street from Route 1A. One traffic guide is located in that area but is sited at Route 1A and Green Street, apparently to encourage drivers to turn onto Green Street
! instead of continuing south on Route 1A. Thus, no guide will I discourage drivers from turning right from Route 1A onto I
f Parker Street. he -Parleer-Street-provi des -relatively-etrai syht and -e asy -aeeeee -te -Reute -F r-many -drive rs -ean -be -e)epeeted -be diereef ard-the-traf fie -eenee-and -bravek-ente -Par)ter-street r-
'Phe -SPMe-f a ne -te -add rees -th ie -likeliheed -and -ite -impaet -on timely-evacuatient
- d. At the intersection of Rolfe's Lane, Green Street and Hanover Street (Appendix J., p. N-4), traffic from three directions will merge and flow onto Hanover Street.
.One traffic guide is located at that intersection. As this intersection will be handling evacuation traffic from Plum
' Island and Newburyport, it is unrealistic to assume that one i guide will be able to adequately direct the traffic flow and
[ .
ensure that opposite travel for emergency vehicles will be possible. Moreover, the merging of these traffic flows will I create a significant bottleneck and vast reductions in or the cessation of travel speed.
- 6. Once on Hanover Street, the evacuation bus is to I
.. cross Route 1, travel onto Middle Street, turn right onto i i
' ~
! Highfield Road and end the route at the Newbury transfer point..
I
- a. At the intersection of Hanover Street and Route j 1, cones are placed so as to discourage travel in any l direction except south on Route 1. The SPMC, if followed, l would require the cones to be temporarily moved or for the i bus to drive over them. The bus also will have to cross southbound traffic on Route 1. Route 1 is a major southbound
~
evacuation route and the SPMC fails to address the. problem the Route 1 southbound drivers who will not permit the bus to cross, an eventuality patently possible in the event of an emergency evacuation. If the bus does somehow cross Route 1, I
it is likely that automobiles will follow it as their drivers l may realistically conclude that the bus is following a preferred or less congested route.
- b. [ Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.]
- c. It is likely that vehicles exiting Newburyport l on Scotland Road will, due to traffic congestion, turn onto Highfield Road in the opposite direction to that taken by the evacuation buses in order to gain access to Route 1 south.
l Highfield Road is merely 1-1/2 lanes in width and drivers L attempting to gain access to Route 1 will render opposing travel impossible. Mereever r-tra ffie -impediments -wkFF-reenkt in -the -event-e f-breahdewne -er-aeeldenter
- d. The transfer point is a narrow (approximately 15' wide) driveway which leads from Highfield Road to a Massachusetts Electric transformer which is in a fenced enclosure at the end of the approximately 100' drive. No
I area l's provided for buses to be able to turn around or for vehicles to park. The area around the transfer point is i heavily wooded and overgrown with brush.
I No area is available for use of those evacuees who are' dropped off ao the transfer point.
E. [ TON 1.e)
- 1. Newbury Bus Route #2 (Appendix J, p. N-7) commences I at the Highfield Road transfer point and follows that road to Middle Road where the driver turns left (north). The bus then follows Middle Road to Route 1 where it turns right l
3 (south). The bus follows Route 1 to Elm Street where the driver is to turn right (westerly).
5
- a. The SPMC is defective in that the intersection I
of Route 1 and Elm Street is marned by no sign indicating the I name of latter street. A driver Lnfamiliar with the aren will be unable to identify the road he/she is expected to follow when exiting Route 1.
- 2. The bus continues on Elm Street until it reaches School Street where it turns right (northwest). School I Street is followed to what is depicted on the SPMC as Orchard Street where the bus turns left (south). The route follows Orchard Street to Elm Street where it turns left (east) until I Elm Street intersects again with School Street where the bus turns left (northwesterly). The route again follows School Street to what appears on the SPMC to be Orchard Street where the bus turns right (northerly).
- a. The intersection of School Street and Elm Street is unmarked by any signs identifying either road for I drivers traveling in any direction. The SPMC thus fails to provide a reasonable assurance that the bus driver will be able to correctly follow Route #2.
- b. No signs identify Orchard Street where the bus is to turn left (south) from School Street. Indeed, what appears to be Orchard Street at that intersection in fact is I Central Street. TP- SPMC fails to demonstrate driver will correctty follow Route #2.
that the
- c. Central Street is narrow, approximately 1-1/2 lanes in width without shoulders. The SI'MC fails to provide an adequate assurance that this portion of Route #2 will l remain passable in the event of vehicle-breakdowns;--aecidents j I er opposing traffic. ]
I
- 3. After the bus turns from School Street onto what is i correctly Central Street, it follows that latter road north f to Orchard Street where it turns right (northeast). Orchard lI I
Street is taken to Boston Road where the route turns right (east). The route follows Boston Road across Route 1 to I. Green Street where it turns left (northerly).
f
- a. e rehard -Street -is -two -Fanes -in -wi-dth -with -ne should e re r -B r ivers -f am i Fiar -with -the -Newbury -area -enn -be e xpeeded -te -ut i-biee -O rch ard -S treet -de -escape -the -EP& -in -the Fi ke Fy -eve n t -o f -Vehi-e he -eengest ien -en -Reu te -F r --No -rou te guides -are -pes ted -a teng -ereh ard -S treet -and -it -ie -F ikeby -that veh icles - exiting -the -SP& -en -that -s treet -w iFF -ase -beth -Fanes e f-erehard -Street r-rendering -nerthbound-traveh-impessibler l
- b. Boston Road intersects with Route 1, a major j southbound evacuation route from the enuire EPZ south of Seabrook Station. Route 1 will thus be heavily congested.
The SPMC calls for no traffic control points at that intersection and it is unlikely that the bus will be able to cross Route 1, particularly in ligh. of the fact that two lanes of southbound traffic will be encouraged only one mile, more or less, north of that intersection. Mereeveer
) sou thbound -traf fie-wiFF-impede -nerthbound -vehicleer i
- c. [ Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.)
- d. Boston Road, particularly after the fork, is about 1-1/2 lanes in width without shoulders. Persons familiar with Newbury can be expected to evacuate the EPZ to
! the south via Boston Road to Route 1, especially if travel on Hanover Street (see Newbury Bus Route #1, App. J, p. N-6) becomes congested. This portion of Route #2 will accordingly become impassable for northeast bound traffic and-wheFFy imp ass able -i n -either -d irec tion -in -the -event -o f -b re akdowns -er aeeidents.
- e. [ Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.)
- 4. The bus is to follow Green Street to Hanover Street where evacuation Route #2 merges with traffic evacuating Newburyport and Plum Island via Hanover Street to Route 1 1
(see Traffic Control Post No. E-NB-02, Appendix J, p. N-4).
- a. As -the -H anover -S tre et -inte rsection -area -is Fi kely -te -be -a -s ign if i-e a nt -bottFeneek -(-see -een ten tion -F rd r-Vr Brr-p_ng.rlt) r-ears-leaving-the-EFE-ean-be-expected-to-dieregard l
' the - tra f fie -eenes -wh ieh -are -intended -be -d i-seeurage -travel sou th -e n -Green -S treet -pas t -H anover -Stree br Green Street (southbound) will in all likelihood be recognized by drivers
! as an alternative route to Route 1 or Route 1A, both of which are major southbound routes. As Green Street is approximately 1-1/2 lanes in width, southbound traffic will render travel to the north on that street impossible.
l l
l I I
- b. Green Street, as well as other roads on all Newbury bus routes, is subject to flooding and becoming impassable. The SPMC makes no provision for such an I eventuality.
- 5. After merging with Hanover Street evacuation I traffic, the bus follows Newbury Bus Route 1 to the transfer point. The bases for the preceding contention regarding the adequacy of this portion of the route are incorporated herein j by reference.
j F. [ TON 1.f] l I 1. Newbury Bus Route #3 (Appendix J, p. N-8) commences at the Highfield Road transfer point where the bus turns right (sourneast) from the transfer point driveway onto I Highfield Road. The inadequacies of the transfer point set forth sucra are incorporated herein by reference. The bus follows Highfield Road to Middle Road which it follows south Bus Route #3 I
until turning left (east) onto Boston Road.
indicates that the bus then makes a 90 degree turn right (southeasterly) onto Hay Street.
I a. The inadequacy of Boston Road for eastbound traffic noted suora is incorporated herein by reference.
I b. The intersection of Boston Road and Hay Street is not a right angle as Route #3 depicts. Rather, it is a "Y" intersection or fork which will cause the driver, if unfamiliar with the area, to become disoriented or lost.
I c. Hay Street is inadequately marked for vehicles traveling northeast on Boston Road.
- d. Hay Street is about 1-1/2 lanes in width and has no shoulders. Opposing traffic to Route 1 via Boston I Road, which is called for in Newbury Bus Route #3, will render travel in both directions impossible,
- e. Portions of Hay Street are within a flood plain and are subject to flooding, but the SPMC identifies no means of dealing with the impassability of Hay Street due to flood waters.
- 2. From Hay Street, the route turns right (easterly) onto Newman Road. The route follows that road to Route 1A where the bus is to merge with southbound evacuees, cross Parker River and turn right (southeasterly) onto Old Rowley I. Road.
- a. Newman Road is not identified by any sign.
I I
I
- b. (Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.]
i'
- c. [ Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.]
- d. No intersection control is provided by the SPMC I to enable the bus to merge onto Route 1A southbound. As that road is one of few southerly evacuation routes, it will be I- necessary to provide some form of control if the bus will realistically be able to join the Route 1A traffic.
- e. Old Rowley Road is 1-1/2 lanes in width and has no shoulders. It is unpaved, crosses a flood plain area and is subject to flooding and becoming impassable due to flood waters r-snew-and-ineperable-vehi-el-es .
3 .. The bus continues on Old Rowley Road to its I intersection with Route 1A. There the bus is to turn left (north) and follow Route 1A to Hay Street where it is to turn left (west).
- a. To travel north on Route 1A from Old Rowley Road will require southbound evacuees on Route 1A to permit the bus to gain access to a northbound lane. Yet no traffic I control or route guide is provided at that intersection. It is thus unlikely that access to a northbound lane will be achieved.
- b. Reube-FA -is-a-mayer -southbound -eveeuabien renbe r --Eb -is -Fikely -th ab -no -nerbhbound -bravel-wiFF -be possibbe-
- c. Reu te -FA -eresses -the -Parker -River -by -means -o f -a two-lane -b ridge -whieh -i-s -about -Ff + -m ile -in -1eng th r --Wh i-1-e I Reu be -1A -is -a -w ide -two-lane -re ad -in -rela b ien -to -virtuelty eve ry -ebher -read -in -Newbu ry r-a bilira bi-en -o f -ibe -entire -w id th by -sou thbound -evacuees -is -1 ihely -for -the -entire -M ass r-epa r-
'Phe-bridge -wi FF-plainky -aeeemmed ate -southbound -braf fi-e -enly I and -nerbhbeund -braveb-will--be - impossiblev
- d. Hay Street is inadequately marked.
- 4. [ Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.]
I 5. After turning onto Boston Road, Newbury Bus Route #3 crosses Route 1 and continues to Middle Road where the bus is to turn right (north), following that latter road to Highfield Road and, from there, gaining access to the I transfer point.
- a. The impracticability of crossing Route 1, as noted suora, is incorporated herein by reference.
I I
L -
L
- b. [ Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.]
G. [ TON 1.g]
- 1. Newbury Bus Route #4 (Appendix J, p. N-9) commences at the Highfield transfer point and turns left ento Highfield '
Road. The bus then turns left (southwesterly) cnto Scotland Road and follows that road for approximately four miles to Moody Street where the route turns left (southeast).
! Scotland Road, before reaching Moody Street is renamed South l Street after passing 195 and again renamed Sprinit Hill Road about one mile further on.
- a. In the likely event that traffic is congested on Scotland Road, drivers will realistically attempt to use Highfield Road to gain access to alternate southbound evacuation routes. As Highfield Road is merely 1-1/2 lanes in width with no shoulders, cars traveling to those alternate routes via Highfield Road will render travel from the transfer point to Scotland Road difficult or impossible.
- b. South -Street-graduaFly -narrows-be-two-narrow Fanes -with -no -shouldere r --Vehicles -attempting -to -f 1-ee -the -EPB f rem -the -wes t -o f -195 -w iFF -Fikely -eses -th i-s -read -be -g ai-n necess -be -that -m aier -hi ghw ay -and -thus -wiFF -imp ede -or -render impessibbe-westerly-travel-en-Seeth-Street- Moreover, vehicles on 195 will likely exit onto South Street if the l former is congested while the latter is lightly traveled.
Yet no traffic control at the intersection (195 and Scotland Road / South Street) exists.
- c. [ Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.]
- 2. From Moody Street, the route turns left (east) onto what appears on the Route #4 map to be Lunt Street which h" takes the bus to the left (east) to Church Street. There, the route turns right (southeasterly) and crosses 195 where it is renamed Central Street. The route turns left (northeast) onto Orchard Street approximately one mile after crossing 195. <
- a. These series of turns are poorly marked and it is likely that drivers will become disoriented or lost in this area.
- b. [ Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.]
l l c. [ Withdrawn by TON Letter of May 25, 1989.)
- d. Veh i-eles -traveling -west -en -een t raF-Street -in o rder -to -g a in -aeeess -to -195 -wi F1 -l-ikely -utiline -the -entire 1
l I wid th -e f -sentral-Streeb r -rendering -wes terly -travet impessibler
- 3. Crchard Street is renamed Middle Road approximately two miler, northeast of Central Street. The route follows Middle Road past Highfield Road and across Route 1 where it becomes Hanover Street. Hanover Street is followed to Green Street where the route turns left (north).
- a. Orchard -Street-and -Middle -Read -censi st -e f-two narrew -lanes -and -h ave -no r-er -very -narrew r-shouldere r-Veh icles -evaeu ating -via -Reute -E -w i 1-1 -FiheFy -attempt -te l utikkee-Middle-Read-es-an-a'E ternate-seethbound-route-in-erder to -bypass -eenges tien -en -Reu te -E -a nd -either -rejoin -Rou te -1 further-south-er gain-aeeess-te-F9&r- 'Praffic-senth-en-Middle Read -w il-F -Fikely -use -aFF -perdiens -o f -th at -read r -the reby rendering-this-perdien-of-the-reute-iapassabber
- b. Buses will likely not be able to cross Route 1 without control of evacuees utilizing that major southbound route,
- c. H anover -Streeb r -e ast -o f -Reu te -F r -is -a -pr im ary route -fer -tra f fie -frem -Newburyport-te-Newbury -attempting-to gain-access-de-Reute-Fr- rFhese-evacuees-wiFF-Fiheby-etilire al-F-traveF-portions-ef-Hanover-Streeb r-rendering -eastbeund travel-impossibler
- 4. Evacuation Route #4 follows Green Street to Parker Street where it turns left (westerly), crosses State Street in the City of Newburyport and continues east to cross Route
- 1. After crossing Route 1 in Newburyport, the bus route turns left (southerly) at the intersection of Graf Road. The route follows that road to Highfield Street and the Newbury transfer point.
- a. Evaeuees -from -Hewbu rypert -and -P1-am -1skand -wi 14 1-ihe by -impede -o r -obs treet -the -Green -S treet -perdien -o f -the -bes route r-especiaFFy -in -the -event -o f -congerbien -en -Hanever Street; t
- b. Left (easterly) turns from Green Street to Parker Street are discouraged (see Traffic Control Post No.
E-NB-02, Appendix J, p. N-4). The bus driver would thus be required to disregard traffic cones located at the turn or be obstructed by inbound traffic on Parker Street. Fn-the t
improbable-event-tha t-Parker-Street-permite-freedem -ef l
moveme n t-by -the -bas r-eveeeees -whe-etherwise-might-ehserve-the tra f fie -guide 8-s -activity -be -diseea rage-entry-ente -Parker Street-wi FF-Fihely -d ksregard-the -eenes-and-guide 6 -direebien .
I l
I
- c. It is unrealistic to expect that evacuation buses will be permitted by traffic flows to cross State Street and Route 1 in Newburyport as provided by the bus I route. State Street will be congested and Route 1 will contain heavy numbers of southbound evacuees.
1, the bus will need to cross two northbound and two To cross Route southbound lanes. En -the-probabbe-evend-th ab-southbeund evacuees -wkFF-uti Fire -aFF-four anes -es-Reube-F r-ereesing Reube -F-wiFF-be -dif ficabb-er -impessibber Inadequate traffic control exists at these crossings,
- d. Congestion of Route 1 will result in evacuees turning from that road onto Parker Street and the eventual congestion of traffic there. The bus route will thus likely '
be impassable.
I e. Graf Road / Scotland Road will in all likelihood be jammed with evacuees attempting to gain access to I95.
Timely travel on this portion of the bus route is accordingly 1 unlikely.
- f. Entry onto Highfield Road from Scotland Road will be impeded or blocked by evacuees and buses attempting I to reach 195 via Scotland Road from Plum Island, Newbury and Newburyport.
H. [ TON 1.h]
Appendix J., p. N-10, of the SPMC includes a map showing a proposed bus evacuation route. The route depicted in that map includes Downfall Road as one of the streets the evacuation bus is to travel upon. Downfall Road is a " paper" street only and, in actuality, is nonexistent and impassable.
I. [ TON 1.1)
Many of the roads, e.g. Boston Road, Hay Street, Old I Rowley Road, constituting bus routes and potential evacuation routes lie in whole or in part within flood plain areas and are subject to periodic flooding. The SPMC fails to provide I a reasonable assurance that these routes will be passable during flooding periods. The SPMC fails to identify alternate bus routes in the event that those which have been I identified become impassable due to flooding, other seasonable impediments-vehicFe-breahdewas-er-aeeldents.
I I i
I J. [ TOWN 7.2A, B, D)
Appendix J, Amendment 2, the prior version now replaced by the applicant, did contain the town map, sketch maps and bus evacuation routes described above. That version was also inadequate to comply with the planning standards or to I
1 provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective j measures can and will be taken in the event evacuation is necessary for the following reasons:
- 1. Appendix J, Amendment 2, p.WN 9-11 consisted of evacuation bus routes in West Newbury. There are no street signs at a number of the intersections at which bus drivers were required to turn in order to follow the routes. Parts of River Road (Route #1) are subject to flooding, rendering segments of the road impassable at certain times of the year.
I A part of Ash Street (Route #2) is a dirt road which is regularly underwater during portions of the year and is closed to traffic during portions of the year.
- 2. The transfer site for the bus routes, located at Stewart Street, is inadequate. It consists of a 26 foot by 29 foot paved area which is inadequate for a bus turn around.
Nor is there any area for people to congregate in the area while awaiting transfer or for emergency personnel vehicle parking. There are no sidewalks in that area of Stewart I Street, and the sides of the road fall off into gullies which are often wet. There was no provision for traffic guides to assist and facilitate bus movement at the transfer site.
- 3. Appendix J, Amendment 2, p.WN-3-8 consisted of sketch maps of traffic control points in West Newbury. The control point at Crane Neck Street and Georgetown Road I provided for traffic cones blocking the turn north on to Georgetown Road -- a turn used on prior bus route #2. The control point at Church Street and Main Street provided for cones blocking the turn from Main Street to Church Street --
a turn used on prior bus route #1.
K. [ TOWN e.1]
Parts of various streets in West Newbury are subject to flooding and may be closed during part of the year. Snow-and ice -may -render -use -o f-regeFa r -vehicles -inadequabe-en-eerbein I. streets -at -eertain -times -o f-the -year . The plan does not adequately address the seasonable impassability of the roads as required by NUREG-0654 J.10.k or provide a reasonable assurance that adequate means exist to deal with seasonal impassability of roads due to flooding er-snew-and-iee. Nor does it identify contingency measures to deal with such impediments.
l I l I
I I Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"(CON] Contention 3 is accepted, excluding the consideration of increased radiation exposure." Order II at
- 26. ,
"[C]ertain bases we reject because they treat topics previously litigated for which we are not given acceptable reasons as to why the previous litigation is inadequate.
l There are three such topics: human behavior, amount of l travel speed reduction to accommodate adverse weather, and stalled vehicles . . . (TON] Contention 1, with its complex of bases, is accepted with the exception of those bases dealing with the three topics identified above." Order II at 32.
" Counsel for the Town of Newbury and counsel for Applicants agreed to a modification of TON Contention 1. Tr.
14572. Counsel also requested the Board to reread some of the bases for Contention 1 to infer that they allege that non-uniformed traffic guides will not succeed as well as uniformed guides. Tr. 14576, 14585, 14625. We have examined counsel's citations and do not agree that they raise an issue of the comparative effectiveness of uniformed and non-uniformed traffic guides." Order (08/19/88) at 6.
" West Newbury supplied additional specification in its reply.3 The basis (TOWN 8.1] is accepted as presented by the town." Order II at 59.
"In the case of Contentions JI-7 and JI-8, the Joint Interveners would now have us accept issues formerly particularized to specific locales as being applicable to the whole of the EPZ. The Applicants and the NRC Staff would narrow the scope of these contentions to the specific locales. We agree with the position of the Applicants and the NRC Staff. We have reviewed the etimology of the 3 "As to basis 1: The roads subject to flooding l include part of River Road (including the area from Worth's Lane to Coffin Street) ; part of Ash Street (including the area from Middle Street to Montclair Road); the lower ends of Church and Bridge Streets near the Rocks Village Bridge.
! Part of Ash Street between Middle Street and Montclair Road is also often closed in the winter due to snow. Roads that may be rendered impassable to regular vehicles due to snow and ice include Illsley Hill Road, Montclair Road and Gunner's Hill." Reply of the Town of Newbury to Responses of the Applicant and the NRC Staff to Interveners' Contentions Concerning the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities, l
I dated June 17, 1988, at 4.
l
contentions and find in favor of specificity." Order (09/30/88) at 2 - 3.
JI 8 ITOWN 8.10 SAPL 6; TOS 191 Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 28, 1989.
II. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING JI 9 FMAG 101 Participating Party: MAG Contention No provisions is made in the SPMC for procedures to be employed in the event of a strike or other form of job action ;
affecting the availability of the emergency personnel relied on to adequately staff and maintain the NHY ORO. In the absence of such procedures, this utility plan does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. See Lona Island Lichtina Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), 21 NRC 644, 888 (1985).
JI 10 IMAG 751 Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.
JI 11 IMAG 771 Participating Party: MAG Contention The SPMC fails to provide for the adequate or continuous staffing of ORO personnel to maintain or sustain an emergency response. For these reasons, the SPMC fails to meet the standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (1), (2), and (5), and the regulatory guidance established by NUREG 0654 II. A.1.e.4.,
B, and E.2.
Basis I A. [ MAG 77A)
The SPMC does not provide for the capability of continuous operations for a protracted period of time.
Personnel are required to report to staging areas at a Site Area Emergency; however, the SPMC fails to specify the number of personnel in each response category who are required to report on first shift, fails to identify adequate mechanisms I
l
i for providing second shifts and bat.\up personnel, fails to identify mechanisms for instructing contract personnel as to which shift they should report for, and fails to provide I assurance of continuity of personnel from the contracted companies.
B. [ MAG 77B]
The NHY Offsite Emergency Response organization fails to provide adequate staffing for evacuation specific positions.
I- The SPMC states " evacuation specific positions will have one compliment only with additional personnel (at least 20%)
available as backup as noted on Figure 2.1-1." Plan 2.2.1.
I Plan 2.1.1. The justification for only providing a single shift for these positions is stated as "If an evacuation is required, the functions will be performed over a relatively I short period of time as opposed to the entire emergency situation which may last for a protracted period." The justification is flawed in that implementing procedures require these positions to be staffed at the Alert and Site I Area Emergency declarations. The time between cal:, out of personnel and deployment to execute evacuation supp art duties may be many hours or even days. Since these positions must I be available to execute protective actionc at any time from declaration of an Alert to termination of the emergency situation, alternate shifts must be available to provide h evacuation support capability during an " emergency situation 3 which may last for a protracted period."
C. [ Withdrawn by MAG Notice dated December 19, I 1988.]
D. [ MAG 77D]
The ORO staffing lists in Appendix H indicate that there are fewer staff available for some positions than will be reasonably necessary on a 24-hour basis during protracted I emergency, especially for such positions as Route Guides, Traffic Guides, Dosimetry Record Keeping, Reception Center Staff and Reception Center Monitoring / Decontamination.
I JI 12 IMAG 78]
Participating Party: MAG contention There is no reasonable assurance that there will be adequate second shift manpower capability for certain evacuation-specific positions. Therefore, the SPMC fails to I comply with 10 CFR 50.47(a), 50. 47 (b) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (15) and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.A.4. and II.O.
I I
- \
Basis A. [ MAG 78A]
Given the length of time that it could reasonably take to evacuate the general population, special facilities, hospitals, schools, day care / nurseries, and the transit-depend / mobility-impaired population, therte is no reasonable assurance that an evacuation can be comp 2eted within one I shift. The SPMC, App. H provides the namos of no second shift personnel for the NHY ORO for the evacuation-specific positions of Traffic Guides, Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel and Reception Center Staff. Instead the plans I. asserts that NHY ORO will request second-shift manpower assistance from Yankee Atomic Electric Company pursuant to a I mutual assistance plan. Plan, S 3.2.2, p. 3.2-9. There is no reasonable assurance, however, that durina a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station which is serious enough to warrant a second shift for these evacuation-specific
, positions, enough volunteers can be recruited by Yankee Atomic to fill all such positions. This is not to be confused with role abandonment, because these workers did not
- previously have assigned emergency roles to fulfill. They
! simply will not volunteer in sufficient numbers or in a timely fashion during a radiological emergency.
B. [ MAG 78B]
There is no assurance that the Yankee Atomic volunteers who do show up for second-shift duty will have received
- adequate training. There is no indication in the SPMC that these workers will have received job-specific pre-emergency h training. The SPMC merely instructs the first-shift evacuation-specific workers to give the second-shift
'B volunteers a " thorough briefing" upon their arrival. See, e.g., App. J, p. J-3 (Traffic Guide Procedures). Such on-I the-job training during an emergency, offered by first-shift workers who want to minimize dose consequences by getting out of the EPZ as quickly as possible, is very likely to be I inadequate. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that these second-shift workers will have the capability of performing their assigned tasks in the proper manner.
I g
I
!I I
JI 13 [ MAG 79; MAG 81D; Stipulation dated Februarv 7. 1989.1 Participating Party: MAG Contention The prerequisite experience required for and the {
training provided to Traffic Guides, the Public Notification {
Coordinator, PAR decisionmakers, and bus drivers are I'
inadequate to provide reasonable assurance that the ORO can cnd will implement adequate protective measures in the event I
l of a radiological emergency at Seabrook St* tion. Therefore )
I the SPMC fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47 (L) (1) ,
- 50. 47 (b) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (14 ) , 50. 47 (b) (15) , NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.A, II.N, II.O.1 and II.O.4.
)
{'
Basis A. [ MAG 79Q)
The SPMC states that no prerequisite experience is required for the position of Traffic Guide. Traffic Guides I will be dispatched to key intersections to set up traffic cones and barricades and direct traffic in a manner that produces the most efficient evacuation possible. They may be required to direct extremely congested traffic under adverse weather conditions and deal with thousands of disorderly, frustrated, and frightened drivers, many of whom may have a been in traffic queues for six or more hours seeking to g distance themselves from Seabrook Station. Many of the drivers will recognize that these Traffic Guides are not state / local police, but agents of the owners of Seabrook. It I is inconceivable that Traffic Guides would not be required to have some substantial prior experience directing congested traffic. The training provided by the SPMC (see Plan, Table l
I 6.3-1) is not adequate to compensate for this deficiency.
B. [ MAG 79J, Stipulation dated February 7, 1989)
The SPMC states that "[p] prerequisite experience in public information is required fu training and qualification as a Public Notification Coordinauar " Plan, 2.1.1, p. 2.1-I 13 (Amend. 3). The Public Notification Coordinator is responsible for a timely and coordinated activation of the Public Alert and Notification System, development of g appropriate EBS messages, and coordination of EBS messages g with New Hampshire and Massachusetts. The Plan fails to address such qualifications as a professional degree, knowledge of the research record regarding the I characteristics of good and poor experience in drafting emergency emergency information, prior warnings, knowledge of human I
behavior in emergencies. The training provided by the SPMC (see Plan, Table 6.3-1) is not adequate to compensate for this deficiency.
C. [ Stipulation dated February 7, 1989]
l The prerequisite experience required for and the B training provided to the following ORO personnel are inadequate to enable them to make appropriate PAR decisions:
the Offsite Response Director; the Assistant Offsite Response I Directors for Response Implementation and for Support Liason; the Radiological Health Advisor; the Technical Advisor. (E_.g.g IP 2.5, page 5.)
D. [ MAG 79P, Stipulation dated February 7, 1989]
I The NHY Plan identifies the qualifications for Bus Drivers as " prerequisite experience as a Bus Driver and a requisite license." Plan, 2.1.1, p. 2.1-30. The Plan fails to quantify the experience and training needed for these I contract positions. Bus drivers are responsible for providing evacuation services to the general public and special populations by driving pre-designated routes and I reporting to special facilities / reception centers. At a minimum these personnel need training in the transport of special populations, training in designated routes, and I
training in the rules and regulations of the state and towns they will be servicing. The training provided by the SPMC (See Plan, Table 6.3-1) is not adequate to compensate for JI 14 IMAG 80; TOA 4.C. H)
Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.
JI 15 IMAG 831 Participating Party: MAG Contention ORO emergency workers will be liable for damages resulting from their actions and the SPMC does not discuss at all what, if any, provisions or agreements for indemnification exist. As a result, the emergency response by ORO workers is unpredictable. Moreover, although state emergency workers are indemnified by the Commonwealth pursuant to statute, the SPMC is silent on the relationship, if any, between authorization of police powers and indemnification for ORO workers.
I '
I ~28-i i
i
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"[T]he burden of proceeding with the evidence [on MAG 83 is] upon the Attorney General." Order I at 107.
III. PAR GENERATION ,
i JI 16 IMAG 02; MAG 811 1
.W ithdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.
JI 17 fMAG 261 Participating Parties: MAG, NECNP Contention The SPMC fails to provide a range of protective actions for the public within the Seabrook plume exposure EPZ. No choice of protective actions is set forth in the SPMC for j large numbers of people. Thus, the SPMC does not meet the standardt:, set forth at 50.47(b) (10) and NUREG 0654 II.J.9, 10.m. and does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. 50. 47 (a) (1) .
Basis f A.. The SPMC does not provide an alternative to evacuation for the beach areas in the Massachusetts portions of the EPZ. Evacuation alone does not constitute a range of protective measures. Secondary mitigating measures,
) including decontamination, are not protective " measures" or "actionc" under 50.47 (b) (10) . In fact, the commission itself has identified " appropriate protective measures" as evacuation or sheltering . 10 C.F.R. 9 100.3(b).
B. In the absence of sheltering for the transient beach populations, the SPMC does not provide adequate protective measures under 50.47 (a) (1) because for all fast-paced serious accidents that produce offsite consequences in less t;ine than the transient beach populations can effect an evacuation, those populations have no adequate protection from severe radiological doses. Substantial portions of the beach population are entrapped by the traffic congestion generated i by an order to evacuate and cannot remove themselves from areas close-in to the plant for many hours.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"We read Basis B of the contention [ MAG Contention 26]
as alleging that, without a sheltering option, evacuation alone does not provide maximum dose savings for the beach I
1 I
l population for all fast-breaking, serious accidents." order II at 46.
) JI 18 fMAG 27; TON 9; MAG 561 Participating Party: MAG Contention i The SPMC does not establish or describe coherent -]
I decision criteria to be used by emergency decision-makers in formulating an appropriate PAR and otherwise fails to provide guidelines for the choice of protective actions consistent The SPMC's decision-making criteria for i with federal policy.
selecting a sheltering as opposed to an evacuation PAR is
, inadequate and inaccurate, and, therefore, fai) s to meet the
[
planning standards set forth at 50.47(b)(10) aLd NUREG 0654 II.J.10.m. and Appendix E, IV, A.4. As a result, the SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate
! protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a l radiological emergency. 50. 47 (a) (1) .
Basis A. [ MAG 27A) t There is no study presented in the SPMC setting forth f the time required for effecting a sheltering PAR for various sectors of the plume exposure EPZ and for various populations in the EPZ as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Part I IV. The effectiveness of sheltering as a dose reduction strategy is significantly influenced by the time required to implement a sheltering response. (Een D. Aldrich, D.
( Ericoso, and J. Johnson, Public Protection Strateales for -
Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents: Shelterina Concents with Existina Public and Private Structures, SAND 77-1725, Feb. 1978, at 13). Therefore, decision criteria must include l
l the time required for the various segments of the population to implement a sheltering PAR.
B. r,dAG 27B)
The SPMC's decision-making criteria calculates a wholebody shelter dose based on a shelter protection factor of .9. According to the 1970 U.S. Housing Census, approximately 93% of the year-round housing units in Massachusetts have basements (SAND 77-1725, App. C, Table C1), which would afford shielding factors of .6 for cloudshine and .05 for groundshine. Therefore, the SPMC's decision criteria are inaccurate and could result in l
l decisions to evacuate the population when a sheltering PAR would afford greater reduction.
I
1 C.
i
[ MAG 27C) ,
g The SPMC's decision criteria do not adequately consider
. dose from groundshine in determining whether to evacuate or
, shelter the population. The decision criteria do not i l adequately consider the shielding factor for groundshine l
) '
afforded by shelters in the Massachusetts EPZ, and do not adequately consider the skin and car deposition doses that
~ persons sitting in cars while waiting to evacuate could ,
receive'if, due to traffic congestion, they are unable to J evacuate the area prior to plume arrival.
D. [ MAG 27D]
The formula used in the SPMC's decision criteria for
) calculating thyroid Lhelter assumes an air exchange bate that
[ is too high for the predominantly winterized structures that would serve as shelters in the Massachusetts EPZ, and, t
therefore, inaccurately calculates projected thyroid dose.
E. [ MAG 27E]
L The decision criteria fails to account for exposures from inhalation other than thyroid exposure.
j F. [ TON 9, Basis.1]
l The SPMC relies on two protective actions for the public, sheltering and evacuation, but fails to provide j anything other than the vaguest of criteria for determining which protective action should be undertaken in a given emergency. M-provides-ne -evaluatien-of-the-sheltering l eapacity -e f -Newbury-er-the -number-ef-pubMe -bukidings h ava hable -fo r -enc h -use r --Partieukarly -w ith -regard -be -Plum Feland r-where-theasa nds -ef -tra nsient-people-may-be-s huated l
at -the -t ime -e f -an -emergeney r -the -SPMe -is -deveid -ef -any -date l
whieh-prevides -a-reasenable -aesuranee-that-ehehtering -is reaMetie r--Mereever r-the -SPMe-prevides -ne-meane -ef-deaMng with -the-reahetic -pessibihty-that-the-owners-e s-build kags nern thy-epen-te-the-publie-wih-net-ahew-their-buildinge-te
/ be- sed -ae -shelters -er -th a t -such -petentiak-ehehe re -are eens brueted-et-materiabe-whieh-provide-a-au f ficient-level-ef l preteetient I
G. (MAG 56B]
The SPMC ignores the entrapment phenomenon described by NUREG 1210, V.4 at 19-20, which will occur at the Seabrook site during times of high beach population and also fails to adequately consider and plan for the possibility of t
I t' entrapment due to bad weather, such as blizzards or flooding conditions.
H. [ MAG 56C)
)
The SPMC does not project doses correctly because it under-estimates doses from iodine and other ground deposited ,
i material, including failing to recognize in its dose !
calculations the increased risk from ground deposition as individuals await evacuation and the possibility of further j~ increased dose from skin deposition and deposition on automobiles.
I. [ MAG 56D) l The SPMC totally ignores the protective action that l- combines sheltering with rapid identification after plume i passage of " hot spots" and relocation although this strategy is recommended by NUREG 1210 as appropriate for certain situations.
J. [ Withdrawn by MAG in " Answers and Responses of the Massachusetts Attorney General to the Applicants' l
Interrogatories and Request for Production Concerning JI 1-26" dated December 19, 1988 at 87.)
Applicable Board Ruling (s) t "The first sentence of the basis for Town of Newbury Contention 9 is accepted as a contention substituting for TON 9 as originally submitted." Order (08/19/88) at 7.
)
JI 19 IMAG 31; MAG 56 P1
) Participating Party: MAG Contention The SPMC, in conjunction with the NHRERP, allows and encourages decision-makers to call for an evacuation of EPZ
[ by sectors (S, SW, HE, SE, N), even within 5 miles, depending
' on which way the wind is blowing. This is a deficiency in violation of 10 C.F.R. 50.47 (a) (1) , 50.47 (b) (10) , and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1,Section II.J. Because-wind-shifts-in l the -are a -e f -the -pland -are -se -frequent r -and -bee ease -the phenomena-e f-seabreezes -ab-this -site-makes -aebuaF-direebien ef pFame-traveF-difficabb-te-predietr-if-an-evaeaation-is
)
requ ired -fer -any -segmenb r-there -sheeld -always -be -a ->&&&
evacuation-eub-to-the-distance-necessaryr- 'Phe cuddca-k&&&
wi-nd -shif b -de r ing -the -eeurse -o f -a -seriens -ha eardens -m ate r iel-s f i re -at -Se ab reek r -New -H amps h i re -in -M a reh -199 & -demons trates
?
t
- I i
I the -feFFy -e f -evaem at ing -by -seetere -rather -th an -by ->&&A i
' kneremente r--Enetead r-the-SPMe Le -precedures-direet-decimien-E m akere -f irst -te -determ ine -the -wind -directien -and r -i-f .
) eendittene-warrant-an-evaematien r-te -evacuate -(-beyond-twe mitee F-enFy -the -dewnwind -seetere r--See-IP -P r& r-Attachments -by l
&, -&-and -G r--Per-this-pkant-site r-the-nermak-petentiet
}'-
resulte-e f-high-and -lew-wind - sp;;ds -ae-ehewn -en-Attachment-6 i i
he -IP -P r& -e kmphy -are -net-reliabbe .
Basis A. (MAG 31, Basis 1] .
r l' '
l V
Because wind-shifts in the area of the plant are so frequent, and because the phenomena of seabreezes at this site makes actual direction of plume travel difficult to
{
predict, if an evacuation is required for any segment, there should always be a 360* evacuation out to the distance necessary. The sudden 180' wind shift during the course of a l
serious hazardous materials fire at Seabrook, New Hampshire I in March 1988 demonstrates the folly of evacuating by sectors rather than by 360* increments. Instead, the SPMC's procedures direct decision-makers first to determine the wind direction and, if conditions warrant an evacuation, to evacuate (beyond two miles) only the downwind sectors. See IP 2.5, Attachments 1, 2, 3 and 6. For this plant site, the j
normal potential results of high and low wind speeds as shown on Attachment 6 to IP 2.5 simply are not reliable.
B. [ MAG 56F) i There is insufficient and untimely incorporation of meteorological data into PAR decision-making. Further,
) meteorological assumptions cade are not appropriate for the Seabrook site and will result in inaccurate dose projections because they do not adequately reflect or account for features of shoreline meteorology, including the frequent L- change of wind direction and the phenomena associated with sea breezes along the coastline.
L JI 20 fMAG 331 Participating Party: MAG contention Even if there were an appropriate ETE study accompanying
/ the SPMC, the SPMC's procedures do not instruct ORO workers to refer to it at all, let alone describe how to use it to adjust an ETE contained in the table in Attachment 4 of IP 2.5 Absent such procedures, the SPMC fails to assure that the ETEs used by protective action decision-makers can or t
I
r will be adequately adjusted to account for conditions that vary from those assumed in the ETE study.
Basis A. [ MAG 33, Basis 1]
l The ETEs to be referenced in the SPMC are those found in Pro-2.5, Attachment 4. There is no indication on Attachment 4 where the times presented came from, who calculated them, how they were calculated, or what their sensitivities are.
Pro-2.5 and Attachment 4 are to be used by the Accident Assessment Coordinator in completing the Protective Action Recommendation Worksheet (Attachment 3). Pro 2.5, 9 5.3.1.B l
)
instructs him to "[s] elect the appropriate estimated evacuation time from Attachment 4 for Item 8 [worksheet). If unsure.of which scenario to select, consult with Radiological Health Advisor." When one reviews the Implementing Procedures for the Radiological Health Advisor at Pro-2.5, SS 5.2.3 and 5.2.4, however, one finds no reference to providing t this function. Instead, he is instructed to "[rjeview the I completed (sic:l Attachment 4 Estimated Evacuation Times for the Massachuset.ts Communities." S 5.2.3. He is also
' instructed to ' f o)onfer with the Assistant Offsite Response l Director, Response Implementation." In Attachment 1 of Pro-1.3 we find that it is the Assistant Offsite Response Director for Response Implementation who is to " evaluate constraints to the Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) (e.g., road p
conditions, current weather conditions and special evacuation problems)." However, the Implementing Procedures for this position in Pro-2.5 do not specify how and toThus, whatnowhere extent in I evacuation constraints should affect ETEs.
the SPMC is there a procedure which specifically directs anyone in the ORO to refer to any ETE study to assess the i
accuracy of an ETE in Attachment 4 of IP 2.5 in light of such variables as road conditions, weather, delays in implementing traffic control or access control, or road blockages. IP 2.5 does contain a section (6.0) labeled " References." The last item listed in this section is the "Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Study, August 12, 1986, KLD Associates, Inc."
Simply listing this ETE study as a reference, however, provides no reasonable assurance that it will be located when needed, that it will be referred to at all when needed, or that if it is referred to it will be used correctly.
i f
h
. - - - ~ _
i
) JI 21 IMAG 40; TON 6; Stipulation dated Februarv 7. 1989) j Participating Party: MAG Contention l p
The figures listed on Applicants' population distribution maps for the permanent residents of the Massachusetts EPZ are incorrect for the current time period. i The " peak" population totals listed for both " summer mid- l week" and " summer weekend" are significantly too low. Absent more accurate figures, Applicants' maps fail to comply with 10 C.F.R. 50. 47 (a) (1) , 50.47 (b) (10) , and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, p Supp. 1,Section II.J.10.b.
g . JI 22 IMAG 431 Participating Party: MAG Contention
)
Because the SPMC's evacuation time estimates have been o rejected by state and local officials as totally unrealistic L and unreliable, in the event of an emergency at Seabrook Station, Massachusetts state and local decision-makers will always reject any immediate implementation of ORO's protective action recommendations based on'those ETEs. As a result, and because those decision makers have no alternative set of ETEs available to them, state and local decision-makers will make an ad bag judgment regarding what protective actions are likely to maximize dose reductions. However,
)
there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can or will be taken through such an ad hgg decision-making process. Therefore, the SPMC does not meet
}
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) , (b) (10) , (c) (10) , and NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, Sections II.J.10.1 and 10.m.
F i Basis
! A. [ MAG 43, Basis 1]
While state and local Massachusetts officials have not read or reviewed the SPMC, they have been informed by consultants retained by the Attorney General that the ETEs contained in the SPMC are not reliable and that realistic evacuation times are likely to be much longer. They also understand that the ETEs in the SPMC were calculated using incorrect assumptions about notification times, beach
)
population, times to staff traffic posts, an "early beach closing," and traffic orderliness. If NHY's ORO ever were to forward a recommendation for a protective action to state or
} local decision-makers, and that recommendation was based on l
i T the SPMC's ETEs, there is no question that these officials would 31 ways reject any immediate implementation of that PAR.
Having no set of pre-calculated, realistic ETEs of their own, these decision-makers would necessarily have to make their
) own PAR judgment on an ad hgs basis.
I Applicable Board Ruling (s) 1 "We accept the contention [ MAG 43) with the understanding and limitations relating to asserted ad hgg h responses set out under MAG Contentions 1 and 3, supra." l Order I at 68.
JI 23 IMAG 59; TOA 2.Bl f
Participating Parties: MAG, TOA '
Contention l The decision criteria described in the SPMC are not coordinated with those set forth in the NHRERP. Thus, the h
possibility exists for delayed and conflicting PARS being ,
formulated, transmitted and recommended to the relevant state j governments. The SPMC has no adequate procedures to prevent this and therefore does not meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (1) and (10) and the guidance of NUREG 0654 II.A. and J.
)
Basis j
A. [TOA 2B)
Even assuming prompt authorization by the Commonwealth l for NHY to direct all PARS, the SPMC indicates that
? additional time will be required for coordination of EBS messages and PARS between the Commonwealth and the State of
! New Hampshire. SPMC Plan, p.3.2-16. There has not been, nor j
is there anticipated, however, any joint training or emergency exercises between government officials from New
, Hampshire and Massachusetts. Many governmental officials in l both states are unfamiliar with the planning documents.
> Public notification, and coordinated PARS between the states, will at a minimum, be unreasonably delayed under actual emergency conditionu.
Applicable Board Ruling (s) y
"[W)e read TOA Contention 2 as challenging the adequacy of the SPMC procedures for preparing and implementing ad h2g messages." Order II at 7 - 8.
I 1
k
l JI 24 ITOA 2.Al Participating Parties: MAG, TOA Contention
' Assuming the Commonwealth and EPZ municipalities would j delegate authority to NHY to perform governmental emergency
-response functions, see, SPMC Plan, p. 3.1-2, an assumption the Town of Amesbury denies, the anticipated protracted delay ;
- f. in obtaining this authority under emergency conditions would preclude prompt public notification or a timely public 4 emergency response. Eeg, NUREG-0654 II.E.6 and NUREG-0654 Appendix 3 (b) (2) (a) . For example, following NHY notification l r to the Commonwealth of an emergency, NHY must explain its own capabilities, and brief the Commonwealth on the emergency.
{ PROCEDURES 2.14, p. 5. The Commonwealth, under the SPMC, !
J' then is required to assess its protective action response (PAR) capabilities and, if inadequate, purportedly may i authorize NHY to implement police powers to provide 1
( assistance. Id; SPMC Plan, p. 3.1-2. The cumulative effect of these delays, briefings, multiple notifications, and communications through numerous lines of authority, will l result in substantial delay in public notification and in l
timely PARS b;r the public, even if it is assumed that police power authority ultimately may be delegated by the Commonwealth and EPZ towns.
)
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"[W]e read TOA Contention 2 as challenging the adequacy I
of the SPMC procedures for preparing and implementing ad hog messages." Order II at 7 - 8.
) JI 25 IMAG 611 Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.
JI 26 IMAG 631 Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.
IV. COMMUNICATIONS / NOTIFICATION JI 27 IMAG 8; TOA 4.Bf311 Participating Parties: MAG, TOA Contention l At an organizational level, the SPMC fails to adequately establish and define the relationships between the ORO and
)
other organizations which are expected and relied upon to perform emergency response activities. Further, the SPMC does not adequately provide for effective coordination of I offort between or clearly delineate the primary responsibilities of these other organizations and the ORO.
As such, the SPMC does not meet the planning standards set l
forth at 50.47 (b) (1) , (2), (3), (5) and (6) ; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV, A.6, 7, 8; and the planning guidance set forth in NUREG 0654 II. A.1.b., c, 2.a., b, 3; B.6, 9; C.5 (Supp.1) ; E.1; and F.1.
Basis A. The SPMC creates nine liaison positions staffed by ORO personnel, one local EOC liaison for each Massachusetts town and three state liaisons, one for the state EOC, one for l
the Area 1 EOC and one for the Massachusetts Department of
) Public Health. The function and role of these liaison personnel is left completely undefined. There is no procedure in the SPMC to insure that these liaison personnel
( are themselves knowledgeable about the SPMC so that they could intelligibly respond to inquiries concerning its structure and function, or otherwise " advise and assist state
! and local officials in implementing" portions of the SPMC.
NUREG 0654, Supp 1, II.C.S. Moreover, there is no portion of the SPMC which would provide any indication to a local governmental official of the actual role to be performed by I specific local organizations. The liaisons fail to establish any organizational or communicational link between the ORO and the local organization which are relied upon to perform certain emergency activities. See Plan, Table 2.0-1.
)
B. The SPMC states that " law enforcement, fire and l rescue needs and snow removal agencies are expected to be
> within local capabilities supported by mutual aid agreements and it is assumed that in an emergency, these agencies will l continue to carry out their normal emergency functions."
( Plan 2.4-3, -4. The ORO will assist these " agencies" with
" appropriate emergency information and exposure control."
Plan 2.4-4.
- 1. There is no basis for the assumption in the SPMC that local capabilities will be augmented or supported by I " mutual aid agreements." Obviously, other EPZ towns will not I be able to provide such assistance and no prior arrangements or procedures are set forth in the SPMC to enable non-EPZ towns to identify the need for resources or to penetrate the L EPZ access control to supply such resources. Thus, there is only an assumed coordination of effort described by the SPMC.
- 2. What is needed during a radiological emergency is something different from " normal emergency functions." The 1
l particular problems of security, public health, timely evacuation and emergency-specific rescue needs in addition to the overall scope and extent of the emergency response make i
) the SPMC's reliance on business as usual totally inadequate.
I Because the SPMC has not even adequately identified the emergency responsibilities of police, fire and rescue '
agencies during a radiological emergency, it certainly has See 50.47 not assigned or established them adequately.
t (b) (1) , Moreover, the SPMC would be of absolutely no assistance to local emergency workers or officials at the 4
)
time of an emergency if they desire to participate in an ad hns fashion.
1 C. The SPMC totally lacks local plans that are specific t o the six Massachusetts communities and totally ignores the l
psrticular established routines existing in these communities
) for response to emergencies. Thus, no effective ad h2G relationship will develop between the ORO and the local communities making effective emergency response on the basis of the SPMC impossible.
)
D. There is no procedure for the notification of supporting organizations concerning which mix of authorization -- as to activity and jurisdiction -- is to be I
implemented by the ORO. As a result, none of the supporting organizations will be informed as to who has control and
)
command over any particular portion of the response. Further there is no delineated relationship between ORO personnel and non-ORO employees of support organizations as to issues of control and command, responsibility and liability.
)
E. [ Dismissed by Board Order of May 23, 1989.)
> F. The SPMC does not detail what emergency response activities can be implemented or what mitigating actions will be taken for those activities for which no authorization is forthcoming from the state. The SPMC does not indicate how the ORO will modulate and specify its response to accord with the specific authorization mix --as to activity and jurisdiction-- that results at the time of an emergency. See
) Pro-2.14, Attachments 7 and 8.
G. The SPMC fails to indicate that effective planning has been done to coordinate the ORO and the SPMC with the State of New Hampshire's emergency response organizations.
In fact, the $PMC does not even indicate that necessary New Hampshire personnel have read the SPMC or been trained with it. See App C, pages C-la-1d.
)
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"As to the town's claim that more intersections need to be staffed, we agree that this assertion does not provide adequate specificity. Except for this assertion, [TOA Contention] Basis 4.B is admitted." Order II at 11.
JI 28 IMAG 12_1 Withdrawn by MAG Notice dated December 19, 1988.
iTJ_;!9 FMAG 131 Withdrawn by MAG Notice dated December 19, 1988.
. JI 30 IMAG 14 CON 5 TOWN 31 Participating Parties: MAG, CON Contention The SPMC relies too heavily on commercial telephone links for critical and essential emergency communications.
Because commercial telephone lines will be and should be assumed to be overloaded shortly after the onset of an accident at Seabrook, no essential emergency communications should be based in the first instance on commercial telephone communications. As such the SPMC fails to meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (6) and planning guidance of NUREG 0654 II F.
Basis A. [ TOWN 3, Basis $)
Aeeerd i ng -to -Table -P rE-E -e f -the -Pla n r -the -Bea rd -ef SeFeetmen -are-in -everaFF-eemm and -and -eentrek-o f-emergency '
response -fu nctions -i-n -West -Newbury r--See tion -B ri rk-e f-the plan-requires -that-the-NHY-O f fside-Respense-B ireeber eemmunicate -with -leeaF-municipaF-authorities -regarding -the reeemmended -precau dienary-actions -and -protective-eetiens r-The -Be a rd -e f -Setee tman -i n -Wes t -Newbu ry -eens is ts -o f -p art -t ime o f f iciake -who -a re -ne t -neeees a riky -in -Wes t -Newbu ry -during -the d ay -and -whe -may -not -be -physic aF1y -avai Fable -to -rece ive eemmunications r-eeerdinate -messages -er-assume-the-neeessary eemmand -and -eentrek-within -the -time -parameters -necessitated by -an -eme rgency -at -Se abreek -S tat ion . Moreover, communications with local governments rely essentially on the use of commercial telephone service and do not provide for adequate backup in the event of the failure of commercial telephone service. Accordingly there is no reasonable
~40-
h assurance that timely notification and local response can be made in the event of an emergency at Seabrook Station.
Applicable Board Ruling (s) j
)
" Applicants and Staff would have us admit the contention
[ CON 5] only to the extent that it challenges the adequacy of means of communicating dosimetry readings. We agree and accept the contention with that limitation." order II at 28.
f JI 31 IMAG 151 Participating Party: MAG Contention The SPMC fails to meet the standards of 50.47 (b) (6) because there is no provision for an effective horizontal or lateral network of communications directly linking emergency field personnel with each other. As a result, all I communications must be first vertically transmitted, processed and recommunicated leading to delay, miscommunication and gaps in the communications network. The failure to provide a lateral communications system is a defect in the SPMC which will affect traffic management and evacuation, security, timely response to emergencies-within-the emergency and otherwise result in a wooden and
) ineffective emergency response. See Lona Island Lichtina Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-2 at 50 et sea. (February 1, 1988).
l JI 32 IMAG 16; TOWN 31 Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.
JI 33 IMAG 171 I
Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.
JI 34 IMAG 18: TON 12; TOWN 31 Participating Party: MAG Contention l The SPMC fails to meet the planning standards set forth
( at 50.47 (b) (5) and the guidance provided in NUREG 0654, II.
E. 1., E.2 and F.1 because the notification and mobilization of response organizations and personnel is not adequate.
I Basis A. (Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.]
)
y' h
B. [ Withdrawn by stipulation dated February 7, 1989.]
r
{ C. The SPMC provides no adequate means of alerting, notifying and mobilizing key emergency personnel such as bus drivers, ambulance drivers and others. The SPMC simply leaves this function to the contracting employers, but prcvides no detail on who, how and when such notification will take place. This fails to meet the standard set forth at NUREG 0654, II . E . '2 .
D. [ Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.] I E. [ Withdrawn by MAG at Tr. 17931-32, 17940.] ]
. JI 35 IMAG 201 Participating Party: MAG Contention The emergency messages to be utilized by the ORO in the event of an emergency at Seabrook are inadequate and will not
, be effective in communicating necessary information to the L
public. As a result, the SPMC does not meet the planning standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (1) , (5) and (6) and the guidance provided by NUREG 0654 at II E.3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, i and F.1.
Basis f
A. The messages prepared by the ORO are everly-Feng 4, misleading, confusing, self-contradictory, impossible-be either -breadeas h -er -receive-in -the-time -avai Fable 5 and ignore i important characteristics of the recipient public in Massachusetts and its response to a radiological emergency at Seabrook, l
B. The SPMC makes no provision and provides no procedure for coordinating emergency messages with participating and non-participating state and local 4 Strikeover per " Answers and Responses of the Massachusetts Attorney General to the Applicants' Interrogatories and Request for Production Concerning u JI Contentions 6 and 27-63" dated December 19, 1988, at 23.
l 7
5 Strikeover per " Answers and Responses of the Massachusetts Attorney General to the Applicants' l Interrogatories and Request for Production Concerning JI Contentions 6 and 27-63" dated December 19, 1988, at 25.
f governments as required by NUREG 0654, II.B.7.d. and Supp. 1, II.E.B.
C. The messages do not adequately address the issue of their source and do not explain who and what is controlling '
and directing the emergency response. There is no discussion in the messages of the emergency relationship between ORO and l the state and/or local gov'rnments. Egg NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, II E.7. ,
i f D. The SPMC provides no adequate procedures for insuring that the emergency messages broadcast to the public correlate with the messages and information provided to the media by the NHY ORO and other officials. I E. The pre-established messages set forth in the SPMC i
} at Pro-2.13, Attachments 2-24, may be altered or modified by l
the Public Notification Coordinator. Pro-2.13 at 8. No :
guidance or training is provided this individual on the essential components of an effective emergency message. As a
{ result, the messages (s) actually broadcast may be less effective than those set forth in the SPMC.
i JI 36 fMAG 211 Participating Party: MAG i- Contention The SPMC does not provide adequate procedures for coordination with the news media, and therefore does not meet I
the planning standards of 10 C.F.R. 50. 47 (b) (7) and (8). No adequate-precederee- Fer -eeerdinating-the-activiti-es -ef-the i
pubbie -in ferm atien -s ta f f -at -the -E-GO -and -the -pereenneF -a t -the Media -eenter -are -p mvided r --Adequebe -preceduree -ahee -de -net exist- fer-the-eeerdinatien-ef-the-aedivities-ef-Media rela ti-ene -representatives -whe -wiFF-be -eemmenicating -di reetly with-the prese-by-behephene.
Basis k
A. [ MAG 21A]
) No provision has been made in the SPMC for the news media at the Emergency operations Facility (" EOF"). The Media Center is located in the Town Hall, Newington, New Hampshire (Plan 3.7-6) which is three to four miles from the EOF and the EOC (Plan 5.1-2). However, the Public Information Advisor who is responsible for issuing news releases and directing public information activities is
) located at the EOC and not the Media Center. No adequate procedures for coordinating the activities of the public
information staff at the EOC and the personnel at the Media Center are provided. Adequate procedures also do not exist for the coordination of the activities of Media relations representatives who will be communicating directly with the press by telephone.
JI 37 IMAG 221 Withdrawn by MAG Notice dated December 19, 1988.
JI 38 fMAG 231 Dismissed by Board Order of May 23, 1989.
JI 39 fMAG 24A: Stipulation dated June 30. 1989)
Participating Party: MAG Contention Plans and procedures for disseminating pre-emergency information are inadequate. There is no assurance that the many thousands of transient,= who frequent the Massachusetts portions of the Seabrook EPZ will have available to them either prior to or at the time of an emergency any information concerning the methods and times required for notification, the protective actions planned, the nature and effects of radiation or a list of sources of additional information. The SPMC therefore does not meet the regulatory standards as set forth at 50.47 (b)(7), NUREG 0654 II. C. and
) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV. D.2.
) JI 40 IMAG 52_1 Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.
V. LEGAL ISSUES I
JI 41 IMAG 11 Participating Party: MAG Contention State and local officials responsible for emergency preparedness and response in Massachusetts have no intention of implementing or following the SPKC in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook. Based on its determination that no adequate planning is possible at this
k
[ site, the' Commonwealth will not participate in any tests, drills, exercises, training or otherwise engage in any planning for such an emergency. State and local officials
) will respond to any Seabrook emergency on an n.dd hq_q basis in light of the resources, personnel and expertise then available. In light of this considered governmental L
i-position, proceeding.
the SPMC is irrelevant to this licensing No emergency plan exists that meets the planning standards of 50.47(b) and further provides a basis for the finding.of " reasonable assurance that adequate protective i
[ measures can and will be taken." 10 CFR 50.47(a) (emphasis supplied).
l' i
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"The Board, with the assistance of the Mass AG's reply, understands the contention to be simply an umbrella allegation that neither the SPMC nor any other plan does or can rule.
meet the planning standards of the NRC emergency planning It is not a rebuttal to a presumptively adequate plan, as the Applicants misread it.
{ It is, rather, a direct attack on the SPMC, placing the Applicants on their proof (as we discuss below) that the plan does indeed meet the planning
)
standards but for the non-participation of the relevant governments and that the compensatory measures are appropriate. These are Applicants' burdens, imposed upon them by the threshold requirements of Paragraph (c) (1) (i) of
) the rule . .
. We accept [ MAG) Contention 1 as interpreted by our understanding of it as stated above." Order I at 14.
"Although the Board has accepted Mass AG Contention 1 as a statement of legal position, we have not accepted any of the bases for it, and Hass AG Contention 1 standing alone cannot be litigated as a factual contention." Order I at 15.
k
" MAG 1 throuch MAG 5 are legal contentions which cannot be litigated factually and cannot support discovery.
14388-90." Order (08/19/88) at 2. Tr.
f JI 42 fMAG 31 Participating Party: MAG Contention Assuming arauendo that at some feture time there is record support for the application of 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1) to the litigation of the SPMC, the permissive presumption set forth at 50.47(c) (iii) should not be applied to the SPMC. As a result, although this Board might assume that state and
) local governments will exercise their best efforts to protect
} the health and safety of the public at the time of the
k emergency, no presumption should be entertained that those officials "would generally follow the utility plan." In ;
reality,-as noted in Contention 1, these officials would
[- respond to an emergency on an ad has basis. Such an incomplete and uncertain state of emergency preparedness cannot (b), (c) (1) .
support a finding of adequacy under 10 CFR 50.47(a),
L
)
Applicable Board Ruling (s) f " Bearing in mind that we must presume that the governments will exercise their best efforts in a radiological emergency, a contention alleging that the best response would be ad hgg can prevail only if such a response is better than following the SPMC or some other plan. Of ;
course.a simple assertion that the response would be ad h2g tells us notning. It will be disregarded, as will a bald.
statement of government policy to that effect." Order I at
- 20. l
' "In organizing the adjudication for hearing, the only place logically to fit the ad hag-response assertion is as a direct 1attack cn the Applicants' case-in-chief. That is, we L
accept the government's ad hge case as an averment that the SPMC (or any substitute for it) is so inadequate, considering its elements and the Seabrook site, that the rebuttable
. presumption-is never born, thus needs no rebuttal." Order I i at 20.
"[ MAG] Contention 3, as we accept it, stands for the principle that well. pleaded contentions attacking directly and specifically the adequacy of the SPMC will place the burden upon the Applicants to proceed with its respective proef that the plan is adequate except for the non-L participation of the governments. As noted above in our discussion of MAG Contention 2, the proceeding does not begin with the presumption that the governments will follow the h SPMC. . Applicants must earn that presumption."
Order I at 20 - 21.
I
" MAG 1 throuch MAG 5 are legal contentions which cannot be litigated factually and cannot support discovery. Tr.
1,4388-90." Order (08/19/88) at 2.
l JI 43 TMAG 41 j Participating Party: MAG I
Contention
[ Assuming aratendo that at some future time there is
}
record support for the application of 10 CFR 50.47(c) (1) to
)
f the litigation of the SPMC, and this Board presumes that the relevant governments will " generally follow" that plan, that presumption will either be rebutted or its evidentiary significance eliminated by the Commonwealth. As a result, there would exist two evidentiary possibilities, neither of which could provide a basis for the requisite finding of
" reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken":
- 1. Once the presumption is rebutted, the Board will find that the relevant governments will not " generally follow" the SPMC. As noted, in reality, the actual response of these governments would be ad hoc.
- 2. Once the presumption is rebutted, the Board will be unable.to determine with an degree of certainty whether or not the relevant governments will " generally follow" the SPMC. (The governments will establish in the record that they will respond to an emergency on an ad hgg basis but will not " generally follow" the SPMC. Without benefit of the presumption, the Applicant will no doubt aver that the governments' respense will result in the implementation of the utility plan.) The uncertainty surrounding this dispositive issue - whether the SPMC will be implemented -
will make it impossible to find reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures "will" be taken.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"At this contention-screening stage of the proceeding we may not categorically reject other rebuttals to the presumption. We accept Mass AG Contention 4 as a threshold, general legal principal. Its application will be left to particular factual contentions with respect to the other Interveners. As it happens, the only class of contentions submitted by the Attorney General and accepted by the Board as permissable rebuttals to the presumption are legal-impediment contentions exemplified by MAG Contention 6, below." Order I at 23 - 24.
I
" MAG 1 throuch MAG S are legal contentions which cannot be litigated factually and cannot support discovery.
14388-90." Order (08/19/88) at 2.
Tr.
)
l JI 44A IMAG 61 Applicants prevailed on summary disposition motion. Public Service Comoany of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-8, 29 NRC 19/ (1989).
- 4 74-
I' JI 44B INECNP 4_1 Applicants prevailed on summary disposition motion.
I' VI.
PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR PARTICUIAR POPULATIONS JI 45 IMAG 47; TOWN 7.31 Participating Parties: MAG, TORN L
Contention The SPMC fails to offer reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can-and will be taken in'a ;.
timely fashion for schools and day care centers. Thus, it i
y f ails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(a) (1) , 50. 4 7 (b) (10) ,
- 50. 4 7 (b) (14 ) , 59. 4 7 (b) (15 ) , 50.47 (c) (1) ; NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, i
Supp. 1, II.J, II.N and II.0; and NUREG 0654, Rev.
Appendix 4. 1, Basis A. [ MAG 47A)
The.SPMC does not contain separate emergency response plans for the staff and students at each of the schools, including day care centers and nursery schools, in the six Massachusetts EPZ communities, and those outside the EPZ
.which receive students from inside the EPZ. Nor does the SPMC provide any reasonable assurance that each of these schools has an adequate school-specific plan for responding appropriately or in a coordinated or integrated manner with the SPMC in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station. Without adequate school-specific plans for each
)
school, there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and wil3 be taken for school children. Most schools have no such plans.
Existing emergency plans, while adequate for responding to fires and snow storms, are wholly inadequate for responding to a radiological smergency, especially one which is serious and fast-developing. While reference is made in Appendix F of the SPMC to a " Generic Massachusetts Public School Plan," the schools have no knowledge of such plans and would not keep or L use them if offered by NHY. Nor could any " generic" plan ever be adequate for the wide range of different types of schools, which have vastly different student populations, l
student age groupings, student / teacher ratios, class sizes,
) laycuts and construction (for sheltering), organizational capabilities, compositions of special needs children, l.
different methods of notifying parents, etc. Absent the i I existence of institution-specific radiological emergency response plans to address the different preparedness needs of l
each school, there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be provided to school children.
B. .[ Dismissed by Board Order of May 23, 1989.] j
[ C. [ Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, !l 1989.] j D. (Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, l 1989.) l l
E. [ MAG 47E)
L' The Implementing Procedures do not make it clear what the School Coordinator will tell the Liaisons to do when the Coordinator is informed that NHY's ORO has " recommended" a i
PAR to state or local officials but is awaiting a response.
The procedures for Special Population Coordinators and Special Population Liaisons do not differentiate clearly between.a PAR which has been recommended by NHY's ORO but is not yet authorized (or rejected) and a PAR being recommended after havinglbeen authorized by state / local officials. If E
the SPMC contemplates sending buses to schools upon ORO's mere recommendation of an evacuation PAR to state / local officials, this would create a host of problems, especially if the state / local officials were to decide sometime later when the buses were loading to direct the population to shelter. If the SPMC does not contemplate that i
buses /ambulences would be sent upon the issuance by ORO of a h mere PAR recommendation to state / local officials, it should clearly state this in the Implementing Procedures and eliminate this confusion.
I F. [ MAG 47F]
The SPMC's reliance on the 16 bus companies listed in Appendix M, pp. M-4, 5, to provide the drivers, vans and buses listed is unfounded. At least eight of the 16 l companies have either confirmed that they will not-
) participate or that they will offer only the buses, vans and drivers that might be available, if any, at the time of an emergency. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that a single bus, van or driver will be available from at least eight of the 16 companies relied upon. The remaining companies do not have sufficient drivers and buses to
}- transport all school children out of the EPZ in a timely
) fashion.
j- G. [ MAG 47G) j will beThe SPMC underestimates the number of school buses that needed. There are more students than have been estimated, especially in day care and nurseries, but also in the schools. In addition, during.an emergency additional adult supervision will be needed on each bus, and the average
- p. capacity of the buses has been overestimated.
H. (MAG 47H)
I The SPMC pr5cedures for notification to the School Coordinator and the confusing implementing procedures for the L
School Coordinator in both Pro. 1.9 and 2.7, prohibit a timely offer of information and transport resources to School Superintendents for all public schools, especially in fast breaking accidents at Seabrook Station. The School Coordinator has to be briefed himself, and then must then call each Superintendent one by one. Ege Pro-l.9, 5 5.1 and Attachment 2.' Some of the school Superintendent phone i
{ numbers are not even listed in Appendix M. Clearly the phone conversations with each Superintendent could be quite L
lengthy, especially since they will have had no prior
(-
emergency response training and will not know a great deal.
The last Superintendent may not be notified for a number of c
hours after an Alert is declared. Where school officials j
have not already heard EBS messages, such time-consuming procedures may prevent school officials from considering early dismissal or other early protective actions. Those school officials who may have already " heard" of a problem at Seabrook Station may already have begun ad hge protective l
action which are inconsistent with the SPMC, e.g.,
instructing parents to pick up children or busing students to L
some facility.
location other than a reception center or a host school I. [ MAG 471]
l The SPMC's procedures for providing information and offering transport resources to private schools, day care and nurseries is even more time-consuming than that for notifying
) School Superintendents.
Such notification is done by School Liaisons after they have reported to the Staging Area, been briefed by the School Coordinator and, if permitted access, driven immediately.
to a local EOC, where a telephone may not be available Egg Pro. 1.9, 5 5.2 and Attachment 4, 5 5.3. Pro. 2.7, Then calls must be made, one by one, again with lengthy conversations likely occurring for euen call.
last school will not be notified for many hours after anThe Alert has been declared. As a result, these school officials may be prevented from considering early dismissal or other
) protective actions.
Those private school officials who may
) __ _
I have already " heard" of a problem at Seabrook Station L.ay already have begun ad hoc protective actions which are ,
t inconsistent with the SPMC, e.g., instructing parents to pick [
) up children for busing students to places other than l reception centers or the host school facility. !
J. [ MAG 47C]
1 The SPMC proposed to include school information in the EBS messages if the schools request that this be done. If most of the schools respond to this offer, the EBS messages will become extremely long and drawn out.
K. [ MAG 47K]
The SPMC's provisions offer no reasonable assurance that sheltering can or will be implemented appropriately or in a timely fashion in the schools. The SPMC contains procedures for having the School Liaisons call the special facilities and read a prescripted School Protective Action Message.
f Pro-2.7, Attachment 1. If sheltering is recommended, however, the Liaison provides no information whatsoever of how this is to be done. Cf. Pro-2.7, Attachment 3. It
} assumes without any basis for doing so that the school has its own sheltering procedures. For those facilities which have no sheltering plan, the message simply affords inadequate guidance on how to implement a timely, safe and effective sheltering response. There are no instructions, for example, as to where in the school shelter should be sought (i.e., in basements or interior rooms), no
}
' instructions regarding the closing of windows and doors, and no instructions regarding what actions should be taken for respiratory protection (such as placing several layers of i
toilet paper over the mouth and nose). No specific TV or radio stations are mentioned for receiving EBS information about sheltering instructions. There is, therefore, no I
reasonable assurance that adequate sheltering will be provided.
L. [ MAG 47L]
l There are a significant number of schools throughout the Massachusetts EPZ that would be totally inappropriate for sheltering school children -- the population most sensitive to radiation exposure -- because the schools have no basements or interior rooms, and have exterior walls which are almost entirely, or substantially, comprised of glass.
In addition, there are a number of newer schools with climate control systems that are totally reliant on outside air.
l
)
M. [ MAG 47M]
j The SPMC does purport to offer schools transportation assistance in the event that an evacuation is recommended but it makes this offer in less than a timely fashion (as noted above) and when the offer is made it does so in a way which does not give schools the option of choosing to use their own staff and equipment to effect evacuation. The School Protective Action Message read by the School Liaison first has the Liaison " verify your transportation requirements in the event of an evacuation." Pro. 2.7, Attachment 3. The Liaison then reads this sentence: "We will have the vehicles you identify dispatched to your school [ ] to support your immediate evacuation." This is inconsistent with the f
Liaison's " conditional response activities" in Pro. 1.9, Attachment 3, p. 4, which suggests that the Liaison at least
" inquire" whether the school's regular contracted bus company is assisting with transportation and, if so, whether they know the route to the appropriate reception center.
{ N. [ MAG 470]
When schools are asked to verify their transportation needs, most schools will not be able to respond with any reasonable degree of certainty if they try to guess how many of their regular contracted buses will show up.
O. [ MAG 47P]
The School Liaisons will not be able to state how I
quickly the SPMC/ORO buses will carriva at given schools. As a result, prudent school officials will not wait for ORO's buses but will seek to implement an ad hpqc transportation i
scheme or will ask parents to pick up childrer.
P. [ MAG 47S2]
' The SPMC fails to ensure that school students who walk or drive themselves to school will take appropriate action during an evacuation when they leave the schools on foot or i
I in their own vehicles. There is no assurance that they will go to Reception Centers or the Host School Facility. There is also no assurance that they will go home and meet up with their families.
Q. [ TOWN 7.3]
Appendix M, Amendment 3 fails to accurately reflect the number of day care providers and children being cared for by these providers in West Newbury. Appendix M, Amendment 3
)
I also fails to accurately reflect the number of students and staff at the schools in West Newbury.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"We accept [ MAG 47 Bases.A, J, L, M and S.2), and agree in part with the Mass AG's explanation that school children, L
as part of the EPZ population, are entitled to adequate ,
protection appropriate.
and that special considerations may be 1 i
However, we do not accept the Mass AG's premise that all population level'of protection."
groups in an EPZ must receive the same Order I at 73.
"We accept [ MAG 47 Basis K) to the extent it would require consideration of the sheltering option for school i, children, but we do not accept the implic: tion in the i contention, and, the express statement in the AG's Reply, that there is any regulatory requirement for ' prior arrangements to insure that these children will be sheltered.' That aspect of the basis seems to preordain sheltering as the protective action for school children to ;
g the exclusion of other protective actions." order I at 73. '
JI 46 IMAG 48; SAPL 5; SAPL 71 Participating Parties: MAG, SAPL Contention 1
( The SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented for l
all those persons who are patients in the two hospitals I within the during the Massachusetts emergency, from EPZ and for those who become injured radiation contamination / exposure.
The SPMC therefore fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1),
5 0. 4 7 (b) (10) , 50. 47 (b) (12) and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.J.10.d, 10.e, 10.g; and II.L.
Basis A. [ MAG 48A]
I In the event of an evacuation, the two hospitals located within the EPZ have more patients than can be accommodated by 1-the hospitals with which NHY has reached agreements. The Amesbury Hospital currently has approximately 44 beds in use.
[ They are atin full capacity to 58 beds August, 1988.at this time and will be expanding The Anna Jacques Hospital in Newburyport operating at 58%
has approximately 156 beds and is presently Gacit 2 (or approximately 90 patients).
Thus, in the event of an evacuation, accommodations would be required for approximately 148 patients.
) -
e-The hospitals with which NHY purports to have agreements would not be able to provide the required beds for these patients.- A summary of the services offered by the hospitals designated in the SPMC are as follows:
Hospital' A has eleven physicians to handle '.imple
- contamination cases. However, in regard to the relocation of
. patients from hospitals within the EPZ, or accommodating radiologically injured persons, the hospital would be able to provide only five beds at best.
f~ !
Hospital B has signed a letter of agreement to care for patients located at the Anna Jaques Hospital in the event I' of a radiological emergency. However, Hospital B has no intention of treating radiologically contaminated individuals.
Hospital C has. contracted with NHY officials to provide emergency disaster services.- They would be able to
! activate these services within a twenty-four hour period.
L Hospital C would only be able to accommodate approximately ten very severely injured patients. The hospital has a i
capacity of 730 beds of which 85-90% are usually occupied.
L Hospital D has no agreements with NHY to care for relocated patients or to provide decontamination facilities.
Hospital E has agreed with NHY officials to accept transferred patients from other hospitals. Its capacity is
! 300 beds, of which 20 are usually available. It does not I have the facilities to handle radiologically contaminated individuals.
L Hospital F has agreed to provide or:1y acute care services to nursing home patients. They have declined to offer decontamination facilities after being approached by NHY. It has a capacity of 108 beds of whion 90 are usually filled.
Hospital G has agreed to assist in the relocation i of patients from Anna Jacques Hospital. They have,not agreed to provide treatment for radiologically contaminated individuals. Hospital G could accommodate approximately forty patients in the event of an emergency.
Hospital H has not made any agreements with NHY l regarding the relocation of patients within the EPZ, or for I' treatment of radiologically contaminated individuals, in the event of an emergency. The hospital is equipped to treat up to three " chemically affected" patients. The hospital is licensed to accommodate 365 patientt and might have approximately ten beds available in the event of an emergency.
NHY.
Hospital I has reached no definite agreement with Officer, It was the understanding of the Chief Operating from discussions with NHY conducted over one year ago, that Hospital I would act as a "back-up" to Anna Jaques Hospital.
Hospital I can accommod- te 311 patients and operates at about 64% of capacity. They do not have any decontamination facilities. In the event of an emergency, it could provide approximately thirty beds.
In summary, the hospitals identified in the SPMC would be able to accommodate, at best, approximately 133 patients.
This total includes beds to be provided by Hospitals D and I which have not entered into any agreements with NHY. Even assuming that these hospitals would provide accommodations in the event of an emergency, the total number of beds provided would fall short of the approximate 148 beds required just to relocate Amesbury Hospital and Anna Jaques Hospital.
The SPMC also fails to ensure that adequate accommodations will be available for the radiologically
' injured in the event of an emergency. It fails to take into consideration that during a radiological emergency it is highly likely that hospitalization will be required for people suffering non-radiological injuries sustained during an etc.)
evacuation (as a result of auto accidents, heart attacks, Reasonable estimates of the number of persons who may need to be hospitalized as a result of radiation from a serious radiological accident at Seabrook Station greatly exceed the beds available. These estimates are based on the size of the beach population on busy summer days, the lack of sheltering available to them, and the fact that severe traffic congestion will entrap thousands of persons in the beach areas and prevent their evacuation'for many hours. The arrangements inadequate. Reasonable in the SPMC for their care are grossly estimates of the number of people who may sustain non-radiological injuries during an evacuation also greatly exceed the beds available.
Furthermore, decontamination facilities are inadequate at the hospitals idertified in the NHY plan. Only Hospital A and Hospital C have E,ated they have the ability to treat radiologically contaminated persons. Hospital C would only 4 be able to treat ten cases, at most, of radiological contamination. Hospital H is equipped to treat up to three
" chemically affected" patients. It is reasonably estimated that a number of persons who will need hospital decontamination services will greatly exceed the capacity of these hospitals to provide this service.
-ss-
- - o
I i
} B. (MAG 483]
The SPMC makes inadequate preparations for the safe, efficient evacuation of_ patients located within the EPZ at Amesbury Hospital and Anna Jaques Hospital, Newburyport.
Amesbury Hospital has_been contacted by NHY officials but the role and/or responsibilities of the hospital were unclear to ;
i hospital administrators. It does not have any agreements !
-with any other hospitals at this time regarding the i relocation or patients during a radiological emergency. In !
the event.that an evacuation was ordered, it would have to be accomplished in an ad has fashion by the town ambulance service, private ambulance service, or by patient's families.
These sources of transportation-would be unreliable. j However, assuming that transportation were available, an evacuation of the hospital would take many hours. No institution-specific evacuation time estimate has been i prepared. At Anna Jaques Hospital, no evacuation plan has been developed to provide _for the evacuation and relocation i of patients in the event of a radiological emergency. Any
[ evacuation which would occur would be as hgg, accomplished through private ambulance services with which the hospital has " working relationships" but no written agreements. These sources would be unreliable, however, in the. event of a radiological emergency. Assuming that adequate transportation were available, an ad has evacuation of the hospital would take many hours. No institution-specific-evacuation time estimate has been prepared.
C. [ MAG 48D)
The SPMC has arrangements for an inadequate number of ambulances to evacuate all those who may reasonably need such transportation so there is no reasonable assurance that NHY
) ORO can implement a timely evacuation of the two hospitals in the Massachusetts EPZ.
D. [ MAG 48E]
The SPMC provides no reasonable assurance that the Amesbury and Ann Jaques hospitals are suitable as shelter in a radiological emergency.
E. [ MAG 48F)
The sheltering instructions provided to hospitals by ORO
! are wholly inadequate to provide reasonable assurance that
[ adequate sheltering measures can and will be taken by hospitals.
l' F. [ MAG 48G]
The Generic EPZ Hospital Plan mentioned in Appendix G is too. vague to be-of any real benefit to the hospitals.
Amesbury Hospital received such a plan but has not kept it.
! There it of anyis no indication benefit that Anna Jaques would keep it or find either.
Only site-specific EPZ hospital plans can provide reasonable assurance of adequate preparedness, and then only when backed up with a staff.
[ trained in appropriate emergency response actions, l
i only support a total of 42 ambulances, at least 4 of which l will not be available since Amoskeag Ambulance has gone out of business.
8 Furthermore, these same ambulances are to be l' drawn upon to transport special facilities populations to
[ host facil students not having equal protection under the '
law, contrary to the requirements of Article XIV of the U. S.
Constitution.
1 j Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"The Applicants do not object to MAG Contention 48 provided that the issue of the treatment of contaminated injured be limited to whether or not the hospitals capable of such treatment have been listed . . . we accept the I limitation." Order I at 75.
" Mass AG asserts in its reply that any person injured I during an emergency is entitled to protection in the form of hospital treatment.
I The AG goes too far. This is a hospital-facilities contention appropriately addressing the evacuation within and relocation of patients already hospitalized the EPZ, I
contaminated andand the treatment of radiologically injured Persons injured but not contaminated during, say, persons. an evacuation may be entitled to appropriate radiological protective actions to achieve dose savings, but, once evacuated, the matter is no longer a radiological consideration. We are aware of no regulatory requirement for the post-emergency injured persons." order I at 75 - 76. care of non-contaminated "However, we do not agree with the Staff that Basis B l [of MAG 48) is a human behavior contention. The major thrust i
of that hospitals.
basis is inadequate preparation for the two named I at 76.
It is accepted under that interpretation." Order "SAPL Contention 7 is admitted except for the second sentence U.S. and references Constitution to the Fourteenth Amendment of the as a basis." Order I at 124.
JI 47 FMAG 491 Participating Party: MAG Contention I
}
There is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station for institutionalized persons (e.g., patients in medical facilities) who cannot be evacuated. The SPMC therefore f ails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(a) (1), 50. 47 (b) (10) and NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, II.J.9, II.J.10.d, and II.J.10.e.
Basis A. [ MAG 49A)
Although the SPMC at Plan 3.6-6 acknowledges that there I may be some institutionalized persons who cannot be evacuate'* , there in no reasonable assurance in the event of an emerysacy in which the general population is advised to I
evacuate that there will be sufficient medical and other i
support staff available to care for the patients who are unable to evacuate.
hospitals under these circumstances.The SPMC makes no provision for staffing Especiahay-in-vkew-ef i
the - f eed -th a t -the -SPMe -ma kes -ne -previ-si-en - fe r -in ferm ing -er instreeting -hespitah-staff -prier-de -en -emergency-e f-thei r I expected -emergeney -rehee r-there-ean -be -ne -reasonable assuranee -thed -su f fic i-en t -hesp it ah -sta f f -w ihl -be -w ih king -te remain -behind -in -a n -emergency -be -eare -fo r -pa t i-ente r -rather l
then -seeing -te -the -sa fety -e f -their -own -f ami hies -whe -may -be eveenatingt i
B. [ Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.)
C. [ MAG 49C]
I i
Although the SPMC at Plan 3.6-6, acknowledges that some institutionalized persons cannot be evacuated, there are no special decision-making criteria for the institutionalized l
popule. tion that take into account the special factors associated with sheltering or evacuating that population such as thet greater risk to that special population from evacua' ion and the relatively better shielding protection that as a 1.ospital.
5ould be afforded by sheltering in a large building such Moreover, the message to be given to hospitals in the event of an emergency where the general population is instructed to evacuate, provides no instructions at all with respect to sheltering, and in fact, only speaks of the hospital's evacuation needs (see Pro-2.7 s
at 15) thus implying that all hospital patients will be evacuated regardless of the situation. Thus, the SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate measures will be taken for institutionalized persons who cannot evacuate.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
Contention "The Applicants 49] Basis A and Staff object to the portion of (MAG
" pertaining to. role conflict. We agree
. . . . Order I at 77.
JI 48 TMAG 50]
Participating Party: MAG Contention The SPMC is deficient because it has not identified all or even most of the special needs resident population, has not sufficiently assured the security of acquired information about special needs individuals, has not adequately determined the specific assistance needed by identified individuals to cope with a radiological emergency has not identified other individuals and organizations cap,able of assisting and the type of assistance required, and has no adequate procedures for assuring that this data is periodically validated.
Thus, the SPMC does not comply with 10 CFR and NUREG-0654, 50. 47 (a) Rev.
(1) , 50. 47 (b) (7) , 50. 47 (b) (10) , 50. 4 7 (c) (1) ,
1, Supp. 1, Sections II.G and II.J.
Basis A. (MAG 50A]
surveys Thebyplan proposes to conduct mail. periodic special needs Plan 3.7. This method is unreliable for a number of reasons. .All homebound persons in need of special assistance be assistedwill therefore not in sheltering be known themselves orto NHY and in evacuation thus thecannot event of an emergency.
inadequate'in the following respects:The identification proposal is 1.
persons with special needs produced unreliable resultsThe survey already co because of the wide-spread opposition to Seabrook. Future surveys will likely product similarly unreliable results. 4 a) Some persons refused to complete forms in protest; I 1
b) Some persons reported that members of
their families had special needs when, in fact, they did not; I
c) Forms were collected by opposition groups and not sent in.
- 2. The deeply-felt and widespread opposition to Seabrook does not engender confidence on the part of special needs persons thet the information they might submit will be kept confidential, thereby discouraging submission of such data.
B. (MAG 50B]
It appears that each special needs resident will be listed by name in Appendix M. This listing will also show each person's address, phone number, and an identification of those who are hearing-impaired, sight impaired, or mobility-impaired (in need of an ambulance, wheelchair van or curbside pickup).
Section 7.2.3 of the SPMC states that because of the confidential nature of the contents, Appendix M will have
" limited distribution." It will also be " maintained at [all) emergency response facilities and provided to Federal Regulatory agencies." Conceivably, there could be dozens of copies of Appendix M which contain this private information.
The SPMC provides no procedures for assuring the effective security of this information.
Any ad hoc procedures that may be devised by NHY do not provide reasonable assurance of adequate security.
C. [ MAG 50C]
Individualized determinations of functional characteristics of special needs persons necessary to cope with a radiological emergency are not sufficiently specific.
Appendix categories.
M utilizes a "Needs Code" with only 5 general Much information on functional characteristics and needs could and should be obtained to enable appropriate and timely assistance to be provided.
D. [ MAG 50DJ With the exception of transporters during evacuation, individuals and organizations capable of assisting handicapped persons on an individual basis have not been identified. The plan also fails to identify people resources within the handicapped community who may be utilized in the development, review and exercise of plans for the homebound and other special needs residents.
E. [ MAG SOE)
)
The proposal provides no reasonable assucerca t.'. c the l
information collected will be validated, updated, or maintained, but merely asserts that periodic surveys will be mailed method.
which, for the reasons stated above, is an unreliable JI 49 IMAG 51; TON 31 Participating Party: MAG Contention The SPMC's provisions for assisting the special needs resident population in taking protective actions are grossly
- deficient and provide no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken by this population.
The SPMC therefore fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(a) (1) ,
5 0. 4 7 (b) (10) , 50. 47 (c) (1) or NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, Section J, and FEMA Guidance Memorandum 24 (Radiological Emergency Preparedness for Handicapped Persons).
Basis A. [ MAG 51, Basis 1 1)
The SPMC's protective action plan is a generic one for I
all those in the resident population who have handicaps.
I Once contacted, by phone or (if hearing-impaired) by Route Guide, the individual is asked to verify his or her transportation requirements in the event that an evacuation is recommended. If a PAR to shelter is in effect at the time contact is made, the individual is given some brief, pre-written sheltering instructions. If a PAR to evacuate is in effect at that time, the person is offered transportation assistance, either by waiting outside along pre-designated i
pick-up routes or by dispatching a wheelchair van or ambulance to the person's home. Following transportation to a reception center, the person is registered and offered temporary shelter in a congregate care facility. This generic plan is inadequate to meet the different needs of different categories of handicapped individuals for each step
' in the process needed to engage in adequate sheltering or evacuation. Therefore, separate protective action plans need to be developed for each of the main categories of handicapped individuals present in the EpZ in order to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. See Memorandum 24 (Radiological Emergency Preparedness for Handicapped Persons), which by its terms " supplements and expands upon the existing guidance" in NUREG 0654, which states as a
)
formal " guideline" that "[p3rotective plans have been developed for all cateaories of handicapped individuals ,
present in the EPZ and integrated into the general 4 o
radiological emergency plan." Id. D.5 (emphasis supplied).
B. [ MAG 51B]
There is one generic element, however, which does need to be included in each of the protective action plans for individuals with different categories of handicaps: for each l handicapped individual who needs assistance with preparing to J
- shelter, sheltering, evacuation preparation, travel processing through a reception center, living in a relocation (congregate care) facility, or recover /re-entry, there needs to be a responsible and knowledgeable contact person to provide communication and physical assistance. Such contact people need to be identified in advance for each individual
{ each activity which requires assistance. The SPMC fails to L
provide reasonable assistance that such contact people are available 24, pp. 5-6.
for each assistant-requiring activity. See G.M.
C. [ MAG 51C)
- 1. Evacuation. Once they are notified by phone to evacuate, some of those persons who are blind will neea assistance with packing necessities, packing provisions for their guide dog, with egress from buildings, and with
! entering unfamiliar vehicles, reception centers, and congregate care centers. Deaf persons will need someone to communicate with them b b
the evacuation process.y The writing and/or by pre-written signing generic through message these Pro. 2.7,individuals receive does not offer this assistance.
- p. 15, Attachment 3.
- 2. If sheltering is ordered, some individuals who are blind will need a responsible contact to make sure windows I
j and ventilators are closed and a wet cloth is being used for respiratory protection. Deaf persons will need a contact person 7.
to keep them informed of EBS messages. See G.M. 24 at There is to perform no assurance this function. that Route Guides will be available D. [ MAG 51D) 1
} 1. Evacuation. The evacuation needs of the home-bound mobility-impaired population has not been adequately provided for in the SPMC because there are an inadequate number of ambulances and wheelchair vans to transport them in a timely fashion. At the reception centers and the host special facility there appear to be accessibility problems, based on examination of the floor plans provided. Bathroom facilities 1
are seriously deficient at the Reception Centers because i there are not enough toilet stalls and they are not wide !
stalls. Necessary ramps appear to be lacking.
1 The Decontamination impaired. Trailers are not accessible to the mobility-
- 2. Shelter. The SPMC does not appear to give mobility-impaired persons a choice if they prefer to be sheltered in-their own homes or at work rather than undergo the strain of evacuation. See G.M. 24 at 7. Whenever they shelter, those i' with mobility impairments need a responsible contact to check f
on closure of windows and ventilators and on respiratory protection.
i The SPMC does not ensure that such a person will be available. Inadequate provision is made to have KI available for those whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or very difficult.
1, II.J.10.e. Seg NUREG 06545, Rev. 1 Supp.
E. [ MAG 51E, Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.)
- 1. Evacuation. The non-functional and emotionally disturbed will need the assistance of trained staff on a one-to-one or other appropriate ratio. At the Monitoring / Reception Center, a Special area should be set aside for registering, monitoring, and decontamination of the mentally and emotionally disturbed and for their maintenance, where staff can exercise appropriate supervision'and control, and can administer medication. G.M. 24 at 8. The SPMC has not made such arrangements. Agreements to receive a specific l
L number of individuals should be made with mental facilities outside the EPZ, to accommodate non-functional severe cases.
G.M. 24 at 8. This has not been done. Responsible staff should remain with each mentally or emotionally impaired homebound entry' phases.
person throughout the reception and recovery /re-G.M. 24 at 8. This, too, has not been provided.
- 2. Shelter. A responsible contact is needed to perform or supervise the required protective actions. G.M. 24 at 8.
The SPMC is deficient in this respect.
F. (TON 3, Basis 5)
} The SPMC (I.P. 2.10, p. 19) identifies five schools within Newbury and five special facilities. The SPMC fails
' to identify what special transportation requirements those facilities may have or provide any reasonable assurance that such requirements can effectively be met. The SPMC fails to identify reasonable routes of access to and departure from 1 the facilities.
I i
Applicable Board Ruling (s) 3
" Applicants and Staff do not object to the contention so 1 D
long as it is understood to relate to transportation resources available to the schools and special facilities of Newbury identified in the SPMC . . .
[ TON) Contention 3 is accepted with the limitations proposed by Applicants and Staff." Order II at 33.
JI 50 IMAG 54; TON 10; SAPL 11; SAPL 7: TOA 4 Df 211
[.
I: Participating-Parties: !
MAG, TOA Contention The SPMC fails to identify all of the special facilities which exist in the EPZ. Even for those facilities which have been identified, there is not reasonable assurance that i protective measures can and will be implemented in a timely and effective manner. Thus, the people in special facilities 1 l-I will not be adequately protected in the event of an emergency, and the SPMC, therefore, fails to comply with 10 CFR 9 50.47 (a) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (3) , 50.47 (b) (8) , 50. 47 (b) (10) and NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, II.A.3, II.C.4, II.J.10.d, II.J.10.e and
,. II.J.10.g.
Basis l
A. [ MAG 54A]
Not all the special facilities have been identified or listed in the SPMC. Specifically, not all the nursing homes have been listed. In addition, in the EPZ towns there are other unidentified special facilities in other categories besides nursing homes, homes for the mentally retarded, and elderly housing projects. These categories include community residences for the mentally ill, transition homes for battered women, and local lock-ups.
B. [ MAG 54B)
The SPMC neither contains separate emergency response plans for the staff and residents at each of the special facilities nor provides any reasonable assurance that each of these facilities has an adequate facility-specific plan for responding appropriately or in a coordinated or integrated manner with the SPMC in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station. Without adequate facility-specific plans for each special facility, there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be I taken for those in special facilities. While Appendix F
[ refers to a " Generic Massachusetts Special Facilities Plan,"
l I
I
I no generic plan for all special facilities, given their diverse populations, can provide the guidance necessary for each facility to respond appropriately. Moreover, the special facilities have not seen such a plan, and many will
{ not keep it or rely on it even if NHY sends it to them.
C. [ MAG 54C)
The only " support and assistance" (see NUREG 0654, Supp.
L 1, II, J.10.d) provided by NHY's ORO to special facilities
}
when an evacuation has been ordered is transportation assistance in the form of buses, vans and ambulances. For many persons in special facilities this transportation is not sufficient nor usable without further pre-boarding support and assistance from " helpers" in preparing the patients / residents to leave; gathering their clothing, necessary belongings, patient records, and medications; allaying their fears, anxieties and bewilderment; treating those who suffer shock and " transfer trauma"; and simply helping individuals with movement impairments onto the buses, vans, and ambulances.
i Without adequate emergency response
) plans for each special facility, there is no assurance that special facility staff can and will perform all these support i
and assistance functions. The implementing procedures for the drivers does not mention offering this assistance, nor is there any assurance that the drivers have the prior experience or training which would enable them to respond I
appropriately to a wide range of needs and difficulties which the residents will have in preparing to board and boarding the transport vehicles.
D. [ MAG 54D]
The implementing procedures for the special population liaisons are poorly drafted, vague, and confusing. For example, Pro-1.10 5 5.2.1 instructs the Special Population Liaisons upon arrival at the Staging Area to " proceed to your location as shown in Attachment 3, Layout of Staging area, of Implementing Procedure 3.2." The Attachment referred to is the NHY ORO Message Form, not the staging area layout, which is Attachment 5 of Pro-3.2. Moreover, the procedures for the f Special Population Liaisons are set forth in two separate Implementing Procedures (1.10 and 2.7) which are neither identical nor sufficiently integrated with each other to ensure that confusion and mistakes will not occur.
E. [ Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, l 1989.]
l F. [ Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.]
V
i G.- [ MAG 54G) !
> The Implementing Procedures do not make it clear what the Special Population Coordinator will tell the Liaisons to
{.
do when the Coordinator is informed that NHY's ORO has
" recommended" a PAR to state or local officials but is awaiting a response. The procedures for Special Population Coordinators and Special Population Liaisons do not differentiate clearly between a PAR which has been recommended by NHY's ORO but is not yet authorized (or L rejected) and a PAR being recommended after having been authorized by stata/ local officials. If the SPMC I.'
contemplates sending buses to special facilities upon ORO's I mere recommendation of an evacuation PAR to state / local officials, this would create a host of problems, especially if the. state / local officials were to decide sometime later l when the buses were loading to direct the population to
) shelter. If the SPMC does not contemplate that-buses / ambulances would be sent upon the issuance by ORO of a mere PAR recommendation to state / local officials, it should clearly state this in the Implementing Procedures and eliminate this confusion.
H. [ MAG 54H]
The SPMC's reliance on the sixteen bus companies listed
( in Appendix M, pp. M-4, 5, to provide the drivers, vans and l buses listed is unfounded. At least eight of the sixteen companies have either confirmed that they will not participate or that they will offer only the buses, vans and drivers that might be available, if any, at the time of an emergency. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that a single bus, van or driver will be available from at least L eight of the sixteen companies relied upon. The remaining companies do not have sufficient drivers and buses to transport all those persons in special facilities out of the EPZ in a timely fashion.
I' I. [ MAG 54I]
The SPMC significantly underestimates the number of ambulances and wheelchair vans needed. This stems, in part, from a failure to correctly identify the number of those j needing more specialized transportation than regular buses
) can provide. Appendix M, p. M-16, indicates that the SPMC will be relying on 48 buses, 21 ambulances (or 6 evacuation bed buses) and 36 wheelchair vans to transport those in the special facilities identified. To meet the needs of this special population, a much higher percentage of ambulances
, and wheelchair vans is needed. Buses, especially school i buses but coaches as well, are unsuitable modes of I
i transportation for large numbers of those who are elderly or mentally retarded. '
1 J. [ MAG 54J]
{
The SPMC states that evacuation bed buses "may be
}-
)
substituted for ambulances when patient care levels permit."
Appendix M, p. M-16. There are no standards or procedures provided anywhere in the SPMC for having an ORO staffer make this judgment, nor are the Special Population Coordinator and Liaisons qualified to make it. If this judgment is is t to the administrator of the special facility by the SPMC, most administrators of nursing homes will not permit the
! frail elderly or others who may be bedridden to be i
transported in bed buses, viewing it as too crude a method to ensure.the patient's health and well-being. Instead, administrators will insist on evacuating these individuals in ambulances. As a result, the evacuation of special facilities will not be completed in a timely fashion.
K. [ MAG 54K]
The plans call for an insufficient number of ambulances to relocate all those in special facilities (non-hospitals)
I who need to be transported by ambulance in the event of an evacuation. In Appendix M, p. M-16, the SpMC calls for 21 ambulances to meet this need. Significantly more ambulances l will be needed for this population. "
, L. [ MAG 54L]
)
The SPMC's reliance for a prompt response on the nine (9) ambulance companies listed in Appendix M, pp. M-138, 139, is unfounded. Six (6) of the companies cannot be relied upon at the time of an emergency to provide all or some of the ambulances indicated. In many instances this stems from an intent by company owners to honor existing prior commitments first before responding to a Seabrook evacuation. For some companies, no drivers have agreed to participate. One company has dropped out altogether, and another is out-of-
} business. Also, when it was enlisting the companies' participation, NHY appears to have: (1) stressed that it was extremely unlikely that the company would ever be called on to perform, and (2) glossed over the potential hazards the job entails, failing in some cases even to inform the owner that ambulances might be traveling into areas which were in or had been in the path of a radiation plume. There is no l
' reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency, the ORO will be able to produce sufficient responding ambulances to evacuate those in special facilities in a timely fashion.
i
)
M. [ MAG 54M]
The SPMC's provisions offer no reasonable assurance that !
sheltering can or will be implemented appropriately or in a timely fashion in the special facilities. The SPMC contains procedures for having the Special Population Liaisons call the special facilities and read a prescripted "Special Population Protective Action Message." Pro-2.7, p. 14, j Attachment 3. If sheltering is recommended the Liaison is to
) call and say: " Sheltering is the recommended action for your area at this time. Please implement your facility's
- sheltering procedures. Please take the following actions
- 1. Close all doors, windows, and vents.
- 2. Turn off all fans, heating, and air-conditioning which use air drawn from outside.
- 3. Extinguish unnecessary combustion.
] 4. Use telephones for emergencies only.
) 5. Remain indoors until advised otherwise.
Move to the basement or the room with fewest windows.
- 6. Keep radio or TV on for Emergency Broadcast System information.
Numerous problems exist with sucn a message. It assumes without any basis for doing so that the facility has its own sheltering procedures. For those facilities lucky enough to have such procedures, the message is contradictory and confusing: the facility is to implement its own procedures and "take the following actions." Some of these actions
(" Move to the basement or the room with the fewest windows")
may well be inconsistent with the facility's own plans. The message is also too rigid to encourage facility staff to uce the appropriate judgment necessary about such critical l matters as turning off all fans, heating, and air
! conditioning in light of the needs of the frail elderly and handicapped population to be protected. For those facilities which have no sheltering plans, the message simply affords
) inadequate guidance on how to implement a timely, safe, and effective sheltering response. No specific TV or radio stations are mentioned for receiving EBS information.
/ N. [ MAG 54N, Stipualtion dated February 7, 1989.]
} The SPMC contains inadequate provisions for the
) distribution of dosimetry to those in special facilities whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or very difficult. Egg Plan, p. 3.6-6. Special population liaisonc are to provide "information" about dosimetry, Pro-2.7, 6 5.5.4, but there is no assurance as to what this information I
h 1
will be or that the liaisons are knowledgeable.enough to present the information adequately.
- 0. [SAPL 7, Basis 5 1]
There are no plans of any description and no y specifically designated host facilities for the hospitals,
). nursing homes, day care centers, schools or other special facilities listed in Appendix M of the plan, though there is now reference to " generic" plans for these facilities in Amendment 3 to Appendix F. Appendix M's Index identifies Shriner's Auditorium as the sole listing under " Host School Facilities" and under " Host Special Facilities." The
)
j description of the facility in the letter of agreement is that it consists of an auditorium and wings totalling approximately 125,000 sq. ft. This does not assure an adequate facility for receipt of special facility residents or clients. Further, Shriner's Auditorium is used for circuses, rodeos and the like and may not be available should
! such an event be in progress at the time of an emergency.
f The Hunt Hospital is to take some nursing home residents, though there is no specification of the number that can be taken.
St.
The same it true of the letters of agreements with John's and St. Joseph's hospitals regarding the nurber of h hospital patients that can be received and cared for. There is therefore no reasonable assurance of adequate host i facility services being provided under the SPMC.
P. [SAPL 7, Basis T 2]
! Furthermore, there are no teachers or health care i
facility workers designated in the SPMC to provide services such as supervising children and assisting the elderly and i
infirm to board evacuation vehicles. Neither are there any f~ NHY-ORO personnel designated to provide such services.
Therefore, there is no reasonable assurance of adequate personnel to carry out the protective action responses for special facilities. The -Faek -e f -pban -p re teed ien - fe r -senth Hamp den -s tudents -whe -a bbend -scheek -in -Aresbery r -MJr-resekts -in g
these -s tudents -net-having -equab-pre bee bien -under -the -Faw7 eentrary -de -the -requ i rements -o f-Artiebe -XFV -ef -the -B r / Genstitutient Ch r--ESAPb-FFr-Basi-s-ft The -nembe es -e f -bases -se t -eu t -in -Amendmen d -} -e f -the -S PMe fer -speekab-Feei Fibies-fer -the -& -M essachusetts -eemmunities have -been -dres theally-r a d u c e d -with-ne -apparen t -reesen7 radienake -er -eempensating -measures -previded -de -expFain -these pFan -ehangee r -- (-See -Appendix -M r -p r -M-F6) --Fer -Aresbury speci-aF-feekkities r-fer-exemple r-beees -were -r c d u c c d -frem-F3 down -to -E -and -wheek -ehe ir -vans -were -redeeed -f rem dewn -to -F r-L i
f~ he -anet her -examp}e r -Newburypert '-e-speei ak-faci Hty-bases -were re d u c e d -f rem -?& -dewn -be -and -the -wheeF -ehair -vene -were r e d u c c d -frem -F& -down -de -F r --Absent -a -reasenable -number -ef emergeney -vehi-el es -fer -the -speehal--f aci-Mbies -fer -these -and
) the -e ther -Mass achere t te -EP & -eemmuniti-ee r -the re -i e -ne reasonable -assurenee -the d -res iden te -e f -speciel--f aci-hties -een
}
be preteetede--The-vehiebe-nembers-are-eed-ferth-in-SPMe ,
l I
Ame nd me n t - + -are -net -en -reasenabl-e -g i ven -the -nambe rs -ef speciak -f acindy -residents -in -these-eemmenitieer R. [ TON 10, Basis 1)
The SPMC (Appendix J, p. 1) identifies day care / nursery schools in each municipality within the EPZ but omits from that listing the operating day care facilities in the Town of Newbury.. The SPMC fails to identify the locations of such
(
facilities, the number of infants and other children L
enrolled, the number of staff personnel or how any special transportation requirements of the facilities will be met.
S. [TOA 4D.2]
I The-9PMe-fans-te previde-an-adequate pretective-aedien p han r-inehuding -neeeseary -staffing r-fer-seheel-e r-nursi ng
) hemee r -and -ether -speciak -f eeiMbiee r-See r -e rg r r -SPMe -Plan-pp r-} r&-} -threugh-} r&--0 . There is no plan in the SPMC as to how the PARS will be implemented.
I Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"SAPL Contention 7 is admitted except for the second sentence U.S. and the references to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution as a basis." Order I at 124.
I "We admit (TOA Contention] Basis 4.D as limited to the portion of sub-basis 4,D(2) alleging that '[t]here is no plan in the SPMC as to how PARS will be implemented' (for special needs facilities)." Order II at 12.
VII. EVACUATION EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES f JI 51 IMAG 55; SAPL 71 Participating Party: MAG contention j-The SPMC proposes that individuals who have been j evacuated from special facilities will be relocated to a single " host special facility". This special host facility contains a large auditorium, an arena, and miscellaneous space on two floors. The SPMC's plans for use of this
i I
facility do not provide reasonable assurance that it will be available in a timely fashion in the event of an emergency or that, even if available, it will be adequate for use as a special needs congregate care center, or that the care l available will be adequate for the number and kind of special needs individuals to be sent there. The SPMC therefore fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(a) (1), 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b}(8),
5 0. 4 7 (b) (10) , and NUREG 0654, Supp. 1, II A.3, II C.4, II J.10.d., and II J.10.g. '
\ Basis A. [ MAG 55A]
This facility is frequently used for a variety of special events including a circus, a rodeo, and a wide variety of "shows".
There is no reasonable assurance that during such an event the facility can be converted in a timely fashion into a facility capable of meeting the relocation needs of nursing home residents, the mentally retarded, those in other special facilities, and the transport dependent population.
B. (MAG 55B)
In Appendix M, p. M-18, the facility is noted as showing a capacity to handle impaired individuals.
2,000 special facility and mobility Given that the second floor of the facility is not serviced by an elevator, that much of the first floor will be serving simultaneously as the sole host school facility for over 9,000 school aged children, that parts of the first floor would be unsuitable as relocation space for those who are less than completely ambulatory, and that a large number of staff must also be present to assist and care for these special needs individuals, the maximum feasible number of special facility and mobility-impaired individuals who can be adequately cared for overnight in this facility is significantly less than 2,000. At the same time, the total number of special facility and mobility-impaired individuals who reasonably may need a place of relocation significantly exceeds 2,000, there are a number of special facilities in the EPZ which have not been identified in the SPMC, and the size of the mobility-impaired population has also been significantly underestimated. Furthermore, the p plan assumes that only 80% of those individuals who are in special facilities or who are mobility-impaired will require ')
overnight shelter. Appendix M, p. M-16. No basis is presented to support this assumption, and it is imprudent.
In the event of an evacuation from the six Massachusetts communities, when all the nursing homes, elderly housing projects, group homes for the mentally retarded, etc. are evacuated and transported to this host special facility, I
L
>=
[~ there are no'public' announcements, as there are for schools, instructing family members to pick up the residents of these special. facilities at the host facility. The SPMC therefore b..
ought to provide the means to shelter, feed, and appropriately care for all these individuals, not 80% of '
i them. This number alone, when all special facilities are l- counted, exceeds 2,000 individuals. To this number should be
). added the mobility-impaired individuals who have been either '
bused out of the EPZ or who have engaged in ride-sharing to evacuate but have no place to stay. A prudent estimate would j
): be that at least 2,500 special needs individuals would need '
care at this special host facility. Add to this the space needed to accommodate adequate staff and care-providers for L this population and there is a need to accommodate at least j i
2,750 persons on a 24-hour basis at the host special '
facility, far more than the " capacity" of the space available.
C. [ MAG 55C]
l I There is no reasonable assurance that there will be sufficient, or indeed any, beds, blankets, food, or basic care available at the host special facility. The SPMC relies
(.
}
on the American Red Cross to establish and operate all congregate care centers, see Plan, 9 2.4.2A. While the SPMC contains a mechanism to request a Red Cross response, Pro-1.6, there is no reasonable assurance that if contacted the
)- Red Cross can respond in time with sufficient staff and resources to turn this facility, possibly then housing a circus, rodeo, or other "show", into a special needs congregate care facility by the time evacuees arrive.
Because it is the policy of the American Red Cross to engage in planning for nuclear power plant disasters only in concert j with governmental planning efforts, the American Red Cross
}- has undertaken no planning for its response in Massachusetts to a disaster at Seabrook Station. Thus, in the event of an emergency, the Red Cross can only respond on an ad h2g basis to provide emergency relief services in Massachusetts. In a recent letter to NHY, a senior official of the American Red Cross commented on the lack of state and local participation in the planning process in Massachusetts by stating:
There should be no doubt that without close coordination of Red Cross and government activities within the framework of tested disaster response plan, Red Cross relief efforts will be negatively affected.
The plan identifies 27 other congregate care centers for those without special needs, see Appendix M, pp. M-9 through M-12. Given responsibility for all these congregate care
I l
centers at once, there is no reasonable assurance that the Red Cross can and will respond in a timely manner, or at all, I I to provide the beds, blankets, food, or any other assistance needed at this special host facility.
l D. [ MAG 55D) !
)
There is no reasonable assurance that the thousands of j
special needs individuals who will end up at the host special facility will be provided with the minimal level of medical care, special diets, and special personal attention (bathing, dressing, etc.) that they need to ensure their health and
)
well being. There is no provision in the SPMC regarding who is to provide this special care. There is no assurance that nursing home owners will send sufficient staff to the host special facility to provide the special care needed by the
{ infirm and frail elderly or those on special diets or medications, nor is there any provision which assures that the for.
mentally retarded will be safely and appropriately cared The American Red Cross does not provide "special" care I
of this kind even when they are participating in planning for nuclear power plant disasters. Thus, there can be no
) presumption that they will do so on an ad h_qc basis here.
The SPMC is inferior to other plans which provide that those in nursing homes and other special facilities are relocated to kin otbar nursing homes and special facilities of the same o f .,
s*e staff are trained and equipped to provide the kind 1 care these evacuees would need.
E. [ MAG 55E)
Owners, operators, administrators, and staff of the
} special facilities have no assurance that the residents of j
their facilities can and will be adequately cared for at the special host facility upon relocation. They have not even been told the name of the special host facility to which their residents would be transported. If, at the time of an emergency, they are told that their residents are to be transported to this site, mest responsible owners, operators,
[
/
administrators, and staff will resist, viewing the facility itself to be patently inadequate. For those who inquire what the plans are for caring for their residents at the facility upon relocation, those plans, if described accurately, will be viewed to be patently 4 cadaquate. Thus, regardless of the participation of state and local officials, most of those who operate and staff the special facilities will not permit those in their care to be relocated to this host facility.
Instead, operators and staff will respond in an ad hoc fashion.
( ,
i i
l F. [ MAG 55H] i L
The American Red Cross has not certified that this
)
facility meets the critoria established by the ARC for h ss care shelters plant disaster. to be used for evacuees from a nuclear power Absent certification by the American Red Cross, there is no reasonable assurance that the ARC will in
) fact establish this shelter during an emergency. l G. [ MAG SSI)
I The facility does not meet the American Red Cross criteria for shelters for nuclear power plant disasters.
H. [ MAG 55J) l Regardless whether the facility meets the ARC generic shelter standards, the facility itself is not suitable for S
use as a host special facility for the population intended.
I. [ MAG 55K) t Use of this facility as a shelter for %e elderly in nursing homes and elderly housing projects cill be hazardous i
to the health and well-being of tnese individuals because ic will substantially exacerbate the effects of the " transfer trauma" they will already be experiencing from the evacuation experience itself.
Jr--[-SAFb-Fr-Basis-t-Fi p There-are-ne phans-of-any-description-and-ne t ' eekfi-eaHy-designated-hest-feenides-fer-the-hespitaks r
.tursing-hweer-day-care-eenbersr scho;Fs-er-ether-brveia-1 i faciMbies-Meted-ia-Appendix-M-ef-the-phanr-though <there-is new-referenee-te ugenerie m . plans-fer-these-faehnties-in Amendment he -Appendix -P r --Appendix -M 's -Endex -identifits
)
Shriner's-Auditeri-em-as-the-sebe-hsting-ender EHesb-Seheet Faekhti-est-and-ander nHeeb-speciaF-FaeihtiesrE--The deee r i p hien -e f -the - feeiMby -in -the -hether -ef -ag reemen t -i s tha t -it -eensists -e f -an -auditerium -and -wings -be ta bHng f approximately -M& r&&& -sq r-f b r --Phis -dees -ne t-assere -en adequate-fae i-Mby-fer-receipt -ef-speci ah-f ac hHty -resi dents er -ebients r --Furthe r r-Shriner 's -Auditeri em -is-esed -fer f e ireu see r-redees -and -the -Hke -and -m ay -ne t -be -av a Mab he -sheeld such -an -event -be -in -prog ress -at -the -ume -e f -an -eme rgency r-
)
The -Hen t -Hespital--i-s -de -take -seme -nurs ing -heme -res iden te-though -there -i-s -ne -spsei ficatien -o f -the -nember -th a t -ean -be I taken r --The -s ame -i-s -tree -e f -the -Fetters -e f -ag reements -w ith Sb r -John 's -and -Sb c-Jeseph 's -hospitabs -regarding -the -nember -ef hespital- patients-that-ean-be-received-and-eared-fere--There
! i
f l
I l i-s - there fe n -ne -reason ab Fe -asse r anee -e f -adequa de -hest fachhdy-se. ' %s-bei-ng-preybeed-ender-the-SPMe-Y r-- ?ShPh-% r-B&si-s -$~-2 9 Perdhermere r -there -are -ne -deachers -er -health -eare faci-Hty-werkers-designeted-in-the-SPMe-de provi-de-services seeh -as -superv is ing -eh nd ren -and -assi-sting -the -elderFy -and i n nem -de -beard -eveee adien -vehiel-es r - -Neidher -are -there -any NHV-GRG -persenneF -des igr. a ded -te -p reytde -seeh -services r-j There Fere r -there -is -ne -reate n able -asse r enee -e f -acequa te personne l--he -carry -end -the -predeedkve -eedien -responses -fer specieF-faehMbiesr-The-Faek-ef plan predeediert-for-Seeth Hampton-etudend'.r-whe-attend scho;F-in-Anesburyr-MA-reseFes-in dhese-stedends-ned-having-equeF-predeedien-eader-tht -Fawr een trary - de -the -requi renen ts -e f -Artiel-e -XIV -ef - bhe -B r -Sv l- eensdidedien.
I Applicable Board Ruling (s)
I "SAPL Contention: 7 is admitted except for the sece;.d senterue end the references to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as a basis." Order I at 124.
I JI 52 fMAG 66; MAG 681 Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.
JI S3 IMAG 67 .SAPL 21 Participating Parties: MAG, COH l
contention l
) The facility identified as a staging area located in Haverhill at 145-185 Water Street is not now available to the ORO for this purpose and no other facility has been identified. The City of Haverhill on February 26, 1988 issued a Cease and Desist Order as to all uses of the premises as a Staging Area based on violations of the City of j Haverhill Zoning Code, 9 255.13. In April, 1988, the Superior Court of the commonwealth entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting any further use of these i premises for the purpose. In light of the function and role
} of the staging Area in the SPMC, the absence of any identified lawful 1cOation for such a facility makes the effective implementation of the SPMC impossible and the SPMC
{ fails to meet the standards set forth at 50.47 (b) (3) , (8),
I (10) and MUREG 0654 II J.10.g, k and H.4.
! ,5
\
)
Basis
) A. [SAPL 2, Basis $)
The SPMC states that the NHY Offsite Response Staging Area is located at 145 Water Street in Haverhill, Massachusetts (see 5.2.2.). The city of Haverhill issued a cease and desist order to Public Service Company of New Hampshire and Mass Electric on February 26, 1988 to preven +.
the use of the facility for an emergency drill. The Assistant City Solicitor for the City of Haverhill stated t that a restraining order was obtained from Superior Court to
> stop a subsequent drill that was to go forward on March 31, 1988. That drill was called off. The City of Haverhill has no intention of allowing that area to be used as a staging area for implementation of the SPMC.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
L "The Board does not accept the Staff's recommendation that the contention [ MAG 67] be rejected under the presumptions of the planning rule because, in part, the l Applicants have elected to meet the issue on its factual merits. Since the Applicants have the ultimate burden of proof and have much at stake we defer to their judgment. The contention is accepted.
"However, if the issue chould ripen for summary consideration by the Board, we might entertain a well pleaded
) and supported motion which raises issues such as:
"Whether a quasi-legislative body such as the City of Haverhill Zoning Board of Appeals is a body of government officials subject to the presumption tat state and local officials will exercise their best efforts to protect their citizens in an actual emergency.
"May the presumption, or one like it, apply before, but in real anticipation of, an emergency where the facility is actually licensed and operating?
"Where legislative action fully within the discretion of l
the officials, for example, the repeal of legislation specifically targeted against licensing, would be in the best interests of the public safety, may it be presumed that the official will take that action?" Order I at 94.
"As in MAG Contention 67, suora, the Applicants raise a r factual dispute over the correctness of the basis fer this
{ contention. Accordingly, we admit SAPL Contention 2 for litigation (p_f. our ruling on SAPL Contention 6, infra)."
order I at 117.
p f>
l
)
"We agree here with the Applicants' response (at 162)~on y' the matter.of the issue of local zoning ordinaces with trespect,to Transfer Points during an emergency, and that
' litigation.
aspect of-the basis'[of SAPL 6] is not admitted for (See, supra, MAG' Contention 67, and SAPL T
Contentions 2 and 3.)" Order I at 122. j JI 54 (MAG 691 Participating Party: MAG Contention The SPMC relies upon the American Red Cross to establish and operate all 27' congregate care centers and the host I- special facility, yet it does not contain any kind of written agreement with the American Red' Cross which identifies the emergency measures to be provided in Massachusetts and the mutually acceptable criteria for their implementation.
Because it is the policy of the American Red Cross to
!- engage in planning for nuclear power plant disasters only in concert with governmental planning efforts, the American Red Cross has undertaken no planning for its response in Massachusetts to a disaster at Seabrook-Station. It has l
1 therefore not entered into any agreement of any-kind with NHY or the Joint Owners to. provide any services. In the event of an emergency at Seabrook Station, the American Red Cross
) response would be at best AG h22 Such a response does not provide reasonable assurance that any of the congregate care centers or the host specia?, facility will be operated by the American Red Cross or that, if tne Red Cross does act to establish mass care centers in Massachusetts, it can be done in a timely fashion. Tha SPMC therefor 6 fails to comply with 10 CFR 50.47 (a) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (3) , 50. 4 7 (b) (8) ,
} 50. 47 (c) (1) and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.A.3, II.C.5, and II.H.4.
f JI 55 [ MAG 71; MAG 72>; MAG 73; TOA 4A, H; SAPL 11; TOA IB; TON 2A; TOWN 9.1, 31 Participating Parties: MAG, SAPL, TOA Contention
)
} The SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that an adequate number of buses, ambulances, wheelchair vans, vans, L tow trucks, drivers and road crews can and will respond in a timely fashion.
b Therefore, the SPMC violates 10 CFR
- 50. 47 (a) (1) , 50.47(b)(1), 50. 4 7 (b) (3) , 50. 4 7 (b) (10) ,
esiI
- 50. 4 7 (c) (1, and NUREG 0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.A.3.,
II.C.4., II.C.5. and II.J.10.
Basis l
A. [ MAG 71A) f The SPMC's reliance on the 16 bus companies listed in Appendix M, pp. 4, 5, to provide the drivers and buses licted is. unfounded. At least eight of the 16 companies have either i-confirmed that they will not participate or that they will ;
offer only the buses, vans and. drivers that might be available, if any, at the time of the emergency. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that a single bus, van, or driver L
will be available from at least eight of the 16 companies relied.upon. The remaining companies do not have sufficient drivers, buses and vans to evacuate the transport-p dependent / mobility-impaired population and all those in hospitals,_special facilities, and schools, and daycare/ nurseries who need bus / van transportation. This i
number is larger than the SPMC estimates, ;
B. -[F%G 71B]
) The SPMC provides no reasonable assurances that the buses'and drivers which will be participating can be mobilized quickly enough to ensure a timely response. First, many of the companies are located at substantial distances from the EPZ< -Second, the SPMC's procedures in Pro. 2.10 for notifying bus companies, determining the availability of I buses and drivers, assigning particular buses to particular bus'needs, assigning Bus Dispatchers, Route Guides, and Dosimetry Recordkeepers, and sending these ORO staffers off to the assigned bus _ycrds is designed for a slow-breaking
, radiological emergency. These procedures are too cumbersome and time-consuming to ensure a timely response in a fast-breaking accident. Third, by dispatching Bus dispatchers, i
t Dosimetry Recordkeepers, and Route Guides to bus yards to assemble and brief the drivers, to distribute dosimetry and Bus Driver Packets, and to lead back in convoy-style the company's full contingent of responding buses, see Plan, 9 3.6.1(B), the SPMC ensures that each company can respond Only as fast as either its last responding bus driver or the ORO bus yard team, whomever arrives at the bus yard last. This is an extremely inefficient, " weak-link" syst6a. Moreover, convoys of buses alve.ys travel more slowly thdi individual buses do, and conveyn will have a much more difficult time
> traveling into the EPZ against avacuating traffic than single buses would, i
18 -
t
C. [ MAG 72A)
The SPMC relies on nine (9) private ambulance companies to provide all the ambulances and wheelchair vans needed to
) l evacuate all those who reasonably may need to be transported by such vehicles during a radiological emergency. This includes all persons in the two EPZ hospitals, the special facilities, and the mobility-impaired transport dependent population who need such vehicles in order to evacuate and
, relocate. Also needing ambulances will be those who are
) injured during the emergency, cidher-by-naturek-evender-aude accidender-and-dlta-Mke-er by radiation. Of these nine companies, indicates that one is out of business and a second I
has dropped out after finding that its drivers would not agree to participate. One company which had agreed in a letter.of agreement to provide four ambulances can provide i
reasonable assurance of providing only two in an emergency.
} Another which had a letter of agreement to provide three ambulances entered into a contract to provide only two. One company actually believes it could provide 22 ambulances and i
12 wheelchair vans, but these vehicles are based all over the state and the company has received no assurances yet from its drivers; so there is no reasonable assurance that it can and
)
will provide any vehicles / drivers in an emergeacy in a timely fashion. Another company with a letter of agrt9 ment to provide ten ambulances, five wheelchair vans, al.d two critical caste units claims to ha're only 0 vehicles, not 17, L and has agreed to make these available only on an "as available" basis if its drivers will participate, which it thinks is unlikely. The remaining three companies have
{ agreed to provide a total of six ambulances / driver teams and three ambulettes/ driver teams, but the ambulettes are not licensed in Massachusetts and cannot be used there.
l D. [ MAG 72B]
In seeking to enlist the participation of these
! ambulance companies and their drivers, NHY led at least some of the companies and' drivers to believe that they would not be driving into arear close to seabrook Station which were radiologically contaminated. This was done through a combination of active misrepresentation and critical omission of facts regarding what kinds of individuals might need ambulance services and where they would be located. Thus, i
there is no reasonable assurance
- hat even these ambulances / driver tuahs that do respond during an emergency will drive into radiologically contaminated areas or handle radiologically contaminated individuals. To the extent that contracts can be construed to require such services, these contracts were obtained using unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation of M.G.L. c. 93A, s 2, and are unenforceable.
t t
)
c L E. [ MAG 73A) o I The NHY ORO does not rely on an adequate number of tow trucks to enable all potential road obstructions to be removed in a timely fashion. In Appendix M, p. M-3,.there are only four road crev (tow) companies listed. For these i companies, Appendix M lists a total inventory of 31 tow . !
vehicles. Even if all these vehicles could respond, there would not-be sufficient tow vehicles to remove all the road L impediments in a timely fashion that can reasonably be i expected during an evacuation of the entire EPZ in l Massachusetts. 'Fhese -t-mpedimen ts -with -eeeur -because -e f -the ;
)
many-autemebike -aecidente r-vehi-ekes -overheating -and -stakhing- j s
vehithes-rt+Mning-eut-ef gasr-and-vehiehes-abandened-dering-en '
evacuatien* Many more tow trucks are needed.
F. [ MAG 73B] i The SPMC's reliance on the four road crew companies listed in Appendix M is unfounded. Two of the companies have
)
dropped out of ORO altogether and will not respond in an emergency. A third company will not renew its agreement to participate after the first year, and even now cannot provide
) reasonable assurance that its drivers will show up in the event of a radiological emergency. The final company (two tow trucks) can give no reasonable assurance that it would respond and feels that it is under no contractual obligation to do so.
G. [ MAG 73C]
Even assuming that tow trucks are available to respond, the SPMC deploys only two tow trucks per town, assigning them both to the " transfer point."{ Pro. 2.10, 5 5.4.7(B). Thus, at most, a total of only 12 tow vehicles will be deployed throughout the six Massachusetts communities. 'This is far I short of the number needed to clear the evacuation routes of all reasonably anticipated blockages in a timely fashion.
H. [SAPL 11, Basis 1)
The numbers of buses set out in Amendment 3 of the SPMC for special facilities for the 6 Massachusetts communitie.s have been drastically reduced with no apparent reason, rationale or compensating measures provided to explain these plan changes. (See Appendix M, p. M-16) For Amesbury l
special facilities, for example, buses were reduced from 13 down to 1 and wheel chair vans were reduced from 9 down to 1.
As another example, Newburyport's special facility buses were reduced from 25 down to 2 and the wheel chair vans were f reduced from 18 down to 1. Absent a reasonable number of
{
p' 1 emergency vehicles for the special facilities for these and the'other Massachusetts EPZ communities, there is~oo i reasonable assurance'that residents of special fa ilities can I be protected. The vehicle numbers are' set forth in SPMC ,
Amendment 4 are not all reasonable given the numbers of j special facility residents in those communities.
I. [TOA 1B) l j
Even assuming these Letters of' Agreement, on their face, [
purported to create a binding commitment to provide emergency i
. resources, the SPMC fails to demonstrate that those ;
)-
individuals deemed "available" to perform emergency services i have in fact been asked, and agreed, to provide these services in an actual emergency, or that these individuals, many employed far from the EPZ, could promptly be located, notified, and deployed to respond to a nuclear accident.
Traffic accidents or additional delay will occur as emergency personnel, business operators, or commuters returning for family members, must maneuver through outgoing evacuation I
traffic, or queue at the perimeter of the EPZ, awaiting identification checks. SPMC Plan, p. 3.6-14.
J. [TOA 4A)
Following declaration of an emergency, the SPMC provides that bus companies'should be contacted to " determine the number of drivers and vehicles (buses and vans, if applicable) which would be available and their mobilization o times . . . bus company managers will call back with the I~ number of vehicles and drivers which can be provided . . . "
PROCEDURES 2.10, p. 5. This underscores two significant i
inadequacies in the SPMC:
(1) On its face, the SPMC indicates that each Letter of Agreement does ILq1; accurately state the number of manned
' vehicles which a particular company can provide in an actual emergency, and that this determination will only be made at the time of an actual emergency.
(2) Substantial delay in deploying emergency transportation will occur as each bus company attempts to determine its availability of manned vehicles. For the SPMC
~ indicates that bus companies will be assigned to a particular need only after each bus company has assessed its available resources, informed NHY, and the total resource pool is known. See, PROCEDURES 2.10, p. 5 (B) and (F).
K. [TOA 4H)
There is no reasonable assurance that the bus drivers who purportedly have agreed to respond to an emergency at p
Seabrook in fact have sufficient experience or training to perform this function. Under the SPMC, bus drivers of L ' emergency: vehicles are not requiredito have any prior experience in 4:mergency operations, no prior experience with H
.special needs populations, and no prior experience busing- I small children, including school children. SPMC Plan, pp.-
V' '2.1-29,.30. Additionally, even assuming these individuals.
T have adequate training and experience, the SPMC fails to L
demonstrate that theLindividual bus drivers, or other private citizens with apparent emergency roles such as teachers and health care staff, have in fact agreed to be available to g
I
- drive in an actual emergency.
L' L. [ TON 2a] '
5 L The SPMC provides that nine buses will be available to evacuate Newbury residents and transients. The SPMC fails to
'4 provide any empirical data to support the conclusion that j'
this number of buses is sufficient to provide adequate evacuation of. transportation dependent persons.
M. [ TOWN 9.1]
I The plan provides for tow trucks to be located at a staging area somewhere in Groveland. The plan does not L specify the number of tow trucks or provide any basis for a
)
finding'that the number will be adequate to respond to disabled vehicles. Nor is there any reasonable assurance i
that the trucks would be able to effectively-reach disabled
" vehicles in West Newbury in a timely manner since they would be entering West Newbury against the flow of outgoing evacuating traffic.
N. [ TOWN 9.3]
The plan fails to provide an adequate basis for a h finding'that the number of ambulances and ather emergency vehicles for the tran.9portation of persons with special needs, or personnel to man those vehicles, are sufficient to h- reasonably assure the safety of persons in West Newbury requiring such transportation. Nor does the plan provide an adequate basis for a finding that such vehicles would be able to reach persons in West Newbury requiring such assistance in a timely manner.
I_
Applicable Board Ruling (s) f "The Staff would exclude from litigation that aspect of the bases which would require transportation for persons sustaining non-radiological injuries during an emergency
. . . We agree with the Staff. The respective part of [ MAG L
72] Basis A'is rejected." Order I at 97 - 98.
" Basis 4.H to this contention [TOA 4] is admitted to the extent that it challenges the experience and training of bus drivers to perform during an emergency, and to the extent
' that other private citizens such as teachers and health ca Orderhave staff II at agreed 13 - 14.to be available to drive an emergency." re
}
"We are not persuaded by the objections that the matters raised by Amesbury [in TOA Contention 1] in regard to
' mandated traffic queues at the EPZ perimeter, inadequate
! traffic control devices on evacuation routes and unrealistic L staff assignments' (that affect the interests of Amesbury) have been litigated in the NHREEP phase of this proceeding.
However, separate LOAs are n21 required for individuals who t
collectively provide a labor force or activity, for I- recipients as opposed to providers of services nor for response regulations organizations or executivewhose orders.functions are cove, red by laws, Allegations to the contrary will not be litigated 18, 1987, at 17)."
(See our Memorandum and Order of May Order II at 5.
JI 56 ISAPL 31 Participating Parties: MAG, SAPL l Contention The SPMC fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate procedures, personnel, equipment and facilities for radiological monitoring and decontamination of general public evacuees, emergency workers and special facility evacuees (e.g. nursing home residents) have been established.
Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 5 50. 47 (a) (1) ,
5 50. 41,7 (b) (8) , 5 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , 5 50. 4 7 (b) (11) and NUREG - 0654, Rev. Supp. 1 II.H.4, II.J.10.d, II.J.12, II, K.S.a and l K.5.b. have not been met.
Basis A. [SAPL 3, Basis $)
The SPMC fails to provide even a reasonably complete
}
description of the facilities, personnel and equipment for monitoring and decontaminating general public evacuees, emergency workers and special facility evacuees. Mention is made of two dedicated Monitoring Trailers for general public evacuees which are to be positioned at or dispatched to Reception Centers in North Andover and in Beverly, Massachusetts. The plan does not describe how the trailers will be dispatched to those areas and from where they would be dispatched should that be necessary. Though a diagram is I
1 - - _ - - - - - -
s f
provided, the plan does not describe the total size of the trailers, so it is impossible to get a true picture of the practicability of monitoring a claimed 8,300 evacuees within j a 12-hour period at each trailer. There are 14 monitoring stations and-a-shewers in each trailer. That would work out approximately 1.2 minutes to get each evacuee passed through a monitoring station, which is not possible in the real l world. Ad-te-minutes-per-shewerr-(-the-time given-by Appheands-for-the-NHRERP-deeendaminadien preceduresFr-enty-6 peephe-eeeH-be-deeenhaminated per-shewer per-heerr-whi-eh
! weeM -mean -that -there -weel-d -enhy -be -the -eapabihdy -ef decontaminating-h++-peepte-in-a-FF-heer perhed-in-each-ef-the tra Rers r -er -a -detah -e f -2& & -peepte -f rem -the -enure Messeehesette-perden-of-the-EP&-twhi-eh-i-s-less-than rn-ef i
the pepeFati-en) r--Even-adding-the-eapacity-ef-the-Emergency We rke r -Fac iHby - (-EWF )--which -i-s -unhhety -te -be -ave nnMe - for i ese -by -anyene -ether -than -emergeney -werke rs r -the
} decontamination -eapebi-Mby -ander -the-SPMe-remai ns -wee feny inadequader--Furtherr-there-is-ne-deseri-phien prevised-as-de hew-the-decentami-nation persenneF-9Mered-to-be-avanable-are depFeyedr It is not clear in Appendix 1 that there are a sufficient quantity of survey meters available.
l B. [SAPL 3, Basis 1 2]
The plan for monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers suffers the same deficiencies in regard to questions
> about the size of the facility and the availability of survey meters. Furthermore, the EWF trailer is supposed to be located at the state staging area in Haverhill, Mass. which l
is not going to be available for use (see Contention 2).
Therefore, there are no suitable facilities and no location for emergency worker decontamination identified in the plans.
l C. [SAPL 3, Basis 1 3}
Finally, there is no specific provision in the letters j of agreement with receiving hospitals (Hunt Hospital, St.
John's Hospital, St. Joseph's Hospital) for the monitoring and decontamination of special facility populations from nursing homes, hospitals and other facilities or for
{ monitoring and decontaminating special needs residents who are evacuated from out in the communities. It is likely that t
many of these individuals could not be handled in the trailers at the reception centers. There are no leters (sic) of agreement of any description in the SPMC for Lawrence General Hospital, Lowell General Hospital, Framingham Union j Hospital or Newton-Wellesley Hospital and the LOA's with New England Deaconess Hospital and Brigham and Women's Hospital make no explicit mention of receiving and treating special facility evacuees.
f J.
D. [SAPL 3, Basis 5 4)
) The -de finibien -o f -eentaminadien -whieh -i-e -de -be -addressed b y -deeentaminatien -preceduree -ander -the -sFMe -he -6&& -epm -above no rm e F -backef reund -red i a t ion ;- -whike -in -New -Hampshire - the - kevet I
e f -con tam i n a d ien -requ i ri ng -ae dien -ender -the -NHRERP -se -EGO I epm r --This -previ-des -an -i nequitab be eveh -ef -predeetion -Fer M ass aehesette -residende -as -eempered-te -New -Hampshi re residends, f Applicable Board Ruling (s)
> "SAPL replies to Applicants averral of absense of
( regulatory requirement for identical contamination levels by citing the requirement (in Section 50.47(a)) for reasonable assurance of ' adequate' public protection. However, nothing in the contention [SAPL Contention 3] or bases point to any standard to support a claim that the level of contamination provided in the SPMC is inadequate for determining which persons may require decontamination, or why differences between inadequacy the. criterion values in the two states would indicate SAPL's reliance on the general requirement of 10 C.F.R. 50. 4 7 (a) (1) fails." Order I at 118.
"SAPL's interpretation of Section 50.47 (b) (10) claiming regulatory support for the theory that since radiological
)
monitoring should be accomplished within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> . . . then radiological decontamination should also be completed within the same time frame, also fails." Ordcr I at 119.
"SAPL Contention 3 is admitted in part, as limited to the adequacy and dispatch of the trailers to the staging areas at North Andover, Beverly, and Haverhill, Massachusetts. The balance of the contention is rejected for the same reasons cited above."
Order I at 119.
JJ 57 ISAPL 41 Participating Party: SAPL f contention The SPMC fails to provide adequate means for the handling and disposal of contaminated waste water and contaminated materials, contrary to the requirements of 10 1
CFR 5 50. 47 (a) (1) , 5 50. 4 7 (b) (9) 5 50. 4 7 (b) (11) and NUREG - 0654 II.I.8. and k.5.b.
)
l
)
Basis 1
l A. [SAPL 4, Basis $ 1]
Implementing Procedure 2.9 states at 5.2.10 that a
{ ctorage area outside the trailer for monitoring and decontamination is to be identified for contaminated articles belonging to evacuees and one person is to be designated to guard the articles. The waste is supposed to be double bagged, labeled and set aside in this area. (1P 2.9 at 5.8.4) Adequate personnel to perform this task are not
) designated. What then happens to the waste material is not j described. A radwaste disposal letter of agreement with Chem Nuclear, provided in Appendix C, was only a 2 year contract which began on July 1, 1986 and will expire in July of this year.
lL .No other waste disposal agreements exist in the SPMC.
Therefore, identified for there are no adequate handling procedures and personnel yet waste materials.
i B. [SAPL 4, Basis 1 2]
The trailers used for decontamination at the reception centers and EWF trailer each only have 1200 gallon collection tanks for contaminated waste water. The average 10-minute rlower uses 3-5 gallons per minute and results in 30-50 gallons of waste water. Therefore, the impoundment I
capability of the storage tanks will only be good for approximately 40 showers at best. Unless procedures are made j
for pumping out or replacing storage tanks and (sic) adequate personnel are assigned to those duties, contaminated water will acceptable be released levels toorthe environment whether it is diluted to not.
JI 58 ITOA 1A1 Participating Parties: MAG, TOA Contention The SPMC fails to demonstrate that each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis, fails to provide for an adequate number of available manned emergency vehicles, in violation of 10 CFR S 50.4 7 (a) (1) , 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3),
- 50. 47 (b) (6) , 50. 45 (b) (8) , NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, REV. 1
)
(hereinafter "NUREG-0654") II.A.1.e, II.A.3, II.A.4, II.C.4, and II.F.1.a. Contrary to Applicants' assertions of
" formalized agreements" demonstrating a commitment to provide certain emergency response resources, see SPMC Plan, p. 1.1-f 2, many Letters of Agreement (LOAs) with service providers are specifically identified only as a " proposed contract,"
rather than a binding agreement. Additional Letters of
).
t Agreement are due to expire, by their express terms, on or before September 1, 1988, or even before completion of litigation;on the SPMC before the Licensing Board. There is
~; no reasonable assurance that the Letters of' Agreement j j
proffered by'New Hampshire Yankee'(NHY) represent binding commitments by the purported service providers or that the i' personnel relied upon in the SPMC will in fact be available in the event of an actual emergency at Seabrook Station.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"We are not persuaded by the objections that the matters raised by'Amesbury in regard to ' mandated traffic queues at
). the EPZ perimeter, inadequate traffic control devices on
{ evacuation routes and unrealistic staff assignments' (that affect-.the interests of Amesbury) have been litigated in the NHRERP' phase of this proceeding. However, separate LOAs are nqt required for individuals who collectively provide a labor force or activity, for recipients as opposed to providers of services, nor for response organizations whose functions are covered by laws, regulations or executive orders.
~
Allegations to the contrary will not be litigated. (Egg our Memorandum at S.
and Order of May 18, 1987, at 17)." Order II JI 59 IMAG 641 L
Dismissed by Board as abandoned, at Tr. 17938, 17940.
JI 60 fCON 6; TON 2b; TOS 15; TOWN 8.121 Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 24, 1989.
1 VIII.
COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCES AND RESPONSE i
JI 61 INECNP 31 Participating Parties: MAG, NECNP
- f. Contention L
Applicants have not met the requirements of 10 CFR
{
5 50.47(a) (1) to provide a " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Radiological emergency" at Seabrook because they i
have failed to show what emergency response measures will be
[ taken by the Massachusetts state and local governments in the event that Mode 1 of the SPMC is followed. Section
- 50. 47 (c) (1) (iii) (B) contains the presumptions that a) " state and local government officials will exercise their best
- efforts to protect the health and safety of the public", and i b) where an applicant's inability to comply with 5 50.47(b) results wholly or partially from the nonparticipation of
~
state and local governments, that in the event of an actual Radiological emergency state and local officials would
" generally follow" the utility plan. The SPMC establishes j two_ alternative governments " modes"Mode to follow. for the 1,
Massachusetts state and local 1 will provide only resources'-- i.e. contemplates equipment,that Applicants buses, F
ambulances, personnel, etc. -- to the state and/or local governments. SPMC at 3.1-2. Aside from broadly describing 4 the~ emergency response functions of each state agency, )
however (SPMC, f 2.2), the SPMC does not contain any blueprint for state and local government agencies to follow in undertaking primary responsibility for the emergency response. The plan describes emergency response functions for the New Hampshire Offsite Response Organization ("ORO")
rather than state or local governments. The means by which the state and local governments are thus presumed to " follow"
) the SPMC in Mode 1 consists only of using Applicants' resources in carrying out an ad h2g response. The mere provision of resources to support an unplanned emergency l- response does not adequately compensate for the state and local governments' lack of preparedness to respond to an accident at Seabrook.
I Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"The operative part of NECNP Contention 3 is the factual allegation in the basis that Mode 1 of the SPMC itself provides for no more that an ad h2c response by unprepared state and local governments, assuming that the governments will exercise their best efforts, and even assuming that they would attempt to follow the utility plan. Stated another way, Mode 1 is inadequate because it does not tell the i
)
governments how they could respond to that mode, and the governments would not be prepared to follow it in any event.
Thus the cuality of the response is brought into issue, not the presumption of the response . . .
The contention is not a rebuttal, but a direct attack alleging that the plan cannot be followed. We accept NECNP Contention 3. Moreover, since NECNP has called its position an attempt to rebut the
' follow-the-utility-plan' presumption, by showing that the plan is incapable of effective implementation, NECNP wins more than it sought. The burden of proceeding with the evidence on the contention must be shouldered by Applicants L as a part of their case-in-chief." Order I at 111 - 112.
l JI 62 INECNP 4; TOA 2B; TON 11b]
Participating Parties: -MAG, NECNP
~ Contention To the extent'that the SPMC contemplates integration of the utility's functions'with state and local emergency response functions, it does not compensate adequately for the lack of preparedness of state and local officiels to respond to a radiological emergency at Seabrook.
The SPMC does not provide a mechanism by which the state and-local governments can swiftly and efficiently interact i' with ORO officials to mount a timely and adequate response to an accident. This results from the cumbersome communication and coordination problems created by the parallel existence of government and ORO emergency response organizations. Each counterpart of the state and local response organization must take the time-consuming steps of communicating _and coordinating its efforts with a counterpart in the CRO organization. For each function, the parties must take the time-consuming steps of agreeing on divisions of responsibilities and all of.the accompanying logistics, including communication and sharing of equipment and personnel. To the extent that the state and local governments-might assume responsibility for an accident response under Mode 2, there are no guidelines in the SPMC that are designed for state and local governments to follow.
l :The Implementing Procedures for the SPMC are addressed to the management of the emergency response by the ORO, not state and local governments. There is simply no plan for the governments to follow.
l Basis A r--['Peh-1Bt Even -esseming -prempt -eatherhatien -by -the -eemmenweehh fer -NHV -te -d heet -an -PARE r -the -SPMe -indi+ates -that addhi eneF-bkme-win-be -requi red -fer -eeerdinatien -e f -EBS mess aefee -and -PARE -be tween -the -eemmenweehh -and -the -sta te -ef p
New-Hampshirer--SPMe-Phanr pr}ra-1Gr--There-has-net-beenr-ner
! is -there-anbiekpated r-hewever r-any -yeind-braining -er emergency-exerei-sea-between geverament-efficiale-frem-New
> Hampshire-and-Massaehesette r--Many -gevernmentek-e f fi-eiaks -in j both -states -are-enfam niar-w hh -the-phanning -decemente r-Pebne -netificatien r-and -eeerdinated -PARE-between -the -states-w kH-at -a-mi nimem r-be -enreasenabby -delayed -ander -aeteat l emergency-eendhienst .
89-
_____-____c._ _ _ _ _ __-_____.____m__._______ - __m - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ - - _ . - - _ -
B. [ TON 11b]
Newbery -e FFieieks -wihh -ned -impl-emend -er -FeFFew -the -S PMe j in -the -evend -eF -an -emergency -as -they -h ave -eene teded -thed -ne i p Fan -een -be -developed -which -edequade hy -wi-H -predeed -the health -and -safe ty -ef -peopl-e -within -Newbury . Newbury officials in command and control of emergency functions are unfamiliar with the contents of the SPMC and-have-ne intentien -e F -nequ iri ag -s e F Fici-en d -knew hedge -de -e nab he -them -te impl-emend-er-FeHew-id: --WhHe-the-bewn-win-exert-its-best efferds-de predeed-peopke-within-ib,--any-respense-by-the-Tewn e f -Newbery -wi-11--eeee rdi ng hy -be -deveheped -as -the -need -arises en-en-d-hee-basis-widheed prier-phanningr-praediee-er adequade-reseurees.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"The second paragr.iph of the is to Mode 2 of the SPMC what Contention is 3[NECNP to Mode Contention
- 1. It 4) basis challenges the implementability of the plan and, contrary to the arguments of Applicants and Staff, it does not challenge the presumption of the rule."
Order I at 112 - 113.
"[W]e read TOA Contention 2 as challenging the adequacy of the messages." SPMC procedures for preparing and implementing M boqc Order II at 7 - 8.
"We accept [ TON Contention 11] Basis B as meaning that the Newbury officials are unfamiliar with the SPMC. We do not accept any implications in the basis that the officials will refuse to acquire sufficient knowledge in the plan to enable emergency.
them to follow it in the event of a radiological Such a refusal is inconsistent with the regulations and with Newbury's own statement that its officials 39.
will exercise its best efforts." Order II at 38 -
11qc, "As to Newbury's allegation that any response will be M j the Board refers Newbury to its ruling on MAG Contention
' 3 (Part I at 20) where we ruled that simple assertions of an M ILqc response to an emergency is of no value." Order II at 39.
l
( "[ TON Contention 11] Basis B, limited to the statement,
'Newbury officials in command and control of emergency functions are unfamiliar with the contents of the SPMC,' is also accepted." Order II at 39.
JI 63-[ MAG 70; TOWN 9.2; TON-lla; TOS 23;-TOWN 4: TOWN 8.111 Participating Parties: . MAG,' TON, TOS Contention' The SPMC fails tx) provide adequate arrangements for requesting and effectively;using assistance and resources that are purportedly _available to the state and local governments. Plan 5.3-1~. Adequate emergency ~ facilities and equipment are not provided and maintained by state and local governments'for an emergency at Seabrook. Thus the SPMC has not met-under finding 50. 4750.47(a)'cannot (b) (3) and (8) and a reasonable assurance be made.
Basis A. '[ MAG 70A]
The'SPMC' identifies the Massachusetts State EOC at
.Framingham and claims that it~"could be used to provide support in the event of an emergency at Seabrook Station, just as it might be used for response provided to an accident at any other nuclear. generating station affecting the state."
Plan 5.3-1.: .This statement'is-false. No current planning exists' that would coordinate the state EOC and the response of ' the ' local _ communities ta) a Seabrook emergency.- The State Area I EOC in Tewsbury is also inadequately staffed for a radiological emergency at Seabrook. There are' inadequate .
maps,. communication. lines and other materials and information
'at the Area I EOC to provide a response to a' radiological emergency at Seabrook.
B. [ MAG 70B]
The local EOCs in the 6 Massachusetts communities are l
) not adequate to handle a radiological emergency at Seabrook.
-These EOCs are inadequately staffed for such a contingency and do not have the communication links necessary, either between themselves or with the ORO EOC to provide any emergency support for such an accident.
C. [ MAG 70C]
L No other planning has been done to coordinate other l
rescu.ces facilit i available to the state, such as laboratory
) es, and make these resources available in a timely and effe*tive manner in the event of an emergency at Seabrook.
D. -[ MAG 70D)
The'SPMC asserts that the Massachusetts State Police will notify appropriate state and local emergency' personnel upon' notification from the ORO and/or Seabrook Station concerning a radiological emergency. However, no prior coordination-or planning to deal with a Seabrook emergency has been done with the State Police. Moreover the SPMC assumes the State Police will follow an emergen,cy plan not even before the Board. No liaison for the State Police is provided by the SPMC although the State Police is considered by the SPMC to be an emergency response organization.
E. [ TON.11a).
The assumption that the SPMC will be implemented by the Town of Newbury is rebutted by the fact that equipment and personnel resources available to the town are inadequate to effectively or reasonably enable it to do so. The Town of Newbury does not have and is unlikely to acquire sufficient equipment or personnel to effectively or reasonably provide
'for or maintain passable evacuation routes, sheltering areas, a means of population notification or relocation, transportation for mobility impaired persons, evacuated area access control or methods of dealing with evacuation impediments.
F. [ TOWN 4, Basis 1 1]
NUREG-0654 I.D.1.c. assumes that local officials will "have the offsite the utility resources plansufficient where .to implement those portions of necessary." That assumption is erroneous as appliedisto the . . local response Town of West Newbury.
G. [ TOWN 4, l Basis 1 3]
I.
The plan assumes that emergency response vehicles and equipment resources such as police and fire department l
vehicles and traffic and access control equipment are available in each of the local EPZ communities (plan, section 2.2.6). The-Town of West Newbury has inadequate resources to I
effectively implement, oversee, or adequately participate in I a safe plan. and effective evacuation of the town pursuant to the H. [ TOWN S.11]
I The plan assumes that emergency response vehicles and I j
equipment resources such as police and fire department vehicles and traffic and access control equipment are available in each of the local EPZ communities (plan, section
t.
(
)
2.2.6). The Town of West Newbury has inadequate resources to effectively implement, oversee, or adequately participate in a safe and effective evacuation of the town pursuant to the plan.
I. [ TOWN 9.2)
The plan assumes that emergency response vehicles such as police and fire department vehicles are available in each l of the local EPZ communities (plan, section 2.2.6). The Town ^
of West Newbury has inadequate resources to effectively implement, oversee, or adequately participate in a safe and ,
effective evacuation of the town pursuant to the plan. i Applicable Board Ruling (s) l "The Staff objects in part on the ground that there is no regulatory requirement that the utility engage in emergency planning with non-participating government entities j as is impled in [ MAG Contention 70) Basis D. We agree with the Staff's sentiment, but we accept Basis D to the extent that it raises a question of State Police readiness and their i
I expected response in a radiological emergency." order I at 96 - 97.
"[ TON Contention 11) Basis A, and the responses to it i
raise the familiar factual issue common to most of the Interveners' petitions, i.e.,
upon local government officials. whether or not the SPMC relies The basis is accepted pending the Board's resolution of dispute of this nature."
Order II at 38.
L "This [TOS Contention 23) is another dispute about what the SPMC does or does not assume with respect to local governments participation. Therefore, the contention is
. accepted pending further guidance from the Board about
). resolving matters where there is no genuine issue of fact."
Order II at 53.
l 1
f-
IX. EXERCISE CONTENTIONS MAG EX-2
~
Contention l
The scope of the June 28-29, 1988, exercise of the SPMC 1 was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results on implementation capability as required by 10 CFR 9 50.47(a) (2) and Appendix E paragraph IV.F.1. in y that it did not include demonstrations or evaluations of {
j major portions of the SPMC and the emergency response l capabilities of many persons and entities relied upon to 1 implement it. The data set forth in the subparts of this contention individually and collectively establish that there is no reasonable assurance that the SPMC can or will be implemented in critical respects. Thus, the Exercise precludes a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken, as )
required by 10 CFR 5 50.47 (c) (1) .
Each of the following portions of the plan, or the response capability of the following organizations relied upon, was required to be tested for this Exercise to qualify as the initial full participation Exercise. For all of the plan portions.and supporting organizations listed, the ;
Exercise did not test "as much of the . . . plans as is !
reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation." 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, par. IV.F.1.
Basis ~
E. ORO's capability to implement a timely evacuation of the Mass. EPZ's two hospitals and all other special facilities was not tested. Specifically, ORO did not attempt to demonstrate that it could muster the appropriate vehicles and personnel to the EPZ hospitals, nursing homes, and other special facilities in a timely fashion and did not attempt to demonstrate appropriate procedures for loading patients.
(The total " extent of play" for testing hospital evacuation procedures was that one ambulance was assigned the task of driving to one hospital and then to a reception center.) The Exercise also failed to test the preparedness of the bus, ambulance, and wheelchair van companies being relied upon for this important function. Et-sheels-be-neted-thed-the simeFated pheme-released--derinef-the-Exereise ped-beth Massachusedds-EP3-hespitake-et-risk-and-evente&Fhy passed ever -them -be th r --Beth -sheeM -have -been -evaeu ated e --Eikew kee-mes t -e the r -specia F-f aeikit ies -in -the -M assachuse tds -EPS -were p th-at-ri-sk-and-sheeM-have-been-evaenaded-es-wel4.
Applicable Board Ruling (s) l t
"[T]o the that would extent involve this basis members callspublic, of the for a demonstration it is inadmissible." Order (12/15/88) at 19.
MAG EX-4 Applicants prevailed on summary disposition motion. Public l Service Company of New Hamoqhing (Seabrook Station, Units 1 i and 2) LBP-89-8, 29 NRC 193 (1989); gag also Memorandum and Order (Ruling on June 1988 General Exercise Contentions) at ;
24-25 (December 15, 1988). '
)
L MAG EX-8 i l
Contention The results of the Graded Exercise reveal that there exist fundamental flaws in the Seabrook off-site emergency plans submitted by the State of New Hampshire and the Applicants with respect to planning standards 10 CFR
- 50. 47 (b) (6) and (b) (8) and the corresponding requirements of NUREG 0654, Supp 1 at II.F.1.b and c, and 2 and H.10. As a
! result, exercise objective 4, which requires that the exercise "[d]emonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel," GM
' EX-3 at 11, was not met and no finding of reasonable assurance can be made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(a) and (c) (1) .
l Exercise results which individually and/or collectively provide basis for this contention include the following:
Basis B. The communication net linking the ORO field personnel with the EOC and with each other was demonstrated I to be completely inadequate. Information flows were delayed and accuracy was compromised by the vertical communication chain required by the SPMC. Further-detai+e .in-suppert-of th i-e -eentent i en -are -eet -ferth -at -MAG -EX--H . ORO field personnel including VANS drivers, traffic guides, transfer point dispatchers, route guides, radiological field teams and others, were using hand-held, battery powered 8 channel radios.
deficient:
Radio communications were demonstrated to be
- 1. The EMS radio, the primary communications link with mobile medical support facilities like ambulances and vans, malfunctioned and could transmit but not receive messages. This indicates that ORO had not provided adequate inspection and inventory check for critical emergency communications equipment. No immediately accessible back-up communications system was available at the Staging Area and portable radios had to be produced-(from an unidentified source in an unidentified manner) and provided to the one 1 ambulance and three vans involved in the Exercise.
(obviously, had the actual emergency number of ambulances and vans been involved this procurement task would have been measurably greater.) Dispatch of one ambulance was delayed 20 minutes while these portable radios were procured. l (However;'this does D2% indicate that it took only 20 minutes i i
to procure them.)
The vans were not " delayed" only because they were not ordered out until after the substitute radios were procured.
i j
'But one van did not establish appropriate radio contact until more than 80 minutes after it had been dispatched.
That van was instead communicating on the wrong channel with the Evacuation Support Dispatcher ("ESD") but {
neither the van nor the ESD notified the appropriate persons (including each other) that the communication linkage was 4
inappropriate.
The other two vans and the ambulance which were using the replacement radios were restricted by the '
shorter range that these substitute radios had in comparison with the EMS that had been malfunctioned.
2.
Radio communication between the ESD and traffic guides was sporadically interrupted by breaks in reception.
points wereCommunications delayed by otherbetween road crews and transfer radio traffic. Apparently, road crews could not communicate directly with the ESD and, in one instance, the ESD was informed using a traffic guide's radio that an additional wrecker was necessary.
3.
l Radio communication between the Staging Area I and school evacuation buses was limited to these periods when the buses were within range. Several bus yards were out of that range and these buses could not be reached for hours.
}
The same problem existed in trying to communicate with the buses for day care centers and the transit dependent.
4.
Other ORO field personnel had only sporadic f communications with the Staging Area because of channel overloading and intermittent reception. When route giudes (sic) and bus drivers were told to ingest KI at 15:45, 4 of I 11 did not ingest KI; 4 of 7 buses for the transit dependent did not receive this transmission.
MAG EX-9 Contention The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in that NHY's ORO demonstrated that it did not have the ability 1 to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate l
I
r L
l information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after initial alert and notification has occurred, as required by 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (5) and (6) and the guidance set i
)
forth at NUREG 0654 (Supp 1) at II.E.3-8, and F.1. As a result, exercise Objective 13 was not met and the exercise l will not support a finding that adequate protective measures j j can and.will be taken in the event of an emergency. ;
provideThesupport followingforbases both individually and collectively this contention: '
Basis i <
L A.
The EBS messages and the News Releases actually generated during the Exercise were confusing and contained conflicting information. An average member of the public who had heard over the radio or on television the ORO News Releases and EBS messages in sequence would have come away with all kinds of unanswered questions. Confusion would have been generated, for example, regarding who/what ORO was, what had happened to town police and civil Defense, what the role of the state was, what it meant that ORO was " activated,"
what go?" it"What meant to leave the " beach areas" ("How far should I if I live there?"). Much confusion would have been generated about the school children, what schools were doing, and what parents should or should not do (as is more specifically described in MAG EX-10). There was even confusion generated on Day 2 of the Exercise with respect to what people would be let into the EPZ to care for animals.
Much confusion was also generated on both days of the Exercise due to the conflicting nature of the ORO and New Hampshire EBS messages and news releases.
B. The EBS messages and news releases were not accurate in many respects. For example, there was misinformation about the Newburyport schools in ORO EBS #3, as FEMA has noted. Also, there was a serious mistake in News Release #15, which said that the overturned lumber truck (described in more detail in MAG EX-13) was blocking traffic on southbound I-95.
C.
instances. The news releases were not timely in many Events were repeatedly not reported at the Media Center until long after they had occurred, as was the case with the overturned lumber truck, which was not reported until long after it had began (sic) blocking traffic.
Messages anc information were not forwarded promptly from the EOC to the Media Center and the Joint Telephone Information center, as can be seen from the times noted on many of the player generated material, Een also FEMA report at 217.
In addition, and perhaps most serious, ORO generally lagged behind New Hampshire in issuing PARS to the public, as can be seen clearly'in the time lines contained in the FEMA report.
On Day 2, for example, it took a very long time after the State of.New Hampshire for ORO to get an EBS message out regarding farmers re-entering the EPZ to care for livestock.
l D. The timing and content of ORO's public information I was not coordinated in~any systematic way with the public .l informtion (sic) being released by New Hampshire. This would l have led to further confusion and mistrust. Comparison of i the messages released at about the same time by NH and ORO l reveal numerous differences that needed to be resolved and ;
L were not. The process for coordinating the information i
- l. released was shown to be ad hgg and therefore inadequate.
MAG EX-10 l I
Contention The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in that NHY's ORO demonstrated that it did not have the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school'and day care children within the plume EPZ, as required by.10 CFR S 50.57(b) (10) and the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, SS J.9 and J.10.g.
i Thus, ORO failed.to satisfy Exercise Objective 19, and this f- precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate
. protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook, as required by 10 CFR S ' 50.47 (c) (1) .
Exercise results which individu?lly and/or collectively form the basis for this contention include the following:
Basis A. Over the course of Day 1 of the Exercise, ORO demonstrated that it was unable to notify and exchange information with all the schools and day care centers in a l timely fashion to keep pace with the changing developments of l the emergency and to implement timely protective actions.
Except in one instance (see B, below), the hundreds of phone calls made to schools and day care centers during the exercise were made to the FEMA Control Cell. FEMA Control Cell personnel received these phone calls, listened to what the School Liaisons had to say, did not ask to have information repeated, infrequently asked a single question or two, and promptly gave any information sought by the School Liaisons. This allowed the Liaisons to make the calls to the assigned schools at an unrealistically rapid pace that could not be achieved in a real emergency when real school officials would ask a great many more questions than FEMA Controllers did and their responses to the Liaisons questions
I would not be as readily forthcoming or as brief. In a real emergency, each of these calls would take considerably I. longer. Moreover, during the Exercise, the phone numbers used by the Liaisons to call the FEMA Control Cell were rarely busy. During a real emergency it must realistically I' be expected that many dozens of phone calls from concerned parents will flood phone lines to the schools making it probable that School Liaisons will have to spend considerable I time making call-backs. Nevertheless, even with the cooperative FEMA Control Cell and the absence of busy school phone lines during the Exercise, ORO's School Liaisons were nut able to make their calls and exchange information with schools and day care centers at a rapid enough rate to keep schools adequately informed in a timely fashion of changing developments and PARc. The Exercise thus demonstrated that I each School Liaison has too many calls to make, and too much information to exchange, to keep all schools adequately informed in a timely fashion in a real emergency.
B. One real school in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ actually was to be contacted on the Day 1 of the exercise and a real, rather than a simulated, exchange of information I was to occur. When the Amesbury School Liaison first called this school at 11:17 a.m. to notify it of the Alert and exchange information, the phone went u anowered. He did not I call back until 1:50 p.m. when he was in the process of making his second round of calls to the Amesbury Schools.
Again he received no answer. No further attempts were made I to call the school; no call was made to the phone company or elsewhere to confirm the accuracy of the phone number; and no route guide was dispatched to see what the problem was at the 1 school. In the event of a real emergency, ORO needs to l
anticipate both that some school officials will be away from their phones momentarily and that school phones generally will often be busy. In either case call-backs need to be I made promptly to ensure that some schools do not get bypassed. During the Exercise, ORO demonstrated that it does not have a system in place for ensuring that call-backs can or will be made promptly or, where schools which are expected to be in session have phones which go unanswered or are repeatedly busy, that timely efforts co' or will be made to contact the schools using alternative v.eans.
C. The ORO demonstrated that it could not make a school PAR and communicate it to the schools in a timely fashion, thereby effectively precluding implementation of the
{ I chosen protective actions for a significant number of school children. While New Hsmpshire was able to make a protective action decision to have its children " stay in school" at 11:52 a.m. (immediately after the SAE was declared), ORO's decisionmakers did not have a serious discussion focussing on the school pars until 1:25 p.m., just minutes before the I
-ee-
I-General Emergency was declared. In that discussion at 1:25 the ORO Director recognized the need to quickly come to a decision on a PAR for schools, because he knew the schools had normal closing times which were generally between 2:15 and 3:00 p.m. Yet he decided to postpone making a PAR decision at 1:25. At 1:32 a General Alert diverted ORO's focus on the schools. Finally, at about 2:05 p.m., a decision on a school PAR was made:
schools rather than releasing them athold the children the normal times.in the By 2:05 p.m., however, ORO had left itself too little time to notify the Merrimac schools of this PAR before it released its students at 2:15. ORO's owns (sic) actions and delays thereby precluded it from implementing this PAR for the Merrimac schools. So the PAR was issued only to the schools in the remaining five communities. But, again, ORO could not act quickly enough and notification was delivered too late to four (4) of the schools in Newburyport to prevent them from releasing their students at the normal time. Thus, because of ORO's delays in making a school PAR and in communicating it to the schools, ORO was unable to implement its recommended PAR in all of Merrimac and most of Newburyport.
D. Thereafter, ORO's efforts to communicate its PAR to the schools and parents, were uncoordinated, confusing, conflicting, and likely would have resulted in chaos at the schools and day care centers. As a result, there is no reasonable assurance that ORO's recommended protective l
actions could have been implemented. First, ORO's leadership failed to explain the specifics and the logic of the " hold the students" decision to its own staff including the School Coordinator, the School Liaisons, and ORO's personnel in the i Media Center. At 2:15, the School Coordinator told all the School Liaisons (except the one for Merrimac) to call their respective schools (including day care centers) and tell them "that the children are to stay at school until parents pick them up or we evacuate them." However, School Liaisons were also instructed to find out whether the schools wished to retain and use their own buses or use ORO buses later on.
Thus, when the School Liaisons called the schools from about 2:15 to 3:15 p.m. after the declaration of the General Emergency, the message given about PARS was confusing and
, lacking in logic. No instructions were given to school administrators about how to implement or whether to implement sheltering for the students. Indeed, it was not even clear I
whether the schools were evacuating, sheltering, or sheltering now and evacuating later. If schools indicated that they could not retain their buses, Liaisons were unable to estimate when ORO buses might be able to get to them.
Difficulties in implementing ORO's school PAR would have resulted from these confused, illogical communications to the schools and day care centers. For example, when the Amesbury
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School Liaison called the Horace Mann School at 2:54 p.m. and found that the school was then in the process of loading students onto its buses, i the Liaison told school officials there to unload the buses and get the children back into the school "due to the release going out to sea." This, of course, makes no sense. It also was not true, for at that time the wind had begun to shift around and to come from the north, blowing the plume toward Massachusetts. If school officials sought out a weather forecast, they would have learned that the wind was soon going to swing around and blow from the east, blowing the plume right at Amesbury. They undoubtedly would have also learned that the Town of Amesbury had been recommended to evacuate. In this situation, in a real emergency, there is no reasonable assurance that Amesbury school officials would have heeded the School i
Liaison's advice to hold the students.
To make matters worse, conflicting messages were then being given regarding whether parents should or could pick up their children at the schools and what was happening to the students. The School Liaisons (except for Merrimac, which sent its students home) were instructed to tell the schools that them the up orchildren should them.
ORO evacuates be kept in school until parents pick Meanwhile, ORO issued an EDS message (ORO EBS #3) at about 2:20 p.m. which advised parents:
j I
- a. that a radioactive release had occurred; b.
that immediate evacuation is recommended for people in Salisbury and Amesbury and that people in Newburyport, Newbury, West Newbury, and i
l Merrimac immediately; was safer if they sheltered in place c.
that "[a]11 schools within the communities directed to evacuate are being evacuated to the designated Reception Centers for I
the community in which they are located. Parents should not dcive to school to meet their children since sncools (sic) are now being evacuated and
' children are being taken safely by bus directly to their Reception Centers.
h School children will then be sent to The may be picked up";
Host Facility in A (sic) where they d.
that schools "in the communities advised to shelter are taking similar sheltering actions.
l Of ficials have instructions for protectir.g the h
children or other persons in their care until sheltering is no longer necessary. Parents and relatives are advised D21 to call the schools or
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l other institutions, nor to drive to the schools to I
I attempt to pick up their children. Community safety will be better protected if the schools are permitted to conduct sheltering activities over the next several hours"; and l
- e. that "[p]arents with children attending school within Salisbury, Amesbury, Newbury, West Newbury and Newburyport are advised that their i children are currently being safely maintained at school, where they will be kept until it is determined that they can be safely moved."
This message was so confusing, contradictory, and misleading that it would have torpedoed any effective I inplementatien of ORO's PAR for the schools and day care centers. Some, but not all, of the problems with this message 6.re as follows:
While ORO's School Liaisons were telling schools that parents can pick up students, this message tells parents to stay away and not even call the schools.
It instructs the general population of I Amesbury and Salisbury to evacuate immediately while telling parents in these towns both (a) that Amerd.pr: sc' cc1 children "are being" evacuated and (b) later in the message, that chese same children B are be!ng "kept" at school "until it is determined that they can be safely moved."
I
- It instructs the general population in Newburyport, Newbury, and West Newbury to shelter 3
in place immediately while telling parents in these towns that schools are taking similar sheltering
~
actions (a) "over the next several hours" and (b) later on in the message, "until it is determined that they can be safely moved." Besides I being confusing, this messege is erroneous in that four of the schools in Newburyport were releasing students and sending them home.
It instructs the general population in Merrimac to shelter in place immediately but gives I parents in Merrimac no information whatsoever about what is happening to their children.
For students who are being or may be evacuated, it failed to say specifically w_helt parents may go to meet them and pick them up and when this can occur.
I
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l t
Despite the precaution in the message not to call or drive to the schools, this EBS message given at about 2:20 p.m. is so confusing and inadequate that in each of the six Massachusetts EPZ communities, parents would not have had sufficient information about what actually was happening to their children, and mont would either have attempted to call or drive to the schocls. Parents' calls would undoubtedly have flooded the schools shortly after 2:20, just when the School Liaisons were calling to inform the schools directly l
of the PAR to " hold" the students and inquire of their need for buses. The likely result woald have been that ORO would have had great difficulty getting phone calls through to each of the schools to inform them of the PARS. Thus implementa-tion of PARS for schools was likely to have been frustrated due to.the confusion generated by ORO's 2:20 p.m. EBS nessage. There is substantial uncertainty regarding what i would have happened next. School officials would likely have hesitated, not sure what to do, causing parents, teachers, I
and the regular bus drivers alike to each consider taking
} independent, ad h2g, uncoordinated action as each group saw fit. ORO's attempt to resolve the confusion it had created over the school children came belatedly in the form of an EBS message at 4:03 p.m., almost 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> after the first message. It, too, was confusing and came too late to have had eay significant impact in resolving the confusion the s
first message would have created. These Exercise results i
demonstrate that ORO is unable to coordi?1te the timing and content of its messages to the schools (through calls from Liaisons) and parents (using the EBS system) to ensure that
) FAR implementation is not frustrated by general confusion and chaotic, independent actions.
E. Events during the Exercise demonstrated that, given i
the absence of school-specific emergency plans, there is no reasonable assurance that school officials will take the appropriate steps to implement proper sheltering techniques in a timely fashion when it becomes necessary to do so. ORO EBS #3 inaccurately stated that school officials "have instruction for protecting the children or other persons in i
I their care until sheltering is no longer necessary." This simply is not the case. While it is true that some EPZ schools were sent a " generic" school plan which contained some very general instructions for sheltering that were not I
specific to any particular school, the schools have not kept this generic plan. The schools also have no plans or l instructions of their own for implementing sheltering, and j school officials are not knowledgeable (sic) in this area.
The Exercise further demonstrated that ORO does not have the capability to compensate for the lack of existing school radiological plans or information, School Liaisons demonstrated that in an accident like the one simulated here,
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which was hardly the fastest developing accident within the l planning basis of NUREG-0654 advancing from an Alert to a
) release of radiction in more than four (4) hours, they were pressed beyond their abilities just to notify schools of developments and PARS end briefly answer a quick question or two. They were too busy with these basic functions to take the time to assess whether in fact schools know how to implement proper sheltering techniques and, if not, to offer detailed, adequate advice. Thus, if the Exercise had been a real emergency, the schools would not have been able to implement proper sheltering techniques while waiting for ORO buses to arrive. Since the simulated plume passed over many
[ of the Massachusetts schools before the buses arrived, this failing would have increased dosages to school children.
I I
F .. If any conclusions are to be drawn from the extremely limited scope of the Exercise regarding ORO's buses for schools, they are: (1) that ORO cannot estimate accurately the arrival time of its buses at any given school and (2) that there is no reasonable assurance that ORO's fleet of hired buses can get to the schools in a timely fashion. Although the SPMC claims to have agreements with private bus companies to provide 534 buses in a radiological emergency at Seabrook, and that 226 buses would be needed to e3'cuate the schools, for this Exercise only four (4) buses were tested by being dispatched and driving routes to i
schools. (Three other buses were dispatched on various routes to day care centers, for which the SPMC specifies only 19 buses may be needed.) Normal mobilization times were not
) even tested as all seven buces and drives had been pre-arranged to be ready to go on the day of the Exercise. The extent of play was limited to dispatching and driving the four school buses to four different schools and then to reception centers in the "real" time sequence. The first Exercise problem ORO encountered after dispatching the buses was to generate an estimated time of arrival (" ETA") of each bus for each target school. School officials and the public would demand these ETAs during an emergency, and the FEMA Control Cell sought them here from the School Liaisons.
During the Exercise, ORO at first delayed but then finally offered a set of ETAs for buses for each town, but these ETAs were not released publicly in a timely fashion. Events
) during the Exercise proved thesE ETAs to be significantly optimistic, and they had to be changed. If the Exercise had been a real emergency and ORO had dealt with the ETAs in this l
same fashion, it would Lave created further difficulty in L implementing a safe and coordinated evacuation of the schools, because both schools and parents would have lost confidence in ORO's ability to do what it promised it would j to, itet, evacuate the students in a timely fashion. This would have spurred parents and schools to take ad hoc, independent, uncoordinated action regar;ing the students.
I
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The second bus-related problem ORO encountered was to have the buses drive the prescribed routes on their ORO maps, locate the target schools, and do so in a timely fashion.
Although only seven buses were tested (four on routes to schools; three on routes to day care centers), there w2re a significant number of mistakes made. Even though each ORO bus had a Route Guide on board to assist the driver in following routes, in several instances the drivers were unable to. follow the prescribed routes. In one case, a bus ended up on a dead end street in such a position that it took 20 minutes to get out.
In some cases the Route Guides made no effort to request that the driver following the prescribed routes. In other instances, Route Guides disregarded their SPMC prescribed routes and improvised other routes. The i
buses for day care centers actually had difficulty locating several day care centers, and one center was actually missing from the SPMC map. The upshot of all these difficulties is that: first, ORO cannot accurately estimate the bus ETAs as
)
they must to ensure that parents and schools will cooperate with evacuation plans, and, second, based on this very limited sample of buses and the number of routing difficulties encountered, there is no reasonable assurance that buses for any given school can and will arrive in a timely fashion to adequately protect the school children.
Here, during the Exercise, because the buses were not able to arrive in a timely fashion, a large number of school children were still waiting in schools for the arrival of the buses when the plume swept over them.
At the root of these problems is the fact that: (a) ORO bus drivers and Route Guidee brought in from other towns just are not familiar enough with this area and (b) the area is so lacking in street signs that difficulties and delays of the sort displayed during the Exercise will be inevitable.
Applicable Board RuliM (s)
"We agree with Staff that basis A may not be used as a l
vehicle to attack FEMA's exercise performance. However, we read this basis as asserting that ORO's performance was lacking." Order (12/15/88) at 32.
)
"While we agree with Staff that basis D may not be used to permit relitigation of the content of EBS messages, the question whether the totality of information furnished during the exercise, including EBS messages, was confusing is a legitimate issue."
Order (12/15/88) at 32.
( "The presence or absence of adequate school emergency 1
plans is at issue in the planning phase of this litigation, and the Attorney General concedes that, should he lose in
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that forum, this contention (Basis E] should be dismissed.
On that understanding, the basis is condit.'onally admitted."
Order (12/15/88) at 32.
"[B] asis E is admitted with the under<,tanding that, if the Attorney General is unsuccessful with respect to a similar contention in the proceeding or. the plan, he will withdraw it . . . . "
Order (12/15/8E) at 33.
MAG EX-11 contention The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in that the NHY ORO demonstrated that it did not have the ability. to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAG's, availability i
of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors, as required by 10 CFR S S 50.47 (b) (10) and the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, 5 J.10.m.
Thus, ORO failed to satisfy Exercise Objective 11, and this precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency at Seabrook, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (c) (1) .
Exercise results which individually and/or collectively i
form the basis for this contention include the following:
Basis
- A.
During the Exercise NHY ORO personnel did not make their own independent assessments, evaluations, judgments or determinations regarding protective action recommendations but merely acted as a conduit, accepting the protective action recommendations received from the Seabrook Station EOF without any meaningful scrutiny being applied to assess their adequacy, from the and then simply seeking approval to implement them (simulated) Massachusetts Governor's representative.
By acting in this fashion, which is contrary to the SPMC's
( procedures 5 3.4.2 and for making protective action decisions at Plan
> the corresponding Procedures sections, the ORO failed to demonstrate that it has the technical under-
' standing, judgment, and ability to assess and weigh all
) factors relevant to a protective action recommendation and to make own. appropriate recommendations in a timely fashion on its B. Virtually every one of the protective actions recommended by the NHY's ORO were not appropriate, in light of all relevant circumstances at the time. Other protective action choices were available which were more appropriate and
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I could have achieved significantly greater dose reduction.
For example:
(1) Upen the declaration of the Alert at Seabrook Station, ORO demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the SPMC I when, after New Hampshire acted to close Hampton and Seabrook j
beaches, and with a wind blowing from west to east that was
' expected to shift around to come from the north and later on from the east, NHY's ORO refused to consider a precautionary beach closing of the Salisbury beaches and actively discouraged the (simulated) Governor's representative when he considered making this recommendation. This refusal to I consider a beach closing at the Alert turned out to be a mistake, for when the wind later shifted as expected, and the plant began releasing a radioactive plume, the plume drifted I across,the Salisbury beach areas long before all persons there evacuated.
I An -earFier -be ach -ehes ing -a t - the -Aherb -e bage r -rathe r -th an at -bhe -Sribe -Aree -Emergener r -weekd -have -been -the -mere appropriate-PAR -for -anether-reasen -ae -weFF r--eensideradiens of-the EshadewS-beach-evaceabien-and-the-braffie-eenditions I wh ieh -id -w ikk -e aese -in -Massachese tte -if -New -Hamps h ire -ahe ne were-de-elese-ide-beaches-dee-to preblems-ab-Seabreek-eegvee d -strengby -that -a -beach -ekesing -in -New -H ampshire -meet I be -eare felly -eeerd in a ded -w ith -and -impeeed -ab -the -same -bime -as a -beach -e hesing -in -M eteachuse tt e r - -Beeanse -thi-s -wee -ned -dene-a nd -New -H ampsh ire -eleeed -ide -beachee -weFF -be fore -these -in M assachused ds -ve re -ehesed ,- -id -weeld -h ave -been -impessibbe 5 ha ber -en -for -the -GRG -to -eentreF -the -tra f fie -ebreaming -threegh Massachereb be -frem -beth -the -Maseachesette -and -New -Hamps hire beach-areas.
(2) After being notified of the SAE at 11:51 a.m.,
ORO finally made a protective action recommendation to close I the beaches but inappropriately failed to make any early PAR whatsoever for the schools, as New Hampshire did. An early school closing, for example, would have been an appropriate PAR at this stage, at least for those schools with buses i available, given all the circumstances known at that time.
This PAR would have ensured that students would not have been hit with the radioactive plume that resulted as a direct result of ORO's delayed-school-closing PAR (see (4), below).
(3) After the General Emergency was declared at 1:30 p.m., with a release of radiation minutes thereafter, i ORO recommended that Amesbury and Salisbury be evacuated and that the four remaining Massachusetts EPZ communities be sheltered. This PAR, too, was inappropriate. If all I relevant factors had been considered and judgment and common sense applied, Newburyport, with its sizeable population, also should have been given a recommendation to evacuate.
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8 The SPMC, however, locks ORO into making PARS for Newburyport only when the same PAR is made for Newbury, West Newbury, and Merrimac. The Exercise demonstrates a fundamental need for i
greater flexibility in shaping appropriate PARS for the i Massachusetts communities.
(4) During the General Emergency, with the wind j
still blowing the plume out to sea but expected to shift around and blow toward Massachusetts, ORO inexplicably made a PAR to hold the school children in school past the normal closing times in all towns except Merrimac. This decision to hold the school children was not only an inappropriate PAR; I it was a disastrous one. Given ORO's knowledge of the plant conditions and weather, and all the uncertainties facing ORO at that time, including uncertainties regarding the lack of I emergency plans for each school, uncertainties regarding whether the buses relied on by the schools would be available after normal departure times, and the uncertainties about how long it would take ORO's huses to arrive at the schools if I those buses were to be used, the appropriate protective action at that time was to close the schools at normal closing times and use the schools' own buses to get the I children home as soon as possible. The scope of the disaster created by ORO's inappropriate PAR to delay closing the schools was made apparent when Seabrook's radioactive plume I swept over many schools before ORO's buses arrived late that afternoon or early in the evening to pick up the students.
The inappropriate PAR to hold the school children may have actually maximized their dose consequences, not minimized them.,
(5) ORO's PAR at approximately 4:00 p.m. that I afternoon was also inappropriate. At that point ORO recommended that the four (4) remaining towns (Newburyport, Newbury, West Newbury, and Merrimac) evacuate. Prior to this time residents in these towns had been advised to shelter.
Given the conditions of the release, the weather forecasts, the ETEs, the uncertainties about how long it would take to get ORO's buses into the towns, and other relevant factors, I this PAR should have been given much sooner. As a result, many residents of these communities who could have evacuated prior to the arrival of the plume were unable to do so.
(6) When a 92-year-old bedridden person who could not be evacuated contacted ORO regarding what to do, he was told: " Keep all your doors and windows closed." This I individual PAR was totally inappropriate, given the person's physical condition.
Assistance should have been offered:
first in the form of an ambulance and, if that was refused, I then by sending help to implement proper sheltering measures for him.
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f 1
)
(7) Traffic heading from Massachusetts to Maine on I-95 was provided with a suggested by-pass route around the EPZ which was inappropriate because (a) the route suggested consisted of a series of highways which do not connect and, if followed, would send travelers right into the EPZ at Portsmouth; and (b) it purported to direct people to Kittery, Maine, to pick up I-95, but Kittery, a border town just across the Piscataqua River from Portsmouth, is much too close to the EPZ to be included on a safe by-pass route.
Indeed, in the evening of Day 1 of the Exercise the plume, with still dangerous concentrations of radioactive material, blew directly over Portsmouth into Kittery. Before that happened, when the wind began blowing the plume northward, ORO should have recognized that use of Kittery on a by-pass route was inappropriate. But, ORO failed to change its by-1 pass re, commendation and directed unwary travelers to drive I right into harms way.
C. During the Exercise ORO demonstrat+ed that it was unable to make appropriate PARS during the summer beach season because it had no reliable method for determining the size of the Massachusetts beach-area population. ORO's I
' method of checking on the size of the Massachusetts beach population (as was done @ 11:30 a.m.) was to dispatch a helicopter to fly over and assess the size of the population I on the beaches. There are numerous problems with this approach, including:
- 1. Coastal fog was reported on the Weather Status Board. In such circumstances, a helicopter probably would I
not fly, and even if it did risk flying, it probably would not see all portions of the beach area; so it would be unable to make the population assessment.
- 2. Even if the helicopter pilot flew over and observed all the beaches, he has no reliable method for quantitatively assessing the actual size of the total population in the beach areas. Yet, that is what protective action decision-makers need to know, not the number of people out on the sand or in the water. While a pilot may be able to fly over and guess roughly how many people are on a given stretch of beach, he cannot determine how many people are inside cottages, motels, and other buildings. He could not tell ORO whether the beach areas are at 50% of capacity or 85% of capacity, a distinction one needs to know when assessing how long the ETEs are for the beach areas that day.
D. The process of deliberation which finally resulted in the selection of a PAR for school children was ad hoc and impromptu and not guided by and [ sic) pre-set procedures, i
plans, or criteria, including institution-by-institution ETEs. As a result the choice that was finally made was not
)
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made in a timely fashion, failed to take into account many relevant factors, and turned out to be a dose-increasing rather than a dose-reducing measure for the children. Thus, the exercise reveals that the SPMC's plans for selecting an appropraite PAR for schools and day care centers is fundamentally flawed in that the plans fail to document an j appropriate decision-making process and criteria for '
selecting the most appropriate PAR for school children.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"We concur with Staff's observation that the admission of this contention does not permit the relitigation of matters taken up in other phases of this proceeding. We are also compelled to note that the Attorney General's position that certain kinds of evacuation shadows have not been
) conside' red and are thus open to litigation in connection with the exercise is incorrect. The exercise litigation does not provide the opportunity to litigate planning matters which were not rained in connection with the plan. The shadow 5
evacuation referred to by the Attorney General is such an issue." Order (12/15/88) at 33.
I "In admitting this contention, we are compelled to note that, despite its citation to this provision, it alleges that i
' the exercise demonstrated that the plan does not comply with '
sec. 50. 47 (b) (10) in only one respect. Basis B(3) alleges that the plan inappropriately restricts ORO's flexibility to i
make PARS fc' the Massachusetts communities. In all other respects, this contention and its bases challenge ORO's l
judgement in making PARS, asserting that that judgement was flawed. We therefore will treat this contention as asserting a fundamental flaw in ORO's training program which is l required by sec. SL . 4 7 (b) (14 ) , (15), and (16), and par. IV of App. E. If, after the hearing, the Attorney General's allegations concerning ORO's lack of judgement are i
substantiated, significant revisions in the training program may be required." Order (12/15/88) at 33-34.
MAG EX-14 i
Contention
) The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in that the medical facilities, equipment, procedures, and personnel demonstrated in the exercise were not adequate for
( handling contaminated, injured or exposed individuals, as t
required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b) (12) and the guidance set forth in the NUREG-0634, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, 9 II.L.1. Thus, ORO
- failed to satisfy Exercise Objective 24, and this precludes a
) finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective
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)
measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook, as required by 10 CFR s 50.47 (c) (1) .
Exercise results which individually and/or collectively form the basis for this contention include the following:
Basis C.
Personnel at the one hospital tested displayed
' serious weaknesses as well. Incredibly, both the medical and the nursing staff did not adequately understand the biological effects radiation and the significance of counts per minute, contamination, and millirems per hour dose rates.
This is a fundamental problem that casts serious doubt on the ability of this hospital, one which does not do much radiological monitoring to perform adequately in an emergen/ cy. decontamination More work, training may or may not be the solution. If these workers rarely get to perform these procedures, occasional training may not be sufficient to keep the staff ready. Only another exercise can adequately assess I
whether training can solve this deficiency.
MAG EX-16 Withdrawn by Stipulation dated February 7, 1989.
MAG EX-17 Dismissed by Board Order of May 23, 1989.
I' MAG EX-19 Contention The Exurcise revealed a fundamental flaw in the Seabrook Station Radiological Plan and Emergency Response Procedures I in that during the Exercise the licensee's personnel did not issue appropriate protective action recommendations PARS")
to the NHY Offsite Response Organization, the State of(" New l
Hampshire, er-the-State-of-Mai-ne, as required by 10 CFR 5 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , and the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, 5 II.J.7. and NUREG-0396.
}
This licensee fail.ing, coupled with the high degree of reliance placed by NHY's ORO, the State of New Hampshire, and
)
the-Shabe-of-Mai-ne on the PARS provided by the licensee, k precludes a finding that there is reasonable assurance that protective measures for the public can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
I Exercise results which individually or collectively form the basis for this contention include the following:
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4 N
i Basis A. As described in detail in MAG EX-11 (incorporated herein by reference), the PARS issued by NHY's ORO were not f appropriate in numerous respects. These PARS were exactly those which were being recommended by the licensee at that time, totally. and the ORO relied on these licensee PARS almost B. The PARS issued by the State of New Hampshire were also inappropriate in many respects, including the following:
1.
While evacuation of Seabrook, Hampton, Hampton Falls, Kensington, 3outh Hampton, and North Hampton was recommended to the public at about 2:30 p.m., people in ERPA F (Brentwood, East Kensington, Exeter, Kingston, Newfields, and Newton) were not recommended to evacuate until almost 5:00 p.m. Given the size of the release, the i
poLential for increased releases Iodines and Cesium if filt9rs degraded or failed, and the uncertain and unfavorable meteorological conditions (particularly regarding wind
! speeds, wind direction, and the likelihood of precipitation),
this ERPA should have been recommended to evacuate sooner.
I As a result, thousands of residents in this ERPA who could have safely evacuated earlier were hit by the plume; and
- 2. The residents of Stratham, Greenland, New Castle, Rye, and Portsmouth were never advised to evacuate but were advised to shelter. Unfortunately, later that evening the plume passed over all of these communities with the possible exception of New Castle.
As a result of these inappropriate PARS, the chances were significantly increased that people in these areas would have received dosages in excess of PAGs. These PARS issued by New Hampshire were exactly those PARS recommended to it by the licensee at that time, and state officials placed great reliance on them.
O r --The -State -of -Mai ne -i-sseed -ne -PARE -to -eveeente -er shelter -eny -ef -ide -downs -dering -the -Exercise r --En d c c d ,
because -they -rehied -ted&FFy -en -the -Fieensee % -PARS r -M a ine -was unaware -that -en -evacuation -and /or -sheltering -PAR -n c c d e d -be -be i-eseed-for-Mitteryr-Mainer-and perhaps-ether-tot'ns-as-weFFr-
'Phe -Fieensee M - f akkere -to -m ake -seeh -e -PAR -Fer -Maine -i re r-de -ex tend -a -PAR -de -these -fest -beyond -the -nerthern -eerder -ef the-EPE -had -seriees -eensequences -beeeeee -by -abee d -& P&O prmr-en-Bay-F-ef-the-Exeresse r-the-pFeme-reached-Mittery-and
) passed -d kreedFy -ever -it -earrying -siceab be -eenee ntr adiens -ef radheaetivityr--Prior-te-that peint-the -same-f acters-neted 1
above-et-B-shouFd-have prempted-the-Fieensee-to-issee-et
)
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)
Feas b -a -sheFderi ng -and -probab Fy -an -evaenadien -PAR -fer -that arear - 'Phe-fai4ere-te-de-se-signifieandFy-inereesed-the FikeF1-heed-thed peephe-i-n-dhis-pard-ef-Maineweekd-have recei-ved-desages-in-eneess-of-PAGer--NUREG-965+ dees-not exe wee -dhe -kieensee -frem -reeemmend ing -predeedi-ve -aediens endside -dhe -epa -when -necessery r --Te -the -eenbrary r -NUREG-&& 94 i mphies - thad -this -wi+F -happen -as -a -ma dder -s f -eew ese -and -uses f
thi-s-as-a-tesdi-fication-for-requiring-detai4ed phanning-enFy eeb-de-abend-E&-mi-tear--Etr-N9 REG-9&&+,- pr-Fer--Beyond-FO j
mikeer-ad-hee-predeedive-actions-ean perhaps-be-effeediver but -enFy -i F -dhe -s ta te -ef fici a ke -i n -eharge -have -been -advised by -the -Fieensee -dhad -seeh -ae dien s -a re -recommended D. In all the instances described above, the licensee's i
inappropriate PARS were derived from its METPAC computer model. It appears from what happened during the Exercise that this model has some fundamental flaws that cause it to
}
fail to take into proper consideration all known facts as well as existing uncertainties in the generation of PARS.
It, among other things, fails to adequately consider ETEs, j weather uncertainties including wind speed and directional changes, and release conditions. In recommending PARS to offsite officials, licensee personnel in the EOF merely f passed on copies of the METPAC print-outs without offering any guidance on how much reliance the PARS contained therein should be given.
f Applicable Board Ruling (s)
" Contention Applicants' and NewMAG EX 19 isPARS.
Hampshire's admitted as it relates to I The question whether the Applicants should have made PARS for areas outside the plume exposure EPZ does not question a major plan element as required by CLI-86-11.
The issue of the METPAC computer model could not have been raised earlier in that it alleges fundamental flaws in the model which were revealed by the exercise. In commenting on ALAB-903 the Staff states that the METPAC issue is 'merely minor, readily correctable instance of performance error.' While it is quite possible that the problem (if one exists) is readily correctable, it is not at are elements all evident important. that it is a minor consideration. Both Order (12/15/88) at 48-49.Therefore basis D is also admitted."
l "We read the two contentions (MAG EX-19 and EX-11]
together as having only one statement of specificity as to the onsite methodology. That is to be found in 19(d). We I adhere to the interpretation of 19(d) that the clause introducing 19(d) which states, "In all the instances described above" was a clause specifying instances described above, looking back at MAG 11.
)
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__..- ' ~
)
We see that those allege faults flowing from the PAR itself offsite and not to the onsite methodology."
Tr. 25130 MAG EX-21 Contention The Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the SPMC in f
that NHY's ORO failed to demonstrate that it has adequate vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured individuals, as required by 10 CFR 5 50. 47 (b) (12) and the guidance set forth in NUREG-l 0654, Rev. 1., Supp. 1, 5 L.4. Thus, NHY's ORO failed to satisfy Exercise Objective 19, and this precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (c) (1) .
Exercise results which individually and collectively i
form the basis for this contention include the following:
Basis B. During the Exercise, only one of the ambulances ORO is relying on to transport contaminated, injured persons was
! tested.
l The two ambulance attendants in ths (sic) ambulance were called to a reception center and asked to deal with one single contaminated, injured person. Procedures were observed and evaluated. By mobilizing only one ambulance and l its crew and testing its knowledge of proper handling procedures, the Exercise failed to test this major portion of ORO's plans using sufficient numbers of ambulances and crews
' to verify in any meaningful way the capability of ORO to respond to the accident scenario contained in the Exercise with an adequate number of ambulances and adequately trained ambulance IV. F. 1.,
attendants, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, App. E,
- n. 4.
D. Based on the performance errors exhibited by the one ambulance crew tested, no valid generalizations can be made that there is " reasonable assurance" that the entire fleet of ambulances and attendants being relied upon by ORO can perform in an adequate manner. Given the small sample size, there were too many errors observed to draw any such conclusion.
SAPL EX-2 Contention The graded exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate the ability to provide a sufficient number of buses and
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ambulances with properly trained drivers to reasonably assure that transit-dependent, special facility and special needs populations can be adequately protected. There was further not an adequate demonstration that the buses that were employed in the exercise could be properly routed.
l Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 5 50.47 (a) (1) ,
5 50. 47 (b) (10) , 5 50. 47 (b) (14) and NUREG-0654 J. 9 and J.10.d, g and k have not been met.
Basis The February 26, 1986 FEMA Final Exercise Assessment described two of the deficiencies in the prior exercise as follows:
Serious questions arose at the exercise regarding the ability of the State to provide buses for transportation of I
special populations, including school I children, mobility-impaired, and otherwise transit-dependent populations.
Driver resources were not sufficient to meet the transportation requirement'..
(February 26, 1988 (sic) Final Exercise Assessment at p. 136)
Bus drivers consistently experienced problems in getting to where they would have been needed. They were unfamiliar I with alternate routes and experienced difficulties because of the poor quality of photocopied maps. One of the bus l drivers made wrong turns and required prompting to complete his route. One of the buses that arrived at the Rockingham
, County Dispatch Center was unable to l
continue because it was low on fuel.
Some of the evacuation and other bus route maps distributed at the Rockingham '
l County Staging Area were illegible, some provided insufficient detail to specify the route clearly, and some did not include adequate addresses for the locations at which evacuees were to be picked up. (February 26, 1988 (sic) l Final Exercise Assessment at p. 238-239)
L Both of those deficiencies were not shown remedied in the current exercise. There still are serious questions l
about the ability of the state to provide buses for transportation of special populations.
t
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l
) '
i The majority of the bus routes run during the exercise were run out of the proper sequence that the scenario would f have required (a good number were run on Day 2). Further, the majority of the routes were run in private passenger Vehicles rather than in buses. This did not provide a realistic test of the capability to coordinate the running of the routes in a timely manner and it did not test the ability to provide the numbers of buses and drivers that would actually be required during an emergency at Seabrook.
Out of the 79 transit-dependent bus routes attempted during the exercise, the exercise report states that only 51 routes or 65 percent were completed with only " minor" problems. Routes that were not completed were as a result mainly of drivers getting lost, though in one instance a l driver actually caused an accident and forced a private passenger vehicle off the road. (See South Hampton Route 1 at p. 211 of the FEMA Draft Exercise Report) Further, no I
routes were run from South Hampton to the Salem Reception i
Center as was supposed to have been done.
It appears that of the 93 routes for schools, nurseries and day care centers attempted, only 70 out of 93 of the routes were completed without controller intervention.
Draft Report stated at p. 225 that only 60 routes were (The f
completed with drivers needing assistance on ten. If this number is correct, it would mean that only 50 routes, or 54 percent of the 93 routes were completed without controller intervention.)
{
During the actual course of the exercise on Day 1 of the scenario, intervenor observers noted that only six buses and r
drivers arrived at the Portsmouth Business Center (formerly the Omne Mall) and only five of those buses were dispatched to other locations.
l At the 14 buses, Rockingham County Staging Area in Brentwood, only one wheelchair van and one ambulance were present.
The FEMA Exercise Report states that 750 regular buses, 95 vans, 34 wheelchair vans, 32 ambulances and 55 coach buses were available (see p. 165). Those vehicles had to have been imaginary; the real numbers were miniscule (sic) in comparison.
There was no explicit mention in the FEMA report of how many vehicle drivers could have been made available on the day of the exercise or how that number was verified. A i total of 87 drivers from the National Guard and DOT were alleged to have been put on standby, but those number would be grossly insufficient if there were a significant shortfall of bus company drivers.
I Virtually the same problems with drivers having l
difficulties getting where they were needed and having
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_ -_ - - - - - - - - - - - ---^---
)
L.
difficulty with reading maps due to not a high enough quality of map were evidenced in this exercise as in the prior i exercise. In several cases this time, maps for special facilities had wrong instructions or wrong addresses (See p.
231 of the FEMA Draft Exercise Report). The FEMA Draft Exercise Report also states that:
"Some drivers demonstrated no capability to read any map" which indicates that problems with driver training have not been adequately addressed.
j Further, the problem of refueling buses has not been adequately addressed. On the day of the exercise, the buses that needed fuel stopped at a gas station, which would not be possible during the course of a real radiological emergency as the proprietors would have evacuated. The signatory of the bus refueling letter of agreement in Volume 5 of Rev. 2 of the NHRERP has gone out of business.
SAPL EX-4 Contention l
The appropriate use of equipment and procedures for collection and transport of samples of food, water and other l
appropriate items was not adequately demonstrated by the exercise. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR
$ 50.47 (a) (1) , 5 50. 47 (b) (9) , 5 50. 47 (b) (10) , 5 50.47 (b) (14) and NUREG-0654 I.7 and 8 and J.11. have not been met.
Basis i
I only two sampling teams were included in the exercise.
One -o f -tw& -sampking -beame r -er -5& -pereend -of -these -e>eereisedy performed peerkyr- 'Peem-#F-was-enfamiFiar-with precedures-Fer sampbe-eeFFeedien -and -with -se rvey -techni ques-with -the assignad -instruments r --Beth -teams -had -breebbe -with -maps -and had -dif ficekdy -reaching -their -eriginal--Feeathens -and-Team -#1 actuaFFy -eeFFeeded -its -sample -at -the -wrong -heeatien r - -Team -#1 l aFee -esed -peer -beehni-que -in -eekFeed ing -the -sampler Applicable Board Ruling (s) l "The Board accepts SAPL EX 4 to the extent it raises a question concerning the scope of the exercise. But to the extent that it raises a challenge to the training of the two sampling teams, it is rejected as not supporting a fundamental-flaw contention." Drder (12/15/88) at 56.
1 I
1 I
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f
{ SAPL EX-6 Contention The graded exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate the adequacy of personnel to staff both the traffic control posts (TCP's) and access control posts (ACP's) designated in
- f. the plan to control evacuation flow and control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. Therefore, the requirements i
of 10 CFR 5 50. 47 (a) (1) , 6 50. 4 7 (b) (10) , 6 50.47(b) (14) and
) NUREG-0654 J.10.i, j., k. and 1. have not been met.
Basis The total number of state police required to provide assistance in staffing of ACP's in New Hampshire is 26-28 state police. (NHRERP, Vol 6 at p. 9-12) An additional 40 state security.
police are needed to staff TCP's and provide municipal During the exercise, only 4 ACP/TCP locations were staffed by N.H. State Police from Troop A, Epping. Only 13 I
of the 17 local communities staffed an ACP/TCP and only one was staffed in each of those communities. There was, therefore, no adequate demonstration that there is the j organizational ability or personnel and equipment resources i
to staff all the required traffic and access control locations in New Hampshire. One of the towns that did not staff any location at all was Hampton. Hampton is the town with largethe mostpopulation.
beach severe evacuation problems due to its extremely The capability to control traffic in that community emergency response.
is critical to an adequate radiological Further, the establishment of the i
TCP/ACP's was done out of the sequence and hence did not provide a true test of the capability to marshall state and/or local personnel and resources to appropriate traffic i
control locations in a timely manner during an emergency.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"The contention is admitted as raising a question of the scope inadequate." of the exercise, alleging that the sample size was Order (12/15/88) at 57.
SAPL EX-7 Contention The graded exercise of the NHRERP for Seabrook Station failed to demonstrate the capability for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and facilities because the facility that is to be used under the plan was not opened up and demonstrated during the exercise. Further, there was no showing that there is adequate provision for disposal of l
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I wastes. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (1) ,
5 50.47 (b) (11) , 5 50. 4 7 (b) (14 ) and NUREG-0654 K.5.a. and b.
have not been met.
Basis The Hillside Junior High School was, according to FEMA's report, unavailable for purposes of demonstration during the
[ course of the exercise. There was no showing that there were adequate numbers of trained personnel to staff the facility and no showing that the facility had been ever tested for its L proposed use. The only FEMA evaluation of the facility was a l
visual inspection on July 22, almost a month following the exercise. Further, there was no exercise of the capability to dispose of contaminated wastes.
Applicable Bourd Ruling (s)
"The contention is admitted as a question of scope."
Order (12/15/88) at 58.
SAPL EX-8 Contention l The graded exercise of the NHRERp failed to demonstrate reasonable assurance of adequate public protection since no capability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> continuous staffing of Staging Areas and Reception Centers was demonstrated and continuous l staffing of local and host EOC's over a continuous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time frame was not shown to be fully adequate in any of the local or host communities. Key positions at the IFO were not l folly staffed by appropriately trained individuals and the Governor's office was not represented according to the plan.
Further, the exercise did not demonstrate that there are l
adequate provisions for filling the roles of those personnel who are absent due to sickness, vacation or other causes.
Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 9 50.47 (a) (1) ,
S 50.47 (b) (1) , 5 50.47 (b) (14) and NUREG-0654 A.1. and'A.4.
are not met.
Basis The host EOC's in Salem, Dover and Rochester did not demonstrate shift changes. The Manchester EOC is alleged to l
have done so, though outgoing staff failed to brief the incoming staff. Neither the Rockingham County Staging Area nor the Portsmouth Circle Business Center Staging Area attempted shift changes. The exercise ended before the shift change was completed at the Reception Center in Dover.
Firefighters in Dover conducted a demonstration and distributed a statement which said, inter alia, that "the
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f' 1
firefighters . . . universally oppose the evacuation plans as
, unworkable." 'Phe -preposed -eerreehive -aedien -mentiened -at -p-
) &&& -e f -the -PEMA -Exercise -Reperb -e f -having -BPHS -eb tain -}0 personnel--frem -the -N rH r-Nati-en eF -Gu ard -dees -ned -add ress -the p roblem -si nee -the -B PH & - f-sie b -f ene t i-ens -reef e i re -very specia Fieed -tr aining -and -experdi-se r --Ferther r -adding personnel- -to -BPHS -dees -net -address -the -preblem -ef -Feek -ef sherif fs - (-sieF -Beput ies -to -s ta f f -a -seeend -shif t -at -the staging-areeer--Referenee-de Sthe-Hampden-eender n -in-the Exercise -Reperd -makes -ne -sense -sinee -there -is -no -seeh leea tion -desi gnated -es -either -e -Staging -Aree -or -R ecep tion senter-ender-the-NHRERP.
l i
Not even one local EOC in the 17 towns demonstrated a full shift change. The Seabrook EOC was not even staffed in l accordance with the plan for the first shift, and the Civil Defense Director did not appear to be trained adequately.
Further, no second shift capability was demonstrated for Sheriff's Deputies staffing the non-participating l communities. Additionally, three of the Local Liaison Officers and a special needs liaison were not replaced on the second shift at the IFO. The second shift state police did not demonstrate appropriate knowledge and capabilities. One of the two positions at the Joint Telephone Information Center (JTIC) was unstaffed due to illness. The exercise i
demonstrated no capability to bring in trained replacement 1 personnel for positions left unfilled due to illness or other causes.
Applicabic Board Ruling (s)
"However, both [the Applicants and the Staff) note that the issue of augmenting the DPHS reception center staffing with National Guardsmen has been litigated as part of the planning issues. We agree and that aspect of the contention 1
will not be relitigated." Order (12/15/88) at 58.
i "The contention is admitted as a question of the scope of the exercise." Order (12/15/88) at 58. '
SAPL EX-12 Contention The adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and l decontamination of evacuees was not demonstrated during the exercise. Facilities were not well organized and not run in an adequately effective manner. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 5 50.47 (a) (1), 5 50. 47 (b) (10) , 5 50. 47 (b) (14) and NUREG-0654 J.12 have not been met.
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Basis I
enFy -two -e f -the -hest -eenmenhi-es -epened -Reception een ders -deri-ng -the -exere see t---Sabem -and -Bever . In Sa1em, mock evacuees were kept waiting outdoors from approximately 3:14 p.m. until 5:09 p.m. when the first evacuee was monitored. Difficulties in setting up the facility included phone lines strung across a corridor, the DPHS Supervisor's l
i radio not working and too few personnel. The personnel problems were compounded when fire personnel got called away to deal with real life situations. Monitoring times were not efficient and there was a mix-up of the Mettags. An actual breakdown in the monitoring process occurred at 6:28 p.m.
l In Dover, the workers in the Reception Center seemed unclear on their responsibilities and there were not enough personnel.
Reception Center Mock evacuees until afterwere 3:30not allowed into the Dover p.m. There was a good deal of disarray in the organization in the monitoring section and the process of monitoring evacuees did not begin until 4:40 p.m.
Some of the evacuees wandered into the wrong areas.
Not instruments. headsets were available for the monitoring enough
! At -the -State -E40,--the -BPH9 -sta f f -who -a re -to -be -an l information-and-referrak-reseuree-de-th -pereenneh-at-the Recep tio n -Gendere -were -no t -fami-Mar -w hh -the i-r responsbehien-and-deties-ander-the-Radiebegieel--Heahh Screening -Prog ram e - -Thie - he -a -very -seriees -de feet -in -the l
re spense -eapabni ty -for -a -radiebegieak -emergency-Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"In commenting on ALAB-903, SAPL points to the ' scope' aspects of the contention implying that all the reception l centers need to be exercised. This is not required, however.
i The exercise included one large and one small center out of two large and two small centers, a very good representation.
Therefore, the scope aspect of the contention is rejected."
Order (l' e/15/88) at 61.
"Therefore the contention . . . is admitted, excluding allegations regarding the State EOC and the scope aspects."
Order (12/15/88) at 62.
SAPL EX-13 Contention The graded exercise of the NHRERP did not provide an adequate demonstration of reasonable assurance that those persons confined to nursing homes, hospitals and like special
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l institutions can be adequately protected in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 5 50. 47 (a) (1) , 50. 47 (b) (10) , 5 50.47 (b) (14) and NUREG-0654 J.9, J.10.d., e., f. and g. have not been met.
l
} Basis There was no test of capability to transport hospital and nursing home patients to host facilities by ambulance and the plan for testing of bus bed conversion capability was severely limited. There were only two mini-scenarios to test the emergency bed bus capability and it is not clear from i
reviewing the Exercise Report whether or not those mini-scenarios were carried out. Further, there is no mention of any test of the ability to make decisions regarding the administration of KI to institutionalized persons in regard to Objective #16. Finally, there was no test of host special facilities to receive special population evacuees and no test I of the capability to monitor and decontaminate these special population evacuees. Therefore, the graded exercise provided no reasonable assurance that institutionalized persons can be l
adequately protected in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook.
Applicable Board Ruling (s)
"[T]he contention clearly raises a questian of the
' capability to transport' patients. This is a ' scope' contention not covered by ALAB-903 and is admitted. " Order I
(12/15/88) at 62.
SAPL EX-14 l
contention l The graded exercise of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP) for Seabrook Station did not result ih an adequate demonstration that appropriate Protective Action decisions will be made for the plume EPZ communities er-thed-expansien-ef-the-respense-berend-den miles-een-be-earried-ettb-when-ib-is predent-de-earry-eed-seeh an-expanded-respense . Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 5 50. 47(a) (1), 5 50. 4 7 (b) (10) and NUREG-0654 J.10.m. have not been met.
l Basis The exercise scenario resulted in a wind shift which brought a concentrated plume over the communities of Portsmouth, Rye and Greenland toward the end of Day 1 of the scenario, yet those communities were never ordered evacuated.
In view of the radiation levels in the plume as the wind
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carried it over those municipalities, the evacuation order should have been expanded to encompass ERPA G. Furtherr-the eeneentration-of-the pFume-es-it passed-ever-Mitteryr-Maine weekd -have -warranted -an -evaceatien -ef -Mit tery -as -weFF r-NUREG-&&&+-states-at pr-12 -that-the-F&-mi-le pkume-EPE pl-ann ing -bas i-e -i-s -b ased -en -the -eensiderati-en r -inter -a k ie-l thatt I
detai-Fed planning-within-19-miles-weel-d provide -a -subs tantiaF -base -for -expansien e f -respense -e f fe rts -in -the -even t -thi-s preved-neeessary The exercise demonstrated that appropriate protective actions were not wholly carried out even within the boundaries of the EPZ. The -e>tereise -shewed -no -e ap ab i 1-ity -for an -expansion -o f -the -response -beyend -FB -mi-1-ee -when -w arr antedr Applicable Board Ruling (s)
! "The portion of the contention alluding to protective action beyond 10 miles is rejected." Order (12/15/88) at 63.
"[T]he contention satisfies the first standard of ALAB-903, and we think that the matter is important enough to support an inquiry into whether the plan provides for ad hoc flexibility of adapting evacuation regions to wind shifts."
Order (12/15/88) at 64.
TOH/NECNP EX-1 Contention The scope of the June 28-29, 1988 Exercise of the New l Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP) was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or I meaningful results regarding the capability to implement that plan, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47 (a) (1) and (a) (2), in that it did not include demonstrations or evaluations of emergency response capabilities of many persons and entities relied l upon to implement the NHRERP. In addition, the exclusion of l
these entities from the Exercise precludes a finding that the Exercise evaluated major portions of emergency response capabilities, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b) (14) and 10 CFR
} Part 50, Appendix E'(T) (1) . Other than limited participation by State of New Hampshire personnel, the majority of the organizations, entities, and individuals relied upon in the NHRERP for implementation of that plan did not participate in the Exercise. Thus, the Exercise did not address the willingness, availability, training, equipment, capability, or adequacy of performance of the entities and individuals identified in Bases a to g below, each of which is necessary
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to implement the portions of the NHRERP referenced therein.
Accordingly, the NHRERP is fundamentally flawed.
Basis (a) None of the teachers relied upon under the NHRERP to implement protective actions for school children, see e.g.
NHRERP Vol. 18A, Appendix F, participated in the Exercise.
Necessarily, the Exercise failed to meet a primary objective to demonstrate the ability and resources nacessary to adequately protect students in an emergency. Exercise Report, p. 172. Since hundreds of teachers through their representatives, and by petition, have already provided evidence in this proceeding of their intent not to implement the NHRERP, failure to test for the availability and participation of New Hampshire teachers represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERp.
(b) Since none of the New Hampshire teachers participated in the Exercise, FEMA could not observe any adequate demonstration of the organizational ability or resources necessary to effect an early dismissal, sheltering, or evacuation, of the school children, even though this demonstration was one of the Exercise objectives. Exercise Report, p. 172. Under the NHRERP, early dismissal, sheltering and evacuation are the only protective actions for school children. EE2 (e.g.) NHRERP Vol. 18A, Ap F. 1-4. All of these protective actions assure,p F. 1-3, and rely upon, teachers for implementation. Id. Failure to observe or test necessary personnel or procedures to protect students
) represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERP.
(d) Although at least 45 traffic control guides are to be provided by the New Hampshire State Police to all Towns under the NHRERP, Id. at Tables 3.1-2, 3.1-3, only two troopers actually assumed that function during the Exercise.
Ege, Exhibit 1, attached. Accordingly, there is no factual basis to support FEMA's finding that State Police could or did properly " handle beach closing," and the time frames for staffing of traffic control points relied on by FEMA are wholly speculative. See, Exercise Report, p. 182.
In addition, the NHRERP requires State Police to provide 28 I
traffic guides to staff access control posts within the New Hampshire EPZ. Volume 6, p. 9-12. Only two troopers were actually deployed to staff ACPs during the Exercise. Exhibit
- 1. FEMA's conclusion that, by 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />, State Police had adequately shown the capability to duploy all 89 troopers for
) ACP/TCPs is without foundation. Exercise Report, p. 182.
Failure to adequately demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to regulate evacuation traffic and EPZ access represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERP. Exercise Report, p. 182.
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(f) 15 of 18 (83%) of the bus companies relied upon under the NHRERP for emergency and special needs transportation did not provide any drivers or buses for the Exercise. Even the three companies who did provide resources deployed only 18 regular buses (4%) of the 453 required for implementation of the NHRERP. Sejit, Exhibit 2, Attached; Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 2, p. 13, October 21, 1987.
The Exercise also utilized only one of 48 ambulances (2%),
and two of 71 special needs buses (3%), deemed necessary for implementation of the Plan. See, Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 2, pp. 13-15, October 21, 1987; Exhibit 2. The adequacy of transportation resources, particularly bus drivers, has been seriously disputed in these proceedings.
The failure to demonstrate the availability of any meaningful I number of these resources represents a fundamental flu in the NHRERP.
(g) There is no basis for FEMA's assertion that the I State, during the Exercise, adequately demonstrated, or
" identified", sufficient manned vehicles to evacuate the entire EPZ. See Exercise Report, p. 165. That I identification process apparently consisted only of phone calls to bus companies to restate the number of drivers specified in each company's letter of agreement. Apparently, I no dete*,.mination of the number of drivers actually available to drive, was provided by the companies or required by the Exercise. The failure to demonstrate the actual availability of necessary transportation resources, including at least 96%
8 (435 of 453) of the drivers required to implement the NHRERP, represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERP. Exhibit 2.
TOR /NECNP EX-2 Dismissed by Board, Tr. 25220-21.
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