ML20215B176
ML20215B176 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Limerick |
Issue date: | 12/11/1986 |
From: | Love A GRATERFORD INMATES, LOVE, A.R. |
To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
References | |
CON-#486-1856 ALAB-845, OL, NUDOCS 8612120061 | |
Download: ML20215B176 (18) | |
Text
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DOCKETED U5tlRC l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA T6 DEC 11 Pl2:22 j NUCLEAR REGULA'IORY COP 94ISSION I m- -
l BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETIY AND LICENSING APPEAL' BOARD fIntheMatterof: :
i
! PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
! (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2) : Nos. 50-352, 50-353' g L
4 h BRIEF OF GRATERFORD INMATES if
- lI. INTRODUCTION v The Graterford Inmates, through their attorney, Angus R. Iove, appeal the d
Supplement to the Fourth Partial Initial Decision relating to the remanded contention regarding manpower mobilization at the State Correctional Institute jatGraterford. The appeal involves a decision of the Atomic Safety and b
,. Licensing Board issued on November 10, 1986. Said decision was made in response That
{;totheAtomicSafetyandLicensingAppealBoardDecisionALAB-845.
! decision required a remand with regard to the Licensing Board's rejection of the i
manpower mobilization contention raised by the Inmates at the State Correctional jjInstitute at Graterford. The purpose of the remand was to determine if the a
f, call-up telephone system used to notify off duty personnel needed to implement 4
I the evacuation at Graterford would achieve the purpose for which it was designed. That purpose being the mobilization of the necessary manpower. The Appeal Board also expressed concern with regard to the time frame needed to accomplish said purpose. The Inmates contend that the Licensing Board's 4
g 8612120061 861211 2 y PDR ADOCK 0500
fdecisionofNovember 10, 1986 failed to properly address the issue before the
- Court. The decision of the Licensing Board states that there is a reasonable e
I:
assurance that the call-up system will achieve its designated purpose of j notifying off duty personnel needed to implement the evacuation. The Inmates j contend that the decision failed to provide such reasonable assurances required by 10 C.F.P. 50.47(b)S, which requires establishment of procedures for
. " notification of emergency personnel by all organizations". (See also NUREG, 0654, Criterion E 2, at p. 43.) The reasons for the Inmates' contention tha l I
the Licensing Board failed to perform the required task are as follows: the call-up system, as it was initially described, has been altered without notice ito opponents or authorization from the approprlate agencies. The designated
. purpose of the call-up system has been altered, in that only the Inmates, and l
not the various records, are due for evacuation. The method of notification has i f
been altered from its initial concept. The number of individuals necessary to conduct the evacuation has been drastically reduced. Finally, the entire con-
, cept of the evacuation has been changed. In addition to the allowance of ad hoc planning on the part of the Commonwealth, the Board refused the legitimate
. discovery requests by the Inmates and failed to provide an impartial tribunal called for in 10 C.F.R. 2.718. The decision also failed to elaborate jonhowthebackupsystemswouldbeabletoperformthenecessarytasks.
F I II. LEGAL ARGUMENT l
l A. The Inmates failed to receive their rights to a fair and impartial I
, tribunal as quaranteed by 10 C.F.R. 2.718.
The Inmates contend they were denied their right to a fair and impartial tribunal according to law. The basis for their contention that they r m c
are entitled to such a hearing can be found at 10 C.F.R. 2.718. This section, which recites the power of the presiding officer, states, "A presiding officer has the duty to conduct a fair and impartial tribunal according to law ...". In order to understand the lack of fairness exhibited by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board with respect to this issue, a brief mention of the history leading up to the recent hearings is necessary. Despite the Inmates'
- recognition as intervenors in September of 1981, the plan was not made available dto the Inmates and their counsel until December 14, 1984. The plan that was presented at that time was reviewed by the Plaintiffs' expert, Major John Case,'
. and found to be unintelligible. Even the chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board acknowledged its unintelligible nature. (See Tr. 20,432, l'20,468, 1
20,474 and 20,640 and Board's Oral Ruling of January 29, 1985 at 20,479-20,481.) Despite the chairman's recognition as to the unintelligible; qnature, additional disclosure was rejected and the Inmates' contention with
, regard to manpower mobilization was dismissed for the first time. Following an.
Happeal suggesting additional disclosure under the protective order format, the 4
[ Inmates were successful in reviewing the contents of the Radiological Emergency
't hResponsePlanfortheStateCorrectionalInstituteatGraterford. Despite their success in gaining access to said plan, the Licensing Board continued to exhib I
hostility to the Inmates' claims by refusing to allow them to revise their contentions which had been based on the initial unintelligible plan. (See Licensing Board Order and Memorandum of April 12, 1985.) This necessitated another appeal, which again resulted in a remand to the Licensing Board. (See Order of Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, May 1,1985.) Said Order allowed the Inmates fif teen days in which to file their revised contentions.
I I I I j 1 i
l l
VPrior to the filing, the Licensing Board issued an exemption from this issue to I!
- the Applicant. In granting said exemption, the Licensing Board continued to (indicate its prejudice by stating that any deficiencies that existed were
- " insignificant". (See Order of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, May 13, 1985, l'
fgranting exemption request of Applicant.) After the Nuclear Regulatory 4
[Comission overruled the Licensing Board's decision in its order of June 11, o
l1985, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board once again rejected the Inmates' contention with regard to manpower mobilization, despite the fact that the
$ Inmates had clearly stated a sufficient basis for a contention regarding manpower mobilization. Their subsequent appeal of this rejection led to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's decision ALAB-845, dated August 28, 1986.
lThat decision requested the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to review the Inmates' contention with regard to manpower mobilization for a fourth time. To the surprise of no one, the Licensing Eoard affirmed is previous position that lthe call-up system was adequate to achieve its designated purpose in its Idecision of November 10, 1986.
u The Inmates contend that the Licensing Board failed to maintain i-(impartiality with respect to the remand in the following ways. Initially, a fconference call was held on September 3,1986, to set up a schedule for the hearing of testimony with regard to the remanded issue. At that time, the 1
l chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board noted the necessity of an Il expedited schedule so that a hearing could be held on September 26, 1986. The
' Inmates' counsel noted their objection to such an expedited schedule for the following reasons. Despite the Inmates' entry into the case in 1981, no actions were taken with regard to their claims until all other matters had been I
addressed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. (See First, Second and I Third Partial Initial Decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.) As h
hnoted by the Appeal Board in its May 1,1985 ruling, any delays in this matter P
are not the fault of the Graterford Inmates. Thus, the Inmates were placed in a l position that they were the last intervenors to request hearings with regard to lthe contentions raised. In this highly charged atmosphere, the Applicant launched a public relations campaign through the media, during proceedingst l
' before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and before the United States Court ofl 1
! Appeals for the Third Circuit. The essence of the Applicant's campaign was that b l the Inmates were costing the Applicant $1.5 million per day for pursuing theiri blawful rights under 10 C.F.R. 50.47. Applicant proceeded with this course of I
jaction despite previous decisions in the above-captioned matter that stated,
'"... economic concerns are not within the proper scope of issues litigated before these proceedings". Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2) ALAB-789, Nov. 5,1984. At that time, the Inmates agreed to an I
expedited schedule in order to satiate the concerns of the Applicant. As the' Applicant has received its full power license and has begun operations of the hUnit 1 generator of the Limerick Generating Station, the Inmates protested the
' necessity of another expedited hearing schedule. Despite their objection, the
. chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board indicated a necessity to waive j normal procedural requirements and pursue an expedited schedule allowing only i one week for discovery and only two and a half weeks prior to presentation of 1
l testimony before the Panel. The Inmates contend that such actions were no longer necessary and that the normal time frames of discovery should have been available to the Inmates.
During the conference call of September 3,1986, the Inmates requested of the Comonwealth, information with regard to the issues to be raised at the lupcominghearingofSeptember 22, 1986. The Inmates made this request due to
- the previous foundation which had been laid with respect to this issue in the n
[ form of Rick Brown's prior testimony and the testimony of both Comissioner
, Jeffes and Superintendent Zimmerman. At that time, Theodore Otto, counsel for the Department of Corrections, indicated there would be no changes-
.in the manpower mobilization plan as it had been previously described. Despite these assertions, the Licensing Board allowed significant unauthorized revisions; of the plan during hearings on September 22, 1986. These alterations include a
' change in the number of personnel needed to conduct the evacuation, a ch themethodologyofthecall-upsystem,aredefiningofthetaskstobeperformedl, i
by the individuals during the evacuation, and a change of the time frames upon: i
'which emergency personnel will have to be notified. All of the above-mentioned changes were done without authorization as required by law. The Inmates note that the page in the Radiological Emergency Response Plan for indicating changes-in the plan was blank. The Inmates further note that said changes were not reviewed by the appropriate authorities, such as Pennsylvania Emergency g Management Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency prior to the j
! testimony with regard to said changes. The Inmates contend that the Licensing l Board exhibited a flagrant disregard for its discretion in allowing testimony of
! changes without notice or approval. Thus, the Commonwealth was allowed to l engage in ad hoc planning in an attempt to circumvent the prior testimony of I
Rick Brown with regard to the reliability of commercial phone lines.
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board further failed to provide the Inmates I
,I of a fair and impartial tribunal by restricting their discovery requests and a
jattempts to put testimony on the record with respect to the incident at Three Mile Island in 1979. As the Inmates noted, the Three Mile Island accident at jthe Middletown, Pennsylvania nuclear power plant, provided an excellent source of information as to how emergency personnel would be notified in the event of Lan emergency. As this accident occurred within the same jurisdiction, i.e., the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and involved the same telephone lines, i.e., Bell of Pennsylvania, the Inmates believe that such information was extremely relevant to the issue before the Court. Despite the Inmates' assertions, the i
- Licensing Board refused to issue a subpoena directed to both Bell of il!
Pennsylvania and the Department of Corrections, requesting information as to how l
Othose organizations responded to the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. The il
' Board further limited testimony of Richard Buell by sustaining the objection of j
[the Applicant with respect to his knowledge of the Three Mile Island accident.
- Af ter refusing the subpoenas and sustaining objections to testimony with regard;
[ ,
to the Three Mile Island incident, the Board, in its decision, stated that it was " unable to translate this limited information into specific projections of the severity, duration or geographical extent of any circuit overloading that
- may result from an emergency at Limerick." (See p. 21 of Atomic Safety and ii
,!L icensing Board Decision, November 10, 1986.) Thus, the Licensing Board chose f
}tooperateinthedarkonthisissueandthenusedsaidlackofinformationasa
!reasonfornotaddressingtheissue.
L l
The Inmates contend that the Licensing Board's past treatment of this issue, refusal to allow a normal discovery period, denial of legitimate subpoena requests, allowance of the Department of Corrections ad hoc decision making i
- without notice or approval, limitation of relevant testimony, and their inherent t
jhostility to the Inmates all exhibit a lack of impartiality as required by 10
'C.F.R. 2.718. In addition to these factors, the Inmates note the regularity of ex parte filings by the Applicant's counsel with the Atomic Safety and Licensing Chairman, Helen Hoyt. On more than one occasion, Robert Rader, counsel for the Applicant, resorted to ex parte filings. These documents taken from pro nuclear trade publications and his own personal views on the subject of emergency plan-
"ning, were an attempt to persuade the Licensing Board of his personal beliefs without giving opposing counsel an opportunity to respond. Chairman Hoyt appeared to accept said documents enthusiastically and graciously thanked him for his concern. All of these factors contributed to an atmosphere that failed to provide impartiality as envisioned by the Code of Federal Regulations and the Constitution of the United States.
B. The unauthorized alterations of the Radiological Emergency Responsef i
Plan for the State Correctional Institute at Graterford, should not be the basis for a decision that said alterations in the plan provide a reasonable assurancei
- I that the necessary manpower will be mobilized.
f As the issue before the Court, by necessity, overflows into other such
' areas, several discussions had been held on the record prior to the hearing of
. September 22, 1986 that involved the manpow 3r mobilization component of the iRadiological Emergency Response Plan for Graterford. These discussions had
!, occurred during the conferences held in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (see Tr.
h (20,535), through discovery requests (see February 27, 1985 Response of the (Commonwealthof Pennsylvania Department of Corrections to Requests for b
Information, p. 4), during hearings held with respect to the expected time of evacuation on July 15, 1985, and prior testimony of Rick Brown with respect to other contentions (see Tr. 18,226). The end result of these prior hearings was that the manpower mobilization component of Graterford would be affected by a
! pyramid call-up system. (See Zimerman Tr. 21,423.) Superintendent Zimmerman
. described this system during the hearings of July 15, 1985 by saying, "We have a
[ kind of a pyramid structure, and there is a list of personnel that are called by i
qthe shif t comander or whoever is designated to call from the facility itself.
They in turn call X number of other people and it is almost like a chain letter
[and eventually everyone is contacted... ." (See Zimerman Tr. 20,809.) Said.
F
' system contemplates telephone calls being made from outside the prison. (See.
Zimmerman Tr. 20,469.) Superintendent Zimerman's assertions went on to state i
! that the maximum number of individuals to be called in, in order to effect the L
- evacuation, would be 300. (See Zimerman Tr. 20,842.) He further indicated that dthe plan itself noted the exact number of individuals to be called in. (See
,Zimmerman pretrial testimony for July 15, 1985 hearing, p. 5.) Additional information with regard to the mechanics of the call-up system was provided by hTheodore Otto in his response of the Comonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of 1
Corrections to requests for information raised at the February 27, 1985
- .conference. At that time, Otto stated, "There is a call-up system in place.
- l This system is available to notify additional manpower if they are needed during 1
a radiological emergency. The plan uses management individuals to call the staff. Each individual has less than ten other persons to call. Furthermore, the callers are of sufficient rank to give the orders to the persons receiving the call to report to work." (See supra p. 4.) This concept of the call-up system was affirmed by Camissioner Jeffes when he stated, "If we have a major
emergency, we are going to have to call up everyone, we are' going to call up heveryonethatwecangetourhandson."
~
(See Tr. 20,535.) The Inmates' kwitness, Major John Case, agreed with Comissioner Jeffes with respect to the
!i number of persons necessary to conduct the evacuation. Case stated, "There is gno way in which you are going to have enough people on one shift to do this, you a
are going to have to call in everyone from outside that's on the other shifts pand perhaps from other institutions as well." (See Tr. 20,533.) Therefore, we have a consensus of opinion from Superintendent Zimerman, Comissioner Jeffes, li j:and Major Case that the plan calls for the mobilization of up to 300 individuals jiin, order to effect the evacuation of the State Correctional Institute at j,Graterford. They further indicated that the source of this information was h
contained in the plan. Due to the sensitive nature of the plan, Inmates' bcounsel was unable to ascertain where in the plan the number of individuals to h
j!be called was located.
l g Despite Mr. Otto's contentions that there would be no alterations of the u
l
[I, plan during the September 3,1986 telphone conference, testimony given at the iSeptember 22, 1986 hearing indicated otherwise. The Inmates again note that changes in the plan cannot be made without documentation as to the changes in l
jthe revision page of the plan and without approval from FEMA and PEMA. Despite I th ese considerations, Superintendent Zimmerman's testimony indicated a drastic i
alteration in many aspects of the manpower mobilization component. (See Tr.
21,473-21,474.) The most significant alteration involved the number of manpower necessary to conduct the evacuation. During this testimony, Zimerman indicated that the number had been reduced by over one-third and would now involve only 15% of all off duty staff. (See Tr. '.1,451.) Zimerman further indicated that i
$there was now a two-tier call-up system which would be used to mobilize the necessary manpower. He indicated that the change was made as a practical matter
- because he did not want his employees making long distance phone calls from their homes. (See Tr. 21,473.) Zimerman further altered the plan by revising
]the concept of the evacuation in that the removal of medical records and files 1
iwerenolongertheresponsibilityoftheindividualstobecalledininorderto leffect the evacuation as contemplated in the Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Graterford. (See Tr. 21,499-21,500.) All of the alterations were made j.in an ad hoc fashion without notice, without approval, and without documentation n
]intheplanitself. Zimmerman also failed to explain how the number of individuals could be altered so drastically, despite his earlier assertions that the plan itself indicated the exact number of personnel to be called in. The lfinal alteration involved the time frames necessary for calling in individuals.
Il JPrevious testimony indicated that individuals would be called in on all shifts ,
i LNow Superintendent Zimerman states that manpower will only have to be mobilizediI c
Jduring the night shift. Coincidentally, the new alterations in the plan neatly fit into a circumvention of prior testimony of Rick Brown with regard to the unreliability of comercial phone lines during emergencies. Home phones are no
/ longer a significant part of the call-up system. Use of phones during peak k
Shours is no longer necessary. Additional duties, such as taking medical records along with the inmates to the relocation site is no longer included in the plan.
The number of personnel necessary to conduct the evacuation has been drastically
' reduced by over one-third. The Inmates failed to receive any notice of these I
revisons. Superintendent Zimerman acknowledged that the revisions were made without documentation or approval. Thus, the Inmates contend that said testimony was self-serving and should not be the bases for the Licensing Board's decision that a reasonable assurance has been provided that the call-up system will perform the task that it has been designated to achieve.
i y C. The Graterford Radiological Emergency Response Plan's manpower d
' mobilization component fails to provide a reasonable assurance that sufficient jmanpower will be on hand in order to conduct an orderly evacuation of the State 3
l! Correctional Institute at Graterford.
li j Even with the drastic unauthorized alterations of the Plan, the Inmates ffcontendthatthesystemisstillflawedinmanyrespects. Testimony of Richard i!
!;Baell, Rick Brown, and Bill Miller establish that telephone servicing does not I
!jcontemplate natural or manmade disasters.
i (See Tr. 21,540, 21,512, and 21,389.)
hInstead,thephonesystemisengineeredtoprovidegoodserviceonanormalbusy 1
Shour. (See Tr. 21,539.) In fact, FCC regulations prevent the use of equipment II lto handle loads beyond the normal busy periods. (See Tr. 21,511.) All three
.: individuals who worked for either the Bell or AT&T systems acknowledged many (instances when manmade or natural disasters had created problems for phone service. These instances included the Hurricane Agnes of 1972, thel-assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, severe winter weather storms, the Three Mile Island accident of 1979, and a recent concert ticket lisales through telephone lines. (See Tr. 21,518, 21,529-21,534, 21,540, and i
{21,395.) Indeed, the Comonwealth's witness acknowledged that a nuclear acident at the Limerick facility may cause an overload of surrounding telephone U
Jstations. (See Tr. 21,413.) It is further noted that the Commonwealth's witness failed to acknowledge the workability of the Graterford call-up system.
(See Tr. 21,429.)
l
4 Superintendent Zimmerman downplayed these assertions by stating that his plan relied upon ten foreign service lines provided by the Commonwealth of l Pennsylvania, which go directly from a Philadelphia switching station. He l
jfurther noted that they have ten additional lines connected with the Department i
,of Corrections in Camp Hill. He also indicated that other back up systems were available, such as the Montgomery County Emergency Radio System, . the IPennsylvania State Police, and the availability of a CIEAN machine. (See Tr.
I.
[21,460-21,462.) Superintendent Zinmerman failed to detail how these various lines could provide the information necessary to mobilize the manpower necessary to conduct the evacuation. Obviously, the State Police, the Montgomery County Emergency Radio System, other state correctional institutes, and the CIEAN I
' achine, would have no idea of the phone numbers and addresses of the guards m
- currently employed by the State Correctional Institute at Graterford. Thus, O
gnone of these organizations or systems would be capable of mobilizing manpower.
- Furthermore, the Inmates provided testimony that the foreign service lines and Comonwealth lines would be of no value if the calls were coming in to thel i
congested area surrounding the Limerick Generating Station. (See Tr. 21,423,.
21,428, 21,592.) This testimony stated that regardless of where the calls are yoming from, determination point is the point in which congestion will occur.
l aiscovery indicated that the vast majority of personnel live in the area l
l surrounding the Limerick Generating Station. 230 people enployed by Graterford ive within the ten mile EPZ. Another 137 individuals live in the Norristown, Boyertown, West Chester and Lansdale areas, which are in close proximity with
- he ten mile EPZ. The Inmates contend that phone servicing in all of these areas will most likely be delayed in the event of an accident at the Limerick i
(See Tr. 21,413.) Additional personnel include 72
', Generating Station.
kindividualswholiveeitherinthecentral,northeasternorwesternPennsylvania b
[ areas. These individuals would require two to six hours' driving time prior to arriving at the institution and thus would be unable to be involved in a ll
[ manpower mobilization operation that would be conpleted in one to two hours.
I Furthermore, testimony indicated that the placement of 199 long distance phone
] calls needed to mobilize personnel living beyond the imediate area would also; p i dexperiencedelays. (See Tr. 21,526.) As Zimerman's changes in reduction of:
l
[the manpower necessary to conduct the evacuation were unauthorized and' unreported, the Inmates will use his original authorized and approved figure of;
'300. With 628 employees available, 72 must be excluded due to driving time' h
exceeding the one to two hour time frame Zimmerman suggests. This brings available personnel to 556. Then we must reduce that figure by 230 who live in jthe EPZ and will be subject to telephone service disruption, bringng the total, I
to 326. We should then consider the 137 individuals living within 20 miles as' also subject to probable telephone service disruption, leaving only 211 I
available for the task. The majority of these individuals live in Philadelphia!
and will need I hour and 15 minutes just to arrive. Thus, it is our contention lthatthenumbersarenotavailabletoconducttheoperationasitwasoriginally contemplated.
{
I Thus, the Inmates contend that the use of the commercial telephone lines I in order to ef fect the manpower mobilization conponent cf the State Correctional l Institute at Graterford is unreliable. Despite Asher's lack of concern regard-ing use of comercial telephone lines, the Inmates note that a similar issue did arise In the Matter of Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. , et al (Wrn. H.
i
,Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Unit 1), Docket No. 50-358; 17 NRC 760 (1983).
jiThey cite the previous experience of the Three Mile Island incident in 1979 as li
';further proof that such a system is unworkable. (See Tr. 21,529-21,534.)
iChairman Iloyt's refusal to allow development of this issue should not be f
iconstrued as a lack of foundation for Brown's testimony with regard to the Three I
i Mile Island accident.
III. CONCLUSION The Inmates respectfully request the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board to reject the unauthorized alterations in the Radiological Emergency.
Response Plan for the State Correctional Institute at Graterford. Clearly, the.
- alterations were designed to circumvent prior testimony of Comissioner Jeffes, l
Major Case, Rick Brown, and Robert Morris regarding the unreliability of commercial telephone lines. Conveniently, a drastic reduction in the manpower
- necessary to conduct the mobilization was allowed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. Further alterations with regard to the time frames necessary ito call in personnel were allowed by said Board. Changes in the descriptions of the duties perforraed by these individuals were also approved by the Board. A new
- two-tiered call-up system was put in place of the previous pyramid call-up I
system. All of these changes were done without documentation in said plan.
- They were further done without the prior approval of PEMA and FEMA. FEMA witnesses were not allowed to observe any aspects of the testing of such a l system. The system, as envisioned by Superintendent Zimmerman, has never been
!used or tested during an emergency that also af fected the general public surrounding the State Correctional Institute at Graterford. Superintendent Zimmerman's testimony is in direct conflict with that of Commissioner Jeffes.
It is further in conflict with the testimony of Major John Case, the expert retained by Graterford Inmates. This ad hoc planning was endorsed and used as the foundation for the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's decision of November 10, 1986. This further exhibited a continuing pattern of hostility and l
! prejudice on the part of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to the llintervenor, Graterford Inmates. For these reasons,the Inmates respectfully I
- request this Panel to reverse the findings of the Atomic Safety and Licensing
[ Board and remand the issue for a fair and impartial hearing before an Atomic-W (Safety and Licensing Board other than the one which heard this matter. .
l
[
Respectfully submitted, !
p WA ANGHS R. 1E, EBQUIRE Attorney r Inmates, SCIG t
I
l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOLFETE:'
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M
'86 DEC 11 R2:22 In the Matter of : GFF!& M DOCKE N i t : " '/ H I PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY N N" (Limerick Generating Station, y Units 1 and 2) : Docket Nos. 50-352, 50-353
.i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE i
I, Angus R. Love, Esquire, attorney for the Inmates at j the State correctional Institute at Graterford, hereby certify 1
i that a true and correct copy of the BRIEF OF GRATERFORD INMATES was sent to those individuals so marked with an *; others re-ceiving cover letter only, on December 9, 1986, first class mail.
[
t h
- Administrative Judge Helen F. Hoyt Robert W. Sugarman, Esquire s Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Sugarman, Denworth & Hellegers U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cmmission 16th F1., Center Plaza Washington, D.C. 20555 101 N. Broad Street Philadelphia, PA 19107 h* Administrative Judge Jerry Harbour Atomic Safety & Licensing Board
- Docket & Service Station
- / U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cmun.
F Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 (3 copies) q*
Counsel for NRC StaffAnn P. Hodgdon, Esquire Mr. Robert L. Anthony i; Office of Executive Legal Director 103 Vernon Lane Box 186 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Moylan,PA19065 Washington, D.C. 20555 David Wersan, Esquire I
Martha W. Bush, Esquire Asst. consumer Advocate Municipal Services Bldg. Office of Consumer Advocate 15th & JFK Blvd. 1425 Strawberry Square Philadelphia, PA 19107 Harrisburg, PA 17120
- Atomic Safety & Licensing
- Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coninission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conrn.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
l f
Frank Rcmano Jay M. Gutierrez, Esquire 61 Forest Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Ambler, PA 19002 Region 1 J 631 Park Avenue
,*Zori G. Ferkin, Esquire King of Prussia, PA 19406 Governor's Energy Council P.O. Box 8010 Phyllis Zitzer 3
1625 N Fro L6erick Ecology Action Harrisburg,nt St;rggqPA inus P.O. Box 761 Mr. Thcmas Ger' u sk 1 , Director 762 Queen Street Bureau of Radiation Protection Pottstown, PA 19464 Dept. of Environmental Resources lFultonBankBldg,5thF1. Charles W. Elliott, Esquire
' Third and Iocust Sts. Counsel for Limerick Ecology Action Harrisburg, PA 17120 325 N. 10ch Street Easton, PA 18042 p
- Spence W. Perry, Esquire Associate General Counsel Eugene J. Bradley, Esquire
, FEMA Rocm 840 Counsel for Philadelphia Electric J 500 CT St., SW 2301 Market Street
,' Washington, D.C. 20472 Philadelphia, PA 19101 I
d James Wiggins Edward G. Bauer, Jr.
jSr.ResidentInspector V.P. and General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conm. Philadelphia Electric Company
,l P.O. Box 47 2301 Market Street jSanatoga,PA19464 Philadelphia, PA 19101 Timothy R.S. Campbell, Director Steven P. Hershey, Esquire Dept. of Emergency Services Ccamunity Legal Services 14 E. Biddle Street 5219 Chestnut Street West Chester, PA 19380 Philadelphia, PA 19139 d
Director Penna. Emergency Management Agency Basement, Transportation Bldg.
Harrisburg, PA 17120
, Arthur E. Gowran i
U.S. Dept. of Justice
,, Appellate Section Land Division d 10th and Penna. Ave. NW 4 Washington,D.C.20530 LW d WU
! AIJGUS R. NE , ~ E IRE' eodore G. Otto, III, Esq. Counsel Inma , SCIG
! Dept. of Corrections Ebntg y County Legal Aid Chief Counsel 107 E. F th Street lllP.O.
Office of Box 598 Norristown, PA 19401 lCampHill,PA17011 (215) 275-5400 lIConner&Wettchahn* Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
1747 Penna. Ave NW Suite 1050 Washington, D.C. 20006