ML20211G597

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Mechanical Generic Issue Rept,Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Units 1 & 2
ML20211G597
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 01/21/1987
From: Carty J, Fletcher J, Stamm S
STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORP.
To:
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ML20211G570 List:
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NUDOCS 8702250443
Download: ML20211G597 (27)
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l1 TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING CO.

g COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

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ll lg MECHANICAL lg GENERIC ISSUE i REPORT

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I STONE & WEBSTER 070a230443 0,0,,g l gm nooca0300,0p

H January 21, 1987

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g TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY B COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 m

STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION'S

" MECHANICAL GENERIC ISSUE REPORT l .

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l H. Fletcher Chief Engineer, Power Division A /

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/J. S. Carty Project Engineer L '/

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S. L. Stamm Project Engineering Manager d'

I 'Jhae R. W. Ackley, Jr.

Project Manager i

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January 21, 1987 i Table of Contents Title Page Table of Contents i Index of Mechanical Generic Issue Report ii

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 SCOPE 3.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION METHODOLOGY 4.0 ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERIC ISSUE REPORT I

Table 1 Mechanical Corrective Action Plans APPENDIX A - Seismic Qualification of Seismic Category I BOP Equipment APPENDIX B - High Energy Line Breaks APPENDIX C - Overpressure Protection of Safety Related Piping and Equipment APPENDIX D - Specification of Mechanical Components APPENDIX E - Determination of Heat Loads for HVAC Equipment Sizing APPENDIX F - Control of Welding Process APPENDIX G - Internal and Turbine Missile Evaluations APPENDIX H - Fire Protection APPENDIX I - System Design SUPPLEMENT A - EBASCo Corrective Action Plan Systems Interaction Program SUPPLEMENT B - IMPELL Corrective Action Plan Fire Protection i

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January 21, 1987 INDEX OF MECHANICAL GENERIC ISSUE REPORT 5 COMMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION I Document Title Revision No.

Date of Issue Interim Issue Date Plan Generic Issue Report Jan. 21, 1987 Mechanical APPENDIX A Seismic Qualification See IMPELL M of Seismic Category I QUALIF. GIR I BOP Equipment APPENDIX B B0P Equipment High Jan. 21, 1987 Energy Line Breaks -

l EBASCO Corrective Action Plan (Supplement A)

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APPENDIX C Overpressure Protection Jan. 21, 1987 of Safety Related Piping and Equipment APPENDIX D Specification of Jan. 21 1987 Mechanical Components APPENDIX E Determination of Heat See EBASCO

!i Loads for HVAC Equipment Sizing HVAC GIR I APPENDIX F Control of Welding Process Jan. 21, 1987 g APPENDIX G Internal and Turbine Jan. 21, 1987 g Missile Evaluations -

EBASCO Corrective Action Plan (Supplement A)

APPENDIX H Fire Protection - Impell Jan. 21, 1987 Corrective Action Plan (Supplement B)

APPENDIX I System Design Jan. 21, 1987 I

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Jr.nusry 21, 1987 TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 & 2

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GENERIC ISSUES REPORT MECHANICAL

1.0 INTRODUCTION

l This Generic Issues Report for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Sta-lj tions (CPSES) Mechanical Systems and Componente describes the method, 3 scope and responsibilities for resolving the Comanche Peak Response

! Team (CPRT) design adequacy issues for mechanical systems and compo-l nents. The objective is to demonstrate a licensable mechanical design, j in accordance with FSAR and other licensing commitments, fully support-ed by adequate documentation.

2.0 SCOPE The corrective action to be implemented consists of the design basis g validation effort described in Section 3.0 and the individual plans B listed in Table 1. The corrective action addresses the CPRT Design Adequacy Program and includes the External Source Concerns resulting I from NRC review teams and inspection reports, Cygna Independent Assessment Program, ASLB hearings, and CASE allegations.

Construction (QOC) and Issue Specific Action Plan (ISAP) Reviews.

It also addresses other design related issues identified by the CPRT Quality of Any I new concerns found by SWEC during the corrective action effort will also be reviewed and resolved.

In formulating this plan, the TERA (D) and External Source (E)

I Discrepancy Issue Reports (DIR) and the TERA Issue Resolution Reports (IRR) were reviewed in order to address all technical concerns. The corrective action will respond to all IRRs and DIRs in the area of mechanical design adequacy.

3.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION METHODOLOGY I Corrective action will be developed to satisfactorily resolve issues related to mechanical design adequacy. In the areas of I construction /QC/ testing, specific concerns identified by the CPRT Review, related to mechanical design adequacy, will be reviewed and resolutions included in the plan.

Corrective action will be accomplished by review of calculations / design input; design criteria and design values; design change implementation and interface control; component specifications and vendor drawings and I documents, and validation of radiological / engineered safety features analyses.

below.

The general corrective action methodology is described The attached appendices describe the plans for specific IRR technical issues in greater detail.

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J:nutry 21, 1987 i The SWEC corrective action effort will be performed in accordance with the SWEC QA Program and the SWEC project procedures for corrective action implementation listed below. SWEC corporate technical I procedures will be used to develop project specific procedures and to The review will provide technical direction to the SWEC reviewers.

include safety-related and selected nonsafety-related systems and I components.

Project I Procedure Number Title j PP-004 Preparation, Review, and Approval of Design Basis y Documents (DBDs).

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Processing TNE Design Deviation Reports (TDDRs).

FP-005

! PP-009 Preparation and Control of Manual and Computerized Calculations.

PP-018 Design Verification.

i PP-029 Review and Update of CPSES Design Calculations.

PP-031 Configuration Control - Preparation and Issue of Design Change Packages (DCPs) Associated with CAPS.

PP-038 Calculation Validation Procedure.

PP-046 Corrective Action Plan Interface.

1. Review and Establish Design Criteria Bases In order to establish design criteria, pertinent mechanical design information will be reviewed. This includes:
  • Applicable NRC SRPs, Regulatory Guides, NRC IE Eulletins and Information Notices, NUREGs, 10CFRs.

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  • CPSES NRC Correspondence, Meeting records, etc. related to design criteria.
  • TERA Design Criteria List.
  • Design Interface Criteria Documents, such as NSSS criteria.
  • Diagrams.
  • Drawings.

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  • Specifications.

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  • Nonconformance resolutions, contained in NCRs, CARS, SDARs, etc.,

which are related to mechanical design adequacy.

These documents will establish the design basis for each system and component design. Inconsistencies in the design commitments of I

these documents will be resolved at this time so that uniform licensing / design criteria can be used for the remainder of the correc-tive action efforts. The Design Basis Documents (DBD) established by TUGC0 Engineering Report ER-SYS-5 will be reviewed and revised to serve as a consolidated criteria baseline for the effort.

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2. Review Design Calculations /FSAR Analyses E

5 A. Calculations I SWEC will review those balance of plant calculations which are pertinent to the specific commitment being reviewed. Calculations performed by the NSSS vendor, specific to the NSSS design criteria, will not be reviewed; however, any criteria imposed on the balance of I plant design from the NSSS design will be validated.

that the assumptions, methodology, and criteria used The review of calculations will validate that design inputs are correct and current, in the E calculations are consistent with the design bases estab1ishea for the B CPSES design, and that the installed and tested conditions have been verified against the calculation results. This review will also ensure that sufficient calculations have been prepared to fully document the I CPSES design commitments. Each design commitment will be reviewed to determine whether calculations are required as documentation and what types of calculations are needed. SWEC will establish these documentation requirements based on co rpora te experience previously found to be acceptable.

I The following items will also be reviewed for proper incorporation of calculation results:

I Specifications Design Drawings and Diagrams Stress Analysis Input Instrument / Control Setpoints System Operating System Layout Drawings Procedures FSAR Analyses -

Radiological / Engineered Safety Features Inconsistencies between the calculations and any of the above items i will be identified and will be resolved in accordance with the applicable design bases. Results from the calculation review will be provided to the appropriate engineering organizations for activities l not within SWEC scope.

i New calculations will be prepared and existing calculations supple-mented, as necessary, to provide complete, documented CPSES calculation bases. SWEC project procedures for review, preparation, revision and control of calculations, including confirmation of design inputs and, assumptions will be developed.

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Jcanary 21, 1987 i B. FSAR Analyses

, The FSAR analyses document that the plant design meets the licensing regulations. The radiological and engineered safety features analyses will be reviewed to ensure technical adequacy. This review will I

address calculation inputs, assumptions, methodology, and results.

Inputs and assumptions will be reviewed for applicability, accuracy, and source. Methodology will be reviewed to ensure that it is appropriate for the objectives of the calculation. Results will be reviewed to confirm that they are reasonable compared to inputs, I methodology, and objectives of the calculation. The following FSAR analyses will be reviewed:

  • Subcompartment pressurization.
  • Containment accident analyses.

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  • Combustible gas control.
  • Source terms.
  • Shielding and dose rates.
  • Accident dose analysis.

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  • Normal radiological releases and population doses.

Control room habitability analysis.

Accident radiation environments.

3. Review Design Documents and Specifications The CPSES design documents and specifications which provide detailed I engineering requirements for the design, fabrication and installation of systems and components will be reviewed for consistency with the established licensing and design bases and the calculation results.

I This review effort will include design documents, such as flow diagrams, instrumentation and control diagrams, technical specifica-tions, component specifications, etc., which define the conceptual I engineering requirements. The review will proceed to detailed produc-tion documents, such as piping isometrics and vendor documents, since the implementation of design criteria must be verified. All of these documents are subject to change for various reasons during the design The planned review will verify that the basic design commit-I process.

ments have been maintained consistently.

4. Utilize As-Built and Test Data l Throughout the review process, as-built data and actual test results i

. will be used to verify calculatic s results, and resolve discrepancies in design documents. As-built and test datt will not be used in place of design document reviews. It will be used as additional information to confirm that the installed plant design meets the CPSES commitments.

I This portion of the effort will draw on the results of the ERC Quality of Construction review and any other source of verified data in order to utilize as much of the existing as-built information as possible.

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i 5. Implementation of Review Results

'g The activity to resolve discrepancies, revise affected documentation,

'5 and initiate design change packages, if necessary, will be ongoing during all review phases. The following guidelines will be used:

  • Resolutions of discrepancies will conform to tne design and l licensing commitments.
  • The Design Basis Documents (DBDs) will be revised as part of the I review effort to provide a final documentation of design bases.

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  • Design document revisions occarring from this corrective action will be sent to TUGC0 for review.
  • Those discrepancies which have a potential for either hardware impact or a change to existing licensing commitments will be considered on a priority basis and a resolution will be proposed to TUGC0 in a timely manner.

It is recognized that many design activities are interdependent and a review of any one area requires input from and output to other review organizations. Stone & Webster will interface with these other organizations in a manner established and directed by specific SWEC and TUGC0 project procedures dealing with each interface. The organizations with which SWEC will interface include TUGCO, Gibbs &

Hill, EBASCO, IMPELL, ERC, and TERA. Others will be included as required.

I At the completion of corrective action, a report will be written.

report will describe the SWEC corrective action for each issue including a description of upgraded documentation, DBDs, and any This required hardware changes.

4.0 ORGANIZATION OF TIE GENERIC ISSUES REPORT An overview of the scope and corrective action methodology is contained in the main body of this report.

I Table 1 lists the appendices which describe the corrective action plan for each IRR issue.

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Janusry 21, 1987 TABLE 1 MECHANICAL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS g A. Seismic Qualification of Seinmic Category I BOP Equipment and Components (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-500)

IB B. High Energy Line Breaks (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-501)

C. Overpressure Protection of Safety-Related Piping and l

Equipment (TERA IRR NO. DAP-E-M-502)

D. Specification of Mechanical Components -

Pressure Boundary Integrity (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-503)

E. Determination of Heat Loads for HVAC Equipment Sizing (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-504)

F. Control of Welding Processes (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-506)

G. Internal and Turbine Missile Evaluations (TERA IRR No.

DAP-E-M-507)

H. Fire Protection (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-EIC-505)

I. System Design (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-508)

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January 21, 1987 APPENDIX A

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l Isaae A - Seismic Qualification of Seismic Category I B0P Equipment (TEM IRR No. DAP-E-M-500)

This issue is being addressed separately by the Impell Generic Technical.

Issues Report (09-0210--061) .

REF: Evaluation and Resolution of TERA Equipment Qualification Issues Resolution Report:

DAP-E-M-500 I

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January 21, 1987 APPENDIX B Issue B - High Energy Line Breaks (TEPA IRR No. DAP-E-M-501)

This issue is being addressed by the Ebasco Systems Interaction

. Program which is described in the Corrective Action Plan attached to this GIR as Supplement A.

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Appendix C E Janagry 21, 1987 i APPENDIX C Issue C - Overpressure Protection of Safety-Related Piping and Equipment (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-502) 1.0 Background The TERA DIRs cite instances where safety-related system designs do not meet ASME III requirements for protection against overpressure. These I instances include:

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  • Components can be isolated and subsequently pressurized without overpressure protection.
  • Backpressures were not correctly determined for relief valve setpoints.

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  • Some relief and safety valve discharge lines were not properly designed (i.e., size and arrangement).
  • Some component relief and safety valve sizing and pressure l transient calculations are not complete.

In addition, preliminary SWEC observations indicate that the design input used to locate, size, and determine the setpoint of overpressure devices may not have considered worst case system alignments. All of I these concerns could lead to inadequate ove rp ressure protection features.

2.0 SWEC's Understanding of the Issue Due to the number and variety of discrepancies, a comprehensive review i of CPSES conformance to ASME III overpressure protection requirements This review will include interpretation of ASME will be performed.

Code requirements, the validation of design input, system arrangement I and design conditions, the specification of overpressure devices, and the as-built, installed conditions.

3.0 SWEC Action Plan to Resolve Issue SWEC will review ASME III overpressure protection compliance in the following manner:

  • Review TUGCO's interpretation of ASME III Code requirements and establish design criteria.
  • Review ASME III portions of system flow diagrams to determine that overpressure protection devices have been provided wherever necessary.
  • Review the system calculations to determine the adequacy of design I values, such inlet / outlet as pipe design pressure, sizing, etc.,

relief used as flow requirements, input for each 6366E-1634503-B2 1 of 2

I Apptndix C I Jznuary 21, 1987 5 overpressure device. Ensure that system calculations consider worst-case operating modes. Prepare new calculations or supplement existing calculations, as necessary.

  • Review the input provided to the stress analyst and support designer for consistency with relief device funcitonal requirements and design conditions.

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  • Review the installed location of piping and overpressure devices and evaluate whether as-built conditions, will result in I acceptable relief conditions. Arrangement considerations, such as routing, pipe size, low point drains, etc. should be examined.
  • Review each ove rpressure device setpoint for consistency with system design calculations. Prepare new cales or supplement existing cales as necessary.
  • Review overpressure device specifications for conformance to design requirements and setpoints.
  • Review vendor documents for conformance of purchased devices to specification requirements.
  • Issue a design change document for any hardware / software revisions.

4.0 Relevant Documents 4.1 Applicable DIRs:

D-0122 D-0159 D-0128 D-0124 D-0226 D-0129 D-0125 D-0229 D-0156 D-0144 D-0238 D-0240 D-1000 D-0239 D-0252 D-0118 D-0265 D-0255 D-0119 D-0296 D-0264 I D-0120 D-0297 D-0298 D-0123 D-0348 D-0131 E-0514 D-0510 D-0149 D-0299 D-0511 D-0055 E-0512 D-0117 E-0515 D-0150 E-0516 D-0162 D-0054 D-0157 D-0054 I D-0121 D-0056 D-0143 D-0116 D-0147 D-0127 4.2 All ASME III Fluid System DBDs plus:

DBD-ME-013 - Containment Isolation DBD-IC-037 - Setpoints I

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E ^PP::adix D E J:nunry 21, 1987 I APPENDIX D Issue D - Specification of Mechanical Components - Pressure Boundary Integrity (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-503) 1.0 Background The DIRs relating to this issue can be grouped into four categories:

1.1 Nozzle loads - There are inconsistencies between the allowable loads specified for the component nozzles when compared to the actual loads imparted by the piping system. This category deals with both large I components such as heat exchangers and in-line components, such as expansion joints.

1.2 Design Conditions - The component specification requirement.s for design pressure, temperature, ambient environment and load combinations are not consistent with the system design and operating conditions.

1.3 Stainless Steel Welding Requirements - The specification welding requirements are inconsistent with the FSAR commitments; in particular, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.44. Some DIRs also address inconsistencies in I corrosion tests and control of heat input and interpass temperature.

The corrective action for this item will be addressed as part of Appendix F - Control of Welding Processes.

1.4 Material Impact Testing - The TERA DIRs cite a number of instances l

where impact test.ing of safety-related ferritic steel components do not meet the requirements of the FSAR and ASME III. These deviations l l 1 5 include:

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  • improperly specified test temperature lack of impact testing requirements The CPSES FSAR commits to impact testing of ASME C1.2 main steam and I feedwater materials and ASME ASME III.

C1. 1 materials in accordance with ASME III requires the testing to be performed at the lowest I se rvice temperature. The deviations cite instances where the lowest i service temperature was not specified or where the requirement for l impact testing was not included in the specification. Because of these deviations there is not adequate assurance that the materials possess

!E sufficient notch toughness to properly function at the lowest service l3 temperature.

SWEC Understanding of the Issue I

2.0 Based on a review of the DIRs, it appears that these concerns were found in the review of a number of ASME III specifications. These j specifications included:

Mechanical Penetrations Nuclear Strainers CCWS Heat Exchangers Expansion Joints I e3eer.1e34ses.e2 1 of 4

E APP ndix D E Jennary 21, 1987 I Shop Fabricated Tanks Feedwater Isolation Valves Main Steam Isolation Valves This sample covered a variety of component types, governed by various code requirements and provides an adequate overview of the conformance of specifications to FSAR, ASME Code and other design commitments.

Since several concerns were found in each . specification reviewed, a I conclusion can be drawn that the requirements of ASME III may not have been clearly addressed in the manner committed in the FSAR. From the information available to date, it is unclear whether this issue is one I of documentation, i.e. a lack of specification completeness, or if the code requirements have not been imposed on the as-built component. The SWEC action plan will first determine whether the as-built component I complies with the applicable codes and, then, determine the extent of documentation available or needed.

3.0 SWEC Action Plan to Resolve Issue 3.1/3.2 Nozzle Loads / Design Conditions Equipment nozzle loads and the specification of design conditions must be evaluated by an engineering process which begins with the definition of component operating requirements during plant operating modes of I startup, shutdown, test, power generation, abnormal and accident such as pressure, conditions. The specific system conditions, temperature, etc. occurring at the nozzles during each mode, must be I determined and the combinations of these system conditions with other loads, such as seismic, must also be specified. This information is normally provided in the component specification as requirements on the I manufacturer's design and analysis. The same data, along with a variety of other input, is also given to the pipe stress analyst who, in turn, works with the support designer to establish an acceptable piping / support configuration in accordance with code requirements.

At the nozzle interface, the piping load imposed on the nozzle due to the as-built piping / support configuration must be reconciled as within I the allowable nozzle loads which the vendor hardware can accept. These interrelationships among the system design conditions, the vendor designs and the piping / support designs must be evaluated simultaneously because any changes can affect this interface.

In order to resolve this issue a final reconciliation of the following items must be performed. SWEC will accomplish the first three tiems as I part of this corrective action plan. Impell will complete the last two items as part of their equipment qualification effort. The interface between both organizations will be closely coordinated since these review efforts are interrelated.

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  • System operating modes and system conditions versus component specification requirements.
  • System operating modes and system conditions versus stress analysis / support design input.

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k Appendix D January 21, 1987

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  • Load combinations used in component specifications and stress analysis.

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  • Vendor stress / seismic analyses consistent with system operating modes, conditions and load combinations.
  • Calculated nozzle loads versus vendor allowable nozzle loads. All i

ASME III component nozzles and those nonsafety component nozzles which are large bore and operating at hot temperatures, will be reconciled.

l The SWEC reconciliation effort will utilize the results of the detailed review of system calculations, system operating modes, plant loading combinations, and component specifications described in Section 3.0 of the main body and Appendix I of this GIR. This validated design data k will also be sent to Impell for use in their review effort.

The impact of any changes in stress input must be evaluated and input to the SWEC PSE effort it restress is required. The review of allowable vs calculated nozzle loads will utilize the loads developed

- by the PSAS effort. Any changes to specification requirements affecting a vendor's design or analysis will be discussed with the

[ vendor or resolved by analysis.

3.3 Stainless Steel Welding Requirements The corrective actions to address this concern are part of Appendix F -

Control of Welding Processes.

3.4 Material Impact Testing SWEC will review the impact testing requirements for compliance to the FSAR commitments for both ASME C1. I and 2 materials in the following manner:

  • Review the basis for the FSAR commitment to impact test ASME C1.2 materials.
  • Review specifications for ASME C1.2 pressure containing components in the main steam and feedwater systems to determine the extent of compliance.
  • Review all specifications for ASME III C1.1 ferritic components to determine the adequacy of impact testing requirements, including the specification of test temperatures in accordance with system design.
  • Assess the technical / code significance of any deviations.
  • Prepare change documents to resolve any deficiencies.

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Appendix D January 21, 1987 5 4.0 Relevant Documents 4.1 Applicable DIRs:

D-0246 D-0354 D-0248 D-0497 D-0266 D-0530 D-0267 D-0544 D-0289 D-0552 D-0307 D-0555 D-0313 D-0562 D-0350 D-0563 D-0351 D-0668 D-0524 D-0161 D-0527 I D-0233 D-0528 D-1234 D-0541 D-0538 D-0542 D-0545 D-0554 D-0247 D-012.8 D-0557 D-0232 D-0609 D-0244 D-0309 I

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January 21, 1987 I APPENDIX E Issue E - Determination of Heat Loads for HVAC Equipment Sizing (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-504)

This issue is addressed separately by the Ebasco HVAC Generic Issues Report.

Evaluation and Resolution of Generic Technical Issues for HVAC Systems, I REF:

Rev. O, Dated December 15, 1986, Appendix 42.

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r-4 App:ndix F I j Janutry 21, 1987

.! P,ENDIX F

!l Issue F - Control of Velding Processes l5 (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-5061 -

lI 1.0 Background This issue addresses the TERA DIRs identified below (!+.1) and includes the concerns expressed in Section 1.3 of Appendix D - Specification of I Mechnical Components - Pressure Boundary Integrity.

The TERA- DIRs cite instances where the welding .cd - s fety-related I stainless steel components was not controlled in accordance with FSAR commitments. These instancet include:

  • Lack of specificaton required vendor documentatioa related to Regulatory Gu'ide 1.44. '
  • Lack of specification requirements for arc heat input controls.

I Lack requi.rements

  • of specification regarding NSSS required modifications to corrosion testi9g methods.

2.0 SWEC's Understanding of the Issue I The DIRs indicate that the FSAR commitrtents to Regulators Guide 1.44 and Regulatory Guide 1.31 have not been consistently invoked in I component specifications and, even in cases where invoked, suppliers may not have complied with the specification requirements. . Because of these conditions, there is not sufficient assurance that adequate I controls have been exercised during the manufacture of safety-related components to avoid the occurrence of microfissures and >he degradation of corrosion resistance of austenitic stainless steels.

3.0 SWEC Plan to Resolve Issue SWEC will review Regulatory Guide 1.31 and 1.44 compliance, the vendor I documentation provided, and the specification requirements input controls and corrosion testing methods in the following manner:

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  • Review all safety-related component specifications requiring the use of austenitic stainlass steel and determine the extent of compliance to FSAR commiteents.
  • Review specification required documentation from vendors to determine extent of compliance to specification requirements.

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Appendix F January 21, 1987 I

  • 4 Assess the technical significance of any deviations to FSAR and/or specification requirements.
  • Prepare change documents to resolve any deficiencies.

1 4.0 Relevant Documents I

1 4.1 Applicable DIRs:

I D-0161 D-1957 D-0163 D-0164 D-0233 D-0234 D-0538 D-0545 I

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7 January 21, 1987 APPENDIX G I Issue G - Internal and No. DAP-E-M-507)

Turbine Missile Evaluations (TERA IRR I This issue is being addressed by the Ebasco Systems Interaction Program which is described in the Corrective Action Plan attached to this GIR as Supplement A.

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January 21, 1987 APPENDIX H Issue H - Fire Protection (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-EIC-505)

This issue is being addressed by the Impell Fire Protection g Program which is described in the Corrective Action Plan i

l3 attached to this GIR as Supplement B.

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App ndix I Jcnu:ry 21, 1987 APPENDIX I Issue I - System Design (TERA IRR No. DAP-E-M-508) 1.0 Background The DIRs listed belov (b.1) concerriing this issue can be grouped into the following major concerns:

  • System performance documentation and analysis - Inadequate identification, improper evaluation and incorrect determina-tion of system performance criteria and requirements, including system interfaces. .
  • Specification and evaluation of component performance -

I Improper specification and evaluation of component perform-ance to meet system operating and functional requirements.

I Control functions - Inadequate provision of control functions to meet system functional requirements.

  • Piping arrangement - Inadequate consideration of piping I arrangement to meet operating conditions of the component piping and system.

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  • Safety classification - Improper safety classification of component piping and safety class interfaces.

2.0 SWEC's Understanding of the Issue 1 2.1 System Performance Documentation and Analysis I It appears that the evaluation of system designs in response to design changes or other related design analyses may not have adequately considered all system operating modes. Incorrect system inputs may I have been used and the effects of changes upon system design parameters may not have been properly reviewed.

and other fluid, Interfaces with the NSSS vendor control or electrical systems may have been I incorrectly addressed when evaluating system performance. Sufficient documentation must be provided to demonstrate that these interfaces were addressed and resolved in accordance with the plant design bases.

2.2 Specification and Evaluation of Component Performance The specification of component design parameters may not have enveloped I all required system operating modes or included necessary margins (e.g.

pump design head or capacity equal to the maximum required with no margin to account for wear).

The evaluation of vendor documentation did not consider the performance of the component within the system. This could result in component I

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I App;ndix I January 21, 1987 I perfo rmance which meets the specification design point, but not the system design requirements.

The review of vendor documentation did not identify or evaluate differences between the equipment procurement specification or sizing I calculations and that specified in the vendor documentation. This could result in the failure to meet equipment functional requirements.

2.3 Control Functions I The implementation of controls to accomplish the system functions, to actuate individual components and to provide automatic vs manual I operator capability may not have been in accordance with system design requirements. The necessary controls must consider all system and component operating requirements and the various licensing regulations I regarding operator actions to accomplish safety functions. Setpoints established for control functions must be in accordance with the system design bases and must have adequate range and accuracy.

2.4 Piping Arrangement The piping arrangement may not have adequately considered all of the I design considerations necessary to ensure a piping dcsign which functions properly. There are specific design requirements associated with the piping layout, some of which are unique to each system.

I Unless properly considered, component performance and achievement of system function may be adversely affected.

I 2.5 Safety Classification i

The safety class designations of piping and the methods of safety boundary isolation may not have been correctly determined. Since the

! I design, procurement and installation requirements for nonsafety piping are less stringent than those for safety-related piping, the ability of the system to achieve its safety function can be jeopardized.

The isolation of a nonsafety portion from a safety portion must be accomplished for all cases where failure of the nonsafety piping could affect the system safety function. Specific licensing regulations exist for considering single failure, manual vs automatic operation, and the number and type of required safety-related isolation components. Nonconformance to any of the licensing requirements could compromise system safety.

3.0 SWEC Action Plan to Resolve Issue 3.1/3.2/3.3/3.4 System Performance / Component Performance / Controls / Piping Arrangement l Corrective action will establish all system and component operating requirements, will document these requirements and will validate that

, these requirements have been correctly input to the system / component designs. The Design Basis Documents (DBDs) will be used to document I 6366H-1634503-B2 2 of 4

I App:ndix I January 21, 1987 I these requirements, along with the applicable calculations, diagrams, and specifications. The review will proceed as follows:

1. Establish system functional requirements, instrumentation and control requirements based on the following:
  • SER and supplements
  • ASME Code compliance
  • Other CPSES 1 &2 commitments to specific licensing issues
2. Review functional requirements against the following system design I documents to establish system operating modes and required control features.
  • Flow diagrams I
  • Logic diagrams Specifications NSSS interface criteria documents
3. Review DBDs and incorporate system operating requirements and control features.
4. Review system calculations for conformance to established system operating requirements. Ensure that all operating modes have been I

enveloped and that the correct operating modes have been chosen as the design basis when calculating component performance requirements.

t I 5. Review that the following items correctly address system operating requirements.

I

  • Equipment specifications Stress analysis input (including fluid transients)

Instrument / control setpoints FSAR analyses - containment (Chapter 6)

I

- radiological (Chapter 12)

- radwaste/ process (Chapter 11)

- accidents (Chapter 15)

  • System operating procedures
6. Review vendor documentation for conformance to calculation I results, system performance requirements, and specification performance requirements. Test data (shop and field) will be used to verify that system and component performance requirements are
met. The available margin between performance requirements and test data will be reviewed to ensure that expected component wear is taken into account.
7. Review system and component physical arrangement to ensure that I

the layout is acceptable, that calculation results establishing l

physical restraints have been included, and that all operating conditions have been considered.

I 6366H-1634503-B2 3 of 4

I Apptndix I Janusry 21, 1987 I 8. Identify resolutions and resolve affecting discrepancies documentation found.

only, For the

" software" appropriate documents will be revised. For " hardware" resolutions, design change control procedures will be used to ensure that changes are properly reviewed, engineered, and implemented in accordance with the overall plant design criteria.

3.5 Safety classification I Safety-related systems will be reviewed to determine that piping with a safety function has been correctly designated as Safety Class 1, 2, or

3. Within a system, piping which must retain its pressure boundary I even though it is not an essential flow path will be included in this review.

After each system has been reviewed to determine the correct safety classification of piping, the isolation methods at the safety /nonsafety boundaries will be reviewed. Specific criteria will be established for:

  • Number and type for isolation devices
  • Safety classification of isolation devices I
  • Instrumentation available to detect failures Automatic vs manual closure Remote vs local control The feasibility of local, manual actions will consider the ambient environments, especially radiation, existing at the time these actions are required. Hardware changes, if necessary, will be identified and a j recommendation made based on providing a licensable design with the l least impact on cost and schedule.

1 4.0 Relevant Documents 4.1 Applicable DIRs:

D-0011 D-2180 D-1207 D-1385 D-0374 D-0014 D-2181 D-1481 D-1480 D-0550 D-0015 D-2190 D-1482 D-2158 D-0610 D-0020 D-0015 D-1483 D-2159 D-0805 D-0484 i D-0158 D-1485 D-2162 D-1342 D-0553 D-0223 D-1653 l D-2163 D-1343 D-1386 D-0253 D-1654 D-2172 D-1366 1 D-1387 D-0219 D-1655 D-2175 D-1368 E-0811 D-0321 ll D-1960 D-2176 D-1384 D-0241 D-0099 D-1961 D-2179 E D-1391 D-0425 D-0152 D-2174 D-2185 D-1486 D-0546 D-0165 D-2186 D-2191 D-2164 D-0556 D-0290 D-2187 T-0020 D-2188 D-0490 D-2184 I D-1383 D-0551 D-2178 D-0310 D-2161 D-1277 D-2189 D-0326 D-0305 D-1963 D-0317 D-1487 D-0687 D-0311 D-2171 D-0306 D-0479 I D-0491 D-2182 D-2173 D-0480 D-0492 D-1484 D-2192 l D-0481 D-0493 D-1652 D-0228 D-0482 D-0494 T-0040 l D-2160 D-0489 D-1136 D-0372 4.2 Safety-related fluid system DBDs.

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