ML23193A876

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1 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 9, Auxiliary Systems
ML23193A876
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Issue date: 06/28/2023
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Millstone Power Station Unit 2 Safety Analysis Report Chapter 9: Auxiliary Systems

Table of Contents tion Title Page GENERAL........................................................................................................... 9.1-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM ........................................ 9.2-1 1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.2-1 1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.2-1 1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.2-1 2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.2-2 2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.2-2 2.2 Components ................................................................................................ 9.2-6 3 System Operation........................................................................................ 9.2-9 3.1 Startup ......................................................................................................... 9.2-9 3.2 Normal Operation ....................................................................................... 9.2-9 3.3 Shutdown .................................................................................................. 9.2-11 3.4 Safety Injection Operation (Emergency Operation) ................................. 9.2-11 4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.2-12 4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.2-12 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM................................................................... 9.3-1 1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.3-1 1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.3-1 1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.3-2 2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.3-2 2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.3-2 2.2 Interface With Other Systems..................................................................... 9.3-3 2.3 Components ................................................................................................ 9.3-4 3 System Operation........................................................................................ 9.3-5 3.1 Plant Heatup................................................................................................ 9.3-5 3.2 Normal Plant Operation .............................................................................. 9.3-5 3.3 Plant Cooldown........................................................................................... 9.3-5 3.4 Refueling..................................................................................................... 9.3-6 3.5 Emergency Conditions................................................................................ 9.3-6

tion Title Page 4 Reliability and Availability......................................................................... 9.3-6 4.1 Special Features .......................................................................................... 9.3-6 4.2 Test and Inspections.................................................................................... 9.3-7 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM ................... 9.4-1 1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.4-1 1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.4-1 1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.4-1 2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.4-2 2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.4-2 2.2 Components ................................................................................................ 9.4-5 3 System Operation........................................................................................ 9.4-5 3.1 Normal Operation ....................................................................................... 9.4-5 3.2 Emergency Conditions................................................................................ 9.4-6 3.3 Shutdown .................................................................................................... 9.4-8 4 Availability and Reliability......................................................................... 9.4-9 4.1 Special Features .......................................................................................... 9.4-9 4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................... 9.4-9 5 Code Structural Qualification ................................................................... 9.4-11 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM ....................................................... 9.5-1 1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.5-1 1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.5-1 1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.5-1 2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.5-2 2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.5-2 2.2 Components ................................................................................................ 9.5-8 3 System Operation........................................................................................ 9.5-8 3.1 Normal Operation ....................................................................................... 9.5-8 3.2 Abnormal Operation ................................................................................... 9.5-9 3.3 Emergency Conditions................................................................................ 9.5-9 4 System Availability and Reliability .......................................................... 9.5-10

tion Title Page 4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.5-10 4.2 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.5-11 5 References................................................................................................. 9.5-12 SAMPLING SYSTEM ........................................................................................ 9.6-1 1 Introduction................................................................................................. 9.6-1 2 Reactor Coolant Pass .................................................................................. 9.6-1 2.1 Equipment Purpose and Description........................................................... 9.6-1 2.1.1 Sample Module ........................................................................................... 9.6-2 2.1.2 Remote Operating Panel ............................................................................. 9.6-2 2.1.3 Reactor Coolant Auxiliary Valve Operating Panel (RCAVOP)................. 9.6-2 2.1.4 Deionized Water Flushing Module............................................................. 9.6-2 2.2 Design Features........................................................................................... 9.6-3 3 Containment Air Pass ................................................................................. 9.6-4 3.1 Equipment Purpose and Description........................................................... 9.6-4 3.1.1 Sample Module ........................................................................................... 9.6-4 3.1.2 Remote Operating Panel ............................................................................. 9.6-4 3.2 Containment Air Samples ........................................................................... 9.6-4 3.3 Design Features........................................................................................... 9.6-4 4 Test.............................................................................................................. 9.6-5 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS ......................................................................... 9.7-1 1 Circulating Water System ........................................................................... 9.7-1 1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.7-1 1.1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.7-1 1.1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.7-1 1.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.7-1 1.2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.7-1 1.2.2 Components ................................................................................................ 9.7-3 1.3 System Operation........................................................................................ 9.7-3 2 Service Water System ................................................................................. 9.7-4 2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.7-4

tion Title Page 2.1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.7-4 2.1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.7-4 2.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.7-6 2.2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.7-6 2.2.2 Components ................................................................................................ 9.7-6 2.3 System Operation........................................................................................ 9.7-6 2.4 Availability and Reliability......................................................................... 9.7-6 2.5 Test and Inspections.................................................................................... 9.7-8 3 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System ....................................... 9.7-9 3.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.7-9 3.1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.7-9 3.1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.7-9 3.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.7-9 3.2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.7-9 3.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.7-10 3.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.7-10 FUEL AND REACTOR COMPONENT HANDLING EQUIPMENT .............. 9.8-1 1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.8-1 1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.8-1 1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.8-1 2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.8-5 2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.8-5 2.1.1 New Fuel Storage........................................................................................ 9.8-5 2.1.2 Spent Fuel Storage ...................................................................................... 9.8-7 2.1.3 Fuel Transfer Tube and Isolation Valve ................................................... 9.8-19 2.1.4 Spent Fuel Pool Platform Crane ............................................................... 9.8-20 2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.8-20 2.2.1 New Fuel Storage Racks........................................................................... 9.8-20 2.2.2 Design and Fabrication of Spent Fuel Racks............................................ 9.8-21 2.2.3 Reactor Refueling Machine ...................................................................... 9.8-22

tion Title Page 2.2.4 Transfer Carriage ...................................................................................... 9.8-25 2.2.5 Upending Machine.................................................................................... 9.8-26 2.2.6 Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Rig .............................................................. 9.8-26 2.2.7 Core Support Barrel Lifting Rig ............................................................... 9.8-26 2.2.8 Upper Guide Structure Lifting Rig ........................................................... 9.8-27 2.2.9 Stud Tensioners......................................................................................... 9.8-27 2.2.10 Surveillance Sample Handling Tool ......................................................... 9.8-27 2.2.11 Mechanism Uncoupling Tool ................................................................... 9.8-28 2.2.12 Underwater Television.............................................................................. 9.8-28 2.2.13 In Mast Sipping Equipment ...................................................................... 9.8-28 2.2.14 Hydraulic Power Package ......................................................................... 9.8-28 2.2.15 Fuel Transfer Tube and Isolation Valve ................................................... 9.8-29 2.2.16 Spent Fuel Pool Platform Crane ............................................................... 9.8-29 2.2.17 Spent Fuel Cask Crane.............................................................................. 9.8-29 2.2.18 New Fuel Elevator .................................................................................... 9.8-29 2.2.19 Spent Fuel Inspection Machine (Deleted - Equipment Permanently Removed) ......................................... 9.8-30 2.2.20 Heated Junction Thermocouple Handling Canister Design...................... 9.8-30 3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.8-31 3.1 New Fuel Transfer .................................................................................... 9.8-31 3.2 Standard System Operations ..................................................................... 9.8-31 3.3 Refueling Operations ................................................................................ 9.8-32 3.4 Refueling Restoration ............................................................................... 9.8-33 3.5 Emergency Conditions.............................................................................. 9.8-34 4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.8-34 4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.8-34 4.2 Test and Inspections.................................................................................. 9.8-38 PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEMS.................................................................. 9.9-1 1 Design Temperature Bases ......................................................................... 9.9-1 2 Control Element Drive Mechanism Cooling System ................................. 9.9-2 2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.9-2

tion Title Page 2.1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.9-2 2.1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.9-2 2.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.9-3 2.2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.9-3 2.2.2 Components ................................................................................................ 9.9-3 2.3 System Operation........................................................................................ 9.9-3 2.3.1 Normal Operation ....................................................................................... 9.9-4 2.3.2 Abnormal Operation ................................................................................... 9.9-4 2.4 Availability and Reliability......................................................................... 9.9-4 2.4.1 Special Features .......................................................................................... 9.9-4 2.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................... 9.9-4 3 Containment and Enclosure Building Purge System .................................. 9.9-5 3.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.9-5 3.1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.9-5 3.1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.9-5 3.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.9-5 3.2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.9-5 3.2.2 Components ................................................................................................ 9.9-6 3.3 System Operation........................................................................................ 9.9-6 3.3.1 Normal Operation ....................................................................................... 9.9-6 3.4 Availability and Reliability......................................................................... 9.9-7 3.4.1 Special Features .......................................................................................... 9.9-7 3.4.2 Tests and Inspections .................................................................................. 9.9-7 4 Containment Auxiliary Circulation System................................................ 9.9-8 4.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.9-8 4.1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.9-8 4.1.2 Design Criteria ............................................................................................ 9.9-8 4.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 9.9-8 4.2.1 System......................................................................................................... 9.9-8 4.2.2 Components ................................................................................................ 9.9-8 4.3 System Operation........................................................................................ 9.9-8

tion Title Page 4.3.1 Normal Operation ....................................................................................... 9.9-8 4.4 Availability and Reliability......................................................................... 9.9-9 4.4.1 Special Features .......................................................................................... 9.9-9 4.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................... 9.9-9 5 Containment Penetration Cooling System .................................................. 9.9-9 5.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 9.9-9 5.1.1 Functional Requirements ............................................................................ 9.9-9 5.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-10 5.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-10 5.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-10 5.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-10 5.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-10 5.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-10 5.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-11 5.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-11 5.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................. 9.9-11 6 Radwaste Area Ventilation System .......................................................... 9.9-11 6.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-11 6.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-11 6.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-12 6.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-12 6.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-12 6.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-12 6.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-13 6.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-13 6.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-13 6.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-13 6.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................. 9.9-14 7 Nonradioactive Area Ventilation System ................................................. 9.9-14 7.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-14 7.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-14

tion Title Page 7.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-14 7.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-15 7.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-15 7.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-15 7.3 Systems Operation .................................................................................... 9.9-15 7.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-15 7.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-16 7.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-16 7.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................. 9.9-16 8 Engineered Safety Features Room Air Recirculation System .................. 9.9-16 8.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-16 8.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-16 8.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-16 8.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-17 8.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-17 8.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-18 8.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-18 8.3.1 Emergency Conditions.............................................................................. 9.9-18 8.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-18 8.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-18 8.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................. 9.9-19 9 Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System ................................................... 9.9-19 9.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-19 9.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-19 9.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-19 9.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-20 9.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-20 9.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-21 9.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-21 9.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-21 9.3.2 Emergency Operations.............................................................................. 9.9-22

tion Title Page 9.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-22 9.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-22 9.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................. 9.9-22 10 Main Exhaust Ventilation System ............................................................ 9.9-23 10.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-23 10.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-23 10.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-23 10.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-23 10.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-23 10.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-24 10.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-24 10.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-24 10.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-25 10.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-25 10.4.2 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.9-26 11 Control Room Air Conditioning System .................................................. 9.9-26 11.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-26 11.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-26 11.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-26 11.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-27 11.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-27 11.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-28 11.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-29 11.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-29 11.3.2 Emergency Operation ............................................................................... 9.9-29 11.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-30 11.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-30 11.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................. 9.9-31 12 Diesel Generator Ventilation Systems ...................................................... 9.9-32 12.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-32 12.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-32

tion Title Page 12.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-32 12.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-33 12.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-33 12.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-33 12.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-33 12.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-33 12.3.2 Emergency Operation ............................................................................... 9.9-34 12.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-35 12.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-35 12.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................. 9.9-35 13 Turbine Building Ventilation System ....................................................... 9.9-36 13.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-36 13.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-36 13.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-36 13.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-36 13.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-36 13.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-36 13.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-37 13.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-37 13.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-37 13.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-37 13.4.2 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.9-37 14 Access Control Area Air Conditioning System* ...................................... 9.9-38 14.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-38 14.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-38 14.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-38 14.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-38 14.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-38 14.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-39 14.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-39 14.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-39

tion Title Page 14.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-39 14.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-39 14.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................. 9.9-39 15 Balance of Unit ......................................................................................... 9.9-40 15.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-40 15.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-40 15.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-40 15.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-40 15.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-40 15.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-41 15.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-41 15.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-41 15.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-41 15.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-41 15.4.2 Tests and Inspection.................................................................................. 9.9-42 16 Vital Switchgear Ventilation System........................................................ 9.9-42 16.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-42 16.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-42 16.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-42 16.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-43 16.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-43 16.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-44 16.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-44 16.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-44 16.3.2 Emergency Operation ............................................................................... 9.9-45 16.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-45 16.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-45 16.4.2 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.9-45 17 Auxiliary Chilled Water System............................................................... 9.9-46 17.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.9-46 17.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-46

tion Title Page 17.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-46 17.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-46 17.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-46 17.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-46 17.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-47 17.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-47 17.3.2 Emergency Operation ............................................................................... 9.9-47 17.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.9-47 17.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-47 17.4.2 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.9-47 18 Vital Chilled Water System ...................................................................... 9.9-47 18.1 Design Basis ............................................................................................. 9.9-47 18.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.9-47 18.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.9-47 18.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.9-48 18.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.9-48 18.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.9-48 18.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.9-49 18.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.9-49 18.3.2 Emergency Operation ............................................................................... 9.9-49 18.4 Availability and Features .......................................................................... 9.9-49 18.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.9-49 18.4.2 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.9-49 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM ........................................................................ 9.10-1

.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.10-1

.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.10-1

.2.1 Site Water Supply System ........................................................................ 9.10-1

.2.1.1 Water Suppression Systems...................................................................... 9.10-3

.2.1.2 Gaseous Suppression Systems .................................................................. 9.10-4

.2.1.3 Portable Suppression Capabilities ............................................................ 9.10-4

tion Title Page

.2.1.4 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems ........................................................... 9.10-5

.2.1.5 Ventilation Systems and Smoke Removal................................................ 9.10-5

.3 Safety Evaluation and Fire Hazards Analysis........................................... 9.10-6

.3.1 Evaluation Criteria .................................................................................... 9.10-6

.3.2 Fire Hazard Analysis Methodology .......................................................... 9.10-7

.3.3 Fire Areas and Zones ................................................................................ 9.10-8

.3.4 Fire Hazard Analysis Results.................................................................... 9.10-8

.4 Inspection and Testing .............................................................................. 9.10-8

.5 Personnel Qualification and Testing......................................................... 9.10-9

.5.1 Fire Protection Organization..................................................................... 9.10-9

.5.2 Fire Brigade and Training......................................................................... 9.10-9

.5.3 Quality Assurance................................................................................... 9.10-10

.6 Safety Shutdown Design Bases .............................................................. 9.10-10

.6.1 Safety Functions ..................................................................................... 9.10-11

.6.2 Analysis of Safe Shutdown Systems and Components .......................... 9.10-11

.6.3 Safe Shutdown Analysis ......................................................................... 9.10-13

.6.4 Reactor Inventory Isolation and Hi/Low Pressure Interfaces ................. 9.10-15

.6.5 Exemptions from the Specific Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, III.G.2, III.G.3, III.J and III.O ................................................................ 9.10-16

.7 References............................................................................................... 9.10-18 1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM......................................................................... 9.11-1

.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.11-1

.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.11-1

.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.11-1

.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.11-1

.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.11-1

.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.11-2

.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.11-2

.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.11-2

.3.2 Emergency Conditions.............................................................................. 9.11-3 1.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.11-3

tion Title Page

.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.11-3

.4.2 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.11-3 WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM ................................................................... 9.12-1

.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.12-1

.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.12-1

.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.12-1

.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.12-1

.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.12-1

.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 9.12-2

.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.12-3

.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.12-3

.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.12-3

.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 9.12-3

.4.2 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.12-4 AUXILIARY STEAM SYSTEM ...................................................................... 9.13-1

.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 9.13-1

.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 9.13-1

.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 9.13-1

.2 System Description ................................................................................... 9.13-2

.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 9.13-2

.2.2 Auxiliary Steam Detection and Isolation System ..................................... 9.13-2

.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 9.13-3

.3.1 Normal Operation ..................................................................................... 9.13-3

.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 9.13-3

.4.1 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 9.13-3

List of Tables mber Title 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Parameters 2 Reactor Coolant and Demineralized Water Chemistry 3 Regenerative Heat Exchanger 4 Letdown Control Valves 5 Letdown Heat Exchanger 6 Ion Exchangers 7 Letdown Filters 8 Volume Control Tank 9 Charging Pumps 10 Concentrated Boric Acid Preparation and Storage 11 Boric Acid Pumps and Strainers 1 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers Design Basis Parameters 2 Shutdown Cooling System Design Parameters 1 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Components 2 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Failure Mode Analysis 3 Minimum Required RBCCW Flow to Essential Safety-Related Loads LOCA Injection and Recirculation Operations 1 Spent Fuel Pool Monitoring Equipment 2 Components of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System 1 Circulating Water System Components 2 Service Water System Components 3 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System Components 4 Service Water Cooling System 1 Transfer Tube Isolation Valve 2 Spent Fuel Pool Platform Crane 3 Spent Fuel Cask Crane 4 Failure Mode Analysis

mber Title 5 Radiation Levels from Heated Junction Thermocouple (R/Hr) 1 Control Element Drive Mechanism Cooling System 2 Containment and Enclosure Building Purge System 3 Containment Auxiliary Circulation System 4 Containment Penetration Cooling System 5 Penetration Air Cooling Requirements 6 Radwaste Ventilation System 7 Nonradioactive Ventilation System 8 Engineered Safety Features Room Air Recirculation System 9 Fuel Handling Ventilation System 10 Main Exhaust System 11 Control Room Air Conditioning System 12 Diesel Generator Ventilation Systems 13 Turbine Building Ventilation System 14 Access Control Area Air Conditioning System 15 Balance of Unit Ventilation System 16 Engineered Safety Features Room Air Recirc. System Failure Mode Analysis 17 Control Room Air Conditioning System Failure Mode Analysis 18 Diesel Generator Ventilation System Failure Mode Analysis 19 Vital Switchgear Ventilation System Component Description 20 Auxiliary Chilled Water System Component Description 21 Vital Chilled Water System Component Description 22 Indoor Design Temperatures for Significant Plant Areas

-1 Compressed Air System Component Description

-2 Gas Receiver Tanks Safety Evaluation

-1 Water Treatment System Components

List of Figures mber Title 1 P&ID Legend 2 P&ID Legend 3 General Legend Notes 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Flow Schematic (Normal Operation) 2 P&IDs: Charging; Deborating; Purification; Boric Acid Systems (Sheet 1) 1 Shutdown Cooling Flow Diagram 1 P&ID RBCCW System RBCCW Pumps and Heat Exchangers 2 RBCCW System Spent Fuel Pool and Shutdown Heat Exchangers 3 P&ID RBCCW. System Containment Spray Pump and Safety Injection Pump Seal Coolers

-4 P&ID RBCCW. System Reactor Coolant Pump, Thermal Barriers and Lube Oil Coolers 5 P&ID RBCCW. System Containment Air Recirculation and Coolant Unit 6 P&ID Diagram RBCCW. System Reactor Vessel Support Concrete Cooling Coils 7 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Pump Performance Curve 1 P&ID Spent Fuel Pool Cleaning and Cleanup System (Sheet 1) 2 Spent Fuel Pool Pump Performance Curve 1 P&ID Diagram Sampling System 2 P&ID Diagram Sampling System 3 P&ID Diagram Sampling System 4 P&ID Post Accident Sampling System Reactor Coolant Sample 5 P&ID Post Accident Sampling System Containment Air Sample

-1 P&IDs - Circulating Water, Service Water, Screen Wash, Sodium Hypochlorite (Sheet 1) 2 P&ID TBCCW System (Sheet 1) 3 Typical Service Water Pump Certified Test Curve 4 Deleted by FSARCR 03-MP2-011

List of Figures (Continued) mber Title 1 Plan of New Fuel Storage Racks 2 New Fuel Storage Racks - Section A-A 3 New Fuel Storage Rack Assembly (8 Rack Module) 4 New Fuel Storage Rack Assembly (4 Rack Module) 5 Storage Rack 6 Closure Bar New Fuel Storage Racks 7 Fuel Pool Arrangement - Four Region 8A Typical Spent Fuel Rack Module/Poison Box - Regions 1 and 2 8B Typical Spent Fuel Rack Module/Regions 3 and 4 8C Poison Box (Boraflex poison no longer credited) 8D Adjustable Foot 9 Collector Leak Channel Plan at Base of Walls 10 Refueling Equipment Arrangement 11 Refueling Machine 12 Deleted by PKG FSC MP2-UCR-2009-006 13 Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Rig 14 Core Support Barrel Lifting Rig 15 Upper Guide Structure Lifting Rig 16 Surveillance Capsule Retrieval Tool 17 Spent Fuel Pool Platform Crane 18 Spent Fuel Pool Platform Crane Travel Limits 19 Spent Fuel Cask Crane 20 Heated Junction Thermocouple Handling Canister 1 P&ID Containment and Enclosure Building Ventilation 2 Ventilation P&IDs (Sheet 1) 3 P&ID Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (Sheet 1) 4 P&ID HVAC System Turbine Building, Intake Structure, Warehouse and Diesel Generator Rooms

List of Figures (Continued) mber Title 4A P&ID Control Room Air Conditioning System

-5 Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) Fan Performance Curve 6 Containment Purge Fan Performance Curve 7 Containment Auxiliary Circulation Fan Performance Curve

-8 Containment Penetration Cooling Fan Performance Curve 9 Radwaste Ventilation Fan Performance Curve 10 Logic Diagram Radwaste Area Supply Fan 11 Non-Radioactive Supply Fan Performance Curve 12 Non-Radioactive Exhaust Fan Performance Curve 13 Battery Room Exhaust Fan Performance Curve 14 Cable Vault Transfer Fan Performance Curve 15 Engineered Safety Features Room Fan Performance Curve 16 Fuel Handling Supply Fan Performance Curve

-17 Deleted 18 Main Exhaust Fan Performance Curve 19 Control Room Air Conditioning Fan Performance Curve 20 Air Cooled Condenser Fan Performance Curve 21 Control Room Exhaust Fan Performance Curve 22 Control Room Filtration System Fan Performance Curve 23 Diesel Generator Room Supply Fan Performance Curve 24 Diesel Generator Fan Performance Curve 25 Turbine Building Supply Fan Performance Curve 26 Turbine Building Exhaust Fan Performance Curve 27 Electrical Room Supply Fan Performance Curve 28 Access Control Area Air Conditioning Fan Performance Curve

-29 Deleted

-30 Deleted 31 P&ID Turbine Building, Intake Structure, Warehouse and Diesel Generator Room

List of Figures (Continued) mber Title Chilled Water System 0-1 Deleted

-2 P&ID Domestic Water (Sheet 1)

-1 P&ID Instrument Air System Compressors F-3E and F-3F

-2 P&ID Instrument Air System Compressors F-3D 2-1 P&ID Diagram Water Treatment System

-1 P&ID Auxiliary Steam and Condensate (Sheet 1)

GENERAL auxiliary systems discussed in this section are those supporting systems which are required to ure the safe operation, protection or servicing of the major unit systems and, principally, the tor coolant system. In some cases the dependable operation of several systems is required to ill the above requirements and, additionally, certain systems are required to operate under rgency conditions. The extent of the information provided for each system is commensurate h the relative contribute of, or reliance placed upon the system in relation to the overall plant ty. The systems considered are:

a. Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS);
b. Shutdown Cooling System;
c. Water Treatment System;
d. New Fuel Handling System;
e. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System;
f. Cooling Water System;
g. Plant Protection System;
h. Fire Protection System;
i. Compressed Air System;
j. Sampling System;
k. Auxiliary Steam System majority of the active components within these systems are located outside of the tainment. Those systems with connecting piping or ductwork between the containment and the iliary building are equipped with containment isolation valves as described in Chapter 5.

wing symbols and abbreviations used throughout the FSAR are shown in Figures 9.0-1, 9.0-nd 9.0-3. Power supplies for these auxiliary systems are discussed in Chapter 8.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

NERAL P&ID LEGEND NOTES PIPING CLASS CODE DEFINITION Piping Classes are designated by a three-letter code. The first letter indicates the Primary Valve and Flange rating; the second letter the type of material; and the third letter the code to which the piping is designed.

The designations are as follows:

First Letter Rating (pounds)

B 2500 C 1500 D 900 E 600 F 400 G 300 H 150 J 125 K Class 250 AWWA L XH AWWA M 150 (Gravity)

Second Letter Material B Carbon Steel C Stainless Steel D Copper E Ductile Cast Iron, Mechanical Joint F Cast Iron, Soil G Carbon Steel, Epoxy Lined R Carbon Steel Radwaste S Stainless Steel Radwaste

Field Fabrication &

Third Letter Design Code Shop Fabrication Installation A Nuclear Power Piping, ANSI B31.7-69 ASME Section III, Class I 1971 B Nuclear Power Piping, ANSI B31.7-69 ASME Section III, Class II 1971 C Nuclear Power Piping, ANSI B31.7-69 ASME Section III, Class III 1971 D Code for Pressure Piping, ANSI B 31.1.0 Certain piping systems or portions of piping systems designed and fabricated to ANSI B 31.1.0 shall have additional testing and examination requirements over and above those required by that code. These additional requirements will be identified by a fourth code letter. The code letters and corresponding requirements are described as follows:

rth Letter Additional Specific Requirements ANSI B 31.1.0 Requirements Plus:

1. 100 percent volumetric examination of Butt Welds
2. Seismic Analysis
3. Base Material Traceability (as per Paragraph 1-723.1.3, ANSI B 31.7)

ANSI B 31.1.0 Requirements Plus:

1. Random volumetric examination of Butt Welds (1)
2. Base Material Identification (as per Paragraph 3-723, ANSI B 31.7)
3. Seismic Analysis ANSI B 31.1.0 Requirements Plus:
1. Base Material Identification (as per ASTM requirements)
2. Seismic Analysis On Butt Welds over four inch nominal pipe size, a minimum of 10 percent of the Butt Welds in a specified class shall be examined volumetrically. Those welds examined must include welds by each welder or welding operator performing welding in the specified class.

1 DESIGN BASES 1.1 Functional Requirements chemical and volume control system (CVCS) is designed to perform the following functions:

a. Maintain the chemistry and purity of the reactor coolant system;
b. Maintain the required volume of water in the reactor coolant system by compensating for coolant contraction or expansion resulting from changes in reactor coolant temperature and for other coolant losses or additions;
c. Provide a controlled path for transferring fluids to the radioactive waste processing system;
d. Inject concentrated boric acid into the reactor coolant system upon a pressurizer low pressure and/or a containment high pressure signal.
e. Control the boron concentration to obtain optimum control rod positioning, to compensate for reactivity changes associated with major changes in coolant temperature, core burnup, and xenon concentration variations, and to provide shutdown margin for maintenance and refueling operations or emergencies;
f. Provide auxiliary pressurizer spray for operator control of reactor coolant system pressure during shutdown;
g. Provide a means for functionally testing the check valves which isolate the safety injection system for the reactor coolant system;
h. Provide periodic sampling analysis of reactor coolant boron concentration and fission product activity;
i. Collect the controlled bleed off from the reactor coolant pump seals;
j. Pressure test the reactor coolant system.

1.2 Design Criteria CVCS is designed in accordance with the following criteria.

1. The system is designed to accept the discharge when the reactor coolant is heated at the design rate of 100F/hr and to provide the required makeup when the reactor coolant is cooled at the design rate of 100F/hr.

permissible level and to automatically line up charging pump suction to the RWST on low VCT level.

3. The system is designed to supply makeup or accept discharge due to power decreases or increases.
4. The system is designed with the capability to allow design transients of 10 percent of full power step changes and ramp changes of 5 percent of full power per minute between 15 and 100 percent power.
5. The system is designed so that the volume control tank has sufficient capacity to accommodate the reactor coolant system water inventory change for a full to zero power decrease with no makeup system operation, with the volume control tank initially at the normal operating level.
6. The system is designed to assure that the activity in the reactor coolant system does not exceed 411 Ci/cc (at 77F) for an assumed 1 percent failed fuel condition.
7. The system is designed to maintain the reactor coolant chemistry within the limits specified in Table 9.2-2.

2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 System CVCS is shown in the simplified block diagram, Figure 9.2-1, and in the detailed piping and rumentation drawing, Figure 9.2-2. The normal flow path is shown by the heavy lines in ure 9.2-2. Coolant letdown flow from one reactor coolant loop cold leg first passes through tube side of the regenerative heat exchanger, where the temperature is reduced to roximately 260F at normal conditions, and then through the letdown control valves. The own control valves are modulated by the pressurizer level control program and control the own flow to maintain proper pressurizer level. The letdown coolant temperature is reduced to F in the letdown heat exchanger downstream of the letdown control valves. This final perature reduction is made to prevent possible damage to the ion exchange resins. Flashing of hot liquid between the letdown control valves and the letdown heat exchanger is prevented by trolling back pressure with a pressure control valve downstream of the letdown heat hanger.

cooled letdown flow is passed through the letdown prefilter to remove suspended solids. The own flow is then directed through one of the two purification ion exchangers. The ion hangers contain resins for removal of corrosion and fission products. The third ion exchanger, deborating ion exchanger, is used for boron removal near the end of core cycle life when it is

letdown strainer located downstream of the ion exchanger retains particulate matter that may s through the ion exchanger retention element. It also serves as a backup to the ion exchanger ntion element, to prevent resin from entering the volume control tank, in the event of gross ure of this element.

coolant then flows through the letdown post filter and is sprayed into the volume control tank re gaseous fission products are released and hydrogen gas is dissolved in the coolant. The rging pumps take suction from the volume control tank and pump the fluid through the shell of the regenerative heat exchanger for recovery of heat from the letdown flow before being rned to the reactor coolant system.

mical shim and shutdown control for the reactor is maintained by control of the boron centration. Boron concentration is monitored by periodic sample analysis. Changing the boron centration in the reactor coolant system is accomplished by dilution with primary makeup er, addition of concentrated boric acid, or any desired blend of both to the reactor coolant em by the feed and bleed operation.

he level in the volume control tank reaches the high level setpoint, the letdown flow is matically diverted to the radioactive waste processing system. If the level in the volume trol tank reaches the low-level setpoint, primary makeup water, borated to the existing centration of the reactor coolant system, can be automatically supplied to the volume control by the makeup system. The system is designed to automatically line up charging pump ion to the RWST on low-low VCT level.

h the level in the normal control band, the volume control tank has sufficient capacity to ommodate the reactor coolant system water inventory change for a full to zero power decrease h no makeup system operation.

centrated boric acid is prepared in the batching tank and then transferred to the boric acid age tanks for storage. The boric acid tank contents may be recirculated by the boric acid ps. These pumps are also used to transfer boric acid to the volume control tank or to the ion of the charging pumps. They also transfer boric acid to the charging pump suction on a ty injection actuation signal (SIAS). On SIAS, both boric acid pumps transfer boric acid ctly to the charging pump suction header. Should the boric acid pumps fail to start on SIAS, dditional line is provided for gravity-feeding concentrated boric acid from the storage tanks to charging pump suction header.

reactor coolant system may be leak tested when the plant is shut down in accordance with t procedures. The system is also provided with connections for installing a hydrostatic test p.

general CVCS parameters are given in Table 9.2-1. The location numbers on the CVCS ng and Instrumentation Diagram serve to indicate process flow reference points in the system.

rence points. Basically, a letdown flow of 40 gpm is normal purification operation, a letdown of 84 gpm is intermediate purification operation and a letdown flow of 128 gpm is maximum fication operation. Typical operating conditions are given for the various makeup system rating modes.

ume Control CVCS automatically controls the volume of water in the reactor coolant system using a signal m the level instrumentation located on the pressurizer. The system reduces the amount of fluid must be transferred between the coolant system and the CVCS during power changes by loying a programmed pressurizer level setpoint which varies with reactor power level. The grammed level setpoint varies linearly with the average reactor coolant temperature. This ar relationship is shown in Figure 4.3-9. The control system compares the programmed level oint with the measured pressurizer water level. The resulting error signal is used to control the ration of the charging pumps and the letdown valves, as described below.

pressurizer level control program regulates the letdown flow by adjusting the letdown control e so that the reactor coolant pump controlled bleed off plus the letdown flow matches the ut from the operating charging pump. When the equilibrium is disturbed by a power change or any other reason, a decrease in level will start the available standby charging pumps to restore l, and an increase in level will increase the letdown flow rate and initiate a backup signal to the operating standby charging pumps. This relationship is shown in Figure 4.3-10.

volume control tank coolant level is controlled manually or automatically. When the level in tank reaches the high level setpoint, the letdown flow is automatically diverted to the oactive waste processing system. When the level in the tank reaches the low level setpoint, eup water borated to the existing concentration of the reactor coolant system can be matically supplied. When the level in the tank reaches the low-low level setpoint the charging p suction is transferred to the refueling water storage tank.

volume control tank can be vented to the radioactive waste processing system. The volume trol tank is designed to handle all gases that come out of solution when the letdown flow is yed into the volume control tank.

mical Control mistry control of the reactor coolant consists of operational control of oxygen concentration maintaining excess hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant. A chemical addition tank pump are used to inject hydrazine into the suction side of the charging pumps for subsequent ction into the reactor coolant system. The hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant em is controlled by the hydrogen overpressure in the volume control tank. The lithium that is duced in the reactor coolant by the reaction B10 (n, ) Li7 is used as the pH control agent. The duction rate of lithium from this reaction is approximately 100 ppb per day at the beginning of life, and decreases with core lifetime in proportion to boric acid concentration. One

ification is accomplished by a combination of ion exchange and filtration. Using one fication ion exchanger intermittently, the reactor coolant lithium concentration is controlled hin specification limits. The control of other impurities such as chlorides and fission products ccomplished by the continuous operation of the second CVCS purification ion exchanger. This ond ion exchanger has been converted to the lithium form and does not remove lithium. These exchangers remove soluble nuclides by the ion exchange mechanism and insoluble particles mpingement of these particles on the surface of the resin beds.

tridge type filters are located upstream and downstream of the ion exchangers to remove luble particles. These filters are removed from service when the pressure drop across the rs, becomes excessive, or when the radiation dose exceeds a predetermined level. A strainer is ted downstream of the ion exchangers to insure against the gross release of resin in the kely event of an ion exchanger retention element failure.

volume control tank is provided with a vent to the waste processing system to allow the ting of hydrogen, nitrogen and fission gases.

ead of controlling the buildup of hydrogen in the waste gases, oxygen is minimized in the es vented to the waste processing system. All systems and components containing hydrogen maintained under slightly positive pressure, with nitrogen if required, to prevent the leakage ir into these systems and to preclude the formation of a potentially dangerous mixture of O2.

he event that oxygen concentration exceeds safe limits, nitrogen will be introduced into the te gas system to lower the concentration of oxygen.

chemical and volume control system is designed to prevent the reactor coolant fission and osion product activities from exceeding the design basis values given in Table 11.A-1 when rating with 1 percent failed fuel.

ctivity Control boron concentration of the reactor coolant is controlled by the makeup portion of the CVCS

a. Optimize the position of the control rods;
b. Compensate for reactivity changes caused by variations in the temperature of the coolant, core burnup, and xenon concentration variations;
c. Provide a margin of shutdown for maintenance, refueling or emergencies.

mally, the CVCS adjusts the boron concentration of the coolant by the feed and bleed ration. To change concentration, the makeup system supplies either demineralized water, centrated boric acid or any intermediate blend to the volume control tank or charging pump ion. During this time, the letdown stream is diverted to the radioactive waste processing em. Toward the end of a core cycle, the deborating ion exchanger is used to reduce the boron centration. This avoids the generation of an excessive quantity of waste from feed and bleed ration.

CVCS can add boron to the reactor coolant at a sufficient rate to override the maximum ease in reactivity due to a cooldown and the decay of xenon in the reactor.

2.2 Components mponents are designed, manufactured, tested and inspected according to the applicable codes.

following code classifications apply to the CVCS. Components not listed are classified as code items.

Component Design Code Code Effective Date Regenerative Heat Exchanger ASME III, Class C 1968 Edition through Summer Tube Side (Primary) of 1969 Addenda Regenerative Heat Exchanger ASME III, Class C 1968 Edition through Summer Shell Side (Secondary) of 1969 Addenda Letdown Heat Exchanger ASME III, Class C 1968 Edition through Summer Tube Side (Primary) of 1969 Addenda Letdown Heat Exchanger ASME III, Class C 1968 Edition through Summer Shell Side (Secondary) of 1969 Addenda Ion Exchangers ASME III, Class C 1968 Edition through Winter of 1969 Addenda Charging Pumps ASME III, Class 2 1974 Edition, Summer 1975 Addenda Boric Acid Makeup Pumps P&V, Class II November 1968 Draft Volume Control Tank ASME III, Class C 1968 Edition through Summer of 1969 Addenda Boric Acid Storage Tanks ASME III, Class C 1968 Edition through Summer of 1969 Addenda Strainers B31.7, Class II & III 1969 Edition Pulsation Dampeners ASME III, Class 2 1971 Edition with Addendum (Discharge) through Winter 1973

1. It is possible to isolate the regenerative heat exchanger on both the shell and tube sides with isolation valves which are remotely operable from the control room;
2. Should it ever become necessary to completely isolate the regenerative heat exchanger an alternate charging path exists through the high-pressure safety injection header;
3. Additional Quality Control and Fatigue Analysis requirements have been placed on the regenerative heat exchanger beyond those normally required of an ASME Section III, Class C vessel.

enerative Heat Exchanger regenerative heat exchanger transfers heat from the letdown stream to the charging stream.

erials of construction are primarily austenitic stainless steel. The characteristics of the nerative heat exchanger are given in Table 9.2-3.

down Control Valves mally, one of the letdown control valves (CH110P, CH110Q) regulates letdown flow, as uired by the pressurizer level control system. The valves reduce the pressure of the letdown d to about 500 psig. The letdown flow is nominally 40 gpm, for coolant purification, but will y as the pressurizer water level changes. The valves are pneumatically operated and fail ed. All parts in contact with reactor coolant are of austenitic stainless steel. The valve racteristics are given in Table 9.2-4.

down Heat Exchanger letdown heat exchanger cools the letdown flow to a temperature compatible with the fication ion exchanger resins. Reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) is the cooling ium on the shell side of the letdown heat exchanger. Tube side materials of construction are enitic stainless steel; shell side materials of construction are carbon steel. The characteristics he letdown heat exchanger are given in Table 9.2-5.

Exchangers o purification ion exchangers purify the reactor coolant by removing corrosion and fission ducts. Each unit is designed to handle the maximum letdown flow of 128 gpm. Maximum flow ng shutdown purification operation is 300 gpm. The vessels and resin retention element are of enitic stainless steel construction.

normal method of adjusting boron concentration is by feed and bleed. Toward the end of a cycle, the quantities of waste produced due to feed and bleed operations become excessive,

characteristics of the ion exchangers are given in Table 9.2-6.

down Filters letdown filters remove insoluble materials from the reactor coolant. One filter, the letdown filter, is located in the letdown line upstream of the ion exchangers. The other filter, the own post-filter, is located downstream of the ion exchangers. Each filter can accommodate imum letdown flow of 128 gpm. Maximum flow during shutdown purification operation is gpm. The filter housings are austenitic stainless steel. The characteristics of filters are given able 9.2-7.

ume Control Tank volume control tank is used to accumulate letdown flow from the reactor coolant system, to ntain the desired hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant, and to provide a reservoir of tor coolant for the charging pumps. A vent to the radioactive waste processing system permits oval of hydrogen, nitrogen and gaseous fission products released from solution in the volume trol tank. The tank is of austenitic stainless steel construction and is provided with rpressure protection. Level controls divert coolant to the radioactive waste processing system igh level or operate the makeup system on low level. The characteristics of the tank are given able 9.2-8.

rging Pumps charging pumps return the purification flow to the reactor coolant system during plant steady e operations. The pumps are horizontal, positive displacement type with a leakage collection em. Each charging pump has a capacity of 44 gpm. On a safety injection actuation signal AS), the available pumps are started (normally, one of the pumps will already be running) and p concentrated boric acid into the reactor coolant system. The pressure containing portions of pump are austenitic stainless steel with internal materials selected for compatibility with boric

. The characteristics of the pumps are given in Table 9.2-9. Pulsation dampeners are located he suction and discharge sides of each pump to minimize vibration induced failures.

ic Acid Storage Tanks operable boric acid storage tank(s), in conjunction with the RWST, store enough concentrated c acid solution to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown condition at any time during the core ime. The solution is prepared in the boric acid batching tank and flows through the boric acid hing strainer before entering the storage tanks. With boric acid concentrations in the BASTs than or equal to 3.5 weight percent, tank heaters are not required to prevent boron ipitation at Auxiliary Building ambient temperatures. Sampling connections are used to fy that the proper concentration is maintained. The tanks are constructed of stainless steel.

ic Acid Pumps boric acid pumps take suction from the concentrated boric acid tanks and provide boric acid blended flow to the volume control tank or direct transfer to the charging pump suction header.

initiation of SIAS, these pumps line up with the charging pumps to permit direct transfer of centrated boric acid into the reactor coolant system. Each boric acid pump is capable of plying boric acid to three operating charging pumps. All wetted parts, except seals, are nless steel. The pump and strainer characteristics are given in Table 9.2-11.

3 SYSTEM OPERATION 3.1 Startup ing RCS fill, the CVCS back pressure control valve is normally used to control RCS pressure.

S heatup commences after a steam bubble is established in the pressurizer. During RCS tup, CVCS (charging pumps and letdown) are used to maintain pressurizer level and RCS ntory; pressurizer heaters and spray are used to maintain RCS pressure. The level controls in volume control tank automatically divert the letdown flow to the radioactive waste processing em (RWS).

en the reactor is shut down, the volume control tank is vented to the radioactive waste cessing system and then pressurized with nitrogen. Prior to reactor startup, a hydrogen blanket stablished in the tank. Any oxygen in the reactor coolant is normally removed by radiolytic mbination with excess hydrogen in the coolant.

oughout startup, the letdown filters are in service to reduce the activity of wastes entering the S. The purification ion exchanger is also normally in service. Within limitations placed on the tdown margin, the boron concentration in the reactor coolant system may be reduced during tup. The operator may inject a predetermined amount of demineralized makeup water by rating the makeup system in the Dilute mode. The concentration of boron in the reactor lant is verified by chemical analysis.

3.2 Normal Operation mal operation includes both the hot standby condition as well as normal plant operation.

ing normal operation:

a. Level instrumentation in the pressurizer automatically controls the volume of water in the reactor system by adjusting the letdown flow.
b. The water level in the volume control tank is maintained manually or automatically, in accordance with plant procedures.
d. Changes in reactivity may be compensated for by adjusting the concentration of boron in the reactor coolant system by the feed and bleed operation. Late in core life, the boron in the reactor coolant is maintained at a very low concentration. At this time the feed and bleed operation would generate excessive quantities of wastes so further reduction is accomplished by use of the deborating ion exchanger. During steady state operation, precise reactivity control is accomplished by utilizing the feed and bleed method. Over core life, an increasing quantity of demineralized water is metered to the suction of the charging pumps in order to minimize power level fluctuations.
e. The makeup system may be operated in four modes:
1. In the Dilute mode, a quantity of demineralized makeup water is selected and introduced into the charging pump suction or the volume control tank.

When the integrating flowmeter indicates that the selected quantity of makeup water has been added, the makeup flow is automatically stopped.

2. In the Borate mode, a quantity of concentrated boric acid is selected and introduced into the charging pump suction or the volume control tank, as described above.
3. In the Manual Blend mode, the flows of the demineralized water and concentrated boric acid can be set for any blend concentration between demineralized makeup water and concentrated boric acid. This mode is primarily used to supply makeup to the volume control tank and refueling water storage tank.
4. In the Automatic mode, the flow rates of the demineralized water and concentrated boric acid are set to match the concentration present in the reactor coolant system at that time in core life. The solution is automatically blended and introduced into the volume control tank according to signals received from the volume control tank level program.

The makeup system is normally set for the dilute mode of operation. This allows the operator to closely monitor all additions to the RCS.

f. The letdown flow is normally routed through one of the purification ion exchangers to reduce coolant activity.

nt shutdown is accomplished by a series of operations which bring the reactor plant from a hot dby condition at normal operating pressure and zero power temperature to a cold shutdown dition.

ore the plant is cooled down, the RCS is degassed to reduce the concentration of fission gases hydrogen in the reactor coolant system. The operator may also increase the letdown flow rate ccelerate the degasification, ion exchange, and filtration processes. All CEAs are inserted and DMs deenergized to begin the mode change to the shutdown condition to prevent inadvertent A withdrawal from subcritical conditions. During cooldown, boron is added, as needed, to the tor coolant system in accordance with plant procedures to maintain adequate shutdown gin.

ing the cooldown, the charging pumps, letdown control valves and letdown backpressure trol valves are used to adjust and maintain the pressurizer water level. The charging system is ned to the Boric Acid Storage Tank(s) or RWST for RCS makeup during cooldown until the uired shutdown margin is verified. The charging suction is then switched to the Refueling er Storage Tank. These steps ensure the proper shutdown margin is maintained. A portion of charging flow is used as an auxiliary spray to cool the pressurizer when the pressure of the tor coolant system is below that required to operate the reactor coolant pumps.

3.4 Safety Injection Operation (Emergency Operation) er emergency conditions, the charging pumps function to inject concentrated boric acid into reactor coolant system. Either the pressurizer level control or the SIAS will automatically start available charging pumps. Normally one of the pumps will already be running. The SIAS al will also function to transfer the charging pump suction from the volume control tank to the harge of the boric acid pumps. If the boric acid pumps are not operable, boric acid flows by vity from the concentrated boric acid tanks to the charging pump suction header. If the rging line inside the reactor containment building is inoperative, this line may be isolated ide the reactor containment building, and the concentrated boric acid solution may be injected he charging pumps through the high pressure safety injection header.

tions of the charging system may be employed to provide long term cooling and boron ipitation control in the event of a LOCA by simultaneous hot and cold leg injection. In the nt that the preferred LPSI hot leg injection method is unavailable, HPSI pump P-41A is ned to inject to the pressurizer auxiliary spray line, and thus the hot leg, through piping in the rging system.

4.1 Special Features assure reliability, the design of the CVCS incorporates component redundancy as well as rational redundancy. This is provided as follows:

Component Redundancy rification Ion Exchangers Parallel Standby Unit arging Pumps Two Parallel Standby Units tdown Flow Control Valves Parallel Standby Valve ric Acid Pumps and Tanks Parallel Standby Unit ckpressure Control Valves Parallel Standby Valve ddition to the component redundancy it is possible to operate the CVCS in a manner such that e components are bypassed. While the normal charging path is through the regenerative heat hanger, it is also possible to charge through the high pressure safety injection header. It is sible to transfer boric acid to the charging pump suction header by bypassing the volume trol tank, or by bypassing the makeup flow controls and the volume control tank. On SIAS separate paths to the charging pump suction header are lined up for boric acid transfer ough boric acid pumps and through the gravity feed line). If the letdown temperature exceeds F, the flow will automatically bypass the ion exchangers and flow to the process radiation nitor and boronometer is stopped.

charging pumps and boric acid pumps are powered by an emergency bus if normal power is

. The boric acid pumps and the motor-operated gravity feed boric acid valves are powered m different buses. Separation is provided between the power and control circuits for the undant boration paths.

ndby features are provided so that at least one charging pump is running after SIAS. Separate er supplies and control circuits are provided among the charging pumps, boric acid pumps the gravity feed boric acid motor-operated valves. Since both boric acid pumps are powered m the same power supply, the redundancy for boration is achieved by the design of the boric gravity feed piping arrangement and gravity feed motor operated valve as the redundant path boration.

ting of the boric acid solution in the Boric Acid Storage Tanks and the piping between the STs and the charging pumps is not required since the boric acid concentration is limited to 3.5 percent and will remain in solution under normal ambient area temperatures. Heat tracing will maintained on the Boric Acid Batching Tank, the batching strainers, and the piping upstream he BASTs because of the possibility of filling these sections with cold water.

TE: The boric acid heat tracing circuits have been isolated awaiting retirement.

ding is inoperative, the charging pump discharge may be routed via the safety injection em to inject concentrated boric acid into the reactor coolant system.

failure position of the backpressure control valves is the closed position. If the valve fails to n, relief valve CH-354 will protect the low pressure portion of the letdown line under all umstances. However, if the CVCS is in the maximum purification mode there is a possibility flashing downstream of the drag valves could occur. However, the maximum purification de of operation requires maximum component cooling water flow to the letdown heat hanger; thus, the letdown heat exchanger would prevent any two-phase flow condition nstream of the heat exchanger. In addition, if the temperature out of the letdown heat hanger exceeds 140F, the letdown flow would bypass the ion exchangers. Also, should the es remain open, the low pressure alarm on the backpressure controller would alert the rator that the valve is no longer functional. Note that in none of these cases would the VCT be ject to over-pressure. In any case, the VCT has a relief valve with a relieving capacity of 250 which is set to protect the VCT from exceeding its design pressure. Also, a VCT high sure alarm provides notification that the VCT is above its normal operating pressure but w the VCT relief valve setting. The volume control tank also has a high temperature alarm ve 130F. Therefore, there is adequate warning and protection to prevent any pressure buildup he low-pressure portion of the system.

uld the backpressure control valves fail closed, the intermediate pressure relief valve

-345) would preclude any overpressure condition from existing. The operator would be ted to this condition by a high pressure alarm on the pressure controller (PIC-201). There ld not be any flashing flow because of the higher set pressure of this relief valve. Since this kpressure control valve fails closed, there is no overpressurization problem downstream of this e and the relief valve relieves the pressure upstream of this valve.

Normal Letdown and Purification Flow, gpm 40 Normal Charging Flow, gpm 44 Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff (4 pumps), gpm 4 Normal Letdown Temperature at Loop, F 550 Normal Charging Temperature at Loop, F 395 Ion Exchanger Operating Temperature, F 120 Chemical and Volume Control System Process Flow Data CVCS Makeup System Operation - Manual Mode CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Flow, gpm 175 175 10 10 0 10 50 50 60 0 Press., psig 10 90 90 85 15 22 155 20 20 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 60 60 140 70 CVCS Location: 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Flow, gpm 0 0 165 155 10 10 0 0 0 Press., psig 90 15 90 90 90 20 10 10 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 CVCS Makeup System Operation - Emergency Boration (SIAS)

CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Flow, gpm 142 142 132 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Press., psig 10 105 105 105 105 15 165 15 15 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 60 60 140 140

CVCS Location: 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Flow, gpm 132 132 10 0 10 10 0 0 0 Press., psig 103 100 105 105 105 20 10 10 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 CVCS Makeup System Operation - Shutdown Boration CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Flow, gpm 180 180 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Press., psig 10 90 90 90 90 15 165 15 15 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 60 60 140 70 CVCS Location: 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Flow, gpm 15 15 165 155 10 10 0 0 0 Press., psig 90 90 90 90 90 20 10 10 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 CVCS Makeup System Operation - Emergency Boration (SIAS) Via Gravity Feed CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Flow, gpm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Press., psig 10 10 10 10 5 15 165 15 15 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 60 60 140 70 CVCS Location: 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Flow, gpm 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 66 132 Press., psig 10 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140

NOTE: (1) See Figure 9.2-2, Bechtel CVCS P&ID No. 25203-26017, for location numbers.

(2) The data shown for the various modes of operation is typical.

(3) The pressure in the isolated piping of the CVCS makeup system will normally be 0 psig, but may rang as high as 140 psig before the thermal relief valves lift.

Chemical and Volume Control System Process Flow Data CVCS Normal Purification Operation (One Charging Pump in Operation)

CVCS Location: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Flow, gpm 40 40 40 40 40 39 1 39 39 40 Press., psig 2205 2195 465 460 27 26 27 25 24 23 Temp., F 550 262 262 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 CVCS Location: 10a 10b 10c 11 12 13 14 14e 14f 14g (a,b,c,d)

Flow, gpm 40 40 44 44 44 44 1 0 4 4 Press., psig 22 20 20 20 2310 2302 100 100 100 21 Temp., F 120 120 120 120 120 395 120 120 120 120 CVCS Maximum Purification Operation (Two Charging Pumps in Operation)

CVCS Location: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Flow, gpm 84 84 84 84 84 83 1 83 83 84 Press., psig 2205 2162 481 460 50 46 50 45 41 37 Temp., F 550 320 320 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 CVCS Location: 10a 10b 10c 11 12 13 14 14e 14f 14g (a,b,c,d)

Flow, gpm 84 84 88 88 88 88 1 0 4 4 Press., psig 33 20 20 20 2310 2278 100 100 100 21 Temp., F 120 120 120 120 120 350 120 120 120 120 CVCS Maximum Purification Operation (Three Charging Pumps in Operation)

CVCS Location: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Flow, gpm 128 128 128 128 128 127 1 127 127 128 Press., psig 2205 2105 510 460 92 82 92 81 71 61 Temp., F 550 675 375 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 CVCS Location: 10a 10b 10c 11 12 13 14 14e 14f 14g (a,b,c,d)

Flow, gpm 128 128 132 132 132 132 1 0 4 4 Press., psig 51 20 20 20 2310 2240 100 100 100 21 Temp., F 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 NOTE: (1) See Figure 9.2-2 Bechtel CVCS P&ID No. 25203-26017, for location numbers.

(2) The pressure drop across the purification filter and ion exchanger will vary with loading. The pressure drops shown are typical.

(3) The pressure in the volume control tank will vary and this will affect the pressures at locations 5 throu 11 proportionally.

CVCS Makeup System Operation - Automatic Mode CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Flow, gpm 175 175 10 10 0 10 140 140 150 0 Press., psig 10 90 90 85 15 22 140 20 22 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 60 60 70 70

CVCS Location: 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Flow, gpm 0 0 165 155 10 10 0 0 0 Press., psig 90 20 90 90 90 20 10 10 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 CVCS Makeup System Operation - Borate Mode CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Flow, gpm 180 180 15 15 0 15 0 0 15 0 Press., psig 10 90 90 75 15 22 165 20 22 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 60 60 140 70 CVCS Location: 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Flow, gpm 0 0 165 155 10 10 0 0 0 Press., psig 90 20 90 90 90 20 10 10 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 CVCS Makeup System Operation - Dilute Mode CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Flow, gpm 160 160 0 0 0 0 130 130 130 0 Press., psig 10 90 90 15 15 22 140 22 22 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 60 60 140 70 CVCS Location: 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Flow, gpm 0 0 160 150 10 10 0 0 0 Press., psig 15 20 90 90 90 20 10 10 10 Temp., F 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140

See Figure 9.2-2, Bechtel CVCS P&ID No. 25203-26017, for location numbers.

The data shown for the various modes of operation is typical The pressure in the isolated piping of the CVCS makeup system will normally be 0 psig but may range as high as 140 psig before the thermal relief valves lift.

DEMINERALIZE PARAMETER REACTOR COOLANT WATER Suspended Solids, ppm maximum 0.35 prior to reactor startup -

pH at 25C Determined by the concentration of boric acid and lithium present. -

Consistent with the Primary Chemistry Control Program.(4)

Chloride, ppm Cl-, maximum 0.15 0.05 Fluoride, ppm F-, maximum 0.10 -

Sodium, ppm Na+, maximum - 0.01 Hydrogen as H2, cc(STP)/Kg H20 25-50 -

Dissolved O2, ppm maximum 0.1 (1) (2) (3) 0.1 Lithium as Li7, ppm Consistent with the Primary Chemistry Control Program. (4) -

Boron, ppm 0-2620 (5) -

Conductivity, S/Cm at 25C Relative to lithium and boron concentration 2.0

DEMINERALIZE PARAMETER REACTOR COOLANT WATER NOTES:

(1) The temperature at which the Oxygen limit applies is > 250F.

(2) The at power operation residual Oxygen concentration control value is ppm.

(3) During plant startup, Hydrazine may be used to control dissolved Oxygen concentration at 0.1 ppm.

(4) During power operation lithium is coordinated with boron to maintain a pH(t) of 7.0, but 7.4, consistent with the Primary Chemis Control Program. Lithium is added to the RCS during plant startup, but prior to reactor criticality, and is in specification per the Prim Chemistry Control Program within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after criticality. Lithium may be removed from the reactor coolant immediately before, during, shutdown periods to aid in the cleanup of corrosion products. By evaluation, a maximum lithium concentration of 4.5 ppm is permissible with a target lithium concentration of 4.3 ppm for 100% power operations.

(5) RCS boron concentration is maintained as necessary to ensure core reactivity or shutdown margin requirements are met. Although th RCS and related auxiliary systems containing reactor coolant are designed for a maximum concentration of 2620 ppm boron, it shou be noted the design basis for the TSP baskets in the containment sump assumes the RCS, SITs, and RWST are at a maximum boron concentration of 2400 ppm.

TABLE 9.2-3 REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER Design Parameters ntity 1 e Shell and Tube, Vertical e ASME III, Class C (1968 Edition through Summer of 1969 Addenda) e Side (Letdown)

Fluid Reactor Coolant, 1 wt % Boric Acid, Maximum Design Pressure, psig 2485 Design Temperature F 650 Materials Stainless Steel, Type 304 Pressure Loss, psi 99 (at 128 gpm)

Normal Flow, gpm 40 Design Flow, gpm 128 ll Side (Charging)

Fluid Reactor Coolant, 12 wt % Boric Acid, Maximum Design Pressure, psig 3025 Design Temperature F 650 Materials Stainless Steel, Type 304 Pressure Loss at 44 gpm, psi 5 Normal Flow, gpm 44 Design Flow, gpm 132

TABLE 9.2-3 REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER (CONTINUED)

Operating Parameters Maximum Maximum Maximum Letdown / Letdown / Letdown /

Maximum Maximum Minimum Tube Side (Letdown) Normal Charging Charging Charging w - gpm at 120F 40 30 128 128 et Temperature F 550 550 550 550 tlet Temperature F 262 165 375 450 Maximum Maximum Maximum Letdown / Letdown / Letdown /

Maximum Maximum Minimum Shell Side (Charging) Normal Charging Charging Charging w - gpm at 120F 44 132 132 44 et Temperature F 120 120 120 120 tlet Temperature F 395 212 310 452

TABLE 9.2-4 LETDOWN CONTROL VALVES Quantity 2 Manufacturer Control Component Incorp.

Design Pressure, psig 2485 Design Temperature, F 550 Maximum Flow (each), gpm 128 Minimum Flow (each), gpm 30

TABLE 9.2-5 LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER Design Parameters ntity 1 e Shell and Tube, Horizontal e ASME III, Class C (1968 Edition through Summer of 1969 Addenda) nufacturer Whitlock Manufacturing Co.

e Side (Letdown)

Fluid Reactor Coolant, 1 weight percent Boric Acid, Maximum Design Pressure, psig 650 Design Temperature F 550 Pressure Loss at 128 gpm 21 Materials, psi Stainless Steel, Type 304 Normal Flow, gpm 40 Maximum Flow, gpm 128 1 300 2 ll Side (Cooling Water)

Fluid RBCCW Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature F 250 Materials Carbon Steel Normal Flow, gpm 190 Design Flow, gpm 1200 During letdown system operation.

During shutdown purification operation.

TABLE 9.2-5 LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER (CONTINUED)

Operating Parameters Maximum Maximum Maximum Letdown / Letdown / Letdown Maximum Maximum Minimum Tube Side (Letdown) Normal Charging Charging Charging w - gpm at 120F 40 30 128 128 et Temperature F 263 165 375 450 tlet Temperature F 120 120 120 127 Maximum Maximum Maximum Letdown / Letdown / Letdown Shell Side (Cooling Maximum Maximum Minimum Water) Normal Charging Charging Charging w - gpm at 120F 190 21 1200 1200 et Temperature F 100 65 100 100 tlet Temperature F 130 130 127 135

TABLE 9.2-6 ION EXCHANGERS Quantity 3 Type Flushable Manufacturer Air Preheater Co.

Design Pressure, psig 200 Design Temperature,F 250 Normal Operating Pressure, psig 60 Normal Operating Temperature, F 120 Resin Volume, each (total), ft3 36.2 Resin Volume, each (useful), ft3 32.0 Normal Flow, gpm 40 Maximum Flow, gpm 128 1 300 2 Code for Vessel ASME III, Class C (1968 Edition thru Winter of 1969 Addendum)

Retention Screen, U. S. Mesh 80 Material Stainless Steel, Type 304 Fluid, Boric Acid, wt % 1 Maximum During letdown system operation.

During shutdown purification operation.

TABLE 9.2-7 LETDOWN FILTERS Quantity 2 Type Elements Disposable Cartridge Data Normal Maximum Operating Design Maximum Allowable Design Weight % Temperature, Pressure, Allowable Pressure Pressure Loss, Filter Cartridge Temperatur Maximum Norma Manufacturer Efficiency F psig Loss, Clean, psi Loaded, psi Rating (Micron) e, F Flow, gpm Flow, gp Filterite 80 120 200 5 at 132 gpm 40 at 132 gpm 3 Nominal 250 132 40 (minimum)

Pall 99 3.44 at 132 gpm 75 at 132 gpm 6, 2, 0.45 250 132 a 40 Cartridge (minimum) Absolute 300 b

a. During letdown system operation.
b. During shutdown purification operation.

Code for Vessel ASME III, Class C (1968 Edition through Summer of 1969 Addendum).

Material Austenitic Stainless Steel.

Fluid, Boric Acid, wt % 1 Maximum.

TABLE 9.2-8 VOLUME CONTROL TANK Quantity 1 Type Vertical, Cylindrical Manufacturer Air Preheater Co.

Design Pressure, Internal, psig 75 Design Pressure, External, psig 15 Design Temperature, F 250 Normal Operating Pressure, psig 15 - 30 Normal Operating Temperature, F 120 Normal Spray Flow, gpm 40 Blanket Gas (during plant operation) Hydrogen Code ASME III, Class C (1968 Edition through Summer of 1969 Addenda)

Fluid, Boric Acid, wt % 6.25 Maximum Material Austenitic Stainless Steel

TABLE 9.2-9 CHARGING PUMPS Quantity 3 Type Positive Displacement Manufacturer Gaulin Corp. n Design Pressure, psig 3010 Design Temperature, °F 250 Capacity, gpm 44 Normal Discharge Pressure, psig 2735 Normal Suction Pressure, psig 20 Normal Temperature, °F 120 Maximum Discharge Pressure (Short Term), psig 3010 Minimum Available Net Positive Inlet Pressure, psia 9.0 Net Positive Inlet Pressure Required, psia 8.25 at 44 gpm Driver Rating, hp 100 Materials in Contact with Pumped Fluid Austenitic Stainless Steel Fluid 12 wt % Boric Acid, Maximum

TABLE 9.2-10 CONCENTRATED BORIC ACID PREPARATION AND STORAGE Boric Acid Storage Tanks Quantity 2 Manufacturer Air Preheater Co.

Internal Volume, each, ft3 870 Design Pressure, psig 15 Design Temperature, F 250 Normal Operating Temperature, F 60-100 Fluid, wt % Boric Acid Minimum 2.5 Maximum 3.5 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Code ASME III, Class C (1968 Edition through Summer of 1969 Addenda)

Boric Acid Batching Strainer Quantity 1 Type Y type, in line Manufacturer Mueller Steam Specialty Co.

Design Pressure, psig 150 Normal Operating Pressure, psig 5 Design Temperature, F 200 Screen Size, U.S. Mesh 10 Design Flow, gpm 130 Materials Austenitic Stainless Steel Fluid, Boric Acid, wt % 3.5 Maximum Pressure Loss, psi USAS B31.7, Class II & III Code (1969 Edition) 10

Boric Acid Batching Tank Quantity 1 Manufacturer Air Preheater Company Useful Volume, gallons 635 Design Pressure Atmospheric Design Temperature, F 250 Normal Operating Temperature, F 85-100 Type Heater Electrical Immersion Heater Capacity, Min., kW 45 Fluid, Boric Acid, wt % 12 Material Austenitic Stainless Steel Code Non code

TABLE 9.2-11 BORIC ACID PUMPS AND STRAINERS PUMPS Quantity 2 Manufacturer Goulds Pump Co.

Type Centrifugal Design Pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature,F 250 Design Head, feet 231 Design Flow, gpm 143 Normal Operating Temperature, F 60-100 NPSH Available (Minimum), feet 20 NPSH Required, feet 8 Horsepower, hp 2.5 Fluid, Boric Acid, wt % maximum 3.5 Material in Contact with Liquid Code (November 1968 Draft) Austenitic Stainless Steel Pump and Valve Code, Class II STRAINER Quantity 1 Manufacturer Mueller Steam Specialty Co.

Type Y type, in line Screen Size U.S. Mesh 200 Normal Operating Pressure, psig 80 Design Pressure, psig 150 Pressure Loss, Clean, psi 1 at 30 gpm Design Temperature, F 200 Normal Operating Temperature, F 85-100 Design Flow, gpm 150 Materials Austenitic Stainless Steel Fluid, Boric, Acid, wt % Code (1969 Edition) 3.5 USAS B31.7, Class II & III

SYSTEMS (SHEET 1) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

SYSTEMS (SHEET 2) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

SYSTEMS (SHEET 3) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

1 DESIGN BASES 1.1 Functional Requirements shutdown cooling system, in conjunction with the main steam and feedwater systems, is gned to reduce the temperature of the reactor coolant in post shutdown periods from normal rating temperature to the refueling temperature. The main steam and feedwater system is zed in the initial phase of the cooldown. The shutdown cooling system functions to reduce the lant temperature to the refueling temperature and also maintains this temperature during eling.

ueling water transfer from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to the refueling cavity in containment building is normally accomplished after the reactor vessel head has been oved by using the high pressure safety injection pumps, low pressure safety injection pumps he refueling water purification pumps. The high pressure safety injection pumps take suction m the RWST and discharge into the reactor coolant system and then to the refueling cavity via open reactor vessel. Pumping continues until the refueling cavity is filled. The low pressure ps can be used to return the refueling water from the refueling cavity to the RWST.

ing shutdown or refueling, the shutdown cooling system can be aligned to cool the spent fuel l system using the low pressure safety injection pumps (see Section 9.5) shutdown cooling system heat exchangers are normally used during the recirculation phase either the containment spray system or the shutdown cooling system, when RCS conditions mit following a LOCA. If permissible RCS conditions exist post-LOCA, the shutdown cooling t exchangers may be aligned to the shutdown cooling system and shutdown cooling may be ated for longterm cooling. Otherwise, the shutdown cooling heat exchangers remain aligned he containment spray system which is used to cool the recirculated water.

functional performance requirements for the shutdown cooling heat exchangers during mal alignment or during LOCA recirculation mode are provided in Table 9.3-1.

owing a LOCA, when the containment spray system is no longer required, the RCS is filled, the shutdown cooling system entry conditions have been met, the preferred method by which rovide long term cooling and boron precipitation control is with the shutdown cooling system s normal plant operation alignment. In the event that the RCS is not filled 8 to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after start of the LOCA, then portions of the shutdown cooling system may be aligned for ultaneous hot and cold leg injection to provide long-term cooling and boron precipitation trol.

e selection and materials requirements are primarily related to the emergency operation ability of the system and are presented in Chapter 6. The shutdown cooling system ponents are designed to meet the design parameters listed in Table 9.3-2.

tem components whose design pressure and temperature are less than the reactor coolant em design limits are provided with overpressure protection devices and redundant isolation ns. System discharge from over-pressure protection devices is collected in closed systems.

erials are selected to meet the applicable code material requirements of the codes given in le 6.3-3. All parts of components in contact with borated water are fabricated or clad with enitic stainless steel.

2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 System shutdown cooling system is shown schematically in Figure 9.3-1. The system uses portions ther systems, i.e., the reactor coolant system (Chapter 4), safety injection system (Section 6.3) containment spray system (Section 6.4).

he shutdown cooling system, reactor coolant is circulated using the low pressure safety ction pumps. The flow path from the pump discharge runs through normally locked closed es SI-452 and SI-453, through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, through normally ed valves SI-456 and SI-457, through normally locked closed valve SI-657 to the low sure safety injection header, and enters the reactor coolant system through the four safety ction header legs. (As required for temperature control, a portion of the pump flow may ass the heat exchangers, going directly to the low pressure safety injection header by flowing ugh the shutdown cooling heat exchanger bypass valve SI-306.) The circulating fluid flows ugh the core and is returned from the reactor coolant system through the shutdown cooling zle in the loop number 2 reactor vessel outlet (hot leg) pipe. The coolant is returned to the ion of the low pressure safety injection pumps through normally closed valves SI-651 and

52. These valves are interlocked to prevent opening when the reactor coolant system pressure eeds the design pressure of the shutdown cooling system. Further, if either of these valves is n when reactor coolant system pressure exceeds a set point of 280 psia, an annunciator will
m. Each valve is independently controlled by separate instrumentation channels. The interlock hese valves is also described in Sections 4.3.8.2.3 and 9.3.4.1.

ressure equalizing line is installed between the valve body of SI-651 and upstream piping

-CCA-10. The line will ensure that over-pressurization of the valve bonnet for SI-651 and sure locking of the valve does not occur.

tdown cooling and total low pressure injection flow are measured by an orifice meter installed he low pressure safety injection header. Flow is indicated in the control room. The flow ment also transmits a signal to a controller.

to the core is maintained by adjusting the heat exchanger bypass valve controller FIC-306

/or the injection valves to compensate for changes in flow through the heat exchangers.

2.2 Interface With Other Systems ety Injection System low pressure safety injection pumps recirculate the reactor coolant during the shutdown ling mode of heat removal. The flow path is described in Section 9.3.2.1.

ctor Coolant System perature control during refueling and the initial cooldown to refueling temperature of the tor coolant system is accomplished by recirculating reactor coolant through the shutdown ling heat exchangers. Reactor coolant is circulated from the hot legs to the cold leg side of the tor vessel, thus maintaining the normal flow direction in the reactor coolant system during the eling cycle. During normal operation two closed valves provide isolation from the reactor lant system. The two isolation valves are also provided with pressure interlocks which lude them from being opened at a reactor coolant system pressure above the design pressure he shutdown cooling loop.

ctor Building Closed Cooling Water System RBCCW system provides the heat sink to which the reactor coolant system residual heat is cted. RBCCW water flows through the shell side of the shutdown cooling heat exchangers and functions to cool the shaft seals on the low pressure safety injection pumps as they circulate heated reactor coolant.

tainment Spray System ing normal plant operation the containment spray pumps are aligned to flow through the tdown cooling heat exchangers. In the shutdown cooling mode of operation isolation valves to separate the heat exchangers from the containment spray system.

mical and Volume Control System ng and valves are provided in the CVCS such that during shutdown cooling a portion of the can be bypassed from the outlet of the shutdown heat exchangers through the letdown ion of the CVCS and returned to the suction line of the low pressure safety injection pumps.

w through this bypass stream provides filtration and ion exchange of the reactor coolant via purification filter and ion exchanger.

ing shutdown or refueling, the shutdown cooling system can be aligned to cool the spent fuel l system using the low pressure safety injection pumps (see Section 9.5).

2.3 Components tdown Cooling Heat Exchanger and Pumps Shutdown Cooling System is made up of components of the Safety Injection System and the ctor Coolant System. The principal characteristics of the major components in those systems given in Sections 6.3 and 4.0, respectively.

shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers and low pressure safety injection pumps are described in tion 6.3. Additional information covering the characteristics of heat exchangers in the tdown cooling mode is given in Table 9.3-1.

tdown Cooling Pumps low pressure safety injection pumps are part of the Shutdown Cooling System but are shared h the safety injection system. During all periods of plant operation when safety injection em operability is required, they are aligned for the emergency core cooling operation.

low pressure safety injection pumps are vertical centrifugal pumps with mechanical seals to imize reactor coolant leakage to the atmosphere. The low pressure safety injection pumps are cribed in Chapter 6.

tdown Cooling Valves nual isolation valves are provided to isolate equipment for maintenance. Manual valves have kseats to facilitate repacking. Control valves are provided for remote and manual control of t exchanger tube side flow. Control valve 2-SI-306 has a lantern ring at the bottom of each of packing boxes followed by a set of packing. It is not equipped with and does not require king leak-off lines. 2-SI-657 has two sets of packing and intermediate leak-off connections discharge to the waste processing system. Check valves prevent shutdown cooling reverse through the low pressure safety injection pumps.

tdown Cooling System Piping shutdown cooling system piping is austenitic stainless steel. All piping joints and connections welded except for a minimum number of injection pumps, for example high pressure safety, orifice plates.

3.1 Plant Heatup r to plant heatup, RCS temperature is held stable with the shutdown cooling system removing ay heat. When heatup is started, the flow through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers is uced to allow decay heat to start warming up the RCS. Since shutdown cooling return perature is monitored as the indicator of reactor vessel temperature until RCPs are started, this reduction must be gradual. After taking into account the possible temperature rise if the m generators are hotter than the reactor vessel, two RCPs are started. Shutdown cooling flow temperature may then be adjusted as required to maintain the desired heatup rate within the ts of the Technical Specifications. When heat removal via the steam generators is available, shutdown cooling system is secured and lined up for emergency operation.

3.2 Normal Plant Operation ing normal plant operation there are no components of the system in operation. The system is mally aligned for possible emergency operation.

3.3 Plant Cooldown nt cooldown is the series of operations which bring the reactor from a hot standby condition to shutdown.

ldown to less than 300F is accomplished by dumping steam to the condenser or to osphere. During this time, after safety injection is no longer required, the shutdown cooling em is prepared for operation. This includes aligning the shutdown cooling heat exchangers to LPSI pumps and the LPSI injection valves. This may also include boron equalization with the ST (through the SIT test line) or warm-up (through valve 2-SI-400). When dumping steam is longer effective in cooling down the reactor, and pressure has been reduced to within the gn pressure of the shutdown cooling system, shutdown cooling is initiated. This is done erably with two reactor coolant pumps still operating, but may be done while cooling down on ral circulation. Use of the reactor coolant pumps is preferred due to better control of the ldown rate and the ability to cool the entire RCS simultaneously.

iation of shutdown cooling is done by opening the suction isolation valves and gradually ning the injection valves with the heat exchanger flow control valve shut. When flow through system is established, the heat exchanger flow control valve is opened gradually to begin oving heat. If reactor coolant pumps are running, vessel temperature is taken as the cold leg perature. If initiating shutdown cooling from natural circulation, vessel temperature is taken old leg temperature until shutdown cooling return temperature becomes lower than cold leg perature. Then vessel temperature is taken as shutdown cooling return temperature. The RCS en cooled down at a rate governed by Technical Specifications. Heat removal is controlled by trolling flow through the heat exchangers with the flow control valve. As cooldown gresses, this flow is increased to compensate for reduced temperature difference. Relatively stant total flow is maintained through the use of the heat exchanger bypass valve and/or the

d and the level of decay heat.

ing cold shutdown and refueling, as long as there is fuel in the reactor, shutdown cooling ration is continuous (with brief exception to support refueling).

3.4 Refueling transfer of refueling water from the refueling storage tank to the reactor cavity may be omplished using the safety injection system at the start of refueling. The reactor vessel head is oved and the high pressure safety injection pumps are started. These pumps take water from RWST and inject it into the reactor coolant loops through the normal flow paths. The low sure safety injection pumps or the containment spray pumps may also be used for this ration.

ing shutdown or refueling, the shutdown cooling system can be aligned to cool the spent fuel l system using the low pressure safety injection pumps (see Section 9.5).

he end of refueling operations, refueling water is returned from the reactor cavity through the tor coolant system and safety injection system to the RWST. A connection is provided from shutdown cooling heat exchanger discharge to the refueling water storage tank for this pose. The low pressure safety injection pumps are used for the transfer operation.

3.5 Emergency Conditions mponents of the shutdown cooling system are also used for emergency core cooling and their ration in this mode of operation is discussed in Chapter 6.

4 RELIABILITY AND AVAILABILITY 4.1 Special Features unit can be cooled to refueling temperature within the 27.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> time period using one LPSI p and two heat exchangers. The unit can still be cooled to refueling temperature if only one t exchanger is available, but it would take considerably longer. The unit can be maintained at eling temperature with one pump and one heat exchanger after decay heat has decreased iciently.

he event of a tube to shell leak in the heat exchanger, a high level alarm on the component ling water surge tank will be generated. The tank overflows to the waste disposal system.

o motor-operated valves in series isolate the shutdown cooling system suction piping from the tor coolant system. An interlock with pressurizer pressure prevents them from opening when tor coolant system pressure exceeds the design pressure of the shutdown cooling system.

er to Section 4.3.8.2.3 for further details. Additionally, one of the valves (2-SI-651) has a

ed open while it is open and in Modes 5 or 6, to preclude inadvertent operation during tdown cooling.

ssure relief valves are provided to protect isolated sections of piping from overpressure. The rce of overpressure for which they are sized is thermal expansion for all but 2-SI-468, which is d to protect the system from the simultaneous injection of all three charging pumps into a d system. Insulation is another means for protecting isolated sections of piping from thermal r pressurization due to an ambient temperature rise.

ief valve 2-SI-469, which is located between two suction isolation valves, has a setpoint of psig and relieves to the primary drain tank. If reactor coolant system pressure is increased h 2-SI-652 inadvertently left not fully closed, or if it is opened prior to sufficiently reducing tor coolant system pressure, 2-SI-469 will open and relieve to the drain tank which is ipped with pressure, temperature, and level alarms. This arrangement results in an extremely interfacing systems LOCA frequency associated with the SDC suction path.

SDC System is susceptible to an overpressure transient due to an inadvertent start of a HPSI p since the injection capability of a HPSI pump exceeds the installed SDC System relief acity. To eliminate an over pressurization of the SDC System caused by an inadvertent start of PSI pump, the HPSI pumps will be prevented from automatically injecting into the RCS when SDC System is connected to the RCS, unless the RCS is sufficiently vented. This can be omplished by the use of administrative controls.

pressure interlock associated with valve 2-SI-651 in the shutdown cooling system has an alled local control switch which can override the pressure interlock to align the shutdown ling system for boron precipitation control post-LOCA. Use of the override would only be uired if vital bus power to motor control center B51 were lost in conjunction with the LOCA.

operators would verify RCS pressure below the shutdown cooling relief valve setting prior to rriding the pressure interlock. The pressure interlock for 2-SI-652 does not have override ability and cannot be opened if reactor coolant system pressure is greater than 280 psia.

4.2 Test and Inspections h component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation. Demineralized water is used to h each system. Initially, the system is operated and tested to verify that the flow path, flow, mal capacity, and mechanical operability meet the design requirements. Instruments are brated during testing. The automatic flow control is tested.

odic testing of the low pressure safety injection pumps as described in Chapter 6, assures the ilability of this equipment for shutdown cooling. Data can be taken during refueling operations onfirm heat transfer capacity.

TABLE 9.3-1 SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS DESIGN BASIS PARAMETERS Shutdown Cooling Mode (27.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after Recirculation Mode Tube Side shutdown) (after LOCA)

Flow, gpm 3000 1350 Heat Load, Million Btu/hr 31 32 Shutdown Cooling Mode (27.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after Recirculation Mode Shell Side shutdown) (after LOCA)

Flow, gpm 3500 2000 Heat Load, Million Btu/hr 31 32 e: The above flow and heat loads are the minimum required to ensure adequate heat removal ng shutdown cooling and post-LOCA recirculation modes.

TABLE 9.3-2 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS Shutdown Cooling System Startup Approximately 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown or trip Suction Piping Design Pressure, psig 300 Discharge Piping Design Pressure, psig 500 Design Temperature, F 350 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Rate, F/hr 75 Refueling Temperature, F 130 Material - Piping and Valves Austenitic Stainless Steel

1 DESIGN BASES 1.1 Functional Requirements function of the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system is to transfer heat m safety related structures, systems, and components to an ultimate heat sink. The RBCCW em safety function is to transfer the combined heat load of these structures, system and ponents under normal operating and loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) conditions.

1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the RBCCW system:

a. The system shall have two independent redundant subsystems having 100 percent heat removal capacity following a LOCA.
b. The system shall have suitable subsystem and component alignments to assure operation of the complete subsystem with associated components.
c. Capabilities shall be provided to assure the system operation with either on site power (assuming off site power is not available) or with off site power.
d. A single failure in either subsystem shall not affect the functional capability of the other subsystem.
e. The RBCCW system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as RBCCW pumps, heat exchangers, valves and piping to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
f. The RBCCW system shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic pressure and functional testing to assure: (1) the structural and leaktight integrity of its components; (2) the operability and performance of the active components of the system; and, (3) the operability of the system as a whole. Under conditions as close to the design as practical, performance of the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, and the transfer between normal and emergency power sources, shall be demonstrated.
g. The system shall be designed to the general criteria as described in Section 6.1.
h. The RBCCW system shall be an intermediate barrier between the service water (seawater) system and the radioactive or potentially radioactive fluids contained in the systems and components being cooled by the RBCCW system.
j. The RBCCW system shall be evaluated to assure that it maintains structural integrity and pressure boundary for the postulated water hammer loading transient resulting from concurrent occurrences of a Design Basis LOCA event (i.e., LOCA or MSLB) with Loss of Normal Power event (i.e., LNP) as described in NRC Generic Letter GL 96-06. The structural design of piping and supporting components shall accommodate the aforementioned water hammer loading transient, with other applicable concurrent loads, so that continued function of the system is assured to mitigate the consequences of the aforementioned accident.
k. The CAR and CEDM Cooler units shall be evaluated to assure the integrity of the pressure boundary and structural adequacy for the GL 96-06 based water hammer loading condition.
l. The RBCCW supply temperature shall not exceed 85F in Modes 1, 2 and 3.

2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 System RBCCW system is shown schematically in Figures 9.4-1 through 9.4-6. The logic diagram is wn in Figure 7.3-1.

RBCCW system consists of two independent headers, each including one motor-driven CCW pump, one RBCCW heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, trols and a downcomer from the RBCCW surge tank. A third RBCCW pump and heat hanger is provided as a spare for the system.

undant safety feature components, cooled by the RBCCW system, are split between the two pendent RBCCW headers. The other systems and components cooled by the RBCCW system divided between the RBCCW headers to equalize header heat loads.

items cooled by the RBCCW system are listed in the following. Further information about h may be found in the section referenced in the parentheses.

Containment air recirculation and cooling units (Section 6.5)

Reactor vessel support cooling coils (Section 6.5.4.1)

Containment spray pump seal coolers (Section 6.4)

High and low pressure safety injection pump seal coolers (Section 6.3)

Shutdown cooling heat exchangers (Section 6.4, 6.3)

Engineered safety features room air recirculation and cooling units (Section 9.9.7)

Primary drain and quench tank heat exchanger (Section 11.1)

CEDM coolers (Section 9.9.1)

Letdown heat exchanger (Section 9.2)

Degasifier effluent cooler (Section 11.1)

Degasifier vent condenser Sample coolers (Section 9.6.2.1)

Spent fuel pool heat exchangers (Section 9.5)

Waste gas compressor aftercoolers Quench tank heat exchanger (Section 10.4.6) h RBCCW pump is designed to circulate 7000 gpm of water through the RBCCW system for oving heat from systems and components that handle the reactor coolant, containment osphere and engineered safety features. The RBCCW is cooled in the RBCCW heat hangers by the service water (seawater) (Section 9.7.2.2.1).

RBCCW System is designed to provide cooling for the following system operating ditions:

Normal Operation 3.5 Hours after Shutdown 27.5 Hours after Shutdown Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Injection Operation LOCA Recirculation Operation tem hydraulic analysis and flow balancing were performed to ensure that the minimum uired flows can be provided to essential safety related loads for the above operating conditions.

flow balance was field tested to demonstrate that when the safety injection actuation signal AS) and the sump recirculation actuation signal (SRAS) automatically realigns the system, the imum required flows will be provided to the essential safety related loads during LOCA ction operation (condition IV) and LOCA recirculation operation (condition V). Table 9.4-3 tifies the minimum required flows for these two post-accident operating conditions.

RBCCW pump and heat exchanger design is based on requirements during normal operation, mal shutdown cooling and a LOCA. This results in a design which provides an adequate ling capacity for normal and emergency conditions, including reactor shutdown.

lower half of the RBCCW surge tank is divided into two equal sections by a vertical weir. If of the two independent RBCCW headers ruptures, the vertical weir in the RBCCW surge tank res that 1000 gallons of makeup water will be available to the functional header.

mineralized water is used for makeup and comes from the primary water storage tank ction 9.12). A flow orifice is located in each surge tank discharge header downstream of the et isolation valves to dampen pressure surges that result from cold starts of the RBCCW ps that could occur following an LNP scenario.

keup water supplied to the RBCCW surge tank enters from the top of the surge tank at two tions on either side of the weir, therefore, makeup water can be supplied to both sections of tank. To stop the flow of water to the failed header, manual valves can be closed.

following instrumentation and alarms located on the main control board give sufficient rmation to assure the operator that makeup water is being supplied to the RBCCW surge tank ion supplying the functional header:

1. Position lights ZS-6000 on makeup valve LV-6000 indicate whether the valve is open or closed. A timed alarm ZAH-6000 indicates that the valve has been open longer than required for normal makeup.
2. Level controller LC-6000 controls 6 inches above the weir, so regardless of which side fails, the controller will keep the makeup water valve LV-6000 open until the failed header is repaired or until the valve is closed by the hand switch HS-6000 or by using manual valves.
3. Level indicators LI-6001 and LI-6730 indicate the water level in each of the two sections of the surge tank. Alarm LAHL-6892 indicates high and low water level in the surge tank.

valves, piping, instrumentation and alarms described above are shown on Figure 9.4-1.

rosion inhibitor can be injected into the RBCCW system to increase the optimal concentration ng normal operation, as required.

ernal leaks, relief valve discharges and drains are collected by the drains system and processed ugh the radioactive waste processing system. Leakage into the RBCCW system can be rmined by a radiation monitor installed on the discharge of the RBCCW pumps.

RBCCW system components located in the containment building are subject to a maximum perature of 289F and a maximum relative humidity of 100 percent during post-incident ration. The RBCCW system components located in the auxiliary building are subject to a perature of 110F and a maximum relative humidity of 100 percent. The RBCCW pumps and ors are subjected to a maximum temperature of 155F after a LOCA.

mponents and heat exchangers served by the RBCCW system, which can be isolated are ipped with self-actuated, spring-loaded relief valves for overpressure protection.

2.2 Components escription of the major RBCCW system components is given in Table 9.4-1.

3 SYSTEM OPERATION 3.1 Normal Operation ing normal operation, RBCCW is supplied to the components described in Section 9.4.2.1 h the exception of the shutdown heat exchangers and the engineered safety features room air rculation and cooling units.

o RBCCW pumps and two RBCCW heat exchangers are required for cooling service during mal operation. The heat load per RBCCW heat exchanger during normal operation is 16.8 x Btu/hr (header A) and 23.4 x 106 Btu/hr (header B) and the RBCCW discharge perature is 85F when the RBCCW heat exchangers are cooled by service water up to imum temperature of 80F.

operation of the RBCCW system is monitored with the following instrumentation:

a. A temperature detector in the inlet and outlet line of the RBCCWS heat exchangers and temperature alarms in the outlet lines.
b. Pressure indicators in the lines between the pumps and the RBCCWS heat exchangers.
c. Level alarms and a controller on the surge tank.
d. Temperature detectors located on the outlet lines of the components being cooled.
e. Flow indicators and high flow alarms in both headers on the discharge side of the RBCCW heat exchangers.
f. Low pressure alarm in both headers on the discharge side of the RBCCW heat exchanger.
g. Hand switches and indicating lights for the pumps and remotely operated control valves.

owing a LOCA, the RBCCW system is automatically aligned for post-incident cooling by the ty injection actuation signal (Section 7.3), the containment isolation actuation signal ction 7.3) and the sump recirculation actuation signal (Section 7.3). The SIAS and CIAS ates valves to stop the RBCCW flow to components not required during a LOCA and to ate RBCCW flow to the engineered safety features room air recirculation and cooling units.

SRAS signal will open the RBCCW shutdown heat exchanger outlet valves. Prior to the AS signal, the RBCCW shutdown heat exchanger outlet valves have a safety function to ain closed (during the injection phase of a LOCA) to ensure adequate RBCCW flow is cted to the CAR coolers. The RBCCW is also supplied to the HPSI, LPSI and containment y pump seal coolers.

RBCCW system operation during a LOCA uses two RBCCW pumps, two RBCCW heat hangers and two headers for LOCA cooling. If one RBCCW header is lost, one RBCCW p, heat exchanger and one header can provide adequate cooling.

culations provide the basis for the FSAR Section 14.8.2 Containment Pressurization Analysis.

maximize the containment pressurization consequences following a MSLB or LOCA accident, e analyses minimize the energy removed from containment by the CAR cooling units and the C heat exchangers. This is accomplished by assuming design fouling of the CAR cooling s, the SDC heat exchanger, and the RBCCW to Service Water heat exchangers, and minimum CCW flow distributions assuming degraded RBCCW pumps. Prior to the sump recirculation AS), two CAR cooling units transfer a maximum of 160 million BTU/hour of energy to the CCW system. Following SRAS, two CAR cooling units transfer a maximum of 70 million U/hr and the SDC heat exchanger transfers a maximum of 47 million BTU/hour of energy to RBCCW System.

RBCCW peak temperature analysis, which maximizes the RBCCW temperatures by ming clean CAR cooling units and SDC heat exchangers, with maximum RBCCW flow ributions was performed to evaluate the system design capability.

ed on the RBCCW peak temperature analysis, the maximum RBCCW heat load from the two tainment air recirculation and cooling units plus the balance of plant components is 204.4 x Btu/hr during the injection mode following a LOCA. During the recirculation mode following OCA the maximum calculated heat load of 130.7 x 106 Btu/hr is transferred to the RBCCW em through the containment air recirculation and cooling units, the shutdown heat exchanger the balance of plant components. The design heat removal capacity of the RBCCW heat hanger is 160 x 106 Btu/hr during the injection mode, but calculations demonstrate that the t exchangers can adequately handle the 204.4 x 106 Btu/hr heat load.

RBCCW peak temperature analysis calculated the maximum system supply temperatures ed on maximum RBCCW flow distribution values, clean CAR coolers and SDC heat hangers, and fouled (design) RBCCW heat exchangers. The component maximum outlet peratures were then determined based on design heat loads. The system components and

plied to the components during a LOCA/MSLB with LNP (GL 96-06 scenario), and sidering no fouling in the CAR Cooler units is less than 149F.

following is a list of essential components cooled by the RBCCW System during a LOCA:

Containment Air Recirculation And Cooling Units Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers Engineered Safety Features Room Air Cooling Coils High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Seal Coolers Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump Seal Coolers Containment Spray Pump Seal Coolers nonessential components which are on line after a LOCA are the waste gas compressors, mary drain and quench tank cooler, CEDM coolers, Reactor vessel support concrete cooling s, reactor coolant pump thermal barriers and lube oil coolers, and degasifier vent condenser.

er SRAS all the nonessential components except for the waste gas compressors and degasifier t condenser shall be off the line. However, the spent fuel pool heat exchanger will be returned ervice within 4 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the start of the LOCA. The Primary Sample Coolers may also eturned to service as necessary to support PASS cooling.

ailure mode analysis is given in FSAR Table 9.4-2 which describes how leaks and functions are detected and what corrective actions must be taken to insure that the safety ctions performed by the RBCCW System are not impaired. Once the operator has detected a or malfunction, the operator will isolate the equipment for repair maintenance if ironmental conditions permit operation of manual valves. If environmental conditions do not mit isolation of the equipment, the entire header may be isolated remotely from the main trol room. The safety functions of the RBCCW system can be performed with only one header peration. If the leak or malfunction involves the RBCCW pump and heat exchanger, the pump heat exchanger can be isolated remotely from the main control room. Also, equipment in the tainment can be isolated remotely in the main control room by closing the containment ation valves.

ief valves, on the RBCCW supply and return headers serving the reactor Coolant Pumps gral heat exchangers, ensure that the RBCCW containment isolation valves, on these headers, be closed during an intersystem LOCA, by ensuring that the valves will not be rpressurized to the point that the valve motors cannot close the valves. The relief valves, ch have a set pressure of 165 psig may open upon a rupture of an integral heat exchanger tube eyond design basis event). This is required in response to NRC IN 89-54 to preclude an olable release of radioactive fluid outside of the containment that may exceed 10 CFR 100 ts.

RBCCW system, consisting of two independent headers, is at a higher pressure than the ice water system during normal operations to prevent service water leaking into the RBCCW em. The only time that the RBCCW system pressure will be lower than the service water em is (1) during shutdown for routine maintenance, (2) if the RBCCW pumps malfunction or if there is a major RBCCW leak greater than 400 gpm. Loss of RBCCW system pressure is cated by low pressure alarms (PAL-6036 & PAL-6037) located in the RBCCW heat hanger discharge headers. Once the operator has observed the low pressure alarm, it will be ided whether this branch can be easily isolated; if this is not possible, the RBCCW header will aken out of service and at the same time the shell side of the RBCCW heat exchanger will be ated. Therefore, the possibility of service water leaking into the RBCCW heat exchanger is ote. If service water does leak into the RBCCW system during periods of low pressure, it will etected by manual sampling on a routine basis.

ce the RBCCW system is potentially capable of contaminating the service water system with oactivity due to leakage, a detection system is located within the RBCCW system.

RBCCW System is continuously monitored for radioactivity by using a self-contained ed-loop radiation monitoring system consisting of (1) a gamma NaI(T1) scintillation detector mbly, (2) a 4 inch schedule 40 stainless steel sample chamber shielded with lead to reduce the ient background radiation level, (3) solid-state, control room readout module, (4) local meter cation with visual and audible alarms, and (5) auxiliary support equipment such as piping, es and recorder.

RBCCW sample is continuously taken from the RBCCW pump discharge and is circulated ugh the sample chamber and detector assembly. The sample returns to the RBCCW pump ion.

radioactivity present in the system is monitored by the gamma detector assembly, displayed recorded in the control room.

rm set points based on the limits established by 10 CFR Part 20, will result in alarm unciations in the control room and at the monitoring site.

3.3 Shutdown RBCCW system is required for continuous operation during normal unit shutdown cooling ction 6.3) beginning 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the start of unit shutdown. The RBCCW system supplies ling water to the shutdown heat exchangers to cool the reactor coolant from 300 to 130F in 24 rs.

ing normal shutdown, such as for refueling, two RBCCW pumps and two RBCCW heat hangers are used for cooling. The heat load per RBCCW heat exchanger is 84.1 x 106 Btu/hr

CCW heat exchanger discharge is less than 130F when the RBCCW heat exchangers are led by service water at a maximum temperature of 80F. At 27.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the start of Unit tdown, the heat load per RBCCW heat exchanger is reduced to 40.8 x 106 Btu/hr.

ne RBCCW heat exchanger or pump should malfunction, the spare can be immediately placed ervice, or the unit can be cooled down at a slower rate with one heat exchanger and one pump.

ing shutdown the operation of the RBCCW system is monitored as described in tion 9.4.3.1.

4 AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY 4.1 Special Features components of the RBCCW system are designed to general design requirements including mic response as described in Section 6.1. All components are protected from missile damage pipe whip from high pressure piping as described in Section 6.1.

ensure pump availability, each RBCCW pump motor is supplied from a specific 4160 volt bus.

buses may be powered from alternate sources (i.e., NSST, RSST, D/G, or via Unit 3 bus 34A 4B). In the event that reserve station service power is lost, the RBCCW pumps, required for ineered safety features systems cooling or normal shutdown cooling, are automatically plied by the emergency buses.

RBCCW pump motor is designed to withstand a maximum temperature of 155F during a CA and maximum relative humidity of 100 percent.

RBCCW system is provided with a radiation monitor to alarm if radioactive fluids leak into RBCCW.

ilure mode analysis is given in Table 9.4-2. A rupture in the system is considered an initiating nt only; it is not postulated concurrent with a LOCA (or any other Chapter 14 event). System undancy and header separation have been provided to maintain continuous cooling in the event single passive failure during post-accident long term cooling.

4.2 Tests and Inspection RBCCW pump was shop-tested for hydraulic performance. Seven test points were used to erate the performance curve which is shown in Figure 9.4-7.

h pump was hydrostatically tested at 375 psi, 1.5 times the design pressure of the pump.

destructive testing for the RBCCW heat exchangers were performed in accordance with the ME Code Section VIII.

a. Shell side gas test (inert gas) at 188 psig which is 1.25 times the design pressure.
b. Shell side hydrostatic test at 225 psig which is 1.5 times the design pressure.
c. Channels hydrostatic test at 250 psig which is twice the tube side design pressure.
d. Tubes, hydrostatic test at 150 psig, which is 1.2 times the tube side design pressure.

h component is inspected and cleaned prior to installing it in the system. Following allation, the RBCCW system undergoes a preoperational test before startup. The detail test cedure is described in Section 13.

ruments are calibrated during testing and the automatic controls are tested for actuation at the per set points. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during preoperational ing.

ially the system was operated and tested with regard to flow paths, flow capacity and hanical operability. At least one pump was tested online to demonstrate head and capacity ction 13).

a are taken periodically during normal operation to confirm the heat transfer capabilities.

or components of the system such as pumps, tanks, and heat exchangers are accessible for odic inspection during operation.

RBCCW system and components are periodically tested to demonstrate the operability, ormance, structural and leaktight integrity of the system and components. The testing is omplished as follows:

a. During normal operation the RBCCW system components and piping are constantly pressurized by the RBCCW pump, therefore, they are constantly being tested for structural and leaktight integrity.

The operability and performance of all components except the engineered safety features room air recirculation and cooling units, the shutdown cooling heat exchanger, the spare RBCCW pump and the spare RBCCW heat exchanger is determined by observing the temperature, pressure and flow instrumentation associated with each component.

Online testing of the spare RBCCW component(s) (pump and/or heat exchanger) is performed by bringing the spare component(s) to be tested into operation while removing the operating component(s) from service. The operation and

Online testing of the remotely operated valves actuated by SIAS signals and located on the discharge side of the containment air recirculation and cooling units, the spent fuel pool heat exchangers, the safeguards room air cooler units and the degasifier effluent cooler is performed by operating each valves manual control switch. The position of the valves is verified by position indication lights in the control room. Testing these valves during power operation by initiating SIAS signals is not performed as it results in unnecessary starting of the emergency diesel generators and causes RBCCW system flow transients which operators must respond to.

Online testing of the other remotely operated valves actuated by SRAS is performed by closing the appropriate manual valves and by manually initiating the SRAS signals for the valves on the discharge side of the shutdown heat exchangers. The position of the valves is verified by position indicated lights in the control room.

b. During shutdown the operability and performance of the RBCCW components and the RBCCW system as a whole is determined by observing the flow, pressure and temperature instrumentation.
c. After normal unit shutdown for refueling, the applicable portion of the RBCCW system used for engineered safety feature systems cooling is tested by actuating SIAS and SRAS signals to demonstrate operability and position of valves on a per facility basis. Structural and leaktight integrity of the system is tested separately as part of the Unit 2 Inservice Inspection Program.

RBCCW containment isolation valves for the supply and return lines for the Containment Air irculation and Cooling heat exchangers have T-Ring seats. In lieu of test results under CFR 50, Appendix J, Type C testing, the T-Ring seats will be replaced based on observed radation. These valves are not included in the Type C testing program because the valves are n during accident conditions. This eliminates a commitment made under letter A06107, dated 6/87 under Docket Number 50-336.

5 CODE STRUCTURAL QUALIFICATION code of record for the RBCCW piping system is USAS B31.1-1967. The portion of piping in containment penetration area is designated as ANSI B31.7, Class 2.

piping and support components are designed for the design basis loads for the appropriate combinations and criteria. The original code qualification was performed for the following conditions and effects: (a) internal pressure, (b) dead weight, (c) thermal expansion at imum temperatures, (d) OBE inertia loads, (e) DBE inertia loads, and (f) seismic anchor vements for OBE and DBE, as applicable. The system and components are evaluated for the

postulated LOCA induced dynamic water hammer loads based on the scenario described in 96-06 is classified as Faulted Plant Occasional Mechanical Load because LOCA is a ulted Plant Condition. Although not part of the original design basis, this load is recognized design basis load.

acceptance criteria for piping is based on maintaining the combined primary stress due to current dead weight, internal pressure and dynamic LOCA/water hammer transient within the erial yield stress of piping at operating temperature. The acceptance criteria for design fication of support components corresponds to conservative Emergency stress limits (i.e.,

ME Level C Limits) as follows, with a minor exception as noted in item b: (a) structural steel ments-within 90% of yield per AISC Code (b) vendor supplied components Load Capacity per d Capacity Data Sheets (LCD) Level C, except those supports which are not protecting the ty related function of the RBCCW system in the post-accident scenario may be evaluated g LCD Level D (c) anchor bolts safety factors shall be 4 for Wedge type (e.g., HILTI KWIK LT) and 5 for shell type (e.g., Phillips Red Head) consistent with NRC I.E. Bulletin 79-02.

LOCA/water hammer is analyzed using dynamic time history analysis method. The time ory forcing functions applicable to various segments of RBCCW piping are determined by iled thermal hydraulic analysis of the system using RELAP 5/Mod 3.2 computer code.

TABLE 9.4-1 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM COMPONENTS CCW PUMP nufacturer Ingersoll-Rand del 12 x 14 SD e Centrifugal, horizontal split case, dual volute with mechanical seals ntity 3 acity each (gpm) 7000 d (feet) 150 p (rpm) 1750 P 312 SH required/available (feet) 23/80 erial Case ASTM A48 Gr 30 Impeller ASTM B143 Alloy 2A Shaft AISI-C1045 tor 350 hp, 400 volt, 60 Hz, 3 phase, 1750 rpm es Motor: NEMA Pump: Standards of the Hydraulic, Institute ANSI B 16.1, ANSI B 31.1 mic Class I CCW HEAT EXCHANGER nufacturer Struthers Nuclear del Horizontal, single-pass, counter-flow straight tubes rolled into tube sheets e TEMA Type AEL ntity 3

Design duty each (Btu/hr) 3 x 106 - normal 36.0 x 106 - 27.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after shutdown 5 x 106 - 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after 160.0 x 106 - loss-of-coolant shutdown Design Overall fouling factor 0.0008 Design pressure (psig) Shell side 150; tube side 125 Design temperature (F) Shell side 250; tube side 120 erial Shell ASTM-A-285-Gr C Tubes Aluminum brass ASME SB-111 Alloy 687 Tube sheets Aluminum bronze ASME SB-171- CDA614 Channel Nickel Copper, UNS N04400, unlined mic Class 1 e TEMA Class R, ASME Section VIII CCW SURGE TANK nufacturer PX Engineering e Vertical with vertical weir divider in lower half of the tank ntity 1 ign pressure (psig) 15 ign temperature (F) 250 ume (gal) 4480 erial Shell ASTM A 285-Gr C Dished head ASTM A 285-Gr C mic Class I e ASME Section VIII

e:

Size - 12 inch and larger Wall Thickness - 0.375 Size - 2.5 inch through 10 inch Wall Thickness - Schedule 40 Size - 2.5 and smaller Wall Thickness - Schedule 80 Material Seamless ASTM-A53-B Code ANSI B31.1.0 plus Random Radiography of Butt Weld Base Material Identification Seismic Analysis ANSI B31.7, Class II Containment Penetration.

Joints Welded except at flanged equipment connections and butterfly valves.

ings inches and larger Butt welding, ASTM A-234 WPB or WPB-W, wall thickness to match pipe.

inches and smaller 3000 lb. socket welding, ASTM A-181, Gr. I Mod nges lb ANSI Std. F&D ASTM A-181 Gr. II (original construction) or ASTM A-105.

TM A-181 12 inches and larger Slip-on, RF 2.5 inches through 10 inches Weld neck, RF 2 inches and smaller Socket Weld, RF ting: Bolt-studs, ASTM A-193 B-7 Hex nuts, heavy steel, ASTM A-194 2H.

ves 2 inches and smaller 800 lb. ANSI, socket weld, carbon steel*

2.5 inches and larger 150 lb. ANSI, butt weld, carbon steel (except butterfly valves)

Non-nuclear Butterfly valves 150 lb., wafer, cast iron Nuclear Butterfly 150 lb, wafer, carbon steel

Valves Code ASME Section III, Nuclear Power Plant Components, Class II Seismic Class Intersystem LOCA relief valves 6 inch x 10 inch, ANSI Class 300, RF, carbon steel, ASME Section VIII 2 inch and smaller Socket-Welding Ends valves were originally specified as an ANSI 600 lb rating. The pressure temperature rating class of valves replaced in accordance with the Dominion Design Control Process is determined based on the design conditions of the application in accordance with applicable Construction Code requirements. Therefore, the pressure temperature rating class of installed replacement valves may be higher or lower than 800 lb, based on the design conditions of the specific application.

TABLE 9.4-2 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION METHOD OF DETECTION AND DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON RESULTANT FAILURE MODE CORRECTIVE ACTION REMARKS AND QUANTITY MONITOR SYSTEM SYSTEM STATUS RBCCW Return Header (2) a. Break equivalent to 0.5 inch Makeup valve opens alarm for a a. Loss of water equivalent to Isolate failed header One header and its Header out of service for repairs; 0.5 inch diameter line and b. Surge tank low level alarm makeup capacity components out of one header sufficient for safe Revision 4106/29/23 for a and b. service; Alternate shutdowns header in operation

b. Large break Low pressure alarm for b. All CRI b. Loss of one header Piston-Operated Valve (6) Fails, as is Position indication CRI None Valve operator repaired Normal operation Valve can be manually operated HV6002 through HV6007 RBCCW pump Suction Header a. Break equivalent to 1.5 inch Makeup valve opens alarm and a. Loss of water equivalent to Failed header isolated; Normal operation Suction and discharge header and (2) diameter line sump high level alarm for a and b. makeup capacity standby pump and header associated pump out of service Surge tank low level alarm for a put for repairs and b.

RBCCW pump Discharge b. Large break Low pressure alarm for b. All CRI b. Loss of one header Header (2)

RBCCW Pump (3) Pump stops Header low pressure alarm; Loss of flow in one header Isolate pump; put standby Normal operation Pump out of service for repairs standby pump starts alarm; both pump in service; valve CRI lined up RBCCW Heat Exchanger Sup- a. Break equivalent to 1.5 inch Makeup valve opens alarm and Loss of water equivalent to makeup Failed header isolated; Normal operation Header out of service for repair ply Header (3) diameter line sump high level alarm for a and b. capacity standby pump and headers Surge tank low level alarm for a put in service and b RBCCW Heat Exchanger Dis- b. Large break Low pressure alarm for b. All CRI Loss of one header charge Header (3)

RBCCW Heat Exchanger (3) a. Shellside rupture; b. Tube rup- Sump level alarm for a. Header Loss of water in one header Failed heat exchanger iso- Normal operation Heat exchanger out of service for ture low pressure alarm; Surge tank lated; standby put into ser- repairs MPS-2 FSAR low level alarm; Makeup valve vice opens alarm for a and b. All CRI Piston-Operated Valve (8) Fails, as-is Position indication None Valve operator repaired Normal operation Valve can be operated manually HV6011 through NV6018 RBCCWS Supply Header (2) a. Break equivalent to 1.5 inch Makeup valve opens alarm for a a. Loss of water equivalent to Isolate failed header One header and Header our of service for repairs; diameter line and b Surge tank low level for a makeup capacity equipment out of ser- one sufficient for safe shutdown and b vice; alternate header in normal operation

b. Large break High pressure alarm for b. b. Loss of one header All CRI Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger a. Shell side rupture a. Surge tank low level alarm and a. Loss of water from half of system a. Isolate failed heat a. Redundant heat a, b. Heat exchanger out of ser-(2) makeup valve opens alarm exchanger exchanger available vice for repairs
b. Tube rupture b. High radiation alarm, CRI b. Radioactivity in header b. Isolate heat exchanger b. Header out of ser- b. Drain header and vice 9.4-17

TABLE 9.4-2 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS (CONTINUED)

COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION METHOD OF DETECTION AND DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON RESULTANT FAILURE MODE CORRECTIVE ACTION REMARKS AND QUANTITY MONITOR SYSTEM SYSTEM STATUS Piston-Operated Valve (2) Fail closed Position indication None Valve operator repaired Normal operation Valve can be operated manually HV6315, HV6316 Shutdown Heat Exchanger (2) During shutdown: Revision 4106/29/23

a. Shell side rupture a. Surge tank low level alarm and a. Loss of water from half of system a. Isolated failed heat Normal shutdown a, b. Redundant heat exchanger makeup valve opens alarm exchanger operation at reduced out of service for repairs; shut-rate down heat exchangers not in use
b. Tube rupture b. Radiation monitor. Both CRI b. Radioactivity in header b. Isolate heat exchanger during normal operation and header Piston-Operated Valve (2) Fails open Position indication None Valve operator repaired Normal operation Valve can be operated manually HV6050, HV6055 HPSI Pump Seal (3) Loss of water less than makeup sys- HPSI pump isolated Normal operation Pump out of service for repairs.

tem water Pumps not in use during normal operation

a. Out leakage Seal rupture: a. Makeup valve open alarm; sump pump alarm in engineered safety fea-tures room
b. In leakage b. High RBCCW outlet tempera-ture alarm and surge tank high level alarm. All CRI LPSI Pump Seal (2) Seal rupture: Loss of water less than makeup sys- LPSI pump isolated Normal operation Pump out of service for repairs; tem water pumps not in operation during normal operation
a. Out leakage a. Makeup valve opens alarm and sump pump alarm in engineered safety features room MPS-2 FSAR
b. In leakage b. High RBCCW outlet tempera-ture alarm and surge tank high level alarm. All CRI Containment Spray Pump Seal Seal rupture: Loss of water less than makeup sys- Pump isolated Normal operation Pump out of service for repair; (2) tem water pump not in service during nor-mal operation
a. Out leakage a. Makeup valve opens alarm and sump pump alarm in engineered safety features room
b. In leakage b. High RBCCW outlet tempera-ture alarm and surge tank high level alarm. All CRI Sample Cooler (7) Shell side rupture Surge tank low level alarm and Loss of water from header B. Cooler isolated No sample Cooler not available until makeup valve opens alarm. Both repaired.

CRI 9.4-18

TABLE 9.4-2 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS (CONTINUED)

COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION METHOD OF DETECTION AND DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON RESULTANT FAILURE MODE CORRECTIVE ACTION REMARKS AND QUANTITY MONITOR SYSTEM SYSTEM STATUS Letdown Heat Exchanger (1) a. Shell side a. Surge tank low level alarm a. Loss of water from header B a. Heat exchanger isolated a, b. No letdown a, b. Letdown heat exchanger out makeup valve opens alarm; possi- of service until repaired ble high temperature in letdown line Revision 4106/29/23

b. Tube side b. Surge tank high level alarm and b. Radioactivity in header B b. Isolate heat exchanger b. Drain header high radiation monitor alarm. All and header CRI Control Valve (1) 2-RB-402 Fails close Position indication; CRI; Abnor- None Valve operator repaired Normal operation mally low letdown temperature Piston-Operated Valve (4) Fails open Position and flow indications, both None Valve operator repaired Normal operation Valves can be operated manually HV6072, HV6073, HV6075, CRI HV6077 Containment Air Cooler (4) Tube side Surge tank low level alarm; Loss of water from one half of sys- Failed cooler isolated Normal operation Failed cooler out of service for makeup valve opens alarm; low tem repairs; only 3 units needed for flow indication, all CRI normal operation Piston-Operated Valve (8) Fails open Position and flow indications, both None Valve operator repaired Normal operation Valves may be operated manually HV6079, HV6080, HV6083, CRI HV6084, HV6087, HV6088, HV6091, HV6092 Motor-Operated Valve (2) Fails as is Position indication, CRI None Valve operator repaired Normal operation Valves may be operated manually HV6095, HV6096 Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal a. Rupture of thermal barrier a. High radiation alarm and high a. Partial loss of reactor coolant a. Isolated failed cooler a. One header out of Reactor coolant pump out of ser-Barrier and Oil Cooler (4) temperature cooling water alarm and header service vice until cooler repaired
b. Rupture of oil cooler tube side b. Low oil level alarm and low oil b. Oil in system b, c. Failed cooler isolated b, c. Reactor coolant pressure indication pump out of service MPS-2 FSAR
c. Rupture of oil cooler shell side c. Makeup valve opens alarm; low c. Loss of water equivalent to flow alarm; all CRI makeup capacity Reactor Vessel Support Cooling a. Coil plugs up a. Low flow alarm a. Partial loss of cooling capacity Failed cooler isolated Normal operation Coil out of service for repair Coils (3) redundant independent coil on other open valves to header
b. Coil connection ruptures b. Low flow alarm and makeup b. Loss of water from header valve open alarms; all CRI CEA Drive Air Cooler (2) Tube side Air temperature indicators; Loss of water in header Failed cooler isolated Normal operation One redundant cooler out of ser-makeup valve opens alarm; both vice for repair CRI Primary Drain Tank and Quench a. Shell side rupture Surge tank level alarm and makeup Loss of water from header A Isolate heat exchanger Heat exchanger out Tank Heat Exchanger (1) valve open alarm for a and b of service until repaired
b. Tube rupture 9.4-19

TABLE 9.4-2 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS (CONTINUED)

COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION METHOD OF DETECTION AND DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON RESULTANT FAILURE MODE CORRECTIVE ACTION REMARKS AND QUANTITY MONITOR SYSTEM SYSTEM STATUS Diaphragm operated Valve (1) Fails open Position indication; CRI None Repair operator Normal operation Valve can be manually operated HV6118 Motor Operated Valve (2) Fails as is Position indication; CRI None None; operator repaired Normal operation Valve can be manually operated HV6108, HV6106 during shutdown Revision 4106/29/23 RBCCW Surge Tank (1) Rupture Surge tank low level alarm and Loss of water Isolate tank Normal operation Surge tank out of service until makeup valve open alarm repaired Diaphragm-Operated Valve (1), Fails open Position indication; CRI Loss of water Isolate valve Normal operation Manual makeup until repaired LV6000 Degasifier Efficient Cooler (1) a. Shell side rupture Surge tank low level alarm; Loss of water from header B Isolate cooler Cooler out of ser-makeup valve open alarms for a vice until repaired and b. All CRI

b. Tube side rupture Piston-Operated Valve (1) Fail closed Position indication; CRI Loss of degasifier efficient cooler Valve operator repaired Normal operation Valve can be manually operated HV6739 and letdown heat exchanger Degasifier Vent (1) Condenser a. Tube side rupture Surge tank low level alarm and Loss of water from header B Isolate vent condenser Vent condenser out makeup valve open alarm for a and of service until
b. All CRI repaired
b. Shell side rupture Diaphragm Operated Valve (1) Fail open Visual None Valve operator repaired Normal operation HV9309 Waste Gas Compressors (2) a. Shell side Surge tank low level alarm and Loss of water from header A Isolate waste gas com- One redundant com- Compressor out of service for (after cooler) makeup valve open alarm; all CRI pressors pressor available repairs
b. Tube side rupture Engineered Safety Features Tube side rupture Surge tank low level alarm, Loss of water from header Isolate coils Coil out of service Coil not required during normal Room Air Recirculation and makeup valve open alarm and low for repairs operation MPS-2 FSAR Cooling Units (2) flow indication; all CRI Quench Tank Heat Exchanger Tube side rupture Surge tank low level alarm, Loss of water from header A Isolate heat exchanger Heat exchanger out makeup valve opens alarm; all CRI of service for repairs Inter system LOCA Relief Inadvertent opening Reduction in RBCCW inventory; Reduction in RBCCW inventory Isolate non-essential loop One header out of Relief valves are installed to mit-Valves surge tank low level alarm in containment; repair service igate a beyond design basis event valve and address NRC IN 89-54 9.4-20

TABLE 9.4-3 MINIMUM REQUIRED RBCCW FLOW TO ESSENTIAL SAFETY-RELATED LOADS LOCA INJECTION AND RECIRCULATION OPERATIONS Condition V LOCA LOCARecirculation Recirculation Condition IV (Spent Fuel Pool (Spent Fuel Pool Essential Load LOCA Injection Cooling Isolated) Cooling Restored)

(Train A Shown) Flow (gpm) (Flow gpm) Flow (gpm)

AR Cooler A 2000 1600 1400 AR Cooler C 2000 1600 1400 C Hx A Isolated 2000 1800 SI Pump Seal Cooler A 15 15 15 SI Pump Seal Cooler B 15 15 15 SI Pump Seal Cooler A 3 3 3 Pump Seal Cooler A 11 11 11 F Room Cooler A 59 59 59 P Cooler A Isolated Isolated 1100

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

EXCHANGERS figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

SAFETY INJECTION PUMP SEAL COOLERS figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

BARRIERS AND LUBE OIL COOLERS figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

AND COOLANT UNIT figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

CONCRETE COOLING COILS figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

PERFORMANCE CURVE 1 DESIGN BASES 1.1 Functional Requirements function of the spent fuel pool cooling system is to remove decay heat generated by spent fuel mblies stored in the pool by limiting the temperature of the borated pool water to an eptable level, thereby ensuring the cladding integrity of stored spent fuel assemblies. In order nsure that spent fuel pool water temperature limits and fuel integrity are maintained two erent refueling operations are analyzed: (1) Normal refueling involves movement of a imum of 80 fuel assemblies or the equivalent heat load from the reactor vessel to the spent pool, and (2) A full core offload of all 217 fuel assemblies from the reactor vessel to the spent pool. A full core offload comprises of an end-of-cycle full core offload or a mid-cycle rgency full core offload. In the event of a full core offload, the spent fuel pool water perature will be limited to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) limit of 150F. This ld utilize one train of the shutdown cooling system for the limiting emergency full core oad. Under less limiting full core offload conditions, the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system or nt Fuel Pool Cooling supplemented by the Shutdown Cooling system may be used, provided a Spent Fuel Pool temperature of less than 150F is maintained spent fuel pool cooling system is provided with a cleanup system for maintaining the purity clarity of water in the spent fuel pool, refueling pool and the refueling water storage tank after pletion of refueling operations. The cleanup systems limit operating personnel radiation osures from these sources by reducing the concentrations of radioactive constituents oduced into these waters.

1.2 Design Criteria spent fuel pool cooling system is designed in accordance with the following criteria:

a. The system shall be designed to ensure adequate decay heat removal capability under normal and postulated accident conditions.
b. The system shall be designed with the ability to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of components important to decay heat removal.
c. The system shall be provided with suitable shielding for radiation protection.
d. Reliable and frequently tested monitoring equipment to detect conditions that may result in loss of decay heat removal shall be provided.
e. The system shall be designed with an adequate spent fuel pool makeup system with appropriate provisions for a backup system for filling the pool.
g. Appropriate containment and cleanup system for spent fuel pool cooling water shall be provided.

2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 System spent fuel pool cooling system, shown in Figure 9.5-1 is designed to remove decay heat erated by stored spent fuel assemblies by circulating the borated pool water through a heat hanger unit consisting of two heat exchangers in parallel. Cooling water for the heat hangers is supplied by the RBCCWS as described in Section 9.4. The two motor-driven ps take suction from the spent fuel pool at elevation 35 feet 6 inches, one foot below the mal operating level of elevation 36 feet 6 inches and at elevation 13 feet 0 inches through the er suction line. The normal depth of the spent fuel pool is approximately 38.5 feet of water.

spent fuel pool cooling water is returned to the bottom of the pool through three headers ch penetrate the pool walls approximately one foot below the normal operating water level, on opposite side of the pool from the supply headers to provide convective circulation of the pool er through the stored fuel assemblies.

re is a make-up connection attached to the emergency make-up water line for a portable diesel en pump to deliver make-up water to the Spent Fuel Pool. This connection is a defense-in-th design feature that is available for coping with an extended loss of AC power (ELAP) nt. The location of the BDB SFP FLEX make-up connection is shown on Figure 9.5-1, Sheet mal Refueling (fuel shuffle) first design basis for the spent fuel pool cooling (SFPC) system is for normal refueling (fuel ffle). Fuel movement to the SFP is assumed to start between 110 and 160 hours0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> of decay, and ceeds at an average rate of 6 fuel assemblies per hour. The case analyzed is refueling at the end lant life to maximize fuel inventory and therefore decay heat of spent fuel in the SFP. Decay t calculations are performed with ORIGEN-ARP. This normal refueling, started at 160 hours0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br />, duces a maximum conservative heat loading of 14.52 x 106 BTU/hr. With both trains of SFPC ervice and 85F RBCCW spent fuel pool water temperature will be maintained to less than F.

ormal refueling with fuel movement starting after 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> of decay, and proceeding at an rage rate of 6 assemblies per hour over the refueling is acceptable as long as RBBCW perature is maintained at or below 75F. The resulting maximum conservative heat loading in spent fuel pool is 16.18 x 106 BTU/hr. In the event that more than 81 fuel assemblies need to moved to the spent fuel pool the evolution may still be defined as a Fuel Shuffle as long as the

h RBCCW temperature maintained at or below 75F the spent fuel pool cooling system can ntain the spent fuel pool temperature at approximately 125F with both pumps and heat hangers in service.

ngle active associated failure analysis of the spent fuel pool cooling system shows the limiting ure to be failure of RBCCW valve 2-RB-8.1A or 8.1B. Failure of either valve closed results in of cooling flow to the associated SFPC heat exchanger. This failure is more limiting than the of a SFPC pump. Failure of RBCCW valve 2-RB-8.1A or 8.1B in the closed position would lt in a SFP bulk water temperature greater than 150F but less than 200F, if the failure urred at maximum heat load. Should this limiting single failure occur, 1 train of the shutdown ling (SDC) system may be used to cool the SFP, or the SDC system may be used to plement the SFPC system. Used in this fashion, depending on heat load, between 0 to 1000 of SDC flow would be able to maintain SFP water temperature150F. See Section 9.3 for escription of the SDC. Since the SDC system will eventually be re-aligned for its ECCS uirements for Mode 4, the SFPC system must be capable of sustaining a single failure without stance from SDC upon entry into Mode 4. Analysis shows that once the SFP heat load drops 0.16 x 106BTU/HR, even if the limiting SFPC single failure occurs, the SFPC system will be to maintain SFP bulk water temperature 150F. At least 616 hours0.00713 days <br />0.171 hours <br />0.00102 weeks <br />2.34388e-4 months <br /> of being subcritical or a t load of 10.16 x 106 BTU/HR is required prior to re-entry into Mode 4 from a refueling age.

SFP Cooling and SDC parameters used in this analysis are:

Credited SFP cooling flow is 850 gpm per SFP cooling pump.

Credited RBCCW flow to each SFP cooling heat exchanger is 1100 gpm.

Credited RBCCW flow to SDC heat exchangers is 3500 gpm.

Credited RBCCW temperature to SFP and SDC heat exchangers is 75F for fuel movement starting after 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> of decay and 85F for fuel movement starting after 160 hours0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> of decay.

SFP and SDC heat exchangers have a 1% tube plugging penalty.

odic maintenance of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system and associated supporting systems is uired. During the performance of maintenance activities it may be necessary to remove system ponents and portions of various support systems from service. While these components and ems are out of service, the ability of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system to meet single failure eria will be limited. These maintenance activities do not conflict with system design or nsing basis. Suitable redundancy is ensured by the shutdown risk program.

ditions, 2 trains of SFP cooling are sufficient to maintain SFP bulk water temperature 150F.

ing refueling, for a fuel shuffle, under limiting postulated conditions, 1 train of SFP cooling need to be supplemented by Shutdown Cooling to maintain SFP bulk water temperature 50F. A single train of Shutdown Cooling is sufficient to remove all decay heat from both the tor vessel and the SFP. Eventually during refueling, 1 train of SFP cooling is sufficient to ntain SFP bulk water temperature150F. For the final refuel outage, this point is reached hours after shutdown or when the SFP heat load is at or below 10.16 x 106 BTU/HR, when 1 n of SFP cooling is sufficient to maintain SFP bulk water temperature150F.

Core Offload as Normal Refueling second design basis for the SFP cooling system is for a full core offload as normal refueling.

l movement to the SFP is assumed to start after 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> with a RBCCW temperature of less or equal to 75F or after 160 hours0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> with RBCCW temperature of less than or equal to 85F.

fuel movement is assumed to proceed at an average rate of 6 assemblies per hour until all 217 assemblies are in the SFP and the reactor vessel is empty of fuel. The case analyzed is the l core offload at the end of plant life to maximize the fuel inventory, and therefore decay heat, pent fuel in the pool. At end of plant life, decay heat removal is needed for a total of 1343 fuel mblies and 3 consolidated fuel storage boxes. The number of fuel assemblies analyzed in the t load analysis bounds the number of fuel assemblies which can be physically stored in the

. Decay heat calculations are performed with ORIGEN-ARP.

last full core offload at end of plant life, calculated in the above manner, produces a imum conservative heat loading of 34.59 MBTU/hr with a 110 hour0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> core hold time and duces 30.90 MBTU/hr with a 160 hour0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> core hold time. With 1 train of SDC available during core offload to cool both the reactor vessel and the core, spent fuel pool water temperature will maintained to less than F.

ing the refueling evolution, cooling is transitioned from the spent fuel pool cooling system to shutdown cooling system when the temperature in the spent fuel pool is observed to rise. This sition begins before challenging the conservatively established normal operating pool perature limit of 120°F.

train of SDC is assumed to be capable of delivering 3000 gpm, however the split of SDC going to the reactor vessel, or cooling the SFP will change during the core offload as the heat shifts from the core to the SFP. With this limiting heat load, at the start of the offload most of SDC flow will go to the reactor vessel (approximately 2000 gpm), with lesser SDC flow going he SFP (approximately 1000 gpm). By the end of the offload most of the SDC flow will go to SFP (up to 1900 gpm), with lesser SDC flow going to the reactor vessel (>1000 gpm). See tion 9.3 for a description of the SDC system.

SDC parameters used in this analysis are:

Credited RBCCW flow to SDC heat exchangers is 3500 gpm.

Credited RBCCW temperature to SDC heat exchangers is 75F for fuel movement starting after 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> of decay and 85F for fuel movement after 160 hours0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> of decay.

SFP and SDC heat exchangers have a 1% tube plugging penalty.

ile the above analysis is for the limiting heat load case at end of plant life, it is acceptable to SFP cooling, or SFP cooling supplemented by lesser amounts of SDC, during any portion of core offload, provided that spent fuel pool bulk water temperature can be maintained below F.

core offload as a normal activity is acceptable because there are 2 redundant trains of tdown Cooling (SDC). One train of SDC is sufficient to ensure that the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) be maintained at a bulk water temperature150F even with the entire core offloaded to the

. The other train of SDC is available as backup, should there be a failure in the operating SDC

n. In the event that maintenance activities during an outage cause the redundant train of SDC e unavailable, the Containment Spray (CS) pump has sufficient capacity (Design Temperature 00F and Design Head of 390 feet at 1600 GPM) in this circumstance to cool the SFP and to ure that SFP temperature is maintained 150F. The CS pump has no required function with core defueled. The CS pump supplemented by a SFP cooling train (if required) will be the ns of backup to SDC during SDC maintenance activities. Suitable redundancy is ensured per Shutdown Risk program.

refore, for a full core offload as normal refueling, the system is conservatively designed to ntain the water in the spent fuel pool water below 150F during all normal conditions or single ve failure conditions.

ergency Full Core Offload third design basis for the spent fuel pool cooling system is for an emergency full core offload.

l movement to the SFP is assumed to start after 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> with a RBCCW temperature of less or equal to 75F or after 160 hours0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> with RBCCW temperature of less than or equal to 85F.

fuel movement is assumed to proceed at an average rate of 6 assemblies per hour until all 217 assemblies are in the SFP and the reactor vessel is empty of fuel. The case analyzed is during final fuel cycle at end of plant life to maximize the fuel inventory, therefore decay heat, of nt fuel in the pool. At end of plant life, decay heat removal is needed for a total of 1343 fuel mblies and 3 consolidated fuel storage boxes. The number of fuel assemblies analyzed in the t load analysis bounds the number of fuel assemblies which can be physically stored in the nt fuel pool. Decay heat calculations are performed with ORIGEN-ARP. Significant servatism is used in the calculation of the decay heat values. A conservatively short decay e of 36 days is chosen for the previous batch of discharge fuel, and 400 days decay for the vious discharge batch, to maximize decay heat of fuel stored in the pool.

d time and produces 35.72 MBTU/hr with a 160 hour0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> core hold time. There is no single failure uirement for emergency core offload calculations, per our current licensing basis. With two ns of SDC available during the emergency core offload, approximately 1900 gpm of SDC flow vailable to cool the SFP during the entire core offload. With 1900 gpm of SDC flow available ool the SFP, the SFP water temperature will be maintained to less than 150F. See Section 9.3 a description of the SDC system.

SDC parameters used in this analysis are:

Credited SDC flow is 3000 gpm per LPSI pump, with a maximum of 1900 gpm diverted to cooling the SFP.

Two trains of SDC are assumed to be available.

Credited RBCCW flow to SDC heat exchangers is 3500 gpm.

Credited RBCCW temperature to SDC heat exchangers is 75F for fuel movement starting after 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> of decay and 85F for fuel movement after 160 hours0.00185 days <br />0.0444 hours <br />2.645503e-4 weeks <br />6.088e-5 months <br /> of decay.

SFP and SDC heat exchangers have a 1% tube plugging penalty.

ile the above analysis is for the limiting heat load case at end of plant life, it is acceptable to SFP cooling, or SFP cooling supplemented by lesser amounts of SDC, during any portion of emergency core offload, provided that SFP water can be maintained below 150F.

refore, for an emergency full core offload, the system is conservatively designed to maintain water in the SFP below 150F.

o since the emergency core offload represents the limiting heat load in the SFP, an additional lysis is performed to verify that the local water temperatures and local fuel cladding peratures were less than boiling. Results of that analysis show that at the maximum rgency core offload heat load, the maximum local SFP water temperature along the fuel mbly is less than 178F, and the maximum local fuel clad temperature is less than 234F.

se temperatures are below the local boiling temperature, at the top of the fuel assemblies, of F.

mal makeup to the spent fuel pool water inventory is supplied from the primary water storage at a rate of 50 gpm. The 50 gpm makeup capability is adequate to provide water at a rate ter than normal water loss due to evaporation and any system leakage. The maximum makeup ability of this permanently installed system is approximately 200 gpm. Backup makeup for the l is from the RWST by using one Refueling Pool Purification Pump to transfer the water at a of approximately 125 gpm. The RWST contents can also be transferred by the use of one I pump and the interconnecting piping between the spent fuel pool cooling system and tdown cooling system. A makeup capability of 3000 gpm for 15 minutes is possible from this

ined from the fire protection system by using temporary hose connections. Flow is at a rate of gpm.

leakage and drains from the spent fuel pool cooling system components are collected in the n drains system and processed as aerated liquid waste as described in Section 11.1.3. The imum system leakage for an extended period of time for which adequate processing by the S is possible is 50 gpm.

ficient monitoring equipment is provided to detect and alert operating personnel to conditions may result in loss of decay heat removal capability. Table 9.5-1 lists the monitoring ipment provided.

w-flow alarm will alert operating personnel that there is either a low pool water level or one oth cooling water pumps has failed to operate. Excessive radiation levels are detected by local radiation monitors as described in Section 7.5.6.

prevent significant reduction in the fuel storage cooling water inventory, all connections to the l penetrate the pool walls near the normal operating water level so that the pool cannot be vity drained by leaking pumps, valves, etc. The cooling water return piping which extends to pool bottom is provided with anti-siphon devices.

tion 5.4.3 describes the way the spent fuel pool has been designed to prevent cooling water entory loss. The spent fuel pool liner leak monitoring and detection system consists of a series hannels welded behind each seam of the pool liner. Any leakage through the pool liner seams ollected in the channels which are piped to the open drain system. The drain header contains a l switch which annunciates in the main control room to alert operating personnel to any age. The drain header is provided with valves to isolate the leak and is of a small pipe size inch) to prevent significant water loss prior to isolation. The location of the leaks in the pool r seams is accomplished by pressurizing the channels with air and observing air bubbles rising he pool water surface. Sections 5.4.3.1.9 and 9.8.4 describe the provisions incorporated in the ion design to preclude and/or limit the consequences of a dropped fuel shipping cask.

on concentration in the spent fuel pool water is maintained consistent with Technical cification requirements. The design of the spent fuel storage racks to preclude criticality and bases for the safe geometry are described in Section 9.8.2.

leanup system consisting of pumps, filters, and a demineralizer is provided to maintain the ty and clarity of the water in the spent fuel pool, refueling pool, and the RWST after pletion of reactor refueling operations. The cleanup system is designed to remove corrosion fission products introduced into these waters by leaking fuel assemblies and mixing with tor coolant during refueling operations. The purity and clarity of these waters are maintained imit operating personnel doses. The radiation levels are closely monitored during refueling rations to establish the allowable exposures times for personnel in accordance with CFR Part 20.

2.2 Components escription of the components of the spent fuel pool cooling system is given in Table 9.5-2.

3 SYSTEM OPERATION 3.1 Normal Operation ing normal operation of the pool, both pumps and heat exchangers are in continuous service.

the decay heat generated by the spent fuel decreases, one pump is stopped. As the decay heat her decreases, operation of the system is intermittent as required to limit the pool water perature to less than or equal to 150F.

described in Section 9.5.2.1, during refuel operations, the spent fuel cooling system, with stance from the shutdown cooling system when needed, is capable of maintaining spent fuel l water temperature below the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) limit of 150°F for a mal refueling through (and including) the end of plant life refueling. This includes allowance a single active failure of the spent fuel pool cooling system, or shutdown cooling system, as ropriate.

described in Section 9.5.2.1, the spent fuel pool heat load must decay to a value of 10.16 x 106 U/HR, for the SFP cooling system to be capable of withstanding the worst single active failure, maintain spent fuel pool water temperature 150F. For the time period before the SFP heat drops to 10.16 MBTU/hr, should the limiting single failure occur, 1 train of the shutdown ling (SDC) system may be used to cool the SFP, or the SDC system may be used to plement the SFP cooling system, to maintain spent fuel pool water temperature 150F.

a result of this need to depend on the SDC for potential SFP cooling single failure per hnical Requirements Manual (TRM), entry into Mode 4 following a refueling is not allowed l either:

616 hours0.00713 days <br />0.171 hours <br />0.00102 weeks <br />2.34388e-4 months <br /> has passed since subcriticality for the fuel bundles remaining in the spent fuel pool ch were discharged from the previous refueling, of 81 fuel bundles, or the heat load to the SFP is less than 10.16 x 10BTU/hr. At a SFP heat load of 10.16 x 106 U/hr, adequate cooling is available to maintain the SFP bulk water temperatures less than or al to 150F should a single failure occur in the SFP cooling system.

se TRM limits assure that the shutdown cooling system would be available for supplemental ling and not committed to its emergency core cooling system functions.

ess of 140F, to prevent demineralizer resin degradation. Alarms and procedural controls are d to prevent spent fuel pool water from reaching the demineralizer resin prior to the perature reaching 140F.

ortion of the spent fuel pool cooling water flow, approximately 125 gpm, is passed through the nup system. Operation of this system as well as the skimmer system is intermittent as required maintain the clarity and purity of the spent fuel pool water. During refueling operations, the eling water purification pumps and spent fuel pool filters may be used for purification of the er in the refueling pool. The demineralizer is used as required for purification service on the nt fuel pool or refueling pool. At the completion of the refueling operations, the pumps are d for transferring the remaining refueling water from the pool to the RWST after the water l is lowered to the elevation of the reactor vessel flange.

3.2 Abnormal Operation mid-cycle emergency full core offload is placed in the spent fuel pool, the cooling capacity for additional spent fuel is provided by connecting the spent fuel pool cooling system with the tdown cooling system, if additional cooling is required to limit the pool water temperature.

shutdown cooling system is placed into service by manual initiation.

3.3 Emergency Conditions he event that a serious leak develops in the spent fuel pool liner, makeup water is supplied to pool from the primary makeup water system by manual initiation from the 14 foot 6 inches l of the auxiliary building. Should the leakage exceed the 50 gpm normal makeup capability, itional makeup is available from the RWST via the refueling water purification system, and fire protection system by temporary hose connections.

owing a postulated LOCA, RBCCW flow to the spent fuel pool cooling system is stopped by automatic closing of valves in the cooling water discharge piping from the heat exchangers on S. The availability of cooling water, normally supplied to the spent fuel pool system, allows greater heat removal capability in the engineered safety features components. As discussed r in Section 9.5.4.1, spent fuel pool cooling loss for a period of 9.76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> will raise the pool er temperature to 212F. RBCCW cooling to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers is ored 4 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the start of the postulated LOCA when the heat load on the RBCCW em is substantially reduced.

the normal case where spent fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool, it is unlikely that a seismic nt will cause loss of cooling water flow. The lines from the spent fuel pool to the suction of the nt fuel pool cooling pumps and from the spent fuel pool heat exchangers to the spent fuel pool e been designed and analyzed to Seismic Category I requirements and the remainder of the em, including the spent fuel pool cooling pumps, heat exchangers and their connecting piping, been analyzed and found to be in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. This vides assurance that cooling water would be available from the spent fuel pool cooling system.

auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) interconnection to the spent fuel pool cooling system.

s allows the use of any AFW pump and the inventory of the condensate storage tank as eup to the SFP. This path is nominally designed to deliver 100 gpm by a flow orifice

-8954).

low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) system interconnection to the spent fuel pool cooling em. This allows the use of a LPSI pump and the inventory of the refueling water storage tank ST). The LPSI interconnection is also capable of taking water from the refueling cavity ng outages when the inventory from the RWST has been utilized to fill the refueling cavity.

events or malfunctions that may require makeup to the spent fuel include the long-term loss pent fuel pool cooling heat removal capability, the failure of a steam generator nozzle dam h the fuel transfer tube isolation valve (2-RW-280) open or the refueling pool cavity seal with fuel transfer tube isolation valve (2-RW-280) open. The catastrophic failure of the cavity seal ot considered to be a credible event, but has been analyzed and is dealt with the unit cedures. Failures of the spent fuel pool structure are not considered to be credible. The ementioned events or malfunctions could allow the spent fuel to boil thus requiring makeup.

maximum required makeup would be approximately 85 gallons per minute which would be core offload conditions.

he case where a full core offload is stored in the spent fuel pool, it is improbable that cooling er flow will be lost entirely due to the redundancy of the cooling equipment. In the event that cooling water flow is lost while a full core offload is being stored in the spent fuel pool, eup water may be available from the refueling water storage tank, refueling cavity, or the densate storage tank.

4 SYSTEM AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY 4.1 Special Features spent fuel pool purification system can be used as a backup to maintain the RWST contents ve 50F. However, this flow path has been administratively prohibited in certain plant rating modes and when the RWST is credited as a borated water source due to seismic/non-mic piping interconnection concerns.

spent fuel pool cooling pumps and heat exchanger units can be supplemented by the tdown cooling system.

most serious failure of the system would be the complete loss of the spent fuel pool water entory. To protect against this possibility, all connections to the pool enter near to or above the l operating water level, so that the pool cannot be gravity drained through leaking valves, ng and equipment maloperation. Piping which extends to the bottom of the pool is provided h antisiphoning devices.

ability.

ing refueling, following the loss of all cooling, the minimum times to reach boiling conditions he SFP occur when the core offload begins at 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> after shutdown. During Normal ueling, Full Core Offload as Normal and Emergency Full Core Offload the minimum times to h boiling are conservatively determined to be in excess of 6.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, 3.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 2.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, ectively.

conservatively estimate the time for the SFP bulk water temperature to reach the SFPC system perature of 200F in Modes 1 through 4, the SFP bulk water temperature is assumed to be F at 616 hours0.00713 days <br />0.171 hours <br />0.00102 weeks <br />2.34388e-4 months <br /> after subcriticality and SFP heat load is at or below 10.16 x 106 BTU/HR. If of SFP cooling is assumed to occur at that time, the SFP bulk water temperature will reach SFPC system temperature of 200F in 7.87 hours0.00101 days <br />0.0242 hours <br />1.438492e-4 weeks <br />3.31035e-5 months <br /> or 212F in 9.76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br />. Alternately, for SFP ting bulk water temperatures of 130F and 117.7F, it takes 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> and 12.96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> ectively to heat the SFP to 200F.

ficient time is available for operating personnel to locate and correct the malfunction.

t portion of the spent fuel pool cooling system that is used in seismic Category I makeup sists of the section of the spent fuel pool heat exchangers outlet piping downstream of check e 2-RW-8 as shown on Figure 9.5-1. HCC-11 has been designed and analyzed to seismic egory I requirements and additionally all connections have been analyzed up to and including first seismic restraint beyond the isolation value in each connecting line. Following is a list of line and valve numbers that constitute the Category I makeup:

Piping 10" - HCC-11, 6" - HCC-11 Valves 2-RW-8, 2-RW-15, 2-RW-65, 2-RW-66, 2-RW-67, 2-RW-71, 2-RW-76, 2-RW-119, 2-RW-213, 2-RW-222 4.2 Tests and Inspections mponents of the spent fuel pool cooling system are nondestructive tested in accordance with applicable codes as listed in Table 9.5-2.

pumps in the spent fuel pool cooling system were manufacturer shop performance tested to onstrate compliance with design head and capacity requirements. A performance curve for spent fuel pool cooling pumps is shown in Figure 9.5-2.

system components are visually inspected and manually adjusted if required to ensure proper allation and arrangement.

completely installed spent fuel pool cooling system was pre operation tested prior to startup.

detailed test procedure is described in Section 13.

components of the spent fuel pool cooling system are located in a low-radiation area which mits access for periodic testing and maintenance.

5 REFERENCES 1 Letter from W. G. Counsil to Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Number 2 Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, dated July 17, 1978.

Equipment Function ent fuel pool temperature Provides continuous monitoring and recording of pool trumentation water temperatures by main control room personnel.

Annunciates high temperature alarm in control room.

ent fuel pool level Annunciates low pool water level alarm in main control trumentation room.

  • Continuous wide range level indication is provided remotely in the Cable Vault and East 480V Switchgear Rooms of the Auxiliary Building.

ent fuel pool cooling water flow Annunciates low spent fuel pool cooling water flow trumentation alarm in main control room.

ent fuel pool heat exchanger Annunciates high temperature alarm in main control tlet instrumentation room.

It is not necessary for this alarm to sound locally since personnel in the area would either visually notice an abnormal pool level or be notified of the abnormal pool level by control room personnel. (Reference 9.5-1).

ling Pumps e Horizontal centrifugal ntity 2 ign temperature (F) 200 ign head tdh (feet) 50 ign capacity, each (gpm) 850 SH available (feet) 60 imum NPSH required (feet) 10 sepower 15 erials Case ASTM A351, Gr CF8M Impeller ASTM A351, Gr CF8M Shaft ASTM A351, Gr CF8M es and Standards Draft ASME Code for Pumps and Valves for Nuclear Service, Class III (1968 Edition) mic design class I ign integrated radiation dosage (rad) 106 plier Gould t Exchangers Unit Original Design Type U-tube with single shell pass Number 2 in parallel Design heat transfer rate, each (Btu/hr) 5.5 x 106 Heat transfer area, each (ft2) 589 Design RBCCW temperature, in/out (F) 85/95 Design spent fuel pool water temperature, in /out (F) 120/107 e design, spent fuel pool water Design pressure (psig) 125 Design temperature (F) 200 Maximum Flow (gpm) 1050 Design Flow (gpm) 850 Pressure drop at 850 gpm flow (psi) 7 Materials ASTM A249 Type 304 Relief valve setting (psig) 125

ll design (RBCCW)

Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (F) 130 Maximum Flow (gpm) 1500 Design Flow (gpm) 1100 Pressure drop at 1100 gpm (psi) 4 Materials ASTM A106 Relief valve setting (psig) 150 es and Standards ASME Section VIII TEMA R mic design class I plier Struthers Nuclear nt Fuel Pool Demineralizer e Mixed bed, nonregenerable mber 1 ign pressure (psig) 100 ign temperature (F) 150 mal operating pressure (psig) 75 mal operating temperature (F) 107-120 in volume (ft3) 42 ign flow (gpm) 132 mal operating flow (gpm) 125 erial ASTM A-240 Type 304 e ASME Section III for Class 3 Components (1971 Edition) mic design class II plier Illinois Water Treatment nt Fuel Pool Filters e Disposable cartridge mber 2 ign pressure (psig) 200 ign temperature (F) 250 mal operating pressure (psig) 75 mal operating temperature (F) 107-120

er rating (micron) 3 ign Filter efficiency (%) 80 minutes ign flow (gpm) 132 mal operating flow (gpm) 125 erial Vessel ASTM A 312 Type 304 Internals Type 304 SS, Micarta Cartridges Ethylene propylene mic design class II e ASME Section III Class C (1968 Edition) plier Filterite Corporation ueling Water Purification Pumps e Inline centrifugal mber 2 ign temperature (F) 150 ign head, tdh (feet) 165 ign capacity (gpm) 125 SH available (feet) 26 imum NPSH required (feet) 5 sepower 15 erials Case ASTM A351 Gr CF8M Impeller ASTM A351 Gr CF8M Shaft ASTM A276 Type 316 es and Standards ASME Section III for Class 3 Components (1971 Edition) mic design class II ign integrated radiation dosage over lifetime (rad) 106 plier Ingersoll Rand

nt Fuel Pool and Refueling Pool Skimmer Pumps e Inline centrifugal mber 2 ign temperature (F) 175 ign head, tdh (feet) 75 ign capacity (gpm) 60 SH available (feet) 46 imum NPSH required (feet) 6 sepower (hp) 3 erials Case ASTM A351 Gr CF8M Impeller ASTM A351 Gr CF8M Shaft ASTM A276 Type 316 e ASME Section III for Class 3 Components (1971) mic design class II ign integrated radiation dosage over lifetime (rad) 106 plier Ingersoll Rand nt Fuel Pool and Refueling Pool Skimmer Filters e Disposable cartridge mber 4 ign pressure (psig) 200 ign temperature (F) 250 mal operating pressure (psig) 50 mal operating temperature (F) 120 er rating (micron) 10 ign filter efficiency (%) 80 ign flow (gpm) 132 mal operating flow (gpm) 60 erial Vessel ASTM A312 Type 304 Internals Type 304SS, Micarta Cartridges Ethylene propylene

e ASME Section III Class C (1968 Edition) mic design class II plier Filterite Corporation ng and Valves ng Material ASTM A-312 Type 304 Design pressure (psig) 100 Design temperature (F) 150 ts:

2.5 inches and larger -Butt welded except at flanged equipment Codes:

Fabrication, ANSI B31.7 Class III Testing and installation, ASME Section III for Class 3 Components (1971 Edition) ves Materials 2.5 inches and larger - ASTM A351 Grade CF-8 2 inches and smaller - ASTM A182 Type F-304 Ratings 2.5 inches and larger - 150 lb. butt welded ends.

2 inches and smaller - 600 lb. socket welded ends.*

Code Draft ASME Code for Pumps and Valves for Nuclear Service (1968 Edition).

2 inch and smaller Socket-Welding Ends valves were originally specified as an ANSI 600 lb rating. The pressure temperature rating class of valves replaced in accordance with the Dominion Design Control Process is determined based on the design conditions of the application in accordance with applicable Construction Code requirements. Therefore, the pressure temperature rating class of installed replacement valves may be higher or lower than 600 lb, based on the design conditions of the specific application.

(SHEET 1) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

(SHEET 2) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

1 INTRODUCTION sampling system consists of Sampling Stations 1 and 2, the Corrosion Monitoring Sample ion, the Waste Gas Sample Sink, and the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS). These vide the means for determining physical, chemical and radioactive conditions of process ds, waste gas, and containment air.

ion 1 is in the sampling room located in the auxiliary building. It handles radioactive sampling the reactor coolant system, the chemical and volume control system (CVCS), and the oactive waste processing systems. The sample room contains the piping, valves, and cooling ipment necessary to reduce the pressure and temperature of the sample fluid or gas to eptable levels for grab sampling or collection in sample bottles. The sample streams are oactive or potentially radioactive and may contain boric acid. Grab samples are taken to the ochemistry laboratory for analyses. The system also contains online hydrogen and oxygen nitors. (See Figure 9.6-1) ion 2 is located in the turbine building. Continuous sampling by semi-automatic and manual hods can be performed. This station contains pressure reducing valves, cooling equipment, sure, temperature and flow control regulators, valves, piping, grab sample sink, continuous and conductivity monitors, recorders, indicators, ion chromatograph, and on-line sodium nitors. (See Figure 9.6-2)

Corrosion Monitoring Sample Station provides a means for sampling condenser hotwells for ence of sea water in-leakage. (See Figure 9.6-3)

Waste Gas Sample sink provides the means for sampling gasses in the volume control tank, te gas surge tank, and the waste gas decay tanks. See Section 11.1 for additional discussion of Gaseous Waste Processing System.

PASS has the capability to obtain samples of reactor coolant and containment atmosphere er accident conditions. The PASS is comprised of two independent units, designated reactor lant PASS and containment air PASS. The reactor coolant PASS is designed to obtain esentative samples of reactor coolant or liquid from the containment. The containment air S is designed to obtain a containment air sample. Once these samples are obtained, ological and chemical analyses can be performed.

2 REACTOR COOLANT PASS 2.1 Equipment Purpose and Description reactor coolant PASS is a dual module unit consisting of one sample module and one remote rating panel. Samples are trapped within the sample module. The equipment within the sample dule is operated remotely via the remote operating panel. The motive force for obtaining tor coolant samples is the differential pressure between the primary plant and the volume

shielded, removable sample chamber within the sample module. Samples to be analyzed on are collected in shielded containers within the sample module. (See Figure 9.6-4) 2.1.1 Sample Module s module contains the valves and components required to physically collect the sample. All ponents are located within a stainless steel cabinet measuring approximately 22 inches wide, 4 inches deep, by 36 inches high, which sits on a 2 foot high stand. An exhaust blower is built the top of the cabinet and discharges into the plant radioactive exhaust ventilation system.

rs are provided on the cabinet for access to remove samples and to perform maintenance. The dule is located in the primary sample room. At this location, levels of radiation created at the dule during the purge of reactor coolant through the sample lines will not result in significant osure to the operator at the remote panel or to other individuals.

ple influent and effluent lines are connected to the sample module. Influent samples are taken m several points at Millstone Unit Number 2 via two flow paths. Reactor coolant samples can aken from the hot leg of the reactor coolant system. Samples of containment sump liquid can btained from the high pressure safety injection pumps, low pressure safety injection pumps, he containment spray pumps. Both influent samples pass through sample coolers prior to being vered to the sample module. Effluent lines connected to the module are directed to the volume trol tank.

2.1.2 Remote Operating Panel s module contains the sample system mimic board, electrical controls, and instrumentation out necessary to remotely operate the sample module. The remote operating panel is located he turbine building in an area which will have low radiation levels during an accident. The ote operating panel is connected to the sample module through electrical cables which carry er and instrumentation indication lines. Nitrogen gas supply lines, used to operate valves and ge the radioactive gas sample after sampling is completed, are hard-piped to the sample and ote modules. The face of the module is normally protected by a lockable closure to prevent age and unauthorized operation.

2.1.3 Reactor Coolant Auxiliary Valve Operating Panel (RCAVOP) s panel contains switches and electrical controls to operate the sample system isolation valves the system flush valves. The RCAVOP is located above the remote operating panel.

2.1.4 Deionized Water Flushing Module onized water flushing module is a modular unit designed to provide deionized water flushing ability at approximately one gallon per minute and up to 375 psig. The module is located cent to the remote operating panel.

plate to form a modular unit.

2.2 Design Features h operating and equipment failure modes are analyzed to maintain exposure ALARA.

sonnel radiation exposure is minimized through the use of remote control operation, flushing niques, and minimal sample volume and shielding.

iation exposure to the operator taking the sample is estimated to be well below the exposure ts defined by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC-19.

PASS system piping downstream of the sample coolers is designed for 2500 psig and 165F.

inherent design of pH probes limits functional usage to pressure of 250 psig. A pressure ulating valve, installed in the influent line, allows fluid to flow through the pH probe. The pH be outer housing is designed to withstand system design pressure of 2500 psig in the event that pressure regulating valve fails and the pH probe internals are inadvertently overpressurized.

fluid boundary materials are of either 300 series stainless steel or Inconel.

normal fail position of each solenoid valve was selected such that failures will still allow hing the system to minimize radiation levels.

enoid valves are equipped with positive position indication at the remote operating panel.

ioactive airborne contamination control is provided by a blower which maintains capture city into the sample module. This blower exhausts into existing plant ventilation.

mmercially available components are utilized to the maximum extent possible and have been cted based upon a reputation for high quality. Swagelok fittings are utilized wherever possible e consistent with existing utility sample system components.

S piping is sized to maintain turbulent flow thereby minimizing crud buildup and plate-out of oactive products.

o sample paths and one effluent return path are available on the reactor coolant PASS viding operational redundancy.

ctor coolant PASS solenoid containment isolation valves are operated from two control rds, located outside the control room.

valves required to be operated during the sampling operation are operated by chemistry onnel at the RCAVOP and remote operating panel.

enoid valves isolating the reactor coolant PASS from the safety class systems are built to the ME Code,Section III requirements, and are fully qualified for postulated accident conditions.

3 CONTAINMENT AIR PASS 3.1 Equipment Purpose and Description containment air PASS has the capability of collecting a sample of containment air. The PASS dual module unit consisting of one sample module and one remote operating panel. The ive force for obtaining a sample is supplied by the hydrogen analyzer sample pumps which w the sample from the hydrogen analyzer system through the PASS sample module, returning ack to the hydrogen analyzer system. (See Figure 9.6-5) 3.1.1 Sample Module s module contains the valves and components required to physically collect a 10 ml sample of tainment air. The equipment is housed within a wall mounted cabinet, located in the spent fuel l skimmer pump area. An exhaust blower is built into the top of the cabinet and discharges the plant radioactive ventilation exhaust system. A door is provided on the cabinet for access emove samples and to perform maintenance. Influent and effluent connections are provided connection to the sample system piping.

3.1.2 Remote Operating Panel s module contains the sample system mimic panel and slave valves required to remotely rate the sample module. The module is located above the Millstone Unit Number 2 railway ess area where radiation levels during an accident are low. The remote operating module is nected to the sample module through electrical cables and piping. A control switch is provided perate a remote valve to purge the sample lines with nitrogen following sample collection and ation.

3.2 Containment Air Samples 0 ml sample of containment air is isolated in a shielded sample chamber. Samples are hdrawn from the chamber via septum using a syringe, injected into a sealed container, and sported to the laboratory for subsequent analysis.

3.3 Design Features h operating and failure modes have been analyzed to maintain exposure ALARA. Personnel ation exposure is minimized through the use of remote control operation, flushing techniques, imal sample volume, and shielding.

erials in contact with the containment air sample are of 300 series stainless steel and have n selected to ensure system integrity up to a pressure of 100 psig at 300F.

t generated by flow of hot fluid through the sample module piping is dissipated by a blower ch provides capture velocity air flow into the sample module and exhausts to the plant oactive ventilation system.

mmercially available components have been utilized to the maximum extent possible and are cted based upon a reputation for high quality. Swagelok fittings have been utilized to be sistent with existing plant equipment.

ation valves and breakdown connections are provided for solenoid valve and other equipment maintenance considerations.

containment air PASS piping and sample pump are sized to maintain turbulent flow, thereby imizing crud buildup and plate-out of radioactive products.

o sample paths and two return paths are available on the containment air PASS providing rational redundancy.

valves are operated from the remote operating panel. Isolation from containment is provided alves in the hydrogen analyzer system.

containment air PASS sample module is powered from vital instrument panel VA20 to allow operation with a loss of off site power.

4 TEST reactor coolant and containment air PASS can be operated during normal plant operations for ing purposes to obtain actual reactor coolant or containment air samples.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

SAMPLE figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

SAMPLE figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

1 CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM 1.1 Design Bases 1.1.1 Functional Requirements function of the circulating water system is to provide a continuous supply of cooling water to main condenser.

1.1.2 Design Criteria

a. The circulating water system shall be designed to remove the heat load from the condenser.
b. The circulating water system shall be designed to use sea water for cooling.

1.2 System Description 1.2.1 System circulating water system is shown in Figure 9.7-1. Four one-fourth capacity (137,000 gpm h) motor driven vertical wet pit pumps circulate the water from the intake structure through the n condenser and discharge into the quarry. The water is taken from Long Island Sound ugh an intake trash rack and four traveling screens located inside the intake structure. The ens are designed to prevent debris larger than three-eighths inch from passing into circulating er pump, condenser and the service water pumps.

odium hypochlorite system capable of chlorinating circulating water on a shock treatment s is provided. The method of circulating water chlorination is gravity feed injection of sodium ochlorite solution directly to the running pump suction. The chlorination of the circulating er system, including the condensers, controls biological fouling while maintaining chlorine centrations within NPDES permit limits.

total inventory of the circulating water system is as follows:

1. Circulating Water Pump up to Turbine Building Condenser Pit Floor elevation equals 232,000 gallons.
2. Circulating Water above Condenser Pit Floor elevation equals 160,000 gallons.
3. Discharge piping below Condenser Pit Floor elevation to quarry equals 990,000 gallons.

minimum time required to stop the circulating water flow would be the coastdown time of the ulating water pumps, 10 seconds. Factors affecting the actual time elapsed would be the rators evaluation of the alarms received in the control room and the severity of the failure.

p-out time for the control circuitry is in the order of a fraction of a second and is insignificant.

he event of a gross failure in the circulating water transport system resulting in the flooding of condenser pit by the discharge from all four circulating water pumps, the total time required to all water flow is approximately 16 seconds and occurs automatically.

circulating water transport system is designed to withstand the maximum operating discharge sure of the circulating water pumps, 10 psig. Piping is designed for 100 psig, with the ansion joints, butterfly valves, condenser water boxes and tube bundles designed for 25 psig.

mal operating pressure for these components has a range of 0-7 psig, with the outlet erboxes operating under a vacuum of about 15 to 20 inches Mercury Absolute.

all leaks around valves and fittings would go undetected except for visual inspection and ld drain into the condenser pit sump. The condenser pit sump is provided with 200 gpm acity sump pumps and provided with high level alarms to indicate water level in the pit 6 es below the top of the sump. Large leaks due to pipe or expansion joint ruptures would be cated in the control room by both a gradual loss of vacuum in the condenser shell and high-h condenser pit level switches, set at 10 inches and initiating a trip of the circulating water ps.

potential for ruptures is minimized by interlocking the circulating water pumps with the er box butterfly valves, requiring the valves to be open between 20 to 25% prior to starting the ps. The water box cross connect valves are also interlocked with the water box discharge es and initiate a pump trip in the event of an incomplete flow circuit. Therefore, the system is quately protected against over pressuring by the circulating water pumps due to improper e operation. However, all components in the system are hydrostatically tested at 1.5 times the gn pressure of 25 psig to ensure system integrity before normal operation.

ures in the circulating water transport system would be inconsequential except those urring above ground in the Turbine Building. The condenser pit is designed to contain these ures and has the capacity to store 284,450 gallons at a maximum depth of 9 feet before spilling r to the Turbine Building ground floor.

worst case of a major failure would be the complete rupture of all the circulating water piping oth condensers. This would result in the draining into the condenser pit of all circulating water se in the above ground components, approximately 160,000 gallons, and flooding the pit to a l of 47 inches. When the water level in the pit reaches 10 inches, approximately 4 seconds r the rupture, the high-high level switches in the condenser pit are actuated and cause the ulating water pumps to trip 2 seconds later. During this 6 seconds, the circulating water pumps have continued to pump approximately 55,500 gallons, which will also drain to the condenser raising the water level to 6 feet 2 inches. During the 10 second coastdown time of circulating

750 gallons before overflowing. During the postulated failure and subsequent flooding of the denser pit, the water level is rising an average of 5.9 inches per second.

condenser pit will contain the water from any postulated failures in the circulating water em without affecting any safety related systems.

1.2.2 Components ratings and materials of construction of the circulating water system are given in Table 9.7-1.

1.3 System Operation four circulating water pumps are in operation during normal operation, with the operating ed of the pumps controlled by the variable frequency drives (VFD). In the event of VFD vailability, the VFD can be bypassed, allowing operation of the pumps at rated speed; ever, no speed control is available in this condition. A cross connection is provided between two water boxes at each end of each condenser shell. Valves are provided so either pump on a denser shell can provide water to both sides of the condenser if one pump is out of service.

valving also provides capability to back flush each condenser section.

inlet cross-connect valve between the condenser inlet water boxes will be opened manually ote) by the operator under the following conditions:

1. With one circulating water pump inoperable.
2. Following the trip of an operating circulating water pump.
3. In anticipation of a circulating water pump trip.

Condition 1:

If a circulating water pump is to be out for maintenance or otherwise inoperable, load will be limited as necessary to maintain vacuum. The inlet cross connect valve will be opened to supply water to both halves of the condenser from the operating pump.

Condition 2:

If during normal operation a circulating water pump(s) should automatically trip, the plant load will be reduced as necessary to maintain vacuum. The discharge valve of the tripped pump(s) will be closed, and the inlet cross connect valve will be opened. The circulating water pumps will trip on the following:

a. Loss of lubricating water.
b. Pump breaker trip.
c. VFD trip.
d. Traveling screens High-High differential pressure.

This trip is preceded by a high differential pressure alarm.

Condition 3:

If during normal operation, it is apparent that a circulating water pump trip is imminent, the plant load will be reduced as necessary to maintain vacuum. The affected pump will be shut down and the pump discharge valve closed. The inlet cross connect valve will be opened. If VFD malfunctions occur, the VFD may be isolated and the affected circulating water pump operated with the VFD bypassed.

This operation requires that the affected circulating water pump be shut down during the transfer to the bypass mode of operation.

2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 2.1 Design Bases 2.1.1 Functional Requirements function of the service water system is to supply a dependable continuous flow of cooling er to the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) heat exchangers, turbine building ed cooling water (TBCCW) heat exchangers, diesel engine heat exchangers, vital AC tchgear room cooling coils, chilled water heat exchangers and the circulating water pump rings.

2.1.2 Design Criteria service water system is designed to the following design criteria:

a. The service water system shall be designed with suitable redundancy that in the event of a LOCA, concurrent with a loss of off site power and a single active failure, the service water system can perform its safety function. (Note: The postulation of a LOCA concurrent with a seismic event is outside the design basis.)
b. The service water system shall be sized and shall have capacity to provide sufficient water for all modes of operation at a maximum ultimate heat sink temperature of 80F.
d. The system shall be designed as a moderate energy system.
e. The system shall be designed to withstand a pipe rupture (as an initiating event).

Single failures in the redundant train shall not be postulated to occur. Multiple failures of the service water piping will not occur.

ultimate heat sink consists of the service water cooling system serving the components tioned in Section 9.7.2.1.1. The water source for the heat sink is the Long Island Sound sea er. It provides sufficient cooling for more than 30 days:

a. to permit safe shutdown and cooldown of the reactor and can maintain a safe shutdown condition for unit 2 and other units at the site;
b. to allow control of an accident in the event one occurs.

UHS temperature determination method shall use SWS header/branch temperature surements. Precision instruments installed at the inlet to the reactor building closed cooling er (RBCCW) heat exchangers will normally be used. All in-service precision instruments t be within the limit. If all of the precision instruments are out of service, alternative ruments that measure SW supply side temperature will be used. In this case, an appropriate rument uncertainty will be subtracted from the acceptance criteria.

S supply temperature measurements shall be obtained for each operable SWS loop and the hest valid SWS supply loop temperature shall be used to determine the UHS temperature.

safety related equipment in the intake structure (pump motors and controls) are protected inst the maximum hypothetical tide and storm surges including wave action by being located ve elevations 22 feet 0 inches. The pumps are also designed for drought condition for low-low er level of minus 7 feet.

ultimate heat sink is served only by one source of water, that of the Long Island Sound sea er. The Long Island Sound sea water capacity is sufficient to provide a total maximum ntity of 24,000 gpm cooling water for more than 30 days. A second source of water is not uired.

als or conduits between the water source and the intake structure are not provided. The intake cture is located on the water source.

2.2.1 System service water system is described by Figure 9.7-1. Three half capacity (12,000 gpm each) ical wet pit motor driven pumps take suction downstream from the traveling screens in the ke structure. Two independent cross-connected supply headers with isolation valves are vided to all heat exchangers. Two independent discharge headers are provided for the RBCCW t exchangers that run above ground from the discharge of the heat exchangers to the discharge al. Two discharge headers are provided, one for each diesel, for the diesel generator cooling er heat exchangers. One discharge header is provided for the TBCCW heat exchangers as the e discharge pipes are combined above ground prior to entering the discharge canal. The harge header for the chilled water system and for the vital switchgear room cooling heat hangers combine with the TBCCW heat exchanger discharge header before entering the harge canal. Normally, one pump and service water header are required to provide cooling of RBCCW and diesel generator cooling water heat exchangers following a loss-of-coolant dent (LOCA) or for Unit shutdown. In the event of a loss of station power, the pump motors supplied power from the emergency buses. The TBCCW headers are isolated for either a S or LNP signal.

2.2.2 Components escription of the service water system components is given in Table 9.7-2.

2.3 System Operation ing normal operation two pumps are operating and provide water to the RBCCW and the CCW heat exchangers and vital switchgear ventilation system cooling coils. Each pump is able of supplying the required service water to one train for accident mitigation and safe tdown. A third standby pump will be started remotely by manual means upon loss of an rating pump. During winter time operation (ultimate heat sink temperature less than 60F), the dby RBCCW and TBCCW heat exchangers may be placed on-line (service water side only) rder to maintain service water pump minimum flow requirements. This may be necessary e much less service water flow is required to remove RBCCW and TBCCW heat loads as ice water temperature decreases.

2.4 Availability and Reliability undant headers and one spare pump are provided. Sea water is chlorinated to prevent slime, e, and mussel growth. Thermal backwashing (mussel cooking) is also performed to prevent ing of the intake structure pump bays. A sodium hypochlorite system capable of chlorinating ice water is provided. The service water chlorination system is capable of injecting sodium ochlorite solution into the service water pump suction bells via an injection pump system. The tion is taken up by the service water pumps and enters the service water system to provide ogical fouling control. Pump motors and controls are located at Elevation 22 feet 0 inches for d protection. The intake structure is designed to withstand any probable tornado missile.

significant coating or lining degradation will be promptly detected. This and proceduralized stigative and corrective actions ensure that coating or lining degradation will not impair ice water system safety functionality.

service water pump has been modified to an open-line shaft design. Thordon bearings are icated by sea water flowing through the pump. No external lube water is required.

service water pumps and motors are not susceptible to a failure from a common cause.

ure of a circulating water line cannot flood the intake structure since the discharge line is low rgy and located below grade. There are no sources of potentially damaging internally erated missiles within the intake structure. Rotating components are limited to the relatively w speed 300 rpm and 900 rpm motors on the circulating water pumps and the service water ps respectively. The rotating masses therein are essentially encapsulated within heavy motor dings. There is no high-energy fluid system to cause any missile within the intake structure.

intake structure louvers have been redesigned to resist penetration by any of the design basis ado driven missiles which were discussed in Section 5.2.5.1.2 of the FSAR.

exterior concrete walls are of adequate thickness to prevent perforation by any of the design s missiles. An investigation of generation of a secondary missile due to concrete spalling cates that only minor spalling may occur due to the impactive energy of the utility pole sile. This spalling is limited to the thickness of the protective cover on the steel reinforcing on interior of the structure. Secondary missiles thus assumed to form would not reach the closest ice water pump. The intake structure is constructed of materials which will not support bustion. Any potential fire, such as a service water pump motor, would be localized in a small and would normally be mitigated by a dry type of fire protection. The spatial separation proximately 20 feet.) would prevent damage to the redundant pumps.

only safety related system in the intake structure is the service water system.

service water pump motors and controls are protected against the maximum hypothetical tide storm surges including wave action.The pumps are also designed for low-low water of minus et. Flooding of the intake structure due to a circulating water pipe rupture is not credible ause the circulating water pipes are below the floor on the intake structure. In case of a service er pipe rupture no water accumulation can be sustained in the intake structure due to the floor ing. Catastrophic failure resulting in missile generation have not been experienced with ulating water or screen wash pumps. Therefore, the service water pumps have not been ected against missiles generated by the failure of circulating water or screen wash pumps.

ause of the redundancy of the service water system even if a hypothetical missile is generated causes the inoperability of one service water pump it will not effect the service water system ration because only two service water pumps are required for normal operation while only one eeded for emergency operation.

ded and the service water to the diesels must be isolated, cooling to one diesel is provided by oss-connection to the Fire Water System.

ilure mode analysis is given in Table 9.7-4. A rupture in the system is considered an initiating nt only; it is not postulated concurrent with a LOCA (or any other Chapter 14 event). System undancy and header separation have been provided to maintain continuous cooling in the event single passive failure during post-accident long term cooling.

2.5 Test and Inspections h service water pump and strainer was hydrostatically tested at 1.5 times the design pressure.

service water pump was tested per ASME Power Test Code Section 8.2, 1965 for hydraulic ormance. The service water pump design curve is given in Figure 9.7-3.

h component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the system. The service water em undergoes a preoperational test prior to startup; the detailed test procedure is described in tion 13.

ruments will be calibrated during testing. Automatic controls will be tested for actuation at the per set points. Alarm functions will be checked for operability and limits during preoperational ing.

system will be operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity and hanical operability. At least one pump will be tested on line to demonstrate head and capacity ction 13).

or components of the system such as pumps and strainers are accessible for periodic ection during normal operation.

t exchanger fouling and other component degradation is common in open cycle Service Water ems due to both macro and micro fouling. This fouling can lead to an inability to provide the ty related cooling that is the function of the Service Water system. NRC Generic Letter (GL) 13 required that actions be taken to confirm and maintain the capability of the Service Water em to perform its design basis functions. Actions performed to ensure the capability of the em to provide the required safety related cooling include:

  • Injecting sodium hypochlorite to minimize biofouling. This injection prevents the attachment and subsequent growth of large quantities of mussels.
  • Inspecting and cleaning the intake bays to minimize fouling. This cleaning removes fouling that might be drawn into the Service Water system and clog downstream components.

near stagnant water can be conducive to the biological growth.

  • Monitoring of available heat exchanger parameters to detect gross debris loading.

This periodic monitoring detects fouling build up in a heat exchanger between visual inspections.

  • Inspecting heat exchanger, pipe, and other component internals on the Service Water Side to remove fouling and repair as needed. Periodic inspections identify component degradation or the slow buildup of fouling prior to it affecting component operability.
  • Cleaning heat exchangers on the Service Water side to minimize fouling buildup.

Cleaning removes deposits of fouling that tend to occur in heat exchanger tubes.

  • Tested heat exchangers to confirm design heat transfer capability. This testing and subsequent analysis verified heat exchanger performance was capable of meeting design requirements.
  • Filling heat exchangers with fresh water during layup to minimize buildup of fouling and component degradation caused by stagnant seawater.

3 TURBINE BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM 3.1 Design Bases 3.1.1 Functional Requirements turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) system provides cooling water to the iliary equipment (associated with the power control system) which is located in the turbine ding and for the condensate polishing facility located in warehouse number 5.

3.1.2 Design Criteria turbine building closed cooling water system shall be designed to cool auxiliary equipment r the full range of operation.

3.2 System Description 3.2.1 System TBCCW system is described by Figure 9.7-2.

turbine building closed cooling water system uses treated water to remove heat from the ine components and sample coolers. The system transfers the heat to the service water system

chemical addition provision to take off thermal expansion of water and maintain the water mistry.

components cooled by this system include:

1. Stator liquid coolers
2. Electro hydraulic coolers
3. Station air compressor and after cooler
4. Steam generator feed pump lube oil coolers
5. Exciter air cooler
6. Heater drains pumps motors and bearings
7. Condensate pumps motor cooling
8. Sampling Station Number 2 sample cooling
9. Generator isolated phase bus cooler
10. Generator hydrogen coolers
11. Turbine lube oil coolers
12. Local sample coolers
13. Warehouse number 5 air conditioning unit
14. Deleted by MP-PACKAGE-FSC-00-MP2-011
15. Multi-circuit cooler
16. Fuel handling area air conditioning units
17. Auxiliary chilled water system mechanical refrigeration units 3.2.2 Components escription of the TBCCW system components is given in Table 9.7-3.

3.3 System Operation ing normal operation two pumps and two heat exchangers are operating. The third heat hanger will be operated upon failure of an operating pump or heat exchanger.

veling Water Screen e Vertical through flow ntity 4 ed (feet per minute) 5 and 20 erial Screen 3/8 inch square openings of No. 14 Stainless steel wire Frame Stainless steel tor Manufacturer Leeson Electric tor 1800/450 rpm, 10/2.5 hp, 3 phase, 60 Hz, 460 V es NEMA een Wash Pumps p Manufacturer Fairbanks Morse del 14 inch M. C.

e Vertical turbine ntity 2 acity each (gpm) 1760 d (feet) 210 erial Case ASTM A-48 Class 30, 2-3% Ni Impeller ASTM A-296 CF 8M (316 SS)

Shaft AISI 316 Stainless Steel tor Manufacturer General Electric tor 125 hp, 460 V, 3 phase, 60 Hz, 1800 rpm Codes NEMA, Standards of the Hydraulic Institute, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes,Section VIII ANSI B16.5

ulating Water Pumps p Manufacturer Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd.

del 78BN e Vertical, wet pit ntity 4 acity each (gpm) 137,200 d (feet) 24 erial Case Materials such as: ASTM A-240, Type 316-L; ASTM A-48 CL-30; ASTM A-436, Type 1B, Ni-Resistant; ASTM A-296, CF 8M (316 SS).

Impeller Shaft - AISI 304 Stainless Steel tor Synchronous 1500 hp, 4000 V, 60 Hz, 3 phase, 300 rpm es NEMA, Standards of the Hydraulic Institute, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, Pressure Vessels, ANSI B16.5 iable Frequency Drive nufacturer Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc.

del Harmony Drive ntity 4 e Air Cooled wers Transformer Cabinet - 3, Cell Cabinet - 3 se Power 1500 hp ut 4160V, +10%, -15%, 3 phase, 60 Hz, 247A RMS put 0-4000V, 3 phase, 0-60 Hz, 260A RMS ght 15,580 pounds losure NEMA1

vice Water Pumps e Vertical, wet pit ntity 3 acity each (gpm) 12,000 d (feet) TDH 100 erial Stainless Steel tor Manufacturer General Electric tor 450 hp, 4000 V, 3 phase, 60 Hz es NEMA, Standards of the Hydraulic Institute, ASTM, ANSI, G16.5 mic Class 1 vice Water Pipe (Selection based on applicable service)

High Performance Stainless Steel, Unlined Carbon Steel Pipe, Epoxy or PVC Lined Stainless Steel Pipe, Epoxy Lined or Unlined Cast Ductile Iron Pipe, Cement and/or Epoxy Lined Copper Nickel Pipe, Unlined Red Brass Pipe, Unlined Nickel Copper, Unlined vice Water Valves (Selection based on applicable service)

High Performance Stainless Steel, Unlined Carbon Steel Valves Stainless Steel Valves Cast Ductile Iron Valves Copper-Nickel Valves Cast Bronze Valves vice Water Strainer e Automatic self cleaning ntity 3 ign flow rate (gpm) 12,000 ign pressure (psig) 100 ign temperature (F) 100 erials Selected for Salt Water Service tor 3/4 hp, 460 V, 1725 rpm, 3 phase, 60 Hz es NEMA, ASME Section VIII mic Class 1

COMPONENTS CCW Heat Exchanger nufacturer Southwestern Engineering Co.

del TEMA type NEN e One pass shell and tube ntity 3 ign duty each (BTU/hr) 28.5 x 106 ign pressure (psig)

Shell side 125 Tube side 125 ign temperature (F)

Shell side 125 Tube side 120 erial Shell ASME SA-516-70 (carbon steel)

Channels SB-171-715 (70-30 CuNi)

Channel covers SA-516-70 with SB-171-715 liner Tube ASME SB-111-715 D.S.R.

Tube sheet ASME SB-171-715 es TEMA - Class C, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, Pressure Vessels mic None cification SP-ME-542 CCW Pump nufacturer Goulds Pump del 3405-10 x 12-12 e Horizontal centrifugal ntity 3 acity each (gpm) 3400 d (feet) TDH 110

erial Case ASTM A-278-59T, Class 30 Impeller 1106 Bronze Shaft AISI Type 316 tor 125 hp, 460 V, 3 phase, 60 Hz, 1800 rpm es NEMA, Standards of Hydraulic Institute, ASME Boiler and Pressure Code Section VIII, Pressure Vessels.

mic Class 2 CCW Head Tank nufacturer PX Engineering e Vertical ntity 1 ign pressure (psig) 15 ign temperature (F) 110 ume (gal) 1100 erial ASTM A-285 Gr C e ASME Section VIII mic Class 2

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL RESULTANT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION & EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE SYSTEM

& QUANTITY MODE MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION STATUS REMARKS

1. Service Water Pump stops. Pump trip alarm. Loss of flow in one Isolate pump. Normal Pump out of Cooling Pumps header. Standby pump is operation. service for (3) put into service. repairs.

Valve line-up.

2. Piston Operated a. Fails to a. & b. Position a. None a. & b. Repair Normal Valves (2) open. indication C.R.I. valve operator. operation.

HV6482, b. Fails to b. Loss of flow from b. Operate valve HV6489 operate standby pump. manually, or (open). direct flow from standby pump to alternate header.

3. Service Water Pipe break. Low flow indication Loss of flow in Break isolated. Normal Header out of Cooling Pump on the effected header. Standby pump is operation. service for Discharge components C.R.I. put into service. repairs.

Header (3)

4. RBCCW Heat Pipe break. Heat exchanger Loss of flow in Break isolated. Normal Header out of Exchanger outlet low flow header. Standby heat operation. service for Supply Header indication. Sump exchanger put into repairs.

and Channels level alarm. Both service.*

C.R.I.

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL RESULTANT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION & EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE SYSTEM

& QUANTITY MODE MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION STATUS REMARKS

5. RBCCW Heat a. Tube side a. Makeup valve. None Failed heat Normal Heat exchanger Exchanger (3) rupture. exchanger operation. out of service None to RBCCW isolated. Standby for repairs.

Surge Tank open heat exchanger alarm. put into service. *

b. C.R.I.
6. Piston Operated Fails as is. Position indication. None Repair valve Normal Valve can be Valve (2) C.R.I. operator. operation. manually HV6399, operated.

HV6400

7. RBCCW Heat Pipe break. High flow indication. None Break isolated. Normal Header out of Exchanger Sump level alarm. Standby heat operation. service for Discharge Both C.R.I. exchanger put into repairs.

Header (2) service. *

8. Piston Operated Fails open. Position indication. Possible rapid Repair valve Normal Place standby Valve (3) Local cooldown of operator. operation. heat exchanger TV6306, RBCCW by service into service if TV6306A, water leading to RCP modulating TV6307, seal problems. control TV6307A, required.

TV6308, TV6308A

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL RESULTANT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION & EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE SYSTEM

& QUANTITY MODE MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION STATUS REMARKS

9. TBCCW Heat Pipe break. 1. Heat exchanger Reduction/Loss Break Isolated Normal Repair header Exchanger flow alarm (C.R.I.). Standby Heat operation.
a. Supply 2. Possible Surge Loss of Service Water Exchanger put Header Tank high level alarm Flow. into service.*

on TBCCW heat up.

3. TBCCW High Temperature Alarm (C.R.I.).
b. Pipe break. Heat exchanger flow Reduction / Loss of Isolate Service Potential trip / Repair header.

Discharge alarm (C.R.I.). Service Water Flow. Water to TBCCW damage to Header Repair Header

  • components due to TBCCW heat up.

10 TBCCW Heat Tube side Flow indication; None Heat exchanger Normal Heat exchanger

. Exchanger (3) rupture. TBCCW Surge Tank isolated.* operation. out of service low level alarm. for repairs.

11 Piston Operated Fail as is. Position indication. None Repair valve Normal Valve can be

. Valve C.R.I. operator. operation. manually (2)HV6438, operated.

HV6439 12 Diaphragm Fail open. Local visual Loss of one heat Repair valve Normal Not required

. Operated Valves indication only. exchanger.* operator. operation. for shutdown.

(3) TV6303, TV6304, TV6305

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL RESULTANT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION & EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE SYSTEM

& QUANTITY MODE MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION STATUS REMARKS 13 Diesel Engine Tube side Diesel Generator Loss of one diesel isolate heat Normal One diesel

. Cooling Water rupture. High Temperature generator. exchanger and operation (one generator Heat Exchanger Alarms. C.R.I. Jacket repair. diesel generator required during (2) cooling pressure low, in service). an emergency.

jacket cooling level low, jacket cooling temperature high /

low. All local.

14 Diesel Engine Pipe break. Heat exchanger Loss of flow in Break isolated. Normal One diesel

. Cooling Water outlet low-flow system. operation (one generator Heat Exchanger indication, lube oil diesel generator required during Supply & temperature, local in service). an emergency.

Discharge jacket cooling SBO allows Headers temperature. Local eight hours to restore power.

15 Piston Operated Fail open. Position indication. None Repair valve Normal Valve can be

. Valve (2) C.R.I. operator. operation. manually FV6389, operated.

FV6397

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL RESULTANT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION & EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE SYSTEM

& QUANTITY MODE MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION STATUS REMARKS 16 Service Water Pipe break. Low pressure alarm. 1. Loss of water. Isolate break. Domestic Water Normal

. Header to C.R.I. Domestic System circulating Circulating water backup to lube supplying water pump Water Pump water open. C.R.I. bearings and operation while Bearings & seals on service water Seals circulating header is water pumps. repaired.

2. Loss of service water supply to circulating water pumps.

17 Diaphragm Fail open. Visual None Repair valve Normal

. Valve (1) operator. operation.

PV6522

  • During wintertime operation (ultimate heat sink temperature less than 60F), the standby RBCCW and TBCCW heat exchangers may b placed on line (service water side only) in order to maintain service water pump minimum flow requirements. If a standby heat exchan required to be placed in-service due to a failure of an RBCCW or TBCCW heat exchanger, then service water pump minimum flow con must be met by manually adjusting service water flow in the affected header. This may result in lower temperatures and will require clo monitoring of RBCCW or TBCCW component temperatures.

SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE (SHEET 1) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE (SHEET 2) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE (SHEET 3) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE (SHEET 4) figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

1 DESIGN BASES fuel and reactor component handling equipment provides for the safe handling, inspection storage of fuel assemblies, control element assemblies (CEA) and reactor internals under mal conditions. It also provides for the safe disassembly, handling, and reassembly of the tor vessel closure head, and in-core instrumentation (ICI).

1.1 Functional Requirements

a. The equipment shall be capable of operation in water with the following design chemistry:

pH (77F) 4.5 to 10.6 Boric Acid, Maximum, weight percent 1.5 Ammonia, Maximum(1), ppm 50 Lithium, Maximum (1) , ppm 2.5 Dissolved Air, Maximum Saturated Chloride, Maximum, ppm 0.15 Fluoride, Maximum, ppm 0.1

b. The equipment will normally be used during refueling for a period of approximately three weeks during which time it must operate continuously without maintenance or service.
c. The equipment is capable of operating dry for the initial reactor core loading.
d. In the event of loss of power, the equipment and its load remains in a safe condition.
e. Equipment located within the reactor containment building is capable of withstanding, without damage, the internal building test pressure.

1.2 Design Criteria

a. Structural Concentrations do not occur simultaneously.

based on properties of the material per American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) requirements.

2. The equipment will withstand the loading induced by the hypothetical vertical and horizontal seismic loadings which are considered as acting simultaneously on this equipment in conjunction with normal loads without exceeding material yield stresses as specified by ASTM.
3. Where required, keepers are provided to preclude derailment of equipment under seismic loading.

The following refueling equipment has been designed to seismic Category I requirements.

a. reactor polar crane
b. spent fuel cask crane
c. spent fuel pool platform crane (1)
d. new fuel elevator (1)
e. spent fuel storage racks
f. new fuel storage racks
g. permanent reactor cavity seal
h. refueling machine (1)
i. fuel transfer machine (1)
j. fuel tilting mechanisms (1)
k. fuel transfer tube and isolation valve The refueling machine and the fuel transfer system have been designed to accept the combined dead weight, live-load, and design seismic loads acting simultaneously without exceeding the allowable stress derived from the applicable Designated Seismic Class II components but designed for Class I earthquake basis.

The possibility of damage to a fuel assembly as a consequence of mishandling is minimized by extensive training, detailed procedures, and equipment design.

Inadvertent disengagement of a fuel assembly from the spent fuel pool platform crane or refueling machine is precluded by positive interlocks. Consequently, the possibility of dropping or damaging a fuel assembly during handling, resulting in the failure of all rods in the fuel assembly with the highest radioactive inventory is minimized. In addition, the exclusion boundary doses resulting from a fuel handling accident have been shown to be within the guideline of 10 CFR Part 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183. The safety aspects of a fuel handling accident are presented in detail in Section 14.7 of the FSAR.

b. Mechanical
1. In general, all hoisting and winching components conform to the requirements of Electric Overhead Crane (EOC)1, Specification number 61 and Crane Manufacturers Association of America (CMAA) Specification number 70.
2. Hoisting units are provided with two means of braking. Electric brakes are capable of holding 100 percent of the motor stall torque and shall permit convenient adjustments. Mechanical load brakes are capable of holding the rated load of the hoist.
3. Drives imparting equipment motions other than hoisting are equipped with automatically operated brakes sized to soft stop conditions.
4. Hoist drives are designed to regulate the speed during lowering so as to prevent undue acceleration.
5. Sheaves are supplied with keepers to prevent the wire rope from falling off.
6. If operation of gearing in oil is required, sealed enclosures are provided.

Drive mechanisms are installed in pans or similar containment to prevent spillage of lubricants. No oil is used underwater.

7. Grapples and mechanical latches which carry fuel assemblies or CEA's are mechanically interlocked against accidental opening.
8. Equipment is provided with suitable locking devices or restraints to prevent parts, fasteners, or limit switch actuators from becoming loose. In those cases where a loosened part or fastener can drop into, or is not separated by a barrier from, or whose rotary motion could propel it into the
9. The refueling machine is capable of removing and installing a fuel assembly at each operating location at the most adverse combined tolerance condition for the equipment, core internals and fuel assemblies.
10. Electrical limit switches and positive mechanical stops prevent the fuel from being lifted above the minimum safe water cover depth.
c. Electrical
1. Electrical equipment conforms to American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standards C6.1, C19.1 and C50 and National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) Standards.
2. Motor housing are grounded with ground straps.
3. Each motor and related conductors is protected against running overload by the use of a separate overload device responsive to motor current, or, in the case of NEMA Design B motors on high reversing duty, by overload devices specifically selected for the applications, such as embedded thermal sensing devices.
4. Where equipment heaters are required, they conform to the following requirements:
a. All control panels and motors are provided with heaters to maintain the temperature inside the panels above the dew point during periods of system inactivity.
b. All heaters are supplied by an independent power supply and suitably protected with overload devices specifically designed for the application.
5. Receptacles are suitably protected by overcurrent devices that will open the power supply leads.
6. The refueling machine hoist and the spent fuel pool platform crane hoist are provided with load measuring devices with a visual display of the load and interlocks to interrupt hoisting if the load reaches the overload setpoint and interrupt lowering if the load reaches the underload setpoint.
7. The refueling machine is provided with dual redundant electric brakes.
1. Where wire rope penetrates the borated water, it is unlubricated stainless steel wire rope with stainless steel core. Hoisting rope is stretched to twice the normal working load. Catch pans are provided where the hoisting rope might drip on the equipment or operator.
2. Equipment which will be located or operate submerged in dilute boric acid are of austenitic stainless steel or other corrosion-resistant material.
3. In general, where 17-4 precipitation-hardened stainless steel is used in the design of the equipment, a minimum heat treat temperature of 1100F (condition H-1100) is required.
4. Wire rope sheave units carrying stainless steel rope are fabricated of austenitic stainless steel or other corrosion resistant material. (Except for the five ton monorail hoist mounted to the spent fuel cask crane, which has a carbon steel bottom block assembly.
e. Radiological Considerations
1. All equipment is designed in an attempt to permit unrestricted access during disassembly, handling and reassembly operations.
2. Crevices in equipment have been minimized to facilitate decontamination.
f. Criticality Accident Requirements Millstone 2 has chosen to comply with 10 CFR 50.68(b).

2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 System 2.1.1 New Fuel Storage w fuel assemblies are transported by truck to the plant and into the auxiliary building in ulating agency approved containers. The new fuel assemblies are removed from the shipping tainers by the auxiliary hook of the spent fuel cask crane inspected and stored in the new fuel age racks which are designed for dry storage of 76 fuel assemblies. The arrangement of the s is shown in Figure 9.8-1.

new fuel assemblies with or without the CEAs nested are stored in an environment of air, perature of 55F to 110F ambient and a relative humidity of 30 to 100 percent. The base of new fuel storage racks is located at Elevation 38 feet 6 inches. The receiving and removal ration of the new fuel assemblies into or out of the storage cells are accomplished by lateral

heir longitudinal axis from a special tool attached to the auxiliary hook of the spent fuel cask e.

new fuel storage racks are fabricated of stainless steel and consisting of vertical cells in llel rows with a center-to-center distance of twenty and one-half inches. The new fuel storage s are designed to the requirements defined below:

a. Structural The structure consists of vertical elongated cells in rows and is of open construction to permit ventilation. Solid plate partitions are used as shear plates to resist horizontal loads or to transmit shear forces. The storage cells are accessible from the aisles between two rows of storage racks above a platform at Elevation 47 feet 6 inches. Guides, hold downs, and new fuel assembly bracings are provided at suitable horizontal intervals to assist receiving and removal operation as well as securing and maintaining the vertical alignment of the new fuel assembly in place for storage. Vertical guides are continuous for the full length of the fuel assemblies. The bottom plates are raised from the floor level and supported by the base of the new fuel rack. The storage rack and the base are designed to withstand all anticipated loadings, including dropping or side swinging of a fuel assembly on the rack in an accidental event. The structural deformations are limited to preclude any possibility of criticality.

The storage racks are laterally braced one to another and supported in a manner which will not permit a reduction in separation space in the event of a design earthquake. The racks themselves are designed not to collapse or bow under the force of a fuel assembly if dropped or swung against the rack.

b. Stability The new fuel storage racks are stabilized by floor anchorage only. This system will prevent significant lateral movement of the racks, containing any number of fuel assemblies and subjected to all anticipated loads, including the design basis earthquake (DBE). An insignificant lateral movement is one which will not reduce the center-to-center distance of the cells below the safe geometry margins. The maximum displacement of any member, joint or component of the structure is within the elastic limit of the material.
c. Safe Geometry Keff for the new fuel storage racks containing adjacent fresh fuel assemblies of 5.0 percent enrichment is less than 0.95 when flooded with clean unborated water, or with low density moderation. The 5 percent enrichment used in the analysis conservatively exceeds the 4.85 percent Technical Specification limit.

prevent possible damage to the fuel element if swung against the rack.

The racks consist of eleven modules for a total of 76 cells as shown on Figure 9.8-1.

With the base of the new fuel storage racks 38.5 feet mean sea level the possibility of new fuel being flooded with sea water is precluded. The new fuel vault is situated in an area over which no large piping is routed. Therefore, the only possible source of water into the vault would be minor leakage of rainwater through the roof or wall of the auxiliary building. The walls of the new fuel vault have been provided with block-outs which would allow any water in-leakage to drain out of the vault. Also, the active part of the new fuel assembly is approximately seven inches above the floor of the vault. In addition, the 20.5 inches center-to-center spacing precludes criticality in the highly unlikely event of flooding. Figure 9.8-2 shows a cross section of the new fuel storage vault.

Figures 9.8-3 through 9.8-6 show details of the new fuel storage racks.

As shown in Figure 9.8-2, the racks are a hybrid between side and top loading racks. This design was based on preventing the placing of two new fuel assemblies adjacent to each other and to minimize the amount of overlap between assemblies during handling in the new fuel vault.

The new fuel rack closure bar is an administratively controlled device which is used to laterally support the top of fuel assembly in the rack (see Figure 9.8-6).

The rack has been designed to take an uplift force equal to the dead weight of the empty rack module.

2.1.2 Spent Fuel Storage spent fuel pool is located in the fuel handling area of the auxiliary building. The pool is gned for the underwater storage of spent fuel assemblies after removal from the reactor core.

heat load analysis of the spent fuel pool conservatively accounts for a total of 1349 fuel mblies. Of these 1349 fuel assemblies, 1343 are intact fuel assemblies, and the other 6 fuel mblies are assumed to have been consolidated into 3 Consolidated Fuel Storage Boxes. As cribed later in this section, there are currently 1346 physical storage locations in the spent fuel

l. The spent fuel pool is designed to maintain approximately 24 feet of borated water above stored fuel assemblies. CEAs removed from the core are stored in the guide tubes of the fuel mblies.

spent fuel pool (SFP) also stores Non-standard Fuel Configurations (discussed later in this ion). A Non-standard Fuel Configuration is an object containing fuel that does not conform to standard fuel configuration. The standard fuel configuration is a 14 x 14 array of fuel rods (or

figuration. Reconstituted fuel in which one or more fuel rods have been replaced by either enriched fuel rods or stainless steel rods is considered to be a standard fuel configuration.

stainless steel storage racks consisting of vertical cells grouped in parallel rows, are designed a center-to-center distance of 9.8 inches in Regions 1 and 2 and 9.0 inches in Regions 3 and 4.

nt fuel decay heat is removed by the spent fuel pool cooling system described in Section 9.5.

fuel storage racks are designed to the requirements defined below while maintaining a sical arrangement that results in a Keff of 0.95 or less during all normal usage of the racks and er abnormal conditions. The arrangement also provides for adequate convective cooling of ed fuel assemblies.

ure 9.8-7 provides a schematic of the spent fuel pool arrangement described below.

a. Structural Region 1 consists of two 8 by 10 modules of spent fuel racks with a nominal center-to-center cell spacing of 9.8 inches. These racks contain Boraflex which is no longer credited in the spent fuel pool criticality analysis. These modules are used to store 80 fuel assemblies (up to a maximum initial planar average enrichment of 4.85 weight percent U-235) in a 2 out of 4 storage pattern as shown in Figure 9.8-7. In a 2 out of 4 storage pattern two locations in a 2 x 2 storage array (4 spent fuel storage locations) can store a fuel assembly, and the other two locations are designated as Restricted Locations as shown in Figure 9.8-7. Fuel storage rack locations designated as Restricted Locations in Figure 9.8-7 shall remain empty. No fuel assembly, no Non-standard Fuel Configuration, no non-fuel component, nor any hardware/material of any kind may be stored in a Restricted Location.(1) There are 80 Restricted Locations in this region.

Region 2 consists of two 8 by 9 modules and one 8 by 10 module of spent fuel racks with a nominal center-to-center cell spacing of 9.8 inches. These racks contain Boraflex which is no longer credited in the spent fuel pool criticality analysis. These modules are used to store spent fuel bundles that have achieved a specified fuel burnup vs. initial planar average enrichment. Region 2 also has two types of storage locations, designated Type 2A and Type 2B. Type 2A locations can store more reactive fuel assemblies than Type 2B. These modules are used to store 164 fuel assemblies in a 3 out of 4 storage pattern in which the fourth Note that Region 1 and 2 SFP rack storage locations contain removable Boraflex panel boxes ch house the Boraflex panels. The Boraflex panel boxes were manufactured as an integral part original SFP racks and as such are NOT stored components in SFP rack storage locations.

icality analysis has shown that the Restricted Locations are acceptable with or without the aflex panel boxes.

Region 3 consists of twelve modules of spent fuel racks with nominal center-to-center cell spacing of 9.0 inches, which do not contain Boraflex. These modules are used to store spent fuel assemblies that have achieved a specified fuel burnup vs. initial planar average enrichment. Region 3 requires that fuel assemblies contain either three Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets (installed in the assembly's center guide tube and in two diagonally opposite guide tubes), or a full length, full strength CEA (Note that credit is NOT allowed for the full-length, reduced-strength CEAs used in Cycles 1 through 6 [CEAs with serial numbers 66 through 73, inclusive] and for the part-length CEAs used in Cycle 1 [CEAs with identifier letters A through H, inclusive]). The region consists of 822 storage locations.

Region 4 consists of one 7 by 9 module and one 7 by 11 module of spent fuel racks with a nominal center-to-center cell spacing of 9.0 inches, which do not contain Boraflex. These modules are used to store spent fuel assemblies that have achieved a specified fuel burnup vs. initial planar average enrichment. These modules are used to store 100 fuel assemblies in a 3 out of 4 storage pattern with 40 Restricted Locations.

No structural changes to the storage rack modules were required as they were initially designed to withstand the static and dynamic loads resulting from the storage of both intact fuel assemblies and consolidated fuel in Regions 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The physical arrangement of the storage locations within the racks and the total number of racks provide for a total of 1346 storage locations. Of this number:

  • 80 locations are available within Region 1 for the storage of any fuel assembly, with 80 cells designated as Restricted Locations
  • 164 locations are available within Region 2 for the storage of fuel assemblies that meet the burnup requirements of this region, with 60 cells designated as Restricted Locations
  • all 822 locations are available within Region 3 for the storage of fuel assemblies that meet the burnup requirements of this region (and contain Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets or a CEA)
  • 100 locations are available within Region 4 for the storage of fuel assemblies that meet the burnup requirements of this region, with 40 cells designated as Restricted Locations.

80 Region 1 - Storage Locations (including Fuel Assemblies, Non-standard Fuel Configurations, and Non-fuel containing components) 80 Region 1 - Restricted Locations 164 Region 2 - Storage Locations 60 Region 2 - Restricted Locations 822 Region 3 - Storage Locations 100 Region 4 - Storage Locations 40 Region 4 - Restricted Locations 1346 Total Region 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 rack storage locations (including Restricted Locations)

Note that each Non-standard Fuel Configuration must have a separate criticality analysis which may allow storage in one or multiple Regions, and which may or may not require insertion of Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets or a full length, full strength CEA if stored in Region 3. A list of Non-standard Fuel Configurations that have been qualified for storage in any non-restricted pool location is included later in this section.

Fuel assemblies and Non-standard Fuel Configurations shall NOT be stored in Region 1 and 2 storage locations in which the Boraflex panel box has been removed. It is permissible to store non-fuel components in non-restricted locations whether or not the location contains a Boraflex panel box.

It should be noted, however, that both the spent fuel racks and the pool/building structure have been analyzed and qualified for the conditions and maximum loadings associated with consolidated fuel stored in each of the 1346 storage locations.

The spent fuel racks in all four regions are fabricated from 304 stainless steel which is 0.135 inches thick. Each cell is formed by welding along the intersecting seams. This enables each spent fuel rack module to become a free-standing module that meets the seismic design requirements without mechanical dependence on neighboring modules or fuel pool walls for support. The rack modules are classified ANS Safety Class III and Seismic Category I.

boxes through natural circulation. Safety analyses of the thermal conditions within the spent fuel pool have been performed to assure that even with the most severe expected heat load, the stored spent fuel can be adequately cooled during normal and abnormal conditions.

b. Stability The spent fuel racks have been designed for direct bearing onto the spent fuel pool floor. An adjustable pad (Figure 9.8-8D) is provided under each corner of the fuel rack. Fuel rack module leveling is accomplished by adjusting each pad height to conform to the pool floor. Each foot can be raised or lowered one-quarter inch and can rotate two to three degrees to accommodate pool floor variations during installation.

The spent fuel storage racks are designed to withstand forces generated during normal operation, an operating basis earthquake (OBE), or a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) with the loads associated with consolidated fuel. Lateral and vertical seismic loads along with fluid forces are considered to be acting simultaneously on the fuel racks. The racks are designed to assure rack structural integrity while at the same time keeping the fuel in a subcritical state.

The seismic analysis of the spent fuel rack includes an assessment of the maximum sliding and tipping that can be expected. The racks are installed with a nominal gap of two inches between modules and the pool walls. The analysis has shown that the maximum motion of the racks, including tipping, sliding, and thermal expansion is less than the gap between adjacent modules.

Materials for all components of the rack support system are made of stainless steel with high temperature and corrosion resistance. The design and fabrication of the system is in accordance with the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Codes where applicable.

c. Safe Geometry Analyses have been performed to ensure that the multiplication factor, Keff of the storage racks including all uncertainties, is less than 0.95, with a 95% probability at the 95% confidence limit, under all normal conditions with water borated to a minimum of 550 ppm, and all accident conditions with water borated to a minimum of 2100 ppm. Analyses have also been performed to ensure that the Keff of the storage racks, including all biases and uncertainties, is less than 1.00, on a 95% probability at the 95% confidence limit, under all normal conditions with unborated water. These analyses cover all four (4) regions of the spent fuel pool, which are designated Regions 1, 2, 3, and 4. These analyses also address other equipment in the spent fuel pool which may hold fuel assemblies on a temporary

water temperature range from 32F to 150F, and an accident condition temperature range from 150F to boiling are bounded by these analyses.

1. Region 1, Region 2, and Region 4 Region 1 fuel storage racks do not credit fuel burnup and require fuel assembly storage in a 2 out of 4 storage pattern. Region 2 and Region 4 fuel storage racks credit fuel burnup and require storage in a 3 out of 4 storage pattern. Figure 9.8-7 shows the spent fuel rack storage patterns, including the designated Restricted Locations, for each region.

The criticality analysis for Region 1 assumes an infinite array of storage locations exist, and that 2 out of 4 storage locations are filled with fuel assemblies that have an initial planar average enrichment of 4.85 weight percent U-235. The criticality analysis for Regions 2 and 4 assumes that an infinite array of storage locations exist, and 3 out of 4 storage locations are filled with the maximum reactivity fuel assemblies allowed by the Technical Specifications. The moderator for each region is assumed to be water borated to 0 ppm for the Keff< 1.0 case, and to a minimum level of 550 ppm for the Keff < 0.95 case.

The Region 1 and 2 fuel storage racks contain Boraflex which is no longer credited as a neutron absorber.

For Regions 1, 2, and 4 the reactivity effects associated with the following manufacturing material and dimensional tolerances are accounted for: storage rack dimensional tolerances, and fuel dimensional and enrichment tolerances. Also accounted for are eccentric loading of fuel in the storage locations and calculational bias/uncertainties in the methods used to calculate Keff. In addition the Regions 2 and 4 analyses account for the reactivity effects associated with axial fuel burnup variations, uncertainty in fuel isotopics, and uncertainty in the declared burnup, clad creep, fuel rod growth, and migration of volatile fission products.

2. Region 3 - Storage of Fuel Assemblies Region 3 fuel storage racks do not contain a neutron poison. Fuel may be stored in all locations of Region 3, subject to meeting the fuel burnup restrictions specified by the Technical Specifications, and containing Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets or a full length, full strength CEA (note that the criticality analysis for a given Non-standard Fuel Configuration may qualify it for Region 3 storage without these inserts). Fuel assemblies which have achieved the burnup required by the Technical Specifications and contain Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets or a full length, full strength CEA may be stored in Region 3. The insertion of Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets and full length, full strength CEAs are

Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets are installed and credited, three poison rodlets must be placed inside the fuel assembly guide tubes. The three Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets must be located in the center fuel assembly guide tube and any two other guide tubes which are diagonally opposite each other.

Qualified fuel assemblies containing Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets or a full length, full strength CEA, as well as qualified Non-standard Fuel Configurations, may be mixed in any manner in the Region 3 storage racks.

The criticality analysis for Region 3 assumes that an infinite array of storage locations exist, all filled with the maximum reactivity fuel assemblies allowed by the Technical Specifications. The moderator is assumed to be 550 ppm borated water at the water temperature which causes the maximum Keff. In Region 3, a positive moderator temperature coefficient exists, therefore, higher water temperatures give larger values of Keff. A water temperature of 150F is the largest normal spent fuel pool temperature. Spent fuel pool temperatures greater than 150F are evaluated as accident conditions.

For Region 3 the reactivity effects associated with the following manufacturing material and dimensional tolerances are accounted for: storage rack dimensional tolerances, Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlet diameter and boron loading tolerances, and fuel dimensional and enrichment tolerances. Also accounted for are eccentric loading of fuel in the storage locations, calculation bias/uncertainties in the methods used to calculate Keff, the reactivity effects associated with axial fuel burnup variations, uncertainty in fuel isotopics, uncertainty in the declared burnup, clad creep, fuel rod growth, and migration of volatile fission products.

3. All Regions - Non-standard Fuel Configurations Each region of the SFP may store Non-standard Fuel Configurations, except for the Restricted Locations and locations in which the Boraflex panel box is removed.

However, each Non-standard Fuel Configuration must have a separate criticality analysis which may allow storage in one or multiple Regions, and which may or may not require Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets or a full length, full strength CEA if stored in Region 3.

The following list contains Non-standard Fuel Configurations which have been analyzed for SFP storage. They may be stored in all regions (except Restricted Locations and locations in which the Boraflex panel box has been removed). The list also indicates whether or not the Non-standard Fuel Configuration requires insertion of Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets or a CEA if stored in Region 3.

The analysis for each Non-standard Fuel Configuration concluded that the multiplication factor, Keff of the storage racks including all uncertainties, is < 0.95 at a 95% probability and 95% confidence level.

Borated Stainless Steel Poison Rodlets or full length, full strength Non-standard Fuel CEA Required for Configuration Description Region 3 Storage?

Failed Fuel Storage Failed fuel storage cage. Normal No Grid Cage G-56 MP2 fuel lattice spacing B&W Failed Rod NUSCO 40 failed rod storage No Storage Container basket. Contains 16 failed fuel rods and a tube with 5 fuel pellet fragments.

Consolidated Fuel Consolidated fuel from two No Storage Box depleted fuel assemblies in each basket.

Individual Rod Storage Hollow stainless steel tube No Container stored in a fuel assembly guide thimble with one failed fuel rod inside.

Storage Cage 8FR Donor cage has normal assembly No pitch and lattice, 52 depleted fuel pins, 12 natural enrichment pins, 86 non-fuel filler rods, and 26 empty locations.

Fuel Assembly P-26 Failed assembly in which a fuel Yes (has missing fuel rod) rod was removed and not replaced.

4. Other Equipment Which May Store Fuel on a Temporary Basis There are two pieces of equipment in the spent fuel pool, other than the storage racks, which could store fuel on a temporary basis. They are: the new fuel elevator and the fuel transfer machine.

The new fuel elevator has been analyzed to be capable of storing a fresh 4.85 weight percent U-235 fuel assembly, and maintaining the Keff of the storage racks including all uncertainties, to less than 0.95, with a 95% probability at the 95%

confidence limit.

percent U-235 fuel assemblies, and maintaining Keff of the transfer machine configuration including all uncertainties, to less than 0.95, with a 95% probability at the 95% confidence limit.

5. Accident Conditions Analyses have been performed to ensure that the multiplication factor, Keff of the storage racks including all uncertainties, is less than 0.95, with a 95% probability at the 95% confidence limit, under all normal conditions with credit for 550 ppm borated water, and all accident conditions with credit for a total of 2100 ppm boron in the water.

The following conditions were considered in these analyses (Note that the following scenarios assume fuel contains zero gadolinia loading):

  • Multiple misloads of 4.85 weight percent U-235 fresh fuel assemblies into Region 1 and 2 storage locations.
  • Multiple misloads of higher than typical reactivity depleted fuel assemblies (initial enrichment of 4.20 weight percent U-235 and 10 GWD/MTU burnup) into Region 3 and 4 storage locations.
  • Mislead or dropping of a single 4.85 weight percent U-235 fresh fuel assembly into a Region 4 storage location.
  • Dropping or misplacing a 4.85 weight percent U-235 fresh fuel assembly between Region 3 and the new fuel elevator, with a 4.85 weight percent U-235 fresh fuel assembly in the new fuel elevator.
  • Three 4.85 weight percent U-235 fresh fuel assemblies are allowed to touch edge to edge. This bounds a scenario in which two fresh fuel assemblies are in the fuel transfer cart and another fresh fuel assembly, by some undefined means, is allowed to come edge to edge with the fuel assembly in the transfer cart.
  • Loss of pool cooling resulting in SFP temperature increase and voiding.
  • Dropping of a fuel assembly or Non-standard Fuel Configuration which comes to rest on top of the racks in a horizontal position.
  • Lateral rack movement due to a seismic event affecting the spacing between racks of any of the Regions.

10 GWD/MTU burnup) into Region 3 and 4 storage locations. The analysis shows that a 2100 ppm boron concentration ensures that Keff remains < 0.95, including all uncertainties and biases.

The spent fuel shipping cask is placed in the spent fuel pool cask laydown area for loading. The spent fuel cask is designed such that spent fuel assemblies can be placed into the cask while maintaining adequate water coverage above the fuel assembly. After loading with fuel assemblies, the cask cover is fastened to the cask and the cask is transferred to the cask wash area by the spent fuel cask crane.

Interlocks are provided on the cask crane to prevent handling of the shipping cask above the storage racks and stored fuel. The cask cover is fastened in place before the cask is moved from the pool to prevent the fuel assemblies from falling out in the unlikely event of a dropped cask accident. Also it prevents the cask cover from becoming a missile in the event of a dropped cask accident. While the cask is en route to the decontamination pit at elevation (+) 38 feet six inches, plastic or other means are provided to catch any contaminated water dripping off the cask. The cask is washed down with demineralized water which is drained to the radioactive processing system. Checks are made to ensure that surface contamination meets transportation regulatory requirements.

Temperature monitoring and alarm instrumentation as described in Section 9.5 are provided in the fuel pool to assure that the decay heat from the spent fuel elements is being removed. A local monitor is used to assure that proper radiation levels are maintained. Means are provided to control entry of personnel and to account for the flow of tools in and out of the area.

Figure 9.8-9 shows the physical arrangement of the ten leak collection zones of the spent fuel pool liner. Figure 9.5-1 of the FSAR shows, schematically, the leak detection equipment.

Leakage from any portion of the spent fuel pool liner would collect in one of the ten zone collector channels and would drain out of the channel into a common header. Once in the header the leakage would accumulate upstream of closed valve 2-RW-175. This accumulation would trip level switch LS-7321 which would, in turn, annunciate the appropriate alarm on the main control board.

The liner plate was manufactured under quality assurance requirements and was tested for leak tightness prior to plant operation. Therefore, no leakage is expected under normal conditions.

The spent fuel cask crane, which includes a monorail hoist, and spent fuel pool platform crane are capable of passing over the spent fuel pool. Since both are designed and analyzed for seismic Category l requirements, their failure and

The spent fuel cask crane handles the following items in the area of the spent fuel pool:

a. The spent fuel cask.
b. The spent fuel pool bulkhead gates.
c. The new fuel assemblies.

The spent fuel cask crane (SFCC), which includes the main hoist (125 tons) and auxiliary hoist (15 tons), has been designed to meet the single failure proof requirements in accordance with NUREG-0612 and NUREG-0554. The design features will ensure that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the system to safely retain the load. Load drop events are not credible for loads lifted by the SFCC when handled and rigged in accordance with the single failure criteria.

The spent fuel pool bulkhead gates are essentially 26 foot long by three foot six inches wide by one inch thick flat plates weighing approximately 5100 pounds each. The gates are normally stored on the west wall of the spent fuel storage area just south of the transfer slot and on the east wall just south of the cask laydown area transfer slot. If for some reason either transfer canal or the cask laydown area must be drained, the spent fuel cask crane moves the gate from its storage location to the transfer slot. Movement of the gates will be performed under administrative controls to ensure compliance with the heavy loads guidelines of NUREG-0612 through use of a single failure proof lifting system or through the use of controlled safe load paths and therefore fuel damage from a spent fuel pool bulkhead gate drop is not a credible event.

New fuel assemblies are transferred to the spent fuel pool by using a short fuel handling tool attached to the auxiliary hook of the spent fuel cask crane and transferring the new fuel assembly into the new fuel elevator located in the spent fuel pool. The new fuel assembly is handled and rigged in accordance with the single failure proof criteria of NUREG-0612. Therefore, a new fuel assembly load drop is not a credible event.

The spent fuel pool platform crane manipulates the fuel under water by means of long tools attached to the hoist. Since there is some operator handling in attaching or detaching the tools, it is conceivable that a tool could be dropped. The tools are approximately 32 feet long by three inches in diameter, weighing approximately 270 pounds. The pool water would offer practically no resistance to this shape, but the weight and drop height are small enough that no damage would be caused to rack or the fuel stored inside even if the dropped tool hit directly on a fuel

dropping of the fuel assembly with no appreciable damage.

The rack has been designed and analyzed to take an uplift force equal to 6000 pounds. The normal capacity of the spent fuel pool platform crane is 2000 pounds, which is less than the analyzed weight so that it is unlikely that the hoist would cause any damage if it were caught on the rack and the cranes overload device failed to operate.

6. Spent Fuel Pool Dilution Criticality analysis has shown that 600 ppm of soluble boron is sufficient under normal conditions in the SFP, to assure not to exceed the 0.95 keff design basis (including biases and uncertainties). The actual analysis shows that 550 ppm of soluble boron is sufficient to meet this keff requirement. The criticality analysis has also shown that 0 ppm of soluble boron, under normal conditions in the SFP, assures keff is maintained less than 1.00 (including biases and uncertainties). An engineering analysis of potential scenarios which could dilute the boron concentration in the SFP demonstrates that sufficient time is available to detect and mitigate a boron dilution prior to reaching 600 ppm, thus not exceeding the 0.95 keff design basis (including biases and uncertainties). It should be noted that the criticality analysis credits 2100 ppm of soluble boron in the SFP for certain accident conditions. However, a boron dilution event does not need to be considered for these conditions. This is because the simultaneous occurrence of two unlikely and independent events such as a boron dilution event and another independent accident condition is not required to be considered.

The systems which could dilute the spent fuel pool, either by direct connection to the spent fuel pool, or by a potential pipe crack/break have been analyzed. There is no automatic spent fuel pool level control system in the spent fuel pool, so that any dilution to the spent fuel pool will add water to the spent fuel pool. Therefore the addition of unborated water to the SFP will lead to increased SFP water level, and if not controlled, an overflow of the SFP.

The ability to prevent the SFP soluble boron concentration from being diluted from less than the TS minimum value of 2100 ppm (analysis was performed at 1720 ppm) to a value of 600 ppm has been demonstrated by showing that each potential dilution source meets one of the following two criteria:

  • The dilution source does not have a sufficient volume of unborated water to be capable of diluting the SFP soluble boron concentration from 1720 ppm (less than the 2100 ppm TS requirement) to 600 ppm.
  • The dilution source flowrate of unborated water is 200 gpm. At a dilution flowrate of 200 gpm of unborated water, at least 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> will be needed

the water added to the SFP will eventually cause a SFP high water level alarm in the control room alarm, or be detected by the Plant Equipment Operator (PEO) detecting high SFP water levels or SFP overflow. A time of 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> is ample time to detect and terminate the dilution event.

7. Spent Fuel Storage in an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

With the installation of the Millstone ISFSI, dry storage of Unit 2 spent fuel on the Millstone ISFSI provides an available fuel storage option. Millstone has selected the NUHOMS spent fuel storage system under Transnuclear Corporations general license as authorized per 10 CFR 72 and approved by the NRC in Certificate of Compliance Number1004 for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

The ISFSI is designed to accommodate on site spent fuel storage through the end of plant life including 20 year license renewal, or until transfer of the spent fuel to a DOE repository. The spent fuel storage canisters are dual purpose, designed for storage in an ISFSI per 10 CFR 72 requirements and transport off site in a spent fuel shipping cask per 10 CFR 71 requirements.

The NUHOMS system consists of reinforced concrete horizontal storage modules (HSMs) and steel dry shielded canisters (DSCs) assembled on a concrete pad within the site protected area boundary. System operation is totally passive crediting natural air circulation for cooling.

Spent fuel is selected based on the Unit 2 spent fuel strategy and the NUHOMS Technical Specification requirements for fuel qualification. The DSC consists of a shell and basket assembly, which can accommodate 32 fuel assemblies. The DSC is inserted into a transfer cask and placed in the cask laydown area of the Unit 2 spent fuel pool for fuel loading. Once loaded, the transfer cask/DSC is relocated to the cask wash pit for draining, drying, closure operations and decontamination.

The transfer cask is utilized to transfer the loaded DSC to the ISFSI pad for loading into an HSM. The HSM array consists of precast concrete components forming a series of concrete storage modules for dry shielded canisters storing spent fuel.

2.1.3 Fuel Transfer Tube and Isolation Valve uel transfer tube extending through the containment wall connects the refueling pool with the nt fuel pool as shown in Figure 9.8-10. During reactor operation, the transfer tube is closed by ns of a manually operated isolation valve located on the spent fuel pool side of the transfer e and a blind flange located inside the containment. Section 9.8.3.2, "Standard System rations" describes preparation of the fuel transfer tube for refueling operations.

transfer tube isolation valve is bolted to the spent fuel pool end of transfer tube. The valve is ported in such a manner to allow for horizontal movement along the centerline of the transfer

. The manual operator for the valve is designed to allow for movement of the valve due to mal expansions and still permit operation. The valve stem extends above the operating pool er level at elevation (+) 36 feet 6 inches and designed for manipulation from the operating k at elevation (+) 38 feet 6 inches. The valve is furnished with a spur gear operator and ition indicator.

2.1.4 Spent Fuel Pool Platform Crane spent fuel pool platform crane consists of a bridge which spans the width of the spent fuel l and a trolley mounted hoist that traverses the length of the bridge. The crane is located above spent fuel pool and rides on rails set in the concrete on the north and south sides of the pool.

ctric motors position the bridge and trolley over the specified rack location, new fuel elevator, sfer carriage upender, and spent fuel shipping cask.

spent fuel pool platform crane transfers:

1. spent fuel assemblies from the upender to the spent fuel storage rack,
2. new fuel assemblies from the new fuel elevator to the upender normally via temporary positions in the spent fuel storage racks,
3. spent fuel assemblies from the spent fuel storage racks to the spent fuel shipping cask,
4. damaged or leaking fuel assemblies into a special container which, in turn, is placed into a special damaged fuel shipping cask,
5. spent fuel assemblies to and from the new fuel elevator for inspection In addition, the spent fuel pool platform crane may be used for retrieving dropped items from the spent fuel pool or to place in and retrieve from the pool various items that may be stored in the spent fuel pool for radioactive decay.
6. CEAs in the spent fuel storage racks.

2.2 Components 2.2.1 New Fuel Storage Racks new fuel storage racks are a welded construction of stainless steel to provide dry, vertical age for 76 assemblies. The new fuel assemblies are placed into the rack through the top of the

2.2.2 Design and Fabrication of Spent Fuel Racks modules of Regions 1, 2, 3, and 4 are designed and licensed to store fuel with a maximum al planar average enrichment of 4.85 weight percent U235 depending on the fuel history and specific requirements of the respective Region of the spent fuel pool where the fuel is to be ed.

spent fuel storage racks are fabricated with 304 stainless steel having a maximum carbon tent of 0.065 percent, with a 304 stainless steel module wall thickness of 0.135 inches. The s are monolithic honeycomb structures with square fuel storage locations as shown in ure 9.8-8A. Each storage location is formed by welding stainless steel sections along the rsecting seams, permitting the assembled cavities to become the load bearing structure, as l as framing the storage cell enclosures. Each module is free standing and seismically qualified hout mechanical dependence on neighboring modules or pool walls. This feature allows ote installation (or removal if required for pool maintenance). Reinforcing plates at the upper ners provide the required strength for handling. The racks are designed to withstand the pping of a fuel assembly or a consolidated storage box onto the top of the racks with no loss of gn function. Figure 9.8-7 shows the arrangement of Regions 1, 2, 3, and 4 modules in the lstone Unit Number 2 pool, including the Restricted Locations.

nless steel bars, which are inserted horizontally through the rectangular slots in the lower on of the module, support the fuel assemblies. The support bars are welded in place and port an entire row of fuel assemblies. The module is supported by adjustable pads to facilitate ling at installation.

ding of the fuel racks is facilitated via movable lead-in funnels. The openings of the funnels symmetrical. The funnels are placed on top of the rack module.

ions 1 and 2 have a combined maximum total of 244 locations available for storage. Each age location, including Restricted Locations, contains or contained a Boraflex poison insert ch is no longer credited. Some storage locations may have their Boraflex panel boxes oved. Fuel assemblies and Non-standard Fuel Configurations shall NOT be stored in locations re these boxes have been removed (it is permissible to store non-fuel components in these tions except for the Restricted Locations). These inserts are made up of Boraflex sheets losed, but not sealed, between two stainless steel sheets. The neutron absorbing material, aflex, is designed to be compatible with the pool environment. Positive venting of the poison rovided by the three-eighth inch diameter hole in the inner walls of the inserts. The stainless l sheets are configured such that a minimum water gap is maintained between the insert and cell wall. These inserts lock into the storage cavity using a spring locking mechanism on the er end which snaps into a hole in the surrounding cell wall. These poison inserts are neutron orbers. A typical Region 1 and 2 fuel rack module and poison box is shown in Figures 9.8-8A 9.8-8C.

rance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Boraflex is a silicone based polymer containing particles of boron carbide in a homogeneous, stable matrix.

ion 3 consists of a maximum of 822 storage locations with no Restricted Locations, and spent assemblies and qualified Non-standard Fuel Configurations can be stored in these locations.

ion 3 employs a combination of burnup credit and insertion of Borated Stainless Steel Poison lets or a full length, full strength CEA for reactivity control (Non-standard Fuel figurations may be qualified for Region 3 storage without insertion of Borated Stainless Steel son Rodlets or a CEA).

ion 4 has a maximum of 100 storage locations available for storage of fuel assemblies and

-standard Fuel Configurations, and also employs burnup credit for fuel assemblies.

ions 3 and 4 are reserved for fuel that has sustained a specified burn-up and for qualified

-standard Fuel Configurations. The spent fuel rack design is based on the criticality eptance criteria specified in Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.13 (1981 draft version (1))

ch allows credit for reactivity depletion in spent fuel. (Previously, the physics criteria for fuel ed in the spent fuel pool were defined by the maximum unirradiated initial enrichment of the

.) A typical Region 3 and 4 module is shown in Figure 9.8-8B.

entire fuel assembly storage rack is constructed of type 304 stainless steel. All welded struction is used in the fabrication of the fuel assembly storage rack. Design of the individual s provides assurance of smooth, snag free passage in the storage cavities so that it is highly robable that a fuel assembly could become stuck in the rack.

storage racks are structurally sized in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel e,Section III, Subsection NF, design allowable stress limits. Welding is performed in ordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section IX. The spent fuel racks are mic Category I, Quality Class 2 structure, ANS Safety Class III.

2.2.3 Reactor Refueling Machine reactor refueling machine is shown in Figure 9.8-11. The refueling machine is located above refueling pool and rides on rails set in the concrete on each side of the pool. The refueling hine consists of a bridge which travels along the north-south axis, a trolley which travels g the east-west axis on the bridge, and a hoist which raises and lowers fuel assemblies with grapple. The grapple is a pneumatically-operated, rotating hook which engages the fuel The 1981 draft of Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.13 was referenced in the Millstone Unit 2 nt fuel pool storage expansion licensing amendment request submitted in 1985. The NRC roved this request in 1986 (Amendment Number 109). Subsequently, the final version of the ision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.13, approved in 2007, removed discussion of credit for tivity depletion in spent fuel.

ective shroud around the hoist box and fuel assembly. The hoist, hoist box, mast and grapple hanism are all supported from the trolley.

dge, trolley, and hoist drives are variable speed with a range of 0 to 50 ft/min on the bridge, 0 0 ft/min on the trolley and 0 to 40 ft/min on the fuel hoist. All other devices on the RFM rate at a single speed. Operating speeds of the air actuated devices (grapple and spreader) are stable at a pneumatic control panel.

refueling machine has three (3) modes of operation; automatic, semi-automatic and manual.

three axes of motion can be controlled via handwheels in the event that the control system is perable.

2.2.3.1 RFM Control System RFM control system monitors all hoist movements using dual-redundant position encoders ll three axes of movement, a load weighing system and the following condition detection limit tches:

Slack Cable Fuel Spreader Retracted Fuel Spreader Extended Grapple Closed Hoist-up Limit Hoist Box Latched Grapple Open RFM control console is installed on the trolley deck during refueling operations only and ved to a storage location at the conclusion of refueling operations. All external electrical nections to the Control Console are made by quick-disconnect connectors. The console has a zontal shelf and a vertical panel. The horizontal shelf has a control panel which contains the rating controls and indicator lights for the bridge, trolley and hoist mechanism, an operator solet with an analog joystick for each axis of movement and grapple and fuel spreader control tches. The vertical panel contains additional indicator lights, override and emergency stop h buttons, hoist load meter, computer monitor and position readouts. The control console also udes a Gai-Tronics jack, phone and speaker to support refueling communication needs.

bridge is operated by moving the joystick towards the FORWARD or REVERSE positions, trolley is operated by moving the trolley joystick towards the LEFT or RIGHT position. Speed etermined by how far the joystick is displaced from the neutral position. The refueling hine control system monitors all bridge and trolley movements using dual-redundant, rack pinion encoders. In the event of a power loss or emergency stop, the bridge brake will set and the bridge with a deceleration less than 0.1g and the bridge encoders will not lose track of the ge position. The trolley will brake to a complete stop and the trolley encoders will not lose k of the trolley position. Both electric brakes can be manually released for handwheel ration. The trolley also features two deck-mounted viewing windows and a pneumatic control el which operates the fuel grapple, fuel spreader and hoist box latch and a camera system that vides operators with an overall view of the area under the trolley deck.

2.2.3.3 Hoist main fuel hoist lifts and lowers the hoist box assembly and consists of an AC servo motor, or drive, gearbox, two (2) electric-brakes, hoist drum, hoist cable and a limit switch. The hoist ounted on the trolley and has a rated capacity of 3590 pounds. The main fuel hoist is operated moving the hoist joystick in the RAISE and LOWER position. Speed is determined by how far joystick is displaced from the neutral position. The refueling machine control system monitors hoist movements using dual-redundant, stainless steel tagline encoders. The load weighing em provides a six (6) position selector switch on the control console to choose the fuel type, thus adjust the individual setpoints for each type.

mast is equipped with a retractable stop called the Latch, located near the top of the mast.

ing operation over the upender, the hoist box automatically engages this stop to hold it in its er, retracted, position. When the weight of the hoist box is transferred to the Latch, a Hoist Latched message is displayed on the touch screen, indicating the hoist box is supported by Latch. The hoist is latched automatically when the refueling machine is over the upender area, unlatched automatically when it is not over the upender area.

2.2.3.4 Mast/Hoist Box mast is a vertically-oriented, cylindrical structure supported by the trolley. Mounted within mast is the hoist box. The hoist box descends from the mast when the hoist is lowered. The pple is rotated to an Open position via a pneumatic mechanism. Lowering the grapple further ws it to pass over the top fitting of the fuel assembly. The grapple is rotated to a closed ition, engaging the fuel assembly. The hoist raises the fuel assembly and the grapple hanism into the hoist box, which is then lifted into the mast, which acts as a protective shroud und the hoist box and fuel assembly. The hoist box is equipped with a fuel spreader to ensure quate spacing between fuel assemblies. The mast can also be manually rotated via a hand el.

RFM Auxiliary Hoist is rated to 1,000 pounds capacity and includes a motorized trolley, load and pendant. The pendant is used for manual control of the auxiliary hoist, its trolley and the M bridge. The pendant also contains local load and height indicators and can be used to initiate Emergency Stop. The auxiliary hoist travels along the east-west axis on the monorail frame unted to the RFM bridge. In the event of a power loss, the auxiliary hoist will brake to a plete stop. The electric brake can be released for manual handwheel operations.

2.2.3.6 Modes of Operation Manual mode, control of all axes of motion (bridge, trolley and hoist) is accomplished using ticks that provide analog speed commands to the PLC. All RFM travel boundaries, operator lays, and safety interlocks remain functional. Arrows will indicate bridge and trolley itions as the RFM moves in response to joystick commands. The encoder positions associated h the desired location will also be displayed for numerical comparison with the instantaneous ition indications on the control console. Once over the core, hoist speed icons will indicate ons where the hoist may operate at high speed or low speed.

Semi-automatic mode, the Operator manually enters a destination coordinate via the hscreen. The bridge and the trolley will move simultaneously toward the destination rdinate. Hoist motion will be controlled manually along with the grapple.

omatic mode includes all features of the Semi-automatic Mode with the added capability to cute a sequence of movements based on fuel management software stored on the computer.

sequence of movements will be displayed on screen. Operators will have the opportunity to fy each move before it is executed.

rlock override mode allows the operators full control of the RFM in the event of a PLC ure. Interlock override mode bypasses the PLC via a key switch on the control console. With PLC bypassed, the RFM will operate as commanded by the operators at intermediate speeds lley - 5 ft/min, Bridge and Hoist - 10 ft/min) with no regard to PLC programmed travel limits interlocks. The Hoist Up Limit and Slack Cable Limit switches will still prevent hoist vements in the up and down direction.

three axis of motion can also be controlled via handwheels in the event that the control system operable.

2.2.4 Transfer Carriage ansfer carriage conveys the fuel assemblies between the refueling pool and the spent fuel age area. Large wheels support the carriage and allow it to roll on tracks within the transfer

e. Track sections at both ends of the transfer tube are supported from the pool floor and permit carriage to be properly positioned to the upending mechanisms. The carriage is driven by steel les connected to the carriage and through sheaves to its driving winch mounted on the

support for the replaceable rails on which the transfer carriage rides are welded to the 36 inch meter transfer tube. The rail assemblies are fabricated to a length which will allow them to be ered for installation in the transfer tube. There are no rails in the valve on the fuel storage side he transfer tube to allow closing of the valve.

2.2.5 Upending Machine o upending machines are provided, one in the containment refueling pool and the other in the nt fuel pool. Each consists of a structural steel support base from which is pivoted an upending ddle frame which engages the two pocket fuel carrier. When the carriage with its fuel carrier is osition within the upending frame, the pivots for the fuel carrier and the upending frame are cident. Two hydraulic cylinders, attached to both the vertical and horizontal positions uired by the fuel transfer procedure. Each hydraulic cylinder can perform the upending ration and can be isolated in the event of its failure. A long tool is also provided to allow ual rotation of the fuel carrier in the event that both cylinders fail or hydraulic power is lost.

2.2.6 Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Rig reactor vessel head lifting rig is shown in Figure 9.8-13.

lifting rig is composed of a removable three part lifting frame and a three part column mbly which is attached to the reactor vessel closure head. The column assembly supports the e hoists which are provided for handling the hydraulic stud tensioners, the studs, washers and

, and links the lifting frame with the reactor vessel head.

weight of the reactor vessel head, with the lift rig, CEDMs and CEDM cooling shroud ched, is approximately 140 tons and its shape is approximated by a right circular cylinder 17 in diameter and 37 feet high. The maximum height above the reactor vessel flange to which reactor vessel head may be lifted is 30 feet. In operation, the head with lift rig attached will be d above the vessel only as high as required to clear the control element drive mechanism DM) extension shafts, approximately 28 feet.

equipment used in lifting the reactor vessel head, namely the head lift rig and the reactor r crane, is analyzed for Seismic Class I requirements and has been manufactured under the lity assurance supervision of a Q-Listed item.

2.2.7 Core Support Barrel Lifting Rig core support barrel lifting rig, shown in Figure 9.8-14, is provided to withdraw the core el from the vessel for inspection purposes. The upper clevis assembly is a tripod shaped cture connecting the lifting rig to the containment crane lifting hook. The lifting rig includes a ader beam providing three attachment points which are to be threaded to the core support el flange. This is accomplished manually from the refueling machine bridge by means of the

2.2.8 Upper Guide Structure Lifting Rig upper guide structure (UGS) lifting rig is shown in Figure 9.8-15.

s lifting rig consists of a delta spreader beam which supports three columns providing chment points to the UGS. Attachment to the upper guide structure is accomplished manually m the working platform by means of lifting bolt torque tools. The integral ICI hoist connects to daptor which is manually attached to the ICI structure by utilizing an adapter torque tool The is then lifted by the crane hook. The upper clevis assembly, which is common to this and the support barrel lifting rig, is installed prior to lifting of the structure by the crane hook.

rect positioning is assured by attached bushings which mate to the reactor vessel guide pins.

weight of the UGS and lift rig is approximately 58 tons and its shape can be approximated by ght circular cylinder 14 feet in diameter and 44 feet in height. The maximum height to which UGS may be lifted is approximately 18 feet. The normal lift height is approximately 13.5 feet.

equipment used in lifting the UGS, namely the UGS lift rig and the reactor polar crane, is lyzed for seismic Category I requirements and has been manufactured under the quality rance supervision as outlined in Appendix 1B (located in the original FSAR dated August 2). In addition the maximum capacity of the reactor polar crane is 160 tons which is roximately 100 tons greater than the lift weight of the UGS.

2.2.9 Stud Tensioners raulically operated stud tensioners are used to apply and remove the preload on the reactor sel head closure studs. These tensioners are suspended from electric hoists which are attached he head lift rig. The tensioner assemblies, when placed over the studs, rest upon the reactor sel head flange. An internal socket is attached to the stud by engagement with the stud upper ads and when hydraulic pressure is applied to the stud tensioner pistons, the studs are gated a predetermined amount. After closure nuts are seated, the hydraulic pressure is ased which result in the preload necessary to maintain the seal between the reactor vessel and reactor vessel head.

ortable pumping unit mounting on a two-wheel truck is the source of hydraulic power. Two operated pumps connected in parallel produce the hydraulic pressure which is routed by hose he tensioner pistons. The control panel contains an air gauge indicating the regulated air sure and air valve for operating the pump. An hydraulic gauge showing the pump pressure is provided as is the hydraulic valve.

2.2.10 Surveillance Sample Handling Tool tool is of simple tubular construction and is approximately 40 feet long to allow it to be rated from the refueling machine. It has a female acme thread on the end which mates with a

e. (Figure 9.8-16).

2.2.11 Mechanism Uncoupling Tool s tool is approximately 17 feet long and consists basically of two concentric tubes with a nel at the end to facilitate engagement with the extension shafts. When installed, pins attached he outer tube are engaged with the extension shaft outside diameter and the pins carried by the er tube are inserted in the inner operating rod of the extension shaft. The inner tube of the tool en lifted and rotated relative to the outer tube which compresses a spring allowing the gripper elease, thus separating the extension shaft from the CEA. The extension shaft is then handled he tool.

2.2.12 Underwater Television underwater television camera has been removed from the Fuel Hoist Assembly for the ctor-Refuel Machine. An updated video camera system is utilized during fuel movement vities.

2.2.13 In Mast Sipping Equipment in mast sipping system is provided to test irradiated fuel assemblies for fuel cladding defects.

s system consists of both permanently mounted components and a portable skid that is set onto refueling machine trolley when a sipping test is to be performed. The in mast sipping system s a water sample from around each fuel assembly as it is lifted from the core into the mast.

water soluble and/or gaseous fission products escaping from a failed fuel rod during this dling process are drawn from the mast region of the fuel assembly handling machine through ng, degassed continuously, and the gas is directed to a detector. The detector measures the ion products and determines the isotopes present. A determination of fuel integrity can be e based upon the concentrations and types of isotopes present. The sample system is then cted back to the refuel cavity and released below the water surface.

tubing and nozzles are permanently installed. The sampling detectors and other equipment part of the portable skid installed onto the refueling machine for each refueling that sampling quired.

2.2.14 Hydraulic Power Package hydraulic power package provides the motive force for raising and lowering the upender with fuel carrier. It consists of a stand containing a motor coupled to a hydraulic pump, a sump rvoir, valves and the necessary hoses to connect the power package to the hydraulic cylinders the upender. The valves can be lined up to actuate either or both upender cylinders. The raulic fluid is deionized water.

36 inch diameter transfer tube is contained in a 42 inch diameter tube which is sealed to the tainment. The two concentric tubes are sealed to each other by a welding ring on the refueling l side and a bellows-type expansion joint on the spent fuel pool side. The transfer tube is icated of ASTM-A-358, Type 304 material. All welding on the tube is in accordance with the uirements of ASME Section VIII, where applicable.

cription of the transfer tube isolation valve is given in Table 9.8-1.

2.2.16 Spent Fuel Pool Platform Crane general arrangement of the spent fuel pool platform crane is shown in Figure 9.8-17. The e travel limits are shown in Figure 9.8-18. Details of the crane are given in Table 9.8-2.

crane is provided with two hold-down bars bolted to each truck frame with the flange nding under the head of the rail to preclude derailment under seismic loads.

mpers - Four heavy duty spring bumpers are provided at the ends of each bridge truck to vent crane derailment and smooth stopping. The bridge and trolley are provided with encoders iscussed in Section 9.8.4.1.10.

factor of safety for the crane is 5.0, except that a factor of 10 is used for cables.

ded fabrication is in accordance with the latest American Welding Society (AWS) Standard cification for Welded Highway and Railway Bridges (AWS D2.0). Structural components of crane which are not to be submerged in the spent fuel pool are fabricated from ASTM A-36 erial or equal.

ctural components of this equipment which are designed for submerged service or come in tact with components which have been, are fabricated of austenitic stainless steel.

three motions of this equipment (bridge, trolley, hoist) may be accomplished manually.

2.2.17 Spent Fuel Cask Crane spent fuel cask crane, located in the auxiliary building as shown in Figure 9.8-19, is cribed in Table 9.8-3.

2.2.18 New Fuel Elevator new fuel elevator provides a means of lowering new fuel assemblies from the fuel handling at elevation (+) 38 feet 6 inches down to a level where the spent fuel platform crane can pick he assembly by means of the long fuel handling tool. The elevator consists of carriage, that is ilar in design to a spent fuel storage rack cell, that rides on a track mounted to imbeds in the nt fuel pool wall. Motive force is provided by an electric motor through a winch with

new fuel elevator is also used as a spent fuel inspection stand. A manually operated turntable he bottom of the carriage rotates the spent fuel assembly in front of a portable underwriter TV era to allow inspection. Raising and lowering of the elevator allows full length inspection. An trical interlock prevents raising of a spent fuel assembly above the minimum shielding depth.

echanical interlock provides backup should the electrical interlock fail.

2.2.19 Spent Fuel Inspection Machine (Deleted - Equipment Permanently Removed) 2.2.20 Heated Junction Thermocouple Handling Canister Design heated junction thermocouple (HJTC) probe handling hardware configuration is shown on ure 9.8-20. The Grayloc flange is disassembled, and a protective bullet nose assembly is wed onto the HJTC probe seal plug. The hub adapter is lowered over the bullet nose onto the yloc seal ring and secured (hand tight) using the Grayloc clamp assembly. The handling ister is then positioned over the bullet nose assembly and a cable is attached to the bullet nose mbly. The handling canister is then lowered over the bullet nose assembly with the weight of handling canister supported by the overhead crane. The cable assembly supporting the HJTC be is then tied off to a lanyard attached to the canister. The winch at the base of the canister is oved with quick disconnect pins. The handling canister assembly, with the HJTC probe inside, en removed to the storage area using the overhead crane. The operation is then repeated for other HJTC probe location with a second handling canister. After the reactor vessel head has n reinstalled, the above procedure is reversed to reinsert the HJTC probes. Some of the cific features for the design of the handling hardware are as follows:

a. The bottom zone of the canister contains sealed attenuating material such that exposure to personnel from the HJTC probe will be kept reasonably low.

Estimated radiation levels are provided in Table 9.8-5.

b. The attenuating material is encapsulated in stainless steel.
c. A winch, attached to the base of the canister with quick release pins, is operated by one man. The man would be standing on a work platform above the control rod drive mechanism housings. (Work would be done in parallel with the other normal head area work.)
d. Modifications to the head lift rig or any head area components are not required for probe handling.
e. The reactor head area/control rod drive (CRD) mechanism area is left completely unencumbered and servicing of the drive mechanisms and underside of the head may be performed without increased personnel radiation exposure and without risk of damage to the probes.
g. A removable drop catcher is provided on the bottom of the handling canister to prevent water dripping while the canister is being transported from the reactor vessel to the storage area.
h. A hub adapter is provided to protect the Grayloc seal ring surface and to pilot the lower end of the handling canister.

3 SYSTEM OPERATION 3.1 New Fuel Transfer w fuel assemblies are removed from their regulatory agency approved shipping containers ected and placed in the new fuel storage racks or in the new fuel elevator. This is omplished by using a short fuel handling tool attached to the auxiliary hook of the spent fuel k crane. New CEAs are inserted into the guide channels of the fuel assemblies while the new is in the new fuel elevator.

r to the start of reactor refueling operations the new fuel is removed from the new fuel storage s and transferred to the new fuel elevator. This operation is accomplished by the auxiliary k of the spent fuel cask crane and the short fuel handling tool.

new fuel elevator lowers the fuel assembly down into the spent fuel pool where the spent fuel l platform crane transfers the fuel assembly normally to a spent fuel rack, or, directly to the nt fuel pool side upending mechanism. Interlocks are provided to prevent the spent fuel pool form crane from lowering the fuel assembly unless the upender is in the vertical position.

rlocks are also provided to prevent raising or lowering the upender if the spent fuel platform e is in the upender zone with the hoist below the hoist-clear elevation. The spent fuel platform e attaches to the fuel assemblies by means of a long fuel handling tool. After the spent fuel form crane has placed a new fuel assembly in the upending mechanism, it removes a spent assembly from the other position of the upending mechanism and transfers the spent fuel to a gnated position in the spent fuel storage racks.

3.2 Standard System Operations ueling operations are initiated with the removal of the missile shield from over the reactor. The DMs are disengaged from their drive shaft extensions by de-energizing the electromagnets, both CEDM and ICI cabling are disconnected in preparation for head removal. The stud ioners are employed to remove the vessel head studs which are then removed and stored.

gs are installed to protect the empty stud holes and two alignment pins are placed to assist in sequent operations. The CEDM coolant shroud is disconnected from its duct work and the sel vent line removed. The hatches in the reactor vessel cavity seal are closed to prevent water m entering the lower portion of the vessel cavity. A lifting frame is then installed on the head

uel transfer tube extending through the containment wall connects the refueling pool with the nt fuel pool as shown in Figure 9.8-10. During reactor operations, this transfer tube is isolated

1) a manually operated isolation valve that is outside containment and within the fuel transfer al and (2) a blind flange located inside containment.

ing preparations for filling the refueling pool for refueling operations, the blind flange on the transfer tube is removed.

owing verification that the water inventories of the spent fuel pool, fuel transfer canal and eling pool are at a common elevation, the isolation valve of the fuel transfer tube is opened.

ng the refueling machine walkway as a work platform, the CEDM drive shaft extensions are onnected from their CEAs by means of tools hung from the polar crane and the refuel hine. The UGS lift rig is installed and the ICI plate is withdrawn into the UGS and locked in e.

vision is made in the refueling pool for the temporary storage of the UGS of the reactor vessel rnals.

3.3 Refueling Operations normal fuel management sequence is initiated by positioning the refueling machine hoist ve the desired fuel assembly in the core. The operators lower the hoist until it stops at the PER GRAPPLE OPERATING ZONE (UGOZ), the indicator illuminates and the operator rgizes the grapple mechanism which rotates to OPEN the grapple. When the SPREADER is y extended, the hoist is lowered until it stops at the LOWER GRAPPLE OPERATING ZONE OZ), the indicator illuminates and the operator energizes the grapple mechanism to close the pple onto the fuel assembly. The hoist motor is started and the fuel assembly is withdrawn into hoist box which protects the fuel assembly during the traverse to the upender. The hoist is ed until the HOIST UP LIMIT is reached, then the hoist will automatically stop. The grapple been designed to preclude inadvertent disengagement as the fuel assembly is lifted vertically m the core. Grapple operation is interlocked both mechanically and electrically to permit pple actuation only in two operating zones UGOZ and LGOZ. Due to the mechanical rlocks, the grapple must be closed while it is being raised or lowered within the hoist box.

er removal from the core, the spent fuel assembly is lowered into one of the two fuel carrier kets located in the refueling pool upender. The refueling machine ungrapples the spent fuel mbly, raises the hoist and returns to the reactor core to move the next fuel assembly in ordance with the fuel management procedure. Under certain fuel management procedures, the eling operator then repeats the process and removes another spent fuel assembly and traverses he refueling pool upender and the second spent fuel assembly is lowered into the second of the fuel carrier pockets.

pool upender, the upending mechanism raises the fuel carrier to the vertical position. The nt fuel pool platform crane removes the spent fuel assemblies and places them into determined spent fuel rack locations. The fuel carrier is lowered to the horizontal position and rned to the refueling pool for one or two more spent fuel assemblies or the spent fuel platform e operator grapples a new fuel assembly and traverses to the spent fuel pool upender in ordance with the fuel management procedure.

en the fuel carrier returns to the refueling pool upender, the fuel carrier is raised to vertical and refueling machine operator either removes the new fuel assembly from the fuel carrier and sfers it to the core or places another spent fuel assembly into the fuel carrier. This sequence is ated until the refueling sequence is completed.

transferring CEAs among fuel assemblies in the refueling pool, a CEA handling tool attached he auxiliary hoist of the refueling machine is used. For transferring CEAs among fuel mblies in the spent fuel storage racks within the spent fuel pool, a CEA handling tool attached he spent fuel pool platform crane is used (refer to Section 9.8.2.1.4).

tron sources are transferred between fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool via a tool ipulated from the spent fuel platform crane. Capsules containing surveillance samples are oved from the reactor vessel assembly utilizing a tool manipulated from the refueling machine ch then transports them to the upender station for insertion into a container similar to a my fuel assembly. The transfer carrier transports the container with the surveillance capsules pent fuel storage area for eventual disassembly and sample evaluation.

mast sipping of fuel assemblies can be conducted, if required, during normal fuel handling rations. A removable control console is installed on the refueling machine with connections to tubing within the refuel mast. The in mast sipping takes a water sample from around each fuel mbly as it is lifted from the core into the mast. The water soluble and/or gaseous fission ducts escaping from a failed fuel rod during this handling process are drawn from the mast on of the fuel assembly handling machine through tubing, degassed continuously, and the gas irected to a detector. The detector measures the fission products and determines the isotopes ent. A determination of fuel integrity can be made based upon the concentrations and types of opes present. The sample stream is then directed back to the refuel cavity and released below water surface.

3.4 Refueling Restoration he completion of the refueling operation, the transfer valve is manually closed. The UGS is serted in the vessel and the ICI plate placed in position. The drive shaft extensions are nnected to the CEAs. The water in the refueling pool is lowered, utilizing one of the low-sure safety injection (LPSI) pumps or one of the purification pumps. The head is then lowered l the drive shaft extensions are engaged by the CEDMs. Lowering of the head is continued l it is seated. Then the head is bolted down, and the transfer tube blind flange installed. The hes in the cavity seal between the reactor vessel flange and the pool are opened to permit

3.5 Emergency Conditions failure mode analysis is shown in Table 9.8-4.

4 AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY 4.1 Special Features 4.1.1 new fuel storage racks are designed to maintain the minimum center-to-center distance essary to preclude criticality of the new fuel even with unborated water. In addition the ctural design precludes any deformation of the racks during earthquake loads, that would uce the center-to-center spacing to a point where the new fuel would approach criticality.

4.1.2 spent fuel storage racks are designed to maintain the minimum center-to-center distance essary to preclude criticality of the spent fuel even with unborated water under normal rating conditions. In addition the structural design prevents deformation of the racks that uces the center-to-center spacing to a point where the spent fuel would become critical due to a E or a dropped fuel assembly (horizontal) on top of the storage racks. The structure provides adequate convective cooling of stored fuel assemblies.

4.1.3 iability of the fuel handling equipment including the bridge and trolley, the lifting hanisms, the upending machines, the transfer carriage, and the associated instrumentation and trols has been assured through implementation of pre-operational tests and routines. Prior to first actual fuel loading, the equipment was cycled through its operations using dummy fuel.

ddition, the following special features of the equipment assure safe and reliable operation:

4.1.4 vision for seismic loading is made by proper sizing and arrangement of the structure and ponents of the equipment. Where required, mechanical means (clips, guide tools, etc.) are zed to prevent overturning or derailing of the equipment during an earthquake.

4.1.5 umper ring mounted on the refueling machine mast interrupts the bridge and trolley drives uld the mast be driven into an obstruction. This feature prevents damage to either the refueling hine or to members or components into which it may be driven.

three major subsystems of the overall fuel handling complex (Refueling Machine, Spent Fuel l Platform Crane and Fuel Transfer System) are electrically interlocked within each other and jointly with each other to prevent incorrect and potentially damaging sequences of operation.

se interlocks accomplish the following:

a. Bridge, trolley and hoist speeds are restricted in areas where fuel assemblies are handled near potential interferences.
b. Hoist drives cannot be operated if either the bridge or trolley drives are operating.
c. Up motion of the hoist is stopped if the hoist is at the up limit or if the hoist is overloaded.
d. Hoist down motion is stopped if the hoist load is below a preset limit or if the cable is slack.
e. The refueling machine bridge and trolley drives may not be actuated when the spreader device is extended.
f. The refueling machine bridge and trolley are inoperative if the fuel hoist is in or below the Upper Grapple Operate Zone (UGOZ), or during interlock override at creep speed only.
g. The refueling machine hoist cannot be raised if the grapple is above the Upper Grapple Operating Zone (UGOZ) and is not closed.
h. The refueling machine hoist is latched automatically when the machine is in the upender zone and unlatched automatically when it is outside the upender zone.
i. The refueling machine fuel spreader cannot be extended when the machine is in the upender zone.
j. The refueling machine hoist cannot lower if in the upender zone and the upender is not vertical.
k. The upender cannot raise or lower if the refueling machine is in the upender zone and the hoist is not in the full up position.
l. The spent fuel pool platform bridge cannot traverse into the upender zone if the upender is not vertical, unless the hoist is full up (loaded) or above the hoist clear elevation (unloaded).
m. The spent fuel pool platform hoist cannot lower if in the upender zone and the upender is not vertical.

(unloaded).

o. The fuel transfer carrier cannot begin a transfer unless both upenders are horizontal. Once started, the carrier travel will be stopped if the cable tension exceeds a preset limit.

4.1.7 refueling machine is equipped with various mechanical interlocks to provide for safe and per operation. They include, positive mechanical locking of the refueling machine grapple to fuel bundle, and a positive mechanical stop to prevent raising a fuel bundle above the imum depth of water.

4.1.8 cellaneous special design features include backup hand operation of hoist and traverse es in the event of power failure; an available 4 to 1 gear reduction at the winch motor to mit applying an increased pull on the transfer carrier in the event it becomes stuck; a viewing in the refueling machine trolley deck to provide visual access to the reactor for the operator; tronic and visual indication of the refueling machine position over the core; a protective ud into which the fuel bundle is drawn by the refueling machine; transfer system upenders ual operation by a special tool in the event that the hydraulic system becomes inoperative; oval of the transfer system components from the refueling pool for servicing without draining water from the pool.

4.1.9 manual operator for the fuel transfer tube isolation valve extends from the valve to the deck at ation +38 feet 6 inches. Also, the operator has enough flexibility to allow for operation of the e due to thermal expansion of the fuel transfer tube.

4.1.10 spent fuel pool platform crane is provided with encoders that monitor the bridge, trolley and t positions and a programmable logic controller that establishes appropriate boundaries to re that fuel assemblies do not contact any of the walls or other equipment in the spent fuel l area. The hoist is also provided with a geared limit switch that assures the minimum water essary for shielding and an anti-two block switch that protects the hoist from damage if the red limit switch fails. The fuel is also protected from damage by a load cell that interrupts hoist vement in the event of overload or underload conditions while raising or lowering. Interlocks ween the platform crane and fuel transfer system prevent lowering a fuel assembly into the fuel ier unless the upender is vertical and prevent the platform crane from entering the upender e unless the hoist is at an elevation that avoids interference with the upender.

4.1.11 single failure proof design of the spent fuel cask crane utilizes limit switches to actuate cial features that sense over travel (control and power), overweight (loads), overspeed (trolley hoists), mis-spooling (wire rope on drum) and unbalanced reeving (wire rope). The electrical gn addresses the effects of phase reversal or phase loss in the hoist power supply as well as ervoltage, overvoltage and overcurrent protection. Detection of any of the above faults oves power from the hoists, placing them in a safe condition. Bridge and trolley motions are ted by travel limit switches, which de-energize the motor at end travels.

spent fuel cask crane travels within the Auxiliary/Warehouse buildings but has features that restrict its path in certain areas. The cask crane has a position switch for NORMAL / CASK NDLING / NEW FUEL modes. When in the NORMAL mode, the crane cannot travel over fuel pool. When the switch is positioned in the CASK HANDLING position, the crane can y travel into the cask pit area of the fuel pool. When the switch is positioned in the NEW EL mode, the crane can only travel into the new fuel area of the fuel pool. This switch is a key switch and will be controlled administratively.

h the main and auxiliary hoists have redundant brakes to allow portions of the hoist drive train e repaired while retaining the load. The hydraulic brakes on the main hoist can be manually dulated to lower a load in the event of a hoisting equipment failure. The auxiliary hoist holding kes are provided with manual override levers to permit manual load lowering.

main and auxiliary hoisting systems also have various modes of operation. The main hoist lift de selector switch is a two position switch that can be selected to critical or non-critical main t operation. In the critical (CRIT) position, the main hoist ultra lift feature is disabled and the rspeed system is set to trip at 110% of critical speed. The lifting speed is limited to 5 feet per ute (fpm). In the non-critical (NON) position, the main hoist ultra lift feature is enabled and overspeed system is set to trip at 110% of non-critical speed. The lifting speed is limited to 7.5

. The auxiliary hoist lift mode selector switch is a two position switch that can be selected to cal or non-critical auxiliary hoist operation. In the critical (CRIT) position, the auxiliary hoist a lift feature is disabled and the overspeed system is set to trip at 110% of critical speed. The ng speed is limited to 20 feet per minute. In the non-critical (NON) position, the auxiliary t ultra lift feature is enabled and the overspeed system is set to trip at 110% of noncritical ed. The lifting speed is limited to 31 feet per minute.

cask crane is equipped with laser distance measuring devices for the bridge and trolley. These ices are retro-reflective and utilize a target for accuracy. The target for the trolley system is ched to the trolley structure, while the bridge target is attached to the building wall. Each em measures the time for the laser light to return to the unit and communicates the calculated ance from the southeast corner of the building to the throat of the main hoist hook, then sends number to the attached scoreboard display mounted on the bridge. The display reads in feet inches continuously while power is applied to the crane. This feature enhances the manual

cask crane is designed to retain control of the main hoist 125 ton maximum critical load CL) and auxiliary hoist 15 ton MCL for all load combinations including a single broken rope, blocking, load hang up and OBE & SSE seismic events.

seismic and structural analysis of the cask crane determined that there is no trolley or bridge ft for any of the applied loading combinations. The bridge and trolley are provided with mic restraints to trap it between the bridge girders and runway beams in the event of a wheel ge or rail failure.

lysis determined that the bridge will remain on the runway and the trolley will remain on the ge with the brakes applied during an OBE and SSE event. The cask crane is designed to ain in place and hold the load during an OBE and SSE event.

4.2 Test and Inspections ipment listed under this section has had nondestructive testing in accordance with the cedures of Section VIII of the ASME Code where applicable.

ddition the entire fuel handling system was tested using a dummy fuel element before the t was put into operation.

following specific tests are performed on the individual equipment in addition to the above new and spent fuel storage racks are tested with a dummy fuel assembly for ease of insertion alignment each time a cavity is fabricated, and after the rack is assembled.

fuel transfer tube is given a vacuum base test to check for leaks.

spent fuel pool platform crane and spent fuel cask crane cables are given rope tests.

spent fuel pool platform crane and spent fuel cask crane, after fabrication and assembly at the dors shop, are given no-load running tests.

ks which are designed to support fuel assemblies are volumetrically tested to detect internal cts prior to testing. The hooks are tested at 150 percent of rated load. After the 150 percent test, they are subjected to liquid penetrant inspection in accordance with ASME Section VIII ssure Vessels Code.

er installation, the fuel handling devices are thoroughly field tested using a dummy fuel mbly.

ection of critical welds. Following completion of manufacture, compliance with design and cification requirements is determined by assembling and testing the equipment in the vendor's

p. Utilizing a dummy fuel assembly and a dummy CEA, each having the same weight, center ravity, exterior size and end geometry as an actual assembly, all equipment is run through eral complete operational cycles. In addition, the equipment is checked for its ability to orm under the maximum limits of load, fuel mislocation and misalignment. All traversing hanisms are tested for speed and positioning accuracy. All hoisting equipment is tested for ical functions and controls, rotation, and load misalignment. Hoisting equipment is also tested 125 percent of maximum working load. Setpoints are determined and adjusted and the stment limits are verified. Interlock function, and backup systems operations are checked.

se functions having manual operation capability are exercised manually. During these tests various operating parameters such as motor speed, voltage, and current, hydraulic system sures, and load measuring accuracy and setpoints are recorded. At the completion of these s the equipment is checked for cleanliness and the locking of fasteners by lockwire or other ns is verified.

en finally installed in the field, the equipment is again tested in a manner which, in effect, is a at of the tests performed at the vendors plant. This allows determination of any changes in stment and condition which may have ensued from transit to the site. In addition, the tests in field permit determination of characteristics which are unique to the actual site installation

, therefore, cannot be duplicated in the vendors shop test.

TABLE 9.8-1 TRANSFER TUBE ISOLATION VALVE Type Wedge gate Size, inches 36 Design pressure, psia 83 Normal operating differential pressure, psi 14.3 psi Design temperature, F 150 Normal operating temperature, F 120 Materials Stainless Steel Design Code Draft ASME Code for Pumps and Valves for Nuclear Power, Class II Seismic Design Classification 1 Design Integrate Dosage 3.2x108 R Supplier W. G. Rovang & Associates

TABLE 9.8-2 SPENT FUEL POOL PLATFORM CRANE dge Capacity, tons 26 Drive 2 hp motor Speed, fpm (variable) 0-40 Manufacturer Dwight-Foote/PaR Nuclear lley Capacity, tons 2 Drive 0.5 hp motor Speed, feet per minute (variable) 0-45 Manufacturer Shepard Niles/PaR Nuclear st Capacity 2000 lb Drive 3 hp motor Speed, fpm (variable) 0-33 feet per minute (variable)

Maximum lift, feet 23 Manufacturer Shepard Niles/PaR Nuclear

TABLE 9.8-3 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE dge Speed, fpm 1.25 - 50 (infinitely variable)

Drive Variable Frequency lley Speed, fpm 1 - 40 (infinitely variable)

Drive Variable Frequency sts Main hoist capacity 125 tons Auxiliary hoist capacity, tons 15 Drive for main hoist Variable Frequency n Drive for auxiliary hoist Variable Frequency Speed of main hoist, fpm 0.25 - 5 critical load speed (infinitely variable) 0.25 - 7.5 non-critical load speed (infinitely variable)

Speed of auxiliary hoist, fpm 0.25 - 20 critical load speed (infinitely variable) 0.25 - 31 non-critical load speed (infinitely variable)

Seismic Design Classification 1 Supplier Harnischfeger Corp. (Bridge & Monorail)

American Crane and Equipment Corp. (ACECO)

(MH, AH & Trolley)

COMPONENT DETRIMENTAL CORRECTIVE IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE EFFECT ON SYSTEM ACTION REMARKS Refueling Machine. Electrical Overload None Continue refueling, Use visual presentation of load o Fuel Hoist weight Trip fails repair on non- meter.

system interfering basis Complete system fails None As above Control System will automaticall disable the hoist.

Fuel Carrier Wheels lock in Transfer change completed Switch to 4:1 gear Torque sufficient to move fuel transfer tube reduction carrier with all wheels locked Hydraulic Power supply Line to cylinder on None Valve off defective Upender has two cylinders, each for upender upender ruptures line which is capable of raising upend Loss of hydraulic Process can continue on Upend manually Use tool provided power slower basis Brake on R. M. fuel Does not provide None Continue, repair on Redundant brake system provide hoist required brake load non-interfering Fuel Carrier Cable Cable parts Delays refueling Move fuel carrier to Remove fuel prior to repair safe position with manual tool Refueling Machine Power Failure Operation can be completed Repair Hoist using manual hand-wheel Hoist Motor Bridge Drive Motor Power Failure Operation can be completed Repair Drive using manual hand-wheel Electronic Position Power Failure None Repair non- Redundant position indicator is Indication interfering basis available on the consoles touchscreen display

COMPONENT DETRIMENTAL CORRECTIVE IDENTIFICATION FAILURE MODE EFFECT ON SYSTEM ACTION REMARKS Fuel Carrier Position Electrical Failure None Repair non- Winch motor stalls on overload Sensing System interfering basis Refueling Machine Loss of air pressure None Repair Continue, using manual mode Dual under deck camera Power or Video None Continue, repair on Refueling can continue using dire system failure non-interfering visual observation of machine operation

(R/HR)

Dose Rates Activation Crud Contribution Contribution Total rface of Canister Zone A 0.007-.02 + 0.20 = 0.22 rface of Canister Zone B 0.007-.25 + 0 = 0.25 rface of Canister Zone C 0.07-2.5 + 0 = 2.5 oot from Surface Zone A Insignificant + 0.05 = 0.05 oot from Surface Zone B 0.125 + 0 = 0.125 oot from Surface Zone C 0.5-1.25 + 0 = 0.5-1.25 es: See Figure 9.8-20 for definition of zones.

Worker dose in Shielded Zone for ten minutes = (10/60) x (.125 R/hr) = 0.021 R 21mR

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

AND 2

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

1 DESIGN TEMPERATURE BASES door Design Temperatures st original Millstone Unit 2 HVAC calculations are based on design conditions for New en, Connecticut, specified in the Heating Ventilating Air Conditioning Guide, 1956 published he American Society of Heating and Ventilating Engineers (ASHVE - now titled ASHRAE, erican Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning Engineers). The summer and ter outdoor design temperatures selected for Millstone Unit 2 calculations to December 3, 6 were based on values in common use per the ASHVE Guide as follows:

eason Temperature Source nter 0F dry bulb ASHVE Guide, Chapter 14 Table 1, Column 9 mmer 95F dry bulb, ASHVE Guide, Chapter 15 Table 3, Columns 7 & 8 75F wet bulb wever, some original HVAC calculations were also based on the ASHRAE Fundamentals dbook 1972, using an outdoor design DB temperature of 86F (2.5% design).

current design basis temperatures for Millstone Unit 2 heating, ventilating, and air ditioning (HVAC) are based on general, long-term, climatic data of averages and extremes ined from the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning Engineers HRAE) 1972 Fundamentals Handbook, Design Weather Data for New London, Connecticut.

selected outdoor temperature values have been substantiated by data collected from the lstone Site meteorology tower during a nineteen year span (1974-1992). Millstone Site matological summary of occurrences of outdoor ambient temperatures below 0F and above F and their durations are shown in Reference 2.3-1, Table 2.3-19, of Section 2.3. The summer winter outdoor design temperatures are as follows:

eason Temperature References nter 0F dry bulb a) ASHRAE 1972, Weather Data and Design Conditions, page 671 mmer 86F dry bulb, 75F wet bulb a) ASHRAE 1972, Weather Data and Design Conditions, page 671 ically nuclear power plants use a 99% winter design temperature. This represents the perature that has been equaled or exceeded by 99% of the total hours in the average winter nths of December, January, February (a total 2160 hours0.025 days <br />0.6 hours <br />0.00357 weeks <br />8.2188e-4 months <br />). In New London, Connecticut, this is F (ASHRAE 1972, page 671, column 4, winter 99%). A conservative design winter

gn temperatures are typically based on 2.5% exceedence. In New London, these temperatures 86F DB and 75F WB (ASHRAE Fundamentals 1972, page 671, summer, columns 6 and 8).

se represent values that are exceeded 2.5% of the total summer hours of 2928; i.e., 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br />, are used for the summer outdoor design temperatures for Unit 2.

nthly, seasonal and annual averages and extremes of temperature from 1901 through 1981 at dgeport, Connecticut, are shown in Reference 2.3-1, Table 2.3-1, of Section 2.3, and for the lstone Site from 1974 through 1992 on Table 2.3-19 of the same reference. These extreme low high temperatures are not used in design but do establish and acknowledge that when the imum temperature exceedences occur above or below the design temperatures, it is for a short ation of time. The episodes from 1974 through 1992 that occurred below 0F and above 86F h the duration for each occurrence are shown in Reference 2.3-1, Table 2.3-19 of Section 2.3.

oor Design Temperatures oor design temperatures for the various areas of the plant are based on design outdoor peratures specified above. Indoor design temperatures excursions may occur coincident with door air temperature excursions for short periods of time. However, temperature excursions mitigated by thermal inertia effects of heavy concrete structures, below grade walls and other ors. In general, critical areas containing equipment required for safety related functions are nitored by installed instrumentation and alarms and/or inspected on a periodic basis (i.e.,

trol Room, Diesel Generator rooms, Intake Structure, etceteras.). Abnormal temperature ditions will be monitored, evaluated and corrected by operator actions. Equipment evaluations sider loss of ventilation for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> without operator action. After 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the luations consider operator actions to occur to reduce ambient temperatures.

ummary of the indoor design temperatures for the significant areas of the plant are provided in le 9.9-21.

2 CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING SYSTEM 2.1 Design Bases 2.1.1 Functional Requirements Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) cooling system functions to maintain a suitable ironment within the CEDM shroud to provide an acceptable coil life and maintain an eptable coil replacement cycle.

2.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the CEDM cooling system:

b. The system shall have suitable subsystem and component alignments to assure operation of complete subsystem with associated components.
c. Capabilities shall be provided to assure the system operation with on site power (assuming off site power is not available) or with off site electrical power.
d. A single failure in either subsystem shall not affect the functional capability of the other subsystem.
e. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans, cooling coils, ductwork, piping, valves and instrumentation to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
f. The components of the CEDM cooling system shall be designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.

2.2 System Description 2.2.1 System CEDM cooling system is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-1.

CEDM cooling system consists of three identical, redundant, independent fan-coil units, each able of removing 0.81 x 106 Btu/hr. The containment air is circulated through the finned-tube-er cooling coils and is supplied by fans to the CEDM shroud. The CEDM shroud is provided h internal baffles to assure proper air distribution over the CEDM coils. The Reactor Building sed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system (Section 9.4) serves as the cooling medium. Air is plied via two ducts to the upper cooling plenum from two of the three cooling units located on missile shield above. The air is distributed through four vertical ducts of the shroud to the er plenum. The air is discharged through holes in the inner shell of the lower plenum.

2.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-1. Fan performance curve is shown in Figure 9.9-5.

2.3 System Operation ling is required for the CEDM whenever the coils are energized (Section 3.3.3). Cooling is required for safe shutdown of the unit but can be provided to prolong coil life.

at 95F is supplied into the shroud to remove the sensible heat from the CEDM coils. The ling air maintains these CEDM coils below a maximum operating temperature of 350F. The s heated sensibly to 120F and discharged from the shroud.

al heat removal capabilities are provided by operating any two of the three CEDM coils. The tchover from one fan-coil unit to the other is accomplished by remote manual control from the trol room. A damper on each fan discharge prevents short circuiting of air through the idle

. The air temperature entering the CEDM is monitored by the computer (Section 7.5.5). Motor alarms are provided for all fans.

2.3.2 Abnormal Operation ing abnormal operation, the CEDM cooling system functions as required to maintain the ironment within the shroud. Cooling is required for a short time only following a scram of the trol rods. Whenever the rods are scrammed, the CEDM coils are de-energized. The CEDM ling system functions to remove residual heat until the CEDM coils are cooled to ambient peratures. The CEDM coil temperatures are monitored on the computer.

cooling of the CEDM coils during abnormal conditions is not critical to shutdown. However, operation is provided to maintain an acceptable CEDM coil life.

2.4 Availability and Reliability 2.4.1 Special Features two of the three CEDM cooling units is capable of maintaining the design environment hin the CEDM shroud. Any one of the three units is capable of maintaining the shroud ambient perature below 145F which is the recommended maximum design temperature. Therefore, tdown is required only upon failure of all three of the CEDM cooling units.

components of the CEDM cooling system are designed to operate in an environment of F, atmospheric pressure, 100 percent relative humidity and 5 x 106 rad of accumulated (40 rs) radiation dose.

CEDM cooling units are located on the reactor vessel missile shield and, therefore, are not osed to flooding or credible missiles.

2.4.2 Tests and Inspection vaneaxial fans are similar to fans which are rated in accordance with Air Moving and ditioning Association (AMCA) Standard 211A. The water cooling coils are tested in ordance with Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Tubular hanger Manufacturers Association (TEMA), Class C. The ductwork is designed and

CEDM cooling system undergoes an acceptance test prior to startup. The test procedure is cribed in Chapter 13.

CEDM cooling system is not accessible for inspection or maintenance except during tdown.

3 CONTAINMENT AND ENCLOSURE BUILDING PURGE SYSTEM 3.1 Design Bases 3.1.1 Functional Requirements purge system functions to maintain a suitable environment for personnel access into the tainment or enclosure building. The purge system provides fresh air ventilation or heating never required.

3.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the purge system:

a. The containment and enclosure building purge system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components such as fan, motor, belt, coil, ductwork, piping and valves to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
b. The purge containment isolation valves shall be designed with leak detection capabilities.
c. The components of the system shall be designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.

3.2 System Description 3.2.1 System purge system is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-1.

purge system can be lined up to either containment or the enclosure building.

purge system is designed to provide adequate fresh air for the containment or the enclosure ding by using supply fan F-23. However, the purge rate is balanced to maintain a negative sure in the area being purged. Its associated steam heating coil, X-43, is sized to temper 0F ide air to 70F for personnel comfort, maintaining a desired environment atmosphere perature of approximately 60F, which is consistent throughout the plant for unmanned areas.

ept interior ducts and two isolation valves, will be located outside the containment. Branch ts and isolation dampers are provided for ventilating the enclosure building. Auxiliary steam is vided as the heating medium when required.

3.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-2. Fan performance curve is shown in Figure 9.9-6.

3.3 System Operation purge system is not operating and the containment isolation valves are locked closed in des 1 through 4 by shutting them, pulling their control power fuse and locking their associated block. By locking them closed in this manner, these valves are considered sealed closed ation valves. When access to the containment is desired and the Plant is in the cold shutdown he refueling mode, the purge fan, if required, is started and the isolation valve opened. If a h containment radiation level is detected, the containment air purge supply and exhaust valves, C-4, 2-AC-5, 2-AC-6 and 2-AC-7, receive a signal to close (FSAR Section 7.3.2.2.c).

wever, automatic isolation of the purge valves is not credited in the fuel handling accident lyses.

3.3.1 Normal Operation purge system is initiated manually in the control room by operator action. Hand switches are vided to start the fan and open isolation valves and dampers. The third main exhaust fan ction 9.9.9 is started to exhaust the containment through particulate and high efficiency iculate air (HEPA) filters (Section 9.9.9.2.2). The system performance is monitored by tainment temperature indication (Section 7.5). Air is supplied in the containment above the rating floor. Mixing is provided by the containment air recirculation and cooling system ction 6.5) throughout the lower elevations of the containment. Mixing is provided throughout upper regions of the containment by the containment auxiliary circulation system ction 9.9.3). The containment ambient conditions during shutdown are described in tion 6.5.3.4.

side air is filtered prior to distribution within the containment. A steam heating coil is vided for tempering the outside air when required. During summer conditions, the outside air upplied at approximately 86F. During winter conditions, the outside air is tempered and plied at 70F.

ioactive effluents released to the site boundary resulting from the containment purge rations are described in the Environmental Report.

containment isolation valves (2-AC-4, 2-AC-5, 2-AC-6, 2-AC-7) on the purge system are ed closed, pneumatically isolated and electrically isolated during all modes of operation

ation valves and fuse blocks are then locked. Once electrically isolated, the valves do not have trol room indication.

owing a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) the supply fan, if operating, and ciated isolation damper, if open, are isolated. Damper closing is monitored by position cation in the control room.

enclosure building is heated or ventilated when required by the purge system. Branch ducting rovided from the main purge line for the enclosure building. Ventilation may be required for area periodically throughout the summer to maintain the enclosure building temperature w 120F. Auxiliary heating, in addition to unit heater, may be required periodically through summer to the winter to maintain the enclosure building temperature above 70F. Unit heaters located near Elevation 48-6 to maintain the lower regions of the enclosure building at 70F.

upper regions in the enclosure building are maintained at 55F minimum. Ventilation and iliary heating in the enclosure building is an operator option for personnel comfort and not ntial for unit operation.

3.4 Availability and Reliability 3.4.1 Special Features components of the purge system are designed to operate in their respective environments.

mponents inside containment are designed to operate in an environment of 120F, atmospheric sure, 100 percent relative humidity and 5 x 106 rads of accumulated radiation dose (40 years).

components located outside the containment are designed for operation in an environment of F, 100 percent relative humidity and atmospheric pressure.

3.4.2 Tests and Inspections purge air handling unit fan is similar to fans which are rated in accordance with AMCA ndard 211A. The heating coil is of the steam distributing type and provided with adequate densate drainage capacity to prevent freezing. The steam coil is tested in accordance with tion VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and TEMA, Class C. The ductwork is gned and fabricated in accordance with SMACNA Standard, High Velocity Duct struction Standards. The purge butterfly valves are in accordance with ASME Code, tion III, Class 2. The purge system undergoes an acceptance test prior to startup. The test cedure is described in Chapter 13. The purge ventilation equipment and exterior containment ation valves are accessible for periodic tests, inspection and maintenance. The ductwork and es inside the containment are accessible during unit shutdown. Purge valve elastomers and t packing are adjusted and/or replaced based on 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Type C test results.

containment purge isolation valve seats are designed to withstand the pressure and perature transients associated with the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

4.1 Design Bases 4.1.1 Functional Requirements containment auxiliary circulation system functions to maintain a uniform temperature by ing the containment atmosphere.

4.1.2 Design Criteria components of the containment auxiliary circulation system shall be designed to operate in environment to which exposed.

4.2 System Description 4.2.1 System containment auxiliary circulation system is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-1. The tainment auxiliary circulation system consists of ductwork from the containment dome region two, two speed vaneaxial fans. The fans are provided with two-speed motors to reduce sepower requirements during leak rate testing conditions (Section 5.2.8). The system exhausts rom the upper regions of the containment through the ductwork and discharges near the inlets he containment air recirculation units (Section 6.5). This operation provides a thoroughly ed containment atmosphere and uniform air temperatures.

4.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-3. Fan performance curve is shown in Figure 9.9-7.

4.3 System Operation containment auxiliary circulation system operates during normal operation and is capable of ration during leak rate testing conditions.

4.3.1 Normal Operation containment auxiliary circulation fans are started manually from the control room. During mal operation, these fans operate at the high speed condition to provide a uniform containment perature by mixing.

containment auxiliary circulation system is capable of approximately 75 percent of the total of the containment air recirculation and cooling system (Section 6.5). Air from the upper ons of the containment is discharged near the operating floor level where it is mixed. This

containment auxiliary circulation system operates during containment purge operations ction 9.9.2) to provide mixing.

fans can operate at the low speed during the elevated pressure conditions of the leak rate ing (Section 5.2.8) conditions. This low speed operation is provided to reduce motor sepower requirements. Fan operation is monitored by motor trip alarms.

4.4 Availability and Reliability 4.4.1 Special Features components of the containment auxiliary circulation system are designed to operate in the mal containment environment and under leak rate testing conditions. The normal environment ditions are 120F, atmospheric pressure, 100 percent relative humidity and 40 year umulated radiation dose of 5 x 106 rad. Leak rate testing environmental conditions are 90F 62.1 psig.

containment auxiliary circulation system is not essential for normal operation. Therefore, loss oth subsystems will not require a unit shutdown.

4.4.2 Tests and Inspection vaneaxial fans are similar to fans which are rated in accordance with AMCA Standard 211A.

ductwork is designed and fabricated in accordance with SMACNA Standard, Low Velocity t Construction Standards.

containment auxiliary circulation system undergoes an acceptance test prior to startup. The tainment auxiliary circulation system is accessible only during shutdown for inspection and ntenance.

5 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLING SYSTEM 5.1 Design Bases 5.1.1 Functional Requirements containment penetration cooling system functions to limit the concrete temperature to 150F und all containment penetration sleeves which contain systems operating at temperatures ter than 150F.

following criteria have been used in the design of the containment penetration cooling em:

a. The system shall have two redundant fans each having 100 percent of the total required heat removal capability.
b. The components of the containment penetration cooling system shall be designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.
c. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans and ductwork to assure the integrity and capability of the system.

5.2 System Description 5.2.1 System containment penetration cooling system is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-2. The tainment penetration cooling system consists of two full capacity redundant vaneaxial fans associated system ductwork. The containment penetration cooling system supplies enclosure ding air to any containment penetration which has a normal operating temperature greater 150F. Each of these penetration sleeves is provided with a baffle plate in the horizontal e (see Figure 5.2-8). Cooling air is supplied in the bottom half of the sleeve, forced down the etration to the flued head where the air is deflected back along the upper portion of the sleeve discharged back into the enclosure building. The temperature of the concrete around the etration sleeve will be maintained below 150F for all penetrations during normal operating ditions.

5.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in ure 9.9-4. Fan performance curve is shown in Figure 9.9-8.

5.3 System Operation containment penetration cooling system operates at any time normal penetration cooling is uired.

5.3.1 Normal Operation containment penetration cooling system is started manually by hand switches located in the trol room.

m the purge system (Section 9.9.2), if required, to maintain the ambient temperature below F. Cooling air at a maximum temperature of 120F is supplied to the penetrations at the rates cated in Table 9.9-5.

performance of the containment penetration cooling system is monitored by temperature cation in each main steam and main feedwater penetration. Fan operation is monitored by or trip alarms. Interlocks are provided to prevent short circuiting of air through idle ipment.

5.4 Availability and Reliability 5.4.1 Special Features containment penetration cooling system is provided with two full capacity fans. Each fan has capability of maintaining the concrete temperature around the sleeve below 150F. Following unlikely loss of penetration cooling, a maximum temperature of 390F may be tolerated for days without appreciable loss of strength of the concrete (Section 5.1.3). The components of containment penetration cooling system are designed to operate in an environment of 120F, ospheric pressure and 100 percent relative humidity.

5.4.2 Tests and Inspection vaneaxial fans are similar to fans which are rated in accordance with the AMCA Standard A. The system ductwork is designed and fabricated in accordance with SMACNA Standard, gh Velocity Duct Construction Standards. The containment penetration cooling system ergoes an acceptance test prior to startup. The test procedure is described in Chapter 13.

ipment is located in controlled access areas but can be inspected periodically.

6 RADWASTE AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM 6.1 Design Bases 6.1.1 Functional Requirements radwaste ventilation system is a Non-QA system, consisting of supply fan F-16 in bination with the main exhaust fans F-34A/B/C. It functions to provide a suitable ironment for the equipment and fresh air ventilation for personnel within the potentially oactive areas of the auxiliary building. The areas serviced by this system consist of the iliary building elevations (-)45 foot 6 inches, (-)25 foot 6 inches, and (-)5 foot 6 inches in its rety, the general open area at elevation 14 foot 6 inches (i.e., area by: elevator, MCC's B51 and

), and the closed rooms (142A, 150) located adjacent to the truck bay area of the auxiliary ding at elevation 14 foot 6 inches.

following criteria have been used in the design of the radwaste ventilation system:

a. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fan, motor, belt, coil, filters, ductwork, piping and valves to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
b. The components of the radwaste ventilation system are designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.
c. The potentially radioactive areas of the auxiliary building shall be served by a separate ventilation system from the clean areas.
d. The potentially radioactive areas of the auxiliary building shall be maintained at a negative pressure.

6.2 System Description 6.2.1 System radwaste ventilation system is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-3.

radwaste area ventilation system consists of a supply fan F-16 providing 100%, once through, pered outside air through a steam heating coil to all levels of the auxiliary building containing ntially radioactive areas, with the exception of the spent fuel area which has its own tilation system (Section 9.9.8). Air flow rates are established to maintain the areas at or below maximum design temperature of 110F and steam coils are provided to maintain a minimum perature of 55F.

air is drawn from the potentially radioactive areas of the auxiliary building via the main aust system, fans F-34A/B/C, (Section 9.9.9) through the radwaste system HEPA filter unit L-nd is discharged into the Unit 2 stack.

auxiliary buildings potentially radioactive areas are maintained at slightly negative pressure hin their defined pressure boundaries. This negative pressure is induced and maintained within e boundaries by exhausting more air, via the main exhaust fans F-34A/B/C, than the supply flow rate provided by fan F-16. The directional air flow between these radioactive areas is ntained in the direction of potentially higher radioactivity.

6.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-6. Fan performance curve is shown in Figure 9.9-9.

radwaste ventilation system is required for building ventilation during unit operation and ng shutdown operation.

6.3.1 Normal Operation radwaste ventilation system is manually started from a local control hand switch in the trol room mechanical equipment area. The system logic (Figure 9.9-10) requires two main aust fans (Section 9.9.9) to be operating prior to initiation of the supply fan F-16.

supply fan F-16 distributes fresh outside air to the potentially contaminated areas at all levels he auxiliary building. A steam heating coil is provided for tempering outside air when uired. A flow switch is provided on the supply unit discharge to monitor air flow and alarm flow conditions. A temperature switch is provided at the heating coil outlet to monitor perature and alarm low temperature conditions. Two (2) safety related steam leak detection perature detectors (RTDs) are located in the ductwork downstream of the heating coils to ate auxiliary steam to the Auxiliary Building (Section 7.10).

door air is supplied at approximately 86F during summer operations to limit the auxiliary ding ambient temperature to 110F. During winter operations, the air is tempered to maintain inimum auxiliary building temperature of 55F in the areas with storage tanks containing on solution to prevent boron precipitation. However, booster coils are provided for elevation eet 6 inches floor level to maintain a desired temperature of 70F within the dressing area for onnel comfort.

exhaust from the radwaste areas is filtered through particulate and HEPA filters and is harged by the main exhaust fans through the Unit 2 stack. This is described in Section 9.9.9.

iation monitoring is described in Section 7.5.6.

6.4 Availability and Reliability 6.4.1 Special Features assure an overall slight negative pressure within the potentially radioactive areas of the iliary building, the supply fan, F-16, can be started only if two main exhaust fans F-34A/B/C ction 9.9.9) are in operation. Upon the loss of the supply fan, F-16, the main exhaust fans keep rating, thus maintaining a negative pressure within these areas. However, the supply fan, F-16, eturned to service as soon as practicable. Upon the loss of two main exhaust fans, a main aust duct pressure switch trips off supply fan F-16.

o automatically closed dampers, in a series arrangement, are provided at all penetrations into Enclosure Building Filtration Region (EBFR) (Section 6.7). These dampers are pneumatically ated and designed to fail in a closed position. All components of the radwaste ventilation em are designed to operate in an environment of 110F, atmospheric pressure and 100 percent tive humidity.

se isolation of the auxiliary steam supply to the Auxiliary Building in isolation valves located he Turbine Building. This condition will also be alarmed in the control room.

6.4.2 Tests and Inspection centrifugal fans are similar to fans which are rated in accordance with AMCA Standard

-A. The steam heating coils are tested in accordance with Section VIII of the ASME Boiler Pressure Vessel Code and TEMA, Class C. The ductwork is designed and fabricated in ordance with SMACNA Standard, High Velocity Duct Construction Standards.

radwaste ventilation system undergoes an acceptance test prior to start-up. The test procedure escribed in Chapter 13.

components of the radwaste ventilation system are accessible for inspection and maintenance.

7 NONRADIOACTIVE AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM 7.1 Design Bases 7.1.1 Functional Requirements nonradioactive area ventilation system is a non-QA system, consisting of supply fan F-17, rculating fan F-19, and exhaust fan F-26 for the East 480-volt switchgear room, and exhaust F-112A & F-112B for the remaining areas. It functions to provide a suitable environment for equipment and fresh air ventilation for personnel within the clean areas of the auxiliary ding, and the East & West turbine building cable vaults. However, there is no heating coil ciated with this system as there is sufficient heat rejected by the electrical equipment within e areas. The maximum design temperature in these areas is 104F and the minimum is 55F personnel comfort, which is consistent throughout the plant for unmanned areas, with the eption of the battery rooms, which is 60F nonradioactive areas of the auxiliary building consist of the East 480 volt switchgear room vation 36 foot 6 inches), the main cable vault (elevation 25 foot 6 inches), the East & West DC tchgear rooms as well as the East & West battery rooms (elevation 14 foot 6 inches), and the AC equipment room (elevation 36 foot 6 inches), which has no ventilation system. The East &

t turbine building cable vaults, elevation 45 foot, are opened to the auxiliary building main le vault (elevation 25 foot 6 inches). The auxiliary building nonradioactive areas are sically separated from the potentially radioactive areas. Other than the East 480 volt tchgear room, which is maintained at a slightly negative pressure, there is no pressurization uirement for the remaining nonradioactive areas.

7.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the nonradioactive ventilation system:

the integrity and capability of the system.

b. The components of the nonradioactive ventilation system are designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.

7.2 System Description 7.2.1 System nonradioactive area ventilation system is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-3.

clean areas of the auxiliary building as well as the East & West turbine building cable vaults served by the nonradioactive ventilation system which consists of supply fan F-17, rculating fan F-19, and exhaust fans F-26 for the East 480 volt switchgear room and battery ms exhaust fans F-112A & F-112B for the remaining areas.

battery rooms are ventilated by drawing main cable vault air through the battery rooms while drawing a small amount from the DC switchgear rooms into the battery rooms with roof aust fans F-112 A & F-112B which discharge to atmosphere. All rooms are separated by fire pers.

7.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-7. Fan performance curves are shown in Figures 9.9-11 through 9.9-14.

7.3 Systems Operation nonradioactive area ventilation system is required during normal and shutdown operations.

7.3.1 Normal Operation nonradioactive area ventilation system supply fan, F-17, is interlocked with the East 480 volt tchgear room exhaust fan F-26 via a room thermostat and time delay relays. These fans start at F and reset at 72F, with a 20 minute time delay. This interlock scheme ensures that the aust fan F-26 starts before supply fan F-17. The control scheme is designed to limit the ber of fan starts to three per hour by running the fans F-17/F-26 for a minimum time of 20 utes per start. This system is designed to maintain the East 480 Volt switchgear room below F, based on a summer outdoor design temperature of 86F. During winter operation there is icient heat generated by the electrical equipment to maintain the room temperature above F for personnel comfort, which is consistent throughout the plant for unmanned areas.

ause the East 480 volt switchgear room is the dominant heat load area, the thermostat trolling supply fan F-17 is located within this room. During warm weather, these areas served

cern for the cable vault areas, the minimum desired battery room temperature is 60F. The ery rooms are provided with HI-LO temperature alarms. Historically, since the steam coil was oved from fan F-17 in 1992, temperature in the battery rooms has not been a problem. The act on the DC switchgear rooms temperature, caused by the small amount of fresh air drawn ugh it, is insignificant.

circulating fan, F-19, equipped with a chilled water coil X-40, and located in the upper 4160 AC switchgear room, elevation 56 foot 6 inches, provides extra cooling for the main cable lt, as well as the East and West turbine building cable vaults.

7.4 Availability and Reliability 7.4.1 Special Features East & West battery rooms are interconnected by ductwork to assure venting following the ure of either 50 percent air flow capacity exhaust fans F-112A or F-112B, which is adequate to ntain room temperatures.

components of the nonradioactive ventilation system are designed to operated in an ironment of 110F, atmospheric pressure, and 100 percent relative humidity.

7.4.2 Tests and Inspection centrifugal and vaneaxial fans are similar to fans that are rated in accordance with AMCA ndard 211-A. The ductwork is designed and fabricated in accordance with SMACNA ndard, Low Velocity Duct Construction Standards.

nonradioactive ventilation system undergoes an acceptance test prior to startup.

nonradioactive system is accessible for periodic tests and inspection.

8 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ROOM AIR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM 8.1 Design Bases 8.1.1 Functional Requirements Engineered Safety Features Room Air Recirculation System (ESFRARS) functions to ntain a suitable environment for the electric motor drivers of the safety injection and tainment spray pumps during post accident operation.

8.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the ESFRARS:

b. The system shall have suitable subsystem and component alignments to assure operation of the complete subsystem with its associated components.
c. Capabilities shall be provided to assure the system operation with on site power (assuming off site power is not available) or with off site electrical power.
d. A single failure in either subsystem shall not affect the functional capability of the other subsystem.
e. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans, coils, ductwork, piping and valves to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
f. The system shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic functional testing to assure the operability and performance of the active components of the system, and the operability of the system as a whole. Under conditions as close to the design as practical, the performance shall be demonstrated of the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, the transfer between normal and emergency power sources, and the operation of the associated cooling water system.
g. The system shall be designed to the general criteria as described in Section 6.1.
h. The components of the system shall be designed to operate in the most severe post-accident environment as described in Section 6.1.

8.2 System Description 8.2.1 System ESFRARS is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-2. The automatic initiation logic for RARS is described by the combination of: (a) the initiation logic diagram for the Safety ction Actuation Signal (SIAS) in Figure 7.3-1, and (b) the tabulation of the equipment that is ated by SIAS in Figures 7.3-2A through 7.3-2D.

ESFRARS consists of two redundant, independent subsystems, each capable of maintaining required temperature in one engineered safety features pump room (Section 6.1.4.1). Each RARS subsystem consists of a fan and finned tubed heat exchanger. Each safeguard pump m contains one full capacity ESFRARS fan and coil unit. The third High Pressure Safety ction (HPSI) pump room is served by both fan and coil units.

h ESFRARS fan and coil unit is capable of cooling two HPSI pumps (including the swing p in C cubicle), one Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump and one containment spray

8.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-8. Fan performance curve is shown in Figure 9.9-15.

8.3 System Operation ESFRARS is provided to maintain a suitable environment for the safety injection and tainment spray equipment following a LOCA.

ing normal plant operations, the Radwaste Ventilation System (F-16), Section 9.9.5 services ESF pump rooms. However, during operation of the shutdown cooling system, the ESFRARS be operated to supplement the cooling provided by fan F-16.

8.3.1 Emergency Conditions ESFRARS is automatically initiated by the safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) ction 7.3). Room air is circulated over the water cooling coils by the vaneaxial fans and harged back into the room. A minimum air flow of 3,650 CFM is diverted to the third high sure safety injection pump room from each recirculation unit fan (F-15A and F-15B).

ESFRARS is aligned with the respective emergency power source (Section 8.3) as the ciated safety features equipment served. The RBCCW system (Section 9.4) serves as the heat tem operation is monitored by temperature and flow indication of the water side. Indication is vided in the control room. Fan operation is monitored by motor trip alarms. High room perature is alarmed in the control room.

8.4 Availability and Reliability 8.4.1 Special Features components of the ESFRARS are designed to the general criteria including seismic response escribed in Section 6.1. All components are protected from missile damage and pipe whip by sical separation of duplicate equipment as described in Section 6.1.

ESFRARS fan and coil units are completely redundant, physically separated in water tight p rooms and powered by separate emergency power sources. A failure mode analysis for the RARS is given in Table 9.9-16.

h ESFRARS subsystem is designed to remove the heat given off by two HPSI pumps luding the swing pump in the C cubicle), one LPSI pump, and one containment spray pump.

ESFRARS is provided to maintain an ambient temperature of no greater than 177.9F for the tric motor drivers of the engineered safety feature pumps. The safety injection and tainment spray pump motors can withstand exposure to the ambient conditions.

components of the ESFRARS are designed to operate in an environment of 177.9F, ospheric pressure and radiation level of at least 106 rad. Electric motors are designed for 100 ent relative humidity.

8.4.2 Tests and Inspection of the two vaneaxial fans is rated in accordance with AMCA Standard 211-A. The water ling coils are tested in accordance with Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel e and TEMA, Class R. The ductwork is designed and fabricated in accordance with ACNA Standard, High Velocity Duct Construction Standards.

visions are incorporated into the system design for on-line testing capabilities. Each RARS subsystem is tested separately from the redundant subsystem. The ESFRARS is matically started by manually initiating the SIAS. Fan operation is indicated by motor trip ms.

ESFRARS undergoes a preoperational test prior to startup. The test procedure is discussed in pter 13.

components of the ESFRARS are accessible for periodic inspection and maintenance.

9 FUEL HANDLING AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.1 Design Bases 9.1.1 Functional Requirements fuel handling area ventilation system is a non-QA system, consisting of supply fan F-20 in bination with the main exhaust fans F-34A/B/C and a recirculating fan F-140 (coil X-191). It ctions to provide a suitable environment for the equipment and fresh air ventilation for onnel within the fuel handling area of the auxiliary building. The fuel handling area consists he open area at elevation 38 foot 6 inches, the mezzanine on the East side, and the open lower known as the truck bay area.

9.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the fuel handling ventilation system:

integrity and capability of the system.

b. The components of the fuel handling ventilation system are designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.
c. The fuel handling area which is part of the auxiliary building shall be served by a separate ventilation system.
d. The fuel handling area shall be maintained at a slightly negative pressure.

9.2 System Description 9.2.1 System fuel handling area ventilation system is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-3.

fuel handling area ventilation system is designed to provide adequate ventilation in the spent pool area and to prevent cross contamination with surrounding areas. The maximum design perature in the fuel handling area is 110F, and the minimum temperature maintained at 55F, ch is consistent throughout the plant for unmanned areas. However, booster coils are provided aintain a desired temperature of 70F for personnel comfort (e.g., dressing area).

fuel handling ventilation system consists of a supply fan, F-20, providing 100 percent outside h air, tempered through a steam coil, to the spent fuel area at elevation 38 feet 6 inches.

elf contained air conditioning unit F-140 (coil X-191), located in the spent fuel pool area, vides cooling whenever operations in the spent fuel pool area are required during extreme m weather. The air conditioner discharges through ductwork along the south wall of the spent pool. The ductwork has been sized to accommodate a second air conditioning unit of similar air is drawn through return registers located on the north side wall, immediately above the nt fuel pool, to ensure that the negative pressure within the fuel handling area of the auxiliary ding is at its strongest across the spent fuel pool surface area where the radioactive gaseous ase is most likely to occur. The air is exhausted at a greater rate than it is supplied to ensure an rall negative pressure within the fuel handling area of the auxiliary building.

ing normal operation, air is drawn by the main exhaust fans F-34/A/B/C through HEPA filter L-27. Prior to the handling of irradiated fuel, the exhaust air control logic may be aligned to auxiliary exhaust system (AES).

tilation of the fuel handling area during handling of irradiated fuel may be provided by main aust or the auxiliary exhaust system (AES), but neither system is required. While these ems are used and fuel handling area boundary integrity is set, then any radioactive effluent is

tilation system is available, then suitable radiological monitoring is recommended per the lstone Effluent Control Program.

discussed in the Millstone Unit 2 Environmental Report and FSAR Section 14.7, an accident is credible unless fuel is being handled or a heavy object has been moved over the spent fuel l.

radiation monitoring system in the fuel handling area consists of four (4) gamma sensitive tic scintillation, detector assemblies equally spaced above the spent fuel pool area with local cation plus visual and audible alarms.

rm circuitry of the readout module located in the control room will provide contact closure ut-of-4 matrix) upon high radiation for automatic operation of the auxiliary exhaust system.

automatic operation of the auxiliary exhaust system is not credited in the fuel handling dent analysis.

rm set points are adjustable and are normally set for 50 mr/hr.

9.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-9. The fan performance curve is shown in Figure 9.9-16. The EBFS is described in tion 6.7.

9.3 System Operation fuel handling area ventilation is available during normal and shutdown operations.

9.3.1 Normal Operation fuel handling area ventilation system is manually started from the control room. The system c requires one main exhaust fan (Section 9.9.9) to be operating prior to initiation of the supply (F-20).

ing normal operation, it may be necessary to move heavy equipment over the spent fuel pool

, moving fuel assembly, fuel cask), in which case the AES may be manually initiated. Manual ation of AES is not credited in the fuel handling accident analyses.

supply fan F-20 distributes fresh outside air to the operating floor level at elevation 38 feet 6 es. A steam heating coil is provided for tempering outside air when required. A flow switch is vided on the supply unit discharge to monitor air flow and alarm flow conditions.

door air is supplied at approximately 86F during summer operation to limit the fuel handling maximum temperature to 110F. During winter operation, the air is tempered to maintain a

F for personnel comfort (e.g,. dressing area).

ing normal operation, air is pulled across the spent fuel pool surface by the main exhaust fans 4A/B/C (Section 9.9.9) through the HEPA filter unit (L-27) prior to discharge to the Unit 2

k. The effluent is monitored for radiation (Section 7.5.6).

air conditioning unit F-140 is manually started and stopped locally as required by the rator to maintain comfortable conditions for the personnel working in the area.

9.3.2 Emergency Operations re is no requirement for operation of the fuel handling area ventilation system prior to vement of irradiated fuel or a cask in the spent fuel pool. Nor is there any requirement for ration of any ventilation system to mitigate a fuel handling accident, or a cask drop accident in fuel handling area. Post-accident doses attributable to a fuel handling or cask drop accident are hin the criteria identified by Regulatory Guide 1.183 and 10 CFR 50.67 and do not credit er the main exhaust or AES ventilation systems.

9.4 Availability and Reliability 9.4.1 Special Features ing normal plant operation, to assure a negative pressure within the fuel handling area of the iliary building, the supply fan F-20 can be started only if one main exhaust fan F-34A/B/C ction 9.9.9) is operating. Upon a loss of the supply fan F-20, ventilation is still maintained, ough at a lower rate by infiltration induced by an increased negative pressure generated by n exhaust fans. However, the supply fan F-20, is returned to service as soon as practicable.

n the loss of all three main exhaust fans F-34A/B/C, a main exhaust duct pressure switch s-off supply fan F-20.

nd ductwork is provided for additional strength for the AES. Generally, if space permits, nd ductwork is provided for seismic Class 1 requirements. This facilitates seismic analysis of system. The components of the EBFS are described in Section 6.7.

components of the normal fuel handling ventilation system are designed to operate in an ironment of 110F, atmospheric pressure and 100 percent relative humidity.

9.4.2 Tests and Inspection centrifugal fans are similar to fans which are rated in accordance with AMCA Standard 211-The steam heating coils are tested in accordance with Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and ssure Vessel Code and TEMA, Class C. The ductwork is designed and fabricated in ordance with SMACNA Standard, High Velocity Duct Construction Standards.

AES is incorporated with provisions for online testing. The AES is manually initiated in the trol room by operator action. The EBFS is automatically isolated from the EBFR and aligned h the fuel handling area. The normal ventilation is isolated from the fuel handling building.

tem operation is monitored by flow and filter differential pressure indication. Damper opening system alignment is monitored by positioned indication in the control room.

components of the fuel handling ventilation system are accessible for periodic inspection and ntenance.

10 MAIN EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM 10.1 Design Bases 10.1.1 Functional Requirements main exhaust ventilation system is a Non-QA system, consisting of exhaust fans F-34A/B/C.

nctions to filter the exhaust from all potentially radioactive areas of the unit.

10.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the main exhaust system:

a. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fan, motor, belt, coil, filters, ductwork, piping and valves, to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
b. The components of the main exhaust system are designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.
c. The potentially radioactive areas of the auxiliary building shall be served by a separate ventilation system from the clean areas.
d. The potentially radioactive areas of the auxiliary building shall be maintained at a negative pressure in respect to the clean areas.

10.2 System Description 10.2.1 System main exhaust system is shown schematically in Figures 9.9-1 and 9.9-2.

supply fan, F-20 and the containment/enclosure building purge fan, F-23. Exhaust air from e areas is processed through HEPA filter units prior to discharge through the unit 2 stack.

main exhaust ventilation system consists of three filter units (L-25, L-26, L-27), three trifugal fans F-34A/B/C, and a pressure relief damper 2-AC-59. Each filter unit is associated h a respective area and is designed for the full system flow. Each main exhaust fan is sized for 000 cfm. However, during start-up it was accepted that the exhaust fans could not generate the gn flow and consequently, supply fans F-16, F-20, F-23 serving the areas covered by the main aust fans are balanced to assure that the exhaust air flow is greater than the supply air flow to ntain a negative pressure in these areas. Normally, two fans are required for the radwaste and handling areas with the third fan on standby. During purging operations or enclosure building tilation, all three exhaust fans are operating.

10.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-10. Fan performance curve is shown in Figure 9.9-18.

10.3 System Operation main exhaust ventilation system is required during normal and shutdown operations.

10.3.1 Normal Operation main exhaust ventilation system is manually started from the control room. Normally two of three fans, F-34A/B/C are initiated for normal operation. Three fans are required to operate ng purging or enclosure building ventilation operations. The third fan serves as backup for the operating and provides redundancy in system design.

is exhausted from the respective areas in the auxiliary building at a greater rate than it is plied to induce a negative pressure in these areas. The exhaust air is processed through the ective HEPA filter unit to remove airborne particulate matter. The exhaust duct from each of three areas is provided with process radiation monitors (Section 7.5.6) to alarm high radiation ls.

w switches are provided at each fan discharge to alarm low flow conditions. A counterweight kdraft damper is provided at each exhaust fan discharge to minimize recirculation through an fan. The damper position for the air pressure damper 2-AC-59, and for each HEPA filter unit 25, L-26, L-27) isolation damper, is monitored in the control room.

10.4.1 Special Features o of the three main exhaust fans F-34A/B/C are required for normal operation. Although ging containment or enclosure building ventilation requires the third fan, this operation is ontinued upon the loss of any exhaust fans. Purging is not essential for unit operation or for tdown and can be discontinued at any time to assure availability of exhaust fans for the iliary building.

visions for outside makeup air are provided through damper 2-AC-59 to act as a pressure relief per whenever the pressure in the main exhaust duct exceeds a preset limit switch (automatic ction) and to act as a flow balancing damper whenever an auxiliary building HEPA filter unit 6/L-27 is taken out of service for maintenance, testing or filter replacement. Outside air is ilable at a maximum rate of 20,000 cfm (automatic function) to prevent the main exhaust um from exceeding its design negative pressure of (-)6 inches wg. By procedure, a manual ction, whenever the radwaste ventilation system HEPA filter unit, L-26 is isolated supply fan 6 is taken out of service, only one exhaust fan is allowed to operate and the makeup air damper C-59 is manually controlled to open at its minimum flow. This operation is necessary because exhaust fans capacity exceeds the spent fuel handling fan, F-20, rated at approximately 00 cfm. The minimum flow is preset to match the actual exhaust fan capacity with the actual handling HEPA filter L-27 rated flow to maintain approximately the same negative pressure hin the fuel handling area.

the MES fans will trip on receipt of a Channel 1 CIAS actuation signal. This trip signal can be rridden to restart the fans to restore the ventilation if a CIAS signal is still present. This trip al is not a credited engineered safety feature (ESF) equipment actuation. The trip will imize the consequence of the single failure of dampers 2-AC-11 (Section 6.7.4.1.2).

procedure, with the fuel handling HEPA filter unit L-27 out of service, supply fan F-20 is nergized, makeup damper 2-AC-59 is opened to its maximum setting providing approximately 00 cfm and two main exhaust fans are activated. The maximum makeup flow is preset to ch the actual exhaust fans capacity with the actual radwaste HEPA filter L-26 rated flow to ntain approximately the same negative pressure within the radwaste areas of the auxiliary ding.

side makeup air capabilities are not required for the purge exhaust scenario since the uirements for the HEPA filter unit L-25 are within one exhaust fan capacity.

h ventilation filter unit is provided with a differential pressure control damper to maintain a stant pressure drop across each unit as the filters get dirty. This provides the means to balance low for operations among parallel HEPA filter units L-25, L-26 and L-27.

assure a negative pressure within the auxiliary building, the main exhaust fans must be started r to starting any of the supply fans F-16, F-20, or F-23. The exhaust fans can maintain the cific area negative pressure upon the loss of its respective supply fan. However, upon the loss

discharge duct from the non-safety related Chemistry Laboratory Exhaust Ventilation Fans, 65 and F-166 is connected to the inlet plenum of Main Exhaust Fans F-34A/B/C. This duct is ipped with an air operated isolation damper, 2.HV-710, which is controlled by a solenoid e designed to close the damper when a low or no flow condition exists in the plenum. The per also closes on loss of instrument air.

components of the main exhaust ventilation system are designed to operate in an environment 10F, atmospheric pressure, and 100 percent relative humidity.

10.4.2 Tests and Inspections centrifugal fans are similar to fans which are rated in accordance with AMCA ndard 211-A. The ductwork is designed and fabricated in accordance with SMACNA ndard, High Velocity Duct Construction Standards.

HEPA filters are periodically tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.140 and ANSI 0-1975, Testing of Nuclear Air-Cleaning Systems.

main exhaust system undergoes an acceptance test prior to startup. The test procedure is cribed in Chapter 13.

components of the main exhaust system located outside the containment are accessible for ection and maintenance. Components within containment are accessible only during tdown.

11 CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM 11.1 Design Bases 11.1.1 Functional Requirements control room air conditioning system functions to maintain a suitable environment for onnel and for safety related control and electrical equipment.

11.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the control room air conditioning system:

a. The system shall have two redundant, independent subsystems, each having 100 percent of the total required heat removal capability. However, there are some common supply and return ductwork and dampers.
c. Capabilities shall be provided to assure system operation with either on site power (assuming off site power is not available) or with off site electrical power.
d. A single failure in either subsystem shall not affect the functional capability of the other subsystem.
e. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans, motors, coils, compressor, filters, piping, valves, instrumentation and ductwork, to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
f. The control room air conditioning system shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic pressure and functional testing to assure (1) the structural and leak-tight integrity of its components; (2) the operability and performance of the active components of the system; and (3) the operability of the system as a whole. Under conditions as close to the design as practical, performance shall be demonstrated of the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, and the transfer between normal and emergency power sources.
g. The system shall be designed to the general criteria as described in Section 6.1.
h. The components of the control room air conditioning system shall be designed to operate in the most severe post-accident environment in which exposed.
i. Adequate radiation protection shall be provided to permit access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposure in excess of 5 rem whole body, or its equivalent to any part of the body, for the duration of the accident.

11.2 System Description 11.2.1 System control room air conditioning system is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-4A.

control room air conditioning system consists of two full capacity, completely independent handling and mechanical refrigeration subsystems with the exception of some common twork and dampers. Each control room air conditioning subsystem is a single zone system.

system has the capability of ventilating with outside air while cooling, using mechanical igeration.

h subsystem is provided with a bypass through the control room filtration system (CRFS) sisting of particulate, HEPA and charcoal filters and fan. The physical properties of the CRFS

ide air into the system after filtering.

side air is not provided for pressurizing the control room because of the potential radioactivity ng the post-accident condition. Outside makeup air is avoided to minimize possibilities of ucing contamination into the control room. Outside air is introduced over the long term post-dent case only to provide fresh air for personnel safety.

trol room pressure is maintained at a relatively neutral pressure during normal plant rations by air balancing the HVAC system. When the HVAC system is in recirculation mode ident condition), the control room in-leakage rate is limited by Technical Specification limits.

control room air conditioning system is designed to maintain a suitable environment in the trol room for operating personnel and safety related control equipment. The control room is ntained at 78F in the summer and 72F in the winter.

control room air conditioning system is equipped with full capacity redundant fans, filters, mechanical refrigeration equipment, plus the necessary dampers and controls for matically switching to full recirculation for post-accident operation. The control room area em performance is continually monitored with alarms for high radiation, fan failure and essive pressure drop through filters. The control room operator has remote, manual control for cting damper position, backup fan and filter operation to ensure satisfactory control room ditions following an accident.

dose in the Unit 2 control room, resulting from a Design Basis Accident (DBA), has been rmined as follows. The fission product release model given in Regulatory Guide 1.183 is med. All activity is assumed to be in the containment atmosphere. The dose to operating onnel in the control room as a result of inhalation, submersion and shine following a LOCA is cribed in Section 14.8.4.

borne radiation in the control room is negligible since any leakage out of the containment is the enclosure building filtration region (Section 6.7) where it is filtered by charcoal filters released through the Millstone stack. In addition, the control room is provided with an air ditioning system which may be operated in a closed, complete recirculation mode with visions for filtering through charcoal filters following a high radiation level.

11.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-11. Fan performance curves are shown in Figures 9.9-19 through 9.9-22.

ure 9.9-4 indicates that a fan unit has been provided between the supply plenum and the trol room (coordinates A-8). This blower is part of the process radiation monitor for the supply duct. This is not part of the process air conditioning system.

11.3.1 Normal Operation control room air conditioning system operates during all modes of operation and shutdown.

flow rate associated with normal operation of the control room air conditioning system is n in Table 9.9-11. The normal flow rate is approximately 14,800 cfm.

hand switch starts the supply air handling unit, opens the outside air dampers and places the perature control system in control of system operation. A second hand switch starts the aust fan and opens the associated isolation damper. The temperature control system satisfies room cooling requirements by providing mechanical refrigeration. System operation is nitored by control room temperature indication in the control room. System alignment is nitored by valve position indication on the control boards. Flow balance and neutral pressure is ntained by directing some flow to the cable vault, equivalent to the fresh air intake.

oke detectors are provided in the return ductwork to automatically isolate the supply unit and ate purging operations. The control room is purged by operating the exhaust fans and harging to atmosphere. Discharge dampers to other areas are automatically closed. Both trol room air conditioning subsystems are served by the smoke detection system. Fire dampers provided at all ductwork penetrations through firewalls.

11.3.2 Emergency Operation mally, the method of conditioning the air is controlled by the automatic temperature control em. In the event of a LOCA emergency safeguards system generates an EBFAS, which matically shifts the control room air conditioning system to a complete recirculation mode of ration in which outside air is not introduced into the system and all outside air dampers are ed. In addition, in the event of a fuel handling accident in the Spent Fuel Pool area, an AEAS enerated which automatically shifts the system to the complete recirculation mode. The lysis does not credit AEAS or EBFS during a fuel handling or cask drop accident. The matic control system is capable of cooling using the mechanical refrigeration. Portions of the em air or outside air, can be manually bypassed through the CRFS charcoal filters for cleanup r to supplying air into the conditioned space. The smoke detection system is overridden by the plete recirculation mode of operation to prevent malfunctions during post-accident ditions.

tem operation is monitored by temperature indication. Process and area radiation monitors are vided in the room supply air duct and control room to indicate and alarm high radiation levels.

ration of the CRFS is monitored by filter bank differential pressure and temperature cation. Fan operation is monitored by motor trip alarms.

he event of a LOCA or a fuel handling accident, the control room air conditioning system is matically switched to the isolation/ recirculation mode. Tests show that the unfiltered in-age is less than 200 scfm.

mergency modes of operation.

control room air conditioning system mode of operation includes an automatic isolation of system to the complete recirculation mode and automatic initiation of the bypass filtering ration. This automatic switchover to the complete recirculation mode and filtering mode is ated by the EBFAS or the AEAS.

post-accident mode of operation is a closed cycle with air intakes and outlets isolated. The trol room atmosphere is exhausted from the space, filtered, and cooled as required and rned to the space. Outside air is not introduced into the system unless required for personnel ty.

11.4 Availability and Reliability 11.4.1 Special Features components of the control room air conditioning system are designed to engineered safety ure requirements including seismic response as described in Section 6.1. All components are ected from missile damage and pipe whip by physical separation of duplicate equipment, as cribed in Section 6.1.

h air conditioning subsystem is capable of maintaining a suitable environment within the trol room. Each system is designed for the normal control room cooling load which is greater the cooling requirements under post-accident operation. Each system is completely pendent, including the control and filtration systems with the exception of some common twork and dampers. Common components such as dampers are isolated during post-accident ration. Control inputs to these devices are overridden. Each subsystem is powered by a arate emergency source (Section 8.3). A failure mode analysis for the control room air ditioning system is given in Table 9.9-17. Although there are common plenums, all ductwork onsidered a passive component not subject to a single failure mode.

charcoal filter elements within the CRFS are analyzed to ensure adequate residual heat-oval capabilities following any single failure. The analysis concludes that the maximum perature calculated, based on a radioactive filter inventory which was conservatively assumed e ten (10) times greater than the maximum inventory calculated resulting from a design basis dent at the site, was less than 212F (100C). This is substantially below the charcoal ignition perature, thus filter bed isolation should not constitute a fire hazard. Temperature indication is vided to alert personnel of excessive charcoal bed temperature.

control room air conditioning system fans and filters are remote from the control area and are exposed to fire hazards. The atmosphere within the control room is maintained as constant as sible during the post-accident recirculation mode.

w screens are located on the roof around the Control Room Make-up Inlet Housing, the trol Room Condenser Fan Housings F-36A and F-36B, and the Control Room Exhaust sing.

shielding design limits dose rates in the control room to less than 0.5 mrem/hr and does not eed 5 rem for the duration of the DBA.

components of the control room air conditioning system located outside the conditioned space designed to operate in an environment of 110F atmospheric pressure and 100 percent relative idity. Typically, safety related components within the conditioned space are designed to rate in an environment of 104F (40C) and 10 to 95 percent relative humidity.

11.4.2 Tests and Inspection centrifugal and vaneaxial fans are similar to fans which are rated in accordance with AMCA ndard 211A. The condenser and compressor are rated in accordance with Air Conditioning and rigeration Institute (ARI) Standard 410-64 and 520-68, respectively. The evaporator coils are d in accordance with American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning ineers (ASHRAE) Standard 33-64. Refrigeration equipment is manufactured in accordance h ANSI B9.1, Safety Code for Mechanical Refrigeration. Refrigeration piping is designed, icated and tested in accordance with ANSI B31, 5-1966, Refrigeration Piping Systems. Filters described in Section 6.7.4.2.

ductwork is designed and fabricated in accordance with SMACNA Standard, Low Velocity t Construction Standards.

control room air conditioning system is incorporated with provisions for online testing. Each system is tested independently for operation of associated components. The subsystem in ration is tested by manually switching to the complete recirculation mode. System alignment valve positions are monitored in the control room by position indication while system ormance is monitored by temperature indication. The associated filtration system is manually ated for alignment with the control room by-passed air and for fresh outside air. System nment and valve position are monitored in the control room by position indication.

redundant air conditioning subsystems are operated alternately to provide assurance of rability.

control room air conditioning system undergoes a preoperational test prior to startup. The cedure is described in Chapter 13.

components of the control room air conditioning system are accessible for periodic inspection maintenance.

12.1 Design Bases 12.1.1 Functional Requirements normal diesel generator room ventilation system (Fan F-27) functions to maintain a suitable ironment for equipment and plant operating personnel during normal operation and shutdown ditions. The emergency diesel generator ventilation (DGV) system (Fan F-38A/F-38B) ctions to maintain a suitable environment for equipment during emergency conditions.

12.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the diesel generator room ventilation em:

a. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fan, motor, belt, coil, and ductwork, to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
b. The components of the system shall be designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.

following criteria have been used in the design of the emergency DGV system:

a. The system shall have an independent ventilation subsystem for each Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) room (2), having 100 percent of the total required heat removal capability.
b. The system shall have suitable subsystem and component alignments to assure operation of the complete subsystem with its associated components.
c. Capabilities shall be provided to assure the system operation with on site power (assuming off site power is not available) or with off site electrical power.
d. A single failure in either subsystem shall not affect the functional capability of the other subsystem.
e. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans and ductwork to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
f. The DGV system shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic pressure and functional testing to assure the operability and performance of the active components of the system, and the operability of the system as a whole. Under conditions as close to the design as practical, performance shall be demonstrated of

normal and emergency power sources.

g. The system shall be designed to the general criteria as described in Section 6.1.
h. The components of the DGV system shall be designed to operate in the most severe post-accident environment to which it is exposed.

12.2 System Description 12.2.1 System normal non-safety diesel generator room ventilation system (F-27), and the QA-safety DGV ems (F-38A/B) are shown schematically in Figure 9.9-4.

normal non-safety diesel generator room ventilation system (F-27), which serves both diesel erator rooms, consists of a heating and ventilation supply air unit and louvered exhaust.

diesel generator rooms are served, during normal operation, by the normal non-safety diesel erator room ventilation system (F-27), which supplies tempered air to these areas. During ter conditions approximately 80 percent of the air flow is recirculated to minimize heating uirements. These rooms are vented to atmosphere through exhaust louvers.

ing emergency operation, DGV fan (F-38A/B) consisting of a direct drive, in-line, vaneaxial is provided for each diesel generator room to provide a suitable operating environment for the els during required conditions. The DGV system is provided with a modulating recirculation per 2-HV-257A/B which is controlled by a room thermostat to maintain a suitable ironment for personnel and equipment during winter conditions. Temperature alarms are vided to indicate low and high room temperature conditions.

12.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-12. Fan performance curves are shown in Figures 9.9-23 and 9.9-24.

12.3 System Operation normal non-safety diesel generator room ventilation system (F-27) operates during all modes nit operation and during shutdown. The QA Category 1 DGV systems (F-38A/B) operate ng emergency operations.

12.3.1 Normal Operation normal non-safety diesel generator room ventilation system (F-27) is manually initiated by rator action from a locally mounted control panel.

perature below 120F during the summer conditions coincident with 86F outside ambient air perature. A temperature sensing element is provided in each diesel generator room to alarm h and low room temperature conditions.

12.3.2 Emergency Operation en required, the emergency DGV fans (F-38A/B) are automatically started, and the exhaust pers (2-HV-255A/B) are opened by the same logic that initiates the diesel generators ction 8.3).

DGV system is designed to maintain the room temperature below 120F during emergency ration by providing outside cooling air. Summer conditions require 100 percent outside air.

ing winter conditions, a modulating recirculation damper (2-HV-257A/B), controlled by a m thermostat, limits the outside air intake to maintain a suitable environment for personnel and ipment.

DGV fans (F-38A/B) are interlocked with the diesel generator such that the fans operate at time the diesel generator is operating. The modulating circulation dampers (2-HV-257A/B),

pneumatically controlled and designed to fail in the closed position. The exhaust damper HV-255A/B) is pneumatically controlled and designed to fail in the open position.

inlet and exhaust ductwork are missile protected.

diesel generator room ventilation system F-27 (Seismic Class 2) is connected to the inlet of DGV fan F-38B. This connection to the DGV inlet (F-38B) is Seismic Class 1 up through the isolation damper 2-HV-253B on the nonvital fan F-27. Some recirculation flow is assumed F-38B via this path. Fan F-27 and its isolation damper 2-HV-253B have no automatic trols, and are manually controlled by their individual local switches.

DGV systems F-38A/B have an inherent short circuiting air flow due to leakage through the rculation damper 2-HV-257A/B and due to the exhaust louvers proximity to the intake vers.

ce Train B DGV system has interaction with the non-QA ventilation system, an analysis servatively evaluated Train B for recirculation air flow. Results show that the amount of rculation due to damper 2-HV-253B remaining open, the non-vital ductwork being ruptured, the proximity of the intake louvers to the exhaust louvers may reach 25 percent of design air without exceeding the EDG room temperature limits of 120F. This analysis also servatively bounds Train A.

12.4.1 Special Features components of the DGV system are designed to engineered safety feature requirements uding seismic response as described in Section 6.1. All components are protected from missile age and pipe whip by physical separation of duplicate equipment as described in Section 6.1.

availability of the DGV system is assured by locating duplicate equipment in separate diesel erator rooms. Each DGV fan is powered by the associated diesel generator located in the ective room. The DGV system is designed with a specific component failure mode to assure availability of air cooling during the worst case. A failure mode analysis for the DGV system iven in Table 9.9-18.

ration of the normal diesel generator room ventilation system (Fan F-27) is not vital for plant ration since the diesels are not normally operating. However, low/high temperature alarms are vided to alert plant personnel to take remedial action. Room temperature limitations of 55F imum and 120F maximum are imposed to assure a suitable environment for the diesel erators.

components of the normal diesel generator room ventilation system (Fan F-27) are specified perate in an environment of 110F and 100 percent relative humidity. The components of the rgency DGV system (Fan F-38A/F38B) are designed to operate in an environment of 120F 60 percent relative humidity. The DGV fan motor is designed to operate in an environment of F and 100 percent relative humidity.

12.4.2 Tests and Inspection centrifugal and vaneaxial fans are similar to fans which are rated in accordance with AMCA ndard 211-A. One of the DGV fans is rated in accordance with the above. The electric heating s are built in accordance with the National Electric Code and Underwriters Laboratory uirements. The ductwork is designed and fabricated in accordance with SMACNA Standard, w Velocity Duct Construction Standards.

DGV system is incorporated with provisions for online testing. The subsystem is tested cident with the respective diesel generator (Section 8.4.1) but separately from the redundant system. The subsystem is automatically initiated by starting the respective diesel generator ually. Subsystem operation and alignment are indicated by visual inspection.

DGV system undergoes a preoperation test prior to startup and the diesel generator room em is acceptance tested. Test procedures are described in Chapter 13.

DGV systems are accessible for periodic maintenance and inspections.

13.1 Design Bases 13.1.1 Functional Requirements turbine building ventilation system functions to maintain a suitable environment for ipment and personnel within the turbine building.

13.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the turbine building ventilation system:

a. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans and ductwork to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
b. The components of the turbine building ventilation system shall be designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.

13.2 System Description 13.2.1 System turbine building ventilation system is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-4. The turbine ding ventilation system is designed to maintain the turbine building environment between 55 110F. The turbine building is provided with a forced air ventilation system using outside air the removal of building heat. Recirculation of building air through the ventilation system is vided for cold weather heating. Unit heaters are provided throughout the building to provide ting for shutdown during cold weather.

turbine building ventilation system consists of nine supply air fans; F-101A through -101G, plemental supply fan F-102, and heater drain pumps motors cooling supply fan F-143, 10 exhaust fans F-111A through -111J and lube oil room and access control area exhaust fan

24. Transfer grilles are provided between the operating floor and lower elevations to enhance distribution.

13.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-13. Fan performance curves are shown in Figures 9.9-25 and 9.9-27.

13.3.1 Normal Operation turbine building ventilation system is manually started by operator action at locally mounted trol panels. Turbine building supply fans F-101A through -101G, provide 100 percent outside during periods of warm weather to limit the turbine building ambient temperature to 110F.

plemental supply fan F-102 is operated to supply additional outside air to the steam generator pumps and southeast turbine bay area, and fan F-143 is operated to provide additional ide air to the heater drain pumps motors.

is exhausted from the turbine bay by roof exhaust fans F-111A through F-111J and from the oil room and access control area by fan F-124.

ing cold weather operation, recirculation is provided by turbine building supply fans F-101A ugh F-101G. Each of the seven fans can supply approximately 20 percent outside air and 80 ent return air to maintain a minimum temperature of 55F for personnel comfort without plemental heating. Unit heaters supplied by auxiliary steam can be operated to maintain 55F n the unit is shutdown during periods of cold weather. Supply and exhaust fans are operated ecessary.

13.4 Availability and Reliability 13.4.1 Special Features re are no requirements to maintain the turbine building at any specific pressure under any des of operation.

ductwork penetrations through fire walls are provided with fire dampers. The turbine building rovided with vent area through the ventilation equipment at 1 square foot of vent area per 100 are feet of floor area. This vent area is provided as a means of smoke removal since the tilation equipment may be out of service.

components of the turbine building ventilation system are designed to operate in an ironment of 110F and atmospheric pressure.

13.4.2 Tests and Inspections vaneaxial fans are similar to fans which have been rated in accordance with AMCA Standard

-A. All fans are provided with steel wheels and housings. The ductwork is designed and icated in accordance with SMACNA Standards, Low Velocity Duct Construction ndards.

turbine building ventilation system undergoes an acceptance test prior to startup. The test cedure is described in Chapter 13.

14 ACCESS CONTROL AREA AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM*

OTE: The area is no longer an access control area. It was converted to office space consisting of offices, lunch and locker rooms and hallways.

14.1 Design Bases 14.1.1 Functional Requirements air conditioning system functions to maintain a suitable environment for personnel comfort hin the area.

14.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the area air conditioning system:

a. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans and ductwork to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
b. The components of the air conditioning system shall be designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.

14.2 System Description 14.2.1 System air conditioning system is shown schematically in Figure 9.9-4.

access control area air conditioning system is provided for comfort cooling and heating of the ess control area, the instrument shop and selected areas in Unit 1 such as the lunch room and ce spaces. The HVAC system is designed to maintain an environment of 78F and 50 percent tive humidity in the conditioned space.

system consists of self-contained air conditioning unit which houses the supply fan, chilled er coil, and filters. Chilled water is provided by the Auxiliary Chilled Water System. Steam ributing coils are provided for heating during winter operation.

air handling unit supply fan delivers ventilation air to the various rooms which include office ce, locker and lunch rooms, and the hallways. Air is distributed and recirculated through twork. Fresh air is mixed with return air. Excess air is exhausted either by the main exhaust (F-34A/B/C) and discharged through Unit 2 stack or by exhaust fan F-124 which discharges ctly to the outside.

major system components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in le 9.9-14. Fan performance curve is shown in Figure 9.9-28.

14.3 System Operation access control area air conditioning system operates during unit operation and during tdown.

14.3.1 Normal Operation air conditioning system is manually initiated by operator action at a locally mounted control el. The system operation is automatically controlled by the temperature control system.

imum outside air is provided through penthouse louvers located on the turbine building. The ditioned air is recirculated through the unit to conserve refrigeration and heating requirements.

flow which is equivalent to the outside air makeup is exhausted without recirculation.

ing the winter heating cycle, steam heat is available by the steam distributing coil.

14.4 Availability and Reliability 14.4.1 Special Features air conditioning system is designed to provide personnel comfort. Loss of the system will not uire shutdown. Fire dampers are provided at all penetrations through fire walls.

components of the air conditioning system are designed to operate in an environment of

ºF, atmospheric pressure and 100 percent relative humidity.

14.4.2 Tests and Inspection centrifugal fan is similar to fans which are rated in accordance with AMCA Standard 211A.

condenser and compressor are rated in accordance with ARI Standard 410-64 and 520-68, ectively. The evaporator coils are rated in accordance with ASHRAE Standard 33.64.

rigeration equipment is manufactured in accordance with ANSI B9.1, Safety Code for chanical Refrigeration. Refrigeration piping is designed, fabricated and tested in accordance h ANSI B31.5-1966, Refrigeration Piping Systems.

ductwork is designed and fabricated in accordance with SMACNA Standard, Low Velocity t Construction Standards.

air conditioning system undergoes an acceptance test prior to startup. The test procedure is cribed in Chapter 13.

15 BALANCE OF UNIT 15.1 Design Bases 15.1.1 Functional Requirements tilation systems for the balance of the unit function to provide a suitable environment for ipment and ventilation for operating personnel.

15.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the systems:

a. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as fans and ductwork to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
b. The components of the systems shall be designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.

15.2 System Description 15.2.1 System safety-related Heating/Ventilation & Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems are provided for the ke structure and other general areas of the plant (i.e., radiation protection facility, telephone ms, computer rooms, etc.) to maintain a year round environment suitable for personnel and ipment. However, the only areas containing safety related equipment are the main equipment m of the intake structure, which houses the safety related service water system, as well as other safety related equipment such as the circulating water pumps, traveling screens and the Old mputer Room which houses the safety related Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System CMS) as well as other non safety-related equipment including CISCO Network Switches that y data from the Station Transformers and RCP vibration monitors to the PPC.

ing normal operation, the temperature of the intake structure main equipment room is a imum of 45F, and a maximum of 104F, with a design basis minimum temperature of 40F.

n loss of ventilation exhaust fans F-114A/B/C, the maximum nominal design temperature of area of the intake structure is 130F. In the event of such a loss of forced ventilation, two sive nonmechanical roof ventilators X-219A and X-219C maintain the main equipment room r below 130F through natural circulation. The non safety related equipment located within main equipment room of the intake structure is designed for 104F while the safety related ipment is qualified for a nominal temperature of 130F.

ces that are at higher temperatures given normal plant operating conditions. A comparatively ll amount of heat gain is due to equipment within the room. As a result, no heating is required older weather due to heat loss through exterior walls and the ceiling/roof. Upon loss of the air ditioning system (X199/198), under worst case accident conditions, the room temperature will to 117.4F. This results in internal ICCMS cabinet temperatures less than their maximum wable temperature of 122F.

15.2.2 Components major system components and associated fabrication and performance data for the main ipment room of the intake structure and Old Computer Room are listed in Table 9.9-15.

15.3 System Operation se non-safety related HVAC systems maintain a year round environment suitable for onnel and equipment during normal and shutdown plant operations. Since the main ipment room of the intake structure and the Old Computer Room of the Auxiliary Building are only areas containing safety related equipment, the other plant areas will not be discussed in subsequent subsections.

15.3.1 Normal Operation he summer mode, the ventilation/cooling is provided to the main equipment room by roof aust fans F-114A/B/C which draw outside air through the four 8 foot by 10 foot louvered nings in the west wall of the intake structure, past the equipment being cooled, then out ugh the exhaust fan discharge. In the winter mode, the wall louvers are closed, mostatically controlled electric heaters operate as needed during times of colder outdoor peratures, and the exhaust fans are manually cycled on/off as necessary to maintain main ipment room temperatures in the range of 45F to 104F.

exhaust fans F-114A/B/C are manually started by operator action at locally mounted control tches.

Old Computer Room is cooled by a split air conditioning system that is automatically trolled by a thermostat nominally set to 70F. Air is circulated within the room by Air Handler 98 which distributes air to four ceiling outlets. Air conditioning is required all year round arily due to the heat gain through interior walls and the floor.

15.4 Availability and Reliability 15.4.1 Special Features ss of the intake structure ventilation/cooling system, which is of concern only in the summer de of operation, will not require a plant shutdown, since passive roof ventilators X-219A and

ween the louvers in the west wall of the intake structure, past the service water pumps, and up ugh the roof ventilators. All safety related components in the main equipment area of the ke structure are qualified for operation in a 130F environment.

ss of heating in the intake structure main equipment room, either through reduced heat load ing shutdown conditions) or loss of the space heaters, which is of concern only in the winter de of operation, could cause freezing conditions that could affect the operability of the service er strainer backwash control system. Therefore, safety related temperature controllers are alled, which automatically initiate the service water strainer backwash cycle if the main ipment room of the intake structure falls to 40F or below.

oss of air conditioning in the Old Computer Room will not result in exceeding the qualified rating temperature of 122F for all safety related components in this area.

15.4.2 Tests and Inspection roof exhaust fans (F-114A/B/C) are similar to fans which have been rated in accordance with CA Standards.

Intake Structure systems underwent acceptance tests prior to startup. Test procedures are cribed in Chapter 13.

components of the systems are accessible for maintenance and inspection.

16 VITAL SWITCHGEAR VENTILATION SYSTEM 16.1 Design Bases 16.1.1 Functional Requirements vital switchgear ventilation system function to maintain a suitable environment for the safety ted electrical equipment during normal operation, loss of off site power and post-accident ditions.

16.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the vital switchgear ventilation system:

a. Each redundant switchgear group shall have an independent subsystem having 100 percent of the total required heat removal capability.
b. The system shall have suitable subsystem and component alignments to assure operation of the complete subsystem with its associated components.
d. A single failure in either subsystem shall not affect the functional capability of the other subsystem.
e. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components such as fans, coils, ductwork, piping and valves to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
f. The system shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic functional testing to assure the operability and performance of the active components of the system, and the operability of the system as a whole. Under conditions as close to the design as practical, the performance shall be demonstrated of the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, the transfer between normal and emergency power sources, and the operation of the associated cooling water system.
g. The system shall be designed to the general criteria as described in Section 6.1.
h. The components of the system shall be designed to operate in the most severe post-accident environment as described in Section 6.1.

16.2 System Description 16.2.1 System vital switchgear ventilation system is shown on Figure 9.9-3, 9.9-4 and 9.9-31.

vital switchgear ventilation system consists of independent subsystems, capable of removing

% of the heat generated in the associated vital electrical equipment room. The vital AC tchgear rooms containing the 4160 volt and 6900 volt electrical equipment and the west 480 unit load center are each cooled by separate closed cycle air subsystems sized for 100% of the m cooling requirements under normal plant operation and emergency conditions such as Loss Coolant Accident LOCA and High Energy Line Break HELB. Therefore, since each system is normally operating, and the normal cooling requirements exceed the cooling uirements for emergency operation, no system realignment is necessary for emergency ditions.

h of the above subsystems consist of fan-coil units utilizing service water as the ultimate heat

. The original room temperature was limited to 40C (104F) for the vital AC switchgear ms. However, engineering analysis responsive to NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water tem Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment, July 18, 1992, identified the need to e the room temperature limitation for the upper and lower 4160/6900 volt switchgear rooms.

a result, the upper and lower 4160/6900 volt rooms have been qualified for a room temperature tation of 50C (122F).

ection for both subsystems in the event of a high energy pipe rupture. Service water supply is vided with isolation valves located outside the rooms. Water detectors within the rooms coffer will cause the corresponding isolation valve to close automatically to prevent flooding.

east 480 volt unit load center is located in the auxiliary building and is cooled during normal emergency operations by 100% outside air supply systems. The room temperature for both east and west 480 volt unit load center rooms is limited to 40C (104F).

east and west vital DC switchgear rooms are provided with closed cycle air subsystems zing mechanical refrigeration to maintain the ambient conditions within these areas. Cooling ormally provided by nonvital chilled water. The room temperature is limited to 40C (104F).

MCC B51 and B61 enclosures are provided with self-contained air conditioning units. (Vital C Coolers Number A/C-3 (B51) and A/C-4 (B61)) which maintain the ambient temperature de the enclosures below 122F during normal plant operation and emergency conditions such Loss of Coolant Accident LOCA and High Energy Line Break HELB. No system ignment is necessary during emergency conditions.

16.2.2 Components major system components and associated performance data are listed in Table 9.9-19.

16.3 System Operation 16.3.1 Normal Operation subsystems serving the two 4160 volt and 6900 volt rooms and the east and west 480 volt unit centers operate during normal operation and are actuated by room thermostats. Normal ling for the east 480 loadcenter is provided by the nonradioactive ventilation system. (See tion 9.9.6.) Air is supplied and exhausted through the roof louvers provided for the radioactive ventilation system and the vital switchgear east 480V room ventilation system.

vital DC switchgear ventilation system operates during normal unit operation. Chilled water ligned for normal cooling from the auxiliary chilled water system (see Section 9.9.16).

ving and components are initiated by remote manual operation.

Vital Coolers A/C-3 (MCC B51) and A/C-4 (MCC B61) operate during normal plant ration and are supplied with electrical power from the same MCC it serves. Each cooler is vided with an integral temperature controller which cycles the unit, as required, to maintain temperature inside the enclosure below 122F.

vital AC switchgear room ventilation system will operate during post accident or loss of off power conditions, depending on the cooling requirements as determined by the corresponding m thermostats.

vital DC switchgear ventilation system, if not already running, is automatically initiated by SIAS or by a loss of AC power. The vital chilled water system automatically assumes the rgency alignment upon SIAS or loss of normal power. To maintain room cooling, the chilled er supply valve to each rooms heat exchanger is secured open and the fans run continuously.

Vital Coolers A/C-3 (MCC B51) and A/C-4 (MCC B61) operate during emergency ditions such as Loss-of-Coolant Accident LOCA and High Energy Line Break HELB to t the temperature inside the enclosures below 122F. Following a loss of normal power the l Coolers, which are powered by the MCC it serves, are automatically supplied with safety ted power via the emergency diesel generators.

16.4 Availability and Reliability 16.4.1 Special Features components of the vital switchgear ventilation system are designed to engineered safety ure requirements including seismic response, as described in Section 6.1.

availability of the system is assured by providing duplicate, full-capacity equipment, each system physically separated from its counterpart. The system is powered by separate, rgency buses.

equipment in the 6900 volt and 4160 volt rooms is designed to operate in an environment of F and 100% relative humidity.

16.4.2 Tests and Inspections centrifugal and vaneaxial fans are rated in accordance with AMCA Standard 211A. The twork is designed and fabricated in accordance with SMACNA Standard, High Velocity Duct struction Standards or Low Velocity Duct Construction Standards, as appropriate.

vital switchgear ventilation system is incorporated with provisions for online testing. Each system is tested independently for operation of associated components. The subsystem in ration is tested by manually switching to the emergency mode. System alignment and valve itions are monitored on the local control panel by position indication while system ormance is monitored by temperature indication.

vital switchgear ventilation system undergoes a preoperational test prior to startup. The cedure is described in Chapter 13.

17 AUXILIARY CHILLED WATER SYSTEM 17.1 Design Bases 17.1.1 Functional Requirements auxiliary chilled water system functions to provide a source of chilled water to maintain a able environment for portions of the safety related electrical equipment during normal plant rations and to provide a source of chilled water for other non-safety related plant cooling uirements.

17.1.2 Design Criteria auxiliary chilled water system has been designed to the following criteria:

a. Two identical mechanical refrigeration units provide a source of chilled water during normal plant operation.
b. The auxiliary chilled water system isolates automatically from the safety related chilled water system upon receipt of a SIAS.
c. Connections to the safety related chilled water system have been designed to Seismic I requirements.

17.2 System Description 17.2.1 System auxiliary chilled water system is shown on Figure 9.9-31. The auxiliary chilled water system sists of two identical mechanical refrigeration units which can be operated either singularly or arallel to provide a source of chilled water during normal plant operation. Cooling of the hanical refrigeration units is provided by the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water CCW).

17.2.2 Components major system components and associated performance data are listed in Table 9.9-20.

17.3.1 Normal Operation auxiliary chilled water system (see Figure 9.9-31) operates during normal operation with the ess control area temperature being controlled by a temperature controller.

17.3.2 Emergency Operation iliary Chilled Water System is automatically isolated following a SIAS, loss of off site power, oss of control air.

17.4 Availability and Reliability 17.4.1 Special Features availability of the system is assured by providing duplicate equipment to provide the essary operating flexibility. The mechanical refrigeration units are liberally sized so that one can handle the expected heat loads. As additional need for chilled water develops due to plant gn changes both units may be required to operate.

17.4.2 Tests and Inspections mechanical refrigeration units are rated in accordance with the ARI Standard 590-62.

components of the auxiliary chilled water system are accessible for periodic inspection and ntenance.

18 VITAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM 18.1 Design Basis 18.1.1 Functional Requirements Vital Chilled Water System functions to provide a source of chilled water to maintain a able environment for portions of the safety related electrical equipment during loss of off site er and post-accident conditions.

18.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the Vital Chilled Water System:

a. Each redundant vital switchgear group shall have an independent vital chilled water subsystem having 100 percent of the loss of off site power or post-accident heat removal capability.
c. Capabilities shall be provided to assure the system operation with on site power (assuming off site power is not available) or with off site electrical power.
d. A single failure in either subsystem shall not affect the functional capability of the other subsystem.
e. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components such as cylinder heads, tubing, piping, and valves to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
f. The system shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic functional testing to assure the operability and performance of the active components of the system, and the operability of the system as a whole. Under conditions as close to the design as practical, the performance shall be demonstrated of the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, the transfer between normal and emergency power sources, and the operation of the associated cooling water system.
g. The system shall be designed to the general criteria as described in Section 6.1.
h. The components of the system are designed to operate in a mild environment.

Harsh environmental conditions may result from a turbine building fire or a high-energy line break event. However, operability of chillers X-169A/B is not required to mitigate these events.

18.2 System Description 18.2.1 System Vital Chilled Water System is shown on Figure 9.9-31. The Vital Chilled Water System sists of two chiller subsystems, both of which are designed to engineered safety features (ESF) uirements to provide a source of chilled water to the Vital Switchgear Ventilation System ng loss of off site power and post-accident conditions.

18.2.2 Components major system components and associated performance data are listed in Table 9.9-21.

18.3.1 Normal Operation o Vital Chilled Water subsystems, X-169A/B are in standby mode during normal operation.

l Switchgear Ventilation chilled water is supplied by the Auxiliary Chilled Water System, 96A/B during normal operation.

18.3.2 Emergency Operation o Vital Chilled Water subsystems are automatically initiated by a SIAS or by a loss of normal power to provide a source of chilled water to the Vital Switchgear Ventilation System.

18.4 Availability and Features 18.4.1 Special Features availability of the system is assured by providing duplicate equipment. The two independent hanical refrigeration units are sized such that each unit can handle its entire loss of off site er or post-accident condition load. The refrigeration units are powered by separate emergency es.

Vital Chilled Water System is designed with specific failure modes to assure emergency em alignment.

18.4.2 Tests and Inspections mechanical refrigeration units are rated in accordance with the ARI Standard 590.

components of the Vital Chilled Water System are accessible for periodic inspection and ntenance.

condenser and evaporator sections of the vital chillers are stamped in accordance with erican Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Section VIII. Refrigeration equipment anufactured in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B 9.1, Safety e for Mechanical Refrigeration. Refrigeration piping is designed, fabricated, and tested in ordance with ANSI B 31.5, Refrigeration Piping Systems.

(F-13A/B/C)

Type Vaneaxial Flow (cfm) 31,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 25 Code NEMA MG-1 Seismic Class II l (X-34A/B/C)

Type Water (RBCCW)

Heat removal capability, each (Btu/hr) 8.10 x 105 (nominal rating)

Air temperature entering/leaving (F) 120/95 (nominal rating)

Water temperature entering/leaving (F) 85/95 (nominal rating)

Water flow rate (gpm) 165 (nominal rating)

Code ASME Section VIII TEMA, Class C Seismic Class II twork Material/Type IAW Specification 526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II

(F-23)

Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 32,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating 15 Code NEMA MG-1 Seismic Class II l (X-43)

Type Steam distributing Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 2.42 x 106 (nominal rating)

Air temperature entering/leaving (°F) 0/70 (nominal rating)

Code ASME Section VIII TEMA, Class C Seismic Class II iculate Filters Quantity Media (field cut)

Type Throwaway twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-52 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II

ng Material ASTM A-333 Grade 6 Wall (inches) 0.375 Fittings Butt-welded except at flanged equipment Flanges Carbon steel, ANSI 150 lb rating Code ANSI B31.7, Class II Seismic Class I ves (2AC-4/5/6/7)

Type Wafer-type butterfly Class 150 lb Line size (inches) 48 Code ASME Section III, Class 2, 1971 Seismic Class I

(F-24A/B)

Type Vaneaxial Flow (cfm) 75,000/37,500 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction (2 speed)

Horsepower rating (hp) 60/30 Code NEMA MG-1 Seismic Class II twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II

(F-37A/B)

Type Vaneaxial Capacity (cfm) 4,320 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 5 Code NEMA MG-1 Seismic Class II twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II

Penetration Number System Air Required (cfm) 19 Main steam 1000 20 Main steam 1000 15 Main feedwater 360 16 Main feedwater 360 22 Steam generator blowdown 300 23 Steam generator blowdown 300 10 Shutdown cooling 300 2 Letdown 100 65 Steam generator blowdown sample 200 72 Steam generator blowdown sample 200 21 Reactor containment and pressurizer sample 200 4320

(F-16)

Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 40,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 40 Code NEMA MG-1 Seismic Class II l (X-37)

Type Steam distributing Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 2.72 x 106 (nominal rating)

Air temperature entering/leaving (F) 0/60 Code ASME Section VIII, TEMA Class C Seismic Class II ers Quantity per unit Media (field cut)

Type Throwaway twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Seismic Class II

Booster Coils (X-56 / 57 / 58)

X-56 X-57 X-58 pe Steam distributing r entering temperature (F) 55 55 55 de ASME Section VIII, TEMA Class C r leaving temperature (F) 70 80 70 (nominal rating) r flow (cfm) 550 3510 645 (nominal rating) ismic Class II

F-17 Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 25,750 (nominal rating)

Code AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 20 Code NEMA MG-1 Seismic Class II iculate Filters Quantity Media (field cut)

Type Throwaway twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA t 480 Loadcenter Room Normal Exhaust Fan F-26 Type Vaneaxial Flow (cfm) 17,500 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 10 Code NEMA MG-1 Seismic Class II

twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II tery Room Roof Exhaust Fans F112A/F112B Type Roof exhaust Flow (cfm) 4125 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 3 Code NEMA Seismic Class II le Vault Transfer Fans F-123 Type Propeller Flow (cfm) 1,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 1/8 Code NEMA MG-1 Seismic Class II twork None (Fan mounted in wall only)

le Vault Air-Recirculation Fan (F-19)

Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 16,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 15 Code NEMA Seismic Class II l (X-40)

Type Chilled water Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 154,000 (nominal rating)

Code ASME Section VIII, TEMA Class C Seismic class II iculate Filter Quantity 12 Type Throwaway twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II

SYSTEM s (F-15A/B)

Type Vaneaxial Capacity (cfm) 18,650 (minimum)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic class I tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 15 Code NEMA MG-1 Seismic Class I ls (X-36A/B Type Water (RBCCW)

Heat removal capability, each (Btu/hr) Note 1 Air temperature entering/leaving (F) Note 1 Water temperature entering/leaving (F) Note 1 Water flow rate (gpm) 60 (minimum)

Code ASME Section VIII TEMA, Class R Seismic Class I twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-506 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class I e 1: Calculation 96-ENG-1529M2 provides a summary of performance data for various RBCCW inlet temperatures including a post-accident temperature transient.

(F-20)

Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 18,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 15 Code NEMA Seismic Class II l (X-41)

Type Steam distributing Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 164 x 106 (nominal rating) ls Air temperature entering/leaving (F) 0/85 Code ASME Section VIII, TEMA Class C iculate Filters Quantity 12 Type Throwaway .

twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II

Conditioner (F-140)

Type Self Contained Capacity 15 Ton Standard ARI 520 Seismic Class II

-components:

Evaporator (X-191) Direct expansion (Refrigerant R-22)

Condenser Water cool (TBCCW)

Compressor Hermetic (Refrigerant R-22) tor:

Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 2 Code NEMA iculate Filters:

Quantity 2 Type Throwaway

(F-34 A/B/C)

Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 32,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 40 Code NEMA Seismic Class II er Housing (L-25, L-26, L-27)

Housing material standard ASTM A-415 Frame material standard ASTM A-36 Seismic Class II Particulate Filters Quantity (per unit)

L-25 32 L-26 44 L-27 20 Type (prefilter) Throwaway HEPA Filters Quantity (per unit)

L-25 32 L-26 44 L-27 20 Type High efficiency, dry Rate air flow per filter at 1 in WG 1,000 cfm Standard MIL-STD-282 twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II

ply Fan (F-21A/F-21B)

Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 16,460 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class I tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 15 Code NEMA Seismic Class I l - Evaporator (X-42A / X-42B)

Type Direct expansion Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 432,000 (nominal rating)

Standard ASHRAE Standard 33-64 Seismic class I iculate Filters Quantity (per unit) 10 Type (prefilter) Throwaway Quantity (per unit) 10 Type (primary) High efficiency (bag) mpressor (F22A / B)

Type Hermetic Power input (kW) 44 Standard ARI 520-68 Seismic Class I denser Type Air cooled Seismic Class I

(F-36A / F-36B)

Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 23,900 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class I tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 20 Code NEMA Seismic Class I l - Condenser Type Refrigerant condenser (R-22)

Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 588,000 Standard ARI Standard 410-64 Seismic Class I iculate Filters Quantity (per unit) 16 Type Throwaway aust Fan (F-31A/F-31B)

Type Vaneaxial Flow (cfm) 16,460 (nominal rating)

Seismic Class I Standard AMCA 211-A tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 7.5 Code NEMA Seismic Class I

trol Room Filtration Fan (F-32A/F-32B)

Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 2500 (10%)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class I tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 5 Code NEMA Seismic Class I ration Unit (L-30A/B)

Housing Seismic Class I iculate Filters Quantity per unit 2 Type Throwaway PA Filters Quantity (per unit) 2 Type High Capacity Rate air flow per filter at 1.30 in WG 1500 CFM Rate air flow per filter at 0.87 in WG 1000 CFM Standard MIL-STD-282 rcoal Filters Quantity per unit (trays) 6 Charcoal type CNN-816 activated coconut shell Rated flow per unit 2500 CFM Standard ANSI N-509 rigeration Piping Standard ANSI B9.1, ANSI B31.5 (1966)

Seismic Class I twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-506 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class I

(F-27)

Type Centrifugal Class Flow (cfm) 1000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Horsepower rating (hp) 1.0 Code NEMA Seismic Class II l (X-44)

Type Electric Heat transfer (kW Btu/hr) 18kW / 61,4000 Btu/hr (nominal rating) ers Quantity 1 Type Throwaway twork (Non-Vital)

Material / Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II V Fan (F-38A / F-38B)

Type Vaneaxial Flow (cfm) 31,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class I tor Horsepower rating (hp) 20 Code NEMA Seismic Class I twork (Vital)

Material/Type IAW Specification M-506 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class I

ply Fan (F-101A through G)

Type Vaneaxial Capacity (cfm) 44,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 20 Code NEMA Seismic Class II ply Fan (F-102)

Type Vaneaxial Flow (cfm) 44,400 (nominal rating)

Code AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 25 Code NEMA Seismic Class II f Exhaust Fans (F-111A through J)

Type Roof exhaust Flow (cfm) 35,400 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 5 Code NEMA Seismic Class II

aust Fan (F-124)

Type Centrifugal (inline)

Flow (CFM) 1,500 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 1 Code NEMA Seismic Class II twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II ply Fan (F-143)

Type Inline Flow (cfm) 15,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 5 Code NEMA Seismic Class II twork Material / Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II AFW Exhaust Fan (F-158)

Type Roof exhauster Flow (CFM) 1,000 (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II

tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 1/4 Code NEMA Seismic Class II

TE: The area is no longer used as an access control area. It was converted to office space consisting of offices, lunch and locker rooms, and walkways.

(F-116)

Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 15,550 (nominal rating)

Code AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II tor Type Induction Horsepower Rating 20 Code NEMA-G Seismic Class II ling Coil (X-85)

Type Chilled Water Heat Transfer (Btu/hr) 420,000 (nominal rating)

Air Temperature Entering (F) 80.7 DB, 66.6 WB (nominal rating)

Air Temperature Leaving (F) 60 DB, 57 WB (nominal rating) ling Coil Code ASME Section VIII, TEMA Class C Seismic Class II ting Coil (X-167)

Type Steam distributing Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 418,000 (nominal rating)

Code ASME VIII Seismic Class II

iculate Filters Quantity (per unit) 8 Type (prefilter) Throwaway Quantity (per unit) 8 Type (primary) High efficiency (bag) twork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA 9l Seismic Class II

ke Structure Fan (F-114A/B/C)

Type Roof exhauster Flow (CFM) 30,000 Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class II Motor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 7.5 Code NEMA Seismic Class II ke Structure Ventilators (X-219A/C)

Type Passive, Non-Mechanical Flow Rate Variable Code Requirements ANSI/AWS D1.1 (1997) ANSI/AWS D1.3 (1989)

Seismic Class II Ductwork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II Computer Room Air Conditioner Type Split system Capacity (Ton) 4 (nominal rating)

Standard ARI 520 Seismic Class II Subcomponents Evaporator Unit (X-198)

Type Direct expansion (refrigerant R-410A)

Motor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 0.75 Code NEMA Seismic Class II denser Unit (X-199)

Type Air cooled Compressor Type Scroll Hermetic Ductwork Material/Type IAW Specification M-526 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class II w Computer Room Air Conditioner (F-144A/B)

Type Split system Capacity (Btu/hr) 218,000 (nominal rating)

Standard ARI 520 Seismic Class II Subcomponents Evaporator Unit (X-200/X-201)

Type Direct expansion (refrigerant R-22)

Motor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 7.5 Code NEMA Seismic Class II Condenser Unit (X-202/X-203)

Type Air cooled Compressor Type Hermetic

Particulate Filter Quantity (per unit) 8 Type Throwaway Ductwork None SAJE Fans parameter F-55A F-55B pe Centrifugal Centrifugal w (cfm) 3204 (nominal rating) 1240 (nominal rating) ndard NAFM NAFM smic Class II II tor type Induction Induction tor horsepower rating (hp) 50 10 tor Code NEMA NEMA tor Seismic Class II II ctwork Material / Type IAW Specification M-526 IAW Specification M-526 ctwork Standard SMACNA SMACNA ctwork Seismic Class II II

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL RESULTANT IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION & EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE SYSTEM

& QUANTITY MODE MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION STATUS REMARK Cooling coils Tube or header Room temperature Loss of cooling Unit taken out of One subsystem Redundant system rupture indication and flow service out of service available in redun indication on tube room. Each room side contains a combin of a minimum saf features.

Fan Fails to operate Status lights from Loss of air flow Same as above Same as above Same as above.

the control room Dampers Damper Room temperature Loss of cooling Same as above Same as above Dampers are man mispositioned alarm secured in positio provide proper flo all rooms.

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE RESULTANT AND QUANTITY MODE & MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION SYSTEM STATUS REMARK Supply fan Fails to Status light on Loss of air flow Unit out of Redundant system Each unit has 1 (F-21A & F-21B) operate C25A/B service operable capacity Evaporator coil Rupture Room Loss of cooling Same as above Same as above Same as above (X-42A & X-42B) temperature indicator Exhaust fan Fails to Status light on Loss of air flow Same as above Same as above Same as above (F-31A & F-31B) operate C25A/B Filtration fan Fails to Status light on Loss of filtered air Same as above Same as above Same as above (F-32A & F-32B) operate C25A/B flow Condenser fan Fails to Room Loss of cooling Same as above Same as above Same as above (F-36A & F-36B) operate temperature capacity indicator Compressor Fails to Room Loss of cooling Same as above Same as above Same as above (F-22A & F-22B) operate temperature capacity indicator Supply outside air Fails to close Status light on None None Redundant damper Safe position fa damper C25A 2-HV-495 closed closed (2-HV-202)

F-21A discharge Fails to Status light on Air flow affected Unit out of Redundant system Each unit has 1 damper operate C25A service operable capacity (2-HV-203A)

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE RESULTANT AND QUANTITY MODE & MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION SYSTEM STATUS REMARK F-21B discharge Fails to Status light on Air flow affected Unit out of Redundant system Each unit has 1 damper operate C25B service operable capacity (2-HV-203B)

F-21A discharge duct N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Fire damper is fire damper remark deemed a passi (2-HV-204A) component F-21B discharge duct N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Fire damper is fire damper remark deemed a passi (2-HV-204B) component F-31A & F-31B N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Fire damper is common return duct remark deemed a passi fire damper component (2-HV-205)

F-31A discharge Fails to Status light on Air flow affected Unit out of Redundant system Each unit has 1 damper operate C25A service operable capacity (2-HV-206A)

F-31B discharge Fails to Status light on Air flow affected Unit out of Redundant system Each unit has 1 damper operate C25B service operable capacity (2-HV-206B)

Exhaust damper to Fails to close Status light on None None Redundant damper Safe position fa cable vault C25A 2-HV-497 closed closed (2-HV-207)

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE RESULTANT AND QUANTITY MODE & MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION SYSTEM STATUS REMARK Exhaust damper to Fails to close Status light on None None Redundant damper Safe position fa atmosphere C25A 2-HV-496 closed closed (2-HV-208)

Return air volume N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Fixed damper damper remark passive compo (2-HV-209)

F-32A/B Common Fails to close Status light on None None Manual action Damper norma intake duct, air C25A open. Needs to damper close only duri (2-HV-210) emergency fres mode.

F-32A/B Common Fails to close Status light on None None Redundant damper Safe position fa outside air damper for C25A 2-HV-495 closed closed emergency fresh air mode (2-HV-211)

F-32A discharge Fails to Status light on Air flow affected Unit out of Redundant system Each unit has 1 damper operate C25A service operable capacity (2-HV-212A)

F-32B discharge Fails to Status light on Air flow affected Unit out of Redundant system Each unit has 1 damper operate C25B service operable capacity (2-HV-212B)

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE RESULTANT AND QUANTITY MODE & MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION SYSTEM STATUS REMARK Filter cross connect. N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A PERMANENT damper remark CLOSED (2-HV-213)

F-32A & F-32B fresh N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A FIX DAMPER air intake volume remark PASSIVE damper COMPONENT (2-HV-234)

F-21A/B or F-32A/B Fails to close Status light on None None Redundant dampers Safe position fa outside air damper C25B to dual path closed (2-HV-495) 2-HV-202 & 2-HV-211 Exhaust damper to Fails to close Status light on None None Redundant damper Safe position fa atmosphere (2-HV- C25B 2-HV-208 closed closed 496)

Exhaust damper to Fails to close Status light on None None Redundant damper Safe position fa cable vault C25B 2-HV-207 closed closed (2-HV-497)

All control room N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Ductwork is ductwork remark seismic Class-1 deemed a passi component Fresh Air Intake N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Fixed Damper Volume Damper (2- remark Passive Compo HV-725)

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL IDENTIFICATION FAILURE DETECTION EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE RESULTANT AND QUANTITY MODE & MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION SYSTEM STATUS REMARK F-32A Discharge N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Fixed Damper Volume Damper (2- remark Passive Compo HV-726A)

F-32B Discharge N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Fixed Damper Volume Damper (2- remark Passive Compo HV-726B)

F-21A Discharge N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Fixed Damper Volume Damper (2- remark Passive Compo HV-727A)

F-21B Discharge N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Fixed Damper Volume Damper (2- remark Passive Compo HV-727B)

Exhaust Volume N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Fixed Damper Damper to Cable remark Passive Compo Vault (2-HV-728)

COMPONENT METHOD OF DETRIMENTAL RESULTANT IDENTIFICATION & FAILURE DETECTION & EFFECT ON CORRECTIVE SYSTEM QUANTITY MODE MONITOR SYSTEM ACTION STATUS REMARKS Fans (2) F-38A/B Fails to start Status lights in One subsystem Repair fan Redundant One diesel control room inoperable system operable generator adequ for LOCI operation Louvers Clogging of None Same as above Cleaning the Same as above Same as above the louvers louvers Modulating dampers Mechanical None Partial loss of outside Repair operator / Same as above Backup system 2-HV-257A/B failure air cooling damper available in the other generator room Exhaust dampers Mechanical None Loss of air cooling Repair operator / Same as above Same as above 2-HV-255A/B failure damper All vital ductwork N/A See N/A N/A N/A N/A Ductwork is a remark passive compon and seismic Cla 1

DESCRIPTION AC Switchgear Air Handling Unit (4.16 KV and 6.9 KV Rooms)

Lower Room Upper Room at EL. 31'-6" at EL. 56'-6" n Fan F-134 Fan F-133 Type Centrifugal Centrifugal Flow, CFM 7200 minimum 6000 minimum Standard AMCA 211-A AMCA 211-A Seismic Class I I oling Coil Coil X182 Coil X183 Type Service Water Service Water Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 192,763 166,879 Code ASME Section VIII ASME Section VIII Seismic class I I tor Fan F-134 Fan F-133 pe Induction Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 5 5 Code NEMA NEMA Seismic Class I I rticulate Filter Quantity 8 6 Type Throwaway Throwaway ctwork Material/Type IAW Spec. M-526 IAW Spec M-526 Standard SMACNA SMACNA Seismic Class I I AC Switchgear Fans (480-Volt Unit Loadcenter Rooms, East and West)

West Room East Room Exhaust East Room

n Fan F-142 Supply Fan F-52 Type Vaneaxial Propeller Vaneaxial Flow (CFM) 18,300 minimum 23,000 21,000 minimum (nominal rating)

Standard AMCA 211-A AMCA 211-A AMCA 211-A Seismic Class I I I oling Coil est Room) Coil X-181A/B Type Service Water Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 295,641 (nominal rating)

Code ASME Section VIII Seismic Class I tor Type Induction Induction Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 25 10 25 Code NEMA NEMA NEMA Seismic Class I I I rticulate Filter Quantity 9 None None Type Throwaway ctwork Material/Type IAW Spec. M-506 None IAW Spec. M-506 Standard SMACNA SMACNA Seismic Class I N/A I D-C Switchgear Air Handling Unit ns F-54A/B Type Centrifugal Flow (cfm) 3500 (minimum)

Standard AMCA 211-A Seismic Class I

tor Type Induction Horsepower rating (hp) 5 Code NEMA Seismic Class I rticulate Filter Quantity (per unit) 2 Type (prefilter) Throwaway Quantity (per unit) 2 Type (primary) High efficiency (bag) ctwork Material/Type IAW Spec. 506 Standard SMACNA Seismic Class I Vital MCC B51 and B61 Coolers A/C-3, A/C-4 pe Self-contained A/C unit wer Supply 480V/3 Ph/60 Hz aporator Fan Data Type Centrifugal Air Flow 500 cfm Motor HP 1/3 Code NEMA MG1 Seismic Class 1 ndenser Fan Data Type Propeller Motor HP 1/2 Code NEMA MG 1 Seismic Class 1 aporator Coil Data Type Direct Expansion

Cooling Capacity 24,000 Btu/hr Standard ARI 410 Seismic Class 1 ndenser Coil Data Type Air cooled Standard ARI 410 Seismic Class 1 mpressor Data Type/Refrigerant Hermetic / R-22 HP nominal 2 Standard ARI 520 Seismic Class 1

DESCRIPTION iprocating Chilled Water Units (X-196A/B) Non-QA denser Flow Rate 277.4 gpm (nominal rating) porator Flow Rate 183.6 gpm (nominal rating) denser Temperature Rise 10F (nominal rating) porator Temperature Drop 12F (nominal rating) t Removal Rate 91.8 tons (nominal rating) lled Water Pumps (P-149A/B/C) e Centrifugal H 140 feet (nominal rating) w 220 gpm (nominal rating)

iprocating Chilled Water Units (X-169A/B)

Type Refrigerant (R-22)

Rating (capacity) 15 Ton (nominal rating)

Standard ARI 590 Seismic Class I porator Type Direct expansion, refrigerant Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 194,000 (nominal rating) denser Type Water cooled Heat transfer (Btu/hr) 234,400 (nominal rating) mpressor Type Semi-hermetic lled Water Pumps (P-122A/B)

Type Centrifugal Total Dynamic Head (ft) 108 (nominal rating)

Flow (gpm) 35 (nominal rating)

Maximum Indoor Design Minimum Indoor Design Zone No. / Zone Description6 Temperature (F) Temperature (F)

Containment Building Elevation General Containment Areas, (Normal Operation Mode 1-4) 120 N/A General Containment Areas, (Shutdown Mode 5, 6) 120 40 (EQ-C06) Pressurizer Block House (Interior), Elevation 14 150 N/A foot 6 inches & 38 foot 6 inches Auxiliary Building (EQ-A15) East 480 Volt Load Center, Elevation 36 foot 6 104 32 inches (EQ-A35) East Vital DC Switchgear Room, Elevation 14 foot 104 32 6 inches (EQ-A36) West Vital DC Switchgear Room, Elevation 14 foot 104 32 6 inches (EQ-A42) Control Room, Elevation 36 foot 6 inches 100 * *per TS 3/4.7.6 N/A (EQ-A28) Emergency Diesel Generator Room A, Elevation 120 (EDG's operating) N/A (EDG's operating) 14 foot 6 inches 120 (EDG's in standby) 55 (EDG's in standby)

(EQ-A29) Emergency Diesel Generator Room B, Elevation 120 (EDG's operating) N/A (EDG's operating) 14 foot 6 inches 120 (EDG's in standby) 55 (EDG's in standby)

Maximum Indoor Design Minimum Indoor Design Zone No. / Zone Description6 Temperature (F) Temperature (F)

(EQ-A02, A03, & A04) ESF Rooms, Elevation (-) 45 foot 6 177.9 (Safety related equipment N/A (Safety related equipment inches operating) operating) 110 (Safety related equipment in 40 (Safety related equipment in standby) standby)

(EQ-A24A & A-24B) MCC B51 & B61 Enclosures, 122 32 respectively, Elevation 14 foot 6 inches (EQ-A27A, B & C) Fuel Handling Area, Elevation 14 foot 6 110 40 inches & 38 foot 6 inches (EQ-A37) West Battery Room B Elevation 14 foot 6 inches 104 60 (EQ-A41) East Battery Room A Elevation 14 foot 6 inches 104 60 EQ-A01A, A01A1, A01B, A03A, A05, A06, A08, A14A, 110 40 A16, A20, A23, A30, A31, A38, A39 Radwaste Potentially Radioactive Areas (EQ-A11) Waste Gas Decay Tanks Room, Elevation (-)25 foot 110 55 6 inches (EQ-A12) Waste Gas Compressors Room, Elevation (-)25 foot 110 55 6 inches (EQ-A13) Waste Gas Surge Tank Room, Elevation (-)25 foot 6 110 55 inches (EQ-A14) Boric Acid and Refueling Water Purification Areas, 110 55 Elevation (-)5 foot 0 inches

Maximum Indoor Design Minimum Indoor Design Zone No. / Zone Description6 Temperature (F) Temperature (F)

(EQ-A21) West Boric Acid Evaporator Room, Elevation (-)5 110 55 foot 0 inches (EQ-A22) East Boric Acid Evaporator Room, Elevation (-)5 110 55 foot 0 inches (EQ-A24) Boric Acid Batch Tank and Chemical Storage Area, 110 55 Elevation 14 foot 6 inches (EQ-A40) Cable Vault in Auxiliary & Turbine Buildings, 104 32 Elevation 25 foot 6 inches (EQ-A09) Charging Pumps, Elevation (-)25 foot 6 inches 110 40 (EQ-A52) Auxiliary Building/CRACS Mechanical Equipment 110 32 Room, Elevation 36 foot 6 inches (EQ-A49) Auxiliary Building Fan Room (Open to Auxiliary 110 32 Building Truck Bay), Elevation 36 foot 6 inches (EQ-A27D) Enclosure Building Filtration System Equipment 110 40 Room, Elevation 14 foot 6 inches (EQ-A07) Coolant Waste Tanks Room Elevation (-)25 foot 6 110 40 inches / (-)5 foot 6 inches (EQ-A10) Spent Resin Tank Room, Elevation (-)25 foot 6 110 55 inches Enclosure Building

Maximum Indoor Design Minimum Indoor Design Zone No. / Zone Description6 Temperature (F) Temperature (F)

(EQ-A50) MS Isolation Valve Room, East Penetration Area, 120 40 Elevation 38 foot 6 inches (EQ-A51) MS Isolation Valve Room, West Penetration Area, 120 40 Elevation 38 foot 6 inches (EQ-A26A & A50A) Enclosure Building Upper & Lower 120 40 Areas, respectively, Elevation 14 foot 6 inches & 38 foot 6 inches (EQ-A17) East Piping Penetration Room, Elevation (-)25 foot 120 40

-6 inches & (-)5 foot 6 inches (EQ-A18) West Piping Penetration Room, Elevation (-)5 foot 6 135 40 inches (EQ-A19) West Piping Penetration Room, Elevation (-)25 foot 120 40 6 inches (EQ-A25) West Electrical Penetration Room, Elevation 14 foot 130 40 6 inches (EQ-A26) East Electrical Penetration Room, Elevation 14 foot 130 40 6 inches Turbine Building EQ-T10, T12, T13, A51A General Area All Levels, Bulk 110 40 Average Temp.

(EQ-T04) West 480-Volt Load center, Elevation 36 foot 6 104 40 inches

Maximum Indoor Design Minimum Indoor Design Zone No. / Zone Description6 Temperature (F) Temperature (F)

(EQ-T07) Lower 4160-Volt Switchgear Room, Elevation 36 122 40 foot 6 inches (EQ-T09N) Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) 135 (TDAFW Pumps in service) N/A (TDAFW Pumps in servi Pump Room, Elevation 1 foot 6 inches 110 (TDAFW Pumps in standby) 40 (TDAFW Pumps in standb (EQ-T09S) Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) 135 (MDAFW Pumps in service) N/A (MDAFW Pumps in service)

Pump Room, Elevation 1 foot 6 inches 110 (MDAFW Pumps in standby) 40 (MDAFW Pumps in standb (EQ-T05) West Cable Vault Room, Cable Vault , Elevation 104 32 45 foot 6 inches (EQ-T06) East Cable Vault Room, Cable Vault , Elevation 104 32 45 foot 6 inches (EQ-T11) Non-Vital Turbine Battery Room, Elevation 31 foot 110 60 6 inches Intake Structure (EQ-I01) Main Area (large open space), Elevation 14 foot 0 130 40 inches

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

WAREHOUSE AND DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

PERFORMANCE CURVE

CURVE CURVE

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

CURVE

CURVE

CURVE CURVE

AND DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM CHILLED WATER SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

Millstone Nuclear Power Station Fire Protection Program Manual, (Reference 9.10-1), has n developed to ensure that any single fire will not cause an unacceptable risk to public health safety, will not prevent the performance of necessary safe shutdown functions, and will not ificantly increase the risk of radioactive release to the environment.

ire Protection Program has been established at Millstone Unit 2. This program establishes the protection policy for the protection of structures, systems, and components important to the ty of the plant and the procedures, equipment, and personnel required to implement the gram. For details, refer to the Station Procedure for the Millstone Fire Protection Program ference 9.10-4).

Fire Protection Program is under the direction of an individual who has been delegated ority commensurate with the responsibilities of the position. Refer to the Fire Protection gram Manual.

.1 DESIGN BASES achieve and maintain a high level of confidence for the Fire Protection Program, it has been anized and is administered using the defense in depth concept. The defense-in-depth concept res that if any level of fire protection fails, another level is available to provide the required nse. In fire protection terms, this defense in depth concept consists of the following levels:

a. Preventing fires from starting.
b. Early detection of fires that do start and controlling and/or extinguishing them quickly so as to limit their damage.
c. Designing the safety system so that if a fire should start in spite of the fire prevention program, and if it should burn for a considerable period of time in spite of fire suppression activities, it will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.

e of these levels can be perfect or complete, but strengthening any one level can compensate ome measure for weaknesses, known or unknown, in the others.

0.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 0.2.1 Site Water Supply System underground fire protection water supply consists of a 12 inch cement lined iron pipe in a p arrangement around Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3. Post-indicating type valves in the piping p permit partial pipeline isolation without interrupting service to the entire system.

supply system services individually valved lines feeding fixed pipe water suppression ems (sprinklers, water spray, and standpipes) throughout the plant. Hydrants are located on an

r the hydrants.

Millstone Station Fire Water Loop is supplied from two 250,000 gallon ground level suction

s. The tanks are automatically filled through a domestic water line fed from the city water em. This line is a 12 inch city feed with a 10 inch meter, bypass line, and two backflow venters. The city supply is capable of refilling the fire water tanks in eight hours. Valves on the rconnected tank suction lines provide the capability to manually isolate each tank in the event ailure of a tank or its piping system. The fire protection water supply system is independent of ice and sanitary water piping systems.

o fire pump houses contain the stations three fire pumps each rated at 2,000 gpm at 100 psi.

three pumps can take suction from either or both tanks and have individual connections to the erground supply system. All three fire pumps have separate control panels supplied from arate power supplies. Pump running and trouble signals for P-82 are available in the Unit 3 trol Room. All pumps and fire water tank level alarms are in the Unit 3 Control Room.

Unit 3 (Building 123) Fire Pumphouse contains the electric fire pump (M7-8), the diesel en fire pump (M7-7), and the 50 gpm electric jockey pump (M7-11). The Unit 2 ilding 124) Fire Pumphouse is a separate structure adjacent to Building 123 and contains the r electric fire pump (P-82). These pumphouses are adjacent and independent of each other h the exception of sharing a common barrier.

tem operation is such that the 50 gpm electric jockey pump (M7-11) maintains system sure by automatically starting when line pressure drops to approximately 105 psig and will until pressure reaches 120 psig as indicated by a line pressure switch. An electric interlock ween the jockey pump and the M7-7 and M7-8 pump exists which stops the jockey pump n either pump starts. A hydro-pneumatic tank is provided in the system to prevent short ling of the jockey pump. The electric driven fire pump (P-82) is driven by an AC motor from 480V load center Bus 22D. This pump is activated by a pressure switch set at 95 psig. In the nt this switch or pump fails to operate and line pressure continues to drop, the electric pump

-8) is activated by a separate pressure switch set at 85 psig. This pump is driven by an motor powered from the MP3 480V Load Center Bus 32Q. In the event this switch or pump s to operate, or system demand overwhelms this capacity and line pressure continues to drop, Diesel Driven Fire Pump (M7-7) is activated by a separate pressure switch set at 75 psig. The el driven fire pump is electrically independent with its own self contained redundant battery em for starting. A battery charger is provided for maintaining the batteries charged.

P-82 motor driven pump automatically stops after system pressure is maintained at 100 psi 5 minutes. Once started, the M7-7 and M7-8 fire pumps remain in operation until manually ped.

major fire in any location of the Millstone Unit 2 site should occur, the combined water tanks makeup water capacity would provide an adequate water supply for Millstone Unit 2. The

site fire water system can be connected to the auxiliary feedwater system to provide an rnate source of water in the event that the primary source of water in the condensate storage is depleted and cannot be adequately replenished. The combination of the two storage tanks h the potential for replenishment from the city water supply provide multiple, reliable sources ater with which to feed the steam generators and remove decay heat over an indefinite period ime. The Technical Requirements Manual ensures the availability of fire water.

ase of a loss of off site power and service water, fire water may be provided for cooling one G via a cross-connection to the service water supply to the EDGs.

.2.1.1 Water Suppression Systems

1. Sprinkler and Waterspray Systems Sprinkler and waterspray systems, provided in various areas of the plant where in-situ combustible loading warrants such protection, have been designed using the guidance of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard Number 13, for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems or NFPA Standard Number 15 for Waterspray Fixed Systems.

Water systems are provided in the following design arrangement:

  • Automatic wet-pipe sprinkler;
  • Automatic fixed waterspray; and
  • Automatic preaction sprinkler.

The individual system details and general locations are indicated in the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) (Reference 9.10-2).

2. Automatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems Wet-pipe sprinkler systems have closed sprinkler heads, and an alarm check valve or alarm flow switch. All systems are provided with an outside screw and yoke (OS&Y) isolation valve between the supply connections and system distribution piping.
3. Automatic Fixed Waterspray Systems Fixed waterspray systems are of the automatic design. All systems have a deluge valve located between the supply header and the distribution piping. An OS&Y isolation valve or post indicating valve (PIV) is used on all systems. Upon

Automatic operation is initiated by a single zone heat detection circuit installed in the hazard area.

4. Automatic Preaction Sprinkler Systems Preaction type sprinkler systems are of the automatic design. All systems have a deluge/preaction valve located between the supply header and the distribution piping. Where appropriate, distribution piping is supervised by monitoring air pressure. An OS&Y isolation valve or PIV is used on all systems. Upon actuation of the deluge/preaction valve, water flows into the distribution piping. Upon actuation of each individual sprinkler head, water is discharged. Automatic operation is initiated by single zone heat detection circuit installed in the hazard area.

.2.1.2 Gaseous Suppression Systems

1. Carbon Dioxide Systems The Main Generator Exciter enclosure is protected with a total flooding carbon dioxide system. This system is automatically discharged by activation of two heat detectors provided in the enclosure. The system can also be manually activated by use of a manual pull station. The carbon dioxide suppression systems are designed using the guidance of NFPA12.
2. Halon Systems Total flooding Halon 1301 fire suppression systems are provided for the Old Computer Room (A-26) subfloor and the New Computer Room (A-27), Z1 and Z2 DC Switchgear Rooms.

The Halon suppression systems are designed using the guidance of NFPA 12A, Halon 1301 Suppression Systems.

.2.1.3 Portable Suppression Capabilities

1. Hose Stream Coverage Hose stream coverage is available to all fire areas of the plant from stand pipe connections to fixed 1.5 inch hose stations or by use of 2.5 inch diameter hose with gated wye connections available from outside hose houses.

Hose station locations are listed in the Millstone Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) (Reference 9.10-6).

Selection and placement of portable fire extinguishers are in accordance with the intent of the guidelines of NFPA Standard Number 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers. All extinguishers utilized are Underwriters Laboratories (UL) listed.

.2.1.4 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems fire detection and alarm systems installed in the plant are designed in general compliance h NFPA Standard Number 72D, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of prietary Protective Signaling Systems.

detection systems are used for early warning detection and in some cases may have the ability to actuate water suppression systems.

ection devices consist of rate-of-rise, fixed temperature, line type, and rate compensated heat ctors, and smoke detectors. Smoke detectors employ either the ionization or photoelectric ciple. Specific application of these detectors in each fire area is detailed in the FHA.

eneral, the installation of detector units is in accordance with the intent of the guidelines set h in NFPA Standard Number 72E, Standard on Automatic Fire Detectors.

/smoke detectors, as with waterflow indicators, CO2 and Halon actuation indicators and valve per devices are arranged to transmit signals to local alarm panels and a water suppression em control panel, if applicable. Actuation signals are also transmitted through the local alarm els to control panels in the Control Room. Trouble signals for these devices are transmitted in milar manner.

alarm system also monitors other miscellaneous fire protection system (FPS) features such as 2 system trouble, Halon system trouble, and preaction sprinkler system air pressure.

.2.1.5 Ventilation Systems and Smoke Removal moval of the products of combustion from any specific plant area requires the use of the mal plant ventilation system. Millstone Unit 2 relies mainly on power venting to satisfy the mmended smoke and heat venting guidelines set forth. No ventilation system was designed the sole purpose of exhausting smoke or corrosive gases. In all areas where airborne activity ld exist, the ventilation is monitored prior to release.

ventilation and filtration systems of safety related or potential radiation release areas are ussed in detail for the cable spreading area, switchgear rooms, battery rooms, 480V load ters, containment, intake structure, auxiliary building, fuel handling area, auxiliary feedwater p room, control room, engineered safety features room, diesel rooms, and enclosure building SAR Section 9.9, "Plant Ventilation Systems".

.3.1 Evaluation Criteria evaluation of the overall Fire Protection Program as indicated by the FHA, found that the gram does provide reasonable assurance that a fire will not cause an unacceptable risk to the lic health and safety. The fire protection program accomplishes this by assuring a fire will not vent the performance of necessary safe shutdown functions and will not significantly increase risk of radioactive release to the environment. Therefore, the Fire Protection Program meets basic requirements of General Design Criteria (GDC) 3 and 5. Appendix A to Branch hnical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power nts, provides the implementing criteria for GDC 3 and gives the general guidelines used to ew Millstone Unit 2. Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5.1 provides the guidelines acceptable to NRC staff for implementing the following criteria:

a. GDC 3 (10 CFR 50, Appendix A) - Fire Protection.
b. Defense-in-Depth Criterion: For each fire hazard, a suitable combination of fire prevention, fire detection and suppression capability, and ability to withstand safely the effects of a fire is provided. Both equipment and procedural aspects of each are considered.
c. Single-Failure Criterion: No single active failure shall result in complete loss of protection of both the primary (fixed installed systems) and backup fire suppression capability (standpipe/extinguishers).
d. Fire Suppression System Capacity and Capability: Fire suppression capability is provided, with capacity adequate to extinguish any fire that can credibly occur and have no significant adverse effects on equipment and components important to safety.
e. Backup Fire Suppression Capability: Total reliance for fire protection is not placed on a single automatic fire suppression system. Appropriate backup fire suppression capability is provided in the form of portable fire extinguishers or hose stations.
f. Acceptability of Manual Fire Suppression: When it can be shown that safe-shutdown capability is independent of any credible fire, manual fire fighting capability is sufficient to protect safety-related systems.

ddition to the specific guidance of the BTP, the evaluation considered the adequacy of the Fire tection Program on the effects of potential fire hazards throughout the plant based on sound protection engineering practices and judgments.

Protection was evaluated by conducting an FHA of individual fire areas and fire zones within plant.

etailed description of the analysis method is given in the following summary:

1. Plant design features related to fire safety were determined. These include the overall plant layout, type, and location of combustible materials, type of construction and its fire resistant characteristics, fire detection, and fire suppression systems, separation distance, etc.
2. Areas containing equipment and components important to safety were identified.

These areas and adjacent areas with fire hazard potential were subdivided into fire areas and zones within areas on the basis of existing fire barrier boundaries and other logical physical divisions or equipment groupings. For each fire area/zone, the following were determined:

a. Total heat potential (Btu/ft2) in the area/zone, assuming total combustion of cable insulation, oil, charcoal, and other identifiable combustibles including transients.
b. Fire severity is determined by the material burned and its rate of burning.

To evaluate the fire resistance needed for any fire barrier, a fire severity (duration) is developed for each area. Severity is measured in terms of temperature and fire duration. Once the total heat potential (Btu/ft2) of an area or zone has been computed and has been corrected to be equivalent to wood, an equivalent fire severity may be determined.

To determine an equivalent fire severity, Table 5-9B, Estimated Fire Severity for Offices and Light Commercial Occupancies, NFPA, Fire Protection Handbook, Fifteenth Edition, has been adopted for this analysis.

c. Safety related equipment and safe shutdown equipment and systems in the area.
d. Fire detection and suppression systems.
e. Fire area/zone boundaries.
3. For each area/zone, the adequacy of existing fire detection and fire suppression systems was evaluated considering the combustibility of materials, potential ignition sources, and the concentration of combustible materials.

specific analysis results for each fire area or zone are provided in the FHA.

NFPA Standard Time-Temperature Curve is representative of the severity of a fire completely ning out of brick, wood-joisted building and its contents. The curve has been adopted by the erican National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society for Testing and erials (ASTM) in ANSI/ASTM E 119, Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building struction and Materials. This curve has been used in the fire hazard analysis to evaluate fire ation.

.3.3 Fire Areas and Zones plant arrangement is divided into fire areas and fire zones for the purposes of conducting the A. Fire areas are defined as plant areas bounded by fire rated assemblies of either three hour d construction or lesser fire resistance as specifically identified and justified in the FHA. For analysis a fire area may also be defined by physical separation of combustible materials and t in fire suppression features which will contain a fire to an area of origin. Examples of built in ures include water curtains and gaseous fire suppression systems.

zones are zones within fire areas that are used to more thoroughly describe the fire area. Fire es may or may not be bounded by fire-rated construction.

the purposes of the FHA, the fire areas and fire zones were divided in accordance with the inal divisions in the 1977 FHA. These divisions provide a clear indication of the combustibles hin a location and their effect on equivalent fire severity. The Millstone Unit 2 Appendix R lysis uses different fire area divisions based on separation requirements. The safe shutdown luation relies only on fire areas to determine the effects of fire on safe shutdown. These sions result in large fire areas that do not permit accurate fire loading and equivalent fire erity analysis. Therefore, from a fire protection standpoint, the divisions in the FHA provide e indicative results with a broader range of uses.

wings provided in the FHA show fire zone/area division and serve as reference for this ion.

.3.4 Fire Hazard Analysis Results FHA results for each fire area are contained in the FHA (Reference 9.10-2).

0.4 INSPECTION AND TESTING ministrative controls are provided through existing Plant Administrative Procedures, rating Procedures and the Quality Assurance Program to ensure that the Fire Protection gram and equipment is properly maintained. This includes Quality Assurance (QA) audits of program implementation, conduct of periodic test inspections, and remedial actions for

ipment deficiencies.

fire protection equipment and systems are subject to periodic inspections and tests in ordance with the intent of National Fire Codes and the Fire Protection Program.

technical requirements found in Millstone Unit 2 TRM (Reference 9.10-6) describe the ting condition for operation and surveillance requirements for the FPS. These technical uirements ensure the FPS is properly maintained and operated.

ipment out of service including fire suppression, detection, and barriers are controlled through administrative program and appropriate remedial actions taken. The program requires all airments to FPS to be identified and appropriate notification given to the Fire Protection tem Engineer for evaluation.

conditions warrant, remedial actions include compensatory measures to ensure adequate level ire protection in addition to timely efforts to effect repairs and restore equipment to service.

.5 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION AND TESTING

.5.1 Fire Protection Organization mulation, implementation, and assessment of the effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program delegated as indicated in Reference 9.10-1, the Fire Protection Program Manual.

responsibilities for Appendix R coordination (including related technical reviews and ntenance of Appendix R Compliance Reports), conduct of FHAs, engineering and design for s, development of specific fire fighting procedures, inspection programs, maintenance, ning (including formal Fire Brigade and Fire Watch training), drills and risk management are ussed in Reference 9.10-1.

0.5.2 Fire Brigade and Training Millstone Site Fire Brigade consists of a minimum of a Shift Leader and four Fire Brigade onnel. The Fire Brigade Shift Leader is qualified to provide direction and support concerning t operations and priorities for their assigned unit. When a specific unit does not have a Fire gade Shift Leader, a Fire Brigade Advisor from that unit is required in addition to the five mber Fire Brigade.

mbers of the Fire Brigade are trained by the Nuclear Training Department. A list of Fire gade training programs is located in Reference 9.10-5.

Fire Brigade personnel are responsible for responding to all fires, fire alarms, and fire drills.

ensure availability, a minimum of a Shift Leader and four Fire Brigade personnel shall remain

ssistance is needed to fight a fire, additional equipment and manpower is supplied by the off local fire departments. Within a 5 mile radius of the plant there are numerous local volunteer companies. Letters of commitment to supply public fire department assistance have been ined from these fire companies.

Shift Leader coordinates the Site Fire Brigade activities, and ensures proper communications coordination of support for the local fire department chief or officer in charge once on site, other on site activities (e.g., Radiological Protection & Chemistry, and Security).

lear Training coordinates with the Site Fire Marshal and periodically familiarizes local fire artment personnel with the Stations layout and fire fighting equipment. The Site Fire Marshal rdinates with the Site Fire Brigade and all Unit Shift Managers, informing them of the status he site fire protection equipment, should equipment become inoperable or unavailable.

Protection drills shall be planned and critiqued by Nuclear Training and members of the agement staff responsible for plant fire protection. Performance deficiencies of the Fire gade or of individual Fire Brigade personnel shall be remedied by scheduling additional ning for the Site Fire Brigade or individuals.

.5.3 Quality Assurance QA Program has been applied via the Fire Protection Program Manual to the FPSs, ponents, and programs providing fire detection and suppression capabilities to those areas of plant that are important to safety.

.6 SAFETY SHUTDOWN DESIGN BASES agraph 50.48(b) of 10 CFR 50, which became effective on February 17, 1981, requires all lear plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979 to comply with specific portions of tion III of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, in addition to any previous fire protection Safety luation Reports (SERs). One of the applicable sections,Section III.G, requires that fire ection features be provided for those systems, structures, and components important to safe tdown. These features must be capable of limiting fire damage so that:

1. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the Main Control Room or the Emergency Control Station(s) is free of fire damage; and
2. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the Main Control Room or the Emergency Control Station(s) can be repaired with 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

tion III.L of Appendix R and Generic Letters 81-12 and 86-10 provide additional guidance on NRC Staffs requirements for this safe shutdown capability.

nsees:

1. Separation of redundant safe shutdown systems outside of containment by either three hour rated barriers, one hour rated barriers plus automatic suppression and detection, or 20 feet of horizontal separation free of intervening combustibles or hazards plus automatic suppression and detection (Section III.G.2, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R)
2. An alternate or dedicated shutdown system and fixed suppression (Section III.G.3, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R)
3. A combination of measures that are shown by analysis to provide an equivalent level of protection (10 CFR 50.48(c)[6] exemption request)

.6.1 Safety Functions cific safe shutdown functions necessary to satisfy Appendix R criteria are as follows:

1. Reactor Reactivity Control Function
2. Reactor Coolant Makeup Control Function
3. Reactor Heat Removal Function
4. Process Monitoring Function
5. Supporting Functions selection of these functions is based on safe shutdown performance goals identified in BTP EB 9.5-1 Section C.5.c(2).

safe shutdown functions, described above, assure that the reactor will be safely shut down, led down, and maintained in a cold shutdown condition. The achievement of safe shutdown ditions precludes the occurrence of an unrecoverable plant condition, e.g., uncontrolled ary depressurization, loss of decay heat removal capability, or a breach of the reactor coolant em (RCS) boundaries.

.6.2 Analysis of Safe Shutdown Systems and Components exact location, duration, and magnitude of potential fires at the plant cannot be predicated in ance. To ensure that safe shutdown can be achieved following any postulated fire, Millstone t 2 has been divided into fire shutdown areas. The maximum credible fire was considered for h fire shutdown area. An engineering evaluation was then conducted to ensure that a fire inating in any one area would not spread to an adjacent fire shutdown area.

rable to allow plant operators to achieve safe shutdown. Where necessary, equipment difications were made, credit was taken for manual operation of remotely actuated valves, and rating and repair procedures were generated, to allow this goal to be achieved. By repeating process for each fire shutdown area, a set of fire shutdown systems, components and cedures was produced. This set is adequate to ensure that safe shutdown can be achieved and ntained regardless of the location of the fire.

above approach is considered to be very conservative. In reality, existing fire detection and pression systems, and mitigating actions by the fire brigade, would limit the extent of fire age. Thus, additional systems would be functional, and the operators would have additional ibility in dealing with the effects of a fire.

ial Assumptions

1. The station is operating at 100% power upon the occurrence of a fire.
2. The reactor is tripped either manually or automatically.
3. The analysis assumes both a loss of off site power and availability of off site power, whichever poses the more severe shutdown condition.
4. No additional single failure is considered other than the loss of off site power, those failures directly attributable to the fire, and spurious operations that can be postulated to occur as a result of the fire.
5. No component or system required for safe shutdown is assumed to be out of service.

e Shutdown Systems following safe shutdown systems were identified and analyzed to determine which portions ded to remain operational and which needed to be isolated and remain isolated to meet the safe tdown functions.

  • Reactor Coolant
  • Safety Injection
  • Chemical and Volume Control
  • Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW)
  • Condensate Storage Tank (CST)
  • Diesel Generator (DG)
  • Ventilation and Area Coolers
  • Emergency AC and DC Electrical Distribution lstone Unit 2 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Compliance Review (Reference 9.10-3) describes the rent features of the system which are required to achieve hot/cold shutdown and their ormance during the design basis fire in each of the Appendix R fire areas.

e Shutdown Components ist of safe shutdown components was developed based on the identified safe shutdown ems. Reference 9.10-3 provides a list of all safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation h their fire area locations.

.6.3 Safe Shutdown Analysis ed on the identified safe shutdown systems and components, a list of all associated power and trol cables were identified and their routing documented on a fire area basis.

er completion of the above tasks and the evaluation of the various scenarios for shutting down plant, a worst case failure analysis was developed for each fire area. The worst case fire in h area is considered a fire that disables all unprotected equipment and systems in that area. The lts of the safe shutdown analysis for each fire area is provided in the safe shutdown matrix vided in Reference 9.10-3. If safe shutdown cables exist in a fire area, a circuit failure analysis performed to determine the impact, if any, on safe shutdown. In some instances manual rator actions were used to mitigate or replace the function of cable assumed to be lost in the st case fire. The matrices also address required operator corrective actions which have to be ormed to allow shutdown for the worst case fire within any fire area. Reference 9.10-3 also vides a summary list of safe shutdown methods by fire area.

uit Failure Analysis rcuit failure analysis was performed when equipment/components, or cables for a component, in a fire area and:

2. Spuriously the equipment/component actuates thereby preventing the system from performing its required function.

circuit failure analysis evaluated the effects of fire induced failures (hot shorts, shorts-to-unds, and open circuits) on that portion of the circuit that is located in the fire area in ordance with Generic Letters 81-12, 86-10, and Information Notice 84-09.

ociated Circuit Analysis ociated circuits are considered as those cables (safety-related, nonsafety-related, Class 1E or

-1E) that have physical separation less than that required by Section IIIG.2 of Appendix R are associated with safe shutdown circuits in one of three ways:

  • Common bus
  • Spurious signals
  • Common enclosure determine the interaction of associated circuits with shutdown systems, a fire area approach utilized in which components and cables of components were identified for each fire area.

es of cables analyzed were power, control, and instrument cables.

tection between associated circuits of concern and shutdown circuits are addressed below for h concern:

1. Common Bus Concern Safety and nonsafety buses for Millstone Unit 2 were reviewed for those circuits which had a common power source with shutdown equipment, to ensure that the power source supply of the shutdown circuits are electrically protected.
a. For the power sources of concern, the trip characteristics of primary and secondary electrical protection devices were reviewed to insure proper coordination.
b. The NRCs Generic Letter 86-10, question 5.3.8, Short Circuit Coordination Studies, requests that the licensees consider the impact of high impedance faults on the shutdown capability. Simultaneous high impedance faults (below the trip point for the breaker on each individual circuit) were considered for all fire areas and area addressed in the shutdown matrices of Reference 9.10-3.
2. Spurious Operation Concern Where equipment/components were subject to spurious operation which would affect the capability to safely shut down, various means of isolation and/or manual actions are utilized, such as prefire opening of circuit breakers, isolation of control circuits by transfer or isolation switches, or de-energizing and manually operating valves post fire. Valve 2-SI-651 has the disconnect switch in its power circuit locked open during plant heatup, while in Mode 4 prior to proceeding to Mode 3.

The disconnect switch is not re-closed (except for periodic testing/maintenance) until the plant attains Mode 4 again. Valves 2-MS-65A and 2-MS-65B have their MCC Power enabled at lockable disconnect switches (on position to operate) during plant start up while in Mode 2 or 3 prior to proceeding to Mode 1. The disconnect switches are not put back to the on position (except for periodic testing/maintenance) or until the plant attains Mode 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 again. Valve 2-MS-202 has a disconnect switch at its MCC that is off during plant start up while in Mode 4 prior to proceeding to Mode 3. The disconnect keys are kept in the control room and the disconnect switches are not put back in the on position (except for periodic testing/maintenance) until the plant attains Mode 4, 5 or 6 again.

Spurious Signal Concern, Current Transformers A current transformer study was performed to determine the applications of where secondary circuits of current transformers were routed between fire areas and were susceptible to fire-induced open circuit failures. Two generic applications resulted from the review, in one case, current transformers were used for protective relaying, and in the other case, current transformers were used for remote reading of current loads. The type JCS-0 current transformers are utilized at both the 4160V level and the 480V level. Manufacturer data on testing of both the current transformers and their secondary circuit wiring has indicated that under open circuit conditions, caused by fire, damage will not result in a breakdown of either component.

3. For Common Enclosure Concern By utilizing the fire area approach, all shutdown equipment and associated cables within a fire area had to be identified and considered subject to a fire induced failure, unless otherwise justified.

.6.4 Reactor Inventory Isolation and Hi/Low Pressure Interfaces se systems that penetrate the RCS that are open to other systems and could cause diversion or of reactor inventory must be able to be isolated and remain isolated. Isolation is essential for

systems which interface with the RCS and could divert inventory are as follows:

  • Chemical and Volume Control Charging Lines
  • Chemical and Volume Control Letdown Line
  • Pressurizer Vent
  • Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Lines
  • Pressurizer Safety Valve Lines
  • Auxiliary Spray Line
  • Reactor Head Vent
  • Low-Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI)
  • Sampling System e systems have been designed with flow check or nonreturn valves to ensure that they would cause the diversion of reactor vessel inventory. For these systems, the valves which provide isolation function are provided in Reference 9.10-3.

remaining systems are not provided with these passive fail safe means of ensuring isolation.

methods which are utilized to provide and maintain isolation of these remaining interfacing ems are also provided in Reference 9.10-3.

0.6.5 Exemptions from the Specific Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, III.G.2, III.G.3, III.J and III.O following exemptions from the requirements of Appendix R have been granted:

1. Exemption from 10 CFR 50 III.J requirement to provide eight hour battery powered emergency lighting in general yard areas. The exemption allows the use of security lights to illuminate outdoor areas to access the Vital Bus 14H Enclosure (formerly Emergency Bus 24F), Intake Structure and Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Pipe Chase Enclosure.

Area (R-1) and MCC B61 (R-2). The exemption allows crediting the steel environmental enclosure for MCC B61, and a water curtain installed to protect the enclosure from fires in this area, as a fire barrier between MCC B61 and the Auxiliary Building.

3. Exemption from the requirement of Section III.O that requires the Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System be designed to withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). The exemption was based on the RCP lubricating oil system being seismically qualified with oil leaks not expected as a result of an SSE. Also, the oil collection system is designed such that dropping of components during a SSE should not cause loss of operability of safety-related equipment nor cause a fire, the systems would not degrade safety features within containment.
4. Exemption from 10 CFR 50 III.G.2 requirement to provide 20 foot horizontal separation (with no intervening combustibles) between redundant Auxiliary Feedwater Valves (2-FW-43A,B) located in the Turbine Building (R-3). The exemption concludes that fire damage to these valves would either cause them to fail open in their required position, or cause them to fail closed, but capable of being opened.
5. Exemption from 10 CFR 50 III.G.2 criteria for separation of redundant charging pump trains located in the Charging Pump Room (R-4). The exemption credits the following for assuring the availability of at least one charging pump for a Charging Pump Room fire:
  • low fire loading,
  • partial height concrete walls,
  • approximate 18 foot horizontal separation between pumps,
  • oil spill containment curbing between the pump cubicles,
  • existing area fire detection system,
  • rerouting of the B and C charging pump (Facility Z2) cables outside fire area R-4.
6. Exemption from 10 CFR 50 III.G.3 requirement to provide a fixed suppression system in an area which relies upon alternative shutdown capability, the Intake Structure (R-16). This exemption was granted on the basis that low combustible loading, limited intervening combustibles, 19 feet of horizontal separation between the redundant service water pumps and existing fire protection features would be sufficient to limit the potential for fire damage to safe shutdown

Unit 3 cross tie capability.

7. Exemption from 10 CFR 50 III.G.3 requirement to provide a fixed suppression system in an area which relies upon alternative shutdown capability, the East 480V Switchgear Room (R-11). This exemption was granted on the basis that low combustible loading, existing fire protection features and the close proximity of the control room which enhances early detection and manual suppression capability would be sufficient to limit the potential for fire damage to safe shutdown equipment in this area and an alternate safe shutdown capability (independent from this area of concern) is available to power hot shutdown equipment via the Unit 3 cross tie capability. Additional considerations for granting this exemption related to the potential water suppression system effects on electrical components, and gaseous suppression system effects on control room habitability.
8. Exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.J requirement to provide eight hour battery powered emergency lighting for access/egress to Unit 3 Alternate AC diesel generator (alternate AC source for fires in specifically identified Unit 2 Appendix R fire areas) based on the use of yard security lighting.

.7 REFERENCES

-1 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Fire Protection Program Manual.

-2 Fire Hazard Analysis Millstone Unit 2, latest revision.

-3 Millstone Unit 2 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Compliance Review, March 1987

-4 Nuclear Fleet Administrative Procedure, CM-AA-FPA-100, Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program

-5 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Station Procedure TQ-1, Personnel Qualification and Training

-6 Millstone 2 Technical Requirements Manual

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

.1 DESIGN BASES

.1.1 Functional Requirements compressed air system provides a reliable supply of clean, dry, oil free, air for the pneumatic ruments, operators and controls. In addition, the system provides the necessary air uirements for normal maintenance.

.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the compressed air system:

a. The instrument air system shall have two subsystems, each capable of providing the total air requirements of the unit.
b. The instrument air system shall have suitable subsystem and component alignments to assure operation of a complete subsystem with associated components.
c. Capabilities shall be provided to assure instrument air system operation with on site power (assuming off site power is not available) or with off site electrical power.
d. The instrument and station air system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as air compressors, receiver tanks, dryers, after filters, piping, and valves to maintain the integrity and capability of the system.

.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

.2.1 System compressed air system is shown schematically in Figure 9.11-1 and 9.11-2. The system rporates two full capacity and one double capacity non lubricated compressors for instrument each having a separate inlet filter, aftercooler and moisture separator. The two full capacity ersoll-Rand instrument air compressors each have separate dedicated air dryer/filter mblies and an air receiver. The double capacity instrument air compressor has a separate, icated air receiver and instrument air dryer and filter assembly. All three compressor systems supply the instrument air header which then divides into branch lines supplying the ke structure, condensate storage tank area, turbine building, main steam dump valves, tainment structure, auxiliary building, enclosure building, diesel generator rooms, primary er storage tank area, and refueling water storage tank area.

plying the intake structure, condensate storage tank area, turbine building, containment cture, auxiliary building, primary water storage tank area, refueling water storage tank area, the condensate polishing facility. Station Air also supplies Instrument Air to the condensate shing facility via a cross-tie with a dedicated air dryer located in the condensate polishing lity. A system cross-tie between Unit 3 service air and Unit 2 station air headers is also vided. In addition, manual cross ties are provided which allow the instrument air compressors e used to supplement the station air supply during periods of heavy use.

emergency backup cross tie from the station air header automatically supplies air to the rument air system if instrument air pressure falls below 85 psig. Local controls isolate station oads when station air is acting as the emergency backup supply to the instrument air system.

emotely operated manual cross tie within the containment can provide station air to the tainment instrument air branch line if the line pressure drops below 80 psig. In addition, a d instrument air receiver is located in the containment structure to provide a 30 minute supply ir in the event that both station and instrument branch lines fail.

design of the compressed air system is based on an estimated station air requirement of 600 m and a minimum instrument air requirement of 217 scfm.

le 9.11-2 gives information on the gas receiver tanks with the exception that tank rupture is considered because the receiver tanks have been designed, per ASME Section VIII, for sures greater than the maximum supply pressures, and each individual tank is provided with ASME Section VIII safety relief valve. As shown on the above-referenced table, all the gas iver tanks are in compliance with Section 1910.169 of OSHA.

.2.2 Components major components and associated fabrication and performance data are listed in Table 9.11-1.

.3 SYSTEM OPERATION

.3.1 Normal Operation ontinuous supply of instrument air is provided to regulate the controllers and controlled ices. Either of the following configurations is acceptable and can be considered normal ration: The double capacity instrument air compressor supplies both the instrument air and ion air systems through available cross tie valves and the other instrument air compressors are utomatic standby, or the station air compressor and one instrument air compressor operate and other instrument air compressors are on automatic standby.

station or instrument air system can be utilized to provide makeup air for the containment ng the long term post-accident hydrogen purge operation (Section 6.6). The instrument and ion air systems are connected to the containment air monitoring system containment etrations (Figure 9.9-2). A globe valve and flow element on each connection provide manual regulation.

operated containment isolation valves are designed to assume the safe position by spring on following a loss of instrument air pressure at the valve operators or electric power to the e operator solenoid valves. Generally, containment isolation valves for nonessential process ems are designed to fail closed and remain tightly closed. Valves for essential processes are gned to fail open to assure proper system alignment. Valves which must close and be capable pening as the hydrogen purge valves are provided with accumulator tanks to assure an air ply. Valves required to maintain a fixed position are designed to fail as is. Where identified, cessible valves that must be capable of operating after a design basis loss-of-coolant accident also provided with backup air bottles to assure an air supply.

.4 AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY

.4.1 Special Features power supply for the compressor motors is the normal distribution system. The power supply the full capacity instrument air motors is backed up by the emergency diesel generators with h compressor on a separate channel (Section 8.3). The double capacity compressor has vital power supplies and is not relied upon for emergency operation.

rument air is primarily used as motive power for valve actuation and is not used in any reactor cation, control, or protective circuit. The overall unit is designed to assure that valve failures urring upon loss of air are consistent with the capability to maintain the unit in a safe dition.

.4.2 Tests and Inspections h component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation in the system. Instruments are brated during testing, and automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper set points.

rm functions are checked for operability and limits during operational testing. The system is rated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity and mechanical operability.

w orifices, thermometers and pressure gauges are provided for local system monitoring.

compressed air system undergoes an acceptance test prior to startup. The test procedure is cribed in Chapter 13.

rument Air Compressor - Mark Number F-3D Quantity One Type Rotary Screw, oil-free type Capacity (acfm) at 115 psig 640 at 100 F, 14.7 psia, 40 % RH Design discharge pressure (psig) 125 Cooling medium Air cooled Motor 150 hp, 460 V, 3 phase, 60 HZ, variable speed Seismic Class II Safety Relief Valve Setpoint 165 psig rument Air Receiver - Mark Number T-51A Type Vertical Design pressure (psig) 135 psig at +20 to 500F Actual volume (feet) 150 Code ASME Section VIII Seismic Class II Safety Relief Valves (2)

Setpoint, Capacity 135 psig, 3196 cfm at 60F each rument Air Dryer - Mark Number T-52C/D Type Heatless - dual tower - purge type - desiccant Quantity 370 lbs of desiccant per tower (2)

Capacity (acfm) at 115 psig 650 at 123F, 100% R.H. inlet conditions Outlet moisture content with saturated air inlet -40F DP at line pressure Seismic Class II Safety Relief Valve Setpoint 135 psig Design Pressure (psig) 150 psig at 450F

rument Air System Compressor - Mark Number F-3E, F-3F Type Rotary-screw, oil free type Quantity 2 Capacity (scfm) 237 Discharge pressure (psig) 100 Cooling medium Air cooled Motor 60 hp, 460 volt, 3 phase 60 Hz Seismic Class II Receiver - Mark Number T-51 Manufacturer Ingersoll-Rand Type Vertical Quantity 1 per 2 compressors Design pressure (psig) 125 Actual volume (feet) 160 Code ASME Section VIII Seismic Class II ng and Valves Seismic Class II ion Air System Compressor - Mark Number F-2 Type Horizontal nonlubricated reciprocating type Quantity 1 Capacity (scfm) 630 Discharge pressure (psig) 100 Cooling medium Water, 16.7 gpm

Motor 150 hp, 460 volt, 3 phase, 60 Hz Seismic Class II ercooler and Moisture Separator - Mark Number X-27 Type Shell and tube Quantity 1 Code ASME Section VIII Seismic Class II Receiver Mark Number T-50 Type Vertical Quantity 1 Design pressure (psig) 125 Actual volume (feet) 160 Code ASME Section VIII Seismic Class II ng and Valves Seismic Class II rument Air Dryer - Mark Number T-52E1/E2 Type Dual tower, heated blower purge, dessicant, regenerative.

Dessicant/Vessel 43.25 inches of activated Alumina.

Capacity (scfm) at 100 psig 300 at 100F inlet air temperature.

Outlet moisture content -40F DP at line pressure.

Purge Rate 24 scfm for one hour out of four hour cycle with cooldown feature enabled.

Seismic Class II Safety Relief Setpoint 165 psig

rument Air Dryer - Mark Number T-52F1/F2 Type Dual tower, heated blower purge, dessicant, regenerative.

Dessicant/Vessel 43.25 inches of activated Alumina.

Capacity (scfm) at 100 psig 300 at 100F inlet air temperature.

Outlet moisture content -40F DP at line pressure.

Purge Rate 24 scfm for one hour out of four hour cycle with cooldown feature enabled.

Seismic Class II Safety Relief Setpoint 165 psig densate Polishing Facility Instrument Air Dryer - Mark Number T-IAS-DRYER1 Type Dual tower, heatless, desiccant, regenerative.

Dessicant/Vessel 40 inches of activated Alumina.

Capacity (scfm) at 100 psig 90 at 100F inlet air temperature.

Outlet moisture content -40F DP at line pressure.

Purge Rate 24 scfm for one hour out of four hour cycle with cooldown feature enabled.

Seismic Class Non-seismic Safety Relief Setpoint 165 psig rument Air Receiver - Mark Number T51E Type Vertical Design Pressure (psig) 155 at 400F Actual volume (gallons / feet) 1060 / 142 Code ASME Section VIII Seismic Class II Safety Relief Valve Setpoint / Capacity 135 psig / 250 scfm

rument Air Receiver - Mark Number T51F Type Vertical Design Pressure (psig) 155 at 400F Actual volume (gallons / feet) 1060 / 142 Code ASME Section VIII Seismic Class II Safety Relief Valve Setpoint / Capacity 135 psig / 250 scfm

MAXIMUM PROTECTIVE DEVIATIO DESIGN OPERATING GAS SUPPLY MEASURES TO FROM OSH TANK PRESSUR PRESSURE PRESSURE PREVENT TANK SECTION TANK NAME NUMBER E (PSIG) (PSIG) (PSIG) LOCATION FAILURES 1910.169 Station air T-50 125 100 100 FSAR Gas supply pressure None receiver tank Figure 1.2-5 is 25 psi less than Zone (D-5) design pressure of tank, tank has relief valve set at 125 psig.

Instrument air T-51 125 110 110 FSAR Gas maximum supply None receiver tank Figure 1.2-5 pressure is 15 psi less Zone (E-6) than design pressure of tank, tank has relief valve set at 125 psig.

Containment T-89 125 100 100 FSAR Gas supply pressure None instrument air Figure 1.2-6 is 25 psi less than receiver tank Zone (E-8) design pressure of tank, tank has relief valve set at 125 psig.

MAXIMUM PROTECTIVE DEVIATIO DESIGN OPERATING GAS SUPPLY MEASURES TO FROM OSH TANK PRESSUR PRESSURE PRESSURE PREVENT TANK SECTION TANK NAME NUMBER E (PSIG) (PSIG) (PSIG) LOCATION FAILURES 1910.169 Instrument air T-51A 135 120 120 FSAR Gas maximum supply None receiver tank Figure 1.2-5 pressure is 15 psi less Zone (C-12) than design pressure of tank; tank has two relief valves set at 135 psig. Note -

factory hydrostatic tested at 203 psig.

Instrument air T-51E 155 110 129 FSAR Gas maximum supply None receiver tank Figure 1.2-5 pressure is 26 psi less Zone (C-10) than design pressure of tank, tank has relief valve set at 135 psig.

Instrument air T-51F 155 110 129 FSAR Gas maximum supply None receiver tank Figure 1.2-5 pressure is 26 psi less Zone (C-10) than design pressure of tank, tank has relief valve set at 135 psig.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

.1 DESIGN BASES

.1.1 Functional Requirements function of the common makeup water treatment system is to provide makeup, ineralized, deoxygenated water for Millstone Unit 2 and Unit 3 nuclear steam supply system SS) and its auxiliary systems, and to provide demineralized makeup water to Millstone Unit 2 Unit 3 secondary systems.

.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the common water treatment system:

a. The vendor makeup water demineralizer section of the water treatment system shall provide up to 400 gpm to meet the demands of Units 1, 2, & 3.
b. The water treatment system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components such as pumps, demineralizers, tanks, filters, valves and piping to ensure the integrity and capability of the system.
c. The water treatment components shall be designed to operate within the environment to which they are exposed.

.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

.2.1 System water treatment system is shown schematically in Figures 9.12-1 and 9.10-2.

mestic (city) water is supplied to vendor demineralization equipment through a back flow vention valve to prevent chemical contamination of the domestic water supply. The common er treatment facility supplies deoxygenated water to the Unit 2 condensate storage tank via the arate eight inch supply header and to all other tanks in Units 2 and 3 via the cross tie header.

mary make-up water is deoxygenated before it is transferred to the PWST.

prevent freezing, the water temperature in the outdoor PWST is maintained at 50F minimum means of a circulation system which uses a primary circulation pump and a primary water heat hanger.

lstone Unit 2 NSSS and its auxiliary systems requiring demineralized, deoxygenated makeup er obtain it from the PWST. The demineralized, deoxygenated water is transferred from the ST to the components requiring makeup water by one of two primary water transfer pumps TP). During normal operation, one of the PWTP will always be in operation whether makeup

Primary Water Heat Exchanger return line to the PWST is a suction connection that provides ake-up water source alternative. This suction connection is a defense-in-depth design feature is available for coping with an extended loss of AC power (ELAP) event. The location of this B PWST FLEX suction connection is shown on Figure 9.12-1.

common water treatment system is sized to provide the makeup water requirements for lstone Units 1, 2 & 3.

lstone Unit 2 secondary systems requiring demineralized makeup water obtain it from the T (Section 10.4.5.3). Millstone Unit 3 systems and other Millstone Unit 2 systems obtain eup water via the cross-tie header.

common water treatment system contracted capacity is 576,000 gpd (400 gpm) of ineralized water. The contracted capacity is based on normal start-up steam generator wdown requirements of any one of the Units to meet chemistry specifications.

ing periods when the makeup water requirements exceed the normal makeup water flowrates either Unit, the common water treatment facility has the capability to divert additional water equired.

design chemical analysis of demineralized water from the vendor water treatment system is ollows:

Silica, maximum (ppb) 10 Conductivity, maximum (umhos/cm) 0.1 Dissolved oxygen, maximum (ppm) 0.1 Sodium, maximum (ppb) 1 Chloride, maximum (ppb) 1 Sulfate, maximum (ppb) 2 Calcium, maximum (ppb) 2 Magnesium, maximum (ppb) 2 Aluminum, maximum (ppb) 10 Total organic carbon (ppb) 50

.2.2 Components escription of the water treatment system components is given in Table 9.12-1.

.3.1 Normal Operation ing normal unit operation, continuous blowdown from both steam generators requires the mon water treatment facility to provide makeup water to the CST. Makeup water flow is ually aligned to the CST, and can be concurrently aligned to any of the other tanks in Unit 2 nit 3.

e makeup water requirement exceeds the normal operating flow rates for either Unit, such as mistry holds during startup, the common water treatment facility has the capability to divert additional water as needed.

operation of the water treatment system is controlled and monitored with the following rumentation:

a. Pressure indication on the discharge of each pump.
b. Level controllers, indicators, and high/low alarms on the PWST.
c. Temperature-indicating controller and high/low alarm on primary water storage.
d. Flow switch and flow controller on the primary water pump discharge.

.4 AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY

.4.1 Special Features ization of vendor supplied and operated make-up water equipment allows for changes in that ipment to remain current with water treatment technology and changing water supply ditions. Key components are supplied with sufficient redundancy to allow for equipment kdowns, and flexible connections between components allows for rapid change outs and atility for changing system demands. Additionally, off-site demineralizer regenerations inates neutralization and discharge of regenerate waste.

side make-up water supply lines are insulated with redundant heat tracing to prevent line ze-up.

makeup water from the PWST is supplied to the various systems by redundant PWTPs.

ssure vessels are provided with relief valves for overpressure protection.

ack Flow Preventor (BFP) prevents contaminants from entering the domestic (city) water ply.

pressure vessels in the Unit 2 water treatment system are inspected and tested per American iety of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Section VIII and are furnished with an ASME e Stamp and Reports.

h component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the system. The water tment system undergoes an acceptance test prior to startup; the detailed test procedure is cribed in Chapter 13.

or components of the system, such as pumps, tanks and heat exchangers, are accessible for odic inspection during normal operation.

ruments are calibrated during testing. Automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper points. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during preoperational testing.

system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity and hanical operability.

al sample points are provided for obtaining samples for laboratory testing of the water quality ng normal operation.

TABLE 9.12-1 WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM COMPONENTS mestic Water Storage Tank nufacturer Richmond Engineering Co e Vertical ntity 1 ign pressure (psig) 15 ign temperature (F) 100 ume (gal) 275 erials Shell and head ASTM A-285 Gr C e ASME Section VIII & IV mic Class II mary Water Storage Tank Manufacturer Richmond Engineering Type Vertical Quantity 1 Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature (F) 100 Net capacity (gal) 150,000 Material SA-240, Type 304 Code AWWA-D100 Seismic Class II mary Water Circulation Pump Pump manufacturer Ingersoll-Rand Model 3 x 2 x 6 VOC Type Inline centrifugal Quantity 1 Capacity (gpm) 100 Head (feet) 25 Net Positive Suction Head required / available (feet) 3 / 25 Materials Casing ASTM A-296 Gr CF8M Impeller ASTM A-296 Gr CF8M Shaft ASTM A-276 - Type 316

Motor manufacturer General Electric Motor 1.5 hp, 460 V, 60 Hz, 1750 rpm Codes Motor: NEMA Pumps: Hydraulic Institute Standards Seismic Class II mary Water Storage Tank Heat Exchanger Manufacturer Perfex Corporation Model AE4 Type Horizontal, U tube Quantity 1 Design duty (Btu/hr) 540,000 Heat transfer area (square feet) 6.1 Design pressure (psig) Shell side: 75 tube side: 75 Design temperature (F) Shell side: 350 tube side: 325 Material Shell ASTM A-106 Gr B Tubes ASTM A-249 Gr TP304 Tube sheet ASTM A-240 Type 304 Channel ASTM A-312 Type 304 Codes TEMA Class C ASME Section VIII Seismic Class II mary Water Transfer Pumps Pump manufacturer Ingersoll-Rand Model 3 x 1-1/2 x 8 VOC Type Inline centrifugal Quantity 2 Capacity P22A (gpm) 200 Capacity P22B (gpm) 188 Head (feet) 190 Net Positive Suction Head required / available (feet 10 / 37)

Materials Casing ASTM A-296 Gr CF8M Impeller ASTM A-296 Gr CF8M Shaft ASTM A-276 Type 316

Motor manufacturer General Electric Motor 20 hp, 460 V, 60 Hz, 3 phase, 3550 rpm Codes Motor: NEMA Pump: Hydraulic Standards Institute Seismic Class II ng, Fittings and Valves Standard ANSI B31.1.0, Standards for Power Piping Seismic Class II

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

.1 DESIGN BASES

.1.1 Functional Requirements auxiliary steam system functions to maintain a suitable environment for equipment and plant rating personnel during normal operation and shutdown conditions. The Unit 2 auxiliary m system receives steam from Unit 3 via a crosstie between the Units. Because the Unit 3 iliary steam system operates at 150 psig and the Unit 2 auxiliary steam system operates at 50

, a pressure reducing valve station, including isolation and relief valves are installed. In ition a condensate return line from the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater surge tank is routed to the t 3 condensate system. Condensate is routed to the auxiliary boiler deaerator, when the Unit 3 iliary boilers are supplying auxiliary steam, or to the Unit 3 condensate surge tank when Unit ain steam is supplying auxiliary steam.

.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the auxiliary steam system:

a. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as piping and valves to assure the integrity and capability of the system.
b. The components of the system shall be designed to operate in the environment to which exposed.

following criteria have been used in the design of the Auxiliary Steam Detection and ation (ASDI) system (Section 7.10):

a. The system shall have a redundant, safety related independent detection and isolation subsystems.
b. The system shall have suitable subsystem and component alignments to assure operation of the complete subsystem with its associated components.
c. Capabilities shall be provided to assure the system isolation function with onsite power (assuming offsite power is not available) or with offsite electrical power.
d. A single failure in either subsystem shall not affect the functional capability of the other subsystem.
e. The system shall be designed to permit periodic inspection of important components, such as temperature detectors and automatic isolation valves to assure the integrity and capability of the system.

system, and the operability of the system as a whole. Under conditions as close to the design as practical, performance shall be demonstrated of the full operational sequence that activates applicable portions of the detection and isolation system.

g. The components of the ASDI system shall be designed to operate in the most severe auxiliary steam line break environment to which it is exposed.

.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

.2.1 System auxiliary steam and ASDI are shown schematically in Figure 9.13-1.

auxiliary steam system is provided for building heating and freeze protection for outdoor er storage tanks. Temporary electric heating has been provided to the fire water storage tanks le auxiliary steam supply is unavailable.

m for the auxiliary steam system is provided via a crosstie connection to Unit 3. Because the t 3 auxiliary steam system operates at 150 psig and the Unit 2 auxiliary steam system operates 0 psig, a pressure reducing valve station, including isolation and relief valves are installed.

pressure reducing valve station consists of two pressure reducing valves installed in parallel supplied with upstream and downstream isolation valves. The isolation valves are located at crosstie between the Unit 3 auxiliary steam system supply to Unit 2. The pressure reducing e station is located in the Condensate Polishing facility in line 3-ASS-008-15-4 downstream solation valve 2-ASS-3. This pressure reducing valve station regulates Unit 3 auxiliary steam em mass flow to Unit 2. The pressure reducing valve station is comprised of a two inch sure reducing valve, four inch pressure reducing valve, isolation valves, pressure sensing line, a dual operated controller. This configuration allows the two inch valve to regulate auxiliary m system mass flow from between 0 and 8,999 lb/hr as long as the downstream pressure sing line indicates an operating pressure of 50 psig or higher. When the downstream operating sure falls below 50 psig, the four inch pressure valve will modulate to allow up to the itional required 35,682 lb/hr auxiliary mass flow required for Unit 2 use.

afety relief valve located downstream of the pressure reducing valve station provides nstream pressure protection for Unit 2 system piping and connected equipment.

ddition a condensate return line from the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater surge tank is routed to the t 2 condensate system. Condensate is routed to the auxiliary boiler deaerator, when the Unit 3 iliary boilers are supplying auxiliary steam, or to the Unit 3 condensate surge tank when Unit ain steam is supplying auxiliary steam.

.2.2 Auxiliary Steam Detection and Isolation System ASDI System is described in Section 7.10.

.3.1 Normal Operation auxiliary steam system is manually initiated by operator action from a locally mounted trol panel.

ration of the auxiliary steam system is classified as non-nuclear safety consistent with ANSI/

S 59.2 1985, Safety Criteria for HVAC Systems Located Outside Primary Containment.

.4 AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY

.4.1 Tests and Inspections ASDI system is incorporated with provisions for online testing (Section 7.10).

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-2 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

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