ML20209A359
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Millstone Power Station Unit 3 Safety Analysis Report Chapter 9: Auxiliary Systems
Table of Contents tion Title Page FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING ....................................................... 9.1-1 1 New Fuel Storage........................................................................................ 9.1-1 1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.1-1 1.2 Facilities Description .................................................................................. 9.1-1 1.3 Safety Evaluation of New Fuel (Dry) Storage Rack................................... 9.1-2 2 Spent Fuel Storage ...................................................................................... 9.1-2 2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.1-2 2.2 Facilities Description .................................................................................. 9.1-4 2.3 Safety Evaluation of Spent Fuel Racks....................................................... 9.1-6 2.4 Spent Fuel Storage in an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) ..................................................................................... 9.1-9 3 Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System................................................ 9.1-9 3.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.1-10 3.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.1-12 3.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.1-14 3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.1-16 3.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.1-17 4 Fuel Handling System............................................................................... 9.1-18 4.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.1-18 4.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.1-19 4.2.1 Fuel Handling Description........................................................................ 9.1-19 4.2.2 Refueling Procedure ................................................................................. 9.1-20 4.2.3 Fuel Handling for Offsite Shipment ......................................................... 9.1-25 4.2.4 Component Description ............................................................................ 9.1-25 4.2.5 Applicable Design Codes.......................................................................... 9.1-30 4.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.1-30 4.3.1 Safe Handling ........................................................................................... 9.1-30 4.3.2 Seismic Considerations............................................................................. 9.1-36 4.3.3 Containment Pressure Boundary Integrity................................................ 9.1-37
tion Title Page 4.3.4 Radiation Shielding................................................................................... 9.1-37 4.4 Inspections and Testing Requirements ..................................................... 9.1-37 4.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.1-37 5 Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems ................................................ 9.1-38 6 References for Section 9.1 ........................................................................ 9.1-38 WATER SYSTEMS ................................................................................... 9.2-1 1 Service Water System ................................................................................. 9.2-1 1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.2-1 1.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.2-3 1.3 Safety Evaluation ........................................................................................ 9.2-7 1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements......................................................... 9.2-8 1.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................... 9.2-9 2 Cooling Systems for Reactor Auxiliaries ................................................. 9.2-12 2.1 Reactor Plant Component Cooling System .............................................. 9.2-12 2.1.1 Design Basis ............................................................................................. 9.2-12 2.1.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-13 2.1.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-17 2.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.2-19 2.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-19 2.2 Chilled Water System ............................................................................... 9.2-21 2.2.1 Design Basis ............................................................................................. 9.2-21 2.2.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-22 2.2.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-24 2.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.2-24 2.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-25 2.3 Neutron Shield Tank Cooling System ...................................................... 9.2-28 2.3.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.2-28 2.3.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-28 2.3.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-29 2.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.2-29
tion Title Page 2.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-29 2.4 Charging Pumps Cooling System ............................................................. 9.2-30 2.4.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.2-30 2.4.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-30 2.4.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-31 2.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.2-32 2.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-32 2.5 Safety Injection Pumps Cooling System .................................................. 9.2-33 2.5.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.2-33 2.5.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-34 2.5.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-34 2.5.4 Testing and Inspections ............................................................................ 9.2-35 2.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-35 2.6 Condensate Demineralizer Component Cooling Water System (Removed from Service)........................................................................... 9.2-36 2.6.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.2-36 2.6.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-37 2.6.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-37 2.6.4 Inspections and Testing Requirements ..................................................... 9.2-37 2.6.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-37 3 Demineralized Water Makeup System ..................................................... 9.2-37 3.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.2-37 3.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-38 3.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-41 3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.2-42 3.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-42 4 Domestic and Sanitary Water Systems ..................................................... 9.2-43 4.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.2-43 4.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-43 4.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-45 4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.2-45
tion Title Page 4.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-45 5 Ultimate Heat Sink.................................................................................... 9.2-46 5.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.2-46 5.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-46 5.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-47 5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.2-47 5.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-48 6 Condensate Makeup and Drawoff System................................................ 9.2-48 6.1 Design Basis ............................................................................................. 9.2-48 6.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-49 6.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-50 6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.2-51 6.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-51 7 Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water System ................................... 9.2-52 7.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.2-53 7.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-54 7.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-54 7.4 Inspections and Testing Requirements ..................................................... 9.2-55 7.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-55 8 Primary Grade Water System ................................................................... 9.2-56 8.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.2-56 8.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.2-57 8.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.2-59 8.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.2-60 8.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.2-60 9 References for Section 9.2 ........................................................................ 9.2-61 PROCESS AUXILIARIES......................................................................... 9.3-1 1 Compressed Air Systems ............................................................................ 9.3-1 1.1 Instrument and Service Air Systems........................................................... 9.3-1 1.1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.3-1
tion Title Page 1.1.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.3-2 1.1.3 Safety Evaluation ........................................................................................ 9.3-3 1.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements......................................................... 9.3-4 1.1.4.1 Preoperational Testing of Instrument Air System ...................................... 9.3-4 1.1.4.2 Inservice Testing......................................................................................... 9.3-5 1.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................... 9.3-5 1.2 Containment Instrument Air System .......................................................... 9.3-7 1.2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.3-8 1.2.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.3-8 1.2.3 Safety Evaluation ........................................................................................ 9.3-8 1.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements......................................................... 9.3-9 1.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................... 9.3-9 1.3 Diesel Instrument Air System..................................................................... 9.3-9 1.3.1 Design Basis ............................................................................................... 9.3-9 1.3.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.3-10 1.3.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.3-10 1.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.3-10 1.3.4.1 Preoperational Testing of the Diesel Instrument Air System ................... 9.3-10 1.3.4.2 lnservice Testing ....................................................................................... 9.3-10 1.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.3-11 2 Process Sampling Systems........................................................................ 9.3-11 2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.3-11 2.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.3-13 2.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.3-14 2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.3-15 2.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.3-15 2.6 Post-Accident Sampling System............................................................... 9.3-15 2.6.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.3-16 2.6.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.3-16 2.6.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.3-18 2.6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.3-18
tion Title Page 2.6.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.3-18 3 Reactor Plant Vent and Drain Systems..................................................... 9.3-18 3.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.3-19 3.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.3-19 3.2.1 Reactor Plant Gaseous Vents System ....................................................... 9.3-19 3.2.2 Reactor Plant Aerated Vents System ........................................................ 9.3-19 3.2.3 Reactor Plant Gaseous Drains System...................................................... 9.3-20 3.2.4 Reactor Plant Aerated Drains System....................................................... 9.3-20 3.2.4.1 Safety-Related Porous Concrete Groundwater Sump (Underdrain System Sump) ........................................................................................... 9.3-21 3.2.5 Containment Isolation Valves................................................................... 9.3-21 3.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.3-22 3.4 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.3-23 3.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.3-24 3.5.1 Reactor Plant Gaseous Vent System......................................................... 9.3-24 3.5.2 Reactor Plant Aerated Vent System.......................................................... 9.3-24 3.5.3 Reactor Plant Gaseous Drain System ....................................................... 9.3-24 3.5.4 Reactor Plant Aerated Drain System ........................................................ 9.3-26 4 Chemical and Volume Control System .................................................... 9.3-30 4.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.3-30 4.1.1 Reactivity Control..................................................................................... 9.3-30 4.1.2 Regulation of Reactor Coolant Inventory ................................................. 9.3-31 4.1.3 Reactor Coolant Purification .................................................................... 9.3-32 4.1.4 Chemical Additions for Corrosion Control .............................................. 9.3-32 4.1.5 Seal Water Injection.................................................................................. 9.3-32 4.1.6 Hydrostatic Testing of the Reactor Coolant System................................. 9.3-32 4.1.7 Emergency Core Cooling.......................................................................... 9.3-32 4.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.3-32 4.2.1 Charging, Letdown, and Seal Water System ............................................ 9.3-33 4.2.2 Reactor Coolant Purification and Chemistry Control System .................. 9.3-35 4.2.3 Reactor Makeup Control System .............................................................. 9.3-36
tion Title Page 4.2.4 Boron Thermal Regeneration System....................................................... 9.3-40 4.2.5 Component Description ............................................................................ 9.3-41 4.2.6 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.3-52 4.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.3-57 4.3.1 Reactivity and Inventory Control ............................................................. 9.3-57 4.3.2 Reactor Coolant Purification .................................................................... 9.3-59 4.3.3 Seal Water Injection.................................................................................. 9.3-60 4.3.4 Hydrostatic Testing of the Reactor Coolant System................................. 9.3-60 4.3.5 Leakage Provisions ................................................................................... 9.3-60 4.3.6 Ability to Meet the Safeguards Function .................................................. 9.3-61 4.3.7 Heat Tracing ............................................................................................. 9.3-61 4.3.8 Abnormal Operation ................................................................................. 9.3-61 4.3.9 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis........................................................... 9.3-61 4.4 Testing Requirements and Inspection....................................................... 9.3-62 4.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.3-62 5 Boron Recovery System ........................................................................... 9.3-63 5.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.3-63 5.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.3-64 5.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.3-67 5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.3-68 5.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.3-68 6 References for Section 9.3 ........................................................................ 9.3-72 AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS....................................................................... 9.4-1 0 DESIGN TEMPERATURE BASES .......................................................... 9.4-1 1 Control Building Ventilation System ......................................................... 9.4-2 1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.4-2 1.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.4-3 1.3 Safety Evaluation ........................................................................................ 9.4-5 1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements......................................................... 9.4-6
tion Title Page 1.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................... 9.4-7 2 Fuel Building Ventilation System............................................................. 9.4-10 2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-10 2.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-11 2.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-13 2.4 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.4-14 2.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-14 3 Auxiliary Building Ventilation System .................................................... 9.4-16 3.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-16 3.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-18 3.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-20 3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-21 3.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-21 4 Turbine Building Area Ventilation System .............................................. 9.4-22 4.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-22 4.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-22 4.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-24 4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-24 4.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-24 5 Engineered Safety Features Building Ventilation System........................ 9.4-25 5.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-26 5.2 System Design .......................................................................................... 9.4-26 5.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-28 5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-30 5.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-30 6 Emergency Generator Enclosure Ventilation System .............................. 9.4-31 6.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-31 6.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-32 6.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-32 6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-33 6.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-33
tion Title Page 7 Containment Structure Ventilation System .............................................. 9.4-34 7.1 Containment Air Filtration Subsystem ..................................................... 9.4-34 7.1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-34 7.1.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-35 7.1.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-35 7.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-35 7.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-36 7.2 Containment Air Recirculation Subsystem............................................... 9.4-37 7.2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-37 7.2.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-37 7.2.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-38 7.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-38 7.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-38 7.3 Containment Purge Air Subsystem........................................................... 9.4-39 7.3.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-39 7.3.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-39 7.3.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-40 7.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-40 7.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-41 7.4 Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation and Cooling Subsystem....... 9.4-42 7.4.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-42 7.4.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-42 7.4.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-42 7.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-43 7.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-43 8 Circulating and Service Water Pumphouse and Other Yard Structures Ventila-tion Systems .............................................................................................. 9.4-44 8.1 Circulating and Service Water Pumphouse Ventilation System .............. 9.4-44 8.1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-44 8.1.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-45 8.1.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-46
tion Title Page 8.1.4 Inspection and Test Requirements ............................................................ 9.4-46 8.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-46 8.2 Yard Structures Ventilation System ......................................................... 9.4-47 8.2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-47 8.2.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-48 8.2.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-48 8.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-48 8.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-49 9 Waste Disposal Building Ventilation System........................................... 9.4-49 9.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-49 9.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-50 9.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-51 9.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-52 9.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-52 10 Main Steam Valve Building Ventilation System...................................... 9.4-53 10.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-53 10.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-54 10.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-55 10.4 Inspection and Test Requirements ............................................................ 9.4-56 10.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-56 11 Hydrogen Recombiner Building Heating, Ventilation, and air Conditioning (HVAC) System........................................................................................ 9.4-56 11.1 Design Basis ............................................................................................. 9.4-57 11.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-58 11.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-60 11.4 Inspection and Test Requirements ............................................................ 9.4-61 11.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-61 12 Miscellaneous Building Heating and Ventilation ..................................... 9.4-61 12.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-61 12.1.1 Service Building Ventilation and air conditioning System ...................... 9.4-61 12.1.2 Auxiliary Boiler Room Ventilation System.............................................. 9.4-62
tion Title Page 12.1.3 Hot Water Heating .................................................................................... 9.4-62 12.1.4 Hot Water Preheating System................................................................... 9.4-62 12.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-63 12.2.1 Service Building Ventilation and air conditioning System ...................... 9.4-63 12.2.2 Auxiliary Boiler Room Ventilation .......................................................... 9.4-65 12.2.3 Hot Water Heating System ....................................................................... 9.4-65 12.2.4 Hot Water Preheating................................................................................ 9.4-66 12.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-66 12.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-66 12.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-67 13 Technical Support Center Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning, and Filtration System ........................................................ 9.4-71 13.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.4-71 13.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.4-72 13.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.4-73 13.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.4-73 13.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.4-74 14 References for Section 9.4.0 ..................................................................... 9.4-74 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ............................................................. 9.5-1 1 Fire Protection System................................................................................ 9.5-1 1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.5-2 1.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.5-2 1.3 Safety Evaluation ........................................................................................ 9.5-2 1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirement .......................................................... 9.5-3 1.5 Personnel Qualification and Training ......................................................... 9.5-3 2 Communication Systems ............................................................................ 9.5-3 2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.5-3 2.2 System Design ............................................................................................ 9.5-3 2.2.1 Intraplant and Intrasite Communications.................................................... 9.5-3 2.2.2 Off site Communications ............................................................................ 9.5-8
tion Title Page 2.3 Design Evaluation..................................................................................... 9.5-14 2.4 Testing and Inspection .............................................................................. 9.5-14 3 Lighting Systems ...................................................................................... 9.5-14 3.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.5-14 3.2 System Design .......................................................................................... 9.5-15 3.3 Design Evaluation..................................................................................... 9.5-17 3.4 Inspection and Testing .............................................................................. 9.5-17 4 Emergency Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System.................. 9.5-17 4.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.5-17 4.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.5-18 4.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.5-22 4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.5-24 4.5 Instrument Requirements .......................................................................... 9.5-25 5 Emergency Diesel Engine Cooling Water System ................................... 9.5-26 5.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.5-26 5.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.5-27 5.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.5-28 5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.5-29 5.5 Instrument Requirements .......................................................................... 9.5-30 6 Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System ................................... 9.5-30 6.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.5-31 6.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.5-31 6.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.5-33 6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.5-34 6.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.5-35 7 Emergency Diesel Engine Lubrication System ........................................ 9.5-35 7.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.5-35 7.2 System Design .......................................................................................... 9.5-37 7.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.5-40 7.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.5-42 7.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.5-42
tion Title Page 8 Emergency Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System ........ 9.5-44 8.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.5-44 8.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.5-45 8.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.5-46 8.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.5-48 8.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.5-48 9 Hydrogen and Nitrogen Storage Distribution Systems............................. 9.5-49 9.1 Hydrogen System...................................................................................... 9.5-49 9.1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.5-49 9.1.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.5-49 9.1.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.5-50 9.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.5-51 9.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.5-51 9.2 Nitrogen System ....................................................................................... 9.5-52 9.2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.5-52 9.2.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.5-52 9.2.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.5-54 9.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.5-54 9.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.5-54 10 Containment Vacuum System .................................................................. 9.5-55 10.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.5-55 10.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.5-55 10.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.5-56 10.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 9.5-57 10.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 9.5-57 11 Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System ......................................... 9.5-58 11.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.5-58 11.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.5-58 11.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 9.5-60 12 References for Section 9.5 ........................................................................ 9.5-60
List of Tables mber Title 1 Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System Principal Component Design Characteristics 2 Performance Characteristics of the Fuel Pool Cooling System (One Fuel Pool Cooler Operating) 1 Service Water System Flow Requirements 2 Service Water System Heat Transfer Requirements 3 Automatic Operation of Service Water System Valves 4 Consequence of Component Failure 5 Reactor Plant Component Cooling System Major Component Design Data 6 Consequences of Component Failures Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System 7 Chilled Water System Heat Loads and Flow Rates 8 Chilled Water System Major Component Design Data 9 Neutron Shield Tank Cooling System Component Data Summary 10 Charging Pumps Cooling System Component Data Summary 11 Consequences of Component Failures, Charging Pumps Cooling Subsystem 12 Safety Injection Pumps Cooling System Component Data Summary 13 Consequences of Component Failures - Safety Injection Pumps Cooling Subsystem 14 Condensate Demineralizer Component Cooling Water System (3CCD) Design Data 15 Design Data for Major Components in the Water Treating Systems 16 Primary Grade Water System Major Component Design Data 17 Primary Grade Water Chemistry Specifications 1 Sampling Points - Reactor Plant 2 Sampling Points - Turbine Plant 3 Post-Accident Sampling System Principal Components Design and Parameters 4 Chemical and Volume Control System Design Parameters
mber Title 5 Principal Component Data Summary 6 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Chemical and Volume Control System Active Components - Normal Plant Operation and Safe Shutdown 7 Boron Recovery System Principal Component Design and Performance Characteristics 8 Assumptions Used in Activity Discharge Calculations 9 Boron Recovery System Failure Analysis 1 Indoor Design Temperatures for Control Building 2 Control Building Component Performance Characteristics for Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation Systems 3 Design Data for Major Components in Fuel Building Ventilation System 4 Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Principal Components and Design Parameters 5 Turbine Building Ventilation System Principal Components and Approximate Parameters 6 Engineered Safety Features Building Principal Components with Approximate Design Parameters 7 Engineered Safety Features Building Ventilation System Consequences of Component Failures 8 Containment Air Filtration Subsystem Principal Components Design and Approximate Parameters 9 Containment Air Recirculation System Principal Components Design and Approximate Parameters
-10 Containment Air Recirculation System Operation Modes and Approximate Design Conditions of Air Recirculation Fan Coolers 11 Containment Purge Air Subsystem Principal Components and Approximate Parameters 12 CRDM Cooling System Principal Components and Approximate Parameters 13 Waste Disposal Building Heating and Ventilation System 1 Compliance with Fire Protection Technical Requirements 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water System Leakage Summary Per Diesel*
mber Title 3 Design Data for Motor Components in Emergency Generator Cooling Water Systems 4 Design Data for the Major Components of Emergency Generator - Diesel Lubricating Oil System 5 Gaseous Hydrogen Storage Tubes 6 Equipment Supplied by the Nitrogen System 7 Nitrogen System Major Component Design Data 8 Design Data for Major Components in the Containment Vacuum System 9 Emergency Generator Auxiliary System Component Characteristics 10 Cooling Water System Leakages
List of Figures mber Title 1 Pictorial View of Typical Region 3 Rack Module 2 Top View of 6x6 Rack Array (Region 3) 2A Deleted by PKG FSC 98-MP3-116 3 Side View of 6x6 Rack Array (Region 3)
-4 Not Used 5 Adjustable Fuel Rack Leveling Pad (Region 3) 6 P&ID Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System 7 Bulk Pool Transient Temperature Plot (Full Core Offload) 7A Bulk Pool Transient Temperature Plot (Emergency Core Offload) 8 Cooldown Curve for Normal Operation (4 Hours Loss of Pool Cooling) 9 Refueling Machine 10 Spent Fuel Bridge and Hoisting Structure 11 New Fuel Elevator 12 Fuel Transfer System 13 DELETED BY PKG FSC 00-MP3-045 14 Spent Fuel Handling Tool 15 New Fuel Handling Tool 16 Reactor Internals Lifting Device 17 Quick Acting Stud Tensioner (sheet 1) 18 New Fuel Vault Layout 19 New Fuel Vault Elevation View 20 Fuel Assembly Transfer Limit Verses CCP Temperature 21 Millstone Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool Layout 22 Region 1 Blocking Scheme for 3-out-of-4 Storage Racks 22A Pictorial View of Typical Region 1 Rack Module 22B Typical Assemblage of Region 1 Cells
List of Figures (Continued) mber Title 22C Elevation View of Region 1 Rack Module
-23 Not Used 23A Pictorial View of Typical Region 2 Rack Module 23B Typical Array of Region 2 Cells 23C Elevation View of Region 2 Rack Module 24 Support Pedestal for Region 1 and Region 2 Rack Modules 1 (Sheets 1-4) P&ID Service Water 2 (Sheets 1-3) P&ID Reactor Plant Component Cooling System 3 (Sheets 1-2) P&ID Reactor Plant Chilled Water System 4 P&ID Safety Injection Pump and Neutron Shield Tank Cooling Systems 5 P&ID Charging Pump Sealing and Lubrication 6 P&ID Condensate Demineralizer Liquid Waste 7 (Sheets 1-6) P&ID Water Treatment System 7(2)(A) (Sheets 1-6) P&ID Water Treatment System (TEMPMOD) 7(5)(A) (Sheets 1-6) P&ID Water Treatment System (TEMPMOD) 8 (Sheets 1-3) P&ID Domestic Water and Sanitary Systems 9 (Sheets 1-3) P&ID Condensate System 10 (Sheets 1-2) P&ID Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water 11 P&ID Primary Grade Water System 1 (Sheets 1-4)P&ID Compressed Air System 2 (Sheets 1-4) P&ID Reactor Plant Sampling System 3 (Sheets 1-2) P&ID Turbine Plant Sampling 4 (Sheets 1-2) P&ID Radioactive Gaseous Waste System 5 P&ID Reactor Plant Gaseous Drains 6 (Sheets 1-3) P&ID Radioactive Liquid Waste and Aerated Drain 7 P&ID Reactor Coolant Pump Seals (Sheet 1)
-7(1)(A) Reactor Coolant Pump Seals (TEMP/MOD) 8 (Sheets 1-4) P&ID Chemical and Volume Control
List of Figures (Continued) mber Title 9 (Sheets 1-3) P&ID Boron Recovery System 9(2)(A) Boron Recovery System (TEMP/MOD) 10 (Sheets 1-3)P&ID Post Accident Sample System 1 (Sheets 1-5) P&ID Control Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 2 (Sheets 1-6) P&ID Reactor Plant Ventilation 3 (Sheets 1-5) P&IDs Turbine Plant Ventilation & ISO Bus Duct Cooling Systems 4 (Sheets 1-3) P&ID ESF and MSV Buildings Ventilation 5 P&ID Containment Structure Ventilation 6 (Sheets 1-3) P&ID Service Building Ventilation 7 (Sheets 1-2) P&ID Auxiliary Boiler and Ventilation 8 (Sheets 1-3) P&ID Hot Water Heating System 9 P&ID Technical Support Center, Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 1 Fire Protection System (Now in FPER Figure 4-1) 2 P&ID Emergency Generator Fuel Oil System 3 P&ID Emergency Diesel Related Systems (Sheets 1-5) 4 Fire Protection System (Now in FPER Figure 4-1) 5 P&ID Nitrogen and Hydrogen System (Sheets 1-3)
-6 Not Used 7 Site Water Fire Protection
FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING lstone 3 has chosen to comply with 10 CFR 50.68(b) concerning criticality accident uirements.
1 NEW FUEL STORAGE 1.1 Design Bases new fuel storage vault facility at Millstone Unit No. 3 has a total storage capacity of 96 fuel mblies. The storage locations are divided into four identical modules, each containing 24 tions in a 4 by 6 array. Each storage location consists of upper and lower steel guides holding uare tube into which an assembly is placed. Two rows of 0.005 g/cm2 B10 Boral sheets are ted in each of the four modules. The arrangement of the storage racks in the new fuel vault is wn in Figure 9.1-18.
fuel storage racks have two basic components: the support structure and the fuel storage cell.
support structure consists primarily of two horizontal grids which are supported by the four ner angles and which maintain the horizontal position and vertical alignment of free storage
- s. The free storage cells rest directly on the new fuel vault floor. Diagonal bracing is vided on the structure to accommodate the loads imposed by rack installation. A schematic wing of a 6 by 4 rack is shown in Figure 9.1-19.
h storage cell is nominally 8-15/16 inches square (I.D.) by 168 inches long with 0.90 inch ls. The cells are flared at the top to aid in insertion of the fuel assembly into the cell. Each rack dule is supported by adjustable swivel feet which raise the rack above the pool floor to the ht required to ensure proper leveling of the rack.
horizontal seismic loads are transmitted from the rack structure to the spent fuel pool walls at grids through rigid seismic bracing. No shear loads are transmitted to the pool floor or rack port pads. The vertical dead-weight and seismic loads are transmitted directly to the pool floor ach storage cell.
1.2 Facilities Description new fuel storage vault is a rectangular structure located in the northwestern quadrant of the building. The new fuel storage vault is 24 feet long by 15 feet 9 inches wide by 18 feet ches deep with the bottom approximately 9 feet 6 inches above grade. The interior walls and r of the vault are of reinforced concrete construction and are lined with 1/4 inch thick stainless l plate.
design and safety evaluation of the new fuel dry storage racks is in accordance with the NRC ition paper, Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage Handling Applications, April 1978.
racks are designated ANS Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I and are designed to hstand normal and postulated dead loads, live loads, and loads caused by the operating basis hquakes and safe shutdown earthquake events.
design of the racks is such that Keff remains less than or equal to 0.95 under all conditions, uding fuel handling accidents and the optimum moderation configuration. Due to the use of barriers and the close spacing of the cells, it is impossible to insert a fuel assembly in other design locations or between the rack periphery and the pool wall.
racks are also designed with adequate energy absorption capabilities to withstand the impact dropped fuel assembly from the maximum lift height of 5 feet over the top of the racks. The storage racks can withstand an uplift force equal to 2000 pounds.
materials used in construction are compatible with the fuel building/vault environment and all aces that come into contact with the fuel assemblies are made of annealed austenitic stainless
- l. All the materials are corrosion resistant and do not contaminate the fuel assemblies or vault ironment.
2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE 2.1 Design Bases spent fuel racks are designated ANS Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I, and are designed ithstand normal and postulated dead loads, live loads, loads due to thermal effects, and loads sed by the operating basis earthquakes (OBE) and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) events.
spent fuel pool liner and structure must sustain these loads. All rack modules are free ding and able to withstand tipping or overturning during postulated SSE events.
design of the spent fuel racks is such that K-effective of the spent fuel pool must remain less or equal to 0.95 under all conditions, including fuel handling accidents. Soluble boron in the nt fuel pool will be credited only for accident conditions which would not concurrently cause a on dilution event.
reactivity condition (K-effective) of the spent fuel pool is assured by the limiting condition operation and surveillance requirements imposed by the Technical Specifications (Sanders).
ny time, should K-effective be greater than 0.95, Technical Specifications require that the nt Fuel Pool be borated until K-effective is less than 0.95, and immediately initiate corrective ons to move a fuel assembly, located in a fuel storage region for which it is not allowed (as ned by the Technical Specification surveillance requirements):
Upon approval of the special nuclear handling document, immediately initiate actions to remove the fuel assembly from the incorrect fuel storage region per the instructions of the special nuclear material handling document.
In a timely manner, place the fuel assembly into an acceptable fuel storage region per the instructions of the special nuclear material handling document.
spent fuel racks are designed to maintain the stored fuel assemblies in a safe, coolable metry, with off site radiological dose consequences due to fuel handling events bounded by fuel handling event described in Section 15.7.4.
design of the spent fuel racks is in accordance with the following criteria:
- 1. General Design Criterion 2 (Section 3.1.2.2) as related to structures housing the racks and the racks themselves being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomenon, such as earthquakes.
- 2. General Design Criterion 5 (Section 3.1.2.44) as related to the capability to transfer heat loads from the safety related structures, systems and components (racks themselves) to a heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions.
- 3. General Design Criterion 61 (Section 3.1.2.61) as related to the rack design for fuel storage and handling, including the following elements:
- The capability for periodic inspection and testing of components important to safety.
- Provisions for decay heat removal.
- Suitable shielding for radiation protection.
- 4. General Design Criterion 62 (Section 3.1.2.62) Prevention of Criticality in fuel storage and handling, as related to the rack design.
- 5. USNRC Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Section 9.1.2, Spent Fuel Storage, Rev. 3, July 1981.
- 6. USNRC letter of April 14, 1978 to all Power Reactor Licensees-OT Position for Review and acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications including modification letter dated January 18, 1979.
spent fuel pool (Figure 3.8-63) is an L-shaped structure located in the southwestern quadrant he fuel building. Two adjacent areas, which are accessible from the spent fuel pool by means ealable gates, are the transfer canal and the spent fuel shipping cask pit.
spent fuel pool is designed to accommodate fuel racks that store new and spent fuel mblies. At the time of initial operation, installed capacity was at least one and one-third cores.
storage racks are located under water in the spent fuel pool.
re are three different fuel storage Regions in the spent fuel pool. The spent fuel storage pool tains 350 Region 1 storage locations, 673 Region 2 storage locations and 756 Region 3 storage tions, for a total of 1779 total available fuel storage locations. An additional Region 2 rack h 81 storage locations has been licensed by the NRC, but is not physically installed in the spent pool. If this additional rack is installed, the Region 2 storage capacity is 754 storage tions. The total storage capacity of the spent fuel pool is limited to no more than 1860 fuel mblies.
h fuel storage Region of the spent fuel pool has a different fuel storage rack design. Each ion is described next. Figure 9.1-21 shows a layout of the spent fuel pool.
ion 1 Region 1 fuel storage racks are made up of 5 rack modules. Each rack module is free standing is made up of a 7 by 10 array of storage cells. The total capacity of Region 1 is 350 storage
- s. Figures 9.1-22A, 9.1-22B, and 9.1-22C show a typical Region 1 rack. The Region 1 racks e a nominal 10.0 inch (North/South) and a nominal 10.455 inch (East/West) center to center cing between adjacent fuel storage locations. The Region 1 storage racks have a neutron flux design, which uses BORAL as the active neutron absorber. BORAL panels are included on peripheral rack locations.
RAL is a thermal neutron poison material composed of boron carbide and an aluminum alloy.
neutron absorbing central layer of BORAL is clad with permanently bonded surfaces of minum. The BORAL is held within the rack by a stainless steel sheath welded to the rack wall.
BORAL panels are a minimum 148 inches in length to fully shadow the active fuel height, uding the blanket region, and BORAL panels are conservatively present on all exterior rack s.
h rack module is provided with adjustable support legs which allow remote leveling of the after its placement in the spent fuel pool (Figure 9.1-24).
ion 1 spent fuel racks can store fuel in either of 2 configurations, described next:
(1) Region 1 spent fuel racks with fuel allowed to be stored in every storage location is called a 4-OUT-OF-4 Region 1 storage configuration. To store
(2) Region 1 spent fuel racks may also contain a cell blocking device in every 4th location for criticality control. This Region 1 storage configuration is called a 3-OUT-OF-4 Region 1 storage configuration. This 4th location is referred to as the blocked location. Fuel stored in this 3-OUT-OF-4 configuration may be fresh fuel up to 5 weight percent nominal U-235 initial fuel enrichment.
re is no requirement on how many Region 1 storage cells are designated for 3-OUT-OF-4, 4-OUT-OF-4 storage. However, 3-OUT-OF-4 storage must meet established interface ts. The boundary configuration between Region 1 3-OUT-OF-4 storage and other Region 1 egion 2 storage configurations must have cell blockers positioned in the outermost row of the ion 1 3-OUT-OF-4 storage perimeter. Figure 9.1-22 shows the location of cell blockers in ion 1 when the Region 1 racks were first placed in the spent fuel pool. The number and tions of Region 1 cell blockers may be changed provided interface requirements are met.
ion 2 Region 2 fuel storage racks are made up of 9 rack modules. Each rack module is free standing h several different storage array sizes.
total installed capacity of Region 2 is 673 storage cells. Figures 9.1-23A, 9.1-23B and 9.1-show a typical Region 2 rack. An additional (tenth) Region 2 rack with 81 storage locations been licensed by the NRC, but is not physically installed in the spent fuel pool. If this rack is alled, the Region 2 storage capacity is 754 storage locations. The total storage capacity of the nt fuel pool is limited to no more than 1860 fuel assemblies. If this tenth rack is placed in the nt fuel pool, it would be located as shown in Figure 9.1-21.
Region 2 racks have a nominal 9.017 inch center to center spacing between adjacent fuel age locations. Like the Region 1 racks, the Region 2 storage racks use BORAL as the active tron absorber. The Region 2 storage racks have a single BORAL panel between adjacent fuel mblies. BORAL panels are included on all peripheral rack locations.
h rack module is provided with adjustable support legs which allow remote leveling of the after its placement in the spent fuel pool (Figure 9.1-24).
egion 2, fuel may be stored in all available Region 2 storage locations, provided that blished limits on minimum fuel burnup as a function of initial nominal U-235 fuel enrichment met. Also, the decay time of the fuel may be used to reduce the fuel burnup requirements for to be stored in this region of the spent fuel pool.
Region 3 fuel storage racks are made up of 21 rack modules. Each rack module is free ding and is made up of a 6 by 6 array of storage cells. Each rack consists of cells welded to a base and welded together at the top through an upper grid to form an integral structure. The l capacity of Region 3 is 756 storage cells. Figures 9.1-1 and 9.1-3 show a typical Region 3
. The Region 3 racks have a nominal 10.35 inch center to center spacing (Figure 9.1-2) ween adjacent fuel storage locations. The Region 3 storage racks have a neutron flux trap gn, which uses Boraflex as the active neutron absorber. However, Boraflex is no longer ited in the criticality analysis of these racks. Each rack module is provided with adjustable ling pads at the center of the four corner cells within the module (Figure 9.1-5).
egion 3, fuel may be stored in all available Region 3 storage locations, provided that blished limits on minimum fuel burnup as a function of initial nominal U-235 fuel enrichment met. Also, the decay time of the fuel may be used to reduce the fuel burnup requirements for to be stored in this region of the spent fuel pool.
2.3 Safety Evaluation of Spent Fuel Racks design and safety evaluation of the spent fuel racks is in accordance with the NRC position er, Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications, April 1978.
racks are designated ANS Safety Class 3 and Seismic Category I and are designed to hstand normal and postulated dead loads, live loads, loads due to thermal effects, and loads sed by the operating basis earthquakes and safe shutdown earthquake events.
design basis for preventing criticality in the spent fuel pool is that, considering possible ations, there is a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent confidence level that the effective tiplication factor (Keff) of the fuel assembly array will be less than 0.95 as recommended in SI N210-1976. The design of the racks is such that Keff meets this design basis under all ditions, including fuel handling accidents, seismic events, and loss of fuel pool cooling.
ortant aspects of the criticality safety analysis of the spent fuel storage racks are:
No credit is taken for soluble boron except as described below for certain accident conditions.
Reactivity allowances are calculated corresponding to manufacturing tolerances for important fuel and rack dimensions.
The most reactive fuel assembly designs present in the pool are considered in the analysis.
The SFP bulk water temperature corresponding to maximum reactivity in the normal operating temperature range is accounted for in the criticality analysis. The normal operating SFP bulk water temperature range used in the criticality analysis is 32°F to 160°F, which bounds the actual normal operating temperature range.
centimeter, respectively. Region 3 takes no credit for neutron absorption by Boraflex.
Penalties are applied for methods, uncertainties, and biases in the calculation of Keff.
icality accidents considered are:
Lateral rack movement due to seismic events.
Inadvertent placement (or drop) of a single 5 weight percent fresh fuel assembly into a blocked location in the Region 1 3-OUT-OF-4 configuration, with all other storage locations containing the maximum permissible fuel reactivity.
Inadvertent placement (or drop) of a single 5 weight percent fresh fuel assembly into either an empty location in Region 1 4-OUT-OF-4, or Region 2, or Region 3, with all other storage locations containing the maximum permissible fuel reactivity allowed by that Region.
Inadvertent placement (or drop) of a single 5 weight percent fresh fuel assembly outside and adjacent to any Region fuel storage rack, with the rack containing the maximum permissible fuel reactivity allowed by that Region.
Dropped fuel assembly on the top of the storage racks.
Spent Fuel Pool temperature increases to boiling.
the above accident conditions:
No soluble boron is needed for lateral rack movement due to a seismic event, or drop of a fuel assembly on top of the racks.
For the inadvertent placement (or drop) of a single 5 weight percent fresh fuel assembly into any vacant or blocked storage cell, or external to the racks, 800 ppm of soluble boron will ensure that Keff of the fuel assembly array will be less than 0.95.
For Regions 1 and 2, the most reactive SFP temperature is in the normal operating temperature range, therefore, there is no reactivity increase associated with SFP temperature exceeding 160°F. For Region 3, there would be a reactivity increase if temperature exceeded 160°F, with boiling being the most reactive condition. However, temperatures in excess of 160°F are outside the design basis of the spent fuel pool cooling system.
Region 3 (Westinghouse) racks are designed with adequate energy absorption capabilities to hstand the impact of a dropped fuel assembly with Rod Control Cluster Assembly (RCCA) associated handling tool with a dry weight of up to 2,400 pounds from the maximum lift
ormed demonstrate that the configuration of the fuel assemblies, storage cell geometry and tron absorber material configuration remain consistent with the configurations used in the mal hydraulic and criticality evaluations. Region 1 and Region 2 racks are designed with quate energy absorption capabilities to withstand the impact of the fuel assembly, RCCA, and ciated handling tool drop, assuming parameters that bound those assumed for the previously lyzed drop onto Region 3 fuel racks.
fuel assembly drop accidents were found to produce localized damage well within the design ts for the racks. The cell geometry and the configurations of the stored fuel and neutron orber are not compromised. Therefore, there are no resulting thermal-hydraulic or criticality cerns.
e of the analyzed scenarios result in any radiological concerns, since all parameters related to damage (weight/design of fuel assembly, drop height, assembly orientation) are enveloped by e of the design basis fuel handling accident. Therefore, the radiological consequences lting from a fuel assembly drop continue to be bounded by the design basis accident.
new fuel handling crane, which is capable of carrying loads greater than that of a fuel mbly, is prevented by interlocks or administrative controls, or both, from carrying such loads r spent fuel in the spent fuel pool. All regions of fuel storage racks can withstand an uplift e equal to the uplift capability of the spent fuel bridge and hoist.
materials used in construction are compatible with the spent fuel pool environment and all aces that come into contact with the fuel assemblies are made of annealed austenitic stainless
- l. All the materials are corrosion resistant and do not contaminate the fuel assemblies or pool ironment.
rder to monitor the effectiveness of the BORAL neutron absorber material used in Region 1 2 storage racks of the spent fuel pool, provision is made for a material monitoring program.
re is no need for a Boraflex monitoring program, since Boraflex is not credited in the cality analysis.
BORAL coupon monitoring program includes coupons suspended on a mounting (called a e) placed in a designated cell and surrounded by spent fuel. Coupons will be removed from array on a prescribed schedule and certain physical and chemical properties measured. The pon program will use a total of 8 test coupons.
schedule for BORAL coupon removal is just prior to the following refueling outages:
eling outage after End-of-Cycle (EOC) 8, EOC 9, EOC 10, EOC 12, EOC 15, EOC 18, EOC and one spare.
coupon tree is surrounded by freshly discharged fuel assemblies at each of the first 5 elings following installation of the racks to assure that the coupons will have experienced a
luation of the coupons removed will provide information of the effects of the radiation, mical and thermal environment of the pool and by inference, comparable information on the RAL panels in the racks.
ign of the facility in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.13 ensures adequate safety under mal and postulated accident conditions.
methodology used in the criticality analysis is discussed in Section 4.3.2.6.
2.4 Spent Fuel Storage in an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) h the installation of the Millstone ISFSI, dry storage of Unit 3 spent fuel on the Millstone SI provides an available fuel storage option. Millstone has selected the NUHOMS spent fuel age system as authorized per 10 CFR 72 and approved by the NRC in Certificate of mpliance Number 1004 for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
ISFSI is designed to accommodate on site spent fuel storage through the end of plant life uding 20 year license renewal, or until transfer of the spent fuel to a DOE repository. The nt fuel storage canisters are dual purpose, design for storage in an ISFSI per 10 CFR 72 uirements and transport off site in a spent fuel shipping cask per 10 CFR 71 requirements.
NUHOMS system consists of reinforced concrete horizontal storage modules (HSMs) and l dry shielded canisters (DSCs) assembled on a concrete pad within the site protected area ndary. System operation is totally passive crediting natural air circulation for cooling.
nt fuel is selected based on the Unit 3 spent fuel strategy and the NUHOMS Technical cification requirements for fuel qualification. The DSC consists of a shell and basket mbly, which can accommodate 32 fuel assemblies. The DSC is inserted into a transfer cask placed in the cask pit area of the Unit 3 spent fuel pool for fuel loading. Once loaded, the sfer cask/DSC is relocated to the cask washdown sump area for draining, drying, closure rations and decontamination. The transfer cask is utilized to transfer the loaded DSC to the SI pad for loading into an HSM. The HSM array consists of precast concrete components ming a series of concrete storage modules for dry shielded canisters storing spent fuel.
3 FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM fuel pool cooling and purification system (Figure 9.1-6) removes decay heat from spent fuel ed in the fuel pool and provides adequate clarification and purification of water in the fuel l, refueling cavity, and refueling water storage tank. Table 9.1-1 lists the principal component gn characteristics for the system. Table 9.1-2 gives the fuel pool cooling system performance racteristics. Figure 3.8-63 shows equipment locations.
fuel pool cooling and purification system is designed in accordance with the following eria:
- 1. General Design Criterion 2 (Section 3.1.2.2), as related to structures housing the system and the cooling portion of the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, established in Chapters 2 and 3.
- 2. General Design Criterion 4 (Section 3.1.2.4), with respect to structures housing the systems and the cooling portion of the system being capable of withstanding the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
- 3. General Design Criterion 5 (Section 3.1.2.5), as related to shared systems and components important to safety being capable of performing required safety functions.
- 4. General Design Criterion 44 (Section 3.1.2.44), to include:
The capability to transfer heat loads from safety related structures, systems, and components to a heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions.
Suitable redundancy of components so that safety functions can be performed assuming a single active failure of a component coincident with the loss of all offsite power.
The capability to isolate components, systems, or piping, if required, so that the safety system function is not compromised.
- 5. General Design Criterion 45 (Section 3.1.2.45), as related to design provisions to permit periodic inspection of safety related components and equipment.
- 6. General Design Criterion 46 (Section 3.1.2.46), as related to the design provisions to permit operational functional testing of safety related systems or components to assure structural integrity and system leak tightness, operability, and adequate performance of active system components, and the capability of the integrated system to perform required functions during normal, shutdown, and accident situations.
- 7. General Design Criterion 61 (Section 3.1.2.61), as related to the system design for fuel storage and handling of radioactive materials, including the following elements:
Provisions for containment, confinement, and filtering.
Provisions for decay heat removal.
The capability to prevent reduction in fuel storage coolant inventory under accident conditions.
- 8. General Design Criterion 63 (Section 3.1.2.63), as it relates to monitoring systems provided to detect conditions that could result in the loss of decay heat removal, to detect excessive radiation levels, and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
- 9. Regulatory Guide 1.13 (Section 1.8, Table 1.8-1), as it relates to the system design to prevent damage resulting from the SSE.
- 10. Regulatory Guide 1.26 (Section 1.8, Table 1.8-1), as it relates to quality group classification of the system and its components.
- 11. Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Section 1.8, Table 1.8-1), as it relates to the seismic design classification of system components.
- 12. Branch Technical Position APCSB 3-1, as it relates to breaks in moderate energy piping system outside containment.
- 13. The temperature of the fuel pool water is maintained at or below 150°F for the normal operating condition of the spent fuel pool.
- 14. The temperature of the fuel pool water should not exceed a maximum temperature of 150°F for any long-term period. The maximum peak temperature the spent fuel pool water can reach is 200°F.
- 15. Purity and clarity of the refueling cavity and fuel pool water is maintained to permit observation of fuel assembly handling during refueling operations.
- 16. Filtration and ion exchange capability are provided to remove suspended and dissolved radionuclides to allow access to required areas.
- 17. The fuel pool cooling system and the service water makeup lines are safety related, Seismic Category I, and are designated SC-3 and designed to the requirements of ASME III, Class 3.
- 18. The purification system is not safety related and is designated nonnuclear safety (NNS).
core offload of 193 fresh fuel assemblies.
- 20. A full core offload is designated as a normal evolution.
3.2 System Description spent fuel pool cooling system has been analyzed to remove the decay heat load of up to 1960 assemblies and maintain a bulk pool temperature at or below 150°F using a single train of nt fuel pool cooling. A thermal-hydraulic analysis for these bounding heat loads was ormed which provided bulk pool temperature curves for three scenarios, a normal full core oad heat load (Figure 9.1-7), an emergency full core offload heat load (Figure 9.1-7A) and a mal operation - loss of fuel pool cooling event (Figure 9.1-8). These curves represent the lysis performed for cooling water to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers (CCP) at F, the upper design temperature limit. For normal and emergency full core offloads, shorter offload times are permitted for lower CCP temperatures as shown in Figure 9.1-20.
thermal-hydraulic analysis assumes that outages for full core offloads will have a minimum ation of 25 days from reactor shutdown to entry into Mode 4 following core reload and that a imum of 97 fuel assemblies recently discharged will remain in the spent fuel pool. Refueling ges outside these conditions (less than 25 days or greater than 97 assemblies) will require cific calculations to show that the spent fuel pool decay heat levels are less that or equal to x 106 BTU/hr.
ling for the spent fuel pool consists of two cooling mechanisms. The first is the active cooling vided by the fuel pool heat exchangers. The spent fuel pool water flows from the fuel pool harge through either of the two fuel pool cooling pumps and through the tube side of either pool cooler, and then returns to the fuel pool. Table 9.1-2 lists the performance racteristics of the fuel pool cooling system. One fuel pool cooling pump and cooler are mally in service. Cooling for the fuel pool coolers is provided by the reactor plant component ling water system (Section 9.2.2.1). The second mechanism is the passive cooling provided by porative cooling from the surface of the pool.
purification system consists of two purification pumps, two purification prefilters, one coarse r, one purification demineralizer, and one postfilter. This equipment is not safety related.
purification system provides means for filtering and demineralizing the following areas:
- 1. The fuel pool water to improve optical clarity for ease of underwater fuel handling and to reduce radioactive contamination in the water
- 2. The refueling cavity water during a refueling operation to improve optical clarity for ease of underwater fuel handling, and to reduce radioactive contamination in the water
er pump can be used with the prefilter to filter the water in the RWST, in the refueling cavity, n the fuel pool.
flow rate for filtration is sufficient to process the entire spent fuel pool water inventory in roximately 3 days. This water can also be purified by diverting the flow through the fication demineralizer. In addition, by operating both pumps, the system can be used to purify fuel pool and simultaneously filter either the RWST or the refueling cavity.
fuel pool filters and demineralizer are located in shielded cubicles to minimize operator osure.
manently installed skimmers in the fuel pool and refueling cavity remove particles on the ace of the water, thus aiding optical clarity.
e sources of impurities are corrosion products, hydroxides, and crud deposited in the reactor sel. Fuel defects, Inconel 718, and other nickel bearing alloys are sources of soluble onuclides. These impurities and radionuclides enter the fuel pool through the fuel transfer in the form of a hydrated film adhered to the spent fuel assemblies.
mal makeup to the fuel pool, necessitated by losses due to evaporation, is primary grade water m the primary grade water system (Section 9.2.8). Borated water from the RWST can be used ill the fuel pool at a concentration matching that used in the refueling cavity during refueling rations. Both of these systems connect to the spent fuel pool through the non-safety related fication system.
odic sampling from the local sample connections is performed to check the boron centration of the fuel pool water. Boric acid can be added manually, if required, from the dry c acid inventory to maintain the minimum boron concentration of 800 ppm. A minimum of 0 ppm is required during refueling operations when fuel is being transferred between the fuel l and refueling cavity to preclude uncontrolled dilution of the filled portion of the RCS.
uld low water level in the fuel pool be alarmed, the operator can stop the operating pumps and corrective actions to locate and isolate the leak. Water from the safety related service water em can be used as an emergency supply to the spent fuel pool. Service water is normally ated from the fuel pool by blank flanges and isolation valves in the supply pipe. Should an rgency arise, service water flow can be established after removing the blank flanges and alling a temporary spoolpiece in the pipe. In addition, water from the fire protection system borated water from the refueling water storage tank (Section 6.22), a Seismic Category I tank, available. Finally, a SFP make-up connection to the emergency Service Water make-up ng, downstream of the removed spool piece, provides a means for a portable diesel driven p to deliver make-up water to the Spent Fuel Pool. This connection is a defense-in-depth gn feature that is available for coping with an extended loss of AC power (ELAP) event. The tion of this BDB SFP FLEX make-up connection is shown on Figure 9.1-6.
s leads to the containment sump. This arrangement makes it possible for water from the nch spray system and containment recirculation system which falls into the refueling cavity to the containment recirculation system. The valves on the tap line are open during plant ration and closed during refueling. The purification pumps transfer the water from the eling cavity to the RWST. The spent fuel cask pool has a drain line to the purification pumps.
lank flanged, permanently installed, piping arrangement terminates in the spent fuel shipping k storage area. Should this piping arrangement be needed, a temporary flanged spool piece can nserted in the line to enable one of the fuel pool purification pumps to pump the water within spent fuel shipping cask storage area either through the prefilters or through the prefilters, ineralizer, and postfilter to the boron recovery tanks (Section 9.3.5). Administrative cedures are followed to assure that the cask storage area gate is inserted in the transfer slot in wall separating the fuel pool from the spent fuel shipping cask storage area before pumping mences. However, the design of the gate is such that even with the gate open, the fuel pool not be drained below the top of the active fuel region of the fuel assemblies.
ng, valves, and components of this system making contact with the fuel pool water are enitic stainless steel which is corrosion- resistant to the boric acid solution.
ample connection is provided downstream of the fuel pool demineralizer for sample removal heck the gross activity, particulate matter, boric acid concentration, and component ormance.
3.3 Safety Evaluation o full-size fuel pool cooling pumps and two full-size fuel pool coolers are provided to ensure percent redundant cooling capacity. This portion of the system is Seismic Category I and ety Class 3. The Seismic Category I cooling portion of the fuel pool cooling and purification em is independent of the nonseismic purification portion. Failure of the purification portion in arthquake does not affect the operation of the cooling trains. Attached to the inlet of the fuel l cooling pump suction piping is a QA Category I vortex suppressor to prevent vortexing in fuel pool at the piping inlet.
h pipe which enters the fuel pool has a 1/2 inch or larger vent hole drilled into the pipe to act n anti-siphoning device or terminates at an elevation above these vent holes. These provisions vent siphoning of the fuel pool water to uncover the spent fuel (see Figure 9.1-6).
pump and one cooler are sufficient to maintain the pool temperatures as indicated in le 9.1-2.
evaluation of the capabilities of the spent fuel pool cooling system has been performed for mal and abnormal conditions.
decay heat loads were calculated for a number of pool operating conditions at the end of pool These are:
fuel pool after one year of operation at full power. The core offload rate and minimum fuel decay time prior to starting core offload to the spent fuel pool is dependent on CCP inlet temperature to the Spent Fuel Pool heat exchangers as depicted in Figure 9.1-20.
- 2. Emergency full core offload (maximum bulk pool temperature - 150°F) - the full reactor core (193 assemblies) from the end-of-life cycle is offloaded to the spent fuel pool after a previous outage lasting for 10 days with 36 days of operation at full power. The heat load to the spent fuel pool is fully bounded by the heat load for a normal full core offload. The core offload rate and minimum fuel decay time prior to starting core offload to the spent fuel pool is dependent on CCP inlet temperature to the Spent Fuel Pool heat exchangers as depicted in Figure 9.1-20.
- 3. Normal Operation/Loss of Pool Cooling - End of life core in the reactor vessel, the latest refueling load (97 assemblies) is in the spent fuel pool with 25 days (600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br />) of decay time. Following a design basis accident with loss of power, cooling to the spent fuel pool is lost for four hours before it is restored. Cooling to the pool is limited to the evaporative heat loss. Cooling water temperature prior to loss of cooling is assumed to be at the bounding limit of 95°F.
determine the decay heat load, the fuel bundles were analyzed as being transferred to the spent pool at an average rate of three bundles per hour over the time it takes to off-load the assumed load.
decay heat in the spent fuel pool is the combination of decay heat from the previously harged fuel assemblies and the decay heat from the most recently discharged fuel assemblies.
decay heat load for cycle 1 through cycle 5 discharged fuel was modeled on historical fuel harge data. The projected fuel discharges for cycles 6 through the end of plant life are servatively modeled at a bounding average batch burnup of 60,000 Mwd/MtU. The projected ber of fuel assemblies discharged is conservative in that the most limiting scenario (yielding largest discharge) was used. The most limiting scenario selected was a half core loading, sisting of alternating fresh fuel batches of 97 and 96 fuel assemblies per cycle. This resulted in harging 1960 Millstone Unit 3 fuel assemblies at the end of plant life (including the final full discharge).
ngle active failure of the spent fuel cooling system was evaluated. A failure is assumed to ble the active train of cooling and 30 minutes is required to put the standby train into service.
uld this failure occur during refueling at the peak pool temperature, forced cooling would be for 30 minutes. In this time, spent fuel pool bulk temperature would increase to roximately 155°F before cooling was restored and spent fuel pool bulk temperature returned elow 150°F.
owing a design basis accident with loss of power, the reactor plant component cooling water em is not available to cool the spent fuel pool coolers until approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the
evaluated for normal plant operation in Case 3 above where pool temperature rose to a imum of 148.8°F. An additional analysis, which is outside the design basis of the spent fuel l cooling system, was conducted for the loss of spent fuel pool cooling during a full core oad. The most limiting case occurs when the pool is at 150°F with the highest heat load in the
- l. For this case, a pool temperature of 200°F would be reached after 4.41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br />. For all cases loss of pool cooling, the pool temperature is maintained below 200°F when pool cooling is ored after four hours.
time required to re-establish Service Water to the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water em following a LOCA is dependent upon the heat loads in the spent fuel pool. Service Water p, strainer and discharge check valve maintenance activities are scheduled at times during the rating cycle when spent fuel pool heat loads are reduced.
a safety grade cold shutdown, the reactor plant component cooling water system supply perature is permitted to increase to 113°F (see Section 9.2.2.1.2). The safety grade cold tdown analysis demonstrates that the spent fuel pool peak bulk operating temperature remains r below 150°F for this mode of operation.
undant safety grade fuel pool temperature indication is provided on the main control board.
undant safety class 3 level switches are connected to the fuel pool which alarm in the control
- m. They are set to provide indication before the water level falls below 23 feet above the top of fuel racks. Piping penetration are at least 11 feet above the top of the spent fuel so that failure nlets, outlets or accidental piping leaks cannot reduce the water below this level.
mal makeup water to the spent fuel pool is the primary grade water system (Section 9.2.8).
uld primary grade water be unavailable, makeup water can be provided from the refueling er storage tank, a Seismic Category I source (Section 6.2.2). Both of these systems connect to spent fuel pool through the non-nuclear safety purification system. Water can also be provided m the hose station of the fire protection system near the spent fuel pool. In addition, as an itional safety feature for the unlikely event of failure of both cooling trains and loss of the rces above, a Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3 flow path is provided from the service water em (Section 9.2.1) to provide makeup water. To prevent contamination of the pool from ice water during normal conditions, a spool piece is included at the fuel pool end of the ng, with a blind flange normally in place. Sufficient time exists before pool boiling to install spool piece.
3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements fuel pool level and temperature instrumentation is tested and calibrated on a periodic basis.
safety related trains are tested for operability in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
ual inspection of system components and instrumentation is conducted periodically.
tion 6.2.6.3.
system is in operation during refueling and whenever spent fuel is stored in the fuel pool.
refore, system operational tests are not required.
spent fuel pool water is sampled weekly for pH, conductivity, boron, chloride, fluoride, idity, and total gamma activity. Chloride and fluoride levels must be less than 0.15 ppm each, le acceptable pH may vary between 4.2 and 10.5. Gamma activity samples, taken from the ineralizer inlet and outlet, monitor the demineralizes decontamination factor. Local erential pressure indicators across the filters and demineralizers are used to indicate when rs and resins should be replaced.
indicators alarm at a local control panel in the fuel building. These setpoints are based upon rating experience.
on concentration is monitored prior to refueling operations as stated in Section 9.1.4.2.2.
3.5 Instrumentation Requirements fuel pool has redundant safety grade low level alarm lights and temperature indicators vided in the main control room. Nonsafety grade level indication is provided locally and high low level alarms are provided both locally and in the main control room. Continuous safety augmented quality wide range level indication is provided remotely in the Auxiliary lding.
cal temperature indicator is provided on the common fuel pool cooler inlet piping and local perature indicators are provided on each fuel pool cooler outlet. Fuel pool cooler outlet high perature is indicated and alarmed locally. Nonsafety grade fuel pool temperature indication is vided locally and high temperature alarms are provided both locally and in the main control
- m. Fuel pool cooler outlet flow is indicated, and low flow alarmed, locally. Fuel pool cooler rumentation is nonsafety grade.
fuel pool cooling pumps have control switches and indicating lights in the main control room.
discharges of all pumps have local pressure indicators. The cooling pumps can be operated ually either from the control room or the switchgear. The purification pumps are operated lly.
w through the fuel pool demineralizer is controlled automatically. Local differential pressure cators are used across the filters and demineralizer to indicate cleanness.
iation monitors installed in the fuel pool area alarm both locally and in the control room.
ximum purification flow can be established in the event of an alarm.
4.1 Design Bases fuel handling system (FHS) consists of equipment and structures used for conducting the eling operation in a safe manner; this system conforms to General Design Criteria 61 and 62 0 CFR 50, Appendix A.
following design bases apply to the FHS:
- 1. Fuel handling devices have provisions to avoid dropping or jamming of fuel assemblies during transfer operation.
- 2. Handling equipment has provisions to avoid dropping of fuel handling devices during the fuel transfer operation.
- 3. Handling equipment used to raise and lower spent fuel has a limited maximum lift height so that the minimum required depth of water shielding is maintained.
- 4. The fuel transfer system (FTS), where it penetrates the containment, has provisions to preserve the integrity of the containment pressure boundary.
- 5. Criticality during fuel handling operations is prevented by the geometrically safe configuration of the fuel handling equipment.
- 6. In the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), handling equipment cannot fail in such a manner so as to damage seismic Category I equipment or spent fuel assemblies.
- 7. The inertial loads imparted to the fuel assemblies or core components during handling operations are less than potential damage-causing loads.
- 8. Physical safety features are provided for personnel who operate handling equipment.
- 9. The spent fuel shipping cask crane is physically prevented from bringing the spent fuel shipping cask over the spent fuel pool.
- 10. Provisions have been included such that a spent fuel transfer cask drop is not credible. Therefore, there will be no damage to safety related equipment or spent fuel assemblies.
- 11. The new fuel handling crane is equipped with interlocks such that it can not carry a load over the spent fuel pool. Administrative controls may be used in lieu of crane interlocks and physical stops for handling fuel racks, spent fuel pool gates, or loads less than 2,200 lbs.
normal handling height.
4.2 System Description FHS consists of the equipment needed for the refueling operation in the reactor core.
ically, this equipment is comprised of core component and reactor component hoisting ipment, handling equipment, and an FTS. The structures associated with the fuel handling ipment are the refueling cavity, the fuel transfer canal, and the fuel storage area.
elevation and arrangement drawings of the fuel handling facilities are shown on Figure 3.8-4.2.1 Fuel Handling Description new fuel handling, the 10 ton new fuel receiving crane transfers the new fuel assembly ping containers from the delivery truck to either a storage location or a location where the 10 new fuel handling crane has access to the new fuel assemblies in their shipping containers.
new fuel handling crane moves the new fuel assemblies from their shipping containers to the fuel dry storage vault and from the new fuel dry storage vault to the spent fuel pool via the fuel elevator. New fuel assemblies received for initial core loading and subsequent fuel ments are removed one at a time from the shipping container and moved into the new fuel age vault area for inspection. After completion of inspection, the acceptable new fuel mblies are lowered by the new fuel elevator for interim storage in the spent fuel racks in the nt fuel pool.
spent fuel handling, the fuel handling equipment handles the spent fuel assemblies underwater m the time they leave the reactor vessel until they are placed in a container for shipment from site. Underwater transfer of spent fuel assemblies provides an effective, economic, and sparent radiation shield, as well as a reliable cooling medium for removal of decay heat. The c acid concentration in the water, as well as spent fuel storage racks that contain neutron lding materials, is sufficient to preclude criticality. No credit is taken for the boric acid centration in the spent fuel pool criticality calculations for the normal storage configuration.
dit is taken for boric acid concentration for fuel handling events.
associated fuel handling structures may be generally divided into two areas. First, the eling cavity and fuel transfer canal on the containment side of the fuel transfer tube, flooded y during plant shutdown for refueling. Second, the spent fuel pool and fuel transfer canal on fuel storage side, kept full of water and always accessible to operating personnel. The fuel age and containment sides of the fuel transfer canal are connected by a fuel transfer tube fitted h a blind flange on the containment end and a valve on the fuel storage area end. The blind ge is in place except during refueling to ensure containment integrity. Fuel is carried through tube on an underwater transfer car.
ed in the FTS fuel container, the lifting arm pivots the fuel assembly to the horizontal position passage through the fuel transfer tube. After the transfer car transports the fuel assembly ugh the transfer tube, the lifting arm at that end of the tube pivots the assembly to a vertical ition so that the assembly can be lifted out of the fuel container.
he fuel building, fuel assemblies are moved about by the spent fuel bridge and hoist. When ng a fuel assembly, the hoist uses a long-handled tool which ensures that sufficient radiation lding is maintained. Initially, a shorter tool is used to handle new fuel assemblies, but the new elevator must be used to lower the assembly to a depth at which the bridge and hoist, using long- handled tool, can move the new fuel assemblies into the fuel storage racks or the FTS.
ay heat, generated by the spent fuel assemblies in the fuel pool, is removed by the spent fuel l cooling and purification system. After a sufficient decay period, the spent fuel assemblies be removed from the fuel racks with the bridge and hoist and loaded into a spent fuel ping cask for removal from the site.
4.2.2 Refueling Procedure ueling Procedure r to initiating refueling operations, the reactor coolant system S) is borated and cooled down to refueling shutdown conditions. The following significant nts are ensured by the refueling procedure:
- 1. The refueling water and the reactor coolant contain approximately 2,600 parts per million (ppm) boron. This concentration, together with the negative reactivity of the control rods, is sufficient to keep the core subcritical keff 0.95 during the refueling operations. It is also sufficient to maintain the core subcritical in the unlikely event that all of the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCA) were removed from the core.
- 2. The water level in the refueling cavity is high enough to keep the radiation levels within acceptable limits when the fuel assemblies are being removed from the core.
refueling operation is divided into four major phases:
- 1. Containment Entry
- 2. Preparation for Fuel Handling
- 3. Fuel Handling
eneral description of a typical refueling operation through the phases is given as follows:
Phase I -Containment Entry The reactor is shut down and cooled to cold shutdown conditions (all rods in). Following a radiation survey, the containment building is entered. At this time, the coolant level in the reactor vessel is lowered to a point slightly below the vessel flange. Then, the fuel transfer equipment and refueling machine are checked for proper operation.
Phase II - Preparation for Fuel Handling
- 1. Using the auxiliary hook of the polar crane, remove all operating floor shielding plugs from their storage position and place in their refueling orientation.
- 2. Disconnect the control drive mechanism (CRDM) fan power and instrument cabling.
- 3. Drain and disconnect the chilled water piping from the CRDM cooling coils.
Isolate the reactor head vent piping and drain. Remove accessible part of vessel head vent piping and supports between vessel head and pressurizer cubicle. These pipe lengths may be stored on the CRDM missile shield, or removed and stored in the annulus area. If stored on the missile shield, care must be taken to secure them to the shield, as it is moved during the refueling evolution.
- 4. Disconnect the CRDM ventilation duct upper elbows. The elbows are stored with brackets hanging from steam generator nitrogen blanket valve catwalk.
- 5. Disconnect the CRDM ventilation vertical sections and store between steam generators A and D.
- 6. Move the CRDM missile shield to the north end of the refueling cavity to allow access to the mat access opening.
- 7. Disconnect the struts connecting the CRDM seismic supports to the refueling cavity liner.
- 8. Disconnect the CRDM ventilation duct lower sections (pant legs). These sections are stored with brackets hanging from steam generator nitrogen blanket valve catwalk.
- 9. Remove the nine reactor vessel head insulation sections. Lift over the refueling machine with the polar crane auxiliary hook. Store in the annulus area operating floor.
and their associated plug boards on the operating floor and secure these cables to the upending cable spreader racks.
- 11. Tip up the up-ending cable spreading racks to the vertical position and secure with pin on the reactor vessel head lifting assembly.
- 12. Remove the reactor cavity seal manway protective covers and install the watertight hatches.
- 13. Remove the checkered plate and support steel over the mat access opening, and store vertically along the steam generator cubicle walls in cubicle A.
- 14. Using the auxiliary hook, remove the head lifting rig tripod spreader section from the reactor vessel head storage stand and mount on the head lifting rig. Supports for the tripod spreader section storage are removed from the head storage stand.
- 15. Place new reactor vessel O-rings on the reactor vessel head storage stand.
- 16. Move the stud tensioners into the reactor cavity using the auxiliary hook of the polar crane. Attach the stud tensioners to the electric hoists on the circumferential rail of the head lifting assembly. Tensioners may be placed on the cavity seal to reduce swing.
- 17. After the studs have been detensioned (a two-step process), remove the stud tensioners, and mount the three stud spinout devices.
- 18. The remaining studs are then unthreaded and fitted with their retaining collars.
After each stud is removed, a plug is placed in the vacated opening. The guide stud holes are left vacant following the last move to allow placement of the guide studs.
These guide studs are stored in the refueling cavity.
- 19. Remove nine studs (as needed) for alignment pin installation and place in their container. The container is then transferred for stud cleaning.
- 20. Remove the fuel transfer tube blind flange.
- 21. Lift the reactor vessel head using the main hook. The head is lifted off the reactor vessel before filling the refueling cavity.
- 22. Move the reactor vessel head assembly over the mat access opening and lower the head onto the head storage stand. At this location the head is decontaminated, the old 0-rings are removed, and the new 0-rings are installed.
- 24. Move the control rod drive missile shield over the mat access opening at the south end of the containment.
- 25. Using the refueling machine auxiliary hoist, disconnect the CRDM drive shafts, using the CRDM unlatching tool stored on the refueling cavity liner.
- 26. After testing the rotolock inserts, the internals lifting rig is attached to the upper internals. The upper internals are then lifted on to the upper internals storage stand with the lifting rig. After removing the upper internals, the reactor cavity is filled to the high level setpoint.
The fuel assemblies and RCCAs are now free from obstructions and the core is ready for refueling.
Phase III - Fuel Handling The refueling sequence is started with the refueling machine. The positions of partially spent assemblies are changed and new assemblies are added to the core. This section represents the normal method of achieving the final re-load core pattern; other methods are also possible.
The general fuel handling sequence for a core off-load and component shuffle in the spent fuel pool is as follows:
- 1. The refueling machine is positioned over a fuel assembly on the outside row of the core and away from the neutron detectors being used to monitor the core.
- 2. This fuel assembly with an RCCA, or a thimble plugging device is withdrawn from the core and raised to a predetermined height sufficient to clear the vessel flange and still leave sufficient water covering the fuel assembly.
- 3. The fuel transfer car is moved into the refueling canal from the fuel storage area.
- 4. The fuel assembly container is pivoted to the vertical position by the lifting arm.
- 5. The refueling machine is moved to line up the fuel assembly with the fuel assembly container.
- 7. The refueling machine then moves back over the core area for the next fuel assembly. The pattern of removal is designed to remove fuel assemblies containing neutron sources and those fuel assemblies nearest the neutron detectors last.
- 8. The container is pivoted to the horizontal position by the lifting arm.
- 9. The fuel container is moved through the fuel transfer tube to the fuel building by the transfer car.
- 10. The fuel assembly container is pivoted to the vertical position. The fuel assembly is unloaded by the spent fuel handling tool attached to the spent fuel bridge and hoist.
- 11. The fuel assembly is placed in the spent fuel storage rack.
- 12. The empty fuel container is pivoted to the horizontal position and moved back into the containment building.
- 13. The fuel container is pivoted to the vertical position.
- 14. The refueling machine is ready to transfer the next fuel assembly to the fuel assembly container.
- 15. This procedure is contained until the core is empty of fuel assemblies.
- 16. While the fuel is in the spent fuel pool, the RCCA's, neutron sources and thimble plugging devices are shuffled into the correct fuel assemblies for the next operating cycle.
- 17. The fuel assemblies are then returned to the core in the reverse of this procedure with new fuel replacing the discharge fuel.
Phase IV - Reactor Assembly Following refueling, reactor assembly is essentially achieved by reversing the operations outlined in Phase II.
ing reassembly of the reactor, the vessel head is lowered until the vessel head engages the de studs. Before reactor vessel head installation, the water is lowered to the top of the reactor sel flange. This allows visual observation of the insertion of drive rods into their proper tions.
fuel handling for this evolution is done in the fuel building. The spent fuel shipping cask SC) is brought into the canopy of the fuel building for initial washdown. The lifting yoke for SFSC is then attached. The lift of the SFSC is made by the 125 ton SFSC trolley. It is taken the fuel building from the railroad canopy and placed in an upright position in the SFSC hdown sump. At this point, the SFSC is further washed down to preclude as many taminants as possible from entering into the spent fuel pool. The SFSC head is taken off and ed in the SFSC washdown sump area. After it has been determined that the SFSC has ergone sufficient washdown, it is filled with demineralized water. This is to prevent the SFSC m encountering buoyancy effects when it is being lowered into the cask pit. Prior to the SFSC g put into the cask pit, the gate that is stored on the cask pit wall is moved into place using the nt fuel bridge and hoist.
s serves to prevent the water level in the spent fuel pool from lowering when the cask pit water l is lowered. The cask pit water level is lowered to prevent the SFSC hook and wire rope from g contaminated.
method of raising and lowering of the SFSC into the cask pit is such that the SFSC cannot ergo more than a 30-foot vertical drop. While moving the cask horizontally, the cask is uired to withstand the impact of striking a SSC without radioactive release. Once the SFSC has n lowered to the bottom of the cask pit, the hook and yoke are disconnected and the cask pit is d to the level of the spent fuel pool. After this has been accomplished, the cask pit gate is ed in its storage position until fuel transfer is complete. Spent fuel is then transferred from age locations in the spent fuel pool to the SFSC. After the SFSC is filled with spent fuel, the is again placed in its position between the cask pit and the spent fuel pool. By using tools vided with the SFSC, the SFSC head is picked up from the SFSC washdown area and placed in SFSC and tightened down. The cask pit water level is then lowered and the SFSC trolley hook SFSC yoke are reconnected. The SFSC is then raised out of the cask pit and initially ontaminated by low pressure spray ring and additional water sprays from hoses as it is being ed out of the cask pit. The SFSC is then taken to the SFSC washdown sump for final ontamination and inspection of the head to ensure it is bolted on properly. Once the SFSC is oved to the washdown sump, the cask pit water level is returned to the same level as the spent pool and the gate is returned to its storage location. After the SFSC has been inspected, it is ved to the railroad canopy for placement on the rail car for removal from the site.
4.2.4 Component Description ueling Machine refueling machine (Figure 9.1-9) is a rectilinear bridge and trolley system with a vertical t extending down into the refueling water. The bridge spans the refueling cavity and runs on s set into the edge of the refueling cavity. The bridge and trolley motions are used to position vertical mast over a fuel assembly in the core. A long tube with a pneumatic gripper on the end wered down out of the mast to grip the fuel assembly. The tube is long enough so that the er end is still contained in the mast when the gripper end contacts the fuel. A winch, mounted
fuel gripper actuator necessary for the fuel assembly gripper is operated by a cylinder located he top of the gripper tube.
controls for the refueling machine are mounted on a console in the trolley. Movement of the hine from one position to another is automatically accomplished by entering the coordinates uired. A panel display indicates the position selected. A panel indicator shows when the cted position has been reached. In addition, position indicators show the position of the bridge trolley at all times. The position indicators receive the position information from the encoders he bridge and trolley tracks for all 3 standard modes of operation (Auto, Semi-Auto and nual).
ddition to the automatic controls, completely separate manual controls are provided for automatic operation. Position indication for this mode may be from either the position oders from the automatic mode or from standard pointers to rail markings.
maximum speed (approximately) for the bridge is 60 fpm, 40 fpm for the trolley and 40 fpm the hoist. The auxiliary monorail hoist on the refueling machine has a two-step magnetic troller to give hoisting speeds of approximately 7 and 20 fpm.
ctrical interlocks and limit switches on the bridge and trolley drives prevent damage to the fuel mblies. The winch is also provided with limit switches which prevent a fuel assembly from g raised above a safe shielding depth. In an emergency, the bridge, trolley, and winch can be rated manually by using a hand-wheel on the motor shaft.
nt Fuel Bridge and Hoist spent fuel bridge and hoist structure (Figure 9.1-10) is a wheel- mounted walkway spanning spent fuel pool and carries a trolley mounted electric hoist on an overhead structure. This hine is used for handling fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool, cask pit, and fuel transfer al by means of a long-handled tool suspended from the hoist. A load monitoring device is ched between the hoist hook and the fuel handling tool for monitoring fuel assembly loads.
hoist travel and tool length are designed to limit the maximum lift of a fuel assembly to a safe lding depth.
bridge and hoist speeds are variable. The maximum speed (approximate) for the bridge is 33 and for the hoist is 20 fpm.
hoist trolley is motor-driven.
w Fuel Elevator new fuel elevator (Figure 9.1-11) consists of a box shaped elevator assembly with its top end n and sized to house one fuel assembly. It is used normally to lower a new fuel assembly to the
new fuel elevator can also be used for installing storage baskets, or new fuel inserts such as trol rods, burnable poisons, source assemblies or thimble plugs into new fuel assemblies or a my fuel assembly for transfer of components into the fuel pool. The new fuel elevator is also d to store fuel for fuel repair and inspection activities. When the new fuel elevator is used for repair or inspection activities, specific procedures are written to control the raising and ering of the elevator with spent fuel in the elevator.
l Transfer System FTS (Figure 9.1-12) includes an underwater, winch cable driven transfer car that runs on ks extending from the containment side of the fuel transfer canal, through the transfer tube, into the fuel building side of the fuel transfer canal; a hydraulically actuated lifting arm is at h end of the transfer tube. The fuel container in the containment side of the fuel transfer canal ives a fuel assembly in the vertical position from the manipulator crane. The fuel assembly is pivoted to a horizontal position for passage through the transfer tube. After passing through tube, the fuel container is raised to a vertical position for removal of the fuel assembly by a suspended from a hoist mounted on a spent fuel bridge and hoist structure in the fuel ding. The spent fuel bridge and hoist structure then moves over a storage position and places spent fuel assembly in the spent fuel storage racks.
ing reactor operation, the transfer car is stored in the fuel building side of the fuel transfer al. A blind flange is bolted on the containment end of the transfer tube to seal the reactor tainment. The terminus of the tube outside the containment is closed by a valve.
nt Fuel Assembly Handling Tool spent fuel assembly handling tool (Figure 9.1-14) is used to handle new and spent fuel mblies in the spent fuel pool, the cask pit and the fuel transfer canal on the fuel building side.
a manually actuated tool, suspended from the spent fuel bridge and hoist, which uses four
-actuated latching fingers to grip the underside of the fuel assembly top nozzle. The operating dle to actuate the fingers is located at the top of the tool. When the fingers are latched, a pin is rted into the operating handle which prevents the fingers from being accidentally unlatched ng fuel handling operations.
w Fuel Assembly Handling Tool new fuel assembly handling tool (Figure 9.1-15) is used to lift and transfer fuel assemblies m the new fuel shipping containers to the new fuel dry storage vault, then to the new fuel ator. A manually actuated tool, suspended from the new fuel handling crane, utilizes four
-actuated latching fingers to grip the underside of the fuel assembly top nozzle. The operating dles which actuate the fingers are located at the side of the tool. When the fingers are latched, safety screw is turned in to prevent accidental unlatching of the fingers.
reactor vessel head lifting device consists of a welded and bolted structural steel frame with able rigging to enable the crane operator to lift the head and store it during refueling rations. Attached to the head lifting device are the monorail and hoists for the reactor vessel tensioners. The lifting device is permanently attached to the reactor vessel head. The vessel d lift rig is attached to the top of the head lifting device. This lift rig is removed and stored ng operation.
ctor Internals Lifting Device reactor internals lifting device (Figure 9.1-16) is a structural frame suspended from the polar
- e. The frame is lowered onto the guide tube support plate of the internals and is mechanically nected to the support plate by three breech-lock type connectors.
hings on the frame engage guide studs in the vessel flange to provide alignment during oval and replacement of the internals package.
ylindrical radiation flange shield, which weights 39,000 lbs., was attached to the lower portion he lift rig during the 1993 outage. The shield reduces radiation exposure to personnel working he area.
ctor Vessel Stud Tensioner stud tensioners (Figure 9.1-17) are used to secure the head closure joint at every refueling.
stud tensioner is a hydraulically operated device that uses oil as the working fluid. The device mits preloading and unloading of the reactor vessel closure studs at refueling conditions. Stud ioners minimize the time required for the tensioning or unloading operation. Tensioners are alled on preselected reactor vessel studs and applied simultaneously as specified in the reactor sel stud tensioning/detensioning procedures. A single hydraulic pumping unit operates the ioners, which are hydraulically connected in series. The studs are tensioned to their rational load in two steps to prevent high stresses in the flange region and unequal loadings in studs. An unloading device prevents overstroking of the tensioner by diverting hydraulic fluid to the reservoir and preventing further piston travel.
w Fuel Receiving Crane new fuel receiving crane is a 10-ton overhead bridge crane located in the northeast corner of fuel building. Its purpose is to remove the new fuel assembly shipping containers from the k on which they were delivered to either a storage location or a location where the new fuel dling crane has access to the fuel assemblies in the shipping containers.
w Fuel Handling Crane new fuel handling crane is a 10 ton overhead bridge crane that is located along the western l of the fuel building. The crane covers the area over the new fuel elevator in the fuel transfer
roved, the new fuel handling crane is used to transport them to the new fuel elevator for rim storage in the spent fuel pool.
nt Fuel Shipping Cask Trolley spent fuel shipping cask trolley is a 125 ton crane used to transfer the spent fuel shipping cask SC) from its delivery point in the railroad canopy of the fuel building through the fuel building he cask pit. The spent fuel shipping cask trolley (3MHF-CRN1) has been designed to meet the le failure proof requirements. The design features will ensure that a single failure will not lt in the loss of the capability of the system to safely retain the load. Load drop events are not ible for loads lifted by the SFSC trolley when handled and rigged in accordance with the le failure criteria. The SFSC trolley design conforms to the following:
REG-0554 REG-0612 ME NOG-1 AA #70 (Crane Manufacturers Association of America) design of the upgraded trolley has considered the possibility of immersion. Therefore, special erial and lubrication requirements for the wire rope and load block components (i.e., sheave thrust bearings) will insure compatibility with the fuel pool chemistry as well as provisions drain holes in the enclosed portion of the lower block to allow for gravity drainage. The trolley gn will limit the potential of foreign material to enter the fuel pool. This includes adequate sures to prevent lubricants and hydraulic fluids from leaking into the fuel pool.
iliary Hoist 5 ton auxiliary crane, which includes the auxiliary hoist, trolley and bridge and related ponents, is of commercial grade design and construction. This auxiliary crane is not designed ingle failure proof criteria and will not be required to lift critical loads in safety related areas.
ne Control SFSC trolley and auxiliary hoist will utilize a remote control radio transmitter for operation.
emergency functions, hoisting and trolley motions will be controlled by the remote radio troller. An operators console is provided on the crane plateform, which has emergency ctions, hoisting, and trolley motions and can be used for emergency or backup operation.
tainment Structure Polar Crane containment structure polar crane consists of two 200 ton main hoists and one 30 ton iliary hoist. The crane is used to remove and reinstall the upper reactor internals, reactor head, attachments.
design codes and standards used for the FHS are given in Sections 3.2 and 9.1.4.3.
er design codes and standards used are:
American National Standards Institute - Standard Safety Code for Overhead and Gantry Cranes (B30.2.0) Specification of General Requirements for a Quality Program (Z1.8)
American Welding Society - Structural Welding Code (D1.1)
National Electrical Manufacturers Association - Applicable Standards Steel Structures Painting Council - Near White Blast Cleaning (Standard SP-10) Shop, Field, and Maintenance Painting (Standard PA1)
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50 Appendix B - Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants 4.3 Safety Evaluation 4.3.1 Safe Handling ign criteria for the FHS are as follows:
- 1. The primary design requirement of the FHS equipment is reliability. A conservative design approach is used for all load bearing parts. Where possible, components are used that have a proven record of reliable service. Throughout the design process, consideration is given to the fact that the equipment spends long idle periods stored in an atmosphere of 120°F and high humidity.
- 2. Except as otherwise specified, the refueling machine and spent fuel bridge and hoist structure are designed and constructed in accordance with Crane Manufacturers Association of America, Inc. (CMAA) Specification 70 for Class A-1 service.
- 3. The static design load for the crane structures and all lifting components is normal dead and live loads plus three times the fuel assembly weight with an RCCA.
- 4. The allowable stresses for the refueling machine and spent fuel bridge and hoist structure supporting the weight of a fuel assembly are as specified in the ASME B&PV Code Section III, Appendix XVII-2200.
- 5. The design load on the wire rope hoisting cables does not exceed 0.20 times the average breaking strength. Two independent cables are used, and each is assumed to carry one half the load.
ustrial codes and standards used in the design of the fuel handling equipment are as follows:
- 1. The refueling machine and spent fuel bridge and hoist: Applicable sections of CMAA Specification No. 70.
- 2. Structural equipment: ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Appendix XVII, Subarticle 2200.
- 3. Fuel Transfer Tube: ASME Code,Section III, Class MC.
- 4. Electrical equipment: Applicable standards and requirements of the National Electric Code, and NFPA 70 for design, installation, and manufacturing.
- 5. Materials: Main load-bearing materials conform to the specifications of the ASTM standards.
- 6. Safety: OSHA standards, 20 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926, including load testing requirements, the requirements of ANSI N18.2, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, and GDC 61 and 62.
ueling Machine refueling machine design includes the following provisions to ensure safe handling of fuel mblies:
- 1. Safety Interlocks - Operations which could endanger the operator or damage the fuel are prevented by mechanical or fail-safe electrical interlocks, or by redundant electrical interlocks. All other interlocks are intended to provide equipment protection and may be implemented either mechanically or by electrical interlock, not necessarily fail-safe.
Fail-safe electrical design of a control system interlock may be applied according to the following rules.
- a. Fail-safe operation of an electrically operated brake is such that the brake engages on loss of power.
- b. Fail-safe operation of an electrically operated clutch is such that the clutch engages on loss of power.
- c. Fail-safe operation of a relay is such that the de-energized state of the relay prevents unsafe operation.
Those parts of a control system interlock required to be fail-safe which are not or cannot be operated in a fail-safe mode as defined in these rules, are supplemented by a redundant component, or components, to provide the requisite protection:
- a. When the gripper is loaded, the crane will not be allowed to traverse unless the guide tube is in the fully retracted position.
- b. When the gripper is unloaded and extended from the stationary mast, the crane will not be allowed to traverse.
- c. Vertical motion, extending outside of the stationary mast, of the guide tube is permitted only in a controlled area over the reactor, the fuel transfer system and the test fixture.
- d. Bridge and trolley travel is limited to a controlled area over the reactor and the fuel transfer system.
- e. A key-operated Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) bypass switch is provided to manually defeat system interlocks under administrative controls.
- f. The gripper is monitored by limit switches to confirm operation of the fully engaged or fully disengaged position. An audible and a visual alarm is actuated if both engage and disengage switches are actuated at the same time or if neither is actuated. A time delay is used to allow for recycle time for normal operation.
- g. The loaded fuel gripper does not release unless it is in its down position in the core or in the fuel transfer system, and the weight of the fuel assembly is off the mast load monitor.
- h. Raising of the guide tube is not permitted if the gripper is disengaged and the load monitor indicates that it is still attached to the fuel assembly.
- i. Raising of the guide tube is not permitted if the hoist loading exceeds the allowable limit set in accordance with the Westinghouse Specification F-5 Instructions, Precautions, and Limitations for Handling New and Partially Spent Fuel Assemblies.
- j. Lowering of the guide tube is not permitted if slack cable exists in the hoist.
- l. The guide tube is prevented from lowering completely out of the mast.
- m. The guide tube travels only at a controlled speed of about 3 feet per minute when the bottom of the fuel begins to enter the core and the gripper approaches the top of the core. In addition, just above these points, the guide tube automatically stops lowering, and requires acknowledgment from the operator before proceeding.
- n. In the transfer machine zone, the fuel transfer system container is prevented from upending unless the loaded gripper is in the full up position, or the unloaded gripper is not extended from the stationary mast, or unless the refueling machine is out of the fuel transfer zone. An interlock is provided from the refueling machine to the fuel transfer system to accomplish this. In addition, the fuel transfer system provides an interlock to prevent any vertical moves on the refueling machine until the fuel transfer container is in a vertical position.
- 2. Bridge and Trolley Hold-Down Devices - Both the refueling machine bridge and trolley are horizontally restrained on the rails by two pairs of guide rollers, one pair at each wheel location on one truck only. The rollers are attached to the bridge truck and contact the vertical faces on either side of the rail to prevent horizontal movement. Vertical restraint is accomplished by antirotation bars located at each of the four wheels for both the bridge and trolley. The antirotation bars are bolted to the trucks and extend under the rail head. Both horizontal and vertical restraints are adequately designed to withstand the forces and overturning moments resulting from the safe shutdown earthquake.
- 3. Main Hoist Braking System - The main hoists are equipped with two independent braking systems. A solenoid release, spring set electric brake is mounted on the motor shaft. This brake operates in the normal manner to release upon application of current to the motor and to set when current is interrupted. The second brake is a mechanically actuated load brake internal to the hoist gear box that engages if the load starts to overhaul the hoist. It is necessary to apply torque from the motor to raise or lower the load. In raising, this motor drives a cam to open the brake; in lowering, the motor slips the brake allowing the load to lower. This brake actuates upon loss of torque from the motor for any reason and is not dependent on any electrical circuits. Both brakes are rated at 125 percent of the hoist design load.
- 4. Fuel Assembly Support System - The main hoist system is supplied with redundant paths of load support such that failure of any one component does not result in free fall of the fuel assembly. Two wire ropes are anchored to the winch drum and carried to a load equalizing mechanism on the top of the gripper tube.
gripper has four fingers gripping the fuel, any two of which supports the fuel assembly ght.
ing each refueling outage and prior to removing fuel, the gripper and hoist system are inely load tested.
l Transfer System following safety features are provided for in the FTS:
- 1. Traverse Control Interlocks - The control consoles for the Fuel Transfer System (FTS) are located in both the Containment and the Fuel Building.
In the manual operating mode, the traverse operation is possible only when both lifting arms are in the down position as indicated by the proximity switches. The basic interlock functions are provided by the proximity switches that sense upender position. The hydraulic power unit (HPU) control valve circuit provides a backup interlock. The control logic will inhibit traverse operation if the HPU control valve is energized for the frame up condition. An additional backup interlock is a mechanical latch device that prevents cart motion when the fuel container is not horizontal.
In the auto sequence mode, the Refueling Machine or Fuel Handling Machine operator can start the traverse operation. In this mode, the fuel container automatically lowers the upender to the down position, the fuel container traverses to the other side and is upended to the vertical condition. Therefore, the interlock can withstand a single failure.
- 2. Lifting Arm, Transfer Car Position - Two redundant interlocks allow lifting arm operation only when the transfer car is at one end of its travel and, therefore, can withstand a single failure.
Of these two redundant interlocks, one interlock is a position limit switch in the control circuit. The electronic encoder positioning system also provides a signal of Transfer Car position.
- 3. Transfer Car, Valve Open - A limit switch on the transfer tube valve provides indication that the valve is open. The valve is also administratively controlled beacuse it is a hand operated valve; i.e., a handwheel is utilized. After opening the valve, the operator is required to secure the handwheel. These dual controls assure the system can withstand a single failure.
- 4. Transfer Car, Lifting Arm - The transfer car lifting arm is primarily designed to protect the equipment from overload and possible damage if an attempt is made to
switch in the control circuit. The backup interlock is a mechanical latch device that is opened by the weight of the fuel container when in the horizontal position.
- 5. Lifting Arm, Refueling Machine - The containment side lifting arm is interlocked with the Refueling Machine. The electronic control systems of the Refueling Machine (RM) and the Fuel Transfer System (FTS) are networked. This allows communication between the electronic controls so that if a fuel assembly is present in the Refueling Machine, the load cell in the refueling mast acknowledges this and the FTS uses this information. If there is no load on the mast, and the RM is located over the FTS fuel container, the FTS upender is permitted to operate if the RM mast is retracted into the stationary mast at the gripper weight only (GWO) position. If there is a load indicated on the RM mast, the mast must be at the full-up position.
- 6. Lifting Arm, Spent Fuel Building Hoist - On the spent fuel pool side, the lifting arm is interlocked with the bridge and hoist. The lifting arm will not operate if the bridge and hoist is over the lifting arm area unless the hoist is at the upper travel limit.
nt Fuel Bridge and Hoist spent fuel bridge and hoist structure includes the following safety features.
- 1. The spent fuel bridge and hoist controls are interlocked to prevent simultaneous operation of bridge drive and hoist.
- 2. Bridge drive operation is prevented except when the hoist is in the full up position.
- 3. An overload protection device is included on the hoist to limit the uplift force which could be applied to the fuel storage racks. The protection device limits the hoist load to the allowable limit set in accordance with the Westinghouse Specification F-5, Instructions, Precautions, and Limitations for Handling New and Partially Spent Fuel Assemblies. This overload protection device can be bypassed with a key for special lifts.
- 4. The static design load on the hoist is the combined dry weight of one fuel assembly and RCCA (1,600 lb) and the weight of the tool (400 lb) which gives it a total weight of approximately 2,000 pounds.
- 5. Restraining bars are provided on each truck to prevent the bridge from overturning.
- 6. Brackets are attached to the lower girder to provide supplemental rigging of spent fuel pool gates to prevent a gate from toppling onto spent fuel racks during a
rigging design consists of a removable wire rope which connects the bracket to a lug attached to the fuel pool gate. The supplemental rigging is employed when a gate is moved in the close vicinity of the spent fuel pool such that the gate could topple onto spent fuel racks during a postulated drop accident. There are two brackets, one for each spent fuel pool gate.
l Handling Tools and Equipment fuel handling tools and equipment handled over an open reactor vessel are designed to prevent vertent decoupling from crane hooks (i.e., lifting rigs are pinned to the crane hook, and safety hes are provided on hooks supporting tools).
ls required for handling internal reactor components are designed with fail-safe features that vent disengagement of the component in the event of operating mechanism malfunction. These ty features apply to the following tools:
- 1. Control Rod Drive Shaft Unlatching Tool - The air cylinders actuating the gripper mechanism are equipped with backup springs which close the gripper in the event of loss of air to the cylinder. Air-operated valves are equipped with safety locking rings to prevent inadvertent actuation.
- 2. Spent Fuel Handling Tool - When the fingers are latched, a pin is inserted into the operating handle and prevents inadvertent actuation. The tools weighs approximately 400 pounds and is preoperationally tested at 125 percent the weight of one fuel assembly and RCCA (1600 lb).
- 3. New Fuel Assembly Handling Tool - When the fingers are latched, a safety screw is inserted in, preventing inadvertent actuations. The tool weighs approximately 100 pounds and is preoperationally tested at 125 percent the weight of one fuel assembly and RCCA (1,600 lb).
4.3.2 Seismic Considerations safety classifications for all fuel handling and storage equipment are listed in Section 3.2.
se safety classes provide criteria for the seismic design of the various components. Safety ss 1 and 2 equipment are designed to withstand the forces of the OBE and SSE. For normal ditions plus OBE loadings, the resulting stresses are limited to allowable working stresses as ned in the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Appendix XVII, for normal and upset conditions.
normal conditions plus SSE loadings, the stresses are limited to within the allowable values n by Subarticle NA 2110 for critical parts of the equipment which are required to maintain the ability of the equipment to perform its safety function. Permanent deformation is allowed for loading combination which includes the SSE to the extent that there is no loss of any safety ction.
ipment might adversely affect Safety Class 1 or 2 equipment.
nonnuclear safety equipment, design for the SSE is included if failure might adversely affect a ety Class 1, 2, or 3 component. Design for the OBE is considered if failure of the nonnuclear ty component might adversely affect a Safety Class 1 or 2 component.
4.3.3 Containment Pressure Boundary Integrity fuel transfer tube which connects the refueling cavity (inside the reactor containment) and the transfer canal (outside the containment) is closed on the refueling cavity side by a blind ge at all times except during refueling operations. Two seals are located around the periphery he blind flange with leak-check provisions between them.
4.3.4 Radiation Shielding ing all phases of spent fuel transfer, the design dose rate from the spent fuel at the surface of water is 2.5 mrem/hr or less. This is accomplished by maintaining a minimum of 10 feet 6 es of water above the active fuel during fuel transit operations.
two fuel handling devices used to raise and lower spent fuel assemblies are the refueling hine and the spent fuel bridge and hoist. The refueling machine uses an electrical limit switch ch stops upward motion of the guide tube to assure that active fuel is more than 10 feet 6 es from the normal water level in the refueling cavity. The spent fuel bridge and hoist moves nt fuel with a long-handled tool. The hoist motor geared limit switch stops upward motion of hoist to maintain a minimum of 10 feet 6 inches of water from the active fuel to the normal er level in the spent fuel pool.
l repair and inspection activities may cause portions of irradiated fuel assemblies to be raised ess than 10 feet 6 inches from the surface of the water. When fuel repair and inspection is e, specific procedures are written to control the repair or inspection activity and maintain ation doses at the surface of the pool at level consistent with safe ALARA practices.
4.4 Inspections and Testing Requirements ministrative controls contained in Project, Operating, Surveillance, and Maintenance cedures have been established to provide test and inspection requirements for equipment ciated with the fuel handling system.
4.5 Instrumentation Requirements control systems for the refueling and fuel handling machines and FTS are discussed in tion 9.1.4.3.1. A discussion of additional electrical controls, such as the interlocks and main t braking system for the FHS, are discussed in Section 9.1.4.3.1.
esponse to NUREG-0612, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 submitted a report to NRC titled NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads, dated March 14, 1985. In the report, lstone Unit 3 committed to the principle of NUREG-0612, including an operator training gram, periodic inspection and maintenance program for the cranes and identification of safe paths for loads that meet the NUREG-0612 criteria for a heavy load, (for the purpose of this ew conservatively considered to be 1800 lbs. and greater). Volumetric examinations using ustic Emissions techniques may be used solely, or in conjunction with the conventional ace examinations recommended by NUREG-0612/ANSI N14.6-1978, to verify the continuing pliance of the specially designed lift rigs, for the Reactor Head and the Reactor Internals.
C Bulletin 96-02, Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor e, or Over Safety Related Equipment, required utilities to review regulatory guidelines ciated with the control and handling of heavy loads over spent fuel, over fuel in the reactor
, or over safety-related equipment while the unit is at power, (in all modes other than cold tdown, refueling and defueled). Administrative procedures have been established to guide the rator in determining whether a NUREG-0612 type lift exists. Consistent with the 10 CFR 9 revision effective 7/2001, should a NUREG-0612 lift be contemplated that has not been viously evaluated, the lift will be evaluated using the appropriate station change process.
6 REFERENCES FOR SECTION 9.1 1 Sanders, C.J. (USNRC) letter to Heacock, D.A. (Dominion), Millstone Power Station, Unit Number 3 - Issuance of Amendment re: Spent Fuel Pool Criticality, TAC Number MD8251, dated March 26, 2010.
COMPONENT DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS el Pool Cooling Pumps Quantity 2 Capacity (gpm) 3,500 Head (feet) 115 Design pressure (psig) 200 Design temperature (°F) 200 el Pool Heat Exchangers Quantity 2 Design heat load per exchanger (Btu/hr) 27.7x106 Reactor plant component cooling water flow per exchanger (gpm) 1,800 Reactor plant component cooling water inlet temperature (°F) 95 Reactor plant component cooling water outlet temperature (°F) 126 el pool cooling flow (gpm) 3,500 el pool water inlet temperature (max °F) 150 el pool water outlet temperature (max °F) 125 be Side design pressure (psig) 150 sign temperature (°F) 200 el Pool Purification Pumps Quantity 2 Capacity (gpm) 250 Head (feet) 277.6 Design pressure (psig) 200 Design temperature (°F) 200 el Pool Prefilters Quantity 2 Capacity (gpm) 300 Design pressure (psig) 165 Design temperature (°F) 200 el Pool Demineralizer
Quantity 1 Capacity (gpm) 150 Design pressure (psig) 165 Design temperature (°F) 200 el Pool Postfilter Quantity 1 Capacity (gpm) 300 Design pressure (psig) 165 Design temperature (°F) 200 el Pool Coarse Filter Quantity 1 Capacity (gpm) 300 Design pressure (psig) 165 Design temperature (°F) 200
COOLER OPERATING)
Emergency Full-Core Operating Condition Full Core Offload Off-load Normal Plant Operation Bounded by Full Core Heat Load BTU/hr 95°F CCP 36.08x106 21.1 x 106 Offload 90°F CCP 39.19x106 85°F CCP 42.30x106 80°F CCP 45.41x106 Required Duty of One Fuel Pool Bounded by Full Core Cooler BTU/hr 95°F CCP 34.20x106 Offload 20.37 x 106 90°F CCP 37.31x106 85°F CCP 40.42x106 80°F CCP 43.53x106 Heat Removal by Evaporation BTU/hr 1.88x106 1.88x106 0.73x106 Maximum Temperature Long 150°F 150°F 127.6°F Term Maximum Peak Temperature Bounded by Full Core 155.7°F N/A Short Term Offload Maximum Peak Temperature 200°F in 4.41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br /> (Condition Bounded by Full Core 148.8°F - Following a DBA with a (Accidents) is outside Design Basis) Offload four hour loss of pool cooling Design Limits Maximum Long Term Temperature (Structural Requirement): 150°F Maximum Short Term Temperature (Structural Requirement): 200°F Maximum Temperature Loss of Pool Cooling: 200°F
Emergency Full-Core Operating Condition Full Core Offload Off-load Normal Plant Operation Flow Rates Tube Side - Fuel Pool Water (SFC): 3,500 gpm Shell Side - Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water CCP): 1,800 gpm Cooling Water Temperatures Reactor Plant Component Cooling (CCP) (Design): 95°F Service Water Temperature (Cools CCP) (Design): 80°F
FIGURE 9.1-1 PICTORIAL VIEW OF TYPICAL REGION 3 RACK MODULE FIGURE 9.1-2 TOP VIEW OF 6X6 RACK ARRAY (REGION 3)
FIGURE 9.1-2A DELETED BY PKG FSC 98-MP3-116 FIGURE 9.1-3 SIDE VIEW OF 6X6 RACK ARRAY (REGION 3)
FIGURE 9.1-4 NOT USED FIGURE 9.1-5 ADJUSTABLE FUEL RACK LEVELING PAD (REGION 3)
FIGURE 9.1-6 P&ID FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.1-7 BULK POOL TRANSIENT TEMPERATURE PLOT (FULL CORE OFFLOAD)
FIGURE 9.1-7A BULK POOL TRANSIENT TEMPERATURE PLOT (EMERGENCY CORE OFFLOAD)
FIGURE 9.1-8 COOLDOWN CURVE FOR NORMAL OPERATION (4 HOURS LOSS OF POOL COOLING)
FIGURE 9.1-9 REFUELING MACHINE FIGURE 9.1-10 SPENT FUEL BRIDGE AND HOISTING STRUCTURE FIGURE 9.1-11 NEW FUEL ELEVATOR FIGURE 9.1-12 FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM FIGURE 9.1-13 DELETED BY PKG FSC 00-MP3-045 FIGURE 9.1-14 SPENT FUEL HANDLING TOOL FIGURE 9.1-15 NEW FUEL HANDLING TOOL FIGURE 9.1-16 REACTOR INTERNALS LIFTING DEVICE FIGURE 9.1-17 QUICK ACTING STUD TENSIONER (SHEET 1)
FIGURE 9.1-17 QUICK ACTING STUD TENSIONER (SHEET 2)
FIGURE 9.1-18 NEW FUEL VAULT LAYOUT FIGURE 9.1-19 NEW FUEL VAULT ELEVATION VIEW FIGURE 9.1-20 FUEL ASSEMBLY TRANSFER LIMIT VERSES CCP TEMPERATURE FIGURE 9.1-21 MILLSTONE UNIT 3 SPENT FUEL POOL LAYOUT FIGURE 9.1-22 REGION 1 BLOCKING SCHEME FOR 3-OUT-OF-4 STORAGE RACKS
FIGURE 9.1-22A PICTORIAL VIEW OF TYPICAL REGION 1 RACK MODULE FIGURE 9.1-22B TYPICAL ASSEMBLAGE OF REGION 1 CELLS FIGURE 9.1-22C ELEVATION VIEW OF REGION 1 RACK MODULE FIGURE 9.1-23 NOT USED FIGURE 9.1-23A PICTORIAL VIEW OF TYPICAL REGION 2 RACK MODULE FIGURE 9.1-23B TYPICAL ARRAY OF REGION 2 CELLS FIGURE 9.1-23C ELEVATION VIEW OF REGION 2 RACK MODULE FIGURE 9.1-24 SUPPORT PEDESTAL FOR REGION 1 AND REGION 2 RACK MODULES
1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM service water system provides cooling water for heat removal from the reactor plant auxiliary ems during all modes of operation and from the turbine plant auxiliary systems during normal ration. Figure 9.2-1 shows the schematic of the service water system.
1.1 Design Bases service water system is designed in accordance with the following criteria:
- 1. General Design Criterion 2 for structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods
- 2. General Design Criterion 4 for structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks
- 3. General Design Criterion 5 for the capability of shared systems and components important to safety being capable of performing required safety functions
- 4. General Design Criterion 44, to assure:
- a. The capability to transfer heat loads from safety related structures, systems, and components to a heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions
- b. Component redundancy so that the safety function can be performed assuming a single active component failure coincident with the loss of off site power (LOP)
- c. The capability to isolate components, subsystems, or piping, if required, so that the system safety function is not compromised
- 5. General Design Criterion 45 for design provisions to permit inservice inspection of safety related components and equipment
- 6. General Design Criterion 46 for design provisions to permit operational, functional testing of safety related systems and components
- 7. Regulatory Guide 1.26 for the quality group classification of systems and components. The service water system supply and return piping for the post
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for the seismic design classification of system components
- 9. Regulatory Guide 1.102 for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of flooding
- 10. Regulatory Guide 1.117 for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of tornado missiles
- 11. Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1 for breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside the containment design of the service water system achieves the following objectives:
- 1. To provide a continuous supply of cooling water, during startup and normal operating conditions, to the components listed in Table 9.2-1
- 2. To provide a continuous supply of cooling water, during normal unit cooldown conditions, to the components listed in Table 9.2-1
- 3. To provide a continuous supply of cooling water in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) to the engineered safety features (ESF) components listed in Table 9.2-1
- 4. To provide a continuous supply of cooling water, during loss of power (LOP), to the safety related equipment listed in Table 9.2-1
- 5. To provide an emergency source of makeup water to the fuel pool
- 6. To provide an emergency backup source of water to the auxiliary feedwater system and the control building chilled water system tions of the service water system operate in support of ESF systems acting to mitigate the sequences of accidents; such portions are, therefore, safety related and designed to QA egory I requirements, and in accordance with the codes and classifications given in tion 3.2.5 and in accordance with the separation and protection criteria discussed in tion 3.6.
service water system provides cooling water during all operating conditions, at a maximum water temperature of 80°F coincident with either the service water pump design low water l (elevation minus 8.0 feet) or the maximum flood protection level (elevation plus 25.5 feet),
at all intermediate water levels.
ipment repair and maintenance periods.
service water pump operation for various modes of system operation are as follows:
Mode of Operation Number of Service Water Pumps Required Normal Operation 2 Normal Cooldown 2 DBA coincident with LOP Minimum ESF 1 Normal ESF 2 Loss of power Hot shutdown 2 Cold shutdown 1 design pressure of the service water system is 100 psig, except for the service water pump harge lines in and under the service water pump cubicles; the 6-inch lines immediately tream and downstream of the control building air conditioning booster pumps suction valves; lines between the upstream motor-operated valves and the containment recirculation coolers; lines between the containment recirculation coolers and the downstream motor-operated es, all of which have a design pressure of 97 psig; the discharge lines from the MCC and rod trol area booster pumps, which have a design pressure of 145 psig; and the ESF Building harge headers, which have a design pressure of 20 psig. The inlet operating temperature emes of the service water system are 80°F maximum and 33°F minimum, determined by the ient sea water temperature in Niantic Bay.
le 9.2-1 lists the service water system flow requirements and Table 9.2-2 lists the service er system waste heat transfer requirements from the components listed to the ultimate heat
, Long Island Sound (Section 9.2.5). These requirements are based on a maximum inlet ice water temperature of 80°F.
service water system and its components are designed for a plant life of 40 years.
1.2 System Description service water system consists of two redundant flow paths, each consisting of two service er pumps, two service water self cleaning strainers, two booster pumps, piping, and valves.
service water pumps and strainers are located in the circulating and service water pump se. The service water system discharges into the circulating water discharge tunnel.
arate bays below the operating floor of the circulating and service water pump house ction 3.8.1). The suction bell of each of the pumps is located at elevation minus 13 feet (msl),
et below their design low water level.
h pump discharges through a separate self-cleaning strainer. The debris removed from the ice water is cleaned from the strainer by backwash flow through the filtering elements. The kwash flow is 650 gpm at a service water pressure of 20 psig. Backwashing is not a continuous ration. It is an automatic operation initiated by a pressure differential across the strainer ter than 4 psi. The maximum passable particle size through the service water pump self-ning strainers is 0.0625 inch.
operating floor (elevation plus 14.5 feet msl) of the circulating and service water pump house ivided by fire and missile protected watertight walls into two pump compartments: one for sing the non safety related circulating water and screen wash pumps and associated ipment, and the other for housing the safety related service water pumps and strainers. The ice water pump compartment is further divided by a fire and missile protected watertight wall two cubicles, each cubicle containing two service water pumps and associated self cleaning iners.
switchgear for each service water pump is located in the control building. The pump motors ne cubicle are powered from one emergency bus, and the pump motors in the other cubicle are ered from the other emergency bus.
ricating water for the circulating water pumps is filtered again after it has passed through the ice water pump discharge strainers. The service water pumps are capable of operating without icating water. The strainers in the circulating water pump lubricating water lines pass a imum particle size of 250 microns.
ing normal operating and unit cooldown conditions, one service water pump on each undant header discharges through the components listed in Table 9.2-1 and then into the ulating water discharge tunnel. The remaining pump on each header is on standby and starts matically on a low pressure signal from its service water discharge header.
control building air conditioning booster pumps, one on each service water header, provide additional head required to circulate service water through the control building conditioning water chiller condenser. Each control building air conditioning booster pump is a gpm, 45 feet total dynamic head, AC motor driven horizontal centrifugal pump. Each pump or is powered from a separate emergency bus in the Class IE power system (Section 8.3.1).
control building air conditioning water chillers may experience difficulty in starting when the ice water temperature is below 55°F. During startup when the control building chilled water t load is not large enough to evaporate sufficient refrigerant in the evaporator to overcome this ct, the chiller would trip due to low compressor suction pressure. To alleviate this problem, a trol building water chiller condenser recirculation valve is provided in the service water
service water entering the booster pump suction to achieve an inlet temperature above 55°F.
temperature control valve is powered from an emergency electrical bus to ensure its rability following a LOP. Service water system piping connections supply cooling water ctly to the cooling coils of the air conditioning units in case both chillers become ultaneously inoperable.
motor control center (MCC) and rod control area booster pumps, one on each service water der, provide the additional head required to circulate service water through the MCC and rod trol area air conditioning units when chilled water flow to these units is lost. Each MCC and control area booster pump is a 175 gpm, 105 foot tdh, AC motor-driven horizontal centrifugal
- p. In the event of a high temperature in the return duct to the MCC and rod control area air-dling unit, or an LOP, the pumps will automatically start if the associated air conditioning unit perating. Each pump motor is powered from a separate emergency bus in the emergency er system (Section 8.3.1).
the emergency mode of operation, the supply lines to the non safety related equipment are ated by automatic closure of isolation valves. A containment depressurization signal (CDA),
OP, automatically closes the motor operated valves in the supply lines to the turbine plant ponent cooling heat exchangers (Section 9.2.2.1), circulating water pumps lube water. The safety post accident liquid sample cooler is isolated during normal operations.
he event of a LOCA or high energy line accident within the containment, a CDA signal closes motor operated isolation valves in the service water supply lines to the reactor plant ponent cooling heat exchangers (Section 9.2.2.1) and opens motor operated isolation valves he supply lines to the containment recirculation coolers. In such an accident coincident with a P, two service water pumps, each supplied by a separate emergency bus, start automatically.
ing hot shutdown due to a LOP, two service water pumps operate with each pump motor plied from a separate emergency bus. Whenever an emergency generator starts (Section 8.3.1),
icient service water is supplied to the emergency generator diesel engine coolers by the matic opening of air operated valves located in the discharge lines of each emergency erator diesel engine cooler. Under all operating conditions, flow is maintained through at least of the two charging pump coolers and safety injection pump coolers.
w through the residual heat removal pumps ventilation units and containment recirculation p ventilation units is automatically regulated by the amount of heat being dissipated through unit. If there is no heat transferred in the ventilation units, the outlet valves are automatically ed.
pressure in the inlet supply lines to the turbine plant component cooling heat exchangers matically closes isolation valves (MOV) in these lines.
open.
eral hours after the LOCA or a high energy pipe break accident and initiation of the CDA al, it will be necessary to supply service water to the reactor plant component cooling heat hangers for fuel pool cooling. This can be accomplished, first, by resetting the CDA signal.
s arrangement then allows the inlet supply motor-operated valve for the reactor plant ponent cooling heat exchangers to be opened, in the train in which both service water pumps running, while continuing to supply service water to the containment recirculation coolers.
s results in a flow of at least 5400 gpm to each of two recirculation spray heat exchangers on train with two service water pump operating.
time required to re-establish Service Water to the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water em following a LOCA is dependent upon the heat loads in the spent fuel pool. Service Water p, strainer and discharge check valve maintenance activities are scheduled at times during the rating cycle when spent fuel pool heat loads are reduced.
operating pressure of the service water system in the tubes of the reactor plant component ling heat exchangers is less than the pressure of the shell side fluid. This precludes leakage of ice water into the shell side fluid; leakage could cause excess fouling or detrimental chemical tions between the service water and the components in the component cooling water system.
automatic response of the service water system valves for various ESF signals is given in le 9.2-3. The table shows the required valve position after initiation of an ESF signal.
iation monitoring equipment (Section 11.5.2.3) located at the discharge of each train of tainment recirculation coolers detects leakage of radioactive contamination into the service er system from the containment recirculation coolers. Motor-operated isolation inlet and outlet es at each containment recirculation cooler can be remotely closed to prevent contamination m escaping to the environment.
erials resistant to corrosive attack from salt water are provided for all piping and component surfaces in the service water system.
use of epoxy coatings is considered a high technology application designed to protect the ace of the substrate from erosion and/or corrosion resulting from a saltwater environment. The ting material is applied to the inside surface of large bore service water system piping and cted components.
use of a rubber sleeve with seals is considered an enhancement designed to protect the ace of the substrate from erosion and/or corrosion resulting from a saltwater environment.
se pipe seals are installed in various locations in the Service Water piping to stop identified erosion. Periodic surveillance will ensure that the seals remain in place preventing further radation of the pipe.
service water system is available is available to supply emergency makeup water to the iliary feedwater system. However, this design feature is only used, as an option of last resort, to seawaters deleterious impact on steam generator tube integrity. Before the auxiliary water pumps can take suction from the service water system, blank flanges must be removed spool pieces installed to connect the service water system to the auxiliary feedwater system.
se spool pieces are provided, in lieu of permanent piping, to preclude inadvertent discharging ervice water to the steam generators.
service water system provides an emergency source of makeup water to the fuel pool ction 9.1.3), and acts as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater system (Section 10.4.9) the control building chilled water system (Section 9.4.0).
1.3 Safety Evaluation service water system is Safety Class 3, missile protected, and Seismic Category I, except for circulating water pumps lubricating water lines, the lines to and from the turbine plant ponent cooling heat exchangers, and the lines to and from the post-accident liquid sampling ler. The circulating water discharge tunnel is a Seismic Category I structure.
RMIS evaluation of the probability of failure of the SW vents above the ESF building under a ado missile has been completed and fount to meet the requirements of SRP Section 3.5.2 and tion 2.2.3. See Section 9.5.8.3 for TORMIS limiting assumptions and exceptions.
he chemical feed chlorination system, the line interfacing with the service water system uding the isolation valves, is Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I. Service water pumps are not eptible to pump house seismic failures since the service water pump cubicle, service water ng, and all reinforced concrete below the operating floor level are Seismic Category I.
service water system is designed throughout to be able to perform its safety function owing a single failure (Section 3.1.1). Power is supplied to redundant service water pumps m separate emergency buses. Each service water pump can supply the minimum cooling water uirements as specified during DBA conditions in Table 9.2-1. Thus, assuming the loss of one rgency bus or the failure of one service water pump to operate, the system safety function is ured by a redundant emergency bus or a redundant pump.
arate supply and discharge lines provide required cooling water to all redundant safety related ponents. This ensures that sufficient service water is provided to all safety related ponents listed in Table 9.2-1 following LOP and/or LOCA. Thus, assuming a single failure of redundant supply or discharge line, the system safety function is achieved.
system design permits maintenance to be performed on any component while providing the uired cooling capability (Chapter 16).
- 1. All safety related piping is buried or located within tornado protected seismically designed buildings.
- 2. All safety related piping is designed to meet Seismic Category I requirements.
o control building air conditioning booster pumps are provided to ensure sufficient cooling er to the control building air conditioning water chiller condensers at a minimum service water perature of 55°F, which is based on thermodynamic properties of Freon-12 (Section 9.4.0).
uming a single failure of one control building air conditioning booster pump, the redundant p performs the required safety function.
h a LOP, cooling water to the motor control center (MCC) and rod control area air ditioning units is supplied from the service water system. The MCC and rod control area ster pumps are provided to ensure sufficient cooling water to these air conditioning units.
undant motor-operated valves, receiving power from separate emergency buses are used for ation and diversion functions. The failure of a single valve to operate will not prevent the ice water system from supplying the minimum flow required to accomplish the required ty functions. Consequences of service water system component failures are shown in le 9.2-4.
service water system does not normally contain radioactive water. Provisions preclude the sible spread of radioactive contamination in the event that a leak into the service water system uld occur. These precautions include radiation monitoring at the discharge of each train of tainment recirculation coolers. Motor-operated isolation valves are located at each inlet and et line of the containment recirculation coolers so that, from the control room, each rculation cooler can be isolated from the main header and the other recirculation cooler of the e train.
ssure relief valves are provided throughout the service water system to preclude system rpressurization.
1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements service water system is inspected during installation to ensure that all components meet their cifications and are properly installed.
Class 3 portion of the service water system is tested, as required, by the ASME Code. The ice water pumps are rotated in service for uniform wear.
major portion of the service water system is continually in use and is monitored and observed hift personnel to assure continued safe operation of the system.
ty related cooling that is the function of the Service Water system. NRC Generic Letter (GL) 13 required that actions be taken to confirm and maintain the capability of the Service Water em to perform its design basis functions. Actions performed to ensure the capability of the em to provide the required safety related cooling include:
- Injecting sodium hypochlorite to minimize biofouling. This injection prevents the attachment and subsequent growth of large quantities of mussels.
- Inspecting and cleaning the intake bays to minimize fouling. This cleaning removes fouling that might be drawn into the Service Water system and clog downstream components.
- Flowing Service Water through normally stagnant portions of piping such as supply to the containment recirculation coolers, diesel generators and ESF ventilation condensers to minimize fouling. Stagnant and near stagnant water can be conducive to biological growth.
- Monitoring of available heat exchanger parameters to detect gross debris loading. This periodic monitoring detects fouling build up in a heat exchanger between visual inspections.
- Inspecting heat exchanger, pipe, and other component internals on the Service Water side to remove fouling and repair as needed. Periodic inspections identify component degradation or the slow buildup of fouling prior to it affecting component operability.
- Cleaning heat exchangers on the Service Water side to minimize fouling buildup.
Cleaning removes deposits of fouling that tend to occur in heat exchanger tubes.
- Testing heat exchangers to confirm design heat transfer capability. This testing and subsequent analysis verifies heat exchanger performance is capable of meeting minimum design requirements.
- Filling heat exchangers with fresh water during lay-up to minimize buildup of fouling and component degradation caused by stagnant seawater.
1.5 Instrumentation Requirements service water system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and controlled, locally emotely.
trol of the service water pumps can be accomplished either from the main board in the control m or from the switchgear. A LOCAL/REMOTE selector switch on the switchgear, normally cted to REMOTE, determines which panel has control. An annunciator is alarmed on the main trol board when LOCAL is selected. A STOP/AUTO/START control switch with indicating
ch is lag.
chemical feed-chlorination system isolation valves have main board OPEN/AUTO-CLOSE hbuttons with indicating lights. The service water pump discharge valves are operated from main board by an OPEN/AUTO pushbutton with indicating lights. The service water pump iner motor is controlled from the main board by a OFF/AUTO/ON switch with indicating ts for the associated service water pump strainer backwash valve.
unciators on the main control board warn personnel of the following conditions:
- 1. Service water pump discharge pressure low
- 2. Service water flow low to emergency generator
- 3. Service water flow high to emergency generator
- 4. Service water pump at local control
- 5. Service water flow low to reactor plant component coolers
- 6. Service water flow high to reactor plant component coolers
- 7. Service water pump motor temperature high
- 8. Bus 34C load control power not available
- 9. Any motor control center loss of control power
- 10. Service water pump strainer differential pressure high
- 11. Service water pumps auto trip/overcurrent
- 12. Service water system train A bypassed
- 13. Service water system train B bypassed cators are provided on the main control board for the following:
- 1. Service water pump motor current
- 2. Service water pump header discharge pressure engineered safety features status window is provided on the main control board to indicate the service water pump is running.
- 1. Service water pump header discharge pressure
- 2. Service water pump breaker position
- 3. Deleted
- 4. Deleted
- 5. Service water pump motor temperature
- 6. Service water pump motor overcurrent
- 7. Service water pump auto trip
- 8. Service water pump A lead (one input for each pump)
- 9. Service water pump discharge valve open
- 10. Service water pump discharge valve closed
- 11. Service water pump strainer backwash valve open
- 12. Service water pump strainer backwash valve closed
- 13. Service water pump motor thrust bearing temperature
- 14. Service water pump motor radial bearing temperature
- 15. Air-conditioning unit molded case circuit breaker open
- 16. Air-conditioning unit control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK
- 17. Service water train A/B bypassed
- 18. BYPASS pushbutton depressed vice water pump A control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK or control circuit open and service er pump C control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK or control circuit open (one input for pumps B D also).
cation of the service water pump motor current is available on the switchgear.
service water pumps are sequenced on by the emergency generator load sequencer after a loss mergency bus power has occurred.
2 COOLING SYSTEMS FOR REACTOR AUXILIARIES cooling systems for reactor auxiliaries consists of the reactor plant component cooling water, led water, neutron shield tank cooling, charging pumps cooling, and safety injection pumps ling systems. These systems are used individually or in combination to provide cooling water heat removal from reactor plant components.
of the reactor plant component cooling system, and the entire charging pumps cooling and ty injection pumps cooling systems are safety related. Tables 9.2-6, 9.2-11, and 9.2-13 ent single failure evaluations of the equipment in each of these respective systems. These es demonstrate the effect of a postulated failure of each piece of equipment on a safe reactor tdown.
ability to isolate the affected equipment in case of failure is discussed and listed in the above es.
gle failure evaluations are not presented for the chilled water and neutron shield tank cooling ems since these systems are neither safety related nor required for a safe reactor shutdown ctions 9.2.2.2 and 9.2.2.3).
2.1 Reactor Plant Component Cooling System reactor plant component cooling water system (CCP) provides an intermediate barrier ween radioactive or potentially radioactive heat sources and the service water system ction 9.2.1). It is designed to remove heat from various plant components in a manner which ludes direct leakage of radioactive fluids to the environment.
reactor plant component cooling system is shown on Figure 9.2-2.
2.1.1 Design Basis reactor plant component cooling water system is designed for maximum normal unit ration. Design data (pressure, temperature, and capacity) of the major components in this em are presented in Table 9.2-5.
reactor plant component cooling water heat exchangers and pumps, surge tank, and ciated piping and valves are designed in accordance with the requirements of Seismic egory I and Safety Class 3. Piping to and from the residual heat removal heat exchangers, dual heat removal pump seal coolers, safety injection pumps cooling surge tank, fuel pool lers, charging pumps cooling surge tank, seal water heat exchanger, letdown heat exchanger, ess letdown heat exchanger, and reactor coolant pumps bearing oil coolers and thermal iers, is designed in accordance with the requirements of Seismic Category I and Safety Class ontainment piping penetrations are designated Safety Class 2, Seismic Category I. The rest of
h safety related and nonsafety related piping classes are shown on Figure 9.2-2.
prevent the occurrence of service water leakage into the component cooling water, the ponent cooling water system is maintained at a higher pressure than the service water system.
ause the system is required to perform its safety function during the short-term and long-term t accident conditions, the safety related passive components as well as the active components designed to meet the single failure criteria. An analysis of postulated cracks in moderate rgy systems is found in Section 3.6.
component cooling water system is designed in accordance with the following criteria, ulatory guides, and codes:
- 1. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) for Nuclear Power Plants GDC 2, 4, 5, 44, 45, 46, 54, 56, and 57, as specified in Section 3.1.2
- 2. NRC Regulatory Guides 1.26 and 1.29, as specified in Section 1.8
- 3. Codes used to design and fabricate this system are discussed in Section 3.2 2.1.2 System Description reactor plant component cooling water system is a closed loop cooling system that transfers t from reactor auxiliaries to the service water system during plant operation and during normal emergency cooldown/shutdown. Additionally, the reactor plant component cooling system vides makeup water to several cooling subsystems. The system consists of three half-capacity or-driven cooling water pumps, three half-capacity heat exchangers, a surge tank, a chemical ition tank, associated piping, valves, instrumentation, controls and auxiliary electrical ipment.
h of the three reactor plant component cooling heat exchangers is capable of removing one of the heat load generated 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the start of unit cooldown. The reactor plant ponent cooling water system is designed to supply 95°F during normal plant operation when service water is at its maximum design temperature of 80°F. For normal cooldown and safety de cold shutdown, the component cooling water supply temperature may reach 110°F and
°F, respectively, due to higher residual heat removal heat duty.
reactor plant component cooling system supplies water to cool the following reactor plant ponents located inside the containment structure:
- 1. Reactor coolant pumps (thermal barriers, upper and lower bearing oil coolers)
(Section 5.4.1)
- 3. Containment air recirculation cooling coils (loss of power or SIS (CIA) only (Section 9.4.6.2)
- 4. On service neutron shield tank cooler (loss of power or SIS (CIA) only)
(Section 9.2.2.3) following components cooled by the reactor plant component cooling water system are ted outside the containment structure:
ety Related Components
- 1. Seal water heat exchanger (Section 9.3.4)
- 2. Letdown heat exchanger (Section 9.3.4)
- 3. Fuel pool coolers (during storage of spent fuel in fuel pool) (Section 9.1.3)
- 4. Residual heat removal pumps seal coolers (during cooldown) (Section 5.4.7)
- 5. Residual heat removal heat exchangers (during cooldown) (Section 5.4.7) safety Related Components
- 1. Thermal regeneration chiller (Section 9.3.4)
- 2. Radioactive liquid waste system equipment: waste evaporator condenser, waste distillate cooler, waste evaporator bottoms cooler (intermittent heat load)
(Section 11.2)
- 3. Radioactive gaseous waste system equipment: degasifier condenser, degasifier trim cooler, process gas compressors (head and precoolers) (Section 11.3)
- 4. Boron recovery system equipment: boron evaporator bottoms cooler, boron distillate cooler, boron evaporator condenser (intermittent heat load)
(Section 9.3.5)
- 5. Chilled water system mechanical refrigeration units (Section 9.2.2.2)
- 6. Reactor plant sample coolers (intermittent heat load (Section 9.3.2)
- 7. Reactor plant sampling system chiller assembly (Section 9.3.2)
- 8. Auxiliary condensate system sample coolers (Section 10.4.10)
- 10. Containment structure penetration coolers (Section 9.2.2.1)
- 11. Cold Shutdown Instrument air compressors and after coolers (normally isolated)
- 12. Metrology Lab Heat Pump ddition, the reactor plant component cooling water system supplies makeup water to the owing:
- 1. Safety injection pumps cooling surge tank (Section 9.2.2.5)
- 2. Chilled water surge tank (Section 9.2.2.2)
- 3. Charging pumps cooling surge tank (Section 9.2.2.4)
- 4. Thermal regeneration chiller surge tank (Section 9.3.4)
- 5. Fuel transfer system (Section 9.1.4)
- 6. Reactor plant component cooling water piping, supplied by condensate makeup and drawoff system, supplies sill cock plumbing in various buildings reactor plant component cooling water system is designed as a closed system. Variations in ume, due to temperature changes, are accommodated by the reactor plant component cooling e tank connected at the reactor plant component cooling pump suctions. The reactor plant ponent cooling surge tank is the high point of the system, and provides the net positive ion head for the reactor plant component cooling pumps.
surge tank is compartmented by an internal partition so that a rapid loss of water from one partment of the surge tank affects only one reactor plant component cooling pump, leaving other reactor plant component cooling pump unaffected and fully capable of safely cooling n the unit if necessary.
reactor plant component cooling surge tank level is controlled automatically. The tank acity is sufficient to accommodate minor system surges, thermal expansion and contraction, ation of a moderate energy line break, and 30 day system leakage. The reactor plant ponent cooling surge tank is provided with one high level alarm and one low level alarm to t the operator to a possible malfunction of the makeup valve, or system leakage.
keup is supplied from the condensate makeup and drawoff system (Section 10.4.10) matically controlled by surge tank level controllers.
excess letdown heat exchanger and a pair of reactor coolant pump coolers are supplied by a ponent cooling water line which penetrates the containment. Another line independently
nections are closed to better balance the operation of the two component cooling water trains.
he event of a reactor plant component cooling water pump failure, cooling water is supplied to eactor coolant pump coolers via these cross connections. To limit temperature in containment ng off normal conditions, the containment air recirculation coolers and the neutron shield tank lers, normally cooled by the chilled water system (Section 9.2.2.2), may be cross connected to reactor plant component cooling water system. Automatic valves are provided that cross nect these nonsafety related components in the chilled water system to the safety related ply and return lines in the reactor plant component cooling water system. These valves open n loss of power (LOP) or SIS (CIA) or Loss of Power (LOP) signal.
reactor plant component cooling water supply and return lines penetrating the containment isolated upon receipt of a DBA (CIB) signal. The containment isolation valve arrangement for reactor plant component cooling water system is shown in Section 6.2.4. During an SIS (CIA) lines penetrating the containment are not isolated and the system continues to operate.
undant pipelines, residual heat exchangers and residual heat removal pump seal coolers are vided so that, in the event of a single failure, the unit can be brought to cold shutdown.
otely actuated valves are provided in the reactor plant component cooling water system to ate the piping outside containment which is nonsafety related from that which is safety related.
he event of a rupture in nonsafety related piping as sensed by low surge tank level, the aged piping is isolated by automatic closure of remotely actuated valves. These valves also e upon a SIS (CIA) or loss of power (LOP) signal.
undant remotely actuated valves are provided in the containment loop header to completely ate each side of the seismically designed system from the other. In the event of piping failure ither non safety related piping or single passive pipe crack (MEB 3-1) in safety related piping sensed by low surge tank level), automatic closure of these containment loop header valves ures separation of the system. Half of the reactor plant component cooling water system is ilable to reduce reactor coolant system temperature to cold shutdown conditions using the dual heat removal system. Wherever a safety related pipe crack is postulated, at least one half he safety related portion of the reactor plant component cooling water system will retain icient water to accomplish safety objectives. At the time of isolation, the quantity of water ed in each half of the reactor plant component cooling surge tank is sufficient to allow tinued operation.
ves are located to allow any component within the reactor plant component cooling water em to be isolated from the remainder of the system.
ing normal operation, two reactor plant component cooling pumps and two reactor plant ponent cooling heat exchangers accommodate the heat removal load. A third pump and heat hanger are provided as installed spares to permit maintenance of either of the other pumps and t exchangers while retaining two train systems operations. Double manual valves are provided he suction and discharge headers to allow connection to either of the redundant safety trains.
ation system (Section 6.2.4).
ling water return lines from each reactor plant component, except the chilled water chiller s, contain valves for controlling flow. The chilled water chiller units have flow control valves heir supply lines. The valves are either manually operated gate, butterfly, globe or ball type itioned before unit startup, automatic type positioned by pressure or temperature control als originating in the cooled systems, or manually controlled from the control room using indication in the control room.
rmal relief valves are provided on all equipment which might be overpressurized by a bination of closed reactor plant component cooling water inlet and outlet valves, and heat ut from the isolated equipment.
eactor plant component cooling chemical addition tank is connected to the reactor plant ponent cooling pumps discharge and suction piping. The required water chemistry is obtained he addition of hydrazine to control long term corrosion of the system. Organic fouling of the t exchangers is not expected due to system water chemistry and the chlorination of the service er system.
2.1.3 Safety Evaluation reactor plant component cooling water system uses equipment and reactor plant components onventional and proven design. All reactor plant components are specified to provide imum safety and reliability.
ngle failure evaluation of postulated reactor plant component cooling water system ponents is presented in Table 9.2-6.
rnado has no effect on the component cooling water system service to safety related ipment because the safety related portions are located inside Seismic Category I tornado, sile, and flood protected buildings.
undant Seismic Category I piping, residual heat exchangers and residual heat removal pumps coolers ensures a safe unit cooldown in the event of a single failure. The safety grade cold tdown process is described in Section 5.4.7.2.3.5. The piping to the fuel pool coolers, seal er heat exchanger, letdown heat exchanger, safety injection pumps cooling surge tank, rging pumps cooling surge tank, excess letdown heat exchanger and reactor coolant pumps lers, is also Seismic Category I to ensure the safe operation of the unit.
or high flow, low pressure, low or high surge tank level, high temperature, and high oactivity alarms alert the operator to malfunctions in the system. A radiation alarm alerts the rator to check the reactor plant components serviced for leakage of radioactive fluid into the tor plant component cooling water system.
hanger is provided to allow pump or heat exchanger maintenance. One reactor plant ponent cooling pump is fed by one emergency bus, a second reactor plant component cooling p is fed by the second redundant emergency bus, while the spare reactor plant component ling pump may be manually connected to either emergency bus (Figure 8.1.1). During dent conditions which do not cause a CDA signal, one reactor plant component cooling pump one reactor plant component cooling heat exchanger accommodate the heat removal load.
ing accident conditions which cause a CDA signal, the CCP heat exchanger SW flow is matically isolated and the CCP system is unavailable for transferring heat to the ultimate heat
. A failure of one power supply train or any reactor plant component in one train does not vent the system from performing its safety function.
omatic air-operated valves are installed in the return cooling water lines from the reactor lant pump thermal barriers (Figure 9.2-2). A check valve is installed in each cooling water ply line to the thermal barriers (Figure 9.2-2). In the event that a leak occurs in a thermal ier cooling coil, a high flow signal in the reactor plant component cooling system closes the operated valve and a resulting low flow alarm is annunciated in the control room.
he event of a loss of cooling water supply, the reactor coolant pumps can be operated finitely without overheating as long as normal seal injection flow is being supplied. Loss of tor plant component cooling water is indicated in the control room and sufficient time is vided for the operator to either correct the problem or trip the plant, if necessary. Redundant ns of supplying information to the control room are provided by thermal barrier low flow ms and by temperature detectors embedded in the bearing material which also alarm in the trol room. In order to enhance the reliability of the cooling water supply to the reactor pumps, following design feature has been provided.
containment supply and return headers have the ability to be cross connected so that, if a tor plant component cooling water pump fails, all four reactor coolant pumps can be supplied h cooling water from the unaffected pump. During normal operation the cross connect valves closed.
-as-is motor operated containment isolation valves are actuated only in the event of a CDA B).
reactor plant component cooling water system does not normally contain radioactive water.
visions are made to preclude the possible spread of radioactive contamination in the event that ak into the reactor plant component cooling water system should occur. These provisions ude the capability of isolating each heat exchanger by manually closing the inlet and outlet tor plant component cooling water valves. Welded construction is used extensively ughout the system to minimize the possibility of leakage from pipes, valves, and fittings.
ioactive contamination of reactor plant component cooling water could result from leakage ween the tubes and shell of heat exchangers in the chemical and volume control, residual heat oval, fuel pool cooling, or reactor plant sampling systems, or from a leak in the thermal barrier
ss leakage from the reactor plant component cooling water system is primarily detected by ng surge tank level. Temperature, level, and flow indicators in the control room are used to ct leakage at certain points. Elsewhere, leaks are detected by inspection.
reactor plant component cooling pumps and necessary instrumentation are located above ding flood levels to allow operation following flooding conditions (external floods or pipe ks). As an added precaution, the reactor plant component cooling pump motors are protected m damage due to water spray.
entially radioactive fluids cooled by the reactor plant component cooling water system are ated from the environment by two barriers. The first barrier is the tube walls of the heat hanger where the potentially radioactive fluid is cooled by the reactor plant component ling water. The second barrier is the tube walls of the reactor plant component cooling heat hanger where reactor plant component cooling water is cooled by service water. Thus, two iers in series, with a radiation alarm in the intervening reactor plant component cooling water, interposed between potentially radioactive fluids cooled by the reactor plant component ling water system and the environment. A radiation monitor in the system detects radioactivity ither redundant flow path.
transfer of supply and return between the reactor plant component cooling water system and chilled water system is accomplished by the automatic or manual operation of flow diversion es. Normally, the containment air recirculation coolers, and the on service neutron shield tank ler are served by the chilled water system. During a loss of power (LOP) or SIS (CIA), the diversion valves automatically position themselves to supply reactor plant component ling water to these components in the chilled water system thereby providing a more reliable rce of water for these nonsafety related components inside the containment. Low surge tank l caused by a pipe rupture in the nonsafety related position of the system automatically closes e valves to isolate safety related systems from nonsafety related components.
2.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements ing the life of the unit, all portions of the reactor plant component cooling water system are er in continuous or intermittent operation. Inspections are performed in addition to periodic nitoring of the system parameters during operation.
ss 2 and 3 pumps and valves are tested in accordance with Section 3.9.6 and inspection of ss 2 and 3 portions of this system is performed in accordance with Section 6.6.
2.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements rumentation and controls are provided for the reactor plant component cooling system to nitor system parameters and alert the operator to any component malfunction. Process ables of components required on a continuous basis for the startup, operation, or shutdown of
ssure, temperature, and flow indicators are provided in the control room for continuous nitoring of the reactor plant component cooling water system. Low pressure alarms and high alarms in the reactor plant component cooling water system are also provided to alert the rator of any major leak in the system.
undant pressure sensing instrumentation (surge tank level switches) is designed to detect a den drop in reactor plant component cooling water system pressure which would result from a ure of system piping. This instrumentation automatically initiates closure of valves isolating safety related piping from the nonsafety related piping and dividing the safety related portion he system to establish two independent trains.
undant reactor plant component cooling supply and return lines serve two residual heat hangers and two residual heat removal pump seal coolers. Temperature elements are provided ach return line and are monitored by the plant computer. A high and low flow alarm is vided on the main control board for each residual heat exchanger. A low flow alarm is vided on the main control board for each residual heat removal pump seal cooler.
ety related temperature elements on the RHS heat exchanger cooling water return piping are rlocked with the RHS heat exchanger bypass valves. In the event of excessive CCP piping perature (155°F) a signal will open the RHS bypass valves fully to preclude heating the CCP rn piping above the maximum pipe-stress limit temperature of 160°F.
flow in the outlet of the fuel pool coolers is alarmed on the main control board.
ependent identical level sensing channels are provided for each of the two reactor plant ponent cooling surge tank compartments. The level in the tank is maintained by automatic trol of the associated makeup control valve. This valve is opened by a low level switch in er compartment and closed when the level in both compartments exceeds the height of the ding wall. Water levels for the reactor plant component cooling surge tank compartments are cated, and extreme limits are alarmed in the control room. Upon receipt of a low level alarm, ndication of a rapidly falling water level, the operator manually closes the air operated valves he lines of nonsafety related piping as well as the air operated valves dividing the safety ted portion in half.
a DBA the reactor plant component cooling water system valves are automatically positioned ollows:
- a. Nonsafety header supply and return isolation valves are closed on receipt of a SIS (CIA) signal except for the cross connect valves to the nonsafety chilled water system which open.
- b. On receipt of a CDA (CIB) signal, the containment isolation valves for the reactor plant component cooling water system are automatically closed.
receipt of a loss of power (LOP) signal, cross connect valves to the chilled water system are ned automatically.
ineered safety feature status lights are provided on the main control board for the non safety der supply and return valves, for the reactor plant component cooling Train A and B cross nect valves, as well as for the reactor plant component cooling heat exchanger service water ply valves.
ctor plant component cooling water heat exchanger service water flow is indicated on the n control board, and service water outlet high or low flow is alarmed on the main control rd.
ctor plant component cooling system bypass alarms for Trains A and B are provided on the n control board in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.47.
2.2 Chilled Water System chilled water system (Figure 9.2-3) is a nonnuclear safety class closed-loop system which vides cooling water for the refueling water storage tank (RWST), service building conditioning units, motor control center (MCC) and rod control area air conditioning units, tainment air recirculation cooling coils and various components inside the containment cture.
2.2.1 Design Basis chilled water system is nonnuclear safety class with the exception of the containment ation valves and the piping between them, which are Safety Class 2.
chilled water system is designed to supply 45°F cooling water for the following functions:
- 1. Cool the water in the RWST to 75°F or less prior to startup and to maintain a 46°F to 48°F temperature band during normal operation.
- 2. Supply cooling water for the following air conditioning units:
- a. Service building clean air, air conditioning unit (Section 9.4.11)
- b. Service building potentially contaminated air, air conditioning unit (Section 9.4.11)
- c. MCC and rod control area air conditioning unit (Section 9.4.2) located in the auxiliary building
- a. Containment air recirculation cooling coils (Section 9.4.6.3)
- b. Reactor coolant pump motor air coolers (Section 5.4.1)
- c. Control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) shroud cooling coils (Section 9.4.6.4)
- d. Neutron shield tank coolers (Section 9.2.2.3)
- 4. Supply cooling water to the radioactive gaseous waste system process vent cooler heat load for the system during normal plant operation is approximately 19.36 x 106 Btu/hr.
le 9.2-7 lists these chilled water system heat loads and flow rates.
2.2.2 System Description system consists of three 50 percent capacity self-contained chiller and circulating pumps, rconnecting piping, valves, and controls. Chiller heat is rejected to the reactor plant ponent cooling water system. The design data of the major components is shown in le 9.2-8. The two mechanical refrigeration units and two chilled water circulating pumps vide the capacity to cool components served by the chilled water system. The mechanical igeration units are designed to produce a chilled water outlet temperature of 45°F, with a led water inlet temperature of 55°F. The third mechanical refrigeration unit and chilled water ulating pump provide a 50 percent standby capacity for the chilled water system. Chilled er system flexibility is provided for by cross-connected piping on the inlet and outlet sides of mechanical refrigeration units.
chilled water system is designed as a closed loop system. Variations in volume due to perature changes are accommodated by the chilled water surge tank, which connects to the led water circulating pumps suction header. The chilled water surge tank is pressurized with ogen to 7 psig to prevent drain down of system high points and minimize system corrosion.
keup water for the chilled water system is provided from the reactor plant component cooling er system through an automatic control valve which operates in response to the chilled water e tank level.
chilled water system supplies cooling water to two 100 percent capacity refueling water lers to reduce the RWST temperature to less than 75°F before unit startup and after refueling ration. During normal unit operation, chilled water is supplied to the RWST coolers as essary, to maintain RWST temperature between 46°F and 48°F. Flow is automatically trolled by a temperature control valve.
peratures. On a loss-of-power (LOP), these units are cooled by the service water system ction 9.2.1).
chilled water system supplies cooling water to the potentially contaminated air conditioning unit and the clean air, air-conditioning unit, located in the service building, to ntain proper ambient temperatures.
chilled water system supplies cooling water to three containment air recirculation coolers to ntain proper ambient temperatures inside the containment.
chilled water system supplies cooling water to two neutron shield tank coolers to maintain per shield tank temperature.
ing a LOP or after receiving a containment isolation Phase A signal (CIA), cooling water ply to two of the three containment air recirculation coolers and the neutron shield tank lers is transferred to the reactor plant component cooling water system (Section 9.2.2.1). This ccomplished by air-operated (AOV) flow diversion valves, which isolate the chilled water ply to these components and lines up the reactor plant component cooling water system to ply the cooling water necessary.
chilled water system supplies cooling water to two control rod drive mechanism shroud lers to cool the control rod drive mechanisms.
chilled water system supplies cooling water to four reactor coolant pump motor coolers to ntain motor air temperatures within specified conditions.
chilled water system supplies cooling water to the radioactive gaseous waste process vent ler, located inside the auxiliary building, to cool the gases prior to their release to the ironment.
containment supply and return chilled water headers are provided with air operated (AOV) tainment isolation valves for isolating the containment structure, in accordance with the uirements of the containment isolation system (Section 6.2.4).
ling water return lines from each component contain valves for controlling flow. The valves either manually operated globe type, positioned before unit startup, or air operated, positioned ressure or temperature control signals originated by the cooled systems.
two supply and return loop headers inside the containment are cross-connected to provide nced flow under various equipment operation modes. Three pairs of closely coupled block es divide each loop into quadrants. These valves allow any quadrant to be isolated while the ainder of the loop is maintained in service. Because the supply loop has two independent plies of cooling water, continued unit operation is assured at reduced load during maintenance single component.
2.2.3 Safety Evaluation s system is not safety related; therefore, no safety evaluation is provided. A design evaluation been performed to demonstrate the system capability to perform its intended function.
chilled water system uses equipment and components of proven, conventional design. All ponents are specified to provide maximum safety and reliability.
pressure, high temperature, or mechanical refrigeration unit trouble alarms will signal the rators attention to malfunctions. If the malfunction causing the alarm is not corrected, ponents and systems served by the chilled water subsystem may be inadequately cooled, uiring the operator to shut down affected components to prevent damage. Cooling of critical ponents inside the containment structure may be transferred to the reactor plant component ling water system.
chilled water system does not normally contain radioactive water; however, provisions are e to preclude the spread of radioactive contamination in the event of a leak into the chilled er system. Such provisions include the ability to isolate any heat exchanger served by the em. In addition, welded construction is used whenever possible to minimize the possibility of age from piping, valves, and fittings.
ing normal operation, two mechanical refrigeration units and two chilled water circulating ps accommodate the heat removal load. The third mechanical refrigeration unit and chilled er circulating pump provides 50 percent spare capacity. Two full capacity refueling water lers and two MCC and rod control area air conditioning units provide a 100 percent spare acity. The single chilled water supply and return line for the refueling water coolers can be iced while the RWST water temperature is at or below its design temperature due to the low tup rate of the large insulated tank.
h the installed 50 percent spare capacity, maintenance of major components can be omplished without loss of chilled water supply.
o of the three containment air recirculation cooling coils and both of the neutron shield tank lers located inside the containment structure and served by the chilled water system are cooled he reactor plant component cooling water system when off site power is not available (LOP) pon receipt of a CIA signal. Air-operated flow diversion valves are used to transfer both the ply and return water headers connecting these components inside the containment structure to reactor plant component cooling water system (Section 9.2.2.1).
2.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements ce the chilled water system is in continuous operation during normal plant operation, ormance tests are not required. During refueling shutdown, this system may run only
visual inspections, which are conducted periodically and following installation of repair parts odifications, to confirm normal operation of the system. Routine prestartup inspections are ormed in addition to periodic observation and monitoring of system parameters during ration.
tainment isolation valves are tested and inspected in accordance with Section 6.2.4.4.
2.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements chilled water system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and controlled locally or otely as follows. Unless stated otherwise, the following controls are on the main control rd:
- 1. Control switches with indicator lights for manual operation of the chilled water circulating pumps.
- 2. The mechanical refrigeration units have control switches and indicator lights at the main control board and locally to start or stop the units.
- 3. Chilled water containment isolation valves have control switches and indicator lights. A CIA signal automatically closes the valves.
- 4. Containment air recirculation coil isolation valves have control switches and indicator lights. The valves are automatically closed by a CIA or LOP signal.
- 5. The refueling water coolers temperature control valve has a control switch with indicator lights. The valve can be closed and opened manually or automatically.
When in automatic, the valve opens when the refueling water storage tank temperature is greater than 48°F and closes when the refueling water storage tank and recirculating pump suction temperature is less than 46°F.
- 6. The chilled water surge tank makeup valve can be opened or closed by a control switch with indicating lights. The valve can also be controlled automatically.
When in automatic control the valve is opened and closed by a surge tank level switch.
- 7. A flow indicating controller with automatic/manual control is utilized to modulate the refrigeration unit recirculation flow valve. The input flow signal to the controller is the summation of outlet flow from the three chillers.
unciators are provided to alarm when the following conditions exist:
- 1. Chilled water circulating pump motor auto trip/overcurrent
- 3. Chilled water supply pressure low
- 4. Chiller outlet flow high/chiller recirculation flow high
- 5. Bus load control power not available
- 6. Mechanical refrigeration unit motor auto trip/overcurrent
- 7. Refueling water coolers outlet flow low
- 8. Chilled water surge tank level high/low
- 9. Containment air recirculation cooling coil flow low ineered Safety feature status lights indicate the following:
- 1. Chilled water containment isolation valves closed
- 2. Containment air recirculation coil isolation valves closed cators are provided to monitor the following parameters:
- 1. Chilled water circulation pump motor amperage
- 2. Chiller recirculation flow
- 3. Mechanical refrigeration unit motor amperage following parameters are monitored by the plant computer:
- 1. Chilled water circulating pump motor overcurrent
- 2. Chilled water circulating pump auto trip
- 3. Chilled water circulating pump breaker position
- 4. Mechanical refrigeration unit auto trip
- 5. Mechanical refrigeration unit breaker position
- 6. Mechanical refrigeration unit overcurrent
- 7. Chilled water containment isolation valves open
- 9. Neutron shield tank cooler outlet temperature greater than a predetermined set point
- 10. Containment air recirculation coil isolation valves open
- 11. Containment air recirculation coil isolation valves closed
- 12. Chiller motor thrust bearing temperature
- 13. Chiller motor radial bearing temperature cating lights are provided at the switchgear for the following units:
- 1. Chilled water circulating pump
- 2. Mechanical refrigeration unit cators are provided at the switchgear for the following:
- 1. Chilled water circulating pump amperage
- 2. Mechanical refrigeration unit amperage following controls are located locally:
- 1. An ON-OFF control switch for the refrigeration transfer unit
- 2. Start/STOP-RESET pushbutton with indicating lights for the mechanical refrigeration unit
- 3. OPEN-HOLD-CLOSE-AUTO control switch for the mechanical refrigeration unit suction inlet guide vanes
- 4. 40-60-80-100 percent position switch for the mechanical unit electrical capacity demand
- 5. RAISE-LOWER control switch for the mechanical refrigeration unit chilled water temperature
- 6. SERVICE-NORMAL control switch for the mechanical refrigeration unit lube oil pump
- 7. AUTO-MANUAL control switch with running indicating light for the mechanical refrigeration unit lube oil pump
- 9. Temperature controller with auto/manual feature and indication for the mechanical refrigeration unit condenser component cooling water supply valve al indicating lights are provided for the following:
- 1. Mechanical refrigeration unit anti-recycling
- 2. Mechanical refrigeration unit oil heater on
- 3. Loss of power
- 4. Lube oil pressure low
- 5. Freon discharge pressure high
- 6. Freon suction pressure low
- 7. Chilled water temperature low
- 8. Lube oil, mechanical refrigeration unit motor or freon discharge temperature high 2.3 Neutron Shield Tank Cooling System neutron shield tank cooling system is shown on Figure 9.2-4.
2.3.1 Design Bases neutron shield tank cooling system cools the water circulated through the neutron shield tank ch is heated by neutron and gamma radiation from the reactor. The neutron shield tank cooling em is not safety related and, therefore, is not designed to Seismic Category I requirements, need not meet the single failure criterion.
2.3.2 System Description tron shield tank cooling system components are summarized in Table 9.2-9. Two 100 percent acity neutron shield tank coolers, a neutron shield tank surge tank, and necessary piping and es constitute the system. The neutron shield tank cooling system is designed as a natural ulation system, thus, pumps are not required.
heated water in the neutron shield tank rises to the top of the tank and exits into the pipe ing to the neutron shield tank coolers. Cool water from the chilled water system ction 9.2.2.2) is circulated through the shell side of the neutron shield tank coolers, cooling the
100 percent capacity neutron shield tank cooler performs the required cooling. The second percent capacity cooler is a spare. The second 100 percent capacity cooler is a spare, but can sed in parallel with the other cooler in the event additional cooling is desired to operate the ld tank at minimum temperatures. The neutron shield tank surge tank accommodates thermal ansion of the neutron shield tank water. Primary grade water supplies makeup water to the tron shield tank surge tank.
rosion inhibiting chemicals are added to the neutron shield tank cooling water via the neutron ld tank surge tank.
2.3.3 Safety Evaluation two 100 percent capacity neutron shield tank coolers provide redundancy and reserve cooling acity. Manual block valves are provided at the inlet and outlet lines of each cooler and enable er cooler to be isolated, if required. The neutron shield tank cooling system uses equipment components of proven, conventional design.
2.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements ydrostatic test was conducted following construction. Specific performance tests are not uired because the neutron shield tank cooling system is in continuous operation and is nitored in the control room (Section 9.2.2.3.5). Periodic analysis of the monitored parameters reveal possible degradation of the systems performance. The neutron shield tank coolers are rnated in service on a scheduled basis. The neutron shield coolers are alternated in service on a eduled basis, when single cooler operation is desired. Both shield tank coolers can be placed in ice simultaneously when reserve cooling capacity is desired. All system components are essible for visual inspections. Routine prestartup inspections are made along with periodic ervation and monitoring of the system during operation.
2.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements neutron shield tank cooling system is monitored, indicated, and controlled, locally or otely, as follows:
- 1. Level sensing instrumentation of the neutron shield tank surge tank indicates and alarms in the control room for low and high tank levels. The system water inventory is controlled by makeup from the primary grade water system and letdown to aerated drains. The makeup initiation is remote-manual from the control room and follows a low level alarm.
- 2. Shield tank cooling water inlet and outlet temperature and the differential temperature is monitored by the plant computer. High neutron shield tank coolant temperature is alarmed in the control room.
charging pumps cooling system (Figure 9.2-5) cools the oil for the charging pumps.
2.4.1 Design Bases charging pump cooling system transfers heat load from the charging pumps lubrication oil to service water system. The system is designated Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I, and hanical components are designed to ASME III, Class 3 requirements. Class IE electrical ponents are qualified to IEEE-323 as described in Section 3.11. The system is designed to t the requirements of the single failure criteria.
2.4.2 System Description o 100 percent capacity charging pumps cooling pumps, two 100 percent capacity charging ps coolers, and a charging pumps cooling surge tank constitute major equipment in the em. The system supplies 15 gpm cooling water to the charging pumps oil coolers (one cooler charging pump) to remove 81,100 Btu/hr per charging pump. Table 9.2-10 lists other design meters.
er of the two charging pumps cooling pump circulates cooling water to the tube side of the rging pumps oil cooler of the operating charging pump, where heat is absorbed from the oil.
ling water is also circulated to the oil cooler of the standby charging pump, which is nected to the emergency bus. The third charging pump is normally electrically disconnected m the emergency bus, and the charging pumps cooling piping to this pump is normally valved ed. Valving to the standby charging pump cooler is aligned for normal operation. If the dby charging pump starts (automatically) during normal operation, cooling water is already plied to its oil cooler. The warmed system water returns from the charging pumps cooling p oil cooler and then passes through the shell side of the associated charging pumps cooler.
heat is transferred to the service water system (Section 9.2.1) via these coolers.
he event that the operating charging pumps cooling pump fails during normal operation, a sure switch located on the pump discharge piping automatically starts the other charging ps cooling pump. In the event of the SIS or loss of power signal, the second charging pumps ling pump will automatically start, and the redundant cross-connection valves in the suction discharge lines of the cooling pumps will close.
omatic isolation of the two charging pumps cooling flow paths will allow the cooling pump of h charging pump to provide cooling water independently to its respective charging pump.
charging pumps cooling system is designed as a closed system. Variations in volume due to perature changes are accommodated by the charging pumps surge tank, connected to the rging pumps cooling pumps suction. The charging pumps cooling surge tank is the high point he system and provides the net positive suction head (NPSH) for the charging pumps cooling ps. Charging pumps cooling system makeup is supplied from a safety related portion of the tor plant component cooling water system, through an automatic control valve which operates
er from one compartment of the surge tank affects only one charging pumps cooling pump, ing the other charging pumps cooling pump unaffected and fully capable of service. The rnal partition is open at the top to allow pressure equalization between compartments. System eup is assured by sizing the surge tank at 500 gallon per redundant system to accommodate a day period without refill and by providing a safety related makeup source from the reactor t component cooling water system (Section 9.2.2.1). The charging pumps cooling system ng is a 150 psi, ANSI rated carbon steel system.
charging pumps cooling pumps are powered from separate emergency buses. Separation of trical components onto two emergency buses ensures that a failure of one bus does not rfere with the function of the redundant system.
2.4.3 Safety Evaluation undant components and piping are used throughout the charging pumps cooling system. The rging pumps cooling pumps are powered from redundant emergency buses. The use of undant components, piping, and emergency buses ensures that the system can withstand a le failure.
charging pumps cooling pump and both charging pumps coolers are normally in service to ply the operating and standby charging pumps oil coolers. The line supplying cooling water to third charging pump oil cooler is normally separated by closed isolation valves. The discharge s of the two charging pumps cooling pumps are connected by a crossover line having two operated trip valves which are normally open. The suction lines of the two charging pumps ling pumps are similarly connected by a crossover line containing two air-operated trip valves ch are normally open. Thus, one charging pumps cooling pump cools both charging pumps lers. In the event of an SIS, the trip valves are closed automatically to isolate redundant ling paths, and the second charging pumps cooling pump starts. A single failure of any ponent in either cooling loop does not affect operation of the redundant train.
ensure that service water is continuously available, the charging pumps coolers are connected eparate service water supply and return lines.
header supplying cooling water to the charging pumps oil coolers is connected through ing to each charging pumps cooling pump. The cooling water supply and discharge headers e isolation valves to allow the charging pumps oil coolers corresponding to any two of the e charging pumps to be separated from the third charging pump oil cooler. The operating and dby charging pump oil coolers are fed through separate flow paths during normal operation.
third charging pump oil cooler remains isolated during normal operation. Failure of one rging pumps cooling pump actuates a low pressure switch which automatically starts the dby charging pumps cooling pump. Should the standby charging pump be required to operate, quate oil cooling capacity is available for two charging pumps with one charging pumps ling pump operating. Under accident conditions, the charging pumps cooling pumps supply return headers are automatically separated for redundancy.
id system operational degradation.
alfunction analysis, giving consequences of component failure, is given in Table 9.2-11.
rnado will have no effect on the charging pumps cooling system because the equipment is ted inside the tornado protected auxiliary building. This system is designed to Seismic egory I requirements and will, therefore, be operable in the event of a safe shutdown hquake.
s system is located above the flood level in the flood protected auxiliary building and thus is affected by floods.
charging pumps cooling system will not cause any radioactivity to be released to the ironment because it does not cool any potentially radioactive fluid. Analysis of postulated ks in moderate energy piping is discussed in Section 3.6.
2.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements charging pumps cooling system is in continuous operation, with essential system parameters tem temperatures, pressures, and flow capacity) continuously monitored and indicated in the trol room by instrumentation. Performance tests are, therefore, not required. The charging ps cooling pumps are alternated in service on a scheduled basis. All components are essible for in service inspections. In service Testing per ASME code for Operation and ntenance of Nuclear Power Plants requirements are performed for each pump on a scheduled s.
ss 2 and 3 pumps and valves are tested in accordance with Section 3.9.6 and inspection of ss 2 and 3 portions of this system is performed in accordance with Section 6.6.
2.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements charging pumps cooling system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled locally or remotely. The charging pumps cooling pumps and valves are controlled from main board in the control room. The instrumentation provisions follow.
unciators are provided on the main board for the following:
- 1. Charging pumps coolers outlet temperature, Low
- 2. Charging pumps surge tank level, High
- 3. Charging pumps surge tank level, Low
- 4. Charging pumps oil coolers outlet temperature, High
- 6. Engineered safety features status lights are provided on the main control board to indicate that the charging pump cooling pump has started and that the charging pump coolers outlet crossover valves are shut.
mputer inputs are provided for the following system parameters:
- 1. Charging pumps cooling pumps started
- 2. Charging pumps cooling pump discharge pressure
- 3. Charging pumps cooling pump suction pressure
- 4. (Deleted)
- 5. (Deleted)
- 6. Charging pumps cooling pump bearing temperature
- 7. Valve position of the charging pump coolers outlet crossover valve
- 8. Charging pumps oil cooler flow al temperature indicators are provided on the inlet and outlet to the charging pump coolers.
al level indicators are provided for the charging pumps cooling surge tank as well as a local totalizer for inlet flow to the surge tank. Local temperature indicators are provided on the et of the charging pump oil coolers.
PULL-TO-LOCK feature is incorporated in the charging pump cooling pump control switch, ch when activated, actuates a bypass status annunciator in compliance with Regulatory Guide 7.
2.5 Safety Injection Pumps Cooling System safety injection pumps (Figure 9.2-4) cools the bearing oil for the safety injection pumps.
2.5.1 Design Bases safety injection pumps cooling system transfers heat load from the safety injection pumps ring oil to the service water system. The system is designated Safety Class 3, Seismic egory I, and mechanical components are designed to ASME III, Class 3 requirements.
ss IE electrical components are qualified to IEEE-323 as described in Section 3.11. The em is designed to meet the requirements of the single failure criteria.
o 100 percent capacity safety injection pumps cooling pumps, two 100 percent capacity safety ction pumps coolers, and a safety injection pumps cooling surge tank constitute major ipment in the system. The system supplies 10 gpm cooling water to the safety injection pumps ring oil coolers (one bearing oil cooler for each safety injection pump) to remove 00 Btuhr. Table 9.2-12 lists other design parameters.
safety injection pumps cooling system is not normally in operation, but automatically ates upon start of the associated safety injection pump. When required to run, each safety ction pumps cooling pump circulates cooling water to the oil cooler of its associated safety ction pump, where heat is absorbed from the pump bearing oil. The warmed system water rns from the safety injection pump bearing oil cooler through the safety injection pump cooler re heat is transferred to the service water system (Section 9.2.1).
safety injection pumps cooling system is designed as a closed system. Variations in volume to temperature changes are accommodated by the safety injection pumps surge tank nected to the safety injection pumps cooling pump suctions. The safety injection pumps surge is the high point of the system and provides the net positive suction head (NPSH) for the ty injection pumps cooling pumps. The surge tank is compartmented by an internal partition hat a rapid loss of water from one compartment of the surge tank affects only one safety ction pumps cooling pump, leaving the other safety injection pumps cooling pump unaffected fully capable of service. The internal partition is open at the top to allow pressure equalization ween compartments. Safety injection pumps cooling system makeup is supplied from a safety ted portion of the reactor plant component cooling water system, through an automatic control e which operates in response to either safety injection pump cooling surge tank compartment
- l. System makeup is assured by sizing the surge tank at 500 gallons per redundant system to ommodate a 30 day period without refill and by providing a safety related makeup source from reactor plant component cooling water system (Section 9.2.2.1).
safety injection pumps cooling subsystem piping is a 150 lb ANSI rated carbon steel system.
safety injection pumps cooling system is designed with redundant, independent, cooling uits. Separation of electrical components onto two emergency buses ensures that a failure of bus does not interfere with the function of the redundant system.
2.5.3 Safety Evaluation undant components and piping are used throughout the safety injection pumps cooling em. Each safety injection pumps cooling pump is powered from the same emergency bus as ssociated safety injection pump. The use of redundant components, piping, and emergency es ensures that the system can withstand a single failure.
safety injection pump cooling pump, serving one safety injection pump, starts whenever its ective safety injection pump is started. The second safety injection pump cooling pump is ciated with the redundant safety injection pump and provides the required redundancy. The
ge tank low level alarms as well as sumps with high level alarms are provided to detect ponent or system leakage, thus permitting the operator to take appropriate action to avoid em operational degradation.
ensure that service water is continuously available, a separate service water supply and a arate service water return line are connected to each of the safety injection pumps coolers. A function analysis, giving consequences of component failure, is given in Table 9.2-13.
rnado will have no effect on the safety injection pumps cooling system because the equipment cated inside the tornado-protected engineered safety features building. The system is gned to Seismic Category I requirements and will, therefore, be operable in the event of a safe tdown earthquake.
safety injection pumps cooling system does not cause any radioactivity to be released to the ironment because it does not cool any potentially radioactive fluids. Analysis of postulated ks in moderate energy piping is discussed in Section 3.6.
2.5.4 Testing and Inspections h safety injection pumps cooling loops are periodically operated with essential system meters being monitored and indicated in the control room by instrumentation. All ponents are accessible for inservice inspections.
ss 2 and 3 pumps and valves are tested in accordance with Section 3.9.6 and inspection of ss 2 and 3 portions of this system is performed in accordance with Section 6.6.
2.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements safety injection pump cooling system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled locally or remotely.
safety injection pump cooling pumps and makeup water valve are controlled from the main rd in the control room. The cooling pumps are controlled with a STOP-AUTO-START switch h indicating lights and the safety injection pumps cooling surge tank makeup valve is operated CLOSE AUTO OPEN switch with indicating lights.
unciators are provided for safety injection pump cooling water flow low, for safety injection p surge tank level high or low, for safety injection pump oil cooler outlet temperature high for MCC power not available. Status lights are provided for MCC load control power not ilable on rear of main control board.
ineered-safety-features status lights are provided to indicate when the safety injection pump ling pumps are running.
- 1. Safety injection pump cooling pump thrust bearing temperature
- 2. Safety injection pump cooling pump bearing temperature
- 3. Safety injection pump cooling pump breaker position
- 4. Safety injection pump cooling pump discharge pressure
- 5. Safety injection pump cooling pump suction pressure
- 6. Safety injection pump oil coolers flow
- 7. (Deleted)
- 8. (Deleted)
- 9. (Deleted) al temperature indicators are provided on the inlet and outlet of the safety injection pump lers. Local level indicators are provided for the surge tanks and local temperature indicators provided for the lubricating oil outlet of the safety injection pump bearing oil coolers.
2.6 Condensate Demineralizer Component Cooling Water System (Removed from Service) condensate demineralizer component cooling water system (Figure 9.2-6), cooled by the en wash disposal system, was designed to supply cooling water to various components in the nerant liquid waste and auxiliary condensate systems. The condensate demineralizer ponent cooling water system is not safety related and is removed from service.
2.6.1 Design Bases condensate demineralizer component cooling water system was designed to provide cooling er to the following components (which were removed from service):
- 1. Regenerant distillate cooler (Section 11.2)
- 2. Regenerant evaporator condenser (Section 11.2)
- 3. Regenerant evaporator bottoms cooler (Section 11.2)
- 4. Regenerant evaporator bottoms sample cooler (Section 11.2)
- 5. Auxiliary condensate sample cooler (Section 10.4.10)
Millstone 3 condensate demineralizer component cooling water system (3CCD) is isolated m the Millstone 2 condensate demineralizer component cooling water system (2CCD).
2.6.2 System Description s system has been removed from service and is isolated from the plant.
2.6.3 Safety Evaluation condensate demineralizer component cooling water system (removed from service) is not ty related; therefore, it is not seismically designed and is not designed to withstand a single ure. Failure of any portion or component of this system will not damage any safety related ponent or system.
2.6.4 Inspections and Testing Requirements s system is removed from service and is isolated from the plant. No further testing is required.
2.6.5 Instrumentation Requirements condensate demineralizer component cooling system is removed from service and is inistratively controlled by operations.
3 DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM demineralized water makeup (WTS) systems (Figure 9.2-7) include the supply water treating em, the wastewater treating system and the common makeup water treatment system. None of e systems is safety related.
3.1 Design Bases function of the common makeup water treatment system is to provide makeup demineralized-erated water for Millstone Unit 2 and Unit 3 nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS) and their iliary systems, and to provide demineralized makeup water to Millstone Unit 2 and Unit 3 ondary systems.
following criteria have been used in the design of the common water treatment system:
- a. The CWTF makeup water demineralizer section of the water treatment system shall provide up to 400 gpm to meet the demands of Units 1, 2 and 3.
- b. The water treatment system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components such as pumps, demineralizers, tanks, filters, valves and piping to ensure the integrity and capability of the system.
- d. The system has automatic and manual control for operation.
- e. The conductivity of product water is designed to be less than 0.1 micromhho/cm.
- f. The CWTF is designed as a non-safety related system. It is not designed to seismic Category I requirements.
wastewater treating system is designed to accept the wastes from two back-to-back nerations of one demineralizer train in the water treating system.
not necessary for the wastewater treating system to be operated continuously, because storage acities adequate for normal usage are provided. Redundancy of all equipment in the water ting system is not required; however, two full sized trains of basic water treating equipment provided to permit uninterrupted operation during demineralizer regeneration and pump ntenance.
3.2 System Description mestic (city) water is supplied to the Common Water Treatment Facility through a back flow vention valve to prevent chemical contamination of the domestic water supply. The Common ter Treatment Facility is sized to provide the makeup water requirements for Millstone Units 1, nd 3. The Common Water Treatment Facility supplies deaerated water to the Unit 2 densate Storage Tank (CST) via the separate eight inch supply header and to all other tanks in ts 2 and 3 via the cross tie header.
e makeup water requirement exceeds the normal operating flow rates for either unit, such as ng chemistry holds during startup, the Common Water Treatment Facility has the flexibility to rt the additional water as needed.
design chemical analysis of demineralized water from the vendor water treatment system is ollows:
Silica, max (ppb) 10 Conductivity, max (mhos/cm) 0.1 Dissolved oxygen, max (ppm) 0.1 Sodium, max (ppb) 1 Chloride, max (ppb) 1 Sulfate, max (ppb) 2 Calcium, max (ppb) 2 Magnesium, max (ppb) 2 Aluminum, max (ppb) 10 Total organic carbon (ppb) 50
er of the two full capacity ultrafiltration supply pumps draws water from the water treating age tank and pumps the water through common discharge piping to either of two trains of afiltration equipment. Each of the two parallel trains provided includes one ultra filtration ster pump and one ultrafiltration module rack. This rack, consisting of mounted membrane ridges, removes any suspended solids or large organic molecules which may be present. An afiltration permeate tank, common to both trains, is used to store product water and to provide mon suction to the Contract Water Treatment Facility (CWTF) supply pumps. Permeate is used to dilute a solution which cleanses the ultrafiltration membranes on a periodic basis.
H adjustment/chemical feed tank and two full capacity chemical metering pumps to add micals to the common supply line leading to both ultrafiltration trains are provided. Chemicals ch may be added include caustic for pH adjustment or a dispersant. This chemical addition, if uired, will ensure that dissolved silica which remains in solution will not foul the membranes.
aning of the ultrafiltration membrane cartridges is done automatically based on a preset sure drop across the unit. A dedicated UF supply pump provides flow required for the two h shear steps of the cleaning cycle. The membranes are backflushed using water from the meate tank supplied by one of two full capacity ultrafiltration flush pumps. A cleaning solution ium hypochlorite) is added during the backflush step. One cleaning solution tank and two full acity chemical metering pumps to add sodium hypochlorite solution to the suction line of the afiltration booster pumps are provided.
aning of the ultrafiltration membrane cartridges (one train) is automatic, based on a preset sure drop across the unit and consists of the following six steps:
- 1. 4 minute high shear sweep of the fiber Walls:
Flow supplied by the UF supply pumps is 600 gpm.
- 2. 4 minute permeate backflush with the addition of a NaOCl concentrate:
Flow supplied by the UF flush pumps is 131 gpm. Flow supplied by the cleaning solution pumps is variable.
- 3. 8 minute pause.
- 4. 4 minute backflush rinse:
Flow supplied by the UF flush pumps is 131 gpm.
- 5. 4 minute high shear sweep of the fiber walls:
Flow supplied by the UF supply pumps is 600 gpm.
Flow supplied by the UF supply pumps is 131 gpm.
kflushing involves closing of the feedwater and permeate valves, and opening the ends of the ridges to drain. The ultrafiltration flush pump supplies water which was stored in the permeate age tank to the permeate side of the hollow fiber cartridges. The water (under pressure) flows ard through the fiber walls, losing accumulated debris and carrying it out both ends of the r tubes to drain. The NaOCl solution is added by means of a chemical metering pump only ng the backflush portion of the cleaning sequence. The chemical pump is operated for 4 utes during the backflush step. After the chemical addition, the cleaning sequence provides an inute pause followed by a 4 minute flush to waste using the UF flush pumps. Following the ond high shear sweep, the system is flushed as in normal operation for 2 minutes to drain ore the permeate is sent to the permeate tank.
ultrafiltration equipment is designed to allow one train to operate in the process cycle while alternate train is in the backflush pause, backflush rinse, or flush steps of the cleaning cycle.
alternate train is shut down during the two high shear steps.
WTS has not been used since plant startup. The following WTS descriptions are for historical poses.
carbon filter must occasionally be removed from service and washed to loosen the carbon bed to remove collected solids from the surface of the bed. Carbon filter washing is operator ated and consists of a timed backwash step and a timed rinse step. Water used for both steps is wn from the permeate tank by the makeup demineralizer supply pumps and directed to the te regenerant neutralizing sump.
cation, anion, and mixed bed vessels are a source of demineralized water as long as the total ons throughout has not been exceeded as set on the water meters, or the water quality has not eeded the conductivity setpoints. When either of the above conditions has been exceeded, rating personnel must initiate regeneration of the demineralizers. Once initiated, the uencing is controlled by timers.
d and caustic solutions regenerate exhausted resin beds. Concentrated acid and caustic are t in storage tanks and chemical transfer pumps pump the acid and caustic, as required, to mical measuring tanks. Acid and caustic metering pumps supply the chemicals through ing tees (where they are diluted) to the appropriate demineralizer beds during regeneration.
regenerate the cation bed, sulfuric acid, diluted with (carbon) filtered water, is added stepwise onvert all cation resin to the hydrogen form. Before and after the acid addition, the cation bed ackwashed with (carbon) filtered water to remove accumulated crud and residual acid.
egenerate the anion bed, caustic, diluted with condensate makeup and drawoff water, is added onvert all anion resin to the hydroxide form. Before the caustic addition, the anion bed is
regenerate the mixed bed, anion and cation resins are separated by backwashing, followed by ition of caustic to convert anion resin to the hydroxide form and addition of acid to convert on resin to the hydrogen form. Both acid and caustic are diluted with the condensate makeup drawoff water. A series of rinsing steps with (carbon) filtered and demineralized water is used urge residual caustic from the anion resin and residual acid from the cation resin. Finally, the ns are remixed.
wastewater treating system (Figure 9.2-7) treats all wastes from the water treating system, uding spent acid and caustic and ultrafiltration cleaning wastes, which drain to an 83,000 on waste neutralization sump. Here, they are batch neutralized and discharged into the ulating water discharge tunnel. Acid and caustic metering pumps draw acid and caustic from chemical measuring tanks and supply these chemicals to the sump as required for tralization. A pH indicator, located on the waste sump recirculation line, is used by operating onnel to determine either the need for further neutralization or the need to direct flow to the ulating water discharge tunnel.
demineralized effluent from the CWTF flows, when required, to the 300,000 gallon capacity densate storage tank (Section 9.2.6), to the 150,000 gallon condensate surge tank ction 9.2.6), or to the two 100,000-gallon capacity primary grade water storage tanks ction 9.2.8) and to the 360,000 gallon capacity demineralized water storage tank ction 10.4.9).
ing periods when demineralized water is not required, a minimum flow can be recirculated ugh the demineralizer water treating supply pump suction.
source of raw water for this system is the Town of Waterford Public Water Supply, which is otable quality. This water is stored in the water treating storage tank which has a capacity of roximately 35,000 gallons. To prevent any possible contamination of the Town of Waterford lic Water Supply from backflow of the water treating system, the piping upstream of the lic water storage tank has an air-break. Table 9.2-15 presents the design data for the major ponents.
3.3 Safety Evaluation se systems are not safety related. Failure of any portion or component of these systems will damage any safety related component or system. The following design evaluation is provided emonstrate the systems capability to perform its intended function.
water treating system and the storage tanks are of sufficient capacity to meet demineralized primary grade water requirements for preoperational cleaning, unit startup, and continuous operation, including periods of demineralizer regeneration and routine maintenance.
system is designed to meet NRC Branch Technical Positions ASB 3 1 and MEB 3 1 ction 3.6) as related to breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside tainment.
3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements entire water treating system is used regularly, on a day-to-day basis, either in the production emineralized water or in the process of demineralizer regeneration. Therefore, the operability he system is regularly demonstrated, and periodic testing to ensure that operability is not uired.
ormance of the demineralizers components can be tested to determine compliance with the uent water quality requirements using test methods published in ASTM Standards, Part 23 -
ustrial Water: Atmospheric Analysis, latest edition.
tem equipment is tested for leakage and proper automatic control action prior to initial ration. The flow and conductivity of the demineralizer train effluent are continuously nitored during normal operation. Samples from the various storage tanks are periodically taken tested.
3.5 Instrumentation Requirements ultrafiltration permeate line flow indicating transmitter, recorder, and totalizer are provided the ultrafiltration permeate.
ow control device is provided at the discharge of the ultrafiltration supply pumps to maintain required water flow to the ultrafiltration booster pumps. A pressure control device is provided e discharge of the ultrafiltration booster pumps to maintain water pressure to the afiltration module bank at the desired setting.
ultrafiltration module bank is cleaned automatically, as required, using both raw water and er from the ultrafiltration permeate tank. The permeate tank is sized to store sufficient water cleaning and for supplying water to the demineralizers during cleaning of the ultrafiltration dules.
ressure control device is provided at the discharge of the water treating supply pumps to ntain the water pressure at the inlet to the carbon filters at the desired setting.
makeup to the condensate storage tank is manually controlled. The air-operated makeup e receives a close signal upon tank high level. The makeup to the condensate surge tank is ually controlled. The air-operated makeup valve receives a close signal upon tank high level.
makeup to the demineralized water storage tank is under administrative control.
4 DOMESTIC AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEMS potable and sanitary water systems (Figure 9.2-8) are not safety related.
4.1 Design Bases domestic water system (Figure 9.2-8) is designed to supply and distribute cold and hot water ughout the unit for sanitary purposes, supply cold water throughout the plant for washdown general maintenance through sillcocks, and supply, makeup or cooling water to selected ems. The domestic water system employs backflow preventers, air gaps, and vacuum breakers ughout the system to prevent any possible contamination of the system. Contamination rces can be from radioactive, chlorine, or other flushing activities conducted on systems ughout the plant.
sanitary system collects drainage from sanitary components and directs noncontaminated nage to the Town of Waterford Sewer System. The sanitary system directs potentially taminated drainage to a contaminated sump for further transfer to the radioactive liquid waste em.
4.2 System Description domestic water system is fed from the Town of Waterford public water supply. A branch line m the extension of the Town of Waterford public water supply is sized to carry a maximum of gpm to the water treating storage tank of the water treating system and a maximum of 240 to the domestic water system.
mestic water is supplied for the following nonsanitary purposes:
- 1. Makeup to control building chilled water (Section 9.4.0). Protection from reverse flow is provided by an air gap.
- 2. Trap seals for the control building mechanical equipment room floor drains.
Protection from reverse flow is provided by an air gap.
- 3. Trap seals for the main steam valve building floor drains. Protection from reverse flow is provided by an air gap.
- 4. Trap seals for the turbine building ventilation vent. Protection from reverse flow is provided by an air gap.
- 5. Seal water to the vacuum priming pumps (Section 10.4.5). Protection from reverse flow is provided by a backflow preventer.
- 7. Makeup water to the water treating storage tank (Section 9.2.3). Protection from reverse flow is provided by an air gap.
- 8. Emergency cooling water to the instrument air compressors (Section 9.3.1.1).
Protection from reverse flow is provided by a backflow preventer.
- 9. Makeup water to the demineralizer water storage tank (Section 10.4.9). Protection from reverse flow is provided by a backflow preventer.
- 10. Seal water to the condensate demineralizer - mixed bed tank (Section 10.4.6).
Protection from reverse flow is provided by a backflow preventer.
- 11. Seal water to the Millstone 2 condensate demineralizer - mixed bed tank.
Protection from reverse flow is provided by a backflow preventer.
- 12. Flushing connection for the Millstone 2 condensate demineralizer - mixed bed system. Protection from reverse flow is provided by a backflow preventer.
- 13. Supply water to the electric steam generator in the warehouse for humidity control.
Protection from reverse flow is provided by a backflow preventer.
- 14. Supply water throughout the entire site for general maintenance and washdown.
Protection from reverse flow is provided by sillcocks with integral vacuum breakers.
- 15. Supply water for sodium hypochlorite injection into service water.
mestic water is maintained at a constant pressure by a pressure regulating valve for either high and or low demand periods.
nt hot water is provided by heating domestic water, using a 48 kW electric water heater with a 0 gallon hot water storage tank. Separate electric hot water heaters are provided in the control ding to minimize the risk of water flooding in the control room level. The warehouse, and the densate polishing area are also provided with independent electric hot water heaters.
uum breakers are provided to prevent reverse flow into the domestic water system at all ice sink faucets with hose connections, washdown hose connections, and lavatory faucets h hose and tubing connections. Backflow prevention in urinals and water closets is achieved n air gap.
he domestic water systems, shock absorbers are used at the ends of branch lines to sanitary ures, to minimize the effects of water hammer.
4.3 Safety Evaluation failure of the domestic and sanitary water systems will have no effect on the safety of the
- t. However, portions of the domestic and sanitary water systems in the control building are mically supported, to assure that the failure of the piping will not cause a loss of positive sure in the control building.
an additional backup for cooling water for cold shutdown, a domestic water connection to the ineralized water storage tank is provided. The connection consists of a spool piece and kflow preventer.
re hose adapter, stored in the DWST cubicle, can be connected to refill the DWST from fire er via a fire hydrant or any other water source.
4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements domestic water system is inspected and tested hydrostatically at 150 percent of their design sure. The domestic water system is disinfected in accordance with the local codes or erican Water Works Association (AWWA) standard C601. The systems are then flushed clean l no chlorine remains in the water coming from the system and left full of water ready for use.
sewage pump discharge piping is tested to 150 percent of the sewage pump shutoff head.
er installation of the sanitary system piping is completed, and before any fixtures are set, a ro test is made. During cold weather when water testing is not suitable, air testing may be used h 5 psi minimum pressure.
nal test is made after all fixtures are installed by filling the traps with water and inspecting re system for tightness.
4.5 Instrumentation Requirements branch line from the extension of the town of Waterford public water supply to the plant estic water supply has two self-contained pressure control valves connected in parallel. One hese valves is sized to control domestic water pressure during periods of high demand, with other sized for periods of low demand.
temperature of the water in the domestic hot water storage tank is sensed by a temperature cating controller which modulates an electric heater in order to maintain a constant domestic water temperature. Whenever the water temperature in the hot water return line decreases to a determined setpoint, a temperature switch automatically starts the hot water recirculation p which runs until the return hot water temperature increases to its normal setting.
ultimate heat sink for Millstone 3 is Long Island Sound. Sensible heat removed from both ty and non safety-related cooling systems during normal operation, shutdown, and accident ditions is discharged via the service water and circulating water systems.
5.1 Design Bases ultimate heat sink functions and design of the related service water system are based upon the owing criteria:
- 1. General Design Criterion 2, for structures housing the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods.
- 2. General Design Criterion 44 for:
- a. The capability to transfer heat loads from safety related structures, systems, and components to the heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions.
- b. Suitable component redundancy so that safety functions can be performed assuming a single active component failure coincident with loss of off site power.
- c. The capability to isolate components, systems, or piping if required so that safety functions are not compromised.
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.27 for the design and functional requirements of the ultimate heat sink.
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for the seismic design classification of system components.
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.102 for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of flooding.
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.117 for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of tornado missiles.
ultimate heat sink is also discussed in Section 2.4.11.6.
5.2 System Description intake structure for Millstone 3 cooling water systems, the circulating and service water p house (Section 10.4.5) is situated on the shoreline of Niantic Bay. The service water cubicle de the pump house meets Seismic Category I requirements. It is also designed to withstand the
located at elevation minus 19.5 feet msl and elevation minus 13.0 feet msl, respectively. The r of the pump bays is at elevation minus 28.0 feet msl.
service water cubicle inside the pump house is designed for flood protection to elevation feet msl. During a probable maximum hurricane (PMH) a standing wave (clapotis) could m on the front wall of the pump house (Section 2.4.5). The maximum clapotis crest would h elevation plus 41.2 feet msl. The front wall of the pump house is designed to withstand the rnal loading from this standing wave and to prevent overtopping.
5.3 Safety Evaluation tem redundancy is provided to assure availability of service water during accident situations ction 9.2.1). The service water system consists of two independent flow paths each supplying ling water to the safety related components; each flow path is provided with two pumps (one rating, one standby).
Millstone 3 service water and circulating water systems discharge into the circulating water harge tunnel. The tunnel is a reinforced concrete structure. The circulating water discharge nel is designed to Seismic Category I requirements. Therefore, structural failure of the ulating water discharge tunnel is not postulated. The circulating water discharge tunnel nects with the quarry which feeds into Long Island Sound through an open channel located at south end of the Millstone peninsula. Millstone 1, 2, and 3 all discharge their cooling water the quarry. In the event that the quarry outlet becomes blocked due to a seismic event or ris clogging, the service water from all three units will flood the quarry discharge area and ntually drain off into Long Island Sound, without restricting the Millstone 3 service water ems heat removal capability or flooding any safety related structures of Millstone 1, 2, and 3.
torical low temperatures entering the main condenser via the circulating water system have n recorded below the Service Water system low design basis temperature of 33°F. Regulatory de 1.27 for the Ultimate Heat Sink allows operation at temperatures other than the extreme, viding operation at the extreme is rare and occurs for short durations. Evaluation of historical determined that operation at intake temperatures below 33°F has occurred less than 1% of the t operating life. An evaluation has been performed of all components and systems interfacing h the Service Water system for operation with temperatures between 28°F and 33°F and has cluded that all equipment will function and perform as required. Operating procedures for the ty injection pump cooling system (See Section 9.2.2.5) require the cooling water pumps to be rated when the ultimate heat sink temperature is below 33°F to prevent freezing of stagnant ling water in the heat exchanger.
5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements tion 9.2.1 discusses these requirements for the service water system.
tion 9.2.1 discusses these requirements for the service water system.
6 CONDENSATE MAKEUP AND DRAWOFF SYSTEM densate storage is provided by the condensate makeup and drawoff system as shown on ure 9.2-9.
6.1 Design Basis condensate surge tank provides the makeup and drawoff requirements of the main condensate em (Section 10.4.7) and the auxiliary boiler feedwater and condensate system ction 10.4.10). The surge tank also accepts drawoff from the turbine plant sampling system ction 9.3.2) and the condensate demineralizer liquid waste system (Section 11.2.2).
condensate storage tank provides makeup or process water, as required, for the following:
- 1. Condensate surge tank
- 2. Auxiliary feedwater system (Section 10.4.9)
- 3. Reactor plant aerated drains system (Section 9.3.3)
- 4. Reactor plant component cooling water system (Section 9.2.2)
- 5. Emergency diesel engine jacket cooling water system (Section 9.5.5)
- 6. Turbine plant component cooling water system (Section 9.2.7)
- 7. Chemical feed condensate system (Section 10.4.7)
- 8. Demineralized water makeup system (Section 9.2.3)
- 9. Generator stator cooling system (Section 10.2)
- 10. Condensate polishing demineralizer system (Section 10.4.6)
- 11. Condensate makeup under turbine skirt of the above systems, are normally isolated from the condensate storage tank. Flow is vided on demand by operation of either control or manual valves located in the interfacing em, except for turbine skirt makeup and the water treating system, in which case the valves located in the condensate makeup and drawoff system.
Millstone 3 condensate storage facilities are not shared with other units on the site. The densate storage and surge tanks and related piping are classified as nonnuclear safety and gned to Quality Group D standards as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.26 (Section 3.2.2).
condensate storage and surge tanks and piping are non seismic and are not protected from the cts of tornados, missiles, or floods. No portion of the condensate storage facility piping is sified as high energy piping. The condensate storage facility and piping need not be protected m the effects of moderate and high energy pipe breaks except where flooding would impair shutdown of the plant (Section 3.6).
following systems receiving makeup water from the condensate storage tank are safety ted:
- 1. Auxiliary feedwater system (Section 10.4.9)
- 2. Reactor plant component cooling water system (Section 9.2.2)
- 3. Emergency diesel engine jacket cooling water system (Section 9.5.5) auxiliary feedwater system normally receives makeup from the safety related demineralized er storage tank which contains sufficient cooling water for the auxiliary feedwater system to ill its safe shutdown function (Section 10.4.9). Valves in the condensate makeup lines to the or driven auxiliary feedwater pump suctions are normally isolated by safety related air rated valves. These valves fail in the closed position. The reactor plant component cooling er surge tank and the emergency generator diesel fresh water expansion tanks have adequate age capacity, such that safe shutdown of the plant would not be impaired by a failure of the densate storage tank. Makeup lines to the reactor plant component cooling water system surge contain level control valves, which are closed during normal plant operation. Lines to the rgency generator diesel fresh water expansion tanks contain safety related local manual es, which are closed during normal plant operation.
6.2 System Description maintain normal water levels, water is supplied from the water treating system (Section 9.2.3) he condensate storage and surge tanks. During startup, water may be supplied to the densate tanks from the domestic water system. Makeup from the domestic water system is xygenated and demineralized. By circulating water through a pump and heater loop, heating is vided for each tank to maintain a minimum water temperature of 40°F. All equipment, piping, valves in the heater circulation loops are located in the yard and are therefore heat traced to vent freezing. The 300,000 gallon condensate storage tank and 150,000 gallon condensate e tank provide makeup and surge inventory of high quality condensate for the main densate system (Section 10.4.7) and the other plant systems which are listed in
low water level in the condenser hot well, condensate is drained by gravity from the surge tank he hot well. On high water level in the condenser hot well, the excess condensate is returned to surge tank by the condensate pumps. Level is maintained in the condensate storage tank by ns of the water treating supply pumps. The condensate storage tank overflow is drained to the d storm sewer system. The condensate surge tank overflows to the turbine building floor drains p (Section 11.2).
condensate storage tank is stainless steel construction and is designed, fabricated, and tested ccordance with API-650. The condensate surge tank is aluminum construction and is gned, fabricated, and tested in accordance with ANSI B96.1.
itrogen blanket is maintained in each condensate tank to prevent the intrusion of oxygen into tank inventories. A vacuum breaker and pressure relief valve is provided on each tank to vent exceeding the tank design pressure.
6.3 Safety Evaluation condensate storage and surge tanks are not safety related. The following design evaluation is vided to demonstrate the system capability to perform its intended function without significant ironmental effects.
er design conditions, the condensate system could contain trace quantities of radioactive opes, which are listed for the condenser in Section 10.4.1. Under normal operating conditions, condensate system contains no radioactivity. Excess condensate returning to the surge tank taminates only the contents of that tank. The condensate surge tank overflow and drain are ed to the turbine building sump from which they can be pumped to either the yard storm sewer em (normal path) or the turbine building component cooling drain sump, if contaminated.
taminated surge water can then be pumped to the radioactive liquid waste system for cessing.
se precautions are taken although the concentrations of radioactive isotopes are such that any age or spillage would have little effect on the environment.
condensate storage tank is not directly connected with the main condensate system nor the iliary boiler steam and condensate system. Therefore, contamination is not expected and the densate storage overflow and drain are piped to the yard storm drains. The condensate surge storage tanks are connected by a line containing a normally closed gate valve and a check e, to prevent backflow from the surge tank into the storage tank.
e shutdown of the plant would not be impaired by loss of all condensate in the condensate age facilities. The safety related systems which receive water from the condensate storage have either a safety class primary water supply or have sufficient storage capacity as ussed in Section 9.2.6.1 to perform their safety functions without additional makeup.
eup pumps. During normal operation, only one pump is operating. The second pump is on dby and starts automatically upon malfunction of the first.
6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements condensate storage and surge tanks are filled with water and examined for leaks after struction. Continuous level checks and periodic visual checks assure proper operability of the densate storage facility. Samples are taken periodically from the condensate storage and surge s to monitor water purity.
6.5 Instrumentation Requirements condensate storage facilities system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled, locally or remotely, as follows:
- 1. The component cooling water makeup pumps, are controlled from the main board in the control room by control switches with indicating lights. The makeup valves to the condensate surge and storage tanks are a part of the water treating system.
- 2. The condensate drawoff control valve, the normal makeup control valve, and the emergency makeup control valve for the condenser hot well can be controlled from the main board manually or locally by AUTO-MANUAL control stations.
- 3. The condensate storage and surge tank makeup valves are part of the water treatment system and are controlled locally.
unciators are provided on the main board to alarm when the following conditions exist:
- 1. Condensate storage tank temperature Low
- 2. Condensate surge tank temperature Low
- 3. Component cooling water makeup pump standby pump running
- 4. Component cooling water makeup pump discharge pressure Low
- 5. Condensate storage tank level High or Low
- 6. Condensate surge tank level High or Low
- 7. Condensate surge tank level Low-Low
- 8. Condenser hot well level High or Low
- 10. Any MCC power not available (common) cators are provided on the main board for condensate storage tank level and for condensate e tank level. There is also a recorder for the condenser hot well water level.
atus window is provided for MCC7B1 load power not available.
condensate storage tank and surge tank heater circulation pumps are controlled locally and m the turbine plant sampling panel by control switches with indicating lights. The pumps can ontrolled from the turbine plant sampling panel when the local control switch is selected to TO. The condensate storage tank and surge tank heaters are controlled locally by control tches with indicating lights. The tank pumps and heaters automatically operate to maintain r respective tank temperatures above 40°F.
el indicating controllers are provided locally for the following valves:
- 1. Condensate drawoff control valve
- 2. Normal makeup control valve
- 3. Emergency makeup control valve following parameters are monitored by the plant computer:
- 1. Emergency makeup control valve not fully closed
- 2. Water treating total flow to condensate storage tank
- 3. Water treating total flow to condensate surge tank
- 4. Auxiliary boiler total flow to condensate surge tank
- 5. Condensate surge tank total flow to auxiliary boiler
- 6. Liquid waste system total flow to condensate surge tank
- 7. Component cooling water makeup discharge total flow
- 8. Liquid waste system total flow to condensate storage tank 7 TURBINE PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM turbine plant component cooling water system (Figure 9.2-10) removes heat from various safety related turbine plant components.
turbine plant component cooling water system provides a closed loop cooling water supply to following turbine plant components:
- 1. Turbine lubrication oil coolers (Section 10.2)
- 2. Electrohydraulic control fluid coolers (Section 10.2)
- 3. Service and instrument air compressors and after-coolers (Section 9.3.1.1)
- 4. Generator stator cooling water coolers (Section 10.2)
- 5. Fourth point heater drain pump coolers (Section 10.4.7)
- 6. Auxiliary boiler blowdown vent condenser (Section 10.4.10)
- 7. Isolated phase bus duct coolers (Turbine Building side) (Section 10.2)
- 8. Exciter air cooler (Section 10.2)
- 9. Generator hydrogen coolers (Section 10.2)
- 10. Feedwater pump coolers (Section 10.4.7)
- 11. Vacuum priming seal water coolers (Section 10.4.5)
- 12. Turbine plant sample system (Section 9.3.2.2)
- 13. Condensate pump motor thrust bearing oil coolers
- 14. Moisture separator drain pump seal coolers and motor thrust bearing oil coolers (Section 10.4.7)
- 15. Condenser air removal pumps seal water coolers (Section 10.4.2)
- 16. Deaerator vacuum pumps seal water coolers (Section 9.2.3)
- 17. Auxiliary boiler condensate and feedwater sample coolers (Section 9.3.2.2)
- 18. Warehouse area self-contained air conditioning unit (Section 9.4)
- 19. Hot Water Heating Sample Cooler (Section 9.3.2.2) h of the turbine plant component cooling water pumps and heat exchangers is designed to vide 50 percent of the maximum heat load cooling capacity for normal unit operation which
7.2 System Description bine plant component cooling water is pumped through shell and tube turbine plant ponent cooling heat exchangers, where it is cooled by service water (Section 9.2.1). The led water then passes to the components listed in Section 9.2.7.1.
turbine plant component cooling water system is designed as a closed system. Variations in ume due to temperature changes are accommodated by the turbine plant component cooling e tank located at the pump suctions. The turbine plant component cooling surge tank is the h point of the system and provides the net positive suction head for the turbine plant ponent cooling pumps.
ps, tanks, heat exchangers, and the remainder of the equipment cooled by the turbine plant ponent cooling water system listed in Section 9.2.7.1 are located in the turbine building, iliary boiler enclosure, and warehouse facility.
ling water return lines from each component contain valves for controlling flow. The valves manually operated globe valves, positioned before unit startup, or automatic air-operated type, itioned by pressure or temperature control signals originating in the cooled system.
ief valves are provided on all equipment which might be over pressurized by a combination of ed cooling water inlet and outlet valves and heat input from the isolated equipment.
bine plant component cooling surge tank level is automatically controlled. The tank capacity is icient to accommodate minor system surges and thermal expansion. The turbine plant ponent cooling surge tank is provided with a high/low level alarm to alert the operator to a sible malfunction of the makeup valve or leakage system.
keup for the surge tank is supplied from the condensate makeup and drawoff system ction 9.2.6). An air-operated valve in the supply line is automatically controlled from a surge level switch.
tem water chemistry for corrosion inhibition is maintained by chemical additions. A turbine t component cooling chemical addition tank is connected to the turbine plant component ling pumps discharge piping. To add chemicals to the system, the tank is isolated, drained, and d with the desired chemicals. The tank isolation valves are then opened, and the discharge sure of the operating pump forces water through the tank, injecting the mixture into the ine plant component cooling pump suction header.
7.3 Safety Evaluation turbine plant component cooling water system is not safety related and is designated to nuclear safety class. Failure of any portion or component of this system will not damage any
turbine plant component cooling water system uses equipment and components of ventional and proven design. All components are specified to provide maximum reliability.
low pressure, high temperature, and surge tank high/low level alarms alert the operator to functions in the system. During normal operation, two turbine plant component cooling ps and turbine plant component cooling heat exchangers accommodate the heat removal load.
third pump and heat exchanger are spares so that, in the event of a pump or heat exchanger ure, a replacement component is available.
7.4 Inspections and Testing Requirements ing the life of the unit, all portions of the turbine plant component cooling water system are er in continuous or intermittent operation, and performance tests are not required. The third p is rotated in service on a scheduled basis for equal wear. All components are accessible for al inspections which are conducted periodically and following installation of spare parts or ng modifications to confirm normal operation of the system. Routine pre-startup inspections performed, in addition to periodic observation and monitoring of the system parameters ng operation.
7.5 Instrumentation Requirements turbine plant component cooling system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled locally or remotely.
rumentation and controls are provided for the turbine plant component cooling water system onitor system parameters and alert the operator to any component malfunction. Process ables of components, required on a continuous basis for the startup, operation, or shutdown of subsystem, are controlled from, indicated, and alarmed in the control room. Those variables ch require minimal operator attention have local indicators.
bine plant component pump motor control switches, indicating lights and motor ammeters, are vided on the main control board. Ammeters and indicator lights are also provided at the tchgear. Two pumps are normally running and if a pump breaker is automatically tripped, it is med on the main control board. Each pumps breaker position is monitored by the main puter system. The turbine plant component cooling water heat exchanger outlet pressure is nitored by a pressure indicator on the main control board. Low outlet pressure is alarmed on main control board; and if pressure continues to drop to a predetermined value, the standby p is automatically started. The outlet of each heat exchanger is monitored for high perature by the computer. Return flow temperature is indicated on the main control board and rn flow high temperature is monitored by the computer. Turbine plant component cooling ply flow is indicated on the main control board and high or low supply flow is alarmed on the n control board.
vided in the control room to warn the operator of trouble in the system.
8 PRIMARY GRADE WATER SYSTEM primary grade water system supplies makeup and flushing water throughout the reactor plant.
primary grade water system consists of two primary grade water storage tanks, two primary de water supply pumps, tank heating loops with electric heater and circulating pump, deaerator h deaerator vacuum skid, deaerator supply and effluent pumps, piping, valves, instrumentation controls (Figure 9.2-11). Table 9.2-16 gives details of the components in the system and le 9.2-17 gives primary grade water chemistry specifications.
8.1 Design Bases primary grade water system is nonnuclear safety class, except for the piping between the tainment isolation valves which is Safety Class 2.
primary grade water storage tanks provide sufficient storage capacity to supply the required eup water to the reactor coolant system (Chapter 5) via the chemical and volume control em (Section 9.3.4) and to store recovered water from the boron recovery system ction 9.3.5) and the radioactive liquid waste system (Section 11.2.2). The capacity of the ary grade water storage tanks is determined using the following criteria:
- 1. To provide adequate primary grade water for one cold startup through about 95 percent of a core fuel cycle without any makeup water availability from the demineralized water makeup system (Section 9.2.3)
- 2. To provide 150 gpm of primary grade water spray for a period of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to the pressurizer relief tank (Section 5.4.11)
- 3. To provide contingency of 10 percent over the capacity determined above mary grade water supply pump capacity is based on the following criteria:
- 1. To supply makeup water to boric acid blender at 75 gpm at 60 psig, or to supply cooling water to pressurizer relief tank at the rate of 150 gpm at 65 psig
- 2. To supply various systems at approximately 50 gpm for miscellaneous services such as makeup, mixing, flushing, etc.
mary grade water storage tanks are provided with nitrogen blanketing to eliminate air ingress the deoxygenated water in the tanks, and with a nitrogen sparger to deoxygenate the water to w 100 ppb.
deaerator and a 200 gpm deaerator effluent pump returns deaerated primary grade water to er the primary grade water storage tanks or the primary grade water supply pumps.
ing normal operation, primary grade water has a boron concentration of less than 5 ppm and have a slight amount of radioactivity (5x10-4 Ci/cc maximum) due to possible activity yover from the boron recovery system (Section 9.3.5).
8.2 System Description primary grade water system is a storage and distribution system for primary grade water. This er is used exclusively by reactor plant systems; it is not supplied to any turbine plant system.
initial fill and makeup for the primary grade water system is supplied from the demineralized er makeup system (Section 9.2.3) and, therefore, consists of demineralized and deaerated er. Table 9.2-17 lists the water chemistry specifications.
mary grade water is capable of being recovered from the reactor coolant letdown which has n stripped of dissolved gases in the radioactive gaseous waste system (Section 11.3) and ntially freed of boric acid, cesium, and other radioactive material in the boron recovery em (Section 9.3.5). When feasible, primary grade water is capable of being recovered from tor plant aerated drains by the radioactive liquid waste system.
functions of the primary grade water system are:
- 1. To supply makeup water to the reactor coolant system via the chemical and volume control system (Section 9.3.4).
- 2. To provide the initial supply of quenching water in the pressurizer relief tank and to cool the contents of the pressurizer relief tank after pressurizer relief (Section 5.4.11).
- 3. To flush spent resin from the ion exchangers, demineralizers, and associated piping in the radioactive solid waste system (Section 11.4).
- 4. To supply water to the spent fuel pool (Section 9.1.3) to compensate for evaporation losses.
- 5. To supply seal injection to the waste evaporator feed pumps and waste evaporator reboiler pump (Section 11.2), and to the boron evaporator reboiler pump and boron distillate pump (Section 9.3.5).
- 6. To supply mixing and flushing water for the waste solidification process in the radioactive solid waste system (Section 11.4).
- 8. To provide primary grade water to the neutron shield tank surge tank (Section 9.2.2.3).
- 9. To supply hose connections in the waste disposal building, auxiliary building, and reactor vessel head storage stand area.
accomplish these functions, the system requires approximately 200,000 gallons of primary de water. Two half size tanks are provided to avoid possible inadvertent contamination of the re stored water capacity when liquid is being received from the boron recovery system or oactive liquid waste system, and to provide operational flexibility. This permits feeding from tank and receiving in the second tank simultaneously. In addition, boron test tanks in the on recovery system prevent inadvertent contamination of the primary grade water storage
- s. Sampling of the water in these tanks occurs before the contents are transferred to primary de water tanks. If a decision is made to further reduce the boron concentration in the liquid r the liquid has been transferred to a primary grade water storage tank, the tank contents can be circulated through the boron demineralizer and boron demineralizer filter of the boron very system.
ce the primary grade water storage tanks are located outdoors, an external forced circulation ting loop protects the tanks from freezing. Each heating loop has an electric heater and a ulation pump. No redundancy is provided since the equipment is expected to be in use for ted periods during the year and limited heating can be provided by operating the primary de water supply pumps on recirculation and by circulating deoxygenated water through the mary grade water deaerator. Each tank is provided with a low pressure nitrogen blanket over water surface to preclude air ingress into the deoxygenated water in the tank.
h tank is also provided with two sets of combination pressure relief (to exhale during tank fill) vacuum breaker (to inhale air upon loss of nitrogen) valves. The nitrogen blanket is supplied h a low pressure nitrogen from a control station, fed from a liquid nitrogen storage tank 3GSN-2 (see Section 9.5.9.2).
h of the two primary grade water supply pumps is designed to provide 200 gpm at 81.5 psig.
pumps are provided with recirculation to the primary grade water storage tanks for pump ection in the event of reduced system demand.
keup to the reactor coolant system and pressurizer relief tank spray is not expected to occur ultaneously, therefore, only one of the two primary grade water supply pumps is required to rate. Pressurizer relief tank spray that cools down the tank and its contents is carried out ually after an event which results in opening of pressurizer relief valves.
itrogen sparger, installed at the bottom of each tank, is operated to reduce the dissolved gen content of primary grade water if the water, when sampled from the tank, exceeds the wable 0.1 ppm. As an alternate, the vacuum deaerator can be used. The deaerator can also be d in-line with the pump which is supplying normal primary grade water. The deaerator is a
rovided by the cascading and scrubbing action in the packings.
deaerator supply pump is designed to provide 200 gpm at 61.7 psig to the primary grade er deaerator. The deaerator effluent pump returns the primary grade water to the suction of the ary grade water supply pump and/or the primary grade water storage tanks. The vacuum in deaerator is maintained by a steam jet air ejector system. Auxiliary steam flow through the m ejector draws the vacuum. Condensate from this system (less than 0.4 gpm) is routed to the tor plant aerated drains system for further processing in the low level radioactive waste em (Section 9.3.3).
8.3 Safety Evaluation primary grade water system provides a reliable source of water for reactor coolant makeup, ling water for the pressurizer relief tank, and miscellaneous services such as mixing and hing, etc. Two primary grade water storage tanks provide redundancy and flexibility. The use wo half-size primary grade water storage tanks ensures that the entire supply of primary grade er does not become contaminated. In the event of high boron concentration in one primary de water storage tank, all the water in the tank is reprocessed by the boron recovery system, le system makeup can be supplied from the other tank. If dissolved oxygen level in any of the ary grade water tanks exceeds the specified level, the tank is sparged with nitrogen, or the eup water is processed by the deaerator. Each of the two full capacity primary grade water ply pumps can deliver sufficient primary grade water to all users as detailed above.
mary grade water system lines penetrating the containment structure are isolated on a tainment isolation phase A (CIA) signal (Section 7.3). These Safety Class 2 lines and ciated valves are designed for SSE, are tornado missile protected, and not subject to the cts of pipe whip (Section 3.6).
system does not use or generate any chemicals and, therefore, poses no spill hazard. A tulated failure of nonnuclear safety class piping results in low pressure in primary grade water der. An alarm and low flow indication on the main control board will alert the operator to shut n the operating primary grade water supply pump and take action to isolate the leak. Neither a ebreak nor an oversupply of water to the primary grade water storage tanks will result in ding of any building containing safety class components or affect any safety class equipment.
safety class equipment is located at elevations higher than a water level which would result if ding continued for 30 minutes until the leak was isolated by the operator. Loss of capability to vide water to the reactor coolant system does not result in loss of the ability of the plant to ieve and maintain safe shutdown. Since primary grade water activity is limited to less than 0-4 Ci/cc, any inadvertent discharge to the environment due to a pipe or tank failure results in more than 0.4 Ci (excluding tritium) being released to the environment.
rogram of testing and inspections ensures that the design basis capability of the primary grade er system is maintained throughout its design life. Primary grade water storage tanks are pled for conformance with the chemistry criteria given in Table 9.2-17. Standby pumps are d on a periodic basis to ensure their availability. Continuously operating equipment is visually mined at appropriate opportunities to ensure their operability. Routine maintenance checks are ormed to ensure that the standby equipment performs upon failure of the operating ponent.
8.5 Instrumentation Requirements primary grade water system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and controlled, lly or remotely, as follows:
orced circulation electric heating loop for each primary grade water storage tank maintains a imum temperature of 40°F. The circulating pumps can be controlled manually or matically from a local control panel and can be controlled manually from the reactor plant ple station. Temperature elements are installed in the storage tanks and in the circulating p suctions. The temperature elements control the electric heater, automatically start the ulating pump, and activate low temperature annunciators on the main control board. The tric heater is protected from overheating and is interlocked with the circulating pump. The ulating pump must be running to energize the electric heater.
vel switch automatically stops the circulating pump if primary grade water storage tank level
- w. A pressure indicator is installed in the discharge of each circulating pump, and a perature indicator is installed at the outlet of each electric heater.
vel indicator transmitter is installed on each storage tank, and the level is indicated on the n control board. Low and high levels are annunciated on the main control board and the level onitored by the computer.
h primary grade water supply pumps can be operated manually from the main control board.
pump runs continuously and the second pump can be started manually by the operator if a discharge flow is indicated on the main control board or if the first pump is stopped. The ary grade water supply pumps are automatically stopped on low suction pressure resulting m a low level in the primary grade water storage tank. Primary grade water supply discharge pressure is annunciated on the main control board.
deaerator portion of the system is monitored as follows:
deaerator supply pump and effluent pump are operated manually at the local control station.
supply pump is automatically stopped on low suction pressure or high level in the vacuum erator. The effluent pump is stopped automatically by low level in the vacuum deaerator.
w to the vacuum deaerator is controlled by a flow controller and flow valve at the deaerator
- t. Level in the vacuum deaerator is controlled by a level valve and controller at the deaerator et.
al pressure indicators, temperature indicators, and flow indicators monitor system parameters.
9 REFERENCES FOR SECTION 9.2 1 NUREG-1838, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of the Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3, Dockets Nos. 50-336 and 50-423, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. October 2005.
DBA Coincident with Loss of Power Loss of Power with Train Failure Hot Standby and Normal Operating Normal Unit Cooldown to RHS Cooldown to Condition Cooldown Condition Minimum ESF Normal ESF Entry Conditions Shutdown Cond No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of Comp. Req. Comp. Comp. Req. Comp. Req. Comp. Req. Comp. R Component Oper. (gpm) Oper. Req. (gpm) Oper. (gpm) Oper. (gpm) Oper. (gpm) Oper. (g Reactor plant component cooling heat exchangers 2 14,776 2 18,000 2 0 0 0 0 1 < 4,400 3 1 7, (Total 3) 1 Turbine plant component cooling heat exchangers 2 9,782 2 9,782 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (Total 3)
Containment recirculation coolers 0 0 0 0 2 10,800 4 21,600 0 0 0 (Total 4)
Control building air-conditioning heat 1 302.7 1 302.7 1 302.7 1 302.7 1 302.7 1 3 exchangers (Total 2)
Containment recirculation pumps 0 0 0 0 1 33.2 2 66.4 0 0 0 ventilation units (Total 2)
Residual heat removal pumps ventilation units 0 0 2 49.94 1 24.97 2 49.94 0 0 1 2 (Total 2)
Charging pumps coolers 2 62.4 2 62.4 1 31.2 2 62.4 1 31.2 1 3 (Total 2) 4 Safety injection pumps coolers 2 39.24 2 39.24 1 19.62 2 39.24 1 19.62 1 1 (Total 2) 4 Emergency generator diesel engine coolers 0 0 0 0 1 1,800 5 2 3,600 5 1 1,800 5 1 1, (Total 2)
DBA Coincident with Loss of Power Loss of Power with Train Failure Hot Standby and Normal Operating Normal Unit Cooldown to RHS Cooldown to Condition Cooldown Condition Minimum ESF Normal ESF Entry Conditions Shutdown Cond No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of Comp. Req. Comp. Comp. Req. Comp. Req. Comp. Req. Comp. R Component Oper. (gpm) Oper. Req. (gpm) Oper. (gpm) Oper. (gpm) Oper. (gpm) Oper. (g Service water strainer 2 2,000 2 2,000 1 1,000 2 2,000 1 1,000 1 1 backwash (Total 4) 6 Circulating water pumps lubricating water 6 30 7 6 30 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (Total 6)
MCC and rod control area booster pumps 0 Note 8 0 Note 8 1 122 2 110 1 122 1 (Total 2)
Post-accident liquid 0 0 0 0 1 5.1 1 5.1 0 0 0 sample cooler (Total 1)
NOTES:
- 1. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after a LOCA and initiation of a CDA signal it is necessary for the operator to take action to supply service water to the reactor plant component cooling water heat exchangers.
- 2. Required flow reflects 10 percent tube plugging. Required flow may be reduced if <10 percent tubes plugged.
- 3. 4,400 gpm is bounding when used individually for each train.
- 4. Service water flow is maintained continuously through the charging pump coolers and safety injection pump coolers. Safety Injection pump coolers are required for some fire shutdown events with loss of power and thus are included.
- 5. Required flow reflects 5 percent tube plugging. Required flow may be reduced if < 5 percent tube plugged. Note: Tube plugging limit may be reduced by down tube coating.
- 6. Flow is not continuous.
- 7. 30 gpm @ maximum allowable pressure drop across strainers.
- 8. Flow is continuous through the MCC and rod control area cooling coils. The pumps start during normal operation on high area temperatures only.
LEGEND:
No. of Comp. Oper. = Number of Components Operating Req. = Requirements
DBA Coincident with Loss of Power Loss of Power with Train Failure Normal Unit Hot Standby and Normal Operating Cooldown Cooldown to RHS Cooldown to Col Conditions (1) Condition Minimum ESF Normal ESF Entry Conditions Shutdown Conditi No. of Req. No. of Req. No. of Req. No. of Req. No. of Req. No. of Req.
Comp. (106 Btu/ Comp. (106 Btu/ Comp. (106 Btu/ Comp. (106 Btu/ Comp. (106 Btu/ Comp. (106 Bt Component Oper. hr) Oper. hr) Oper. hr) Oper. hr) Oper. hr) Oper. hr)
Reactor plant component cooling heat 2 111 2 197 0 0 0 0 1 26 1 118 exchangers (Total 3)
Turbine plant component cooling heat 2 65 2 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 exchangers (Total 3)
Containment recirculation 0 0 0 0 2 617 (3) 4 1234 (3) 0 0 0 0 coolers (Total 4)
Control building air-conditioning water chillers 1 2.8 1 2.8 1 2.8 1 2.8 1 2.8 1 2.8 (Total 2) (4)
Containment recirculation pumps 0 0 0 0 1 0.4 2 0.8 0 0 0 0 ventilation units (Total 2)
Residual heat removal pumps 0 0 2 0.68 1 0.36 2 0.72 0 0 1 0.36 ventilation units (Total 2)
DBA Coincident with Loss of Power Loss of Power with Train Failure Normal Unit Hot Standby and Normal Operating Cooldown Cooldown to RHS Cooldown to Col Conditions (1) Condition Minimum ESF Normal ESF Entry Conditions Shutdown Conditi No. of Req. No. of Req. No. of Req. No. of Req. No. of Req. No. of Req.
Comp. (106 Btu/ Comp. (106 Btu/ Comp. (106 Btu/ Comp. (106 Btu/ Comp. (106 Btu/ Comp. (106 Bt Component Oper. hr) Oper. hr) Oper. hr) Oper. hr) Oper. hr) Oper. hr)
Charging pumps coolers (Total 2) 2 0.17 2 0.162 1 0.081 2 0.162 1 0.081 1 0.081 (4)
Safety injection pumps coolers 2 0 2 0 1 0.028 2 0.056 1 0 1 0 (Total 2) (4)
Emergency generator diesel 0 0 0 0 1 13 2 26 1 13 1 13 engine coolers (Total 2)
MCC and rod control area air-conditioning 0 0 0 0 1 0.561 2 1.122 1 0.561 1 0.561 units (Total 2) (4)
Post-accident liquid sample 0 0 0 0 1 0.29 (3) 1 0.29 (3) 0 0 0 0 cooler (Total 1)
NOTES:
(1) These are maximum operating heat loads.
(2) N/A.
(3) Heat load is not continuous. This is the temporary peak heat load for the containment recirculation coolers and the post-accident liquid sample cooler.
(4) Service water flow will be maintained continuously through the charging pump coolers, safety injection pump coolers, control building air-conditioning w chillers, and the MCC and rod control area air conditioning units.
LEGEND:
No. of Comp. Oper. = Number of Components Operating Req. = Requirements
Action Upon (1)
Signal Service Water Valve Initiation of Signal Loss of Power Emergency generator diesel engine cooler Valves open outlet (AOV) (2)
Reactor plant component cooling heat Valves remain open exchangers inlet supply (MOV) (3)
Turbine plant component cooling heat Valves close exchangers inlet supply (MOV)
Containment recirculation cooler inlet supply Valves remain closed (MOV)
Circulating water pumps lubricating water Valves close inlet supply (MOV)
Containment Emergency generator diesel engine cooler Valves open Depressurization outlet (AOV)
Reactor plant component cooling heat Valves close exchangers inlet supply (MOV)
Turbine plant component cooling heat Valves close exchangers inlet supply (MOV)
Containment recirculation cooler inlet supply Valves open (MOV)
Circulating water pumps lubricating water Valves close inlet supply (MOV)
Safety Injection Emergency generator diesel engine cooler Valves open outlet (AOV)
Reactor plant component cooling heat Valves remain open exchangers inlet supply (MOV)
Turbine plant component cooling heat Valves remain open exchangers inlet supply (MOV)
Containment recirculation cooler inlet supply Valves remain closed (MOV)
Circulating water pumps lubricating water Valves remain open inlet supply (MOV)
Service Water Turbine plant component cooling heat Valves close Header Pressure exchangers inlet supply (MOV)
Low TES:
Required position of valve after initiation of an ESF signal.
AOV = air-operated valve MOV = motor-operated valve
Component Failure Mode Comments and Consequences Service water pump Pump casing ruptures The four service water pumps are designed as Seismic and QA Categor They are missile and tornado protected. Rupture by missiles is not considered credible. Redundant pump will perform safety function.
Service water pump Original pump fails to Redundant pump will perform safety function.
operate Service water strainer Strainer motor fails or Redundant strainer-pump arrangement on each discharge line will strainer elements clog perform safety function.
System valves Improper position Prevented by prestartup and operational checks. When the system is in service, such a condition would be observed by operating personnel monitoring the system parameters.
Control building Pump casing ruptures There are two full-size booster pumps, one on each redundant service air-conditioning booster pumps water header. These pumps are designed to Seismic Category I requirements. They are missile protected and may be inspected at any time. Rupture by missiles is not considered credible. Any pump can be isolated by suction and discharge isolation valves. Full capacity will be retained by using the standby pump.
Control building Pump fails to operate Redundant pump will perform safety function.
air-conditioning booster pump Control building Tube or shell ruptures in There are two full-size water chiller condensers one on each redundant air-conditioning water chiller one condenser service water header. Each water chiller can be isolated in case of ruptu condensers Because of the low operating pressure and temperatures, Seismic Category I design, and missile protection arrangements, such ruptures w be considered noncredible.
MCC and rod control area Pump casing ruptures There are two full-size booster pumps, one on each redundant service pump booster water header.
Component Failure Mode Comments and Consequences These pumps are designed to Seismic Category I requirements. They a missile protected and may be inspected at any time. Rupture by missile not considered credible. Any pump can be isolated by suction and discharge isolation valves. Full capacity will be retained by using the standby pump.
MCC and rod control area Ventilation unit ruptures There are two full-size ventilation units, one on each redundant service air-conditioning units water header. Each ventilation unit can be isolated in case of rupture.
Because of the low operating pressure and temperatures, Seismic Category I design, and missile protection arrangements, such ruptures w be considered noncredible.
Emergency generator diesel Tube or shell ruptures in There are two full-size diesel engine coolers, one on each redundant engine coolers one cooler service water header. Each diesel engine cooler can be isolated in case rupture. Because of the low operating pressure and temperature, Seism Category I Design, and missile protection arrangements, such ruptures will be considered noncredible.
Emergency generator diesel Loss of air in accident Valves fail in open position on loss of air allowing services water flow air-operated isolation valves Containment recirculation Tube or shell ruptures in Four 50 percent capacity containment recirculation coolers are provide coolers one cooler Each pair of containment recirculation coolers is supplied cooling wate from a separate redundant service water header (Section 6.2.2).
Reactor plant component Tube or shell ruptures in Each of the three heat exchangers can be isolated in case of rupture. Ea cooling heat exchangers one heat exchanger of the remaining heat exchangers is capable of performing 50 percent capacity (Section 9.2.2) subsystem.
Safety injection pump coolers Tube or shell ruptures in Each of the two coolers can be isolated in case of rupture. The remaini one cooler cooler is capable of performing subsystem capacity (Section 9.2.2.5).
Charging pumps coolers Tube or shell ruptures in Each of the two coolers can be isolated in case of rupture. The remaini one cooler cooler will be capable of performing subsystem capacity (Section 9.2.2.4).
Component Failure Mode Comments and Consequences Residual heat removal pumps One ventilation unit There are two full-size ventilation units, each with its own condenser.
ventilation unit condenser condenser ruptures Each condenser can be isolated in case of rupture. Because of the subsystems low operating pressures and temperatures, Seismic Catego I design, and missile protection arrangements, such ruptures will be considered noncredible.
Motor-operated valves Valve fails to operate Redundant motor operated valves will perform safety function.
Service Water lines to the Pipe rupture in nonseismic Rupture of Seismic Category II pipe, if not immediately identified, wil hypochlorite system, the post- non-safety related piping not adversely affect overall performance of service water system.
accident sampling system cooler, circulating water pumps for lube water, and the turbine building component cooling water system Electronically powered Failure of one AC Redundant electrically operated components will be supplied from components, such as water emergency power supply independent emergency electric AC buses. The failure of one emergen pumps, and motor-operated AC bus will not impair the system safety functions.
valves Containment recirculation One ventilation unit There are two full-size ventilation units, each with its own condenser.
pump ventilation unit condenser condenser ruptures Each condenser can be isolated in case of rupture. Because of the subsystems low operating pressures and temperatures, Seismic Catego I design, and missile protection arrangements, such ruptures will be considered noncredible.
Turbine plant component Tube or shell ruptures in Three 50 percent heat exchangers are provided. Each heat exchanger c cooling one heat exchanger be isolated in case of a rupture. Motor-operated valves provide barrier isolation for the safety-related portion of the service water system.
Post-accident liquid sample Tube or shell ruptures One cooler is provided and may be lined up to either service water trai cooler Manual isolation valves, which are normally closed, provide the barrie isolation for the safety-related portion of the service water system.
COMPONENT DESIGN DATA Component Cooling Surge Tank Number (dual) 1 Design Pressure (psig) 15 Design Temperature (°F) 150 Design Capacity (gal) (total) 14,577 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Number 3 Heat transfer rate at design 76,000,0001,3 / 75,084,6252 condition (Btu/hr/unit)
Tube Side Shell Side Design Pressure (psig) 1001 / 1002 1851 / 1852 Design Temperature (°F) 1251 / 2002 2001 / 2002 Design Flow (lb/hr) 4,000,0001 / 5,142,0002 4,050,0001 / 4,000,0002 Fluid Service Water Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water Component Cooling Pump Number 3 Design Pressure (psig) 250 Design Temperature (°F) 160 Design Capacity (gpm per 8,100 pump)
TES:
e 1 - 3CCP*E1C per 2214.413-446 (M446) e 2 - 3CCP*E1A & 3CCP*E1B per M3-SPEC MP PS-ME-1214 and Holtec Data Sheets e 3 - M446 - Normal Plant Operation heat transfer of 76,000,000 based on original ufacturer data sheets
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Components
- Malfunction Comment and Consequences actor plant component Pump casing ruptures These pumps are designed to Seismic oling pumps Category I requirements. They are missile protected and may be inspected at any time.
Rupture by missiles is not considered credible. Any pump can be isolated by suction and discharge isolation valves. Full system capability is retained by using the standby pump.
actor plant component Original pump fails to Standby pump is used to achieve full system oling pump start capability.
actor plant component Tube or shell ruptures Each heat exchanger can be isolated in case oling heat exchangers of rupture. Each of the remaining heat exchangers is capable of performing 50 percent system capacity. Because of the systems low operating pressure and temperature, Seismic Category I design, and missile protection arrangements, such rupture is considered unlikely.
stem valves Improper position Prevented by prestart-up and operations checks. When the system is in service, such a condition would be observed by operating personnel monitoring system parameters.
oling water to Pipe rupture in The piping not designed to Seismic Category idual heat exchangers nonseismic piping or I is isolated, and the seismic portion is split seismic piping in half. If the rupture occurs in the seismic piping, one-half of the Seismic Category I portion becomes inoperable. The remaining redundant seismic section remains operable to safely bring the reactor coolant system to cold shutdown conditions.
actor plant component Pipe rupture in surge The surge tank is divided; thus, providing a oling surge tank tank line connecting to separate source of water for each pump pumps suction from two separate surge lines. The affected pipe line causes loss of one pump, but the suction pressure is maintained on the other pump through the redundant surge line.
Components
- Malfunction Comment and Consequences ctrically powered Failure of one power Electrically powered components are mponents, such as supply bus segregated and each separate group powered ctor plant component from a different emergency bus: one reactor oling pumps, controls, plant component cooling pump, its controls, wer operated valves and valves on one bus; the other pump is on a separate bus; the failure of one bus affects only part of this redundant system, and system function is unimpaired.
TE:
The single failure of any component listed in this table does not preclude safe shutdown of the reactor.
Heat Load Component Flow (gpm) (Btu/hr) fueling water coolers (2) 400 (1) 289,200 (6,252,000) (2) (3) tentially contaminated air air-conditioning unit 120 601,400 ean air air-conditioning unit 110 536,000 tor control center and rod control area 190 1,020,000
-conditioning units (2) actor coolant pump motors 880 5,970,000 DM shroud coolers (2) 880 3,700,000 ntainment air recirculation coolers (3) 996 (4) 6,870,000 utron shield tank coolers (2) 80 226,000 cess vent cooler 30 147,800 Total 3,686 19,360,400 TES:
Cooldown after refueling.
Only one unit supplied at a time.
This heat load is excluded from the total heat load above.
Flow is to all three coolers although only two fans are running at any one time.
illed Water Circulating Pumps Number 3 Design Pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 300 Design capacity (gpm) 2,100 illed Water Surge Tank Number 1 Design Pressure (psig) 20 Design temperature (°F) 200 Design capacity (gpm) 860 chanical Refrigeration Units (chillers)
Number 3 Capacity at specified conditions (tons) 938 each Evaporator Chilled water temperature, inlet/outlet (°F) 55/45 Chilled water flow (gpm) 2,250 Condenser Water temperature, inlet/outlet (°F) 95/105.5 Water flow (gpm) 2,700 Refrigerant charge Type R-12 Weight (lb) 3,400
SUMMARY
utron Shield Tank Number 1 Volume (gal) 32,000 Design pressure (psig) 22 Design temperature (°F)
Maximum 150 Minimum 65 Material Carbon steel utron Shield Tank Coolers Number 2 Duty (Btu/hr) 226,000 Chilled Water (Shell) pacity (lb/hr) 20,000 erating pressure (psig) 125 sign pressure (psig) 150 sign temperature (°F) 160 erating temperature in/out (°F) 50/60.5 terial Carbon steel Neutron Shield Tank Water (Tubes) pacity (lb/hr) 7,000 erating pressure (psig) 10 sign pressure (psig) 15 sign temperature (°F) 160 erating temperature in/out (°F) 120/90 terial Copper-nickel utron Shield Tank Surge Tank Number 1 Volume (gal) 230 Design pressure (psig) 20 Design temperature (°F) 160 Material Carbon steel
SUMMARY
arging Pumps Cooling Pumps Data Summary Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 225 Design temperature (°F) 150 Design flow (gpm) 90 Design head (ft.) 83 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel arging Pumps Cooler Number 2 Duty (Btu/hr) 81,100 Cooling Water Capacity (gpm) 7.8 Operating pressure (psig) 19 Design pressure (psig) 65 Design temperature (°F) 130 Operating temperature, in/out (°F) 130/108 Service Water Capacity (minimum required) (gpm) 31 Operating pressure (psig) 45 Design pressure (psig) 100 Design temperature (°F) 95 Operating temperature, in/out (°F) 80/85 Material Copper-nickel arging Pumps Cooling Surge Tank Number 1 (divided wall)
Capacity (gal) 1,000 Design pressure (psig) 3 Design temperature (°F) 150 Material Carbon steel
COOLING SUBSYSTEM Components Malfunctions Comments and Consequences
- arging pumps Pump casing ruptures These pumps will be designed to Seismic oling pumps Category I requirements. They will be missile protected and may be inspected at any time. Rupture by missiles is not considered credible. Any pump can be isolated by suction and discharge isolation valves. Full system capability will be retained by using the standby pump.
Original pump fails to Redundant pump can be used to achieve full start system capability.
arging pumps Tube or shell ruptures Each heat exchanger can be isolated in case olers of rupture. The remaining heat exchanger will be capable of performing system capacity. Because of the systems low operating pressure and temperature, Seismic Category I design, and location apart from potential missile, such rupture will be considered unlikely.
bsystem valves Improper position Prevented by prestart-up and operational checks. When the system is in service, such condition should be observed by operating personnel monitoring system parameters.
arging pumps Automatic level control The surge tank is a partitioned tank with oling surge tank fails to operate correctly redundant surge lines. System surge capacity will be provided to the unaffected portion of the tank, and system function will be unaffected. The charging pump cooling system performance will not be affected.
arging pumps Pipe rupture in surge The surge tank will be divided, with two oling surge tank tank line connecting to sources of water for pump suctions from pumps two separate surge lines. The affected pipeline will be isolated, and suction pressure maintained through the redundant surge line.
Components Malfunctions Comments and Consequences
- ctrically powered Failure of one power Electrically powered components will be mponents, such as supply bus separated and each separate group powered arging pumps, from a different emergency bus. One arging pumps cooling charging pumps cooling pump, its controls mps, controls, power- and valves will be on one bus; the other erated valves pumps will be on a separate bus; failure of one bus will affect only part of this redundant system, and system function will be unimpaired.
TE:
The single failure of any component listed in this table will not preclude safe shutdown of the reactor
DATA
SUMMARY
fety Injection Pumps Cooling Pumps Data Summary Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 225 Design temperature (°F) 150 Design flow (gpm) 25 Design head (ft.) 54 Material Austenitic stainless steel fety Injection Pumps Cooling System Cooler Number 2 Duty (Btu/hr) 27,900 Cooling Water:
Capacity (gpm) 10 Operating pressure (psig) 13 Design pressure (psig) 35 Design temperature (°F) 130 Operating temperature, input (°F) 130/124 Material Copper-nickel fety Injection Pumps Cooling System Surge Tank Number 1 (divided tank)
Volume (gal) 1,000 Design pressure (psig) 3 Design temperature (°F) 150 Material Carbon steel
Components Malfunctions Comments and Consequences Safety injection pumps cooling Pump casing ruptures These pumps are designed to Seismic Category I requirements.
pumps They will be missile protected and may be inspected at any time.
Rupture by missiles is not considered credible. Any pump can be isolated by suction and discharge isolation valves. Full system capability is retained by using the standby pump.
Original pump fails to start Redundant pump can be used to achieve full system capability.
Safety injection pumps cooling Tube or shell ruptures Each heat exchanger can be isolated in case of rupture. The system coolers remaining heat exchanger is capable of performing system capaci Because of the systems low operating pressure and temperature, Seismic Category I design, and missile protection arrangements, such rupture is considered unlikely.
Subsystem valves Improper position Prevented by prestart-up and operational checks. When the syste is in service, such condition would be observed by operating personnel monitoring system parameters.
Safety injection pumps cooling Automatic level control fails to The surge tank is a partitioned tank with redundant surge lines.
system surge tank operate correctly System surge capacity is provided to the unaffected portion of th tank, and system function is unaffected. The safety injection pum cooling system performance is not affected.
Safety injection pumps cooling Pipe rupture in surge tank line The surge tank is divided in half by a partition, with two sources system surge tank connecting to pumps water for pump suctions from two separate surge lines. The affect pipeline is isolated, and suction pressure maintained through the redundant surge line.
Components Malfunctions Comments and Consequences Electrically powered Failure of one power supply bus Electrically powered components are separated and each separate components, such as safety group powered from a different emergency bus. One component injection pumps cooling pumps, cooling pump, its controls, and valves on one bus; another pump, controls, power-operated valves controls, and valves are on a separate bus. The failure of one bus affects only that part of this redundant system, and system functi will be unimpaired.
SYSTEM (3CCD) DESIGN DATA ndensate Demineralizer Component oling Water Heat Exchangers (Removed from Service) Data Summary Design duty (Btu/hr) 26.5 x 106 Flow Component cooling water (gpm) 2,640 Seawater (gpm) 3,430 oling Water Pump (Removed from Service)
Design flow 2,650 Design head (ft. of water) 112 DESIGN DATA FOR COMPONENTS COOLED BY 3CCD generant Distillate Cooler (Removed from Service)
Design duty (Btu/hr) 2.3 x 106 Component cooling water flow (gpm) 230 generant Evaporator Condenser (Removed from Service)
Design duty (Btu/hr) 22.7 x 106 Component cooling water flow (gpm) 2,260 generant Evaporator Bottoms Cooler (Removed from Service)
Design duty (Btu/hr) 63.8 x 104 Component cooling water flow (gpm) 130 generant Evaporator Bottoms Sample Cooler (Removed from Service)
Design duty (Btu/hr) 33 x 103 Component cooling water flow (gpm) 7.0 xiliary Condensate Sample Cooler (Removed from Service)
Design duty 33 x 103 Component cooling water flow (gpm) 7.0
Design Flow Component Equipment Number Design Pressure (psig) (gpm each)
Water treating storage tank 3WTS-TK5 Atm --
Carbon filters WTS-FLT1A, B Abandoned 150 124 Cation demineralizers 3WTS-DEMN1A, B Abandoned 150 124 Anion demineralizers 3WTS-DEMN2A, B Abandoned 150 124 Mixed bed demineralizers 3WTS-DEMN3A, B Abandoned 150 124 Primary grade water deaerator 3WTS-DA1 Abandoned 125 (-29 in. vac) 30 Acid storage tank 3WTS-Tk2 Atm --
Caustic storage tank 3WTS-Tk4 Atm --
Acid measuring tank 3WTS-Tk1 Atm --
Caustic measuring tank 3WTS-Tk3 Atm --
Caustic dilution water heater 3WTS-E1 Abandoned 180 90 Water treating supply pumps 3WTS-P6A, B 154 240 Deaerator effluent pumps 3WTS-P7A, B Abandoned 76 30 Deaerator vacuum pumps 3WTS-P8A, B Abandoned 25 in. Hg abs. 60 acfm Acid transfer pumps 3WTS-P2A, B 70 25 Caustic transfer pump 3WTS-P4A, B 70 25 Acid regenerant pumps 3WTS-P1A, B 900 (hydrotest) 1.65 Acid regenerant pumps 3WTS-P1C, D Abandoned 900 (hydrotest) 0.52 Caustic regenerant pumps 3WTS-P5A, B Abandoned 900 (hydrotest) 1.65 Caustic regenerant pump 3WTS-P5C Abandoned 900 (hydrotest) 0.31
Design Flow Component Equipment Number Design Pressure (psig) (gpm each)
Cleaning solution tank 3WTS-TK9 Atm pH solution tank 3WTS-Tk7 Atm Ultrafiltration cartridge filters 3WTS-FLT2A, B 150 265 Ultrafiltration module racks 3WTS-FLT3A, B 100 125 Permeate tank 3WTS-TK8 Atm Ultrafiltration supply pumps 3WTS-P10A, B, C 62 265 Ultrafiltration booster pumps 3WTS-P13A, B 31 132 Ultrafiltration flush pumps 3WTS-P14A, B 25 208 Contract Water Treatment Facility supply 3WTS-P15A, B 128 (90 Max.) 124 (400 Max., 200 pumps MP3)
Waste regenerant neutralizing sump 3WTW-Tk1 Atm --
Waste regenerant sump pumps 3WTW-P1A, B 65 200 Acid neutralizing pump 3WTW-P2 50 1 Caustic neutralizing pump 3WTW-P3 50 1 pH adjustment/chemical feed pumps 3WTS-P12A,B 115 1.06 Cleaning solution pumps 3WTS-P11A,B 220 0.68 Water treating storage tank 3WTS-P9 27 60 Heater circulating pump
DESIGN DATA Design Data Primary Grade Water Storage Tank Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 0 Design temperature (°F) 150 Design capacity (gal) 100,000 each Primary Grade Water Storage Tank Heater Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 50 Design temperature (°F) 100 Design capacity (kW) 7 Primary Grade Water Heating Pump Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 350 Design temperature (°F) 250 Design capacity (gpm) 60 Primary Grade Water Supply Pumps Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 141 Design temperature (°F) 100 Design capacity (gpm) 225 Deaerator Number 1 Design pressure (psig) / Vacuum 100/30 in Hg Design temperature (°F) 200 Design capacity (gpm) 200 Deaerator Supply Pump Number 1 Design pressure (psig) 150
Design Data Design temperature (°F) 100 Design capacity (gpm) 200 Deaerator Effluent Pump Number 1 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 100 Design capacity (gpm) 200 High Vacuum Steam Jet Ejector Number 1 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design capacity (lb/hr) 125 Low Vacuum Steam Jet Ejector Number 1 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design capacity (lb/hr) 75 Condensers Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 150 Capacity, cooling water (gpm) 25 Condensate Pump Number 1 Design pressure (psig) 100 Design temperature (°F) 600 Capacity, intermittent (gpm) 1.25
Electrical Conductivity Less than 2.0 Mhos/cm at 25°C pH 6.0 to 8.0 Oxygen Less than 0.10 ppm Chloride Less than 0.15 ppm Fluoride Less than 0.15 ppm Total Solids 1 Less than 0.5 ppm Particulates Filtered to less than 25 microns Silica Less than 0.2 ppm Boric Acid 2 Less than 10 ppm as boron Total Gamma Activity 2 Less than 5 x 10-4 Ci/cc TES:
Excluding boric acid Only when transferring water from the Boron Recovery System
FIGURE 9.2-1 (SHEETS 1-4) P&ID SERVICE WATER figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
IGURE 9.2-2 (SHEETS 1-3) P&ID REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
GURE 9.2-3 (SHEETS 1-2) P&ID REACTOR PLANT CHILLED WATER SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
IGURE 9.2-4 P&ID SAFETY INJECTION PUMP AND NEUTRON SHIELD TANK COOLING SYSTEMS figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.2-5 P&ID CHARGING PUMP SEALING AND LUBRICATION figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.2-6 P&ID CONDENSATE DEMINERALIZER LIQUID WASTE figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.2-7 (SHEETS 1-6) P&ID WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.2-7(2)(A) (SHEETS 1-6) P&ID WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM (TEMPMOD) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.2-7(5)(A) (SHEETS 1-6) P&ID WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM (TEMPMOD) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
GURE 9.2-8 (SHEETS 1-3) P&ID DOMESTIC WATER AND SANITARY SYSTEMS figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.2-9 (SHEETS 1-3) P&ID CONDENSATE SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
IGURE 9.2-10 (SHEETS 1-2) P&ID TURBINE PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.2-11 P&ID PRIMARY GRADE WATER SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS s section describes the instrument air system, containment instrument air system, and service ystem.
se air systems are not safety related, except for the portion of the instrument air and service air ems that penetrate the containment between the containment isolation valves.
ure 9.3-1 is the piping and instrumentation diagram for the compressed air system.
1.1 Instrument and Service Air Systems instrument and service air systems are designed to provide sufficient compressed air of able quality and pressure for all instrumentation and controls and pneumatically operated s.
1.1.1 Design Bases instrument and service air systems provide the following design features:
- 1. Normal plant instrumentation and service air requirements.
- 2. Three identical compressors, two instrument air compressors, and one service air compressor. To ensure reliability, each instrument air compressor has the capacity to supply 100 percent of the plant instrument air requirements. One of the instrument air compressors is powered from a Class 1E bus.
- 3. Each instrument and service air compressor is designed to deliver 750 scfm of air at a discharge pressure of 110 psig.
- 4. Two identical 100 percent capacity shutdown instrument air compressors. These compressors are powered from the orange and purple Class IE. The shutdown compressors can supply all air-operated valves inside containment and only those valves outside containment required for orderly cold shutdown. Each shutdown instrument air compressor is designed to deliver 150 scfm of air at a discharge pressure of 100 psig. These compressors are normally isolated and are not credited for accident mitigation or Loss of Power events.
- 5. Design temperatures of the instrument air distribution system are based on extreme ambient conditions. During normal plant operation, the instrument air aftercooler is capable of cooling the discharge air to 120°F.
containment between the containment isolation valves.
- 7. Automatic instrument air backup from the service air system.
- 8. Provision to connect a portable air compressor to the service air system.
- 9. Provision to connect a portable air compressor to the instrument air system.
assure instrument air quality air dryers maintain the dew point at -40°F, redundant air filters ove 100 percent of all particle sizes above 1 micron and oil-free compressors minimize the oil tent of the air. Inline moisture indicators are provided locally. The instrument air system also a local inline moisture annunciator. Afterfilter differential pressure and trouble indicators and unciators are provided locally and on the main control board, allowing operator action to ect any air quality deviation. Periodic air samples are analyzed for contamination during em operation.
1.1.2 System Description o oil-free instrument air compressors located in the turbine building normally provide rument air for plant services. One operates on a load/unload mode, and one on a standby matic mode. The instrument air compressor on the automatic mode starts if the instrument air em pressure falls below a preset minimum value. The instrument air compressor operating des are reversed periodically to maintain uniform wear and verify proper component rability. One compressor is powered from a Class 1E bus.
oil-free service air compressor, located in the turbine building, provides service air. The ice air header is connected to the instrument air header to serve as backup for the instrument ystem. On a low pressure signal from the instrument air system, a pressure control valve ween the instrument and service air headers allows air to flow from the service air header to instrument air headers.
instrument air line penetrating the containment structure wall contains one air-operated valve ted outside the structure and one motor-operated globe valve located inside the containment cture; these valves serve as containment isolation valves. Upon receipt of CIA signal both tainment isolation valves close automatically.
shutdown instrument air compressor header delivers air from the two shutdown air pressors located in the auxiliary building to the instrument air line penetrating the tainment structure and to the headers outside the containment which are associated with erly cold shutdown. These compressors are normally isolated and are not credited for accident gation or Loss of Power events.
service air line penetrating the containment contains one locked closed valve outside the tainment structure and one locked closed valve inside the containment which serve as
ing routine maintenance of either instrument air compressor, instrument air aftercooler, or rument air receiver, the service air system serves as a backup to the instrument air system.
o, there are capabilities to cross connect the Millstone 2 instrument air system which can be e up manually by inserting a flanged spool piece to permit the use of Millstone 2 instrument There is a permanent service air crosstie to Millstone 2 station air which can be manually ned to serve as a backup.
h compressor in the instrument air system and the service air system is furnished with an ke filter silencer, a water-cooled aftercooler, and air receiver. Instrument air may be used for thing services on an infrequent basis at the utilitys discretion.
ief valves are provided on the instrument air receivers and on the lines upstream from the rcoolers to prevent overpressurization of the air receivers and aftercoolers.
hundred percent capacity water-cooled aftercoolers are provided for each instrument and ice air compressor. One dual tower desiccant type instrument air dryer is provided for use ng normal instrument air system operation. It includes two full capacity drying elements; one ment is drying while the other is regenerating. A single tower nonregenerative desiccant dryer rovided as a backup when the dual tower dryer is out of service for maintenance. Afterfilters nstream of the instrument air dryers remove 100 percent of all particles above 1 micron.
h shutdown air compressor is furnished with an intake filter silencer, a water-cooled rcooler, and air receiver.
shutdown air compressors are provided with their own individual dual tower desiccant type dryer and afterfilters which remove 100 percent of all particles above 1 micron.
1.1.3 Safety Evaluation instrument and service air systems are non safety-related except for the containment isolation es and the piping between. The isolation valves and associated piping are Safety Class 2. The ainder of the instrument and service air systems are designed non-nuclear safety (NNS).
instrument and service air systems are not protected from earthquakes, flooding, tornadoes, siles, or the effects of high and moderate energy pipe breaks, except for the piping between the tainment isolation valves. The instrument and service air systems located close to safety ted equipment are supported in such a manner that any failure will not preclude operation of ty related equipment.
instrument air system is not required for safe shutdown. Instrumentation and controls for the owing systems are designed such that control equipment fails in the safe mode upon loss of
- 2. Systems required for safe shutdown (Section 7.4).
- 3. All other instrumentation systems required for safety (Section 7.6).
instrument air system is designed with the following features to assure instrument air quality onsistent with the operability requirements of air operated valves and instruments in safety ted systems:
- 1. Air dryers which maintain the dewpoint at -40°F. An emergency dryer is available in the instrument air system in the event of servicing or of failure of one or both drying towers.
- 2. Redundant air filters which remove 100 percent of all particle sizes above 1 micron.
- 3. Oil-free compressors which minimize the oil content in the air.
- 4. In line moisture indicators are provided locally. The instrument air system also has a local inline moisture annunciator. Afterfilter differential pressure and trouble indicators and annunciators are provided locally, and on the main control board which assure system operation within the proper range and which allow operator action to correct any air quality deviation.
1.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 1.1.4.1 Preoperational Testing of Instrument Air System operational testing of the instrument air system complies with Regulatory Guide 1.68.3 as ussed below:
instrument air system is non safety-related, with the exception of the piping penetrating the tainment boundary up to and including the isolation valves on either side of the penetration.
s portion of the system is pressure tested to verify the integrity of the containment boundary.
plant instrument air system has an interface with components that are part of safety related ems. These air controlled components were tested to verify that upon loss of their safety-related air supply, they will respond by assuming their designed fail-safe position.
verify that loss of the instrument air system will not affect any of the functions of the safety ted systems, a loss of instrument air test was conducted at near normal operating temperature pressure conditions.
ing operation, periodic simulated low air pressure tests are performed on the instrument air em to ensure proper starting of the standby compressor when required. Other testing of the rument air system is not required as they are normally in operation.
1.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements instrument air and service air system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled locally at the turbine building or remotely from the control room.
following controls and instruments are located on the instrument and service air panel in the ine building:
trol switches and indicating lights for:
- 1. Service air to instrument air valve
- 2. Domestic water and component cooling water valves
- 3. Service air supply valve t-out annunciators on the instrument and service air panel in the turbine building that alarm n the following conditions exist:
- 1. Instrument air compressor cooling water temperature high
- 2. Instrument air compressor discharge air temperature high
- 3. Instrument air receiver pressure low
- 4. Instrument air compressor lube oil pressure low
- 5. Instrument air dryer afterfilter differential pressure high
- 6. Instrument air supply header pressure low
- 7. Instrument air aftercooler outlet air temperature high
- 8. Instrument air dryer discharge air moisture content high
- 9. Service air compressor water jacket temperature high
- 10. Service air compressor discharge air temperature high
- 11. Service air aftercooler outlet air temperature high
- 13. Service air compressor lube oil pressure low following instruments are located on the main board in the control room:
- 1. Indicating lights for the instrument air compressor, and the service air compressor
- 2. An indicator for instrument air supply header pressure
- 3. Annunciators that alarm when the following conditions exist:
- a. Service or instrument air trouble
- b. Instrument air compressor auto/trip
- c. Service air compressor breaker auto/trip or overcurrent following controls and instruments are located locally near the instrument and service air ponents:
- 1. Control switches for:
- a. Service air compressor
- b. Instrument Air Dryers
- c. Load transfer switch for the service air compressor
- d. Load transfer switch for the instrument air compressor
- 2. Local pressure and temperature indicators on the air compressors and aftercoolers, and local pressure indicators on the air receivers to monitor their operation
- 3. Instrument air dryer discharge air moisture content high indicator light
- 4. Indicating lights on the switchgear for the instrument air compressor feeder breaker and the service air compressor following parameters are monitored by the plant computer:
- 1. Instrument air compressor feeder breaker position
- 2. Instrument air compressor lube oil pressure low
- 3. Instrument air compressor cooling water temperature high
- 5. Instrument air compressor supply header pressure
- 6. Service air compressor breaker position shutdown portion of the instrument air systems operating parameters are monitored, cated, and controlled locally or remotely. The following instruments and controls are located he main control board:
- 1. Shutdown instrument air compressor control switches and indicator lights
- 2. Shutdown air system isolation valve control switch and indicator lights
- 3. Shutdown instrument air header pressure indicator
- 4. Annunciators that alarm when the following conditions exist:
- a. Shutdown instrument air compressor cooling water temperature high
- b. Shutdown instrument air compressor discharge air temperature high
- c. Shutdown instrument air compressor lube oil pressure low
- d. Shutdown instrument air dryer afterfilter differential pressure high
- e. Shutdown instrument air supply header pressure low following controls and instruments are located locally near the shutdown instrument air em components:
- 1. Load transfer switches for the emergency instrument air compressors
- 2. Indicator for air dryer discharge air moisture content
- 3. Local pressure indicators on the shutdown instrument air receivers to monitor their operation hutdown instrument air header pressure indicator is provided on the auxiliary shutdown panel.
1.2 Containment Instrument Air System containment instrument air system uses the instrument air system to provide control air to rumentation located within the containment boundary.
containment instrument air system is designed to meet the following requirements:
- 1. The containment instrument air system is designed to provide air of suitable quality and pressure for reactor containment instrumentation.
- 2. The containment instrument air system is not safety related.
- 3. The containment instrument air system is continuously supplied air from the instrument air system.
1.2.2 System Description containment instrument air system is normally supplied by compressed air from the rument air compressors.
from the instrument air system (Section 9.3.1.1.2) is continuously supplied to containment rument air system, components inside the reactor containment. Air is normally supplied by the rument air compressors.
1.2.3 Safety Evaluation containment instrument air system is not safety related. The containment instrument air em components are designed NNS.
containment instrument air system is not protected from the effects of missiles or high and derate energy pipe breaks because the containment instrument air system is not required for shutdown. The containment instrument air system located close to safety related equipment is ported in such a manner that any failure will not preclude operation of safety related ipment.
rumentation and controls for the following systems are designed such that control equipment s in the safe mode upon loss of air:
- 1. Engineered safety features systems (Section 7.3)
- 2. Systems required for safe shutdown (Section 7.4)
- 3. All other instrumentation systems required for safety (Section 7.6) tainment instrument air quality is consistent with the operability requirements of air-operated es and instruments in safety related systems. The air quality is provided by the design of the rument air system (Section 9.3.1.1.3).
1.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements operational testing was performed as described in Section 9.3.1.1.4.1.
ing operation, periodic testing is performed as discussed in Section 9.3.1.1.4.2.
1.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements ineered safety features status lights are provided on the main board, one light to indicate when containment instrument air supply pressure valve is closed and one light to indicate when the tainment instrument air isolation valve is closed.
mputer inputs are provided to monitor the following system parameters:
- 1. Status of the containment instrument air supply pressure valve (open or closed)
- 2. Status of the containment instrument air isolation valve (open or closed) ressure indicator for containment instrument air supply pressure is also provided on the main rd.
1.3 Diesel Instrument Air System diesel instrument air system is designed to provide sufficient compressed air of suitable lity and pressure for all instrumentation and controls. The diesel instrument air system nects to and is part of the instrument air system.
1.3.1 Design Basis diesel instrument air system provides the following design features:
One electric air compressor powered by a dedicated diesel generator to supply 100 percent of the plant instrument air requirements.
The compressor is capable of delivering 750 scfm of air at a discharge pressure of 110 psig.
The diesel instrument air system components are classified as non safety-related.
The system will automatically start on low instrument air system pressure.
The system can be manually started to supply instrument air when required.
The system has an emergency operation run time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
oil-free air compressor located in the CPF that functions to provide a back-up supply of rument air for plant services. The compressor is powered by a dedicated diesel generator ted outdoors on the west side of the CPF. The diesel instrument air system will automatically t and supply instrument air if the normal instrument air system header pressure falls below a et minimum value. This system has a heatless desiccant dryer and air receiver with a relief e to prevent over pressurization.
diesel instrument air compressor is a self-contained, air cooled unit, with its own control and nitoring system.
diesel instrument air dryer is a dual tower, non-heated system that is self-contained, including wn control and monitoring system. The drying has a full capacity, manually operated, bypass if the dryer becomes unavailable.
diesel instrument air diesel generator is located outdoors on the west side of the CPF. The el generator supplies power only for the operation of the diesel instrument air system ponents.
diesel instrument air receiver tank is an ASME Section VIII pressure vessel, located in the 1.3.3 Safety Evaluation diesel instrument air system components are designated NNS.
diesel instrument air system is not protected from the effects of missiles or high and moderate rgy pipe as the system is not required for safe shutdown.
1.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 1.3.4.1 Preoperational Testing of the Diesel Instrument Air System diesel instrument air system components are non safety-related. This system connects to and art of the instrument air system. The system is pressure tested up to the point of connection to existing station instrument air system. The system is functionally tested to ensure all ponents will perform their intended functions.
1.3.4.2 lnservice Testing ing operation, periodic simulated low air pressure tests are performed on the diesel instrument ystem to ensure proper starting of the diesel generator, air compressor and air dryer to verify ability to supply air to the instrument air system.
diesel instrument air system operating parameters are monitored, indicated and controlled lly in the CPF or remotely indicated in the Unit 3 Control Room.
following controls and instruments are located on the diesel instrument air system control el in the CPF or outdoors on the diesel generator skid.
System control and indication panel
- a. System control - Off - Manual - Auto Diesel generator control and indication panel Air compressor control and indication panel Air dryer control and indication panel Local pressure indication on the receiver tank Pressure switch for system pressure monitoring and system activation.
following indication is located on the main control board in the Unit 3 Control Room.
Two indicating lights are located on the main control board to provide status of the diesel instrument air system.
diesel instrument air system is not monitored by the plant process computer.
re are no main control board annunciators for the diesel instrument air system.
2 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEMS sampling system consists of two systems - reactor plant sampling system (SSR) and turbine t sampling system (SST).
2.1 Design Bases design bases for the reactor and turbine plant sampling systems are:
- 1. Representative samples from process streams or tanks in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.21.
- 2. Representative samples from gaseous process streams and tanks in accordance with ANSI N13.1 - 1969 and Regulatory Guide 1.21.
- 4. All sample streams that are not purged directly to their corresponding sample sink will either be reclaimed to the origin or flow to their corresponding floor drain sumps.
- 5. Flow restrictions in the following lines, limiting reactor coolant loss from a rupture of the sample line SSR lines: pressurizer vapor space, reactor coolant hot legs, reactor coolant cold legs, and the steam generator blowdown line. SST lines: main steam, first point feedwater heater, and condenser hotwell lines.
- 6. Sample lines are adequately purged before a sample is collected to ensure that a representative sample is obtained.
- 7. The following ASME code classes and safety classes apply:
- a. The sampling lines from the steam generator blowdown lines, safety injection accumulators, reactor coolant hot and cold legs, and pressurizer, up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves, are designed in accordance with ASME III, Class 2, and are classified Safety Class 2. The sample line from the pressurizer relief tank is ASME III, Class 2, and Safety Class 2 only at the penetration.
- b. Sampling lines connected to Safety Class 2 and 3 systems, up to and including the solenoid-operated isolation valve, as indicated on Figure 9.3-2 are designed in accordance with ASME III, Class 2 and 3, respectively, and are classified Safety Class 2 and 3, respectively.
- c. All other sampling lines are designed to ANSI B31.1 and are classified nonnuclear safety (NNS).
- 8. Sample coolers are provided to reduce sample temperatures to 150°F or less for safe handling.
- 9. All of the SSR lines that penetrate the containment are provided with containment isolation valves in accordance with General Design Criteria 55, 56, and 57.
- 10. The following portions of the reactor plant sampling system either perform a safety function or maintain their integrity for pressure boundary isolation purposes following a safe shutdown earthquake, and therefore meet Seismic Category I design requirements:
- a. Sampling lines upstream of the outside containment isolation valve, except for the pressurizer relief tank sample line. For this line, the containment penetration and isolation valves only are Seismic Category I.
volume control system.
- c. All valves used for isolation at these safety class transitions.
- d. The portion of the hydrogenated liquid purge header interfacing with the chemical and volume control system downstream of and including the check valve.
- e. All instrumentation and controls which perform a containment isolation function.
se portions of the system are protected from missiles and tornado winds.
remaining portions of the reactor plant sampling system have no seismic or tornado design uirements except that their failure does not cause a loss of function of any safety related ipment or personnel injury.
turbine plant sampling system has no seismic design requirements.
2.2 System Description reactor and turbine plant sampling systems (Figures 9.3-2 and 9.3-3, respectively) have the ability for sampling all normal process systems and principal components listed in Tables 9.3-d 9.3-2.
reactor plant remote samples are taken at sample sinks located in the auxiliary and waste osal buildings. The remote turbine plant samples are taken at the sample sink located in the ine building.
reactor plant sampling lines coming from within the containment structure, except for the surizer relief tank gas space sample and the safety injection accumulator samples, are high perature samples. Each reactor plant sampling line, except the steam generator blowdown ple lines, and some sampling lines originating outside the containment structure, have noid-operated selection valves in their lines that are operated remotely from their respective ple sinks in the auxiliary or the waste disposal building. The turbine plant sample lines have ual selection valves except for the condenser hotwell sample lines which have remote uenced valves.
h reactor plant sampling line penetrating the containment structure, except the steam generator wdown lines, has three remote operated solenoid isolation valves:
A sample isolation and a containment isolation valve inside containment and a containment isolation valve outside containment. The steam generator blowdown sampling lines have one remotely operated isolation valve outside containment.
uenced safeguard signal (CDA, SIS, or LOP), an auxiliary feedwater pump auto start signal y steam generator 2/4 low-low level), or an AMSAC actuation signal is present. Each pling line isolation valve can be opened and closed by an individual switch on the main trol board. A CIA signal overrides the manual signal to the containment isolation valve from switch on the main control board.
reactor plant sample sinks have ventilation hoods with fans and carbon absorbers in the aust duct, which protect operating personnel and prevent the spread of radioactive tamination. The turbine plant sample sink has a hood with an exhaust fan.
h temperature sample lines are provided with sample coolers which cool the high temperature ples to a temperature low enough for safe handling (150°F or less). Pressure regulators are vided to reduce the pressures of high pressure lines to no more than 25 psig for normal liquid ples in each sample line. High pressure samples are taken at or near system operating sures. After sufficient purging, a pressurized sample is obtained by isolating the sample in a ple capsule and removing the capsule from the sample line for analysis.
purge flows of the various samples in the reactor and turbine plant sampling systems are harged to systems as shown on Figures 9.3-2 and 9.3-3.
Reactor Plant and Turbine Plant systems provide continuous radiation monitoring of various ams, as well as continuous monitoring of those parameters required by the EPRI PWR ondary Water Chemistry Guidelines. Each sampling system is operated manually on an rmittent basis, except where continuous sampling is provided, during conditions ranging from power operation to cold shutdown.
al instrumentation at the sample sinks permits manual control of sampling operations and ures that the samples are at suitable temperatures and pressures before diverting the flow to the pling sinks. Each purge header contains a flow indicator to indicate if the flow is sufficient to in a representative sample.
2.3 Safety Evaluation systems are designated NNS, except for those portions of the sampling lines that are inside penetrate the containment, including their isolation valves, and those lines that connect to a ty class (SC-2 or SC-3) system, which are designated SC-2 or SC-3, respectively. The primary em sample line containment isolation valves close on receipt of a CIA signal. The steam erator blowdown sample line isolation valves automatically close whenever a sequenced guard signal (CDA, SIS, or LOP), an auxiliary feedwater pump auto start signal (any steam erator 2/4 low-low level), or an AMSAC actuation signal is present. The sampling systems are gned in accordance with standard industrial practice and do not jeopardize or interfere with operation of any safety system. If a critical sampling line, i.e., reactor coolant, becomes perable because of a malfunction, at least one alternate path exists which can be used to obtain
samples having an operating temperature greater than 150°F are cooled to below 150°F for handling.
grab samples and continuous samples are reduced in pressure to 150 psig or below before g sampled.
2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements st components are used regularly during power operation and shutdown, ensuring the ilability and performance of the sampling systems. Monitors that operate continuously are odically tested, calibrated, and checked to ensure proper instrument response and operation of ms.
ety class valves in the system require testing as specified in Section 6.2.4.
2.5 Instrumentation Requirements pling instrumentation is located adjacent to the sample sink.
al temperature indicators, at the outlet of the high temperature sample coolers and the constant perature bath, measure sample temperature prior to sample collection.
al pressure indicators downstream from the high pressure throttling valves and pressure ucing valves permit the adjustment of these valves.
al flow indicators monitor sample flow rates.
ief valves protect sample coolers and sample lines from overpressure.
ote control switches and indicator lights are located on the main control board for manual ration of sample line isolation valves. Primary system sample line containment isolation es are closed automatically on receipt of a CIA signal. The steam generator blowdown sample isolation valves automatically close whenever a sequenced safeguard signal (CDA, SIS or P), an auxiliary feedwater pump auto start signal (any steam generator 2/4 low-low level), or AMSAC actuation signal is present. Alarms and annunciators indicate adverse conditions on sample panels. Also, an annunciator is alarmed on main control board when the following dition exists: steam generator blowdown sample isolation valve reset.
2.6 Post-Accident Sampling System post-accident sampling system (Figure 9.3-10) is nonnuclear safety related (NNS).
design bases for the post-accident sampling system are:
- 1. Collecting primary coolant or sump liquid samples for analysis.
- 2. Isolating samples of the containment air for analysis.
- 3. Containment penetration piping and isolation valves along with interface piping and valves to reactor plant sampling lines are Safety Class 2. Containment isolation valves are designed to fail closed. All other piping and components are designed NNS and nonseismic.
- 4. Amendment 201 eliminated the requirements to have and maintain the post-accident sampling program (PASS). The ability to obtain and analyze post-accident samples of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere are no longer a required activity and were removed from Section 12.3.1.3.2.
endment Number 201 to the operating license eliminated the requirements for PASS in the hnical Specifications and PASS specific requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory ers. However, if radiological conditions permit, post accident samples can be obtained and lyzed based on the recommendations of the Emergency Response Organization.
2.6.2 System Description post-accident sampling system has the capability of obtaining samples from the following:
- 1. Primary coolant from the four reactor coolant cold legs and the two reactor coolant hot legs via connections to the reactor plant sampling lines when RCS pressure is
> 240 psig.
- 2. A representative containment air sample via the hydrogen recombiner intake lines.
liquid and air samples are sent to the hydrogen recombiner building where the post-accident pling module units are located. The motive force for obtaining reactor coolant samples is the erential pressure between the primary reactor loop and the liquid sample module. The tainment recirculation spray pumps supply the liquid sample module with a containment floor id sample. A bellows pump located in the hydrogen recombiner building supplies a esentative containment air sample to the air sample module via the hydrogen recombiner ion piping.
h post-accident sampling line used for obtaining a primary coolant sample or a sump liquid ple has a solenoid-operated selection valve that is operated remotely from a control panel in
mbiner building. These manual valves are operated by reach rods from a shielded area in the rogen recombiner building.
post-accident sampling line supplying primary coolant or a containment sump liquid sample, one return line to the containment penetrate the containment structure. Each line penetrating containment structure has one automatic, solenoid-operated isolation valve inside containment one locked closed manually-operated isolation valve outside containment. The automatic tainment isolation valves close automatically on a containment isolation (CIA) signal.
reactor coolant post-accident sampling system and containment air post-accident sampling em are each dual module units consisting of one sample module and one remote-operated dule.
r to entering the post-accident sampling module the liquid is cooled in the reactor coolant dule cooler to acceptable temperatures (165°F or less). The reactor coolant sample module is gned to a pressure of 2500 psig.
h the reactor coolant sample module and the containment air sample module cabinets have an aust blower that discharges into the supplementary leak collection system. The sample module tilation system exhausts at a nominal design flow of 100 cfm to establish a minimum capture city of 50 fpm into the sample modules with one panel door in the open position.
ples to be analyzed off site are collected in a 2-ml shielded, removable sample chamber hin the sample module. The sample may be either pressurized at primary system pressure or ressurized (less than 70 psig). Radiological analysis can identify and quantify isotopes on site he range from approximately 10 Ci/ml to 10 Ci/ml.
accuracy, range, and sensitivity are adequate to provide pertinent data to the operator in order escribe the radiological status of the reactor coolant system.
post-accident sample lines and equipment are purged after the sample is obtained. A flushing dule is provided to purge the liquid sample system with demineralized water. The flushing dule consists of a 30 gallon water storage tank and a positive displacement pump. The flushing dule also contains a pressurized nitrogen supply with an auxiliary supply from the permanent t nitrogen system (Section 9). The nitrogen supply is used to purge the dissolved gases in the id sample system and to purge the containment air sample system. The liquid sample system urged to the volume control tank via the reactor coolant pump seal injection return line. The id purge may also be directed to the containment drain sump. The containment air sampling em can be purged back to the containment via the hydrogen recombiner discharge piping.
ept for the portion of post-accident sampling lines that penetrate the containment, including isolation valves, and the solenoid valves and piping interfacing with the safety related pling piping within containment, the post-accident sampling system is not safety related.
undancy is designed into the system to obtain a reactor coolant liquid sample or a containment ample. A reactor coolant liquid sample can be obtained from any of the four cold legs or from two hot legs of the primary coolant system. Thus, if one of the sampling lines becomes perable because of a malfunction, there is an alternate sample path. Likewise, a containment ample can be obtained from either of two redundant hydrogen recombiner supply lines.
2.6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements tem solenoid valves are cycled periodically to ensure functionality and availability.
2.6.5 Instrumentation Requirements post-accident sampling system inside containment isolation valves have control switches and cator lights on the main control board. The open and close positions are monitored by the t computer. Engineered safety features status lights on the main control board indicate when post-accident sampling system inside containment isolation valves are open. The isolation es are closed automatically on receipt of a CIA signal.
trol switches and indicator lights are located on a panel in the hydrogen recombiner building control of the individual sample valves.
sample containment air sample pump has controls for manual operation from a panel in the rogen recombiner building.
containment air sample module is operated from the containment air sample remote panel the reactor coolant module is operated from the reactor coolant remote panel in the hydrogen mbiner building.
3 REACTOR PLANT VENT AND DRAIN SYSTEMS reactor plant vent and drain systems collect waste gases and liquids from valve and pump offs, tank drains, and other equipment and floor drains containing radioactive contamination, transfer them to the gaseous and liquid waste systems for treatment and/or disposal. These ems consist of the reactor plant gaseous vent system, the reactor plant aerated vent system, the tor plant gaseous drain system, and the reactor plant aerated drain system (Figures 9.3-4 ugh 9.3-6, respectively).
reactor plant vent and drain systems are non safety-related, except for the lines penetrating containment structure and the three safety related sumps located in the Engineered and Safety tures Building. Two of the three sumps (3DAS*SUMP7A & B) collect miscellaneous ipment drainage. The third sump is the porous concrete groundwater sump that collects undwater that has circumvented the waterproof membrane that surrounds the containment cture and containment structure contiguous buildings. For containment penetration areas, ation valves on both sides of the containment structure wall and the piping between them are ety Class 2.
gaseous vent system handles vents where hydrogen and radioactive gases predominate, while aerated vent system handles vents where air predominates. These vent systems flow separately he radioactive gaseous waste system (Section 11.3).
gaseous drain system handles drains containing nonaerated reactor coolant. These drains may irected to the radioactive gaseous waste system for degasification and return to the reactor lant system (Chapter 5) via the chemical and volume control system (Section 9.3.4).
rnately the drains may be directed to the Boron Recovery System (Section 9.3.5). The aerated n system handles drains containing air and flows to the radioactive liquid waste system ction 11.2).
3.2 System Description 3.2.1 Reactor Plant Gaseous Vents System eous vents (Figure 9.3-4) are vented during normal operation from the containment drains sfer tank (Figure 9.3-5), pressurizer relief tank (Chapter 5), primary drains transfer tank ure 9.3-5), volume control tank (Section 9.3.4), and reactor plant sampling hydrogenated eous purge header (Figure 9.3-2). The radioactive gaseous waste system process effluent gas ischarged to the gaseous vents system header. These vents are transferred by the gaseous vent em to the radioactive gaseous waste system.
3.2.2 Reactor Plant Aerated Vents System ated vents (Figure 9.3-4) from the following tanks, condenser, and container in the boron very system (Section 9.3.5), radioactive liquid waste system (Section 11.2), and radioactive d waste system (Section 11.4) are transferred by the aerated vent system to the radioactive eous waste system (Section 11.3): boron recovery tanks, boron distillate tank, boron porator condenser, waste distillate tank, high level waste drain tanks, waste bottoms hold tank, level waste drain tanks, spent resin dewatering tank, disposable waste shipping container.
eous drains (Figure 9.3-5) originate from systems containing reactor coolant or from systems ch potentially could contain reactor coolant and are collected in the pressurizer relief tank, the tainment drains transfer tank, and the primary drains transfer tank.
pressurizer relief tank is located in the containment structure and receives gaseous drains m the pressurizer safety valves (Section 5.4.11).
containment drains transfer tank is located inside the containment structure and collects eous drains from the reactor coolant pumps seal leakoffs (Section 9.3.4), valve stem leakoffs, tor vessel flange leak detection line (Section 5.2.5), and from the safety injection accumulator s (Section 6.3). The reactor coolant loops can be drained to the containment drains transfer directly or via the excess letdown heat exchanger in the chemical and volume control system.
primary drains transfer tank is located in the auxiliary building (Section 3.8.4) and receives ns from the reactor plant sampling system hydrogenated contaminated liquid purge header ure 9.3-2); valve stem leakoffs outside the containment structure; relief valve discharges m the radioactive gaseous waste system, chemical and volume control system, and high and pressure safety injection systems (Chapter 6); and drains from the volume control tank.
containment drains transfer tank, pressurizer relief tank, and primary drains transfer tank h has two full capacity drain transfer pumps to transfer gaseous drains to the degasifier very exchangers (Figure 11.3-1) in the radioactive gaseous waste system or the cesium oval ion exchangers (Figure 9.3-9) in the boron recovery system. The pumps are started ually and stopped automatically.
3.2.4 Reactor Plant Aerated Drains System ated drains are collected in sumps located inside the containment structure (incore instrument m sump, unidentified leakage sump, and containment drains sump); Engineered Safety tures Building (two residual heat removal cubicle sumps, two containment recirculation icle sumps, and Engineered Safety Features Building sump); auxiliary building; pipe tunnel; building; waste disposal building (two sumps); and turbine building (two turbine plant ponent cooling drain sumps and turbine building floor drain sump).
aerated drain system also contains four underdrain sumps. Three of these sumps collect nage from under the Engineered Safety Features, Fuel, Waste Disposal, Auxiliary, Service and trol Buildings. The uncontaminated effluent from these sumps is pumped directly to the yard m sewer system. The fourth underdrain sump is located in the basement of the Engineered ety Features Building. This sump collects groundwater that has circumvented the waterproof mbrane that was installed around the Containment Structure and the Containment Structure tiguous buildings. The effluent from this sump is pumped to a storage tank in the yard. The uent is not radiologically contaminated, but the groundwater has a high pH and is treated as essary to achieve effluent limits prior to discharge. There is no connection between the erdrain sumps and the contaminated section of the aerated drains system.
ns in their respective areas. The containment drains sump collects aerated drains directly from ipment and systems inside the containment structure. Depending on the activity level, all ted drains except the turbine building floor drain sump are transferred by sump pumps ugh either the high or low level waste drain header (Figure 9.3-6) to the high or low level te drain tank, respectively (Figure 11.2-1) in the radioactive liquid waste system.
turbine building floor drain sump is monitored for radioactivity. It is normally pumped to the d drainage system, but is directed to the liquid radioactive waste system via the turbine plant ponent cooling drain sump on a predetermined radioactivity level.
neutron shield tank cooling system (Section 9.2.2.3) uses potassium dichromate as a osion inhibitor. Whenever this system is drained to the containment drains sump, the sump is ped directly, under administrative control, to the high level waste drain header. Drainage from radioactive solid waste system (Figure 11.4-1) flows directly to the high level waste drain der.
3.2.4.1 Safety-Related Porous Concrete Groundwater Sump (Underdrain System Sump) porous concrete groundwater sump is located in the Engineered Safety Features Building.
s sump collects (via an underdrain and porous concrete media) any significant amount of undwater seepage which has circumvented the waterproof membrane. The sump is equipped h a non-safety related electric sump pump. The sump protects the containment steel liner from rostatic loading. It is sized such that using a design basis seepage of approximately 2200 ons per day, 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> are available to replace a failed non-safety related electric sump pump restore the groundwater removal capability of the sump pump. The sump pump transfers undwater collected in the sump to a tank in the yard. Sampling and pH treatment is performed ecessary on the tank contents prior to discharge. The sump pump is accessible via the ineered Safety Features Building roof and is outside the SLCRS boundary (i.e., the sump p can be removed and installed from the roof). The electric sump pump is powered by non-ty related electrical circuits which derive power from a safety related electrical bus (see le 8.3-3). Utilizing a safety related power source to provide power to the non-safety related p provides greater assurance of a reliable energy source. A spare sump pump is stored on site.
ministrative controls are in place to monitor the groundwater inleakage and the non-safety ted electric pump operability. Administrative controls include monitoring of the non-safety ted pump start and stop times, the water level of the porous concrete groundwater sump and water level of the tank in the yard.
3.2.5 Containment Isolation Valves tainment isolation valves are provided in all lines penetrating the containment structure ction 6.2.4). Both containment isolation valves in the gaseous vents system are open during mal operation. During normal operation for both the gaseous and aerated drains systems, the tainment isolation valve inside the containment structure is closed and the one outside the
3.3 Safety Evaluation reactor plant vent and drain systems are designed and sized to handle the maximum flow rate ents and drains expected during unit operation.
tenitic stainless steel piping and tubing is used to transfer all fluids in the reactor plant vent drain systems.
containment drains transfer pumps, pressurizer relief tank drains transfer pumps, and primary ns transfer pumps drain their respective tanks in the reactor plant gaseous drain system. Two ps are provided for each tank. The pumps are started manually and stop automatically.
receipt of a high level alarm for the containment drains transfer tank or the primary drains sfer tank, one of the pumps associated with the alarming tank is started by remote manual trol. If the level does not decrease, the second pump is started remote manually. The pumps stopped automatically on receipt of the tank low level signal.
n receipt of the pressurizer relief tank high level alarm, the normally closed air-operated valve he suction line from the pressurizer relief tank to the pressurizer relief tank drains transfer ps is opened remote manually and one of the pumps is started remote manually. If the level s not decrease, the second pump is started remote manually. The pressurizer relief tank drains sfer pumps stop automatically on receipt of a pressurizer relief tank low level signal. The operated valve in the suction line to the pumps is closed remote manually.
IA signal closes the containment isolation valves in the reactor plant gaseous drain system, ch stops the pressurizer relief tank drains transfer pumps and containment drains transfer ps. This CIA signal terminates any potential radioactive release from containment by this way.
uplex pump arrangement is provided for each of the following reactor plant aerated drains em sumps (Figure 9.3-6): containment drains sump, turbine building floor drain sump, iliary building sump, fuel building sump, two waste disposal building sumps, and three erdrain sumps. With the exception of the turbine building floor drain sump, one pump is in matic service and the other on standby, and each pump is independently controlled. When the er level in a sump reaches a specified height, the associated sump pump starts automatically. If water in the sump reaches a specified higher level, the associated standby sump pump also ts automatically. The sump pumps stop automatically when the water has decreased to a cified level in the associated sump. A CIA signal closes the containment isolation valves in the tor plant aerated drain system, which stops the containment drains sump pumps terminating potential radioactive release from containment by this pathway.
turbine building floor drain sump pumps are provided with auto start signals at pre-defined e intervals.
residual heat removal cubicle sumps, two containment recirculation cubicle sumps, and ineered safety features building sump. Each pump starts automatically when the water level in associated sump reaches a specified level, and stops when the level drops to a specified level.
rms are activated if the level rises above a specified level, except for the unidentified leakage
- p. The unidentified leakage sump alarm (KA) initiates if P10 restarts too soon after stopping f P10 runs too long. The frequency of operation of the unidentified leakage sump pump is nitored as one method of detecting excess leakage inside the containment structure ction 5.2.5).
ddition to the pumps described above, the Engineered Safety Feature Building (ESFB) is ipped with a non-safety related sump pump to remove groundwater that has circumvented the erproof membrane surrounding the Containment Structure and the Contain Structure tiguous buildings. The pump is credited with groundwater removal during normal operation, owing a LOCA and during loss of normal power scenarios. The ESFB roof is accessible after ours post LOCA with respect to radiation. The single non-safety related sump pump design is eptable because the sump pump is accessible from the ESFB roof and sufficient time is ilable to perform maintenance activities for the pump without overfilling the sump and hout compromising safety related structures, systems or components. A spare sump pump is ed on site.
residual heat removal cubicle sumps and pumps are located in safety related areas, although are not safety related themselves. The cubicles are completely separate from one another.
thermore, drain piping is run to an elevation high enough to prevent back flooding from the ineered safety feature building back to these cubicles. The other pumps are in safety-related areas.
lines in the systems penetrating the containment structure have two containment isolation es in series (Figure 9.3-4 through 9.3-6). The power to each solenoid-operated pilot valve for redundant containment isolation valves is supplied from a separate emergency bus. All of e containment isolation valves fail closed on loss of actuating air, loss of actuating signal, or of power.
en systems or components containing potassium dichromate are drained, the affected sump is ped directly, by administrative control, to the high level waste drain tanks via the high level te drain header for processing in the waste evaporator (Figure 11.2-1). This administrative trol procedure ensures that drained potassium dichromate inhibitor is not released to the ironment.
3.4 Tests and Inspections odic testing of the reactor plant vent and drain systems is not necessary because they are used ormal operation. Inspection is performed in accordance with normal maintenance procedures.
tainment isolation valves are tested in accordance with the procedures in Section 6.2.4.
umulated groundwater from the sump. The testing also confirmed that the ESFB basement is water tight up to an elevation that is equal to the top of the safety related sump. The sump ualified for seismic loading and post accident conditions and performance testing was ducted to confirm that the subsystem would operate as required post LOCA.
3.5 Instrumentation Requirements 3.5.1 Reactor Plant Gaseous Vent System reactor plant gaseous vent system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled, locally or remotely as follows:
n Control Board
- 1. The main control board has pushbuttons with open and close indicating lights for the inside and outside containment isolation valves in the reactor plant gaseous vent system.
- 2. Status windows monitor the inside and outside containment isolation valves, in reactor plant gaseous vent system, closed position.
- 3. Computer inputs are for the inside and outside containment isolation valves, in the reactor plant gaseous vent system, open and closed positions.
ressure control valve, located in the reactor plant gaseous vent system discharge line to the denser air removal system, maintains back pressure in the line. A local pressure indicator is vided in the reactor plant gaseous vent system discharge line.
3.5.2 Reactor Plant Aerated Vent System instrumentation is associated with this system.
3.5.3 Reactor Plant Gaseous Drain System reactor plant gaseous drain system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled, locally or remotely as follows:
n Control Board
- 1. The main control board has pushbuttons with open and close indicating lights for the following valves:
- a. Pressurizer relief tank drains outlet valve
- 2. The main control board has a BLOCK-AUTO pushbutton for the pressurizer relief tank drains outlet valve to override auto control of the valve.
- 3. The main control board has control switches with start and stop indicating lights for the following pumps:
- a. Pressurizer relief tank drains transfer pumps
- b. Primary drains transfer pumps
- c. Containment drains transfer pumps
- 4. Annunciators monitor the following conditions:
- a. Pressurizer relief tank drain valve OVERRIDE
- b. Pressurizer relief tank water level, High-High/High/Low
- c. Gaseous drain system outside containment pressure, High
- d. Containment drains transfer tank water level, High/Low
- e. Containment drains transfer tank water level, High-High
- f. Primary drains transfer tank water level, High/Low
- g. Primary drains transfer tank water level, High-High
- h. Reactor vessel flange leakoff temperature, High
- i. Reactor plant drains to boron recovery system temperature, High
- 5. Indicators monitor the following:
- a. Pressurizer relief tank water level
- b. Gaseous drain system outside containment pressure
- c. Containment drains transfer tank pressure
- d. Containment drains transfer tank water level
- e. Reactor vessel flange leakoff temperature
- 6. Status windows monitor the following:
- a. Gaseous drains inside containment isolation valve, open
- b. Gaseous drains outside containment isolation valve, closed
- 7. The plant computer inputs from this system are:
- a. Pressurizer relief tank water level
- b. Gaseous drain system outside containment pressure
- c. Gaseous drains inside containment isolation valve, open
- d. Gaseous drains inside containment isolation valve, closed
- e. Gaseous drains outside containment isolation valve, open
- f. Gaseous drains outside containment isolation valve, closed
- g. Containment drains transfer tank water level
- h. Primary drains transfer tank water level
- i. Pressurizer relief tank drains transfer pumps total flow
- j. Primary drains transfer pumps total flow
- k. Containment drains transfer pumps total flow
- 8. Local pressure indicators indicate pressure at the following locations:
- a. Containment drains transfer tank inlet
- b. Pressurizer relief tank drains transfer pumps discharge lines
- c. Containment drains transfer pumps discharge line
- d. Primary drains transfer pumps discharge lines 3.5.4 Reactor Plant Aerated Drain System reactor plant aerated drain system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled, locally or remotely as follows:
- 1. The main control board has pushbuttons with open and close indicating lights for the inside and outside containment drains isolation valves
- 2. Annunciators monitor the following conditions:
- a. Radioactive liquid waste system trouble
- b. Safeguards area flooding
- 3. Indicating lights indicate the following:
- a. Pipe tunnel floor water level High
- b. Emergency core cooling system pipe cubicle floor water level High
- c. Residual heat removal cubicle floor water level High
- d. Containment recirculation cubicle floor water level High
- 4. Computer inputs are for the following:
- a. Incore instrument sump pump discharge pressure
- b. Incore instrument room sump pump stopped
- c. Incore instrument room sump pump running
- d. Auxiliary building sump pump running
- e. Auxiliary building sump pump stopped
- f. Containment drains sump pump running
- g. Containment drains sump pump stopped
- h. Engineered safety features building sumps total flow
- i. Inside containment drains isolation valve open
- j. Inside containment drains isolation valve closed
- k. Outside containment drains isolation valve open
- l. Outside containment drains isolation valve closed
- n. Containment drains sump discharge total flow
- o. Residual heat removal cubicle sump pump running
- p. Residual heat removal cubicle sump pump stopped
- q. Containment unidentified leakage sump 2 level
- r. Containment unidentified leakage sump pump running
- s. Containment unidentified leakage sump pump stopped
- t. Turbine building floor drain sump pump running
- u. Turbine building floor drain sump pump stopped
- 5. Status windows monitor the following:
- a. Inside containment drains isolation valve open
- b. Outside containment drains isolation valve closed uid Waste Panel
- 1. The liquid waste panel has control switches and indicating lights for the following pumps:
- a. Core instrument room sump pump
- b. Containment drains sump pumps
- c. Containment unidentified leakage sump pump
- 3. First-out annunciators monitor the following conditions:
- a. Fuel building sump level High-High
- b. Incore instrument sump 1 level high-high
- c. Under drain sumps 1, 2 and 3 level High-High
- f. Containment drains sump 3 level High-High
- g. Turbine plant component cooling drain sumps 11A & B level High-High
- h. Residual heat removal cubicle sumps 6A & 6B level High-High
- i. Pipe tunnel sump 4 level High-High
- j. Containment unidentified leakage trouble
- k. Containment recirculation cubicle sumps 7A & 7B level High-High
- l. Turbine building floor drain sump 1 level High
- m. Waste disposal building sumps 9A & 9B level High-High
- 4. Indicating lights for the following:
Turbine building floor drain discharge valve directional flow to yard drains or radioactive liquid waste system
- 5. Indicators for the following:
- a. Incore instrument room sump pump run timer
- b. Containment drains sump pump run timer
- c. Containment drains sump 3 level
- d. Containment unidentified leakage sump pump run timer
- e. Containment unidentified leakage sump 2 level turbine plant sampling panel has a control switch with indicating lights for start and stop of turbine building floor drain sump pump.
al
- 1. Control switches with indicating lights (start and stop) for the following pumps:
- a. Auxiliary building sump pump
- c. Turbine building floor drain sump pump
- 2. Lead-follow selector switch for the following pumps:
- a. Auxiliary building sump pumps
- 3. Local pressure indicators in the discharge lines of the following pumps:
Under drain sumps pumps iation monitoring of this system is discussed in Section 11.5 4 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM 4.1 Design Bases Chemical and Volume Control System (CHS), shown on Figure 9.3-7, Figure 9.3-7(1)(A),
Figure 9.3-8, is designed to provide the following services to the reactor coolant system S):
- 1. Maintenance of programmed water level in the pressurizer, i.e., maintain required water inventory in the RCS.
- 2. Maintenance of seal-water injection flow to the reactor coolant pumps.
- 3. Control of reactor coolant water chemistry conditions, activity level, soluble chemical neutron absorber concentration and makeup.
- 4. Emergency core cooling (part of the system is shared with the emergency core cooling system).
- 5. Provide means for filling and draining of the RCS.
- 6. Boration and inventory control for safety grade cold shutdown.
- 7. Provide reactor coolant purification capabilities during a cold or refueling shutdown ntitative design bases are given in Table 9.3-4 with qualitative descriptions given below.
4.1.1 Reactivity Control CHS regulates the concentration of chemical neutron absorber (boron) in the reactor coolant ontrol reactivity changes resulting from the change in reactor coolant temperature between
ctor Makeup Control
- 1. The CHS is capable of borating the RCS through several flow paths and from two boric acid sources.
- 2. The amount of boric acid stored in the CHS always exceeds that amount required to borate the RCS to cold shutdown concentration. This amount of boric acid also exceeds the amount required to bring the reactor to hot standby and to compensate for subsequent xenon decay.
In the determination of boration requirements, the initial RCS concentration is based on a minimum expected hot full power or hot zero power condition with peak/maximum xenon. The final RCS cold shutdown concentration accounts for the subsequent xenon decay and assumes that the most reactive control rod is not inserted into the core. This set of conditions requires a minimum usable volume of 28,352 gallons of 6600 ppm borated water from the boric acid tanks (see Table 9.3-4).
The indicated water volume of the boric acid tanks is equivalent to usable plus unusable water volumes. The unusable volume in each boric acid tank is 1,824 gallons and includes instrument inaccuracy, vortexing, level tap location and suction location. Both boric acid tanks are required to attain the required usable volume due to tank volume limitations. Therefore, the combined total indicated volume requirement is 32,000 (28,352 + 1824 + 1824) gallons from both boric acid tanks.
- 3. The CHS is capable of borating the RCS to cold shutdown concentration using only safety grade equipment to provide a continuous flow of boric acid solution.
(See Section 9.3.4.2.6 for description of safety grade cold shutdown.)
on Thermal Regeneration CHS is designed to control the changes in reactor coolant boron concentration to compensate the xenon transients during load follow operations without adding makeup for either boration ilution. This is accomplished by the boron thermal regeneration process which is designed to w load follow operations as required by the design load cycle. This system was installed as a gn feature of the plant. The present operational practice is not to operate the plant in a load owing mode. As a result, the boron thermal regeneration system is installed but not used.
4.1.2 Regulation of Reactor Coolant Inventory CHS maintains the coolant inventory in the RCS within the allowable pressurizer level range all normal modes of operation including startup from cold shutdown, full power operation,
wable RCS leakage). The CHS also functions to provide makeup to the RCS during safety de cold shutdown operations. See Section 9.3.4.2.6 for a detailed discussion of safety grade shutdown.
4.1.3 Reactor Coolant Purification CHS is capable of removing fission and activation products, in ionic form or as particulates, m the reactor coolant in order to provide access to those process lines carrying reactor coolant ng operation and to reduce activity releases due to leaks.
4.1.4 Chemical Additions for Corrosion Control CHS provides a means for adding chemicals to the RCS which control the pH of the coolant ng initial startup and subsequent operation, scavenge oxygen from the coolant during startup, counteract the production of oxygen in the reactor coolant due to radiolysis of water in the region.
CHS is capable of maintaining the oxygen content and pH of the reactor coolant within limits cified in Table 5.2.4.
4.1.5 Seal Water Injection CHS is able to continuously supply filtered water to each reactor coolant pump seal, as uired by the reactor coolant pump design.
4.1.6 Hydrostatic Testing of the Reactor Coolant System mporary hydrotest pump is provided with the high pressure safety injection system to rostatically test the reactor coolant system, when required (Section 6.3).
4.1.7 Emergency Core Cooling centrifugal charging pumps in the CHS also serve as the high-head safety injection pumps in emergency core cooling system. Other than the centrifugal charging pumps and associated ng and valves, the CHS is not required to function during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA),
ept when the reestablishment of charging/letdown flow is required according to the emergency ration instructions. During a LOCA, the CHS is isolated except for the centrifugal charging ps and the piping in the safety injection path.
4.2 System Description CHS is shown on Figure 9.3-7, Figure 9.3-7(1)(A), and Figure 9.3-8 with system design meters listed in Table 9.3-4. The codes and standards to which the individual components of CHS are designed are listed in Section 3.2. The CHS consists of several subsystems: the
4.2.1 Charging, Letdown, and Seal Water System charging and letdown functions of the CHS are employed to maintain a programmed water l in the RCS pressurizer, thus maintaining proper reactor coolant inventory during all phases lant operation. This is achieved by means of continuous feed and bleed process during which feed rate is automatically controlled based on pressurizer water level. The bleed rate can be sen to suit various plant operational requirements by selecting the proper combination of own orifices in the letdown flow path.
uld only safety grade equipment be available, makeup and letdown functions could be vided in the cold shutdown design, described in Section 9.3.4.2.6.
ctor coolant is discharged to the CHS from a reactor coolant loop cold leg; it then flows ugh the shell side of the regenerative heat exchanger where its temperature is reduced by heat sfer to the charging flow passing through the tubes. The coolant then experiences a large sure reduction as it passes through the letdown orifice(s) and flows through the tube side of letdown heat exchanger where its temperature is further reduced. Downstream of the letdown t exchanger, a second pressure reduction occurs. This second pressure reduction is performed he low pressure letdown valve, which maintains upstream pressure, thus preventing flashing nstream of the letdown orifices.
coolant then flows through the letdown filter to one of the mixed bed demineralizers. The may then pass through the cation bed demineralizer which is used intermittently when oval of lithium from the reactor coolant is required for pH control, or to remove cesium.
ing reactor coolant boration and dilution operations, especially during load follow, the own flow leaving the demineralizers may be directed to the boron thermal regeneration em. The coolant then flows through the reactor coolant filter to the degasifier (radioactive eous waste system) and into the volume control tank through a spray nozzle in the top of the
. Hydrogen from the hydrogen system is continuously supplied to the volume control tank. In event the degasifier becomes inoperative, fission gases may be stripped from the reactor lant in the VCT, with the contaminated hydrogen being vented to the radioactive vent system.
partial pressure of hydrogen in the volume control tank determines the concentration of rogen dissolved in the reactor coolant for control of oxygen produced by radiolysis of water in core.
ee centrifugal charging pumps are provided to take suction from the volume control tank and rn the cooled, purified reactor coolant to the RCS. Normal charging flow is handled by one of three charging pumps. This charging flow splits into two paths. The bulk of the charging flow umped back to the RCS through the tube side of the regenerative heat exchanger. The letdown in the shell side of the regenerative heat exchanger raises the charging flow to a temperature roaching the reactor coolant temperature. The flow is then injected into a cold leg of the RCS.
o charging paths are provided from a point downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger. A
ce of the pressurizer during plant cooldown. This provides a means of cooling the pressurizer r the end of plant cooldown, when the reactor coolant pumps, which normally provide the ing head for the pressurizer spray, are not operating. Should only safety grade equipment be ilable, depressurization could be performed by the safety grade cold shutdown design cribed in Section 5.4.7.2.3.5.
ortion of the charging flow is directed to the reactor coolant pumps (nominally 8 gpm per p) through a seal water injection filter. The flow is directed to point above the pump shaft ring. Here the flow splits and a portion (nominally 5 gpm per pump) enters the RCS through labyrinth seals and thermal barrier while cooling the lower bearing.
remainder of the flow is directed upward along the pump shaft to the shaft seal. The CVC seal er return (CBO (controlled bleed off)) flows through the pressure breakdown device (PBD) of h stage, discharges to a common manifold, exists from the containment, and then passes ugh the seal water return filter and the seal water heat exchanger to the suction side of the rging pumps, or by alternate path to the volume control tank. A very small portion of the seal passes through the lower, middle and upper stage seal faces. Any residual flow from the seal s is then discharged to the containment sump.
excess letdown path is provided as an alternate letdown path from the RCS in the event that normal letdown path is inoperable. Reactor coolant can be discharged from a RCS crossover during initial heating or from the reactor vessel head letdown line during power operation. The p drain valves are closed with air removed in modes 1-3 to preclude spurious actuation in the t-LOCA containment environment. Discharge flow is directed through the tube side of the ess letdown heat exchanger where it is cooled by component cooling water. Downstream of heat exchanger, a remote-manual control valve controls the letdown flow. The flow normally s the number 1 seal discharge manifold and passes through the seal water return filter and heat hanger to the suction side of the charging pumps. The excess letdown flow can also be cted to the containment drains transfer tank or directly into the volume control tank via a y nozzle. When the normal letdown line is not available, the normal purification path is also in operation. Therefore, this alternate condition would allow continued power operation for a ted period of time, dependent on RCS chemistry and activity.
ges in RCS inventory due to load changes are accommodated for the most part in the surizer. The volume control tank provides surge capacity for reactor coolant expansion not ommodated by the pressurizer. If the water level in the volume control tank exceeds the mal operating range, a controller modulates a three way valve downstream of the reactor lant filter to divert a portion of the letdown to the boron recovery system via the radioactive eous waste system (GWS). If the high-level limit in the volume control tank is reached, an m is actuated in the control room and the letdown flow is completely diverted to the boron very system via the GWS.
level in the volume control tank initiates makeup from the reactor makeup control system. If reactor makeup control system does not supply sufficient makeup to keep the volume control
nnels causes the suction of the charging pumps to be transferred to the refueling water storage 4.2.2 Reactor Coolant Purification and Chemistry Control System ctor coolant water chemistry specifications are given in Table 5.2-4.
Control pH control chemical employed is lithium hydroxide. This chemical is chosen for its patibility with the materials and water chemistry of borated water/stainless steel/zirconium/
nel systems. In addition, Lithium-7 is produced in the core region due to irradiation of the olved boron in the coolant.
concentration of Lithium-7 in the RCS is maintained in the range specified for pH control ble 5.2-4). If the concentration exceeds this range, as it may during the early stages of a core le, the cation bed demineralizer may be employed in the letdown line in series operation with a ed bed demineralizer. Since the amount of lithium to be removed is small and its buildup can eadily calculated, the flow through the cation bed demineralizer is not required to be full own flow. As an alternative, an H-OH form resin may be used in the mixed bed demineralizer emove lithium. If the concentration of Lithium-7 is below the specified limits, lithium roxide can be introduced into the RCS via the charging flow. The solution is prepared in the ratory and poured into the chemical mixing tank. Reactor makeup water is then used to flush solution to the suction manifold of the charging pumps.
gen Control ing reactor startup from the cold condition, hydrazine is employed as an oxygen scavenging nt. The hydrazine solution is introduced into the RCS in the same manner as described above the pH control agent. Hydrazine is not employed at any time other than startup from the cold tdown state.
solved hydrogen is employed to control and scavenge oxygen produced due to radiolysis of er in the core region. Sufficient partial pressure of hydrogen is maintained in the volume trol tank such that the specified equilibrium concentration of hydrogen is maintained in the tor coolant. A pressure control valve maintains a minimum pressure in the vapor space of the ume control tank. This valve can be adjusted to provide the correct equilibrium hydrogen centration (25 to 50 cc hydrogen at STP per kilogram of water). Hydrogen is supplied from hydrogen system.
ctor Coolant Purification o mixed bed demineralizers are provided in the letdown line to provide cleanup of the letdown
. The demineralizers remove ionic corrosion products and certain fission products. One
um and lithium isotopes from the purification flow. The cation bed demineralizer can also be rged with an anion resin mixture for removal of anion impurities or boron. The second mixed demineralizer serves as a standby unit for use if the operating demineralizer becomes austed during operation, or for removal of lithium if an H-OH form anion resin is used.
urther cleanup feature is provided for use during cold shutdown and residual heat removal. A ote operated valve admits a bypass flow from the residual heat removal system (RHS) into the own line upstream of the letdown heat exchanger. The flow passes through the heat hanger, through a mixed bed demineralizer and the reactor coolant filter to the volume control
. The fluid is then returned to the RCS via the normal charging route.
ers are provided at various locations to ensure filtration of particulate and resin fines and to ect the seals on the reactor coolant pumps.
ion gases are removed from the reactor coolant by continuous degasification of the letdown in radioactive gaseous waste system. The hydrogen is then replaced in the volume control tank.
4.2.3 Reactor Makeup Control System reactor makeup controls consists of a group of instruments, pumps, and valves arranged to vide a manually preset makeup composition to the charging pump suction header or the ume control tank. The makeup control functions are to maintain desired operating fluid ntory in the volume control tank and to adjust reactor coolant boron concentration for tivity and shim control.
boric acid is stored in two boric acid tanks. Two boric acid transfer pumps are provided with pump normally aligned to provide boric acid to the boric acid blender, and the second pump eserve. On a demand signal by the reactor makeup controller, the pump starts and delivers c acid to the boric acid blender. The pump can also be used to recirculate the boric acid tank d.
ing reactor operation, changes are made in the reactor coolant boron concentration for the owing conditions:
- 1. Reactor startup - boron concentration must be decreased from shutdown concentration to achieve criticality.
- 2. Load follow - boron concentration must be either increased or decreased to compensate for the xenon transient following a change in load.
- 3. Fuel burnup - boron concentration must be decreased to compensate for fuel burnup and the buildup of fission products in the fuel.
boron thermal regeneration system is normally used to control boron concentration to pensate for xenon transients during load follow operations. Boron thermal regeneration can be used in conjunction with dilution operations of the reactor makeup control system to uce the amount of effluent to be processed by the boron recovery system.
control switches for the reactor makeup control system are located on the main control board g with the batch integrators and the flow controllers. Two switches are provided: one for F/MANUAL/BORATE/ALTERNATE DILUTE/DILUTE/AUTO MAKEUP and another for OP/START. The second switch activates the makeup system after the desired mode is selected the setpoints established. It can also be used to terminate the makeup operation in any of the modes of operation. The following paragraphs describe the operating modes:
- 1. Manual The manual mode of operation permits the addition of a preselected quantity of boric acid solution at a preselected flow rate to the refueling water storage tank, or through the temporary (flanged) connection to another item of equipment. While in the manual mode of operation, automatic makeup to the reactor coolant system is precluded. The discharge flow path must be aligned by opening manual valves in the desired path.
The manual mode of operation also permits the addition of dilute boric acid solution at a preselected flow rate to the reactor coolant system to maintain a desired operating fluid level in the volume control tank. The dilute boric acid solution is preset to match the boron concentration in the reactor coolant system.
The discharge flowpath must be aligned by manually opening makeup stop valve (FCV-110B).
The operator sets the mode selector switch to Manual, the boric acid and makeup water flow controllers to the desired flow rates, and the boric acid and makeup water batch integrators to the desired quantities and actuates the makeup start switch. Actuating the start switch activates the boric acid flow control valve (FCV-110A) and makeup water flow control valve (FCV-111A) and starts the boric acid transfer pump. When the preset quantities of boric acid and reactor makeup water have been added, the pump stops and boric acid and makeup water flow control valves close. This operation may be stopped manually by actuating the makeup stop switch.
If either batch integrator is satisfied before the other has recorded its required total, the pump and valve associated with the integrator that has been satisfied terminates flow. The flow controlled by the other integrator continues until that integrator is satisfied. The lines are flushed by reactor makeup water, when boric acid is piped through unheated areas of the plant.
The borate mode of operation permits the addition of a preselected quantity of concentrated boric acid solution at a preselected flow rate to the reactor coolant system. The operator sets the mode selector switch to Borate, the concentrated boric acid flow controller setpoint to the desired flow rate, and the concentrated boric acid batch integrator to the desired quantity and actuates the makeup start.
Actuating the start switch opens the makeup stop valve (FCV-110B) to the charging pump suction and the boric acid control valve (FCV-110A) and starts the selected boric acid transfer pump. The concentrated boric acid is added to the charging pump suction header. The total quantity added in most cases is so small that it has only a minor effect on the volume control tank level. When the preset quantity of concentrated boric acid solution has been added, the batch integrator causes the boric acid transfer pump to stop and the concentrated boric acid control valve and the makeup stop valve to close. This operation may be terminated manually at any time by actuating the makeup stop. A deviation in the boric acid flow alarms and terminates the operation after a short time delay.
- 3. Dilute The Dilute mode of operation permits the addition of a preselected quantity of reactor makeup water at a preselected flow rate to the reactor coolant system. The operator sets the mode selector switch to Dilute the reactor makeup water flow controller setpoint to the desired flow rate and the reactor water batch integrator to the desired quantity to actuate the makeup start. The start signal causes the makeup control to open the makeup stop valve (FCV-111B) to the volume control tank inlet and the makeup water flow control valve (FCV-111A). The makeup water is injected through the volume control tank spray nozzle and through the tank to the charging pump suction header. Excessive rise of the volume control tank water level is prevented by automatic actuation of a three-way diversion valve (by the tank level controller), which diverts the reactor coolant letdown flow to the boron recovery system via the radioactive gaseaus waste system. When the preset quantity of reactor makeup water has been added, the batch integrator causes the reactor makeup water control valve to close. This operation may be terminated manually at any time by actuating the makeup stop. A deviation in the reactor makeup water flow alarms and terminates the operation after a time delay.
- 4. Alternate Dilute The alternate dilute mode of operation is the same as the dilute mode, except a portion of the dilute water flows directly to the charging pump suction (FCV-110B) and a portion flows into the volume control tank (FCV-111B) via the spray nozzle and then flows to the charging pump suction. This mode of operation minimizes the delay in having to dilute the volume control tank before the RCS can be diluted.
the dilution to criticality and minimizes the mixing delays associated with the use of the VCT.
- 5. Automatic Makeup The automatic makeup mode of operation of the reactor makeup control provides dilute boric acid solution, preset to match the boron concentration in the reactor coolant system. The automatic makeup compensates for minor leakage of reactor coolant without causing significant changes in the coolant boron concentration. It operates on demand signals from the volume control tank level controller (LICA-112).
Under normal plant operating conditions, the mode selector switch is set in the Automatic Makeup position, and the boric acid and reactor makeup water flow controllers are set to give the same concentration of borated water as contained in the reactor coolant system. The mode selector switch must be in the correct position and the control energized by prior manipulation of the Start switch. A low-level signal from the volume control tank level controller (LICA-112) causes the automatic makeup control action to start a boric acid transfer pump and to open the makeup stop valve (FCV-110B), the boric acid flow control valve (FCV-110A), and the reactor makeup water flow control valve (FCV-111A). The flow controllers automatically set the boric acid and reactor makeup water flows to the preset rates.
Makeup addition to the charging pump suction header causes the water level in the volume control tank to rise. At a preset high-level point, the boric acid transfer pump stops, the reactor makeup water and boric acid flow control valves close, and the makeup stop valve closes. This operation may be terminated manually at any time by actuating the makeup stop.
The quantities of boric acid and reactor makeup water injected are totalized by the batch counters and the flow rates are recorded on strip recorders. Deviation alarms for both boric acid and reactor makeup water are provided if flow rates deviate from setpoints. These deviations also close the makeup stop valves (FCV-110B) after a time delay.
- 6. Makeup Stop By actuating the makeup stop, the operator can terminate the makeup operation in any of the five modes of operation.
- 7. Alarm Functions
- a. Deviation of total makeup flow rates from control setpoint for more than a short time
- b. Deviation of boric acid flow rate from control setpoint for more than a short time 4.2.4 Boron Thermal Regeneration System s system was installed as a design feature of the plant. The present operational practice is not perate the plant in a load following mode. As a result, the boron thermal regeneration system stalled but not used.
wnstream of the mixed bed demineralizers, part of the letdown flow can be diverted to the on thermal regeneration system where it can be treated when boron concentration changes are red for load follow. After processing, the flow is returned to a point upstream of the reactor lant filter.
age and release of boron during load follow operation is determined by the temperature of d entering the thermal regeneration demineralizers. A chiller unit and a group of heat hangers are employed to provide the desired fluid temperatures at the demineralizer inlets for er storage or release operation of the system.
flow path through the boron thermal regeneration system is different for the boron storage the boron release operations. During boron storage, the letdown stream enters the moderating t exchanger and from there it passes through the letdown chiller heat exchanger. These two t exchangers cool the letdown stream prior to its entering the demineralizers. The letdown at heat exchanger is valved out on the tube side and performs no function during boron age operations. The temperature of the letdown stream at the point of entry to the ineralizers is controlled automatically by the temperature control valve which controls the l side flow to the letdown chiller heat exchanger. After passing through the demineralizers, letdown enters the moderating heat exchanger shell side, where it is heated by the incoming own stream before going to the volume control tank.
refore, for boron storage, a decrease in the boric acid concentration in the reactor coolant is omplished by sending the letdown flow at relatively low temperatures to the thermal neration demineralizers. The resin, which was depleted of boron at high temperature during a r boron release operation, is now capable of storing boron from the low temperature letdown am. Reactor coolant with a decreased concentration of boric acid leaves the demineralizers enters the VCT, and is subsequently directed to the RCS via the charging system.
ing the boron release operation, the letdown stream enters the moderating heat exchanger tube
, bypasses the letdown chiller heat exchanger, and passes through the shell side of the letdown eat heat exchanger. The moderating and letdown reheat heat exchangers heat the letdown
rate on the tube side of the letdown reheat heat exchanger. After passing through the ineralizers, the letdown stream enters the shell side of the moderating heat exchanger, passes ugh the tube side of the letdown chiller heat exchanger, and then goes to the volume control
. The temperature of the letdown stream entering the volume control tank is controlled matically by adjusting the shell side flow rate on the letdown chiller heat exchanger. Thus, for on release, an increase in the boric acid concentration in the reactor coolant is accomplished by ding the letdown flow at relatively high temperatures to the thermal regeneration ineralizers. The water flowing through the demineralizers now releases boron which was ed by the resin at low temperature during a previous boron storage operation. The boron ched reactor coolant is returned to the letdown line.
BTR system is designated as non safety-related and is not designed to Seismic Category 1 uirements.
an additional function, a thermal regeneration demineralizer can be used as a deborating ineralizer, which would be used to dilute the RCS down to very low boron concentrations ards the end of a core cycle. To make such a bed effective, the effluent concentration from the must be kept very low, close to zero ppm boron. This low effluent concentration can be ieved by using fresh resin. Use of fresh resin can be coupled with the normal replacement le of the resin; one resin bed being replaced during each core cycle.
4.2.5 Component Description ummary of principal component design parameters is given in Table 9.3-5, and safety sifications and design codes are given in Section 3.2.
CHS piping that handles radioactive liquid is austenitic stainless steel. All piping joints and nections are welded, except where flanged connections are required to facilitate equipment oval for maintenance and hydrostatic testing.
rging Pumps ee centrifugal charging pumps are supplied to inject coolant into the RCS. All parts in contact h the reactor coolant are fabricated of austenitic stainless steel or other material of adequate osion resistance. There is a minimum flow recirculation line to protect the centrifugal rging pumps from a closed discharge valve condition. Alternate minimum flow paths are vided when the charging pump is functioning in its engineered safeguards mode. These are cribed in Section 6.3.
rging flow rate is controlled through a pressurizer level signal by an automatic flow controller ch actuates a modulating valve on the discharge side of the charging pumps. Two charging ps also serve as safety injection pumps in the emergency core cooling system. A description he charging pump function upon receipt of a safety injection signal is given in Section 6.3.2.2.
he two canned motor pumps supplied, one is normally aligned to supply boric acid to the ion header of the charging pumps while the second serves as a standby. Manual or automatic ation of the reactor coolant makeup system will start the one pump to provide normal makeup oric acid solution to the suction header of the charging pumps. Miniflow from this pump s back to the associated boric acid tank and helps maintain thermal equilibrium. The standby p may be placed on recirculation to mix the contents of the boric acid tank. Emergency ation, supplying boric acid solution directly to the suction of the charging pumps, can be omplished by manually starting either or both pumps.
pumps are located in a heated area to prevent crystallization of the boric acid solution. All s in contact with the solution are of austenitic stainless steel.
ller Pumps o centrifugal pumps circulate the water through the chilled water loop in the boron thermal neration system. One pump is normally operated, with the second serving as standby.
enerative Heat Exchanger regenerative heat exchanger is designed to recover heat from the letdown flow by reheating charging flow, which reduces thermal effects on the charging penetrations into the reactor lant loop piping.
letdown stream flows through the shell of the regenerative heat exchanger and the charging am flows through the tubes. The unit is constructed of austenitic stainless steel, and is of all ded construction.
temperatures of both outlet streams from the heat exchanger are monitored with indication n in the control room. A high temperature alarm is actuated on the main control board if the perature of the letdown stream exceeds desired limits.
down Heat Exchanger letdown heat exchanger cools the letdown stream to the operating temperature of the mixed demineralizers. Reactor coolant flows through the tube side of the exchanger while ponent cooling water flows through the shell side. All surfaces in contact with the reactor lant are austenitic stainless steel, and the shell is carbon steel.
low pressure letdown valve, located downstream of the heat exchanger, maintains the sure of the letdown flow upstream of the heat exchanger in a range sufficiently high to vent two phase flow. Pressure indication and high pressure alarm are provided on the main trol board.
vides input to the controller in the component cooling system. The exit temperature of the own stream is thus controlled by regulating the component cooling water flow through the own heat exchanger. Temperature indication is provided on the main control board. If the et temperature from the heat exchanger is excessive, a high temperature alarm is actuated and mperature controlled valve diverts the letdown directly to the volume control tank, bypassing CVCS demineralizers, to protect the resin beds.
outlet temperature from the shell side of the heat exchanger is allowed to vary over an eptable range compatible with the equipment design parameters and required performance of heat exchanger in reducing letdown stream temperature.
ess Letdown Heat Exchanger excess letdown heat exchanger cools reactor coolant excess letdown flow. This flowrate is ivalent to the portion of the nominal seal injection flow which flows into the RCS through the tor coolant pump labyrinth seals.
excess letdown heat exchanger can be employed when normal letdown is inoperable to ntain the reactor in operation. The excess letdown flows through the tube side of the unit and ponent cooling water is circulated through the shell side. All surfaces in contact with reactor lant are austenitic stainless steel and the shell is carbon steel. All tube joints are welded.
mperature detector measures the temperature of the excess letdown flow downstream of the ess letdown heat exchanger. Temperature indication and high temperature alarm are provided he main control board. Equivalent instrumentation is also provided upstream of the heat hanger in the header from the reactor vessel head letdown line.
ressure sensor indicates the pressure of the excess letdown flow downstream of the excess own heat exchanger and excess letdown control valve. Pressure indication is provided on the n control board; it is used in setting the control valve to ensure that this pressure does not eed the allowable backpressure on the RCP seals.
l Water Heat Exchanger seal water heat exchanger is designed to cool fluid from three sources: reactor coolant pump C seal return (CBO), reactor coolant discharged from the excess letdown heat exchanger, and iniflow from a centrifugal charging pump. Reactor coolant flows through the tube side of the t exchanger and component cooling water is circulated through the shell. The design flow rate ugh the tube side is equal to the sum of the nominal excess letdown flow, maximum design tor coolant pump seal leakage, and miniflow from one centrifugal charging pump. The unit is gned to cool the above flow to the temperature normally maintained in the volume control
. All surfaces in contact with reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel and the shell is on steel.
moderating heat exchanger operates as a regenerative heat exchanger between incoming and going streams to and from the thermal regeneration demineralizers.
incoming letdown flow enters the tube side of the moderating heat exchanger. The shell side d, which comes directly from the thermal regeneration demineralizers, enters at low perature during boron storage and high temperature during boron release.
down Chiller Heat Exchanger ing the boron storage operation, the process stream enters the tube side of the letdown chiller t exchanger after leaving the tube side of the moderating heat exchanger. The letdown chiller t exchanger cools the process stream to allow the thermal regeneration demineralizers to ove boron from the coolant. The desired cooling capacity is adjusted by controlling the chilled er flow rate passed through the shell side of the heat exchanger.
letdown chiller heat exchanger is also used during the boron release operation to cool the id leaving the thermal regeneration demineralizers to ensure that its temperature does not eed that of normal letdown to the volume control tank.
down Reheat Heat Exchanger letdown reheat heat exchanger is used only during boron release operations and it is then used eat the process stream. Water used for heating is diverted from the letdown line upstream of letdown heat exchanger, passed through the tube side of the letdown reheat heat exchanger then returned to the letdown stream upstream of the letdown heat exchanger.
ume Control Tank volume control tank (VCT) provides surge capacity for part of the reactor coolant expansion ume not accommodated by the pressurizer. When the level in the tank reaches the high level oint, the remainder of the expansion volume is accommodated by diversion of the letdown am to the boron recovery system via the GWS. The tank also provides the means for oducing hydrogen into the coolant to maintain the required equilibrium concentration of 25 to c hydrogen (at STP) per kilogram of water and is used for degassing the reactor coolant. It serves as a head tank for the charging pumps.
pray nozzle located inside the tank on the letdown line provides liquid to gas contact between incoming fluid and the hydrogen atmosphere in the tank.
rogen (from the hydrogen system is continuously supplied to the volume control tank while a otely operated vent valve, discharging to the radioactive gaseous waste system permits an rnate means of removal of gaseous fission products. These are stripped from the reactor lant and collected in VCT in the event that the degasifier becomes inoperative. Relief ection, gas space sampling, and nitrogen purge connections are also provided. The tank can
ume control tank pressure is monitored with indication given in the control room. Alarm is ated in the control room for high and low pressure conditions. The volume control tank sure is controlled by the VCT vent header isolation valve and VCT vent valve.
o level channels govern the water inventory in the volume control tank. Level indication with a h and low alarm is provided on the main control board for one controller and local level cation with a high and low alarm on the main control board is provided for the other troller.
e volume control tank level rises above the normal operating range, one level channel vides an analog signal to the controller which modulates the three-way valve downstream of reactor coolant degasifier (in the GWS) to maintain the volume control tank level within the mal operating band. The three-way valve can split letdown flow so that a portion goes to the on recovery system via the GWS and a portion to the volume control tank. The controller ld operate in this fashion during the dilution operation when reactor makeup water is being to the volume control tank from the reactor makeup control system.
e modulating function of the channel fails and the volume control tank level continues to rise, high level alarm alerts the operator to the malfunction and the full letdown flow is matically diverted by the backup level channel.
ing normal power operation, a low level in the volume control tank initiates auto makeup ch injects a pre-selected blend of boric acid solution and reactor makeup water into the rging pump suction header. When the volume control tank level is restored to normal, auto eup stops.
e automatic makeup fails or is not aligned for operation and the tank level continues to rease, a low level alarm is actuated. Manual action may correct the situation or, if the level tinues to decrease, a low-low signal from both level channels opens the stop valves in the ply line from RWST to charging pump suction, and closes the stop valves in the volume trol tank outlet line, and actuates an alarm.
ic Acid Tanks boric acid storage system has the capacity to store sufficient boric acid solution for refueling, nough for a cold shutdown from full power operation with the most reactive control rod not rted.
concentration of boric acid solution in storage is maintained between 6600 and 7175 ppm.
contents of the boric acid tanks are sampled after filling, but prior to placing them in service.
refore, measured amounts of boric acid solution can be delivered to the reactor coolant to trol the boron concentration.
o level detectors indicate the level in each boric acid tank. Level indication with a high, low, empty level alarm is provided on the main control board. The high alarm indicates that the may soon overflow. The low alarm warns the operator to start makeup to the tank. The empty l alarm is set to give warning of loss of pump suction.
ching Tank batching tank is used for mixing a makeup supply of boric acid solution for transfer to the c acid tanks.
cal sampling point is provided for verifying the solution concentration prior to transferring it of the tank. The tank is provided with an agitator to improve mixing during batching rations and a steam jacket for heating the boric acid solution.
mical Mixing Tank primary use of the chemical mixing tank is in the preparation of caustic solutions for pH trol and hydrazine solution for oxygen scavenging.
ller Surge Tank chiller surge tank handles the thermal expansion and contraction of the water in the chiller
- p. The surge volume in the tank also acts as a thermal buffer for the chiller. The fluid level in tank is monitored with level indication and high and low level alarms provided on the main trol board.
ed Bed Demineralizers o flushable mixed bed demineralizers assist in maintaining reactor coolant purity. A um-form cation resin and hydroxyl-form anion resin or an H-HO form resin are charged into demineralizers. The anion resin is converted to the borate form in operation. Both types of n remove fission and corrosion products. In particular, the H-OH form resin will remove um. The resin bed is designed to reduce the concentration of ionic isotopes in the purification am, except for cesium, tritium, and molybdenum, by a minimum factor of 10.
h demineralizer has more than sufficient capacity for one core cycle with one percent of the d core thermal power being generated by defective fuel rods. One demineralizer is normally in ice with the other in standby.
mperature sensor monitors the temperature of the letdown flow downstream of the letdown t exchanger and if the letdown temperature exceeds the maximum allowable resin operating perature (approximately 140°F), a three-way valve is automatically actuated to bypass the around the demineralizers. Temperature indication and high alarm are provided on the main
ion Bed Demineralizer ushable demineralizer with cation resin in the hydrogen form or anion resin in the hydroxyl m is located downstream of the mixed bed demineralizer and is used intermittently to control concentration of Li7 which builds up in the coolant from the B10 (n, ) Li7 reaction. The ineralizer also has sufficient capacity to maintain the Cesium-137 concentration in the coolant w 5.0 Ci/cc with 0.29 percent defective fuel. The resin bed is designed to reduce the centration of ionic isotopes, particularly cesium, and molybdenum by a minimum factor of 10.
demineralizer has more than sufficient capacity for one core cycle with one percent of the d core thermal power being generated by defective fuel rods. If desired, the cation resin may eplaced with an anion resin for removal of boron or anion impurities.
rmal Regeneration Demineralizers function of the thermal regeneration demineralizers is to store the total amount of boron that t be removed from the RCS to accomplish the required dilution during a load cycle in order to pensate for xenon buildup resulting from a decreased power level. Furthermore, the ineralizers must be able to release the previously stored boron to accomplish the required ation of the reactor coolant during the load cycle in order to compensate for a decrease in on concentration resulting from an increased power level.
thermally reversible ion storage capacity of the resin applies only to borate ions. The capacity he resin to store other ions is not thermally reversible. Thus, during boration, when borate ions released by the resin, there is no corresponding release of the ionic fission and corrosion ducts stored in the resin.
thermal regeneration demineralizer resin capacity is directly proportional to the solution on concentration and inversely proportional to the temperature. Further, the differences in acity as a function of both boron concentration and temperature are reversible. For the 50°F to
°F temperature cycle, this reversible capacity varies from the beginning of a core cycle to the of core life by a factor of about 2.
demineralizers are of the type that can accept flow in either direction. The flow direction ng boron storage is, therefore, always opposite to that during release. This provides much er response when the beds are switched from storage to release and vice versa, than would be case if the demineralizers could accept flow in only one direction.
perature instrumentation is provided upstream of the thermal regeneration demineralizers to trol the temperature of the process flow. During boron storage operations, it controls the flow ugh the shell side of the letdown chiller heat exchanger to maintain the process flow at 50°F t enters the demineralizers. During boron release operations, it controls the flow through the e side of the letdown reheat heat exchanger to maintain the process flow at 140°F as it enters
additional temperature instrument is provided to protect the demineralizer resins from a high perature condition. On reaching the high temperature setpoint, an alarm is sounded on the n control board and the letdown flow is diverted to the volume control tank from a point tream of the mixed bed demineralizers.
ure of the temperature controls resulting in hot water flow to the demineralizers would result release of boron stored on the resin with a resulting increase in reactor coolant boron centrations and increased margin for shutdown. If the temperature of the resin rises ificantly above 140°F, the number of ion storage sites will gradually decrease, thus reducing capability of the resin to remove boron from the process stream. Degradation of ion removal ability will occur for temperatures of approximately 160°F and above. The extent of the radation and rate at which it occurs depend upon the temperature experienced by the resin and length of time that the resin experiences this elevated temperature.
ure of the temperature control system resulting in cold water flow to the demineralizers would lt in storage of boron on the resin and reduction of the reactor coolant boron concentration.
amount of reduction in reactor coolant boron concentration is limited by the capacity of the n to remove boron from the water (Chapter 15). As the boron concentration is reduced, the trol rods would be driven into the core to maintain power level. If the rods were to reach the tdown limit setpoint, an alarm would be actuated informing the operator that emergency ation of the RCS is necessary in order to maintain capability of shutting the reactor down with trol rods alone.
ctor Coolant Filter reactor coolant filter is located in the letdown line upstream of the degasifier. The filter ects resin fines and particulates from the letdown stream. The nominal flow capacity of the r is greater than the maximum purification flow rate.
o local pressure indicators are provided to show the pressures upstream and downstream of the tor coolant filter and thus provide filter differential pressure.
l Water Injection Filters o seal water injection filters are located in parallel in a common line to the reactor coolant p seals; they collect particulate matter that could be harmful to the seal faces. Each filter is d to accept flow in excess of the normal seal water flow requirements.
ifferential pressure indicator monitors the pressure drop across each seal water injection filter gives local indication with high differential pressure alarm on the main control board.
filter collects particulates from the reactor coolant pump seal water return and from the ess letdown flow. The filter is designed to pass the sum of the excess letdown flow and the imum design leakage from all reactor coolant pumps.
o local pressure indicators are provided to show the pressure upstream and downstream of the r and thus provides differential pressure across the filter.
down Filter letdown filter is placed in the letdown line to prevent particulate from collecting in the mixed demineralizers. This arrangement is intended to increase resin life. The filter is sized to ommodate maximum purification flow rate. It is provided with vent and drain connections.
tream and downstream line pressures are indicated locally, providing differential indication.
ic Acid Filter boric acid filter collects particulates from the boric acid solution being pumped from the c acid tanks by the boric acid transfer pumps. The filter is designed to pass the design flow of boric acid transfer pumps operating simultaneously.
al pressure indicators indicate the pressure upstream and downstream of the boric acid filter thus provide filter differential pressure.
down Orifices ee letdown orifices are provided to reduce the letdown pressure from reactor conditions and to trol the flow of reactor coolant leaving the RCS. The orifices are placed into or out of service emote operation of their respective isolation valves. One orifice is designed for normal own flow with the other two serving as standby. One or both of the standby orifices may be d in parallel with the normally operating orifice for either flow control when the RCS pressure ss than normal or greater letdown flow during maximum purification or heatup. Letdown is administratively controlled to approximately 120 gpm or less by selection of orifices. Each ice consists of an assembly which provides for permanent pressure loss without recovery, and ade of austenitic stainless steel or other adequate corrosion resistant material.
ow monitor provides indication in the control room of the letdown flow rate, and a high alarm ndicate unusually high flow.
w pressure letdown control valve, located downstream of the letdown heat exchanger, trols the pressure upstream of the letdown heat exchanger to prevent flashing of the letdown id. Pressure indication and high pressure alarm are provided on the main control board.
chiller is located in a chilled water loop containing a surge tank, chiller pumps, the letdown ler heat exchanger, piping, valves, and controls.
purpose of the chiller is two fold:
- 1. To cooldown the process stream during storage of boron on the resin.
- 2. To maintain an outlet temperature from the boron thermal regeneration system at or below 115°F during release of boron.
ves ere pressure and temperature conditions permit, diaphragm type valves are used to essentially inate leakage to the atmosphere. All packed valves which are larger than two inches and ch are designated for radioactive services are provided with a stuffing box and lantern leakoff nections. All control (modulating) and three-way valves are either provided with stuffing box leakoff connections or are totally enclosed. Leakage to the atmosphere is essentially zero for e valves. Basic material of construction is stainless steel for all valves which handle oactive liquid or boric acid solutions.
ief valves are provided for lines and components that might be pressurized above design sure by improper operation or component malfunction.
- 1. Charging Line Downstream of Regenerative Heat Exchanger If the charging side of the regenerative heat exchanger is isolated while the hot letdown flow continues at its maximum rate, the volumetric expansion of coolant on the charging side of the heat exchanger is relieved to the RCS through a spring loaded check valve.
- 2. Letdown Line Downstream of Letdown Orifices The pressure relief valve downstream of the letdown orifices protects the low pressure piping and the letdown heat exchanger from overpressure when the low pressure piping is isolated. The capacity of the relief valve is equal to the maximum flow rate through all letdown orifices. The valve set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the letdown heat exchanger tube side.
- 3. Letdown Line Downstream of Low Pressure Letdown Valve The pressure relief downstream of the low pressure letdown valve protects the low pressure piping and equipment from overpressure when this section of the system is isolated. The overpressure may result from leakage through the low pressure letdown valve. The capacity of the relief valve exceeds the maximum flow rate
with the Seal Water Return Line [Charging Pumps Bypass Flow] and Letdown Re-heat Heat Exchanger) to the Volume Control Tank. The common relief header has been designed and analyzed to demonstrate that adequate system relief capacity is provided in accordance with NC-7512.
- 4. Volume Control Tank The relief valve on the volume control tank permits the tank to be designed for a lower pressure than the upstream equipment. This valve has a capacity greater than the summation of the following items: maximum letdown, normal seal water return, excess letdown and nominal flow from one reactor makeup water pump.
The valve set pressure equals the design pressure of the volume control tank.
- 5. Charging Pump Suction A relief valve on the charging pump suction header and a relief valve on each charging pump suction line relieve pressure that may build up if the suction line isolation valves are closed or if the system is over pressurized. The valves set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the associated piping and equipment.
- 6. Seal Water Return Line (Inside Containment)
This relief valve is designed to relieve overpressurization in the seal water return piping inside the containment if the motor-operated isolation valve is closed. The valve is designed to relieve the total CVC seal return (CBO) flow from the seal of the reactor coolant pumps plus the design excess letdown flow. The valve is set to relieve at the design pressure of the piping.
- 7. Seal Water Return Line (Charging Pumps Bypass Flow)
This relief valve protects the seal water heat exchanger and its associated piping from overpressurization. If either of the isolation valves for the heat exchanger are closed and if the bypass line is closed, the piping would be over pressurized by the miniflow from the centrifugal charging pumps. The valve is sized to handle the miniflow from the centrifugal charging pumps. The valve is set to relieve at the design pressure of the heat exchanger. The valve discharges to a common relief header (shared with the Letdown Line Downstream of the Low Pressure Letdown Valve and the Letdown Re-heat Heat Exchanger) to the Volume Control Tank. The common relief header has been designed and analyzed to demonstrate that adequate system relief capacity is provided in accordance with NC-7512.
- 8. Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger
side, overpressurization could occur. The valve is set to relieve at the design pressure of the heat exchanger shell side. The valve discharges to a common relief header (shared with the Seal Water Return Line [Charging Pumps Bypass Flow]
and the Letdown Line Downstream of the Low Pressure Letdown Valve) to the Volume Control Tank. The common relief header has been designed and analyzed to demonstrate that adequate system relief capacity is provided in accordance with NC-7512.
- 9. Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger The relief valve is located on the piping leading from the shell side of the heat exchanger. If the shell side were isolated while flow was maintained in the tube side, overpressurization could occur. The valve is set to relieve at the design pressure of the heat exchanger shell side.
- 10. Steam Line to Batching Tank The relief valve on the steam line to the batching tank protects the low pressure piping and batching tank heating jacket from overpressure when the condensate return line is isolated. The capacity of the relief valve equals the maximum expected steam inlet flow. The set pressure equals the design pressure of the heating jacket.
- 11. Charging Pump Discharge The alternate miniflow upstream isolation valves (8511A, 8511B) are normally closed, isolating the alternate miniflow lines from the charging pumps discharge.
On an SIS signal, these isolation valves open, allowing the discharge of the pumps to be protected from overpressurization when the normal miniflow recirculation lines are isolated. The alternate minimum flow lines discharge to the RWST.
ng CHS piping that handles radioactive liquid is austenitic stainless steel. All piping joints and nections are welded, except where flanged connections are required to facilitate equipment oval for maintenance and hydrostatic testing.
4.2.6 System Operation nt Startup nt startup is defined as the operations which bring the plant from cold shutdown to normal ration temperature and pressure.
- 1. Normal residual heat removal is in progress.
- 3. Reactor makeup control system is set to provide makeup at the cold shutdown concentration.
- 4. RCS is either water solid or drained to minimum level for the purpose of refueling or maintenance. If the RCS is water solid, system pressure is maintained by operation of a charging pump and controlled by the low pressure letdown valve in the letdown line (letdown is achieved via the residual heat removal system).
- 5. The charging and letdown lines of the CHS are filled with coolant at the cold shutdown boron concentration. The letdown orifice isolation valves are closed.
e RCS requires filling and venting, the procedure is as follows:
- 1. One charging pump is started, which provides blended flow from the reactor makeup control system at the cold shutdown boron concentration.
- 2. The vents on the head of the reactor vessel and pressurizer are opened.
- 3. The RCS is filled and the vents closed.
rpressure protection is provided by the relief valves in the RHR system. The letdown orifice ation valves, which are normally open during cold shutdown, provide additional overpressure ection.
system pressure is raised by using the charging pump and controlled by the low pressure own valve. When the system pressure is adequate for operation of the reactor coolant pumps, water flow to the pumps is established and the pumps are operated and vented sequentially l all gases are cleared from the system. Final venting takes place at the pressurizer.
en it is desired to form a pressurizer bubble, after the filling and venting operations are pleted, charging and low pressure letdown flows are established. The pressurizer heaters are energized. Steam bubble formation in the pressurizer is accomplished by increasing the own flow above the charging flow. When the pressurizer water level reaches the no-load grammed setpoint, the pressurizer level control is shifted to control the charging flow to ntain programmed level. The RHS is then isolated from the RCS and the normal letdown path stablished. The pressurizer heaters are now used to increase the RCS pressure.
reactor coolant boron concentration is now reduced either by operating the reactor makeup trol system in the Dilute mode or by operating the boron thermal regeneration system in the on storage mode, and when the resin beds are saturated, washing off the beds to the boron
al criticality following refueling. Nuclear heatup may then proceed with corresponding ual adjustment of the reactor coolant boron concentration to balance the temperature fficient effects and maintain the control rods within their operating range. During heatup, the ropriate combination of letdown orifices is used to provide necessary letdown flow.
r to or during the heating process, the CHS is employed to obtain the correct chemical perties in the RCS. Chemicals are added through the chemical mixing tank as required to trol reactor coolant chemistry, such as pH and dissolved oxygen content. Hydrogen rpressure is established in the volume control tank to assure the appropriate hydrogen centration in the reactor coolant.
er Generation and Hot Standby Operation e Load constant power level, the rates of charging and letdown are dictated by the requirements for water to the reactor coolant pump and the normal purification of the RCS. One charging p is employed and charging flow is controlled automatically from pressurizer level. The only stments in boron concentration necessary are those to compensate for core burnup. These stments are made at infrequent intervals to maintain the control groups within their allowable ts. Rapid variations in power demand are accommodated automatically by control rod vement when in automatic rod control. If variations in power level occur, and the new power l is sustained for long periods, some adjustment in boron concentration may be necessary to ntain the control groups within their maneuvering band.
ing normal operation, normal letdown flow is maintained and one mixed bed demineralizer is ervice. Reactor coolant samples are taken periodically to check boron concentration, water lity, pH and activity level. The charging flow to the RCS is controlled automatically by the surizer level control signal through the discharge header flow control valve.
d Follow ower reduction will initially cause a xenon buildup followed by xenon decay to a new, lower ilibrium value. The reverse occurs if the power level increases; initially, the xenon level reases then it increases to a new and higher equilibrium value associated with the amount of power level change.
boron thermal regeneration system is normally used to vary the reactor coolant boron centration to compensate for xenon transients occurring when reactor power level is changed.
reactor makeup control system may also be used to vary the boron concentration in the tor coolant.
most important intelligence available to the plant operator, enabling him to determine ther dilution or boration of the RCS is necessary, is the position of the control rods. For
ition, the operator must dilute the reactor coolant to bring the rods inward.
ing periods of plant loading, the reactor coolant expands as its temperature rises. The surizer absorbs this expansion as the level controller raises the level setpoint to the increased l associated with the new power level. The excess coolant due to RCS expansion is letdown stored in the volume control tank. During this period, the flow through the letdown orifice ains constant and the charging flow is reduced by the pressurizer level control signal, resulting n increased temperature at the regenerative heat exchanger outlet. The temperature controller nstream from the letdown heat exchanger increases the component cooling water flow to ntain the desired letdown temperature.
ing periods of plant unloading, the charging flow is increased to make up for the coolant traction not accommodated by the programmed reduction in pressurizer level.
Standby quired, for periods of maintenance, or following spurious reactor trips, the reactor can be held critical, but with the capability to return to full power within the period of time it takes to hdraw control rods. During this hot standby period, temperature is maintained at no-load T by ally dumping steam to remove core residual heat, or at later stages, by running reactor coolant ps to maintain system temperature.
owing shutdown, xenon buildup occurs and increases the degree of shutdown margin.
ediately following shutdown from equilibrium full power operation, the core is maintained critical to the shutdown margin required by the Technical Specifications by the equilibrium on present in the fuel and by the insertion of the control rods (with the exception of the most tive control rod). The effect of xenon buildup is to increase the shutdown margin by roximately 1.5 to 2 percent k/k at about 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> following shutdown from equilibrium full er conditions. If hot standby is maintained past this point, xenon decay results in a decrease in degree of shutdown margin to the initial equilibrium value at about 20 to 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> after tdown from equilibrium full power conditions. For periods beyond 20 to 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> after tdown from equilibrium full power conditions, subsequent decay of xenon may result in a uction of shutdown margin below the value required in the Technical Specifications, and may se an eventual return to criticality unless boration is used to counteract the xenon decay and ntain the minimum shutdown margin.
rapid recovery is required, dilution of the system may be performed to counteract this xenon dup. However, after the xenon concentration reaches a peak, boration must be performed to ntain the reactor subcritical as the xenon decays out.
nt shutdown is the operation which takes the plant from hot standby to cold shutdown ditions. The reactor is subcritical by 3 percent k/k or greater (depending on critical boron centration), and Tavg 200°F.
mal Cold Shutdown ore initiating a cold shutdown, the RCS hydrogen concentration is lowered by reducing the T overpressure, by replacing the VCT hydrogen atmosphere with nitrogen, and by continuous ging to the GWS.
ore cooldown and depressurization of the plant is initiated, the reactor coolant boron centration is increased to the cold shutdown value. After the boration is completed and reactor lant samples verify that the concentration is correct, the operator resets the RMCS for leakage sets the system concentration makeup at the shutdown reactor coolant boron concentration.
traction of the coolant during cooldown of the RCS results in actuation of the pressurizer l control to maintain normal pressurizer water level. The charging flow is increased, relative etdown flow, and results in a decreasing VCT level. The VCT level controller automatically ates makeup to maintain the inventory. Depressurization is performed by cooling the vapor ce of the pressurizer with spray flow from an RCS loop with an operating RCP.
er the RHRS is placed in service and the RCPs are shut down, further cooling of the surizer liquid is accomplished by charging through the auxiliary spray line from the outlet of CHS regenerative heat exchanger. Coincident with plant cooldown, a portion of the reactor lant flow is diverted from the RHS to the CHS for cleanup. Demineralization of ionic oactive impurities and stripping of fission gases reduce the reactor coolant activity level iciently to permit personnel access for refueling or maintenance operations.
ety Grade Cold Shutdown expected that the CHS would perform normally during shutdown under safety grade ditions. Special design features are employed to ensure that the CHS functions relied upon for shutdown are always available. Should other portions of the CHS not be operable, the rator would follow contingent procedures to use the safety grade backup systems of the cold tdown design (described in Section 5.4.7).
ing the first phase of safety grade cold shutdown, the CHS is used to borate the RCS to the uired cold shutdown margin while the plant is maintained at hot standby (i.e., the RCS is ated prior to cooldown). Borated water is injected from the boric acid tanks to the suction of charging pumps via the safety-grade gravity drain lines. Control of the boration rate is omplished with one of two CHS throttling valves (CHS*HCV190A or CHS*HCV190B). Each e is powered by a separate power train to ensure the boration control function can be ormed with a single failure. Valve CHS*HCV190A can be used to control boration rate ugh the charging bypass line while CHS*HCV190B can be used to control boration rate
ce boration to the cold shutdown margin is accomplished prior to cooldown, no credit can be n for coolant shrinkage. In order to maintain the RCS inventory constant during the boration se, the mass flow rate injected by charging must equal the mass flow rate removed by letdown.
ce it is assumed that the CHS letdown line is not available under safety grade conditions, the ition to the RCS inventory is accommodated by letdown using the reactor vessel head vent em. Safety-grade letdown flow via the reactor vessel head vent system terminates at the surizer relief tank.
he RCS cools, additional borated water must be injected from either the boric acid tanks or the eling water storage tank to make up for coolant shrinkage; however, no letdown is required.
r the end of this phase of cooldown, the RCS is depressurized by cooling the pressurizer.
ce it is assumed that neither the RCPS nor the CHS auxiliary spray path are available under ty grade conditions, this function is performed by the safety-grade pressurizer power-operated ef valves.
ore detailed description of safety grade cold shutdown is provided in Section 5.4.7.
4.3 Safety Evaluation classification of structures, components, and systems is presented in Section 3.2. A further ussion on seismic design categories is given in Section 3.7. Conformance with NRC General eria for the plant systems, components, and structures important to safety is presented in tion 3.1. Also, Section 1.8 provides a discussion on applicable Regulatory Guides.
4.3.1 Reactivity and Inventory Control mal Plant Operation and Safe Shutdown CHS is used to control the soluble neutron absorber and maintain proper inventory in the S. Redundant pumps, valves, flow paths, and sources of boron are provided to optimize this ormance under normal conditions.
time the plant is at power, the quantity of boric acid retained in the boric acid tanks and ready injection always exceeds that quantity required for normal cold shutdown, assuming that the trol assembly of greatest worth is in its fully withdrawn position. This quantity always exceeds quantity of boric acid required to bring the reactor to hot standby and to compensate for sequent xenon decay. An adequate quantity of boric acid is also available in the refueling er storage tank to achieve cold shutdown.
undant paths are provided between the boric acid tanks and the two boric acid transfer pumps, er of which can supply boric acid to the suction of any of the three centrifugal charging ps. As a backup to the normal boric acid supply, the operator can align the RWST outlet to the ion of the charging pumps.
injection.
tain initiating HELB events, postulated to occur in the operating CHS pump discharge piping, n combined with a single active failure of the standby CHS pump to start, may lead to a loss ll charging. In addition, all charging may be lost as a result of certain postulated fire ditions (See FSAR Section 9.5.1 and the FPER for SIH system performance requirements).
these conditions, the SIH pumps will provide the required RCS inventory and boration flow to ieve safe shutdown.
en the reactor is subcritical (i.e., during hot standby cold shutdown, refueling and approach to cality), the neutron source multiplication is continuously monitored and indicated. Any reciable increase in the neutron source multiplication, including that caused by the maximum sical boron dilution rate, would be slow enough to give ample time to start a corrective action revent the core from becoming critical. (The boron dilution accident is discussed in tion 15.4.)
rate of boration, with a single boric acid transfer pump operating, is sufficient to take the tor from full power operation to 1 percent shutdown in the hot condition, with no rods rted in less than 90 minutes. In less than 90 additional minutes, enough boric acid can be cted to compensate for xenon decay, although xenon decay below the equilibrium operating l does not begin until approximately 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> after shutdown. Additional boric acid is loyed if it is desired to bring the reactor to cold shutdown conditions.
ctor coolant pump seal injection can be used to supply borated water to the RCS at a rate of roximately 5 gal/min per pump. Using boric acid solution at the charging rate of 20 gal/min (5 min per RCP), approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> are required to add enough boric acid solution to nteract xenon decay, although xenon decay below the full power equilibrium operating level not begin until approximately 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> after the reactor is shut down.
CVCS is capable of making up for a small RCS fluid leak of approximately 130 gpm using centrifugal pump and still maintaining seal injection flow to the RCPs. The maximum break for which the normal makeup system can maintain the pressurizer level is obtained by paring the calculated flow from the RCS through the postulated break against the charging p makeup flow at normal RCS pressure (2,250 psia). A makeup flow rate from one charging p is adequate to sustain pressurizer pressure at 2,250 psia for a break through a 0.375 inch meter hole. This break results in a loss of approximately 17.5 lb/sec. This also allows for imum RCS cooldown contraction and is accomplished with the letdown isolated.
ety Grade Cold Shutdown Operations tions of the CHS are also relied upon to perform in conjunction with other systems in the cold tdown design to control the reactivity and inventory of the RCS.
hest reactivity worth is stuck in its fully withdrawn position.
vity drain lines are provided from the boric acid tanks to the charging pump suction header.
makeup for primary shrinkage due to RCS cooldown, borated water from the RWST can be vided to any of the three charging pumps via the suction lines provided for safety injection.
uld the normal charging path not be available for boration or makeup, redundant safety grade s with necessary throttling capability are provided by the charging bypass flowpath and CS high head safety injection headers. Under safety grade conditions, the CHS is capable of ating the RCS to a cold shutdown concentration at a rate that is compatible with the objectives he cold shutdown design, described in Section 5.4.7.2.3.5 (Safety grade letdown to ommodate boration is also discussed in Section 5.4.15.2.)
tain initiating HELB events, postulated to occur in the operating CHS pump discharge piping, n combined with a single active failure of the standby CHS pump to start, may lead to a loss ll charging. In addition, all charging may be lost as a result of certain postulated fire ditions (See FSAR Section 9.5.1 and the FPER for SIH system performance requirements).
these conditions, the SIH pumps will provide the required RCS inventory and boration flow to ieve safe shutdown.
ce inoperability of a single component does not impair ability to meet boration and makeup uirements, plant operating procedures allow components to be temporarily out of service for irs. However, with an inoperable component, the ability to tolerate additional component ure is limited. Therefore, when the RCS is in Modes 1, 2, or 3, operating procedures require ediate action to effect repairs of an inoperable component, restrict permissible repair time, demonstrate the operability of the redundant component. Also available are appropriate rating procedures for the use of the CHS in conjunction with other systems in the cold tdown design.
4.3.2 Reactor Coolant Purification CHS is capable of reducing the concentration of ionic isotopes in the purification stream as uired in the design basis. This is accomplished by passing the letdown flow through one of the ed bed demineralizers which removes ionic isotopes, except those of cesium, molybdenum, yttrium, with a minimum decontamination factor of 10. Through occasional use of the cation demineralizer, the concentration of cesium can be maintained below 1.0 ci/cc, assuming one ent of the rated core thermal power is being produced by fuel with defective cladding. The on bed demineralizer is capable of passing the maximum purification letdown flow, though y a portion of this capacity is normally utilized. Each mixed bed demineralizer is capable of cessing the maximum purification letdown flow rate. If the normally operating mixed bed ineralizers resin has become exhausted, the second demineralizer can be placed in service.
h demineralizer is designed, however, to operate for one core cycle with one percent defective
own heat exchanger. The flow passes through the heat exchanger and then passes through one he mixed bed demineralizers and the reactor coolant filter to the volume control tank. The d is then returned to the RCS via the normal charging route.
maximum temperature that will be allowed for the mixed bed and cation bed demineralizers pproximately 140°F. If the temperature of the letdown stream approaches this level, the flow be automatically diverted so as to bypass the demineralizers. If the letdown is not diverted, only consequence would be a decrease in ion removal capability. Ion removal capability starts ecrease when the temperature of the resin goes above approximately 140°F. The resins do not their exchange capability immediately. Ion exchange still takes place (at a faster rate) when perature is increased. However, with increasing temperature, the resin loses some of its ion hange sites along with the ions that are held at the lost sites. The ions lost from the sites may eexchanged farther down the bed. The number of sites lost is a function of the temperature hed in the bed and of the time the bed remains at the high temperature. Some capability for exchange is retained as long as there are some ion exchange sites available.
re would be no safety problem associated with overheating of the demineralizer resins. The y effect on reactor operating conditions would be the possibility of an increase in the reactor lant activity level. If the activity level in the reactor coolant were to exceed the limit given in Technical Specifications, reactor operation would be restricted as required by the Technical cifications.
4.3.3 Seal Water Injection w to the reactor coolant pump seals can be provided by three charging pumps, any one of ch is capable of supplying the normal charging line flow plus the nominal seal water flow.
4.3.4 Hydrostatic Testing of the Reactor Coolant System rotesting is achieved through the use of a hydrotest pump in the high-pressure safety injection em (Section 6.3).
4.3.5 Leakage Provisions S components, valves, and piping which see radioactive service are designed to limit leakage he atmosphere. The following are preventive means which are provided to limit radioactive age to the environment.
- 1. Where pressure and temperature conditions permit, diaphragm type valves are used to essentially eliminate leakage to the atmosphere.
- 2. All packed valves which are larger than 2 inches and which are designated for radioactive service are provided with a stuffing box and leakoff connections.
- 4. Welding of all piping joints and connections, except where flanged connections are provided to facilitate maintenance and hydrostatic testing.
volume control tank provides an inferential measurement of leakage from the CHS as well as RCS. The amount of leakage can be inferred from the amount of makeup added by the reactor eup control system.
ing normal operation, the hydrogen and fission gases in the letdown stream (degasifier) are tinuously purged to the radioactive gaseous waste system to limit the release of radioactive es through leakage by maintaining the radioactive gas level in the reactor coolant several times er than the equilibrium level. Also provided are two mixed bed demineralizers which maintain tor coolant purity, thus reducing the radioactivity level of the RCS water.
4.3.6 Ability to Meet the Safeguards Function ailure analysis of the portion of the CHS which is safety related (used as part of the emergency cooling system) is included as part of the emergency core cooling system failure analysis ented in Tables 6.3.5 and 6.3.6.
4.3.7 Heat Tracing t tracing requirements for boric acid solutions depend mainly on the solution concentration.
this plant, the concentration of boric acid ranges from 10 ppm to 7175 ppm. Electrical heat ing is not required on any CHS component which contains 7175 ppm (4.1 weight percent) c acid, providing these components are located in a room maintained at 59°F or higher.
perature alarms, one for the boric acid tank room and one for the boric acid storage tank, are vided to assure room temperature does not go below 67°F.
4.3.8 Abnormal Operation CHS is capable of making up for a small RCS leak of approximately 130 gpm using one trifugal charging pump and still maintaining seal injection flow to the reactor coolant pumps.
s also allows for a minimum RCS cooldown contraction. This is accomplished with the own isolated.
4.3.9 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis tions of the CHS are relied upon for safe shutdown and accident mitigation. The failure mode effects analysis (FMEA), summarized in Table 9.3-6, demonstrates that single component ures do not compromise the CHS safe shutdown functions of boration and makeup. The EA also shows that single failures occurring during CHS operation do not compromise the ity to prevent or mitigate accidents. These capabilities are accomplished by a combination of
tions of the CHS are also relied upon to provide safety grade boration and makeup. The ability of the CHS to perform in conjunction with other systems of the cold shutdown design is ented in the Section 5.4.7.
4.4 Testing Requirements and Inspection part of plant operation periodic tests, surveillance inspections, and instrument calibrations are e to monitor equipment condition and performance. Most components are in use regularly; efore, assurance of the availability and performance of the systems and equipment is provided ontrol room and/or local indication.
hnical Specifications (Chapter 16) have been established concerning calibration, checking, sampling of the CHS.
er to Chapter 14 for further information pertaining to preoperational testing.
4.5 Instrumentation Requirements cess control instrumentation is provided to acquire data concerning key parameters about the S. The location of the instrumentation is shown on Figure 9.3-7, Figure 9.3-7(1)(A), and ure 9.3-8.
instrumentation furnishes input signals for monitoring and/or alarming purposes. Indication
/or alarms are provided for the following parameters:
- 1. Temperature
- 2. Pressure
- 3. Flow
- 4. Water level instrumentation also supplies input signals for control purposes. Some specific control ctions are:
- 1. Letdown flow is diverted to the volume control tank upon high temperature indication upstream of the mixed bed demineralizers.
- 2. Pressure upstream of the letdown heat exchanger is controlled to prevent flashing of the letdown liquid.
- 3. Charging flow rate is controlled during charging pump operation.
- 5. Temperature of the boric acid solution in the batching tank is maintained.
- 6. Reactor makeup is controlled.
- 7. Temperature of letdown flow to the boron thermal regeneration system is controlled.
- 8. Temperature of the chilled water flow to the letdown chiller heat exchanger is controlled.
- 9. Temperature of letdown flow return from the boron thermal regeneration demineralizers is controlled.
5 BORON RECOVERY SYSTEM boron recovery system is capable of processing reactor coolant to recover primary grade er and boric acid for reuse or disposal (Figure 9.3-9). The liquid entering the boron recovery em is produced by the feed and bleed operations necessary to maintain the boron centration in the reactor coolant at the desired level. This liquid is reactor coolant letdown m the chemical and volume control system (CHS) (Section 9.3.4) through the radioactive eous waste system (GWS) (Section 11.3). The liquid has been processed through a mixed bed ineralizer and degasifier.
5.1 Design Bases design bases for the boron recovery system are:
- 1. The system will process the letdown liquid generated by normal unit operations, under either base loaded or load following conditions.
- 2. The system will handle, by means of sufficient tankage, one cold shutdown-startup sequence at any time prior to the fuel cycle being approximately 95 percent complete with no boron evaporator availability.
- 3. The system will handle a back-to-back cold shutdown-startup sequence until the time the reactor is first control limited in its ability to follow the programmed weekly load schedule with limited boron evaporator availability (65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> during back-to-back sequence).
- 4. The system will accommodate a programmed weekly unit load schedule consisting of 52 hours6.018519e-4 days <br />0.0144 hours <br />8.597884e-5 weeks <br />1.9786e-5 months <br /> at a weekend power level of 30 percent power, followed by an increase to full power in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and then 4 days of power operation - each day consisting of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> at full power, a decrease to 50 percent power in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, remaining there for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and then returning to full power in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The 4 days are
- 5. The system will have an evaporator availability of 90 percent for any 30-day period during normal operation.
- 6. The system is capable of producing distillate from the boron evaporator with approximately 5 ppm boron and to include provision by means of the boron demineralizers (mixed bed ion exchange units) to reduce the boron concentration even further below 5 ppm if desired.
- 7. The system is capable of producing an effluent from the boron recovery system to the radioactive liquid waste system (LWS) discharge with an activity, excluding tritium, of less than the values given in the LWS (Section 11.2). This liquid is discharged as required to maintain a water balance within the unit and to control the tritium concentration in the reactor coolant. Tables 11.2-11 and 11.2-14 list the expected and design radionuclide concentrations in the effluent from the boron recovery system.
- 8. The system will produce, from the boron evaporator bottoms, boric acid solutions of either 4 percent by weight for reuse in the reactor plant, or 12 percent by weight boric acid for processing in the radioactive solid waste system (WSS). The radionuclide concentration in the boron evaporator bottoms for the maximum expected case is discussed in Chapter 11.
- 9. This system is not safety related, and is designated nonnuclear safety (NNS) and nonseismic.
5.2 System Description boron recovery system is shown on Figure 9.3-9. Characteristics of the components of the on recovery system are shown in Table 9.3-7.
plant operates primarily as a base loaded unit. It was originally designed to possess sufficient rating flexibility to follow the weekly load schedule of a load following unit. This flexibility obtained through the combined use of the boron thermal regeneration subsystem (BTRS) of CHS (Section 9.3.4) and the boron recovery system.
sage through the cesium removal ion exchangers, storage, evaporation, and demineralization stitutes the processing that the reactor coolant letdown can receive in the boron recovery em before discharge to the radioactive liquid waste system (Section 11.2). If the boron very system distillate is to be recycled to the primary grade water system (Section 9.2.8) or itional processing is required, additional demineralization and filtration may be performed.
bottoms from the boron evaporator are filtered and are capable of being sent either to the S for reuse or to the waste bottoms holding tank in the radioactive liquid waste system and
ctor coolant, which previously passed through the mixed bed demineralizer in the CHS and stripped of gases in the GWS (Section 11.3), is pumped through a cesium removal ion hanger and a boron recovery filter. The two cesium removal ion exchangers provide an eptable decontamination factor for removal of radio isotopes. The two cesium removal ion hangers can be operated in series if required. From the cesium removal ion exchanger(s), the lant is filtered by one of two boron recovery filters before passage to the boron recovery tanks.
letdown is then stored in one of the two boron recovery tanks where it awaits further cessing by the boron evaporator. The boron recovery tanks (150,000 gallons each) are sized hat, in conjunction with the boron evaporator (25 gpm), the boron recovery system provides capability for meeting a wide range of unit operating conditions. The boron recovery tanks are ted in a reinforced concrete diked area and covered with a metal siding enclosure. The boron very tanks are protected from freezing by external forced-circulation heating circuits, using tric boron recovery tank heaters and boron recovery tank heating pumps located adjacent to tanks.
liquid in the boron recovery tanks is pumped to the boron evaporator by one of two boron porator feed pumps. Either pump is able to supply the boron evaporator with feed in addition upplying liquid, if necessary, to the high level waste drain tanks of the radioactive liquid waste em for processing and disposal.
boron evaporator is constructed with an external reboiler, a vapor-liquid separator, and a tray ion to reduce any liquid carryover to insignificant amounts and to maintain the boron content he distillate at less than 5 ppm. For the specific design of the boron evaporator to be used in unit, a decontamination factor for nonvolatiles of greater than 103 is calculated at a oms-to-feed concentration ratio greater than 1,000 (i.e., the worst condition for removal of onuclides). Operation of the boron evaporator is automatic, based on selector control from the on recovery panel in the auxiliary building. Manual bypass piping and controls are provided.
id drainage of the boron evaporator is provided by transferring the evaporator bottoms to the on recovery tanks. Pump or reboiler maintenance may require emptying of the boron porator.
boron evaporator distillate is collected in the boron distillate tank from which it is tinuously removed on level control by the boron distillate pump, cooled in the boron distillate ler, and discharged to one of the two boron test tanks. A small side stream from the boron illate pump is utilized for reflux in the fractionating column of the boron evaporator.
condensible gases (primarily resulting from absorption of nitrogen, xenon, and oxygen and m decay of iodine) which are removed from the liquid phase in the boron evaporator are harged from the boron evaporator condenser and the boron distillate tank to the reactor plant ted vents system (Section 9.3.3). The vent system combines these gases with the discharge m other vents and directs them to the radioactive gaseous waste system (Section 11.3).
other tank. The contents of the filled tank are mixed (by circulating the contents with a boron tank pump), sampled, and discharged (Section 11.2.2.3) to the environment via the discharge
. These discharges occur when necessary to maintain a water balance within the unit or to trol the tritium concentration within the reactor coolant system. However, the discharge vity, excluding tritium, from the boron recovery system to the discharge line is designed to not eed the values given in the radioactive liquid waste system (Section 11.2).
boron test tank liquid can also be sampled and if the boron content is suitable, pumped to a ary grade water storage tank (Section 9.2.8). Should the boron test tank contents require her reduction of the boron concentration, the contents are processed through the boron ineralizers, either one demineralizer or both in series, and filtered by the boron demineralizer r prior to storage in the primary grade water storage tanks. If a decision to further reduce the on concentration in the distillate is made after the primary grade water is transferred to the ary grade storage tanks, the contents of the primary grade storage tanks are circulated ugh the boron demineralizers and boron demineralizer filter.
on test tank contents can also be pumped to the high level waste drain tanks (Section 11.2.2.1) processing in the radioactive liquid waste system.
ontamination factors and retention times assumed for the analysis of the radionuclides in the on distillate effluents are given in Table 9.3-8.
en the concentration of the boric acid in the boron evaporator bottoms is at the desired value of ut 4 percent by weight, the reclaimed boric acid is pumped batch-wise through the boron porator bottoms cooler and the boron evaporator bottoms filters to the boric acid tanks in the S. The boron evaporator cooler reduces the bottoms temperature to about 170°F.
en packaging of the boron evaporator bottoms is desired for off site shipment, the boric acid centration in the bottoms is increased to about 12 percent by weight. The bottoms are then ped to the radioactive solid waste system for immobilization in a shipping container. The vities described in Section 11.4 are based on the relevant assumptions given in Table 9.3-8 an average residence time of 1 week for the evaporator bottoms in the boron evaporator.
piping in the boron recovery system containing liquids with greater than 4.1 percent by weight oric acid is electrically heat traced to prevent precipitation of boric acid.
control of each process in the boron recovery system is automatic once the system setpoints e been established by preoperational tests prior to startup. Operation of the boron evaporator is ated from the boron recovery panel in the auxiliary building. Batch processing and proper pling of liquids ensure control of boron recovery system effluent streams.
design criteria listed in Section 9.3.5.1 are met through the choice of boron recovery tankage boron evaporator capacity. Because there is an interdependence between the sizing of the on recovery tankage and the sizing of the boron evaporator, it is possible, within certain limits, ade evaporator capacity for tankage. However, the design criteria place a boundary on the imum size of tankage required, and this, in turn, determines the maximum evaporator acity. Boron recovery tankage is 300,000 gallons and is supplied with a 25 gpm boron porator.
oval of radioactive ions from the degassed letdown liquid is accomplished through the use of exchange, storage, and evaporation. Conservatism in design is evident in a comparison of the ontamination factors assumed in Table 9.3-8 with those obtained through actual plant rations and equipment design (Connecticut Yankee Operating Reports 1972 and Cohen 1969).
example, iodine is removed from borated solutions with decontamination factors which are n more than an order of magnitude greater than those assumed in the calculations. If required, use of the boron demineralizers in series operation effects a higher decontamination factor for adioactive ions. High decontamination factors are accomplished through the measurement control of the interstage activity between the boron demineralizers.
nitoring devices are provided to measure conditions of pressure, temperature, flow, and liquid l in the boron recovery system. These monitoring devices ensure that the boron recovery em is operated safely within design limits.
boron evaporator is designed with an external reboiler, a large liquid disengaging space above bottoms, a vapor-liquid separator, and a tray section to reduce carryover to a minimum. In ition, the boron evaporator is designed with a low vapor velocity throughout to further reduce entrainment of liquid. Use of the boron evaporator yields a minimum decontamination factor reater than 103 for nonvolatiles under the worst-case condition, where the bottoms-to-feed centration ratio is greater than 1,000.
performance of the boron recovery system is ensured through the overall design of the em. The use of equipment having high decontamination factors and of long retention times ses the system effluent activity to be considerably less than that required for discharge, even the design basis case.
t tracing of boron recovery system piping containing liquids with greater than 4.1 weight ent boric acid provides protection against loss of solubility of boric acid.
cific design requirements for tankage containing radioactive liquid is described in tion 11.2. Evaluation of the postulated failure of tankage containing radioactive liquid is cribed in Section 15.7.3.
alfunction analysis of the boron recovery system is presented in Table 9.3-9.
boron recovery system is operated frequently during normal unit operation. This frequency of ration plus administrative control ensure the proper performance of boron recovery system ponents.
tine preventive maintenance is performed on the system to ensure continued operation and em reliability.
5.5 Instrumentation Requirements boron recovery system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and controlled from boron recovery panel.
oron recovery system trouble annunciator located on the main control board alarms whenever larm is activated on the boron recovery panel.
following controls and instruments are located on the boron recovery panel:
trol switches and indicating lights for the following:
- 1. Boron evaporator feed pumps
- 2. Boron evaporator bottoms pump
- 3. Bottoms coolant pump
- 4. Bottoms coolant preheater feeder breaker
- 6. Distillate pump
- 7. Boron test tank pumps
- 8. Boron test tank divert valve
- 9. Boron demineralizer filter primary grade water divert valve
- 10. Boron evaporator bottoms pump inlet valve position indicating lights
- 11. Boron evaporator condenser vent valve control switch
- 12. Boron distillate tank vent valve unciators that alarm when the following conditions exist in the boron recovery system:
- 2. Boron recovery filter differential pressure High
- 3. Boron recovery tank liquid level High
- 4. Boron recovery tank liquid level Low
- 5. Boron recovery tank temperature Low
- 6. Boron evaporator liquid level Low
- 7. Boron evaporator pressure high
- 8. Distillate tank liquid level High
- 9. Distillate tank liquid level Low
- 13. Distillate pump seal water flow Low
- 14. Boron test tank temperature Low
- 15. Boron demineralizer filter differential pressure High
- 16. Boron demineralizer filter outlet conductivity High
- 17. Boron test tank level High
- 18. Boron test tank level Low
- 19. Distillate cooler outlet conductivity High
- 20. Boron evaporator bottoms pipe liquid level High
- 21. Boron evaporator bottoms pipe liquid level Low
- 22. Bottoms pump discharge pressure Low
- 23. Boron evaporator bottoms filter inlet temperature High
- 25. Boron evaporator bottoms filter differential pressure High
- 26. Boron evaporator bottoms cooler coolant preheater temperature Low
- 27. Boron evaporator bottoms cooler coolant preheater temperature High
- 28. Boron evaporator bottoms cooler coolant preheater feeder breaker auto trip
- 29. Bottoms pump seal water flow Low trollers with auto/manual feature and indication for the following:
- 2. Boron evaporator level control valve
- 4. Boron distillate cooler temperature control valve
- 5. Boron evaporator reflux flow control valve
- 6. Boron evaporator condenser pressure control valve
- 7. Boron evaporator bottoms cooler coolant temperature control valve
- 8. Boron distillate tank level control valve cators that monitor the following parameters in the boron recovery system:
- 1. Boron recovery tank liquid level
- 2. Boron evaporator tray differential pressure
- 4. Boron evaporator condenser noncondensible gas temperature
- 5. Boron evaporator bottoms pump discharge pressure
- 6. Boron evaporator bottoms to filter temperature
- 7. Boron evaporator bottoms drain pipe liquid level
- 9. Boron test tank liquid level boron evaporator bottoms drain pipe liquid level is also indicated on the radioactive liquid te panel.
orders are provided for the following:
- 1. Boron distillate cooler outlet conductivity
- 2. Boron demineralizer filter outlet conductivity
- 3. Boron evaporator liquid level ltipoint recorders are provided for the following:
- 1. Boron evaporator feed flow
- 2. Boron evaporator reflux flow
- 3. Boron distillate tank inlet temperature
- 4. Boron evaporator temperature
- 7. Boron evaporator outlet temperature
- 8. Boron evaporator feed temperature following controls are located in the vicinity of the associated equipment:
- 1. Boron recovery tank heater control switch.
- 3. Control switches with indicating lights for the boron recovery tank heating pump and the boron test tank heating pump.
- 4. Boron recovery tank heater power on, and heater on indicating lights.
- 5. Control switches with indicating lights are also provided for the boron recovery tank and for the test tank heating pumps on the reactor plant sampling panel.
1 Cohen, P. 1969. Water Coolant Technology of Power Reactors, Chapter 7, Gordon &
Breach, NY.
2 Connecticut Yankee Operating Reports (NUSCO). January 1970 - March 1972.
Sample System Source Location ACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Reactor coolant hot legs Containment Reactor coolant cold legs Containment Pressurizer gas space Containment Pressurizer relief tank gas space Containment FETY INJECTION SYSTEM Accumulator Containment SIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM RHR heat exchanger outlet ESF building S SYSTEM Reactor coolant filter inlet Auxiliary Building Letdown heat exchanger outlet Auxiliary Building Thermal regen demineralizer outlet Auxiliary Building Volume control tank gas Auxiliary Building Boric acid transfer pump discharge Auxiliary Building EL POOL COOL AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Fuel pool demineralizer inlet Auxiliary Building Fuel pool demineralizer outlet Auxiliary Building IMARY GRADE WATER Storage tanks Yard ENCH SPRAY SYSTEM Refueling water storage tank Yard RON RECOVERY SYSTEM Boron recovery tanks (pump discharge) Yard Boron test tanks (pump discharge) Yard Boron demineralizer outlet Auxiliary Building DIOACTIVE GASEOUS WASTE SYSTEM Process gas charcoal adsorber inlet Auxiliary Building Process gas charcoal adsorber A outlet and B inlet Auxiliary Building
Sample System Source Location Process gas charcoal adsorber outlet Auxiliary Building DIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM High-level waste drain tanks Waste Disposal Low-level waste drain tanks Waste Disposal Waste bottom holding tank Waste Disposal Waste test tanks Waste Disposal Waste demineralizer outlet Waste Disposal Containment sump Waste Disposal Waste evaporator bottoms Waste Disposal DIOACTIVE SOLID WASTE SYSTEM Cesium removal ion exchgr outlet Waste Disposal EAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM Each steam generator blowdown line (grab sample) Containment ACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Main header Auxiliary Building TE:
eria for remote samples are given in Regulatory Guide 1.21.
Sample System Source Location rbine plant component cooling water Turbine Building st point heaters Turbine Building in steam 4 Turbine Building cond point heater outlet Turbine Building ndensate Turbine Building ndenser hot well Turbine Building th point heaters inlet (condensate) Turbine Building ndensate storage tank Yard ndensate surge tank Yard mineralizer water storage tank Yard rbine building floor drain sump Turbine Building urth point heater drain pumps Turbine Building xiliary feedwater and recirculation Turbine Building urth point heater outlet (condensate) Turbine Building Main Steam Valve Building (Downstream of containment am Generator blowdown lines (4 with continuous flow) isolation valves 3BDG*CTV22A - D)
DESIGN AND PARAMETERS Components Design Parameters actor Coolant Sample Module 3SSP-SAS1 Number of Units 1 Capacity (gpm) 1 Design Pressure (psig) 2500 Design Temperature (°F) 165 ntainment Air Sample Module 3SSP-SAS2 Number of Units 1 Capacity (gpm) 0.4 Design Pressure (psig) 100 Design Temperature (°F) 300 rge Skid 3SSP-SK2 Number of Units 1 Tank Capacity (gal) 30 Pump Discharge Pressure (psig) 375 Pump Capacity (gpm) 1 Motor (hp) 1/3 actor Coolant Module Cooler 3SSP-SCL3 Number of Units 1 Inlet Temperature (max °F) 650 Outlet Temperature (max °F) 165 Design Pressure (psig) 2500 Capacity (gpm) 1 r Sample Pump 3SSP-P4 Number of Units 1 Design Temperature (°F) 140 Design Pressure (psig) 100 Capacity (cfm) 1.35 Motor (hp) 3/4
PARAMETERS General Parameters al water supply flow rate, for four reactor coolant pumps, nominal (gpm) 32 al water return flow rate, for four reactor coolant pumps, nominal (gpm) 12 tdown flow:
Normal (gpm) 75 Maximum (gpm) 120 arging flow (excludes seal water):
Normal (gpm) 55 Maximum (gpm) 100 mperature of letdown reactor coolant entering system at full power (°F) 556 mperature of charging flow directed to reactor coolant system (°F) 517 mperature of effluent directed to boron recycle system (°F) 115 ntrifugal charging pump bypass flow (each) (gpm) 60 ount of 6600 ppm boric acid solution required to meet cold shutdown 28,352 uirements shortly after full power operation (gallons)
ntrifugal Charging Pumps Summary Number 3 Design pressure (psig) 2800 Design temperature (°F) 300 Design flow charging (gpm) 150 Design head, feet (at design 5800 charging flow)
Material Austenitic Stainless Steel ric Acid Transfer Pump Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 175 Design flow (gpm) 75 Design head, feet 235 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel iller Pumps Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 200 Design flow (gpm) 400 Design head, feet 150 Material Carbon Steel generative Heat Exchanger neral Number 1 Heat transfer rate at design conditions (BTU/hr) 11.0 x 106 ell Side Design pressure (psig) 2485 Design temperature (°F) 650 Fluid Borated Reactor Coolant
Material Austenitic Stainless Steel be Side Design pressure (psig) 2735 Design temperature (°F) 650 Fluid Borated Reactor Coolant Material Austenitic Stainless Steel erating Parameters (Normal):
ell Side (Letdown)
Flow (lb/hr) 37,200 Inlet temperature (°F) 557 Outlet temperature (°F) 290 be Side (Charging)
Flow (lb/hr) 27,300 Inlet temperature (°F) 130 Outlet temperature (°F) 517 tdown Heat Exchanger neral Number 1 Heat transfer rate at design conditions (BTU/hr) 16 x 106 ell Side Design pressure (psig) 165 Design temperature (°F) 250 Fluid Component Cooling Water Material Carbon Steel be Side Design pressure (psig) 600 Design temperature (°F) 400 Fluid Borated Reactor Coolant Material Austenitic Stainless Steel erating Conditions:
ell Side (Heatup Case) Design Normal Flow (lb/hr) 498,000 204,040 Inlet temperature (°F) 95 95 Outlet temperature (°F) 127 127 be Side (Letdown)
Flow (lb/hr) 59,500 37,200 Inlet temperature (°F) 380 (max) 290 Outlet temperature (°F) 115 115 cess Letdown Heat Exchanger Number 1 Heat transfer rate at design conditions (BTU/hr) 5.2 x 106 Shell Side Tube Side Design pressure (psig) 185 2485 Design temperature (°F) 250 650 Design flow (lb/hr) 125,000 12,400 Inlet temperature (°F) 95 557 Outlet temperature (°F) 137 165 Fluid Component Cooling Water Borated Reactor Coolant Material Carbon Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel al Water Heat Exchanger Number 1 Heat transfer rate at design conditions (BTU/hr) 1.6 x 106 Shell Side Tube Side Design pressure (psig) 165 150 Design temperature (°F) 250 250 Design flow (lb/hr) 125,000 66,000 Inlet temperature (°F) 95 139 Outlet temperature (°F) 108 115 Fluid Component Cooling Water Borated Reactor Coolant
Material Carbon Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel derating Heat Exchanger Number 1 Heat transfer rate at design conditions (BTU/hr) 2.53 x 106 Shell Side Tube Side Design pressure (psig) 300 300 Design temperature (°F) 200 200 Design flow (lb/hr) 59,640 59,640 Design inlet temperature (boron 50 115 storage mode) (°F)
Design outlet temperature (boron 92.4 72.6 storage mode) (°F)
Inlet temperature (boron release 140 115 mode) (°F)
Outlet temperature (boron release 123.1 131.7 mode) (°F)
Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel tdown Chiller Heat Exchanger Number 1 Heat transfer rate at design conditions (BTU/hr) 1.65 x 106 Shell Side Tube Side Design pressure (psig) 150 300 Design temperature (°F) 200 200 Design flow (boron storage 175,000 59,640 mode) (lb/hr)
Design inlet temperature (boron 39 72.6 storage mode) (°F)
Design outlet temperature (boron 48.4 45 storage mode) (°F)
Flow (boron storage mode) 175,000 59,640 (lbhr)
Inlet temperature (boron release 90 123.7 mode) (°F)
Outlet temperature (boron release 99.8 94.9 mode) (°F)
Material Carbon Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel tdown Reheat Heat Exchanger Number 1 Heat transfer rate at design conditions (BTU/hr) 1.49 x 106 Shell Side Tube Side Design pressure (psig) 300 600 Design temperature (°F) 200 400 Design flow (lb/hr) 59,640 44,730 Inlet temperature (°F) 115 280 Outlet temperature (°F) 140 246.7 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel lume Control Tank Number 1 Volume (ft3) 400 Design pressure (psig) 75 Design temperature (°F) 250 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel ric Acid Tank Number 2 Capacity, each (gallons) 23,400 (1)
Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature (°F) 200 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel tching Tank Number 1 Capacity (gal) 400
Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature (°F) 350 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel emical Mixing Tank Number 1 Volume (gal) 5 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 200 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel iller Surge Tank Number 1 Volume (gal) 500 Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature (°F) 200 Material Carbon Steel xed Bed Demineralizers Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature (°F) 250 Design flow (gpm) 120 Resin volume, each (ft3) 30 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel tion Bed Demineralizers Number 1 Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature (°F) 250 Design flow (gpm) 75 Resin volume (ft3) 20 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel ermal Regeneration Demineralizers
Number 5 Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature (°F) 250 Design flow (gpm) 200 Resin volume, each (ft3) 74.3 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel actor Coolant Filter Number 1 Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature (°F) 300 Design flow (gpm) 150 Particle Retention 98 percent of 0.2 to 25 micron size or 6/40 composite Material (vessel) Austenitic Stainless Steel al Water Injection Filters Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 3100 Design temperature (°F) 250 Design flow (gpm) 80 Particle Retention 98 percent of 5 micron size maximum Material (vessel) Austenitic Stainless Steel al Water Return Filter Number 1 Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature (°F) 250 Design flow (gpm) 150 Particle Retention 98 percent of 25 micron size Material (vessel) Austenitic Stainless Steel tdown Filter
Number 1 Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature (°F) 250 Design flow (gpm) 150 Particle Retention 98 percent of > 6 micron size terial (vessel) Austenitic Stainless Steel ric Acid Filter Number 1 Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature (°F) 250 Design flow (gpm) 150 Particle Retention 98 percent of 25 micron size Material (vessel) Austenitic Stainless Steel tdown Orifice 45 gpm 75 gpm Number 1 2 Design flow (lb/hr) 22,230 37,050 Differential pressure at design 1700 1700 flow (psia)
Design pressure (psig) 2,485 2,485 Design temperature (°F) 650 650 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Austenitic Stainless Steel iller Number 1 Capacity (Btu/hr) 1.66 x 106 Evaporator Design flow (gpm) 352 Evaporator Inlet temperature (°F) 48.4 Evaporator Outlet temperature (°F) 39 TE:
Refer to Technical Specification 3.1.2.5 and 3.1.2.6 for BAT system requirements.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- 1. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure reduces redundancy, of a. Valve position indicator a. Valve is designed to fail operated globe Volume Control - providing letdown flow isolation to (open to closed position closed and is electrically valve LCV459 letdown flow. protect PRZ heaters from uncovering change) at CB. wired so that the electrical (LCV460 at low water level in PRZ. No effect solenoid of the diaphragm analogous) on system operation. Alternate operator is energized to op isolation valve (LCV-460) provides the valve. Solenoid is backup letdown flow isolation. deenergized to close the v upon the generation of a lo level PRZ control signal.
valve is electrically interlo with three letdown orifice isolation valves and may n closed manually from the any of these valves are at open position.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- b. Fails closed. b. Charging and b. Failure blocks a normal letdown b. Valve position Volume Control - flow to VCT. Minimum letdown indication (closed to letdown flow. flow requirements for boration of open position change) at RCS to safe shutdown concentration CB; letdown flow level may be met by establishing temperature indication letdown flow through, alternate, (TI-127) at CB; letdown excess letdown flow path. If the flow pressure indication alternate, excess letdown flow path (PI-131) at CB; letdown to VCT is not available due to flow indication (FI-132) common mode failure (loss of at CB; and VCT level instrument air supply) affecting the indication (LI-112) and opening operation of isolation valves low water level alarm at in each flow path, the plant operator CB.
can borate the RCS to a safe shutdown concentration level without letdown flow by taking advantage of the steam space available in the PRZ. Letdown can also be provided from the reactor vessel head.
- 2. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure prevents isolation of normal a. Valve position 1. Valve is of similar design operated globe Volume Control - letdown flow through regenerative indication (open to that stated for item numbe valve 8149B letdown flow. heat exchanger. No effect safe closed position change) Solenoid is deenergized to (8149C and 8149A shutdown operation. Containment at CB. the valve upon the generati analogous) isolation valve (8152 or 8160) may a low level PRZ signal or be remotely closed from the CB to closing of letdown isolatio isolate letdown flow through heat valves (LCV459 and LCV exchanger. upstream of the regenerati heat exchanger.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- b. Fails closed. b. Charging and b. Failure blocks normal letdown flow Volume Control- to VCT. Normal letdown flow to letdown flow. VCT may be maintained by opening alternate letdown orifice isolation valve 8149C. Minimum letdown flow requirements for boration of RCS to safe shutdown concentration level may be met by opening letdown orifice isolation, valve 8149A or 8149C. If common mode failure (loss of instrument air) prevents opening of these valves also prevents establishing alternate flow through excess letdown flow path, plant operator can borate the RCS to a safe shutdown concentration level without letdown flow by taking advantage of steam space available in PRZ. Letdown can also be provided from the reactor vessel head.
- 3. Air diaphragm- a. Fails closed. a. Charging and a. Same effect on system operation as a. Same methods of 1. Valve is of similar design operated globe Volume Control- that stated for Item number 1, failure detection as those stated that stated for item Numbe valve 8152 (8160 letdown flow. mode Fails closed. for item number 1 Solenoid is deenergized to analogous) failure mode Fails the valve upon the generati closed. In addition, an ESF T signal.
close position group monitoring light at CB.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- b. Fails open. b. Charging and b. Failure has no effect on CHS b. Valve position Volume Control- operation during normal plant indication (open) at CB.
letdown flow. operation. However, under accident conditions requiring containment isolation, failure reduces the redundancy of providing isolation of normal letdown line.
- 4. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open. a. Boron a. Failure inhibits use of BTRS for a. Letdown heat 1. Valve is designed to fail o operated globe Concentration load follow operation (boration) due exchanger tube and is electrically wired so valve TCV-381B Control - boron to low temperature of letdown flow discharge flow (FI-132) the electrical solenoid of t thermal entering BIRS demineralizers. and pressure (PI-131) diaphragm operator is regeneration Alternate boration of reactor coolant indications at CB and energized to close the valv (boration). is possible using RMCS of CHS. No BTR demineralizer inlet 2. BTRS operation is not req effect on operation to bring reactor to flow temperature in operations of CVCS sys safe shutdown condition. indication (TI-381) at used to bring the reactor to CB if BTRS is in shutdown condition.
operation.
- b. Fails closed. b. Boron b. Failure inhibits use of BTRS for b. Same method of Concentration load follow operation (boration) due detection as those stated Control - boron to loss of temperature control of for item number 1, thermal letdown flow entering BTRS failure mode Fails regeneration demineralizers. Failure also blocks closed except no (boration). normal letdown flow to VCT when closed to open position BTRS is not being used for load change indication at follow. Minimum letdown flow CB.
requirements for boration RCS to safe shutdown concentration level may be met as stated for effect on system operation for item number 1, failure Fails closed.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- 5. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure prevents control of pressure a. Letdown heat 1. Same remark as stated for operated globe Volume Control - to prevent flashing of letdown flow exchanger tube Number 4, in regards to va valve PCV-131 letdown flow. in letdown heat exchanger and also discharge flow design.
allows high pressure fluid to mixed indication (FI-132) and bed demineralizers. Relief valve high flow alarm at CB; (8119) opens in demineralizer line to temperature indication release pressure to VCT and valve (TI-130) and high (TCV-129) changes position to temperature alarm at divert flow to VCT. Boration of RCS CB; and pressure to safe shutdown concentration level indication (PI-131) at is possible with valve failing open. CB.
- b. Fails closed. b. Charging and b. Same effect on system operation as b. Letdown heat Volume Control - that for item No. 1, failure mode exchanger discharge letdown flow. Fail closed. flow indication (FI-132), and pressure indication (PI-131) and high pressure alarm at CB.
- 6. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open for a. Charging and a. Letdown flow bypassed from a. Valve position 1. Electrical solenoid of air operated three-way flow only to Volume Control - flowing to mixed bed demineralizers indication (VC Tank) at diaphragm operator is valve TCV-129 VCT. letdown flow. and BTRS. Failure prevents ionic CB. electrically wired so that purification of letdown flow and solenoid is energized to op prevents operation of BTRS. valve for flow to the mixe Boration of RCS to safe shutdown demineralizers.
concentration level is possible with valve failing open for flow only in VCT.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- b. Fails open for b. Charging and b. Continuous letdown to mixed bed b. Valve position flow only to Volume Control- demineralizers and BTRS. Failure indication (Demin.) at mixed bed letdown flow. prevents automatic isolation of CB. If BTRS is in demineralizer. mixed bed demineralizers and BTRS operation, BTRS under condition of high letdown flow demineralizer return temperatures. Boration of RCS to flow indication safe shutdown concentration level is (FI-385).
possible with valve failing open for flow only to demineralizers.
- 7. Air diaphragm- a. Fails closed. a. Charging and a. Failure prevents use of the excess a. Valve position 1. Valve is designed to fail operated globe Volume Control - letdown line of the CHS as an indication (closed to closed and is electrically valve 8153. excess letdown alternate path that may be used for open position change) at wired so that the electrical flow. letdown flow control. CB and excess letdown solenoid of air diaphragm heat exchanger outlet energized to open the valv pressure indication 2. If normal letdown and ex (PI-124) and letdown flow is not availa temperature indication for safe shutdown operatio (TI-122) at CB. plant operator can borate to safe shutdown concentr using steam space availabl PRZ. Letdown can also be provided from the reactor vessel head.
- b. Fails open. b. Charging and b. Failure reduces redundancy of b. Valve position Volume Control - providing excess letdown flow indication (open to excess letdown isolation during normal plant closed position change) flow. operation and for plant startup. No at CB.
effect on system operation.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- 8. Air diaphragm- a. Fails closed. a. Charging and a. Failure prevents use of excess a. Same methods of 1. Same remarks as those sta operated globe Volume Control - letdown line of the CHS as an detection as those stated above for item Number 7.
valve HCV-123 excess letdown alternate path that may be used for for item number 7, flow. letdown flow control. failure mode Fails closed except for no valve position indication at CB.
- b. Fails open. b. Charging and b. Failure prevents manual adjustment b. Excess letdown heat Volume Control - at CB of RCS system pressure exchanger outlet excess letdown downstream of excess letdown heat pressure indication flow. exchanger to a low pressure (PI-124) and consistent with CVC seal return temperature indication (CBO) backpressure requirements. (TI-122) at CB.
Relief valve 8121 opens in seal return line to release pressure to PRT.
- 9. Motor-operated a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure has no effect on CHS a. Valve position 1. Valve is normally at a full globe valve 8112 Volume Control - operation during normal plant indication (open to position and motor operat (8100 analogous) seal water flow operation. However, under accident closed position change) energized to close the valv and excess conditions requiring containment at CB. upon the generation of an letdown flow. isolation of seal water flow and T signal.
excess letdown flow, redundancy is reduced.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- b. Fails closed. b. Charging and b. RC pump seal water return flow and b. Valve position 2. If normal letdown and ex Volume Control - excess letdown flow blocked. Failure indication (closed to letdown flow is not availa seal water flow inhibits use of the excess letdown open position change) at for safe shutdown operatio and excess fluid system of the CHS as an CB; group monitoring plant operator can borate letdown flow. alternate system that may be used for light and alarm at CB; to concentration using stea letdown flow control during normal and seal water return space available in PRZ.
plant operation. Relief valve 8121 flow recording provides capability of seal water in (FR-154,156,158,160) cooling RC pump bearings. and low seal water return at CB.
- 10. Motor-operated gate a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure has no effect on CHS a. Valve position 1. Valve is normally at a full valve 8105 (8106 Volume Control - operation during normal plant indication (open to position and motor operati analogous) charging flow. operation. However, under accident closed position change) energized to close the valv condition requiring isolation of at CB. upon the generation of a S charging line, failure reduces Injection S signal.
redundancy of providing isolation of normal charging flow.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- b. Fails closed. b. Charging and b. Failure prevents use of normal b. Valve position Volume Control - charging line to RCS for boration, indication (closed to charging flow. dilution, and coolant makeup open position change) operations. Seal water injection path and group monitoring remains available for boration of light (valve closed) at RCS to a safe shutdown CB; letdown concentration level and makeup of temperature indication coolant during operations to bring (TI-127) and high-the reactor to safe shutdown temperature alarm at condition. CB; charging flow temperature indication (TI-126) at CB; charging pump discharge header pressure indicator (PI-120) at CB; VCT level indication (LI-112) and high-level alarm at CB.
- 11. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure prevents manual adjustment a. Seal water injection 1. Same remark as that state operated globe Volume Control - at CB of seal flow. flow indicator (FI- item Number 4 in regards valve HCV-182 seal water flow. 142A, 143A, 144A, design of valve.
145A) at CB.
- b. Fails closed. b. Charging and b. CCP cools reactor coolant pump b. Valve position Volume Control - thermal barrier to prevent seal indication (closed to seal water flow. failure. open position change) at CB; group monitoring light and alarm at CB, seal water injection flow indicator (FI-142A,143A,144A, 145A) at CB.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- 12. Motor-operated a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure has no effect on CHS a. Valve position 1. Valve is normally at a full globe valve 8110 Volume Control - operation during normal plant indication (open to position and motor operat (8111 A,B,C charging flow and operation. However, under accident closed position change) energized to close the valv analogous) seal water flow. condition requiring isolation of at CB. upon the generation of a s centrifugal charging pump miniflow injection signal.
line, failure reduces redundancy of providing isolation of miniflow to suction of pump via seal water heat exchanger.
- b. Fails closed. b, Charging and b. Failure blocks miniflow to suction b. Valve position Volume Control - of centrifugal charging pumps via indication (closed to charging flow and seal water heat exchanger. Normal open position change) at seal water flow. charging flow and seal water flow CB; group monitoring prevents deadheading of pumps light (valve closed) and when used. Boration of RCS to a alarm at CB; and safe shutdown concentration level charging pump and makeup of coolant during discharge header flow operations to bring reactor to safe indicator (FI-121A) and shutdown condition is still possible. high flow alarm at CB.
- 13. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure has no effect on CHS a. Valve position 1.Same remarks as that state operated globe Volume Control - operation during normal plant indication (open to item Number 4 in regards valve 8146 charging flow. operation or safe shutdown closed position change) design of valve.
operation. Valve is used during cold at CB.
shutdown operation to isolate normal charging line when using the auxiliary spray during the cooldown of the PRZ. Cold shutdown of reactor is still possible, however, time for cooling down PRZ will be extended.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- b. Fails closed. b. Charging and b. Failure block normal charging flow b. Valve position Volume Control - to the RCS. Plant operator can indication (closed to charging flow. maintain charging flow by open position change) at establishing flow through alternate CB; charging flow charging path by opening of isolation indication (TI-126) at valve (8147). CB; regenerative heat exchanger shell side exit temperature alarm at CB; and charging pump discharge header flow indicator (FI-121A) and low flow alarm at CB.
- 14. Air diaphragm- a. Fails closed. a. Charging and a. Failure reduces redundancy of a. Valve position 1. Same remark as that state operated globe Volume Control - charging flow paths to RCS. No indication (closed to item Number 4 in regards valve 8147 charging flow. effect on CHS operations during open position change) at design of valve.
normal plant operation or safe CB.
shutdown operation. Normal charging flow path remains available for charging flow.
- b. Fails open. b. Charging and b. Same effect on system operation and b. Valve position Volume Control - shutdown as that stated above for indication (open to charging flow. item number 14, failure mode Fails closed position change) open if alternate charging line is in at CB.
use.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- 15. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure results in advertent operation a. Valve position 1. Same remark as that state operated globe Volume Control - of auxiliary spray that results in a indication (open to item Number 7 in regards valve 8145 charging flow. reduction of PRZ pressure during closed position change) design of valve.
normal plant operation. PRZ heaters at CB and PRZ pressure operate to maintain required PRZ recording (PR-455) and pressure. Boration of RCS to a safe low-pressure alarm at shutdown concentration level and CB.
makeup of coolant during operation to bring reactor to safe shutdown condition is still possible.
- b. Fails closed. b. Charging and b. Failure has no effect on CHS b. Valve position Volume Control - operation during normal plant indication (closed to charging flow. operation. Valve is used during cold open position change) at shutdown operation to activate CB.
auxiliary spray for cooling down the PRZ after operation of RHS.
- 16. Centrifugal a. Fails to deliver a. Charging and a. Failure reduces redundancy of a. Pump circuit breaker 1.Flow rate for a centrifugal charging pump working fluid. Volume Control - providing charging and seal water position indication charging pump is controll 3CHS*P3A (Pumps charging flow and flow to RCS. No effect on normal (open) at CB; common a modulating valve (FCV-P3B and P3C seal water flow. plant operation or bring reactor to a pump breaker trip, in discharge header for the analogous) safe shutdown condition. Three alarm at CB; charging centrifugal charging pump pumps are provided, one being an pump discharge header (Note ***)
installed spare. flow indicator (FI-121A) and low-flow alarm at CB. PRZ level recording (LR-459) and low-level alarm at CB.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- 17. Air diaphragm- a. Fails closed. a. Chemical Control a. Failure blocks hydrogen flow to a. VCT pressure operated globe Purification and VCT resulting in loss of hydrogen indication (PI-115) and valve 3GSH-PV48 Makeup-oxygen overpressure. No effect on operation periodic sampling of gas control. to bring the reactor to safe shutdown mixture in VCT.
condition.
- 18. Motor-operated gate a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure has no effect on CHS a. Valve position 1. During normal plant oper valve LCV-112B Volume Control - operation during normal plant indication (open to valve is at a full open posi (LCV-112C charging flow and operation and bringing reactor to a closed position change) and the motor operator is analogous) seal water flow. safe shutdown condition. However, at CB. energized to close the valv under accident conditions requiring upon the generation of a V isolation of VCT, failure reduces low low water level signal redundancy of providing isolation upon the generation of a S for discharge line of VCT. Injection S signal.
- b. Fails closed. b. Charging and b. Failure blocks fluid flow from VCT b. Valve position Volume Control - during normal plant operation and indication (closed to charging flow and when bringing the reactor to safe open position change) at seal water flow. shutdown condition. Alternate CB; group monitoring supply of borated coolant from the light (valve closed) at RWST to suction of charging pumps CB; charging pump can be established from the CB by discharge header flow the operator through the opening of indicator (FI-121A) and RWST isolation valves (LCV-112D low-flow alarm at CB; and LCV-112E). and PRZ level recording (LR-459) and low-level alarm at CB.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- 19. Air diaphragm- a. Fails closed. a. Chemical Control a. Failure blocks venting of VCT gas a. VCT pressure 1. Same remark as that state operated globe Purification and mixture to reactor plant gaseous indication (PI-115) and item Number 7 in regards valve 8101 (8157 Makeup -oxygen drains for stripping of fission high pressure alarm at 810 valve design.
analogous) control (8101), products from RCS coolant during CB. Periodic sampling VCT pressure normal plant operation. No effect on of gas mixture in VCT.
control (8157). operations to bring the reactor to safe shutdown condition.
- 20. Air diaphragm- a. Fails closed. a. Boron a. Failure blocks fluid flow from a. Valve position 1. Same remark as that state operated diaphragm Concentration reactor makeup control system for indication (closed to item Number 7 in regards valve FCV-110B Control - reactor automatic boric acid addition and open position change) at valve design.
makeup control - reactor water makeup during normal CB; total makeup flow boration, auto plant operation. Failure also reduces deviation alarm at CB; makeup, and redundancy of fluid flow paths for and VCT level alternate dilution. dilution of RC coolant by reactor indication (LI-112 and makeup water and blocks fluid flow LI-185) and low level for boration of the RC coolant when alarms at CB.
bringing the reactor to a safe shutdown condition. Boration (at BA tank boration concentration level) of RCS coolant to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown condition is possible by opening of alternate BA tank isolation valve (8104) at CB.
- b. Fails open. b. Boron b. Failure allows for alternate dilute b. Valve position Concentration mode type operation for system indication (open to Control - reactor operation of normal dilution of RCS closed position change) makeup control - coolant. No effect on CHS operation at CB.
boration, auto during normal plant operation and makeup, and bringing the reactor to a safe alternate dilution. shutdown condition.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- 21. Air diaphragm- a. Fails closed. a. Boron a. Failure blocks fluid flow from a. Same methods of 1. Same remark as that state operated diaphragm Concentration RMCS for dilution of RCS coolant detection as those stated item Number 7 in regards valve FCV-111B Control - reactor during normal plant operation. No above for item No. 21 valve design.
makeup control - effect on CHS operation. Operator failure mode Fails dilution and can dilute RCS coolant by closed.
alternate dilution. establishing alternate dilute mode of system operation. Dilution of RCS coolant not required when bringing the reactor to safe shutdown position.
- b. Fails open. b. Boron b. Failure allows for alternate dilute a. Valve position Concentration mode type operation for system indication (open to Control - reactor operation of boration and auto closed position change) make up control - makeup of RCS coolant. No effect at CB.
dilution and on CHS operation during normal alternate dilution. plant operation and when bringing the reactor to a safe shutdown condition.
- 22. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open. a. Boron a. Failure prevents the addition to a a. Valve position 1. Same remark as that state operated globe Concentration preselected quantity of concentrated indication (open to item Number 4 in regards valve FCV-110A Control - reactor boric acid solution at a preselected closed position change) valve design.
makeup control- flow rate to the RCS coolant during at CB; and boric acid boration and auto normal plant operation and when flow recording (FR-110) makeup. bringing the reactor to a safe and flow deviation shutdown condition. Boration to alarm at CB.
bring the reactor to a safe shutdown condition is possible, however, flow rate of solution from BA tanks cannot be automatically controlled.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- b. Fails closed. b. Boron b. Failure blocks fluid flow of boric b. Valve position Concentration acid solution from BA tanks during indication (closed to Control - reactor normal operation and when bringing open position change) at makeup control - the reactor to a safe shutdown CB; and boric acid flow boration, and auto condition. Boration (at BA tank recording (FR-110) and makeup. boron concentration level) of RCS flow deviation alarm at coolant to bring the reactor to safe CB.
shutdown condition is possible by opening of alternate BA tank isolation valve (8104) at CB.
- 23. Air diaphragm- a. Fails closed. a. Boron a. Failure blocks fluid flow of water a. VCT level indication 1. Same remark as that state operated globe Concentration from reactor makeup control system (LI-112 and LI-185) and item Number 7 in regards valve FCV-111A Control - reactor during normal plant operation. No low water level alarms valve design.
makeup control - effect on system operation when at CB; and makeup dilute, alternate bringing the reactor to a safe water flow recording dilute, and auto shutdown condition. (FR-110) and flow makeup. deviation alarm at CB.
- b. Fails open. b. Boron b. Failure prevents the addition of a a. Makeup water flow Concentration preselected quantity of water recording (FR-110) and Control - reactor makeup at a preselected flow rate to flow deviation alarm at makeup control - the RCS coolant during normal plant CB.
dilute, alternate operation. No effect on system dilute, and auto operation when bringing the reactor makeup. to a safe shutdown condition.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- 24. Motor-operated a. Fails closed. a. Boron a. Failure reduces redundance of flow a. Valve position 1. Valve is at a closed positi globe valve 8104 Concentration paths for supplying boric acid indication (closed to during normal RMCS oper Control solution from BA tanks to RCS via open position change) at 2. If both flow paths from Emergency charging pumps. No effect on CHS CB and flow indication tanks are blocked due to fa Boration. operation during normal plant (FI-183A) at CB. of isolation valves (FCV-1 operation or safe shutdown and 8104), borated water f operation. Normal flow path via RWST is available openin RMCS remains available for isolation valve LCV-112D boration of RCS coolant. LCV-112E.
- b. Fails open. b. Boron b. Failure prevents the addition of a b. Valve position Concentration preselected quantity of concentrated indication (open to Control - reactor boric acid solution at a preselected closed position change) makeup control - flow rate to the RCS coolant during at CB and flow boration and auto normal plant operation, and when indication (FI-183A) or makeup. bringing the reactor to a safe CB.
shutdown condition. Boration to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown condition is possible, however, flow rate of solution from BA tanks cannot be automatically controlled.
- 25. Boric acid transfer a. Fails to deliver a. Boron a. No effect on CHS system operation a. Pump motor start relay pump 3CHS*P2A working fluid. Concentration during normal plant operation or position indication (BA transfer pump Control - reactor bringing reactor to safe shutdown (open) at CB and local P2B analogous) makeup control - condition. Alternate BA transfer pump discharge boration and auto pump P2B may be used to provide pressure indication makeup. necessary delivery of working fluid (PI-113).
for CHS system operation.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- 26. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open for a. Charging and a. Failure bypasses normal down flow a. Valve position (Holdup 1. Valve is designed to fail o operated three-way flow only to Volume Control - Boron Recovery Tank resulting in Tank) at CB; VCT water for flow to VCT and is valve LCV-112A Boron letdown flow. excessive use of RMCS. No effect on level indication (LI-185 electrically wired so that Recovery operation to bring reactor to safe and LI-112) and low electrical control solenoid Tank. shutdown condition. level alarms at CB; and valve are energized for flo increase water level in Boron Recovery Tank. Va BRS recycle holdup opens to flow to Boron tank. Recovery Tank on high V water level signal.
- 27. Air diaphragm- a. Fails open. a. Charging and a. Failure prevents manual adjustment a. High PRZ level 1. Same remark as that state operated globe Volume Control - at CB of charging flow results in an indication and alarm at item Number 4 in regards valve FCV-121 charging flow. increased flow via the normal CHS CB. Charging Pump design of valve.
charging line and a reduction of flow Discharge Header Flow to the RCS via labyrinth seals and Indicator (FI-121A) and pump shaft flow for cooling pump high alarm at CB.
bearings. Boration of RCS to a safe shutdown concentration level and makeup of coolant during operations to bring reactor to safe shutdown condition is possible through normal charging flow paths.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- b. Fails closed. b. Charging and b. Failure prevents use of normal b. Valve position Volume Control - charging line to RCS for boration, indication (open to charging flow. dilution, and coolant makeup closed position change) operations. Seal water injection path at CB; letdown remains available for boration of temperature indication RCS to a safe shutdown (TI-127) and high concentration and makeup of coolant temperature alarm at during operations to bring the reactor CB; Charging Pump to a safe shutdown condition. Discharge Header Flow Indicator (FI-121A) and low alarm at CB. VCT level indication (LI-112 and LI-185) and high-level alarm at CB. PRZ, decreasing level, at CB.
COMPONENTS NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND SAFE SHUTDOWN (CONTINUED)
CHS Operation Effect on System Operation and Failure Detection Component Failure Mode Function Shutdown* Method ** Remarks
- List of acronyms and abbreviations used:
BA Boric Acid BRS Boron Recovery System BTR Boron Thermal Regeneration BTRS Boron Thermal Regeneration System CB Control Board CHS Chemical and Volume Control System Demin. Demineralizer HX Heat Exchanger PRZ Pressurizer RC Reactor Coolant RCS Reactor Coolant System RHS Residual Heat Removal System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank RMCS Reactor Makeup Control System VCT Volume Control Tank
- Equipment performance is monitored as part of plant operation, periodic tests, surveillance inspections, and instrument calibrati Failures may be detected during such monitoring of equipment in addition to Failure Detection Method notes.
- Certain initiating HELB events, postulated to occur in the operating CHS pump discharge piping, when combined with a single active failure of the standby CHS pump to start, may lead to a loss of all charging. In addition, all charging may be lost as a resu certain postulated fire conditions (See FSAR Section 9.5.1 and the FPER for SIH system performance requirements). For these conditions, the SIH pumps will provide the required RCS inventory and boration flow to achieve safe shutdown.
AND PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS Characteristics ron Evaporator Number 1 Design Capacity (gpm) 25 Design pressure (psig) 100/full vacuum Design temperature (°F) 350 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Recovery Tanks Number 2 Design Capacity (gal) 150,000 Design pressure (psig) Atmospheric/full liquid Design temperature (°F) 180 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Test Tanks Number 2 Design Capacity (gal) 12,000 Design pressure (psig) Atmospheric/full liquid Design temperature (°F) 150 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Distillate Tank Number 1 Design Capacity (gal) 300 Design pressure (psig) 100/full vacuum Design temperature (°F) 340 Material of construction Stainless steel sium Removal Ion Exchangers Number 2 Resin volume (ft3) 35 Design pressure (psig) 200
Characteristics Design temperature (°F) 300 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Demineralizers Number 2 Resin volume (ft3) 35 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 140 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Recovery Filters mber 2 sign capacity (gpm) 200 sign pressure (psig) 200 sign temperature (°F) 300 terial of construction Stainless steel ron Evaporator Bottom Filters Number 2 Design capacity (gpm) 50 Design pressure (psig) 200 Design temperature (°F) 300 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Demineralizer Filter Number 1 Design capacity (gpm) 200 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 140 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Distillate Cooler Number 1 Duty (Btu/hr) 1,632,500
Characteristics Material of construction Stainless steel Distillate (shell)
Capacity (lb/hr) 12,500 Operating pressure (psig) 50 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 274 Operating temperature, in/out (°F) 250/120 Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water (tube)
Capacity (lb/hr) 81,625 Operating pressure (psig) 167 Design pressure (psig) 175 Design temperature (°F) 274 Operating temperature, in/out (°F) 95/115 ron Evaporator Boiler Number 1 Duty (Btu/hr) 15,395,125 Saturated Steam (shell)
Capacity (lb/hr) 17,484 Operating pressure (psig) 100 Design pressure (psig) 180 Design temperature (°F) 400 Operating temperature, in/out (°F) 338/338 Material of construction Carbon steel Borated Water (tube)
Capacity (lb/hr) 1,375,000 Operating pressure (psig) 25 Design pressure (psig) 100 Design temperature (°F) 350 Operating temperature, in/out (°F) 253/264
Characteristics Material of construction Stainless steel ron Evaporator Condenser Number 1 Duty (Btu/hr) 13,010,250 Material of construction Stainless steel Saturated steam (shell)
Capacity (lb/hr) 13,750 Operating pressure (psig) 15 Design pressure (psig) 100 Design temperature (°F) 350 Operating temperature, in/out (°F) 250/250 Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water (tube)
Capacity (lb/hr) 650,512 Operating pressure (psig) 125 Design pressure (psig) 240 Design temperature (°F) 350 Operating temperature, in/out (°F) 95/115 ron Evaporator Bottoms Cooler (3BRS-E5)
Number 1 Duty (Btu/hr) 637,500 Cooling water (shell)
Capacity (lb/hr) 63,750 Operating pressure inlet (psig) 207 Design pressure (psig) 210 Operating temperature, in/out (°F) 140/150 Material of construction Carbon steel Borated water (tube)
Capacity (lb/hr) 7,500 Operating pressure inlet (psig) 50
Characteristics Design pressure (psig) 170 Operating temperature, in/out (°F) 255/170 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Bottoms Coolant Preheater (3BRS-E6)
Number 1 Total duty (kW) 90 Capacity (gpm) 150 Design pressure (psig) 263 Design temperature, in/out (°F) 140/185 Operating pressure (psig) 100 Material of construction Carbon steel ron Test Tank Heaters Number 2 Total duty (kW) 3 Capacity (gpm) 75 Design pressure (psig) 50 Operating pressure (psig) 30 Design temperature, in/out (°F) 40/100 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Recovery Tank Heater Number 2 Total duty (kW) 7 Design capacity (gpm) 75 Design pressure (psig) 50 Operating pressure (psig) 30 Design temperature, in/out (°F) 40/100 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Evaporator Feed Pumps Number 2
Characteristics Design capacity (gpm) 50 Design head (ft.) 90 Pump casing design pressure (psig) 350 Pump casing design temperature (°F) 250 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Distillate Pump Number 1 Design capacity (gpm) 30 Design head (ft.) 62.9 Pump casing design pressure (psig) 350 Pump casing design temperature (°F) 250 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Evaporator Bottoms Pump Number 1 Design capacity (gpm) 15 Design head (ft.) 122.1 Pump casing design pressure (psig) 350 Pump casing design temperature (°F) 250 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Test Tank Pump Number 2 Design capacity (gpm) 50 Design head (ft.) 223 Pump casing design pressure (psig) 350 Pump casing design temperature (°F) 250 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Evaporator Reboiler Pump Number 1 Design capacity (gpm) 2,750
Characteristics Design head (ft.) 60 Pump casing design pressure (psig) 600 Pump casing design temperature (°F) 350 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Bottoms Coolant Pump Number 1 Design capacity (gpm) 120 Design head (ft.) 7.5 Pump casing design pressure (psig) 350 Pump casing design temperature (°F) 250 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Test Tank Heating Pump Number 2 Design capacity (gpm) 60 Design head (ft.) 62.4 Pump casing design pressure (psig) 350 Pump casing design temperature (°F) 250 Material of construction Stainless steel ron Recovery Tank Heating Pump Number 2 Design capacity (gpm) 60 Design head (ft.) 62.4 Pump casing design pressure (psig) 350 Pump casing design temperature (°F) 250 Material of construction Stainless steel
Decontamination Factors I Cs/Rb Other sium Removal Ion Exchangers 10 2 10 ron Evaporator 100 1,000 1,000 oes not include boron demineralizers) ron Demineralizer 1 1 1 TOTAL 1,000 2,000 10,000 ention Times on recovery system 68.97 days down flow rate 75 gpm
Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences Pressure vessel and other components ssure vessels and other are protected from overpressure by mponents containing Outleakage automatic controls and relief valves; down liquids with therefore, only minor leaks are solved gases considered possible.
Only degassed liquids are normally stored in these tanks which are protected ron recovery tanks Outleakage by a diked area capable of retaining the entire contents of the tanks.
Sufficient capability to make boric acid solution for station requirements exist in e boron recovery Failure to function the boric acid batch tanks, and the aporator and auxiliaries primary water tanks can supply adequate quantities of water.
FIGURE 9.3-1 (SHEETS 1-4)P&ID COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.3-2 (SHEETS 1-4) P&ID REACTOR PLANT SAMPLING SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.3-3 (SHEETS 1-2) P&ID TURBINE PLANT SAMPLING figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.3-4 (SHEETS 1-2) P&ID RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS WASTE SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.3-5 P&ID REACTOR PLANT GASEOUS DRAINS figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
GURE 9.3-6 (SHEETS 1-3) P&ID RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE AND AERATED DRAIN figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.3-7 P&ID REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS (SHEET 1) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.3-7(1)(A) REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS (TEMP/MOD)
FIGURE 9.3-8 (SHEETS 1-4) P&ID CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.3-9 (SHEETS 1-3) P&ID BORON RECOVERY SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.3-9(2)(A) BORON RECOVERY SYSTEM (TEMP/MOD)
FIGURE 9.3-10 (SHEETS 1-3)P&ID POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
oughout Section 9.4, design values are used for space temperatures (dry bulb (db) or wet bulb
)), relative humidity, chilled water temperature, service water temperature, hot water perature, air flow rate (cfm), differential pressure (dp), and various cooling/heating water flow m). These values represent nominal values that were used in initial calculations to estimate the ting ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems requirements. Since these are nominal gn values, however, actual operating values during plant operations may vary.
AC systems are designed to maintain acceptable room conditions for human comfort and ipment environmental qualifications. HVAC equipment is sized to maintain a particular inal design value at some specific dependent parameters, such as outdoor air temperature, l system resistance (pressure drop), temperature differential across cooling coils, or heat gain/
calculation results. The nominal design value represents a specific point of operation which mally takes into account the most limiting dependent parameters, and is not, necessarily, the oint value at which the HVAC equipment is required to operate or the space conditions are to maintained. HVAC equipment operation and space conditions are maintained within an eptable range as determined by engineering. In specific cases, the nominal design value ears with such qualifiers as: less than, greater than, not to exceed, minimum, or maximum. For mple, design air flow rates depicted in the FSAR are nominal design values without any lifiers, whereas the actual air flow rate can vary by +/- 10 percent as determined by engineering he acceptance criteria of the air balancing procedure.
0 DESIGN TEMPERATURE BASES design basis temperatures for Millstone Unit 3 HVAC are based on the 1972 American iety of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) Design Weather a for New London, CT. The summer and winter outdoor design temperatures selected for lstone Unit 3 are as follows:
Season Temperature Source ASHRAE 1972, Weather Data and Design nter 0°F dry bulb Conditions, page 671 86°F dry bulb ASHRAE 1972, Weather Data and Design mmer 75°F wet bulb Conditions, page 671 ically, nuclear power plants use 99% winter design temperature which represents the perature that has been equaled or exceeded by 99% of the total hours in the average winter nths of December, January, February (a total 2160 hours0.025 days <br />0.6 hours <br />0.00357 weeks <br />8.2188e-4 months <br />). In New London, CT this is 4°F (Ref.
rce, column 4, winter, 99%). A more conservative design winter temperature of 0°F is selected Millstone Unit 3. Temperatures less than 0°F will occur for less than 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> in an average ter.
is used for sizing of HVAC equipment.
a statistically average summer, the magnitude of the outdoor temperature excursion beyond F for 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> is taken as the average of the maximum values recorded for the Bridgeport area r a 30 year period. This equals 93°F. The application of this temperature over the 40 year life he plant for equipment qualification is discussed in Appendix 3B. Climatological data for dgeport and Millstone, Tables 2.3-1 and 2.3-19 show maximum ever recorded temperatures of
°F and 91°F, respectively. 103°F was selected as a one time occurrence in the life of the plant its application for equipment qualification is discussed in Appendix 3B. Outdoor winter perature excursions below 0°F and the associated indoor temperature excursions do not ersely affect equipment qualification and are not considered.
oor design temperatures for the various areas of the plant are defined in the sections which ow. Indoor temperature excursions above the summer temperature are reflected in the perature profile of Appendix 3B of Section 3.11 which are used in the environmental lification of safety related electrical equipment. Indoor design temperatures excursions will ur along with outdoor air temperature excursions for the average 73 hour8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> periods. However, perature excursions are partially mitigated by thermal inertia effects of heavy concrete ctures, and by the type of HVAC (e.g., air conditioning, once through ventilation or variations etween). Critical areas containing equipment required for safety related functions are nitored by installed instrumentation and alarms and/or inspected on a periodic basis. Abnormal perature conditions will be monitored, evaluated and corrected by operators actions.
1 CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM control building ventilation system consists of air conditioning, heating, filtration, and tilation subsystems which provide a suitable environment for the comfort and safety of onnel within the control room area; and facilitates removal of equipment generated heat ept for the chiller and cable spreading areas.
1.1 Design Bases control building ventilation system design is based on the following criteria.
- 1. General Design Criterion 2 (Section 3.1.2.2) for protection against natural phenomena.
- 2. General Design Criterion 4 for protection against temperature, pressure, humidity, and accident conditions.
- 3. General Design Criterion 19 for providing adequate radiation protection for control room personnel under accident conditions except as stated in Section 3.1.2.19.
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.52 for air filtration requirement.
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.95 for protection of nuclear plant control room operators against an accidental chlorine release.
- 7. Regulatory Guide 1.78 for assumptions for evaluating the habitability of the control room following postulated chemical release.
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.26 for the Quality Group Classifications of systems and components.
- 9. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for the seismic design classification of system components.
- 10. Instrumentation and controls, required to perform a safety function and located in the control building, are qualified to environmental conditions in accordance with IEEE 323-1974 as described in Section 3.11.
- 11. The range of indoor design temperatures during normal and abnormal plant conditions as given in Table 9.4-1.
1.2 System Description ure 9.4-1 shows the control building air conditioning, filtration, ventilation, and chilled water ems. Table 9.4-2 lists the principal components and approximate parameters.
following control building air conditioning and ventilation subsystems are provided.
- 1. The control room air conditioning subsystem consists of two redundant 100 percent capacity air conditioning units, each containing a fan, cooling coil, an electric heating element, and filter. Each unit is rated at 21,725 cfm. A humidifier maintains a minimum humidity level in winter.
- 2. The instrument rack and the computer room air conditioning subsystem consists of two redundant 100 percent capacity air conditioning units, each containing a fan, cooling coil, an electric heating element, and filter. Each unit is rated at 32,300 cfm. A humidifier maintains a minimum humidity level in winter.
- 3. Each of the two switchgear areas has a separate air conditioning subsystem consisting of two air conditioning units. For each air conditioning subsystem, depending upon the cooling load needed, one or two air conditioning units operate to filter, cool, and deliver up to 31,000 cfm air to the distribution ductwork and finally into the area.
heating elements. Each fan is rated at 2,000 cfm and, when operated together, can purge the chiller equipment space in the event of refrigerant discharge.
- 5. The control room toilet and kitchenette exhaust ventilation subsystem consists of an exhaust fan, which is rated at 595 cfm.
- 6. The purge ventilation subsystem consists of a supply and exhaust fan. Each fan is rated at 4,000 cfm.
- 7. Each battery room has an independent exhaust fan and associated ductwork. Air to these areas is drawn in from adjacent switchgear areas through louvers, filters, and grills. To make up for the battery room exhaust and to provide ventilation air in the switchgear areas, independent supply ducts with an axial fan rated at 1500 cfm, electric heating coils, and prefilters are provided.
control room emergency ventilation filtration and pressurization system consists of two undant emergency air filtration units. The emergency ventilation system operation is matically initiated upon receipt of a Control Building Isolation (CBI) signal. The CBI signal provide a signal to the Control Building inlet isolation valves to open if they are closed and vide a signal to the A Train Control Building Emergency Ventilation Fan Inlet Damper to n, which in turn will start the A train Control Room Emergency Ventilation system fan and n the A Train Control Building Emergency Ventilation Filter Air Return Damper. If, after econds, adequate flow has not been obtained in the outlet ductwork of the A train Control m Emergency Ventilation system, the B Train Control Building Emergency Ventilation Fan t Damper will receive a signal to open, which in turn will start the B train Control Room ergency Ventilation fan and open the B Train Control Building Emergency Ventilation Filter Return Damper. This places the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system in the surized filtration mode of operation within two (2) minutes of receipt of a CBI signal. This vides a source of filtered outside air with which to pressurize the Control Room Envelope.
h of the air conditioning units is supplied with chilled water by the control building chilled er system. The control building chilled water system is redundant and consists of two percent capacity water chillers, two 100 percent capacity chilled water pumps, and two ansion tanks. Each chiller is rated at 250 tons of refrigeration. Each chilled water pump is d at 450 gpm. The chilled water piping is arranged in two redundant flowpaths to serve the trol building air conditioning unit cooling coils.
h air conditioning unit cooling coil has a flow control valve controlled by a thermostat in the ective area. The differential pressure control valve automatically maintains constant return to the chilled water pump by modulating bypass flow in proportion to varying air ditioning system flow.
Category I electrically-powered motors and controls associated with the control building air ditioning and ventilation systems and the chilled water systems are redundant to ensure
ditions, emergency power is supplied from either the preferred off site source or the rgency diesel generators.
outside air supply and exhaust ducts for the control room pressure envelope air conditioning em, kitchen-toilet exhaust system, and purge system are fitted with air-operated butterfly es located as close as possible to the control building wall.
control building is heated electrically. Area thermostats activate heating elements in the trol room air conditioning units to maintain a minimum design temperature. A control switch vates heating elements in the instrument rack and computer room air conditioning units in the nt heating is required. The mechanical equipment space is heated with electric unit heaters that controlled separately from thermostats located in the room. The chiller equipment space is ted with electric duct heaters and electric unit heaters that are controlled separately from mostats. Electric heaters are not required to function following loss of off site power.
control building purge ventilation system removes smoke, carbon dioxide or Halon from the rument rack and computer rooms, the switchgear rooms, and the mechanical equipment room ugh administrative controls. The system is designed to permit the operator to purge each ce containing smoke, carbon dioxide or Halon by opening the supply and exhaust purge ation dampers from outside that space.
eliminate the cable spreading area purge duct as a potential path for carbon dioxide to migrate the control room or switchgear rooms, the cable spreading area portion of the purge system been blanked off and retired in place. Portable fans will be used to remove carbon dioxide, ke, or Halon from the cable spreading area and control room.
1.3 Safety Evaluation control building air conditioning, emergency ventilation filtration, and chilled water systems Seismic Category I and QA Category I. Ventilation, except for the kitchen-toilet exhaust and purge system, are Seismic Category I and QA Category I. All of the systems are enclosed in a egory I missile- and tornado-protected building.
adiation monitor connected with the makeup air duct of the control room area air conditioning s detects and respond to the presence of radioactivity. At the discretion of the operator, the rgency ventilation system can be started manually and the return air of the control room or the door air supply diverted through the emergency ventilation filtration assembly.
h radiation detected by the monitors located in the air intakes result in a control building ation (CBI) signal (Section 6.4).
ing control building isolation, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system is matically started in the pressurized filtration mode to provide filtered outside air to pressurize control room.
tilation ductwork common to redundant portions of this system consist of at least two fire pers in parallel in order to preclude a single failure of one fire damper from impairing the ty function of the system. Administrative controls to shut down control room air conditioning s in the event of a fire detection alarm within the control room envelope are used to ensure fire per closure if a fire exists. Tightly sealed doors, sealed penetrations and fire walls inhibit ke, heat, carbon dioxide or Halon from entering the control room. A purge system is provided emove smoke or gases from the instrument rack and computer rooms, switchgear rooms and mechanical equipment room. The control room proper and cable spreading area are purged ually by portable fans. The chiller room has 100 percent outside air circulation. Based on ble damper isolation, potential smoke or CO2 leakage into the control room from areas iced by the purge system is limited. The purge system shares a common air intake duct, but is rated completely independent of all control building air conditioning and ventilation systems.
largest area served by the purge system can be ventilated at a rate of approximately one air nge per hour.
1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements control building air conditioning and ventilation system was field tested and inspected for air nce and completeness of installation.
control room emergency filter ventilation system is tested in accordance with the guidance ined in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, as discussed in Table 1.8-1.
control building air conditioning and ventilation systems not normally in use (standby) are rationally tested once per quarter (see Test 1 and 3 below), with the exception of the control m emergency ventilation system which is on a staggered monthly test basis (see Test 3 below).
control building isolation signal is operationally tested at intervals not greater than once per eling (see Test 2 below), or at major alteration of the control room envelope pressure ndary.
system tests are conducted as follows:
t (1): Simulate a component failure in a train of the control building air conditioning system.
ult: The failure causes a complete changeover to the standby control building water chiller, chilled water system, and air conditioning units serving the control room area and the instrument rack and computer room.
t (2): Simulate a control building isolation (CBI) signal to control building ventilation makeup air dampers.
ult: The signal automatically closes the control building ventilation makeup air dampers.
ult: The component failure causes a changeover to start a redundant fan.
control building air conditioning and ventilation unit components except for switchgear room kup units are tested, at intervals not exceeding once per refueling, as follows:
air conditioning units, supply fans, exhaust fans, water chillers, and pumps are started and functionally checked. An acceptable level of performance for air conditioning units and supply and exhaust fans is that they start and reach their operating speed (as indicated by no low flow alarms present). An acceptable level of performance for a water chiller is that it starts and operates for a length of time to indicate that normal pressures and temperatures have been reached. An acceptable level of performance for the chilled water pump is that it starts and reaches its operating speed with full flow through the pump.
All tests are considered satisfactory if the ventilation panel and visual observations indicate that all systems and components have operated as designed.
tem operability is assured by the surveillance requirements imposed by Technical cifications. Additional component inspections and planned maintenance is performed odically in accordance with industry practice to maintain optimum system performance.
testing and inspection of the control room pressurization system is described in Section 6.4.5.
1.5 Instrumentation Requirements control building air conditioning units, except the east and west switchgear rooms air ditioning units, have a STOP-AUTO-START control switch and indicator lights on the main ting and ventilation panel in the control room. Each air conditioning Train (A and B) has a RM-TEST selector switch.
h the selector switch in NORM and the air conditioning units control switch in AUTO, the air ditioning units are started and stopped automatically when the associated chilled water pump arted or stopped. The air conditioning units are controlled manually when the selector switch TEST.
east and west switchgear rooms each have an air conditioning unit that is normally running a backup air conditioning unit that is started and stopped automatically by an area perature switch.
lled water is supplied to the east and west switchgear air conditioning units by the running led water train. Chilled water isolation valves in each Train (A and B) are interlocked to open close respectively when the associated chilled water pump is started and stopped.
trol room.
perature control valves for the normally running east and west switchgear room air ditioning units are modulated by temperature controllers. The backup air conditioning units e temperature control valves interlocked to open when the area temperature is high and close n the air temperature is low.
chilled water pumps are provided with control switches and indicator lights locally near the ipment, at the switchgear, and at the main heating and ventilation panel. REMOTE/LOCAL trol switches are located at the switchgear. When local control is selected, an annunciator is vated on the main control board.
chilled water pump is normally running with the other pump on standby. The standby pump arted automatically by a low air flow signal from air conditioning units in the running Train and B), or if the running chiller's outlet chilled water temperature is high, or if the running led water pump flow is low. Starting the standby chilled water pump causes a complete nge over of air conditioning trains. The train that was running is shut down and the standby n is started.
ormal operation, the chilled water pumps are not affected by a CBI signal. The CBI signal vents the running pump from being manually stopped from the control room.
chillers are provided with ON-STOP chiller safety circuit push buttons and START-STOP hbuttons for local manual control. The chiller safety circuit is normally ON for both chillers.
chillers are started automatically when the associated chilled water pump is started.
trol room air conditioning unit heaters are controlled by automatic temperature controllers.
rument rack and computer room air conditioning units are controlled by temperature switches he event heating is required.
control room envelope area is automatically pressurized by the Control Room Emergency tilation system after a CBI signal is initiated.
BI signal is initiated when any of the following conditions exist:
air-intake radiation high; containment pressure high 2 out of 3 signal; manual initiation from main control board; manual initiation from main heating and ventilation; or manual safety injection signal.
ures status lights on the main control board indicate when the valves and dampers are closed.
opened and closed positions are monitored by the plant computer. The control building air eup dampers and isolation valves are automatically closed on receipt of a CBI signal.
chiller equipment space supply fans have control switches and indicator lights on the main ting and ventilation panel. The exhaust fans are interlocked to start and stop with the ciated supply fan. One train is normally running with the other train on standby.
purge supply fan is interlocked with the purge supply damper. The supply fan is started when supply damper is opened and stopped when the damper is closed. The purge exhaust fan is ually started from a control switch at VP1. A control switch and indicator lights for the fans damper are located on the main heating and ventilation panel.
trol switches and indicator lights for manual control of the east and west switchgear supply and the battery room exhaust fans are located on the main heating and ventilation panel in the trol room. The battery exhaust fans are interlocked to start and stop respectively when the ciated switchgear supply fan is started and stopped.
following instrumentation and controls are located on the main heating and ventilation panel.
unciators:
trouble alarm for each air conditioning unit; chiller equipment space supply fan system trouble; battery room hydrogen high; control building emergency ventilation fan system trouble; control room area temperature high; filter differential pressure high; expansion tank chilled water level; chilled water system A or B trouble; chilled water pump A or B flow low; service water pump A or B flow low; air flow battery rooms 1, 3, and 5; and air flow battery rooms 2 and 4.
differential pressure between west control room stairway and control room; hydrogen level for each battery room; pressure for air pressurization system; and air storage tank reduced pressure.
following instrumentation and controls are located on the main control board.
unciators:
any motor control center power not available; control building isolation signal bypass Train A and bypass Train B; fire - control building inlet ventilation smoke; and er not available status lights are provided on the rear of the main control board for each motor trol center.
radiation monitor alarms annunciate in the control room.
2 FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM fuel building ventilation system (Figure 9.4-2) removes heat generated by equipment and er vapor from fuel pool evaporation, prevents moisture condensation on interior walls, vides a suitable environment for equipment operation and personnel. It also limits potential oactive release to the atmosphere during normal operation or anticipated operational sients. This system is not credited in the fuel handling accident analysis (Section 15.7.4).
2.1 Design Bases fuel building ventilation system is designed in accordance with the following criteria.
- 1. General Design Criterion 2, as related to the system being capable of withstanding the effects of earthquakes.
- 2. General Design Criterion 5, as related to shared systems and components important to safety.
- 3. General Design Criterion 60 and Regulatory Guides 1.52 and 1.140, for design testing and maintenance criteria for atmosphere cleanup systems.
- 5. Outdoor air design temperatures are listed under design weather data in Section 9.4. The fuel building ventilation system is designed to maintain the
- d. following space temperatures during normal operation.
Maximum Space Minimum Space Spent Fuel Pool Area Temperature Temperature Pool water temperature is greater than 140°F 98°F 85°F Pool water temperature is greater than 100°F 95°F 85°F Pool water temperature is less than 100°F 95°F 65°F All other areas 104°F 65°F
- 6. Air flow is directed from areas of lower potential radioactivity to areas of higher potential radioactivity.
- 7. The fuel building exhaust ventilation system components are located in the auxiliary building, a seismic- and tornado-protected structure. This system is capable of withstanding the effects of earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, external missiles, internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks, in accordance with General Design Criteria 2 and 4.
- 8. Radiation detectors are located in the fuel building ventilation system to monitor airborne effluent activity during normal operation, for anticipated operational transients, and following postulated accidents. Section 11.5 gives the details of the process and effluent radiological monitoring system.
2.2 System Description fuel building ventilation system includes a nonnuclear safety related supply air system, aust air system, and a nonnuclear safety related portion of the exhaust air system. Principal ponent design and performance characteristics are listed in Table 9.4-3.
supply air system consists of three 50 percent capacity heating and ventilating units shared ween the waste disposal building ventilation system and the fuel building ventilation system.
h heating and ventilating unit consists of the following components described in the order of low travel:
- 1. prefilter
- 2. hot water preheat coil
- 4. fan prefilter is an extended dry media type with rigid frame.
hot water preheat coil is capable of raising the incoming outside air temperature from 0°F to F.
hot water reheat coil raises the incoming air from the preheat coil to maintain winter design perature of 65°F.
ting of the building is provided by the heating and ventilating units. The ventilation system plies air to the spent fuel pool area and remaining portions of the building. A reheater, supplied m the hot water heating system, serves the spent fuel pool area to maintain an indoor perature of 85°F during winter when the outside air temperature is between 0°F and 50°F and spent fuel pool water temperature is greater than 100°F. This design maintains the walls and ing surface temperatures in this area above the inside air dew point, minimizing condensation.
ting of the building during periods of plant shutdown is provided by hot water unit heaters.
supply air system provides approximately 39,000 cfm during normal operation. The supply low is controlled by an air-operated damper mounted in the supply ductwork to the fuel ding. Two safety related wall mounted backdraft dampers located on the east wall of the fuel ding provide makeup air to the building in the event of loss of the non safety related supply air em or the isolation of the same system following a failure of one of the two redundant special r assemblies.
exhaust portion of the system consists of redundant 100 percent capacity special filter mblies with associated fans and dampers and one nonnuclear safety related 100 percent acity exhaust fan. The normal exhaust system provides approximately 41,360 cfm during mal plant operation, while the exhaust system maintains the building at slightly negative sure if operating during fuel handling operation and accident conditions in relation to the ve supply air quantities. The fuel building ventilation exhaust system serves all areas of the building and is discharged (unfiltered or filtered) through the radiation monitored ventilation t.
flow of the air within the fuel building is directed from areas of low potential for airborne tamination to areas of greater potential for airborne contamination. The unfiltered exhaust air, subjected to contamination under normal operation conditions, is discharged through the nitored ventilation vent. (See Section 9.4.2).
fuel building ventilation exhaust system is capable of detecting and controlling radioactive tamination. On receipt of a high radioactivity signal from the particulate and gas monitor ch samples the ductwork exhaust, the unfiltered ventilation exhaust system is manually ated, in the control room, by the closing of two safety related dampers located on the supply
nuclear safety related damper in the supply ductwork, then the exhaust air is manually rted through one of the two fuel building filtration units. Operational control of the supply air res the prevention of condensation of water vapor from the spent fuel pool and maintenance negative pressure in the fuel building to prevent uncontrolled release of radioactive tamination.
he event of a failure in the nonnuclear safety related supply air system, the safety related kdraft dampers, which are mounted in the fuel building exterior wall, admit the required eup air.
ing fuel handling or movement of any loads within the spent fuel pool, the exhaust air may be ually diverted through one of the fuel building filtration units, in addition to reducing the ply air, thus maintaining a negative pressure.
2.3 Safety Evaluation ing normal plant operations, the ventilation air is discharged by one nonnuclear safety related aust fan to the atmosphere via the ventilation vent. A particulate and gas radiation monitor is vided which samples the exhaust air stream prior to the filtration units as discussed in tion 11.5. On receipt of a high radiation alarm, the exhaust air is manually diverted through of the fuel building filtration units, the normal exhaust fan is stopped, and the associated ty related fan is started. High radiation signals from radiation monitors located above the nt fuel pool and in the new fuel storage area alarm locally and in the control room.
ngle nonnuclear safety related damper with associated locking device is provided in the tilation supply system to reduce air capacity in the fuel building so that a negative pressure can maintained in the fuel building. The actuation of this damper occurs simultaneously with the ation unit used to ensure maintenance of a negative pressure within the building. In the event failure in the nonnuclear safety related supply system, the safety related wall-mounted kdraft dampers admit the required makeup air. This operation prevents potentially taminated air from leaving the spent fuel pool area. The filtered exhaust system is provided h redundant 100 percent capacity fans, dampers, and filtration units.
fuel building ventilation exhaust system used during the emergency filtration modes is mic Category I, and is designed so that failure of a portion of the system does not compromise operability of another portion.
ategory I air operated isolation damper is installed in the supply ductwork to the fuel building.
damper is interlocked with both exhaust filter trains to close upon failure of either train if h filters are running. Presently, dual filter train operation is not required nor included in plant rating procedures. Additional testing may be performed in the future to allow for dual train ration, if required. The three air handling units are isolated from each other by manually rated isolation dampers.
lt of any single failure.
ventilation exhaust ductwork is seismically supported. Ventilation supply ductwork located ve the spent fuel pool and portions that compromise the integrity of safety related systems are seismically supported. The ventilation exhaust system components, excluding the unfiltered exhaust fan, are Seismic Category I. The modulating damper in the ventilation supply system he fuel building is QA Category II and Seismic Category II. The wall mounted backdraft pers are QA Category I and Seismic Category I. The isolation damper in the ventilation ply system to the fuel building is QA Category I and seismically supported. These categories discussed in Section 3.2.
andby redundant fuel building ventilation exhaust system is provided to assure that a loss of ctional performance capability of the system does not occur due to a single active failure.
n low flow in the operating exhaust fan discharge line, the standby system is automatically ted and the isolation damper is automatically closed as discussed in Sections 7.3.2 and 9.4.1.5.
damper assemblies installed in ventilation ductwork common to redundant portions of this em consist of at least two fire dampers in parallel in order to preclude a single failure of one damper from impairing the safety function of the system.
he event that the fuel building exhaust and filtration system is not in use, or the fuel building rs are not closed, suitable radiological monitoring shall be performed to ensure that the uirements of the Millstone Effluent Control Program are met.
he event of a fuel handling accident in the fuel building, the Control Room personnel should action to close the fuel building doors as soon as practicable and may choose to actuate the building exhaust and filtration system. It should be noted that this system is not credited for t-accident mitigation of a fuel handling accident as described in Section 15.7.4.
2.4 Tests and Inspections t and inspections are not required for the fuel building ventilation system.
2.5 Instrumentation Requirements mperature controller mounted in the spent fuel pool area supply ductwork maintains the spent pool area temperature at 85°F by modulating the hot water temperature control valve for the t air hot water heater, provided outside air temperature is less than 50°F (measured inside) and nt fuel pool temperature is higher than 100°F. When any one of the above two conditions is not ent, the hot water temperature control valve is closed. The control circuit of the valve can also ctivated manually with a normal and override control switch mounted on the local control el.
of the fuel building supply fans is started, provided the normal exhaust fan inlet and outlet pers are open.
fuel building normal exhaust fan inlet and outlet dampers are manually operated from the n heating and ventilation panel in the control room, by control switches and indicator lights vided.
fuel building air inlet damper has a MINIMUM POSITION/OPEN control switch with cator lights on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room.
fuel building air inlet damper is interlocked with the normal exhaust fan as follows:
full open when normal exhaust fan is running, and minimum flow position when the normal exhaust fan is not running.
trol switches and indicator lights are provided on the main heating and ventilation panel in the trol room for manual operation of the fuel building filter bank exhaust fans and dampers. The aust fans are interlocked with the filter bank inlet and the fan discharge damper so that the two ciated dampers must be open to run the fan.
airflow in a filter bank in service causes an automatic start of the standby filter bank.
filter heater is controlled by a thermostat, provided the following interlocks are satisfied:
associated exhaust fan running, and filter high air temperature cutout reset cator lights on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room indicate when a r heater is energized or deenergized.
following instrumentation is located on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control m.
unciators:
fuel building filter system differential pressure high; fuel building Exhaust Fan A breaker auto trip/overcurrent; fuel building Exhaust Fan B breaker auto trip/overcurrent; fuel building Exhaust Fan A transfer switch in local position; and
following parameters are monitored by the plant computer:
fuel building filter exhaust fan motor overcurrent; fuel building filter exhaust fan auto trip; fuel building filter exhaust fan breaker position; differential pressure across moisture separator high; differential pressure across prefilter high; differential pressure across inlet HEPA filter high; differential pressure across charcoal filter high; and differential pressure across outlet HEPA filter high.
following instrumentation and controls are located at the load center:
local/remote control switches and indicator lights for the fuel building filter exhaust fans; control transfer switch for each fuel building filter exhaust fan; and position indicators for each fuel building filter inlet damper and exhaust fan discharge damper.
al differential pressure indicators are provided for each fuel building filter section.
ative humidity upstream of each charcoal filter is indicated locally.
3 AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM auxiliary building ventilation system (ABVS) (Figure 9.4-2) provides an environment able for personnel access and equipment operation. It also controls and minimizes the ntial for spread of airborne radioactive material within the building.
3.1 Design Bases design bases for the auxiliary building ventilation system are in accordance with the owing:
- 1. General Design Criterion 2 for the auxiliary building to protect against natural phenomena (Chapters 2 and 3).
(Chapters 2 and 3).
- 3. General Design Criteria 60 and 64 for control and monitoring radioactivity releases in the auxiliary building ventilation system.
- 4. General Design Criterion 5 for shared systems and components important to safety.
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for the seismic design classification of system components.
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.26 quality group classification of systems and components.
- 7. Regulatory Guide 1.52 for the air filtration and adsorption units (Section 1.8.1.52).
- 8. Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1 for breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside containment.
- 9. Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 for fire protection design.
- 10. Outdoor air design conditions are listed in FSAR Section 9.4.
- 11. Indoor air design temperature of 104°F in the summer and a minimum of 65°F in the winter except for the charging pump and reactor plant component cooling pump and heat exchanger area winter design temperature which is maintained above 32°F during an emergency bus single failure. The motor control center (MCC), rod control, and cable vault areas are maintained at 86°F during normal operation in the summer and not more than 120°F during DBA.
- 12. Typically air flow shall be maintained from the least contaminated to the more contaminated spaces.
- 13. The auxiliary building shall be maintained at negative pressure.
- 14. The ABVS is nonnuclear safety related with the exception of: the building isolation dampers; charging pump, component cooling water pump, and heat exchanger ventilation system; MCC, rod control, and cable vault ventilation system; and the auxiliary building filtration units including fans, dampers, and segment drainage up to and including the isolation valves, all of which are Safety Class 3.
- 15. The ABVS is actuated manually. The charging pump, component cooling water pump, and heat exchanger areas ventilation supply and exhaust dampers to and from each charging pump cubicle are actuated by the operation of the charging
- 16. The ABVS normally maintains the charging pump cubicle temperature above the solubility temperature limit of 59°F for a 4 percent boron concentration except during an emergency bus single failure in the winter at which time the temperature is maintained above 32°F.
3.2 System Description ABVS is comprised of the following subsystems:
auxiliary building general area ventilation; charging pump, reactor plant component cooling water pump, and heat exchanger areas ventilation; auxiliary building filtration system; MCC, rod control, and cable vault areas ventilation; and electric cable tunnel area ventilation.
design parameters for the principal components of the ABVS are given in Table 9.4-4.
general area ventilation air supply portion includes two 50 percent capacity air handling s, each rated at 33,000 cfm. (One of the units has been rebalanced to operate at 31,550 cfm).
air exhaust portion consists of two axial flow fans; one rated at 20,000 cfm (rebalanced to rate at 22,000 cfm) and the other rated at 50,000 cfm.
h air handling unit includes a prefilter, preheat coil, fan, and heating coil. The coils use hot er as a heating medium. Outside air is supplied continuously to all levels of the auxiliary ding through ductwork.
exhaust fans maintain the building at a negative pressure. One exhaust fan draws air from ation 66 feet 6 inches and elevation 43 feet 6 inches, and the other draws air from elevation 24 6 inches and elevation 4 feet 6 inches plus two rooms at elevation 43 foot 6 inches and one at elevation 66 foot 6 inches. The air flow path within the auxiliary building is from general s with lesser potential for contamination to the cubicle area where a greater potential for tamination exists except during winter mode alignment. Exhaust registers are mainly located hin the cubicle areas. Once air is drawn from the building space, it is either discharged to the osphere through the ventilation vent, diverted to the auxiliary building filtration units, prior to ase through the ventilation vent or mixed with outside air to maintain a minimum air perature.
ice building.
ventilation vent effluent point of release is at elevation 157 feet and 133 feet above site grade l, and the discharge velocity is approximately 2,500 fpm. The vent is located in the northeast ner of the turbine building auxiliary bay roof. A radioactive particulate and gaseous detection em is installed in the common duct to monitor effluent and provide visible and audible alarm he control room. Section 11.5 gives details of the process and effluent radiological monitoring ems. The total air flow through the ventilation vent is also measured and monitored by the S computer system.
samples are drawn from several points in the exhaust ductwork for radioactivity analysis tream of the filtration units. High radioactivity initiates an alarm. Subsequent to an alarm al, exhaust air is manually diverted through one of the two filter units. The filtration capacity unit is 30,000 cfm. Each unit includes, in the direction of flow, a moisture separator, electric ting coil, prefilter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, a charcoal adsorber and a ond HEPA filter. The prefilter has a minimum filtration efficiency of 80 percent as rated by HRAE Standard 52. A gasketless, nontray type charcoal adsorber is designed for a 0.22 second ll time per 2 inch depth for gases at a flow velocity of 46 fpm. Four inch depth of charcoal is vided. The impregnated charcoal is capable of removing in excess of 99 percent of methyl de (CH I) and 99.5 percent of elemental iodine at nominal design air flow. Testing of used rcoal, post Generic Letter 98-02 (Ref. Amendment 184) uses ASTM D3803-89 testing dards assuring charcoal efficiency of 97.5% or greater. The HEPA filters have a minimum r efficiency of 99.97 percent when filtering particulates that are 0.3 micron or larger.
tion 6.5 discusses the filter design bases in detail. The auxiliary building radioactive iculate and gas detection system is described in Section 11.5.
charging pump and reactor plant component cooling water pump and heat exchanger areas tilation system has two modes of system operation with two season dependent system manual per positions. The winter mode is established for the time period between November 1 and y 1. The summer mode is used for the remainder of the year. In the winter mode of operation, ual dampers are positioned such that outside air is mixed with return air at a fixed rate to ntain a minimum area temperature as defined in Section 9.4.2.1. Supplementary heat is vided by eight safety related electric heaters (four on each train) powered from emergency er buses. Air is supplied directly to the reactor plant component cooling water pump and heat hanger area, then drawn into the charging pump cubicles through the door openings. Air not rned is exhausted from both areas directly to the Auxiliary Building roof vent and then to the bine Building stack. In the filtration mode of operation, air is exhausted through the Auxiliary lding Filtration Units then directed to the Auxiliary Building roof vent and ultimately released ugh the Turbine Building stack.
he summer alignment, the system manual dampers are repositioned such that the recirculation path is isolated and outside air is supplied directly to both, the component cooling water p area and the charging pump cubicles. An exhaust flow path remains the same as described the winter mode of operation.
tdown; the building outlet isolation dampers close; the charging pump, reactor plant ponent cooling water pump, and heat exchanger ventilation exhaust dampers close; the iliary building filter unit inlet and outlet dampers open; the filter exhaust fans start matically and the charging pump, reactor plant component cooling water pump, and heat hanger supply and exhaust fans continue to operate venting through the turbine building stack r filtration. This ABVS line-up augments SLCRS in drawing the required negative pressure in secondary containment. The negative pressure aspects of ABVS are described in tion 6.2.3. In the event of a LOP signal, system alignment is identical to responses to SIS and A except that building inlet isolation dampers remain open and the auxiliary building filter inlet and outlet dampers open from the sequenced safeguards signal.
ddition to the ventilation systems described, the MCC, rod control and cable vault ventilation em serves the electrical equipment areas on elevation 24 feet 6 inches and elevation 43 feet ches. Each of the redundant system supply units consists of a prefilter, service water cooling
, chilled water cooling coil, and fan. Either unit continuously recirculates 26,000 cfm of ditioned air through the electrical spaces to maintain design temperature. During normal plant ration, cooling water is supplied to the MCC/Rod Control Area air-handling units by the lled Water system. In the event of a high return air temperature or a Loss of Power (LOP) al, the service water system MCC and Rod Control area booster pumps will automatically t if the associated air conditioning unit is operating.
electric cable tunnel area is ventilated by a 2,000 cfm capacity exhaust fan which discharges o the ventilation vent. This same exhaust path and fan is also used to purge the two MCC and control areas utilizing two normally closed purge exhaust dampers. Supply air to the electric nel area is furnished from the service building ventilation system (Section 9.4.11).
3.3 Safety Evaluation iation monitors are provided at various points in the exhaust air duct stream of the auxiliary ding ventilating system. Upon the receipt of a high radiation signal, exhaust air can be ually diverted through one or both auxiliary building filtration units prior to its discharge to ventilation vent. This reduces any potential of radioactive contaminated air being released to atmosphere.
charging pump, reactor plant component cooling water pump, and heat exchanger ventilation em; and the MCC, rod control, and cable vault ventilation system are nuclear safety related are provided with redundant 100 percent capacity supply and exhaust fans.
ductwork in the auxiliary building is seismically supported thus eliminating the possibility of safety related equipment being damaged by ductwork. The charging pump, reactor plant ponent cooling water pump, and heat exchanger ventilation system; the MCC, rod control, cable vault ventilation system; the filtration units including their fans, and building isolation pers are QA and Seismic Category I.
auxiliary building ventilation subsystems are air-leak and pressure tested, air-balanced for ply and exhaust, and inspected for proper installation of ductwork, equipment, supports, etc.
auxiliary building general area ventilation subsystems operate continuously during normal t operation and no periodic testing is required. Routine maintenance and surveillance are ormed as required.
3.5 Instrumentation Requirements auxiliary building ventilation supply units and exhaust fans have control switches and cator lights on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room. The exhaust fans interlocked with the associated auxiliary building ventilation inlet dampers, filter inlet pers and normal outlet dampers. The auxiliary building ventilation inlet dampers and either filter inlet or the normal outlet dampers must be open for the exhaust fan to run. A temperature tch is used to monitor the supply unit preheating coil outlet temperature and stop the exhaust when temperature drops to 35°F or less. An annunciator is alarmed on the auxiliary building tilation panel and an auxiliary building ventilation trouble annunciator is alarmed on the main ting and ventilation panel in the control room when inlet air temperature is 35°F or less.
auxiliary building air supply units are interlocked with the associated exhaust fans. The aust fan must be running to operate the associated air supply units.
aust air from the charging pumps and component cooling water and heat exchanger areas is nitored by temperature elements which alarm in the control room on low and high building perature.
aust air is monitored by radiation monitors and high radiation is alarmed locally and in the trol room. Air flow is monitored by the RMS computer system; indication is available through RMS computer system workstations.
ineered safety feature status lights on the main control board indicate the status of the outlet inlet dampers of the auxiliary building ventilation system. The outlet dampers are closed matically on receipt of a SIS, CDA, or loss of power (LOP) signal. The inlet dampers are ed automatically on receipt of a SIS signal.
MCC, rod control, and cable vault air conditioning air supply units have control switches and cator lights located on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room. One air ditioning unit is normally running serving both MCC and rod control train areas while the er unit is on standby. On receipt of a carbon dioxide (CO2) discharge signal into either train
, the automatic closure of fire dampers in the interconnecting ducts between the two air ditioning units isolates the two MCC and rod control areas from each other. The automatic tup of the standby unit via low airflow switch actuation in the suction and/or discharge cross-nect lines allows each air conditioning unit to serve its own train area.
aust fan outlet dampers close on receipt of a SIS. On receipt of a CO2 discharge signal to er electric tunnel area, the exhaust fan is automatically stopped and the associated electric nel exhaust damper is closed. On receipt of a CO2 discharge signal into either MCC and rod trol area, the exhaust fan is automatically stopped and both MCC and rod control area purge aust dampers are closed. Engineered safety feature status lights on the main control board cate when the dampers are closed.
4 TURBINE BUILDING AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM turbine building area ventilation system, a nonnuclear safety related system, removes the heat ipated from equipment, piping, and lighting to provide a comfortable environment for onnel and proper function of equipment, instrumentation, and control.
4.1 Design Bases turbine building area ventilation design is based on the following criteria:
- 1. During the summer, coincident with the outdoor air design temperature, the turbine building temperatures range from 95°F at operating floor to 104°F just below the roof. During the winter, the inside temperature is maintained at a minimum of 65°F.
- 2. The system is non safety related and is designated nonnuclear safety class (NNS).
- 3. Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants.
4.2 System Description turbine building area ventilation system is designed as shown on Figure 9.4-3. The principal ponents and approximate parameters are listed in Table 9.4-5.
supply portion of the system consists of four axial flow fans, each with inlet sound nuators, mixing plenum, associated ductwork, and air intake louvers and dampers. There are six transfer fans, which transfer air from the lower level and battery room to the upper level he turbine building.
exhaust portion of the system consists of twelve axial flow exhaust fans located below the ine building roof. Each fan has sound attenuators, ductwork, backdraft damper, and a therproof hood.
storage area, condensate polishing area, elevator machinery room, lubricating oil storage m, and sample sink areas have separate ventilation systems.
ns, the interlocked exhaust fans start up in sequence according to the damper position tches. As the damper closes, the exhaust fans shut down accordingly. The direction of the air inside the building is from the respective floor level to the inlet of exhaust fans under the h supply fan is rated at 165,000 cfm and takes suction from duct plenums located on the east l of the turbine building at the operating level.
suction portion of each supply fan ductwork is arranged to mix the outside air and rculated air, when necessary, to temper the outside air. The supply fan discharge air is ributed through ductwork to all levels of the turbine building. The temperature of the turbine ding ventilation system supply air is maintained at a minimum of 65°F during the winter.
re are six turbine building ventilation transfer fans, each rated at 70,000 cfm. Four fans are ted near the west wall, and the other two are located near the east wall. These fans transfer air m lower levels to the turbine building operating level in the direction of the turbine building aust fans. The transfer fans provide a better mixing of air and create a more uniform perature inside the building.
r sets of exhaust fans, each containing three fans rated at 60,000 cfm each, are interlocked h the four supply fan outside air dampers. As an inlet air damper opens, a set of three exhaust is energized in sequence by the damper position switches mounted such that, when the ide air damper is 35 percent open, the first exhaust fan runs; at 70 percent open, the second aust fan runs; and at 100 percent open, the third fan runs. As the outside air damper closes, the shut down accordingly.
arate ventilation systems are provided for each of the following areas:
- 1. The two turbine building lubricating oil storage rooms are ventilated by separate systems, each consisting of a 2,000 cfm exhaust fan. Each lubricating oil storage room is ventilated by turbine building air which enters the room through a fire-damper opening in the wall. The exhaust fan takes its suction through a fire-dampered opening in the wall from the lubricating oil storage room and exhausts the air at the turbine building roof through a weatherproof hood.
- 2. Battery room 6 is ventilated by a 1200 cfm supply fan mounted on the battery room roof. The fan takes suction from the relatively cool ambient air in the Turbine Building basement area. The supply fan is controlled locally at the entrance to the battery room. The inlet and outlet ducts are equipped with fire dampers. The concentration of the hydrogen in battery room number 6 is continuously monitored with indication on the ventilation panel VP-3.
- 3. The elevator machinery room is ventilated by exhausting 500 cfm of air with a propeller roof exhaust fan.
Air is drawn through the hood over the sample sink, through the filters, and discharged into the turbine building.
- 5. The welding area ventilation system consists of a manually operated 5,900 cfm axial exhaust fan, sound attenuator, back draft damper, and weatherproof exhaust hood. The 5,900 cfm is supplied to the area by infiltration. The entrance door to this area is normally closed, having no interlock with the exhaust fan.
- 6. The maintenance/operations offices are supplied by a 10,000 cfm air conditioning package unit. This unit is located in the turbine and laydown storage area, and is manually started with an indicator.
- 7. The maintenance toilet area is ventilated by a 450 cfm exhaust fan mounted on the outside wall. The ventilation air enters the maintenance toilet area through a louvered door from the turbine area.
- 8. The condensate polishing area is ventilated by one supply fan and one exhaust fan, each rated at 10,400 cfm. The condensate polishing area supply fan supplies outside air throughout the condensate polishing area through the ductwork. This fan has its own weatherproof hood. The exhaust fan discharges air to the atmosphere through a sound attenuator and weatherproof hood.
water unit heaters, provided inside the turbine building, maintain the minimum 65°F perature in the winter season.
4.3 Safety Evaluation turbine building ventilation system does not have safety related functions, and its failure does affect operation of any other safety related system or component.
4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements turbine building ventilation system was air-leak tested, pressure tested, air balanced for ply and exhaust, and inspected for proper installation of ductwork, insulation, equipment, and ports. Periodic testing, corrective and preventive maintenance are performed to keep the ems running properly.
4.5 Instrumentation Requirements turbine building ventilation system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled, locally or remotely, as follows:
The controls for the turbine building area ventilation system are located on the local ventilation panel in the turbine building. STOP-START control switches with indicating
-OFF control switches with indicating lights are provided for the following:
- 1. Sample sink exhaust fan
- 2. Turbine building transfer fan
- 3. Condensate polishing area supply fan
- 4. Welding area exhaust fan
- 5. Lube oil room exhaust fan
- 6. Turbine building exhaust fans
- 7. Maintenance area toilet exhaust fan
- 8. Maintenance/Operations office package air conditioning unit t-out annunciators are provided on the turbine building area local ventilation system panel for utomatic trip or overcurrent trip of the turbine plant supply fans and also for a high hydrogen l in battery room number 6.
cators are provided on the turbine building area ventilation panel to monitor the following:
- 1. Turbine building supply fan discharge temperature
- 2. Turbine building supply fan AUTO TRIP (light only)
- 3. Battery room number 6 hydrogen concentration sample sink hood exhaust fan is controlled locally near the sample sink by an ON-OFF trol switch with indicating lights.
annunciator is provided on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room for ine plant ventilation trouble, which is actuated by an automatic trip or overcurrent in a turbine ding area ventilation supply fan.
mputer inputs are provided for the turbine building supply fan breaker position.
5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM function of the engineered safety features (ESF) building ventilation system (Figure 9.4-4) is rovide a suitable environment for personnel and equipment operation and to prevent or
5.1 Design Bases design bases of the ESF building ventilation system are:
- 1. The outdoor air design temperatures are listed in Section 9.4.
- 2. The ESFB areas are maintained at a temperature below 104°F. During winter, the indoor temperature is maintained at a minimum of 50°F.
- 3. To minimize the release of airborne radioactivity during a postulated accident, the ESFB areas adjacent to the containment are maintained at a negative pressure by exhausting air and diverting it through the supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) filters (Section 6.2.3).
- 4. General Design Criterion 2, for structures housing the system and the system itself being able to withstand the effects of natural phenomena including earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, as established in Chapters 2 and 3.
- 5. General Design Criterion 4, for structures housing the system and the system itself being able to withstand the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
- 6. Nuclear safety related areas are in accord with General Design Criterion 5, for shared systems and components important to safety. No systems or components are shared. A single active failure cannot result in the loss of system function performance capabilities.
- 7. Regulatory Guide 1.26, for the quality group classification of system components.
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.29, for the seismic design classification of system components.
- 9. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.89, as described in IEEE 323-1974 for the environmental qualification of Class IE electrical equipment.
5.2 System Design ESF building ventilation system is shown on Figure 9.4-4 and the principal component gn and performance characteristics are given in Tables 9.4-6 and 9.4-7. The ESF building tilation system consists of two systems: normal and emergency ventilation.
normal ventilation system is non safety related and consists of three sets of supply and aust fans and one self contained air conditioning unit. One set (SUPPLY 3HVQ-FN3,
- 1. Safety injection pump and quench spray pump areas, and residual heat removal pump and heat exchanger areas
- 2. Containment recirculation pump and cooler areas
- 3. Refueling water recirculation pump area
- 4. Motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump areas
- 5. Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump area; and third set of fans (SUPPLY 3HVQ-FN8, EXHAUST 3HVQ-FN7) ventilate the piping cubicles S and QSS area) to provide air exchange during occupancy.
MSS Valve Pipe Ventilation system (3HVQ-ACU3) consists of an 1300 cfm direct ansion, self contained air conditioning unit. The air conditioning unit consists of a centrifugal fan, direct expansion coil, filter, refrigerant tubing and a remote air-cooled condensing/
pressor unit (3HVQ-CND1). This system cools the MSS valve pipe tunnel when the perature exceeds 90°F.
normal ventilation system is designed to limit the temperature to a maximum of 104°F.
ctric unit heaters keep all areas at a minimum temperature of 50°F during normal plant ration.
ept for exhaust from the ventilation mechanical rooms, ESF building normal ventilation em exhaust is monitored for radiation releases during normal plant operation.
ESF building emergency ventilation system contains the following five safety related tilation subsystems.
o - Residual heat exchanger area, residual heat removal pump area, safety injection and quench spray pump area systems served by self contained air conditioning units (3HVQ*ACUS1A/1B).
o - Containment recirculation pump and cooler area systems served by self contained air conditioning units (3HVQ*ACUS2A/2B).
- Mechanical room and auxiliary feedwater pump areas system served by supply (3HVQ*FN5A/5B) and exhaust fans (3HVQ*FN6A/6B).
se subsystems are classified QA Category I and Seismic Category I, and are supplied with ss IE electric power. The self contained air conditioning units consist of a centrifugal flow fan, ct expansion coil, compressor, ASME III condenser, ASME III regulating valve and prefilter.
ective area start, supply air throughout the equipment area and return the air to the units.
safety related ventilation subsystem servicing the mechanical rooms and auxiliary feedwater ps area consists of two redundant trains of 100 percent capacity axial flow supply fans VQ*FN5A/5B) and exhaust fans (3HVQ*FN6A/6B). Design of this system permits the use of utside air supply during the summer and air recirculation during the winter. A single train is able of maintaining a maximum temperature at 104°F during the summer and a minimum of F during the winter. The exhaust fan *FN6A/6B is interlocked with the supply fan *FN5A/5B.
supply fan can be manually started from the Main Control Room HVAC Panel VP1 or will t automatically under the following conditions.
- a. Fan 3HVQ*FN5A will start on any of the following: (1) either 3HVQ*ACUS1A or ACUS2A starts, (2) the train A motor-driven Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) pump starts.
- b. Fan 3HVQ*FN5B will start on any of the following signals: (1) either 3HVQ*ACUS1B or ACUS2B starts, (2) the train B motor-driven Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) pump starts.
- c. When any of the three air-operated isolation valves to the Turbine Driven AFW pump opens, both trains A & B receive a start signal.
- d. Whenever both Trains A & B receive a start signal, the following occurs:
- 1. With neither trains in operation, train A (*FN5A) starts as the preferred/
lead train because train B (*FN5B) start circuit has a time delay.
- 2. With a train in operation, and its low flow switch (*FS53) satisfied, it will prevent the second train from starting.
- 3. If the low flow switch (*FS53) in the operating train senses a low flow, the second train will start.
n receipt of SIS, the dampers within the normal ventilation system close, isolating the safety ction pump, quench spray pump, RHR pump, and heat exchanger areas. At this time, the CRS (Section 6.2.3) starts and maintains a negative pressure within the interior cubicles. The ty related air conditioning units start and cool their respective areas.
5.3 Safety Evaluation ESF building normal ventilation system is not required to operate during or after a postulated dent and is not safety related. The failure of this nonessential system does not preclude ration of any essential safety related systems.
of the safety related ESF building ventilation subsystems are located in a Seismic Category I cture that is tornado, missile, and flood protected. The redundant components are connected to undant Class 1E buses and can function as required in the event of loss of off site power. The ty related ESF building ventilation system can withstand a single active component failure or ure of one of its Class 1E electric power sources without degrading the performance of the ty function.
safety related ESF building ventilation system uses equipment of proven design. All ponents are specified to provide maximum safety and reliability. Consequences of probable ponent failures are tabulated in Table 9.4-7.
h of the redundant safety injection and quench spray pump areas, residual heat removal pump heat exchanger areas, and the containment recirculation pump and cooler areas has its own tilation system. The redundant ventilation system ensures that, in the event of a ventilation failure, a second train is available. The auxiliary feedwater pumps and mechanical room s have ventilation systems with two trains of 100 percent capacity supply and exhaust fans h common supply and exhaust ductwork. Fire damper assemblies installed in ventilation twork common to redundant portions of this system consist of at least two fire dampers in llel in order to preclude a single failure of one fire damper from impairing the safety function he system. These redundant fans ensure the integrity of this duct system.
ing normal plant operation, safety related systems do not operate.
ing plant shutdown, whenever a safety injection pump, a quench spray pump, or a residual t removal pump is required to be operable, the corresponding safety related ventilation system quired to be operable. The safety related ventilation system is designed to automatically start never one of the corresponding pumps is started.
ing a postulated accident, the ESF building emergency ventilation subsystems automatically t whenever any of their respective safety related pumps start. These ventilation systems supply exhaust air throughout their equipment areas to maintain environmental conditions at which pumps and coolers can perform their safety functions. Upon a failure of any of the safety ted units in one train, the redundant train can maintain the areas at the designed conditions.
areas in which safety related equipment is located are monitored for high temperature and unciated in the control room. Upon a high temperature alarm within one of the areas the rator can switch to the redundant system for backup. Upon receipt of a safety injection signal, residual heat removal pump and heat exchanger areas, safety injection and quench spray pump s, and containment recirculation pump and cooler areas are isolated from the normal ESF ding ventilation system. Two automatically-actuated dampers in series are provided to ensure ation in each duct penetrating the interior cubicle walls. The SLCRS then exhausts air to ntain a negative pressure within these areas (Section 6.2.3).
ESF building ventilation systems were air-leak tested, pressure tested, air balance tested, sted, and inspected for proper installation prior to operation. The normal ventilation systems he ESF building are in continuous operation and, therefore, periodic testing is not necessary.
ESF building emergency ventilation subsystems are not in operation under normal ditions. These ventilation systems are interlocked with the equipment they are serving, and t whenever their respective equipment starts. Therefore, these systems are tested and verified e operating at the same time that the equipment is tested.
5.5 Instrumentation Requirements ESF building normal ventilation system fans are controlled manually and operate tinuously. Control devices and indicating lights are located on their respective motor control ters. Electric unit heaters in the ESF building areas are automatically controlled by thermostats aintain a 50°F minimum temperature. A temperature controller modulates an electric duct ter in the mechanical rooms air intake to maintain a 50°F minimum supply air temperature never the fans are operating.
afety injection signal overrides the manual control and closes the normal ventilation inlet and et dampers for the safety injection pumps, quench spray pumps and residual heat exchangers s, and the containment recirculation pumps and coolers areas. In addition to the control cating lights on the main ventilation panel located in the main control room, ESF status lights provided on the main control board for each set of dampers to indicate they are both closed.
safety related self contained air conditioning units for the ESF building emergency tilation subsystems may be controlled manually from the main ventilation panel. These units t automatically when any of the ESF equipment in their areas is started. In addition to the trol indicating lights on the main ventilation panel, status indicating lights are provided on the n control board for each air conditioning unit, to indicate when a unit is running.
auxiliary feedwater pumps area emergency ventilation fans may be controlled manually from main ventilation panel. Also, one train starts automatically whenever any of the equipment in ssociated area is started. In addition to the control indicating lights on the main ventilation el, an ESF status light is provided on the main control board to indicate when an emergency tilation supply fan is running. A bypass alarm is actuated whenever both Train A supply and aust fans and Train B supply and exhaust fans are not available for operation.
en the auxiliary feedwater pumps area emergency ventilation system is operating, outside air sed exclusively until the supply air temperature decreases to 50°F d.b. At this point, the ply, exhaust, and recirculation dampers modulate the incoming outside air with a portion of recirculated area air to maintain a 50°F d.b supply air temperature. In addition to the damper ition indicating lights on the main ventilation panel, ESF status lights are provided on the main trol board to indicate that either the supply or exhaust ventilation damper and the recirculation per are fully closed.
also monitored by the plant computer.
ESF building normal ventilation discharge is monitored for gaseous radiation and sampled particulate and iodine releases. The radiation monitors are discussed in Section 11.5.2.2. Air is measured and monitored by the RMS computer system.
ssure differential indicators are provided for each inlet filter in the normal ventilation systems in the inlet filters for self contained air conditioning units to monitor the filter condition. The t filter for the auxiliary feedwater pumps emergency ventilation system is equipped with a sure differential switch which energizes an annunciator on the main ventilation panel as a lt of high differential pressure. This switch is also monitored by the plant computer.
6 EMERGENCY GENERATOR ENCLOSURE VENTILATION SYSTEM emergency generator enclosure has both safety related and non safety related ventilation ems (Figure 9.4-3) which provide an acceptable environment for personnel and equipment ration.
6.1 Design Bases design bases for the emergency generator enclosure ventilation system are:
- 1. The ability to remove the heat generated by the operation of the emergency generator to meet the indoor design temperatures listed below.
- 2. Outdoor air design conditions are listed in FSAR Section 9.4.
- 3. The emergency generator enclosure summer indoor design temperature is 104°F during emergency generator operation. The winter indoor design temperature is 50°F during emergency generator standby condition.
- 4. General Design Criterion 2, as related to structures housing the system, and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquake, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, as established in Chapters 2 and 3.
- 5. General Design Criterion 4, with respect to structures housing the system, and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of environmental conditions and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and impingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
- 6. Nuclear safety related areas are in accordance with General Design Criterion 5, as related to shared systems and components important to safety.
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.29, as related to the seismic design classification of system components.
- 9. All ventilation intakes and outlets provided with concrete missile protected hoods.
6.2 System Description re are two safety related and two non safety related ventilation systems, one each per rgency generator enclosure. The respective safety related system automatically starts upon t of the emergency generator diesel engine, provided the temperature in the associated losure rises above 65°F. Each safety related ventilation system consists of two 50 percent acity supply fans and electrohydraulically operated inlet air, recirculating air, and exhaust air pers. Each fan provides 60,000 cfm of supply air. The only ductwork in this system is the ing plenum, which mixes the outside air with the recirculated air and a short stub between the aust dampers and the tornado dampers through the concrete floor at elevation 52 foot 0 inches.
re are two electrohydraulically operated exhaust dampers per enclosure.
supply fans introduce mixed inside and outside air into the enclosure, forces air out of the losure through the exhaust dampers and then through the muffler enclosure to the outdoors.
s flow, through the muffler enclosure, carries away the heat rejected by the emergency erator combustion air exhaust muffler. All equipment and ductwork in this ventilation system seismically designed and supported. All ventilating systems are provided with tornado pers.
h enclosure also has a non safety ventilation system which consists of one exhaust fan, twork and a backdraft damper. This system operates when the emergency generator is not rating. Each of these ventilation systems consists of a 2,000 cfm exhaust fan that draws air the enclosure through building infiltration. The air is discharged to the outdoors through a kdraft damper, a tornado damper and the muffler enclosure at elevation 51 foot 0 inches.
hough the system is non safety related, it is seismically supported in order to prevent damage afety related equipment during a seismic event.
ting is provided to the emergency diesel generator enclosure by three 20 kW and one 15 kW tric unit heaters for the north enclosure and three 15 kW and one 20 kW electric unit heaters the south enclosure. Space temperature is maintained at approximately 50°F, when outside perature is at minimum design condition.
6.3 Safety Evaluation h safety related emergency generator enclosure ventilation system is powered from a separate rgency electrical power train. Each safety related ventilation system receives its emergency er from the electrical bus that is supplied by the corresponding emergency generator; efore, ensuring the removal of heat generated by emergency generator operation. In the event
ure of the heating and ventilation system, in either of the safety related enclosures, an losure temperature switch alarms in the control room, when that enclosure temperature eeds 110°F or falls below 52°F. Run status lights are provided in the control room for the ty related fans.
non safety related ventilation system is not required for safe shutdown of the plant. However, ailure to remain in position during a seismic event could jeopardize safety related equipment.
refore, both the ventilation system and the unit heaters are seismically supported.
6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements er installation was completed, all fans were tested by operating them as separate components as integrated systems with their inlet, exhaust, and/or recirculation dampers. Airflow surements were taken to ensure that the specified design capacity was achieved.
non safety related ventilation system operates continuously when the emergency generator is standby mode. The system can be shut down for inspection of wear, bearing alignment, ring lubrication of fans and dampers, and inspection of dampers for free operation and tightly ing blades.
odic surveillance testing and preventative/corrective maintenance are performed on the rgency generator safety related ventilation systems to ensure proper and reliable operation.
6.5 Instrumentation Requirements emergency generator enclosure ventilation system operating parameters are monitored, cated, and controlled locally and remotely, as follows:
Both supply fans automatically start when the respective emergency generator diesel engine is running at a rate greater than 360 rpm and the ambient room temperature is above 65°F. When the supply fans have started, the temperature controller modulates the inlet damper, the recirculation damper, and both outlet dampers to maintain temperature below the profile outlined in FSAR Appendix 3B, Environmental Design Conditions, in the emergency generator enclosure. The temperature controller requires single or dual fan operation to modulate the dampers. When the emergency generator diesel engines have stopped (less than 360 rpm), the supply fans are stopped manually from the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room. The inlet damper goes to the fully closed position, the outlet and recirculating dampers go fully close and open, respectively.
us lights are provided on the main board in the control room for the following:
- 1. Emergency generator enclosure supply fans operating
unciation is provided on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room when the rgency generator enclosure temperature is either greater than 110°F or less than 52°F.
cator lights are provided on the main ventilation and air conditioning panel in the control m for the status of each supply fan and for the position of each damper.
t heaters are also provided in the enclosures to maintain temperatures above 50°F. The non ty related exhaust fans run continuously and are manually controlled from a local switch.
7 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE VENTILATION SYSTEM containment structure ventilation system (Figure 9.4-5) consists of four separate subsystems ch are described in the following order:
- 1. Containment air filtration subsystem
- 2. Containment air recirculation subsystem
- 3. Containment purge air subsystem
- 4. Control rod drive mechanism ventilation and cooling subsystem 7.1 Containment Air Filtration Subsystem air filtration portion of the containment ventilation system filters the containment atmosphere educe the concentration of airborne radioactive particulates and iodine to permit containment ess.
7.1.1 Design Bases design bases for the containment air filtration subsystem are in accordance with the owing:
- 1. Subsystem designated nonnuclear safety (NNS) as described in Section 3.2
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for seismic design classification of systems, structures, and components (Section 1.8)
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.140 for air filtration and adsorption units (Section 1.8)
containment air filtration subsystem includes two 100 percent capacity fans and filter banks.
fans are rated at 12,000 cfm each. Each filter bank includes a heater, prefilter, carbon orber, and two high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters.
prefilter has a minimum efficiency of 80 percent by ASHRAE Standard 52. The carbon orber is constructed of stainless steel casing, is gasketless, and of nontray type. The carbon bed inches thick and is designed for 0.25 second dwell time per 2 inch depth of charcoal for gases flow velocity of 40 fpm. The impregnated charcoal is capable of removing over 99 percent of hyl iodide (CH I) and 99.5 percent of elemental iodine with air inlet conditions of 70 percent tive humidity and temperature of 77°F (25°C). The HEPA filters have a minimum filter ciency of 99.97 percent when filtering particulates 0.3 micron or larger in size. Air is drawn the filter units from the low elevations of the containment and discharged by the fans to the er elevation.
air filtration system design is based on reducing the containment atmosphere I-131 centrations to below 1 EC (Effluent Concentration) in 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> using 1 unit under the ditions of reactor coolant leakage discussed in Section 12.3.3.1. Design conditions of the tainment air filtration subsystem are given in Table 9.4-8.
7.1.3 Safety Evaluation containment air filtration subsystem, during normal plant operation and shutdown conditions, oves both radioactive particulates and iodine gases released to the containment air to enable ess to the containment. Although the system is not safety related, the filter bank contains ures essential for efficient operation, personnel safety, and maintenance. When one fan fails to rate, the redundant fan and filter are manually placed into operation. The redundant fans and r banks are operated alternately to ensure equal wear.
7.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements filter casing and filters are factory and site tested as follows:
- 1. The filter housings were field tested for leak tightness to meet the leakage requirements of ANSI N509, Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units and Components.
- 2. The HEPA filters are tested for efficiency using the DOP method before leaving the manufacturers facilities and are checked for leakage after installation.
- 3. The carbon adsorbers are factory-tested for efficiency and checked for leakage after installation.
- 4. The airflow distribution within the filtration units was tested for uniformity after installation.
- 6. The fans were also tested after installation. Routine maintenance and surveillance are performed to ensure their operability.
7.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements containment air filtration system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled locally or remotely, as follows:
The containment air filtration fans are controlled from the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room by ON-OFF control switches with indicating lights. The containment air filter cooling bleed damper is also controlled from that panel by pushbuttons with indicating lights.
The main heating and ventilation panel in the control room also contains an annunciator which alarms on high differential pressure across any filter in the filter banks.
mputer inputs are provided to monitor the following:
- 1. Containment structure air filtration fans running
- 2. Containment structure air filtration fans stopped
- 3. Containment structure prefilter differential pressure high
- 4. Containment structure upstream HEPA filter differential pressure high
- 5. Containment structure charcoal filter differential pressure high
- 6. Containment structure downstream HEPA filter differential pressure high filter heater is controlled automatically by a temperature switch and is protected from over perature by a temperature switch that must be manually reset locally. The filter heater is rlocked with a filter fan running signal.
h temperature in the charcoal filter is alarmed on the ventilation panel VP1 in the control m.
differential pressure across each filter section is indicated locally.
containment atmosphere airborne radiation monitor (Section 12.3.4) alerts the operator when er the normal gaseous or airborne particulate radiation level is exceeded and operation of the tainment air filtration subsystem is required.
air recirculation portion of the containment ventilation system is designed to maintain the k air temperature in the containment suitable for personnel and equipment operation during mal plant operation and for equipment operation following loss of off site power.
7.2.1 Design Bases design bases of the containment air recirculation subsystem are in accordance with the owing criteria:
- 1. General Design Criterion 2 for protection against natural phenomena (Chapters 2 and 3).
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.26 for the quality group classification of system components (Section 1.8).
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.29, for the seismic design classification of system components (Section 1.8).
- 4. Subsystem designated as NNS. The air recirculation fans are Seismic Category I.
Two fans are supplied from the emergency power buses. Tables 9.4-9 and 9.4-10 give the modes of operation and design conditions of the containment air recirculation system.
7.2.2 System Description containment air recirculation subsystem consists of three containment air recirculation unit lers with an air distribution ductwork. Each unit cooler consists of one fan and six cooling
- s. Its performance characteristics are given in Tables 9.4-9 and 9.4-10.
h fan draws air across the cooling coil assembly and discharges the air to a common duct ch distributes it through secondary ducts to different levels of the containment. During normal ration, two of three containment recirculation unit coolers operate. After a loss of off site er, one or two containment recirculation unit coolers operate.
cooling coils in each recirculation unit cooler assembly are served by the plant chilled water em at 45°F during normal plant operation and by component cooling water at 95°F after a loss ff site power or a SIS (CIA).
electrical power is supplied from redundant emergency buses for two units and from the mal bus for the third unit.
o of the three containment air recirculation unit coolers are required to maintain the tainment average temperature below 95°F. If one unit fails, the remaining two units maintain average temperature below 95°F during normal operation.
ts A and B are supplied with emergency power. During a loss of off site power, these unit lers can operate with emergency power maintaining an average air temperature of the tainment below 135°F. The CAR system is seismically supported and the fans are seismically lified.
7.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements containment air recirculation subsystem was inspected, tested, and air-flow balanced during struction. The entire water system was hydraulically tested for leakage and the water flow to cooling coils was properly balanced.
cooling coils were pressure and leak tested. Since the system is continuously in operation, odic testing is not required.
7.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements containment atmosphere recirculation system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, controlled, locally or remotely, as follows:
The containment air recirculation fans are controlled from the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room by START-STOP control switches with indicating lights. The A & B fans can also be controlled at the switchgear by START-STOP control switches with indicating lights. The switchgear also contains the REMOTE-LOCAL transfer switches for selecting which panel has control of these fans. An annunciator is alarmed on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room when LOCAL control is selected for the A or B fans.
unciators are provided on the main heating and ventilation panel for the following system meters:
- 1. Containment air recirculation fan auto trip
- 2. Containment air recirculation fan airflow low
- 3. Containment air recirculation cooling coil water flow low cators are provided on the main heating and ventilation panel to monitor the containment air rculation cooling coil chilled water discharge temperature.
guard signal is initiated whenever an SIS or LOP signal exists.
containment atmosphere recirculation fans A and B are stopped automatically on receipt of a A signal, even if the SIS or LOP signal has previously started the fans.
mponent cooling water is provided to the containment atmosphere recirculation cooling coils ead of chilled water on receipt of an LOP or CIA signal. The cooling water flow is controlled temperature sensor installed in the return airflow.
mperature element installed in the outlet airflow of each containment air recirculation cooling provides input data to the computer.
7.3 Containment Purge Air Subsystem containment purge air subsystem is designed to reduce the airborne radioactivity in the tainment, and to provide outdoor air during extended periods of occupancy, such as refueling.
so provides the flow path for containment pressurization during containment leak testing as l as for containment repressurization to atmospheric conditions following reactor cooldown.
7.3.1 Design Bases design bases for the containment purge air subsystem are in accordance with the following eria:
- 1. Provision for approximately one change of containment free air volume every hour.
- 2. Air supplied at a rate consistent with reducing airborne activity to as low as reasonably achievable.
- 3. Supply air maintained above 70°F, with heating supplied as required.
- 4. The containment penetrations, the containment isolation valves, their controls, and the piping between the valves are Safety Class 2 (SC-2). The remainder is nonnuclear safety (NNS). The ductwork within the containment building is seismically supported.
- 5. The purge system exhaust is provided with connections to charcoal filters to filter the exhaust before releasing to atmosphere, if necessary.
7.3.2 System Description containment purge air subsystem consists of a supply and an exhaust subsystem. Its ormance characteristics are given in Table 9.4-11.
exhaust consists of two 50 percent capacity exhaust fans. The exhaust fans have a capacity of 000 cfm, enough to handle approximately one air change of the containment per hour.
purge air system supply pipe is provided with a separate pipe connected to atmosphere. This connection is used to raise the containment pressure during shutdown. It is also used as an air ply line for containment pressurization during containment leakage testing (Section 6.2.6).
containment purge air subsystem exhaust is also provided with a connection to the auxiliary ding filter units which contain prefilters, particulate filters, and charcoal filters. This enables system to filter the exhaust if radioactivity is detected and ensures that no radioactivity beyond allowable limits is released to atmosphere.
ing unit shutdown, this system is manually actuated from the main control room if oactivity levels within the containment are high enough to require purging before personnel
- y. This system also functions as heating and ventilating system during periods of refueling and ntenance.
ply and exhaust ductwork have butterfly isolation valves. During normal operation of the t, the purge circuit is inoperative and the isolation valves are closed.
7.3.3 Safety Evaluation ing normal plant operation, the containment isolation valves are closed and the containment is purged. The isolation valves are opened and purge system is started manually from the main trol room only during cold shutdown. Area radiation monitors are provided on the operating k of the containment with the capability of containment isolation. When high airborne oactivity preclude the unfiltered discharge of purge exhaust air due to limits on site antaneous release rates, an operator can divert the containment exhaust air through the main r banks in the auxiliary building. Isolation or filtration are not credited in the fuel handling dent per Section 15.7.4.
unciators and indicators in the main control room permit the control operator to position the pers correctly so that the exhaust passes through the filter bank before being released to osphere if there is any radioactivity detected in the containment air.
exhaust duct length from the intake to the containment isolation valve is sufficient to ensure the containment isolation valves are closed before radioactivity passes through them.
7.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements containment isolation valves for the purge air subsystem are tested for leak tightness as part he containment leak testing program for Type C test, as described in Section 6.2.6.
tems, published by SMACNA, 1967.
ting and inspections of safety class 2 containment penetrations and isolation valves are ered in FSAR Section 6.2.6 and 6.6.
7.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements containment purge air system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and controlled, lly or remotely, as follows:
The containment purge heating and ventilation air supply units are controlled manually from the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room by START-STOP control switches with indicating lights. These switches are also interlocked to open or close the inlet dampers to the unit being operated.
Operation of the dampers on the outlet of the containment air purge exhaust fans are controlled by pushbuttons with indicating lights located on the main heating and ventilation panel. The pushbuttons operate the outlet dampers to open on the exhaust to the auxiliary building filter system filter banks or on the exhaust directly to the atmosphere, or to close both sets of exhaust dampers. The containment purge air exhaust fans are interlocked with the dampers to start when both dampers in the same exhaust line are fully open. Indicating lights of the exhaust fans are provided on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room.
Containment purge inlet and outlet isolation valves are controlled from the main heating and ventilation panel by OPEN-AUTO-CLOSE keylock control switches with indicating lights. The switch key is locked in the AUTO position. The containment purge inlet and outlet isolation valves are designed to be automatically closed on receipt of a high radiation signal from the containment purge air exhaust radiation monitors, although isolation is not credited for the fuel handling accident per Section 15.7.4.
Annunciators are provided on the main heating and ventilation panel for a reactor plant ventilation trouble alarm which is actuated by a containment purge heating and ventilation air supply unit heating coil discharge air temperature low. This condition also actuates a first out annunciator on the auxiliary building ventilation panel.
ineering safety features status lights are provided on the main control board in the control m for the following:
- 1. Containment purge heating and ventilation inlet dampers open.
- 2. Auxiliary building filter system inlet dampers from containment purge system and containment purge system, normal outlet dampers.
7.4 Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation and Cooling Subsystem control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) cooling system is a forced air cooling system provided removal of heat from the CRDM magnetic coils using cooling water from the plant chilled er system (Section 9.2.2.2).
7.4.1 Design Bases CRDM cooling system is designed in accordance with the following requirements:
- 1. Maintains the temperature of the stationary and moveable gripper and lift coils wiring insulation below allowable maximum of 392°F during normal reactor operation.
- 2. Supplies cooling airflow in the situation where the normal power supply is interrupted and the reactor is maintained at hot standby.
- 3. System designated non safety related (NNS), except for the power supplies for two of the three cooling fans.
7.4.2 System Description CRDM cooling system is a forced air cooling system which provides a reliable supply of ling to the CRDM magnetic coils during normal reactor operation.
ling is provided by the CRDM cooling system which draws containment ambient air through shroud and detachable ductwork. The CRDM cooling system contains three 50 percent fans, ling coils, and duct plenum. The fans draw air through the cooling coils and discharge it to the tainment. All fans are operable, and two of them have emergency power connections.
le 9.4-12 gives the performance characteristics.
7.4.3 Safety Evaluation ing normal conditions, two fans are in operation to supply 90,000 cfm (minimum) design low through the CRDM coils area. The CRDM cooling system is not a safety related system; ever, two fans are powered from the emergency buses. This ensures airflow and cooling ng loss of off site power to prevent damage to the CRDM components by limiting the imum temperature in the magnetic coils. During loss of power no cooling water is available to CRDM cooling coil assembly. Absorbed heat from the CRDM is rejected to containment osphere thus becoming a load on the air recirculation system.
system was tested and inspected as separate components and as an integrated system before allation. Upon initial startup testing of the fans, the airflow was measured at a value ificantly above design and was accepted.
acity and performance of fans were tested and rated in compliance with Air Moving and ditioning Association (AMCA) requirements.
ce the system is continuously in operation, periodic testing is not required.
7.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM) cooling system operating parameters are monitored, cated, and controlled, locally or remotely, as follows:
The CRDM cooling fans are controlled from the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room by START-STOP control switches with indicating lights. Indicating lights for the fans are also provided at the switchgear.
unciators are provided on the main heating and ventilation panel for the following:
- 1. CRDM cooling fan local control
- 2. CRDM cooling fans auto trip
- 3. CRDM shroud temperature high
- 4. CRDM shroud cooler outlet flow low re are indicators on the main heating and ventilation panel for the CRDM shroud temperature.
trol of the cooling water to the CRDM shroud cooler is accomplished at the main board in the trol room. Pushbuttons with indicating lights are provided to operate the CRDM shroud cooler t valve.
following system parameters are monitored by the plant computer:
- 1. CRDM cooling fan local control
- 2. CRDM cooling fan auto trip CRDM fans stop automatically upon receipt of an LOP signal or containment ressurization actuation (CDA) signal. The CRDM fans will start automatically on receipt of a uenced safeguard signal from the emergency generator load sequencer (Section 8.3).
8.1 Circulating and Service Water Pumphouse Ventilation System circulating and service water pumphouse (Figure 9.4-3) has both safety and non safety ted ventilation systems, which provide a suitable environment for personnel and equipment.
h service water pump cubicle has a safety related ventilation system. The remaining areas of pumphouse are served by non safety related ventilation systems.
8.1.1 Design Bases design bases for the circulating and service water pumphouse ventilation system are:
- 1. The ability to maintain an environment suitable for personnel and equipment located in the area.
- 2. The outside air summer-design temperature for the Millstone Point site of 86°F and the outside air winter-design temperature of 0°F.
- 3. The summer indoor design temperature coincident with 86°F outside temperature is 104°F during normal operation with one service water pump running. The winter indoor design temperature is 40°F during normal operations and 50°F during maintenance periods. In a post LOCA mode of operation with two service water pumps running, the summer indoor design temperature is 119°F.
- 4. In accordance with General Design Criterion 2 for structures housing the system, and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, as established in Chapters 2 and 3.
- 5. In accordance with General Design Criterion 4 for structures housing the system, and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effect of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
- 6. Nuclear safety related areas are in accordance with General Design Criterion 5 for shared systems and components important to safety. No systems or components are shared. A single active failure cannot result in loss of the system functional performance capabilities.
- 7. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26 for the quality group classification of system components.
- 8. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29 for the seismic design classification of systems components.
8.1.2 System Description service water portion of the pumphouse contains four service water pumps arranged with two ps in each of two cubicles. Each cubicle contains its own safety related (QA Category I, mic Category I) ventilation system. Each service water pump cubicle ventilation system plies and exhausts air through air inlets and discharges located on the roof. The air inlet and aust ductwork is seismically supported and designed and is provided with sound attenuators to uce noise emission from the service water section of the pumphouse. The system operates in er a summer or winter mode by manually repositioning a balancing damper located nstream of the fan in the spring and fall respectively. Each 100 percent fan provides 16,500 total flow in the summer and 15,500 cfm total flow in the winter. In either mode, an access r located downstream of each fan is permanently removed to recirculate partial air flow (8,300 summer and 12,400 cfm winter). Based on this recirculation flow a net exhaust flow of 8,200 summer and 3,100 cfm winter is achieved. Air enters each cubicle through a roof mounted operated damper and silencer. All air operated dampers fail in the open position. Emergency er is supplied to each service water pump cubicle by a separate independent train. Each train plies power to the ventilation system and the service water equipment within that cubicle.
h ventilation system exhaust fan is operated by means of a temperature control switch which ntains the service water pump cubicle at the desired temperature.
two cubicles are separated from each other and from the circulating water pump section of pumphouse by missile and flood barriers.
air intake and exhaust hoods for each service water cubicle ventilation system are protected m tornadoes and floods and are designed to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake.
ting is provided to the service water cubicles by an electric heater in each cubicle to maintain ce temperature above 40°F. Heating of the service water pump cubicles is not essential and is safety related nor seismically designed. Heaters in the service water pump cubicle are mically supported so that damage to the essential portions of the service water pump cubicle tilation system does not result from a seismic event creating heater generated missiles.
circulating water portion of the pumphouse has six circulating water pumps arranged with e pumps at each end of the building. There are two 50 percent capacity ventilation systems, serving each end of the circulating water side of the pumphouse. These systems supply ide air through wall intake louvers and exhaust the air through roof hoods. The air inlet and aust ductwork has sound attenuators installed to reduce noise emission from the circulating er section of the pumphouse. Each exhaust fan has a capacity of 51,000 cfm, and exhausts air ugh a backdraft damper to the outside. A temperature control switch cycles each systems aust fan and inlet damper to maintain the desired space temperature. One fan normally rates with the other fan in standby. The other fan operates in case one fan cannot maintain the red space temperature or the running fan stops. Heating is provided to the circulating water ion of the pumphouse by electric unit heaters and to the screenwash section of the pumphouse
er and screenwash sections are not essential to the safe shutdown of the plant and are not ty related.
pumphouse also has a chlorine room which contains equipment for chlorination of the service er. The system supplies 1,100 cfm of outside air to the area through an air operated inlet per, and the exhaust fan exhausts 1,100 cfm through a back draft damper to the outside. Two tric heaters heat the chlorine room to maintain space temperature above 50°F.
8.1.3 Safety Evaluation two service water cubicle ventilation systems are redundant with a separate emergency trical power supply to each system.
same emergency bus that powers the service water pumps powers the associated ventilation em. Emergency power ensures operation of the service water cubicle ventilation system in the nt of a loss of off site power or unit shutdown. In the event of damper control failure, the air rated inlet dampers fail in the open position. In the event of a mechanical failure of either ice water cubicle exhaust fan, a space temperature switch alarms in the control room when cubicle temperature exceeds a predetermined set point. In the event that the space perature falls below a predetermined set point a low temperature is sensed and alarms in the n Control Room on the Plant Process Computer and the operator can take action to prevent potential freezing problems. The loss of ventilation in a service water pump cubicle has no ct on the operation of the service water system equipment in that cubicle, providing action is n in a timely manner after the space high temperature alarm is received in the control room.
mplete failure of one service water pump cubicle ventilation system does not preclude a safe tdown or mitigation of any accident by the service water system because the redundant service er pump cubicle ventilation system and the redundant service water system are operable.
8.1.4 Inspection and Test Requirements fans were tested by operating them as an integrated system with their associated air operated t dampers. Air flow measurements were taken to ensure that the specified design capacity was ieved. The service water cubicle safety related ventilation systems are functionally tested odically.
8.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements circulating and service water pumphouse ventilation systems operating parameters are nitored, indicated, and controlled locally or remotely as follows:
h service water pumphouse exhaust fans can be controlled manually from the main heating ventilation panel in the control room. The fans are controlled by Category I temperature tches. The intake dampers are interlocked with their associated exhaust fan. The damper must ully open for the exhaust fan to run.
h service water pumphouse cubicle is provided with a high temperature annunciator on the n heating and ventilation panel in the control room. The annunciators are activated when the perature exceeds 120°F.
vice water system bypass status indication is provided on the main control board which ives inoperability signals from the exhaust fans of the service water pump cubicles in ordance with Regulatory Guide 1.47. For a complete list of input signals, see Section 7.3.1.1.5.
th circulating water pumphouse exhaust fans can be manually controlled at the main heating ventilation panel in the control room. Normally, the fans are controlled automatically by two perature switches. One fan is the lead fan and the second is a follow fan. The lead and follow can be selected manually at the main heating and ventilation panel. When the lead fan is ble to maintain temperature at a predetermined set point, the follow fan is automatically led on and off, as necessary. The inlet dampers of the circulating water pumphouse exhaust are interlocked with their associated exhaust fan. The inlet damper must be fully open for the aust fan to run.
ctric heaters in the service water pump cubicles and the circulating water pump area are matically controlled by thermostats to maintain the temperature greater than 40°F.
8.2 Yard Structures Ventilation System yard structures ventilation system is shown on Figure 9.4-3, and includes the warehouse
, office, telephone exchange room, warehouse rest rooms, and elevator. The system is nuclear safety related.
8.2.1 Design Bases design bases for the yard structures ventilation system are as follows:
- 1. The yard structures ventilation system is a non safety related system (NNS). It is designed to provide a suitable environment for personnel and equipment.
- 2. The outdoor air design temperatures are listed in Section 9.4.
- 3. Air-conditioned spaces in the yard structures ventilation system include the telephone exchange room and office areas, and are designed to maintain a space temperature between 70°F-85°F in telephone exchange room and 75°F in office areas. The general warehouse area ventilation system provides four volume changes per hour by the use of ventilation fans.
yard structures ventilation system consists of the following:
- 1. Warehouse area ventilation system.
- 2. Office areas air conditioning system.
- 3. Telephone exchange room air conditioning system.
- 4. The system also contains exhaust fans for the elevator penthouse and the restrooms.
- 5. Waste neutralization tank(s) exhaust system.
warehouse area ventilation system includes a supply filter assembly, two supply fan silencers, 50 percent capacity vane axial supply fans and one 100 percent capacity vane axial exhaust The fans serve two levels through distribution ductwork. The 100 percent outdoor air is used ool and ventilate this area. The ventilation fans are controlled by means of a temperature troller. Auxiliary heating is provided to this area by separate steam unit heaters.
office areas, consisting of offices, store rooms, and classrooms are air-conditioned through vidual variable air volume (VAV) boxes. The VAV boxes are serviced through a self contained conditioning (A/C) unit, a return air fan and distribution ductwork. The A/C temperature is trolled by an electronic central panel monitoring the return air and the discharge air. Individual V boxes are controlled by a corresponding local thermostat.
waste neutralization tank exhaust system consists of a corrosion proof exhaust fan dedicated dor removal from the waste sumps.
(NPRF) is provided with a dedicated halon fire protection system.
telephone exchange room system consists of a self contained air conditioning unit and ribution ductwork. The space temperature is controlled by a room temperature controller ch modulates the return and outdoor air damper, and the heating coil in the air conditioning 8.2.3 Safety Evaluation ventilation and air conditioning system serving the yard structures ventilation system are non ty related systems and are not required to perform any safety function.
8.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements yard structures ventilation system was inspected during and after installation. The system was fully tested and balanced to ensure the supply and return of the design air quantity.
ular system maintenance to confirm normal system operation.
8.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements yard structure ventilation systems operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled, locally and remotely as follows:
- 1. The warehouse area exhaust fan starts automatically when the temperature increases above 85°F. The supply fans are interlocked to start when the exhaust fan starts. The exhaust and supply fans can also be controlled manually. Unit steam heaters are provided to maintain the area temperatures greater than 65°F.
- 2. The office areas air conditioning unit is controlled unit is controlled through a central electronic panel.
- 3. Individual VAV boxes servicing specific office areas are controlled by a corresponding local thermostat.
- 4. The telephone exchange room is provided with a separate air conditioning unit that can be manually selected to heat or cool the area, or to automatically maintain the temperature between 70°F-85°F.
- 5. The waste neutralization tank(s) exhaust fan (2HVY-FN5) is controlled by a local on/off switch.
9 WASTE DISPOSAL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM waste disposal building ventilation system (Figure 9.4-2) provides a suitable environment for onnel and equipment operation as well as to minimize the release of airborne radioactive erial to the atmosphere. The system is nonnuclear safety related.
9.1 Design Bases safety related portions of the waste disposal building ventilation system are designed in ordance with the following criteria:
- 1. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for seismic design classification of system components.
Only those portions of the waste disposal building ventilation system located inside the auxiliary building and designated QA Category I are classified as seismic Category II system and designed to Regulatory Guide 1.75, Section 1.8.
The safety related portions of the waste disposal building exhaust ventilation are located in the auxiliary building, a seismic and tornado protected structure. This system is capable of withstanding, or is protected from, the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles.
- 3. General Design Criterion 5 for sharing of structures, systems, and components important to safety.
- 4. General Design Criterion 60, and Regulatory Guide 1.140 for control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment.
- 5. Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1. A break in high and moderate energy piping systems is not postulated within the waste disposal building.
However, those portions of the waste disposal building ventilation system classified as QA Category I and located inside the auxiliary building are subject to the environmental conditions resulting from this type of accident.
The waste disposal building ventilation system is also designed in accordance with the following criteria:
- 6. Outdoor air design temperatures of 86°F dry bulb for summer and 0°F dry bulb for winter.
- 7. During summer, coincident with the outdoor air design temperature, the space temperature is maintained at or below 90°F in the control area and 104°F in other areas. During winter, the indoor temperature is maintained at a minimum of 65°F.
- 8. Air within the building will be controlled to move from areas of low radioactivity to areas of progressively higher radioactivity.
- 9. Limitation of the release of airborne particulate radioactivity to the atmosphere by remote manual diversion of the exhaust air to the auxiliary building filter system (Section 9.4.2) upon receipt of a high radiation level in the exhaust air.
- 10. Areas subject to radioactive contamination are mechanically exhausted with natural supply from adjacent areas, thus maintaining a slightly negative pressure relative to the surrounding areas, minimizing the spread of the contamination as required by Regulatory Guide 1.143 (formerly BTP ETSB 11-1, Rev. 1)
(Section 1.8).
- 11. The exhaust system air is monitored by a radiation monitor (Section 11.5).
9.2 System Description waste disposal building heating and ventilating system is shown on Figure 9.4-2. Principal ponent design and performance characteristics are listed in Table 9.4-13. The waste disposal ding ventilation system is a once-through system using outside air as the ventilation and ling medium and consisting of separate supply and exhaust subsystems.
ciency filter, hot water preheating coil, hot water reheating coil, and centrifugal supply fan h associated controls. The air intake to each unit consists of air-intake hood, ductwork, and air-rated inlet damper. The three units are connected to a common discharge duct that supplies air he fuel building and the waste disposal building. The supply portion to the waste disposal ding is furnished with a flow controller that modulates an air-operated damper to maintain t airflow at a predetermined setting.
exhaust subsystem consists of two axial fans with one operating and the other on standby.
exhaust duct system is arranged in such a manner that all exhaust air is drawn from areas with highest radiation contamination potential, thereby inducing air flow from clean areas into ntially contaminated areas and maintaining the potentially contaminated areas at atmospheric pressure. The exhaust air is monitored for radiation by the radiation monitor ted in the plant vent stack and locally in the exhaust duct from the waste disposal building.
ing normal plant operation, the exhaust air is directed to the ventilation vent stack, located on turbine building, through a set of two air-operated dampers. Upon detecting a high radiation l in the exhaust system, the exhaust air is manually diverted to the auxiliary building filter em through a set of two air-operated dampers before being discharged to the atmosphere via ventilation vent stack.
9.3 Safety Evaluation hough the waste disposal building heating and ventilating system is not required for safe tdown of the plant, the following features are incorporated in its design to ensure system ability and to minimize the uncontrolled release of airborne radioactive contaminants during mal plant operation:
- 1. Three 50 percent capacity air heating and ventilating supply units are provided with two units operating and a third on standby. This design ensures full supply air capacity with one unit inoperative.
- 2. The potentially contaminated areas are maintained at a negative pressure with respect to surrounding cleaner areas to minimize the spread of radioactive contaminants.
- 3. Exhaust air is monitored for radiation level prior to discharge to the atmosphere. A high radiation level annunciates an alarm in the control room and, from the control room, the operator can manually divert the exhaust air to the auxiliary building filter system, thereby minimizing the release of radioactive contaminants to the atmosphere.
waste disposal building heating and ventilating system was inspected during construction to ure proper installation. All components were inspected prior to installation to ensure that they plied with their design specification. The standby heating and ventilating unit is tested odically to ensure its availability. The testing and balancing of this system was performed ore putting the system into operation. Further testing is unnecessary since the system is rating continuously. The power-operated dampers located at the waste disposal exhaust fans harge are tested monthly.
9.5 Instrumentation Requirements waste disposal building ventilating outlet dampers and auxiliary building filter inlet dampers e control switches and indicator lights on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control
- m. The filter inlet dampers from the waste disposal building exhaust close automatically on ipt of a SIS, LOP, or CDA signal.
ineered safety feature status lights indicate, in the control room, when the filter inlet dampers closed.
waste disposal building exhaust fans have control switches and indicator lights on the iliary building ventilation panel. The exhaust fans are interlocked with the auxiliary building r inlet dampers and the waste disposal building ventilation normal outlet dampers. Either the r inlet or the normal outlet dampers have to be open to run an exhaust fan. One fan is started ually with the other on standby. The standby fan starts automatically on low air flow in the ciated ductwork of the running fan.
roportional controller is used to modulate the waste disposal building ventilation inlet damper.
controller maintains air flow to the waste disposal building at a predetermined setpoint, vided one of the waste disposal building exhaust fans is running. The damper is interlocked to e when both exhaust fans are stopped.
waste disposal building heating and ventilation supply fans have control switches and cator lights on the auxiliary building ventilation panel. The inlet dampers are opened and ed when the associated supply fan control switch is placed in the ON and OFF position, ectively. For freeze protection, a temperature switch monitors air temperature at the outlet of hot water preheater and automatically closes the inlet damper when the temperature drops to F. The inlet dampers are interlocked to start the supply fan when open and stop the supply fan n closed. Low inlet air temperature is alarmed on the auxiliary building ventilation panel and uxiliary building ventilation trouble annunciator is alarmed on the main heating and tilation panel in the control room.
ste disposal area ventilation exhaust is monitored by radiation monitors and high radiation is med locally and in the control room.
main steam valve building ventilation system (Figure 9.4-4) provides a suitable environment personnel, equipment operations and controls during normal operation and for safety related ipment during loss-of-off site power (LOP) transients and upon safety injection signal (SIS) ation.
10.1 Design Bases design bases of the main steam valve building ventilation system are as follows:
- 1. During normal summer and winter operation, the buildings indoor design temperatures are 120°F and 40°F, respectively. The maximum normal operating temperature is 120°F. The maximum normal excursion (NME) temperature is 140°F for eight hours based on an LOP transient. The maximum MSVB maximum design temperature is 240°F based on concurrent LOP, SSE, and single failure of one of two safety-related MSVB exhaust fans. The latter design condition is used in the qualification of safety related equipment in the main steam valve building to the requirements of IEEE-323-1974. (Also reference Branch Technical RSB 5-1 and FSAR page Q440.24-1.) In addition, the environmental conditions resulting from a main steam line break in the Main Steam Valve Building are also applied in the qualifications of safety related equipment in the main steam valve building to the requirements of IEEE-323-1974.
- 2. To minimize the release of airborne radioactivity after a postulated design basis accident (DBA), the building is maintained at a slight negative pressure after a complete shutdown of the normal ventilation exhaust and air intake systems by exhausting air using the supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) discussed in Section 6.2.3 in conjunction with the auxiliary building ventilation system discussed in Section 9.4.2.
- 3. Portions of the ventilation system required to operate during LOP for maintaining the equipment environment are designated QA Category I. They are connected to the safety related Class IE power supply.
The safety related portions are isolated from the non safety related portions of the system and are missile protected.
- 4. The safety related portions of the ventilation system are in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A. Both the system and housing structures are capable of withstanding the effects of either externally or internally generated missiles as well as jet impingement forces associated with either pipe whip or a pipe break.
systems and components important to safety.
- 6. The QA Category I portion of the ventilation system is in accordance with the requirements of IEEE-323-1974 for qualifying Class IE electrical equipment.
- 7. The safety related portion of the ventilation system is in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29, for the seismic design of systems components.
10.2 System Description ure 9.4-4 shows the main steam valve building (MSVB) heating, ventilation, and air ditioning (HVAC) system.
s system, consists of a natural air supply with a mechanical exhaust subsystem and a spot ling subsystem. The supply/exhaust subsystem consists of four axial flow fans and two intakes h dampers, heating coils, and associated ductwork. Two fans, each rated to handle roximately 16 percent of the normal ventilation load, are powered from the normal power ply. The other two fans, each rated to handle approximately 34 percent of the normal tilation load, are powered from the Class IE power supply. Each safety related fan has a harge back draft damper arranged in series with an inlet emergency powered, motor operated per. Each non safety related fan has inlet and discharge Class IE powered air operated pers arranged in series to meet single-failure criteria (LOP with one damper failing open).
h intake assembly consists of two Class IE powered motor-operated dampers in series.
ciated ductwork, and a hot water heating coil with pneumatically operated integral face and ass dampers controlled by a non safety related temperature controller. Redundant, safety-ted temperature switches are located at the discharge of each heating coil to close the undant intake dampers on sensing subfreezing air temperatures.
ing normal operation, air enters the main steam valve building through the outdoor intake mblies located on the outside wall at the lowest level of the structure. The air is drawn upward he roof-mounted exhaust fans through various building levels to remove heat from the main m and feed water piping and is discharged to the atmosphere. During winter operation, air wn into the building is heated to a minimum of 40°F. Local hot water unit heaters are also alled.
owing LOP, both normally powered exhaust fans shut down, building intake dampers fail n, and Class 1E powered fans continue to operate and limit space temperature below ipment qualification temperatures.
owing an SIS, all exhaust fans are shut down, their associated Class 1E powered inlet and harge dampers are closed, and the redundant building intake dampers are closed. These ons establish the integrity of the SLCRS boundary, allowing the SLCRS system to create a ht negative pressure within the MSVB.
spot cooling subsystem consists of a normally powered axial flow fan and distribution twork in each of the north and south bay of the MSVB. These fans take suction from elevation eet 0 inches before the air has been significantly heated by process waste heat. The air is ributed to spot cool various safety-related equipment located at elevation 71 feet 0 inches and ntain the local temperatures below equipment qualification temperatures.
bridge portion of the main steam valve building which connects to the turbine building is ated from the ventilated portion of the building by doors and is neither heated nor ventilated.
floor of the structure in this area is steel grating which is open to the atmosphere, thereby jecting the structure interior and contents to outdoor ambient conditions. All large piping in area is drained when not in operation. Small piping is heat traced to prevent freezing.
10.3 Safety Evaluation main steam valve building ventilation system exhaust fans powered by the normal AC power ply are not required to operate during or after a postulated accident and are therefore not safety ted. The failure of these fans does not interfere with operation of other safety related systems.
wever, two of the ventilation exhaust fans and their associated components are connected to ss IE power supplies in order to permit their continued operation to mitigate the consequences OP transients. These components are designed and manufactured to QA Category I uirements to maintain the integrity of the Class IE power system.
trols and actuations associated with building isolation and HVAC system shutdown during a A are safety-related and are connected to Class 1E power supplies. Redundant, independently ered, intake dampers installed at each building intake close on an SIS. Each safety related aust fan and its associated, independently powered inlet damper receive separate train SISs to t down the fan and/or close its inlet damper ensuring integrity of the SLCRS boundary. The t and discharge dampers of each non safety related fan also receive separate train SIS to vide redundancy in isolation.
trols and actuations associated with building intake dampers closure due to a loss of heating function are safety-related. Redundant, independently powered temperature switches are alled at the discharge of the heating coils set to close the intake dampers on sensing freezing temperatures. This ensures continued operability of main steam pressure sensing rumentation and will prevent exposing other equipment in the building to subfreezing ditions.
sure of a building intake damper causes shutdown of associated exhaust fans. Provisions are alled to allow administratively controlled restart of individual fans if intake damper closure caused by failure of a temperature switch or one or both heating coils. This will prevent eeding equipment qualification limits.
main steam valve building ventilation system was air-leak tested, pressure tested in ordance with Specification for Installation of Ventilation and air conditioning Systems, air nce tested, adjusted and inspected for proper installation prior to operation. The automatic ation feature of the exhaust system components and the outdoor intake assembly components tested in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications.
10.5 Instrumentation Requirements main steam valve building ventilation system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, controlled remotely. The spot cooling subsystem is controlled locally.
exhaust fans and spot cooling fans of the MSVB operate continuously during normal ration.
heating coil capacity is regulated by a pneumatically controlled face and bypass dampers ch assume a fail-to-heat position on loss of instrument air supply. Local temperature tches actuate annunciators on the control room HVAC control panel alerting control room rators if coil discharge temperatures exceed prescribed limits.
sure of intake damper(s) due to loss of hot water coil heating capability during subfreezing door conditions will automatically stop the exhaust fans. Temperature switches actuate unciators on the control room HVAC panel to alert operators to MSVB low inlet temperature.
nual fan switches on the control room HVAC panel provide control room operators the ability ndividually restart exhaust fans during normal plant operating conditions if required to ntain building temperatures within allowable limits.
trol switches and indicating lights on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control m permit manual operation of all normal HVAC subsystem fans and dampers from the control
- m. The spot cooling subsystem is controlled from local control panels.
a result of LOP condition, the normal powered components of the system automatically shut n, while the Class IE powered components continue to operate.
SIS overrides both the manual and automatic controls, closing the inlet and outlet dampers of main steam valve building and stopping the exhaust fans. Engineered safety features yellow us lights are provided on the main control board for each inlet and outlet damper to indicate it is closed.
11 HYDROGEN RECOMBINER BUILDING HEATING, VENTILATION, AND AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) SYSTEM primary functions of the hydrogen recombiner building HVAC system (Figure 9.4-2) are to vide a suitable environment for personnel and equipment operation and to mitigate the ntial for a release of airborne radioactive material to the atmosphere. The hydrogen
dent exhaust system are installed, but not used for any mitigating function. The hydrogen mbiner system, associated controls, alarms (including Regulatory Guide 1.47 bypass alarms) post-accident exhaust system ventilation equipment have been isolated awaiting ndonment. The system discussion describes the system as originally installed and operated.
hydrogen recombiner building (HRB) control room air conditioning (A/C) system, HVAC m ventilation system, and the building heating system are not safety related.
11.1 Design Basis design basis of the hydrogen recombiner building HVAC system is as follows:
- 1. The outdoor air design temperatures are listed in Section 9.4.
- 2. Indoor Design Conditions
- a. During normal summer operation, indoor design temperatures are:
Area Temperature B control room 75°F dry bulb AC equipment room 104°F dry bulb recombiner cubicles Not controlled (110°F dry bulb maximum) mple room Not controlled (104°F dry bulb maximum)
- b. During normal winter operation, indoor design temperatures are:
HRB control room 67°F dry bulb HVAC equipment room 50°F dry bulb H2 recombiner cubicles 50°F dry bulb Sample room 50°F dry bulb
- c. Automatic temperature control is provided for the operation of the system.
Heating and cooling components are supplied by the normal power supply.
- d. The hydrogen recombiner skid-mounted package system includes a ventilation blower assembly maintaining the return process gas stream at 150°F.
- e. The HRB control room A/C system provides fresh air makeup.
SLCRS system to minimize the release of airborne radioactivity after a design basis accident (DBA).
- 4. The hydrogen recombiner ventilation system and the hydrogen recombiner building post-accident exhaust system are nuclear safety related and are designated QA Category I. The control room air conditioning system, HVAC equipment room ventilation system, and all electric space unit heaters are non-nuclear safety related.
- 5. The QA and Seismic Category I portion of the HVAC system is in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 2 for structures housing the system being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, as established in Chapters 2 and 3.
- 6. The QA and Seismic Category I portion of the HVAC system is in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 4 for structures housing the system as well as the system being capable of withstanding the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with a pipe break.
- 7. The QA and Seismic Category I portion of the HVAC system is in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 5 for shared systems and components important to safety.
- 8. The QA and Seismic Category I portion of the HVAC system is in accordance with the requirements of IEEE-323-1974 for qualifying Class IE electrical equipment (Section 3.11B.1).
- 9. The QA and Seismic Category I portion of the HVAC system is in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.26, for the quality group classification of systems components (Section 3.2).
- 10. The QA and Seismic Category I portion of the HVAC system is in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29, for the seismic design classification of system components (Section 3.2).
- 11. All ventilation intakes and exhaust outlets are provided with concrete missile protected hoods.
11.2 System Description hydrogen recombiner building HVAC system is shown on Figure 9.4-2. The system is prised of the following subsystems:
- 2. Control room air conditioning (3HVZ-ACU1).
- 4. Hydrogen recombiner building heating (3HVZ-UHE1A/1B/2/3A/3B/4A/4B).
- 5. Hydrogen recombiner building post-accident exhaust system (Hoods Sampling Modules 3SSP-SAS1/SAS2).
- a. The hydrogen recombiner ventilation system is a safety related QA-Category I system consisting of a ventilation fan which is an integral component of the hydrogen recombiner skid mounted package, supply and exhaust duct networks, a radiation monitor, and isolation dampers, all powered from Class IE power supply. During normal plant operation, the two redundant hydrogen recombiner skid-mounted package systems are not used. Use of the systems is also not credited following a design basis accident.
Electro-hydraulic operated dampers (MOD) on the supply and exhaust duct lines are normally closed. The MODs on the supply and exhaust duct lines are manually activated by a hand switch located in the Main Control Room on the HVAC VP-1 Panel to open or close. The MODs through limit switches are interlocked with the recombiner package system allowing the system to start. However, upon receiving a high radiation signal from its exhaust duct radiation monitor, the corresponding isolation dampers close and the recombiner package system trips off. Both the hydrogen recombiner and the hydrogen recombiner ventilation fan are manually activated from individual AUTO, OFF, HAND switches mounted on the local hydrogen recombiner control consoles. The recombiner ventilation system is designed to maintain the process return gas stream to the containment atmosphere at 150°F.
- b. The hydrogen recombiner control room air conditioning system is non-nuclear safety related. The system consists of an evaporator-blower, air cooled condensing unit, an air filter, associated ductwork, and motor operated dampers. The system thermostatically operates to maintain the control room high temperature at approximately 75°F. Two electric heaters, each controlled by its own thermostat maintain the control room low temperature between 62°F and 72°F.
- c. The hydrogen recombiner HVAC equipment room ventilation system is non nuclear safety related. The system consists of a propeller exhaust fan, motor-operated supply and exhaust dampers, a supply air filter, and related
- d. The hydrogen recombiner building heating system is non-nuclear safety related. It consists of electric unit heaters located in all areas of the building providing a space temperature range of 45 to 55°F except for the hydrogen recombiner control room heaters that maintain a range from 62°F to 72°F.
- e. The hydrogen recombiner building post-accident exhaust system serving the post-accident sampling module units (Section 9.3.2.6) is connected to the supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS)
(Section 6.2.3). Whenever a sample is required, one of the SLCRS fans (Figure 9.4-2) is started and a manual damper opened to provide filtered exhaust from the module unit hood.
11.3 Safety Evaluation two hydrogen recombiner package systems and the ductwork associated with the post-dent sample module exhaust system up to and including isolation damper 3HVR*DMP60 er to Figure 9.4.2, Sheet 5) are QA and Seismic Category I. The hydrogen recombiner skid unted package systems are located within a Seismic Category I structure, which is designed for sile, earthquake, tornado, and flood protection. The hydrogen recombiner ventilation twork, associated components and QA Category I portions of the hydrogen recombiner ding post-accident exhaust systems are also seismically supported.
preclude post-accident containment leakage into the hydrogen recombiner building, the ndary of the SLCRS (Section 6.2.3) extends to the annular space between the containment and hydrogen recombiner building. This area has been provided with air tight seals to allow proper ctioning of the SLCRS.
electrical components (electro-hydraulic dampers, fans, and radiation elements) of the rogen recombiner ventilation system are powered from the Class IE power supply to maintain function of the system during a postulated accident. In the event of a loss of electrical power, electro-hydraulic operated dampers are additionally designed to fail close. A manual control tch with position indicating lights is provided on the ventilation panel (VP-1) for each train of e dampers allowing manual operation for building isolation from the main control room.
undancy is designed into the system (separate ventilation loops for each of the redundant rogen recombiner package systems) to assure that no single failure results in the loss of ction of both systems. Three hour rated fire dampers are located where ductwork runs from room into another. This minimizes the adverse effects of a fire to systems and components ortant to safety.
h hydrogen recombiner package system has a radiation element in its related exhaust twork to detect airborne radiation in the event of a rupture in the process piping loop. Upon
11.4 Inspection and Test Requirements hydrogen recombiner building HVAC systems were air-leak tested, pressure tested, air-nce tested, adjusted and inspected for proper installation of ductwork, components, and ports. The HVAC equipment room ventilation system, the control room air conditioning em and the electric unit heaters are operated when required during normal plant operation; efore, no periodic testing is necessary.
11.5 Instrumentation Requirements hydrogen recombiner control room air conditioning system thermostatically operates to ntain the control room high temperature at approximately 75°F. Two wall mounted electric ters, each controlled by its own thermostat maintain the control room low temperature at roximately 67°F. The hydrogen recombiner HVAC equipment room ventilation system mostatically operates to maintain the equipment room below 104°F.
hydrogen recombiner ventilation inlet and outlet isolation dampers have manual controls and cator lights located in the Main Control Room on the main HVAC Panel VP-1. Upon iving a high radiation signal from its exhaust ventilation radiation monitor, the corresponding ation dampers are closed automatically, and the recombiner package system shuts down.
ough limit switches, the inlet and exhaust MODs are interlocked with the hydrogen mbiner package system allowing the recombiner system to start.
12 MISCELLANEOUS BUILDING HEATING AND VENTILATION s section includes the following systems:
- 1. Service building ventilation and air conditioning (Figure 9.4-6)
- 2. Auxiliary boiler room ventilation (Figure 9.4-7)
- 3. Hot water heating (Figure 9.4-8)
- 4. Hot water preheating (Figure 9.4-8) of these systems are nonnuclear safety related.
12.1 Design Bases 12.1.1 Service Building Ventilation and air conditioning System service building ventilation and air conditioning system provides a suitable environment for onnel and equipment.
tilation air requirements, whichever is greatest.
tions of the service building ventilation are designed to control airborne contaminants erated in potentially contaminated areas (PCA). All service building PCA ventilation exhausts designed to be separate from those exhausts that serve clean areas.
outdoor air design temperature is 86°F in the summer and 0°F in the winter.
inside air-conditioned spaces are designed for a temperature of 75°F in both summer and ter. Non air-conditioned spaces where electrical equipment is located, such as the switchgear m, are designed for a temperature of 104°F in summer and 65°F in winter.
vice building non air-conditioned spaces, such as the machine shop are designed for a imum temperature of 95°F in summer and a minimum of 65°F in winter.
flow provided for dilution of toxic vapors is sufficient to provide not less than 10 air changes hour in all areas within the service building. Laboratory hoods are designed to have minimum velocities of 50 to 125 feet per minute to ensure that toxic vapors do not escape from the ratory hoods into the building area.
12.1.2 Auxiliary Boiler Room Ventilation System auxiliary boiler room ventilation system provides a suitable environment for personnel and ipment.
outdoor air design temperature is 86°F in the summer and 0°F in winter.
auxiliary boiler building ventilation system is designed for a maximum temperature of 104°F.
12.1.3 Hot Water Heating hot water heating system supplies hot water throughout the plant to provide space heating.
system provides a supply of 270°F hot water to the various heating units, with a return perature of 190°F.
12.1.4 Hot Water Preheating System hot water preheating system supplies hot water to various ventilation units for tempering door air before it is heated and distributed in the building.
system uses water from the hot water heating system and a three-way control valve to ulate the temperature of water supplied to the preheating coils.
12.2.1 Service Building Ventilation and air conditioning System service building ventilation and air conditioning system (Figure 9.4-6) consists of seven systems:
- 1. Clean area air conditioning subsystem.
- 2. Potentially contaminated area (PCA) air conditioning subsystem.
- 3. Clean locker, shower and instrument repair shop ventilation subsystem.
- 4. Switchgear ventilation subsystem.
- 5. Shop area ventilation subsystem.
- 6. Mechanical equipment room ventilation subsystem.
- 7. Metrology Lab Air Conditioning System.
subsystems are arranged so that PCA exhaust air fans serving a given area are electrically rlocked with the supply air fans serving the same area to be sure that air is not supplied to an unless air is also being exhausted from that area. In clean areas, the exhaust air fans do not rate until the associated supply air fans are in operation.
an Area Air Conditioning Subsystem clean area air conditioning unit serves the clean area office cubicles, the instrument ervisor and instrument foreman offices, instrument repair room, storage room, kitchen, lunch m, first aid, toilet and janitor room areas. This system operates on a recirculation basis. The ke air damper and the exhaust and bypass air dampers modulate to maintain a minimum ed air temperature supplied to the air conditioning unit. The air conditioning unit heats or ls the supply air to maintain required space temperature through temperature controllers ted in the conditioned spaces. The outside air temperature sensing element regulates the ration of the hot water heating coil valve. From the kitchen area, air is exhausted by a locally trolled rooftop ventilator.
entially Contaminated Area (PCA) Air Conditioning Subsystem PCA air conditioning unit serves the radiation protection areas, the calibration room, the nt room, the radioactive chemistry laboratory, the chemist offices, and the PCA storage area 24 feet 6 inches). The air conditioning unit heats or cools the supply air to maintain space perature through temperature controllers located in the conditioned spaces. The outside air perature in conjunction with the hot deck temperature regulates the operation of the hot water at coil valve. In the radioactive chemistry laboratory, relative humidity is maintained through
designated as a potentially contaminated area (PCA). All the exhausts from the PCA are red through HEPA filters and exhausted by two centrifugal exhaust fans to the vent in the tor plant ventilation system.
an Locker and Shower Ventilation Subsystem eating and ventilating unit serves the clean locker rooms, washrooms, corridors, mens and mens rooms. The instrument repair shop is equipped with an oil bath, which has a wall aust fan. This exhaust fan operates only when the oil bath is in use. The heating and tilating unit maintains space temperature through temperature controllers located in the ditioned spaces. The temperature controllers modulate the hot and cold deck dampers to ntain the proper supply air temperature. The outside air temperature sensing element regulates operation of the hot water reheat-coil valve, through proper instrumentation. An axial flow aust fan, equipped with a back-draft damper, exhausts all the air from this system.
tchgear Ventilation Subsystem switchgear room is ventilated by two 50 percent capacity supply fans equipped with back-t dampers and two 50 percent capacity exhaust fans also equipped with back-draft dampers.
s system operates on a recirculation basis. The room temperature controller maintains the m temperature by modulating the intake air damper, the exhaust, and bypass air dampers. The tchgear room ductwork contains fire dampers at required locations to isolate the room in the nt of combustion hazards. Air transferred to and exhausted from the service building elevator electrical tunnel areas for ventilation purposes is replaced by dry media prefiltered air from ide the subsystem.
p Area Ventilation Subsystem vice building shop area ventilation is furnished by a 100 percent capacity axial flow supply a 100 percent capacity axial flow exhaust fan, and two centrifugal fans. One of the centrifugal exhausts the breaker repair facility. The other centrifugal fan exhausts the flammable erials storage area, which is isolated by fire dampers in the event of fire hazards.
shop area supply air is filtered by a dry media prefilter and heated by a hot water heating coil n called for by the temperature controller in the room. This system operates on a recirculation
- s. A preset temperature controller placed before the prefilter and the heating coil modulates intake air damper, the exhaust air damper, and the recirculation air dampers.
chanical Equipment Room Ventilation Subsystem mechanical equipment room is ventilated by a 100 percent capacity axial flow fan and austed by a 100 percent capacity axial flow fan. The supply air is filtered by a dry media ilter and heated by a hot water heating coil, when called for by the temperature controller in room. The system also operates on a recirculation basis. A preset temperature controller,
rology Lab Metrology Lab is served by a water source heat pump for both summer cooling and winter ting. The system operated on a recirculation basis with fresh air makeup coming from the an Locker and Shower Ventilation Subsystem. The unit maintains the desired temperature by ns of a thermostat located in the room. The source of cooling/heating water is the Component ling System (CCP).
12.2.2 Auxiliary Boiler Room Ventilation auxiliary boiler room ventilation system (Figure 9.4-7) serves the entire auxiliary boiler ding. The system contains two 50 percent capacity supply fans equipped with silencers and 50 percent capacity exhaust fans also equipped with silencers. This system operates on a rculation basis and uses 100 percent outdoor air for cooling. The room temperature controller ntains the room temperature by modulating the intake air damper, the exhaust air damper, and recirculation air dampers.
12.2.3 Hot Water Heating System hot water heating system (Figure 9.4-8) supplies hot water for heating the turbine building auxiliary bay, warehouse, service building, auxiliary building, fuel building, waste disposal ding, main steam valve building, auxiliary boiler room, and condensate polishing enclosure.
system also supplies hot water to the hot water preheat system and condensate polishing losure.
major components of this closed loop system include two 60 percent capacity steam to water t exchangers, two 100 percent capacity winter water circulating pumps, one 100 percent acity summer water circulating pump, and one hot water heating makeup pump. An air arator is included in the return lines to the pumps. One expansion tank in the return line ommodates water expansion from cold start to system operating temperature. Nitrogen rging of the expansion tank provides system pressurization to maintain system pressure above of the auxiliary steam system.
hot water heating system has two operating modes depending on outside temperature. When outside temperature drops below 50°F, it is in the winter mode. Hot water is channeled from heat exchanger to unit heaters in the various buildings and to the hot water preheating system.
en the outside temperature rises above 55°F, the system is automatically transferred to the mer mode and circulation of water is passed through the hot water heat exchangers and to ous air conditioning and ventilation units.
ssure switches are installed to allow isolation of hot water heating system supply lines to the iliary and fuel building in case of a high-energy break in these areas. (See Table 3.6-5.)
hot water preheating system (Figure 9.4-8) supplies heated water to the heating coils of the owing units:
- 1. Auxiliary building ventilation units.
- 2. Clean locker ventilation units.
- 3. Reactor containment purge units.
- 4. Waste disposal/fuel building ventilation units.
- 5. Potentially contaminated area air conditioning unit.
hot water preheating system consists of two 100 percent capacity circulating pumps and a perature control valve. The temperature valve mixes return water with hot water from the hot er heating system to control the preheating water temperature.
hot water preheating mixing valve is modulated by a temperature indicating controller.
12.3 Safety Evaluation ventilation and air conditioning systems serving the service building, and auxiliary boiler m are non safety related systems and are not required to perform any safety function.
hot water heating and hot water preheating systems are also non safety related systems. These ems operate at a pressure above that of the auxiliary steam system, so that in the event of a e leak in the steam to water heat exchanger, water flows out of the heating system. This vents any possible contamination within the auxiliary steam system from entering the hot er heating system.
12.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements ventilation and air conditioning systems serving the service building, office building, and iliary boiler room and the hot water heating systems were inspected during and after allation. These systems were carefully tested and balanced to be sure that each space or area ives its design air quantity or heating requirements.
ventilation systems and heating systems are normally in operation. Therefore, they do not uire any periodic testing. Visual inspections are conducted following any regular system ntenance to confirm normal system operation.
vice Building Ventilation service building ventilation system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and trolled, locally or remotely as follows. Unless stated otherwise the following instruments and trols are located on the service building ventilation panel:
- 1. Control switches with indicator lights are provided for manual operation of the switchgear room and tunnel supply fans. The supply fans are stopped automatically by a CO2 release equipment shutdown signal. The switchgear room ventilation exhaust fans are interlocked to start and stop with the associated supply fan.
- 2. A temperature controller located in the switchgear room is utilized to modulate the switchgear room ventilated inlet, outlet, and recirculation dampers when either switchgear room and tunnel supply fan is running. When both supply fans are stopped, or when the CO2 purge switch is placed in purge, the inlet and outlet dampers open and the recirculation damper closes.
- 3. The electrical tunnels inlet dampers are interlocked to open when either switchgear room and tunnel supply fan is running. The inlet dampers are closed when both supply fans are stopped. When a CO2 release equipment shutdown signal exists for an individual tunnel, only the inlet damper to that tunnel closes. Position indicator lights are provided for both dampers.
- 4. A thermostat located in the elevator shaft controls the service building elevator exhaust fan. The fan is stopped automatically by a CO2 release equipment shutdown signal.
- 5. The service building air handling unit is provided with a control switch and indicator lights. The air-handling unit inlet damper is opened and closed by the control switch and the air handling unit is interlocked to start when the inlet damper is open and stop when the inlet damper is closed. The inlet damper closes automatically when the air entering the hot water preheater is less than 35°F to protect against freezing.
- 6. A temperature controller is utilized to modulate the hot water heating valve.
Outside temperature is compared to the hot deck air temperature; the delta is the controller input signal.
- 7. Local temperature controllers are used to modulate hot and cold deck air dampers.
The service building clean locker area exhaust fan is interlocked to start and stop with the service building air handling unit. Indicator lights are provided on the service building ventilation panel.
interlocked to start and stop with the supply fan. To protect the hot water heater from freezing, the supply fan stops automatically if the hot water heater outlet temperature drops to 40°F.
- 9. A direct sensing temperature controller is utilized to modulate the equipment room inlet, outlet, and recirculation dampers to maintain mixed inlet and recirculated air temperature above 50°F provided when the equipment room supply fan is running.
- 10. The hot water heating temperature valve is modulated by a thermostat located in the equipment room. The valve is interlocked to open when the supply fan is stopped.
- 11. The service building shop supply fan is provided with a control switch and indicator lights for manual operation. If the hot water heater outlet temperature drops to 40°F, the fan stops automatically to protect the hot water heater from freezing.
- 12. The service building machine shop exhaust fan, the service building welding shop exhaust fan, and the service building flammable materials storage area exhaust fan are interlocked to start and stop with the service building shop supply fan. The exhaust fans are all provided with indicator lights.
- 13. A direct sensing temperature controller is utilized to modulate the service building shop inlet, outlet, and recirculation dampers to maintain mixed air (inlet and recirculation) temperature above a preset temperature provided the service building shop supply fan is operating.
- 14. The potentially contaminated area (PCA) air conditioning unit is interlocked to start when the PCA A/C unit inlet damper is open and stop when the inlet damper is closed. The inlet damper will open automatically when the PCA exhaust and radiation chemistry laboratory exhaust fans are running. The exhaust fans stop automatically if the hot water preheater temperature drops to 35°F. Indicating lights are provided on the inlet damper, exhaust fans, and air conditioning unit.
- 15. All service building filters are provided with a first out annunciator that alarms when the differential pressure across the filter is high. A local differential pressure indicator is provided at each filter to indicate a dirty or clogged filter.
- 16. First out annunciators are provided to alarm when the inlet air temperature drops to 35°F for heating coils in 3HVE-HVU1, 3HVL-ACU1 and 3HVL-ACU2 or the outlet air temperature drops to 40°F for heating coils 3HVE-CH1 and 3HVE-CH2.
- 17. Any annunciator that alarms on the service building ventilation panel causes the service building ventilation system trouble annunciator on the main heating and
placed in purge, the service building ventilation system trouble annunciator alarms on the main heating and ventilation panel.
Water Preheating System hot water preheating system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and controlled, lly or remotely as follows. Unless stated otherwise, all controls are located on the hot water ting panel:
Control switches and indicator lights are provided for the hot water preheating circulating pumps. The hot water preheating circulating pumps are interlocked so that one hot water winter heating pump must be running to start a hot water preheating circulating pump.
Annunciators are provided to alarm when the following conditions exist:
- 1. Hot water preheating circulation pumps discharge pressure Low.
- 2. Hot water preheating return water temperature High.
mperature indicating controller is utilized to modulate the hot water preheating mixing valve.
side air temperature is compared with the preheating circulating pump discharge temperature; delta is used as an input to the controller.
ot water heating system trouble annunciator is alarmed on the main control board when an m condition exists on the hot water heating panel.
Water Heating hot water heating system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and controlled, lly or remotely as follows:
main control board has annunciators for:
- 1. 480 volt bus undervoltage
- 2. Load center loss of control power
- 3. Hot water heating system trouble
- 4. Hot water expansion tank level Low - Low main control board rear has status windows for the service building bus undervoltage and loss ontrol power.
following instruments and controls are located on the hot water heating panel:
- 1. START-AUTO-STOP control switch with indicating lights for the winter water circulating pumps.
- 2. RUN-AUTO-OFF control switch with indicating lights for summer water circulating pump and the hot water heating makeup pump.
- 3. SUMMER-AUTO-WINTER mode switch with indicating lights for the summer/
winter changeover valve.
- 4. OPEN-AUTO-CLOSE control switch with indicating lights for the hot water expansion tank level valve.
unciators
- 1. Winter water circulating pump discharge pressure Low.
- 2. Summer water circulating pump discharge pressure Low.
- 3. Winter water circulating pump auto trip/overcurrent.
- 4. Hot water heating water temperature High/Low.
- 5. Hot water expansion tank pressure High/Low.
- 6. Hot water expansion tank level High/Low.
cators
- 1. Hot water expansion tank level.
- 2. Outside air temperature.
ontroller with auto-manual feature and indication utilized for the steam-to-water heat hanger summer and winter temperature valves is located on the hot water heating panel.
cating lights for the winter water circulating pump operation are provided at the switch gear.
following parameters are monitored by the plant computer:
- 1. Winter water circulating pumps breaker position.
- 2. Winter water circulating pump autotrip.
auxiliary boiler room ventilation supply fans have control switches with indicator lights ted on the auxiliary boiler room ventilation panel. In the automatic mode, the B supply starts matically when room temperature reaches 75°F; the A fan starts when room temperature hes 85°F. Both fans will maintain room temperature at a maximum of 105°F.
exhaust fans are interlocked to start and stop with the supply fans.
mperature controller for each train is utilized to modulate the inlet, outlet, and recirculation pers to maintain supply fan discharge temperature at a minimum preset value provided the ply fan is running. The supply fans discharge temperature is indicated on the auxiliary boiler m ventilation panel.
13 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER HEATING, VENTILATION, AIR CONDITIONING, AND FILTRATION SYSTEM technical support center (TSC) is the on site facility from which technical direction can be inistered, to relieve plant operators from peripheral duties during an emergency, by up to 20 nsee and NRC personnel. Capacity in the TSC may exceed 20 people provided atmospheric nitoring is conducted. The primary functions of TSC heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and ation (HVACF) system are to provide a suitable environment for maintaining proper ipment operation, to provide for radiological protection to personnel occupying the TSC, and rovide storage of plant records.
ortable radiation monitor located within the TSC office area detects and responds to the ence of radioactivity.
technical support center HVACF system is classified as nonnuclear safety related and non-mic.
13.1 Design Bases technical support center HVACF system design is based on the following criteria:
- 1. American National Standard, ANSI N509-1980, Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units and Components.
- 2. American National Standard, ANSI N510-1980, Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems.
- 3. System is designated as Nonnuclear safety as described in FSAR Section 3.2.
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 (for carbon media).
Maximum Space Minimum Space Area Temperature Temperature C Office 75°F 75°F C Lavatory 85°F 65°F C Mechanical Equipment Penthouse 104°F 40°F
- 6. The range of outdoor temperatures are as follows:
Summer design temperature - 86°F dry bulb - 75°F wet bulb Winter design temperature - 0°F dry bulb Outdoor daily range of dry bulb temperatures - 16°F
- 7. Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability.
- 8. Radiation exposure to any person occupying the TSC does not exceed 5 rem TEDE as a result of a design basis accident.
13.2 System Description technical support center HVACF system is shown on Figure 9.4-9. The system is comprised he following subsystems:
- 1. TSC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning.
- 2. TSC filtration.
- 3. TSC lavatory exhaust.
system consists of a split-system air conditioning unit, duct-mounted electric heating coil, or-operated dampers, and associated duct work and accessories. The air is passed through a osable type impingement filter, direct expansion (DX) coil, and blower before it enters the ditioned space. The majority of air is recirculated and is mixed with an adequate quantity of ide makeup air during normal plant operation. The system operates automatically and is trolled by a thermostat located in the TSC office area.
ing the heating season when the TSC air space temperature is lower than a predetermined oint, the office area temperature indicating controller activates the electric coils mounted in duct to provide heated air to TSC office areas and the mechanical equipment penthouse.
llow for building isolation. The TSC charcoal filtration assembly starts to operate in a filtered rculation mode (2,000 cfm of recirculated air for 30 minutes) and the lavatory exhaust fan ts down.
filtration assembly fan draws 2,000 cfm through a disposable type impingement prefilter, an tream HEPA filter, a 95 percent efficient charcoal adsorber, and a downstream HEPA filter, discharge the air to the intake of the air conditioning unit.
rty minutes following the isolation signal, the solenoid-operated dampers modulate to provide cfm outside air and 1,900 cfm recirculation air into the TSC charcoal filtration assembly ch is discharged to the intake of the air conditioning unit.
mixture of filtered air and recirculation air is drawn through the air conditioning unit to vide conditioned air for breathing and a positive pressure in TSC air space to minimize ltration of airborne radioactivity.
13.3 Safety Evaluation technical support center HVACF system does not have a safety related function, and its ure does not affect operation of any other safety related system or component. The HVACF em can operate during or after a postulated accident and can be operated during normal plant ditions.
ventilation electrical and control circuitry is not designed to meet Class 1E, single failure or mic qualification requirements, but is powered by the normal AC power supply and, through a sfer switch, is supplied with reliable auxiliary power from the site security diesel during loss ff site AC power.
13.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements TSC air conditioning and ventilation system was field tested and inspected for air balance completeness of installation.
PA filters and charcoal adsorbers are procured to the performance requirements of ANSI 9-1980, Section 5.1 and Table 5.1, respectively, as stated in Regulatory Guide 1.52, agraphs 3.d and 5.d.
filter housing, HEPA filter bank, and charcoal adsorber bank are tested to the inplace leakage ing requirements of ANSI N510-1980. Test canisters are provided to allow for periodic oval of used activated carbon samples for laboratory testing to the criteria of Regulatory de 1.52, Table 2.
mpliance with these testing requirements allows the assigned decontamination efficiencies d in Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, for 95 percent efficiency of particulate and
filters (prefilter, HEPA, and charcoal adsorbers) are provided with pressure differential cating switches for visual maintenance checks to ensure replacement when setpoints indicate y filter conditions.
13.5 Instrumentation Requirements mperature switch controls the operation of the air conditioning unit and a temperature switch rgizes the electric heater mounted in the duct air stream. A switch for either STOP or START des of operation for the air conditioner fan, and status indication lights, are provided on a local el.
TSC is automatically isolated from the outside atmosphere upon receipt of a CBI signal with dulation of motor-operated dampers. The dampers are provided with indication lights on a l panel for OPEN/CLOSED status indication.
filtration assembly is provided with locally mounted OFF-AUTO control switches and Unit F-RUNNING status indication lights on a control panel located in the office area. In the TO mode, the filtration fan starts by closure of a motor-operated isolation damper. Pressure erential indicating switches are provided locally for filter condition surveillance. A fire ctor for indication of ignition of the carbon media alarms locally and in the control building trol room.
14 REFERENCES FOR SECTION 9.4.0 1 American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and air conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE),
1972 Handbook of Fundamentals.
Dry Bulb Temperatures Winter Summer Relative Humidity Area (°F) (°F) (%)
ntrol room 75 75 40-60 trument rack room and computer room 75 75 40-60 itchgear areas 65 85 10-70 ttery rooms 1, 2 and 5 65 85 10-70 iller room 50 104 10-90 chanical room 50 104 10-70 ble spreading room 50 104 10-90 ttery Room 3 55 85 10-70 ttery Room 4 60 85 10-70
CHARACTERISTICS FOR AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS Components Design Parameters itchgear Area Air conditioning units First unit (2) 3HVC*ACU4A, 4B 21,000 cfm each at 3.50 inches water gage (wg) (1)
Cooling coil 432,000 Btu/hr Filter 90 - 95% efficiency Second Unit (2) 3HVC*ACU3A, 3B 10,000 cfm each at 3.70 inches wg (1)
Cooling coil 210,000 Btu/hr Filter 90 - 95% efficiency keup fan (2) 3HVC*FN3A, 3B (2) 1,500 cfm each ctric duct heater (2) 3HVC*CH2, 3 31.0 kW each pply air filters (2) 3HVC*FLT2, 3 55-65% efficiency, each rge System Supply fan 3HVC-FN4 4,000 cfm Exhaust fan 3HVC-FN5 4,000 cfm ttery Rooms Room 1 exhaust fan 3HVC*FN9A 450 cfm Room 2 exhaust fan 3HVC*FN9B 750 cfm Room 3 exhaust fan 3HVC*FN9C 400 cfm Room 4 exhaust fan 3HVC*FN9D 750 cfm Room 5 exhaust fan 3HVC*FN9E 650 cfm iller Room Supply fan (2) 3HVC*FN2A, 2B 2,000 cfm each Electric duct heater (2) 3HVC-CH1A, 1B 41 kW each Exhaust fan (2) 3HVC*FN7A, 7B 2,000 cfm each Supply air filter (2) 3HVC*FLT4A, 4B 55-65% efficiency, each trument Rack Room and Computer Room
VENTILATION SYSTEMS (CONTINUED)
Components Design Parameters Humidifier 3HVC-HUM2 15 lb/hr moisture Air conditioning unit (2) 3HVC*ACU2A, 2B 32,300 cfm each at 11.23 inches wg (1)
Cooling coil 662,500 Btu/hr Heating coil 50 kW Filter 90-95% efficiency ntrol Room Air-conditioning unit (2) 3HVC*ACU1A, 1B 21,725 cfm each at 5.95 inches wg (1)
Cooling coil 551,000 Btu/hr Heating coil 70 kW Filter 90-95% efficiency Humidifier 3HVC-HUM1 55 lb/hr of water Pressurizing air storage tank (9) 23.27 cubic feet (liquid) each 3HVC*TKIA, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E, 1F, 1G, 1H, 1J Piping 2,450 psig Valve 2,450 psig Toilet and kitchenette exhaust fan 3HVC-FN6 595 cfm Emergency ventilation filter unit (2) 3HVC*FLT1A, 1B 1,225 cfm clean / 1,000 cfm dirty Moisture separator 99% efficiency at 10 to 100)
HEPA (2) 99.97% efficiency DOP Charcoal 99.99% efficiency (iodine adsorption)
Prefilter 80% efficiency NBS Heater 9.4 kW Fan 3HVC*FN1A, 1B 1,070 cfm at 12.6 inches wg ntrol Building Isolation Valves (3)
Exhaust 3HVC*AOV22, 23 4,000 cfm
VENTILATION SYSTEMS (CONTINUED)
Components Design Parameters Exhaust 3HVC*AOV20, 21 595 cfm Chilled water pump (2) 3HVK*PIA, 1B 450 gpm each Isolation Dampers (4)
Supply 3HVC*AOD27A, B Water chiller (2) 3HVK*CHL1A, 1B 250 tons each TES:
Units in inches water gage (wg) at static pressure (sp).
3HVC*FN3A (3B) are axial flow fan assemblies, each consisting of two axial flow fans installed in series (i.e. 3HVC*FN3A1 & 3HVC*FN3A2, 3HVC*FN3B1 and 3HVC*FN3B2) with each fan driven by its own motor.
Design closure time for all valves is 3 seconds under maximum of 5 in wg pressure differential.
Design closure time for 3HVC*AOD27A, B is 6 seconds.
VENTILATION SYSTEM el Building Filter Bank Exhaust Fans Approximate Design Parameters (NOTE 1) uipment mark number 3HVR*FN10A, 10B antity 2 (NOTE 2) ecification number 2170.430-140 nufacturer Buffalo Forge Co.
Type Vane axial Rated Capacity (cfm) 30,000 Fluid Air Design temperature (°F)65-104 Operating temperature (°F)65-104 Drive Direct Total pressure (in wg) 16.5 (NOTE 3)
Motor data:
Type TEAO Horsepower 2 at 75 hp each Volts/phases/frequency 460/3/60 Speed (rpm) 3600 Insulation class H Weight (lb.) 2800 Reference drawing EB-45G Location Auxiliary building el Building Filter Bank Bypass Fan Approximate Design Parameters (NOTE 1) uipment mark number 3HVR-FN9 antity 1 ecification number 2138.430-007 nufacturer Joy Manufacturing Co.
Type Vane axial Capacity (cfm) 41,360 Fluid Air Design temperature (°F)65-104 Operating temperature (°F)65-104 Drive Direct
Total pressure (in wg) 5.5 (@ 46,400 cfm)
Motor data:
Type TEAO Horsepower (nominal) 75 Volts/phases/frequency 460/3/60 Speed (rpm) 1770 Insulation class F Weight (lb.) 1,857 Reference drawing EB-45L, EB-45M Location Auxiliary building el Building Filtration Units Approximate Design Parameters (NOTE 1) uipment mark number 3HVR*FLT 2A/2B antity 2 ecification number 2170.430-065 tal capacity (cfm/unit) 20,680 (note 1) ter pressure drop (in wg) 9.86 (note 3) filter:
Efficiency (percent) (ASHRAE) 80-90 Rated capacity (cfm) 20,680 Pressure drop, clean/changeout (in wg) 0.55/1.00 in wg (NOTE 3)
PA Filter:
Rated capacity (cfm) 20,680 Pressure drop, clean/changeout (in wg) 1.30/2.00 in wg (NOTE 3) arcoal adsorber:
Rated capacity (cfm) 20,680 Pressure drop, clean/changeout (in wg) 2.81 in wg (NOTE 3) ference flow diagram P&ID EM-148C cation Auxiliary building
el Building Heating and Ventilating Supply Approximate Design Parameters (NOTE 1) its uipment mark number 3HVR-HVU3A, 3B, 3C antity 3 ecification number 2138.430-143 nufacturer Buffalo Forge Co.
Performance at specified conditions:
Fan capacity (cfm) 34,000 Suction pressure (in wg) 4.0 Rotation/rpm 1,072 Brake horsepower 38.6 Heating coils (preheat/reheat):
Capacity (MBh) 2070/724 Face area (sq. ft.) 41.4g/27.5 Rows furnished 2/1 Pressure drop (ft. of water) 3.4/0.7 Filters:
Type Continental Cono 45 or equivalent Operating weight, complete unit (lb.) 7,750 Motor data:
Horsepower 50 Full load (rpm) 1,800 Enclosure ODP Reference drawing EB-77Q Location Waste Disposal Building Waste Disposal Building TES:
Some values are based on rated flow of 30,000 cfm, not the design flow of 20,680 cfm reflected on the P&ID and startup testing.
3HVR*FN10A (10 B) are axial flow fan assemblies, each consisting of two axial flow fans installed in series with each fan driven by its own motor (Ref: P&ID EM-148C).
This value is based on vendors rated flow of 30,000 cfm not the actual startup test and P&ID value of 20,680 cfm.
COMPONENTS AND DESIGN PARAMETERS Components Design Parameters xiliary Building Heating and Ventilating Supply Units Number of units 2 Number of fans per unit 1 Capacity, each (cfm) 33,000/31,550 Total pressure (in wg) 3.5/3.6 Motor (hp) 30 xiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust Fans Number of fans 1/1 Capacity (cfm) 50,000/22,000 Total pressure (in wg) 5.7/4.9 Motor (hp) 75/30 xiliary Building Filtration Units and Fans Number of units 2 Number of fans per unit 1 Capacity, each (cfm) 30,000 Total pressure (in wg) 10.5 Motor (hp) 75 tor Control Center, Rod Control, and Cable Vault Air conditioning its Number of units 2 Number of fans per unit 1 Capacity, each (cfm) 26,000 Total pressure (in wg) 9.0 Motor (hp) 50 arging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger eas Supply Fans Number of fans 2 Capacity, each (cfm) 27,000 Total pressure (in wg) 6.5
Components Design Parameters Motor (hp) 40 arging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Exchanger eas Exhaust Fans Number of fans 2 Capacity, each (cfm) 30,000 Total pressure (in wg) 6.5 Motor (hp) 60
COMPONENTS AND APPROXIMATE PARAMETERS Fan Static Capacity Pressure Motor (Hp)
Component Title Quantity (cfm) Each (in wg) Each rbine building supply fans 4 165,000 4.3 200 rbine building exhaust fans 12 60,000 2.6 50 rbine building transfer fans 6 70,000 2.2 40 be oil room exhaust fans 1 2,000 1.42 1 1 2,000 0.42 1 vator machine room exhaust fan 1 500 0.125 0.125 mple sink exhaust fan 1 1,700 2.75 2 elding area exhaust fan 1 5,900 0.45 5 intenance toilet area exhaust fan 1 450 0.125 0.08 ndensate polishing area supply fan 1 10,400 1.6 7.5 ndensate polishing area exhaust fan 1 10,400 2.1 7.5 ttery room No. 6 supply fan 1 1,200 1.75 2
PARAMETERS Design Parameters*
Total Capacity Pressure Motor Fans Qty Type (cfm) (in wg) (hp) Remar NORMAL VENTILATION SYSTEM COMPONENT Mechanical rooms supply (3HVQ-FN3) and exhaust 2 Axial 4,000 1.9 Supply 3 Supply O.A. **4, (3HVQ-FN4) fans 1.0 Exhaust 2 Exhaust to O.A.
Both safety injection and quench spray pump areas, 2 Axial 8,100 2.5 Supply 5 Supply O.A. 8,1 residual heat removal pump and heat exchanger areas, containment recirculation pump and cooler areas, refueling water recirculation pump areas, main steam piping penetration area, turbine-driven auxiliary 2.0 Exhaust 5 Exhaust O.A. 8,1 feedwater pump area, and both motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump areas supply (3HVQ-FN1) and exhaust (3HVQ-FN2) fans RSS and QSS area supply (3HVQ-FN8) and exhaust Supply from refu 2 Centrifugal 1,500 0.90 Supply 1 (3HVQ-FN7) fans pumps area exha 0.75 Exhaust 0.5 refueling pump a Emergency Ventilation System Component Mechanical rooms A, B, C, and D, both motor-driven Supply O.A. fro 2 Axial 20,000 4.5 Supply 20 auxiliary feedwater pump areas and the turbine-driven to 0 cfm auxiliary feedwater pump area supply (3HVQ*FN5A/ Exhaust to O.A.
5B) and exhaust (3HVQ*FN6A / 6B) fans 2 Axial 20,000 3.5 Exhaust 15 20,000 to 0 cfm
- Design parameters are based on corresponding equipment specification and vendor drawings.
- Outside air.
06/28/18 9.4-85 Revision 3
Total Static Total Condenser Capacity Pressure Refrigerant Fan Motor Cooling A/C Qty. Type (cfm) (in wg) Load (Btu) (hp) (hp) Media Refrige COMPONENT Safety injection and Self-contained quench spray pump air conditioning Service area, residual heat 2 units 7,600 4.1 392,144 7.5 40 water at R-22 removal pump and (3HVQ*ACU1 80°F heat exchanger areas A/1B) ventilation Self-contained Containment air conditioning Service recirculation pump 2 units 7,600 4.1 392,144 7.5 40 water at R-22 and cooler areas (3HVQ*ACU2 80°F ventilation A/2B)
SYSTEM CONSEQUENCES OF COMPONENT FAILURES Components Malfunctions Comments and Consequences e quench Spray Pump, Safety ection Pump, Residual Heat moval Pump and Heat changer Ventilation System, HVQ*ACW5A/B) Containment circulating Pumps and Cooler ntilation System (Figure 9.4-4)
HVQ*QCW52A/2B)
Casing leakage, air Partial loss of cooling; redundant r conditioning unit casing bypass cooling coil unit is available for cooling.
Partial loss of cooling; redundant Excessive dust loading, r filter air conditioning is available for reduced airflow cooling.
n Failure to operate Redundant unit is available.
Partial loss of cooling, redundant oling coil Tube leakage unit is available for cooling.
mpressor Failure to operate Redundant unit is available.
Partial loss of cooling; redundant ndenser Tube leakage unit is available for cooling.
gulating valve Failure to operate Redundant unit is available.
Partial loss of ventilation, the rooms are served by supply and return systems. Should air leakage ctwork Duct leakage occur, adequate airflow is maintained in the rooms due to pressure differential created by undamaged duct.
xiliary Feedwater Pump Area ntilation System (SUPPLY VQ*FN5A/5B, EXHAUST VQ*FN6A/6B) (Figure 9.4-4):
Loss of ventilation; redundant unit n Failure to operate is available.
Dampers fail to safe position.
mper Failure to operate Possible partial loss of ventilation; redundant system is available.
Components Malfunctions Comments and Consequences Partial loss of ventilation; the rooms are served by supply and return systems. Should air leakage ctwork Duct leakage occur, adequate airflow is maintained in the rooms due to pressure differential created by undamaged duct.
COMPONENTS DESIGN AND APPROXIMATE PARAMETERS Components Design Parameters tration Fans Number of fans 2 Capacity, each (cfm) 12,000 Total pressure (in wg) 9.0 Motor, each (hp) 50 PA-Charcoal Filter Banks Quantity 2 Capacity, filtration each (cfm) 12,000 Pressure drop (in wg)
HEPA filter 1.30 new HEPA filter 1.75 requires replacement Charcoal adsorber 2.44
COMPONENTS DESIGN AND APPROXIMATE PARAMETERS Components Design Parameters ntainment Air Recirculation Units Quantity 3 Number of cooling coils per unit 6 Number of fans per unit 1 Fan capacity, normal mode 143,500 cfm each with 2 fans in use Cooling media during normal operation Chilled water Cooling media during loss of power Component cooling water rmal Fan Total pressure head (in wg) 6.0 Motor (hp) 250
ODES AND APPROXIMATE DESIGN CONDITIONS OF AIR RECIRCULATION FAN COOLERS Total Capacity Containment Temperature No. of Units in Mode of Operation (°F) Operation (cfm) (Btu/hr) rmal 95 2 287,000 6,870,000 ss of offsite power < 135 1 160,000 2,740,000
COMPONENTS AND APPROXIMATE PARAMETERS Components Design Parameters pply Units Number of units 2 Number of fans per unit 1 Capacity, each (cfm) 17,500 Total pressure (inches wg) 6.16 Motor (hp) 30 haust Fans Number of fans 2 Capacity, each (cfm) 17,500 Total pressure (inches wg) 8.0 Motor, each (hp) 40
APPROXIMATE PARAMETERS Component Design Parameters DM Fans Type Axial Number 3 Flow/fan (cfm) - 2 fan operation 45,000 tal pressure (inches wg) 10.67 tor (hp) 200 et Air Maximum temperature (°F) 120 et Air Maximum humidity (%) 100 ad Load Maximum design (btu/hr) 3,700,000
SYSTEM ating and Ventilating Supply Units Design Parameters uipment mark number 3HVR-HVU3A, 3B, 3C antity 3 ecification number 2138.430-143 nufacturer Buffalo Forge Co.
rformance at specified conditions:
Fan capacity (cfm) 34,000 Fan static pressure (in wg) 4.0 Rotation/rpm 1,072 Brake horsepower 38.6 ating coils (preheat/reheat):
Capacity (MBh) 2070/724 Face area (square feet) 41.49/27.5 Rows furnished 2/1 Pressure drop (feet of water) 3.4/0.7 ters:
Type Continental Cono 45 or equivalent erating weight complete unit (lb.) 7,750 tor data:
Horsepower 50 Full load (rpm) 1,800 Enclosure ODP Reference drawing EB-77Q Location Waste Disposal Building aste Disposal Building Exhaust Fans Design Parameters uipment mark number 3HVR-FN8A/8B antity 2 ecification number 2138.430-007 nufacturer Joy Manufacturing Co.
pe Vane Axial pacity (cfm) 29,860 id Air sign temperature (°F)65-104 erating temperature (°F)65-104 ive Direct tal pressure (in wg) 11.8 tor data:
Type TEAO Horsepower 75 Volts/phases/frequency 460/3/60 Speed (rpm) (Later)
Insulation class (Later) eight (lb) 1,988 ference drawing EB-45G cation Auxiliary building, elevation 66 feet 6 inches
URE 9.4-1 (SHEETS 1-5) P&ID CONTROL BUILDING HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.4-2 (SHEETS 1-6) P&ID REACTOR PLANT VENTILATION figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
IGURE 9.4-3 (SHEETS 1-5) P&IDS TURBINE PLANT VENTILATION & ISO BUS DUCT COOLING SYSTEMS figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.4-4 (SHEETS 1-3) P&ID ESF AND MSV BUILDINGS VENTILATION figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.4-5 P&ID CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE VENTILATION figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.4-6 (SHEETS 1-3) P&ID SERVICE BUILDING VENTILATION figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.4-7 (SHEETS 1-2) P&ID AUXILIARY BOILER AND VENTILATION figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.4-8 (SHEETS 1-3) P&ID HOT WATER HEATING SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
GURE 9.4-9 P&ID TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER, HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Fire Protection Program, has been developed to ensure that any single fire will not cause an cceptable risk to public health and safety, will not prevent the performance of necessary safe tdown functions, and will not significantly increase the risk of radioactive release to the ironment. Compliance with fire protection technical requirements is shown in Table 9.5-1.
Fire Protection Program establishes the fire protection policy for the protection of structures, ems, and components important to the safety of the plant and the procedures, equipment, and onnel required to implement the program.
Fire Protection Program is under the direction of an individual who has been delegated ority commensurate with the responsibilities of the position.
achieve and maintain a high level of confidence for the Fire Protection Program, it has been anized and is administered using the defense-in-depth concept. The defense-in-depth concept res that if any level of fire protection fails, another level is available to provide the required nse. In fire protection terms, this defense-in-depth concept consists of the following levels:
- a. Preventing fires from starting.
- b. Early detection of fires that do start and controlling and/or extinguishing them quickly so as to limit their damage.
- c. Designing the safety system so that if a fire should start in spite of the fire prevention program, and if it should burn for a considerable period of time in spite of fire suppression activities, it will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant e of these levels can be perfect or complete, but strengthening any one level can compensate ome measure for weaknesses, known or unknown, in the others.
following source documents form the basis for the Millstone Unit 3 nuclear power plants fire ection program.
rce Documents 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants.
NUREG-0800, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Branch Technical Position, CMEB 9.5-1, Rev. 2.
In terms of addressing and complying with the listed source documents, the following NU programs and procedures have been implemented:
mpliance Documents Fire Protection / Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown Program Procedure Millstone 3 Fire Protection Evaluation Report Millstone 3 Fire Fighting Strategies Millstone 3 BTP 9.5-1 Compliance Report 1.1 Design Bases Fire Protection Program involves several levels of fire protection features in support of its nse-in-depth concept. For a more detailed summary of the features/programs provided, refer he appropriate section of the Millstone 3 Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER), as listed w:
1.2 System Description lstone 3 FPER, Section 4, Plant Design Features, contains an explanation of the various fire ection features, ventilation capabilities, access and egress routes, emergency lighting, and munication systems as well as active support systems that have been provided in order to guard plant systems/operations from a damaging fire affecting its safe shutdown capabilities.
individual fire protection system types and general schematic layout are shown in Figure 9.5-1.3 Safety Evaluation lstone 3 FPER, Section 5, Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), provides an area-by-area detailed fire lysis of the various areas/zones within Millstone 3. This section details the equipment within various areas/zones of the plant defined by construction design features. The analysis includes scussion of fire protection features that are installed and the postulated fire and its sequence on plant operation.
lstone 3 FPER, Section 6, Safe Shutdown Evaluation, provides a brief summary of the safe tdown systems available after a postulated fire in each area/zone of the plant. An in-depth, iled review/analysis is provided in the Millstone 3 BTP 9.5-1 Compliance Report. Millstone 3 R, Section 7, Support Systems, provides a brief summary of the active support systems uired for the functions shown on Section 6 Figures 6-1.1 through 6-10.
lstone Unit 3 Fire Protection Technical Requirements Manual, 3TRM-7.4, contains the fire ection operability requirements listing (formerly known as Technical Specifications Governed tems). Administrative controls and testing/surveillance requirements to ensure that an quate level of fire protection is maintained at all times, are provided. This listing also contains ting conditions and action statements to govern off-normal status of installed systems.
1.5 Personnel Qualification and Training lstone 3 FPER, Section 3.2, Fire Protection Organization, contains the organizational structure overall responsibility for the Fire Protection Program at Millstone 3.
lstone 3 FPER, Section 3.3, Fire Brigade and Training - The Millstone Station Fire Fight ining Program establishes the requirements of, and responsibilities for, the training of fire ade personnel. BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A, provides the guidelines for developing the program.
lstone 3 FPER, Section 3.4, Quality Assurance - The Quality Assurance Program has been lied to the fire protection systems, components, and programs providing fire detection and pression capabilities to those areas of the plant that are important to safety.
2 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 2.1 Design Bases iable communication systems are provided for intra-plant, intra site, and plant-to-off site ch meet the requirements of operation and maintenance of the unit. Multiple communication ems are provided to ensure the capability to notify the necessary personnel of the presence of nsafe condition so that corrective measures can be taken. Physical and electrical ependence is maintained between the systems.
se communication systems provide effective communications between plant personnel in key rating vital areas during the full spectrum of accident or incident conditions (including fire) er maximum equipment operating noise levels. The design is based on previously reviewed ts with satisfactory operating experience. The communications systems for fire fighting meet requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.120.
2.2 System Design 2.2.1 Intraplant and Intrasite Communications aplant and intrasite communications consist of the following systems:
plant switching network (Private Branch Exchange (PBX) and connected telephones and data equipment)
control room intercom system voice paging system evacuation alarm system maintenance jack system fuel handling carrier phone system sound-powered telephone system station trunked radio system multiple telemetering systems for station data escription of these systems follows.
nt Switching Network plant switching network or private branch exchange (PBX) is a telephone system consisting tandard telephones, multiline telephones, a digital PBX, cellular telephones, cellular base ions, and a radio exchange.
PBX and its associated telephones allow communication throughout the plant by dialing the ropriate four-digit extension number. Communication off site, is accomplished by dialing the ropriate telephone number(s) or tie line code(s).
plant switching network is operated at (-) 48V DC power, which is provided by lineage 2000 ifiers. The rectifiers also provide a charging and float current to maintenance free batteries, ch are the emergency battery backup system.
plant switching network is directly coupled to the Public Switched Network (refer to tion 9.5.2.2.2) and the voice paging system.
omatic Ringdown Telephones re are on site automatic ringdown telephones installed in the Unit 3 Control Room. These phones are configured to ring at the terminating end when the handset is lifted from the phone.
omatic ringdown telephones ring from the Unit 3 Control Room to the following on site tions: Operational Support Center (OSC), Security, and the Technical Support Center (TSC).
ically, automatic ringdown telephones are independent of the Plant PBX systems. Refer to off communications, multiple dedicated automatic ringdown telephones, Section 9.5.2.2.2, for itional information on this system.
control room intercom system provides a communication link between the control rooms of ts 2 and 3. The intercom operates independently of the PBX and voice paging systems.
ce Paging System intraplant/intrasite voice paging system provides communications from the control room to uildings and control areas within the unit. In addition, through interconnections with the X, this system provides communication from one control area to any other. Isolation is vided between the two systems which have different operating voltages and impedances. The aplant/intrasite voice paging system is an independent system using separate amplifiers and akers at each paging station. Public address loudspeaker stations are provided in buildings ch comprise the plant and in the outside areas surrounding the plant. Access to voice paging akers is provided and initiated by dialing a code number from any designated plant dial phone. The control room has priority access to the public address system. This access asses the plant switching network.
voice paging system consists of loudspeaker stations, amplifiers, a telephone interface, two e override handsets, and a multitone generator. The power source for most of the system is a vital bus, powered by inverter INV-5 (Figure 8.3-2). The power source for parts of the system serves some outlying buildings and some yard areas is the Technical Support Center electrical ribution system.
loudspeaker stations are suitable for operation in conjunction with the loudspeaker lifiers. Horn-type speakers have accessories suitable for mounting on horizontal or vertical ctural surfaces. Mounting hardware permits orientation of horn-type speakers in both azimuth elevation and locks them in the desired position. Voice coil terminals of all drivers are marked polarity.
amplifiers are suitable for operation on a 120 V (+/-10 percent), 60 Hz, single-phase supply.
el control is provided to regulate amplifier output and to prevent overdriving at any stage.
ed output of unit loudspeaker amplifiers is not less than 12 W. The output transformers for the dspeaker amplifiers have taps for 8 and 16 ohms.
h handset station includes a handset, a hookswitch, amplifier, terminal facilities, page/party ng-loaded selector switch, and 6 feet of self-coiling cord. The handsets include a magnetic iver and a low impedance noise cancelling transmitter. These handsets are located in the trol room and at the auxiliary shutdown panel, and include an override control for paging.
cuation Alarm System evacuation alarm system is comprised of a multitone generator, and it utilizes the amplifiers speakers associated with the voice paging system. The integration of equipment from these systems provides an effective warning system for site emergencies.
scillator/amplifier unit which is housed in a 16-gauge steel enclosure. All connections to the lifier unit terminate in a plug on the amplifier chassis. A self-aligning receptacle in the losure accommodates the plug. A well-marked terminal strip mounted inside the enclosure vides for external wiring. All electrical components in the amplifier unit are premium-grade ustrial type.
various tones are produced individually by closing the contacts between the appropriate nts on the terminal strip. The site evacuation yelp tone, a varying tone between 400 and 840 is activated remotely by a switch in the control room(s). The tone is transmitted by the erator over the voice paging system and is heard throughout the site. The emergency tone rrides any voice paging.
ntenance Jack System maintenance jack system, which is utilized for calibration and maintenance, consists of lifiers, headsets, handsets, and a network of plug-in jack stations with five-party selector tches located throughout the plant. Its power source is a nonvital bus powered by inverter
-5 (Figure 8.3-2).
k stations are mounted on control panels or in separate enclosures. Each station contains a position selector switch (position for each of the five channels and an off position) and a ptacle to receive the plug unit of the headset or handset. Those jack stations that are mounted eparate enclosures have a provision to cover the receptacle when the station is not in use.
dsets and handsets contain speaker(s), a microphone assembly, a cord, and a plug suitable to e with the receptacle of the jack stations.
ystem amplifier (located in Emergency Switchgear Room 2, control building, elevation 4 feet ches) consists of five independent amplifiers each capable of driving a channel.
maintenance jack system does not interface with any other communication system.
l Handling Carrier Phone System fuel handling carrier phone system consists of an amplifier, jack plug stations, and handsets.
ower source is a nonvital bus powered by inverter INV-5 (Figure 8.3-2).
k stations are mounted in separate enclosures. Each station contains a receptacle to receive the g unit of a handset, as well as provisions to cover the receptacle when the station is not in use.
jack stations are of single channel design.
dsets include a speaker, a microphone assembly, a cord, and a plug suitable to mate with the ptacle of the jack stations.
jack stations are located on the spent fuel pool bridge, manipulator crane, five in the tainment at various elevations, and four in the fuel building.
fuel handling carrier phone system does not interface with any other communication system.
nd-Powered Telephone System sound-powered telephone system consists of a master station, a switch box, and 16 stations with handsets. The system is self-powered.
h substation includes a handheld telephone with a push-to-operate button located on the dset, a handset holder, and a wall-mounted cast aluminum case containing a manually rated magneto generator for call signaling and an audible call-signal device.
master station, in addition to the equipment furnished with a substation, includes a selector tch (for calling substations individually) and a switch box containing sixteen 6-pole switches disconnecting any faulted substation cable in the system.
master station is located in the auxiliary shutdown panel area (control building, elevation 4 6 inches). Substations are located in the emergency diesel generator enclosures, the rgency switchgear rooms, the main control room, and the Fire Transfer Panel Area in the trol Building, the Charging Pump Control Cubicle, the East MCC Rod Control Area, and the e Penetration Area in the Auxiliary Building; the Motor Operator Vent Valve Area in the Main am Valve Building; the Train A Room and the Train B Room in the Circulating and vice Water Pump House; and the Auxiliary Feed Water pump 1A Cubicle, the orange/purple C area, the Manual Feed Isolation Valve area, and the Pipe Tunnel Area in the Engineered ety Features Building.
sound-powered telephone system does not interface with any other communication system.
ion Trunked Radio System s is a five-channel, digital-based trunking radio system. The trunking repeaters and central trollers are installed in the Telecommunications Radio Housing adjacent to the Millstone
- k. The repeater stations are capable of 75 watts of RF power output with continuous duty ration. The primary power source is 120 VAC. The backup power is provided by a diesel erator. Panel type antennas are mounted on the stack. A backup system, designed to come on in the event of a failure at the primary site, is installed in 475, 3rd floor. The Control Room access to a dedicated channel from the communications console. System control is from the o consoles in Units 2 and 3, the security central and secondary alarm stations, and the EOF.
base station is located in the CPF Building. The directional antennas are located on the roof he CPF Building and the installation design is such to withstand wind speeds up to and uding 100 mph.
lding. This repeater is capable of 100 watts of RF power output with continuous duty ration. The primary power source is 120 VAC and the backup power source is battery. The vidual portable radio is also equipped with a small antenna which provides a portable-to-able feature between the radios. An omnidirectional antenna is mounted on the roof of the F Building and the installation design is such to withstand windspeeds up to and including 100 h.
ddition to the 800 MHz and 900 MHz compatible antenna located on the roof of the Auxiliary lding, antennas are also located on Warehouse Number 5 (Building 435), the Technical port Center (Building 315), and the Security Operations Center (Building 405). These nnas are connected to coaxial type antenna cables distributed throughout the interior of these dings.
emetering Systems emetering equipment to assist load dispatching is also provided in the control room.
2.2.2 Off site Communications off site communication systems consist of the following:
public switched network (off site dial telephone system)
Emergency Telecommunication System (ETS) multiple dedicated automatic ringdown telephones multiple radio systems multiplexing/SONET system escription of these systems follows:
lic Switched Network public switched network is operated by various telephone companies (i.e., SNET) and nects various outside agencies.
public switched network is tied directly to the plant switching network with multiple central ce trunk lines. The plant switch network is also tied remotely to the public switched network ugh dial repeating tie trunks.
NRC currently provides reliable long distance telephone service to nuclear power plant sites remote Emergency Operations Facilities (EOFs) for the following six essential communications functions:
ergency Notification System (ENS) - Unit Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC),
Emergency Operating Facility (EOF).
ctor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL) - EOF and TSC.
nagement Counterpart Link (MCL) - EOF and TSC.
al Area Network (LAN) - EOF and TSC.
tective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL) - EOF, and lth Physics Network (HPN) - EOF.
ltiple Dedicated Automatic Ringdown Telephones s system consists of auto-ringdown phones from the Millstone 3 control room to: the State ce Troop E, the Waterford Police, the site Emergency Operations Facility, Connecticut Valley ctric Exchange (CONVEX), and ISO New England (Independent System Operator). All off auto-ringdown phones receive their power for signaling and ringing from SNET New London ce via individual hard wire pairs. All circuits are independent of the station PBX. As part of emergency communications system, the locations and connections of the automatic ringdown phones are illustrated in the Millstone site Emergency Plan.
ltiple Radio Systems off site multiple radio systems include the following:
CONVEX Command Control Network (CCN); (Tone Alert)
Waterford Police System Trim-town UHF radio system; (Tone Alert)
State Police system; VHF radio paging system edicated radio remote control console is provided in the Millstone 3 control room for munications with all associated on site as well as off site radio facilities (as outlined above).
ower source is a nonvital bus powered by INV-5 (Figure 8.3-2). Normally, all radio systems,
ted radio dispatchers to contact the control room operator.
radio console (400 panel) installed in the Millstone 3 control room consists of four individual s secured together as a consolidated unit. The total length of the equipment is 92 inches with a ht of 43.75 inches and an overall depth of 29.5 inches. The console is an equipment enclosure sing audio amplifiers (T/R modules), tone generators (encoders), tone decoders, and dual er supplies. Additionally, two outboard bays contain telephone equipment which operate pendently of the console power supplies.
console generates low level audio and DC voltages only, for the single purpose of controlling otely located base station radios.
power supplies and termination panels for the control consoles are located in the lower ion of the equipment housings. Provisions are included on the rear-hinged termination panel securing cable entries. The two inner bays contain the heart of the console radio control em. These two bays can be considered as left center and right center as viewed from the rator side of the console. The left side of the console contains the controls for police, site urity, tri-town, operations/maintenance radios, and master control module. The emergency t paging system occupies the right half of the console. The radio control panel is mounted ctly in front of the radio dispatchers position. This provides the interface functions required ween the operator and the console (microphone, speakers, volume controls, push to talk tches).
microphone is a moving coil, dynamic unidirectional, that is uniform with frequencies of 80 3,000 Hz. The microphone is adjustable vertically and horizontally to accommodate different rators and is internally rubber-vibration-isolated to avoid physical damage.
console contains two power supplies; a low voltage supply and a high voltage supply, each h an input voltage of 120 VAC. The low voltage supply provides +24 VDC and is capable of dling up to 24 radio channels. It includes a nominal +13.8 VDC 10 percent regulator which, in junction with an overcurrent protection circuit, can provide a maximum continuous output ent of 1 amp. The power supply has an output current capability of 8 amps. The high voltage ply provides +175 VDC for keying up to 24 DC controlled radios.
console contains 15 audio amplifiers (T/R modules) with expansion capability of 15 future dules. One T/R module is used with each radio control channel. The module contains both c circuits and receive/transmit audio circuits. The logic circuits include channel select, keying, y, and priority functions. The receive audio circuits include speech processing (using an audio pressor circuit), muting, audio gating, and a voice enabled call indicator. The transmit audio uits include a preamplifier, tone mixing amplifier, gating circuits, and a transmit audio line er.
re are three tone generators (encoders) with external push-button operator controls located in console. A touch tone encoder allows standard touch code two frequency tone codes to be
ch alerts the operator that the transmission of a code can proceed. A programmable timing uit automatically resets the encoder and unkeys the transmitter if the tone sequence is not red within a predetermined time. The encoder and transmitter automatically reset if the rator fails to complete a code entry. All codes generated by the encoder are compatible with dard touch tone equipment. A two-tone sequential tone generator allow encoding pocket ers and fixed receive monitors. The operating controls and indicators are located on the front el of the unit. The encoder has 16 push buttons, a four-digit call code display, a call indicator, a talk indicator. A code is manually punched into the encoder keyboard and the sequence is matically sent whenever desired. The transmitter stays on the air for a predetermined amount me after the code transmittal terminates in order for a voice message to be sent out to the red pager or monitor.
remaining tone generator is the auto page encoder module. This unit is an engineered hybrid g digitally synthesized tones and logic switching circuits. The encoder, once activated, matically selects predetermined transmitters and send out a programmed tone sequence to t pagers and fixed receive monitors. The unit works in unison with a tape deck containing a ned tape message selected by the operator.
console contains eight touch tone decoders that activate indicator lights and a sonalert audible ice. This alerts the operator of an incoming call on a particular channel. The audio circuits of console are muted until activated by the decoder, and turned on to normal volume when a per code sequence is decoded. The audio circuit and sonalert have to be manually reset uring that the operator does not miss an incoming call.
ould be noted that the Millstone 3 console (400 panel) is identical to that in Unit 2. This vides an expanded backup system for the communications systems on the Millstone site.
mmand Control Network (CCN)
CONVEX CCN is a two-way radio system using tone alert signaling to provide munications among the control room, the CONVEX load dispatcher and other key operating lities.
s system is controlled by the radio console in Units 2, and 3. The transmitter/receiver base ion is installed in the CPF Building 212 telecommunications room. It is installed in an impact-stant, 41-inch cabinet bonded to electrical ground. AC voltage is the primary power source.
base station is fully solid-state incorporating integrated circuitry, located on plug-in modules ndependent printed circuit boards. Highly reliable reed switches are used for antenna tching. The base station produces 13.8VDC to supply power, and draws little current.
eated, temperature compensated plug-in oscillator modules are used for frequency control.
unit contains a continuous duty transmitter that can operate indefinitely on full power. There five front-mounted metering receptacles for ease of maintenance troubleshooting. The station motely controlled by tone frequencies. The wire line controlling the station need not have DC tinuity for operation.
les only. The cable ultimately terminates at the antenna mount on the CPF Building penthouse.
coaxial cable has the outer copper jacket bonded to ground before entry into the building. The xial cable has an impedance of 50 ohms and offers a combination of remarkable flexibility, h strength, and superior electrical performance. It includes a copper clad aluminum center ductor, a protective black polyethylene foam dielectric, a corrugated copper outer conductor, a protective black polyethylene jacket. The antenna is rigidly mounted to a permanent bracket ured to the parapet of the CPF Building. It is a highly directional r-f radiating device with a er gain of 5 dB. The antenna is designed to withstand severe environmental conditions.
iating elements are made of three-quarter inch diameter tubing and reinforced with 7/8-inch meter sockets at the mounting boom. It contains direct ground lightning protection and has a d rating of 97 mph. The installed antenna weighs 37 pounds.
terford Police Radio Waterford Police Department two-way radio system provides communications between the terford Emergency Communications Dispatcher and the control room. The system is trolled by the radio console in Units 2 and 3. The base station is located in the CPF Building communication room.
antenna is installed on the CPF Building penthouse. It is provided with lightning protection has a wind rating of 150 mph.
Town UHF Radio System Tri-Town (Waterford, New London and East Lyme) UHF radio system is an administrative
-way radio system used by three towns in the Millstone area. Each of these towns has the ity to call the control room using tone alert signaling.
system is controlled by the consoles in Units 2 and 3 and base/control station and repeater y station. The base/control station is located in the CPF Building digital microwave room. It tains two transmit frequencies, the second frequency being talk-around in the event of a ater relay station failure. The unit is installed in an impact resistant cabinet bonded to the trical ground. The primary power source is 120 VAC backed up from an uninterruptible er supply. The station is fully solid-state. The station is connected to the antenna via a 1/
ch jacketed semirigid coaxial cable. The antenna is rigidly mounted to a permanent bracket ured to the parapet of the CPF Building penthouse. The antenna is designed to provide 5 dB of
. The wind survival of the antenna is 125 mph, and all elements are operated at DC ground to ure immunity from lightning damage.
repeater relay station is located in the Telecommunications Radio Housing adjacent to the lstone stack. The repeater is fully solid-state and has r-f control capability to turn the unit on off. Its primary power source is 120 VAC, backed up from the security diesel.
-stack collinear array designed to provide 9 dB of gain, broad bandwidth, and minimum ern distortion.
e Police Radio System State Police two-way radio system provides two-way communication between Millstone, l and state police barracks located in Montville, CT.
system is controlled from the consoles located in Units 2 and 3. The base station is located in CPF Building telecommunications room. The station fully utilizes the advantages of solid-e circuits, reliability, small size ruggedness, and low maintenance requirements. Efficient heat ators ensure safe operating temperatures for the transmitter power amplifier stages, and the er supply regulator transistors. The stations' primary power source is 120 VAC, and it is ected from over current conditions.
base station is connected to the antenna via a jacketed 0.5 inch diameter semirigid cable. The le is installed in cable tray OTX850N which is dedicated to communication cables only. The le ultimately terminates at the antenna mount on the CPF Building penthouse. The antenna is dly mounted to permanent bracket secured to the parapet of the CPF Building penthouse. The nna is a unity power gain omnidirectional antenna, with a wind rating survival of 100 mph.
F Radio Paging/Emergency Notification and Response System (ENRS)
Emergency Notification and Response System (ENRS) is an automated radio-paging, phone, audio message and fax delivery system designed to meet the needs of nuclear power lities, including the requirements of notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix E NUREG-0654. The system initiates emergency notification through telephones, radio pagers fax machines using application software which features call back and notification fication, and status display and reporting capability as described in the Millstone Nuclear er Station Emergency Plan. The system activates the Paging System and provides radio pages ite Emergency Response Organization (SERO) personnel, and informational alphanumeric es and faxed event information to State and Local Agencies. The Incident Report Form (IRF) xed by computer to outside agencies. ENRS is comprised of redundant telephone servers and nt terminals located in the control room and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Client inals are connected to telephone servers through the local area network and individual dems.
ltiplexing/SONET System lstone is supported by a Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) connected in a diverse ring figuration (fiber optic cable) and by multiplexing equipment. This equipment is located in the F building and in Building 475. Telecommunication traffic placed on the SONET system is the e type that would be placed on the microwave system. The multiplexer has the capability to
SONET terminal is powered by a 48 VDC source with battery backup. The batteries can vide backup power for a period of 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br />.
2.3 Design Evaluation ministrative procedures prevent handheld station trunked radios from affecting the solid-state tor protection and/or ESF systems.
cables in the communication systems are independent from those of other systems and are lded or isolated from power cables and any other sources of line noise which could adversely ct the audibility of the systems. The communication systems use twisted, balanced audio pairs urther reduce the effects of longitudinally induced magnetic noise.
communication systems are physically and electronically independent. The failure of any em does not cause the malfunction of the other systems. To ensure high power supply ability, nonvital systems (requiring power) receive power from the 120/208 V nonvital bus ction 8.3.1), the Technical Support Center electrical distribution system, or the normal DC er system (Section 8.3.2). The plant PBX is provided with a backup power system using a ifier and backup battery. The microwave system is provided with a separate battery-rectifier er system. The normal and emergency power supply systems for the Public Switched work are located at the telephone company operating facilities.
2.4 Testing and Inspection design of the communication systems permits routine testing and inspection without upting normal communication facilities. The evacuation alarm system will be tested odically in accordance with normal station procedure.
3 LIGHTING SYSTEMS 3.1 Design Bases ion lighting provides adequate lighting during all operating conditions, accident conditions, sients, fire, and during the loss of off-site power. The systems provide, as a minimum, lighting nsities at levels recommended by the Illuminating Engineering Society (IES) Lighting dbook 1981 Application Volume, IES Transaction on Nuclear Power Plant Lighting and REG-0700. Emergency lighting for fire fighting meets the requirements of Regulatory Guide 20.
orescent and light emitting diode (LED) lamps are used for general lighting of the station.
ndescent lamps are the only type of lamp used within the containment and in certain areas of fuel building.
hting in the area of the main control board is controlled by dimmers to give the best resolution sible.
mination is provided in accordance with current OSHA requirements for means of access/
ss for all facilities. Exit signs are illuminated by the essential AC system. Lighting is provided ediately outside exits.
normal AC lighting system is both physically and electrically separated from the essential station lighting design is based on previously approved plants with satisfactory operating erience.
3.2 System Design ion lighting comprises three separate systems.
- 1. Normal AC lighting system is supplied from the normal (i.e., black) 480 VAC motor control centers (Section 8.3.1) through dry-type 480/208-120 VAC, three-phase lighting transformers. This system provides general plant area lighting. Illumination levels conform to IES standards for access/egress and task areas.
- 2. Essential AC lighting system is supplied from the emergency (i.e., orange or purple) 480 V AC motor control centers (Section 8.3.1) through 480/240-120 VAC, single phase, dry-type voltage regulating transformers which are qualified as isolation devices. The output of the isolation transformers, although black, is run exclusively in conduit and does not share raceways with normal black power, emergency power, or with black power that originates from an isolation transformer supplied from the opposite emergency bus. The output of the isolation transformer is protected by a molded case circuit breaker. This system provides lighting for the control room, the emergency switchgear rooms (including the auxiliary shutdown panel), and other safety related and vital areas required to bring the plant to safe shutdown. In addition, access and egress paths for personnel evacuation throughout the station are provided with lighting from this system. The essential AC lighting operates continuously, with the exception of the lighting in the containment. Upon loss of off site (normal) AC power, the essential AC lighting is automatically reenergized via the emergency diesel generators as discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.3. Illumination levels provided by the essential lighting system upon loss of normal lighting meet the requirements for safety lighting as defined by the IES Transaction on Nuclear Plant Lighting and the IES Handbook-1981 Application Volume.
battery packs are supplied with a trickle charge via the essential ac lighting system (reference Section 8.3.1.1.2) which, in the event of a loss of off site power, is supplied automatically from the emergency generator (reference Section 8.3.1.1.3). In some areas of the plant, these battery packs are supplied with a trickle charge via the normal ac lighting system (reference Section 8.3.1.1.1).
The DC lighting system operates upon the loss of essential or normal AC lighting power (reference Sections 9.5.3.2 (1) and 9.5.3.2 (2)). Upon energization of the essential or normal AC lighting system (reference Sections 9.5.3.2 (1) and 9.5.3.2 (2)), the DC emergency lighting fixtures turn off. The DC lighting system is sufficient to provide emergency lighting for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> unless AC lighting is returned sooner. The DC lighting system provides lighting in the following areas as required by IES standards:
- Areas where operators should have sufficient illumination while maintaining safe plant operations and where time loss of normal and essential lighting could hamper their ability to function quickly and safely.
- Areas where operators must have sufficient illumination while maintaining the plant in a safe hot shutdown condition following a control room evacuation.
- Normal routes of travel to accomplish the above functions.
The illumination levels for the emergency DC lighting system for Millstone Unit Number 3, as defined by IES standards, are:
- Manned work stations listed below are illuminated to 10 FC maintained average at the panel surface.
Main Control Board, CB-9 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, CB-1 Transfer Switch Panel, CB-1 and CB-2 Fire Transfer Switch Panel, CB-2 Generator Circuit Breakers, CB-1 and CB-2 Emergency Generator Panels, EG-3 and EG-4
- Access/egress routes between manned work stations will be illuminated to 0.5 FC average maintained.
- High hazards are illuminated to 2 FC at the center point of the hazard.
Other access/egress pathways identified via the Fire Protection Evaluation are illuminated by DC emergency silhouette lighting. The adequacy of this lighting is verified by field walkdown to be sufficient to allow the operators to access the task areas and perform the intended tasks. This approach is consistent with NRC guidance contained in Generic Letter 85-01, Section 4.1. Portable battery-powered lanterns are available to supplement the fixed lighting when and where required either to perform specific event-related tasks or to perform maintenance on safety related equipment. In addition, this lighting is supplemented with the Millstone Station Security Lighting for outdoor access/egress routes, and access to the Appendix R equipment cage in Warehouse Building Number 435.
3.3 Design Evaluation ion lighting is provided to operate the unit safely under normal and accident conditions, uding a single failure and loss of off site power.
fixtures within the control room are seismically supported. Clips are provided to prevent the rescent lamps from breaking electrical contact and/or dropping out of the electrical sockets ng a seismic event. Also, high quality ballasts are used to minimize the interaction to the ss 1E system.
3.4 Inspection and Testing ign of the station lighting systems permits routine surveillance and testing of all critical ting systems without disrupting normal lighting service.
4 EMERGENCY GENERATOR FUEL OIL STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM emergency generator fuel oil storage and transfer system (EGF) is a safety related system gned to supply fuel oil to the emergency diesel generator engines.
4.1 Design Bases design bases for the EGF are as follows.
- 1. The outside air summer design dry bulb temperature for the Millstone Point site of 86°F and the outside air winter design dry bulb temperature of 0°F.
- 2. In accordance with the codes and classifications listed in Table 3.2-1.
effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, as established in Chapters 2 and 3.
- 4. In accordance with General Design Criterion 4, for structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
- 5. In accordance with General Design Criterion 5, for the capability of the system and its components to perform its required safety functions. A single active failure cannot result in loss of the system-functional performance capabilities.
- 6. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26, for the quality group classification of system components.
- 7. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29, for the seismic design classification of systems components.
- 8. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.102, for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of flooding.
- 9. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137, for fuel oil systems design, fuel oil quality, and tests. Exceptions for time required to complete fuel oil testing noted in Table 1.8-1.
- 10. In accordance with ANSI Standard N195, fuel oil systems for standby diesel generators, except as noted herein.
- 11. In accordance with Branch Technical Positions APCSB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, for breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside containment.
- 12. In accordance with Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 Appendix A, guidelines for fire protection at nuclear power plants.
- 13. In accordance with General Design Criterion 17, for the capability of the fuel oil system to meet independence and redundancy criteria.
4.2 System Description EGF (Figure 9.5-2) is an ASME III, Class 3 system except for the fill line, its associated iner, and the flame arresters which are ANSI B.31.1, Class 4 (NNS). It provides fuel oil to the rgency diesel generators for operation under all plant operating conditions and during all gn basis events. There is a separate fuel oil storage and transfer flow path for each emergency erator.
ps maintain the level in the day tanks automatically as discussed in Section 9.5.4.5. Each day has two supply and one return connections to the fuel oil injection system, mounted grally, and provided with its respective diesel engine.
emergency generator fuel oil system has the following features.
- 1. Two tanks installed in an underground concrete vault one for each diesel engine.
Each emergency generator fuel oil storage tank is sized to store approximately 35,000 gallons of diesel fuel oil. All openings are located in the top of the tanks.
Openings are provided for filling and draining, sampling and sounding, level instrument connections, determining fuel level with a stick gauge, pump piping connections, and a manway. Each tank is separately vented to the atmosphere through a vent line fitted with a flame arrester.
- 2. Four full-capacity, electric motor-driven, vertical, centrifugal, tank-mounted, emergency generator fuel oil transfer pumps (Table 9.5-9) are supplied; two pumps for each emergency generator fuel oil storage tank. Each pump is provided with an orificed recirculation line back to its associated emergency generator fuel oil storage tank to provide a minimum flow for pump protection. A DC motor-driven fuel pump powered from a Class 1E source is provided in addition to the gear-driven engine-mounted pump to ensure starting of the diesel generator.
Each pump has sufficient capacity to fill both day tanks with both emergency generators running, since the fuel consumption at rated load and speed for one emergency generator is 6.16 gpm.
- 3. Two emergency generator fuel oil day tanks; one for each diesel engine. Each emergency generator fuel oil day tank is sized to store approximately 550 U.S.
gallons of diesel fuel oil. Each day tank feeds its respective diesel fuel oil injection system through two supply lines. Each tank is located at an elevation to provide sufficient positive head for its respective diesel fuel oil injection system suction.
Each tank is located at an elevation conforming to a tank bottom elevation of 13 feet above the diesel generators bottom of skid elevation. This fulfills the diesel engine manufacturers recommendation of a minimum elevation of 12 feet above the diesel generators bottom of skid elevation. Two return lines from the diesel fuel oil injection pumps, one to the day tank and one to the storage tank, are provided for excess flow. Openings are provided in the day tanks for piping connections, level instrumentation, and a manway. Valved drain connections are provided in the bottom of the tanks for removing any accumulation of condensation. Each tank is separately vented to the atmosphere through a vent line fitted with a flame arrester.
- 4. Only one (primary) pump is required to transfer fuel oil from a storage tank to the day tank. If it should fail, a backup transfer pump is also available. Each primary
ensures that the fuel oil delivered to the day tank meets the diesel generator manufacturers standards of purity. The backup pumps provide storage tank fuel oil samples for particulate analysis. Therefore, no strainers are provided for these pumps in order to assure particulates are not removed from the sample stream.
- 5. An interconnection with two normally locked-closed valves between the two emergency generator fuel oil supply headers is supplied to facilitate the use of either tank to supply either emergency generator. One pump on each tank is arranged to allow transfer from the A electrical bus to the B electrical bus, or vice versa, by means of a 480 V, seismically qualified Class 1E, manually operated transfer switch, under administrative control, thus ensuring approximately a 6-day supply of fuel for one diesel generator. (See Sections 8.3.1.1.2 and 9.5.4.5).
- 6. A duplex fuel oil strainer is provided for each diesel generator by the manufacturer.
- 7. All piping and fittings are ASME III, Class 3, except for the fill line, its associated strainer, and the flame arresters which are ANSI B.31.1, Class 4. All piping and fittings in the system are 150 pound rating.
fuel oil storage tanks are located in an underground concrete vault adjacent to the emergency erator enclosure. The tanks are separated by a wall 18 inches thick to provide the minimum ulated fire boundary between tanks. The vaults two foot thick concrete outside walls and roof vide the required tornado protection per Regulatory Guide 1.117. Access openings and pipe etrations have water tight seals to provide protection of the vaults against the effects of ding. The fuel oil transfer pumps are mounted directly on top of a flanged connection to the age tanks. Removable concrete covers are provided on the vaults to facilitate pump ntenance or removal. The concrete vault covers are designed to provide tornado and missile ection. The pump strainers and discharge valves also are located in the vault area. The storage vents are located outside the vaults and terminated at 6 feet above finished ground grade in ado and missile proof 2-foot thick reinforced concrete labyrinth enclosures. The labyrinth losures preclude the entrance of water into the fuel oil tanks through the vents. The common harge line from each storage tanks transfer pumps and the overflow line are routed erground to and from the respective fuel oil day tank, which is located in the emergency erator enclosure. These lines run under the concrete structure to provide the required tornado sile protection. The fuel oil transfer pumps may be started and stopped manually from the rgency diesel generator panel located in the emergency generator enclosure. The fuel oil age tank fill lines are located outside the vaults, terminated at an elevation of 3 feet 9 inches ve finished ground grade. The fill lines are capped and locked to preclude entrance of water the tanks. Should the fill lines become damaged, the fuel oil storage tanks also can be filled m within their enclosure through a manhole on the top of the tanks. In the event the fuel oil age tank enclosure area is flooded, the tanks may be filled through their vent lines which are ted well above the site flood stage of 24 feet 6 inches (refer to Section 2.4.2.3).
losure.
l oil degradation due to the turbulence of sediment in the bottom of the fuel oil storage tank ng the addition of new fuel oil is minimized by the following.
- 1. Normal fill line strainer (0.10 inch perforation size).
- 2. Primary fuel oil transfer pump discharge strainer (0.062 inch perforation size). The strainer is provided with a pressure differential indicating switch and alarm which activates a high differential pressure alarm on a local panel, and a local panel trouble alarm on the main board. If a high pressure differential exists that prevents sufficient fuel oil flow to the day tanks, the redundant fuel oil transfer pump will be automatically started on low-low day tank level.
- 3. Engine-mounted duplex fuel oil filter (0.00012 to 0.00020 inch). The filter is provided with a local dual pressure indicator and a pressure switch downstream of the filter which annunciates low fuel oil pressure on a local panel and a trouble alarm on the main control board. These filters are frequently monitored, and filter cartridges replaced when necessary.
ddition, the fill line for each fuel oil storage tank is located a sufficient distance from the fuel ransfer pump to enhance settling of sediment away from the pump suction.
enable fuel oil pump testing, test piping is installed off the pump discharge downstream of the em flow elements. This piping allows fuel oil to be directed to the storage tank bypassing the el day tank. Normally closed valves located in the test lines prevent bypass during transfer of oil to the day tanks.
emergency generator fuel oil storage tanks and the emergency generator fuel oil day tanks are ected from corrosion by interior and exterior corrosion protective painted coatings applied in ordance with Steel Structures Painting Council Standards PA1, Paint Application Guide for p, Field, and Maintenance Painting, and Department of Defense Military Specification L-C-4556D, Coating Kit, Epoxy for Interior of Steel Fuel Tanks. The paint type used on the rior is Ameron 56C Primer and Ameron 56C Finish, and on the exterior, Keeler & Long, Inc.,
7 Epoxy White Primer. Interior paint repairs are made using Mobil/Valspar 78D-7 Primer and bil/Valspar 78W-3 White Finish Coat or engineering approved equal. To preclude the need for odic corrosion protection, underground fuel oil piping is encased in concrete, and the fuel oil age tanks, and all other piping in the fuel oil transfer system are located in underground crete vaults.
umber of design features are provided to prevent occurrence of a fire. Both the storage tank the day tank vents are routed outside their respective areas and are equipped with flame sters.
power supply to the transfer pumps.
suppression for each of the fuel oil tank vaults is provided by a total flooding carbon dioxide em that is actuated by heat detectors. A discharge by either carbon dioxide system is unciated in the main control room.
re is a complete and separate fuel oil storage and transfer flow path for each emergency erator, each of which is located in a separate fire area. A fire in either flow path does not affect operability of the other system from performing its designed task.
4.3 Safety Evaluation a result of the redundancy incorporated in the system design, the EGF system provides its imum required safety function under any one of the following conditions:
loss of off-site power coincident with failure of one emergency generator; loss of off-site power coincident with maintenance outage or failure of one emergency generator fuel oil transfer pump associated with each emergency generator; and loss of off-site power coincident with maintenance outage or failure of either emergency generator fuel oil storage tank.
h of the emergency generator fuel oil storage tanks is sized to store sufficient diesel fuel oil for roximately 3 days of continuous operation of an emergency generator loaded to the 2000 hr.
ng of 5335 kW. An interconnection with two normally locked-closed valves is provided ween the two emergency generator fuel oil transfer pump discharge headers to facilitate the use ither tank to supply either emergency generator. A single failure does not compromise the pendence of the two systems. There are no direct connections between the two systems. One p on each tank is arranged to allow transfer from the A electrical bus to the B electrical bus, isa versa, by means of a 480 V, seismically qualified Class 1E transfer switch manually rated under administrative control. Diesel oil meeting ASTM D975 requirements is provided egular and emergency fuel oil suppliers. Emergency fuel oil suppliers can deliver fuel to the within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after being contacted. Plant procedures ensure that, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after an P or postulated accident occurs, action is taken to notify suppliers of a need for fuel oil. Fuel pliers, both regular and emergency, can provide fuel oil using 8000-gallon fuel trucks. Fuel oil also be supplied by railway tank car, if necessary.
l routings exist which would not be subject to the detrimental effects of floods. The railroads can clear snow from tracks as required. Land routes for trucks have proved dependable rding the ability to keep them clean even after heavy snowstorms. Since fuel can be obtained rland through varied suppliers at different orientations (west, north, and east) from the site via tes 1, 95, or 395, adequate fuel availability despite the potential of flooding is ensured. The access road does not become unusable during floods, and is cleaned frequently during
ys and beyond, as conditions require.
itionally, should an LOP event occur, it has been estimated (see EPRI Report NP-2301) that site power can be restored to the site 95 percent of the time within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. This mate is based on data reported for nuclear power plants within the region of the Northeast er Coordinating Council. During the 14 years the switchyard has been in operation, prior to time Millstone 3 received its full power license, the Millstone site has experienced only one P. This event occurred when salt spray contaminated insulators in the switchyard, causing m to flashover. These insulators have since been replaced with ones having a considerably ter creepage distance which reduces the likelihood of flashover. In addition, an automatic salt tamination monitoring system was installed at the Millstone site in 1982. This system alarms pproximately 50 percent of the contamination level from salt-induced flashovers, further ucing a repeat performance.
transmission grid to which the Millstone switchyard is connected is a highly integrated and able network which has not suffered an outage since November 1965. The fact that power to New York City and Long Island areas was lost in 1977 without affecting Connecticut further sts to the reliability of the grid.
d reliability combined with a high probability of restoring off site power within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ures that the present fuel oil storage scheme for the emergency diesel generators is adequate.
ddition, the availability and reliability of off site fuel oil supplies to replenish fuel oil storage s has been demonstrated. Consequently, the Applicant believes that grid reliability and fuel ilability justify the position that having a 7 day on site fuel oil storage capability per diesel erator is not necessary. The Applicant, therefore, takes exception to this requirement in ulatory Guide 1.137 and ANSI N195.
h of the emergency generator fuel oil day tanks is sized to store 550 U.S. gallons of diesel fuel in accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards (Section 3.1). The tank storage capacity supports engine continuous operation for various time periods ending on fuel oil level in the tank at the beginning of engine operation. At the shutoff level the two fuel oil transfer pumps there is approximately 493 gallons of fuel stored in the tank 3 gallons usable volume) which corresponds to approximately 60 minutes of engine operation e 2,000 hr. rating of 5335 kW. At the first makeup pump set point there is 372 gallons of fuel ed in the tank (284 gallons usable volume) which is sufficient to support approximately 42 utes of engine operation at the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating. At the second makeup pump setpoint, the est level with auto makeup capability, there is 278 gallons (189 gallons usable volume) of fuel ch is sufficient for 27 minutes of engine operation at the 2,000 hr. rating. In the standby dition, a minimum of 493 gallons of fuel is maintained. When water is removed or when ning of a day tank becomes necessary, a 1 inch drain line with a normally locked closed valve ted at the bottom of each tank is used. The oil is drained to a portable container and removed m the emergency diesel generator enclosure. The portable container is brought into the losure only when draining of the tank becomes necessary.
aces. Fuel oil piping to the diesel generator fuel pumps is directed to the opposite end of the el, away from the insulated exhaust piping.
fuel oil day tanks are located in an area monitored by a flame detection system and protected h a sprinkler fire suppression system to mitigate the consequences of an open flame in close ximity to the fuel oil day tanks.
day tank is designed for gravity feed to the emergency generators. The supporting structure is ipped with a drip pan to contain leakage of oil from the day tank. Oil level in the drip pan is nitored by a level switch (normal power only) which provides a signal to a high level alarm, ted in the diesel enclosure, and a common alarm in the control room, initiating operator action rain the drip pan. Oil in the drip pan is addressed by system design; i.e., the oil flows by vity from the drip pan through a 4 inch floor drain line piped to the oil separator. Backflow vention devices preclude oil backing up out of the floor drains in the event of a day tank ure. Further details on this drain path are provided in the Millstone 3 Fire Protection luation Report, as referenced in Section 9.5.1.
r to adding new fuel oil to the storage tanks, the following properties are verified: specific or gravity, water and sediment content and viscosity. Analysis of the other properties listed in applicable specifications are completed within 30 days of addition. This is an exception to ulatory Guide 1.137, which requires that the test are completed within 14 days, but in ement with Technical Specifications Section 4.8.1.1.2 testing requirements.
h fuel oil storage tank is provided with a sump for water collection and removal. The fuel oil age tanks are periodically sampled for water contamination and accumulated water, if cted, is removed. Removal of water precludes the growth of algae which can exist at the er-oil interface.
sulfur content of the diesel fuel oil is 0.5 percent maximum (by weight) to minimize osiveness of sulfur compounds in the diesel engine exhaust gas. Other more restrictive sulfur tent requirements may apply. Number two fuel oil is supplied which is in accordance with TM D975 and the ambient conditions below grade in a storage vault. Fuel oil supplied to the is first checked for water content and sediment upon its arrival. If acceptable, it is off loaded m its supply source to the fuel oil storage tanks. Fuel is sampled for quality requirements as ed out in ANSI N195 and Regulatory Guide 1.137 in accordance with Technical cifications.
h emergency generator fuel oil transfer pump receives power from its associated emergency erator (Section 8.3).
4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements er the initial hydrostatic test on the emergency generator fuel oil supply piping at completion onstruction, all active system components and controls are functionally tested periodically in
l oil is sampled monthly to determine water and particulate content. If a high level of iculate is detected, the reasons for increased levels of particulate will be determined and ropriate action taken. If algae is found to be the cause of the high level of tank particulate, an ropriate action will address its treatment. Any accumulated water detected during sampling is oved when found.
4.5 Instrument Requirements diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system operating parameters are monitored, cated, and controlled, locally or remotely, as follows.
following instruments and controls are located on the emergency generator panels.
Control switches and indicator lights for the emergency generator fuel oil transfer pumps.
Annunciators that alarm when the following conditions exist for the emergency generator fuel system:
- storage tank fuel level low;
- transfer pump discharge strainer differential pressure high;
- day tank fuel level low;
- day tank fuel level low-low;
- day tank fuel level high; and
- day tank drip pan fuel level high (connected to normal power system only).
Indicators that monitor the following parameters:
- emergency generator fuel oil storage tank fuel level, and
- emergency generator fuel oil day tank level.
following emergency generator fuel oil system parameters are monitored by the plant puter:
- fuel oil transfer pump running;
- fuel oil transfer pump stopped;
- fuel oil transfer pump discharge flow;
- day tank fuel level; and
- storage tank fuel level.
emergency generator panel trouble annunciator is provided for panels A and B in the control
- m. The annunciators are energized when an alarm condition exists on the respective panel. In ition, the fuel oil day tank level low-low alarm has its own annunciator window for each tank he main control board.
ergency generator fuel oil day tank level indicators are provided on the main control board.
re is pressure indication from the discharge of each transfer pump in the main control room.
re is a level indication from the fuel oil storage tank at each Emergency Diesel Enclosure, as l as in the main control room.
fuel oil transfer pump can be manually or automatically operated. Each of the two emergency erator fuel oil day tanks is provided with level switches to automatically start and stop the ciated emergency generator fuel oil transfer pumps in a LEAD-FOLLOW arrangement. The AD-FOLLOW emergency generator fuel oil transfer pumps for each tank are powered from associated emergency bus. The lead emergency generator fuel oil transfer pump is started n its associated level switch in the emergency fuel oil day tank reaches a predetermined level.
e lead emergency generator fuel oil transfer pump fails to start and the oil level continues to rease, the follow emergency generator fuel oil transfer pump is started when the fuel oil l reaches the predetermined low level switch setting. At this level, the low level alarm is on at emergency generator panel to inform the operator of a malfunction. The emergency generator oil transfer pumps stop automatically at a predetermined day tank high level. Level switch set nts are determined in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI N195.
anually operated transfer switch is provided for one of the two transfer pumps on each storage
. When electrical power is lost to one of the storage tank pump systems, the transfer switch onnects that pump from its motor control center and reconnects it to the electrical supply of other storage tank pump system. This pump is then controlled manually by a circuit breaker.
5 EMERGENCY DIESEL ENGINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM h of the two emergency diesel engines is cooled by the jacket water and the intercooler water ems (Figure 9.5-3).
5.1 Design Bases redundant engine jacket water and intercooler water subsystems are joined at the common ansion tank. The system as a whole is completely self-contained within a closed loop. These
interface with the cooling water systems, except at the cooling water heat exchangers.
engine-driven water circulating pumps (3EGS*P3 and 3EGS*P1) are of adequate capacity to t the temperature of the jacket cooling water leaving the engine to the engine manufacturers cified limit of 165°F, and to maintain the temperature of the inter-cooler water leaving the air ler water heat exchanger to 95°F under all conditions based on the extremes of the service er temperature (Section 9.2.1).
jacket and intercooler water are controlled by temperature-regulating valves that maintain the ine cooling water at a uniform temperature, are of adequate size and capacity to perform their nded function, and include a method of bypassing the heat exchangers for fast engine m-up.
500 gallon expansion tank, common to the jacket and inter-cooler water systems, is normally d with 275 gallons of water. Adequate capacity at the expansion tank low level is available to pensate for system leakage, without draining the tank, for 30 days without makeup to the em. Table 9.5-2 presents the leakage analysis. The Seismic Category I expansion tank is ted approximately 20 feet above the jacket and inter-cooler water pumps. This ensures that ufacturers NPSH requirements for these pumps are met for the entire 30 days of diesel erator operation at full load without additional makeup. Although the tank is designed to not uire make-up for 30 days, evaluation has shown that operator action can be credited to fill the after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of EDG operation. In the event of a leak greater than what was assumed in the nufacturers 30 day analysis, several non-safety related sources of water are available; Service ter provides the safety related make up source if required.
makeup source of water for the emergency diesel engine cooling water system is provided m the condensate makeup and draw off system (Section 9.2.6). The makeup line penetrates the of the diesel engine fresh water expansion tanks and is not safety related.
mical cleaning is not used in the emergency diesel engine cooling water system. The osion inhibitor treatment used is recommended by a cooling water system chemical supplier, roved by both the diesel manufacturer and diesel sub-vendor.
h engine jacket cooling water system has a thermostatically controlled electric immersion er heater and electric motor-driven circulating pump. These components maintain the jacket ling water system warm during standby conditions, to assist in the fast start capability of the ine and to minimize long-term engine wear.
5.2 System Description cooling water systems of each emergency diesel consist of the jacket water system and the rcooler water system (Figure 9.5-3). The jacket water system, which dissipates heat rejected m the cylinder liner jackets, turbochargers, and lube oil coolers, consists of a direct engine-
intercooler water system, which dissipates heat rejected from the engine air coolers, and ide bearing at the alternator end consists of a direct engine-driven water circulating pump, er temperature regulating valve, and heat exchanger.
jacket cooling water cooler and the air cooler water heat exchanger are shell and tube types, in accordance with the mechanical standards for TEMA Class R heat exchangers, and form to the applicable edition of ASME III, Class 3.
engine cooling water flows through the shell side, and the service water through the tube side he heat exchanger.
le 9.5-10 lists the types of diesel jacket cooling water system leakages, means used to detect e leakages, and the corrective measures that will be taken.
shell side design pressure is sufficiently high to eliminate the possibility of overpressurization result of any mode of operation of the equipment supplied. The tube side design pressure is psig. Tube material is 18 BWG, 90-10 Cu-Ni, per SB-111, Alloy 706.
diesel engine cooling water system is chemically treated to preclude long-term corrosion and anic fouling. Water purity and chemistry are maintained in accordance with engine ufacturers and corrosion inhibitor manufacturers recommendations.
rosion inhibiting chemicals are added to the diesel engine cooling water system and periodic lysis of the cooling water is performed to verify that it meets specifications.
ples of makeup water supplied from the condensate makeup and draw off system are taken odically to ensure makeup water chemistry is within specified limits (Reference tion 9.2.6.4).
le 9.5-3 lists the design data for the major components in emergency generator cooling water ems.
5.3 Safety Evaluation diesel generator cooling water systems are housed in the Seismic Category I emergency el generator enclosure (Section 3.8.4).
diesel engine cooling water system is an integral part of the diesel engine. Section 8.3.1.2.6 vides the electrical single-failure evaluation of the diesel engine.
emergency diesel generator engines and associated subsystems are independent and undant (reference Sections 8.3.1.1.3 and 9.5.5.1). There is no sharing of cooling water
tion 9.2.1 and Figure 9.2-1 describe the interface to, and the analysis of, the service water em.
single failure or piping interconnections between the engine water jacket, lube oil cooler, ernor lube oil cooler, and the engine air intercooler can cause degradation of both emergency el generator engines.
tection from floods, tornadoes, and missiles is discussed in Sections 3.4.1, 3.3, and 3.5, ectively. Protection from high and moderate energy pipe breaks is discussed in Section 3.6.1.
emergency diesel cooling water systems are Seismic Category I, as defined in Regulatory de 1.29 (Section 3.2.1). They are Safety Class 3 (Section 3.2.2) and designed to ASME III, e Class 3, to the extent possible (Section 3.2.2). Emergency generator protective trip circuit asses are discussed in Section 8.3.1.
tain engine-mounted components, not covered by ASME III, are designed in accordance with diesel manufacturers latest standards for reliability. These components include:
lower header and flexible hose supply cooling water to the cylinder jackets and turbocharger; upper header, including orifices, returning cooling water from the cylinder jackets and turbocharger; piping and orifice supplying water to and returning water from the governor lube oil cooler; piping, pump, and controls associated with the cooling water keep-warm system; engine-driven jacket water pumps; flexible hoses and couplings.
emergency diesel generator cooling water system is vented back to the overhead expansion to assure that the entire system is filled with water.
nual valves are provided for isolating portions of the system for maintenance. Refer to tion 8.3.1.1.3 for quality group clarification locations.
5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements tion 8.3.1 discusses emergency generator testing requirements. All active system controls are odically tested (Chapter 16).
emergency diesel engine cooling water system is provided with low pressure, high perature, and low temperature alarm switches to alert personnel when the manufacturers mmended limits are exceeded. A low level alarm switch is provided on the overhead ansion tank to alert personnel of coolant loss from the system due to excessive leakage.
tion 8.3.1 discusses alarms and trips for the emergency generators.
unciators located on the emergency generator panels alarm when the following conditions t:
emergency diesel generator jacket coolant pressure low; emergency diesel generator jacket coolant temperature high; emergency diesel generator jacket coolant temperature low; and emergency diesel generator fresh water expansion tank level low.
ouble alarm for each emergency diesel generator panel is located on the main control board is alarmed whenever the associated panel has a condition alarmed on it.
perature regulating valves maintain the engine cooling water at a preset temperature range n the engine is running.
electric heater controlled by a temperature controller has a local AUTO/OFF control switch.
heater is energized when the standby jacket cooling pump is running, jacket coolant perature is less than a preset temperature and the control switch is in AUTO. The heater is de-rgized automatically when the standby jacket coolant pump is stopped or the jacket coolant perature is greater than a preset temperature. The heater is de-energized manually by placing control switch in the OFF position.
standby jacket coolant pump has a local START/STOP/AUTO control switch. The pump is ted automatically when engine speed is less than a preset speed and the control switch is in TO or stopped when engine speed is above a preset speed. The pump can be stopped or started ually with the control switch.
operability of the standby jacket coolant pump is verified by normal operation when the rgency generator is not running.
6 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR SYSTEM emergency generator starting air system is shown on Figure 9.5-3.
h emergency diesel generator is provided with a dedicated air starting system consisting of separate subsystems. Each subsystem includes a motor-driven air compressor, an air receiver
, all necessary valves and fittings, and a complete instrumentation and control system to vide pressurized air to one bank of seven cylinders. A normally closed cross-connect valve is alled between the subsystems in the discharge line from the compressor. Opening this valve ws maintenance to be performed. All air start functional requirements are satisfied in this ormal configuration. Each subsystem is capable of starting the engine five times from an al receiver pressure of 425 psig without recharging the receiver. The air start system (both systems operating in parallel) is able to crank the diesel engine to the manufacturers mmended rpm and enables the generator to reach voltage and frequency and begin load uencing within 11 seconds, from receiver pressure of 350 psig. The one 11 second start can be ieved, regardless of whether the cross-connect valve is open or closed, as long as both receiver sures are at or above 350 psig.
h motor-driven air compressor has sufficient capacity (26.5 cfm) to recharge its associated air iver in 30 minutes from minimum starting air pressure to maximum starting air pressure.
6.2 System Description re are two emergency diesel generators for Millstone 3. Each generator has an independent over-piston starting system consisting of two separate subsystems. The air starting system can t the engine without off site power. However, on site power in the form of Class 1E 125 VDC rce (batteries) is required for the operation of the air start solenoid valves. Each emergency erator starting air system includes the following components.
AC Motor-Driven Air Compressors (3EGA-C1A, C2A, C1B, C2B)
Each system is supplied with two air compressors (Table 9.5-9) that are driven by electric motors. Each compressor and motor are mounted on a welded steel baseplate and anchored to the building foundation. A pressure switch is used to start a compressor motor when the pressure in the associated air start reservoirs decreases to no less than 375 psi, and stop the compressor motors when the pressure increases to 425 psi (high setpoint).
Each compressor has a free air delivery rate of 26.5 cfm and is equipped with an automatic loadless starting device to allow the compressor to come up to rated speed before they start compressing air. A safety valve is installed in the discharge line of the air compressor and is set at 500 psig. A normally closed cross-connect valve is installed between the subsystems in the discharge line from the compressors allowing maintenance to be performed on the compressors. This provides the capability for one compressor to supply air to its own associated air receiver and/or the air receiver in the opposite subsystem.
When crossed connected, the operable compressor will charge both air receivers automatically based on the pressure signal from its respective receiver. Automatic operation of the compressor via the pressure switch is not provided when feeding the opposite receiver only; however, hand switches are installed to allow manual operation.
Each air compressor is provided with a seismically mounted drying skid. Compressed air that will be delivered to the starting air receiver tanks is first passed through the drying skid. The skid components consist of an aftercooler, pre-coalescing filter, coalescing filter, desiccant type air dryers and a particulate afterfilter. The function of this equipment is to ensure that a clean, dry source of air is available for recharging the receiver tanks. Dual desiccant towers are provided on each skid to allow for continuous drying. Air is passed through one tower for drying while the second tower is being regenerated. At the end of each absorption cycle, the flow is automatically reversed by means of a programmed timer which operates to place the saturated tower into a regenerative mode and the regenerated tower into drying service. A moisture analyzer is used to monitor the outlet dew point of the dry air and provides an alarm if the dew point rises above 10°F.
Each dryer skid is provided electrical power from the 120 VAC, Class 1E distribution system via two circuit breakers in series. The two circuit breakers in series provide isolation between the power supply and the dryer skid. An isolation device is required because the dryer skids are not safety-related equipment (refer to Table 8.3-3).
Starting Air Tanks (3EGA*TK1A, 2A, 1B, 2B)
Two 30 inch x 108 inch air reservoirs that are manufactured in conformance with ASME III are provided for each system. By design, each reservoir supplies enough air to effect five starts from an initial receiver pressure of 425 psig. Vendor tests proved that each reservoir has a capacity to supply enough air to effect five starts from an initial receiver pressure of 350 psig. Each of the air reservoirs is equipped with a safety valve that is set at 450 psi and a manually operated drain valve that is used periodically to blow down any moisture that may have accumulated in the reservoir. These starting air tanks are complete with all necessary pressure gages, pressure relief valves, and all other necessary fittings for connection into the starting systems of the engine.
Air Start Solenoid Valves (3EGA*SOV26A, *SOV27A, *SOV26B, *SOV27B)
Each system is equipped with two solenoid operated three-way, two-position, normally closed magnetic valves which pilot an air admission valve in each of the air inlet lines to the engine. These air admission valves allow the starting air to enter the engine under the control of the air start distributor.
h bank of seven cylinders has a separate air supply subsystem consisting of all valves and ngs and a complete instrumentation and control system. Normally, both subsystems and both tart valves are used when starting the engine. The emergency generator starting air system, lusive of the motor-driven air compressors, starting air dryers, starting air tanks, and rconnecting piping, is an integral part of the emergency generator diesel engine.
diesel engine starting sequence is as follows.
seven cylinders of the engine.
During starting, air pressure is applied to the starting booster device causing the control linkage and fuel injection pump racks to move toward the max fuel position.
Starting air rotates the engine and causes the firing to commence. As the engine speed increases, the tachometer relay senses when the engine reaches 115 rpm and causes the start control relays to de-energize.
De-energizing the start control relays causes the air start solenoid valves to become de-energized and shuts off the starting air supply to the engine.
If the engine fails to start during the cranking period of 7 seconds, the normally open contacts of the cranking time limit relays close to energize the start failure relay.
When energized, the normally open contacts of the start failure relay close to lock in the relay coil and keep the relay energized. Energizing the start failure relay also causes the normally closed contacts to open to energize the annunciator and de-energize the start relays.
De-energization of the start relays causes the normally open contacts to reopen and de-energize the air start solenoid valves.
During any restart condition, the engine shutdown reset push-button on the control panel must be operated in order to start the diesel engine. This will de-energize the start failure relay and the shutdown relay if it were energized.
A 0.19 cubic foot capacity, 450 psig design pressure, ASME III, Class 3 air tank is provided in the air supply line to each servo fuel rack shutdown and starting booster solenoid valve (3EGA*SOV25A&B). A check valve isolates the tank from the main starting air system. The air tanks are provided to ensure a source of air for positive fuel shut off in the event of loss of all starting air pressure in the main starting air system.
6.3 Safety Evaluation arting air system is supplied for each emergency generator capable of cranking the diesel ine to the manufacturers recommended rpm and enabling the generator to begin load uencing within 11 seconds. By design each air system consists of two separate subsystems h capable of starting an engine 5 times from an initial receiver pressure of 425 psig without arging. Vendor tests demonstrated that each reservoir is also capable of starting an engine 5 es from an initial receiver pressure of 350 psig without recharging. The starting air system is sed in the Seismic Category I emergency generator building (Section 3.8.4). There is no ing of starting air system components between the two emergency generators. A complete ure in one emergency generator starting air system will not lead to a failure of the other
system. This design feature improves EDG reliability/availability. During compressor ntenance, the cross-connect valve may be opened. However, overall EDG train single failure eria is unaffected by the cross-connect valve being opened.
tection from floods, tornadoes, and missiles is discussed in Sections 3.4.1, 3.3, and 3.5, ectively. Protection from high and moderate energy pipe breaks is discussed in Section 3.6.1.
emergency generator starting air system is Seismic Category I, as defined in Regulatory de 1.29 (Section 3.2.1), Safety Class 3, and designed to Quality Group C Standards gulatory Guide 1.26, Section 3.2.2), to the extent possible. Engine mounted components and starting air compressors which are not covered in the rules of ASME III, Code Class 3 are gned in accordance with the diesel manufacturers latest standards for reliability. These ponents include the following:
engine mounted air start distributors; engine mounted air start valves; engine mounted starting booster air valve; engine mounted fuel rack shutdown and starting booster servo; and Seismic Category I starting air receiver tanks are of sufficient capacity to start the emergency el generator and operate the engine controls for at least 7 days.
ddition, a 0.19 ft3 capacity, 450 psig design pressure, ASME III, Class 3 air tank is provided in air supply line to each servo fuel rack shutdown and starting booster solenoid valve GA*SOV25A&B). A check valve isolates the tank from the main starting air system. The air s are provided to ensure a source of air for positive fuel shut off in the event of loss of all ting air pressure in the main starting air system. However, a loss of this air will not result in the ure or shutdown of the emergency diesel generator.
6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements t connections have been provided on the interconnecting piping between the emergency erator and starting air tanks. This enables the operator to manually bleed the storage tanks, and odically, to test and check startup of the starting air compressors.
isture and other contaminants which might affect the air starting system are removed by the
-mounted drying systems and by periodic blowdown of the air storage tank. Other plant rating procedures consistent with the recommendations of the diesel manufacturer have been eloped to ensure proper functioning of the air starting system.
tion 8.3.1 discusses the emergency generator functional testing requirements.
re are two air compressors and separate air systems for each generator. Each air compressor is ipped with a manual control switch and indicator lights, located on the motor control center. A sure switch on the air receiver tank automatically starts and stops its associated compressor.
s switch is set to start the compressor when the associated tank pressure drops no less than 375 and to stop the compressor when the pressure reaches the high set point pressure of 425 psig.
relief valves on the air receiver tanks are set at 450 psig and at each air compressor discharge 00 psig to protect the system from overpressurization. The compressor motor is also protected inst thermal overload.
e receiver tank pressure drops to the low alarm point pressure of 360 psig, the condition ates an alarm on the respective emergency generator panel and the emergency generator ble alarm on the main control board. Each receiver tank is also provided with a local pressure cator. In the event receiver tank pressure drops to 350 psig and the compressor is not available echarge the receivers, the receivers still are able to supply a sufficient quantity of air for a imum of one start and begin load sequencing within 11 seconds based upon actual field test shutdown control is also governed by the control air and starting air systems.
shutdown control consists of an air cylinder and an oil cylinder in a two-compartment body.
air cylinder (linkage end) has connection to the starting air control pressure. During starting, starting air pressure expands the cylinder by moving the piston which moves the linkage to the ction pump to admit fuel to the engine.
trol air pressure is connected to the cylinder opposite to the rod end through a line containing utdown solenoid valve. The engine is stopped when the shutdown solenoid valve admits ugh control air pressure against the piston to move the piston which will move the injection p linkage to the no fuel position.
operability of the air compressors are verified by normal operation when the emergency erator is not running.
7 EMERGENCY DIESEL ENGINE LUBRICATION SYSTEM h emergency diesel engine lubrication system (Figure 9.5-3) lubricates and cools various rgency diesel engine components.
7.1 Design Bases engine driven lubricating oil and rocker-arm lubricating oil pumps have sufficient capacity to ure adequate lubrication of main bearings, crank pins, camshaft bearings, valve gear, rocker s, and all other wearing parts. The oil also provides a cooling media for the pistons.
system warm during standby conditions, to assist in the fast start capability of the engine and inimize long term engine wear.
Mobilguard 312 lubricating oil in the rocker arm lubrication system has a pour point of 0°F.
oil is heated by conduction from the standby jacket coolant heating system which has a imum temperature of 95°F. This maintains the operability of the rocker arm lubrication em when room temperatures are within expected ranges. If a failure of either emergency erator enclosure heating system occurs, a low room temperature alarm actuates at 52°F on tilation Panel 1 in the control room. In response to this alarm, operator corrective action ld be taken. Actions that may be taken include:
bringing in portable space heaters; increasing room temperature by turning on lights or equipment; and starting the emergency diesel generator.
rocker arm assembly is prelubricated once a week for 5 minutes to establish an oil film on the ker arm assembly. The oil film remains on the wearing parts of the rocker arm assembly to ure lubrication during any emergency start. Therefore, it is not necessary to operate the or-driven rocker arm pump in parallel with the engine driven rocker arm pump. The electric or driven rocker arm prelube oil pump is powered from an electrical Class 1E power source.
tions of the emergency diesel engine lubrication system are also designed to the following eria.
- 1. General Design Criterion 2 for structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods.
- 2. General Design Criterion 4 for structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
- 3. General Design Criterion 5 for the capability of shared systems and components important to the performance of required safety functions.
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.26 for quality group classification of the system components.
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for the seismic design classification of system components.
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.38 for quality assurance requirements for the packaging, shipping, receiving, storage, and handling of items for water-cooled nuclear power
- 7. Regulatory Guide 1.68 for preoperational and startup testing of the diesel engine lubrication system.
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.102 for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of flooding.
- 9. Regulatory Guide 1.117 for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of tornado missiles.
- 10. Specific design criteria as follows.
- a. The operating pressure, temperature differential, flow rate, and heat removal rate of the jacket water system which is external to the engine are in accordance with recommendations of the engine manufacturer and are listed in Table 9.5-3.
- b. The system has been provided with sufficient protective measures to maintain the required quality of the oil during engine operation.
- c. Protective measures (such as relief ports) have been taken to prevent unacceptable crankcase explosions and to mitigate the consequences of such an event.
Relief ports are spring loaded relief valves that quick open crankcase doors on increasing pressure. The doors will quick close upon pressure relief.
- d. The temperature of the lubricating oil is automatically maintained above a minimum value by means of an independent recirculation loop, including its own pump and heater, to enhance first try starting reliability of the engine in the standby condition.
- 11. Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 for lube oil system fire protection.
- 12. Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB) for diesel engine lubricating system protective interlocks during accident conditions.
7.2 System Design re are two emergency diesel generators for Millstone 3, each with an independent lubrication em. Each engine lubrication system, as shown on Figure 9.5-3, is self-contained, integral to emergency diesel engine, and consists of the following three subsystems.
water and fuel leaks at the cylinder head upper deck level.
Subsystem Components:
Engine Driven Rocker Arm Lubricating Oil Pump (3EGO*P2A/B)
This pump takes suction from the engine mounted oil reservoir and discharges through the duplex filter to the upper cylinder header and lubricates the rocker arms during engine operation.
Electric Motor Driven Rocker Arm Prelubrication Oil Pump (3EGO*P1A/B)
This pump is operated 2 minutes prior to any manual engine start in order to prelubricate the rocker arm assemblies. Refer to Table 9.5-9.
Duplex Rocker Arm Lubricating Oil Filter (3EGO-FLT2A/B)
This duplex filter is provided to remove foreign particles, which may have entered the system, before they reach the engine.
Rocker Arm Lubricating Oil Reservoir This reservoir provides the rocker arm lubricating oil subsystem with an adequate supply of lube oil. It is connected to the diesel engine lubricating system (lube oil header) by a float valve that controls the admission of lube oil to the reservoir. The reservoir is also equipped with a sight glass, a vent, supply and return line connections, and a drain connection.
Rocker Arm Oil Pressure Regulating Valve (3EGO*PCV22A/B)
This valve opens when the pressure becomes too great at the discharge of the duplex filter to allow some of the oil to be returned to the suction of the rocker arm engine driven pump.
- 2. The lubricating oil keep warm subsystem maintains the temperature of the engine lubricating oil between 115-135°F, enhancing the capability of the engine to come up to rated speed within the required 11 second time limit, without delay for engine warm up.
System Components:
Electric Motor Driven Prelubrication and Filter Pump
suction from the engine sump (crankcase) via a strainer and discharges through a 15-kW electric heater to the lubricating oil header and engine. Refer to Table 9.5-9.
15-kW Electric Prelubricating Oil Heater This heater is thermostatically controlled to maintain the lubricating oil temperature in the crankcase greater than the low temperature alarm setpoint of no less than 110°F. This maintains the oil system in a state of readiness for automatic startup from the standby condition, within the required 11 second time limit.
Lubricating Oil Filter This filter is capable of retaining 98 percent of particles 5 microns and larger. The lube oil filter elements require replacement when the differential pressure exceeds 20 psi at the normal operating temperature.
Prelubrication and Filter Pump Suction Strainer The strainer prevents foreign particles leaving the engine sump from entering the prelubrication and filter pump. The strainer is cleaned weekly initially, then at an interval determined by operating experience.
- 3. The diesel engine lubricating oil subsystem lubricates the main bearings, crank pins, camshaft bearings, and other wearing parts.
System Components:
Direct Engine Driven Lubricating Oil Pump (3EGO*P3A/B)
This pump is mounted below the governor drive and is gear-driven from the engine drive gear. It takes suction from the engine oil sump (crankcase) and discharges into the engine lube oil header.
Thermostatic Three-Way Temperature Control Valve (3EGO*TCV20A/B)
This valve controls the flow of lube oil to the lube oil heat exchanger during engine operation and maintains the temperature of the lubricating oil to the lube oil header between 125°F and 140°F under all conditions of load and ambient temperature. It also bypasses the flow of lubricating oil around the lube oil heat exchanger on startup of the engine.
Lubricating Oil Cooler (3EGS*E3A/B)
pressures encountered in this service. This oil cooler is capable of controlling the lube oil (flowing through the shell) temperature between 125°F and 140°F by using the engine jacket cooling water (flowing through the tubes). The heat exchanger is designed in accordance with mechanical standards for TEMA Class R heat exchangers and conforms to the applicable edition of ASME III, Safety Class 3.
Lubricating Oil Strainer (3EGO*STR1A, 5A/1B, 5B)
This full flow strainer removes foreign particles from the lubricating oil before they reach the engine lube oil header. The lube oil strainer elements should be removed and cleaned when the differential pressure exceeds 10 psi at the normal operating temperature.
protective measures for the lubricating oil system consist of oil filters and strainers that do require power sources or alarms and are of the multiple element, continuous full flow type.
crankcase vacuum system (Figure 9.5-3) includes a crankcase vacuum pump, oil separator, ng, and fittings. The crankcase vacuum system removes oil vapors from the diesel crankcase venting the leakage of oil vapors through crankcase seals. The crankcase vacuum system can tarted, if an accident signal is not present, either manually if the vacuum pump control switch the start position, or automatically if the control switch is in the auto position and the rgency diesel generator is running at greater than 360 rpm. Both operating modes are possible vided there is no vacuum pump motor thermal overload. The vacuum pump is powered from a ty-related motor control center as described in Table 9.5-9. The diesel crankcase is equipped h relief ports to mitigate the consequences of a crankcase explosion.
,200 gallon capacity lubricating oil sump is provided to supply the engine with an adequate unt of lubricating oil during engine operation. The minimum recommended sump level of roximately 1,000 gallons would be reached after 5 days of operation at full rated load with a mal oil usage rate of 40 gallons per day. The lubricating oil sump low level is alarmed at the l control panel and a common trouble alarm is actuated in the main control room and at the t computer. Upon reaching this minimum level, oil is added to the system without an engine tdown. Adequate lubricating oil is stored on site to ensure 7 days of operation at rated load. An usage rate of 65 to 70 gallons per day is considered excessive and is one indication that an ine overhaul is needed.
le 9.5-4 provides the design data for the major components in the emergency diesel icating oil system.
7.3 Safety Evaluation lubrication system is housed in the Seismic Category I emergency generator enclosure ction 3.8.4). There is no sharing of lubricating system components between the two emergency
tection from tornadoes, floods, and missiles is discussed in Sections 3.3, 3.4.1, and 3.5, ectively. Protection from high and moderate energy pipe breaks is discussed in Section 3.6.1.
emergency diesel lubrication system is Seismic Category I, as defined in Regulatory de 1.29 (Section 3.2.1).
emergency diesel lubrication system is classified as Safety Class 3 and is designed to Quality up C, as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.26 (Section 3.2.2) Standards and ASME III, Code ss 3, to the extent possible.
tain engine mounted components as well as components either not covered by the rules of ME III, Code Class 3 or not related to the safety function of the diesel engine are designed in ordance with the manufacturers latest standards for reliability. The components include the owing:
prelube and filter pump strainer; prelube and filter pump; three-way, three-position, three-port valve; 15 kW lube oil heater; three-way valve, plus piping, around the 5 micron oil filter; 1.5 inch check valve and a length of 1.5 inch piping; on outlet of 5 micron oil filter; three-way valve, plus piping, around the lube oil strainer; engine driven lube oil pump and suction strainer; rocker arm lube system; and crankcase vacuum pump and crankcase vacuum oil separator.
condition of the lubricating oil in both the Rocker Arm and Engine Reservoirs is checked on riodic basis, consistent with good maintenance practice and industry experience. The oil is lyzed for numerous parameters, including viscosity, percent water, oxidation, soot, fuel tion, total base number, as well as the presence of various metals that are indicative of bearing
- r. The results of the analyses are reviewed by maintenance and engineering personnel.
acuum pump, an additional protective measure available when an accident signal is not ent, maintains a vacuum on the engine crankcase preventing the accumulation of oil mist ch reduces oil leakage and minimizes the possibility of crankcase explosion.
terious materials into the engine lubrication oil system.
diesel engine prelubrication system is self-contained and integral to the diesel engine.
tinuous operation is permitted in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations. The design of the diesel engine allows for lubricating oil to continuously drain down to the engine
- p. This prevents the buildup of lubricating oil in the cylinders which could be blown into the aust system on engine start. The turbocharger lubricating system is self-contained and does get its supply from the engine oil header thus preventing buildup of oil in the turbocharger sing during prelubrication of the engine.
h diesel engine prelubrication system is periodically inspected during plant operation for sible leakage. This ensures against any dangerous accumulations of lubricating oil that could te during continuous prelubrication.
prelubrication period for the rocker arm lubricating system is 2 minutes prior to any manual t which is in accordance with the recommendations of the diesel engine manufacturer.
7.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements tion 8.3 discusses emergency generator inspection and testing requirements.
7.5 Instrumentation Requirements tion 8.3 discusses emergency generator protective trips and trip circuit bypasses. Refer to pter 16, Technical Specifications, for periodic tests of active components.
w lubricating oil level alarm is provided to alert personnel when the lubricating oil level in sump falls below the manufacturers recommended minimum level.
igh pressure alarm is provided to alert personnel when the pressure in the crankcase exceeds manufacturers recommended high pressure limit.
igh level alarm switch is provided to alert personnel when the oil level in the separate rocker lubricating, oil tank exceeds the manufacturers recommended maximum.
oat valve connected to the main lube oil header provides makeup oil to the rocker arm lube oil rvoir and maintains the level above the manufacturers recommended minimum. A low sure alarm on the local panel and a local panel trouble alarm on the main control board are vided to alert personnel when the rocker arm lubricating oil pressure falls below the ufacturers recommended minimum. Upon actuation of this alarm, the rocker arm lube oil rvoir level and the rocker arm lube oil duplex filter pressure differential is checked and ective action taken to maintain operability of the rocker arm lube oil system. The diesel ine manufacturer has indicated that the low pressure switch in the rocker arm lube oil system vides an indication of low level in the oil reservoir. This low pressure indication is sufficient to
eekly on engines on standby and daily an operating engines.
en the engine is running, actuation of any one of the low lube oil pressure switches will rgize a main board annunciator and give a local alarm that the lubricating oil pressure has hed a dangerously low level. Actuation of any two of these low lube oil pressure switches will tdown the engine.
h and low temperature alarms are provided to alert personnel when the oil temperature rises ve, or falls below, the operating range recommended by the manufacturer.
following annunciators are on each emergency generator local panel:
rocker arm lube oil pressure low; crank case pressure high; lube oil sump temperature low; lube oil sump level low; lube oil temperature high; rocker arm reservoir level high; and lube oil pressure low.
emergency generator local panel trouble annunciator for each panel is located on the main trol board and is alarmed whenever a respective local panel annunciator is alarmed.
prelube oil filter pump has a local STOP/START control switch and the motor has thermal rload protection. The rocker arm prelube oil pump has a local STOP/START control switch a remote STOP/START control switch on the main control board. The motor has thermal rload protection.
emergency generator prelube oil heater has a local OFF/AUTO control switch. When in TO, the heater is automatically energized when the following conditions exist:
Emergency generator speed below a preset setpoint.
Lube oil temperature below a preset temperature.
Prelube oil filter pump running.
operability of the prelube oil filter pump and rocker arm prelube oil pumps are verified by mal operation when the emergency generator is not running.
8 EMERGENCY GENERATOR COMBUSTION AIR INTAKE AND EXHAUST SYSTEM emergency generator combustion air intake and exhaust system supplies filtered air to the rgency diesel engine for combustion and releases exhaust gases to atmosphere (Figure 9.5-3).
is supplied from outside through filter and silencer to the diesel engine and is exhausted ugh a muffler to atmosphere. The system is QA Category I, nuclear safety-related except for pipe from the muffler to the atmosphere which is QA Category II.
8.1 Design Bases safety-related portion of the emergency diesel combustion air intake and exhaust system is gned in accordance with the following.
- 1. General Design Criterion 2 for structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods.
- 2. General Design Criterion 4 for structures housing the systems and the system components being capable of withstanding the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
- 3. General Design Criterion 5 for shared systems and components important to safety being capable of performing safety functions.
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.26 for quality group classification of the system components.
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for the seismic classification of system components.
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.68 for preoperational and startup testing of the combustion air and exhaust system.
- 7. Regulatory Guide 1.102 for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of flooding.
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.117 for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of tornadoes.
arranged such that no degradation of engine function will be experienced when the emergency generator set is required to operate continuously at the maximum rated power output.
- 10. The combustion air intake system is provided with a means of reducing airborne particulate material over the entire time period that emergency power is required, assuming the maximum airborne particulate concentration at the combustion air intake.
- 11. Suitable design precautions have been taken to preclude degradation of the diesel engine power output due to exhaust gases and other dilutants that could reduce the oxygen content below acceptable levels.
- 12. Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1 for breaks in high and moderate energy piping outside containment.
- 13. Branch Technical Position I CSB 17 (PSB) for diesel engine air intake and exhaust system protective interlocks during accident conditions.
8.2 System Description emergency generator combustion air intake and exhaust system (Figure 9.5-3) consists of twork filters, silencers, manometers, recorders, pressure indicators, mufflers, temperature nitors, exhaust pipe, and stack.
h emergency diesel combustion air intake and exhaust system is capable of supplying 19,250 of filtered outside air to the diesel engine for combustion, and exhaust 48,306 cfm of bustion gases to the outside atmosphere.
side air is drawn in through a sound attenuated, screened, missile protected wall opening and through a filter of dry media and a silencer for each combustion air intake system.
the outlet of the silencer, a manometer indicates the pressure in the duct at that point.
ressure differential switch is installed across the air filter to measure the differential across the r and alarm in the control room if the maximum allowable pressure drop of 3.0 inches water e has been exceeded. Another pressure indicator is located at the inlet to the diesel engine for l indication.
h emergency diesel exhaust system directs the diesel engine exhaust to the exhaust muffler ugh two Safety Class 3 pipes connected to expansion joints at the diesel engine outlet. A perature element is located in each of the two outlet connections to monitor the exhaust gas perature. The muffler is located in the ventilation exhaust plenum of each enclosure such that
exhaust stack is connected to the muffler outlet expansion joint. The stack goes straight up r the ventilation exhaust plenum and releases the exhaust gas at an elevation of 71 feet to id any combustion gases from being drawn into the intake (Figure 9.5-4). The maximum sure drop allowed and designed for across the emergency diesel exhaust system is 10 inches er gage. The entire combustion air intake and exhaust system is seismically designed.
8.3 Safety Evaluation re are no moving parts where failure could jeopardize system function in the emergency diesel bustion air intake and exhaust system.
emergency generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is located within a Seismic egory I structure which is designed for missile, earthquake, and flood protection.
combustion air intake is provided with a downward oriented low velocity air inlet plenum ipped with a screened opening. This precludes direct entrainment of precipitation into the rgency generator combustion air intake during either standby or operating conditions. Dust is vented from accumulating within the diesel combustion air intake during standby conditions he same oriented intake plenum. During diesel operation under conditions of high ospheric dust concentrations, the dry extended media intake filter intercepts particulate matter ore it reaches the diesel combustion chambers. Filter differential pressure is sensed by a erential pressure switch which actuates a high differential pressure alarm locally and a mon trouble alarm in the control room. Surveillance is performed during diesel monthly ilability testing (Section 8.3) to ensure diesel generator availability on demand.
re are no gas storage tanks in the vicinity of the emergency diesel generator enclosure which inates the possibility of any accidental gas release at the combustion air intake.
es stored on site, in containers having greater than 100 pound quantities, include nitrogen, on dioxide and hydrogen, as discussed in Sections 9.5.9.2, 9.5.1, and 9.5.9.1, respectively.
radation of the emergency diesel generators will not occur due to the release, intentional dental, of any of these gases since the distance and intervening structures (service, control, turbine buildings) between the gas storage area and the diesel combustion air intakes ludes significant concentrations from reaching the combustion air intakes. The location of the storage area is south of the containment structure as shown on Figure 1.2-2.
analysis has been performed to determine whether the diesel generator operation could be cted due to CO2 entrainment in the diesel combustion air intake. CO2 at a maximum centration of 50 percent issues from an opening at 20 feet above ground elevation in the ine wall of the control building as a result of suppressing a fire. The opening is a missile-ected structure which directs the emerging jet downward into the passageway between the trol building and the emergency generator enclosure. Air is entrained prior to jet impact with
roximately 37 percent CO2.
assumed that wind effects are limited to preventing a portion of the air-CO2 mixture from ping by flowing down the passageway away from the yard (emergency generator fuel oil age area). This assumption produces the worst case condition of directing all the air-CO2 ture into the yard. A stabilized pool of the mixture eventually occupy the semi enclosed yard.
ensity-induced flow allows the air-CO2 mixture to escape from the yard to an open area.
propensity to locally entrain the air-CO2 mixture into the superposed (upper) air layer and into the diesel generator air intake is analyzed by a selective withdrawal model. (Harleman 9).
results of the analysis show that the limiting withdrawal rate is larger than the maximum air ow rate of the diesel engine air intake. Consequently, the air-CO mixture in the yard is not wn into the air intake and does not affect the performance of the diesel generator.
emergency generator diesel engines and all auxiliary systems are designed to start and rate at rated load during a tornado which results in a decrease in atmospheric pressure of 3 psi seconds. The probability of damage to the diesel exhaust pipe by a postulated tornado missile been evaluated using TORMIS methodology and found to meet the requirements of SRP tion 3.5.2 and Section 2.2.3.
re are no limiting assumptions used or exceptions taken when applying the NRC approved RMIS Methodology to evaluate the acceptability of safety related components that are rotected from tornado missile damage to meet the acceptance criteria of 10 CRF Part 100 per NRC guidance found in SRP Section 2.2.3 (NUREG-800, Rev. 2).
normalized annual arithmetic mean tornado missile impact probability factor has been ited in the evaluation to meet the acceptance criteria for unprotected safety-related SSCs not luated in the original Millstone 3 TOMRIS analysis for being exposed to tornado missiles ch could negatively affect safe shutdown. This normalized annual arithmetic mean tornado sile impact probability is directly derived using the values obtained from the original lstone TORMIS analysis. The TORMIS methodology remains intact with no exceptions when g this factor, but extends the TORMIS methodology to other unprotected components not ctly assessed with the TORMIS software.
ause the original Millstone TORMIS results were extremely conservative, and was based on struction materials which are no longer being stored in areas that were taken into account, zation of this factor is acceptable since the potential missle population is substantially uced since Millstone 3 has been operational, thus the use of the normalized annual arithmetic n tornado missile impact probability is conservatively bounded by the TORMIS analysis inally completed.
h emergency diesel generator exhaust pipe is a 40 inch diameter pipe which protrudes about nches over the top of the diesel generator enclosure. The pipe is located toward the edge of the ding. Typical snowfall depths would not exceed 36 inches in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. In addition, the lstone 3 Environmental Report, Section 2.3.1.9, indicates a maximum snowfall depth of nches in 2 days. Based on past experience with the Millstone Units 1 and 2 diesel generators ose stacks are significantly smaller in diameter), snow accumulation in exhaust pipes has not n a problem. Since the exhaust pipes are located close to the edge of the building, drifting of w into the pipes is not likely.
emergency diesel generator exhaust is also equipped with a normally open low point drain.
frozen precipitation would be melted during the monthly diesel generator availability tests drained through the diesel exhaust low point drain. Due to the large exhaust pipe diameter, it ot credible that any precipitation which collects and freezes, before it can pass through the n line, will be sufficient to cause exhaust restriction. In addition, running of the diesel erator for availability testing will blow collected snow out of the exhaust. Therefore, clogging he exhaust pipe with snow is not a problem.
possibility of pipe whip does not exist in either emergency generator enclosure. All bustion air intake equipment and ductwork and the exhaust equipment and piping are mically designed.
8.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements emergency generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is tested and inspected at the e time as the emergency generator set (Section 8.3.1.1.3).
8.5 Instrumentation Requirements emergency diesel combustion air intake and exhaust system operations parameters are nitored, indicated, recorded, and controlled as follows.
The combustion air intake and exhaust system is available when the diesel engine is started.
When air is drawn in through the filter and silencer, a manometer measures pressure drop.
Red (running) and green (stopped) indicating lights are provided locally at the MCC for the emergency diesel engine crankcase vacuum pumps.
Filter differential pressure is sensed by a differential pressure switch which actuates a high differential pressure alarm locally and a common trouble alarm in the control room.
A pressure indicator is provided, locally, for inlet pressure to the diesel.
9 HYDROGEN AND NITROGEN STORAGE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 9.1 Hydrogen System hydrogen system (Figure 9.5-5) supplies hydrogen to two components: the turbine generator ure 10.2-3) and the volume control tank (Figure 9.3-8). The hydrogen system is not ty-related.
9.1.1 Design Bases hydrogen system provides adequate hydrogen gas of suitable quality and pressure for plant rogen requirements.
ensure reliability of the hydrogen supply system, a discharging stanchion serves as a fill nection and enables hydrogen to be supplied from a truck in the event of system malfunction he hydrogen storage equipment.
esign temperature of 95°F for the hydrogen supply system is determined by ambient perature extremes (0 to 86°F). Design pressure of the hydrogen supply system is 2,450 psig tream, and 125 psig downstream, of the pressure control manifold.
system and its components are designed for a plant life of 40 years.
9.1.2 System Description hydrogen supply system consists of one trailer discharging stanchion, one flammable unding assembly, one pressure control manifold, one excess flow manifold, and 18 high sure gaseous hydrogen storage tubes.
18 storage tubes are divided into two groups: 16 active and 2 reserve tubes. Hydrogen flows m the storage tubes to the pressure control manifold where it is reduced for plant use. The sure regulators on the active and reserve tubes are at 105 and 90 psig, respectively. The rve regulator, set to maintain 90 psig line pressure, is isolated during normal plant operations.
s is meant to preclude reduction of reserve bank capacity during normal make up operations to turbine generator since this operation may cause main header supply pressure to temporarily p below 90 psig depending on the amount of product required for makeup. In the event of a ained low main header pressure alarm, a manual valve may be opened to align the hydrogen em to the reserve bank. Table 9.5-5 lists the design parameters of the gaseous hydrogen age tubes.
following components are supplied by the hydrogen system.
for normal leakage.
- 2. The volume control tank system (chemical and volume control, Section 9.3.4) requires a maximum of 1 scfm of hydrogen continuously at 50 psig.
ief valves are provided downstream of the high pressure storage tubes and pressure control ifold to prevent overpressurization of the equipment. Rupture discs are also provided on the h pressure storage tubes, located in the yard, for overpressure protection.
hydrogen system is equipped with an excess flow manifold to ensure safety from a line ure between the storage facility and the supplied components. The excess flow manifold has xcess flow valve which is designed to close at 6,500 scfh hydrogen flow, securing flow.
9.1.3 Safety Evaluation following provisions have been made to preserve an adequate hydrogen supply and ensure em reliability.
- 1. A trailer discharge stanchion is connected into the high pressure side of the pressure control manifold. This enables a tube trailer truck to be used as a source of gaseous storage or for recharging the storage vessels. A tube trailer grounding assembly has been provided to ground the tube trailers before discharge begins.
- 2. An excess flow manifold provides automatic isolation of the system in the event of a pipe rupture or excessive leakage.
- 3. All valves (except for check and control valves) located inside the building are of the sealed globe type to prevent the leakage of hydrogen gas. The pressure switches located inside the control cabinet are explosion-proof.
- 4. All hydrogen gas supply piping, located inside buildings, is either enclosed in steel guard piping (which is vented to the atmosphere), or designed to Seismic Category I, both provisions being in accordance with Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.d(5).
- 5. The hydrogen storage equipment is located in the gas storage area of the south yard (Figure 1.2-2). The hydrogen storage tubes are positioned such that an explosion of the tubes would direct them away from safety-related buildings and/
or equipment. An eight foot high fence with a barbed wire top surrounds the area, and a flame barrier wall isolates the hydrogen storage tubes from the access road.
- 6. The following protective measures in the generator hydrogen and carbon dioxide system have been designed to prevent fires and explosions during filling, purging, and normal operation of the generator:
inspection or repairs;
- a gas analyzer is provided at the outlet of the generator casing for constant indication of the percentages of air, carbon dioxide, and hydrogen present; and
- the vent for the generator casing is shielded outside of the turbine building and is located to prevent accidental contact with discharge vapors, fire, sparks, high voltage lines, or vent intakes.
re are no safety-related components or equipment necessary for safe shutdown that require the ration of the hydrogen system.
9.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements hydrogen system is in continuous operation with essential system parameters continuously nitored and indicated by instrumentation; therefore, performance tests are not required.
ection is performed in accordance with normal maintenance procedures.
9.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements hydrogen system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and controlled, locally or otely as follows.
- 1. The parameters monitored by local indicators are:
- reserve hydrogen bank temperature;
- active hydrogen bank temperature;
- hydrogen supply pressure;
- active hydrogen bank pressure;
- reserve hydrogen bank pressure; and
- reserve and active bank pressure regulator inlet and outlet pressure.
- 2. Annunciators on the main control board are alarmed when the following conditions exist:
- reserve hydrogen supply bank pressure low;
- reserve and active banks pressure regulators outlet pressure low; and
- active hydrogen bank pressure low.
9.2 Nitrogen System nitrogen system (Figure 9.5-5) supplies nitrogen to various components. The nitrogen system ot safety related; however, the containment isolation valves shown on Figure 9.5-5 and the necting piping are Safety Class 2.
9.2.1 Design Bases nitrogen system is designed to provide adequate nitrogen gas of suitable quality and pressure normal nitrogen requirements.
ensure reliability of the nitrogen supply system, discharging stanchions are provided which ble nitrogen to be supplied from tube trailer supply trucks in the event of system malfunction he nitrogen storage equipment.
ign temperatures of the nitrogen supply system have a maximum of 95°F resulting from eme ambient conditions and a minimum of -320°F on the basis of the liquid nitrogen storage perature. Design pressure of the nitrogen supply system varies and is dictated by the nitrogen
- s. Piping design pressures range from 2,450 to 200 psig.
system and its components are designed for a plant life of 40 years.
9.2.2 System Description nitrogen supply system is comprised of three subsystems.
- 1. The high pressure nitrogen supply system includes one liquid nitrogen storage vessel, one high pressure liquid nitrogen pump, one high pressure ambient air vaporizer, six high pressure gaseous storage vessels, one high pressure control manifold, and one tube trailer discharging stanchion.
Liquid nitrogen is pumped into the high pressure ambient air vaporizer where the liquid is vaporized into gas form. The gas then passes into the storage vessels which act as a surge volume for the pump during peak flow and provide a volume of high pressure storage. The liquid nitrogen pump starts automatically when the pressure in the gas storage vessels drops to 800 psig and shuts off when the storage pressure reaches 2,300 psig.
3,000 scfh of nitrogen gas.
- 2. The low pressure nitrogen supply system consists of six low pressure ambient air vaporizers, one low pressure control manifold, and one tube trailer discharging stanchion.
Liquid nitrogen is drawn from the storage vessel and flows to the low pressure ambient air vaporizers. Gas leaving the vaporizers flows to the pressure control manifold where the gas pressure is reduced to 185 psig for plant use. The pressure control manifold has been sized to allow a maximum flow of 18,000 scfh nitrogen gas.
- 3. The low pressure primary grade water tanks nitrogen supply system consists of one liquid nitrogen storage vessel, one low pressure ambient air vaporizer, two nitrogen blanketing control stations and two nitrogen sparging control stations.
Liquid nitrogen flows from the vessel to the vaporizer. Gas leaving the vaporizer flows through a distribution manifold to a nitrogen blanketing control station and a sparging station located at each primary grade water tank. The system has been sized to allow maximum flow of up to 6,000 scfh nitrogen gas.
le 9.5-6 gives the equipment being supplied by nitrogen, including the usage, pressure, and
. Table 9.5-7 lists the major components of the nitrogen supply system and their design meters.
mperature indicating switch or a sensor and a temperature control valve located downstream he high and low pressure ambient air vaporizers, respectively, activate when the temperature ps to -20°F. In the high pressure line, the pump is shut down by the temperature indicating tch; in the low pressure line, the temperature control valve closes. These actions prevent the orizers from icing up and protects downstream piping.
ief valves are provided downstream of the high and low pressure vaporizers, high pressure age tubes and high pressure liquid nitrogen pump to prevent overpressurization of the ipment. Relief valves are also provided around the liquid nitrogen storage vessel for rpressure protection and on the low and high pressure plant supplies to set the design pressure.
h the low and high pressure supply systems are provided with tube trailer discharge stanchions nable nitrogen to be supplied from tube trailer trucks in the event of liquid nitrogen storage vaporization equipment malfunction.
nitrogen line penetrating the containment structure contains air- operated containment ation valves outside and inside the containment structure. The containment isolation valves piping between them are Safety Class 2.
following provisions have been made to preserve an adequate nitrogen supply and ensure em reliability.
- 1. Tube trailer discharge stanchions are connected to both the high and low pressure subsystems. This enables a tube trailer truck to be used as a source of nitrogen in the event of a storage equipment malfunction.
- 2. Excess flow valves have been provided on subsystems 1 and 2 all system outlet lines to isolate the nitrogen supply in the event of a pipe rupture or excessive leakage.
- 3. Relief valves are provided throughout the nitrogen system to prevent overpressurization of the equipment.
9.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements nitrogen system operates continuously with essential system parameters continuously nitored and indicated by instrumentation. Performance tests are therefore not required.
ection is performed in accordance with normal maintenance procedures. The containment ation valves are tested in accordance with the procedures of Section 6.2.4.
9.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements nitrogen system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and controlled, locally or otely, as follows.
- 1. Control switches with position indicating lights are provided on the main control board for the nitrogen supply containment isolation valves. Containment isolation signals (CIA and CIB) automatically close both valves. Valve positions are monitored by the plant computer. An engineered safety feature status light is provided on the main control board to indicate when either of the valves are not closed.
- 2. Nitrogen storage tube low pressure is alarmed on the main control board.
- 3. Control switches are provided locally for the high pressure liquid nitrogen pump, and the following auto pump trips are identified by local indicator lights:
- liquid nitrogen pump discharge gas temperature low;
- liquid nitrogen pump discharge pressure high; and
- liquid nitrogen pump cavitation high.
- liquid nitrogen storage vessel pressure and level indicators;
- nitrogen storage tubes temperature and pressure indicators;
- low pressure nitrogen pressure indicator; and
- high pressure nitrogen pressure indicator.
10 CONTAINMENT VACUUM SYSTEM containment vacuum system (Figure 9.4-5) establishes and maintains the reactor tainment internal pressure at subatmospheric conditions during normal operations. The system ot safety-related, except for the portion of the system required for containment isolation.
10.1 Design Bases containment vacuum system is designed to perform the following functions.
- 1. Reduce the containment atmosphere pressure from atmospheric to subatmospheric conditions prior to plant startup.
- 2. Remove air from the containment atmosphere to maintain subatmospheric conditions, which compensates for containment structure air inleakage during normal operation.
- 3. Serve as a purge mode backup to the redundant hydrogen recombiner system for the control of combustible gas concentrations in the containment.
only portions of the containment vacuum system which are safety- related (QA Category 1; mic Category 1) are the containment structure penetrations, the containment isolation valves, r controls (Ref. Figure 9.4-5 and Table 6.2-65) and the associated piping.
10.2 System Description containment vacuum system (Figure 9.4-5) consists of a containment vacuum ejector, two tainment vacuum pumps, piping, valves, and instrumentation. The design data for the major ponents in the containment vacuum system are shown in Table 9.5-8.
containment vacuum ejector removes air from the containment structure to create a atmospheric pressure prior to initial unit operation and after subsequent refueling operations.
motive medium for the ejector is 135 psig saturated steam which is supplied at 14,000 pounds hour from the auxiliary steam system (Section 10.4.10). The containment vacuum ejector harges directly to the atmosphere through a silencer.
tainment vacuum pumps is directed through the radioactive gaseous waste lines (Section 11.3) ch are connected to the Millstone stack for elevated release. The system is not required to orm any safety related function. One of the vacuum pumps may be used for hydrogen centration control. One pump draws air from the auxiliary building and discharges it into the tainment while the second pump continues to remove air from the containment to the oactive gaseous waste system.
h containment vacuum pump is capable of removing containment structure air inleakage ng normal operation and maintaining containment atmosphere pressure in the operating range 0.6 to 14.0 psia.
10.3 Safety Evaluation containment vacuum pumps are operated remote manually from the control room to maintain tainment atmosphere pressure at or below the maximum permissible value.
ration of the containment vacuum system is not required for at least several weeks after a A; therefore, the system is not an engineered safety feature. This allows ample time for repair eplacement of containment vacuum system equipment, if necessary.
essive depressurization of the containment structure is not considered credible. The tainment vacuum pumps have a relatively small capacity when compared to the containment cture free volume. Uninterrupted operation of a containment vacuum pump for approximately ays would be required to lower the containment atmosphere pressure from 9.0 psia to the imum design pressure of 8.0 psia, assuming no air temperature change. The plant technical cifications require the operating pressure be above 10.6 psia.
steam ejector is used for evacuating the containment from atmospheric pressure to atmospheric pressure during startup operations, in approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, compatible with the mal startup schedule. Unit startup is performed in accordance with detailed written cedures, which include operation of the steam ejector system. The establishment of atmospheric pressure in the containment is governed by administrative procedures and is ely supervised by personnel responsible for unit startup. Pressure indicators are located in the trol room to provide the operator with a continuous indication of containment pressure. This e supervision and monitoring assure that the normal operating pressure is not reduced below permitted by Technical Specification 3.6.1.4. In the unlikely event containment pressure is uced below the value defined by the Technical Specifications, because of the slow rate of ressurizing the containment, there is sufficient time to take corrective action; i.e., take the tor out of service. When the normal containment operating pressure is reached, the steam jet tor is secured and locked out under administrative control and is not used during normal unit ration.
tinued operation of the ejector after establishment of the operating pressure is not considered ible because of the control room indication and administrative controls previously discussed.
tainment isolation valve on the containment vacuum ejector suction line is locked closed by ns of a key-operated switch on the main control board, and the manual outside containment ation valve is locked closed with a local lock. Therefore, excessive depressurization during al operation of the ejector and inadvertent ejector operation during normal unit operation ld be possible only with a violation of operating procedures and removal of the locking ices on the ejector suction valves. Although the containment vacuum ejector is normally rated from the auxiliary building, the suction valve switch ensures positive control of ejector ration by the operators in the control room.
portion of the system that penetrates the containment is classified QA Category I along with isolation valves that close on a CIA signal.
10.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements containment vacuum ejector is not required during unit operation, and because it is a simple hanical device having no moving parts, periodic testing of the ejector is not required. The tainment vacuum pumps are operated prior to fuel load to demonstrate adequate capacity to ove inleakage (Table 14.2-1, Preoperational Test No. 16). System design provides the ability to perform Type C testing as specified by Appendix J of 10 CFR 50.
10.5 Instrumentation Requirements tainment air pressure instrumentation is part of the containment leakage monitoring system ction 6.2.6). Details of this instrumentation are discussed in Section 7.6.7.
containment vacuum pumps are manually activated from the control room and are rlocked with the two containment vacuum system isolation valves. When either isolation e in a pump suction line is closed, the vacuum pump is stopped automatically. The tainment vacuum system isolation valves close automatically on a Phase A containment ation signal. The containment vacuum pumps are also stopped automatically by a pump harge temperature signal greater than 280°F.
containment vacuum system isolation valves have control switches and indicator lights on the n control board. Open and closed positions are monitored by the plant computer. Engineered ty feature status lights indicate on the main control board when an isolation valve is open.
containment isolation valve for the vacuum system ejector suction is manually controlled m the main control board. The valve is provided with a keylock control switch and indicator
- t. The key can be removed only in the closed position.
unciators are provided on the main control board that alarm when the following conditions t:
Containment Vacuum Pump A - discharge temperature high;
Any MCC load power not available (status lights on rear of main control board indicate which MCC is without power).
cal total flow indicator is installed in the combined discharge line for the containment vacuum ps.
11 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OIL COLLECTION SYSTEM reactor coolant pump (RCP) oil collection system incorporates enclosures having drip pans splash guards at potential oil leakage sites to reduce the possibility of oil fires caused by tion of oil leakage by hot RCS components and to maintain cleanliness of area.
11.1 Design Bases RCP oil collection system is designed in accordance with the following.
- 1. General Design Criteria 2 for structures housing the system and system components to withstand effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods without loss of function.
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for the seismic classification of system components.
- 3. Paragraph C.7.a(1)(e) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
11.2 System Description RCP motor OSPS consists of a package of splash guards, drip pans, and enclosures mbled as attachments to the RCP motor at strategic locations. These enclosures do not rfere with RCP ventilation or bearing insulation, or the seal maintenance stand. Shroud losures are removable to facilitate maintenance.
oil collected at the shroud enclosures is gravity drained to four oil collection tanks, one for h RCP. Each oil collection tank has a capacity of approximately 320 gallons and is vented to tainment through a flame arrester/vent assembly. Removal of oil from the collection tank is omplished via a hose connection on the tank and a portable pump.
collection and control package consists of the following.
- 1. Oil Cooler and Oil Cooler Piping Enclosure The motor oil cooler has a number of flanged connections which represent potential sources of oil leaks. The entire oil cooler and connecting oil piping are therefore provided with an enclosure which collects any leaks which occur. This enclosure is designed to provide maximum access to the oil cooler through the use
such a size and configuration that they can be handled by one man without hoists or lifts. A drain suitable for draining the leakage oil is provided.
- 2. Upper Oil Level Alarm Enclosure A drip pan is placed under the upper oil level alarm detector to collect any oil that may leak from the associated piping fittings. The pan has deep, removable sides to protect against atomizing of the leakage oil by the air currents around the motor. A viewing window is provided for reading the oil level sight glass. A drain connection is included.
- 3. Upper Oil Fill and Drain Pipe Enclosure A drip pan is placed under the oil fill and drain valve to collect any leaks from the valve. The pan has deep, removable sides to protect against atomizing of the leakage oil by air currents around the motor. A drain connection is provided.
- 4. Upper RTD Conduit Box Enclosure A drip pan is placed under the upper RTD conduit box. This pan also has deep, removable sides. A drain connection is provided.
- 5. Oil Lift System Enclosure The oil lift system provides high pressure oil to the motor thrust bearings during startup. A leak in this system could result in oil being sprayed on hot system components. The oil lift system enclosure isolates the high pressure oil from the environment in the event that the system should leak during its operation.
The enclosure is designed to provide maximum access to the oil lift pump and motor through the use of multiple piece removable construction. A viewing window is provided in the enclosure. The pieces of the enclosure are of a size and configuration such that they can be handled by one man without hoists and lifts.
Handles are provided where appropriate. A drain connection is provided.
- 6. Lower Bearing Oil Pot Drip Pan This catch basin is located immediately below the lower bearing oil pot and is removable. The pan surrounds the shaft and extends to the lower bracket edge thus protecting the entire underside of the lower oil pot.
- 7. Upper Bearing Oil Pot Drip Pan
point external to the upper bracket.
11.3 Safety Evaluation re are no moving parts where failure could jeopardize system function in the oil collection em.
thquakes and fires are the only natural and postulated phenomena which might affect the ration of this system. The RCP oil collection system is seismically supported.
12 REFERENCES FOR SECTION 9.5 1 Albertson, M.L., Dai, Y.B., Jensen, R.A., and Rouse, H. Diffusion of Submerged Jets.
Trans. ASCE, Vol 115. 1950.
2 Colt Industries Fairbanks Morse Engine Division, P.O. No. 2447. 300-241, MP3 Vendor Factory Diesel Air Test Reports.
3 Harleman, D.R.F. Section 26--Stratified Flow. From Handbook of Fluid Dynamics. Ed.
V.L. Otruter. 1969.
TABLE 9.5-1 COMPLIANCE WITH FIRE PROTECTION TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS Refer to the Fire Protection Evaluation Report, Appendix B.
LEAKAGE
SUMMARY
PER DIESEL*
JACKET WATER SYSTEM (gph) (gal/30 days) ing and Valves 0.02 14.4 mp Seal 0.06 43.2 rbochargers and Piping 0.01 7.2 ifices, Gasketed both sides 0.00 0.0 trumentation 0.00 0.0 Subtotal (Jacket Water System) 0.09 64.8 INTERCOOLER WATER SYSTEM (gph) (gal/30 days) ing and Valves 0.03 21.6 mp Seal 0.06 43.2 trumentation 0.00 0.0 Subtotal (Intercooler Water System) 0.11 64.8 TOTAL 0.20 129.6 (Jacket and Intercooler Water Systems)
TE:
Leakage rates are provided by the diesel generator manufacturer Operators can manually provide make up to the Jacket Water Expansion Tank after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The acceptable leak rate for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is 6 GPH.
SYSTEMS DESIGN FLOW TEMPERATURE DESIGN HEAT HEAT REMOVAL RATE PRESSURE CAPACITY DIFFERENTIAL REMOVAL REQUIRED AT 5335 kW DG COMPONENT (psig) (gpm) (°F) RATE (Btu/hr) RATING (Btu/hr)
PUMPS Jacket Water Engine Driven Pump 57 880 --- --- ---
Jacket Water 460 V Motor-Driven Circ Pump 10 60 --- --- ---
Intercooler Water Engine-Mounted Pump 57 880 --- --- ---
HEAT EXCHANGING EQUIPMENT: JACKET WATER SYSTEM Cylinder Liner Jackets and Turbochargers --- --- 6,781,000 Lube Oil Cooler 150 913 (normal) 3.6 1,638,000 Governor Lube Oil Cooler 0 Total: 8,419,000 Jacket Water Heat Exchanger 150 913 (shell) 18.5 (shell) 8,419,000 8,235,000 1900 (tube) 8.9 (tube)
INTERCOOLER WATER SYSTEM Intercooler Water Heat Exchanger 150 (tube/shell) 800 (shell) 10.8 (shell) 4,338,055 4,045,000 1900 (tube) 4.6 (tube)
NOTE: Jacket water and intercooler water heat exchangers were sized at 110% diesel generator load (5486 kW).
GENERATOR - DIESEL LUBRICATING OIL SYSTEM Design Flow Temperature Design Heat Pressure Capacity Differential Removal Rate Component (psig) Each (gpm) (°F) (Btu/hr) bricating Oil Heat 150 475 (shell) 15.4 (shell) 1,638,000 changer 51,194 (design be Oil Heater 120 50 -
heat duty)
MPS:
bricating Oil Pump 100 (normal) 400 (normal) - -
cker Arm Lubricating 20 at 514 rpm 2.2 - -
Pump lubricating Oil Filter 100 50 - -
mp cker Arm Pre-Lube Oil 50 (discharge) 2 - -
mp TE:
h component has approximately 12 percent additional capacity (margin).
Design Parameter Value mber of active tubes 16 mber of reserve tubes 2 lume of each tube (ft3) 51.1 ximum storage pressure (psig) 2,300 be test pressure (psig) 3,675 rage capacity (1 tube) of gaseous hydrogen between 100 psig and 6,935 00 psig (scf) at 95°F pture disk rupture pressure (psig) 3,307 sign temperature (°F) 95
Section Equipment Reference Usage Pressure (psig) Flow
- 1. Main steam isolation trip valves 10.3 Intermittent 185 Negligible
- 2. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th point feedwater heaters 10.4.2 Intermittent 185 15 scfm/heater
- 3. Auxiliary boilers 10 Intermittent 5 50 scfm/boiler
- 4. Hot water expansion tank 9.2.6 Continuous 120 67 scf/day to leakage
- 5. Main steam system 10.3 Intermittent 5 50 scfm/loop
- 6. Safety injection accumulator tanks 6.3 Intermittent 660 3,000 scfh
- 7. Process gas precooler 11.3 Intermittent 5 200 ft3 total
- 8. Process gas charcoal bed adsorbers 11.3 Intermittent 5 4,000 ft3 total for purging
- 9. Process gas degasifier 11.3 Intermittent 5 4,000 ft3 total for purging
- 10. Process gas compressor prefilter 11.3 Intermittent 5 3 ft3 total for purging
- 11. Volume control tank 9.3.4.2.5 Intermittent 185 400 ft3 for purging
- 12. Reactor plant gaseous drains 9.3.5 Continuous 5 480 scf/day (total)
- 13. Reactor plant gaseous vents 9.3.5 Continuous 3 7 scfm/vent
- 14. Steam generator blowdown 10.4.6 Intermittent 5 50 scfm/sg
- 15. Pressure relief tank 5.4.11 Continuous 2 508 scf/day
- 16. Chilled water expansion tank
- 9.2.2 Intermittent 7 10 scf/day to leakage
- 17. Condensate storage tank 9.2.6 Continuous <.75 9,380 scfh maximum
- 18. Condensate surge tank 9.2.6 Continuous <.75 39,135 scfh maximum
- 19. Primary grade water storage tanks 9.2.8 Continuous 0.5 In. Wtr. 5,805 scfh maximum
- Supplied by separate nitrogen bottle.
TABLE 9.5-7 NITROGEN SYSTEM MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN DATA I. High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System and Low Pressure Nitrogen Supply System (Subsystems 1 and 2)
Component Value rogenic Liquid Storage Vessel Net liquid capacity (gal) 3,082 Net gas equivalent capacity (scf) 287,000 Maximum working pressure (psig) 245 at 150°F Design temperature (°F) -320 to 150 Operating temperature (°F) -320 uid Nitrogen Pump Design flow (gpm) 1.79 Pump speed (rpm) 250 Motor design (hp) 10 w Pressure Ambient Air Vaporizers Number of vaporizers 6 Design temperature (°F) -425 to 150 Maximum allowable working pressure (psig) 300 Capacity (scfh) 3,000 Test Pressure (psig) 375 gh Pressure Ambient Air Vaporizer Number of vaporizers 1 Design temperature (°F) -425 to 100 Maximum allowable working pressure (psig) 3,000 Capacity (scfh) 10,000 Test Pressure (psig) 4,500 gh Pressure Gaseous Storage Tubes Number of tubes 6 Volume of each tube (ft3) 51.1
Component Value Maximum storage pressure (psig) 2,300 Tube test pressure (psig) 3,675 Total storage capacity of gaseous nitrogen between 660 and 2,300 psig 35,139 tubes) (scf)
II. Primary Grade Water Tanks Nitrogen Supply System Component Value yogenic Liquid Storage Vessel Net liquid capacity (gal) 1,490 Net gas equivalent capacity (scf) 138,400 Maximum working pressure (psig) 250 Operating pressure (psig) 155 to 165 Design temperature (°F) -320 to 100 Operating temperature (°F) -320 w Pressure Ambient Air Vaporizer Number of vaporizers 1 Design temperature (°F) -425 to 160 Maximum working pressure (psig) 500 Capacity (scfh) 8,000 rogen Blanketing Control Station mber of stations 2 ximum capacity per station (scfh) 5084 pply pressure (psig) 150 ntrol pressure range (inches of water) 1/4 to 3/4
VACUUM SYSTEM Design Operating Pressure Design Capacity (1)
Component (psia) (Each) cuum ejector Suction 14.5 16,575 lb/hr Discharge 15.0 cuum pump Suction 9.7 108 cfm Discharge 16.06 (66 scfm) (1)
TES:
- 1. At 9.5 psia, dry air, 90°F
- 2. At standard conditions (14.69 psia, dry air, 60°F)
CHARACTERISTICS ankcase Vacuum Pump Power Source Train A Bus 32-1T (1)
Train B Bus 32-1U (1)
Horsepower 1 hp Voltage 460 V Phase 3 Frequency 60 Hz Pump Capacity 630 sfcm Discharge Head 1.2 inches water ndby Jacket Coolant Heater (i.e., Electric Immersion Heater)
Power Source Train A Bus 32-1T (via 3EGS*PNL1A) (1)
Train B Bus 32-1U (via 3EGS*PNL1B) (1) kW Output 18 kW Voltage 480 V Phase 3 ndby Jacket Coolant Pump (i.e., Motor-Driven Water Circulating Pump)
Power Source Train A Bus 32-1T (via 3EGS*PNL1A) (1)
Train B Bus 32-1U (via 3EGS*PNL1B) (1)
Horsepower 1 hp (3EGS*P2A) (3EGS*P2B)
Voltage 460 V Phase 3 Frequency 60 Hz Pump Capacity 60 gpm Discharge Head 22 ft TDH ergency Generator Air Compressor (i.e., Motor-Driven Air Compressor)
Power Source Train A Bus 32-1T (two compressors) (1)
Train B Bus 32-1U (two compressors) (1)
Horsepower 15 hp
Voltage 460 V Phase 3 Frequency 60 Hz Fuel Oil Pump Power Source Train A Bus 301A-1 (via 3BYS*PNLDG1F) (2)
Train B Bus 301B-1 (via 3BYS*PNLDG2F) (2)
Horsepower 2 hp Voltage 90-140 V dc el Oil Transfer Pump Power Source Train A Bus 32-1T (two pumps) (3)
Train B Bus 32-1U (two pumps) (3)
Horsepower 3 hp Voltage 460 V Phase 3 Frequency 60 Hz Pump Capacity 40 gpm Discharge Head 65.5 ft of oil cker Arm Prelube Oil Pump Pump Source Train A Bus 32-1T (via 3EGS*PNL1A) (1)
Train B Bus 32-1U (via 3EGS*PNL1B) (1)
Horsepower 0.5 hp Voltage 460 V Phase 3 Frequency 60 Hz Pump Capacity 2 gpm Discharge Head 50 psi lubrication and Filter Pump Pump Source Train A Bus 32-1T (via 3EGS*PNL1A) (1)
Train B Bus 32-1U (via 3EGS*PNL1B) (1)
Horsepower 7.5 hp Voltage 460 V Phase 3 Frequency 60 Hz Pump Capacity 50 gpm Discharge Head Built-in relief valve set at 120 psig lube Oil Heater (i.e., Electric Heater)
Power Source Train A Bus 32-1T (via 3EGS*PNL1A) (1)
Train B Bus 32-1U (via 3EGS*PNL1B) (1) kW Output 15 kW Voltage 480 V Phase 3 TES:
- 1. Refer to Section 1.7, Drawing 12179-EE-1AK
- 2. Refer to Section 1.7, Drawings 12179-EE-1BB and 1BC
- 3. Refer to Section 1.7, Drawing 12179-EE-1AK and Section 8.3, Figure 8.3-6
Permissible Inleakage or Type of Leakage Means Used to Detect Corrective Measures Outleakage
- 1. Jacket water into lube oil a. Visual inspections of lube oil sump system (standby mode) tank (abnormal level) and color of Repair cooler leakage and Lube oil water content of 0.5 oil (greyish of yellow-brownish tint clean percent maximum if water is polluted)
- b. Periodic testing of the lube oil quality
- 2. Lube oil into the jacket water a. Periodic testing of the jacket water Any significant lube oil leakage Repair cooler leak and system (operating mode) quality which results in visual detection clean expansion tank sight glass
- b. Visual inspection of expansion tank water
- 3. Jacket water into the engine a. Visual inspection of turbocharger Repair defective air intake and governor jackets Lube oil water content of 0.5 turbocharger or governor systems (operating or standby percent maximum lube oil cooler mode) lube oil
- b. Periodic testing of the governor lube oil quality
- 4. Jacket water/service water a, Periodic testing of the jacket water Repair tank in jacket water Any leakage which results in systems quality cooler or engine air cooler exceeding manufacturers water water heat exchanger quality limits
- b. High level in the expansion tank
FIGURE 9.5-1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (NOW IN FPER FIGURE 4-1)
THIS FIGURE NOW IN FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION REPORT Figure 4-1
FIGURE 9.5-2 P&ID EMERGENCY GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.5-3 P&ID EMERGENCY DIESEL RELATED SYSTEMS (SHEETS 1-5) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.5-4 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (NOW IN FPER FIGURE 4-1)
FIGURE 9.5-5 P&ID NITROGEN AND HYDROGEN SYSTEM (SHEETS 1-3) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.
FIGURE 9.5-6 NOT USED FIGURE 9.5-7 SITE WATER FIRE PROTECTION