ML20214T250

Response of FEMA to Commonwealth of Ma Atty General Jm Shannon Offsite Emergency Preparedness Interrogatories & Request for Production of Documents to FEMA (Set 2).* FEMA Position on Contentions Encl.Related Correspondence

ML20214T250
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	06/04/1987
From:	Eric Thomas Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Shannon J MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF
Shared Package
ML20214T252	List: ML20214T250 ML20214T290 ML20214T299
References
CON-#287-3677 OL, NUDOCS 8706100176
Download: ML20214T250 (104)

Text

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, 6/4/87 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA COLkEiEI NUCLEAR REGUIAIORY COMMISSION BEEDRE 'INE A'IOMIC SAFE'IY LICENSING BOARD

'87 JJN -5 P2 :16 In the Matter of ) 0FFin w MI

) Ebcket No. @dd.1f Public Service Co. of New Haropshire, ) 50,444 et al. ) (Offsite)

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2 )

RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 'IO MASSACHUSETTS ATIORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON'S OFF-SIIE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUENTS TO FEMA (SET No. 2)

The Federal Duergency Management Agency (FEMA) is not a party to the above-captioned proceeding and it is, for that reason, not obligated to responr1 to the interrogatories propounded by any intervenors. FEMA voluntarily pro-vides the information supplied below, but reserves the right to object to future discovery requests.

f Interrogatory No.1:

Describe in detail your position with respect to each contention to be .

litigated by the Attorney General and each subpart of each such contention.

Describe in detail the reasons for your position.

Answer No. 1 FENA has developed a position on all off-site contentions admitted for litigation in this proceeding. The position and the reasoning for it is attached as Appendix A and is incorporated into my response to these inter-rogatories.

?, Interrogatory No. 2 Identify and produce all documents on which you hve relied, do rely, or will rely to support your position on each of these contentions. Identify the 8706100176 870604 PDR ADOCK 05000443 O PDR 3

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information.in each doc ment on which you have relied, do rely, or will rely and the specific subpart of each contention which that information concerns.

Answer No. 2 In formulating our position on the contentions to be litigated in this proceeding, FENA relied on the published FEMA Regulations concerning Radiological Emergency Planning (44 CFR 350 et. seq.); NUE.DG 0654, FEMA REP-1 Revision-1; the FEMA /RAC Reviews of radiological emergency preparedness for the Seabrook site which have been served on the parties to this proceeding and are listed in our answer to Attorney General Jams Shannon's off-3ite EP Interrogatory Set No.1, Olestion 2; and the FEMA memorandum of December 24, 1985, (attached as Appendix B to this response to interrogatories). The FEMA position on each contention and subpart of contention cites which of these docments was relied upon in developing that particular position.

Interrogatory No. 3 State whether you have relied, do rely, or will rely on any study, calculation, or analysis to support your position on each of these contentions. ,

If so, pleases

a. Describe the nature of the study, calculation or analysis and identify any docments that discuss or describe the study, calculation or analysis;

b. Identify the persons who performed the study, calculation or analysis;

c. State when and where the study, calculation or analysis was performed;

d. Describe in detail the information or data that was studied, calculated or analyzed;

e. Describe the results of the study, calculation or analysis;

f. Explain how such study, calculation, or analysis provides support for your position on each of these contentions.

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Answer No. 3 FEMA has no current intention to rely on any study, or analysis beyond those set forth in response to question 2.

Interrogatory No. 4 Do you intend to offer the testimony of any expert witness with respect i

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to any contention to be litigated by the Attorney General? If so, please: ,

a. . Identify each expert witness who you intend to present with respect to each subpart of each such contention; u

b. State the substance of the facts to which each expert witness is expected to testify; i

i c. State the substance of the opinion or opinions to which each expert witness is expected to testifyr

d. Provide a sa mary of the grounds for each opinion to

' which each expert witness is expected to testify;

e. State whether the facts and opinions listed.in response 3 to the foregoing are contained in any doctment; State whether the opinion of any expert witness is 1

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i based in whole or in part on any scientific rule or d principle, and, if so, set forth such rule or principle; .

g. State whether the opinion of any expert witness _is based in whole or in part on any code or regulation, c

goverrnental or otherwise, and, if so, identify each such code or regulation and the specific section or portion thereof relied upon; and i

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g. State whether the opinion of any expert witness is t

based in whole or in part upon any scientific or engineering book or other publication, and, if so, identify the book or publication.

I Answer No. 4 FEMA has not yet identified the witnesses it intends to have testify l with respect to any of the contentions admitted to this proceeding and can 1

i describe neither the substance of their testimony nor any doctments to be i

relied upon beyond our response to Interrogatory 1 supra.

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Interrogatory No. 5 Do you intend to offer the testimony of any no n xpert witness with

,' respect to.iny contention to be litigated by the Attorney General? If so, please;

a. Identify each nonexpert witness who you intent to present with respect to each subpart of each such contention;

< b. State the substance of the facts to which each non-expert witness is expected to testify; and

c. State whether the facts listed in response to the foregoing '" ,

are contained in any document, and produce the same.

Answer No. 5 FEMA has not yet identified the witnesses it intends to have testify with respect to any of the contentions admitted to this proceeding and can i neither describe the substance of their testimony nor describe any documents-

' referenced in response to Interrogatory 1 supra.

f Interrogatory No. 6 Identify and produce all documents in which you or any agent on your behalf have assessed the adequacy of state and local emergency plans with ,

respect to any contention to be litigated by the Attorney General. Include in your response any documents concerning steps which have been taken or will be taken by the State of New Hampshire or the Applicants to address inadequacies in any past or current local plans.

Answer No. 6 i

< All publicly available documents in which FEMA or an agent on our behalf has assessed the adequacy of State and local plans with respect to i

the New Hampshire Radiological Bnergency Response Plans are referenced in i response to Interrogatory 1 supra.

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FENA has no docments concerning the steps which ha/e been taken or will be taken by;the State of New Hampshire or the Applicants to address the in-adequacies uncovered in the current local New Hampshire RERP, other than the progress reports served on the parties by the New Hampship Attorney General.

Objection to Massachusetts Interrogatory 6 FENA objects to this Interrogatory as irrelevant and unduly burdensme ,

to the extend that this Interrogatory requests docments in the possession of FEMA which concerns steps which have been taken by the State of New Hampshire or the Applicant to address inadequacies in any past local plans.

'Ihe information requested is irrelevant since previous plans are not in

- contention in this licensing hearing. It would be unduly burdensme for FENA to assenble the information since these documents may well date back to 1981 and are not the type which FENA regularly maintains. Assembling this information would require extra search of FEMA"s records and possibly records of other Federal agencies to produce the information requested. .

Interrogatory No. 7 For each of those contentions to be litigated by the Attorney General for which FEMA has not yet adopted a position, (a) state the date by which FEMA expects to have adoped a positon; (b) state whether FENA will voluntarily make its position known on each contention as soon as it has adopted its position and, if so, how it will make its position known; (c) state whether, pursuant to the Memorande of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA, 50 Fed. Reg.15485 et seq.,

" FEMA will respond informally to discovery re5ests by parties," id at 15487, af ter it has made its position known with respect to any contention to be litigated by the Attorney General.

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W Answer No. 7 FEMA has developed and enclosed as Appendix A a position on all admitted of f-site contentions in this proceeding.

Interrogatory No. 8 Is it your position that the vast majority of evacuating persons who, in the event of an accident with an of f-site release of radiation, are instructed to report to reception centers for monitoring will comply with .

those instructions? What percentage of the evacuees do you expect will comply?

Answer No. 8 FEMA has developed a national policy concerning this issue which is -

attached as Appendix B. Briefly, that policy doctanent indicates that state and local governments should plan that at least 20% of the EPZ population will report to reception centers for radiological monitoring.

Interrogatory No. 9 In the event of an accident with an off-site release of radiation, what percentage of the EPZ population would you expect to be instructed to report to reception centers for monitoring? What is the largest number of persons that might be instructed to report for monitoring? What is the smallest ntaber of persons that might be instructed to report for monitoring?

Answer No. 9 The permutations of possible accident sequences involving off-site releases; time of day; time of year; weather before, during and after the j release; and wind characteristics during and after a release probably

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approach infinity. It is therefore inpossible to speculate with any worthwhile result about what the instructions to the public concerning monitori$ganddecontainationmightbeinagivenactualaccident. The largest number of persons who might be instructed to report for monitoring is likewise subject to a nearly infinite n eber of variables and has no theoretical boundary. FEMA has therefore adopted the national policy on the matter referenced in our answer to Interrogatory 8 supra. We smallest number of persons who might be instructed to report for monitoring could be zero in certain accidents involving off-site release such as a small release of noble gas.

Interrogatory'10 ,

In the event of an accident with a widnpread off-site release of radiation, if all persons instructed to report to reception centers for monitoring do so report, could a bottleneck be created at the entrance to such reception centers? Have any sensitivity studies been performed to determine the impact such bottleneck (s) would have on ETEs? Please .

explain your responses and provide any such studies.

Answer 10 FEMA has no specific information on this. Dr. Th mas Urbanik will be responsible for presenting testimony relative to Evacuation Time Estimates.

Interrogatory 11 With respect to the FEMA Memorandum, No. Rl-TH-85-28 dated 12/31/85, from IMward A. %cmas to the Regional Assistance Canittee, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Task Force, on the subject of Seabrook Dnergency Plans, pleases (a) describe the factors, referred to in 1 1 of that Memorandum that are " unique (at least in Magnitude)" to Seabrook;

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(b) describe in what manner the above-referenced factors are deemed

. unique;

( c) if any of the questions raised in that menorandum have been responded to, provide such response (s) and any docments supporting such response (s);

(d) for any questions or issues raised by that memorandum but not yet answered, to the extent possible, state what the consider-ations are that will have a bearing on the response when given

- and provide any documents relevant to the consideration of the issue; e

(e) provide all records and state the substance of all comunications, written or oral, within FEMA or between FEMA and any other agency, person, cmpany or organization that is directly or indirectly relevant to the issues raised in this memorandum.

Answer No. 11 a) The factors unique at least in magnitude to Seabrook referred to in our Decenber 31, 1985 memorandum concerning protection of the Seabrook beach population are the size of the transient (" day tripper") beach population; size of the beach population; number of unwinterized housing /

comiercial buildings; volme of corridor type road traffic; conplexity of road network; number of local governments involved in the emergency .

planning process; and large geographic size of the EPZ.

b) 'Ihe above referenced factors are unique in magnitude and resulting need for extremely emplex emergency planning.

c) A copy of the February 18, 1987 memorandum from the NRC is attached as Appendix D to this subnission since it has already been released to one of the parties to this proceeding. FEMA will not release the other responses to its December 31, 1985 memorandum out of concern that the release of these doc ments may interfere with the deliberative and collegial RAC process.

If necessary, FEMA will seek to protect the other responses by asserting Executive Privilege.

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4 d) h e issues raised by that memorandum have been sufficiently .

responded to for FEMA to develop and articulate a position which ,

is set forth in our response to the contentions: Revised Town of Hampton VIII to Revision 2, SAPL-16, and NECNP RERP-8 contained in Appendix A of this Response to Interrogatories.

e) By agreement between counsel FEMA offers the following general response to this Interrogatory. As stated in our response to e Contentions: Revised 'Ibwn of Hanpton VIII to Revision 2, SAPL-16, and NECNP RERP-8 oontained in Appendix A of this docunent, this issue has been of tremendous concern to FEMA since our earliest.

involvement in the Seabrook emergency planning process. more j therefore, have been many dozens of meetings, phone calls, and con-versations directly related to the memorandun within FEMA, between FEMA and the NRC, within the member agenciIns of the Regional Assist-ance Cannittee, between FEMA and representatives of the utility, between FEMA and representatives of the State of New Hampshire, as well as between FEMA and the staff of the S*v==ittee on Energy Conservation and Power of the United States House of Representatives.

Hundreds and perhaps thousands of oral or written ccanunications involving FEMA and other persons or organizations can concievably be considered indirectly relevant to the issues contained in our Memorandum of December 31, 1985.

It is the general policy of FEMA that we will seek to protect conver-sations within FEMA, and within the Regional Assistance Casnittee from discovery on the grounds of Executive Privilege out of concern that the release of docunents or suunaries of discussion may

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interfere with the deliberative and collegial nature of the RAC process and impair ability of FEMA staff to reach fully 9

. fully informed decisions.

If necessary, FENA will therefore seek to limit this interrogatory on grounds of Executive Privilege. In addition this interrogatory seeks potentially hundreds of documents, 4

and reconstruction of thousands of phone calls concerning pr H ecisional material of dubious relevance to a decision . ,

made by this Agency whose basis for decision is set forth in Appendix A. Therefore, if necessary, FEMA would seek a further protective order on the basis that a more ccmplete answer to i this interrogatory would be irrelevant and unduly burdensane.

I declare, under penalty of perjury that the foregoing responses, including FEMA's responses to Gntentions set forth as Appendix A to the Massachusetts Attorney General's Interrogatories and Request for Production of Doctments are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. .

Edward A. Thanas, Division Chief Natural & Technological Hazards Region I Federal Bnergency Management Agency g

Dated June 4,1987 Boston, Massachusetts Any objections expressed are made by counsel.

H. Joseph Flynn l

Attorney Federal Bnergency Management Agency 4

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O CURRENT FEMA POSITION UN ADMITTED CONTENTIONS ON NEW HAMPSHIRE PLANS FOR SEABROOK

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TABLE OF CONT E NT S Page Rye Contention 2 1 Hampton Falls Contention 2 2 Hampton Falls Q)ntention 4 3 South Hampton Contention 1 4 South Hampton Contention 2 5 South Hampton Contention 3 6-7 South Hangton Contention 6 8 Revised Hampton Contention III 9 Revised Hampton Contention IV 10 - 21 Revised Hampton Contention VI 22-28 Revised Hanpton Contention VIII 29 Kensington Contention 1 30 -31 Revised Kensington Contention ,

32 Revised Kensington Contention 4 33 Revised Fensington Contention 6 34-35 Revised Kensington Contention 10 36 NECNP Contention RERP-2 37 .

NECNP Contention RERP-8 38-39 NECNP Contention NHLP-2 40-43 NECNP Contention NHLP-6 44-57 SAPL Contention 7 58-59 SAPL Contention 8 & 8A 60 SAPL Contention 15 61-69 SAPL Contention 16 70 SAPL Contention 18 71 SAPL Contention 25 72-74 Revised SAPL Contention 31 75 SAPL Contention 33 76 SAPL Contention 34 77 SAPL Contention 37 78

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I Rye Conterition 2 The proposed Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Rye is unworkable because of the lack of provisions for any means of protecting the safety of Rye's special needs populations. Rye has at least four (4) major special needs groups, not including special needs people !!ving at home, for which no provisions are made in the plan; and, while the plan attempts to make provision for Rye's special needs facilities (5 schools),

nevertheless, those provisions are inadequate particularly with regard to transportation and sheltering.

DASIS:

. No Provisions in the Rye RERP for the Rannie Webster Nursing and Elderly Home.

FEMA Responset

- FEMA and the Regional Assistance Committee have reviewed the special facility plans submitted by the State of New Hampshire in Rev. 2 of their RERP for Seabrook, including plans for the Rannie Webster Nursing Home.

The December, 1986 RAC Review of the New Hampshire Plans indicates at

p. 67 that this section of the State Plan is adequate.,

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e 2.

HAMPTON FALLS CONTENTION 2 ,

The plan designated as Hampton Falls fails to provide reasonable assurance since it cannot provide for continuous 24-hour operation for a protracted period, of local responsibilities, as required by NUREG-0654,

A.4. -

! B ASIS:

Hampton Falls has one full-time police officer. It has no RADEF Officer or Transportation Coordinator. It has a volunteer, non-governmental Fire Department, most of whose members work out of

, town. The Police Chief has two back-ups who are employed at other jobs.

There is no demonstration that the duties assigned to local authorities in Hampton Falls by the plan can be met on a continuous 24-hour basis, or that other resources will be availab!c to meet thesc '

tasks.

FEMA RESPONSE In its Dec.1986 review of Rev. 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological

Emergency Response Plans for Seabrook. FEMA and the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) reviewed all municipal (EPZ) plans for their capacity to provide for 24-hour continuous operation for a protracted period. Specif-f eally Planning Standard A.4 f rom FEMA-REP-1 defines this requirement.

On page 6 of the Dec.1986 RAC Review of Rev. 2 tiunicipal Plans, FEMA i f ound that some key emergency response positions do not have a back-up listed for second shift responsibilities. In Appendix A of the Hampton ,

l Falls P1an, there are no back-up personnel listed for the positions of Civil Defense Director, Transportation Coordinator, RADEF Officer, Police Chief, Health Officer, Road Agent, and Town Clerk. For the positions of RADEF Officer and Transportation Coordinator, there are no primary desig- -

nations either. Based on these review findings, FEMA does not have assurance that the Town of Hampton Falls can implement its plan.

Since Hampton Falls has indicated that it will not actively partici-pate in the planning and response for a possible accident at Seabrook Station, it is necessary to apply Planning Standard A.4 to the State's ability to fully compensate for the Town of Hampton Falls' emergency response functions.

In its June 1986 RAC Review of Rev. 1 of the NH Compensatory P1an for Seabrook l

Station, FEMA found that the plans did not adequately identify the personnel to carry out the State's Compensatory Plan. The State responded to this by indicating that a resource allocation study was being conducted to identify the personnel and equipment necessary to implement local and State plans, covering all functions. Rev. 2 of the NH Plans still do not contain the results of this personnel allocation study. FEMA's findings are found on page 3 of the December 1986 RAC Review of the New Hampshire Compensatory P1an for Seabrook. .

Until New Hampshire develops this information as part of its planning l base, FEMA has no basis to change its determination that the State has not demonstrated that it has adequate per sonnel resources to compensate for l the non-participation of Hanpton Falls personnel. [See RAC Review of the Compensatory Plan, pages; 3(A.4); 6(H.4), 7(H.10)].

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3.

HAMPTON FALLS CONTENTION 4 The Hampton Falla RERP does not adequately meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a)(1), 5 50.47(b)(5), 5 50.47(b)(6) and NUREG-0654 planning standard E because there are no mutually agreeable basis for ' notification of response organizations and much of the communications equipment referred to in the Hampton Falls RERP is nonexistent.

BASIS:

NUREG-0654 !! . E .1. states that "Each organization shall establish procedures which describe mutually agreeable bases for notification of

- response organtastions consistent with the emergency classification level and action level scheme set forth in Appendix 1." (emphasis added)

Planning Standard E in general requires that procedures and the means for notifying local response organlaations, emergency personnel and the public have been established. The llampten Falls Selectmen have not agreed that the initial point of contact in an emergency should be the policeman on duty or on call, as the plan states at p. !!-2. Neither have they agreed that the Fire Chief should have the primary responsibility for activation of the public alerting system, as shown in the diagram at I-18.

The First Chief works out of town and would not be able to fulfill that function on a continuous 24-hour basis, as required by NUREG-0654 A.4.

The Selectmen are not willing to rely on volunteer firemen as back-up.

Neither do the Selectmen agree that the Chairman of the Board of Selectmen should be in direct charge of all emergency operations for the Town. This gentleman is in the New Ilampshire Air. National Guard and may have conflicting responsibilities.

The H.F. plan states at p. !!-4 that the initial notification is to be made to a police officer "via pocket voice pagers". The town has no such pagers. The town also has no means of activating the alerting system as alluded to at p. !!-6. The town also is not in possession of " tone alert -

radio receivers" as stated at page !!-7. No Civil Defense Radio Network nor Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES) have been provided nor identified to the town.

For all the above-stated reasons, there is no basis for reasonable ascurance that the local emergency response organization. emergency personnel, or the public will receive notification of an emergency. In the absence of such reasonable assurance, it cannot be assumed that the public is adequately protected. ,

(Limited as to adequacy of compensatory measures and equipment].

Board Order, April 1.1986.

FEMA RESFONSE:

This Contention deals primarily with the ability of the town to be notified and the adequacy of the equipment to accomplish this. As discussed above in FEMA's responses to the Motions for Kensington Contention 2 and 10 the Rockingham County Dispatch Center can provide notification to Hampton Falls over existing equipment. Additional communications equipment and the gene *ator already purchased would further enhance this capability.

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TOWN OF SOUTH HAMPTON South Hampton Contention 1 The RbRP for South Hampton fails to provide " reasonable assurance" because, contrary to NUREG-0654 A.3, the plan includes no written agreements referring to the concept of operations or signatures of local agencies.

B ASIS:

Although a signature page was provided in the September, 1984 draft of the South Hampton RERP, it has now been eliminated. No '

agreements with the town's teachers, or voluntary town workers, have been obtained.

[ Limited as to local agencies having an emergency response role within the EPZ) Board Order, 4/1/f 6.

FEMA RESPONSE:

This Contention deals primarily with the deficiency noted in FEMA's June 2,1986 RAC Review of Revision 1 of New Hampshire's Seabrook planning regarding letters of agreement with towing companies. In the December 15, 1986 RAC Review of Revision 2, fella found this deficiency to have been adequately corrected. -

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SOUTH HAMPTON CONTENTION 2 The RERP for South Hampton falla to provide reasonable assurance the town lacks the capacity for because c#ntrary to NUREG-0654 A.4 twenty-four hours continuous operation for a protracted period.

B ASIS:

All town personnel are volunteers, with insufficien't backup to provide twenty-four hour coverage. This is true of both the police and tire departments, where even the chiefs are part-time, and many officers are not available because of other jobs.

[ As modifies to provide "for twenty-four 'nour continuous operation ,

for a necessary protracted period after declaration of any emergency"1.

Board Order 4/1/86.

FEMA RESPONSE in its Dec.1986 review of Rev. 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Seabrook, FEMA and the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) reviewed all municipal (EPZ) plans for their capacity to provide for 24-hour continuous operation for a protracted period. Specif-ically Planning Standard A.4 from FEMA-REP-1 defines this requirement.

On page 6 of the Dec.1986 RAC Review of Rev. 2 ftunicipal Plans, FEMA f ound that some key emergency response positions do not have a back-up listeo for second shift responsibilities. In Appendix A of the South Hampton Plan, there are no back-up personnel listed for the positions of Transpor-tation Coordinator, RADEF/ Health Officer, Town Clerk, and Highway Agent.

Based on these review findings, FEMA does not have. assurance that the Town of South Hampton can implement its plan. .

Since South Hampton has indicated that it will not actively partici-pate in the planning and response for a possible accident at Seabrook Station, it is necessary to apply Planning Standard A.4 to the State's ability to fully compensate for the Town of South Hampton's emergency response functions, in its June 1986 RAC Review of Rev.1 of the NH Compensatory Plan for Seabrook Station, fella found that the plans did not adequately identify the personnel to carry out the State's Compensatory Plan. The State responded to this by indicating that a resource allocation study was being conducted to identify the personnel and equipment necessary to implement local and State plans, covering all functions. Rev. 2 of the NH Plans still do not contain the results of this personnel allocation study. FEMA's findings are found on page 3 of the December 1986 RAC Review of the New Hampshire Compensatory Plan for Seabrook.

Until New Hampshire develops this information as part of its planning base, FEMA has no basis to change its determination that the State has not demonstrated that it has personnel resources to compensate for the non.

participation of South Hampton personnel. [See RAC Review of the Compensatory Pl an, pages; 3( A .4), 6(H.4), 7(H.10].

6.

SOUTH HAMPTON CONTENTION 3 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable assurance because, cohtrary to NUREG-0654 C.4, it contains no letters of agreement from voluntary police officers, voluntary firemen, other emergency workers, school teachers. transportation companies and bus drivers. It also contains no agreements from Midway Excavators and personnel at the Tweksbury Pond Campground.

B ASIS:

The number of available personnel at the Tweksbury Pond Campground, which has a peak population of 1.500 (about twice that of ,

the size of the town) is exaggerated.

(Limited as to agreements with Transporation companies and midway excavators] board Order, d/1/86.

FEliA RESPONSE :

FEliA has addressed South Hampton Contention 3 and its basis that the South Hampton plan contains no letters of agreement with transportation companies or with Midway Excavators by applying P1anning Standards A, C and J (Evaluation Criteria A.3 C.4,J.10 9, and J.10/k) in fella-REP-1.

The December 15, 1986 RAC review of the State and municipal plans reflects FEi1A's views on this issue. Specifically, FEMA's review comments on the New Hampshire State plan on,this issue are provided on pages 74, 74-b, and 85 of Section 1, on page 1 of the letters of agreement subsection of Section IV, and on page 50 of the Compensatory Plan subsection of Section IV. FEMA's review comments on the municipal plans on this issue are provided on pages

• 5 and 6 of Section 11.

FEttA relied u)on the following documents in forming its conclusions on this issue: Rev1 sion 2 to the New Hampshire State plan; Revision 2 to the municipal plans.

The letters of agreement with transportation companies are present in Volume 5 of the State plan, and the RAC concluded that the letters are ade-quate. The South Hampton )lan does not itself contain copies of letters of agreement with transportation companies. However, they are incorporated by reference. Appendix 0 of the South Hampton plan is a cross-reference index to appropriate sections of the plan where descriptive material applicable to specific NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 Criteria elements are found. For those criteria Volume elements pertaining 5 of the New to State Hampshire lettersplan of agreement is referenced(i.e.,

(pageA.301, and C.4)Ix 0 Append of South Hampton plan). The letters of agreement with transportation companies are present in Volume 5 of the State plan.

The RAC has concluded that the letters of agreement are suf ficient to provide enough buses and delvers (see December 15, 1986 RAC review pages 74 and 74-b of Section I, and page 1 of Letters of Agecement subsection of

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SOUTH HAffTON CONTENTION 3 (Cont.)

Section IV)'. However, in the case of complete evacuation it would be necessary to use drivers provided by the Teamsters local no. 633, and it might be necessary to use some of the military vehicles listed in Apendix C of Vol. 2 of the State plan. The total number of buses providable under the letters of agreement are slightly in excess of the number required for full evacuation. The approximate equality of buses and bus requirements in the most severe emergency implies that any problems in getting buses from companies to communities could exhaust bus company resources, requiring use of the National Guard. The Teamsters will have to provide drivers to those bus companies without enough drivers for their buses. A letter of agreement with Teamsters local No. 633 is provided in Volume 5 of the State plan. In FEMA's April 15, 1987 Affidavit in Opposition to Summary Disposition of Certain Contentions, item 31 of that document, FEMA noted that there were not any assurances that the employers of the Teamsters drivers made available by that letter of agree-ment will be willing to allow them to leave their jobs to respond to an emergency.

There is no letter of agreement with (11dway Excavating Company in either the South Hampton plan or the State plan, even though it is listed as a con-tractor in Appendix C (page C-3) of the South Hampton plan. The listing of tiidway Excavating as a potential resource for the Highway Department implies that this contractor could be used for assisting in the removal of impediments to evacuation. Even though Midway Excavating Company may not be available to the town of South Hampton, it appears that there would be sufficient other resources available from the State to remove impediments to evacuation. Letters of agreement between the State and 16 other towing companies are present in Volume 5 of the State plan. Because of these letters of agreement, the listing of equipment provided in Appendix C of Volume 2 of the State plan, the discussion of State 00T highway maintenance equipment in section 2.6.5 of the State plan, the RAC concluded that the plans adequately treated the issue

• of resources for removing impediments to evacuation (see page 85 of RAC review of S*. ate plan, Section 1).

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TOWN OF SOUTH HAMPTON South Hardpton Contention 6 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide . reasonable assurance because, contrary to NUREG-0654 H.3, the town of South Hampton does not have a ROC capable for use in directing and controlling response functions.

B ASIS:

The plan describe 6 the South Hampton EOC as located in the fire station, states that it has ample space to accommodate all key town -

officials, and a generator. to supply backup power. The town does not have an EOC, and the location pictured (the fire station) does not have adequate accommodations, especially in the winter, and it has neither a generator not the two-way radio communications with the school or with State Civil Defense as indicated in the plan.

FEMA RESPONSE:

This Contention deals with the adequacy of the town's EOC for directing and controlling response functions. The town's fire station should make a suitable E0C, when fitted with the generator and communications equipment already purchased and available according to affadviti submitted by the applicant and the State of New Hampshire.

9.

REVISED HAMPION CORTENTION III TO REVISION 2 The Evacuation Time Estimate Study (ETE) prepared by KLD Associates. Inc., Revision 2 Volume 6, is based upon inaccurate and biased factual data and unreasonable or misleading assumptions, fails to comply with NRC regulations, and falls to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken, or that adequate facilities , equipment, or personnel will be provided to the Town of Hampton, in the event of radiological emergency. 10 CFR (50.47(a)(1),

(b)(1)(10); NUREG-0654, App.4.

FEMA RESPONSE:

The validity of the Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) prepared by KLD Associates and incorporated into the NHRERP was challenged by the following Contentions:

Hampton Revised Contention III SAPL Contention 18 SAPL Revised Contention 31 SAPL Contention 34 -

SAPL Contention 37 ,

At FEMA's request, the RAC reviewed the ETEs, specifically evaluating them against the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.l. The RAC found the ETEs sufficiently canplied with the guidance contained in Appendix III of NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 so as to serve as an adequate basis for protective action decision-making. FEMA concurs in that view. ,.

The views of the RAC were expressed in further detail in the Ibcember 15, 1986, RAC Review of Revision 2 of the NHRERP.

The witness who will address these issues at the licensing hearing is Dr. Thomas Urbanik, a recognized expert in the field. He has reviewed the LTEs and has also concluded that they are adequate under the standards set forh in NUREG-0654, FENA REP-1 Rev.1. The NRC staff has consulted with Dr. Urbanik on other evacuation time estimate studies and will sponsor his testimony.

. 10.

TOWN OF HAMP10N REVISED CONTENTION IV 'IO REVISION 2 Revision 2 fails to provide for adequate emergency equipment, fails to demonstrate that adequate protective responses can be implemented in the event of radiological emergency, and fails to correct deficiencies in emergency response capabilities apparent from the emergency exercise.

10 C.R.R. I 50.47(1)(8)(10)(14).

BASIS:

The bases for Contention IV set forth in CONTENTIONS OF Tile TOWN OF !!AMPTON TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE

- PLAN FOR THE TOhN OF HAMPTON. NEW HAMPSHIRE, NOVEMBER, 1985, ano revised Contention IV set forth in CONTENTIONS OF THE .

Y5WN OF HAMPTON TO REVISED RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN AND TO CO.YPENSATORY PLAN FOR THE TOWN OF HAMPTON.

NEW HAMPSHIRE are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference herein.

B ASIS:

NUREG requires that each local RERP include written agreements with any organization serving an emergency response mle within the emergency planning zone. NUREG, page 32(3). The State has entered into three agreements with transportation companies to provide buses and vans to the Town of Hampton in the event of evacuation. Under the Compensatory Plan , however. only two bus companies will provide the transportation for Hampton in the event of emergency. Compensatory Plan, page 7A-24. The transportation provided to the Town of Hampton under the Compensatory Plan and Revised RERP fail to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protective measures mandated by 10 C.F.R.

I 50.47( A)(1) for the following reasons: ,

FEMA RESPONSE FEMA has addressed Hampton Revised Contention IV and its basis of inadequate evacuation transportation resources for residents, transients, and those with special needs, by applying Planning Standards A, C, J, and O (Evaluation Criteria A.3, A.4, C.4, J.9, J.10.j, and 0.4) in FEMA-REP-1.

The December 15, 1986 RAC review of the State and municipal plans re-flect FEMA's views on this issue. Specifically, the RAC's review ccments on the thw Hampshire State plan on this issue are provided on pages 10, 64, 74, 74-a , 74 -b , 74 -c , 12 7, 128, and 129 of Section I, and on page 1 of the Letters of Agreement subsection of Section IV, and on pages 3 and 49 of the Cmpensatory Plan subsecticn of Section IV. 'Ihe RAC review ccments on the municipal plans on this issue are provided on page 17 of Section II.

7he PAC relied upon the following documents in forming its conclusions on this issue: Revision 2 to the New Hampshire State Plan; Revision 2 to the municipal' plans.

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11.

TOW OF HAWION REVISED CONTENTION IV IV REVISION 2 (Cont.)

Because of the need for resolution and clarification of several items, FEMA does not yet have cmplete assurance of the adequacy of evacuation. transportation resources and procedures.

Responses to specific portions of Hampton Revised Contention IV are provided below.

( A) Under the Conpensatory Plan, the Berry Bus Company shall provide the Ibwn of Hampton with 40 buses. Page 7A-24. Under the terms of the IAtter of Agreement with Berry Bus, however, see attached Berry Bus is only obligated to provide 31 buses in the event of emergency, or 9 fewer buses than even the State acknowledges are necessary in the event of radiological emergency.

FEMA RESK)NSE:

( A) The letter of Agreement with Berry Transportation Company dated 8/7/86, located in Wlume 5 of the State Plan, indicates that it can provide approximately 62 buses and 9 drivers during an emergency. However, the buses from Berry Transportation Coupany are not specifically assigned to provide transportation for the Ibwn of Hanpton. As noted in the RAC Ibview (page 1 of Letters of Agreement subsection of Section IV), the State appears to have eliminated the prior allotment of buses to cmmunities in its compensatory plan and in letters of agreement. The RAC has con-cluded that, overall, the nunbers of buses and drivers available according to the letters of agreements are sufficient for the needs of Hampton and other cmmunities (see RAC Review pages 74, 74-a , 74-b, 74-c of Section 1, and page 1 of Iatters of Agreement subsection of Section IV).

(B) The Compensatory Plan provides only one bus to evacuate Aslan's Pride School, Happy Apple Nursery , and the Taylor School Compensatory Plan, page 7 A-7. Rather than provide a van emergency.

to evacuate each of these schools in the event of emergency, the Compensatory Plan therefore requires a single bus driver to maneuver through heavy evacuation traffic an to proceed to each of the three schools to evacuate the children.

Substantial delay, if not impossibility, of requiring c single bus driver to evacuate three schools is unreasonable and would likely result in substantial delay in removing these children from the EPZ.

FEMA RESK)NSE

( B) The revised plan (see page IV-34 of Hampton Plan, Wlume 18) indicates separate evacuation vehicles (vans ) for Aslan's Pride School, and the Taylor School. Happy Apple Nursery referenced in the contention, is not listed as one of the special facilities in Hampton.

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12.

'ITM OF HAPION REVISED CONTENTION IV 'lV REVISION 2 (Cont.)

(C) The Compensatory Plan and the Revised Hampton RERP acknowledge,that 23 emergency and special neede vthicles will be recuired to evacuate the Town in the event of emergency. Compensatory Plan, page 7A-7; Revised Hampton RERP, page II-30. The letter agreements for Hampton's transportation needs, however, fail to allocate a single emergency or special needs vehicle for the Hampton population.

FEMA PISP M E:

(C) The revised State and Hampton local plans indicate the estimated need for two (2) special needs buses, six (6) bus conversion kits, four (4) vans, and tw (2) reclinin; seat coaches for the Town of Hampton (see Appendix I, page I-3 of Wlume 2 of State Plan, and page IV-34 of Town of Hampton Plan), in addition to 77 regular school buses. 'Ihese vehicles will be provided for Hampton frcrn the resource pool of bases and EMS vehicles documented by letters of agreement in Wlume 5 of the State Plan. 'Ihe provision of these vehicles will be coordinated by the Bnergency Medical Services (EMS)

Coordinator located in the State EOC. (See EMS Coordinator Proce-dures in Nblume 4B of State Plan). The RAC has concluded that there are adequate letters of agreement to account for the estimated needs of buses and ambulances (see page 10 of RAC Review,Section I). .

(D) The Revised Hampton RERP does not provide transportation for any vacationers, transients or cther non-resident individuals who may lack their own transportation and may be present in the Town at the timt of emergency. In view of the substantial number of tourists and -

transients coming to Hampton throughout the year, and particularly

, during the summer months, it is only reasonable to assume that a significant number of additional public transportation vehicles will be required to promptly carry out an evacuation.

FES. FESPONSE (D) As noted on pages 11-28 and 11-29 of the Hampton Plan, transients

! without access to shelters or vehicles in which they may evacuate when sheltering has been reccmended will be provided for by the Public 1rbrks Director who will provide transportation for those transients to a suitable sheltering location. If evacuation has been reccmended, the plan also states that each municipality has provisions for evacuating residents, including transients. In add-ition, the State is prepared to provide emergency transportation resources to those ccmnunities that have exhausted the local response capability. tbwever, the RAC has concluded that the issue of the adequacy of transportation for transients will remain open pending infomation to be supplied by the State on the number of transients needing transprrtatir f see FK Review cf element J.9 on page 64

13.

'IOW OF HAWION REVISED CONTENTION IV 'IO REVISION 2 (Cont.)

of State plan review,Section I; and page 17 of local plan review,Section II).

(E) Under the Compensatory Plan, the Timberlane. Bus Company of Salem , New Hampshire shall provide the Town of Hampton with 35 buses in the event of emergency. Salem is located approximately 40 miles from the Town of Hampton. Since under the Revised Hampton RERP, individuals evacuated from Hampton will be taken to Nashua, immediately adjacent to Salem , Revised RERP, page !!-17, the Timberlane buses attempting to reach Hampton for evacuation purposes will be required to The likelihood of maneuver through evacuation traffic leaving Hampton.

substantial delay , if not impossibility , of evacuation vehicles reaching Hampton therefore raises significant questions on the feasibility of the evacuation transportation provided to the Town under its Revised RERP.

The Revised Hampton RERP therefore fails to provide reasonable assurance of prompt access for emergency vehicles to the EPZ and fails to consider the potential impediments of evacuation traffic in promptly providing evacuation vehicles to the Town. NUREG-0654, page 63.

FEMA RESPONSE (E) The August 1986 Istter of Agreement between the State and the Timberlane Transportation Cmpany of Salem, which is located in Volume 5 of the State Plan, indicates that approximately 40 buses and 40 drivers will be available during an~ emergency.

These buses are not specifically assigned to provide transpor-tation for the 'Ibwn of Hampton. As noted in the RAC Review (page 1 of Istters of Agreement subsection of Section IV), the State appears to have eliminated the prior allotment of buses to ccmnunities in the Compensatory Plan and in letters of ,

agreement. 'Ihe RAC has concluded that, overall, the numbers of buses and drivers available according to the letters of agreement are sufficient for the needs of Hampton and other connunities*(see RAC Paview pages 74, 74-a , 74-b, 74-c of Section I, and page 1 of Letters of Igreement subsection of Section IV). However, further clarification is still needed regarding the availability of teamsters frcxn their employers i

during work hours. It should also be noted that Nash.la is no l

longer a host ccamanity for Hampton, as referenced in the con-

' tention. Individuals evacuated frcru Hampton will be taken to the Reception Center in Ebver.

By way of further basis:

(A) Dnargency Resources and Equipent .

i l

l

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l I

14.

TOW OF HAWION REVISED CONTENTION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont.)

Revisipn 2 fails to allocate adequate buses or EMS vehicles to the Town of Hampton to reasonably support an evacuation on grounds including:

1. The State indicates that the bus companies under Letter Agreement will provide 553 buses and 496 drives to support an evacuation in the event of radiological emergency. Vol. 4, App.1-1 and 2. These figures are inaccurate and misleading. Many of the buses to be provided by a particular bus company lack sufficient drives and, conversely, other bus companies are prepared to provide drivers, but have no buses for them to drive. Id. FEMA correctly notes that only " bus-and-driver pairs" under agreement should be counted to determine the maximum number of emergency vehicles available to support an evacuation. FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, 6/2/86, at p. 39. The state, however, can only demonstrate 541 bus-and-driver pairs. Vol. 4. App.1-1 and 2, or 13 1

bus / driver pairs leFs than thc 444 necesscry minimum required to carry out an (vacu ation , Vol. 4, App. I-6, even using the Stcte's own unreasonably low EPZ population figures.

FENA RESPONSE:

1. The RAC has concluded that, although there are neerous inconsis-tencies in bus needs estimates, overall the numbers of buses and drivers available according to the Istters of Agreement in Volune 5 of the State Plan are sufficient (see pages 74, 74-a, 74-b, 74-c of RAC Review of State Plan Section I, and page 1 of tatters of Agreenent subsection of Section IV). .

As indicated on page 74 of the RAC Review (Section I), the Air National Guard, National Gaard and DOT vehicles are listed in Volume 2, App. C. School buses are listed in Volume 2, App. I which lists capability of 574 buses but only 446 bus and driver pairs available at bus empanies to affect evacuation. The 574 buses listed plus the private vehicles of the persons in the EPZ l plus the reserve resources of the Air National Guard, Amy, and l Highway Depart:nent totalling 851 vehicles offer a large reduncancy of resources.

As further described on page 74-b of the RAC Review (Section I),

the " Transportation Resources Requirements" totals from \bl. 2, Rev. 2 - 8/86, page 1-3, indicate that the bus requirements are well in excess of the number of bus cmpany drivers that have agreed to drive, but smewhat less than the number of buses avail-able according to the Letters of Agreement.

The Plan properly allows for the fact that not all bus em.panies

! have as many drivers willing to serve as they have buses that would be made available. A Letter of Agreement with Teamsters i

15.

"IDW4 OF HAWION REVISED CCNTENTION IV 'IO REVISION 2 (Cont. )

loca No. 633 of New Hampshire provides for the Incal to provide as many as 1,500 personnel, a value well in excess of any foresee-able needs.

2. The bus-and-driver pairs under Letter Agreement with the State represent an " absolute maximum," FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, 6/2/86, at p. 39, and do not provide reliable figures to measure available evacuation buses or personnel. FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, 6/2/86, App. I at p. 233. Both common sense and conversations between FEMA and the bus companies indicate that in fact the actual bus-and-driver availability would be substantially less than as specified in the Letter Agreements, id, which could reasonably be expected to be reduced by reason of bus breakdown, driver unEvailability, drivers who may gct lost enroute to the EPZ, or who may become imbedded in outgoing evacuation traffic thereby substantially delaying or prohibiting a driver from timely reaching the EPZ. RAC Review , August, 1986,Section VI, p.12.

4 FDiA RESPONSE

2. See response to Item #1 above.

3. In an apparent effort to address FEMA's concerns on the inadequacy of available personnel and transportation resources, the State -

has entered into an agreement with the Teamsters Union, apparently for the purpose of providing additional bus drivers for evacuation. Vol. 4, App . 1-11. Revision 2, however, fails to demonstrate that the Teamsters under agreement are in fact adequately trained to drive the school buses and emergency vehicles for the mobility impaired to properly effectuate an evacuation, fails to specify how these backup drivers promptly will be notified and coordinated with available buses, and falls to support the purported agreement with the Teamsters with Letter Agreements executed by the individuct members of this union.

FEMA RESPONSE:

3. 'Ihe I.etter of Agreement with Teamsters Incal No. 633 is present in

\blume 5 of the State Plan and documents the Union's agreement to provide approximately 1,500 personnel to drive transportation vehicles

as needed during emergencies. In regard to training, the 6/2/86 agreement between the State and the Teamsters indicates that "the New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency will provide training to the Incal 633

. 16.

'IOW OF HAMPION REVISED CCriIHTTION IV 'IO REVISION 2 (Cont. )

membership regarding potential emergencies in New Hampshire." The State training program is described in Section 3.2 of the State Plan.

As indicated on page 3.2-6 of the State Plan, fECDA will provide annual instruction to the drivers of bus and ambulance transportation resources. The training will consist of "an overview of the RERP and emergency response organization, notification, emergency classification levels, protective actions, location of staging areas, basic radiation '

concepts, and radiological exposure control, including the use of dosimeters" (pages 3.2-7 and 3.2-9 of State Plan). Although the RAC had no specific ccranents on the training program for bus drivers, Planning Standard O (Radiological Dnergency Response Training) was rated as adequate by the RAC (pages 127,128, and 129 of Section 1 of State Plan review).

No details were found in the plan as to how Teamsters' bus drivers will be notified and coordinated with available buses. Ibwever, there is a contact person for Teamsters Iocal No.633 and telephone ntrnber listed on page 1-11 of Appendix 1 of tacDA Procedures in Volume 4 of the State Plan. Although the procedure for the EOC Resources Coordinator (\blume 4 State Plan) and the Director of Pupil Transportation Safety (Voltane 4B State Plan) iridicate that they will request bus ccinpanies to conduct a fleet inventory and driver avail-ability poll, no other procedures could be found which describe how individual Teamsters drivers are contacted and matched with available buses which require drivers. Although the RAC did not coment on this in its review, this information should be provided in the plan ,

to ensure that Teamsters' drivers can be contacted, mobilized and matched with available buses in a timely manner.

(B) Emergency Exercise.

The February 26 exercise only confirmed the consistent position of the Town of flampton and other intervenors that evacuaticn of the EPZ around Seabrook Station is not feasible and that the personnel and equipment allocated to support an emergency response are inadequate.

For example , the State could not satisfy even the limited demand for buses of communities participating in the exercise, FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, p. 40, could not provide adequate EMS or ambulance service.

FEMA. Final Exercise Assessment, pp. 42, 44, no buses were allocated for summertime employees, RAC Review. August 1986, Section Vi at p. 9. the State felled to demonstrate that adequate backup buses were available to support an evacuation, FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, 6/2/86, p. 4 2, and the State did not allocate transportation for those individuals who may have a vehicle in the household, yet the vehicle may be unavailable

17.

'IUW OF HAWION REVISED 00NTENTION IV 'IO REVISION 2 (Cont.)

at the time of an emergency. RAC Review, August 1986, Section 1,

p. 71. hevision 2 fails to correct these anc related deficiencies.

Additionally, if the State was unable to reasonably carry out a limited and preplanned evacuation exercise, with no requirement for coordination with Massachusetts , and in the dead of winter, an actual evacuation of the summertime beach population is wholly unrealistic and unworkable.

FENA RESPONSE: ,

(B) The Final Exercise Assessment of the February 26, 1986 Exercise documented many deficiencies in the State's ability to provide evacuation transportation resources in a prompt and coordinated manner. Remedial actions to correct these deficiencies will have to be successfully demonstrated in a future exercise.

(C) Special Needa Population.

Revision 2 calculates the special needs population for the Town of Hampton based upon an " annual survey." Vol. 18, p . 11-30. This

" annual survey" is in fact a mere " postage paid mail back card" sent out by the State purportedly to all persons residing within Hampton. Id.

Less than 2 percent of the Town responded. Vol. 18, p. IV-34. The survey is a grossly inadecuate vehicle to compute the special needs and

- transit dependent populations of the Town of Hampton and unreasonably I places the burden upon handicapped, mobility-impaired, and other transit dependent or special needs individuals to affirmatively request transportation or be ignored under the State's emergency plan. The

, State itself recognized the inadequacy of its own survey since it increased by 50 percent the transportation allocation for the special needs populations for all towns, in view of the "small sample sizes" received from each community. RAC Review, August,1986 Section VI, p. 6. As the RAC pointed out, however, no statistical justification has been provided by the State for this 50 percent increase, id at p. 5. The special needs populations for the Town of Hampton, and for other EPZ towns, therefore represent an unknown quantity for evacuation planning.

(C) 'Ihe RAC Paview indicates that there needs to be clarification in the Plan on the basis for determining the number of people in the E2P cornunities requiring transportation during an evacuation. 'Ihe RAC Peview also indicates that numerous inconsistencies need to be resolved. The RAC Boview (page 74-a of Section I) noted that the special needs survey of transit dependent residents is different frm the telephone survey which was used for couputation in the

. 18.

ItMJ OF HAWION REVISED CONTENTION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont. )

Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) Study. The special needs survey gives the lowest number of residents requiring transportation.

There are sczne very large differences in special needs survey estimates of requirements by cmmunity (see W1. 4, Rev. 2 - 8/86, pages 189-2 through 188-27) and the ETE telephone survey estimates (see Table 11-7, W1. 2) . The Plan should state the basis of its use of a particular set of numbers, give date when the estimates were developed, and explain whether and why those numbers take precedence over any other set of numbers which were , constructed for essentially the same purpose. The plan reviewers do not now have enough inforTnation to judge the accuracy or priority of a given set of nunbers.

Specific ccmnents on Volune 6 (ETE Study) will be provided by an expert witness to be sponsored by the NIC.

(D) Compensatory Plan.

FEMA has recommended that the State Compensatory Plan be revised "to anticipate the non-participation of any of the local jurisdictions in the Seabrook plume EPZ." FEMA, Final Exercise Assesament, 6/2/86, p. 44.

Based upon the FEMA recommendation , and from the avowed non-participation of the Town of Hampton and numerous other towns within the EPZ to implement the NHRERP, the State has promulgated a compensatory plan consisting of only five pages. Vol. 2, App. G. As presently drafted, the Compensatory Plan wholly fails to allocate adequate personnel, equipment , or resources to implement an evacuation on -

grounds including:

1 1. The plan erroneously assumes the cooperation and participation of Hampton school officials. although no letter agreements confirming this participation have been obtained. Vol . 2, App. G-2.

FEMA RESPCt4 set (D) Appendix G of Volume 2 of the State Plan does not represent the total State Ccrnpensatory Plan, but only represents and outline of the concept of operations. The details of how the Compensatory Plan operates have been incorporated into the plan procedures (Volunes 4, 4A, and 4B) .

19.

'IOkN OF HAWION REVISED OCNTENTION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont.)

1. It' is correct that the Compensatory Plan assumes the cooperation of Hampton School officials in implementing their response plans and in providing information on school attendance (page G-2 of Appendix G to Wlune 2 of State Plan). It is also correct that the plan contains no letters of agreement with Hampton School officials confirming this cooperation. However, FEMA REP-1 does not name letters of agreement with school officials since schools are considered public agencies.

2. Aside from vague reference to the coordination of ' law enforcement activities and traffic cont rol . Vol. 2, App. G-3, the compensatory plan wholly fails to specify where this additional law enforcement personnel will be obtained to make up for those local police who will not participate in the implementation of the NHRERP. including the llampton Police Department. Either the plan erroneously assumes local participation in the face of the express vote of the Town of Hampton not to so participate, or the plan relies upon the inadequate number of personnel in State Police Troop A to carry out local law en forcement duties. With its 35 troopers. however. Troop A ,oes not even have sufficient personnel to staff secess control points for the EPZ, as required under Revision 2. let klone take over the traffic mcnagement and security duties prestntly assigned to Hampton and other local police departments . FEMA. Final Exercice Assessment. 6 / 2'/ 8 6 at p . 4 f ,

3 FEMA RESPONSE:

2. 'Ihe New Hampshire State Police Troop A procedures include pro-visions to mobilize additional personnel to compensate for municipaliaties that may be unable to respond to the emergency.

As noted in the procedures for the Troop A IED Pepresentative (page 6, step #6, Troop A Procedures in Volune 4B of State Plan),

"If additional personnel and equipment are required, contact the State Police EOC Liaison to initiate state police alerting procedures to call in troopers fran other parts of the State."

The procedures also indicate that if still further assistance is required, thre State EOC representative is to be contacted to request support fran other State resources. The RAC Review indicated that this revised procedure was adequate (see page 49 of Compensatory Plan subsection of Section IV). The procedure for mobilizing additional support, therefore, appears to be adequate, although the adequacy of overall resources still requires resolution. For example, the State indcated (page 3 of Compensatory Plan subsection of Section IV of RAC Review) that "A resource allocation study is currently being conducted.

This study will (1) identify the personnel and equipment l

required to implement the local and State plans and procedures

20.

1tMI OF HAWION REVISED CXNTENTION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont. )

and (2) assure that adequate resources are available to cover all emergency functions. Chee this study is completed, rosters and equipment lists in the plans and procedures will,be reviewed and updated according to the results of this analysis."

The RAC concluded that the adequacy of resources depends on the outccrae of the cited study.

(E) Transit Dependent Individuals.

Revision 2 adopts a " concept of pre-designated bus routes" to evacuate transit dependent residents and transients without private Section I, p. 73.

transportation. R A C Review . August . 1966_.

Apparently this procedure has been adopted to purportedly increase the speed of evacuation, by eliminating the need for door to door pick These ups of transit dependent individuals as provide din the prior NHRERP.

pre-designated bus routes, however, will require individuals, during a radiological including the " mobility-impaired ." to leave their homes emergency, to locate the pre-designated bus routes , and to remain outdoors subject to increased radiological exposure, awaiting evacuation buses which FEMA has already indicated may reasonably be expected notThTi to arrive. FEMA. Final Exercise Assessment. 6/2/16, at p. 40.

procedure unreasonably compromises the public health and will not from radiation injury.

adequately protect the Hampton population Additionally. the transportation allocated for the Town of flampton under Revision 2 Vol. 18 p. 34, does not include buses for Vol. the4.substantial App.1-8.

number of transients, including the beach population.

I FEMA RESPONSE (E) The concept of pre-designated bus routes for the evacuation of residents and transients without transportation does not eliminate the need for door-to-door pickups for " mobility-impaired" indi-viduals with special needs. As indicated on page II-31 of the Hampton Plan, the Public Works Director is responsible for main-t.aining a current listing of the residents that require evacuation by special vehicle or that require physical help to evacuate.

The Public Works Director is responsible for ensuring transpor-tation is provided for these people. As indicated in the Hampton Plan (page 11-31), the transportation requirements are transmitted to the town IFO local liaison for assignment and dispatch of the

-appropriate transportation resources. As noted in the Public Works Directors' procedures (page IV-32 Hampton Plan), town emergency workers will be assigned to report to the homes or other locations of people with special needs to assist them in

21.

'IOW OF HAWION REVISED CONIENTION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont. )

b rding vehicles. Directions will also be provided for EMS vehicles reporting to homes of people requiring ambulance transport.

Should town officials not participate,these activities would be performed by the State under the Cornpensatory Plan. In regard to the adequacy of transportation for transients in Hampton, see the previous FEMA response to Item "(D)" of the original

. basis of Hampton Contention #4.

O d

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22.

PEVISED HAMPION CONTENTION VI 'IO REVISION 2 Revision 2 fails to demonstrate that adequate personnel are available to respond. or to augment their initial response on a continuous basis, in the event of radiological emergency. 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(1)(10).

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B ASIS:

The bases for Contention VI set forth in CONTENTIONS OF Tile TOWN OF HAMPTON TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE TOWN OF HAMPTON. NEW HAMP5 HIRE, NOVEMBER.1955 and revised Contention VI set forth in CONTENTIONS OF THE TOWN OF l HAMPTON TO REVISED RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN AND TO COMPENSATORY PLAN FOR THE TOWN OF HAMPTON. NEW II AMPS HIR E , are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference terein (see p. 3).

FEMA RESPONSE This contention, taken overall, concerns the capacity for the Town of Hampton and the State to provide sufficient personnel resources to sup) ort an initial and on-going emergency response. The requirement is def 4ned in Planning Standard A.4 of FEMA-REP-1.

In the December 1986 RAC review of the REV. 2 Hunicipal plans, on page 6, FEMA found that some key emergency responsq' positions do not 4

have any back-up for second shif t response. Apendix A of the Hampton Plan does not show any alternates for the positions of Civil Defense Ofrector, RADEF Officer, and Health Officer. In addition, the Town Manager is listed as the incumbent official for three emergency response positions, those being Town fianager, Civil Defense Director, and Health Officer. Based on these review findings, FEMA does not have assurance '

that the Town of Hampton can implement its plan. ,

Since Hampton has indicated that it will not actively participate in the planning and response for a possible accident at Seabrook Station, it is necessary to apply Planning Standard A.4 to the State's ability to fully compensate for the Town of Hampton's emergency response functions.

The same comments apply here as for the Contentions South Hampton 2 Kensington 1, and Hampton Halls 2.

FE

's responses to the specific basis contained in this Contention

, IWMON VI (Cont.) ...

3.

(A) Revision 2 provides that 28 local traffic guards are required for the Town of Hampton and Hampton Beach, Vol. 6, p. 8-11, although the Hampton Police Department only has a total of 24 full time officers in the entire force. Vol. 18, p. IV-41. Even adopting the State's implicit, and unreasonable, assumption that the entire llampton police force would be immediatelp available to respond to a radiological emergency, the force simply does not have adequate personnel to man the traffic control points, Vol. 6, p. 8-11 Vol . 18, p. IV-43, to provide EOC security, Vol. 18,

p. IV-42, to provide security patrols throughout the Town, Vol. 18,

p. IV-43, to provide those people within Hampton at the time of emer-gency with backup public alerting, Vol.18. IV-41, or to close and patrol the town beaches. Vol. 18A App. G-3.

FEMA RESPONSE Basis A (Rev. 2)

This basis asserts that the town's 24 full-time police of ficers are not sufficient to perform all the duties assigned to them. Since the town has indicated that it will not commit its full or part-time police of ficers (which together are sufficient to perform all assigned emergency response functions), and the State has committed to compensate for local emergency response responsibilities (Volume 2, Appendix G of State Plan),

this basis is without merit.

(D) In an effort to compensate for the lack "of local personnel to adequately respond to a radiological emergency, Revision 2 provides that the New llampshire State Police will provide "as sistance to local police departments for law enforcement and traffic control." Vol. 1, p. 1.3-20.

State Police Troop A is the only State Police force in reasonable proximity .

to the EPZ. Since Troop A , however, has only 35 troopers, and 44 -

officers are required to staff the access control points for the EPZ, FEMA has properly concluded that Troop A does not even have sufficient personnel for access control, FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment. 6/2/86,

p. 46. Necessarily, Troop A has no additionul personnel to assist local municipalities , such as llampton , Vol. 1, p., 1.1-20, lacks resources to provide arv traffic control beyond access control within the EPZ, will be unable to respond to requesta from DOT to provide road barriers. signs, or read clearance during evacuation, or otherwise to perform the excesrive number of duties assigned to the State Police under Revision 2 Vol. 2 p 1.3-20 and 21. FEMA has therefore properly noted that "even with help from other troops, the State Police force could be seriously depicted ond law enforcement possibly impaired." FEMA, Final Exercise Assengey 6/2/86 at p. 46.

FEMA RESPONSE gsis B (Rev. 2)

T he problem of obtaining suf ficient State Police resources, in a timely manner, to perform assigned duties plus any necessary compensa-tory actions, remains. The logistics would seem to require a full mobilization of State Police Troops at the ALERT level to allow for extra travel time to the Seabrook area.

IINWim VI (Cont.) 24.

B ASIS:

(A) Population estimates. In establishing adequate levels of local personnel to respond in the event of a radiological emergency, the llampton RERP relies upon a " peak seasonable population" of 110,000 for the Town , of flampton. This population estimate is purportedly "the maximum population which may be expected in the llampton area at any time during the peak summer months," llampton RERP. pg.1-11, and was computed utilizing second hand information prepared by non-local sources.

The llampton RERP thereby violates FEMA regulations since " estimates of transient population shall be developed using local data such as " peak tourist volumes." NUREG. Appendix 4 - 3.

By letter of October 29, 1985, the Town of flampton specifically advised the State that the llampton RERP peak population estimate of 110,000 was substantially below traffic counts and local business figures.

As set forth on the attached Affidavit of Glen French, President of the Town of flampton Chamber of Commerce, the local Chamber of Commerce routinely relies upon population estimates of between 150,000 to 200,000 people per day for the Town of flampton during the summer season. As many as 250,000 people can be expected within the town on each day over

the Fourth of July weekend.

The State therefore relies upon a peak population estimate less than one-half of actual figures , as determined by local officials uniquely qualified to make these computations based upon parking, both legal and illegal, business receipts, and seasonal shifts in the demand for municipal services. At a minimum, HUREG, Appendix 4 - 3 requires the State to fully explore with local officials the basis for the disparity in State and local population figures. The State, however, terminated all discussion on this issue.

Necessarily , the State's re11ance upon unreasonably low population estimates raises substantial questions on the adequacy of local personnel allocated to the Town under the RERP to respond to a radiological f emergency.

FEftA RESPONSE Basis A (Rev .1)

See FEftA response to Contention SAPL 34 (D) Police Departments. The llampton RERP provides that a total of 80 police officers and personnel will be available to respond to a radiological emergency. Ilampton RERP. Appendix C-1. These f!gures are misleading and fall to account for the fact that 50 of the 60 police personnel are "special officers" hired by the department on a part time or seasonal basis. These special officers therefore lack the experience ,

s kill, and training necessary to promptly implement adequate protective responnen in the event of radlological emergency.

FEMA RESPONSE Basis 8 (Rev.1)

With proper training, the 50 special of ficers should be able to function adequately in their emergency response duties, However, this basis is now without merit, since the Town of Hampton does not plan to participate in the emergency planning process.

IA*!P;ni VI (Cont.) 25.

(C) Department of Public Works. The Hampton REFP provides that a total of '60 personnel are available from the Hampton Public Works Department to implement protective responses in theThese event offigures radiologicalare emergency. Hampton RERP. Appendix C-3.

misleading. Of the 60 department personnel, 24 of these individuals constitute " temporary" employees, who, by reason of inadequate training and experience, cannot reasonably be expected to promptly and appropriately implement necessary evacuation procedures. Similarly, an additional 19 members of the Public Works Department are routinely employed in waste water treatment and sewer maintenance. Accordingly, these individuals cannot reasonably be expected to implement the traffic control, evacuation transportation, or maintenance of evacuation routes which represent the primary responsibilities of the llampton Public Works Department in the event of evacuation. Hampton RERP. IV 29.

The remaining department personnel consist of the director and 16 highway personnel upon which would fall primary responsibility for initiating and implementing protective responses in the early stages of a radiological emergency. See NUREG. pg. 20. These duties include:

1. Responsibility for evacuation of all individuals without automobiles , families without the use of the vehicle, and people with special transportation needs. NUREO, Appendix IV - 27(7). Plainly the limited staff of 17 in the Public Works Department who are familiar with highway and transportation problems are wholly inadeouate to insure the transportation of the thousands of individuals who may be located on the beach at the time evacuation is implemented, even assuming this was the sole function to be performed by the department in the event of a radiological emergency. The additional and substantial duties of the department to canvas the town and direct evacuation of special needs individuals, families, vacationers, and other non-auto owning individuals, merely underscores the gross inadequacy of local public works personnel 10 C . F. R . ,

to meet their responsibilities under the RERP.

Section 50.47(b)(1).

2. Under the llampton RERP, the Public Works Department is responsible for ensuring that "all evacuation routes are serviceable throughout the course of an evacuation." llampton RERP !! - 31.

Clearly the available Public Works Department personnel are inadequate even to carry out this single function mandated by the Ifampton RERP.

More significantly, the llampton RERP unreasonably assumeu that maintaining accessibility of evacuation routes will " entail normal adverse weather route maintenance only . " RERP, pg. !! - 31.

unreasonably fails to account for accidents, The RERP therefore breakdowns, driver disobedience, panic, and gas shortages which must be reasonably anticipated in the event of mass evacuation. The llampton RERP therefore falls to provide reasonable assurance that the town has adequate staff to carry out its evacuation responsibilities, NUREG, relies upon an pr. 31. Assignment of Responsib(11tv, and the RERP unreasonable and unrealistic model in determining staff capability to implement the plan. NUREG, pg. 61. Protective Response.

IWMot! VI (Cont.) 26.

FEMA RESPONSE Basis C (Rev. 2)

With proper training, Department of Public Works personnel (both full time and part time) should be able to function adequately in their emergency response duties. However, this basis is now without merit, since the Town of Hampton does not plan to participate in the emergency planning process.

(D) Selectmen. The Board of Selectmen for the Town of Ilampton are provided ultimate authority to direct radiological emergency operations for the Town. Hampton RERP 1 - 16. The RERP igncres the fact, however, that Selectmen are only part-time officials who may have full-time jobs even outside the Town of Hampton. It is reasonsble to assume that at least certain members of the Board of Selectmen would be unavailable to promptly respond, implement, and direct an appropriate protective response. Additionally the Hampton Selectmen are annually elected which may thereby seriously compromise effective RERP education and training for newly elected officials. .

FEMA RESPONSE Basis D (Rev. 1)

Same response as for basis B and C above. -

_ . . , , , . , . _ _ _ - m . _ . . . - . _ _ _r .. _ . _

, HAMPION VI (Cont.) 27.

CASIS:

(E) The Revised Ifampton RERP relies upon the cooperation and participation of Town of Hampton employees and officials, including Selectmen, RERP IV-2, police , IV-41, and fire officials, IV-16, to implement' protective actions in the event of emergency. By vote of the llampton Town Meeting on March 8, 1986, and by Resolution adopted by the Daard of Selectmen on March 24, 1986, however, the Town of Hampton has declined and refused to participate in the preparation or implementation of the Hampton RERP prepared by the State. Necessarily the State cannot rely upon Hampton personnel to carry out the State plan for the Town. Accordingly, the llampton RERP fails to provide reasonable assurance that Hampton personnel will implement or carry out

. protective actions during an emergency.

(F) Under the Revised Hampton RERP, the duties and responsibili-ties of the Town Manager and the Town Civil Defense Director have been expanded. Revised llampton RERP IV, pages 7-16. The Revised Hampton RERP, however, falls to account fore the fact that, within the Town of flampton, the Town Manager is presently serving as acting Civil Defense Director. Accordingly, the emergency administrative responsibilities placed upon this single individual for the Town of flampton are wholly unreasonable and far exceed the abilities of one person, however, capable. For example, among other duties, the Town Civil Defense Director is required to assess and monitor the Town transportation needs in the event of emergency and acquire additienal vehicles should allocated transportation prove inadequate. Compensatory Plan IV-13, 14. At the same time, the Town Manager is responsible to insure that all Town Departments are adequately staffed and that appropriate and adequate staffing is provided throughout the emergency.

Compensatory Plan IV-9. Since these responsibilities may continue on a 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> b asis , it is unreasonable to assume that the Civil Defense Director / Town Manager can continue to provide adequate transportation -

and personnel for the duration of an emergency as required by 10 C.F.R. ~

l 50.47(b)(1).

Additionally, even assuming that separate individuals are designated as Town Manager and Civil Defense Director for the Town, the Town believes that the numerous duties imposed on each of these individuals under the Revised Ilampton RERP place an unreasonable and unrealistic burden on Town personnel in violation of 10 C.F.R C 50.47(b)(1). For example , the Town's Civil Defense Director is not only required to insure adequate transportation for evacuees, but must fu rther monitor all manpower and equipment requirements for the entire Town during an evacuation of tens of thousands of people and determine "if these needs

~

can be augmented with State resources." Revised fiampton RERP IV-14.

No provision is made in the Revised RERP in the event such State resources prove unavailable and by default, these responsibilities for acquiring additional vehicles or personnel would fall upon the Town Civil Defense Director.

FEMA RESPONSE Basos E and F (Rev. 2)

See FEMA response at beginning of Contention.

. IIA:PIM VI (Cont.) 28.

(G) The State Compensatory Plan relies upon local school officials, under direction of a single local liaison, to evacuate the Hampton school students. In violation of NUREG - 06564, page 32, no letters of agreement have been filed indicating any willingness on the part of these individuals- to participate in, or accept responsibility for, these mandated responsibilities under the Compensatory Plan , Compensatory Plan, page 13A-14. Additionally, it is unreasonable to as officials responsible for evacuating the schools are of sufficient numbers, have adequate training, or will pacrwise be available to evacuate the more than 2,600 Ilampton school .. tidren in the event of radiological emergency. See Compensatory Plac, py;e 7 A-7.

FEMA RESPONSE Bjsis G (Rev . 2)

FEMA REP-1 does not require letters of agreement with government agencies, and thus FEMA does not require letters of agreement with schools, or their staff. While schools are in session, it is the normal responsibility of the staff to provide for the safety of the student population.  ;

(H) The Compensatory Plan provides that only a single Sate Police vehicle will be provided to the Town of Hampton to " maintain security and to report on local road and traffic condition." Compensatory Plan, Troop A. New Hampahlre State Police Emergency Response Procedures, page 2.

Since even the State acknowledges that Hampton may have an " upper peak seasonal population of 110,000" Revised flampton Plan 1-11, it is wholly unreasonable to expect that a single police cruiser can maintain security and remain adequately apprised of road conditions throughout the Town in the event tens of thousands of individuals are attempting to evacuate Hampton. ,

The Compensatory Plan further provides that troopers should not

" expedite the flow of traffic leaving the EPZ...at the expense of access control functions." Compensatory Plan. Troop A Emergency Response Procedure, page A-1. Accordingly, since vehicle breakdowns, accidents, stalled cars, and other impediments to evacuation must reasonable be anticipated given the number of vehicles and evacuees, the Compensatory

' Plan makes no provision for State Po!!ce or other adequate personnel to maintain the accessibility of the evacuation roads.

Finally , the 28 troops assigned to access control for Hampton are inadequate to insure reasonably prompt evacuation of the tens of thousands of vehicles leaving flampton, as well as additional vehicles parsing through the Town from surrounding communities atTherc the time of is no emergency, Compensatory Plan, Appendix C. page C-70.

showing that State Police Troop A has sufficient personnel to meet its responsibilities for access control, security and other duties for the Town of flampton and other communities within the EPZ, or to augment this response on a 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis. 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(1).

FEMA RESPONSE Basis H (Rev. 2)

See FEMA response at beginning of Contention.

29.

REVISED HAMPIQ1 CCtTTE?TrION VIII 'IO REVISIcel 2 Revision 2 fails to provide adequate emergency caufpment, facilities, or personnel to support an emergency response and fails to demonstrate that adequate protective responses can be implemented in the event of radiological emergency. 10 C.F.R.150.47(1)(8)(10).

B ASIS:

The bases for Contention Vi!! set forth in CONTENTIONS OF TIIE TOWN OF HAMPTON TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE TOWN OF HAMPTON. NEW II AMPSIIIRE. NOVEMBER.1985, and Revised Contention VIII set forth in CONTENTIONS OF THE TOWN OF HAMPTON TO REVISED RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN AND TO COMPENSATORY PLAN FOR TIIE TOWN OF HAMPTON. NEW H AM PSillRE, are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference herein.

FEMA RESPONSE See FEMA Response te, NECNP-RERP-8.

e

. 30.

KENSINGTON CONTENTION 1

~

The. December,1985 draf t radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Mensington does not assure that each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(1), because there are not alternates in several of the key emergency response positioqs and other departments are inadequately staffed to respond to an emergency as outlined'in the plan.

BASIS:

There are currently no alternates for the positions of Civil Defense Director, Fire Chief, and RADEF Of ficer. With many of these individuals '

working out of the area on frequent occasions, continuous protection cannot be provided without alternate individuals to act in their place. Addition-ally, there is no transportation coordinator.

FEMA RESPONSE in its Dec.1986 review of Rev. 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Seabrook FEMA and the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) reviewed all municipal (EPZ) plans for their capacity to provide for 24-hour continuous operation for a protracted period. Speci f-ically Planning Standard A.4 from FEMA-REP-1 defines this requirement.

On page 6 of the Dec.1986 RAC Review of Rev. 2. Municipal Plans, FEMA f ound that some key emergency res)onse positions do not have a back-up listed for second shift responsib111 ties. In Appendix A of the Kensington P1an, there are no back-up personnel listed for the positions of Civil Defense Director, Transportation Coordinator, RADEF Of ficer, Police Chief, Health Of ficer, Road Agent, or Town Clerk. Based on these review findings, FEMA

• does not have assurance that the Town of Kensington can implement its plan.

Since Kensington has indicated that it will not actively participate in the planning and response for a possible accident at Seabrook Station, it is necessary to apply Planning Standard A.4 to the State's ability to fully compensate for the Town of Vansington's emergency response functions.

In its June 1986 RAC Review of Rev.1 of the NH Compensatory P1an for Seabrook Station, FEMA found that the plans did not adequately identify the personnel to carry out the State's Compensatory Plan. The State responded to this by indicating that a resource allocation study was being conducted to identify the personnel and equipment necessary to im)lement local and State plans, covering all functions. Rev. 2 of the NH Plans still do not contain the results of this personnel allocation study. FEMA's findings are found on page 3 of the December 1986 RAC Review of the New Hampshire Compensatory P1an for Seabrook.

Until New Hampshire develops this information as part of its planning base, FEHA has no basis to change its deterraination that the State has not demonstrated that it has adequate personnel resources to compensate for the non-participation of Kensington personnel. (See RAC Review of the Compensatory Plan, pages; 3(A.4); 6(H.4), 7(H.10)].

31.

KENSINGTON CONTENTION 1 (Cont.)

BASIS: .

The Kensington Volunteer Fire Department is served by individuals who work out of town. There is no assurance that fire department personnel will be reachable or capable of responding in a timely manner in the event of a radiological emergency. .

The Police Chief in Kensington does not reside within the town and there is no assurance that he will be reachable or capable of responding promptly in the event of a radiological emergency during his off-duty hours.

FEMA RESPONSE The availability of emergency response personnel to respond to an emergency does not necessarily depend on their working or living in the affected community, in this case Kensington. As long as designated emergency response personnel can be reached by telephone or radio at their place of work and home and be able to staf f their posts in time to carry out their assigned duties, there is no reason to presume these personnel will not be reachable or able to respond. Since local community EOC's are activated at the Alert classification level, there should be enough time to mobilize and deploy emergency response staff to their respective i posts. As discussed earlier in the response to this Contention, FEMA's concern is primarily with the number of local emergency responders.

In a fast breaking situation, the capacity exists to implement protec-tive actions such as sheltering without the local response organization being fully staffed.

BASIS:

The Kensington Road Agent is responsible for assuring a successful, smooth evacuation by clearing roads of snow, stalled cars, accidents, and otherwise assuring that the roadways remain open for evacuation. Kensington's Highway Department does not have suf ficient personnel or resources to fulfill these responsibilities, and the common arrangements for ad hoc assistance by private contractors are insufficient to assure that these responsibilities will be met. Kensington has only one Road Agent, and relies on local con-tractors to assist as needed during winter storms. The Road Agent is also a volunteer fireman and medic and may be needed to perform other duties during an evacuation.

FEliA RESPONSE FEMA's position concerning the availability of one road agent, with no back-up, is that this is not sufficient to ensure adequate coverage for this E0C position. The response to the first basis of this contention explains fella's position in greater detail.

• 32.

l REVISED KENSINGTON CONTENTION 2 l

The NHRERP, Revision 2 for "TOK" does not provide for adequate

" notification, by the licensee of State and local response organizations, and for notiffication of emergency response personnel by organizations, as required by 10 C.F.R 6 50.47(b)(5). Provision for notification of the town emergency response organization is inadequate in that it depends upon notification through the Rockingham County Dispatch.

I

! BASIS:

(

"TOK" will no longer be using Rockingham County 01spatch as of the end of 1986.

FEliA RESPONSE:

l This Contention deals with the means by which the Town of Kensington j

will receive notification of an emergency at Seabrook. In its review of Rev. 2 of New Hampshire Plans for Seabrook dated December 15,1986, fella l

l and the RAC found that the Rockingham County Otsptach Center had both l adequate equipment and personnel coverage for providing notification to

! the towns. Thus, although the Town of Kensington may not use the Rocking-I ham County Dispatch Center on a routine basis, there*is no reason that it

! could not notify Kensington personnel in the event of an emergency at Seabrook.

i l l 1

l l

1 i

l I

l l

l

33.

REVISED KENSINCrf0N CORITNTICN 4 r The NHRERP, Revision 2 for "TOK" does not provide reasonable assurance l that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (a)(1), because the Kensington Elonentary School provides inadequate radio-logical protection.

e ,

l RASIS: .

% e Kensington Elementary School is currently proposed as a shelter for elenuntary school students in the event that sheltering is reccreanded.  ;

2 The elementary school in the Town of Kensington is inadequate for sheltering children, the highest risk pcpulation, due to the fact that there are no interior roms, no basement, and all classrooms have a wall of windowsn.

4

, FINA RESPONSE:

his contention deals with the suitability of the Kensington Elementary

School as a shelter, with a Dose Reduction Factor at least .9. In that the New Hangshire Plan does not differentiate between students and the general public reaarding the suitability of sheltering as a protective action, and ,

the Dose Peduction Factor inherent in virtually any winterized building is [

l at least .9, FEMA has no reason to bellow that the Kensington Elenentary i School is unsuitable as a shelter.

]

i 4

I t

4

} f I

l

I 34.

, }

i  !

i

\

l '

REVISED KENSINGTON CONTENTION 6 The NHRERP. Revision 2 for "TOK" does not provide adequate  ;

arrangements for effectively using assistance and resources as required by 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(3) because there are not appropriate letters of

! agreement to identity support organlaations and other facilities whleh are l to provide assistance.

I j ,

BASIS:

l NURIG-0664 !! C.4. requires that each organlaation shall identify i nuclear and other facilities, organlaations or individuals which can be [

relied on in an emergency to provide assistance. Such assistance shall be i 1 identitled and supported by appropriate letters of agreement. "TOK" is not aware of a letter of agreement with Midway Excavators. "TOK" has ,

been informed by Midway Excavators (not by NH State Civil Defense) that i as of November 21, 1986 it will not be servicing any towns. Midway i Excavators left "TOK" unplowed during the snow storm of November 19 l 1984 and, in fact 'never showed up" or called 'TOK" to inform "TOK" l that it would not be coming. Midway Excavators is servleing only State t

.' swede as of November 21, 1984. In AFFIDAVIT OF RICif ARD N. STROME (CONTENTION MENSINGTON -6 AND CONTF;NTIOMB 50UTN HAMPTUN-1 l

i

? AND 3 MAY 15 IWes in support of AFFLICANT5' MOTION FOR BUMMARY E 8INGTON CONTzNTIori UO. 6 AND 50UTM i

! HAMPTON CONTENTION 5 N05.1 AND 3 MAY 20,1955 Richard H.  !

5trome states: at 3. "As to local tow or snow removal companies such as l

]

Midway Excavators, the state has adequate back-up resources should local  !

7 contractors be unavailable to two or to plow the snow in the Town of i South Hampton." In light of Midway Excavators action of November 21 .t 1986 in which it effectively transferred the resources of "TOK" to the  :

I State. "TOK" has serious questions as to the existence of the State's l back-up resources and the adequ6cy of any resources the State purports l

! to have. "TOK" no longer has a Snow Removal Agreement with Midway ,

Excavators.

i I

i " TOM" does not accept as appropriato letters of agreement the  ;

letters of agreement with transportation companies. Many of thesu letters i llat more buses and other vehicles than there are drivers. There are no letters of agreement for the already inadequate number of drivers.

FEMA RESPONSE:

TEMA has addressed Town of Konsington flovised Contention 6 and its basis that there are not appropriato letters of sarcoment with fifdway fxcavators or l j with transportation compantos by applying Pfanning Standards A. C. and J. l

(Evaluation Critoria A.3 C.4. J.10.g. and J.10.k) in FEftA REP 1. l l The December 15,1986 RAC Roylow of the Stato and municipal plans  !

! reflect reft %'s views on this issuo. Specifically. telfa's review coments l 1 ,

1  !

i

O 35.

REVISED KENSINGTON CONTENTION 6 (Cont.)

on the Ne# Hampshire State Plan on this issue are provided on pages 74, 74-b, and b5 of Section I, on page 1 of the Letters of Agreenent subsection of Section IV, and on page 50 of the Compensatory Plan subsection of Section IV. FEHA's review comments on the municipal plans on this issue are pro-vided on pages 5 and 6 of Section !!. .

FEMA relied upon the following documents in forming its conclusions on this issue: Revision 2 of the New Hampshire State Plan; Revision 2 to the municipal plans.

For a response to this issue, see tne FEMA response to South Hampton ,

Contention 3. As noted in the response, there is no Letter of Agreement with Itidway Excavating Companj. However, it appears that there would be sufficient other resources available from the State to remove impediments to evacuation. It is noted, however, that flidway Excavating Company was not identified in the Kensington Plan as a provider of contracted services (see page C-3 of Appendix C of Kensington Plan). As also noted in the FEtiA response to South Hampton Contention 3, which is applicable to the response to Kensington Revised Contention 6, the letters of agreement with transportation companies are considered by the RAC to be adequate.

l l

L

. . 36.

REVISED KENSINGTON CONTENTION 10 The NHRERP. Revialon 2 for "TOK" does not provide for communi-cations with contiguous State / local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. as required by 10 C.F.R. I 50.47 App. E.E.(9)(a),

because provisions for communications with the State government are inadequate. .

H ASIS:

NUREG 0054 F.1.b. requires provisions for communications with

. contiguous State / local governments within the EPZ. The Kensington Emergency Operations Center (EOC) currently has only one telephone '

(red phone) for communications with State / local governments, located on the ground floor of the EOC, wh!!e the command post is located on the second floor of the EOC. This system is not adequhte to allow necessary emergency communications. "TOK" asserts that there is no showing that the equipment exists. The NilRERP. Revision 2 for "TOK" at page !!-8 states: "This description 16 of the new communications system planned for the Town of Kensington. All of this equipment has been purchased, however the town has elected to accept only a portion of this equipment at this time." "TOK" hks not made such an " election". In AFFIDAVIT OF GARY J. CATAPANO RE MENSINGTON CONTENTIONS NOS. 2 AND 10 MAY 16, IH6 in support of APPLICANT 5'

SUMMARY

DISPCSTION OF KE!?SINGTON CONTENTIONS NOE. 2 AND 10, MAY 20,1986 Gary J.

Catapano states at 5: " Additional radio equipment was purchased for the Kensington Police Department as part of a complete reconfiguration of the existing communications net work and installation was begun.

(Installation was halted, insofar as I am aware at the direction of some offielk! of the Town." No official gave such direction. "TOK" has never refused equipment. .

FEHA RESPON$E:

This Contention deals with the adequacy of communications equipment to contact contiguous Stato and local governments. Equipment already in place would allow Kensington to communicate with State / local governments.

The availability of additional radio equipment, already purchased and ready for installation, would certainly enhance the town's communications abilities. (See FEHA/RAC Review of New Hampshiro Municipal Plans, December 15,1986, pp 9-10).

37.

NECNP Contention RERP-2 The New Hampshire RERP violates 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(3) as implemented by NUREG-0454 at I II.C.1.b in that the state has not specifically identified all areas in which it requires federal assistance or the extent of its needs; nor has it made arrangements to obtain that assistance: nor has it stated the expected time of arrival of Federal assistance at the Seabrook site or EPZ.

HASIS:

NRC regulations at 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(3) require that

" arrangement for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made: before offsite plans may be approved. NUREG-0654 further provides that each state "must make provisions for incorporating -

the Federal response capability into its operation plan ," including ~

" specific Federal Resources expected", and their " expected time of arrival at specific nuclear facility sites." I!!.C.1.b. The New !!ampshire RERP does not comply with these requirements in several respects. First, the HERP does not specifically identify all of the state' needs for assistance from the federal government. Section 1.4.5 (dentifies a need for support from the Boast Guard and Federal Aviation Administration for restriction of the coastal waters and the airport. The plan also identitles a need for

" shellfish contamination screening" but does not describe the agency that it expects help from. Section 1.4.4 also vaguely describes the state's need for nontechnical and technical support , including " radiological monitoring." The exact nature and extent of these needs is not described. .

This generalized identification of need does not give the Federal government cufficient notice of the state's expectations for assistance, nor does it give sufficient assurance that the necessary steps will be taken to protect the public health and safety. The plan must instead identify the

• particular functions that the State cannot carry out, and the equipment and number and qualifications of Federal personnel needed to carry them out.

Second, the plan speaks of requests for aid as a future task. RERP li 1.4.4, 1.4.5. There is no indication of the time at which Federal aid is to be arranged for--whether it is sometime in the near future, or after un emergency has occurred. In order to assure that Federal aid will be made availabic promptly upon request, specifle types of Federal assistance must be prearranged by written contract with the Federal government.

The arrangements for Federal aid must include an indication of when the aid is expected to arrivo in the EPZ, as required by NUREG-0654 It!.C.1.b. Without these measures, there can be no reasonable assurance that the stato plan can and will be implemented.

Limited as to required federal assistance, 11oard Order, 4/1/86.

FEMA RESPONSE:

This Contention deals with the areas in which the State requires federal j assistance, especially from the U.S. Coast Guard and for shellfish exam-i ination, in the FEftA'R AC Heview of December 15, 1986, it was found that i the deficiencies noted tri Rev.1 of the tww Hampshire Plans with respect i to this matter had been corrected (see page 14 of tne State Plan Review).

I i

38.

NECNP CONTENTION RERP-8 The New ifampshire RERP does not provide a " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 50.47f a)(1), in that radiological emergency," as required' by 10 C.F.R.

the plan does not provide reasonable assurance Nor that sheltering does the plan is an provide

" adequate protective measure" for Seabrook.

adequate criteria for the choice between protective measures, as required by 5 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654. 9 II.J.10.m.

t FEMA RESPONSE to Revised Town of Hancton Contention VIII to Revision 2 (of the New Hampshire RERP for Seabrook) , SAPL Contention 16, and NECNP Contention RERP-8 These three contentions all deal with what is fundamentally the same issues protection fran a radiological release for beach-going population at Seabrook who do not have ready access to any effective form of sheltering.

his group includes both " day-trippers to the beach and those persons who only have access to unwinterized or other types of construction which will offer a lesser degree of protection than that offered by standard residential or comnercial buildings.

Background - This issue has been of great concetn to FEMA fran our earliest detailed involvement with the preparation of plans and the achieve-ment of a level of emergency preparedness which would achieve our regulatory standard set for that 44 CFR 350.5 of adequately protecting the public health and safety by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological J emergency at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant.

In December 1985 the State of New Hampshire submitted plans for protecting the public in the event of an accident at Seabrook to FEMA for review pur-suant to 44 CFR 350. Mose plans were forwarded for revies by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), an interagency group established pursuant to 44 CFR 350 to both assist state and local government in the developnent of radiological emergency response plans and to evaluate the adequacy of such plans. On Ibcember 31, 1985, FEMA, as chair of the RAC, requested that i

the members of the RAC (as well as the other FEMA staff who were reviewing the New Hampshire Plans) innediately focus on the issue of the protection

of beach population and the occupants of unwinterized acccmnodations. His memorandum is attached as Appendix C to this response to interrogatories.

HNA Position - Since the time of our December 31, 1985, memorandum on the subject at the protection of the public on and near the beaches around Seabrook, the State of New Hampshire has refined and improved its emergency plans and subnitted a detailed Evacuation Time Estimate which sheds a considerable amount of light on this issue. H e facts relevant to understanding this issue are that:

j

a 39.

NECP COtTfmrION 'Clo-8 (Cont.)

(1) . The primary guidance d-nant used by FEMA and the RAC in reviewing offsite emergency plans is NUREX3-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, a docGnent jointly developed by FEMA and the NRC. That guida6.ce document indicates on p.13 that "(t)he range of times between the onset of accident conditions and the start of a major release is of the order of on d alf hour to several hours". This statement is further clarified on p.17, Table 2 to indicate that (a) the major portion of a release may occur in a time period ranging fra as little as one-half hour to one day after the release begins and (b) that the travel time of the release to exposure point can range fre one-half hour to two hours at five miles, and one hour to four hours at ten miles.

(2) On peak sener days there are thousands of beachgoers in the Seabrook EPZ in areas beginning approximately 1.7 miles frm the plant. The current New Hampshire plans contemplate evacuating the many thousands of beachgoers who have access to no adequate shelter as a protective action in the event of an accident at Seabrook.

We understand that the plans contain no consideration of sheltering the " day trippers" because on sener days when there are a large number of these people, it is not possible to find reasonably accessible shelter for them. Were are an additional number of persons who would be in or have access only to shelter in unwinter-ized cottages and motel rooms. The protection afforded by sheltering in these structures will definitely be less than that afforded by a normal wood frame house. -

(3) ~ The Evacuation Time Estimate for the Seabrook EPZ submitted by the State of New Hampshire indicates at pp.10-1 et. seq. that in good weather when the beaches are at 60 to 100 percent of capacity it will take three and one-half hours to clear the beaches, and a J total of from four hours and fifty minutes to five hours and fifty minutes to evacuate all the population on the beaches from the EPZ. In s ee situations such as sudden bad weather following a peak sumner day, the total evacuation time for portions of the EPZ l- range up to seven hours and fifty minutes..

Therefore, using the standard guidance for the initiation and duration l of radiological releases, and the current New Hampshire RERP including ETE, I i it appears that thousands of people could be unable to leave during an l accident at Seabrook involving a major release of radioactivity without

! adequate shelter for as much as the entire duration of that release.

l Therefore, until these issues are resolved even if all the other inadequacies and deficiencies cited in the RAC Reviews of the New Hampshire Plans, and i u ,the Review of the Exercise of these plans were to be corrected, FEMA would l

not be able to conclude that the New Hangshire State and local plans to i protect the public in the event of an accident at the Seabrook Nuclear I Ibwer Plant are adequate to meet our regulatory standard that such plans

" adequately protect the public health and safety by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency." (See, 44 CFR 350.5(b)).

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40.

NECNP CONTENTION NHLP-2 The local emergency response plans for New Hampshire communities within the plume Txposure emergency planning zone do not assure that "each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis," 10 C.F.R. 50.47. 50.47(b)(1), in the following respects:

a. The police forces for the towns surrounding Seabrook do not have sufficient personnel or resources to carry out their responsibilities under the plan.

d. The plans contain no demonstration that private companies or individuals who will be depended on to assist in an emergency will actually be able, committed and willing to perform those functions.

g. Under the plans, the local fire departments are responsible for such tasks as assisting in monitoring the evacuation, for decontamination of of affected individuals, operating and maintaining the EOC or the public alert system (PAS), and assessing emergency transportation needs. The local fire departments do not have sufficient personnel or resources to fulfill these responsibilities.

h. There is no assurance that local emergency response personnel will be reachable or that they will be able to respond soon enough to assure protection of the public health and safety. .

i. The local plans do not provide for adequate backups or alternates f or important positions, in the event that assigned personnel are not available.

j. Many of the posts crucial to an effective emergency response have not yet been filled. ,

FEMA RESPONSE:

FEMA's position on this Contention, overall, is the same as that for the other personnel resources contentions (Kensington 1, Hampton Falls 2, South Hampton 2, Hampton 6, and SAPL 8) which is, FEMA does not have assurance that there exists the capability to staff local emergency response positions for an initial response, and to augment that response on a continuing basis, since there are numerous positions in the local emergency response organiza-tions which do not have alternates (P1 anning Standard A.4, page 6 of RAC Comments for Municipal Plans). Similarly, the State has not adequately demonstrated in its planning that it has the capability to fully compensate for non-participating localities and localities needing supplemental State assistance (see RAC comments on page 3 of Compensatory P1 an review, P1anning Standard A.4).

FEMA's responses to the six basis of this Contention are as follows:

Basis A -

This basis concerns the adequacy of the staffing of local police forces to carry out their responsibilities, as identified in the local plans.

~ 41.

FDR RESPONSE NECNP CONTENTION NHLP-2 (Cont.)

It ts not clear to FEMA what procedure (s) the local police are to fol-low to assist with public alerting and notification. The system of public notification is primarily a State responsibility, with activation of the system to occur at the Rockingham County Complex. Each local community has back-up activation capability, which physically involves no more than the pushing of several buttons. This is not resource-intensive at the local level. However, if there are siren failures, then is the police chief responsible for implementing route alerting (which could be resource intensive)? See RAC comments for item J.10.c. on page 18 of the Municipal Plan Review.

The following tabulation shows the total number of local police, as identified in Appendix C of the respective local plans, versus the number of personnel necessary to staff local traffic control posts for each respective community, as found in Table 8-6 of Volume 6 of the New Hampshire State Plan.

EOC Police -

TCP Secur-l Full l Part l Total -

Staff ity Totall 1

Greenland 3 3 - 3 1 4 I \

Kingston l 4 l 3 l 7 - 5 . 1 6 E. Kingston 4 4 - 3 1 1 4 l I Kensington 6 6 - 3 1 4

{

l -

S. Hampton 5 l 5 -

2 1 3 Rye 7-10 17 29 3 1 4 l

Newfields 1 6 7 - 4 1 5 l l 1 l l New Castle 3  ; 7 l 10 -

2 l 1 3

) I l Hampton Falls l 1 l 3 l 4 -

1 1 2

- l l l l Stratham 5 1 3 l 8 - 4  : 1 5 l l Exeter l 19 13 l 32 -

10 1 11 l 1 Brentwood 10 l 10 - 3 1 4

~

I \

Hampton l 24 l 50 l 74 - 15 1 16 As can be seen, local police resources (both full-time and part-time) range from marginal to more than adequate for traffic control.

42.

FDR RESPONSE NECNP CONTENTION NHLP-2 (Cont.) ,

When:you factor in the responsibility of providing security at the local EOC and normal police duties, all of which require 24-hr staffing, it is apparent that the Town of Greenland will need outside assistance and the Towns of Kingston, E. Kingston, Newfields, and Stratham may need ifmited assistance due to the fact there are not alternates for all necessary police personnel. The Towns of Kensington, So. Hampton, Rye, Hampton Falls, and Hampton have indicated their intentions not to participate in the emergency response organization, thus shifting the responsibility for emergency response onto the State. See comments at beginning of this Contention. .

Basis D Letters of agreement for towing companies and bus transportation com-panies are now found in Volume 5 of the State Plan, and are referenced as such in each local plan. This is appropriate, since the State now controls the distribution of these resources. FEMA and the RAC found the State's resources for removing impediments to evacuation were adequate (see page 85 of the RAC Review of State Plan, item J.10.K). Additionally, the RAC found that the letters of agreement with transportation companies were generally adequate (see RAC Review of State Plan, pages 74 and 74-b, item J.10.g; pg.1 of RAC Review of Letters of Agreement, items A.3 and C.4).

Basis G The designation of volunteer firefighters as local emergency workers is not uncommon or inappropriate. As long as designated emergency workers can be reached at home and work, and can travel to their assigned posts ~

in time to fulfill their emergency responsibilities, there is no reason to conclude that the use of volunteers is inadequate.

FEMA has not determined whether the number of fire department person-nel, both full-time and volunteer, is sufficient to cover assigned duties in all municipalities, since the State's Resource Allocation Survey is not yet completed and submitted to FEMA (see RAC Review of Municipal Plans, page 6, Planning Standard A.4).

Basis H As stated above for Basis G, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with designating part-time personnel as local emergency workers, so long as they can be reached at work and home and arrive at their assigned posts in time to fulfill their responsibilities. Since emergency workers should be mobilized at the ALERT stage, this should allow sufficient time to travel to emergency response posts. In a more rapidly developing emergency the plan provides for alerting the public to take protective actions without fully staffing the State or local E0Cs.

43. .

EDR RESPONSE -

NECNP CONTENTION NHLP-2 (Cont.)

The ability to alert and mobilize emergency workers, whether full-time or part-time, is something that is frequently tested in exercises. FEftA'a judgment about this matter will be made at the next Seabrook Exercise.

Basis I See FEMA response at beginning of Contention.

Basis J With the exception of Hampton Falls, all key emergency response positions have been filled. However, many do not have alternates. See response at beginning of Contention.

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44-NECNP Cont;nti n NHLP-6 The local emergency plans do not provide for an adequate range of protective actions , 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(10), because they contain inadequate means cf relocation or other protection for those with special needs, those without private transportation, school children, or persons confined to institutions or elsewhere for health or other reasons.

f.foreover, the resources available to the towns for these purposes are inadequate to provide a reasonable assurance that the public will be protected in the event of an accident.

FEMA RESPONSE FEMA has addressed Amended NECNP Contention NHLP-6 and its basis of in-adequate means of relocation, and inadequate resources in host communities,

^

by applying Planning Standards A,C,E,H,J, and L (Evaluation Criteria A.3,C.4, E .7,H.l l ,J .10.h ,J .10.g ,J .12,L .1,L .3, a nd L.4) i n FEMA-REP-1.

The December 15, 1986 RAC review of the State and municipal plans re-flect FEMA's views on this issue. Specifically, FEMA's review comments on the New Hampshire State plan on this issue are provided on pages 12, 34, 74, 74-a, 74-b, 74-c,113, and 114 of Section I, and on page 1 of the Letters of Agreement subsection of Section IV. FEMA's review comments on the Host communities municipal plans on this issue are provided on pages 10, 12, 15, and 16 of Section III.

FEMA relied upon the following documents in forming its conclusions on this issue: Revision 2 to the New Hampshire State Plan; Revision 2 to the municipal plans. .

~

FEMA does not yet have assurance of the adequacy of plan provisions for means of relocation and resources at host communities.

Responses to specific portions of Amended NECNP Contention NHLP-6 are -

provided below. ,

!!I. Amendments to Contention NHLP-6 A. The following basis is substituted entirely for the basiy i supplied in NECNP's contention NIILP-6, dated February 24, 1986:

a. In many cases there is a telephone number to call for those without private transportation who need relocation assistance. Such a provision is inadequate not only because of the vulnerability of telephone systems in the vent of an emergency, but because even if the telephone works, there is no assurance that the assistance will be available to all who need it. Moreover, the telephone system in the EOC may be overloaded. Fop example, there are 1,798 people in Exeter who have no transportation FEMA RESPONSE

( a) The revised municipal plans no longer require telephone calls to the E0C at the time of the emergency to request relocation assistance. Pre-designated bus routes or pickup points are now used to provide transportation for residents and transients requiring transportation. These bus routes are shown on public information material distributed annually to residents. EBS messages will also direct residents to these routes or pickup points (e.g.,

Exeter plan pages 11-32 and 33). Identification of those people with special needs is done by return of a special postage-paid survey card which is included

45

. NBCNP NE-6 (Cont.)

in the public information material (e.g., Exeter plan page 11-33). The listings of those people with special transportation needs is held by local officials in the communities for purposes of transportation resource planning.

It is, therefore, not necessary for people to call in to the local E0C to ob-tain transportation assistance, except for those people who have not previously notified officials of their special needs, and are unable to get to a pickup point on a bus route. As noted in the local plans (e.g., Exeter plan page 11-33), these requests will be handled on an ad hoc basis as the peoplec'all in to the E0C or State number provided in the compensatory plan to request assistance.

The contention refers to 1798 people in Exeter who have no transportation.

The means of obtaining that information is not described and differs signiff-cantly from the figure used by the State for planning purposes in Vol. 6 of the State Plan. At this time, FEMA has no reason to believe the State's figures ,

are incorrect,

b. Residents requiring transportation will have to report to the nearest bus route location for pick-up. During a radiological emergency, making an estimate of the arrival time of these buses at any given point will be nearly impossible. Thus, people without transportation may find themselves standing outside during an emergency for an undetermined amount of time, waiting for a bus to come along the route. Evacuees may be exposed to unacceptable levels of radiation while waiting outside for a bus. Discouraged evacuees might also further risk exposure by returning to their homes and giving ,'up on evacuating.

" Latchkey" children who are at home while their parents are at work may also fail to call for help or to understand directions regarding bus pick-up . .

FEMA RESPONSE (b) The plan anticipates that evacuation buses for residents requir-ing transportation will make multiple runs along the pre-designated bus routes (see ETE, State plan Volume 6, page 11-11; Hampton plan, Public Works Director procedures, pages IV-31 and IV-32). Therefore, it will not be necessary for residents to arrive at pickup points at an exact time. The length of time people will be waiting outside for buses will also be mini-mized by this method. The times required to mobilize buses and evacuate the people have been estimated in the ETE. These estimated times will be used as one of the variables in protective action decision-making described in State plan Section 2.6.7. In other words, the possibility of evacuees being exposed to radiation while waiting outside for buses will be taken into account in the decision to evacuate or shelter.

. 46.

MD:P hWE-6 (Cont.)

c. The RERP does not provide a reasonable assurance of safety for school children who may be evacuated in a radiological emergency. For example, the Hampton plan notes that "[i]n the event of an evacuation, the State Resource Coordinator will direct the dispatch of buses from the State Staging Area to the Local Staging Area (EOC) where they will e provided maps and directions to the schools." Vol.18 at

!!-29. The State RERP instructs the Director of Pupil Transportation Safety to "have the available drivers and buses (which normally service the schools) report to their appropriate schools with adequate fuel in the buses." Vol. 4B, Pupil Transportation Safety Procedures at 2. Thus, it is not clear where buses will go and from whom they will receive directions .

FEMA RESPONSE (c) Although not specifically commented on in the RAC review, there is some discrepancy in the plan and procedures as to where the buses that evacu-ate schools report to. For example, the Hampton local plan (Volume 18, page 11-29) states that, "the State Resources Coordinator will direct the dispatch of buses from the State Staging Area to the Local Staging Area (E0C) where they will be provided maps and directions to the schools." A similar de-scription is provided in the Exeter plan (Volume 26,,'page 11-31). Conversely, the State plan procedures for the Director of Pupil Transportation Safety (Volume 4B, p. 2) state, "have the available drivers and buses report to their appropriate scnoob." The LOC Resource Coordinator procedures in Volume 4 of the State plan also state, "have the Director or rupil frans-portation Safety instruct available drivers and buses to report to their .

appropriate schools" (page 7-3). The logistics for mobilizing evacuation -

buses to the schools need to be clarified and made consistent in the State and local plans.

l l

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47.

NIINP NH!T-6 (Cont.)

d. According to Revision 2, the State of New Hampshire now intends to coordinate the dispatch of buses to schools in the EPZ.

However, the State has not demonstrated that this can be done in an efficient and timely manner. The cumbersome process of dispatching school buses invites confusion and delay. The bus companies will need to contact their buses and drivers, and be in continuous contact with the State staging area to update resource availability. If the regular drivers are not available, the Teamsters union or other drivers who may act as substitutes will have to be contacted, get to where their designated bus is stored, and acquaint themselves with tasks such as learning a route and familiarizing themselves with an unfamiliar bus. The State staging

- urea will need to determine how many buses have gone directly to schools, and therefore how many are needed to go to local staging areas.

The local staging areas will have to make their needs known to the State sgency, and will therefore need to be continuously updated on the number of buses headed directly to the schools. The schools and the local staging area will need to be in constant contact as well, so that the school can inform the local staging area of the arrival of normal buses and make its needs known to the local staging area, which will transfer that information to the State staging area, who will be in direct contact with the needed resources. The amount of time involved in gathering all of the necessary information and coordinating a response from the State Staging area will be enormous: the task is far too cumbersome to assure adequate protection to the evacuees who rely on buses.

FEMA RESPONSE (d) Procedures in the State and local plans need to be clarified to ensure that the State can efficiently coordinate the dispatch of buses to ,"

the schools for evacuation. As noted in the preceding response for item

"(c)," there are inconsistencies which need.to be resolved in where the buses report to. Also, as noted in the response to further basis item A.3 in the response to revised Hampton Cnntention IV, there are no details in the plans as to how the supplementary Teamsters' Local No. 633 bus drivers will be notified and , coordinated with available buses, or, for that matter, ow many Teamsters will be released by their employers for emergency response

40*

NBCND NHLP-6 (Cont.)

o. The RERP indicates that the normal drivers and buses will be counted on substantially, regardless of the time of day, schedule of drivers , and availability of buses, to perform the functions that they perform at the beginning and end of a school day. Vol. 4 B , Pupil transportatfQn Safety Procedures at 2. This assumes that the regular drivers are the same drivers that have been guaranteed in the letters of agreement. Nothing in the letters of agreement with the bus companies demonstrates that the same drivers , familiar with the route, will be available. For example, a driver with Timberline in Portsmouth told us that many drives have second jobs, live far from the bus company, or are unreachable in between runs. She also told us that the regular school buses were not sitting in the lot all day in between the start and the end

. of the school day, but are on the road for special runs and field trips as much of the time as possible. In addition, many of these buses do not have radios, so even if they were close to the EPZ, they may not be reachable. Thus, there may be a large number of the normal school buses and drivers who will not be available during a radiological emergency.

FEMA RESPONSE

~

(e) Although the use of drivers and buses which normally trnsport school children will be used for evacuation transportation to the greatest extent possible, the plan provides for supplementary resources as needed.

As noted in the response to item A.1 in the further basis to revised Hampton Contention IV, the RAC has concluded that, although there are numerous in-consistencies in bus needs estimates, overall the numbers of buses and -

drivers available according to the Letters of Agreement in Volume 5 of the State plan are sufficient. (See pages 74, 74-a, 74-b, 74-c of December 15, 1986 RAC review of State plan Section I, and page 1 of Letters of Agreement subsection of Section V.) However, as mentioned previously, FEMA does have a cocern about the provisions in place with the Teamsters' employers l

to release them when needed.

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L

NBCNP FHLP-6 (Cont.) 49 . .

. B. Cr.ntanti n HP-1:

The host plans for Manchester, Dover, Salem, and Rochester, do not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Sections 50.47(a), 50.47(8), (10),

(11). and (13), or NUREG-0695, Sections J.12 and K.5.b.

BASIS:  ;

a. NOREG-0695 requires that the personnel and equipment at relo-cation centers should be . capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers. Section J.12.

MANCIIESTER:

1. The Manchester relocation center does not contain enough equipment to assure that all individuals can be administered the quick one minute check for contamination before entering the reception facility for registration (the check would take over 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> if all the available monitoring equipment were used only for this checkpoint), nor enough to do a more thorough check on those evacuees who are contaminated to find out where the contamination is. Only 3,060 of the 20,000 expected evacuees could be scanned in 12 hours in the decontamination facility if all of the available monitoring equipment were used only at this checkpoint. This is only for the first scan in each case. However the facility per person. 4 plans call for several scans in the decontamination Moreover, it is absurd to assume that evacuecs,'w ould stand in line for this long before being able to register and begin rencezvous process.

It is very likely that the host facilities will be abandoned by most evacuees when the inefficiency becomes apparent, leaving people without access to the organized method of finding one another within the reception area. Those discouraged individuals may seek shelter in other -

parts of the State or outside the State, thus spreading radioactive contamination as they travel.

2. After twelve hours, the Manchester facility is scheduled to become the only facility that will handle the decontamination of emergency workers. Vol. 36 at B -2. Obviously , monitoring and decontamination of the general public will still be underway at that time.

Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that the Manchester relocation

(

center can meet the needs of emergency workers.

ROCHESTER:

j 3. There will not be enough equipment in the Rochester l

relocation center to assure that everyone can be administered even the quick one minute check for contamination before entering the reception l

facility for registration. The plans do not clearly state how many

' CDV-700 surveying instruments will be available for use in Rochester.

However, there will be four radiological monitoring kits, and therefore no more than four CDV-700's can be counted on. Vol. 35 at II-11.

It is possible that 35,000 evacuees will go to the Rochester host facility for decontamination. Vol. 35 at I-10. If there are four CDV-700's for the initial scanning, it will take the last evacuee 143 hours0.00166 days <br />0.0397 hours <br />2.364418e-4 weeks <br />5.44115e-5 months <br /> to get inside the reception facility. This clearly will not provide adenuate protection to the evacuees.

r l'DCNP MHLP-6 (Cont.) 50.

DOVER _: 4. There will not be enough equipment at the Dover host ,

facility to assure that everyone can be administered even the quick one l I

minute check for contamination before entering the reception facilities for registration. There will be 43 CDV-700's available for use in Dover during a rqdiological emergency. Vol. 33 at 11-11. There could be 57,000 evacuees coming to Dover for decontamination. Vol. 33 at I-10.

Just to get everyone into the reception facility after one scan will take 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />.

SALEM:

5. There will not be enough equipment in the Dover host facility to assure that everyone can be administered even the quick one

- minute check for contamination before entering the reception facility for registration. There will be 3 CDV-700's available for use in Salem during -

a radiological emergency. Vol. 38 at 11-11. There could be as many as 29,000 evacuees coming to Salem for decontamination. Vol. 38 at I-8.

Just to get everyone into the reception area after one scan will take 161 hours0.00186 days <br />0.0447 hours <br />2.662037e-4 weeks <br />6.12605e-5 months <br />.

FEMA RESPONSE (B) Host Plans (HP-1)

(a) Manchester (items 1 and 2); Rochester (item 3); Dover (item 4);

and Salem (item 5).

The RAC, in its December 15,1986 review, has concluded that the host plans are inadequate to determine if there are adequate resources (equip-ment and personnel) to support the monitoring and decontamination operations for the anticipated number of evacuee arrivals in a 12-hour period. As indicated by the RAC in its review of the host community plans (Section III, pages 10 and 15), the descriptions of the number of staff members required -

for monitoring and decontamination activities is provided in Appendix 83 -

of each host community plan. However, it is impossible to assess from the plans if the number of staff positions are adequate to support the operations for the anticipated number of evacuee arrivals in a 12-hour period, and if there are enough trained personnel available locally to fill the required number of staff positions. Call list rosters for local personnel (see Appendix B9) are not yet available. In addition, it is also not known if the number of monitoring instruments available (see Section II.E.4) is sufficient to support the operations.

Section II.E.4 of each of the host community plans refers to CDV-700 survey meters. Although the meters are also listed on the inentory sheets provided in Appendix 88, there is no indication on the inventory as to the quantity of survey meters (and dosimeters) on hand (see p. 88-1). It is recommended that the total number of each item on hand be indicated on the inventory sheets.

The RAC recommended that in order to clarify the capabilities and ade-quacy of resources to perform the monitoring and decontamination operations, the plans should clearly specify the assumptions used in preparing the staffing lists indicated in Appendix B3 and the equipment resources indi-cated in Section II.E.4 (i .e., what are the total number of evacuees ex-pected to arrive at the monitoring and decontamination facilities of the reception center, and what percent of the evacuated population does this number represent?)

NTNP NHLP-6 (Cont.) 51. J

b. The human resources available according to the plans are inadeouate to protect the public health and safety. All of the host plans

- regardless of the size of the populations they are expected to serve -

provide for 04 staff members to perform the many diverse tasks associated with the facility. Vols. 33, 35, 36 38 at B3-1, -3. Not only are these numbers in&dequate on their face, but the State clearly has applied a generalized formula without making any attempt to determine what are the staffing needs of each separate facility.

FEMA RESPONSE (b) (See response to previous item "(a)" on the need for additional supporting information on the staffing resources.)

c. The plan does not assure that everyone evacuated from the EPZ will go to a reception area. Vols. 33, 35, 36, 38 at I-11. Without an assurance that every evacuated person and every evacuation vehicle is scanned for radiological contamination and decontaminated if necessary, a public hazard in the form of radiologically contaminated people and vehicles will go unchecked throughout the state, into other states and to Canada. In addition , there is no assurance that people who miss ,

decontamination services at the host community will be able to obtain them .

anywhere else in a reasonable amount of time, since few hospitals have extensive decontamination capabilities. Vol. I at 2.8-5.

FEMA RESPONSE (c) The sample prescripted EBS messages contained in the State plan state that monitoring and decontamination services are available to evacuees at the reception enters (NHCDA Procedures, Volume 4, Appendix G, pages G-31 and G-37). However, as noted by the RAC comments (Section I, page 34), the RAC recommended that in the case of a contaminating accident in which people may actually have become contaminated the messages should specifically direct evacuees to go to reception centers for monitoring.

T NDCNP IMLP-6 (Cont.) 52.

d. The plan does not adequately accommodate the decontamination needs of evacuated hospits! patients and nursing home residents. Since the decontamination of these individuals will occt:r at their host health care facilities, they will need to wait for the arrival of a CDV-700 which will already be in great demand at the reception center.

Likewise -the monitoring team trained to perform decontaminations to be dispatched to these facilities will have more than . enough to do at the reception center. In addition , there are no procedures for how to decontaminate these individuals in the plans. Further, the host medical facilities may risk exposing regular residents to radiologically contaminated materials. Vols. 33, 35, 36, 38 at B-3.

FEMA RESPONSE (d) Based on the description on page B-3 of Appendix 8 of the host community plans, monitoring and possible decontamination of evacuated hospital patients or health care facility residents will not be performed by staff at the health care host facilities, but by personnel from the same resource pool supplying staff for monitoring at the reception centers.

Since the adequacy of staffing and equipment for monitoring and decontami-nation at the reception centers is in question, the availability of staff and equipment to be dispatched to the health care host facilities is also in question. (See response to previous item "(a)" on the need for additional supporting innformation on the staffing resources.)

e

r MDIP NHLP-6 (Cont.) 53.

e. It is not clear that injured contaminated evacuees or internally contaminated evacuees will be accommodated by the plans. Both sets of people are to be referred to the DPIIS Supervisor. Vol. 33, 35, 36, 38 at B-4. However, there is no indication of what s/he will do with them beyond the vague setivity of referring them to medical authorities, how s/he will base decisions, and what facilities will be available for these people. For example, the two Manchester hospitals that are listed in Volume 1 of the RERP are Catholic Medical Center , which has no decontamination capability, and Elliot Hospital, which can handle one contaminated patient per hour. There is no reasonable assurance from this that medical care will be available for injured and contaminated or internally contaminated individuals.

FEMA RESPONSE (e) The December 15, 1986 RAC review concluded that the plans have adequate provisions for medical services for contaminated injurtij individ-uals. As noted in the RAC review (pages 113 and 114 of Section I), hospital capabilities are listed on Table 2.8-1 of the State plan (pages 2.8-5, -5A, and -Sb). Letters of agreement from these hospitals are included in Appendix H of Volume 2 of the State plan.

The handling of injured contaminated individuals who arrive at the reception centers is described in procedures for the DPHS Supervisor, the E0C RHTA, and DPHS Director in Volume 4A of the State plan. Based on the individual case, the individual may then be transported to one of the hospitals listed in Table 2.8-1 of the State plan. 4s noted inn the RAC review of the host community plans, this will be handled by coordinating with the State on a case-by-case basis (page 16 of Section III).

O

O 54 NBCNP NHLP-6 (Cont.)

f. The host facilities coordinator is charged with the task of identifying personnel who may provide emergenc'y medical treatment on-site. So explanation of how this will be done or where the host coordinator will find these people is demonstrated in the plans. Vols. 35, 36 at III-76, Vols. 33, 38 at III-8.

FEMA RESPONSE

( f) The method or means by which the Host Facilities Coordinator '

identifies " personnel who may provide emergency medical treatment on-site" is not clear in the plans. For example the Dover Host plan (Volurr.e 33) indicates on page 1-17 that the City of Dover Health Officer will, " Assist the DHS, DPHS, and ARC in identifying and treating health problems of evacuees." The Dover plan also states on page 11-10 that, " Medical support will be supplied by the Rescue Section Chief of the Fire Department. Went-worth Douglas Hospital will provide shelter for evacuated patients who need skilled nursing care." On Page 11-;14, the Dover plan also indicates that the DHS will provide " medical services references" at the reception center.

The State plan procedures (Volume 4B, Division of Human Services, Appendix B, page B-7) also indicate that several state agencies are available to support the Reception Center activities, and that the Division of Public Health, Emergency Medical Services can provide ambulance service support and medical facility references. Thus, while it appears that sufficient medical resources would be available, it is not clear in the plan how the Host Facili-ties Coordinator coordinates these resources, and which source is most appro-priate. The plans should be revised to clarify this issue. .

e I

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r i tO l l

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• - l 55.

temp MEo-6 (Cont.)

g. . Although there is a letter of understanding with the Red Cross that it will take responsibility for feeding, clothing, and sheltering.

all evacuees who have those needs, there is no demonstration of a Red Cross capability to provide these services to the huge number'of people who may need them. Vol. 5, Statement of Understanding between the State of New Ilampshire and the American Red Cross.

FEMA RESPONSE (g) The RAC review of the host community plans (page 12 of Section III) indicated that the mass care facilities appear to have adquate capacity. The Statement of Understanding with the Red Cross in Volume 5 of the State plan documents its intent and capability to provide feeding, clothing, and shelter-ing services to evacuees in a radiological emergency. The American Red Crosas has proven ability to provide these disaster relief services to large numbers of people and there is no compelling reason to question its capabilities in this specific instance. In its Statement of Understanding, the Red Cross- -

states that "American Red Cross disaster responsibilities are nationwide.

Therefore, when the local chapters in the affected ardas are unable to meet the needs of disaster victims, the resources of the t'otal organization are made available."

m

___y

NECNP NHLP-6 (Cont.) 56.

h. Although the plans report that there is a dt.y's food regularly on hand at local schools, it is not clear whether that is a day's food for the 1,000 regular students at the school, or a day's food to serve 20,000. In addition, the State claims that within that one day period , Red Cross win be able to gather its resources to provide for further food needs. However, no evidence is given to support that projection. Vols . 33, 35, 36, 38 at II-10. The Red Cross will also be responsible for providing any clothing that is r eeded. . Vols. 33, 35, 36, 38 at 11-10. Since fresh clothing ja an integral part of the decontamin-ation facility, it is not adequate to rely on receiving clothes on an ad hoc baats.

FEMA RESPONSE (h) The statement in the host community plans that "public schools generally have enough food on hand to last for a day" should be clarified.

It probably refers to either the normal student population or to the evacuee capacity of each facility. However, this requires confirmation and clarification in the host plans.

In regard to the ability of the Red Cross to assemble its resources to supply food after one day, the Merican Red Cross has proven ability to provide disaster relief services in atimely manner to large numbers of people, and there is no compelling reason to question its capabilities in this specific instance.

It is also noted in each of the host plans that the host communities will pro-vide interim supplies, including food and clothing to the reception centers, decontamination centers, and mass care shelters as 95 eded to assist State agencies or the Merican Red Cross (page 11-11 of Volumes 33, 35, 35; pages 11-10 and 11-11 of Volume 38).

The Red Cross is primarily responsible for providing clothing to evacuees.

However, supplementary resources are also available. The plans indicate that -

the Salvation Army may assist the Red Cross in providing supplies (food and -

clothing) for evacuees at the mass care shelters (pages I-20,11-13, and II-17 in Volume 33; pages 1-20,11-13, II-16 in Volume 35; pages I-19, and 11-17 in Volume 36; pages 1-19 and 11-16 in Volume 38). In addition, the procedures for the Host Facilities Coordinator indicate that he/she will coordinate with the local EOC in obtaining additional replacement clothing if initial De-contamination Center supplies appear insufficient (pasge III-7 of Volumes 35 and 36; page III-8 of Volumes 33 and 38). Although the host community plans indicated that a letter of agreement with the Salvation Army is present in Volume 5 of the State plan, the RAC review (page 12 of Section I) of the State plan indicated that this letter wqas not present. If the State and host communities intend to rely on the Salvation Army to assist the Red Cross in providing supplies, the appropriate letter of agreement should be added to Volume 5 of the State plans.

r 57.

12 DIP IRILP-6 (Cont.)

1. The host plans contain no system Vols.

to communicate 33, 35, 36, lists 38 stof registered evacuees with other host facilftfes.

!!-12. If the host facility does not keep track of the location of evacuees, order among evacuees will not be kept. For families who are split up because children go to school in a different area than their parents live or work, or spouses who work in different areas. a more comprehensive system of logging the whereabouts of evacuees will be necessary to maintain order.

FEMA RESPONSE (i) Although there appears to be adequate capabilities at the reception centers and mass care facilities to track and communicate the lists and loca-tions of evacuees who use the host community facilities, the host community plans do not specifically describe how this will be done. Addition of this activity description to the host community plans and procedures would clarify who is responsible for performing this activity. The capability is presently described in detail only in the State plan procedures for the Division of Human Services, which is responsible for operation of,'the reception centers.

Appendix B of the Division of Human Services indicates that all persons entering the reception center are registered on ,a special form (Appendix B, page B-1). A copy of this form is sent to the Message Exchange and Locating Service. As indicated in the procedures, a phone line for incoming telephone calls will be installed at the Message Center for receiving inquiries from -

outside friends and relatives (page B-2). Persons inquiring about the location -

of relatives / friends will be directed to this station to find out if the individual they seek has registered, and/or to determine if any messages have been left for the inquirer (page B-2).

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r 58.

SAPL - Contention 7 The New flampshire State and local plans fail to meet the require-ments of 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(11) and NUREG-0654 K.S.b. because there has been no showing that the means of radiological decontamination of emergency personnel, wounds, supplies and equipment have been established. Further, there has not been a clear showing that adequate means for waste disposal exist.

By way of amendment of the basis and additional basis, SAPL states as follows: The NIIRERP Rev. :: now assumes that all monitoring and decontamination of evacuees will be handled by host community personnel under the supervision of DPHS. There are no letters of agreement committing the host community personnel to perform these functions (save that for the American Red Cross) and there are no letters of agreement securing the reception center facilitier contemplated for use under the plans. Therefore, the adequacy of personnel and eculpment is not assured. Further , there are now two less host community primary reception centers due to the deletion of Nashua and Durham, which will increase the burden on the municipal resources (personnel and equipment) for those communities still participating. According ,to Rev. 2, the peak summer midweek population is 142,929. A high percentage of the evacuating population could require monitoring and decontamination under plausible accident scenarios. Even lesser percentages would overwhelm the facilities and personnel available to perform monitoring and decontamination services.

The decontamination centers' procedures and facilities are now more adequately described than heretofore, though how contaminated areas of

. the decontamination centers are to be vacuumed or otherwise decontaminated to prevent individuals from becoming contaminated at the facility is not well described. There is still no storage capability for waste water that will result from the washing of evacuees and their vehicles. The State of New Ilampshire still contemplates dilution as the

- solution to this hazardous pollution problem. That is not a satisfactory

answer and could lead to a public risk for the residents of the host communities.

The Decontamiantion Supervisor Pool at Vol. 4 A , p . A-2 lists an "R. Letellier" as a possible supervisor for three centers, "E. Thompson" for two centers and "C. Albano" for two centers. If these are actually the same people listed more than once, as it appears, this creates the false impression that there is a larger pool of potential supervisors than actually are available.

F

. 59.

FENA RESPONSE 'IO SADL 7 In the December 1986 review of the New Hampshire State and Host Cunmunity Planning, FEMA and the RAC examined the provisions for the registration and monitoring of evacuees at reception centers. Planning Standard J.12 cf FEMA REP-1 defines the requirenents which must be met. The RAC concluded that the State Plan contained adequate provisions for the registration and monitoring of evacuees, (page 98 of State Plan RAC Review) but, the host plans do not adequately describe the resources (equipnent and personnel to support the monitoring and decontamination operations for the anticipated number of evacuee arrivals in about a 12-hour period (page 15 of Host Plans PAC Review). As indicated by the RAC in its review of the host cmmunity plans (Section III, pages 10 and 15), the descriptions of the number of staf f members required for monitoring and decontamination activities is provided in Appendix B3 of each host ccmmunity plan. However, it is inpassible to assess from the plans if the number of staff positiom are adequate to support the operations for the anticipated number of evacuee arrivals in a 12-hour period, and if there are enough trained personnel available locally to fill the required number of staff positions. Call list rosters for local personnel (see Appendix B9) are not yet available.

In addition, it is also not known if the number of monitoring instruments available (see Section II. E.4) is sufficient to support the operations.

Section II.E.4 of each of the host emmunity plans refers to CDV-700 survey meters. Although the neters are also listed on the inventory sheets provided in Apendix B8, there is no indication on the inventory as to the quantity of survey neters (and dosineters) on hand (see . Bi-1). It is recommended that the total number of each its on hand be indicated on the inentory sheets.

The RAC recommended that in order to clarify the capabilities and adequacy of resources to perform the monitoring and decontamination opera- '

ticns, the plans should clarly specify the assumptions used in preparing the staffing lists indicated in Appendix B3 and the equipment resources indicated in Section II.E.4., (i.e. , what are the total number of evacuees expected to arrive at the conitoring and decontamination facilities of the reception center, and what percent of the evacuated population does this nunber represent?)

It is FENA's position, as articulated in the mmorandum frczn Richard Krimm to all FEMA regions, dated Decenter 24, 1985, that provisions for monitoring evacuees must address at least 20% of the total EPZ population (see Appendix B for a copy of this menorandum).

'Ihe RAC found that Appendix F of the DPHS procedures specifies appropriate criteria for decontamination and that the facilities for conducting decon-tamination are acceptable (pg. 109 and pgs. 110-112 of RAC Review of State Plan, elenents K.Sa and K.5b). Intters of agreerent with host cmmunity personnel and facilities are not necessary, since they constitute local governnent organizations.

F 60.

SAPL Cant nti?n 8 The New Hampshire State and local plans fall to meet the requirements that there be adequate manpower and 24-hour per day emergency response. including 24-hour per day manning of communications links , as required by 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47(a)(1),

5 50.47(b)(1), 5 50.47(b)(2), and NUREG-0654  !!.A.1.e. II. A .4. and

!!.F.1.a.

Contention SA:

The New !!ampshire Compensatory Plan fails to meet the requirements that there be adequate manpower and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day emergency

- response, including 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day manning of communications links, as NUREG-0654 5 50.47(h)(1),

required by 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a)(1),

II. A.1.e. , II. A.4. , and II.F.1.a.

FEMA RESPONSE:

In its Dec.1986 review of Rev. 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological anergency Response Plans for Seabrook, FEMA and the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) reviewed all municipal (EPZ) plans for their capacity to provide for 24-hour continuous operation for a protracted period. Specif-ically Planning Standard A.4 fran FEMA-REP-1 defines this requirement.

On page 6 of the Dec.1986 RAC Review of Rev. 2 Municipal Plans, FEMA found that many key emergency response positions do not have a back-up listed for second shift responsibilities. Based on t-hese review findings, FEMA does not have assurance that the EPZ municipalities can fully inclement their plans.

In Volume 2, Appendix G of the State Plan (Compensatory Plan), the State has clearly counitted its personnel and equignent resources to providing '

support to municipalities where the required emergency response exceeds the capabilities of the municipalities. Since many of the nunicipal plans, in their respective Appendix A, indicate an insufficient second shift capability, it is quite conceivable that the State may have to cannit sane of its limited personnel resources to assisting one or more local community in implementing its emergency response due to the unavailability of the primary local responder. In addition, there are currently six comunities who have indicated they will not participate in the planning process. The State will have to fully canpensate for those conmunities.

In its June 1986 RAC Review of Rev.1 of the NH Coupensatory Plan for Seabrook Station, FEMA found that the plans did not adequately identify the personnel to carry out the State's Ocznpensatory Plan. 'Ihe State responded to this by indicating that a resource allocation study was being conducted to identify the personnel and equipnent necessary to inplement local and state plans, coverina all functions. Rev. 2 of the NH olans still does not contain the results of this personnel allocation study.

FEMA's findings are found on page 3 of the December 1986 RAC Review of the New Harnpshire Campensatory Plan for Seabrook.

Until New Hampshire develops this information as part of its planning base, FEMA has no basis to change its determination that the State has not demonstrated that it has adequate personnel resources to canpensate for the non-participation or supplemental needs of the EPZ camunities.

(See RAC Review of the Compensatory Plan, pages, 3(A.4), 6(H.4), 7(H.10)).

SAPL Crnt ntion N7. 15 61.

SAPL russerts Redrafted SAPL Contention No.15 and the basis for that contention in SAPL's filing of April 8,1986.

Redrafted SAPL Contention No.15 The letters of agreement that have been submitted by the N.H. Civil Defense Agency in Volume 5 of the State plan fall to meet the require-ments of 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1),150.47(b)(1), 850.47(b)(3), $50.47(b)(12),

Appendix E.II.B. and NUREG-0654 II. A.3., II.C.4. , and !!.P.4. because they do not demonstrate that adequate arrangements' for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically estab!!shed, that each principal response organization has staff to respond or to augment its initial response on a continuous basis, or that agreements are being reviewed and certified to be current on an annual basis as is required.

FEMA RESPONSES ( AMENDMENTS AND RJRTHER BASIS)

FEMA has addressed the redraf ted and amended Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) Contention No.15 and its basis of inadequate letters of agree-ment by applying Planning Standards A, C, and J (Evaluation Criteria A.3, C.4, and J.10g) in FEMA-REP-1.

On December 15, 1986 RAC review of the State and municipal plans reflect FEMA's views on this issue. Specifically, FENA's review catutents on the New Haripshire State plan on this issue are provided on pages 10, 12, 19 and 74-b of Section I, and on pages 1 and 2 of the tatters of Agreement subsection of Section IV. FEMA's review coments on the municipal plans on this issue are provided on page 3 of Section III.

FEMA relied upon the following document in forming its conclusions on this issue: Revision 2 to the New Hastrpshire State plant Revision 2 to the municipal plans.

FEMA does not yet have assurance of the adequacy of the written agree-ments. As noted in the Decer:ber 15, 1986 RAC review, evaluation criteria element A.3 is considered inadequate duo to the fact that the State plan does not contain all letters of agreement which have been referenced in the host community plans (see pages 10 and 12 of Section I RAC review).

Other aspects of resource assistance and letters of agreement are generally considered adequate by the RAC. Resp 3nses to specific contention issues are provided below.

e

. EML 15 (Cont.) 62 By way of amendment and statement of further basis, SAPL holds as follows:

1) Though the Coast Guard and llew Hampshire Towing Association agreements' are now signed, the USAF agreement has wholly disappeared.

There is thus no assurance that Pease AFB will make its hospital and runway facilities available, which are key in the emergency response effort for Seabrook Station. Civil Air Patrol flights must be able to fly into Pease for transport of officials and radiological samples. The agreement with the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has also disappeared.

FENA RESPONSE

1) The written agreenents with the U.S. Air Force (Pease AFB) and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard have been deleted from the plan. Inclusion of these letters is not required since assistance by these federal facilities could be provided under the Federal Radiological Diergency Response Plan (FRERP). A copy of the FRERP is now provided in Volume 5 of the State plan. In a separate letter included in Appendix H of State plan Volume 2, the U.S. Air Force Hospital at Pease Air Force Base has indicated its willingness to make its hospital facilities available during a radiological emergency to the extent that such care to civilian casualties does not interfere with its primary responsibility to active duty military personnel.

2) There are no letters of agreement with the reception centers and mass care facilities in the local communities and letter agreements are missing for certain of the host care facilities for special facilities in the EPZ (egs. Goodwin's of Exeter, Eventide liome, Seacoast Ilealth Center).

The RAC specifica!!y asked these agreements (Reply to RAC, P.10 of -

134).

FEMA RESPONSE

2) The American Red Cross (ARC) is responsible for providing mass care to individuals evacuated from the plume exposure EP2 (see State Plan, page 1.3-17). A written agreenent between the ARC and the State of New Hangshire is included in Volume 5 of the State plan. As noted on page 10 of the Decenber 1986 RAC review of the State plan (Section I), the RAC found that the Red Cross letter of agreenent adequately denonstrates an ability to open and staff planned mass care facilities. However, as noted on page 12 of the FAC review (Section I), other letters of agreement are referenced in the host connunity plans as being available in Volume 5 of the State plan (see page I-19 of Manchester and Salem plans, and page I-20 of Dover and Rochester plans). 'Ihe PAC found this item to be inadequate because no letters of agreement related to noss care are present in Volume 5 of the State Plan for the following private organizations

e-SAPL 15 (Cont.) 63.

• Salvation Army

• New Haneshire College

• Notre Dame College and Parochial School

• District Nursing Association

• Salem Boys Club

• Rochester Catholic School

• Rochester Day Care Center Although not specifically noted in the PAC review, it is correct that there are also no letters of agreement in the plans frcm the host facilities for resic'ents of the following special facilities: Goodwin's of Exeter (Volume 26A), Eventide Hcme (Volume 26A), and the Seacoast Health Center (Volune 18A).

Page A-2 of Attachment A of each of the preceeding special facilities have been received, written confirmations are " currently under review." 'Ihese written agrements should be provided in the plans.

3) Thcugh the N.!!. Towing Association letter is now signed, there is still no letter of agreement with Rockingham County to assure that the Dispatch Center can be used. This facility is key in the emergency notification scheme.

FENA RESPONSE

3) A letter of agreement with the Rockingham County Sheriff's Department is present in Volume 5 of the State plan. Notification procedures for the Rocxingham County Dispatch Center are also fully described in the Procedures section of the State plan (Volume 4B).

4) Though a letter of agreement has been secured with the Federal Aviation Administration, there is still no letter of agreement with New England Telephone. The November 1985 draft of the NiiRERP stated that it was "on file." It has not yet surfaced in the pikrso.

FEMA RESPONSE

4) Volume 5 of the State plan does not contain a letter of agreement with New England Tolephone. However, the need for such a letter is not aoparent.

r SAPL 15 (Cont.) 64.

5) The letter of agreement with Teamsters Local No. 633 does not provide the requisite reasonable assurance that sufficient drivers will be available to make up the shortfall of drivers indicated by the letters cf agreement with the specific bus companies.' Many of the drivers would have prior ccmmitments to be coing other ,dobs, the l'ncividual members cf the union itave in no way demonstrated their willingness to perform these functions or and are where they there is no indication relative of how to the location the buses.

of the drivers would be notified

, FENA PESPONSE

5) The PAC has concluded (see page 74-b of Section I of P.AC review of State plan, and page 1 of Section IV PAC review of letters of agreement) that the State plan properly allows for the fact that not all bus ccznpanies have as mny drivers willing to serve as they hae buses that would be made available. 'Ihe letter of agreement with Teamsters Local No. 633 of New Hampshire (Volume 5 of State Plan) provides for the tocal to provide as many as 1,500 personnel, a number well in excess of any foreseeable needs, to drive trans-portation vehicles as needed during major emergencies. However, FENA does not yet have assurances that there are procedures in place for mobilizing the

'Deamsters from their places of enploynent.

6) The letter signed by OMNE Partners !! on July 31,1986 may or may not remain current for a reasonable period of time since OMNE is in a bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, there is no assurance that this transportation staging area will indeed be available.

FENA PISPCNSE

6) 'Ihe letter of agreement with CNNE Partners II provides for the availability of the CMNE Mall parking areas as a transportation staging area. 'nnletter of agreement also clearly states that, "this agreement is subject to renegotiation at such time as ownership of the property is conveyed frcm CNNE Partners II to another party."

r ST@L 15 (Cont.)

65.

BASIS:

NUREG-)654 II. A.3. requires that each plan include written letters of agreement referring to the concept of operations between Federal.

State and local agencies and other support organizations having an emer-gency response role within the EPZ. The agreements are supposed to identify the emergency measures to be provided and the mutually accept-able criteria for their implementation and specify the arrangements for the exchange 'of information. NUREG-M54 II . C. 4 states that each organi-

stion shall identify nuclear and other facilitics . organizations or individuals which can be relied upon in an emergency to provide assistance and that such assistance "shall be identified and supported by appropriate letters of agreement." NUREG-0654 II.P.4 states that each organization shall update its plan and agreements as needed, review and certify it to be current on an annual basis. The letters of agreement in

, Volume 5 of the State plan do not suffice to satisfy these requirements for the following reasons:

a) Some of the letters of agreement bear no signature. The New Englar.d Interstate Radiological Assistance Compact has no signature page to validate it. The letter of agreement between New !!ampshire Ycnkee and the State of New Hampshire and Massachusetts is neither completed.

nor signed. The Memorandum of Understanding with the Coast Guard has a typed in name, but no signature. The agreement with the New liampshire Towing Association is not signed. (A prospective date of 11/27/86 appears on the agreement.) The Memorandum of Understanding Between the USAF and the State of New Ilampshire is nct signed nor dated.

FENA PESPONSE (BASIS)

(a) Many of the letters of agreement have been updated for Revision 2 to the plan. With only a few exceptions, the letters and agreenents have been '

signed. Letters of agreements which are unsigned include:

• Agreement between New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Cmpany of New Hampshire and the states of New Hapshire and Massachusetts (unsigned by Massachusetts representative, as noted on page 2,Section IV RAC review of Letters of Agreement).

• New England Interstate Radiation Assistance Plan (no signature page included).

• Agreements between radio stations NCYT/W W H, NUNH and the New Hartpshire Civil Defense Agency (unsigned by either party).

• Memorandum of Understanding with U.S. Coast Guard (includes typed-in nam for no signature of Coast Guard representative).

All other agreements have been signed, including the one with the New Hartpshire Towina Association. The menorandum of understanding with the U.S.

Air Force has been deleted frm the plan (as noted above in item #1 of mended basis).

i

SAPL 15 (Cont.) 66.

b) There are no !ctters of agreement with many of the key response organizations and governments. For example , there are no letters of agreement with the 17 N.II. local communities nor are there letters of agreement with the host communitics. Thus, the requirements of NUREG-0654 II. A.3 are not met.

FENA RESPONSE (b) There are no letters of agreement with the 17 New Hampshire EPZ carnunities or with the four host emmunities. 'Ihe concept of operations for emergency response by the local ccmmunities is provided in the radiological emergency response plans for these cmmunities. If specific cmmunities are unable to implement their plans, the State of New Harnpshire would assum responsibility for implementation of the plans under provisions of the State cmpensatory plan.

c) Some of the agreements date back a number of years. For example, the New England State Police Compact is dated 6/69. Clearly ,

the specifics of any emergency response for the area surrour. ding Seabrook Station were not contemplated when this compact was signed.

This is contrary to the requirements of NUREG-0654 II.P.4.

FENA RESPONSE (c) Although the fact that an agreement is old does not necessarily negate its applicability, it would appear prudent for the state during its annual .

review and update of the plan to confirm that old agreements, such as the New Ergland State Policy Compact, are applicable to a radiological emergency response at Seabrook.

d) There are not letters of agreement with School Administrative Units , schools, teachers, owners of towing companies (other than the unsigned postdated agreement with the New England Towing Association mentioned above), day care centers, nursing homes, Rockingham County Dispatch , but drivers or other organizations or individuals to be relied upon to provide assistance in an emergency as reouired by NUREG-0654 II.C.4.

FENA RESPONSE (d) Letters of agreement with individual teachers and bus drivers are not included in the plan. However, letters of agreenent with those organiza-tions supplying bus drivers (e.g., bus cmpanies and Teamsters Local No. 633) are present in Volume 5 of the State Plan. Iatters of agreement with towing cmpanies are also now present in Revision 2 of the plan (Volume 5). Also see FENA response to items #2 and #3 of the amended basis given above for letters of agreement which are present or absent frm Rev. 2 to the plan.

3 -

-O SAPL 15 (Cont.) 67.

7

~~

e) Thsra is no shewing that the FAA Conesrd Flight Servico Agreement or the agreement with New England Telephone are sufficient to establish the responsibilities of those organizations as required by W ' 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(1) because those letters are not provided in Volume 5 but are said to be "on file."

FENA RESPONSE (e) Revision 2 of the Stateplan (Volume 5) now contains a letter of s s agreement with the FAA. As noted in the above FENA response to iten #4 of the amended basis, there is still no letter of agreement with New England Telephone. However, the need for such a letter is not apparent.

f) The letters of agreement with hospitals include a number of letters from hospitals which are not listed in the New Hampshire State Plan (see p.2.8-5 for the list.) It is very clear to SAPL why these letters even appear in Volume 5. For example, the October 9,1985 letter frcm Alice Park Day Memorial Hospital in Lebanon, New Hampshire states

"...because APD is a small hospital with extremely limited resources, it is unable to ~ handle radiation victims . " The October 7, 1985 letter from Valley Regional Hospital similarly states, " .. .the physical design of our facility, and in particular our emergency receiving area, would make apprcpriate isolation of the contaminated patient impossible. " SAPL believes that all extraneous letters from entities not to be counted upon in an emergency response should be removed from Volume 5. It seems SAPL that it would only add to the difficulty emergency responders face -

in making appropriate referrals to have non-applicable information to sift through.

The letters from hospitals that are listed in the State plan do not demonstrate that the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(12) have been met. There is no letter for Newport ilospital, which is listed in the state 2

p lan . Pease Air Force Base f!ospital states, "We are willing to cooperate fully with civilian hospitals and disaster authorities is assisting with care of civilian causalities to the extent that such care does not interfere with our primary responsibilities to active duty military personnel." (emphasis added) There is, therefireT no assurance that this hospital's resources will be available to civilians. Further, as was stated previously in SAPL Contention #4, Please is just a short distance beyond the EPZ boundary ,

and could under certain circumstances need to be evacuated. The letter l provided for iluggins llospital is illegible. The letter for Lakes Regional General Hospital in Laconia dated 10/15/85 states " . . .we recognize our responsibilities to treat such cases that occur in our service area and to help neighboring hospitals that may be faced with more casiiiltles thH they can treat as a result of a disaster situation." (emphasis added)

Seabrook Station and its EPZ are not in the Lakes P.egion General Hospital service area nor are the hospitals in the Seabrook EPZ neighboring hospit als . The letter from Catholic fledical Center dated 10/17/65 states

l

. ShPL 15 (Cont.) 68.

that a letter written by Dr. Windler on 1/6/84 still holds. No copy of the 1/6/84 letter is provided. For these and other reasons, the letters of agreement from hospitals included in Volume 5 of the State plan do not provide support for a finding that adequate arrangements for medical services. for contaminated injured individuals have been made.

FENA RESPONSE (f) The letters of agreement with hospitals having radiological emer-gency capability are presented in Appendix H of the State plan (Volume 2, Rev. 2). He letters are now consistent with the listing presented on Table 2.8-1 of the State plan (pages 2.8-5, -Sa, and -Sb). A letter from Newport Hospital is also included in the revised plan.

he letter frcm Pease Air Force Base Hospital indicates that this military hospital is willing to cooperate and assist in the care of civilian casualties to the extent that such care does not interfere with the hcspital's

" primary responsibility to active duty military personnel." Althouah there is no assurance that this hmpital's resources will be available to civilians, its inclusion with the other hospitals is appropriate in the plan since it represents a resource which potentially might be available in a radiological emergency.

The letter frcm Lakes Regional General Hospital reflects the hospital's responsibility to " treat such cases that occur in our service area and to help neighboring hospitals that may be faced with more casualties than they can treat as a result of a disaster situation." he fact that Seabrook Station and its EPZ may not literally be "in the Lakes Pegion General Hospital service area," and the hospitals in the Seabrook EPZ may not literally be

" neighboring hospitals" probably does not negate the hospitals' willingness to provide the specialized medical services in a radiological emergency.

Both the 10-17-85 and the earlier 1-6-84 letters frcm the Catholic Medical Center are now included in Appendix H of the revised State plan (Volume 2).

g) Many of the letters are too non-specific and do not demonstrate that adequate arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made. The concept of operations is not clearly defined. For example, the R.S. Landauer, Jr. & Co. letter of 12/30/83 does not tell how fast the company can provide film badges.

(The letter also needs to be updated as required by MUREG-0654 II.P.4.)

The Memorandum of Understanding between the USAF and the State of New Ilampshire makes no reference to an accident at Seabrook, and, as was mentioned above, it is unsigned and undated.

FEMA RESPONSE (g) An updated letter frcm R. S. Landauer, Jr. , & Col, dated 3-3-86 is now included in Revision 2 of the State plan (Volume 5). ne letter provides information on the required logistics and time frame for providing readouts of badges which are being supplied.

He Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Air Force has been deleted from the State plan. (Also see FENA response to above its #1 in the amended basis.)

SAPL 15 (Cont.) 69.

~

h) The letters of egreemsnt with bus ccmpanies provid2 no assurance that bus drivers will be available to drive buses into the EPZ.

In some cases their (sic] are too few drivers for the number of buses to be provided by a company under the plans. JanCar Leasing Corporation, for example, is to provide 197 buses, but only lists 150 drivers. SAPL also is concerned that some of the buses that are alleged to be available during eme'rgencies might be chartered out or otherwise not available.

FENA RESPONSE (h) In regard to the availability of bus drivers to drive evacuation buses, see the FEMA respor e to above item #5 in the amended basis.

1) The letters of agreement with ambulance companies do not support a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective meksures can and will be taken. Most, if not all, of the companies listed are a minimum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />'s drive from the EPZ. None of the companies except Berlin Emergency Medical Services, Inc. state how many ambulances and what personnel are available. That company's letter notes that "If the patient is in a hazardous area, we usually have to wait on the outskirts until the patient is brought to us. This might be signifi-cant in the event of a disaster involving the nuclear plans."

For all of the above cites reasons, the letters of agreement fail to support the requisite 10 C . F. R 550.47(a)(1) finding of reasonable assurance that adeouate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.

FEMA RESPONSE (i) Ambulance providers are located both within and outside of the EPZ. As noted in State Plan Section 2.8.3 (page 2.8-2), ambulance providers frm cutside the EPZ will provide nonemergency medical transportation (i.e. ,

evacuation) of nobility-impaired persons. Ehergency medical services from within the EPZ will maintain emergency medical transportation. IAtter of agreement with ambulance providers are included in Volume 5 of the State l plan. All letters in the revised plan (Rev. 2) now state the number and i

type of medical transport vehicles available as well as the number of EMrs.

The August 1986 letter of agreement with Berlin Emergency Medical Serices no longer states that "if the patient is in a hazardous area, we usually have to wait on the outskirts until the patient is brought to us."

The RAC review indicated (pace 10 of Section I) that according to estimates of ambulance needs, an adequate number of letters of agreement with ambulance cmpanies have been signed. In addition, names and addresses of numerous ambulance cmpanies for which there are no letters of agreement are provided as an additional resource.

,70.

SAPL Contention 16 The New llampshire State and local plans do not make adequate provisions for the sheltering of various segments of the populace in the EPZ and therefore the plans fail to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a}(1), 550.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J.10.a. and m.

FDiA RESPONSE:

See FEMA Response to NECNP-RERP-8 O

e

-* 71.

SAPL CONTENTION 18 The NHRERP Rev. 2 significantly miscalculates the numbers of non-euto owning population for the 17 New Hampshire local communities.

No buses -are provided in the plans for the individuals who are not accounted Tor due to these miscalculations. Therefore, these plans fails 550.47(b)(8),

to meet the requirements of 10 CTR 550.47(a)(1),

NUREG-0654 II.J.10.g. and NUREG-0654 Appendix 4. p. 4-3.

. FEMA RESPONSE:

The validity of the Dracuation Time Estimates (ETEs) prepared by KLD Associates and incorporated into the NHRERP was challenged by the following Contentions:

Hampton Revised Contention III SAPL Contention 18 SAPL Pavised Contention 31 SAPL Contention 34 -

SAPL Contention 37 At FEMA's request, the RAC reviewed the ETEs, sgiecifically evaluating them against the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.l. The RAC found the ETEs sufficiently canplied with the guidance contained in -

Appendix III of NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 so as to serve as an adequate basis for protective action decision making. FEMA concurs in that view.

The views of the RAC were expressed in further detail in the December 15, ,

1986, RAC Review of Revision 2 of the NHRERP. -

The witness who will address these issues at the licensing hearing is Dr. Thanas Urbanik, a recognized expert in the field. He has reviewed the ETEs and has also concluded that they are adequate under the standards set forh in NUREG-0654, FENA REP-1 Rev.1. The NRC staff has consulted with Dr. Urbanik on other evacuation time estimate studies and will sponsor his testimony.

72.

AMENDED SAPL CONIENTION NO. 25 The Mew Hampshire State and local radiological emergency response plans do . not reasonably assure that the public health and safety will adequately be protected because the provisions for protecting those persons wh'ose mobility may be impaired due to such factors as institu-tional or other confinement are patently lacking. Therefore, the plans do not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1), 550.47(b)(8) and NUREG-0654 ' ll.J.10. d.

. By way of amendment and additional basis, SAPL states as follows:

The Exeter Hospital Radiological Emergency Response Plan contained in Volume 26A of the NHRERP Rev. 2 does not support a finding that there will be adequate care provided for those patients classified as Cate-gory I (Advanced Care Required) or Category IV (School Dus) because the letters of agreement with the host hospitals for Exeter Hospital do not indicate that any of these facilities have the willingness or facilities to take these patients. Catholic Medical Center and Concord Hospital only assert a willingness to accept Class II and Class llI patients. IIampstead Hospital's letter is non-specific in regard to how many or what category of patients it will accept 'and does not support a finding that these patients will be cared for. There is, therefore, no reasonable assurance that these individuals will be adequately provided for.,

Further, at page 15 of the Exeter Hospital Radiological Emergency Response Plan, it states:

Patients aged 55 years old or considered too critical for transport should be considered candidates for sheltering rather than evacuation. -

Coordinate with DPHS.

FEMA RESEONSE:

FEMA has addressed the amended Seacoast Anti-Pollution Imague (SAPL) Contention tb. 25 and its basis of inadequate provisions for protecting institutionalized mobility-impaired persons by applying Planning Standards A, C, and J (Evaluation Criteria A.3, C.4, J.10.d and J.10m) in FEMA REP-1.

The December 15, 1986 RAC Review of the State and municipal plans reflect FEMA's views on this issue. Specifically, FEMA's review ccmnents on the New Hampshire State Plan on this issue are provided on pages 10, 12, 87 and 88 of Section I . FEMA's review ccmnents on the municipal plans on this issue are provided on page 19 of Section II.

T4A RESPONSE 73.

AMENDED SAPL COtTTENTION NO. 25 (Cont.)

FEMA relied upon the following documents in forming its conclusions on this issue Revision 2 to the New Hampshire State Plan; Pavision 2 to the municipal plans.

FEMA does not yet have assurance, based on the available letters of agreement, that there are adequate provisions for protecting institulon-alized persons. The December 15, 1986 RAC Review of the State and local plans for evaluation criteria element J.10.d indicated that plan revisions adequately treated protection of the mobility impaired (see page 67 of Section I, State Plan review; and page 19 of Section II, local plan review).

However, the RAC Review did not ccmnent on the fact that letters of agreement with the host hospitals for evacuated patients from Exeter Ebspital do not include provisions for acceptance and care of Category I and Category IV patients. The letters from Concord Ibspital and Catholic Medical Center only indicate their agreement to accept Class II and Class III patients (see Attachnent A to Exeter Ibspital Radiological Dnergency Ibsponse Plan in Volume 26A of plans). The letter from Hampstead Hospital is non-specific.

Additional infonnation needs to be provided in the agreements and plans to clarify how Category I and Category IV patients frcm Exeter Hospital will be protected in the event of a radiological emergency.

In regard to the sheltering of Exeter Ibspital patients " aged 55 years old or considered too critical for transport," rather than evacuate them, State Plan Section 2.6.5 indicates that New Hampshire relies on two protective actions for limiting the direct exposure of the general publaic within the Plume Exposure EPZ. These two protective actions are sheltering and evacuation (State Plan, page 2.6-4). The decision whether to shelter or evacuate 10 based on coveral variables, including dose reduction factors due to sheltering (State Plan, page 2.6-29) . State Plan Section 2.6.5 (page 2.6-6) indicates that New Hampshire employs the " Shelter-in-Place" concept if sheltering is the chosen protective action.

In regard to sheltering residents of special facilities such as Exeter Ibspital the State indicates that sheltering is the preferred protective action (State Plan, page 2.6-7). FEMA concludes that the plans have been adequately revised to take into account the sheltering protec-tion factors for special facilities (RAC Review,Section I, page 67). A special tabulation of specific protection factors for each of the facilities (including Exeter lbspital) is present in Table 2.6-3 of the State Plan (RAC Review,Section I, page 67). The RAC Review (Section I, page 88) indicates that the flow diagram in the State Plan (Fig. 2.6-7) now properly reflects the decision-making process for the election between sheltering and evacuation, and that the treatment of institutionalized is now adequately detailed.

Relative to the lack of written agreements with the host facilities for residents of certain special facilities (Seacoast Health Center in

74.

FDR RESNUSES AMENDED SAPL CXNTENTION NO. 25 (Cont.)

Hampton, Coodwin's of Exeter, and Eventide Home of Exeter), and the lack of written agreements for reception and mass care facilities, see the FEMA response to Item #2 in the amended and redrafted SAPL Contention No. 15.

The basis for the contention statement that "O' Brie'n Anbulance of Beverly, Massachusetts, has stated thata the campany will not be able to participate in any type of response in the Seabrook area" is unknown. The Latter of Agreement with O'Briedn Anbulance, Inc. (January 1986) provided in Wlune 5 of the State Plan makes no such statement.

O e

75.

Revised SAPL Contention No. 31:

The evacuation time estimate report, as described in Volume 6 of NHRERP Rev. 2 does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1),

550.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J.2, II . J .10, i, 10 h and 10 1, r.nd Appendix 4. because it fails to account properly for the number of vehicles that would be evacuating the EPZ: relies in part upon unsupported assumptions; relies in part upon potentially biased input data: does not rely upon an extensive enough empirical base; relies upon traffic control personnel not shown to be available; doe snot appropriately account for travel impediments such as flooding, snow, fog and icing of roadways; does not account for the effect of driver disobedience on evacuation time estimates ( ETE's) ; doe snot appropriately deal with topographical features; does not deal realistically with the transport of transit dependent persons; in some instances overestimates roadway capacity and, for all of these reasons. underestimates the amount of time '

it would take to evacuate the EPZ and it subparts (" Regions") under the various scenarios analyzed.

FEMA RESPONSE:

The validity of the Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) prepared by KLD Associates and incorporated into the NHRERP was challenged by the following Contentions: ,

Hartpton Revised Contention III SAPL Contention 18 SAPL Pavised Contention 31 SAPL Contention 34 -

SAPL Contention 37 ,-

At FEMA's request, the RAC reviewed the ETEs, specifically evaluating them against the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.l. The RAC found the ETEs sufficiently ccmplied with the guidance contained in

• Appendix III of NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 so as to serve as an adequate basis for protective action decisionmaking. FEMA concurs in that view.

The views of the RAC were expressed in further detail in the December 15, 1986, RAC Review of Revision 2 of the NHRERP.

The witness who will address these issues at the licensing hearing is Dr. Thcnas Urbanik, a recognized expert in the field. He has reviewed the ETEs and has also concluded that they are adequate under the standards set forh in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1 Rev.1. The NRC staff has consulted with Dr. Urbanik on other evacuation time estimate studies and will sponsor his testimony.

e 76.

e-SAPL Contention No. 33 Contr)ry to the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1), 550.47(b)(8),

650.47(b)(0), 550.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J.12, there is no showing that NHRERP Rev. 2 provides adequately for the registration and moni-toring of evacuees at reception centers within about a 12-hour period.

BASIS:

The NHRERP Rev. 2 has reduced the number of host communities

. from six communities down to four communities in eliminating Nashua and Durham. This has had the resultant effect of lessening the - base of municipal resources that can be drawn upon to assist the evacuating -

population and has reduced the likelihood, which was not great before.,

that kil evacuees seeking assistance would indeed be assisted within the time frame set forth in NUREG-0654 as reasonable, i.e. , about a 12-hour period. The rate at which evacuees can be processed through the remaining reception and decontamination facilities has not in any fashion been established in the planc. Therefore, reasonable assurance has not been demonstrated that any significant fraction of the summer midweek population of 142,929 estimated in these plans for the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ could be assured the requisite assistance in the speci-fled time frame.

FEMA RESPONSE: .

Refer to FEMA Response for SAPL Contention 7.

(

o 77.

SAPL Contention No. 34 The New Hampshire State and local plans do not meet the recuire-ment that there be maps showing the population distribution around the facility as required at NUREG-0654 J.10.b. and Appendix 4. Therefore, there is no reasonable assurance that adequkte protective measures can and will be taken pursuant 10 CFR $50.47(a)(1) and $50.47(b)(10).

FEMA RESPONSE:

The validity of the Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) prepared by KLD Associates and incorporated into the NHRERP was challenged by the ,

following Contentions:

Hanpton Revised Contention III SAPL Contention 18 SAPL Revised Contention 31 SAPL Contention 34 -

SAPL Contention 37 At FEMA's request, the RAC reviewed the ETEs, specifically evaluating them against the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.l. The RAC found the ETEs sufficiently ccmplied with the guidance contained in *'

Appendix III of NURED-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 so as to serve as an adequate basis for protective action decisiornnaking. FEMA coricurs in that view.

The views of the RAC were expressed in further detail in the December 15, 1986, RAC Review of Revision 2 of the NHRERP.

The witness who will address these issues at the licensing hearing -

is tr. Thcunas Urbanik, a recognized expert in the field. He has reviewed '

the Crts and has also concluded that they are adequate under the standards set forh in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1 Rev.1. The NRC staff has consulted with Dr. Urbanik on other evacuation time estimate studies and will sponsor his testimony.

f 78.

SAPL Contention No. 37 The NHRERP Rev. 2 fails to provide reasonable assurance of adequate public protection because an adequate number of emergency vehicles are not provided for in the plans and further there is no assurance ,that effective use of these vehicles will be possible in view of a potentikl outgoing flow of evacukting traffic and a significant lack of drivers . Therefore, these plans do not ceet the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47(s)(1). 550.47(b)(3), 150.4"(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 ll.J.10.g. and II . J .10. k . -

. FEMA RESPONSE:

The validity of the Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) prepared by KLD Associates and incorporated into the NHRERP was challenged by the following Contentions:

Hanpton Revised Contention III SAPL Contention 18 SAPL Revised Contention 31 SAPL Contention 34 .

SAPL Contention 37 At FEMA's request, the RAC reviewed the ETEs, specifically evaluating them against the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.l. The RAC found the LTEs sufficiently emplied with the guidance contained in -

Appendix III of NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 so as to serve as an adequate basis for protective action decision-making. FEMA concurs in that view.

The views of the RAC were expressed in further detail in the December 15, 1986, RAC Review of Revision 2 of the NHRERP. .

The witness who will address these issues at the licensing hearing is Dr. Thomas Urbanik, a recognized expert in the field. He has reviewed the E'IEs and has also concluded that they are adequate under the standards set forh in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1 Rev.1. The NRC staff has consulted with Dr. Urbanik on other evacuation time estimate studies and will sponsor his testimony.

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__ _,.. _ _.___ ~ _ _ . _ - , _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

4)

> APPENDIX C I

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse Boston, Massachusetts 02109 INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM DATE: December 11. 1985 NUMBER: RI-TH-85-28 MEMORANDUM FOR: Regional Assistance Committee (RAC)

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Task Force (REP)

Edward A. Thomas, Division Chief C /

FROM: ,

" Natural & Technological Hazards

SUBJECT:

Seabrook Emergency Plans We have all known for years that the state and local plans to protect the public in the event of an accident at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant must include special attention to several factors which are unique (at least in magnitude) to the Seabrook area. By now, all of you should have received the formal submittal from the State of New Hampshire of the off-site emer-gency plans for Seabrook. As we indicated in the transmittal memo, portions of the plan have not yet been developed and, therefore, were not included in the package sent to you. Therefore, some of the special, quasi-unique factors which affect Seabrook, such as the impact of the road network on evacuation times, cannot be addressed by the RAC at this time. However, the state and local plans do indicate what steps the state proposes to take with respect to the vital area of sheltering and evacuating the beach population.

At the earliest possible time in the RAC review process, I propose that we focus in on the beach population to determine if special technical assistance from the RAC may be needed to assist state and local governments refine their plans to protect this group. It appears to us that when we discuss beach population, we are talking about two different groups: (a) the transient beach population, and (b) summer residents who inhabit unwinterized accom-modations on or near the beach A. The Transient Beach Population The transient beach population is that group who make day trips to the beaches near Seabrook by auto, bus, or other means of locomotion. This pop-ulation has no identified place of shelter other than any vehicle in which they may have arrived at the beach. The emergency plans submitted by the State of New Hampshire essentially indicate that this population will be protected in the event of an accident at Seabrook by closing the beaches at the earliest sign that a serious emergency is developing, and encouraging the transient beach population to leave the area. Those beachgoers who have nearby shelter would be encouraged to seek the shelter or evacuate as con-ditions at the plant dictated. The consulting firm of KLD Associates is in

!0 APPENDIX C (Cont.)

the process of developing revised evacuation time estimates for all popula-tion groups.in the Seabrook EPZ. We do not now have an estimate for how long it would take to evacuate the beach population in an accident either when everyone else in the area was told to take shelter, or when the entire EPZ was ordered to evacuate, or any combination of evacuations in between these extremes. However, for the sake of discussion, we believe that it is reasonable to assume for the present that the beach population would be out in the open, or in vehicles close to the center of the EPZ for several hours after the earliest indication that an accident was in progress.

Issue Based on the RAC's knowledge of the accepted literature in the fields of accident sequences, source terms, and the health effects of radiation, is the current planning acceptable or nearly acceptable? Before you can l I

answer, do you require more precise information on the times that the tran-sient beach population would be in the open, or in a vehicle? If we have advice for the state and local governments on this matter, I believe that we should make it known as soon as possible. If we need additional infor-mation to deal with the issue, we should let them know now.

B. Occupants of Unwinterized Accommodations A number of people associated with the Seabrook emergency plans process have suggested that special attention needed to be paid to occupants of the many unwinterized cottages, motel rooms, and camp gr_ounds in the Seabrook EPZ. These people believe that the normal assumptions we make about the protective effects of sheltering are not valid for structures which are:

(a) not designed to resist air intrusion, and/or (b) which have a very small protective factor because of the slight mass of the structure.

Issue L If the RAC believes that this is an issue which sould be covered in the emergency plans, we should raise it now to afford the state / local governments time to quantify the problem and to plan to deal with it. Finally, if we have any other preliminary comments on the emergency plans, we probably should make them known to the state / local governments as soon as possible. We would be particularly interested in passing on any indication that you have as to whether the plans are in adequate shape for a full-scale exercise at the end of February as is currently planned.

We request that you respond to this memorandum within fourteen days.

After the responses are in, we will call a meeting of the RAC to formulate a position on these matters.

HAPPY NEW YEARl

j AP P END I X B 4

.i

\ .

Federal Emergency Management Agency O. ' W/ 3

' k.' '[

Washington, D.C. 20472 g

DEL 2 4 %

) Mb MD40RANDLM FOR: NDI Division 011efs FD% Regional Offices F104: Richard W. Krimm Assistant Associate Director -

State and Local Programs and Supirrt SLBJECTs Gaidance on NUREG-0654/FDiA-REP-1 Evaluation Criterion J.12 .

Bis memorardun provides interpretative guidance on NLRED-0654/FDB-REP-1 protective response evaluation criterion J.12:

Each organization shall describe the means for registering and monitoring of evacuees at relocation centers in host areas. We personnel ard equignent available should be capable of monitoring within about a 12-hour period all QD residents ard transients in the plune exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers.

De question arises as to the percentage of the evacuees that could Previous reassn-experience .

ably be expected to arrive at a relocation center (s). -

gathered on evacuation responses to a variety of natural and technological emergencies is not conclusive. Research into this matter, however, has revealed that anywhere fran 3 to 20 percent of the e/acuees arrived at f For radiolcgical emergencies, it is rea-relocation centers or shelters.

sonable to assune that additional evacuees, to allay their concerns and fear over radiation, will go to relocation centers whether or not they have been exposed to radiation. Sus, the percentage of potential evacu-ees for radiological emergencies may be closer to the upper end of the 3 to 20% rarge.

De congregate care issue is reviewed as a part of all Atonic Safety and Licensing Board hearirgs, although it has never been formally litigated at stch a hearirg. De corgregate care facility capacity in the vicinity of nuclear power plants is usually cited as being between 5 and 15 percent of With these preentages in mind, it is the estimated runber of evacuees.

apparent that there is significant diversity in the frame of reference sur-roundirg this issue. .

9

AP P END 1 x B (Cont.)

- 2

?

The guidance prcuided below is based on the following factors:

( experience with evacuations regardless of the(1)nature Past of the energ (2) inclusion of fear and uncertainty factors associated with radiological facilities cited in ASLB hearings. emergencies ard (3) percentage of ptential e Guidance The State ard local radiological energency preparedness plans should incitde provisions at relocation center (s) in the form of trained personnel ard equipnent to monitor a minimtru of 20_,

percent of the estimated population to be evacuated.

For highly improbable radiological releases involvirg high levels of radiation enconpassirg a relatively large area, it may be necessary to monitor a greater runber of evacuees beyond 20 percent of the population. In such a situation, State ard local goverrments muld be expected to develcp and implement ad hoc response _

by Ebderal and"TriVKte sec_ measures, supplenented, if needed, tor remurces. -

Any questions Mctbtt at 646-2857. or concerns about this guidance should be directed to Mr. Bill m., e

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_.-_._____,______,.__.__.,m._.__. - . - _ _ _ .

I UNITED STATES APPENDIX D i

~#

. [p a4%k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'~

{ $ REGION l

'5 f $31 PARK AVENUE

/[

s MING OF PRUSSI A. PENNSYLVANt A I9404

.3 1 8 198 7 Edward A.' Thomas, Chairran

' Regional Assistance Cccinittee Federal Emergency Management Agency John W. McCormack Post Office and Court House Boston,-Massachusetts 02102

Reference:

Your memo of December 31, 1985 relative to the beach populations in the Seabrook area As requested, I am responaing to your memo regarding the adequacy of the New Hampshire RERP relative to the protection of the beach population. My response is based on Revision 2 of the NH RERP; the RAC/ contractor consnents on it, including the Seabrook Evacuation Time Study; the analyses of specific Seabrook Station features; and my professional knowledge and judgement related to emergency The bases of my opinion that the plans are or will be

' adequate (preparedness. contingent on completion of actions by New Hampshire to res concerns) to protect the beach population (both the beach transient group and those who inhabit unwinterized accomodations) are provided in the Enclosure to this correspondence. .

! Should you have any questions concerning the above, please contact me at FTS

488-1213. I would be happy to meet with you and/or the RAC to discuss my 1

response.

/ .

r

, Robert Bores, Technical Assistant l Division of Radiation Safety l and Safeguards l

Enclosure:

As Stated l

l cc w/ encl:

l W. Lazarus, RI l

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1 APPENDIX D (Cont,)

PROTECTION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE BEACH POPULATIONS

!- BACKGROUND The requirements for emergency preparedness stem from 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1) and

' (2), which state that except as provided in 10 CFR 50.47(d) (relative to licensing of a facility for operation up to 5% of rated power), no operating license for a' nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. The NRC will base its finding on a review of the FEMA findings and detenninations as to whether state and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there i.s reasonable assurance that they can be implemented, and on the NRC assessment of the adequacy and implementability of the licensee's onsite emergency plans.

The FEMA finding is primarily based on the review of the state and local -

emergency plans. Any other infonnation already available to FEMA may be used in considering whether there is reasonable assurance that the plans can be implemented. Paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 50.47 requires that the onsite and offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors meet 16 specified planning standards.

NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants",

i was issued to provide a connon reference and guidance source for state and 4

local governments and licensees in the development of~ emergency response plans and preparedness for response to a radiological emergency and for FEMA, NRC and other federal agencies for use in the review of those plans

and preparedness.

The planning basis adopted by NRC and FEMA for emergency preparedness around N nuclear power plants was taken from NUREG 0396/ EPA 520/1-78-016 " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants". "The overall objective of the emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in

' some cases, innediate life savings) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of the PAGs (NUREG 0654). NUREG 0396 intended that the planning basis range from trivial events to worst case accidents and it attempted to identify the boundary parameters based on available knowledge of potential accident consequences, timing of releases, and release charac-teristics (source tenn). It should be noted that doses in excess of the EPA PAGs do not equate with loss of life or even a health hazard. The PAGs were intended for use by protective action decision makers in arriving at a balance between radiation risk and that of taking a protective action in the absence of constraints to that action.

Enclosure w +ve-----e,,-w-.+www--,-.,w- y,,,-w-y---yem, ,,s.,,w-w ww .-y-=+,w"

2 APPENDIX D (Cont.)

e Relative to the adequacy of emergency preparedness for the Seabrook beach population, NUREG 0654 elements J.9 and J.10 appear to be pertinent to the situation. Element J.9 states, in part, that each state and local plan must establish a capability for implementing protective measures' based upon protec-tive action guides and other criteria. Element J.10 states that these plans to implement protective measures shall include, in part: maps showing evacuation

' routes and areas, relocation (reception) centers and the population distribution around the nuclear facility by evacuation areas; the means to notify all segments of resident and transient population; the means for pro-tacting persons whose mobility may be impaired; the means of relocation; reception centers / host facilities; projected traffic capacities of evacuation routes under emergency conditions; control of access to evacuated areas and organizational responsibilities for control; identification of and means for 3

' dealing with potential impediments to use of evacuation routes and contingency measures; time estimates for evacuation of various sectors and distances based on a dynamic analysis; and the bases for choice of reconmiended protective actions for the plume exposure pathway during emergency conditions, including consideration of local protection available and estimated evacuation times.

REVIEW OF NEW HAMPSHIRE PLAN, REVISION 2 AUGUST,1986 J.9 -- The RAC review of element J.9, the establishment of capability for

implementing protective measures, for both the State and local level '

plans, has indicated that no apparent actie was warranted by the State at this time for this element. This element was rated

" inadequate" for the State, however, because the RAC had not yet i resolved the " beach population issue", the subject of this document.

New Hampshire is also currently reexamining all emergency resource needs and the resource availability and distribution to support .

protective action implementation. The resource needs and -

availability area will be reviewed by the RAC after completion of the

NH study. Based on the RAC and my examination of the plans and

. preparedness for the beach population and those individuals in unwinterized housing, I conclude that these populations can be 4

' appropriately protected by implementing those provisions of the t current NH emergency plans. There appears to be no unique problem in j this area that has not been adequately addressed.

J.10.a -- The RAC review of element J.10.a relative to beach population protective action implementation, i.e., the maps of evacuation routes, of evacuation areas, and of reception and host areas for both the State and local plans, reveal n_oo inadequacies. (An

" inadequacy" was identified with regard to the map of the environ-mental sampling locations; however, this is unrelated to beach population prote tion measure implementation. Several minor clari-fications were recomended for bus route maps. However, relative to the beach population, this element appears to be adequate.

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3 APPENDIX o (cont,)

i J.10.b - . The RAC review of element J.10.b maps showing population distri-

- bution by evacuation areas around the nuclear facility, indicate no inadequacies for either the State or local plans. No actions were required of nor recommended to the State for this element.

J.10.c -- Relative to J.10.c, the means for notifying all segments of the population, the RAC left the evaluation of the State portion of this element "open" pending completion of the FEMA-REP-43 (now FEMA-REP-10, Nov. 85) review of the alert / notification system. For the local plans this element was rated " inadequate" because details were not provided relative to provisions for identifying siren failures and for providing backup notification in those instances of identified siren failures. It should be noted that this inadequacy was generic for all town plans and was not applicable only to the beach population.

The physical siren system and the administrative procedures, plans and means for alerting and notifying the public appear to be in place 1

and adequate. Provisions for early notification of beach populations with both siren tones and voice message capability are in place. The alert / siren system can be activated on an individual siren basis, in i

groups, or as the entire system to provide flexibility to the i

decision makers to accomodate the circumstances of the event.

J.10.d -- Relative to J.10.d, the means for protectirig persons whose mobility is impaired, the RAC identified no inadequacies at either the State or local level. Provisions were found adequate for health care facilities, Rockingham County Jail, schools, etc. Relative to

" individuals with special needs", however, the RAC left this item .

"open" pending a review at a future date by FEMA of the lists of such .

special needs individuals. This open item is generic to the entire EPZ and 1s NOT unique to the beach population.

! The RAC also recomended that the protection factors for special facilities be considered in any KI administration decision as they are when considering evacuation of these facilities. (The current

~

provisions use no designated protection factors for special facil-ities when calculating projected thyroid doses for purposes of KI j administrationdecisions.)

! J.10.e -- Element J.10.e, provisions for use of KI, is not applicable to the beach population, at least not in any unique sense. Therefore, no evaluation is considered here. The RAC rated this element "ade-quate".

4 APPENDIX D (Cont.)

J.10.f -- Element J.10.f, decision making for use of K! is not directly applicable to the beach population and, therefore, is not considered here. The RAC rated this element " adequate".

J.10.g -- Relative to J.10.g. the means of relocation, the RAC found pro-visions to be " adequate" at both the State and local levels. The RAC did, however, have a number of reconnendations in this area relative to plan and procedure inconsistencies in the bus and ambulance resource needs, resources available, resource response times and in the mechanism for detennining precisely the number of special needs persons to be acconnodated by the identified resources.

These inconsistencies, however, were closely evaluated by the RAC and were judged not to result in a lack of resource provisions to adequately acconnodate those needing transportation.

J.10.h -- Relative to J.10.h relocation centers, the RAC found that provisions for reception centers and host facilities were " adequate". No addi-tional needs or reconnendations were identified.

J.10.1 -- Relative to J.10.1, projected traffic capacities of evacuation routes, the RAC indicated that the appropriate traffic capacity data were provided. No inadequacies were identified for this element.

J.10.j -- Relative to J.10.j, control of access to evacuated areas, the RAC found no inadequacies. The State has responsibility and adequate provisions to perform this function. The only RAC reconnendations for this element concerned radiological directions for emergency workers and access logs.

J.10.k -- Relative to J.10.k, identification of and means for dealing with -

potential impediments to the use of evacuation routes, the RAC found no inadequacies but did have one additional reconnendation to be considered by the State for possible improvement. Inventories of equipment, procedures and letters of agreement were provided and were found to be " adequate".

J.10.1 -- Relative to J.10.1, evacuation time estimates, the RAC has reviewed the "Seabrook Station Evacuate Time Estimate Study" (Vol. 6 of the RERP) and concluded that although the study was " essentially adequate" in terms of fonnat, there still exist a number of technical

i. issues that are of concern and need be addressed. The bulk of these technical concerns can be grouped into several areas: the evacuation times appear to be overly pessimistic in that the " worst case situa-

tions" were generally utilized whenever there were uncertainties in

) data or conditions; inconsistencies in data or results were not satisfactorily explained; the bases for data /results were not always j clear; and maps and tables had some inconsistencies.

o 5 WUE U ""

It should be noted that the purpose of Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) is not to provide data showing that any or all areas can necessar11yTe evacuated prior to plume arrival, but rather to.

provide the decision makers with the best estimate of times needed to evacuate a given area (s) under the circumstances such that,the most appropriate decision can be made relative to whether to evacuate an area (s) and the timing of such reconenendations.

J.10.m -- Relative to J.10.m. bases for choice of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway, the RAC left this item "open", citing element J.9 in its cossnents. No specific actions were asked of nor recom-mended to the State to resolve this issue. As with J.9, there appears to be no unique problem associated with the beach populations which has not Een adequately addressed by the NH plans.

Sussnary - In reviewing the RAC consnents relative to the adequacy of provisions for being able to protect the beach population, only element J.10.c was left " inadequate" (lack of detailed provisions in local plans concerning the identification of siren failures and backup notifica-tion capability). Element J.10.d was left "open" pending FEMA review of lists of " individuals with special needs". This item is not specific to the beach population but is generic to the EPZ. Elements J.9 and J.10.m were left "open", basically awaiting RAC resolution of the " beach population issue", but citing ncLspecific inadequacies.

As noted above, no additional or unique actions appear to be required to adequately protect the beach populations. Element J.10.1, although rated " adequate", can be considered "open" pending the provision of additional clarification of data / assumptions /results in the evacuation time study. Overall, there appears to be no .

identified technical problem which has a significant potential for

• precludingadequateprotectionofthebeachpopulations(including those persons residing in unwinterized shelters).

1 ADDITIONAL PLAN DISCUSSION i

The New Hampshire RERP for Seabrook site appears to reet or will meet the NUREG 0654 criteria (after RAC conenents are resolved) in the generic sense. This means that the plan should be adequate to provide reasonable assurance that public health and safety can be protected during a spectrum of emergency scenarios. In addition, particular attention was given to specific features of the offsite land uses and demography. Specifically, the nearby beach areas and

, high seasonal populations have been studied in depth over a number of years and by a number of organizations. Volume 6 of the NH RERP, Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Study, incorporates many of the results of those studies, expands on other studies and provides additional data and clarifications in other areas. While the scope of Volume 6 includes the entire EPZ, particular attention was focused on the beach areas, the seasonal populations and their evacuation during an emergency under a variety of conditions (ninety-five sets of conditions in all were examined in this study). For suniner accident

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I 4 scenario.s. the evacuation time estimates for the beach populations ranged from

about.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> evacuate individual andareas 10 minutes has been togiven.

about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes after the order Similar evacuation time estimates

~

(ETEs) for the population area within a 2-m11e radius of the plant range from I 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 20 minutes to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 40 minutes according to the studies. Again, these studies tended to maximize parameters in the direction of increasing l evacuation times. (The more likely situation would involve more rapid evac-untions.) As noted earlier, the ETEs are required to provide the decision i makers with the best information (neither under-estimates nor over-estimat of the times likely to be needed to evacuate a given area under the specific

• circumstances at the time of the accident. This infomation is necessary to

• a.

make the optimum decision relative to the type and timing of protective action recossendations for a given situation, i

The State and local plans include many special considerations for protecting the beach populations. Some of those considerations are listed below.  ;

1.

Provisions have been made to consider closing the beaches or restricting i

public access to the beach at the Alert emergency classification. At this i

classification level, no offsite action would be ordinarily warranted to protect the public, but its consideration here would provide additional  !

time to clear the beaches or prevent additional pub 11c access to the beach, just in case the situation worsens. Note Even at the Site Area  :

' Emergency classification, one would ordinarily". expect that offsite pro- l tactive actions would not, be necessary to protect the public.

i 2. An alert and notification system has been installed with the beach areas i to provide siren coverage. The sirens can be activated individually, in 1

! selected groups or as the total system, can be rotated for better coverage -

or fixed in any direction, and can also carry voice messages and emergency instructions. The system has backup activation capability locally in each Sl

! town. j i 3. Administrative provisions and coordination of emergency instructions to be f t

{' broadcast have been provided to enable the decision makers the flextht11ty  !

to get the most appropriate message aired in a timely manner for the  ;

! spectrum of possible scenarios. The scope of situations covered range

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from that when the emergency organizations are fully staffed and are i following a slowly developing situation to the unlikely case when the

situation is rapidly developing, obviously severe in nature, and occurs  ;

prior to emergency organizations being able to fully staff or assess the

{ situation. (

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} 4 j Procedures and resources have been provided to assist the public in evacuating the beaches, for directinel and controlling traffic, for j providing transportation for those w' thout vehicles and for removing i

impediments or obstructions along evacuation routes. '

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- 7 APPENDIX D (Cont.)

9

5. Provtsions have also been made to coordinate New Hampshire decisions regarding New Hampshire beach populations with Massachusetts for con-sideration regarding the Massachusetts beach areas.

PLANT FEATURES AND CON $!DERATIONS Seabrook Station is a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor (PWR) with a large, dry, strong containment system. Public Service of New Hampshire, the licensee, has prepared two documents, "Seabrook Station Risk Management and Emergency Planning Study" - PLG-0432 and "Seabrook Station Emergency Planning Sensitivity Study" - PLG-0465, to provide the detailed analyses of potential -

accident sequences, chronology of accident and release sequences, source tems and risks specific to Seabrook Station.

Brookhaven National Laboratory (SNL) reviewed the above analyses and perfomed additional analyses of the systems and features of Seabrook Station. In December 1986 BNL released the " Draft Technical Evaluation of the EPZ Sensi-tivity Study for Seabrook", Technical Report A-3862. The source terms utilized in the New Hampshire Yankee and SNL studies were developed using the " Reactor Safety $tudy" - WASH 1400 (R$5) methodology and did not utilize potential source term reductions under consideration in current NRC and industry studies.

Using the R$$ assumptions, the New Hampshire Yankee and ONL studies indicated that a severe accident at Seabrook Station posed a public health risk at about two miles from the station that was essentially the same magnitude as considered in NUREG 03g4 at 10 miles from a nuclear plant.

INL concluded that "f t)here is negligible probability of prompt containment failure at Seabrookj. Failure during the first few hours after core melt is also unl(ikely and the timing of overpressure failure (of containment) is very -

long compared to the RSS. Most core melt accidents would be effectively -

mitigated by containment spray operation. 'The above conclusions were not based on Seabrook specific calculations performed at 8NL but reflected our best judgment based on extensive reviews of other similar containment designs..."'

BNL reviews of containment bypass accident scenarios also indicated that significant releases from such accidents were also not likely in the first hours af ter a severe accident.

Relative to the beach population, the distance to the Seabrook Station from the nearest beach area is almost two miles. This distance provides additional time to evacuate beach areas from the time of release until the front edge of the plumearrivesoverthebeacharea(assumingthewindisblowingtothebeach).

This distance also can provide considerable dispersion and dilution of the plume activity in traveling from the site to the beach. (The magnitude of concentration decrease is dependent on existing meteorological conditions, but could be several orders of magnitude.) Note: If dispers'en and dilution are small, then the impacted, albeit " hot" area must be small and the corresponding nurber of affected persons is also considerably smaller and presumably easier to protect.

o 8 APPENDIX D (Conto)

It is also, noted that when large, seasonal beach crowds are likely to be present (on het and sunny days), the typical wind pattern is from the offshore, cooler surface to the onshore, warmer surfaces of the land masses. This means that any " sea breezes" would likely prevent the plume from traveling to the nearby beach areas when the beaches are most heavily populated.

01KU5510N The foregoing discussions have indicated that the current NH plans meet or will meet the criteria of NUREG 0654 in a generic sense. Specific and detailed procedures have been provided to assure early notification and evacuation of .

the beach population can be effected should the plant status appear to be threatening. The review of these plans and procedures do not indicate the presence of concerns or situations involving the beach populations which warrant unique solution or provisions beyond those already incorporated.

The beaches themselves are nearly two miles from the station at their closest approach. This distance provides for dispersion and dilution of the plume as well as additional plume travel time for a plume to reach the beach area from the site. Additionally, because of the sea breeze situations nomelly associated with sea coast areas, the wind direction will be nome 11y on shore, i.e., toward the plant, rather than off shore from the plant to the shore) during hot, sunny days when the beaches are likely to be most populated.

The analyzed severe accident scenarios (core melt with early containment failure) indicate that the major portion of the dose to the affected population from such an event is due to exposure to deposited radioactive meterials on the ground surfaces rather than from the passing plume. The risk / consequence codes generally used (CRAC models or MACCS) all assume that the population is esposed .

to this pround deposition for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the arrival of the first portion .

of the p use and to any additional plumes over that area. In other words, the codes assume that no protective actions are implemented for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the release reaches the beach (or other areas of interest). In view of the NH plans for beach closure and access control as early as the Alert classification; the cited " negligible probability of prompt containment failure" at Seabrook and low consequence / low probability of serious containment bypass sequences; the plume travel time to the beach areas and the relatively short (2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) time estimated to clear the beaches, it appears that risks to the beach population are a small fraction of the cited risks in NUREG 03H for this distance. Thus, even if there were a prompt, severe, contaminating release and a portion of the beach population were caught in or under the plume for two hours during the evacuation process, their exposure to deposited radioactivity would only te approximately 2/24 or less than one-tenth of the code assumed dose. In acoitton, they would be avoiding any additional exposure to the plume (s) after leaving this area.

, 9 APPENDIX D (Cont.)

The overall objective of emergency response plans, as cited in NUREG 0654, is

...to provide cosa savings (and in some cases, inmediate life savings) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of the PAGs.

It has never been the intent of emergency preparedness / emergency plans to guarantee that no one would ever be exposed to radiation, or exposed in excess of the EPA PAGs as a result of any accident or postulated accident. Rather, the purpose is to minimize the risks (produce dose savings) to the extent possible under the circumstances of the given accident. In this context, it is clear that it would be inappropriate to judge the adequacy of emergency planning on the basis of whether or not the plans and preparedness can guarantee that no one would be exposed in excess of the PAGs as a result of any accident scenario. As stated earlier, the PAGs are guidance tools for use by decision makers and are ng levels of acceptable or unacceptable risks. The adequacy of emergency plans must be based on a finding that "there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." Edward Christenbury of the NRC defined the NRC position relative to " reasonable assurance" in his letter to Spence Perry of FEMA, dated June 18,1986,(copyattached). This position appears to be applicable to the protection of the Seabrook area beach populations.

A similar analysis for persons inhabiting nonwinterized facilities would parallel the above. Further, this subset of the beach population would appear to be less at risk than the beach population with no sheltert would be a ses11er number than the beach populations and would generally be treated as part of the local population group. (Those persons *1n properties on the beach front would be considered part of the beach population during daytime beach season.)

Since precautionary evacuation for nearby areas appears to be the accepted federal and state protective action strategy if the EPA pAGs are projected to

• be exceeded, the sheltering potential of buildings, other than identified special facilities, is generally not considered for populations within about a 2 mile radius. Persons inhabiting unwinterized buildings in this area would be treated in the same manner as other (year around) residents, i.e., evacuated.

Persons outside this arta may be considered separately on an ad hoc basis by the decision makers. Finally, it is noted that habitation of unwinterized buildings is generic to all sites with nearby beach or resort areas and that this situation is not unique to Seabrook. The New Hampshire provisions for these individuals near the Seabrook site appear to be well advanced in comparison with those at other applicable sites.

I 10 APPENDIX D (Cont,)

CONCLUSIONS Following are some of the areas considered above which were utilized in arriving at a conclusion relative to the beach populations.

NN state and local plans essentially meet NUREG 0654 critieria generically

. Special provisions for beach populations in place

. No identified problems requiring unique or unaddressed solutions ,

Provisions for early warning of beach populations

. g

. Adequate transportation resources available for those needing public transit

. Beaches are nearly two miles from station affording delay in pluma .

arrival and dilution and dispersion of plume Sea breezes would tend to keep plume from traveling directly toward -

n beach when beaches are most populated ETEs for beaches are relatively small  ;,

. Containment at Seabrook is very strong; probability of prompt containment failure is negligible

. Containment bypass is unlikely to cause severe offsite problems .

. Site specific studies for Seabrook indicate risks at two miles are comparable to NUREG 0396 analyzed risks at 10 miles

" Reasonable assurance" does not equate with " absolute safety", i.e.,

guarantee of no exposures or exposures above the PAGs Based on the above. it appears that contingent on the completion of action by ,

the State to resolve the other RAC concerns with the New Hampshire and local plans, those plans appropriately provide for dose savings for the spectrum of possible accidents and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the beach and unwinterized housing populations will be protected and that these plans will essentially meet tPe criteria of NUREG 0654 and the intent of the NRC regulations in this area.

Attachment:

Letter from Christenbury to Perry dated June 18, 1986