ML23193A903

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6 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 6, Engineered Safety Features
ML23193A903
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Issue date: 06/28/2023
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Millstone Power Station Unit 3 Safety Analysis Report Chapter 6: Engineered Safety Features

Table of Contents tion Title Page INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 6.0-1 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE MATERIALS ................................ 6.1-1 1 Metallic Materials ....................................................................................... 6.1-1 1.1 Materials Selection and Fabrication ........................................................... 6.1-1 1.2 Composition, Compatibility, and Stability of Containment Spray and Safety Injection Coolants ....................................................................................... 6.1-3 2 Organic Materials ....................................................................................... 6.1-4 2.1 Protective Coatings ..................................................................................... 6.1-4 2.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.54 ................................................... 6.1-4 2.3 Other Organic Materials Used in the Primary Containment....................... 6.1-5 3 References for Section 6.1 .......................................................................... 6.1-5 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS .................................................................... 6.2-1 1 Containment Functional Design ................................................................. 6.2-1 1.1 Containment Structure ................................................................................ 6.2-1 1.1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 6.2-1 1.1.2 Design Features........................................................................................... 6.2-2 1.1.3 Design Evaluation....................................................................................... 6.2-3 1.2 Containment Subcompartments ................................................................ 6.2-15 1.2.1 Design Basis ............................................................................................. 6.2-15 1.2.2 Design Features......................................................................................... 6.2-18 1.2.3 Design Evaluation..................................................................................... 6.2-18 1.2.4 Short-term LOCA Mass and Energy Releases ......................................... 6.2-29 1.3 Mass and Energy Release Analyses for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents .

6.2-31 1.3.1 Mass and Energy Release Data................................................................. 6.2-33 1.3.2 Sources of Mass and Energy..................................................................... 6.2-33 1.3.3 Blowdown Model Description.................................................................. 6.2-35 1.3.4 Refill Model Description .......................................................................... 6.2-35 1.3.5 Reflood Model Description ...................................................................... 6.2-35 1.3.6 Post-Reflood Model Description .............................................................. 6.2-35

tion Title Page 1.3.7 Decay Heat Model .................................................................................... 6.2-36 1.3.8 Single Failure Analysis ............................................................................. 6.2-37 1.3.9 Metal-Water Reaction............................................................................... 6.2-37 1.4 Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated Secondary System Pipe Rupture Inside Containment ..................................................................... 6.2-38 1.4.1 Mass and Energy Release Data................................................................. 6.2-38 1.4.2 Single Failure Assumptions ...................................................................... 6.2-38 1.4.3 Initial Conditions ...................................................................................... 6.2-39 1.4.4 Description of Blowdown Model ............................................................. 6.2-40 1.4.5 Energy Inventories .................................................................................... 6.2-42 1.4.6 Additional Information Required for Confirmatory Analyses ................. 6.2-43 1.5 Minimum Containment Pressure Analysis for Performance Capability Studies of Emergency Core Cooling System ........................................................ 6.2-45 1.5.1 Mass and Energy Release Data................................................................. 6.2-45 1.5.2 Initial Containment Internal Conditions ................................................... 6.2-46 1.5.3 Containment Volume ................................................................................ 6.2-46 1.5.4 Active Heat Sinks ..................................................................................... 6.2-46 1.5.5 Steam Water Mixing ................................................................................. 6.2-46 1.5.6 Passive Heat Sinks .................................................................................... 6.2-46 1.5.7 Heat Transfer to Passive Heat Sinks......................................................... 6.2-47 1.5.8 Other Parameters....................................................................................... 6.2-47 1.6 Testing and Inspection .............................................................................. 6.2-47 1.7 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 6.2-47 2 Containment Heat Removal System ......................................................... 6.2-47 2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 6.2-48 2.2 System Design .......................................................................................... 6.2-49 2.3 Design Evaluation..................................................................................... 6.2-55 2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 6.2-64 2.4.1 Quench Spray System ............................................................................... 6.2-64 2.4.2 Containment Recirculation System .......................................................... 6.2-65 3 Secondary Containment Functional Design ............................................. 6.2-67

tion Title Page 3.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 6.2-68 3.2 System Description ................................................................................... 6.2-68 3.3 Safety Evaluation ...................................................................................... 6.2-69 3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 6.2-70 3.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 6.2-71 4 Containment Isolation System .................................................................. 6.2-72 4.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 6.2-72 4.1.1 Governing Conditions............................................................................... 6.2-72 4.1.2 Isolation Criteria - Fluid Systems Penetrating the Containment.............................................................................................. 6.2-73 4.1.3 Isolation Criteria - Fluid Instrument Lines Penetrating the Containment.............................................................................................. 6.2-73 4.1.4 Design Requirements for Containment Isolation Barriers........................ 6.2-73 4.2 System Design .......................................................................................... 6.2-74 4.3 Design Evaluation..................................................................................... 6.2-81 4.4 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 6.2-81 4.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 6.2-81 5 Combustible Gas Control in Containment................................................ 6.2-81 5.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 6.2-81 5.2 System Design .......................................................................................... 6.2-83 5.3 Design Evaluation..................................................................................... 6.2-84 5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements....................................................... 6.2-87 5.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 6.2-87 6 Containment Leakage Testing .................................................................. 6.2-89 6.1 Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test (Type A) .............................. 6.2-89 6.2 Containment Penetration Leakage Rate Test (Type B) ............................ 6.2-91 6.3 Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Rate Test (Type C) ...................... 6.2-92 6.4 Scheduling and Reporting of Periodic Tests............................................. 6.2-93 6.5 Special Testing Requirements .................................................................. 6.2-94 7 References for Section 6.2 ........................................................................ 6.2-94

tion Title Page EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ............................................ 6.3-1 1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 6.3-1 2 System Design ............................................................................................ 6.3-3 2.1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams ........................................................ 6.3-3 2.2 Equipment and Component Descriptions ................................................... 6.3-4 2.2.1 Accumulators .............................................................................................. 6.3-4 2.2.2 Tanks........................................................................................................... 6.3-5 2.2.3 Pumps.......................................................................................................... 6.3-6 2.2.4 Containment Recirculation Coolers............................................................ 6.3-8 2.2.5 Valves ......................................................................................................... 6.3-9 2.2.6 Accumulator Motor Operated Valve Controls.......................................... 6.3-12 2.2.7 Motor Operated Valves and Controls ....................................................... 6.3-12 2.3 Applicable Codes and Classifications....................................................... 6.3-13 2.4 Material Specifications and Compatibility ............................................... 6.3-13 2.5 System Reliability..................................................................................... 6.3-13 2.6 Protection Provisions ................................................................................ 6.3-17 2.7 Provisions for Performance Testing ......................................................... 6.3-17 2.8 Manual Actions......................................................................................... 6.3-17 3 Performance Evaluation............................................................................ 6.3-19 4 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 6.3-21 4.1 ECCS Performance Tests.......................................................................... 6.3-21 4.2 Reliability Tests and Inspections .............................................................. 6.3-22 5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 6.3-24 5.1 Temperature Indication............................................................................. 6.3-25 5.2 Pressure Indication.................................................................................... 6.3-25 5.3 Flow Indication ......................................................................................... 6.3-26 5.4 Level Indication ........................................................................................ 6.3-26 5.5 Valve Position Indication.......................................................................... 6.3-27 6 Reference for Section 6.3.......................................................................... 6.3-27 HABITABILITY SYSTEMS ..................................................................... 6.4-1 1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 6.4-1

tion Title Page 2 System Design ............................................................................................ 6.4-2 2.1 Control Room Envelope ............................................................................. 6.4-2 2.2 Ventilation System Design ......................................................................... 6.4-4 2.3 Leaktightness .............................................................................................. 6.4-6 2.4 Interaction with Other Zones and Pressure-Containing Equipment ........... 6.4-6 2.5 Shielding Design......................................................................................... 6.4-7 3 System Operational Procedures .................................................................. 6.4-7 4 Design Evaluation....................................................................................... 6.4-8 4.1 Radiological Protection............................................................................... 6.4-8 4.2 Toxic Gas Protection .................................................................................. 6.4-9 5 Testing and Inspection ................................................................................ 6.4-9 6 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................. 6.4-10 7 References for Section 6.4 ........................................................................ 6.4-10 FISSION PRODUCT REMOVAL AND CONTROL SYSTEMS ............ 6.5-1 1 Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Filter Systems ...................................... 6.5-1 1.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 6.5-1 1.2 System Description ..................................................................................... 6.5-2 1.3 Safety Evaluation ........................................................................................ 6.5-3 1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements......................................................... 6.5-3 1.5 Instrumentation Requirements .................................................................... 6.5-4 1.6 Materials ..................................................................................................... 6.5-4 2 Containment Sprays as a Fission Product Cleanup System........................ 6.5-5 2.1 Design Bases............................................................................................... 6.5-5 2.2 System Design ............................................................................................ 6.5-6 2.3 Design Evaluation....................................................................................... 6.5-7 2.3.1 Iodine Removal Coefficients ...................................................................... 6.5-7 2.3.2 Range of Spray pH...................................................................................... 6.5-7 2.3.3 Ultimate Sump pH ...................................................................................... 6.5-7 2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements......................................................... 6.5-7 2.5 Materials ..................................................................................................... 6.5-7 3 Fission Product Control Systems ................................................................ 6.5-8

tion Title Page 3.1 Primary Containment .................................................................................. 6.5-8 3.2 Secondary Containment .............................................................................. 6.5-8 4 References for Section 6.5 .......................................................................... 6.5-8 INSERVICE INSPECTION OF CLASS 2 AND 3 COMPONENTS ......................................................................................... 6.6-1 1 Inservice Inspection Program ..................................................................... 6.6-1 2 Accessibility................................................................................................ 6.6-1 3 Augmented Inservice Inspection to Protect Against Postulated Piping Failures ............................................................................................ 6.6-1

List of Tables mber Title 1 Typical Materials Employed for Components of ESF Systems 2 Parameters for Ultimate Sump pH Calculation (1) 3 Painted Surface Area Inside Containment 4 Other Organic Materials Used Inside Containment 1 Containment Peak Pressure and Temperature Results Following a Main Steam Line Break Inside Containment 2 Passive Heat Sinks (1) 3 Containment Design Evaluation Parameters 4 LOCA Peak Pressure Results 5 LOCA Peak Pressure - DEHL Break - Initial Condition Sensitivity 6 LOCA Sequence of Events - Containment Peak Pressure 6A LOCA Peak Temperature Results 6B LOCA Sequence of Events - Containment Peak Temperature

-6C LOCA - Containment Depressurization Results - DEPS - Break 6D LOCA Sequence of Events - Containment Depressurization 6E LOCA-Containment Sump Water Temperature at RSS Pump Start 6F LOCA-Accident Chronology for Pump Suction Double Ended Rupture-Limiting Case for Containment Sump Temperature 6G Accident Chronology for Full Double-Ended Rupture Main Steam Line Break at 0% Power-Limiting Case for Containment Pressure 6H Accident Chronology for Full Double-Ended Rupture Main Steam Line Break at Full Power Plus Uncertainty Power-Limiting Case for Containment Temperature 7 System Parameters Initial Conditions for LOCA Mass and Energy Release Analysis 7A LOCA Mass and Energy Analysis Core Decay Heat Fraction 8 Double Ended Hot Leg Break Blowdown Mass and Energy Release 9 Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Blowdown Mass and Energy Release 10 Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Maximum ECCS Flows Blowdown Mass and Energy Release

mber Title 11 Double Ended Cold Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flow Blowdown Mass and Energy Releases 12 Deleted by PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 13 3.0 Ft2 Pump Suction Split Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Blowdown Mass and Energy Releases 14 Double Ended Hot Leg Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Mass and Energy Releases 15 Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Mass and Energy Releases 16 Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Maximum ECCS Flows Reflood Mass and Energy Releases 17 Double Ended Cold Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Mass and Energy Releases 18 Deleted by PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 19 3.0 Ft2 Suction Split Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Mass and Energy Releases 20 Double Ended Hot Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Principal Parameters 21 Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Principal Parameters 21A Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Maximum ECCS Flows Reflood Principal Parameters 21B Double Ended Cold Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Principal Parameters 21C Deleted by PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 21D 3.0 Square Feet Pump Suction Split Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Reflood Principal Parameters 21E Double Ended Hot Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Mass Balance 21F Double Ended Hot Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Energy Balance 21G Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Mass Balance 21H Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Energy Balance 21I Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Maximum ECCS Flows Mass Balance

mber Title 21J Double Ended Pump Suction Break with Maximum ECCS Flows Energy Balance 21K Double Ended Cold Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Mass Balance 21L Double Ended Cold Leg Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Energy Balance 21M Deleted by PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 21N Deleted by PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 21O 3.0 ft2 Pump Suction Split Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Mass Balance 21P 3.0 Square Feet Pump Suction Split Break with Minimum ECCS Flows Energy Balance 22 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 23 Main Steam Line Break Mass and Energy Releases Inside Containment - Initial Conditions Assumptions 24 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 25 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 26 Steam Generator Cubicle Peak Differential Pressures Feedwater Line Break 27 THREED Input for Analysis at Pressurizer Cubicle 28 THREED Input for Analysis of Steam Generator Cubicle B 29 Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 30 Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 31 Mass and Energy Release Rates for a Spray Line DER in the Pressurizer Cubicle 32 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 32A Mass and Energy Release Rates for a Surge Line DER in the Pressurizer Cubicle 33 Pressurizer Cubicle Peak Differential Pressures 34 Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 35 Mass and Energy Release Rates for a Double Ended Guillotine Break of the Pressurizer Surge Line (Used for a 196.6 Square Inch Hot Leg LDR in the Steam Generator Cubicle) 36 Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 36A Mass and Energy Release Rates for a Feedwater Line SES in the Steam Generator Cubicle

mber Title 36B Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 37 Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 37A Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 37B Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006

-38 Steam Generator Cubicle Peak Differential Pressures, Pressurizer Surge Line LDR

-39 Steam Generator Cubicle Peak Differential Pressures, Residual Heat Removal Line LDR 40 Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 41 Deleted by PKF FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 42 Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 43 Subcompartment Design and Maximum Calculated Differential Pressures 44 Omitted 45 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 46 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 47 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 48 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 49 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 50 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 51 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 52 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 53 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 54 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 55 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 56 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 57 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 58 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 59 Balance of Plant Parameters Used in Steam Line Break Mass and Energy Release Calculation

mber Title

-60 Deleted 61 Containment Heat Removal Systems Component Data 62 Containment Heat Removal Systems - Consequences of Components Malfunctions 63 Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System Principal Component and Design Parameters 64 Containment Enclosure Building Design Parameters 65 Containment Penetration (12) 66 Omitted 67 Hydrogen Recombiner System Design Parameter 68 Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-010 69 Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-010 70 System Alignment for Type A Tests 71 Pipe Insulation Inside Containment (8 Inches and Larger) 72 dELETED 73 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 74 Deleted by Change PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 75 Deleted By FSARCR 02-MP3-017 76 Deleted By FSARCR 02-MP3-017 77 dELETED 78 Input Data for Minimum Containment Pressure Analysis 1 Emergency Core Cooling System Component Parameters 2 Emergency Core Cooling System Relief Valve Data 3 Motor Operated Isolation Valves in the Emergency Core Cooling System 4 Materials Employed for Emergency Core Cooling System Components 5 Single Active Failure Analysis for Emergency Core Cooling System Components 6 Emergency Core Cooling System Recirculation Piping Passive Failure Analysis

  • 7 Switchover Procedure

-11 Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency Core Cooling System Pumps 1 Control Room Component Performance Characteristics for Habitability Systems 1 Comparison of ESF Filter Systems with Respect to Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2 Positions 1 Inservice Inspection Program Class 2 & 3 Systems

List of Figures mber Title 1 Engineered Safety Features 1 Containment Pressure Response - Double Ended LOCA (Break Location) 2 Containment Pressure Response - Pump Suction LOCA (Break Size) 3 Containment Vapor Temperature Response - LOCA 4 Containment Liner Temperature Response 5 Containment Depressurization Response - LOCA 6 Containment Sump Temperature Response 7 Containment Pressure from 1.4 square foot MSLB at 0% Power No Entrainment -

Limiting Peak Pressure Case 8 Containment Temperature From 1.4 square foot MSLB at Full Power, No Entrainment - Limiting Peak Temperature Case 9 Containment Liner Temperature From 1.4 square foot at 0% Power, No Entrainment - Peak Temperature Case 10 Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 11 Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 12 Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 13 Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 14 Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 15 Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 16 Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 17 Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation View with Nodal Arrangement 18 Plan View for the Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation 95.3 feet 18A Plan View for the Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation 74.2 feet 18B Plan View for the Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation 51.3 feet 18C Plan View for the Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation 25.7 feet 18D Plan View for the Pressurizer Subcompartment Elevation 12.75 feet

-19 Steam Generator Subcompartment Elevation with Nodal Arrangement

List of Figures (Continued) mber Title 20 Plan View for the Steam Generator Subcompartment Elevation 3 feet 8 inches 21 Plan View for the Steam Generator Subcompartment Elevation 28 feet 6 inches 22 Plan View for the Steam Generator Subcompartment Elevation 51 feet 4 inches 23 Upper Reactor Cavity Subcompartment Plan Elevation and Nodal Arrangement 24 Pressurizer Subcompartment Nodalization Diagram 25 Steam Generator Subcompartment Nodalization Diagram 26 Staggered Mesh Approximation for Nodes and Internal Junctions 27 General Flow Chart for THREED 28 Pressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 28A Pressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 29 Pressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 29A Pressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 29B Pressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 29C Pressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 29D Pressure Response Pressurizer Cubicle 30 Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 31 Pressure Response Steam Generator Cubicle 32 Pressure Response Steam Generator Cubicle 33 Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 34 Pressure Response Steam Generator Cubicle 34A Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 34B Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 34C Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 34D Deleted by PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 35 Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 36 P&ID Quench Spray and Hydrogen Recombiner 37 (Sheets 1-3) P&ID Low Pressure Safety Injection/Containment Recirculation 38 Typical Containment Structure Sump

List of Figures (Continued) mber Title 39 Spatial Droplet Size Distribution of Spraco 1713A Nozzle Applying Surface Area Correction and Spraying Water at 40 psig Under Laboratory Conditions 40 Containment Recirculation Pumps Characteristic Curves 41 Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 42 Containment Recirculation Spray Coverage Bend Line (Elevation 104 feet),

Elevated Temperature (275°F), Spray Header at Elevation 141 feet 9 inches 43 Containment Recirculation Spray Coverage Bend Line (Elevation 104 feet),

Elevated Temperature (275°F), Spray Header at Elevation 145 feet 3 inches 44 Unobstructed Quench Spray Coverage at the Bend Line (Elevation 104 feet),

Elevated Temperature (275°F), Spray Headers at Elevation 153 feet and 168 feet 45 Deleted by Change: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 46 Auxiliary Building Ventilation System and Supplementary Leak Collection &

Release System 47 Containment Isolation System (Sheet 1 of 14) 48 Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-010 49 Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-010 50 Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-010 51 Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-010 52 Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-010 53 P&ID Containment Monitoring System 54 Quench Spray Pumps Characteristic Curves 55 Deleted by FSARCR 05-MP3-010 56 Containment Internal Structure Openings 57 Expected Long-Term Circulation Patterns in Containment 58 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System 59 deleted 59A Deleted by FSARCR 02-MP3-017 60 deleted 61 Deleted by PKG FSC 07-MP3-024

List of Figures (Continued) mber Title 62 Deleted by PKG FSC 07-MP3-024 1 Safety Injection / Residual Heat Removal System Process Flow Diagram (Sheet 1 of 2) 2 (Sheets 1-2)P&ID High Pressure Safety Injection 3 Residual Heat Removal Pump Performance Curve 4 Charging Pump Curve Assumed for Safety Analysis 5 High Head SI Pump Curve Assumed for Safety Analysis 6 Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Levels 1 Control Room Area 2 Control Room Intake and Hazardous Material Storage Locations 1 Post DBA Minimum Containment Sump pH

INTRODUCTION engineered safety features (ESF) serve to mitigate the consequences of postulated events h as a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and to protect the public by preventing or minimizing release of fission products. The ESFs are designed to provide emergency coolant maintain the and the containment structure within design maximum conditions during accidents, thereby venting or minimizing the release of fission products to the environment.

following ESFs, each separate and independent, are provided to satisfy the functions cated:

tainment Structure containment structure is a carbon steel-lined, reinforced concrete structure, which contains all ponents and piping that constitute the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

ing normal operation, the containment atmosphere is maintained at a subatmospheric sure. After a LOCA, the containment is depressurized to limit outleakage of radioactivity ch may be present in the containment atmosphere.

tions 6.2.1 and 3.8.1 describe the containment structure in detail.

tainment Heat Removal Systems pressure of the containment atmosphere is maintained below the design pressure during dents by the containment heat removal systems consisting of the quench spray and tainment recirculation systems.

combination of the quench spray and containment recirculation systems is capable of ucing the containment pressure to 19 psig in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following a design basis accident A). The containment recirculation system is capable of maintaining the reduced pressure de the containment structure following the DBA. Section 6.2.2 describes containment heat oval systems in detail.

ergency Core Cooling System emergency core cooling system (ECCS) provides a borated emergency cooling water supply he reactor core for the entire spectrum of reactor coolant system (RCS) breaks and main steam feedwater line breaks to limit core temperature, maintain core integrity, and provide negative tivity for additional shutdown margin.

ECCS automatically initiates safety injection coolant delivery into the reactor core on receipt safety injection signal (SIS) coincident with a cold leg injection permissive (P-19) signal.

ing the injection mode of the ECCS operation, a minimum of one charging pump, one safety

dent. In addition, four nitrogen pressurized safety injection accumulators, which require no ation signal, inject their contents of borated water into the RCS when RCS pressure drops w a predetermined value (Section 6.3). The order in which these components function ends on the loss rate of the reactor coolant.

operator manually aligns the ECCS for the recirculation mode to provide long term cooling the reactor core. Initiation of recirculation is governed by the nature and severity of the dent. The RWST is isolated, and two of the containment recirculation pumps recirculate water m the containment sump directly to the containment recirculation spray headers and to the S or to the suctions of the charging and safety injection pumps, depending on RCS pressure.

water is cooled by the containment recirculation coolers. The ECCS is described in detail in tion 6.3. Figure 6.0-1 presents a combined schematic of the containment depressurization ems and the ECCS.

iliary Feedwater System auxiliary feedwater system provides an emergency supply of water to the steam generators the removal of sensible and decay heat from the reactor core.

additional information regarding the auxiliary feedwater system, refer to FSAR tion 10.4.9.

plementary Leak Collection and Release System supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) includes exhaust fans and two r banks. Each filter bank consists of a demister, electric heating coil, roughing filter, carbon orber, and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. The SLCRS is put into operation matically by an SIS signal or remote-manually. This system, during accident conditions, ntains a negative pressure within the containment enclosure building, auxiliary building, ineered safety features building, hydrogen recombiner building, and the main steam valve ding. During system operation the air is filtered and discharged to the atmosphere through the lstone stack. Radioactivity released to the environment is thereby minimized. Section 6.2.3 cribes the SLCRS in detail.

tainment Isolation System ensure containment structure integrity following an accident, containment isolation valves are vided in fluid system piping which penetrates the containment structure. The containment ation valves are located inside and outside of the containment structure and are either check es, normally closed manual valves, valves capable of remote manual operation, or valves ch either open or close automatically on receipt of a SIS, containment isolation phase A A), containment isolation phase B (CIB), feedwater isolation (FWI) signal, or steam line ation (SLI) signal.

tem Redundancy h ESF system is designed with sufficient redundancy to satisfy the system safety function ming a single failure (Section 3.1.1). Active components of the ESF systems are powered m the emergency buses (Section 8.3.1). Two emergency diesel generators are provided to ure highly reliable power sources to the emergency buses should other power sources fail.

operability of ESF equipment is ensured in several ways. Some of the equipment, such as the rging pumps, functions during normal unit operation, thus providing a constant check on rational status. The balance of the ESF equipment, such as the pumps in the containment ressurization systems, functions only in the event of an accident. In this case, system and ipment design permits periodic testing. Testing is described in the applicable system sections.

ensure that a high quality level is obtained in the ESF components and systems, a quality rance program (Chapter 17) is implemented during the design, construction, and operations ses of the ESF systems.

s section provides a discussion of the materials used in engineered safety features (ESF) ponents and material interaction that could impair operation of ESF. Systems that comprise ESF are described in Chapter 6.0.

1 METALLIC MATERIALS 1.1 Materials Selection and Fabrication erials were selected on the basis of their compatibility with the reactor coolant and tainment spray solutions. General corrosion, intergranular corrosion, and caustic and chloride ss corrosion have been considered. Mechanical properties of the pressure boundary materials d in the ESF are in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section II.

ction and fabrication of ESF component materials are in compliance with the ASME Code, tion III.

le 6.1-1 lists the principal pressure-retaining material specifications for components of the grity of ESF Components welding materials used for joining the ferritic base materials of the ESF conform to or are ivalent to ASME Materials Specifications SFA 5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.17, 5.18, and 5.20. The welding erials used for joining nickel-chromium-iron alloy in similar base material combination and in imilar ferritic or austenitic base material combination conform to ASME Material cifications SFA 5.11 and 5.14. The welding materials used for joining the austenitic stainless l base materials conform to ASME Material Specifications SFA 5.4 and 5.9. These materials qualified to the requirements of the ASME Code Section III and Section IX and are used in cedures which have been qualified to these same rules. The methods utilized to control delta ite content in austenitic stainless steel weldments are discussed in Section 5.2.3.

parts of components in contact with borated water were fabricated of or clad with austenitic nless steel or equivalent corrosion resistant material. The integrity of the safety related ponents of the ESF was maintained during all stages of component manufacture. Austenitic nless steel is utilized in the final heat treated condition as required by the respective ASME e Section II material specification. Austenitic stainless steel materials used in the ESF ponents were handled, protected, stored, and cleaned according to recognized and accepted hods which are designed to minimize contamination which could lead to stress corrosion king.

tinghouse supplied ESF components within the containment that would be exposed to core ling water and containment sprays in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) utilize erials listed in Table 6.1-1. These components were manufactured primarily of stainless steel ther corrosion-resistant material. The integrity of the materials of construction for ESF ipment when exposed to post design basis accident (DBA) conditions has been evaluated. Post

2.) performed by Westinghouse considered spray and core cooling solutions of the design mical compositions, as well as the design chemical compositions contaminated with corrosion deterioration products which may be transferred to the solution during recirculation. The cts of sodium (free caustic), chlorine (chloride), and fluorine (fluoride) on austenitic stainless ls were considered. Based on the results of this investigation, as well as testing by Oak Ridge ional Laboratory (ORNL) and others, the behavior of austenitic stainless steels in the post A environment will be acceptable. No cracking is anticipated on any equipment even in the ence of postulated levels of contaminants, provided the core cooling and spray solution pH is ntained at an adequate level. The inhibitive properties of alkalinity (hydroxyl ion) against ride cracking and the inhibitive characteristic of boric acid on fluoride cracking have been onstrated.

ceptibility to intergranular corrosion in the heat-affected zone of austenitic stainless steels is uced due to controlled welding processes to limit sensitization, limited time at elevated peratures, and the fact that the chemicals used at low concentrations are not significant rgranular corrosives. Because of the solution-annealed condition of the base metal, it is une to intergranular corrosion. Additional information concerning austenitic stainless steel, uding the avoidance of sensitization and the prevention of intergranular attack, can be found ection 5.2.3.

d-worked austenitic stainless steels exhibiting a yield strength in excess of 90,000 psi were not d.

melting alloys (zinc, lead, mercury, etc.) that can cause stress corrosion cracking when in tact with stainless steel were prohibited during fabrication of stainless steel parts.

erials such as aluminum and zinc which could be attacked by the caustic spray solution, were ricted within the containment. Extremely limited amounts of these materials were allowed for ll, nonfunctioning parts.

per-nickel (90-10) is subject to only slight general corrosion, which is taken into account n providing corrosion allowances. The Monels are subject to general corrosion only. The rate orrosion is negligible, since the resistance to coolant or spray solutions improves with easing nickel content.

phite filled asbestos packing with Inconel is immune in borated water systems, as onstrated by previous experience. Carbon and tungsten carbide are inert. Note: Products taining asbestos were utilized in original installations. Asbestos products shall not be used in or replacement installations unless a suitable substitute does not exist.

ligible attack of carbon and low-alloy steels is anticipated during a LOCA because these erials are resistant to basic solutions.

integrity of safety related components of the ESF was maintained throughout component ufacture and installation through use of the guidance provided in the following regulatory des:

1. Delta Ferrite control is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.31.
2. Insulation for austenitic stainless steel is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.36. (The allowable amounts of leachable chloride, fluoride, sodium, and silicates are limited to the values listed in Regulatory Guide 1.36).
3. Contamination and cleanliness control is provided consistent with Regulatory Guides 1.37 and 1.44, respectively.
4. The use of stainless steel is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.44.
5. To avoid hot cracking, all production welding on austenitic stainless steel is in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.31 and 1.44.

tion 1.8 lists the degree of compliance with these Regulatory Guides.

1.2 Composition, Compatibility, and Stability of Containment Spray and Safety Injection Coolants method used for controlling the recirculated sump solution pH is discussed in Section 6.2.2.

tainment spray pH control is required for fission product removal and for purposes of erials compatibility.

owing a design basis accident (DBA) that initiates the containment quench spray system, the p solution would be acidic (pH of approximately 4.15) for a brief period due to the boron centration in the RWST water. In the long term (greater than four hours after the DBA), the eous phase inside the containment reaches an equilibrium pH 7.0 due to the addition of odium phosphate from the baskets located at elevation. (-)24 feet 6 inches of the containment.

le 6.1-2 identifies and quantifies the soluble acids and bases in the solution. The parameter es listed in this table are consistent with the appropriate technical specification limits.

ss corrosion cracking of stainless steel piping in simulated pressure-suppression and fission duct absorption sprays were investigated by Griess (1971). It was found that the higher pH ate solutions (pH of 6.5 and 7.5) caused little or no stress corrosion cracking of this material.

als subject to corrosion (aluminum and zinc) inside the containment were closely monitored ng the plant design and generally not used in safety related components which must function owing an accident.

accumulators are filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. The umulators are carbon steel clad with austenitic stainless steel. Section 6.3 lists their principal gn parameters.

refueling water storage tank (the source of borated cooling water for quench spray and safety ction) is austenitic stainless steel. Section 6.2.2 gives principal design parameters of the eling water storage tank.

nificant corrosive attack on the vessels storing the ESF coolants is not expected because of the osion resistance of the materials and the absence of chlorides.

2 ORGANIC MATERIALS 2.1 Protective Coatings approximate quantities of protective coatings used within the primary containment are tified in Table 6.1-3. These coatings have been tested to demonstrate that they remain intact he surface to which they are applied during postulated post-DBA conditions. Tests were ormed in accordance with Section 4 of ANSI N101.2, Protective Coatings for Light Water lear Reactor Containment Facilities, to meet or exceed the DBA conditions described in tion 6.2. Commencing mid-cycle 6, coating materials to be applied to surfaces inside tainment are tested in accordance with either ANSI N101.2 Protection Coatings (Paints) for ht Water Nuclear Reactor Containment Facilities, or ASTM D3911, Evaluating Coatings d in Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants at Simulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) ditions.

2.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.54 s guide states that ANSI N101.4-1972, in conjunction with ANSI N45.2-1971, provides an quate basis for complying with quality assurance requirements for protective coatings applied erritic steels, aluminum, stainless steel, galvanized steel, concrete, and masonry.

tings for large equipment supplied by the NSSS, Westinghouse are specified to meet the uirements of this regulatory guide and are qualified using the standard ANSI tests.

uirements for coatings of large equipment supplied by the NSSS are stipulated in tinghouse process specifications.

lity assurance program recommendations stated in Regulatory Guide 1.54 are followed for all

-NSSS supplied major equipment and structures, except for the inspection defined in Section 4 of ANSI N101.4-1972. Inspection is in accordance with ANSI N5.12-1974, Section 10, pection for Shop and Field Work. The total area coated in accordance with the Regulatory de includes approximately 798,700 square feet of carbon steel surface and 163,850 square feet oncrete surface.

s (flat) materials. A gloss epoxy enamel finish coat is used on both steel and concrete.

le 6.1-3 lists the total estimated quantities of protective coatings on such equipment. Those s not specifically listed in Table 6.1-3 (such as valves, hand wheels, valve bodies, control inets, emergency lights, loudspeakers, off the shelf components, etc.) require protective tings on much smaller surface areas and are procured from numerous vendors. For this ipment, the specifications require that high quality coatings be applied using good commercial tices.

tective coatings for use in the reactor containment have been evaluated as to their suitability in t-DBA conditions. Tests have shown that the epoxy and modified phenolic systems are eptable for inside containment use. These evaluations (WCAP 7198L, WCAP 7825, Keeler Long Report 78-0810-1) considered resistance to high temperature and chemical conditions cipated during a post-DBA, as well as high radiation resistance.

rmation regarding quality assurance requirements for protective coatings (Regulatory Guide

) is discussed in Section 1.8. Further compliance information concerning Westinghouse plied equipment has been submitted and accepted by the NRC (letter dated April 27, 1977, to icheldinger from C. J. Heltemes, Jr.).

2.3 Other Organic Materials Used in the Primary Containment le 6.1-4 lists other organic materials used in the primary containment and their approximate ntities. These materials have been selected because they have adequate resistance to cipated radiation exposure and there is no significant degradation of their properties under a mal operating environment as well as under a post-DBA environment.

3 REFERENCES FOR SECTION 6.1 1 Greiss, J. C. and Creek, G. E. 1971. Design Considerations of Reactor Containment Spray Systems, The Stress Corrosion Cracking of Types 304 and 316 Stainless Steel in Boric Acid Solutions. USAEC Report ORNL-TM-2412, Part X, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

2 Keeler and Long 1978, Radiation Tolerance, Decontamination, Design Basis Accident, Physical Properties and Chemical Properties Tests for Carbon Steel and Concrete Coating Systems. (1977 ORNL Test Series) Final Report 78-0810-1.

3 WCAP-7198-L (Proprietary), April 1969 and WCAP-7825 (Non- Proprietary),

Westinghouse 1971, Evaluation of Protective Coatings for Use in Reactor Containment, Westinghouse Corporation.

SYSTEMS Component and Material Material Specification ing Stainless Steel SA-312 TP304, SA-376 TP304, SA-358 TP304 CL1, SA-376, TP316 Carbon Steel SA-106 Gr. B, C tings, Connections, and Flanges Stainless Steel SA-182 F304, SA-403 WP304, SA-403 WP304H, SA-182 F316 Carbon Steel SA-105, SA-234 WPB skets Flexitallic, Flexicarb Style CG/CGI TP304SS lting Studs SA-193 Gr. B6, SA-193 Gr. B7, SA-453 Gr. 660 Nuts SA-194 Gr. 6, SA-194 Gr. 2H, SA-453 Gr. 660 lves Stainless Steel

a. Valve Stems SA-182 F316, SA-187 F304
b. Body Castings SA-351 CF8, SA-351 CF8M
c. Body Forgings SA-182 F304, SA-182 F316
d. Packing Grafoil
e. Studs and Nuts See Bolting Above Carbon Steel
a. Bonnet Nuts SA-194 Gr. 2H
b. Bonnet Studs SA-193 Gr. B7
c. Valve Stems SA-182 Gr. F6
d. Body Castings SA-216 WCB
e. Body Forgings SA-105
f. Packing Grafoil als and Seal Rings Metals Austenitic Stainless Steel Plastics Polyethylene, Nylon

Component and Material Material Specification Elastomers PON2-N, Viton, Natural Rubber ntainment Spray Nozzles Austenitic Stainless Steel SA-351 Gr. CF8M ntainment Spray Pumps (CRS and QSS)

Suction Casing SA-182 F304, SA-312 TP304 Discharge Column SA-312 TP304 Discharge Head SA-312 TP304, SA-182 F304 Discharge Flange SA-182 F304 Bolting SA-193 Gr. B8 Mechanical Seal Tungsten Carbide, Carbon F Sump Strainer Plate Stainless Steel Type 304/304L Fins Stainless Steel Type 304/304L ntainment Atmosphere Recirculation Coolers Cooling Coils Cu/Cu-Ni (90-10) Alloy SB-111 Alloy 706 (0.049 Wall)

Housing Galvanized Steel lding Materials Ferritic Steel ASME SFA-5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.17, 5.18, and 5.20 Austenitic Stainless Steel ASME SFA-5.4 and SFA-5.9 Ferritic to Austenitic ASFA-5.11 and SFA-5.14 Copper and Copper Alloy ASME SFA-5.6, 5.7, 5.8 xiliary Heat Exchangers Heads SA-240, Type 304 Nozzle Necks SA-182, Gr. F304; SA-312, Type 304; SA-240, Type 304 Tubes SA-213, Type 304; SA-249, Type 304; Tubesheets SA-182, Gr. F304; SA-240, Type 304; SA-516, Gr. 70 with Stainless Steel Cladding A-8 Analysis Shells SA-240 and SA-312 Type 304 xiliary Pressure Vessels, Tanks, Filters, etc.

Component and Material Material Specification Shells and Heads SA-351, Gr. CF8A; SA-240, Type 304; SA-264 Clad Plate of SA-537, C1.1 with SA-240, Type 304 Clad and Stainless Steel Weld Overlay A-8 Analysis Flanges and Nozzles SA-182, Gr. F304; SA-350, Gr. LF2 with SA-240, Type 304 and Stainless Steel Weld Overlay A-8 Analysis Piping SA-312 and SA-240, Type 304 or Type 316 Seamless Pipe Fittings SA-403, Type 304 Seamless Closure Bolting and Nuts SA-193, Gr. B7 and SA-194, Gr. 2H xiliary Pumps Pump Casing and Heads SA-182, Gr. F304 or F316; SA-351 Gr. CF8 Flanges and Nozzles SA-182, Gr. F304 or F316; SA-403 Gr. WP316L Seamless Stuffing or Packing Box Cover SA-182, Gr. F304; SA-351 Gr. CF8 or CF8M; SA-240 TP 304 or TP 316 Closure Bolting and Nuts SA-193, Gr. B6 and Gr. B7; SA-453, Gr. 600; and Nuts, SA-194, Gr. 6 and Gr. 7 Piping SA-312 TP 304 or TP 316 Seamless Pipe Fittings SA-403, Gr. WP316L Seamless

TABLE 6.1-2 PARAMETERS FOR ULTIMATE SUMP PH CALCULATION (1)

Minimum pH (2)

ST volume (gal) at sump conditions 1,162,609 ron concentration in RWST (ppm) 2,900 S volume (gallons, excluding pressurizer and surge line) at sump 56,136 nditions ssurizer and surge line mass (lbm) 65,627 ron concentration in RCS (ppm) 2,900 accumulator volume (gal) at sump conditions 27,946 ron concentration in accumulators (ppm) (Conservative analytical 6,000 ut to accommodate future change.

lume of TSP in Containment (cubic feet) (3) 974 imate Sump pH at 30 days 7.05 TE:

pH calculated at 77F.

Control of the boron concentration varies the pH in the RCS between a maximum pH that reflects an alkaline solution (8-14) and a minimum pH that reflects an acidic solution (1-6).

The value of (7) reflects a condition where the alkalinity/acidity of the solution has been balanced, or neutralized.

Minimum density of the trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is 54 lb/cubic feet For range of sump pH, see Section 3.11B.5.2

Component Painted Surface Area (ft2) ncrete surfaces 163,850 rbon steel surfaces (including equipment listed below) 799,015 actor coolant pump assemblies 3,700 cumulator tanks 3,800 fueling machine 2,600 her refueling equipment 2,125 maining equipment 1,300 ch as valve, auxiliary tanks and heat exchanger supports, nsmitters, alarm horns, and small instruments) lar crane 12,900 utron shield tank 3,154

Approximate Item Material Amount tor electrical insulation Polyester varnish 300 lb netration sealing compound Silicone foam 1,500 lb draulic oil Petroleum base 128 gal bricating oil Petroleum base 960 gal ctrical cable insulation EPR Hypalon cross linked polyethylene 82,600 lb ters Charcoal 8,500 lb

1 CONTAINMENT FUNCTIONAL DESIGN 1.1 Containment Structure 1.1.1 Design Bases containment structure is designed in accordance with General Design Criteria 13, 16, 38, 50,

64. (See Section 3.1). The criteria are amplified as follows:
1. The peak calculated containment pressure following the design basis accident (DBA) is below the containment design pressure (45 psig). The loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or the main steam line break (MSLB) accident which results in the highest calculated containment pressure is the DBA for the containment structure (Containment Integrity DBA).
2. A spectrum of accidents and single active failures combined with simultaneous occurrences such as seismic events and loss of off site power (LOP) are considered to establish the limiting containment peak pressure and long-term temperature and pressure transient.
3. The maximum calculated pressure differential that results from inadvertent actuation of the containment heat removal systems is less than the containment external design differential pressure.
4. The design bases for the containment internal structures (subcompartments) are given in Section 6.2.1.2.
5. The sources and rates of mass and energy released into the containment for a LOCA and a MSLB accident are described in Sections 6.2.1.3 and 6.2.1.4, respectively.
6. The design bases of the containment heat removal systems are described in Section 6.2.2.
7. The capability for post-accident pressure reduction and energy removal from the containment under various single failure conditions in the engineered safety features is discussed in Section 6.2.2.
8. The containment system is designed to limit fission product leakage following an accident. Section 6.5.2 and Chapter 15 discuss the analysis.
9. The basis for the containment back pressure analysis used for the ECCS analysis is discussed in Section 6.5.1.5.

water temperature and level following an accident. Chapter 7 describes the equipment (e.g., type, range, accuracy, and response) and the parameters recorded.

A discussion of the qualification of the instrumentation for the post-accident environment is provided in Section 3.11.

11. The containment structure is designated Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category I (Section 3.2).

1.1.2 Design Features containment structure is a cylindrical, painted carbon steel lined, reinforced concrete cture which encloses the components and major piping within the reactor coolant pressure ndary. The structure is designed to contain the radioactive fluids and fission products which result from postulated accidents inside the containment.

containment is a subatmospheric-type containment. During normal operation the containment cture is maintained at approximately atmospheric pressure to minimize containment leakage ng normal plant operation.

angements and cross sections of the containment structure are shown on Figures 3.8-59 ugh 3.8-60. The structure design is described in Section 3.8. The design provisions to protect containment structure and engineered safety feature (ESF) systems against loss of function m dynamic effects (e.g., missiles and pipe whip) that could occur following postulated dents are described in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. Applicable codes and standards are identified in tion 3.8.1.2.

containment structure is designed to withstand internal pressurization from high energy pipe ks within it and the external pressurization due to inadvertent actuation of the containment t removal systems. The internal maximum design pressure is 45 psig. The internal minimum gn pressure is 8.00 psia.

internal design of the containment structure precludes the accumulation of hydrogen gas in a l area. All cubicles and compartments within the containment are open at the top and allow ulation.

rther discussion of combustible gas control in the containment is found in Section 6.2.6.

containment structure is equipped with a containment sump located at the outer wall of the tainment (Figure 3.8-60). Extensive use is made of gratings and openings in the upper floors structures of the containment to allow water entering the containment to drain down to the tainment sump. For a more detailed description of the sump, sump area, and water drainage to sump, refer to Section 6.2.2.2.

iscussion of the net positive suction head availability for the recirculation pumps is found in tion 6.2.2.3.

missible pressures inside containment are specified in plant technical specifications.

containment atmosphere recirculation system, which controls the atmospheric temperature in containment during normal operation, is discussed in Section 9.4.6. This system is non-safety ted and not designed for operation following a DBA.

1.1.3 Design Evaluation following paragraphs describe the methods used to evaluate the functional capability of the tainment design and also describe the computer code (GOTHIC) utilized to evaluate the ctrum of pipe ruptures.

tions 6.2.1.1.3.5 and 6.2.1.1.3.6 give the results of the analysis of a spectrum of pipe ruptures the primary and secondary systems.

1.1.3.1 Internal Pressure Response Evaluation ressure peak occurs near the end of the initial blowdown of the reactor coolant system (RCS) r a double ended rupture (DER) of either a hot or cold leg. This is referred to as the blowdown k pressure. Its magnitude is a function of the following parameters:

1. The containment free volume.
2. The mass of air inside the containment structure (a function of initial pressure, temperature and humidity).
3. The amount of energy flow out of the break during the initial blowdown of the RCS.
4. The rate of heat removal from the containment atmosphere by the passive heat sinks within the containment structure.

largest blowdown peak pressure occurs after a DER of a hot leg. This event releases the most rgy to the containment atmosphere during the initial blowdown since the hot leg pipe size is er than that of an RCS pump discharge, and there is no resistance to flow due to an RCS pump s the case with a pump suction DER. The magnitude of the blowdown peak pressure is pendent of the active ESF (minimum or normal) because they do not become effective l after the peak pressure is reached. However, the accumulators do have a small effect on the peak.

ion breaks yield the highest energy flow rates during the post blowdown period and sequently result in the most limiting containment depressurization scenario. The containment ressurization rate is a function of the following parameters:

1. The containment free volume.
2. The mass of air inside the containment structure.
3. The rate of heat transfer between the containment atmosphere and the passive heat sinks within the containment structure.
4. The rate of heat removal from the containment atmosphere by the containment heat removal systems (this is dependent on the RWST and the ultimate heat sink temperature).
5. The rate of mass and energy release to the containment from the break following the end of core reflooding.
6. The mass of nitrogen added to the containment from the safety injection accumulators.

er the first day, the heat removal systems continue to remove energy from the containment at a sufficient to continually reduce the containment pressure.

1.1.3.2 Containment Response Analytical Method 1.1.3.2.1 LOCA - Containment Response Analytical Method GOTHIC computer program was developed for the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Numerical Applications, Inc. It is used to model the containment system, the passive heat sinks the containment heat removal systems. A topical report (DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A) described, in il, the assumptions used and the mathematical formulations employed. The NRC approved use of GOTHIC for containment analysis in a letter dated August 30, 2006. For MPS-3, DNC met the conditions established in the NRCs Safety Evaluation. All GOTHIC code and DNC hodology limitations and restrictions have been met.

THIC solves the conservation equations for mass, momentum and energy for multi-ponent, multi-phase flow in lumped parameter and/or multidimensional geometries. The se balance equations are coupled by mechanistic models for interface mass, energy and mentum transfer that cover the entire flow regime from bubbly flow to film/drop flow, as well ingle phase flows. The interface models allow for the possibility of thermal non-equilibrium ween phases and unequal phase velocities, including countercurrent flow. GOTHIC includes treatment of the momentum transport terms in multidimensional models, with optional dels for turbulent shear and turbulent mass and energy diffusion. Other phenomena include

1.1.3.2.1.1 Passive Heat Sinks rmal conductors are the primary heat sink for the blowdown energy. The conductors can be e up of any number of layers of different materials. One dimensional conduction solutions are d to be consistent with the lumped modeling approach.

thermal conductor is divided into regions, one for each material layer, with an appropriate kness and material property for each region. GOTHIC accepts inputs for material density, mal conductivity and specific heat. These values are obtained from published literature for the erials present in each conductor. Conductors with high heat flux at the surface and low thermal ductivity must have closely spaced nodes near the surface to adequately track the steep perature profile. The node spacing is set so the node Biot number for each node is less than The Biot number is the ratio of external to internal conductance.

not practical or necessary to model each individual piece of equipment or structure in the tainment with a separate conductor. Smaller conductors of similar material composition can be bined into a single effective conductor. In this combination, the total mass and the total osed surface area of the conductors is preserved. The thickness controls the response time for conductors and is of secondary importance. The conductors are grouped by thickness and erial type. The effective thickness for a group of wall conductors is calculated by the equation

w. The heat sink material types, surface areas and thickness are derived based on plant cific inventories. Concrete, carbon steel and stainless steel are the most common materials.

i group t i A i

= ---------------------------------------

i group A i istance to heat transfer at the liner-concrete interface is considered in the containment analysis se of a conservatively low value of thermal contact conductance of 100 Btu/hr-ft2-F (Gido 8). Since the steel liner is used as a form for pouring of the concrete, and since the concrete is very wet, the liner, in effect, becomes glued to the concrete. This concrete resistance ween the containment liner and the concrete is conservatively modeled in GOTHIC as a arate material layer at the nominal gap thickness with applicable material properties. This restimates the contact resistance because convection and radiation effects will be ignored. The width is determined by dividing the gap thermal conductivity by the gap conductance.

containment passive heat sinks are included in the lumped containment volume. The primary em metal and steam generator secondary shells are included in the simplified RCS model that sed for the calculation of long term mass and energy release; however, these conductors are used for condensation or convection heat transfer with the containment atmosphere. The tainment passive heat sinks are summarized in Table 6.2-2.

Direct heat transfer options with the Diffusion Layer Model (DLM) condensation option is d for all containment passive heat sinks except the sump floor. With the Direct option, all densate goes directly to the liquid pool at the bottom of the volume. The effects of the densate film on the heat and mass transfer are incorporated in the formulation of the DLM on. Under the DLM option, the condensation rate is calculated using a heat and mass transfer logy to account for the presence of the non-condensing gases.

a conductor representing the containment floor or sump walls that will eventually be covered h water form the break and condensate, the Split heat transfer option is used to switch the heat sfer from the vapor phase to the liquid phase as the liquid level in the containment builds. A ker transition to liquid heat transfer is more conservative for containment analysis. The Split on is used with lmax, the maximum liquid fraction, set to ax = d/H ere D is the transition water depth and H is the volume height. A reasonable value for d is 0.1 switches in the heat transfer from the vapor phase to the liquid phase as the liquid level in the tainment reaches 0.1 inch. Other values may be appropriate depending on the geometry of the r and sump.

conductors with both sides exposed to the containment, the Direct option is applied to both

s. Alternatively, if the conductor is symmetric about the center plane, a half-thickness ductor can be used with the total surface area of the two sides and an insulated back side heat sfer option. The conductor face that is not exposed to the atmosphere is assumed insulated.

Specified Heat Flux option is used with the minimal heat flux set to zero.

tainment walls above grade and the containment dome have a specified external temperature ndary condition with a heat transfer coefficient of 2.0 Btu/hr-ft2-F to model convective heat sfer to the outside atmosphere. The GOTHIC heat transfer solution scheme allows for urate initialization of the temperature distribution in the containment wall and dome prior to transient initiation.

onservative containment liner response is obtained by adding a small conductor that has the e construction and properties as the liner conductor. A conductor surface area of 1 square foot sed to minimize impact on the lumped containment pressure and temperature response. The de heat transfer option is the same as that used for the actual liner conductor (Direct with M) with a multiplier of 1.2 for conservatism.

1.1.3.2.1.3 Spray Modeling THIC includes models that calculate the sensible heat transfer between the drops and the or and the evaporation or condensation at the drop surface. The efficiency (the actual perature rise over the difference between the vapor temperature and the drop inlet

nolds number dependent fall velocity and heat transfer coefficients. A heat and mass transfer logy is used to calculate the effective mass transfer coefficient, which is used to calculate the poration or condensation. Containment spray is modeled as described in M-NAF-3-0.0-P-A.

1.1.3.2.1.4 Containment Heat Removal t exchangers that remove energy from the containment sump are modeled with the available t exchanger options in GOTHIC. Use of a GOTHIC heat exchanger option dynamically ples the heat exchanger performance to the predicted primary and secondary fluid conditions.

s can provide a small benefit compared to other codes (e.g., LOCTIC) that use bounding UA es to cover the fluid conditions predicted over the entire transient.

GOTHIC heat exchanger type that closely matches the actual heat exchanger is selected. The de and outside heat transfer areas are calculated from the heat exchanger geometry details. For and shell arrangements, the shell side flow area is set to the open area across the tubes at the

-plane of the heat exchanger and the shell side hydraulic diameter is set to the tube outer meter. The GOTHIC option for built in heat transfer coefficients is used to determine heat sfer coefficients that depend on the primary and secondary side Reynolds and Prandtl bers. The heat exchanger models in GOTHIC are for basic heat exchanger designs and may account for the details of a particular heat exchanger (e.g., baffling in a tube-and-shell heat hanger). A forcing function can be used on the primary and secondary side heat transfer fficients to tune the heat exchanger performance to manufacturer or measured specifications.

ernatively, the heat transfer area can be adjusted to match the specified performance. Fouling ors and tube plugging are applied when conservative.

1.1.3.2.1.5 MSLB - Containment Response Analytical Method MSLB containment response is performed using the GOTHIC computer code with the hodology in topical report DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A. The containment modeling (geometry, em components, heat structures, and heat transfer options) is consistent with the LOCA model ussed in Section 6.2.1.1.3.2.1. The only change from the LOCA model is the modeling of the k effluent. As described in Section 6.2.1.4, the mass and energy releases were developed by tinghouse for a spectrum of break sizes and power levels (see Table 6.2-23), with and without id entrainment, using the LOFTRAN code. The break mass and enthalpy are entered as table ing functions in GOTHIC. The break junction uses 100 micron droplets for entrained liquid ase per DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A, Section 3.5.2. All GOTHIC and DNC methodology rictions and limitations were met for the MSLB containment analysis.

sitivity studies were performed to determine the separate effect impact on the containment sure and temperature from variations in heat structure surface area, accumulator tank deling, and RWST temperature. The study results were consistent with the MSLB result in le 4.7-1 in DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A.

1.1.3.3 Mass and Energy Releases to Containment

1. Loss-of-Coolant Accident The rates of mass and energy release to the containment during the blowdown, reflood, and post-reflood periods are discussed in Section 6.2.1.3 for pipe failures at the following locations:
a. Hot leg (between reactor vessel and steam generator)
b. Pump suction (between steam generator and RC pump)
c. Cold leg (between RC pump and reactor vessel)
2. Main Steam Line Break Accident Refer to Section 6.2.1.4 for a discussion of the mass and energy release analysis for secondary system pipe rupture inside the containment.

1.1.3.4 External Pressure dvertent operation of the containment heat removal systems causes a decrease in the pressure de the containment, thereby increasing the external pressure differential on the containment cture.

analysis of maximum external differential pressure assumes inadvertent actuation of the nch spray system caused by a single spurious containment depressurization actuation (CDA) al. Note that two active component failures are necessary to generate a spurious CDA signal Section 7.3.2.2.1, Single Failure Criteria).

minimum internal pressure is determined by modeling inadvertent quench spray pump start g the LOCTIC computer program. The minimum internal pressure is calculated to be 8.08 occurring approximately 50 minutes after the initiating event. This delay provides sufficient e for the operator to be alerted to the condition, reset the CDA signal, and secure the quench y pumps, thus terminating the event.

parameters used in calculating the minimum containment pressure are shown in Table 6.2-Each parameter was selected as representing the most severe allowable initial condition for imizing pressure. As a result, the calculated pressure is a lower bound estimate.

Table 6.2-3 for additional containment design evaluation parameters.

1.1.3.5.1 Input Parameters, Assumptions and Acceptance Criteria 1.1.3.5.1.1 Input Parameters and Assumptions initial containment atmospheric conditions are chosen consistent with the guidance of REG-0800, Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.1.1.A. The assumptions vary depending on the containment gn limit that is being verified. For the MPS-3 containment, the influence of the containment al conditions, as documented in Table 3.6.1 of DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A, was confirmed by ning parametric studies using the MPS-3 specific GOTHIC model that assumes a Technical cifications limit on total pressure and by varying one input while keeping the others constant.

most conservative settings for containment integrity analyses are summarized below. The mption of maximum temperature for the limiting LOCA Peak Pressure differs from Table 1 of DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A. This is discussed in additional detail in Section 6.2.1.1.3.5.2.1.

Analysis Pressure Temperature Humidity LOCA Peak Pressure MAX MAX MIN LOCA Peak Temperature MAX MAX MAX Containment Depressurization MAX MAX MAX term MAX indicates that the parameter is set to the largest allowable operating value ommodating instrument uncertainty), while MIN indicates the parameter is set to the smallest wable operating value. For example, the initial containment conditions that yield the highest k calculated containment pressure are the maximum pressure, maximum temperature and imum relative humidity.

QSS is assumed to be initiated when containment pressure exceeds 24.7 psia and delivers y to the containment atmosphere 70.2 seconds later. The QSS spray is assumed to be 75F id from the RWST.

recirculation spray system is assumed to start when the RWST level reaches the low level m setpoint.

tainment analyses performed to support the stretch power uprate were performed assuming a ueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) temperature up to 100F and a service water temperature o 80F. As a result of Westinghouse NSAL-11-5, Reference 6.2-46, new analyses were ormed resulting in an increase in the LOCA peak temperature and pressure in containment.

ile some of the analyses might assume less restrictive limits, the limiting analytical initial dition ranges that are used in the containment integrity analysis are as follows:

Initial containment pressure of 14.2 psia to 10.4 psia.

Service water (ultimate heat sink) temperature of up to 80F.

Refueling water storage tank temperature of up to 75F.

Table 6.2-3 for additional containment design evaluation parameters.

1.1.3.5.1.2 Application of Single Failure Criterion ngle failure analysis is not necessary for the peak containment pressure evaluation since the k pressure for each break case analyzed occurs early in the transient, before any active ESF em affects the results. For the verification of the remaining containment design criteria, the owing single failures have been evaluated:

  • Minimum ESF (diesel generator failure resulting in loss of one ESF train, i.e., one charging pump, one safety injection pump, one RHR pump, one quench spray pump, and two containment recirculation pumps with associated coolers).
  • Failure in the EDG load sequencer or a loss of breaker control power which could prevent one train of containment recirculation pumps from starting and result in two containment recirculation pumps and four ECCS pumps (two charging and two safety injection pumps) running
  • Another partial failure considered is a loss of a motor control center (MCC) which powers the quench spray pump containment isolation valve, the service water inlet valve on each of the containment recirculation system heat exchangers, and the cross-connect valves to the ECCS which are used to establish flow from the containment recirculation pumps to the ECCS pumps during recirculation mode of ECCS.

1.1.3.5.1.3 Acceptance Criteria containment analysis acceptance criteria are as follows:

  • Containment pressure must be less than 45 psig.
  • Containment liner temperature must be less than 280F.

ddition to the above, the following design limits should also be verified:

  • The containment pressure and vapor temperature must be less than the analyzed values for environmentally qualified equipment inside containment.
  • The containment sump temperature must be less than the design value for various affected system piping and components of ECCS and containment heat removal systems.

LOCA containment transient analysis was performed using the GOTHIC computer code for a ctrum of pipe break locations and sizes that are documented in Section 6.2.1.3. The spectrum udes the largest cold and hot leg breaks, and a range of pump suction breaks from the double ed break down to a 3.0 square feet split break. These mass and energy (M&E) release rates m the basis of GOTHIC computations to evaluate the containment response following the tulated LOCA scenarios and to ensure that containment design margin is maintained.

1.1.3.5.2.1 Peak Pressure Analysis results of the containment pressure analysis are tabulated in Table 6.2-4. The initial tainment conditions that yield the highest peak calculated containment pressure are the imum pressure, maximum temperature and minimum relative humidity. The assumption of imum temperature is different from Table 3.6-1 of DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A. As noted in le 6.2-5, the maximum temperature is only slightly limiting at the minimum relative humidity.

igher relative humidity values, minimum temperature is limiting. The limiting containment sure transient response for the hot leg, cold leg pump discharge and cold leg pump suction ble ended ruptures (DERs) are given on Figure 6.2-1. The containment pressure transient onse for the two pump suction break sizes analyzed are given on Figure 6.2-2.

maximum peak containment pressure occurs after a Double Ended Hot Leg Break. As shown able 6.2-4, the calculated containment pressure is below the containment design pressure of sig. The Double Ended Hot Leg is the DBA for the containment structure. The sequences of nts for the limiting peak pressure case is shown in Table 6.2-6.

ngle failure analysis is not necessary for the peak containment pressure evaluation since the k pressure for each break case analyzed occurs early in the transient before any of the ESF ems start.

1.1.3.5.2.2 Peak Temperature Analysis results of the containment temperature analysis are tabulated in Table 6.2-6A. The initial tainment conditions that yield the highest peak calculated containment temperature are the imum pressure, temperature and relative humidity. The limiting containment temperature sient response for the spectrum of the LOCA breaks analyzed are given on Figure 6.2-3 and response for the containment liner temperature is given on Figure 6.2-4.

maximum peak containment temperature occurs for a Double Ended Hot Leg Break. The lts are insensitive to single failures since the peak temperature occurs before the start of any system. The results of this calculation were used to demonstrate that the calculated tainment temperature profile is well bounded by the analyzed values for environmentally lified equipment inside the containment. The sequence of events for the limiting temperature nario is shown in Table 6.2-6B.

results of the containment depressurization analysis are tabulated in Table 6.2-6. The initial tainment conditions that yield the slowest containment depressurization are the maximum sure, temperature and relative humidity. The limiting containment pressure transient response the spectrum of the LOCA breaks analyzed is provided on Figure 6.2-5. From Table 6.2-6C Figure 6.2-5 the conditions that maximize pressure at one hour are different from the ditions that maximize pressure at five hours.

y a Double Ended Pump Suction break is considered for the long term containment ressurization analysis since, as described earlier, this break produces the highest energy flow s during the post-blowdown period.

limiting single failure for this analysis was determined to be a diesel generator failure lting in loss of one ESF train (i.e., one charging pump, one safety injection pump, one RHR p, one quench spray pump, and two containment recirculation pumps with associated cooler).

s single failure has the combined effect of reducing the containment heat removal capability minimizing the credit for steam condensation due to steam/water mixing, since SI flow is ed on a conservative minimum calculation.

results of this calculation were used to demonstrate that the calculated containment pressure ile is well bounded by the analyzed values for environmentally qualified equipment inside the tainment. The sequences of events for the slowest depressurization scenario are shown in le 6.2-6D.

1.1.3.5.2.4 Sump Temperature Analysis results of the containment sump temperature analysis are tabulated in Table 6.2-6E. The al containment conditions that yield the highest peak calculated containment sump perature are the minimum pressure, maximum temperature and maximum relative humidity.

limiting containment sump temperature transient response for the spectrum of the LOCA ks analyzed are given on Figure 6.2-6.

maximum containment sump temperature at the start of the containment recirculation pumps urs after a Double Ended Cold Leg Break at the Pump suction. The limiting single failure for analysis was concluded to be diesel generator failure resulting in the loss of one train of ESF.

result of this analysis was used to verify that the design temperature for various affected em piping and components of ECCS and containment heat removal systems remain bounding.

sequence of events for the limiting sump temperature scenario is shown in Table 6.2-6F.

1.1.3.6.1 Input Parameters and Assumptions and Acceptance Criteria 1.1.3.6.1.1 Input Parameters and Assumptions tainment initial conditions are biased for conservatism consistent with Table 3.6.1 of M-NAF-3-0.0-P-A. The conservative direction of these biases was confirmed for the lstone 3 MSLB model as follows.

Analysis Pressure Temperature Humidity MSLB Peak Pressure MAX MAX MIN MSLB Peak Temperature MIN MAX MIN MSLB peak pressure analyses assume an initial containment pressure of 14.2 psia and the LB peak temperature analyses assume an initial containment pressure of 10.4 psia. These lysis assumptions include 0.2 psi margin to the MPS-3 Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 rating limits of 10.6-14.0 psia to account for instrument uncertainty. For all MSLB analyses, initial containment temperature is assumed to be 125F and the initial relative humidity is med to be 10 percent.

the containment response, one train of emergency power is assumed to be unavailable, ing one train of the QSS system with minimum flow available for containment cooling. The tainment recirculation spray system is not credited in the MSLB containment response lysis. The QSS system is initiated when containment pressure exceeds 10.0 psig and delivers y to the containment atmosphere 70.2 seconds later. The QSS spray is assumed to be 100F id from the RWST.

credit is taken for RSS initiation.

1.1.3.6.1.2 Acceptance Criteria containment analysis acceptance criteria are

  • Containment pressure must be less than 45 psig.
  • Containment liner temperature must be less than 280F.

ddition, the containment pressure and vapor temperature must be less than the analyzed values environmentally qualified equipment inside containment.

MSLB containment transient analysis was performed using the GOTHIC computer code zing mass and energy (M&E) release rates for a spectrum of power level, break size and le failures that are documented in Section 6.2.1.4. These M&E release rates form the basis of THIC computation to evaluate the containment response following a spectrum of postulated LB scenarios and to ensure that containment design margin is maintained.

le 6.2-1 summarizes the peak containment pressures and temperatures calculated by GOTHIC 16 combinations of power level and MSLB break size postulated to occur inside containment.

plant power levels are at the NSSS power provided in Table 6.2-23. The difference between peak pressure and peak temperature case at the same statepoint is the initial containment sure. Thus, the results from 32 GOTHIC analyses are shown in Table 6.2-1.

1.1.3.6.2.1 Containment Peak Pressure maximum containment pressure of 38.15 psig (52.85 psia) occurs for the 1.4 square feet ble ended rupture at 0 percent power and is less than the design limit of 45 psig. This scenario the largest initial steam generator liquid mass and results in the largest mass release to the tainment. The double ended rupture cases consistently produce higher peak pressures than the split breaks for the same initial power levels. Containment pressures are also higher when id entrainment does not occur, as well as when the MSIV fails to isolate. The results are sistent with expectations since the pressure response is directly related to the quality of vapor ed to containment. Table 6.2-6G shows the time sequence of events for the limiting peak tainment pressure case. Figure 6.2-7 shows the containment pressure response from GOTHIC the same case. Containment pressure decreases at a more rapid rate after 1800 seconds from termination of auxiliary feedwater, which stops the break release.

GOTHIC MSLB containment pressure profiles from all 16 cases were confirmed to be less the analyzed pressures for environmentally qualified equipment in containment.

1.1.3.6.2.2 Containment Peak Temperature maximum containment temperature of 343.0 F occurs for the 1.4 square feet double ended ure at full power (including uncertainty). The containment temperature is below the short-equipment qualification limit of 350F. Short-term vapor temperatures are considerably her for the double ended ruptures without entrainment. A review of the energy release data ws a decrease in the break flow enthalpy early in the event for the entrainment cases. This er break flow energy significantly reduces the containment temperature response, since tainment temperature is directly related to the enthalpy of the fluid in the containment vapor ce. The pipe split cases produce peak temperatures that are comparable in magnitude to the ble ended ruptures with entrainment. For the split breaks, the higher enthalpy blowdown flow elayed with respect to the double ended ruptures at the same power level. This delay means there is a lower mass flow rate at the time that the higher energy fluid is being released and there is more time for the heat structures to remove energy from the containment atmosphere

nitial power level increases, the containment peak temperature increases. However, this tionship is reversed after several hundred seconds, with marginally higher long term peratures for cases initiated at lower power levels because of the larger amount of steam erator liquid mass that is released from the low power case.

le 6.2-6H shows the time sequence of events for the limiting peak containment temperature

. Figure 6.2-8 shows the containment temperature response from GOTHIC for the same case.

GOTHIC MSLB containment temperature profiles from all 16 cases were confirmed to be than the analyzed temperatures for environmentally qualified equipment in containment.

1.1.3.6.2.3 Containment Liner Temperature MSLB containment response analyses included an additional 1 square foot thermal conductor etermine a conservative containment liner temperature response in accordance with Section 3 of DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A. The conductor used a 1.2 multiplier on the Direct/DLM heat sfer coefficient.

re is little variation in the magnitude of the maximum liner temperature between the cases. In eral, the results follow the same trends as the long term containment response. The double ed rupture cases without entrainment have marginally higher values than the other cases at the e power levels, and the peak liner temperatures increase slightly at lower initial power level.

maximum calculated liner temperature of 246F occurs for the 1.4 square foot double ended ure initiated from 0 percent power. The maximum liner temperature is below the design value 80F. Figure 6.2-9 shows the containment liner surface temperature from the limiting case.

1.1.3.7 Feedwater Pipe Break Results feedwater pipe break is not as severe as the main steam pipe break, since the break effluent is lower specific enthalpy. A feedwater pipe break analysis for containment pressure and perature is, therefore, not performed.

1.2 Containment Subcompartments 1.2.1 Design Basis containment subcompartments are designed in accordance with General Design Criteria 4

50. (See Section 3.1).

AP-10586 and NUREG-1838 document the justification and approval of Leak-Before-Break B) technology to eliminate the postulated pipe breaks in the large primary RCS piping from design basis for the containment subcompartments. However, some discussion of these

ak locations and types (Section 3.6.1.3.3) are chosen as follows for the various compartments:

1. Upper pressurizer cubicle - Spray line doubled ended rupture (DER) in the upper pressurizer cubicle is the largest break that can occur in the upper pressurizer cubicle. Section 6.2.1.2.3 describes the break types.
2. Lower pressurizer cubicle - A surge line limited displacement rupture (LDR) of less than two pipe cross-section areas is the largest break which can occur within the pressurizer cubicle. However, the full DER is chosen as the design basis.
3. Lower steam generator subcompartments - A reactor coolant system (RCS) 707 square inches hot leg intrados split break is the largest area break which can occur in the lower steam generator subcompartment. (This break has been eliminated with leak-before-break methodology.)
4. Upper steam generator subcompartments - A feedwater line single ended split (SES).
5. Upper reactor cavity - RCS 100 square inches cold leg limited displacement break inside the upper reactor cavity. This break area exceeds the maximum which can occur inside the upper reactor cavity. (This break has been eliminated with leak-before-break methodology.)

the design basis containment subcompartment support, the mass and energy release rates for various sizes of primary coolant system breaks were computed with the SATAN V program cribed in WCAP-8264-P-A, Rev. 1 and WCAP-8312-A, Rev. 2, while the feedwater line le ended split (SES) mass and energy release rates were determined by a manual calculation g the frictionless Moody correlation assuming blowdown liquid saturated at full power luding uncertainties) steam generator operating pressure. (see Table 6.2-7) ce the operating pressure and temperature for the postulated pipe breaks are changed under the tch power uprate (SPU) conditions, the pre-SPU mass and energy release rates are adjusted at SPU conditions (and evaluated for MUR conditions) only if releases are increased. Otherwise, existing mass and energy release rates remain unchanged. The detailed discussions are vided in the analysis results in Section 6.2.1.2.3.

initial containment conditions selected for the subcompartment analyses are as follows.

ssurizer Subcompartment

1. Temperature 100F
3. Relative humidity 10 percent initial conditions of pressure and relative humidity used in the Pressurizer Subcompartment lyses are conservative based upon sensitivity analysis. Technical Specifications require tainment average temperature to be between 80F to 120°F. The resulting peak pressure is not sitive to initial temperatures in this range, therefore, 100°F was selected for consistency ween cases.

am Generator and Upper Reactor Cavity Subcompartments

1. Temperature 120F
2. Pressure 9.9 psia
3. Relative humidity 50 percent e that the Technical Specifications for the containment require that the containment operating sure be between 10.6 and 14.0 psia with 0.2 psia uncertainty. Therefore, the initial pressure med for steam generator and upper reactor cavity subcompartments is conservative since use ower initial pressure would result in higher calculated pressure differences across cubicle ls. The differences in other initial conditions (i.e., temperature and relative humidity) for the compartment analyses are not significant with respect to the results of those analyses.

compartment nodalization schemes are chosen to provide a conservative load and moment on ven component and structure. All vent flow paths used in the analysis are considered bstructed by movable objects throughout the transient. These flow path areas are servatively calculated. Nominal reductions to the net vent areas are typically made to account building tolerances. Insulation and associated materials are the only movable obstructions to

. Vent areas in the steam generator and pressurizer subcompartments are relatively large, and ordingly, the likelihood of significant blockage by displaced insulation is remote. Vent areas l to the break location in the upper reactor cavity subcompartment are, in general, ificantly smaller than in other subcompartments and are, therefore, more susceptible to kage. According to the Subcompartment Analysis Procedures (Gido 1979), it is conservative ssume blockage of some vent areas local to the break. However, it is unlikely that the blockage ains itself because the high local pressures would immediately dislodge the debris.

flows through all flow paths with the nodalized subcompartment model are based on a ogeneous mixture in thermal equilibrium with the assumption of 100 percent liquid carryover ction 6.2.1.2.3).

le 6.2-43 shows that the subcompartments design differential pressures are, in all cases, ter than the calculated pressure differences. Multinode schemes providing a conservative load moment on a given component and structure are considered in the subcompartment design.

ures 3.8-59 and 3.8-60 provide detailed plan and section drawings of the containment compartments. They show the arrangement of structures and components within the tainment. Views of the upper and lower pressurizer cubicle are shown in Figures 6.2-17 ugh 6.2-18D; of the most limiting steam generator subcompartment (cubicle B) in Figures 19 through 6.2-22 and of the upper reactor cavity in Figure 6.2-23. Schematic nodalization dels of the upper and lower pressurizer cubicle and the most limiting steam generator compartment are given in Figures 6.2-24 and 6.2-25, respectively. Figure 6.2-23 provides the compartment plan elevation and nodal arrangement for the upper reactor cavity. The esponding subcompartment vent path and nodal descriptions are given in Tables 6.2-27 and

-28.

updated most limiting steam generator subcompartment model (cubicle B 26 node model) cribed in Figures 6.2-19, 6.2-20, 6.2-21, 6.2-22, 6.2-25 and Table 6.2-28 incorporated the manent installation of selected refueling floor concrete plugs under the SPU conditions.

1.2.3 Design Evaluation ditions considered in the subcompartment analyses are the development of pressure gradients ss the walls, major equipment, and supports. The resulting asymmetric pressures are used to ulate loads and moments applied to the equipment and its supports. The maximum differential sure across the walls is used as the design basis for the subcompartment structures.

volume of the subcompartment is divided into a series of nodes with as many connecting ts as there are significant flow resistances. A model that provides a conservative load and ment on the given component and structure is used.

ak Type Definitions and Areas o types of breaks are used to analyze containment subcompartments. The first is a guillotine

k. A guillotine break, which results in a break flow area of two pipe cross sections, is called a ble ended rupture (DER). In some subcompartments, pipe restraints limit the displacement of two broken ends of the pipe so that the break flow area is less than two pipe cross-sectional
s. This type break is called a limited displacement rupture (LDR). The special case of a LDR ne pipe cross-sectional area is called a single ended rupture (SER).

second type of break is a longitudinal split which is equivalent to a hole in the wall of the

. A split which results in a break flow area of one pipe cross section is called a single ended t (SES).

containment subcompartment analysis results describe all breaks analyzed within a particular compartment. Pipe restraints are provided (see FSAR Section 3.6) to limit break areas to sizes ch are less than or equal to those postulated in subcompartment pressure analyses.

tulated ruptures of the primary coolant loop piping. The following breaks no longer need to be lyzed with the application of LBB:

1. Steam generator inlet nozzle LDR with 196.6 square inches opening (steam generator compartment).
2. RCS hot leg intrados split break with 707 square inches opening (steam generator compartment).
3. Steam generator outlet nozzle LDR with 500 square inches opening (steam generator compartment).
4. Pump suction loop closure weld LDR with 500 square inches opening (steam generator compartment).
5. RCS cold leg LDR with 100 square inches opening (upper reactor cavity).

aks with less than two cross-sectional flow areas are used in the analysis for the steam erator subcompartment. The mechanical piping analysis shows that less than two surge line s-sectional areas is the maximum achievable break area in the pressurizer cubicle. However, full DER mass and energy releases are used in the subcompartment pressure analysis.

mass and energy releases for the feedwater (FW) line single ended split (SES) (Table 6.2-

) were determined by a manual calculation using the Moody correlation with a flow stance of 1.0 for a saturated liquid at maximum steam generator (SG) operating pressure (i.e.,

rcent power). Prior to break initiation, the FW line is filled with subcooled liquid at the FW p discharge pressure and FW temperature. The SG upper downcomer annulus is filled with rated liquid at the SG operating pressure. Upon break initiation, the pressure at the break in FW side immediately drops to close to saturation pressure at the FW temperature, since the ng is sufficiently long and since the break occurs gradually in reality. The liquid flashes as it s the break. Thus the break flow is governed by the saturation pressure, not the initial FW harge pressure prior to break initiation. The same is true for the SG side, with the SG rating pressure. Furthermore, due to limited flow area (i.e., J-tube area of 0.9 square feet) from SG side, the FW side break flow is expected to be dominant over the SG side for combined via 1.6585 square foot SES area. Therefore, use of Moody critical flow correlation with a resistance of 1.0 assuming blowdown liquid saturated at 0 percent power SG operating sure is considered to be conservative.

t Loss Coefficient vent loss coefficients used in the subcompartment analyses depend on the geometry of the icular vent. The basis for the coefficients is the Handbook of Hydraulic Resistance (Idelchik 0). Tables 6.2-27 and 6.2-28 give the values of the loss coefficients utilized in compartment analyses.

compartment Analytical Model

1. Functional Description of THREED Code

postulated rupture in a moderate or high energy pipeline. The results obtained from such an analysis are used to calculate loads on structures and to define environmental conditions for equipment qualification.

The THREED computer program is similar to RELAP4 (Aerojet Nuclear Company 1976; Moore and Rettig 1974) and gives the same results as RELAP4 if similar options are chosen. THREED performs subcompartment analyses with capabilities and options extended beyond those available in RELAP4. A significant improvement in THREED is that the homogeneous equilibrium mode (HEM) has been extended to include two-phase, two-component flow which is encountered in subcompartment analysis.

The current THREED computer program was put into use in October 1978, and has been used in the design of Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, River Bend Station, and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2.

2. Description of the Model The THREED computer code can be viewed as a numerical integrator for the macroscopic form of the basic field equations describing the conservation of mass, energy, and momentum. The conservation equations, along with the equation of state for the fluid, give a complete solution to the fluid flow phenomena. THREED solves a stream tube form of the field equations based on the assumptions of one-dimensional, homogeneous, thermal-equilibrium flow. Although THREED does not prohibit the use of multidimensional flow paths, the flow paths are modeled to approximate a one dimensional equation. Subcompartments are modeled in THREED as a hydraulic network which consists of a series of interconnecting user defined nodes (mass and energy control volumes). Nodes are connected by internal junctions (momentum control volumes) with the internodal flow rates being determined by the solution of the momentum equation. An internal junction control volume is defined as the composite volume between the centers of adjacent nodes. This inconsistency in control volumes (different control volume for momentum than for mass and energy) is illustrated on Figure 6.2-26. This staggered mesh approximation is necessary for purposes of solving the equations.

Fill junctions are dissimilar to internal junctions in that they have no initial node and their flow rate is dependent only on the junction area and time. These junctions are used to simulate flow originating external to the network (blowdown).

Mathematically, they are treated as boundary conditions.

THREED numerically solves finite difference equations which account for mass and, momentum, energy flows into and out of a node.

The fluid conservation equations used by THREED can be obtained by integrating the stream tube equations over a fixed volume, V. The mass and energy equations are developed for the generalized i node, while the momentum equation is developed for the generalized j internal junction connecting nodes K and L.

Neglecting kinetic energy effects, the resulting equations are as follows:

For conservation of mass, the mass equation is (Aerojet Nuclear Company 1976):

dM i

= Wij (6.2-13) dt j re:

Mi = total mass in node i (Mi = Mwi + Mai)

Mwi = total mass of water in node i Mai = total mass of air in node i Wij = mass flow rate into node i from junction j conservation of energy, the energy equation for homogeneous flow is (Aerojet Nuclear rgy Company 1976):

dU

i =

dt Wij hij + Zij - Zj (6.2-14) j re:

Ui = total fluid internal energy in node i hij = local enthalpy at junction j of the fluid entering or leaving node i Zij -Zi = elevation change from the center of mass in node i at Zi to junction j conservation of momentum, the incompressible equation for homogeneous flow is (Aerojet lear Company 1976):

dW j I j --------- = P K + P Kgj - P L + P Lgi - F j (6.2-15) dt re:

Ij = geometric inertia for junction j Wj = mass flow rate in junction j PK = total static pressure in node K (at center)

PKgj = gravity pressure differential from the center of node K to junction j PLgj = gravity pressure differential from junction j to the center of node L Fj = static pressure change term equation of state, the functional form of the equation of state is:

Pi = F(Ui, Mwi, Mai) (6.2-16) re:

Pi = total static pressure in node i Mwi = total mass of water in node i Mai = total mass of air in node i following assumptions are made in deriving the equation of state:

1. The components of water and air form a homogeneous mixture with a uniform temperature.
2. Water, if present, occupies the entire volume. Air, if present, occupies the same volume as the water vapor according to the Gibbs-Dalton Law. Air is assumed to be insoluble in water, and there can be no air present if the volume is filled with liquid water.
3. Air is treated as a perfect gas.
4. If air and liquid water are present, the water vapor is saturated (relative humidity of 100 percent).
5. If air is present, the liquid water conditions are the saturated conditions for Pwi. A more accurate model would have liquid water at the subcooled conditions corresponding to Pi and Ti. This assumption is made to limit calls to the water property routines to one per iteration.

If no water is present in the volume (Mw = 0), the detailed form of the equation of state is:

Ui = MaiCvaTi (6.2-17)

M ai R a T i P i = ----------------------

- (6.2-18)

Vi

Cva = constant volume specific heat of air Ti = temperature in node i Ra = gas constant of air Vi = volume of node i ater is present in the volume (Mw + 0), the detailed form of the equation of state is:

Vui = Vi/Mwi (6.2-19)

Ui = MwiUwi(Ti, Vwi)+MaiCvaTi (6.2-20)

M ai R a T i P ai = ------------------------------------------------

- (6.2-21)

X i M wi V gi T i V wi Pi = Pwi(Ti, Vwi)+Pai (6.2-22) re:

vwi = specific volume of water in node i.

uwi = specific internal energy of water in node i.

Pai = partial pressure of air in node i.

Xi = quality in node i.

vgi = specific volume of water vapor in node i.

Pwi = partial pressure of water in node i.

ould be noted that the internal code calculations are done in SI units. The reference perature used for the calculation of the internal energy of air is zero degrees Kelvin. The perties of steam are based on the 1967 ASME formulation of the properties of steam.

junctions are normally used to input blowdown (mass and energy release tables) into a e(s). Their functional form is:

Wj = f(t) (6.2-23) hij = f(t) (6.2-24) fan junction - these internal junctions are used to model ventilation fan operation in situations re such modeling is appropriate. Their functional form is:

Wj = f(Hj) (6.2-25)

Hj = head difference across the fan junction choked flow options (internal junctions), since an incompressible flow model has no hanism to restrict flow through a junction to the maximum allowable (choked) flow rate, it is essary to use a separate calculation to restrict the flow rate. To determine if the flow is choked, momentum Equation (6.2-15) is solved using a forward finite difference approximation and pared with a calculated choked flow (HEM or Moody). The lesser flow is selected as the tion flow rate for the time step.

h the homogeneous equilibrium model (HEM) and the Moody flow model are based on nation properties. Since it is not usually possible to calculate the velocity in a node, it is med that the static and stagnation properties in a node are the same (neglect kinetic energy cts). This may result in an under prediction of the choked flow rate, which is conservative in t cases.

mogeneous Equilibrium Model - The homogeneous equilibrium model is approximated in REED using an ideal gas approximation. That is, the choked isentropic ideal gas flow ation is utilized and the isentropic exponent is modified to accommodate two-phase,

-component flow. The isentropic exponent is defined as:

V wi P i i = - -------- ----------- (6.2-26)

P i V wi s re:

i = isentropic exponent in node i equation utilized by THREED to calculate the HEM is:

i + 1 2 i - 1 2 P oi W j = 12 A j ---------- g c i ------- (6.2-27) i + 1 V oi re:

Aj = flow area of junction j (square feet) i = isentropic exponent of source node i gc = proportionality constant - 32.174 (ft-lbm)/(lbf-sec2)

Poi = stagnation pressure in source node i (psia)

Voi = stagnation specific volume in source node i (cu ft/lbm)

ody Choked Flow Model - the Moody flow model (Moody 1965), used in THREED, is based he interpolation of tables from Aerojet Nuclear Company (1976). The model is for one ponent flow and, when air is present, the tables are accessed with the total pressure and rage enthalpy of the node.

a junction with a valve, a valve may be modeled in any non-fan internal junction as follows:

Normally closed - trips open instantaneously Normally open - trips closed instantaneously time step control, if the automatic time step control option is selected, the maximum time step mited by the following calculation based on the nodal conditions (Aerojet Nuclear Company 6).

0.01 DT = min seconds, for i=1,..., N (6.2-28)

Pi Pi re:

dP DT = time step size P* i = --------i dt umptions

1. The lumped parameter (control volume) approach is utilized.
2. Adiabatic process.
3. Independent inflow (blowdown).
4. Thermodynamic equilibrium in each node.
5. One dimensional formulation.
6. Staggered-mesh for the conservation equations.
7. Incompressible form of the momentum equation.
8. Kinetic energy effects are neglected.
10. Valves open/close instantaneously.

tainment Subcompartment Analysis Results

1. Pressurizer Cubicle The pressurizer cubicle is analyzed according to the nodalization diagram of Figure 6.2-24. The nodal complexity is consistent with recommendations of NUREG/CR-1199 (Gido 1979) and is discussed in detail in the response to NRC Question 480.9.

Eight postulated breaks are evaluated in the pressurizer cubicle analysis. These breaks are described as follows.

1. Upper pressurizer cubicle spray line DER in node 15.
2. Upper pressurizer cubicle spray line DER in node 11.
3. Upper pressurizer cubicle spray line DER in nodes 16 and 17.
4. Upper pressurizer cubicle spray line DER in nodes 14, 15, 16 and 17.
5. Lower pressurizer cubicle surge line DER in node 20.
6. Lower pressurizer cubicle surge line DER in node 4.
7. Lower pressurizer cubicle surge line DER in node 5.
8. Lower pressurizer cubicle surge line DER in node 2.

The break locations are shown on Figure 3.6-14. The pressurizer is supported from the floor at elevation 51 feet 4 inches which defines the boundary between the upper and lower cubicles.

The mass and energy release rates for a spray line DER are given in Table 6.2-31 and for a surge line DER in Table 6.2-32A.

The effect of the SPU and Tavg coastdown was a decrease in RCS cold leg temperature from 561.3F assumed in WCAP-8264-P-A, Rev. 1 to 533.4F for the SPU and Tavg coastdown. This decrease in RCS temperature and the increase in assumed RCS pressure from 2250 psia to 2300 psia resulted in an increase in the mass and energy releases for the spray line break of less than ten percent. Since these increases are bounded by the ten percent residual uncertainty that was

spray line break mass and energy releases given in Table 6.2-31 bound SPU operation including Tavg coastdown. Thus, Table 6.2-31 conservatively remained unchanged for the SPU and Tavg coastdown and has subsequently been evaluated as applicable for MUR conditions.

The effect of the SPU and Tavg coastdown was a decrease in RCS hot leg temperature from 623.9F assumed in WCAP-8264-P-A, Rev. 1 to 601.6F for the SPU and Tavg coastdown. This decrease in RCS temperature and the increase in assumed RCS pressure from 2250 psia to 2300 psia resulted in an increase in the mass and energy releases for the pressurizer surge line break. Since the ten percent residual uncertainty was applied when the pre-SPU analyses were performed and since it has been determined that the ten percent residual uncertainty can be removed, the net increases in release rates for the SPU and Tavg coastdown were 5.23 percent in mass and 1.15 percent in energy. The increased mass and energy releases are given in Table 6.2-32A. The release conditions have been evaluated as bounding for MUR conditions.

Pressurizer cubicle subcompartment nodal volumes, vent areas, K-factors, and inertias for the THREED analysis are listed in Table 6.2-27.

The pressure response for the pressurizer cubicle (maximum pressure differential across the pressurizer and pressurizer cubicle walls) is shown on Figures 6.2-28 and 6.2-28A for the spray line break, and on Figures 6.2-29, 6.2-29A, 6.2-29B, 6.2-29C, and 6.2-29D for the surge line breaks.

The peak calculated differential pressures between contiguous nodes for the pressurizer cubicle are given in Table 6.2-33. The time of peak differential pressure is given with the peak calculated differential pressure.

A sensitivity study was conducted regarding the initial conditions used in the analysis. The variation of the initial temperature, pressure, and relative humidity within the operating range did not result in a significant increase in peak pressure difference.

2. Steam Generator Compartment The nodalization schematic used in the steam generator compartment analysis is shown on Figure 6.2-25. Seven postulated breaks are considered for the steam generator analysis. They are as follows.
1. Steam generator inlet nozzle with a 196.6 square inch LDR (Break 3).(1)
2. Pressurizer surge line with a 196.6 square inch LDR (Break 11).
4. RCS hot leg intrados split break with 707 square inches opening (Break 7).

(1)

5. Feedwater line 238.8 square inch SES.
6. Steam generator outlet nozzle LDR with 500 square inches opening (Break 4). (1)
7. Pump suction loop closure weld LDR with 500 square inches opening (Break 12). (1)

Refer to Figures 3.6-12 and 3.6-13 which shows the locations of the various breaks, with the exception of the feedwater line SES.

Among those break cases, breaks 3, 7, 4, and 12 have been eliminated due to the application of LBB technology.

The most limiting steam generator subcompartment (cubicle B) nodal volumes, vent areas, K-factors, and inertias for the THREED analyses are listed in Table 6.2-28 (for the existing breaks 11, 9, and feedwater line). Note that cubicle B was conservatively selected to represent all four cubicles for analyses of breaks since the volume and vent areas of cubicle B are relatively smaller than other cubicles.

Tables 6.2-32A, 6.2-35, and 6.2-36A give the mass and energy release for the following breaks: Pressurizer Surge Line DER in the Pressurizer Cubicle; Pressurizer Surge Line with 196.6 square inch LDR; and Feedwater Line SES in the Steam Generator Cubicle.

The impact of the SPU and Tavg coastdown on the mass and energy release rates for breaks 11, 9, and feedwater line is assessed and concluded as follows.

For break 11, as discussed in the pressurizer cubicle, the pre-SPU mass and energy release rates were increased 5.23 percent in mass and 1.15 percent in energy for the SPU and Tavg coastdown. The release conditions have been evaluated as bounding for MUR conditions.

For break 9, the pre-SPU pressurizer surge line (14 inch schedule 160 piping) mass and energy release rates were conservatively used for the pre-SPU RHR line (12 inch schedule 140 piping) break release rates. Since the reduction in the break These breaks have been eliminated with LBB methodology; however, the analyses of these breaks are being ned.

surge line break releases for the SPU and Tavg coastdown, the existing pre-SPU pressurizer surge line mass and energy release rates remain bounding for break 9 under the SPU operation including the proposed Tavg coastdown. Additionally, the release conditions have been evaluated as bounding for MUR conditions.

For feedwater line break, the pre-SPU mass and energy release rates remain bounding for the SPU (and evaluated as bounding for the MUR), since the reduction in the release rates applying more representative Moody critical flow with a flow resistance of 1.0 instead of the very conservative frictionless Moody critical flow offsets more than the increases seen for the SPU.

Figures 6.2-31, 6.2-32, and 6.2-34 show the pressure response for the steam generator cubicle (maximum pressure differential across the steam generator and the cubicle walls for each break).

Tables 6.2-26, 6.2-38, and 6.2-39 list the peak calculated differential pressure between contiguous nodes of each breaks. The time of peak differential pressure is given with the peak calculated differential pressure.

The main steam line is not routed through any portion of the compartment and is not considered in this analysis.

3. Upper Reactor Cavity The postulated 100 square inches cold leg LDR within the reactor cavity has been eliminated by using the LBB methodology. This is the only postulated break within the upper reactor cavity subcompartment, thus no further analysis is required for the upper reactor cavity.
4. Primary Shield Wall Pipe Penetrations There are no breaks postulated inside the primary shield wall pipe penetrations.

The penetrations are conservatively designed to withstand the maximum design pressure within the upper reactor cavity.

1.2.4 Short-term LOCA Mass and Energy Releases rt-term loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) mass and energy (M&E) release calculations were ormed to support the lower steam generator subcompartment, upper reactor cavity, lower surizer cubicle and the upper pressurizer cubicle. The original licensing basis for these ctures were 1) a 707 square inch hot leg intrados split break, 2) a 100 square inch cold leg ted displacement break, 3) a double ended break in the pressurizer surge line and 4) a double ed break in the pressurizer spray line, respectively.

k M&E release rate that occurs during a subcooled condition; thus the Zaloudek correlation, ch models this condition, is used in the short-term LOCA M&E release analyses ference 6.2-31).

part of the approval for stretch power uprate (SPU), the NRC reviewed the Millstone Power ion Unit 3 (MPS-3) evaluation of the effect of SPU on the leak-before-break (LBB) methods ference 6.2-30). With the elimination of the large reactor coolant system breaks, the only k locations that need to be considered are the largest branch lines off of the primary loop ng. These branch lines include the pressurizer surge line, the pressurizer spray line, the umulator line and the residual heat removal (RHR) line from the hot leg to the first isolation

e. The releases associated with these smaller breaks are considerably lower than the large S breaks.

B has eliminated the 707 square inch hot leg intrados split break from consideration for compartment pressurization. The reduction in break area for the lower steam generator partments comparing the 707 square inch hot leg intrados split break to a double ended break he pressurizer surge line is a factor about 3.6. A reduction of this magnitude in pipe break size been shown to have a significant impact on the subcompartment loadings. For example, based n available sensitivities (Reference 6.2-32), it is estimated that the peak break compartment sure was shown to be reduced by a factor of 2.76, and the peak differential across an adjacent l was reduced by a factor of 3.86.

100 square inch cold leg limited displacement break for the upper reactor cavity has been pletely eliminated by the application of LBB and no further consideration is required.

release calculations for the pressurizer lower and upper cubicles are limited by the pressurizer e line and the pressurizer spray line, respectively. These breaks have not been eliminated by B.

pressurizer spray line break LOCA M&E are derived from Reference 6.2-31, Table III-2-6.

se mass and energy releases from Reference 6.2-31 are based on a RCS hot leg temperature of

.9F and pressurizer saturated liquid temperature at 2280 psia. At full power, RCS cold leg perature can be as low as 533.4F and an RCS pressure as high as 2300 psia in the pressurizer.

se changes in RCS conditions of pressure and temperature could increase the spray line mass energy releases by as much as 3.4 percent. The increase lies within the 10 percent residual gin applied to Table 6.2-31 release and therefore the spray line mass and energy releases umented in Table 6.2-31 are bounding.

pressurizer surge line break LOCA M&E are derived from Reference 6.2-31, Table III-2-6.

se mass and energy releases from Reference 6.2-31 are based on a RCS hot leg temperature of

.9F and pressurizer saturated liquid temperature at 2280 psia. At full power, RCS hot leg perature can be as low as 602.3F and RCS pressure as high as 2300 psia in the pressurizer.

se changes in RCS conditions of pressure and temperature could increase the surge line mass energy releases by as much as 15.75 percent on mass released and 11.27 percent on energy

erator cubicle differential pressures are discussed in Section 6.2.1.2.

steam generator compartment RHR line break is addressed in Section 6.2.1.2 Containment compartments, Section 6.2.1.2.3, Design Evaluation, which describes the breaks analyzed for steam generator compartment.

y are as follows:

1. Steam generator inlet nozzle with a 196.6 square inch limited displacement rupture (LDR).
2. Pressurizer surge line with a 196.6 square inch LDR.
3. Residual heat removal line with 196.6 square inch LDR.
4. RCS hot leg intrados split break with a 707 square inch opening.
5. Feedwater line 238.8 square inch single ended split (SES).
6. Steam generator outlet nozzle LDR with a 500 square inch opening.
7. Pump suction loop closure weld LDR with a 500 square inch opening.

aks 1, 4, 6 and 7 have been eliminated due to the application of leak-before-break. Break 2, the surizer surge line break, is discussed above. Thus, only break 3, the residual heat removal

, needs to be addressed. The RHR line break for a 12 inch schedule 140 pipe would have a le ended break area of 0.6013 square feet or 86.59 square inches. This break is approximately percent the size of the pressurizer surge line break. Thus, the existing 196.6 square inch LDR k used in lieu of the RHR line break for the steam generator subcompartment and the results wn in Table 6.2-39 bound power operation and Tavg coastdown.

1.3 Mass and Energy Release Analyses for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents s section presents the mass and energy releases to the containment subsequent to a othetical loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The release rates were calculated for pipe failures hree distinct locations:

1. Hot leg (between vessel and steam generator)
2. Pump suction (between steam generator and pump)
3. Cold leg (between pump and vessel)

omes superheated. However, relative to breaks at the other locations, the core flooding rate d therefore the rate of fluid leaving the core) is low, because all the core vent paths include the stance of the reactor coolant pump. For a hot leg pipe break, the vent path resistance is tively low, which results in a high core flooding rate, and the majority of the fluid which exits core bypasses the steam generators in venting to the containment. The pump suction break bines the effects of the relatively high core flooding rate, as in the hot leg break, and steam erator heat addition, as in the cold leg break. As a result, the pump suction breaks yield the hest energy flow rates during the post-blowdown period.

spectrum of breaks analyzed includes the largest cold and hot leg breaks, and a range of pump ion breaks from the double ended break down to a 3.0 square foot break. Because of the nomena of reflood as discussed above, the pump suction break location is the worst case for g term containment depressurization. This conclusion is supported by studies presented in erence 6.2-37 which included studies for hot leg and cold leg breaks. Thus, an analysis of ller pump suction breaks is representative of the spectrum of break sizes. The hot leg break is worst case for containment pressure due to the high short term blowdown release associated h this break location.

LOCA transient is typically divided into four phases:

1. Blowdown - which includes the period from accident initiation (when the reactor is at steady state operation) to the time that the RCS and containment reach an equilibrium state.
2. Refill - the period of time when the lower plenum is being filled by accumulator and ECCS water. At the end of blowdown, a large amount of water remains in the cold legs, downcomer and lower plenum. To conservatively consider the refill period for the purpose of containment M&E releases, it is assumed that this water is instantaneously transferred to the lower plenum along with sufficient accumulator water to completely fill the lower plenum. This allows an uninterrupted release of M&E to containment. Thus, the refill period is conservatively neglected in the M&E release calculation.
3. Reflood - begins when the water from the lower plenum enters the core and ends when the core is completely quenched. The reflood calculation for the double ended hot leg break was performed with the model described in Reference 6.2-35, and all other reflood transients were calculated using the model described in Reference 6.2-37.
4. Post-reflood - describes the period following the reflood phase. For the pump suction break, a two- phase mixture exits the core, passes through the hot legs, and is superheated in the steam generators prior to exiting the break as steam. Later, after the broken loop steam generator cools, the break flow becomes two phase.

1.3.1 Mass and Energy Release Data wdown Mass and Energy Release Data les 6.2-8, 6.2-9, 6.2-10, 6.2-11 and 6.2-13 present the calculated mass and energy releases the blowdown phase of the various breaks analyzed.

mass and energy releases for the hot leg double ended break, given in Table 6.2-8, terminate seconds after the postulated accident. Since safety injection does not become effective until ut the time blowdown terminates, these releases would apply for both minimum and imum safety injection.

lood Mass and Energy Release Data les 6.2-14, 6.2-15, 6.2-16, 6.2-17 and 6.2-19 present the calculated mass and energy releases the reflood phase of the various breaks analyzed along with the corresponding safety injection mption (minimum or maximum). Tables 6.2-20, 6.2-21, 6.2-21A, 6.2-21B, 6.2-21C and 21D present the principal parameters for the reflood transients analyzed.

o Phase Post-Reflood Mass and Energy Release Data two phase post-reflood mass and energy releases were calculated by the DNC GOTHIC tainment model.

1.3.2 Sources of Mass and Energy sources of mass considered in the loss-of-coolant mass and energy (LOCA M&E) release lysis are given in Tables 6.2-21E, 6.2-21G, 6.2-21I, 6.2-21K and 6.2-21O. These sources ude the:

RCS water Accumulator water Pumped injection (SI) energy inventories considered in the LOCA M&E release analysis are given in Tables 6.2-

, 6.2-21H, 6.2-21J, 6.2-21L and 6.2-21P. The energy sources are the following:

RCS water Accumulator water Pumped injection (SI)

Core stored energy RCS metal (includes steam generator tubes)

Steam generator metal (includes transition cone, shell, wrapper, and other internals)

Steam generator secondary energy (includes fluid mass and steam mass)

Secondary transfer of energy (feedwater into and steam out of the steam generator secondary: feedwater pump coastdown after the signal to close the flow control valve) analysis used the following energy reference points:

Available energy: 212F; 14.7 psia (energy available that could be released)

Total energy content: 32F; 14.7 psia (total internal energy of the RCS)

M&E inventories are presented at the following times, as appropriate:

Time zero (initial conditions)

End of blowdown time End of refill time End of reflood time methods and assumptions used to calculate the release from the various energy sources are n in Reference 6.2-37. A discrepancy between volumetric heat capacities used in WCAP-25-P-A (Reference 6.2-37) and those documented in more recent ASME Code documents was tified. This condition was addressed in PWROG-17034-P-A (Reference 6.2-47), where the C determined, with NSAL 06-6, NSAL-11-5 and NSAL-14-2 addressed, the continued use of AP-10325-P-A is acceptable for performing LOCA mass and energy release analysis for s with large dry and sub-atmospheric containments.

following items ensure that the core energy release is conservatively analyzed for maximum tainment pressure.

Maximum expected operating temperature of the RCS (full power operation).

Allowance for RCS temperature uncertainty (+5.0F which includes a 1F bias).

Margin in RCS volume of 3 percent (which is composed of 1.6 percent allowance for thermal expansion and 1.4 percent allowance for uncertainty).

Core rated power of 3709 Mwt.

Allowance for calorimetric error (0.4 percent of power).

Conservative heat transfer coefficients (i.e., steam generator primary/secondary heat transfer and RCS metal heat transfer).

Allowance in core stored energy for effect of fuel densification.

Allowance for RCS initial pressure uncertainty (+50 psi).

A maximum containment back pressure from the containment analysis.

SGTP level (0 percent uniform)

  • Reduces RCL resistance, which reduces the P upstream of the break for the pump suction breaks and increases break flow.

le 6.2-7 provides the analysis values.

1.3.3 Blowdown Model Description model used for blowdown transient (SATAN-VI) is the same as the model described in erences 6.2-38 and 6.2-39. Reference 6.2-37 provides the method by which the model is used.

1.3.4 Refill Model Description he end of blowdown, a large amount of water remains in the reactor coolant system cold legs, ncomer, and lower plenum. To conservatively model the refill period for the purpose of tainment mass and energy releases, this water is instantaneously transferred to the lower um along with sufficient accumulator water to completely fill the lower plenum. Thus, the e required for refill is conservatively neglected.

1.3.5 Reflood Model Description model used for the reflood transient (WREFLOOD) is a slightly modified version of the dels described in References 6.2-39 and 6.2-30. References 6.2-36 and 6.2-37 describe the hods by which this model is used and the modifications. Tables 6.2-20, 6.2-21, 6.2-21A, 6.2-and 6.2-21D present the principal parameters for the reflood transients analyzed.

1.3.6 Post-Reflood Model Description ing a LOCA event, most of the vessel liquid inventory will be displaced by steam generated lashing. The vessel is then refilled by the accumulators and the high, intermediate and low sure injection systems. GOTHIC is not suitable for modeling the refill/reflood period because volves quenching of the fuel rods where film boiling conditions may exist. Current versions of THIC do not have models for quenching and film boiling. Therefore, for the blowdown, refill reflood stages, the mass and energy release rates are obtained from Westinghouse LOCA lysis. The Westinghouse release data includes the water from the ECCS accumulators, but the ogen release to containment is modeled separately in GOTHIC.

he end of reflood, the core has been recovered with water and the ECCS continues to supply er to the vessel. Residual stored energy and decay heat comes from the fuel rods. Stored

tainment sump. In addition, there may be some buoyancy driven circulation through the intact m generator loops that will remove stored energy from the steam generator metal and water on secondary side. Depending on the location of the break, the two-phase mixture in the vessel pass through the steam generator on the broken loop and acquire heat from the stored energy he secondary system. As discussed in Topical Report DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A, for these ditions, GOTHIC is capable of calculating the mass and energy release from the break into tainment.

GOTHIC long term mass and energy release accounts for the transfer of the decay heat and stored energy in the primary and secondary systems to the containment after the end of ood. The energy for each source term is acquired at the end of reflood from the Westinghouse s and energy release analysis. The rate of energy release is determined by a simplified, THIC RCS model that is coupled to the containment volume. Thus, the flow from the vessel to containment is dependent on the GOTHIC calculated containment pressure.

ped volumes are used for the vessel, downcomer, cold legs, steam generator secondary side, low steam generator tubes and down-flow steam generator tubes. Separate sets of loop and ondary system volumes are used for the intact and broken loops with the connections between broken loop and containment as necessary for the modeled break location. The Westinghouse ulated mass and energy inventory at the end of reflood establishes the liquid volume fractions the fluid temperatures in the primary and secondary systems.

primary and secondary system geometries, including primary system resistances, are sistent with the models used for non-LOCA accident analyses. In order to predict the natural ulation through the intact loops and the correct water level in the vessel and downcomer, the umes are modeled with the correct elevations and heights. The vessel height may be adjusted hat the water and steam inventory at the end of reflood matches the vendors boundary ditions, but this correction does not affect the hydraulic analysis.

ety injection fluid is added to the intact and the broken loop cold leg volumes. In both tions, the SI fluid mixes with the resident fluid and any vapor from the intact steam erators. The SI flow is taken from the RWST until the manual initiation of cold leg rculation upon the annunciation of low-low level in the RWST, at which time the charging and rmediate head SI pumps are supplied water from the containment sump.

1.3.7 Decay Heat Model erican Nuclear Society (ANS) Standard 5.1 was used in the LOCA M&E release model for S-3 for the determination of decay heat energy. This standard was balloted by the Nuclear er Plant Standards Committed (NUPPSCO) in October 1978 and subsequently approved. The cial standard was issued on August 1979. Table 6.2-7A lists the decay heat curve used in the er uprate M&E release analysis.

1. The decay heat sources considered are fission product decay and heavy element decay of U-239 and Np-239.
2. The decay heat power from fissioning isotopes other than U-235 is assumed to be identical to that of U-235.
3. The fission rate is constant over the operating history of maximum power level.
4. The factor accounting for neutron capture in fission products is taken from American AND Standard 5.1.
5. The fuel is assumed to be at full power for 108 seconds.
6. The total recoverable energy associated with one fission is assumed to be 200 MWV/

fission.

7. Two sigma uncertainty (two times the standard deviation) is applied to the fission product decay.

ed upon NRC review, (Safety Evaluation Report of the March 1979 evaluation model, erence 6.2-37), use of the ANS Standard 5.1, November 1979 decay heat model, was roved for the calculation of M&E releases to the containment following a LOCA.

1.3.8 Single Failure Analysis effect of single failures of various ECCS components on the mass and energy releases is uded in the data provided in Tables 6.2-8 through 6.2-21P. Two analyses bound this effect for pump suction double ended rupture. The minimum emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

, the single failure assumed is the loss of one emergency diesel. This failure results in the loss ne pumped safety injection train. The maximum ECCS case assumes no single failures in the CS in determining the mass and energy releases but assumes loss of off site power. For the imum ECCS case, the single failure is assumed to occur in the containment heat removal ems. The analysis of both minimum and maximum ECCS cases ensures that the effect of all ible single failures is bounded.

1.3.9 Metal-Water Reaction energy releases from the zirconium-water reaction is considered as part of the Reference 6.2-methodology. Based on the way that the energy in the fuel is conservatively released to the sel fluid, the fuel cladding temperature does not increase to the point were the zirconium-water tion is significant. This is in contrast to the 10 CFR 50.46 analyses, which are biased to ulate high fuel rod cladding temperatures and therefore a non-significant zirconium-water tion. For the LOCA M&E calculation, the energy created by the zirconium-water reaction e is small and is not explicitly provided in the energy balance tables. The energy that is rmined is part of the M&E releases, and is therefore already included in the LOCA M&E ase.

am line ruptures occurring inside a reactor containment structure may result in significant ases of high energy fluid to the containment environment and elevated containment peratures and pressures. The magnitude of the releases following a steam line rupture is endent upon the plant initial operating conditions and the size of the rupture as well as the figuration of the plant steam system and the containment design. These variations make it icult to determine the absolute worst cases for either containment pressure or temperature luation following a steam line break. The main steam line break (MSLB) analysis considers a ety of postulated pipe breaks encompassing wide variations in plant operation, safety system ormance, and break size in determining the mass and energy releases for use in containment lysis. A spectrum of MSLB accidents, covering different break areas and reactor operating er levels, is analyzed (see Table 6.2-1) and discussed in the following sections. As stated in tion 6.2.1.1.3.7, a feedwater line break is not analyzed since an MSLB is the most limiting, servative case with regard to containment design, integrity of the containment pressure ndary and the resulting containment environmental conditions.

1.4.1 Mass and Energy Release Data determine the effects of plant power level and break area on the mass and energy releases from ptured steam line, spectra of both variables have been evaluated. At plant power levels of full er (including uncertainty), approximately 70 percent, approximately 30 percent and 0 percent ominal full load NSSS power (see Table 6.2-23), two break types have been defined. These ks are defined as the following:

1. A full double ended rupture (DER) downstream of the steam line flow restrictor, which is integral with the steam generator nozzle. For this case, the actual break area equals the cross-sectional area of the steam line, but the blowdown from the steam generator with the broken line is controlled by the flow restrictor throat area (1.4 square feet). The reverse flow from the intact steam generators has been conservatively assumed to be controlled by the pipe cross section (4.12 square feet). Actually, the combined flow from the three steam generators is limited by the seat area of a main steam isolation valve in the broken steam line, which is 3.4 square feet.
2. A split rupture that represents the largest break that will neither generate a steam line isolation signal from the primary protection equipment nor results in water entrainment in the break effluent. Reactor protection and safety injection actuation functions are obtained from containment pressure signals.

1.4.2 Single Failure Assumptions manner consistent with the mass and energy release computations using the evaluation model cribed in WCAP-8822, various single failures have been identified and used in the spectrum of LB case analyzed. One of these failures is considered as part of the containment response

a. Failure of the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) in the faulted loop.

The main steam line isolation function is accomplished via the MSIV in each of the four steam lines. Each valve closes on an isolation signal to terminate steam flow from the associated steam generator. The main steam line rupture upstream of this valve, as postulated for the MSLB mass and energy release analysis inside containment, creates a situation in which the steam generator on the faulted loop cannot be isolated, even when the MSIV successfully closes. The break location allows a continued blowdown from the faulted loop steam generator until it is empty and all sources of main feedwater and auxiliary feedwater addition are terminate. If the faulted loop MSIV fails to close, blowdown from more than one steam generator is terminated by the closure of the corresponding MSIV for each intact loop steam generator. Therefore, there is no failure of a single MSIV that could cause continued blowdown from multiple steam generators.

b. Failure of the main feedwater isolation valve (FWIV) in the faulted loop.

If the FWIV in the feedwater line to the faulted steam generator is assumed to fail in the open position, backup isolation is provided via the main feedwater flow control valve (FCV) closure. The inventory between the FWIV and the FCV in the faulted loop plus any additional pumped main feedwater until FCV closure would be available to be released to containment. The piping volume between the FWIV and the FCV is small; and the closure time of each valve is identical. Thus, the mass and energy releases inside containment conservatively assume the failure of the FWIV in the same loop as the ruptured steam line for all MSLB cases analyzed.

c. Failure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) runout control functions.

If the AFW runout control equipment does not function properly, there would be an increase in the auxiliary feedwater flow to the faulted loop steam generator prior to realignment of the AFW system. The additional inventory created by the higher AFW flowrate until the flow is isolated from the faulted loop steam generator would be available to be released to containment. However, there are flow limiting cavitating venturis in the AFW piping. The cavitating venturi choke point limits the maximum AFW flow to any steam generator. Thus, this single failure is not applicable to the analysis of the MSLB mass and energy releases inside containment.

1.4.3 Initial Conditions am line breaks can be postulated to occur with the plant in any operating condition ranging m hot shutdown to full power. Since steam generator water mass decreases with increasing

t, increased heat transfer in the steam generators, and additional energy generation in the fuel, energy release to the containment from breaks postulated to occur during full power, or near power, operation may be greater than for breaks occurring with the plant in a low power, or shutdown, condition. Additionally, pressure in the steam generators changes with increasing er and has a significant influence on the rate of blowdown.

ause of the opposing effects on mass versus energy release for the MSLB due to a change in al power level, a single power level cannot be specified as the worst case for either the tainment pressure response or the containment temperature response. Therefore, esentative power levels including full power (including uncertainty), approximately 70 ent, approximately 30 percent, and 0 percent of nominal full NSSS power conditions (see le 6.2-23) have been investigated based on the information in WCAP-8822.

eneral, the plant initial conditions are assumed to be at the nominal value corresponding to the al power for that case, with appropriate uncertainties included. Table 6.2-23 identifies the es assumed for NSSS power, RCS vessel average temperature, RCS flowrate, RCS surizer pressure, pressurizer water volume, feedwater temperature, steam generator pressure, steam generator water level corresponding to each power level analyzed. Steam line break s and energy releases assuming an RCS average temperature at the high end of the Tavg dow are conservative with respect to similar releases at the low end of the Tavg window. At the h end, there is more mass and energy available for release into containment. The thermal gn flowrate has been used for the RCS flow input consistent with the assumptions umented in WCAP-8822.

ertainties on the initial conditions assumed in the analysis have been applied only to the RCS rage temperature (+5.0F), the steam generator water level (+12 percent narrow range span),

the power fraction (+2.0 percent) at full power. Nominal values are adequate for the initial ditions associated with pressurizer pressure and pressurizer water level. Uncertainty ditions are only applied to those parameters that could increase the amount of mass or energy harged into containment.

1.4.4 Description of Blowdown Model LOFTRAN code (WCAP-7907) calculates mass and energy releases to the containment owing a steam line rupture, as specifically described in WCAP-8822 and which is summarized ollows:

Primary system fluid temperatures and pressures calculation.

LOFTRAN code is used for studies of transient response of a pressurized water reactor R) system to specified perturbations in process parameters. LOFTRAN is a versatile program ed to both accident evaluations and control system studies. LOFTRAN simulates a multiloop em by a model containing a reactor vessel, hot and cold leg piping, steam generators (tube and l sides), and the pressurizer. The pressurizer heaters, spray, relief and safety valves are

ogeneous, saturated mixture for the thermal transients and a water level correlation for cation and control. Core decay heat generation assumed in calculating the MSLB mass and rgy releases is based on the ANS (1979) decay heat + 2 sigma model.

wdown mass and energy releases determined using LOFTRAN include the effects of core er generation, main and auxiliary feedwater additions, engineering safeguards systems, tor coolant system thick-metal heat storage including steam generator thick-metal mass and ng, and reverse steam generator heat transfer.

use of LOFTRAN code for the analysis of the MSLB mass and energy releases is umented in Supplement 1 of WCAP-8822, which has been reviewed and approved by the C for this application.

Steam generator fluid mass.

aximum initial steam generator mass in the faulted loop steam generator has been used in the lysis of the MSLB inside containment. The use of a high faulted loop initial steam generator s maximizes the steam generator inventory available for release to containment. The initial s has been calculated as the value corresponding to the programmed level +12 percent narrow ge span and assuming 0 percent tube plugging, plus a mass uncertainty. The initial mass ertainty is a conservative value with respect to the plant specific value. This assumptions is servative with respect to the RCS cooldown through the faulted loop steam generator resulting m the steam line break.

Steam generator reverse heat transfer.

e the steamline isolation is complete, the steam generators in the intact loops may become rces of energy that can be transferred to the steam generator with the broken steam line. This rgy transfer occurs via the primary coolant. As the primary plant cools, the temperature of the lant flowing in the steam generator tubes could drop below the temperature of the secondary d in the intact steam generators, resulting in energy being returned to the primary coolant. This rgy is then available to be transferred to the steam generator with the broken steam line.

Reactor coolant system metal heat capacity.

he primary side of the plant cools, the temperature of the reactor coolant could drop below the perature of the reactor coolant piping, the reactor vessel, the reactor coolant pumps, and the m generator thick-metal mass and tubing. As this occurs, the heat stored in the metal is ilable to be transferred to the steam generator with the broken line. The effects of this RCS al heat are included in the results using conservative thick-metal masses and heat transfer fficients.

Beak flow model.

ulations. The full DER representing the largest break of the main steamline producing the hest mass flowrate from the faulted loop steam generator has been analyzed both with ainment in the break effluent and with no entrainment (saturated steam). The entrainment del for the MSLB mass and energy release analysis is discussed in WCAP-8821 and has been lied at each initial power for the Model F steam generator design. When assumed, entrainment he effluent is from only the steam generator in the faulted loop. The assumption of saturated m being released for all breaks is a conservative assumption that maximizes the energy release containment.

Loss of off site power.

s of off site power is not assumed in the MSLB analysis. The assumption of a trip of all the tor coolant pumps (RCPs) coincident with reactor trip is less limiting than with off site power ilable since the mass and energy releases are reduced due to the loss of forced reactor coolant

, resulting in less primary to secondary heat transfer (WCAP-8822). Therefore, all MSLB s and energy release cases are analyzed with the RCPs continuing to operate.

Core reactivity coefficients.

ce the steam line rupture is a cooldown event, it is conservative to use large negative derator coefficients and low Doppler coefficients as characteristic of end-of-cycle (EOC) life.

st limiting core reactivity coefficients at EOC are used to maximize the reactivity feedback cts resulting from the steam line break. Use of maximum reactivity feedback results in higher er generation if the reactor returns to criticality, thus maximizing heat transfer to the ondary side of the steam generators. Also, for all steam line ruptures, the most reactive control is assumed to be stuck out of the core.

1.4.5 Energy Inventories rapid depressurization that occurs following a steam line rupture typically results in large unts of water being added to the steam generators through the main feedwater system. A rapid ing FWIV and FCV in each of the main feedwater lines limits this effect. The feedwater ition that occurs prior to closing of the FWIV or FCV influences the steam generator wdown in several ways. First, because the water entering the steam generator is subcooled, it ers the steam pressure thereby reducing the flowrate out of the break. As the steam generator sure decreases, some of the fluid in the feedwater lines downstream of the isolation valves flash into the steam generators providing additional secondary fluid which may exit out of the ure. Secondly, the increased flow causes an increase in the total heat transfer from the primary econdary systems resulting in greater integrated energy being released out of the break.

owing the initiation of the MSLB, main feedwater flow is conservatively modeled by ming an increase in feedwater flow prior to reactor trip. The initial increase in feedwater flow il fully isolated) is in response to the feedwater pump control valve opening up in response to steam flow/feedwater flow mismatch, or the decreasing steam generator water level as well as

ation response time, following the safety injection signal, is assumed to be a total of 7 seconds, ounting for delays associated with signal processing plus FWIV stroke time. For the umstance in which the FWIV in the faulted loop fails to close, there is no effect on the water isolation time since the total delay for the FCV closure is also 7 seconds.

owing feedwater isolation, as the steam generator pressure decreases, some of the fluid in the water lines downstream of the isolation or control valve may flash to steam if the feedwater perature exceeds the saturation temperature. This unisolable feedwater line volume is an itional source of fluid that can increase the mass discharged out of the break. The unisolable ume in the feedwater line is maximized for the faulted loop. Feedwater line piping volume ilable for steam flashing in this analysis is shown in Table 6.2-59.

erally, within the first minute following a steam line break, the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) em is initiated on any one of several protection system signals. Addition of auxiliary water to the steam generators will increase the secondary mass available for release to tainment as well as increase the heat transferred to the secondary fluid. The auxiliary water flow to the faulted and intact steam generators has been assumed to be a function of the k pressure on the AFW pumps as a result of the depressurizing steam generator in the MSLB lysis inside containment. Cavitating venturis in each of the AFW supply lines to the steam erators have been assumed to limit the maximum flow. Auxiliary feedwater flow to the faulted p steam generator has been assumed up until the time of operator action at 30 minutes after nt initiation to isolate the flow to the steam generator near the break location. Auxiliary water system assumptions that have been used in the analysis are presented in Table 6.2-59.

1.4.6 Additional Information Required for Confirmatory Analyses the DER cases, the forward flow cross-sectional area from the faulted loop steam generator is ted by the integral flow restrictor area of 1.4 square feet, which is less than the actual area of square feet for the main steam piping inside containment. The cross-sectional area of the m piping at this location is nearly as large as the sum of the flow restrictors in the intact loop m generators. Therefore, the assumption is made that the larger cross-sectional area, of the ured steam line expels steam faster than the smaller cross-sectional area of the intact loop m generator flow restrictors can fill it. The contribution to the mass and energy releases ring containment from the entire main steam and turbine plant piping steam inventory has n included in the mass and energy release calculations. The flowrate is determined using the ody correlation corresponding to saturated steam at the initial steam generator pressure and the e cross-sectional area. The initial mass flowrate is assumed to be constant while the entire n steam and turbine plant piping steam inventory is discharged to containment. The steam s and energy releases in this volume of piping depend on the secondary system pressure, ch varies with the initial power level. A conservative steam piping volume of 10,111 cubic is used in this blowdown calculation representing the main steam piping from the steam erators up to and including the moisture separator reheaters and the main turbine throttle

e. Reverse flow for a full DER during this initial emptying of the main steam and turbine t piping is independent of MSIV failure since the entire piping inventory is exhausted before

IVs, at which time reverse flow from the three unaffected steam generators is terminated.

full DER represents the break producing the highest mass flowrate from the faulted loop m generator. Smaller DER break sizes are represented by a reduction in the initial steam wdown rate at the time of the break. Therefore, no other DER break sizes have been sidered other than the full DER.

the split break MSLB cases, the break area is smaller than the area of a single integral flow rictor. The flowrate from all steam generators prior to MSIV closure and the flowrate from a le steam generator after MSIV closure supply the steam flow to the break. The steam in the olable portion of the steam line does not affect the blowdown until the time of steam erator dry out, when the flowrate from the steam generator would decrease below the critical rate out of the break. At this point, the additional steam in the piping begins to have an effect eak flowrate until the steam line piping is empty. To model this effect, the mass of the olable steam in the steam line is added to the initial mass of the faulted steam generator. This urately reflects both the total mass and energy that will be released from the break, and the ng of the effect of the unisolable steam line volume on the blowdown. When all MSIVs are ited to successfully close, the unisolable steam line volume is 947 cubic feet. A failure of the IV on the faulted loop increases the unisolable steam line volume to a conservatively large e of 8,074 cubic feet.

m line isolation is assumed in all four loops to terminate the blowdown from the three intact m generators. A delay time of 12 seconds, accounting for delays associated with signal cessing plus MSIV stroke time, with unrestricted steam flow through the valve during the e stroke, has been assumed.

following cases of the MSLB inside containment have been analyzed. Table 6.2-23 identifies values assumed for NSSS power.

Full power (including uncertainties), full double ended (1.4 square feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; no entrainment.

Full power (including uncertainties), full double ended (1.4 square feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; entrainment in the faulted loop steam generator.

Full power (including uncertainties), 0.653 square feet split rupture; FWIV single failure.

Full power (including uncertainties), 0.653 square feet split rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures.

70 percent power, full double ended (1.4 square feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; no entrainment.

70 percent power, full double ended (1.4 square feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; entrainment in the faulted loop steam generator.

70 percent power, 0.659 square feet split rupture; FWIV single failure.

30 percent power, full double ended (1.4 square feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; no entrainment.

30 percent power, full double ended (1.4 square feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; entrainment in the faulted loop steam generator.

30 percent power, 0.671 square feet split rupture; FWIV single failure.

30 percent power, 0.671 square feet split rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failure.

0 percent power, full double ended (1.4 square feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; no entrainment.

0 percent power, full double ended (1.4 square feet) rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failures; entrainment in the faulted loop steam generator.

0 percent power, 0.512 square feet split rupture; FWIV single failure.

0 percent power, 0.512 square feet split rupture; MSIV and FWIV single failure.

1.5 Minimum Containment Pressure Analysis for Performance Capability Studies of Emergency Core Cooling System containment back pressure used for the limiting case break for the emergency core cooling em analysis (Section 15.6.5.2) is depicted on Figure 15.6-15. The containment back pressure alculated using the methods and assumptions described in WCAP-16996-P-A (Reference 6.2-This section describes the input parameters including the containment initial conditions, net tainment volume, passive heat sink materials, thicknesses, surface areas, and starting time and ormance parameters of containment cooling systems used in the analysis.

1.5.1 Mass and Energy Release Data mass and energy releases to the containment during the blowdown and reflood portions are ulated in accordance with the methodology of WCAP-16996-P-A (Reference 6.2-48).

mathematical models which calculate the mass and energy releases to the containment are cribed in Section 15.6.5.2 and conform to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K, ECCS Evaluation dels. A break spectrum analysis is performed (references in Section 15.6.5) that considers ous break sizes, break locations, and Moody discharge coefficients for the double ended cold guillotines which do affect the mass and energy released to the containment. This effect is sidered for each case analyzed. During refill, the mass and energy released to the containment ssumed to be zero, which minimizes the containment pressure. During reflood, the effect of m water mixing between the safety injection water and the steam flowing through the reactor lant system intact loops reduces the available energy released to the containment vapor spaces therefore tends to minimize containment pressure.

following initial values were used in the analysis:

1. a containment pressure of 10.4 psia;
2. a containment temperature of 89F;
3. a refueling water storage tank temperature of 40F < TRWST < 75F; and
4. an outside air temperature of -20.0F.

se containment initial conditions are representatively low values anticipated during normal power operation.

1.5.3 Containment Volume volume used in the analysis is 2.35 x 106 cubic feet, the maximum estimated volume. This e was determined by calculating the containment gross volume and subtracting the volumes ll of the containment internal structures and equipment. The gross volume was maximized by ming the containment liner is erected at the maximum radial tolerance. The internal volume tracted from the gross volume was minimized by reducing the nominal values for internal crete and some equipment by 5 percent.

1.5.4 Active Heat Sinks quench spray system operates to remove heat from the containment. Table 15.6-4 gives the inent data for this system.

heat removal capacity of this system is modeled by using a range of RWST water peratures, the minimum delay time for the system to become effective, and maximum system rates.

1.5.5 Steam Water Mixing er spillage rates from the broken loop accumulator are determined as part of the core ooding calculation and are included in the containment code (COCO) calculational model.

1.5.6 Passive Heat Sinks passive heat sinks used in the analysis, with their thermophysical properties, are given in le 15.6-5. The passive heat sinks and thermophysical properties were derived in compliance h Branch Technical Position CSB 6-1, Minimum Containment Pressure Model for PWR ECCS ormance Evaluation.

condensing heat transfer coefficients used for heat transfer to the steel containment structures calculated in accordance with the FSLOCA method (Reference 6.2-48).

1.5.8 Other Parameters other parameters, including the operation of the containment minipurge system, have a stantial effect on the minimum containment pressure analysis.

1.6 Testing and Inspection operational and periodic tests are performed on the containment structure and supporting ems. These are discussed in the sections as referenced.

Test Section Section Containment shell leakage 6.2.6 Containment valve and penetration leakage 6.2.6 Containment spray system 6.2.2.4 Containment atmosphere recirculation 9.4.7.3.4 ESF sump test 6.2.2.4 High head safety injection 6.3.4 Low head safety injection 6.3.4 Residual heat removal (RHR) 5.4.7.4 1.7 Instrumentation Requirements cators are provided on the main control board to monitor containment atmosphere pressure temperature and the containment sump level and temperature. Recorders are provided for tainment atmosphere temperature and pressure. The instrumentation is discussed in detail in tion 7.5.

2 CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM systems provided for containment heat removal consist of:

1. the quench spray system (QSS) and
2. the containment recirculation system (CRS) containment heat removal systems are designed to reduce the containment pressure following eak in either the primary or secondary piping system inside the containment. Heat is

tainment recirculation system heat exchangers.

quench spray and the containment recirculation systems are shown on Figures 6.2-36 and 37, respectively. System component data is given in Table 6.2-61. The operation and heat oval capabilities of these systems are discussed below.

2.1 Design Bases containment heat removal systems are designed in accordance with the following criteria.

1. General Design Criterion 38 with respect to containment heat removal.
2. General Design Criterion 39 with respect to inspection of the containment heat removal system.
3. General Design Criterion 40 with respect to testing of the containment heat removal system.
4. General Design Criterion 50 with respect to the containment design basis. The containment peak pressure, following the DBA, shall be less than the containment design pressure assuming the worst single active failure.
5. Regulatory Guide 1.1 as related to the net positive suction head (NPSH) available to the ECCS and containment heat removal system pumps (as clarified by SRP 6.2.2).
6. Regulatory Guide 1.26 quality group standards. The systems are designed in accordance with ASME III, Class 2 and is designated Safety Class 2.
7. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for seismic classification. The systems are designed to Seismic Category 1.
8. Regulatory Guide 1.82 for the design of sumps for ECCS and containment spray systems. See Table 1.8-1 for further information.
9. The systems are capable of operating in the post-accident environment for 30 days following the DBA.
10. The quench and containment recirculation spray headers are capable of delivering spray water to the containment atmosphere in sufficient quantity over a sufficient area of the containment and with an average droplet diameter to ensure adequate heat removal to accomplish design bases 1, 4, and 9 above.

recirculation mode, or hot leg recirculation mode of the ECCS has no effect on its ability to perform its engineered safety function.

12. Instrumentation is provided to monitor the containment heat removal systems and system component performance under accident conditions in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97.
13. Provisions are made to allow drainage of spray and emergency core cooling water to the containment sump. The sources and quantities of energy that must be removed from the containment to meet the design bases are discussed in Section 6.2.1.
14. Trisodium phosphate (TSP) stored in baskets at the containment sump will dissolve in rising sump water and will maintain the containment sump water final pH 7.0 while not exceeding for any significant duration a spray pH of 10.5.

2.2 System Design containment heat removal systems consist of two parallel redundant quench spray systems feeding two parallel 360 degree spray headers, and two parallel redundant tainment recirculation subsystems feeding two parallel 360 degree spray headers.

interconnecting valving between subsystems of the containment recirculation system, with exception of small drain lines, is locked closed to improve the overall system reliability in that ure in one subsystem does not affect the capability of the other subsystem to perform its gnated safety function.

containment heat removal systems are constructed entirely of corrosion-resistant materials, arily stainless steel.

components of the containment heat removal systems have been selected so that the ditions of service (pressure, temperature, and fluid composition) do not prevent the systems m performing their intended functions. Refer to Section 3.11 for a discussion of the ironmental design of the containment heat removal systems.

nch Spray System owing a DBA, the QSS is activated immediately upon the receipt of the CDA signal, if power vailable. This signal is initiated at or before the safety analysis limit of 10 psig is reached. The S becomes effective in approximately 70 seconds event initiation, assuming loss of off site er and only one pump operating; and assuming the CDA signal is generated prior to power g available. Contributors to the startup delay are:

Signal generation and process delay

Valve Opening Pump Acceleration System fill time oth quench spray pumps are operating, the system fill time is less since there are two parallel paths.

h redundant quench spray subsystem draws water independently from the RWST. The ntity of water stored is sufficient to supply the needs of all of the engineered safety systems.

RWST is a vertical Seismic Category I cylindrical tank with a flat bottom and hemispherical mounted on and secured to a reinforced concrete foundation. The tank is fabricated of Type stainless steel plates. Component design data for the RWST is given in Table 6.2-61.

minimum pH of the spray from the quench spray headers into the containment structure is

. However, the final pH of the water in the containment structure sump after a DBA, uding the contents of the RWST, is 7.0 due to neutralization effects of trisodium phosphate P) located in baskets on elevation (-)24 feet 6 inches (see Containment Recirculation tem).

borated water in the RWST is maintained at a maximum temperature of 75F by circulating RWST water through the refueling water coolers, which use chilled water from the chilled er system (Section 9.2.2.2). The RWST is insulated to limit the temperature rise of the water to F, or less, per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period whenever the chilled water system is inoperable. Periodic pling of the RWST water monitors the waters chemistry. Provisions are made to purify the er when necessary, by circulating the water through the fuel pool cooling and purification em (Section 9.1.3).

ortex suppression assembly is installed in the RWST at the quench spray suction lines to inate vortex formation. The assembly consists of a single horizontal plate above both suction zles, supported off the bottom of the tank by vertical vanes. The quench spray pumps are matically tripped at the RWST empty level, which is set so that with allowance for negative rument error, vortex formation does not occur.

RWST also has a connection for supplying water to the ECCS. The RWST is provided with a hole for inspection access during refueling periods.

er to Section 6.3.2.8 for a discussion of RWST design relative to instrument error, working wance, ECCS switchover allowance, most limiting single failure, and compliance with design s.

h quench spray pump is capable of supplying approximately 4,000 gpm of borated water tion to the two 360 degree quench spray headers located approximately 101 and 116 feet ve the operating floor in the dome of the containment structure. The pumps are located in the

ide the containment structure.

preoperational test is described in Section 6.2.2.4. The design evaluation of the system is tained in Section 6.2.2.3.

tainment Recirculation System h of the two containment recirculation subsystems consist of two containment recirculation lers and pumps which share two 360 degree spray headers. Each containment recirculation y header is fed by two risers, each riser running from one of the containment recirculation lers in each of the subsystems. The two pumps in each subsystem are connected to different y headers, but they are both connected to the same emergency bus. Failure of one emergency does not prevent delivery of sufficient containment recirculation flow.

four containment recirculation pumps take suction from a common containment sump, which nclosed by a strainer assembly. The strainer consists of multiple fins constructed from ugated perforated plate with 1/16 inch holes. The fins are erected vertically over the sump and nd beyond the sump to achieve the required surface area. Post accident water covers the iner and is filtered by the strainer prior to entering the containment recirculation pump ions. Design of the strainer is based on a thorough mechanistic analysis and debris-bed head testing to demonstrate that adequate NPSH and pump suction line flashing margin exists er worst-case debris clogging scenarios. Vortex suppression is provided by the design of the iner as confirmed by analysis and head loss testing. Strainer design also included structural lysis to demonstrate structural adequacy under all possible conditions of debris blockage.

s, water will be available to the suctions of the containment recirculation pumps under all gn basis accident conditions.

strainer perforated fins have an opening size (1/16 inch) that is smaller than the minimum riction found in the ECCS systems served by the sump, including the orifice of the spray zles (3/8 inch). The ECCS throttle valves are set so the minimum valve clearance is greater the size of the fine mesh screening.

Robust Fuel Assembly (RFA) implemented in Cycle 7 (Region 9) includes the debris stant bottom nozzle (DRBN) and the protective bottom grid (P-Grid) fuel features (see tion 4.2). Due to these Region 9 fuel features, the minimum restriction at the fuel assembly t of approximately 0.075 in. that is larger than the fine mesh screening for the sump (1/16 inch 0625 inch).

effects of fibrous debris on the reactor fuel have been evaluated by Westinghouse in WCAP 93-NP. The WCAP results provide reasonable assurance that long term core cooling will be blished and maintained post-LOCA considering the presence of debris in the RCS and core.

debris composition includes both particulate and fiber debris, as well as post-accident mical products.

four containment recirculation pumps and motors are located outside the containment cture. The pumps are of the vertical deep well type, each mounted in a separate stainless steel l casing supported by the concrete containment structure mat. The pumps are located adjacent he containment structure at an elevation sufficiently below the containment structure sump to ure an adequate available net positive suction head (NPSH). Access to the motors for ection and maintenance is provided. Each containment recirculation pump has a design flow pproximately 3,950 gpm. The containment recirculation pumps are started automatically on RWST Low-Low Level signal coincident with a containment depressurization actuation A) signal. Each containment recirculation pump shaft is fitted with a tandem mechanical seal ngement. The outboard cavity between the mechanical seals is filled with demineralized er, which is maintained at a nominal pressure of 1 psi above the inboard cavity by a seal head

. A failure of either seal is detected by a level alarm provided for the seal head tank.

seal head tank reservoir will become depleted after approximately 7 days of pump operation.

en the seal head tank reservoir is depleted, the demineralized water in the outboard cavity ween the seals will be replaced with containment recirculation water that leaks into the board cavity from the inboard seal. The leakage of this fluid from the outer pump seal is ounted for in the dose analysis.

ilure of either seal, within approximately seven days of pump operation, will also deplete the d tank reservoir. If the outboard seal fails, the full system pressure will be retained by the oard seal. If the inboard seal fails, the full system pressure will be retained by the outboard

. The dose analysis takes into account the potential for leakage of containment recirculation er out of an RSS pump in the event either the inboard or the outboard seal fails.

orifice is installed on the discharge of each containment recirculation pump. The orifice has n designed to limit pump flow to a maximum of 3,000 gpm. This maximum flow is based on idance of suction line flashing and CRS heat exchanger baffle plate load limitations.

containment recirculation coolers are conventional shell and tube heat exchangers with tainment recirculation water flowing through the shell, where the water is cooled by service er flowing in the tubes.

onservatively minimum service water flowrate of 5,400 gpm is assumed to each cooler for tainment analysis. The heat transfer duty for the coolers varies throughout the DBA. This is to the reduction in the temperature of the water on the containment structure floor. Each tainment recirculation cooler has an overall heat transfer coefficient (UA) of approximately 9 x 106 Btu/hr/F which includes an allowance for plugging of 5 percent of the heat exchanger es and a fouling factor of 0.0005 hr-ft2-F/Btu on the tube side and the shell side. The service er temperature range is33-80F for containment analysis.

containment recirculation coolers are welded at all points where there is a potential for age of radioactive containment recirculation water into the service water. Because the

ures that the margin necessary for cold shutdown by boron is maintained.

service water from each pair of the containment recirculation coolers is monitored by a ation monitor which actuates an alarm if outleakage occurs. If outleakage is detected, the cted pair of coolers is then isolated. Section 11.5 describes the radiation monitoring devices techniques that are employed.

ing normal unit operation, the containment recirculation coolers are kept clean and dry, with imum heat transfer capability. For long term operation, on the order of weeks, there may be e fouling of the tubes on the service water side, with resultant loss in heat transfer capability.

8 inch thermal expansion loops on the discharge side of the containment recirculation coolers be maintained filled with borated water during normal plant operation. This will prevent air m becoming trapped in these lines during system filling after an accident in containment.

ll spray headers, a combination of spray nozzle orientations is used to obtain maximum erage. The average vertical fall height, considering the location of the spray headers and spray icle trajectories, is in excess of 101 feet for the quench spray and 87 feet for the containment rculation spray.

four containment recirculation pumps and the associated suction line valve and motors ide the containment structure are designed and installed to account for the differential vement between the pumps in the ESF building and the containment structure. Restraints and ports are used as appropriate.

containment structure floor is sloped and channeled to ensure that sufficient water is provided he containment structure sump at the time that the containment recirculation pumps are started.

cubicles, except the incore instrumentation tunnel (ITT), drain to the containment structure

r. The ITT will hold up water until its level reaches elevation -11 feet, at which point the water spill onto the containment floor. This design ensures that almost all water discharged into the tainment structure during a LOCA reaches the sump.

ng sump water due to a LOCA will dissolve 974 cubic feet of trisodium phosphate ecahydrate (TSP) of minimum density of 54 pounds per cubic feet, stored in twelve porous kets located on elevation (-)24 feet 6 inches of the containment structure.

s amount of TSP is sufficient to raise the final pH of the containment sump water to above 7.0, sidering the maximum total volume of borated water that could become available in the sump owing a LOCA. The dissolving characteristics of the TSP assure its dissolution at a rate equal aster than the rate of its submergence in the rising water. The mixing action of the containment rculation pumps assures evenly distributed pH throughout the flooded and sprayed areas.

uce this potential leakage to a negligible amount.

sistent with letters from the ACRS (Hanover 1969) concerning vital piping which must ction during a DBA, passive failure of the containment recirculation suction piping during a A is not considered credible during the short term period following the start of the DBA.

lation ovable type encapsulated insulation is used on most piping within containment. Encapsulated lation consists of multiple layers of 300 series austenitic stainless steel sheets filled with rglass composition and encased by inner and outer jacketing of 300 series austenitic stainless l sheets. The minimum thickness of the inner jacketing is 0.010 inches and of the outer eting is 0.018 inches. Design details permit tight interlocking of adjacent sections of the mbled insulation. Where removal of insulation is required, quick release mechanical fasteners provided. Some piping 3 inches and smaller is insulated with encapsulated fiberglass blankets losed in stainless steel lagging.

mechanistic analysis of strainer debris clogging includes a detailed and conservative debris sport analysis. Significant amounts of debris are postulated to be dislodged by high-energy er and steam break jets from the double-ended guillotine break. All of the dislodged debris is servatively assumed to end up in the containment sump water in various sized pieces. Debris he post-accident sump water includes such items as insulation, coatings, dirt, dust, and kers. Much of the debris is assumed to be reduced to transportable pieces by either the break

, temperature and humidity in containment, or subsequent erosion from break water flows, erfalls in containment, and containment spray. A portion of the fibrous debris that is dislodged reak flows is assumed to remain intact in stainless steel jacketing or encapsulation. This ris is not subject to subsequent erosion.

strainer is designed to be fully covered with a worst-case debris bed and still able to maintain quate NPSH and suction line flashing margin for the containment recirculation pumps. The st case debris load is a thin-bed of fiber (nominally 1/8 inch) with particulate debris (from tings and resident dirt) enmeshed in the debris bed creating much higher head losses than ld be seen from a debris bed composed only of fiber or a thick fibrous bed which has a similar unt of particulate as the thin-bed.

remaining piping requiring general thermal insulation, is insulated with fiberglass or foam s type insulation and covered with stainless steel lagging. The lagging serves to minimize odging of insulation from the effects of a high energy pipe rupture, thereby, minimizing the ntial for containment sump screen clogging.

all amounts of insulation, such as Min-k and Foamglas, are utilized in areas where the allation of encapsulated insulation is impractical. Refer to Table 6.2-71 for quantities and tions of the various types of insulation employed inside the containment.

icles in the pumped fluid has no long-term effect on the operability and performance of the rculation system pumps.

recirculation system pumps are designed to accommodate the anticipated debris present in containment sump. Parts of the pump running with close tolerances are provided with surface dness and finish to withstand particulate matter.

cifically the bearings of the pump are carbon/graphite type with flushing grooves. The pumps t sleeves are 304L stainless steel with hardfacing. The combination of the two provides a hly reliable bearing surface in the presence of particulates.

ilarly, the pumps wearing rings, both impeller and bowl, are hardened to provide wear stance if particulate matter is in pumpage. The impeller wearing ring is hardfaced with a ide material and the bowl ring is a heat treated stainless steel brought to a hardness to provide fference in Brinell hardness between the stationary and rotating ring.

pumps sealing system is a tandem seal arrangement (two seals) used with demineralized er which is cool and clear of solids, to keep both seals clean. A nominal overpressure of 1 psi aintained in the seal cavity so that if the inner seal should leak, flow is into the pumpage, and e outer seal should leak, clean water is lost to the environment. The seal head tank reservoir become depleted after approximately 7 days of pump operation. The demineralized water in cavity between the seals will then be replaced with containment recirculation water by leakage m the inboard cavity which, due to settlement and low flow velocities through the seal cavity, latively free of particles. A seal cooler and circulator ensures that the seal fluid is properly led.

ce the pump is open-line shafted, a minor amount of wear could be expected across bearings h a differential pressure, however, the degree of wear is less than design and would not impair function of the bearings.

design, the materials of construction ensure the long-term reliability of the pumps to perform equired.

2.3 Design Evaluation analyses of the effects of the containment heat removal systems on the containment structure made using the GOTHIC code (Section 6.2.1).

quench spray system sprays chilled water from the RWST into the containment atmosphere, the containment recirculation system sprays cooled containment structure sump water into the tainment atmosphere.

nch spray flow is determined as a function of the difference between the containment total sure and the difference in elevation (converted to psi) between the RWST water level and the nch spray header. This is based upon the degraded or worn pump head vs capacity curve, and pressure losses in the lines, header, and nozzles. The quench spray pump design curve plied by the manufacturer is degraded in accordance with ASME XI inservice testing wances to account for pump wear. The degraded curve is used in the safety analysis and is wn on Figure 6.2-54.

thermal effectiveness of the quench and recirculation spray in removing heat from the tainment atmosphere following a LOCA is described in detail in Section 6.2.1.1.3.2.1.3.

QSS and CRS utilize Spray Engineering Company (SPRACo) Model Number 1713A spray zles. Droplet size spectrum tests were accomplished by using high speed photography. A cial chamber was used to house the photographic equipment. A slot on the roof of the chamber e it possible to penetrate a portion of the spray cone into the photographic chamber.

tographic equipment was mounted on a traversing rack which traversed outward from the y axis.

images of stopped motion droplets were recorded, measured, and counted. Histograms, ch are incremental frequency plots, were constructed for each test condition. A typical ogram is shown on Figure 6.2-39.

ures 6.2-42 and 6.2-43 are plan views at the containment bend line depicting expected tainment recirculation spray coverage and overlap for each header at an elevated containment perature of 275F. Figure 6.2-44 depicts the same for both quench spray headers. Analysis at elevated temperature predicts the minimum area coverage. The figures show that a high entage of the area at the bend line is covered at elevated temperatures. As the containment perature decreases, the area coverage increases, and approaches 100 percent.

tainment Recirculation System containment recirculation system transfers heat from inside the containment structure via the tainment recirculation coolers to the service water system. The amount of heat transferred and containment recirculation water outlet temperature are calculated by the standard heat hanger efficiency method based on the flows and the cooler UA.

containment recirculation system remains in the injection mode of operation until the RWST

-low level is reached and manual actions are performed to realign the containment rculation system to the cold leg recirculation mode of operation. The RWST low-low level is hed as early as approximately 40 minutes in a large break LOCA scenario with all accident gation systems operating as designed (maximum ESF). Twenty five minutes are allocated to w the operators to manually complete the transfer from the injection mode of operation to the leg recirculation mode of operation. Therefore, the transfer to the cold leg recirculation mode peration can be completed as early as approximately 65 minutes after event initiation. For the

de of operation can be completed as late as approximately 115 minutes after event initiation.

erences:

1. RWST low-low level reached reference: S-04226S3, Rev. 0.
2. Twenty five minute allowed time to manually transfer to cold leg recirculation:

US(B)-295.

ing this mode, a portion of the containment recirculation flow is diverted to the low head ty injection lines for use as core injection (Section 6.3). Two pumps are lined up for injection spray and the remaining two continue to spray only. For minimum engineered safety features F), one pump is lined up for injection and spray and one will continue to spray only.

m the receipt of the RWST Low-Low Level signal coincident with a CDA signal, there is a l maximum delay of 5 minutes before the recirculation spray becomes effective. The rculation pumps require less than 3 minutes to fill the system.

containment recirculation pump design curve supplied by the manufacturer is degraded in ordance with the recommendations of ASME XI to account for pump wear. Figure 6.2-40 es the degraded or worn head capacity curve for the containment recirculation pumps. The raded curve is used in the safety analysis. The available NPSH (referenced to the first stage eller) is calculated using the following equation:

ilable NPSH = P + Z - Hf - Pv re:

Containment atmosphere total pressure.

Elevation head of water above first stage impeller.

Pump suction piping, debris bed and strainer head losses.

Vapor pressure of sump liquid (saturation pressure at liquid temperature).

parameters are expressed in feet of head. This expression can be simplified by making the servative assumption that the vapor pressure of the pumped liquid is equal to the total tainment pressure, as follows:

ilable NPSH = Z - Hf following tabulation presents the determination of the minimum available NPSH following a ll break LOCA inside the reactor cavity and a comparison with the required NPSH to onstrate adequate margin. The parameter values used to evaluate the minimum available SH are taken at the time the available NPSH is at a minimum, which is the time of initial pump t-up for the spray mode. In addition, water level is minimized by assuming one quench spray

tainment sump screen losses.

required NPSH is selected from the pump manufacturers test data.

ertainties, such as NPSH variation between similar pumps and testing inaccuracies, were sidered but not included in the calculations due to the large margin between available and uired NPSH.

rculation Spray Mode Elevation head (feet) (Z) 26.7 Pipe losses (feet) (H) 3.8 Strainer and debris bed loss (feet) 5.5 Available NPSH (feet) (Z-H) 17.4 Pump flow (gpm) 3,000 Required NPSH (feet) 4.0 Margin (feet) 13.4 result shown in the above tabulation is sensitive to break size but not initial containment ditions. The assumption that the vapor pressure of the liquid in the sump is as great as the tainment total pressure eliminates any dependence of the ECCS spillage temperature, initial tainment pressure and temperature, RWST temperature and service water temperature. The imum sump level at CRS pump start is estimated using a simplified yet conservative approach alculating sump water inventory in the containment based on RWST inventory transferred at low-low level switchover and water held up in the reactor cavity, instrumentation tunnel, rating floors, heat sink surfaces, QSS piping filled, insulation absorption, etc. The minimum p level is calculated for both large and small break LOCA. For a small break LOCA, the ulation assumes that RCS water remains in the safety injection accumulators and reactor lant system refilled with cooled water.

margin to suction line flashing is calculated in the same fashion as available NPSH except the water level is calculated between the pump suction nozzle and the sump water surface.

sidering the water level present when the CRS pumps start, a positive margin exists at the t of CRS pump operation considering maximum CRS pump flow. Subsequently, the drop in p flow rate as the system becomes filled significantly reduces the suction line losses, causing h the available NPSH and the suction line flashing margins to increase rapidly.

both large break LOCA and small break LOCA sump levels there is no flashing in the strainer RS pump start.

ure 6.2-38 shows plan and elevation views of the containment sump screen assembly.

owing the DBA LOCA, the elevation of water inside the containment at the time of tchover to cold leg recirculation is above the top of the screen assembly. After switchover, the p level increases several more feet until the RWST is empty.

recirculation spray pumps take suction from a single sump. The sump and strainer were gned to eliminate any credible failure mechanisms which would require installation of a undant sump or strainer and is considered especially qualified for service and exempt from sive failure.

lation Debris Transport to the Containment Emergency Sump debris at the sump strainer causes a drop in pressure across the strainer. Thus, the available SH calculation for the CRS pumps and the submersion of the suction inlets must consider this e dependent head loss.

ak Size and Location aks were considered at a number of locations and in all piping systems that rely on rculation to mitigate the postulated pipe break. Breaks were considered in the reactor coolant ng, secondary piping, and other high-energy line break piping systems (i.e., safety injection charging), which may require sump recirculation. Only large break and small break loss of lant accidents require sump recirculation.

largest sources of insulation are the Steam Generators. Placing the break at the Steam erator Crossover Leg nozzles will generate the largest amount of debris from the Steam erator insulation. In addition, placing the break with the largest possible zone of influence in middle of Steam Generator cubicles will envelope the whole cubicle and will generate the est quantity of other piping and equipment insulation and coating debris. Therefore, breaks at four Steam Generator Crossover Leg nozzles envelope all other possible break locations for h the total amount of debris and proximity to the recirculation sump.

following break locations were considered:

Breaks in the RCS with the largest potential for debris.

Large breaks with two or more different types of debris.

Breaks with the most direct path to the sump.

Large breaks with the largest potential particulate debris to insulation ratio by weight.

Breaks that generate a thin-bed (high particulate load with a nominal one-eighth inch fiber bed).

largest total piping insulation volume is generated by the Crossover Leg break in Loop 2.

s break also produces the largest volume of Microtherm (micro porous debris) which is imental to sump strainer performance. An additional break in loop 1 was analyzed based on ximity and clear debris path to the recirculation strainer. These breaks are considered to

quantity of fiber from the limiting large breaks in the Reactor Coolant system is far in excess he amount of fiber needed for formation of a thin-bed on the ECCS strainer. Many possible h energy line breaks can be postulated where a small quantity of fibrous debris are generated transported to the strainer, followed by wash down of particulate latent debris and unqualified tings debris resulting in formation of a thin-bed. In lieu of analyzing specific breaks for the ential to form a thin-bed, strainer head loss testing specifically tested for worst-case head loss.

worst-case head loss resulted from formation of a thin-bed. This testing included determining minimum fiber necessary to form a thin-bed in conjunction with the postulated particulate that ld result from the worst large break LOCA. This combination bounds any small break which ld form a thin-bed since the particulate includes the qualified coating debris load for a large k LOCA which exceeds the qualified coating debris load for any small break LOCA.

itionally, this thin-bed testing bounds the case where a large break LOCA occurs but only ugh fiber to form a thin-bed is transported to the strainer. Testing of the thin-bed fiber rmined the minimum fiber bed thickness necessary to form a thin-bed and showed that eases in fiber bed thickness beyond this thin-bed thickness lead to lower head losses across strainer.

lation Debris types of insulation considered in debris generation analysis include all of the fiberglass found oop piping and equipment such as Steam Generators and Reactor Coolant Pumps inside the p rooms. Additionally, Microtherm insulation is installed at specific locations on loop piping is considered part of the debris mix.

nt Debris h qualified and unqualified coatings exist in containment. For the debris generation analysis, lified coatings are those that are expected to remain intact following a LOCA except where are impacted by the break jets. All coating impacted by the break jets is postulated to fail as micrometer size particulate since that makes the failed coating all transportable to the strainer leads to the worst head loss in a fiborous debris bed. Unqualified coatings (coatings that are expected to remain intact following a LOCA) are postulated to fail throughout containment to temperature and humidity. All unqualified coatings are postulated to fail as 10 micrometer particulate similar to qualified coatings impacted by break jets.

ent Debris ent debris is the dirt, lint, hair, dust, sand, and other miscellaneous debris resident in tainment. This debris is considered to be 85 percent particulate and 15 percent fiber and is

eign Materials eign materials in containment include labels, stickers, tape, and placards as well as glass and esives. Much of this material is expected to be transported to the strainer and be in the strainer ris bed. This material is minimized by containment inspections and procedures to maintain the ign material within the bounds of design assumptions.

nsport Model Millstone 3 analysis assumes all fiber debris falls to the containment floor. Similarly, all tings debris is also conservatively modeled as falling to the containment floor. Thus, all LOCA erated debris is conservatively modeled as falling to the floor in the post-accident ironment. This is reasonable as large debris should be modeled as falling to the containment r and small debris that could reach the dome would eventually wash down to the containment

r. Conservatively, no debris is assumed to be intercepted by other structures and retained re it is unable to be transported to the strainer.

latent debris and foreign material are likewise modeled as falling to the containment floor via y washdown or break flows.

ediately after a break occurs, water spills from the break to the floor and begins to flood the tainment. During this fill-up, the water velocity at the wave front is expected to be much ter than the debris transport velocities. Thus, debris initially deposited on the floor is pushed g with the wave front.

st fine debris is not in the containment sump water immediately following a line break since it kely still airborne. Nonetheless, for analyzed breaks, all fine debris is conservatively modeled ransporting to the containment floor during blowdown and along the floor during fill-up of the tainment sump area.

ris transport along the floor for low-density fiberglass is dependent on debris size gorization.

irculation transport is the horizontal transport of debris in the active portions of the pool of er in the containment lower level by both reactor coolant system break flow, quench and rculation spray flow and recirculation flow exiting at the sump screen. The recirculation sump cated in the containment annulus. Debris may be transported along with the water. The ntity of and types of debris that will reach the sump strainer are dependent on the flow cities and flow patterns outside the loop rooms and the flow velocity at which debris transport urs for each type of debris. In order to accurately model the flow velocities to the strainer, a putational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis is used.

ailed recirculation transport analysis that uses the CFD analysis is performed for non-fines ous debris only. Detailed recirculation transport analyses are not performed for Microtherm coatings since they are modeled as 100 percent small fines which all transport to the strainer.

ocity contours at all water elevations are examined in the CFD analysis to ensure that there is a continuous flow path across multiple elevations with velocities in excess of the incipient bling velocity.

all fines of fibrous debris are assumed to transport independent of CFD analysis because they assumed to remain suspended in the containment sump water.

sion by spray and break flows is conservatively assumed to reduce 90 percent of small and e piece fiberglass insulation to small fines and thus allow transport. The transport properties d for the remaining small and large piece fibrous debris are the velocity at which incipient bling occurs (transport threshold velocity) and the lift over curb velocity. CFD analysis shows sufficient velocity exists in containment to allow transport of all small and large piece fibrous ris.

the fibrous debris is conservatively assumed to transport to the strainer but intact pieces and 10 percent of the small and large pieces, which do not erode, are not assumed to lift onto the iner due to inadequate velocity. There is no curb on the strainer, however, a curb can servatively be assumed to form from floor transported debris. The strainer fins (surface area) approximately 7 inches above the floor. The velocity profiles at the strainer (based on the CFD lysis) are not high enough to lift any of the intact fibrous debris onto the strainer fins pendent of whether a curb exists. However, the remainder of the fibrous debris (59 percent of total) is assumed to lift onto the strainer. Effectively then, 59 percent of the fibrous debris is deled as transporting to the strainer surface during recirculation.

ris transport to the strainer for Microtherm, latent fiber, qualified coating, and unqualified tings is considered to be 100 percent in the analytical transport calculation since all of this erial is assumed to fail as, or erode into, small fines.

ent Particulate Transport ent debris found in containment consists of dust, dirt, paint chips, metal grit, hair, lint, wood s, and tie wraps. In the debris transport calculation, all of the latent particulate was assumed to sport to the strainer.

inage from the refueling cavity to the containment drains sump is conservatively neglected.

gle Active Failure

tainment atmosphere cooling. Two redundant trains of active components are provided to ure that the CRS safety functions are accomplished. Containment sump inventory to support ration of the CRS pumps is provided via the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and any led reactor coolant system inventory. Each train of CRS starts upon receipt of the associated n RWST low-low level signal (present concurrently with a containment depressurization ation (CDA) signal). When the RWST low-low level is reached (considering worst case ertainties), adequate sump inventory is available to support operation of the CRS pumps.

CRS pumps start upon receipt of the RWST low-low level signal when a CDA signal is ent. An EDG failure concurrent with a loss of off site power, will result in the failure of the ciated CRS train to operate. An instrumentation failure (e.g., failure to generate all RWST

-low signal) will also result in the failure of the associated CRS train to operate. Adequate imum CRS flow performance is achieved considering these single active failures. There is no erse impact to CRS performance due to the failure of a low head safety injection pump (i.e.,

dual heat removal pump) to auto stop when the RWST low-low level signal is generated.

quate containment sump inventory is present to support operation of the CRS pumps. The ST supply line / line(s) to the low head safety injection pumps are independent from the ply lines (containment sump lines) to the CRS pumps and therefore there is no impact on the ion line losses due to this failure. The impact to emergency core cooling pump performance

, charging pump and safety injection pump) due to potential head / net positive suction head act is addressed in Section 6.3. Any RWST inventory directed to the core via the low head ty injection pump(s) will spill out of the faulted reactor coolant system and will condense and umulate in the containment sump.

piping and supports of the QSS and CRS have been evaluated for system operation at the ated temperatures associated with the spectrum of LOCAs and MSLBs. A brief synopsis of ificant accidents is provided within this paragraph. A significant LOCA is the double ended ure at the reactor coolant pump (RCP) suction (PSDER). This is a significant accident for ions of the CRS piping and portions of the QSS piping due to the rapid increase to a high ained containment saturation temperature. While the containment will reach a higher ration temperature for a break in the hot leg, both the containment pressure and temperature be reduced more rapidly following the initial reactor coolant system (RCS) blowdown phase for the RCP suction break since the hot leg break will not cause energy from the steam erators to flow into containment. Since the steam generators are an additional source of energy the RCP suction break, the break will result in a sustained temperature difference for heating QSS and RSS piping before these systems are filled. A significant accident for portions of the S piping is a small main steam line break (MSLB). This accident releases energy into tainment at a slower rate than the large LOCAs and larger MSLBs. Relative to the other cases, small MSLB results in a slower increase in QSS piping temperature and a slower pressure rise ontainment. The differential thermal motion of the QSS piping in this case with respect to the tainment structure can be greater than in the LOCA and other MSLB cases. This larger erential thermal motion can result in governing piping and pipe support loads for portions of QSS piping and pipe supports. The single active failures in the study included:

Motor Control Center 32-4T. This failure prevents the service water supply valve in each RSS heat exchanger and the QSS pump discharge valve in the same train from opening.

The crossover valve from the RSS to the RHR would also be prevented from opening.

Therefore, both RSS pumps on the affected train would continue to spray hot water.

One diesel generator. This results in failure of one train of all engineered safety features.

The failure is generally limiting for long term heat removal.

Sequencer failure. Fails to start the RSS pumps in the affected train. Therefore, one RSS pump provides flow to the RSS header and the second pump provides flow to both trains of ECCS and the second RSS header.

ure Analysis ilure analysis for the components of the containment heat removal systems is given in le 6.2-62.

2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements 2.4.1 Quench Spray System the initial system test, pipe plugs are inserted in the spray nozzle sockets in the spray headers.

internals of the containment isolation and spray header check valves of the quench spray flow not under test are removed, and the flow path to recirculate water to the Reactor Pressure sel (RPV) hot and cold legs and the refueling water storage tank (RWST) flush connection is pleted by opening the valve in the test line of the pump to be tested. Each quench spray pump en started individually, and flow through each subsystem is measured in the discharge line.

pump developed head (discharge pressure minus the suction pressure) and the measured flow compared to the pump head-flow curve (Figure 6.2-54).

er points on the pump curve will also be measured by recirculating flow back to the RWST via ttled test lines bypassing the spray headers. These tests will verify the individual pumps ormance curves.

inservice inspection and flow testing, each quench spray pump may be periodically flow ed by recirculating water back to the RWST through the pump test lines with the spray headers ated. The pump developed head and the measured flow will be compared to the pump head curve (Figure 6.2-54), to verify inservice inspection acceptability.

ssure retaining components are inspected for leaks from pump seals, valve packings, flanged ts, and safety valves during system testing. In addition, Safety Classes 2 and 3 pressure ining components are subject to periodic inservice inspection, as described in Section 6.6.

ested for leakage during the Type C containment isolation valve leakage rate tests described in tion 6.2.6.

ans are provided for spray nozzle in-place testing or inspection when necessary as indicated in hnical Specifications. Spray nozzle in-place airflow testing was performed during the final e of preoperational testing for this system to verify that the nozzles were not plugged.

part of the initial system test, the refueling water recirculation pumps and coolers are aligned ecirculate water in the RWST. Pressure retaining components are inspected for leaks from p seals, valve packings and flanged joints during system testing.

2.4.2 Containment Recirculation System the initial system test, pipe plugs are inserted in the spray nozzle sockets in the spray headers.

containment recirculation pump suction well casing, cooler, suction and discharge piping, containment structure sump are filled by opening the locked closed valves in the pump test connecting the pump suction to the RWST. After the sump is filled the valves in the pump test are closed. The containment structure sump is enclosed by a temporary cofferdam to provide quate sump capacity for pump operation.

internals of the containment isolation check valves of the recirculation spray flow path not er test are removed, and a flow path to recirculate water to the RPV hot and cold legs is blished via test lines in the residual heat removal and low pressure safety injection systems. If essary, makeup water to the cofferdam can be provided by gravity flow from the RWST ugh system piping not under test.

h containment recirculation pump is then started, pumping water from the containment cture sump (cofferdam) to the RPV hot and cold legs.

w through each subsystem is measured by flow elements in the pump discharge lines. The p developed head (discharge pressure minus suction pressure) and the measured flow are pared to the pump head-flow curve (Figure 6.2-40). Other points on the pump curve will also measured by taking suction directly on the RWST and recirculating back to the RWST via the lines with the spray headers isolated. These tests will verify the individual pump performance ves. Acceptable pump NPSH is also verified when pumping from the containment structure p.

ortion of the initial preoperational testing of the containment sump vortex control was omplished by means of a model test as described in Section 14.2.7.11.

texing was evaluated during scale model testing. During all scale model tests, water level was so that module submergence was less than or equal to the minimum strainer submergence in tainment. A submergence of 8 inches was used to match the minimum design submergence of strainer. In a large scale test using a full sized module, a test was also run with the clean

was sent through the test tank and strainer. The submergence level was then raised to 0 es of submergence (at the top of the fins) again using twice the nominal flow rate. No hollow-vortices (evidence of air ingestion) were observed at any of these submergence levels in e vortexing tests. No air bubbles were observed in the discharge piping during these vortexing

s. These tests confirm that vortexing for the strainer is not a concern.

itionally, a full flow test of the service water through the tube side of each containment rculation cooler ensures that the required flow and head for effective system operation is ieved (Section 9.2.1.4). Following the test, the coolers are flushed with demineralized water, left in a drained and ready condition, making further testing of the coolers unnecessary.

per functioning of interlocks, time delays, alarms, instruments, and valves during both the y mode and switchover to recirculation mode will be verified during a simulated system ation test. Valve speed and positioning will be verified in the control room and by local visual ervation.

inservice inspection and flow testing, the containment recirculation pumps are capable of g flow tested quarterly via miniflow test lines. Full flow testing can be performed during eling outages by closing the containment isolation valves in the pump suction and discharge, ning the locked closed valves in the test line from the RWST, opening the valve to the low sure safety injection discharge line, and opening the valve in the residual heat removal return to the RWST. The acceptability of pump developed head and the measured flow will be fied by the inservice inspection program.

pump performance curve and the safety analysis curve are shown on Figure 3.2-40.

ssure retaining components are inspected for leaks from pump seals, valve packings, flanged ts, and safety valves during system testing. In addition, Safety Classes 2 and 3 pressure ining components are subject to periodic inservice inspection, as described in Section 6.6.

ans are provided for spray nozzle in-place testing or inspection when necessary as indicated in hnical Specifications. Spray nozzle in-place airflow testing was performed during the final e of preoperational testing for this system to verify that the nozzles were not plugged.

containment quench and recirculation spray systems are principal plant safety features and normally inoperative during reactor operation. Complete system tests cannot be performed n the reactor is operating because a safety injection signal causes reactor trip, and main water and containment isolation. A containment spray system test would require the system e temporarily disabled. The method of assuring operability of this system is, therefore, to bine system tests normally performed during plant refueling shutdowns, with more frequent ponent tests, (i.e., motor-operated valves) which can be performed during reactor operation.

system test, at or between each major fuel reloading, demonstrates proper automatic ration of the containment spray systems. With the pumps blocked from starting, a test signal is lied to initiate automatic actuation and verify that the components receive the safety injection

tainment recirculation pump startup circuit.

ing reactor operation, the control room instrumentation, which initiates the containment spray em is checked periodically and the initiating circuits tested monthly on a staggered basis. The ing of analog channel inputs is accomplished in a similar manner as the reactor trip system.

engineered safety features logic system is tested by means of a semi-automatic tester to ulate digital inputs from the analog channels. The semi-automatic tester uses short duration es to prevent master relay actuation. Verification of logic actuation is indicated by a test light.

n completion of the logic checks, verification that the circuit from the master relay to the e relays is complete, is accomplished by use of a built-in slave relay tester to check continuity.

ddition, the active components (pumps and valves) are tested periodically, as indicated in the hnical Specifications. The test checks the operation of the starting circuits and verifies that the ps are in satisfactory running order. Testing of containment quench and recirculation spray ems instrumentation and controls is discussed in Section 7.3.

3 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT FUNCTIONAL DESIGN secondary containment is comprised of the containment enclosure building, engineered ty features building (partial), auxiliary building, main steam valve building (partial),

rogen recombiner building (partial) and the associated supplementary leak collection and ase system (SLCRS) provided to mitigate the radiological consequences of postulated dents of the dual containment plant concept for Millstone 3.

secondary containment is kept under a negative pressure relative to atmospheric pressure.

negative pressure is measured at the Auxiliary Building 24 foot 6 inch elevation and ntained per Technical Specifications at greater at than or equal to 0.4 inches water gauge after sign basis accident (DBA). This single location is considered to be adequate and esentative of the entire secondary containment due to the large cross-section of the air passage ch interconnects the various buildings within the boundary. The negative pressure is ntained with the SLCRS operating together with the charging pump, component cooling water p and heat exchanger area, and auxiliary building filtration portions of the auxiliary building tilation system (ABVS). The system fans and filtration units are located in the auxiliary ding. The SLCRS operating together with the charging pump, reactor plant component ling water pump and heat exchanger area ventilation system and auxiliary building filtration ions of the auxiliary building ventilation system (ABVS) also maintains all contiguous dings (main steam valve building (partially), engineered safety features building (partially),

rogen recombiner building (partially), and auxiliary building under a negative pressure owing a DBA by exhausting air from these areas, filtering and removing particulate and eous iodine from the air before discharging to the atmosphere via the Millstone stack and bine Building Stack. The system is designed as Safety Class 3.

auxiliary building ventilation system (ABVS) is shown on Figure 9.4-2 and described in tion 9.4.2. The auxiliary building filtration units discharge to the environment via the tilation vent on the roof of the turbine building discussed in Section 15.6.5.4.

SLCRS is designed according to the following criteria:

1. General Design Criterion 2 for protection against natural phenomena as established in Chapters 2 and 3.
2. General Design Criterion 4 for protection against adverse environmental conditions and missiles as established in Chapters 2 and 3.
3. General Design Criterion 5 for sharing systems and components important to safety.
4. General Design Criterion 41 for containment atmosphere cleanup.
5. General Design Criterion 64 for monitoring radioactivity releases.
6. Regulatory Guide 1.26 for quality group classification of systems and components.

This system is QA Category I, Safety Class 3.

7. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for seismic design classification of system components.

This system is classified as Seismic Category I.

8. Regulatory Guide 1.52 for air filtration and adsorption units as indicated in Section 1.8.1.52.

er design bases include:

1. The maintenance of negative pressure in areas contiguous to the containment.
2. The filtration and adsorption by impregnated charcoal of contaminated air for radioactive iodine removal with efficiency as indicated in Table 6.5-1.
3. The provision of continual monitoring for radioactive particulate in the discharge of the air at an elevated release point.
4. Containment enclosure building integrity for normal wind load and frame integrity for tornado load; displacement integrity for LOCA conditions and containment integrated leakage rate test conditions.

3.2 System Description containment enclosure building is Seismic Category I building and is comprised of structures h uninsulated metal siding and built up roofing over an insulated metal roof deck. The tainment enclosure building design incorporates horizontal and vertical sliding joints to ensure the integrity of the containment enclosure building will be maintained during maximum

provide the required air tightness within the enclosure building, the metal siding, metal deck joints and end laps have two continuous lines of caulking at all joints. Neoprene gaskets and ets are used to provide a flexible seal between the containment enclosure and the other dings.

supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) is shown on Figure 6.2-46.

principle components and design parameters for the SLCRS are listed in Table 6.2-63.

SLCRS consist of two exhaust fans, each supplied from a separate emergency bus, two filter ks and associated ductwork and dampers.

h filter bank includes a moisture separator, electric heater, upstream HEPA filter, a charcoal orber, and downstream HEPA filter.

charcoal adsorber is of gasketless nontray type and is designed for a residence time in excess

.25 seconds per 2 inches depth for gases at a flow velocity of less than 40 fpm. The actual th of the absorber is 4 inches.

SLCRS collects a portion of the primary containment leakage from the buildings contiguous he containment, which house the various containment penetrations and the engineered safety ures equipment circulating radioactive fluids, filters it, and releases it to atmosphere through Millstone stack. All leakages from the primary containment following a DBA flow into these

s. A portion of the auxiliary building atmosphere is exhausted via the auxiliary building tilation system (see Section 9.4.2). In the main steam valve building, hydrogen recombiner ding, and engineering safety features building, interior walls serve as the SLCRS boundary, separating areas contiguous to the containment from the remainder of these buildings.

SLCRS boundaries are established by use of low leakage doors (weather stripped), sealed ding joints, sealed piping, conduit cable and ductwork penetrations, and boundary isolation pers for ventilation systems. Therefore, containment leakage is contained in these areas until red by the SLCRS and the ABVS filtration subsystem as described in Section 9.4.2.

3.3 Safety Evaluation SLCRS is not normally in operation. The SLCRS system and the auxiliary building filtration ion of the auxiliary building ventilation system (ABVS) start on receipt of a SIS signal and is sidered operative when the SLCRS fan gets up to full speed. The drawdown flow capacity of h redundant SLCRS filter train is 9,500 cfm with free inlet conditions; i.e., with SLCRS ndaries not isolated in a Safety Injection mode of operation. This capacity exceeds the design age rate across the boundaries of the building with a differential pressure across the ndaries. The excess margin in fan-filter train capacity, which is augmented by ABVS, is uired in order to drawdown the SLCRS area to a negative pressure within 120 seconds after the

gn accident (DBA). This single location is considered to be adequate and representative of the re secondary containment due to the large cross-section of the air passage which interconnects various buildings within the boundary. Therefore, with the enclosure building and the tiguous buildings sealed and the doors closed, one SLCRS fan-filter unit up to full speed in junction with the auxiliary building filter system draws down the pressure to the minimum 0.4 negative pressure, in 110 seconds from the time of emergency diesel generator breaker ure. The pressure is drawn down asymptotically, approaching a more negative pressure while equilibrium flow rate stabilizes at a value less than 9,500 cfm. The 0.4 inch water gauge ative pressure is measured at the Auxiliary Building 24 foot 6 inch elevation in order to ensure gative pressure in all areas inside the secondary containment boundary under most on site eorological conditions.

ensure protection from loss-of-function due to common events, the filter banks are physically arated, with a barrier (12 inch thick concrete slab) placed between them.

ure 9.4-2 provides indication of the failure position of all air-operated dampers in the SLCRS.

SLCRS is not specifically designed to remain functional following a high energy line break ide the primary containment.

diation monitor which monitors the air being processed by the SLCRS, is located downstream he filter and warns the operator of a potential problem that requires operator action.

3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements SLCRS components are tested and inspected as separate components and as an integrated em. Instrument readings are taken to ensure that all air systems are balanced to exhaust air at rates which draw down the SLCRS areas to a negative pressure of 0.4 inch measured in the iliary Building at elevation 24 feet 6 inches within 120 seconds after the SIS.

acity and performance of fans conform to the required conditions and ratings and are in pliance with AMCA test codes and certified ratings program. SLCRS ductwork is leak-tested r installation to ensure against any bypass potentials. The ductwork is of all-welded struction and is pressure tested to 1.25 times the operating pressure. A thermal tylphthalate (DOP) smoke test with 0.3 micron smoke particle diameter at 100 percent and percent rated filter air flow is given to each HEPA filter cell before leaving the manufacturers lities. A cold DOP test is conducted after filter installation at the site to ensure that there is no age from upstream to downstream of the HEPA filter. Provision is made to inject DOP at the t of the HEPA filter banks.

h charcoal adsorber bank is field tested for leakage using a refrigerant and air mixture oduced upstream of the charcoal adsorber and a halogen detector of the gas chromatograph e to confirm that the bypass allowables are met. Filter banks are periodically tested for leakage le in place and defective cells are replaced and all leaks eliminated. Test canisters are installed nstream of the adsorber banks to be used for periodic laboratory testing and inspection of the

s, air-operated dampers, and controls are tested once a month by manually starting the system allowing it to reach rated speed with all dampers in the operating position before being shut

n. The system is automatically started at least once per refueling interval on a simulated SIS al. The capability of SLCRS and the charging pump, component cooling water pump and heat hanger area, and auxiliary building filtration portions of the auxiliary building ventilation em (ABVS) to achieve and maintain a negative pressure in the enclosure building and tiguous buildings is verified by a test performed at least once per refueling interval.

3.5 Instrumentation Requirements SLCRS is actuated on receipt of a SIS. Its logic is described in Section 7.3.

erential pressure switches indicate pressure drop across each filter section locally and alarm h differential pressure remotely in the control room.

h filter heater has two temperature switches for high temperature protection of the heater. One ection temperature switch is an automatic reset type while the other has a local manual reset ure. Heater ON and OFF indicator lights are located on the main heating and ventilation panel he control room. The heater for each filter bank is interlocked with the respective filters aust fan to deenergize the heater when the fan is stopped.

ative humidity is monitored upstream of each charcoal filter section and indicated locally.

discharge air temperature of each charcoal filter section is continuously monitored. When harge air temperature reaches 190F, a local amber light at the fire detection panel is minated, and high temperature condition is alarmed on the fire protection panel in the control

m. If air temperatures continue to rise reaching 270F, a high-high temperature alarm light is minated on the fire protection panel located in the control room. Supervisory circuits are used onitor the temperature sensors and actuate a local and control room trouble light for the cted area.

trol switches and indicator lights are provided on the main heating and ventilation panel in the trol room for each filter bank exhaust fan. Position indicator lights are also provided on the n heating and ventilation panel for filter inlet dampers.

er flow is monitored at the inlet of each fan. The standby filter bank is started automatically by ow switch on low flow in the running filter bank.

iation monitor (Section 11.5) monitors the common discharge header of the filters for ation prior to discharge via the Millstone stack.

ass alarms are provided in the control room in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.47 for the RS.

containment isolation system isolates piping lines which penetrate the containment boundary inimize the release of radioactive materials to the environment for postulated accidents hin the containment.

4.1 Design Bases containment isolation valve arrangement ensures containment integrity assuming the urrence of a single failure (Section 3.1.1). The containment isolation system provides at least barriers between the atmosphere outside the containment structure and:

1. The atmosphere inside the containment structure
2. The reactor coolant system
3. Systems which would become connected to either Item 1 or 2 as a result of, or subsequent to, a DBA tainment structure penetrations for ESF systems (Section 6.0), which will function to mitigate consequences of an accident, will be opened or closed, as required, to allow system operation.

4.1.1 Governing Conditions ause a wide variation exists in accident severity that would necessitate a unit shutdown, the tainment isolation system is designed to differentiate between the more and less severe dents.

engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation signals, i.e., safety injection (SIS), containment ation Phase A (CIA), containment isolation Phase B (CIB), steam line isolation (SLI), and water line isolation (FWI) provide this selectivity. Section 7.3 describes the ESF actuation em.

SIS initiates the following:

Operation of the emergency core cooling system (Section 6.3). Note: The charging pumps will not automatically inject into the reactor coolant cold legs unless there is also a cold leg injection permissive [(P-19) - pressurizer pressure low] signal present to open the charging pumps to RCS cold leg injection headers parallel isolation valves.

The FWI signal which closes the containment isolation valves in the main feedwater lines (Section 10.4.7).

Closure of the containment isolation valves in the reactor coolant charging lines (Section 9.3.4).

purpose of the CIA signal is to isolate systems which are not required for an orderly and safe tdown of the unit in order to protect equipment which will be required to resume operation e the initiating cause for the CIA signal has been corrected.

he event of a major design basis accident (DBA), after which normal heat removal systems ht not function or might not provide adequate core and containment cooling, a CIB signal will ow the CIA signal to complete containment isolation (except for isolation valves required to pen for operation of ESF systems). The CIA and CIB signals which isolate containment, may nitiated by diverse parameters (e.g. reactor coolant system low pressure, or containment high sure), as described in Section 7.3. The containment pressure setpoint which initiates the CIA al (3.0 psig) is set at the minimum value consistent with normal subatmospheric operating ditions (Section 6.2.1.5).

e the cause of the CIA/CIB has been corrected, two manual operator actions are required to rn each affected component to service (Section 7.3).

FWI signal isolates flow to the steam generators in the event of a steam generator high-high l, or a safety injection signal, or a reactor trip coincident with a low reactor coolant system rage temperature.

containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves meet the Requirements of Branch hnical Position CSB 6.4. They automatically close on a high radiation signal from tainment area radiation monitors (Section 9.4.6). Pending issuance of Regulatory Guide 41, Rev. 1, lines penetrating containment are identified in Table 6.2-65 as being either ntial or non-essential, based on SRP Rev. 2, Section 6.2.4, Item II.5.h. All non-essential lines ch may be open during normal operation are automatically isolated upon initiation of a tainment isolation signal. The remaining non-essential lines are isolated with manual valves ed closed during normal operation.

4.1.2 Isolation Criteria - Fluid Systems Penetrating the Containment design of isolation valving for fluid system lines penetrating the containment structure forms to the intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 16, 54, 55, 56,

57. Section 3.1.2 discusses compliance with the GDC. Exceptions for the specific ngements described in the GDC are discussed in Section 6.2.4.2.

4.1.3 Isolation Criteria - Fluid Instrument Lines Penetrating the Containment design of isolation valving for fluid instrument lines penetrating the containment structure forms to the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.11, as described in Section 6.2.4.2.

4.1.4 Design Requirements for Containment Isolation Barriers following are general design requirements for containment isolation barriers:

between the atmosphere outside the containment and the containment atmosphere or the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

2. The design pressure of all piping and components within the isolation boundaries afforded by the containment isolation system is equal to, or greater than, the design pressure of the reactor containment. Piping, valves, and reactor containment penetrations are designed, constructed, and installed in accordance with Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category I Requirements (Section 3.2).
3. Containment isolation system components, including valves, controls, piping, and penetrations, are protected from internally or externally generated missiles, jet impingement, and pipe whip.
4. Containment isolation valves are physically located as close to the reactor containment wall as practical, thereby, minimizing the length of piping between the valves and their penetrations. Containment isolation valves outside reactor containment are located no more than 10 feet from the reactor containment wherever practical. Table 6.2-65 provides actual distances.
5. Containment isolation valves which are under administrative control are locked closed with a local lock, for manual valves, and a key operated switch in the control room, for remotely operated valves. Local manual operators are only specified for valves which are locked closed during normal unit operation. The operation of the remotely operated valves is directed from the control room.
6. Spare penetrations are sealed with a welded closure.
7. Piping between isolation valves which could be filled with water is protected from overpressurization due to heatup of trapped liquid following a DBA.

4.2 System Design eral le 6.2-65 gives details of the design of the containment isolation system for each individual etration. Piping and instrumentation drawings for the containment isolation valve ngements are included on Figure 6.2-47. Descriptions of the design of piping, electrical, and ess reactor containment penetrations are given in Section 3.8.1 ctor containment penetrations are classified in accordance with General Design Criteria 55, and 57 and the functions of the respective fluid systems, as follows:

ss A penetration piping is connected to the reactor coolant system or is open to the reactor tainment atmosphere and is in use during normal operation. Any normally operating system ng, which could become connected to either the reactor coolant system or the reactor tainment atmosphere as a result of a DBA, also is classified as Class A.

ss B Penetrations ss B penetration piping is separated from the reactor coolant system and the reactor tainment atmosphere by a membrane barrier (i.e., sealed inside the reactor containment) and is d during normal operation.

ss C Penetrations ss C penetration piping is part of the ESF systems. As such, these penetrations are not isolated containment isolation signal following a DBA, so that the system safety function can be omplished.

ss D Penetrations ss D penetration piping is not in use during normal operation and is isolated from the reactor tainment atmosphere by a normally closed valve. The operation of the valves is under inistrative control (i.e., locked closed).

ESF actuation signals that initiate closure of the containment isolation valves are discussed in tion 6.2.4.1.1 and described in Section 7.3.1.

C Exceptions containment isolation system conforms to the specification of General Design Criteria 54 ugh 57 with the following exceptions:

1. ESF Penetrations (Section 6.0)

The containment isolation valves for the emergency core cooling system, the quench spray system, and the discharge lines of the containment recirculation system are not closed by an automatic containment isolation signal, because operation of these systems is required following an accident inside the reactor containment. However, each line is fitted with the valving necessary to satisfy the single failure criterion and to remote-manually isolate these lines, when isolation is desired or required.

2. Containment Recirculation Pump Suction Penetrations (Section 6.2.2)

isolation valves in this piping is impractical because the valves would have to be encased in concrete or be capable of submerged operation after an accident.

Because the containment recirculation system is operated after a LOCA, suction line isolation is only required in the event of a pipe rupture outside of the reactor containment. Outside the reactor containment, single normally open, remotely controlled, motor-operated isolation valves are provided. Because these lines do not have isolation valves inside the reactor containment, the piping from the reactor containment wall to each valve outlet is individually encapsulated in stainless steel (Figure 6.2-47). This encapsulation is an extension of the containment structure and prevents a rupture in the suction line between the reactor containment wall and the motor-operated isolation valve from causing a release of fluids from inside the reactor containment to the environment. In addition, both the process pipe and the encapsulation comply with the crack exclusion zone threshold stress limit as defined in SRP 3.6.2 and Branch Technical Position MEB3-1.

3. Containment Leakage Monitoring Open Tap Penetrations (Section 6.2.6)

The containment isolation designs for these small instrument lines comply with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.11 instead of General Design Criteria 55 and 56 due to their size. All instrument lines are Safety Class 2, up to and including the containment isolation valves. The design, protection and location of these safety class lines minimize the likelihood of accidental damage, prevent failure from pipe whip and allow periodic, visual inspection. The lines are sized (or provided with restricting orifices) to restrict leakage flow from the reactor containment to a value which does not significantly affect off site doses (in the event of a line rupture or isolation valve failure). The containment leakage monitoring open tap lines serve safety related instruments. A normally open motor-operated containment isolation valve located in each line outside the containment structure isolates the lines, when remote-manually closed from the control room.

4. Containment Vacuum Pump Suction Penetration (Section 9.5.10)

The containment vacuum system must be capable of operating after a DBA. This system has two containment isolation valves in series outside the reactor containment. The containment isolation valves are closed on a CIA signal. The use of two outside containment isolation valves ensures that the lines are isolated in the event of any single active failure. A passive failure during the short term is not postulated (see Section 3.1.1). Therefore, the intent of General Design Criterion 56 is satisfied. The standard containment isolation valving arrangement is not employed on these lines to ensure reliability. This system is operated after a DBA, and has no isolation valves inside containment capable of preventing out-leakage due to a postulated passive failure in the long term between the containment penetrations and outboard isolation valves. To meet containment isolation criteria,

Augmented inservice inspection (AISI) is performed on those sections of piping.

5. Containment Atmosphere Monitoring Pump Suction Penetration (Section 12.3.4)

The containment atmosphere monitoring system must be capable of operating after a DBA. Containment isolation is achieved by utilizing two containment isolation valves in series outside the reactor containment. The containment isolation valves are closed on a CIA signal. The use of two outside containment isolation valves ensures that the lines are isolated in the event of any single active failure. A passive failure during the short term is not postulated (see Section 3.1.1).

Therefore, the intent of General Design Criterion 56 is satisfied. The standard containment isolation valving arrangement is not employed on these lines to ensure reliability. This system is operated after a DBA, and has no isolation valve inside containment capable of preventing out-leakage due to a postulated passive failure in the long term between the containment penetration and outboard isolation valve. To meet containment isolation criteria, pipe break exclusion criteria is applied to this section of piping outside containment from this containment penetration to the first isolation valve. Augmented inservice inspection (AISI) is performed on that section of piping.

6. Hydrogen Recombiner Suction Penetration (Section 6.2.5)

The hydrogen recombiner is designed to be capable of operating after a DBA. The system, though currently installed, is not used to provide any mitigating function.

The containment isolation valve arrangement for the hydrogen recombiner suction lines consists of two locked-closed, manually operated valves outside the reactor containment. The use of two outside containment isolation valves ensures that the line is isolated in the event of a single active failure. Therefore, this arrangement meets the intent of General Design Criterion 56 and deviates from the standard arrangement to ensure reliability of operation after the LOCA. This system is operated after a DBA, and has no isolation valves inside containment capable of preventing out-leakage due to a postulated passive failure in the long term between the containment penetrations and outboard isolation valves. To meet containment isolation criteria, pipe break exclusion criteria is applied to these sections of piping outside containment from the containment penetrations to the first isolation valves.

Augmented inservice inspection (AISI) is performed on those sections of piping.

7. Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Water Penetrations (Section 9.3.4)

The valves in the lines that supply seal water to the reactor coolant pumps are normally open and do not receive the containment isolation signal. A check valve is provided inside the containment and a motor-operated valve is located outside the containment in each of the seal lines. The lines must remain open to supply seal

operating times for containment isolation valves are given in Table 6.2-65. All or-operated or air-operated valves, which may be open during unit operation, are designed for d operation in order to ensure containment integrity and to satisfy ESF operational uirements. Valve closure time is limited to as small a period as possible, consistent with the gn of the valves and operators.

tem Requirements design of fluid piping lines penetrating the containment structure conforms to NRC ulatory Guide 1.141 (Section 1.8.1.141).

design of fluid instrument lines penetrating the containment structure conforms to the uirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.11 as described in Section 6.2.4.2.

ng, valves, and components within the containment isolation barriers are designed, structed, and installed in accordance with Safety Class 2 (Section 3.2.2) which meets the nt of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.26 (Section 1.8) and Seismic Category I (Section 3.2.1) which forms to the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Section 1.8).

tainment isolation system components, including valves, controls, piping, and penetrations, protected from internally or externally generated missiles, waterjets, and pipe whip and jet ingement. Details regarding the design of this protection are given in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. All tainment isolation system components are located in missile protected, heated structures. The mic Category I design (Section 3.7B.1) of the containment isolation system components vides assurance of protection from earthquakes.

containment isolation valves and valve operators are designed to assure operability both ng normal plant operating conditions and following a DBA. A detailed description of seismic lification testing and analysis performed on safety related mechanical equipment to assure rability during and after a postulated earthquake is given in Section 3.9.2.2. Section 3.11B.1 cribes the environmental conditions considered in the design of the containment isolation em and includes a discussion of the tests and analyses conducted to assure the adequacy of ponents performance under the specified environmental conditions.

containment isolation valves are designed to maintain their integrity and leak tightness. The t severe reactor containment environmental conditions occur within the first hour following a A. With the exception of the instrument air, containment atmosphere monitor discharge, tor coolant pump seal water return lines, and reactor plant component cooling return header s, all normally open containment isolation valves inside the reactor containment are operated valves, solenoid valves, or check valves. The fail closed feature of these valves is not cted by the most severe post-DBA environmental conditions. The containment isolation es for the instrument air, containment atmosphere monitor discharge, reactor coolant pump

sed systems used as one of the isolation barriers inside or outside the containment satisfy the owing requirements:

1. The systems do not communicate with either the reactor coolant system or the containment atmosphere.
2. The systems are protected against missiles, pipe whip and jet impingement.
3. The systems are designated Seismic Category I.
4. The systems are classified Safety Class 2.
5. The systems are designed to withstand temperatures at least equal to the containment design temperature.
6. The systems are designed to withstand the external pressure from the containment structural acceptance test.
7. The systems are designed to withstand the loss of coolant accident transient and environment.

ves used for containment isolation barriers are designed, constructed, and installed in ordance with Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category I Requirements. The design pressure of tainment isolation valves is equal to, or greater than, the design pressure of the reactor tainment. Containment isolation valve type is selected on the basis of fluid system uirements (pressure drops, radioactivity, etc.), seat leak tightness, and the standard industry tices for the applicable valve size. Containment isolation valve procurement specifications uire strict seat and packing leak tightness tests in addition to the code requirements. Branch s located between the containment and the outside or inside isolation valve meet the same tainment isolation criteria as the main line.

ign provisions are made to ensure the integrity of containment isolation valves and connecting ng under dynamic forces resulting from inadvertent closure. Details of these provisions are n in Section 3.7.3.

containment isolation system design provides mechanical and electrical redundancy. The ation valve arrangement ensures containment integrity, assuming the occurrence of a single ure, by providing at least two barriers between the atmosphere outside the containment and the tainment atmosphere or the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

ve actuators are either motors, air or hydraulic pilots (solenoid actuated), solenoids or local dwheels. All air and solenoid operated containment isolation valves fail in the position of ter safety on loss of control voltage to the associated solenoid valve or on loss of air for the

sfy General Design Criteria 55 or 56, either the as- is position is the position of greater ty or redundant motor-operated valves are provided in series or parallel to ensure safety.

tor operators are employed when post-accident operation is necessary or when the l-closed feature of the air-operated valve is undesirable (e.g., auxiliary feedwater and reactor t component cooling water lines).

power for redundant containment isolation valves and their controls is supplied from two pendent power sources so that loss of one supply does not prevent the automatic line isolation n required.

sical and electrical separation between controls of redundant containment isolation valves are vided to prevent electrical faults or physical damage to one of the containment isolation valve trols from affecting the controls of the redundant valve.

ddition, means are provided for manual initiation of the SIS, CIA, CIB, and SLI functions m the control room in the event of malfunction in the automatic circuitry.

ks in lines or components with the capability for remote-manual isolation are detected or rred in one or more ways, depending on the system involved. For example, leaks in a reactor lant pump thermal barrier cooling coil cause a high flow indication (Section 9.2.2.1). Leaks in containment recirculation pump suction and discharge lines are detected by high sump liquid l, and low discharge pressure, respectively (Section 6.2.2). Feedwater heater tube leaks are cted by high drains levels. All such signals are annunciated and alarmed in the control room.

mary and secondary modes of valve actuation are shown in Table 6.2-65. All otely-operated containment isolation valves (actuated by ESF actuation signal or ote-manually operated) have position indication and a manual control switch in the control m.

visions are made for operability testing (Section 7.3) of containment isolation valves and for age rate testing (Section 6.2.6) of containment isolation barriers. As shown on Figure 6.2-47, h penetration which requires testing is provided with test connections so that the isolation es may be tested for leakage.

motor-operated containment isolation valves required to operate under post-DBA conditions qualified under IEEE 323-74 and IEEE 344-75 guidelines. Additional information concerning ironmental qualifications is provided in Section 3.11B.1.

tain piping in the containment penetration area is designated as a break exclusion area as ned in Section 3.6.1. This portion of the piping is designed to meet the requirements of ASME Sub-Article NE-1120 and other design requirements specified in the Branch Technical ition MEB 3-1.

design of the containment isolation system meets the design basis requirements for system grity, response, operation, and reliability. Isolation valve and piping design and location ure reactor containment integrity for any postulated accidents inside the reactor containment.

ESFAS provides automatic reactor containment isolation, which is selective for accident erity. The containment isolation valve arrangements for ESF penetrations ensure system rability and provide the capability for reactor containment isolation to protect against a single ure.

containment isolation valves can be reopened only after:

1. The isolation signal has been reset
2. Each valve must be opened by a single operator action tainment purge and vent valves are normally closed during operation and automatically close high radiation signal during cold shutdown. These valves are not credited with closure for the handling accident discussed in Section 15.7.4.

4.4 Tests and Inspections ting and inspection requirements are described in Section 6.2.6.

4.5 Instrumentation Requirements rumentation required for containment isolation is described in Section 7.3.

5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL IN CONTAINMENT mbustible gas control is maintained by mixing as described in Section 6.2.5.3 and the rogen monitoring system which monitors the hydrogen concentration within the containment beyond design basis accidents. Hydrogen recombiners are installed, but are not used for any gating function. The hydrogen recombiner system, associated controls, alarms (including ulatory Guide 1.47 bypass alarms) and ventilation dampers have been isolated awaiting ndonment. The system discussion describes the system as originally installed and operated.

hydrogen recombiner system is shown on Figure 6.2-36 and the system component data are n in Table 6.2-67. The hydrogen monitoring system is shown on Figure 6.2-58.

5.1 Design Bases design of the hydrogen recombiner system and the hydrogen monitoring system is in ordance with the following criteria:

1. General Design Criterion 41 with respect to containment atmosphere cleanup.
3. The containment atmosphere is maintained uniformly mixed by the action of the containment spray to prevent local high concentrations of combustible gases (Hilliard et al., 1970), (Knudsen et al., 1969), and (USAEC 1972).
4. The capability to monitor and sample the combustible gas concentrations within the containment during post-accident conditions in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97.
5. Deleted.
6. The hydrogen recombiner system and hydrogen monitoring system are designed to remain operable assuming any single failure.
7. The systems are protected from the effects of tornadoes, external missiles, pipe ruptures, pipe whip, and jet impingement.
8. Regulatory Guide 1.29 for the seismic design classification of components; the systems are classified Seismic Category I.
9. The hydrogen recombiner system and the hydrogen monitoring system are capable of operating in the accident environment as described in Section 3.11.
10. General Design Criterion 42 with respect to inspection of the containment cleanup system
11. General Design Criterion 43 with respect to testing the atmosphere cleanup system
12. The hydrogen recombiners and the hydrogen monitors are located in the hydrogen recombiner building which provides adequate shielding for each unit and for personnel protection.
13. The capability for a controlled purge of the containment atmosphere to aid in cleanup.
14. Leak rate testing is performed periodically on the system as described in Section 6.2.6.
15. Regulatory Guide 1.26 for the quality group classification of components; the recombiner system is designed to Safety Class 2, and ASME Class 2 standards.

hydrogen recombiner system has two redundant 100 percent capacity trains. The recombiner mbines hydrogen with oxygen from the containment atmosphere to form water. Electric er for operation is supplied from the Class IE emergency buses. Electro-hydraulic operated pers (MOD) on the supply and exhaust duct lines are normally closed. The MODs on the ply and exhaust duct lines are manually activated by a hand-switch located in the Main trol Room on the HVAC VP-1 Panel to open or close. The MODs, through limit switches, are rlocked with the recombiner package system allowing the system to start. However, upon iving a high radiation signal from its exhaust duct radiation monitor, the corresponding ation dampers close and the recombiner package system shuts down. Both the hydrogen mbiner and the hydrogen recombiner ventilation fan are manually activated from individual UTO, OFF, HAND switches mounted on the local hydrogen recombiner control consoles. The rogen recombiner ventilation system is described in Section 9.4.10.

h recombiner train is designed to process an average of 35 scfm or greater during post-LOCA ditions.

h recombiner train utilizes a positive displacement blower for its process gas flow, an electric ter, a thermal recombiner chamber, and a ventilation blower to cool the return process gas and er vapor stream.

fixed displacement recombiner blower provides a controlled gas flow from the containment osphere to the thermal recombiner chamber. Initially the gas stream is preheated to 1,200F ore it enters the recombiner chamber. Depending on the gas stream dynamic conditions (i.e.,

rogen concentration percent, flow rate), hydrogen ignition occurs above 1,000F. Once tion occurs, the process is maintained exothermically in the recombiner chamber where rogen recombines with oxygen producing water vapor. Thereafter, the recombiner chamber perature is controlled at approximately 1,300F.

er passing through the recombiner chamber, the gas and water vapor mixture flows through the cooler, which reduces its temperature to 150F. This eliminates the need for a water cooled tainment structure penetration and ensures that only a minimum amount of water condenses in piping, returning the gas and water to the containment atmosphere.

containment atmosphere is drawn through open ended pipes located near the top of the tainment structure. Adequate mixing of the hydrogen in the containment atmosphere is red due to the turbulence created by the containment spray systems (Section 6.2.2) and by the usion of hydrogen in the containment atmosphere.

hydrogen recombiner system has two inch containment penetrations which are sized for the requirements of the recombiner. These penetrations are dedicated to the use of the hydrogen mbiner, and the post-accident sampling system (Section 9.3.2). A description of containment ation provisions of these penetrations is provided in Section 6.2.4.

tion 9.5.10.

Millstone 3 containment hydrogen monitoring system is designed as Category I (Class 1E) h dual redundant trains (Train A and Train B). Each train contains stand-alone analyzer and trol cabinets which analyze, monitor, alarm, and trend containment hydrogen concentration.

containment hydrogen monitoring system samples hydrogen sources on an automatic/manual s selectable from the control cabinet located in the hydrogen recombiner building control

. Withdrawal of the samples from existing hydrogen recombiner lines, measurement of the rogen concentration, and return of the total sample to the containment are the basic functional gnments of the hydrogen analyzer cabinet. The containment hydrogen monitoring system is ilable for continuous monitoring within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 30 minutes of an accident. This is sistent with Regulatory Guide, 1.7 Revision 3.

hydrogen analyzer control cabinet provides the data acquisition, computation, and automatic/

ual control of all analyzer functions. The hydrogen monitoring system combines the basic nology of electrochemical sensing of reactive gases with proven real time process rumentation concepts and hardware to provide a simple, reliable, direct measurement system.

direct-reading hydrogen sensor measures partial pressure with complete independence from ors such as; background gases, free water, carrier gases, reference cells, total pressure, sample

, or sensor face velocity. Hydrogen concentration is measured and converted to an analog al (0-10 percent H) for display on the digital panel meter, mounted on the control cabinet. The em has analog output for display (two meters), recording (Train A only), and alarming in the n control board. Input is also provided to the plant computer.

5.3 Design Evaluation ing of hydrogen in the containment following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) lts from three mechanisms:

  • momentum transfer from the fluid jet exiting the break,
  • forced and natural convection flows within the containment atmosphere, and
  • molecular diffusion.

these mechanisms work together to enhance mixing within the containment to provide a ogeneous gas mixture and prevent local accumulation of hydrogen. A brief discussion of each ing mechanism follows.

d containment compartment mixing occurs during the blowdown period of the postulated CA due to the break effluent. The momentum of the jet from the break causes turbulent mixing hin the containment. This was demonstrated in a test performed for a high velocity jet source oom 1982). Results from this test showed that when the jet was initiated, local gas velocities,

ce condenser lower compartment geometry, the test results would be applicable to compartments (e.g., steam generator cubicle, pressurizer cubicle) which are open to the tainment.

ced convection in the containment atmosphere is generated by the containment spray systems ch are designed to cool the containment atmosphere (see Section 6.2.2.). Approximately 3,000 (long-term) recirculation spray flow rate (assuming minimum ESF) is provided.

spray induces mixing by imparting momentum to the containment atmosphere. Air ainment by the spray causes bulk mass motion which creates both large and small scale ulence. Therefore, complete mixing should occur within a few minutes following a LOCA h containment spray operation (Sandia 1983).

ddition, steam condensation and cooling of the containment atmosphere by the sprays results ow to low pressure regions. This does not result in significant mixing within individual partments, although significant inter compartment fluid transfer can occur (IDCOR 1983).

ural convection due to density differences (buoyant effects) is another source which causes ing to occur in the containment atmosphere. Gas flow occurs whenever there is a temperature erence between the wall and the bulk atmosphere. Gases heated or cooled by the walls rise or respectively, due to the density differences between the gas and the surrounding atmosphere.

s buoyant force imparts momentum to the gas, and significant turbulence mixing results.

presence of large heat sinks in the containment, such as internal walls, together with localized t sources, such as hot equipment surfaces, are expected to set up large scale natural circulation

s. These circulation cells will help decrease any stratification which may occur in areas with absence of jet-induced or forced-convection flows. Tests conducted during the containment ems experiment (CSE) program in a steam/air atmosphere indicated that natural convection sed good mixing in a large vessel (Hilliard/Coleman 1970 and Knudsen 1969).

er completion of the blowdown period of the postulated LOCA, natural convection flows hin the containment atmosphere also are developed due to the break effluent. Cooling water is cted into the reactor core by the ECCS (see Section 6.3). The injected water exits the break as m/water mixture. Buoyancy forces cause the released steam to rise. This upward steam flow erates containment mixing due to the entrainment of the atmosphere gases in the steam plume.

extent of mixing in areas away from the break due to the buoyant thermal plume discharging the containment is a function of geometry, plume to atmosphere density ratio, and ratio of mentum to buoyancy forces (IDCOR 1983).

lecular diffusion is another mechanism which would provide mixing within the containment owing a postulated LOCA. Diffusion occurs due to concentration gradients. The rate of usion is too slow to expect mixing of large containment volumes in short times by itself, ough molecular diffusion would add to the other mixing processes previously discussed.

ority of the containment volume does not have significant barriers to obstruct mixing from the ous mechanisms. The steam generator and pressurizer subcompartments, the annulus between crane wall and containment wall, and the hoisting spaces are open at the top and bottom and nect with each other at various elevations (see Figure 6.2-56). Extensive use is made of ing at intermediate levels within the compartments. The quench and recirculation spray zles are located and oriented to cover as much area as possible. This design arrangement ances mixing by establishing air movement and flow paths. In summary, the design of the rnal containment structure allows free circulation and mixing of gases, while the spray system ances the circulation process throughout the containment.

lower reactor cavity and incore instrumentation tunnel are the only areas that may not be ctively mixed with the bulk containment volume. Since accumulation of water on the floor in lower reactor cavity is expected to be insignificant, the generation of hydrogen from olysis, in turn, would be insignificant in this area. Small amounts of hydrogen enter and exit tunnel area by diffusion; however, hydrogen accumulation and large concentration gradients ot occur due to the absence of a hydrogen source.

h diffusion being the only mixing mechanism present, the maximum concentration of rogen that can occur is equal to the maximum concentration that exists in the well mixed on just outside the entrance to this area.

ure 6.2-57 depicts the expected predominant circulation patterns within the containment after ination of the initial release from LOCA.

majority of gas mixing results from the spray systems. The recirculation spray entrains air, its predominantly downward motion forces the gas mixture to the lower elevations and, in

, up through and between the various compartments.

m pluming is a secondary mixing effect which assists in the overall gas mixing process. The m plume from the break is vertically upward from either the steam generator, pressurizer, or er reactor cavity subcompartment depending on the break location. This effect generally ances the mixing process in the region above the operating floor and within the compartment re the break occurs.

rogen generation from oxidation of zircaloy fuel cladding, radiolysis of the water in the core, hydrogen present in the reactor coolant system would be released through the break opening he containment. Local accumulation of hydrogen within the compartment where the break urred is unlikely due to the mixing action of the released effluent and the containment partment design which does not significantly impede the mixing process.

rogen generation from the radiolysis of water in the sump and corrosion of metals by the y would be generated over long periods of time. Due to the slow rates of release, diffusion and y mixing mechanisms would tend to keep the atmosphere mixed (IDCOR 1983).

failure modes and effects analysis performed for the hydrogen recombiner system is cribed in Section 7.3.

5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements reoperational performance test was performed by the supplier of the skid mounted portion of h hydrogen recombiner train before shipment. This test was accomplished by placing the system into operation. The hydrogen recombiner blower was started, the test air inlet was ned, and atmospheric air was allowed to flow through the subsystem. A minimum flow of 50 m was maintained and checked by the flowmeter. Hydrogen was added through a test nection to the rotameter of an equivalently-sized recombiner for a demonstration test at the ory (NUREG-0390) until a concentration of 4 percent hydrogen was reached in the gas am. The flow of hydrogen was increased slowly from one-half percent to 4 percent. Normal ration of the various components, together with a satisfactory temperature rise through the tric preheater and thermal recombiner and a check of the hydrogen concentration in the exit am, indicated proper operation of the train.

5.5 Instrumentation Requirements hydrogen recombiner system is initially started and monitored locally in the hydrogen mbiner building once the ventilation MODs are activated open from the main control room AC VP-1 panel. After the initial heatup of the system, the system operates automatically with mon alarms located in the control room to alert the operator of a system malfunction. Each rogen recombiner/analyzer train is totally independent of the other, with each train being ered from a separate Class IE emergency bus.

hydrogen recombiner system operating parameters are monitored, indicated, and controlled, lly or remotely, as follows:

following controls and instruments are located on the main board in the control room.

unciators that alarm when the following conditions exist:

1. Hydrogen recombiner bypassed
2. Hydrogen recombiner trouble
3. The hydrogen recombiner BYPASS pushbutton (when depressed) and loss of control power to hydrogen recombiner cubicle ventilation dampers are monitored by the plant computer.

following controls and instruments are located on the hydrogen recombiner panel in the rogen recombiner building:

1. Hydrogen recombiner
2. Air blast heat exchanger fan
3. Positive displacement blower t out annunciators that alarm when the following conditions exist:
1. Hydrogen recombiner air circuit breaker tripped
2. Hydrogen recombiner annunciator ground
3. Hydrogen recombiner control switch in STOP position
4. Reaction chamber gas temperature low
5. Reaction chamber gas temperature high
6. Heater outlet gas temperature high
7. Gas return temperature high
8. Positive displacement blower not running
9. Air blast heat exchanger not running
10. Inlet gas flow low cators that monitor the following parameters:
1. Inlet gas flow
2. Inlet gas pressure
3. Return gas pressure following hydrogen monitoring system controls and instruments are located on the main rd in the control room:
1. Two hydrogen concentration indicators (Train A and B)
2. One hydrogen concentration recorder (Train A)
3. Hydrogen concentration high annunciator
5. Hydrogen monitor trouble annunciator following hydrogen monitoring system controls and instruments are located in the hydrogen mbiner building:
1. Hydrogen analyzer cabinets: one hydrogen concentration indicator per cabinet
2. Hydrogen analyzer control cabinets:
a. one digital indicator for displaying parameters selectable by key pad for each control cabinet.
b. Alarm lights for system error, high concentration, high-high concentration, flow failure, analyzer power failure, and calibration-in-progress.
c. Manual auto-start switch.

diation monitor is provided to monitor the ventilation outlet of each hydrogen recombiner icle (one monitor per cubicle.)

6 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE TESTING sting program is implemented to measure primary containment leakage prior to initial ration of the plant and periodically throughout its operating life. The testing program includes ormance of Type A tests to measure the overall integrated leakage rate, Type B tests to detect measure local leakage across pressure-containing or leakage-limiting boundaries other than es, and Type C tests to measure containment isolation valve leakage rates.

leakage tests are performed in accordance with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR 50, ctor Containment Leakage Testing for Water Cooled Power Reactors, as described below.

6.1 Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test (Type A) st program for Type A testing is scheduled and conducted in accordance with Appendix J of CFR 50. A preoperational test was performed at Pa, the calculated peak primary containment rnal pressure resulting from a design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and specified in Technical Specifications. The preoperational Type A test was preceded by a structural grity test at a pressure of 51.8 psig (1.15 Pd).

Type A test establishes the preoperational measured containment leakage rate, Lam, which fies that the maximum allowable leakage rate, La, used in the accident analysis (Chapter 15) is exceeded.

h Type A test is preceded by a general inspection of the accessible interior and exterior aces of the containment for structural deterioration. All defects are reported and resolved prior onducting the test.

t instrumentation includes an absolute manometer, temperature detectors, and dew point sors.

containment isolation valves are closed by their normal mode of operation. Where possible, s subjected to containment atmosphere following a LOCA are drained and vented during the e A test. Table 6.2-70 identifies those systems that penetrate the containment which are not ned and vented during the Type A tests. Systems that are normally filled with water and rating under post-accident conditions will not be drained and vented. For those systems that uld be vented and drained but are not, the Type C leakage will be added to the Type A leakage tainment leakage rate testing is performed in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate ting Program described in the Technical Specifications and referenced codes and standards.

er completion of all procedural prerequisites, the containment is pressurized to above Pa and wed to stabilize for a minimum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The plant computer or portable computer is used data acquisition and/or leakage rate calculations. The data acquisition package reads all the log inputs (pressure, temperature, and dew point temperature), converts these readings into ineering units, and stores/prints these values to be used for leakage rate calculations. The age rate is calculated using either the total time or mass point method. Total time calculates age rate based on the most recent data point and the data point taken at the beginning of the

. Each successive leakage calculation is based on a longer period of time. The overall leakage is determined by applying a linear regression analysis to the leakage rates at each data point.

distribution for 95 percent confidence limits is added to the calculated leakage rate to rmine the upper confidence limit. The mass point method consists of periodically calculating masses within containment over a period of time from pressure, temperature, and dew point ervations during the test. The air masses are computed using the ideal gas law. The leakage is then determined by plotting the air mass as a function of time, using a least-squares fit to rmine the slope. The leak rate is expressed as a percentage of containment air mass lost in 24 rs. When the containment is at this pressure, a 95 percent confidence level is calculated using distribution. The sum of the leakage rate and the 95 percent confidence level is the upper fidence limit. A verification test is performed following each Type A test. This test provides a hod of assuring that systematic error or bias is given adequate consideration. The verification consists of a superimposed leakage rate equal to 75 percent to 125 percent of La, which is sured independently from Type A instrumentation. This air change and that which is sured by the containment leakage Type A instrumentation must agree within 25 percent.

containment leakage monitoring system is shown on Figure 6.2-53.

ording to Appendix J of 10 CFR 50, the following classes of penetrations require Type B ing:

1. Primary containment penetrations whose design incorporates resilient seals, gaskets, or sealant compounds, and piping penetrations fitted with expansion bellows and electrical penetrations fitted with flexible metal seal assemblies
2. Air lock door seals, including door operated mechanical penetrations which are part of the primary containment boundary
3. Doors with resilient seals or gaskets penetrations requiring Type B testing are: Fuel transfer tube flange, fuel transfer tube ows, equipment hatch flange, equipment hatch manway and operating shaft, personnel ock, and electrical penetrations.

ctrical penetrations fall under Class 1. Eighty electrical penetrations are provided for carrying trical circuits through an aperture (nozzle) into the containment pressure barrier. Each trical penetration utilizes a welded header plate design to maintain containment integrity at aperture. The 6.9 kV penetration design provides for the maintenance of the containment sure boundary at each feed-through by incorporating Viton O-ring seals at both ends of the etration feed-through assembly. The low voltage penetration design utilizes metal pression fittings to maintain integrity at the feed-through. Each penetration has a test valve ted and connected to the header plate of the penetration outside of the containment and is used etermine seal leakage.

fuel transfer tube consists of a sleeve welded to the containment liner and attached to the sfer tube by means of a bellows connection. The area between the tube and the sleeve is vided with a test connection for testing the bellows seal connection to a pressure of Pa. The transfer tube blind flange is double gasketed and can be pressurized to Pa for leakage rate ing.

penetrations falling under Class 2 include personnel access lock, escape hatch, equipment h, and equipment hatch manway and operating shaft. These are sealed by means of covers ch incorporate double O-ring seals. The space between the seals can be pressurized to Pa and age rate determined by the makeup air method. The personnel access lock and escape hatch integral assemblies and are tested as one unit.

test pressure equal to Pa is applied against the penetration seals for determination of etration leakage rate. Either the makeup air or the pressure drop method is employed to rmine the penetration leakage rate.

bined with the total leakage of the Type C test, they are less than 60 percent of La, as defined Appendix J.

6.3 Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Rate Test (Type C) le 6.2-65 lists all containment isolation valves and identifies those requiring Type C tests g with the test methods used. The following penetrations are excluded for the following ons:

Penetrations Reason for Type C Testing Exemption 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, These penetrations are directly 47, 48, 49, 50, connected to the steam generator 74, 75, 76, 79, secondary side and, therefore, are 80, 81, 82, 122A, considered an extension of the B, C, & D, 123 primary containment.

Class 2 instrument piping outside containment is not considered to rupture and these instrument lines are 9A, 13C, 33A, 68 leakage tested as a part of the Type A test in accordance with the recommendations contained in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan 6.2.6,Section II.

re are two methods used in Type C tests. With either method, each valve to be tested is closed ormal operation without any preliminary exercise or adjustment.

Method 1, the section of piping with the containment isolation valves is isolated from the ainder of the fluid system by using valves or blanking flanges as necessary, and the piping is ned (if applicable). The inside and outside containment isolation valves are tested individually h air at a pressure equal to Pa. Test air is applied at a test connection on the inboard side ard the inside of the containment structure) of the valve to be tested, and the leakage air is ted through a test vent on the outboard side of the valve. A flowmeter, connected to the sure source is used to measure leakage through the containment isolation valve as a function me. In this procedure, airflow across the valve seat is always in the inside-to-outside tainment structure direction.

Method 2, test pressure is applied between the two isolation valves where the innermost valve ide containment) is a diaphragm, symmetric butterfly type valve, or a globe type valve where test pressure is under the seat. The outermost valve (outside containment) is tested in the ward direction. The innermost valve (inside containment), is tested in the reverse direction by test pressure. This test is equally effective for diaphragm and symmetric butterfly valves and ast equally or more conservative for globe valves with the test pressure under the seat.

licable).

inside and outside containment isolation valves are tested simultaneously with air at a sure equal to Pa. Test air is applied at a test connection inside the containment between the valves, and leakage air is vented through a test vent on the opposite side of each valve. A meter connected to the pressure source is used to measure leakage through the containment ation valves as a function of time.

e containment isolation valves may be tested against a static head of fluid on its downstream

. For these valves, the test pressure is corrected to include the pressure attributable to the static sure, therefore, providing a P equal to Pa plus the static head.

acceptance criteria for the combined leakage for all penetrations and valves subject to Types nd C testing are equal to or less than 60 percent of the maximum allowable leakage rate of the tainment.

6.4 Scheduling and Reporting of Periodic Tests veillance frequency of primary containment integrated leakage rate tests (Type A) is based n performance of leakage tests that meet the requirements of Appendix J. Type A tests are y conducted while the plant is in the shutdown condition.

tainment resilient seal penetration tests, including electrical penetrations, (Type B tests) are ormed prior to initial criticality and periodically thereafter. An extended test interval for Type sts may be increased up to a maximum of once per 120 months.

personnel air lock full volume test is performed prior to initial fuel load and at least once per ty month intervals thereafter. If the air lock is open during periods when the containment grity is not required, door seals must be tested prior to establishing containment integrity. If air lock is opened when containment integrity is required, door seals should be tested within 7 s after such opening. If the air lock door is routinely used for access more frequently than once ry 7 days, the air lock door seals are tested at least once every 30 days. The air lock door has able seals and testing of the seals fulfills the 7 day requirement. The test pressure is no less Pa. Seal tests are not to be substituted for the 30 month air lock test.

tainment isolation valve testing (Type C tests) is performed prior to initial criticality and at a uency up to a maximum of 75 months, based on performance.

port of each periodic Type A test is maintained at the site and made available to the Nuclear ulatory Commission (NRC) for review upon request. Any instance of leakage exceeding the orized limits in the technical specifications of the license are reported to NRC. The report tains an analysis and interpretation of the Type A test results. In addition, the report has a mary analysis of the periodic Type B and C tests performed since the last Type A test.

6.5 Special Testing Requirements e A, B, and C tests, as applicable, are conducted following containment structure difications in accordance with Paragraph IV.A of Appendix J, 10 CFR 50.

containment structure enclosure is evacuated by the supplementary leak collection and ase system (SLCRS) to slightly negative pressure immediately following the design bases dent initiation of the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS). This ensures all age from the primary containment is passed through the high-efficiency particulate air filters he SLCRS prior to release from the containment structure enclosure, engineered safety feature ding, main steam valve building, hydrogen recombiner building or auxiliary building which all connected to the SLCRS.

s filtration will ensure a reduction of effective primary leakage released to the environment.

SLCRS was tested prior to initial fuel loading to verify that a slightly negative pressure can btained and maintained following an ESFAS actuation in the areas mentioned above. This test be conducted again at each refueling or at intervals not to exceed once per refueling. Some age through piping systems may bypass the secondary containment. This leakage is limited to design leak rates through these piping systems. The bypass leakage penetrations, identified in le 6.2-65, in addition to the Type B bypass leakage penetrations which consist of the fuel sfer tube and the fuel transfer tube enclosure, are tested in accordance with Sections 6.2.6.2 6.2.6.3, and the combination of their leakage rates is compared with the maximum allowable

. When the actual leakage rate approaches this limit, corrective action will be taken.

7 REFERENCES FOR SECTION 6.2 1 Aerojet Nuclear Company, 1976. RELAP4/MOD5: A Computer Program for Transient Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of Nuclear Reactors and Related Systems. Users Manual Vol I-III, Report ANCR-NUREG-1335.

2 American Nuclear Society (ANS) 1979, American National Standard for Decay Heat Power in Light Water Reactors, ANSI/ANS-5.1-1979, August 1979.

3 Atomics International Division Rockwell International. Test Procedure - Hydrogen Analyzer Systems, No. N019DTP120003.

4 Baer, Robert L. (Office of Reactor Regulation Division of Project Management, (USNRC) 1978. Letter to Mr. Gordan Pinsky (Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation).

5 Bloom, G.R., et al., Hydrogen Distribution in a Containment with a High Velocity Hydrogen-Steam Source. Presented at the Second International Workshop on the Impact of Hydrogen on Water Reactor Safety, Albuquerque, New Mexico, October 3-7, 1982.

Laboratory, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Holden, Massachusetts. November 1982.

7 Crank, J. The Mathematics of Diffusion. Oxford University Press, 1956, pp 186-199.

8 Gido, R.G. Liner-Concrete Heat Transfer Study for Nuclear Power Plant Containments, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, LA-7089-MS Informal Report NRC-4, issued January 1978.

9 Gido, R.G. Subcompartment Analysis Procedures. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.

NUREG/CR-1199, LA-8169-MS, Informal Report R-4. December 1979.

10 Hanover, Stephen H. (Chairman Advisory Committee of Reactor Safeguards) 1969. Letter to Hon. Glenn T. Seaborg (Chairman USAEC) Report on Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.

11 Hanover, Stephen H. (Chairman Advisory Committee of Reactor Safeguards) 1969. Letter to Hon. Glenn T. Seaborg (Chairman USAEC) Report on Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.

12 Hilliard, R.K., et al., 1970. Removal of Iodine and Particles from Containment Atmosphere by Sprays. Battelle-Northwest, Richland, Wash. BNWL-1244.

13 Hilliard, R.K., and Coleman, L.F. Natural Transport Effects on Fission Product Behavior in the Containment Systems Experiment. BNWL-1457, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington. December 1970.

14 IDCOR Program Report, Technical Report 12.2, Hydrogen Distribution in Reactor Containment Building. September 1983.

15 Idel'chik, I.E. 1960. Handbook of Hydraulic Resistance, Published pursuant to an agreement with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.

16 Knudsen, J.G. and Hilliard, R.K. 1969. Fission Product Transport by Natural Processes in Containment Vessels. Battelle-Northwest, Richland, Wash. BNWL-943.

17 LOCTIC - A Computer Code to Determine the Pressure and Temperature Response of Dry Containments to a Loss-of-Coolant Accident, SWND-1, (SWEC), 1971. Letter from W.J.L. Kennedy to P.A. Morris et al.

18 Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Reactor Safety and Technology Quarterly Progress Report, 1976. LA-NUREG-6447-PR, p 53.

19 Moody, L.J. 1965. Maximum Flow Rate of a Single Component, Two-Phase Mixture.

Journal of Heat Transfer Transactions, ASME Vol. 87, p 134-142.

21 NS-TMA-2075. 1979. A letter from T. M. Anderson, Westinghouse, to J. F. Stolz, 1979.

Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Model for Containment Design, March 1979 Version.

22 AECL Test Report MIL3-34325-TR-001, Rev. 0, Test Report for Reduced-Scale Testing for Millstone 3 Replacement Containment Sump Strainers, Dated March 20, 2007.

23 Report MIL3-34325-TR-002, Rev. 0, Large-Scale Testing for Millstone 3 Replacement Containment Sump Strainers, Dominion - Millstone, Dated April 2007.

24 NS-TMA-2075. 1979. A letter from T. M. Anderson, Westinghouse, to J. F. Stolz, 1979.

Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Model for Containment Design - March 1979 Version.

25 Nystrom, J.B. Experimental Evaluation of a Reactor Containment Sump, MNPS-3, Alden Research Laboratory, Report No. 114-82/M10XXF, October 1982.

26 Sandia National Laboratory and General Physics Corporation. NUREG/CR-2726, SAND 82-1137, R3, Light Water Reactor Hydrogen Manual. June 1983.

27 Spray Engineering Company. Spray Analysis on SPRACo Model 1713A Nozzles.

Nashua, New Hampshire.

28 USAEC 1974b. Evaluation of LOCA Hydrodynamics. Regulatory Staff: Technical Review.

29 WCAP-6174, 1974, Bordelon, F. M. et al., SATAN-VI Program: Comprehensive Space-Time Dependent Analysis of Loss-of-Coolant.

30 WCAP-8170, 1974. Collier, G. et al., 1974, Calculational Model for Core Reflooding After a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (WREFLOOD Code).

31 WCAP-8264-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-8312-A (Nonproprietary), Revision 2, Westinghouse Corp. 1975, Westinghouse Mass Energy Release for Containment Design.

32 WCAP-8339, 1974, Burdelon, F. M.; Massie, H. W.; Zordum, J. A. Westinghouse Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model - Summary.

33 WCAP-9220, 1978, Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model.

Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. October 2005.

35 WCAP-8264-P-A, Rev. 1, August 1975 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8312-A, Rev. 2 (Nonproprietary), Topical Report Westinghouse Mass and Energy Release Data Containment Design.

36 WCAP-12035, Containment Subcompartment Analysis Utilizing Leak Before Break Technology for Watts Bar Units 1 and 2, November 1988.

37 WCAP-10325-P-A, May 1983 (Proprietary), WCAP-10326-A (Nonproprietary),

Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Model for Containment Design, March 1979 Version.

38 WCAP-8302, June 1974 (Proprietary), SATAN VI Program: Comprehensive Space-Time Dependent Analysis of Loss-of Coolant.

39 WCAP-9220-P-A, February 1978 (Proprietary), Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model, February 1978 Version.

40 Dominion Topical Report, DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A, GOTHIC Methodology for Analyzing the Response to Postulated Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment, September 2006.

41 NRC Letter, Kewaunee Power Station (Kewaunee), Millstone Power Station, Units Nos.

2 and 3 (Millstone 2 and 3), North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (North Anna 1 and 2) and Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Surry 1 and 2) - Approval of Dominions Topical Report DOM-NAF-3, GOTHIC Methodology for Analyzing the Response to Postulated Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment (TAC Nos. MC8832, MC8833, MC8834, MC8835 and MC8836, dated August 30, 2006.

42 WCAP-8821-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-8859-A (Nonproprietary), Land, R.E.,

TRANFLO Steam Generator Code Description, June 2001.

43 WCAP-8822 (Proprietary) and WCAP-8860 (Nonproprietary), Land R.E., Mass and Energy Releases Following a Steam Line Rupture, September 1976; WCAP-8822-S1-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-8860-S1-A (Nonproprietary), Osborn, M.P. and Love, D.S.

Supplement 1 - Calculations of Steam Superheat in Mass/Energy Releases Following a Steam Line Rupture, September 1986; WCAP-8822-S2-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-8860-S2-A (Nonproprietary), Butler, J.C. and Linn, P.A., Supplement 2 - Impact of Steam Superheat in Mass/Energy Releases Following a Steam Line Rupture for Dry and Subatmospheric Containment Designs, September 1986.

44 WCAP-7907-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-7907-A (Nonproprietary), Burnett, T.W.T, McIntyre, C.J. and Buker, J.C., LOFTRAN Code Description, April 1984.

46 Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-11-5, Westinghouse LOCA Mass and Energy Release Calculation Issues, July 25, 2011.

47 PWROG-17034-P-A, Evaluation of the WCAP-10325-P-A Westinghouse LOCA Mass

& Energy Release Methodology, March 2020.

48 WCAP-16996-P-A, Revision 1, (Proprietary), 2016, Kobelak, J. R., et al., Realistic LOCA Evaluation Methodology Applied to the Full Spectrum of Break Sizes (FULL SPECTRUM LOCA Methodology).

BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT Mass/Energy Pressure (3) Temperature (4)

Power Level Break Size Break Assumed

(%) (ft2) Type Failure (1) Entrainment (2) Peak (psia) Time (sec) Peak (F) Time (se 100.4* 1.4 DER MSIV No 47.58 150.3 343 12.8 100.4* 14 DER MSIV Yes 45.59 126.2 250.3 120.2 100.4* 0.653 Split No 40.19 290.2 245 67.0 100.4* 0.653 Split MSIV No 42.02 314.3 245 67.6 70** 1.4 DER MSIV No 48.2 178.3 341.3 12.8 70** 1.4 DER MSIV Yes 45.54 148.3 248.6 142.3 70** 0.659 Split No 40.56 332.3 245 62.2 70** 0.659 Split MSIV No 42.51 358.3 247.9 274.4 30** 1.4 DER MSIV No 48.77 158.2 339.8 12.6 30** 1.4 DER MSIV Yes 45.01 115.1 246.4 113.1 30** 0.671 Split No 42.21 282.2 248.5 276.5 30** 0.671 Split MSIV No 44.24 310.3 252.7 302.5 0 1.4 DER MSIV No 52.85 194.3 338.1 12.61 0 1.4 DER MSIV Yes 47.56 140.2 253.1 138.3 0 0.512 Split No 44.92 412.4 253.4 406.4 0 0.512 Split MSIV No 46.95 444.4 257.2 438.5 (1) All cases assume a MFIV failure. This column identifies whether the mass and energy release analysis also assumed an MSIV failure. The GOTHIC containment analyses assume the failure of an emergency bus to minimize containment cooling.

(2) Identified cases with entrainment in the faulted loop steam generator assess the effect of this assumption.

(3) Cases assume maximum initial containment pressure of 14.2 psia to maximize containment pressure.

(4) Cases assume minimum initial containment pressure of 10.4 psia to maximize containment temperature.

  • Uncertainty of 0.4% is included, for a total core power of 3723 MWt assumed in the analysis.

TABLE 6.2-2 PASSIVE HEAT SINKS (1)

Beginning Boundary Slab Description Ending Boundary Area Case Square Paint Coeff. Paint Coeff.

No. Case Description Feet Exposure BTUx(hr-ft2-F) Width Material BTUx(hr-ft2-F) Expos Refueling Cavity Floor (2)

Stainless 784 Containment 0.450 in. 1,000 Contain 1 and Liner Steel 4.320 ft Concrete Refueling Cavity Wall (2)

Stainless 6,944 Containment 0.450 in. 1,000 Contain 2 and Liner Steel 3.00 ft. Concrete 120,58 3 Interior Concrete Containment 1,000 1.360 ft. Concrete 0 Insulate 4

4 Interior Concrete 16,218 Containment 1,000 2.11 ft Concrete 0 Insulate 5 Interior Concrete 5,938 Containment 1,000 3.00 ft Concrete 0 Insulate Supporting Pedestals for 6 1,815 Containment 1,000 1.75 ft Concrete 0 Insulate SG Containment Shell 34,827 Containment 1,000 0.514 in. Carbon Steel 1,000 Atmosph 7

(above ground) 4.50 ft Concrete Containment Shell 22,325 Containment 1,000 0.514 in. Carbon Steel 0 Insulate 8

(below ground) 4.50 ft Concrete Containment Floor 11,000 Water 1,000 2.00 ft Concrete 0 Insulate 9 0.250 in. Carbon Steel 10.0 ft Concrete Containment Dome 30,852 Containment 1,000 0.554 in. Carbon Steel 1,000 Atmosp 10 2.56 ft Concrete

Beginning Boundary Slab Description Ending Boundary Area Case Square Paint Coeff. Paint Coeff.

No. Case Description Feet Exposure BTUx(hr-ft2-F) Width Material BTUx(hr-ft2-F) Expos (2)

Stainless 11 Valves 1,409 Containment 1.29 in. 0 Insulate Steel 12 Valves 452 Containment 1,000 0.710 in. Carbon Steel 0 Insulate (2)

Stainless 13 Piping Wall < 0.4 inches 11,970 Containment 0.240 in. 0 Insulate Steel (2)

Stainless 14 Piping Wall > 0.4 inches 1,867 Containment 0.658 in. 0 Insulate Steel 15 Piping Wall < 0.4 inches 8,112 Containment 1,000 0.277 in. Carbon Steel 0 Insulate 16 Piping Wall > 0.4 inches 1,160 Containment 1,000 0.990 in. Carbon Steel 0 Insulate Structural Steel 453,77 17 Containment 1,000 0.218 in. Carbon Steel 0 Insulate Supports, etc. 6 Racks, Ducts, and Misc. 163,03 18 Containment 1,000 0.113 in. Carbon Steel 0 Insulate Sinks 7 (2)

Stainless 19 Equipment 9,027 Containment 0.365 in. 0 Insulate Steel 20 Equipment 30,328 Containment 1,000 0.781 in. Carbon Steel 0 Insulate (1) The containment analysis was performed utilizing the most up to date structural heat sink data for MPS-3 in accordance with the Millstone mass tracking program. Millstone Nuclear Power Station Common Engineering Procedure C EN 114, Containment Mass Tracking provides instructions for reporting a tracking the amount and type of the identified changes to materials inside containment as well as containment volume as a result of various design modificati The impact of variations in structural heat sink data on containment analysis is routinely evaluated prior to each design modification. If required, the analyse record are reanalyzed and the associated documentation updated.

(2) Surface is not painted.

TABLE 6.2-3 CONTAINMENT DESIGN EVALUATION PARAMETERS eneral Information - Containment A. Interior minimum design pressure (psia) 8.0 B. Internal design pressure (psig 45 C. Containment liner design temperature (F) 280 D. Minimum free volume (ft3) 2.26 x 106 E. Design leak rate (weight percent/day) 0.3 Initial Conditions A. Reactor and Reactor Coolant System

1. Reactor - maximum calculated power MWt 3,723
2. Reactor coolant system volume (ft3)

(excluding pressurizer and surge line) 10,597

3. Temperature (F) (vessel average) 594.5
4. System pressure, maximum (psia) 2300 B. Emergency Core Cooling System (Safety Injection Accumulators)
1. Safety injection accumulators minimum water volume (ft3/unit) 885
2. Pressure range (psia) 636-694
3. Temperature (F)80-120 C. Containment
1. Pressure 10.4-14.2
2. Inside Temperature (F)75-125
3. Outside Temperature (F) 103
4. Relative Humidity (percent) 0.0-100
5. Service Water Temperature (F) 33-80 (1)

D. Refueling Water Storage Tank

1. Minimum Usable Volume (gal) 1,072,886 (1)
2. RWST Temperature (F)40-100 (1)

TE:

These parameters are conservative for the containment analysis but are not applicable for the Service Water System or Refueling Water Storage Tank Design. Design bases for these systems can be found in Technical Specifications 3/4.7.5 and 3/4.5.4, respectively.

Break Location Peak Pressure (psia) Time of Peak Pressure (sec)

Hot Leg 56.53 21.13 Pump Suction 54.63 21.21 mp Suction (3 ft2) 51.71 32.66 Pump Discharge 48.12 16.82

SENSITIVITY Initial nitial Pressure (psia) Temperature (F) Initial RH (%) Peak Pressure (psia) 14.2 125 0 56.09 a 14.2 75 0 56.03 14.2 125 50 55.57 14.2 75 50 55.86 14.2 125 100 55.15 14.2 75 100 55.81 The sensitivity studies were performed for the SPU project, and the conclusions remain valid for the current plant iguration. However, the results have not been updated from the SPU project. The limiting case reanalyzed with ect mass and energy data yields a peak pressure of 56.53 psia.

Event Time (sec) cident begins 0.0 A setpoint reached (10 psig) 1.93 ontainment peak pressure occurs (56.53 psia) 21.13 d of Blowdown 23.6 ouble Ended Hot Leg Break

Time of Peak Temperature Break Location Peak Temperature (F) (sec)

Hot Leg 266.89 20.83 Pump Suction 264.07 21.12 mp Suction (3 ft2) 258.99 32.36 Pump Discharge 263.57 16.82

TEMPERATURE Event Time (sec) cident begins 0.0 A setpoint reached (10 psig) 1.93 ontainment peak temperature occurs (266.89F) 20.83 d of Blowdown 23.6 ouble Ended Hot Leg Break

Initial Pressure Initial Initial Relative Pressure at 1 Hour Pressure at 5 (psia) Temperature (F) Humidity (%) Single Failure (psia) Hours (psia) 14.2 75 0 1 EDG 28.5 22.6 a 14.2 125 0 1 EDG 30.2 22.1 14.2 75 50 1 EDG 28.4 22.3 10.4 125 50 1 EDG 25 16.9 14.2 75 0 MCC 22.4 22.5

a. The sensitivity studies were performed for the SPU project, and the conclusions remain valid for the current plant configuration. However, the results have not been updated from the SPU project. The limiting case reanalyzed with corrected mass and energy data yields a pressure of 25.1 psia at 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

Initial Pressure Initial Initial Relative Pressure at 1 Hour Pressure at 5 (psia) Temperature (F) Humidity (%) Single Failure (psia) Hours (psia) 14.2 75 0 1 EDG 28.6 25.1

DEPRESSURIZATION Event Time (sec) cident begins 0.0 ontainment peak pressure occurs (54.62 psia) 21.2 d of Blowdown 25.8 fety Injection becomes effective 45.5 ench spray becomes effective 71.9 circulation spray become effective 5105 itchover to recirculation mode 5855 ench spray terminates 10907 ximum post-Quench Spray peak pressure occurs (25.2 psia) 15709 ouble Ended Pump Suction Break

Initial Initial Single Active Containment Containment RWST Sump Tempera Break Type Failure Pressure (psia) Temperature (F) Temperature (F) at RSS Start (

Double ended pump discharge 1EDG 14.2 125 100 221.2 Double ended pump suction 1EDG 14.2 125 100 230.7 a Double ended pump suction 1EDG 14.2 125 80 220.6 (1)

Double ended hot leg 1EDG 14.2 125 100 187.9 Pump suction - 3 square feet 1EDG 14.2 125 100 211.9 Cold leg slot break - 8 inches 1EDG 14.2 125 100 199.7 Hot leg slot break - 8 inches 1EDG 14.2 125 100 190.9

a. Limiting sump temperature case based upon a 100F RWST temperature was re-run using an 80F RWST temperature. Other cases should experience a similar temperature reduction.

NDED RUPTURE-LIMITING CASE FOR CONTAINMENT SUMP TEMPERATURE Event Time (sec) cident begins 0.0 ntainment peak pressure occurs 21.51 d of Blowdown 25.8 rogen accumulator injects 26.6 fety Injection actuates 45.5 ench spray actuates 72.1 S auto setpoint actuates 4,366 S pump flow begins 4,535 itchover to recirculation completed 5,270 ench spray terminates 11,390

IN STEAM LINE BREAK AT 0% POWER-LIMITING CASE FOR CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ime (sec) Event Accident occurs, ruptured steam generator and turbine plant piping blowdown 0.0 into containment begins 0.47 Steam Line Isolation setpoint for closing the MSIV and FWIV is reached 4.0 Containment pressure setpoint for spray initiation is reached 7.47 FWIV is fully closed 12.47 MSIV is fully closed 74.24 Quench spray enters containment atmosphere 194.3 Peak containment pressure is reached 1800.0 AFW is isolated by operator action 1801.6 Steam release to containment ends

MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK AT FULL POWER PLUS UNCERTAINTY POWER-LIMITING CASE FOR CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE ime (sec) Event Accident occurs, ruptured steam generator and turbine plant piping blowdown 0.0 into containment begins 0.73 Steam Line Isolation setpoint for closing the MSIV and FWIV is reached 6.06 Containment pressure setpoint for spray initiation is reached 7.73 FWIV is fully closed 12.73 MSIV is fully closed 12.81 Peak containment temperature is reached 76.34 Quench spray enters containment atmosphere 1800.0 AFW is isolated by operator action 1802.0 Steam release to containment ends

AND ENERGY RELEASE ANALYSIS Parameters Value re Thermal Power (c) (MWt) 3723 S Total Flow Rate (Lbm/sec) 37,343.6 ssel Outlet Temperature (a) (F) 627.6 re Inlet Temperature (a) (F) 561.4 ssel Average Temperature (a) (F) 594.5 tial Steam Generator Steam Pressure (psia) 948 am Generator Design F TP (%) 0 tial Steam Generator Secondary Side Mass (Lbm) 128,622.0 cumulator Water volume (ft3) per accumulator (minimum) (b) 884.7 N2 cover gas pressure (psia) (minimum) 664.7 Temperature (F) 120 start time, (sec) [total time from beginning of event, which includes the 45.3 ximum delay from reaching the setpoint xiliary Feedwater Flow (gpm/steam generator) (Minimum Safeguards) 0 xiliary Feedwater Flow (gpm/steam generator) (Maximum Safeguards) 0 es:

e thermal power, RCS total flow rate, RCS coolant temperatures, and steam generator ondary side mass include appropriate uncertainty and/or allowance.

RCS coolant temperatures include +4.0F allowance for instrument error and deadband and a +1.0F bias.

Does not include accumulator line volume.

Core rated power including uncertainties for calorimetric error.

FRACTION Time (sec) Decay Heat Generation Rate (Btu/Btu) 10 0.053876 15 0.050401 20 0.048018 40 0.042401 60 0.039244 80 0.037065 100 0.035466 150 0.032724 200 0.030936 400 0.027078 600 0.024931 800 0.023389 1000 0.022156 1500 0.019921 2000 0.018315 4000 0.014781 6000 0.013040 8000 0.012000 10,000 0.011262 15,000 0.010097 20,000 0.009350 40,000 0.007778 60,000 0.006958 80,000 0.006424 100,000 0.006021 150,000 0.005323 200,000 0.004847 400,000 0.003770

Time (sec) Decay Heat Generation Rate (Btu/Btu) 600,000 0.003201 800,000 0.002834 1,000,000 0.002580 2,000,000 0.001909 4,000,000 0.001355

ENERGY RELEASE Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.001 47795.4 31187.6 47794.1 31185.8 0.1 42089.2 27746 27283.5 17762 0.2 37063.5 24362.6 24082.9 15581.7 0.3 36315 23799.1 21267.4 13572.7 0.4 35130.8 23005.1 19907.4 12476 0.5 34461.7 22564.8 19100.5 11760.2 0.6 34401.1 22532.3 18577.5 11262 0.7 34011.5 22320.7 18189.3 10886.7 0.8 33265.3 21907.7 17912.9 10609.1 0.9 32508.6 21507.7 17702.3 10392.8 1.0 32122.3 21369.2 17535.9 10218.5 1.1 31782.6 21270 17459.7 10109.3 1.2 31368.7 21113.1 17463.7 10055.2 1.3 30819.2 20857.1 17509.1 10031.4 1.4 30179.6 20527.8 17581.5 10028.7 1.5 29585.8 20215.8 17666.3 10039.2 1.6 29101.9 19971.1 17755.9 10058 1.7 28662.7 19752.4 17840.7 10079.4 1.8 28141.7 19468.8 17910.5 10097.3 1.9 27520.5 19101.7 17959.6 10108.5 2.0 26889.6 18717.5 17989.4 10112.7 2.1 26354.8 18395 18000.3 10109.9 2.2 25888.8 18118.9 17994.2 10100.4 2.3 25421.6 17834.4 17969.1 10082.6 2.4 24937.2 17527.5 17924.9 10056.2

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 2.5 24445.5 17205.1 17863.6 10021.7 2.6 23999.6 16907.9 17788.4 9980.63 2.7 23612.4 16650.8 17701.8 9934.12 2.8 23255.1 16410.6 17607.6 9884 2.9 22900.7 16164.7 17501 9827.5 3.0 22578 15935.8 17388.2 9767.83 3.1 22263.4 15705.7 17266.6 9703.51 3.2 21987.4 15498.8 17141.2 9637.08 3.3 21743.1 15311.9 17010.7 9567.94 3.4 21517.3 15133.8 16878.1 9497.6 3.5 21317.6 14971.2 16740.9 9424.62 3.6 21135.6 14818.2 16601.9 9350.59 3.7 20972.1 14675.7 16460.4 9275.03 3.8 20825.8 14543.5 16314.7 9197.19 3.9 20702.2 14426.7 16169 9119.19 4.0 20600.1 14324.1 16016.4 9037.33 4.2 20488.6 14185.6 15605 8813.46 4.4 20371 14048.8 15167.4 8576.81 4.6 20262.6 13939.8 14752.5 8354.85 4.8 20178.1 13861 14473.1 8211.46 5.0 20107.6 13784.3 14163.7 8047.92 5.2 20114.4 13725.7 13698.2 7794.13 5.4 20178.4 13691.4 13337.5 7602.61 5.6 20262.5 13659.2 12990.9 7418.65 5.8 20387.5 13640.3 12673 7250.68 6.0 20553.5 13636.6 12378.6 7094.92

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 6.2 20763.9 13658.4 12069.9 6929.53 6.4 21016.4 13701.2 11771.4 6769.89 6.6 21350.1 13786.2 11493.8 6621.86 6.8 14556 10347.5 11221.6 6476.46 7.0 16475.5 11454.3 10956.7 6334.12 7.2 16605.6 11472 10692.3 6191.75 7.4 16661 11428.7 10458.9 6066.94 7.6 16756.8 11430.5 10224.2 5939.91 7.8 16796.1 11400.2 9992.51 5814.22 8.0 16842.6 11353 9771.09 5694.36 8.2 16933.3 11370.6 9556.07 5578.08 8.4 16927.7 11318.4 9346.13 5464.53 8.6 16937.7 11265.2 9136.24 5350.9 8.8 16985.3 11240.1 8930.95 5240.13 9.0 17004.5 11205.3 8729.3 5131.62 9.2 16691.1 10984.9 8527.1 5022.92 9.4 16754.6 10968.5 8327.72 4916.06 9.6 16817.3 10955.4 8128.62 4809.94 9.8 16852.4 10930.2 7933.4 4706.28 0.0 16831.8 10875.2 7740.25 4604.09 0.2 16779.3 10805.4 7551.13 4504.43 0.4 16692.6 10719.6 7365.35 4406.92 0.6 16563.8 10613.3 7180.42 4310.19 0.8 16386.8 10484.1 7001.59 4217.14 1.0 16157.6 10329.1 6823.02 4124.43 1.2 15887.6 10154.9 6647.97 4034.05

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.4 15597.7 9972.91 6476.87 3946.15 1.6 15306.1 9792.52 6310.4 3861.16 1.8 15021.3 9618.71 6148.79 3778.99 2.0 14739.9 9449.14 5992.51 3699.98 2.2 14456.5 9281.33 5842.57 3624.37 2.4 14165.2 9111.68 5697.33 3551.32 2.6 13864.5 8939.44 5557.78 3481.25 2.8 13554.5 8764.52 5422.35 3413.33 3.0 13240 8589.53 5292.77 3348.49 3.2 12922.8 8415.37 5167.88 3286.07 3.4 12604 8242.88 5046.81 3225.6 3.6 12284.7 8072.58 4929.64 3167.16 3.8 11964.8 7904.79 4815.27 3110.21 4.0 11646.6 7740.79 4704.87 3055.27 4.2 11328.5 7579.52 4598.04 3002.12 4.4 10997.6 7413.96 4493.21 2949.81 4.6 10632.1 7233.7 4386.25 2896.45 4.8 10240.5 7042.95 4273.69 2840.41 5.0 9822.79 6841.57 4148.26 2779.01 5.2 9392.24 6636.91 4007.08 2711.84 5.4 8949.2 6425.38 3851.26 2639.63 5.6 8456.37 6162.98 3674.97 2558.11 5.8 7166.78 5786.12 3497.55 2476.27 6.0 6348.18 5511.53 3317.7 2390.99 6.2 5737.02 5201.31 3139.23 2304.18 6.4 5259.75 4910.09 2967.81 2222.23

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 6.6 4863.21 4659.34 2805.68 2146.11 6.8 4532.78 4443.57 2649.88 2075.1 7.0 4284.66 4247.94 2500.91 2008.94 7.2 4043.49 4061.98 2360.03 1947.8 7.4 3805.06 3865.94 2228.4 1890.51 7.6 3547.56 3666.19 2104.03 1837.05 7.8 3272.06 3469.81 1987.13 1787.72 8.0 2988.86 3268.81 1878.9 1742.58 8.2 2705.92 3066.82 1774.67 1701.28 8.4 2450 2868.18 1681.05 1658.74 8.6 2244.07 2678.57 1588.91 1622.82 8.8 2106.83 2548.37 1489.73 1584.02 9.0 2000.77 2445.54 1400.3 1545.58 9.2 1912.51 2333.4 1317.8 1499.94 9.4 1825.29 2230.41 1256.7 1454.94 9.6 1727.51 2116.45 1205.71 1412.77 9.8 1622.44 1993.68 1164.33 1375.66 0.0 1532.62 1885.16 1141.23 1358.87 0.2 1447.22 1782.91 1102.09 1319.73 0.4 1361.41 1681.65 1064.53 1279.33 0.6 1267.89 1575.97 1035.65 1248.87 0.8 1192.96 1486.35 990.23 1203.11 1.0 1117.62 1397.21 916.34 1122.52 1.2 1038.32 1300.3 844.53 1039.02 1.4 968.66 1216.12 788.94 973.58 1.6 899.27 1127.21 736.05 910.3

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.8 851.79 1068.32 614.87 760.4 2.0 815.77 1021.15 543.08 675 2.2 787.71 978.98 432.07 537.85 2.4 765.06 944.16 378.25 472.21 2.6 744.05 915.75 342.57 429.03 2.8 723.57 891.73 308.08 385.81 3.0 496.84 629.76 174.13 218.93 3.2 169.74 216.45 149.68 189.62 3.4 0.0 0.0 91.4 116.1 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mass and energy released on the vessel side of the break.

Mass and energy released on the broken loop steam generator side of the break.

FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.001 88648.5 49449 42509.5 23658.5 0.1 41996.3 23442.3 21623.3 12021.7 0.2 42487.9 23874.9 24076.6 13397.4 0.3 43176.2 24484.8 24423.7 13602.8 0.4 43978.1 25224.7 23738.6 13234.7 0.5 44539.3 25860.6 22689.6 12659.4 0.6 44516 26159.8 21810.6 12174.3 0.7 43684.7 25951.7 21036.5 11745 0.8 42353 25404.2 20417.7 11401.6 0.9 40930.4 24764.4 20001.1 11172.9 1.0 39599 24148.8 19765.7 11044 1.1 38436.6 13616.8 19625.5 10967.6 1.2 37482.2 23199.3 19538.4 10919.8 1.3 36689.9 22874.8 19478.5 10886.6 1.4 35987.9 22605.4 19434.3 10861.6 1.5 35338.4 22367.8 19407 10845.7 1.6 34678.1 22129.8 19398.9 10840.5 1.7 33989.6 21881.2 19398.3 10839.6 1.8 33247 21604.5 19381.2 10829.3 1.9 32360.1 21237.7 19338.4 10804.4 2.0 31453.6 20854.7 19273.9 10767.4 2.1 30505.7 20434.8 19182.6 10715.6 2.2 29543 19997.1 19072.3 10653.4 2.3 28563.7 19534.4 18923.4 10569.8 2.4 27427.6 18942.9 18724.4 10458.2

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 2.5 25805.9 17990.1 18261.6 10198 2.6 23651.9 16622.7 17966.8 10034.2 2.7 21395.1 15147.6 17740.4 9908.44 2.8 20574.6 14679.8 17496.1 9772.48 2.9 19461.8 13948.6 17244.1 9632.46 3.0 18363.4 13218.2 17002.2 9498.52 3.1 17415 12586.3 16793.7 9383.7 3.2 16473.4 11948.3 16606.3 9280.88 3.3 15616.8 11368.5 16423.2 9180.48 3.4 14888.3 10878 16259.4 9091.1 3.5 14307.2 10490.2 16110.8 9010.36 3.6 13841.8 10180.2 15965.4 8931.35 3.7 13459.8 9923.76 15829.1 8857.55 3.8 13146.4 9712.22 15706.5 8791.51 3.9 12873.5 9526.18 15586.9 8727.11 4.0 12625.7 9354.22 15468.1 8663.13 4.2 12211.2 9060.91 15259.7 8551.69 4.4 11887.3 8821.2 15046.4 8437.53 4.6 11644 8629.3 14843.5 8329.34 4.8 11455.8 8469.25 14648.5 8225.69 5.0 11323.7 8345.63 14482.5 8138.23 5.2 11265.4 8270.15 14331.4 8058.84 5.4 11240.4 8214.62 15583.3 8772.62 5.6 11205.4 8153.23 15490.9 8723.82 5.8 11191.9 8107.8 15473.6 8720.84 6.0 11208.9 8085.08 15342.2 8651.59

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 6.2 11201.6 8050.65 15202.7 8578.4 6.4 11151.5 7994.95 15056 8500.69 6.6 11075.2 7927.84 14892.5 8412.96 6.8 10983.1 7855 14714.9 8316.68 7.0 10869.1 7772.56 14556.5 8230.29 7.2 10751.4 7693.8 14444.3 8169.16 7.4 10646.2 7623.09 14381.6 8134.55 7.6 10549.1 7550.68 14251.8 8059.92 7.8 10506.5 7504.2 14106.3 7976.33 8.0 10705.1 7607.95 13999.2 7915.26 8.2 10470.9 7638.9 14013.7 7923.41 8.4 9274.32 7338.87 13808.8 7804.53 8.6 8736.47 7031.58 13602 7686.41 8.8 8709.41 6957.1 13432.7 7592.88 9.0 8740.75 6892.88 13321.2 7531.9 9.2 8758.58 6826.64 13142.4 7429.93 9.4 8808.09 6784.32 12948.8 7319.52 9.6 8867.98 6742.69 12824.8 7249.24 9.8 8921.63 6699 12677.9 7165.3 0.0 8973 6659.96 12506.3 7067.25 0.2 9002.72 6613.01 12375.9 6992.92 0.401 8999.62 6554.07 12239.4 6914.92 0.402 8999.53 6553.72 12238.5 6914.44 0.403 8999.45 6553.37 12237.6 6913.94 0.6 8973.89 6490.95 12093.6 6831.63 0.8 8922.24 6418.44 11964.5 6757.96

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.0 8843.09 6336.15 11835 6684.19 1.2 8741.27 6247.2 11707.8 6611.74 1.4 8622.77 6154.42 11584.8 6541.68 1.6 8491.98 6059.71 11464.7 6473.43 1.8 8347.96 5961.64 11347.6 6406.9 2.0 8202.98 5868.2 11232.2 6341.38 2.2 8056.37 5776.92 11118.3 6276.81 2.4 7906.66 5685.48 11006.8 6213.68 2.6 7759.67 5598.03 10897.1 6151.57 2.8 7615.51 5514.14 10786.8 6089.12 3.0 7473.24 5432.54 10679.8 6028.69 3.2 7333.43 5353.52 10573.1 5968.41 3.4 7197.4 5277.34 10465.6 5907.76 3.6 7064.48 5203.11 10361.4 5849 3.8 6935.79 5131.53 10256.5 5789.91 4.0 6806.67 5060.5 10156.7 5733.88 4.2 6685.48 4996.56 10051.5 5674.7 4.4 6563.85 4930.1 9946.29 5615.86 4.6 6441.21 4860.65 9830.14 5551.14 4.8 6310.69 4784.44 9693.58 5475.4 5.0 6172 4700.99 9558.16 5401.43 5.2 6031.55 4612.18 9422.53 5327.75 5.4 5899.94 4523.43 9293.19 5257.15 5.6 5783.94 4440.3 9172.44 5190.81 5.8 5680.86 4362.7 9057.48 5127.56 6.0 5590.9 4292.45 8953.6 5070.75

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 6.2 5509.85 4228.23 8851.69 5015.38 6.4 5435.36 4170.28 8756.44 4964.63 6.6 5363.61 4117.16 8660.74 4914.51 6.8 5291.87 4067.53 8567.8 4867.06 7.0 5219.58 4021.32 8475.19 4816.3 7.2 5144.39 3976.95 8332.73 4722.78 7.4 5040.41 3917.36 8177.69 4602.58 7.6 4882.42 3829.82 8048.12 4469.99 7.8 4678.69 3717.79 7885.24 4294.88 8.0 4461.98 3597.44 7783.24 4142.22 8.2 4251.11 3474.26 7462.81 3881.05 8.4 4082.74 3368.38 7251.54 3689.25 8.6 3974.23 3290.33 6872.95 3443.65 8.8 3896.58 3264.99 6634.76 3282.93 9.0 3740.84 3262.64 6334.69 3100.9 9.2 3492.52 3245.39 6049.46 2929.24 9.4 3217.03 3219.36 5781.05 2772.52 9.6 2940.74 3179.64 5515.57 2623.81 9.8 2684.96 3113.71 5085.55 2394.44 0.0 2465.89 2988.99 4716.14 2165.32 0.2 2240.21 2756.51 4415.94 1962.59 0.4 2057.89 2546.35 4328.33 1862.03 0.6 1888.29 2344.7 4485.3 1878.88 0.8 1717.8 2139.2 5286.87 2177.11 1.0 1566.15 1955.5 5205.41 2124.82 1.2 1459.32 1826.31 3939.96 1599.07

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.4 1370.24 1717.7 3407.6 1381.05 1.6 1286.23 1615.03 2759.73 1113.19 1.8 1191.64 1498.08 2325.58 896.61 2.0 1090.05 1372.75 2748.16 985.69 2.2 997.73 1258.12 3760.49 1289.5 2.4 909.18 1147.85 4614.16 1543.86 2.6 817.45 1033.72 4519.49 1489.24 2.8 731.88 926.83 4052.76 1321.82 3.0 653.99 828.94 3613.1 1167.17 3.2 584.19 741.17 3289.88 1051.08 3.4 534.38 678.62 3028.83 954.76 3.6 487.95 619.83 2784.66 864.78 3.8 417.96 531.33 2525.85 772.29 4.0 357.36 454.68 2246.42 676.28 4.2 311.62 396.8 2013.5 596.96 4.2 313.89 399.95 1773.15 517.99 4.6 301.06 383.74 1541.2 443.82 4.8 179.82 229.32 1279.52 363.5 5.0 91.75 117.32 993.53 279 5.2 1.6 2.06 694.06 193.25 5.4 0.0 0.0 374.46 103.9 5.6 0.0 0.0 169.81 47.18 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mass and energy exiting the steam generator side of the break.

Mass and energy exiting the pump side of the break.

FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.001 88648.5 49449 42509.5 23658.5 0.1 41996.3 23442.3 21623.3 12021.7 0.2 42487.9 23874.9 24076.6 13397.4 0.3 43176.2 24484.8 24423.7 13602.8 0.4 43978.1 25224.7 23738.6 13234.7 0.5 44539.3 25860.6 22689.6 12659.4 0.6 44516 26159.8 21810.6 12174.3 0.7 43684.7 25951.4 21036.5 11745 0.8 42353 25404.2 20417.7 11401.6 0.9 40930.4 24764.4 20001.1 11172.9 1.0 39599 24148.8 19765.7 11044 1.1 38436.6 23616.8 19625.5 10967.6 1.2 37482.2 23199.3 19538.4 10919.8 1.3 36689.9 22874.8 19478.5 10886.6 1.4 35987.9 22605.4 19434.3 10861.6 1.5 35338.4 22367.8 19407 10845.7 1.6 34678.1 22129.8 19398.9 10840.5 1.7 33989.6 21881.2 19398.3 10839.6 1.8 33247 21604.5 19381.2 10829.3 1.9 32360.1 21237.7 19338.4 10804.4 2.0 31453.6 20854.7 19273.9 10767.4 2.1 30505.7 20434.8 19182.6 10715.6 2.2 29543 19997.1 19072.3 10653.4 2.3 28563.7 19534.4 18923.4 10569.8 2.4 27427.6 18942.9 18724.4 10458.2

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 2.5 25805.9 17990.1 18261.6 10198 2.6 23651.9 16622.7 17966.8 10034.2 2.7 21395.1 15147.6 17740.4 9908.44 2.8 20574.6 14679.8 17496.1 9772.48 2.9 19461.8 13948.6 17244.1 9632.46 3.0 18363.4 13218.2 17002.2 9498.52 3.1 17415 12586.3 16793.7 9383.7 3.2 16473.4 11948.3 16606.3 9280.88 3.3 15616.8 11368.5 16423.2 9180.48 3.4 14888.3 10878 16259.4 9091.1 3.5 14307.2 10490.2 16110.8 9010.36 3.6 13841.8 10180.2 15965.4 8931.35 3.7 13459.8 9923.76 15829.1 8857.55 3.8 13146.4 9712.22 15706.5 8791.51 3.9 12873.5 9526.18 15586.9 8727.11 4.0 12625.7 9354.22 15468.1 8663.13 4.2 12211.2 9060.9 15259.7 8551.69 4.4 11887.3 8821.2 15046.4 8437.53 4.6 11644 8629.3 14843.5 8329.34 4.8 11455.8 8469.25 14648.5 8225.69 5.0 11323.7 8345.63 14482.5 8138.23 5.2 11265.4 8270.15 14331.4 8058.84 5.4 11240.4 8214.62 15583.3 8772.62 5.6 11205.4 8153.23 15490.9 8723.82 5.8 11191.9 8107.8 15473.6 8720.84 6.0 11208.9 8085.08 15342.2 8651.59

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 6.2 11201.6 8050.65 15202.7 8578.4 6.4 11151.5 7994.95 15056 8500.69 6.6 11075.2 7927.84 14892.5 8412.96 6.8 10983.1 7855 14714.9 8316.68 7.0 10869.1 7772.56 14556.5 8230.29 7.2 10751.4 7693.8 14444.3 8169.16 7.4 10646.2 7623.09 14381.6 8134.55 7.6 10549.1 7550.68 14251.8 8059.92 7.8 10506.5 7504.2 14106.3 7976.33 8.0 10705.1 7607.95 13999.2 7915.26 8.2 10470.9 7638.9 14013.7 7923.41 8.4 9374.32 7338.87 13808.8 7804.53 8.6 8736.47 7031.58 13602 7686.41 8.8 8709.41 6957.1 13432.7 7592.88 9.0 8740.75 6892.88 13321.2 7531.9 9.2 8758.58 6826.64 13142.4 7429.93 9.4 8808.09 6784.32 12948.8 7319.52 9.6 8867.98 6742.69 12824.8 7249.24 9.8 8921.63 6699 12677.9 7165.3 0.0 8973 6659.96 12506.3 7067.25 0.2 9002.72 6613.01 12375.9 6992.92 0.401 8999.62 6554.07 12239.4 6914.92 0.402 8999.53 6553.72 12238.5 6914.44 0.403 8999.45 6553.37 12237.6 6913.94 0.6 8973.89 6490.95 12093.6 6831.63 0.8 8922.24 6418.44 11964.5 6757.96

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.0 8843.09 6336.15 11835 6684.19 1.2 8741.27 6247.2 11707.8 6611.74 1.4 8622.77 6154.42 11584.8 6541.68 1.6 8491.98 6059.71 11464.7 6473.43 1.8 8347.96 5961.64 11347.6 6406.9 2.0 8202.98 5868.2 11232.2 6341.38 2.2 8056.37 5776.92 11118.3 6276.81 2.4 7906.66 5685.48 11006.8 6213.68 2.6 7759.67 5598.03 10897.1 6151.57 2.8 7615.51 5514.14 10786.8 6089.12 3.0 7473.24 5432.54 10679.8 6028.7 3.2 7333.43 5353.52 10573.1 5968.41 3.4 7197.4 5277.34 10465.6 5907.76 3.6 7064.48 5203.11 10361.4 5849 3.8 6935.79 5131.53 10256.5 5789.91 4.0 6806.67 5060.5 10156.7 5733.88 4.2 6685.48 4996.56 10051.5 5674.7 4.4 6563.85 4930.1 9946.29 5615.86 4.6 6441.21 4860.65 9830.14 5551.14 4.8 6310.69 4784.44 9693.58 5475.4 5.0 6172 4700.99 9558.16 5401.43 5.2 6031.55 4612.18 9422.53 5327.75 5.4 5899.94 4523.43 9293.19 5257.15 5.6 5783.94 4440.3 9172.44 5190.81 5.8 5680.86 4362.7 9057.48 5127.56 6.0 5590.9 4292.45 8953.6 5070.75

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 6.2 5509.85 4228.23 8851.69 5015.38 6.4 5435.36 4170.28 8756.44 4964.63 6.6 5363.61 4117.16 8660.74 4914.51 6.8 5291.87 4067.54 8567.8 4867.06 7.0 5219.58 4021.32 8475.19 4816.3 7.2 5144.39 3976.95 8332.73 4722.78 7.4 5040.41 3917.36 8177.69 4602.58 7.6 4882.42 3829.82 8048.12 4469.99 7.8 4678.69 3717.79 7885.24 4294.88 8.0 4461.98 3597.44 7783.24 4142.22 8.2 4251.11 3474.26 7462.81 3881.05 8.4 4082.74 3368.38 7251.54 3689.25 8.6 3974.23 3290.33 6872.95 3443.65 8.8 3896.58 3264.99 6634.76 3282.93 9.0 3740.84 3262.64 6334.69 3100.9 9.2 3492.52 3245.39 6049.46 2929.24 9.4 3217.03 3219.36 5781.05 2772.52 9.6 2940.74 3179.64 5515.57 2623.81 9.8 2684.96 3113.71 5085.55 2394.44 0.0 2465.89 2988.99 4716.14 2165.32 0.2 2240.21 2756.51 4415.94 1962.59 0.4 2057.89 2546.35 4328.33 1862.03 0.6 1888.29 2344.7 4485.3 1878.88 0.8 1717.8 2139.2 5286.87 2177.11 1.0 1566.15 1955.5 5205.41 2124.82 1.2 1459.32 1826.31 3939.96 1599.07

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.4 1370.24 1717.7 3407.6 1381.05 1.6 1286.23 1615.03 2759.73 1113.19 1.8 1191.64 1498.08 2325.58 896.61 2.0 1090.05 1372.75 2748.16 985.69 2.2 997.73 1258.12 3760.49 1289.5 2.4 909.18 1147.85 4614.16 1543.86 2.6 817.45 1033.72 4519.49 1489.24 2.8 731.88 926.83 4052.76 1321.82 3.0 653.99 828.94 3613.1 1167.17 3.2 584.19 741.17 3289.88 1051.08 3.4 534.38 678.62 3028.83 654.76 3.6 487.95 619.83 2784.66 864.78 3.8 417.96 531.33 2525.85 772.29 4.0 357.36 454.68 2246.42 676.28 4.2 311.62 396.8 2013.5 596.96 4.4 313.89 399.95 1773.15 517.99 4.6 301.06 383.74 1541.2 443.82 4.8 179.82 229.32 1279.52 363.5 5.0 91.75 117.32 993.53 279 5.2 1.6 2.06 694.06 193.25 5.4 0.0 0.0 374.46 103.9 5.6 0.0 0.0 169.81 47.18 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mass and energy exiting the steam generator side of the break.

Mass and energy exiting the pump side of the break.

BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.001 31491.5 17526.7 31490.1 17525.3 0.002 33477 18632.6 33383.7 18578.2 0.1 26504.1 14755.7 59777.3 33425.1 0.2 23883.1 13323.1 60699.6 33947.2 0.3 23446.7 13085.1 58792.6 32871.7 0.4 23218.1 12960.4 58688.6 32812.3 0.5 23006.6 12849.5 58552.5 32735.7 0.6 22830.3 12764.3 57754.3 32285.8 0.7 22738 12733.2 56081.9 31347.6 0.8 22645 12707.5 55514.8 31026.1 0.9 22459.7 12634.3 54544.7 30483.7 1.0 22217.5 12532.3 53725.3 30028.9 1.1 21952.6 12420.8 53848.2 30109.7 1.2 21681.9 12307.9 52800.6 29542 1.3 21479.2 12235.6 51646.6 28917.4 1.4 21287.1 12170.3 50396.4 28238.7 1.5 21106.7 12111.2 49527.2 27770.1 1.6 20877.4 12022.8 49067.2 27531.4 1.7 20665.3 11942.7 48639.7 27314.3 1.8 20526.6 11904 46704.4 26257.7 1.9 20450.2 11900.4 45059 25360 2.0 20342.8 11876.7 44151.2 24869.7 2.1 20006 11717 42901.1 24180.7 2.2 19660.1 11548.8 41970.8 23670.3 2.3 18957.8 11165.6 41141.2 23219.2

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 2.4 17776.7 10495.8 40007.6 22598.8 2.5 16810 9948.19 39586.6 22378.4 2.6 15958.6 9464.56 37290.2 21095.1 2.7 15227.3 9049.01 37277.9 21097.5 2.8 14634.3 8713.01 36793.3 20829.7 2.9 14155.9 8444.25 36361.2 20592.2 3.0 13813.6 8256.35 35597.8 20168.1 3.1 13556.8 8119.58 34636.5 19632 3.2 13326.4 7998.86 34514 19568.8 3.3 13094.7 7877.83 34171.2 19378.9 3.4 12864.9 7759.21 33633.2 19075.8 3.5 12645.4 7648.55 32759 18578.7 3.6 12438.5 7548.22 31379 17791.3 3.7 12246.7 7459.89 29712.6 16838.7 3.8 12056.6 7376.03 28294.7 16024.7 3.9 11863.4 7294.04 27570.4 15604.7 4.0 11672.9 7217.42 27230.3 15405 4.2 11299.6 7080.42 26632.8 15060 4.4 10902.2 6940.4 26200.9 14813.3 4.6 10502.7 6804.27 25891.9 14641 4.8 10072.2 6639.88 25669.5 14519.3 5.0 9692.68 6490.95 25437.2 14395.7 5.2 9367.96 6351 25118.3 14230.9 5.4 9098.44 6220.71 24829 14099.3 5.6 8852.48 6086.89 24679.5 14034.8 5.8 8655.3 5985.01 24536.8 13972.3

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 6.0 8446.37 5888.06 24222.2 13822.8 6.2 8199.08 5781.32 23878 13662.2 6.4 7915.9 5657.53 23481.6 13478.4 6.6 7612.49 5514.72 23162.4 13346.1 6.8 7333.31 5375.15 22786.2 13189 7.0 7078.87 5235.53 22419.8 13033 7.2 6848.61 5094.43 22048.4 12862.4 7.4 6653.1 4960.25 21670.8 2683.7 7.6 6488.2 4831.86 21293 12510.2 7.8 6353.49 4709.2 20920.2 12342 8.0 6265.71 4607.46 20905.2 12405.9 8.2 6322.25 4599.83 20287.2 12151.5 8.4 6366.19 4568.63 20095.9 12103.9 8.6 6536.02 4644.68 19629.7 11936.8 8.8 6630.85 4748.74 19150.8 11818.9 9.0 6422.23 4765.54 18691.3 11728.4 9.2 5934.31 4646.05 17387.7 11177.1 9.4 5452.94 4433.24 16224 10705.7 9.6 5181.63 4242.85 14897.9 10143.8 9.8 5050.15 4104.3 13649.7 9605.47 0.0 4971.46 4000.11 12669.2 9116.25 0.2 4888.68 3898.23 11834.9 8715.28 0.4 4822.21 3822.16 10885.3 8287.77 0.6 4750.59 3755.14 10473.3 8063.85 0.8005 4667.2 3690.73 10047 7826.43 0.8015 4666.8 3690.46 10045.9 7825.54

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 0.8024 4666.4 3690.18 10044.7 7824.66 0.8033 4666 3689.89 10043.6 7823.77 0.8042 4665.64 3689.64 10042.6 7822.98 1.0 5153.88 3676.88 9819.68 7659.15 1.2 6373.42 3836.97 9630.26 7474.45 1.4 6774.25 3835.03 9462.2 7311.58 1.6 6791.36 3767.54 9285.44 7150.57 1.8 6702.66 3691.2 9157.82 7007.13 2.0 6596.52 3625.17 9033.74 6867.98 2.2 6479.53 3561.7 8925.22 6739.04 2.4 6353.08 3495.07 8821.57 6614.4 2.6 6232.15 3428.3 8717.99 6495.85 2.8 6122.39 3364.88 8610.29 6380.26 3.0 6020.67 3305.68 8489.77 6263.41 3.2 5926.5 3251.55 8323.75 6135.98 3.4 5835.17 3200.19 8164.78 6006.05 3.6 5743.96 3149.89 8030.72 5869.16 3.8 5646.63 3095.92 7807.89 5675.11 4.0 5531.02 3029.44 7424.33 5415.87 4.2 5398.19 2957.09 6928.73 5137.33 4.4 5248.31 2886.64 6378.05 4862.11 4.6 5079.26 2815.71 5995.04 4609 4.8 4898.56 2744.63 5831.81 4379.68 5.0 4717.06 2676.53 5440.08 4237.33 5.2 4550.68 2621.39 5627.92 4009.25 5.4 4391.65 2562.6 5171.01 3898.92

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 5.6 4250.77 2493.37 5631.9 3659.64 5.8 4157.53 2470.53 5231.27 3470.83 6.0 4032.37 2455.61 5346.62 3293.89 6.2 3687.5 2211.82 5037.86 3082.17 6.4 3253.71 1714.76 5031.47 2892.26 6.6 3256.08 1652.11 4872.27 2741.4 6.8 3202.87 1565.61 4700.97 2586.69 7.0 3152.51 1499.8 4729.55 2427.45 7.2 3107.83 1445.23 4930.98 2346.89 7.4 3057.73 1388.09 5075.74 2296.08 7.6 3002.03 1329.43 5168.26 2250.61 7.8 2949.43 1275.29 5182.79 2189.51 8.0 2892.35 1216.93 5131.77 2110.04 8.2 2844.61 1165.89 5022.3 2013.21 8.4 2793.14 1111.37 4868.51 1905.43 8.6 2740.48 1058.64 4676.5 1789.59 8.8 2690.39 1007.33 4471.31 1674.23 9.0 2645.04 958.55 4291.81 1573.76 9.2 2591.22 905.27 4187.34 1503.34 9.4 2542.69 855.61 4086.74 1436.68 9.6 2476.46 801.22 3958.39 1362.67 9.8 2402.47 745.03 3833.77 1291.36 0.0 2304.63 684.76 3724.76 1227.05 0.2 2153.9 613.63 3612.06 1163.66 0.4 1846.61 505.39 3506.01 1104.46 0.6 1346.78 355.3 3428.11 1055.81

Break Path No. 1 (1) Break Path No. 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands me (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 0.8 0.0 0.0 3376.54 1016.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 3395.61 999.4 1.2 0.0 0.0 3396.02 978.53 1.4 0.0 0.0 3377.7 955.65 1.6 0.0 0.0 3822.43 1053.02 1.8 0.0 0.0 4305.79 1152.42 2.0 0.0 0.0 4138.91 1084.77 2.2 0.0 0.0 3244.48 836.36 2.4 0.0 0.0 1964.81 500.92 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mass and energy exiting the broken loop side of the break.

Mass and energy exiting the vessel side of the break.

TABLE 6.2-12 DELETED BY PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 TABLE 6.2-13 3.0 FT2 PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Break Path No. 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.001 24452.4 13609.7 0.13 43402.2 24243.1 0.25 43326.2 24292.7 0.38 41771.8 23538.5 0.5 40778.7 23115.8 0.63 39474.6 22519.2 0.75 38218.6 21939.1 0.88 37170.4 21463.2 1.0 36365.1 21107.6 1.13 35771.9 20855 1.25 35337 20681.4 1.38 34848.2 20467.8 1.5 34307.2 20214 1.63 33797.7 19970.1 1.75 33444.4 19813.6 1.88 33056.8 19635.2 2.0 32380.3 19283.4 2.13 31689.6 18921.1 2.25 30888.8 18490.2 2.38 29970.6 17988 2.5 28788.5 17325.5 2.63 27854.8 16805.9 2.75 27647.6 16725.8 2.88 27353.1 16596.9 3.0 26963.7 16411.2 3.13 26519.7 16189.8

FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path No. 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 3.25 26093.7 15971.4 3.38 25723.5 15786.4 3.5 25364.5 15612.3 3.63 24972.6 15418.5 3.75 24576.6 15216 3.88 24231.9 15039 4.0 23916.4 14879.8 4.25 23238.8 14524.5 4.5 22677.2 14205.4 4.75 22105.3 13859.3 4.0 21613.5 13534.1 5.25 21191.1 13242.6 5.5 20827.1 12988.7 5.75 20593.3 12800.8 6.0 20806.1 12823 6.25 20679.3 12719 6.5 20535.2 12596.1 6.75 20311.5 12449.8 7.0 20041.5 12290.8 7.25 19823.1 12159 7.5 19652.9 12068.2 7.75 19542.3 12000.5 8.0 19480.1 11950.4 8.25 19445.1 11913.4 8.5 19427.2 11890.3 8.75 19456.1 11894.9 9.0 19749.6 12168.5

FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path No. 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 9.25 19561 11874.4 9.5 19434.7 11803.6 9.75 19704 11618.6 0.0 18616.4 11420.8 0.251 17926.5 11118.8 0.253 17920.8 11116.1 0.5 17331.8 10848.7 0.75 16911.1 10648.3 1.0 16696.5 10526.5 1.25 16565.3 10443.5 1.5 16465.3 10361.9 1.75 16363.8 10287.3 2.0 16216.5 10197.1 2.25 16090.7 10119.4 2.5 15952.2 10035.3 2.75 15824.3 9951.39 3.0 15723 9875.63 3.25 15646 9811.39 3.5 15588.3 9757.42 3.75 15536.7 9707.59 4.0 15480.5 9654.93 4.25 15420.1 9600.17 4.5 15356.2 9544.22 4.75 15288.2 9487.43 5.0 15215.5 9429.69 5.25 15135.2 9369.87 5.5 15045.9 9306.69

FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path No. 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 5.75 14947.6 9240.66 6.0 14840.8 9171.17 6.25 14728.7 9100.02 6.5 14612.4 9028.07 6.75 14493.9 8955.93 7.0 14370.2 8881.87 7.25 14243.1 8806.99 7.5 14113.3 8731.57 7.75 13982.6 8656.49 18 13823.7 8564.8 8.25 13695 8492.4 8.5 13561 8417.57 8.75 13428.1 8344.06 9.0 13293.9 8270.23 9.25 13160 8197.17 9.5 13025.2 8123.98 9.75 12891 8051.54 0.0 12757 7979.59 0.25 12623 7907.96 0.5 12489.7 7836.99 0.75 12356.2 7766.2 1.0 12224.3 7696.53 1.25 12092.2 7627.02 1.5 11959.7 7557.6 1.75 11828.9 7489.36 2.0 11695.1 7419.7 2.25 11558.2 7348.28

FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path No. 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 2.5 11406.2 7268.67 2.75 11235.4 7180.15 3.0 11044.9 7080.83 3.25 10849.2 6979.4 3.5 10662.5 6881.52 3.75 10489.1 6788.67 4.0 10332.6 6702.56 4.25 10188.5 6621.49 4.5 10053.3 6545.05 4.75 9921.86 6471.42 5.0 9792.18 6400.26 5.25 9606.49 6301.25 5.5 9384.85 6168.51 5.75 9149.58 6033.59 6.0 8903.24 5901.21 6.25 8633.35 5762.02 6.5 8343.02 5612.53 6.75 8078.18 5458.22 7.0 7880.18 5311.72 7.25 7750.12 5176.58 7.5 7760.45 5093.09 7.75 7732.5 4998.92 8.0 7591.84 4857.86 8.25 7393.82 4703.58 8.5 7190.06 4561.7 8.75 6875.44 4394.21 9.0 6477.33 4206.86

FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path No. 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 9.25 6045.67 4012.49 9.5 5618.82 3820.8 9.75 5224.08 3641.67 0.0 4854.5 3477.3 0.25 4541.26 3342.69 0.5 4286.98 3229.34 0.75 3971.11 3084.42 1.0 3704.72 2950.72 1.25 3536.11 2837.93 1.5 3458.67 2740.22 1.75 3395.35 2641.54 2.0 3366.26 2549.17 2.25 3269.15 2436.24 2.5 3004.5 2287.62 2.75 3090.13 2205.29 3.0 3213.1 2099.56 3.25 3014.92 1929.97 3.5 2475.67 1711.03 3.75 2399.58 1617.63 4.0 2373.68 1548.27 4.25 2136.36 1408.8 4.5 1926.5 1273.27 4.75 1808.99 1145.88 5.0 1541.13 1006.48 5.25 1337.12 894.48 5.5 1301.37 804.12 5.75 1075.41 678.78

FLOWS BLOWDOWN MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path No. 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 6.0 805.6 583.37 6.25 648.72 525.06 6.5 589.02 489.01 6.75 543.04 462.9 7.0 529.54 438.01 7.25 452.27 415.67 7.5 437.9 397.26 7.75 441.45 387.37 8.0 433.65 374.53 8.25 425.98 366.04 8.5 406.48 356.82 8.75 520.83 356.35 9.0 633.38 363.87 9.25 1356.34 493.68 9.5 1667.62 577.74 9.75 1587.22 545.64 0.0 1366.94 469.72 0.25 1149.94 403.36 0.5 938.35 352.47 0.75 756.15 306.73 1.0 611.49 268.18 1.25 481.19 231.27 1.5 352 194.1 1.75 221.58 156.18 2.0 87.39 108.41 2.25 0.0 0.0

MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Break Path 1 (1) Break Path 2 (2)

Energy Energy (thousands (thousands Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) Flow (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 3.6 122.5 143.9 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 610.7 450.4 0.0 0.0 4.2 383.5 448.7 0.0 0.0 27 1437.3 694.9 0.0 0.0 0.4 2236.7 873.4 0.0 0.0 3.6 2535.2 937.5 1921.4 184.9 0.0 2198.4 829.3 1586.7 138.7 0.6 2184.5 825.1 1574 137 1.2 2170.5 779.7 0.0 0.0 2.3 904.9 535 0.0 0.0 1.8 549 462.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 465.4 426.2 0.0 0.0 8.6 386 393.5 0.0 0.0 6.8 383.5 371 0.0 0.0 Mass and energy released on the vessel side of the break.

Mass and energy released on the broken loop steam generator side of the break.

FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.28 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.48 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.58 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.68 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.78 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.85 30.15 35.43 0.0 0.0 6.96 35.96 42.27 0.0 0.0 7.06 19.37 22.77 0.0 0.0 7.16 20.99 24.67 0.0 0.0 7.26 27.88 32.76 0.0 0.0 7.36 35.13 41.28 0.0 0.0 7.46 39.37 46.27 0.0 0.0 7.56 43.6 51.24 0.0 0.0 7.66 47.56 55.9 0.0 0.0 7.76 51.31 60.31 0.0 0.0 7.86 54.88 64.5 0.0 0.0 7.96 58.29 68.51 0.0 0.0 8.06 61.56 72.36 0.0 0.0 8.14 63.93 75.15 0.0 0.0 8.16 64.71 76.06 0.0 0.0 8.26 67.74 79.64 0.0 0.0 8.36 70.68 83.09 0.0 0.0 8.46 73.53 86.44 0.0 0.0 8.56 76.29 89.69 0.0 0.0 8.66 78.98 92.86 0.0 0.0

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 8.76 81.6 95.93 0.0 0.0 8.86 84.15 98.94 0.0 0.0 9.86 106.82 125.63 0.0 0.0 0.86 125.87 148.07 0.0 0.0 1.87 327.11 386.43 3649.11 497.55 2.64 427.63 506.39 4783.68 687.15 2.94 429.64 508.82 4801.21 693.58 3.94 424.78 503.02 4756.01 690.71 4.94 417.78 494.64 4688.76 683.35 5.94 410.47 485.89 4617.08 675.12 6.94 403.16 477.15 4544.43 666.6 7.34 400.27 473.7 4515.5 663.18 7.94 395.99 468.58 4472.41 658.06 8.94 389.02 460.26 4401.78 649.61 9.94 382.3 452.22 4332.92 641.33 0.94 375.81 444.47 4266.03 633.26 1.94 369.57 437.02 4201.16 625.42 2.94 363.56 429.85 4138.32 617.8 3.54 360.07 425.68 4101.57 613.34 3.94 357.78 422.95 4077.47 610.41 4.94 352.23 416.32 4018.55 603.25 5.99 378.11 447.18 4335.02 625.7 6.99 372.89 440.96 4280.9 619.3 7.99 367.99 435.1 4230.2 613.01 8.99 363.26 429.45 4181.01 606.89 9.99 358.69 423.99 4133.27 600.95

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 0.49 356.46 421.33 4109.92 598.04 0.99 256.59 302.8 2649.97 468.71 1.99 396.99 469.68 315.95 224.92 2.99 392.37 464.19 313.75 222.07 3.99 382.67 452.6 309.34 216 4.99 373.23 441.32 305.07 210.11 5.99 364 430.3 300.9 204.38 6.99 355.32 419.96 296.99 199.01 7.89 348.24 411.5 293.8 194.63 7.99 347.47 410.59 293.45 194.16 8.99 339.97 401.64 290.09 189.54 9.99 332.79 393.08 286.87 185.14 0.99 325.9 384.88 283.79 180.93 1.99 319.3 377.01 280.85 176.91 2.99 312.96 369.46 278.03 173.06 3.99 306.88 362.23 275.34 169.39 4.99 301.05 355.28 272.76 165.87 5.99 295.45 348.62 270.29 162.51 6.99 290.07 342.23 267.93 159.29 7.99 284.91 336.09 265.67 156.22 8.99 279.96 330.2 263.5 153.27 9.99 275.2 324.54 261.43 150.45 0.99 270.63 319.11 259.44 147.75 1.99 266.24 313.9 257.55 145.17 2.99 262.03 308.9 255.73 142.7 3.99 257.99 304.1 253.99 140.33

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 4.99 254.11 299.49 252.33 138.07 5.99 250.39 295.07 250.74 135.91 6.19 249.66 294.21 250.43 135.49 6.99 246.82 290.83 249.22 133.84 7.99 243.39 286.77 247.76 131.86 8.99 240.11 282.87 246.37 129.96 9.99 236.96 279.13 245.05 128.15 0.99 233.93 275.54 243.77 126.42 1.99 231.03 272.1 242.56 124.76 2.99 228.25 268.8 241.4 123.18 3.99 225.59 265.64 240.29 121.66 4.99 223.04 262.62 239.24 120.22 5.99 220.6 259.73 238.23 118.83 6.99 218.27 256.96 237.27 117.52 8.99 213.9 251.79 235.49 115.06 0.99 209.92 247.06 233.87 112.82 2.99 206.29 242.76 232.41 110.79 4.99 202.99 238.85 231.09 108.95 6.99 200 235.3 229.9 107.28 8.99 197.29 232.1 228.83 105.77 0.29 195.67 230.17 228.17 104.87 0.99 194.95 229.32 227.86 104.48 2.99 193.2 227.25 227.12 103.53 4.99 191.63 225.4 226.45 102.68 6.99 190.22 223.73 225.85 101.91 8.99 188.96 222.24 225.31 101.22

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 0.99 187.83 220.91 224.83 100.6 2.99 186.83 219.72 224.4 100.06 4.99 185.95 218.68 224.02 99.57 6.99 185.17 217.76 223.68 99.14 8.99 184.5 216.97 223.39 98.77 0.99 183.92 216.28 223.13 98.44 2.99 183.42 215.7 222.91 98.16 4.99 183.01 215.21 222.73 97.93 6.99 182.67 214.81 222.57 97.73 8.79 182.42 214.51 222.45 97.58 8.99 182.39 214.49 222.44 97.56 0.99 182.19 214.24 222.34 97.43 2.99 182.03 214.06 222.26 97.33 4.99 181.94 213.94 222.2 97.26 6.99 181.89 213.89 222.16 97.21 8.99 181.88 213.88 222.15 97.18 0.99 181.92 213.93 222.14 97.18 2.99 182 214.02 222.16 97.2 4.99 182.11 214.15 222.18 97.23 6.99 182.26 214.32 222.22 97.28 8.99 182.43 214.53 222.28 97.35 0.99 182.62 214.75 222.34 97.43 2.99 182.82 214.99 222.4 97.51 4.99 183.05 215.26 222.48 97.6 6.99 183.29 215.55 222.56 97.71 8.99 183.56 215.86 222.65 97.83

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 9.99 183.69 216.02 222.7 97.89 0.99 183.84 216.19 222.75 97.95 2.99 184.13 216.54 222.85 98.08 4.99 184.45 216.91 222.96 98.23 6.99 184.77 217.29 223.08 98.37 8.99 185.11 217.69 223.2 98.53 0.99 185.46 218.11 223.33 98.69 2.99 185.82 218.53 223.46 98.86 4.99 186.19 218.97 223.6 99.03 6.99 187.18 220.13 224.2 99.54 8.99 188.21 221.35 225.4 100.11 0.99 189.37 222.72 227.17 100.79 2.99 190.62 224.2 229.36 101.54 4.99 191.9 225.71 231.85 102.33 6.99 193.14 227.18 234.52 103.11 9.99 194.3 228.56 237.28 103.86 0.99 195.37 229.82 240.09 104.57 2.99 196.32 230.94 242.9 105.23 3.09 196.37 230.99 243.04 105.26 4.99 197.16 231.93 245.7 105.83 6.99 197.88 232.78 248.48 106.38 8.99 198.48 233.49 251.25 106.88 0.99 198.95 234.05 254.02 107.32 2.99 199.3 234.46 256.83 107.71 4.99 199.54 234.75 259.66 108.07 6.99 199.7 234.94 262.49 108.38

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 8.99 199.78 235.02 265.35 108.67 0.99 199.76 235.01 268.23 108.94 2.99 199.67 234.9 271.12 109.17 4.99 199.5 234.69 274.04 109.38 6.99 199.25 234.4 276.98 109.57 8.99 198.93 234.02 279.94 109.74 0.99 198.54 233.55 282.91 109.89 2.99 198.07 233 285.91 110.03 4.99 197.54 232.37 288.92 110.15 6.99 196.94 231.66 291.94 110.25 8.59 196.41 231.04 294.37 110.32 8.60 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mass and energy exiting the steam generator side of the break.

Mass and energy exiting the pump side of the break.

FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.28 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.48 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.58 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.68 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.78 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.85 33.93 39.85 0.0 0.0 6.96 33 38.76 0.0 0.0 7.06 18.79 22.07 0.0 0.0 7.16 20.8 24.43 0.0 0.0 7.26 27.57 32.38 0.0 0.0 7.36 34.85 40.93 0.0 0.0 7.46 39 45.8 0.0 0.0 7.56 43.13 50.66 0.0 0.0 7.66 47.01 55.22 0.0 0.0 7.76 50.69 59.54 0.0 0.0 7.86 54.19 63.66 0.0 0.0 7.96 57.54 67.59 0.0 0.0 8.06 60.75 71.36 0.0 0.0 8.16 63.84 75 0.0 0.0 8.26 66.82 78.51 0.0 0.0 8.36 69.71 81.9 0.0 0.0 8.46 72.51 85.19 0.0 0.0 8.56 75.23 88.39 0.0 0.0 8.66 77.87 91.5 0.0 0.0 8.76 80.45 94.53 0.0 0.0

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 8.86 82.96 97.48 0.0 0.0 9.86 105.28 123.75 0.0 0.0 0.86 124.08 145.89 0.0 0.0 1.87 339.31 400.86 3858.54 526.76 2.71 425.55 503.81 4827.67 691.54 2.91 426.34 504.77 4834.56 694.64 3.91 421.63 499.15 4789.61 691.83 4.91 414.77 490.94 4722.31 684.5 5.91 407.57 482.34 4650.39 676.28 6.91 400.37 473.72 4577.44 667.76 7.41 396.81 469.47 4541.11 663.47 7.91 393.3 465.28 4505.05 659.2 8.91 386.44 457.07 4434.04 650.74 9.91 379.8 449.14 4364.78 642.45 0.91 373.4 441.5 4297.48 634.36 1.91 367.24 434.15 4232.19 626.5 2.91 361.32 427.08 4168.91 618.87 3.71 356.74 421.62 4119.73 612.93 3.91 355.62 420.28 4107.63 611.47 4.91 350.14 413.75 4048.27 604.3 5.91 425.67 503.91 4934.17 671.42 6.91 419.8 496.91 4873.55 665.39 7.91 415.02 491.2 4825.53 659.34 8.91 410.4 485.67 4778.84 653.45 9.91 405.92 480.32 4733.44 647.72 0.31 404.18 478.23 4715.63 645.48

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 0.96 340.59 402.35 3997.02 564.78 2.01 157.11 184.77 1173.77 232.11 3.01 156.42 183.96 1175.47 231.91 4.01 155.74 183.15 1177.3 231.74 5.01 155.06 182.35 1179.18 231.59 6.01 154.39 181.56 1181.06 231.45 7.01 153.72 180.76 1182.92 231.3 8.01 153.05 179.97 1184.76 231.15 9.01 152.38 179.19 1186.59 231 0.01 151.72 178.4 1188.4 230.86 1.01 151.06 177.62 1190.2 230.71 1.51 150.69 177.19 1190.33 230.48 2.01 150.49 176.94 1190.99 230.45 3.01 150.21 176.61 1192.07 230.38 4.01 149.93 176.28 1193.15 230.31 5.01 149.65 175.95 1194.21 230.23 6.01 149.38 175.62 1195.27 230.15 7.01 149.11 175.3 1196.32 230.08 8.01 148.84 174.98 1197.37 230 9.01 148.57 174.66 1198.4 229.92 0.01 148.3 174.34 1199.44 229.84 1.01 148.04 174.03 1200.46 229.76 2.01 147.78 173.72 1201.49 229.68 3.01 147.52 173.41 1202.5 229.6 4.01 147.26 173.1 1203.52 229.52 5.01 147.01 172.8 1204.53 229.43

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 6.01 146.75 172.5 1205.54 229.35 7.01 146.5 172.2 1206.54 229.27 8.01 146.25 171.9 1207.53 229.19 9.01 146 171.61 1208.52 229.1 0.01 145.76 171.31 1209.5 229.01 1.01 145.51 171.02 1210.47 228.93 2.01 145.27 170.73 1211.44 228.84 3.01 145.02 170.44 1212.4 228.75 4.01 144.78 170.15 1213.36 228.66 5.01 144.54 169.87 1214.31 228.56 6.01 144.3 169.58 1215.26 228.47 7.01 144.06 169.3 1216.2 228.38 7.11 144.04 169.27 1216.29 228.37 9.01 143.59 168.74 1218.06 228.18 1.01 143.12 168.18 1219.91 227.99 3.01 142.66 167.63 1221.74 227.79 5.01 142.2 167.08 1223.56 227.6 7.01 141.75 166.54 1225.36 227.39 9.01 141.3 166.01 1227.14 227.19 1.01 140.9 165.54 1228.67 226.99 3.01 140.59 165.18 1229.71 226.81 5.01 140.29 164.82 1230.75 226.62 7.01 139.99 164.46 1231.77 226.44 9.01 139.69 164.11 1232.79 226.25 1.01 139.39 163.76 1233.8 226.06 3.01 139.1 163.42 1234.8 225.87

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 5.01 138.81 163.07 1235.79 225.68 5.71 138.71 162.95 1236.13 225.61 7.01 138.52 162.73 1236.77 225.49 9.01 138.23 162.39 1237.74 225.29 1.01 137.95 162.06 1238.71 225.1 3.01 137.66 161.72 1239.67 224.9 5.01 137.38 161.39 1240.63 224.7 7.01 137.1 161.06 1241.58 224.5 9.01 136.82 160.73 1242.52 224.3 1.01 136.55 160.41 1243.46 224.09 3.01 136.27 160.08 1244.39 223.89 5.01 136 159.76 1245.32 223.68 7.01 135.72 159.44 1246.24 223.48 9.01 135.45 159.12 1247.16 223.27 1.01 135.18 158.8 1248.07 223.06 3.01 134.91 158.48 1248.99 222.85 5.01 134.65 158.17 1249.89 222.63 7.01 134.38 157.85 1250.79 222.42 7.11 134.37 157.84 1250.84 222.41 9.01 134.12 157.54 1251.69 222.21 1.01 133.85 157.23 1252.59 221.99 3.01 133.58 156.91 1253.49 221.77 5.01 133.31 156.6 1254.38 221.55 7.01 133.05 156.29 1255.28 221.33 9.01 132.78 155.97 1256.17 221.1 1.01 132.52 155.66 1257.05 220.88

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 3.01 132.26 155.35 1257.94 220.65 5.01 131.99 155.04 1258.82 220.43 7.01 131.73 154.73 1259.7 220.2 9.01 131.47 154.43 1260.58 219.97 1.01 131.21 154.12 1261.45 219.74 3.01 130.95 153.81 1262.33 219.51 5.01 130.69 153.51 1263.2 219.28 7.01 130.44 153.21 1264.07 219.05 9.01 130.18 152.91 1264.93 218.81 1.01 129.93 152.61 1265.8 218.58/

1.91 129.81 152.47 1266.19 218.47 3.01 129.67 152.31 1266.66 218.35 5.01 129.42 152.01 1267.52 218.11 7.01 129.17 151.71 1268.38 217.87 9.01 128.92 151.42 1269.24 217.64 1.01 128.67 151.12 1270.1 217.4 3.01 128.42 150.83 1270.95 217.16 5.01 128.17 150.54 1271.8 216.92 7.01 127.93 150.25 1272.66 216.69 9.01 127.68 149.96 1273.51 216.45 1.01 127.43 149.66 1274.4 216.21 3.01 127.16 149.35 1275.39 215.96 5.01 126.89 149.03 1276.37 215.71 7.01 126.63 148.72 1277.36 215.47 9.01 126.37 148.41 1278.34 215.22 1.01 126.1 148.1 1279.33 214.97

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 3.01 125.84 147.79 1280.31 214.73 5.01 125.59 147.49 1281.29 214.48 7.01 125.33 147.18 1282.28 214.23 9.01 125.07 146.88 1283.26 213.99 1.01 124.82 146.58 1284.25 213.74 1.21 124.79 146.55 1284.34 213.72 3.01 124.57 146.29 1285.23 213.5 5.01 124.32 145.99 1286.22 213.25 7.01 124.07 145.7 1287.2 213.01 9.01 123.82 145.41 1288.19 212.77 1.01 123.58 145.12 1289.18 212.53 3.01 123.34 144.83 1290.17 212.28 5.01 123.1 144.55 1291.16 212.04 7.01 122.86 144.27 1292.15 211.81 9.01 122.62 143.99 1293.15 211.57 1.01 122.39 143.71 1294.14 211.33 3.01 122.15 143.44 1295.14 211.1 5.01 121.93 143.17 1296.14 210.86 7.01 121.7 142.9 1297.15 210.63 9.01 121.47 142.63 1298.15 210.4 1.01 121.25 142.37 1299.17 210.18 3.01 121.03 142.11 1300.18 209.95 5.01 120.81 141.85 1301.2 209.73 7.01 120.6 141.6 1302.23 209.5 9.01 120.38 141.35 1303.26 209.29 1.01 120.17 141.1 1304.29 209.07

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 3.01 119.97 140.85 1305.33 208.86 5.01 119.76 140.61 1306.38 208.65 7.01 119.56 140.37 1307.44 208.44 7.91 119.47 140.27 1307.91 208.35 7.92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mass and energy exiting the steam generator side of the break.

Mass and energy exiting the pump side of the break.

REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.68 1689.98 151.53 0.0 0.0 3.78 1685.26 151.1 0.0 0.0 3.88 1680.56 150.68 0.0 0.0 3.98 1675.89 150.26 0.0 0.0 4.08 1671.25 149.85 0.0 0.0 4.23 1662.03 149.02 0.0 0.0 4.33 1659.41 148.79 0.0 0.0 4.43 1655.18 148.41 0.0 0.0 4.48 1650.64 148 0.0 0.0 4.49 1646.12 147.6 0.0 0.0 4.53 1641.62 147.2 0.0 0.0 4.64 1637.76 146.91 0.0 0.0 4.74 1633.89 146.51 0.0 0.0 4.84 1629.45 146.1 0.0 0.0 4.94 1625.03 145.7 0.0 0.0 5.04 1619.01 145.16 0.0 0.0 5.15 1615.48 144.85 0.0 0.0 5.25 1611.85 144.52 0.0 0.0 5.35 1609.14 144.28 0.0 0.0 5.45 1605.55 143.96 0.0 0.0 5.55 1601.98 143.64 0.0 0.0 5.65 1598.44 143.32 0.0 0.0 6.65 1569.37 146.85 0.0 0.0 7.65 1563.2 175.17 0.0 0.0 7.75 1561.17 176.18 0.0 0.0

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 8.65 1542.63 183.84 0.0 0.0 9.65 1520.75 189.7 0.0 0.0 0.65 1501.14 197.04 1436.89 206.33 1.74 1488.5 208.4 4074.37 594.73 2.74 1463.41 206.27 4087.91 600.51 3.74 1438.81 203.51 4025.01 594.48 4.54 1419.89 201.37 3973.1 589.31 4.74 1415.26 200.85 3960.15 588.01 5.74 1392.69 198.3 3895.92 581.5 6.74 1371.04 195.86 3832.96 575.03 7.74 1350.24 193.51 3771.59 568.67 8.74 1330.24 191.26 3711.95 562.43 9.74 1310.98 189.09 3654.11 556.34 0.74 65.49 77 3598.06 550.4 1.74 65.12 76.56 3543.78 544.61 2.74 64.76 76.13 3491.22 538.98 3.74 64.42 75.73 3440.32 533.49 4.74 79.25 93.22 240.78 283.23 5.04 78.94 92.86 239.91 282.19 5.74 217.81 89.05 183.49 184.17 6.74 216.92 87.96 187.1 183.05 7.74 217.13 88.17 190.21 183.44 8.74 217.35 88.38 193.35 183.84 9.74 217.55 88.57 196.51 184.25 0.74 217.74 88.75 199.67 184.65 1.74 217.93 88.93 202.8 185.04

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 2.74 218.11 89.1 205.89 185.42 3.74 218.29 89.27 208.93 185.78 4.74 218.46 89.42 211.91 186.11 5.74 218.63 89.57 214.81 186.43 6.74 218.78 89.72 217.63 186.72 7.74 218.93 89.85 220.36 186.98 8.74 219.08 89.97 223 187.21 9.74 219.21 90.09 225.55 187.41 0.74 219.34 90.19 227.99 187.59 1.74 219.46 90.29 230.35 187.73 2.74 219.57 90.38 232.6 187.84 3.74 219.67 90.45 234.75 187.93 4.74 219.77 90.52 236.81 187.99 5.74 219.86 90.58 238.77 188.02 6.74 219.94 90.63 240.64 188.02 7.74 220.01 90.67 242.43 188 8.74 220.08 90.71 244.13 187.96 9.74 220.14 90.74 245.75 187.89 0.74 220.2 90.76 247.29 187.8 1.74 220.25 90.78 248.76 187.7 2.74 220.3 90.79 250.17 187.57 3.74 220.34 90.79 251.51 187.43 4.74 220.38 90.79 252.79 187.27 5.74 220.41 90.79 254.01 187.1 6.74 220.44 90.78 255.19 186.91 7.74 220.47 90.77 256.31 186.71

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 8.74 220.49 90.75 257.39 186.51 9.74 220.51 90.73 258.43 186.29 0.74 220.53 90.71 259.43 186.06 1.74 220.55 90.68 260.39 185.82 2.74 220.56 90.66 261.32 185.58 3.74 220.58 90.63 262.22 185.33 5.74 220.6 90.56 263.95 184.81 6.84 220.6 90.52 264.85 184.51 7.74 220.61 90.49 265.57 184.27 9.74 220.62 90.41 267.12 183.72 1.74 220.63 90.33 268.61 183.16 3.74 220.63 90.25 270.04 182.59 5.74 220.63 90.16 271.42 182.01 7.74 220.63 90.07 272.76 181.43 9.74 220.63 89.98 274.07 180.85 1.74 220.61 89.91 275.06 180.37 3.74 220.57 89.86 275.9 179.94 5.74 220.54 89.8 276.72 179.5 7.74 220.51 89.75 277.53 179.07 9.74 220.46 89.67 278.34 178.64 1.74 220.4 89.58 279.14 178.22 3.74 220.34 89.5 279.93 177.8 5.74 220.28 89.42 280.71 177.38 7.74 220.23 89.33 281.49 176.96 9.74 220.17 89.25 282.25 176.54 0.04 220.16 89.24 282.36 176.48

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.74 220.11 89.17 283 176.13 3.74 220.06 89.08 283.75 175.72 5.74 220 89 284.49 175.31 7.74 219.95 88.92 285.22 174.9 9.74 219.89 88.84 285.95 174.49 1.74 219.84 88.76 286.67 174.09 3.74 219.78 88.67 287.39 173.68 5.74 219.73 88.59 288.1 173.28 7.74 219.67 88.51 288.81 172.88 9.74 219.62 88.43 289.52 172.48 1.74 219.56 88.35 290.21 172.09 3.74 219.5 88.26 290.91 171.69 5.74 219.45 88.18 291.6 171.3 7.74 219.39 88.1 292.29 170.91 9.74 219.34 88.02 292.98 170.52 1.74 219.28 87.94 293.67 170.13 3.74 219.22 87.85 294.35 169.74 5.74 219.17 87.77 295.03 169.35 6.84 219.13 87.72 295.41 169.14 7.74 219.11 87.68 295.71 168.97 9.74 219.05 87.6 296.39 168.58 1.74 218.99 87.51 297.07 168.2 3.74 218.93 87.42 297.75 167.81 5.74 218.87 87.34 298.42 167.43 7.74 218.81 87.25 299.09 167.05 9.74 218.75 87.16 299.76 166.67

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.74 218.69 87.07 300.43 166.29 3.74 218.63 86.99 301.1 165.91 5.74 218.57 86.9 301.77 165.53 7.74 218.51 86.81 302.44 165.16 9.74 218.44 86.72 303.1 164.78 1.74 218.38 86.62 303.77 164.41 3.74 218.32 86.53 304.44 164.04 5.74 218.25 86.44 305.1 163.66 7.74 218.19 86.35 305.77 163.29 9.74 218.12 86.26 306.43 162.92 1.74 218.06 86.16 307.09 162.56 3.74 217.99 86.07 307.76 162.19 5.74 217.93 85.97 308.42 161.82 7.74 217.86 85.88 309.09 161.46 8.04 217.85 85.86 309.19 161.4 9.74 217.79 85.78 309.75 161.1 1.74 217.72 85.69 310.41 160.73 3.74 217.65 85.59 311.06 160.37 5.74 217.58 85.49 311.72 160.01 7.74 217.51 85.39 312.37 159.65 9.74 217.44 85.3 313.02 159.3 1.74 217.37 85.2 313.67 158.94 3.74 217.3 85.1 314.32 158.58 5.74 217.23 85.01 314.97 158.23 7.74 217.15 84.9 315.63 157.88 9.74 217.07 84.79 316.29 157.53

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.74 216.99 84.68 316.96 157.18 3.74 216.91 84.57 317.62 156.84 5.74 216.83 84.46 318.29 156.49 7.74 216.75 84.35 318.96 156.15 9.74 216.67 84.24 319.62 155.81 1.74 216.58 84.13 320.29 155.47 3.74 216.5 84.02 320.96 155.13 5.74 216.42 83.91 321.63 154.8 7.74 216.33 83.79 322.31 154.46 9.74 216.25 83.68 322.98 154.13 1.74 216.17 83.57 323.66 153.8 3.74 216.08 83.46 324.33 153.47 5.14 216.02 83.38 324.81 153.24 5.74 216 83.34 325.01 153.15 7.74 215.92 83.23 325.69 152.82 9.74 215.83 83.12 326.37 152.5 1.74 215.75 83 327.06 152.18 3.74 215.66 82.89 327.74 151.86 5.74 215.58 82.78 328.43 151.55 7.74 215.49 82.66 329.12 151.24 9.74 215.41 82.55 329.81 150.93 1.74 215.32 82.44 330.51 150.62 3.74 215.24 82.32 331.21 150.31 5.74 215.16 82.21 331.91 150.01 7.74 215.07 82.1 332.61 149.71 9.74 214.99 81.98 333.32 149.42

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.74 214.9 81.87 334.03 149.12 3.74 214.82 81.76 334.74 148.83 5.74 214.74 81.65 335.46 148.55 7.74 214.65 81.53 336.18 148.26 9.74 214.57 81.42 336.91 147.99 1.74 214.49 81.31 337.64 147.71 3.74 214.39 81.18 338.19 147.38 5.74 214.29 81.05 338.57 147.02 7.74 214.18 80.91 338.96 146.66 9.74 214.05 80.74 339.37 146.31 1.74 213.92 80.57 339.78 145.96 3.74 213.79 80.4 340.19 145.61 5.74 213.65 80.22 340.36 145.19 7.74 213.5 80.04 340.48 144.78 9.74 213.36 79.86 340.64 144.37 1.44 213.24 79.7 340.81 144.03 1.74 213.22 79.68 340.85 143.97 3.74 213.08 79.5 341.09 143.58 5.74 212.94 79.32 341.36 143.2 7.74 212.8 79.14 341.66 142.83 9.74 212.67 78.97 342 142.46 1.74 212.53 78.79 342.37 142.1 3.74 212.39 78.62 342.77 141.75 5.74 212.26 78.45 343.19 141.41 7.74 212.12 78.27 343.64 141.08 9.74 211.99 78.1 344.12 140.75

Break Path Number 1 (1) Break Path Number 2 (2)

Energy Energy Flow (thousands Flow (thousands Time (seconds) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) (lbm/sec) BTU/sec) 1.74 211.86 77.93 344.63 140.43 3.74 211.72 77.76 345.16 140.12 5.74 211.59 77.59 345.72 139.82 7.74 211.46 77.43 346.3 139.52 9.74 211.33 77.26 346.9 139.23 1.74 211.2 77.09 347.5 138.95 3.74 211.07 76.92 348.13 138.67 5.74 210.94 76.76 348.78 138.4 7.74 210.8 76.58 349.31 138.09 9.74 210.66 76.4 349.7 137.75 1.74 210.52 76.22 350.08 137.42 3.74 210.38 76.05 350.47 137.09 5.74 210.24 75.87 350.85 136.76 7.74 210.1 75.69 351.24 136.43 9.74 209.95 75.5 351.51 136.07 1.74 209.8 75.31 351.64 135.68 3.74 209.66 75.12 351.81 135.31 5.74 209.51 74.94 352.01 134.94 7.74 209.36 74.75 352.24 134.58 8.84 209.28 74.65 352.38 134.38 8.85 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mass and energy exiting the broken loop side of the break.

Mass and energy exiting the vessel side of the break.

TABLE 6.2-18 DELETED BY PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 ABLE 6.2-19 3.0 FT2 SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES Break Path Number 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 2.25 0.0 0.0 2.73 0.0 0.0 2.93 0.0 0.0 3.03 0.0 0.0 3.13 0.0 0.0 3.23 0.0 0.0 3.28 0.0 0.0 3.38 51.27 60.18 3.48 20.45 23.99 3.58 17.48 20.51 3.68 21.87 25.66 3.78 28.18 33.07 3.88 34.64 40.65 3.98 38.59 45.29 4.08 42.48 49.85 4.18 46.14 54.14 4.28 49.61 58.22 4.38 52.91 62.11 4.48 56.09 65.83 4.58 59.13 69.41 4.68 62.07 72.86 4.73 63.51 74.55 4.78 64.91 76.2 4.88 67.67 79.44 4.98 70.34 82.58 5.08 72.94 85.63 5.18 75.47 88.6

REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path Number 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 5.28 77.93 91.5 6.28 250.89 128.54 7.28 271.18 152.94 8.28 4013.39 850.78 9.29 5518.79 1230.76 0.29 5492.99 1226.9 1.29 5432.2 1213.69 2.29 5364.85 1198.78 3.29 5295.37 1183.29 3.89 5253.55 1173.95 4.29 5225.79 1167.75 5.29 5157.1 1152.41 6.29 5089.82 1137.4 7.29 5024.23 1122.79 8.29 4960.43 1108.61 9.29 4898.49 1094.87 9.99 4856.23 1085.51 0.29 4838.39 1081.57 1.29 4780.09 1068.69 2.29 4723.56 1056.23 3.29 4668.73 1044.16 4.29 4615.53 1032.48 5.29 4563.91 1021.17 6.29 648.4 621.71 6.99 861.78 929.56 7.29 1119.35 1304.98 8.29 1126.1 1315.05

REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path Number 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 9.29 1052.87 1225.66 0.31 1017.41 1182.61 0.56 1013.03 1177.36 1.31 981.94 1139.53 2.31 941.05 1085.68 3.31 864.26 952.62 4.31 799.78 851.02 5.31 734.58 748.63 6.31 680.7 673.99 7.31 643.37 622.75 8.31 593.69 554.33 9.31 574.94 529.19 0.31 563.65 514.28 1.31 553.91 501.48 2.31 544.91 489.68 3.01 538.97 481.89 3.31 536.5 478.67 4.31 528.62 468.37 5.31 521.23 458.73 6.31 514.29 449.68 7.31 507.77 441.19 8.31 501.62 433.2 9.31 495.83 425.68 0.31 490.37 418.6 1.31 485.23 411.94 2.31 480.39 405.67 3.31 475.81 399.75

REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path Number 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 4.31 472.24 395.19 5.31 469.35 391.54 6.31 466.57 388.04 7.31 463.88 384.66 8.31 461.28 381.39 9.31 458.77 378.22 0.31 456.34 375.16 1.31 454.09 372.34 2.31 451.94 369.65 3.31 449.86 367.05 5.11 446.31 362.6 5.31 445.93 362.13 7.31 442.26 357.54 9.31 438.85 353.27 1.31 435.68 349.31 3.31 432.75 345.64 5.31 430.04 342.25 7.31 427.54 339.15 9.31 425.23 336.3 1.31 424.86 335.81 3.31 424.55 335.4 5.31 424.23 334.99 7.31 423.93 334.59 9.31 423.63 334.2 1.31 423.33 333.81 1.91 423.24 333.7 3.31 423.04 333.43

REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path Number 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 5.31 422.76 333.06 7.31 422.48 332.69 9.31 422.2 332.33 1.31 421.93 331.97 3.31 421.66 331.62 5.31 421.4 331.27 7.31 421.14 330.93 9.31 420.89 330.6 1.31 420.71 330.37 3.31 420.61 330.24 5.31 420.51 330.11 7.31 420.41 329.98 9.31 420.32 329.86 1.31 420.23 329.75 1.71 420.21 329.72 3.31 420.14 329.63 5.31 420.06 329.52 7.31 419.98 329.41 9.31 419.9 329.31 1.31 419.82 329.21 3.31 419.75 329.11 5.31 419.68 329.02 7.31 419.61 328.92 9.31 419.54 328.84 1.31 419.47 328.75 3.31 419.41 328.67 5.31 419.35 328.59

REFLOOD MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES (CONTINUED)

Break Path Number 1 Time (seconds) Flow (lbm/sec) Energy (thousands BTU/sec) 7.31 419.29 328.51 9.31 419.24 328.43 1.31 419.19 328.36 3.31 419.14 328.29 4.21 419.11 328.26 5.31 419.09 328.23 7.31 419.04 328.16 9.31 419 328.1 1.31 418.95 328.04 3.31 418.91 327.98 5.31 418.86 327.92 7.31 418.82 327.86 9.31 418.78 327.81 1.31 418.74 327.76 3.31 418.71 327.71 5.31 418.67 327.66 7.31 418.64 327.61 9.31 418.61 327.56 1.31 418.58 327.52 3.31 418.55 327.48 5.31 418.53 327.44 7.31 418.5 327.41 9.31 418.49 327.38 9.61 418.48 327.38 9.71 551.19 144.67 9.72 0.0 0.0

PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Flooding Injection Core Enthal Time Temperature Rate Carryover Height Downcomer Flow Total Accumulator SPIL (BTU (seconds) (F) (in./sec) Fraction (ft) Height (ft) Fraction (ft3/sec) (ft3/sec) (ft3/sec) lbm) 0 288.21 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 89.66 0.24 282.72 56.605 0 0.61 -0.05 0.999 122.4 122.4 0 94.92 0.32 279.1 68.513 0 1.03 -0.39 0.887 122.1 122.1 0 94.93 0.56 274.94 3.963 0.363 1.5 -0.39 0.865 120.3 120.3 0 94.94 0.61 274.86 3.884 0.375 1.51 -0.24 0.865 120.2 120.2 0 94.95 3.38 267.5 7.325 0.747 2 6.88 0.91 106.6 106.6 0 95.27 6.82 254.14 10.208 0.834 2.5 12.88 0.908 90.3 90.3 0 95.7 10.01 241.53 11.299 0.852 2.95 16.12 0.905 78.8 78.8 30.7 96.23 10.36 240.27 11.248 0.854 3 16.12 0.905 78.2 78.2 30.3 96.29 14.18 228.68 10.794 0.86 3.5 16.12 0.906 72.2 72.2 26.3 96.95 18.25 219.63 10.396 0.861 4 16.12 0.907 67 67 22.7 97.65 22.48 212.62 10.012 0.861 4.5 16.12 0.908 70.3 62.3 27.7 87.21 26.85 206.74 9.631 0.86 5 16.12 0.909 66.4 58.3 25.4 87.03 27.01 206.54 9.618 0.86 5.02 16.12 0.909 66.3 58.2 25.3 87.02 27.57 205.86 9.573 0.859 5.08 16.11 0.909 8.1 0 0 68.04 31.84 201.78 6.806 0.849 5.5 12.89 0.91 8.7 0 0 68.04 38.73 198.82 4.146 0.821 6 10.17 0.9 9.1 0 0 68.04

Flooding Injection Core Enthal Time Temperature Rate Carryover Height Downcomer Flow Total Accumulator SPIL (BTU (seconds) (F) (in./sec) Fraction (ft) Height (ft) Fraction (ft3/sec) (ft3/sec) (ft3/sec) lbm) 48.25 198.31 2.623 0.791 6.5 8.9 0.882 9.3 0 0 68.04 60.36 199.44 2.052 0.775 7 8.77 0.87 9.3 0 0 98.04 73.79 200.99 1.913 0.771 7.5 9.15 0.866 9.3 0 0 68.04 87.58 202.29 1.887 0.771 8 9.65 0.866 9.3 0 0 68.04 101.47 203.15 1.884 0.771 8.5 10.18 0.866 9.3 0 0 68.04 105.01 203.29 1.883 0.771 8.63 10.31 0.866 9.3 0 0 68.04 115.39 203.51 1.884 0.771 9 10.71 0.866 9.3 0 0 68.04 129.3 203.35 1.885 0.771 9.5 11.24 0.866 9.3 0 0 68.04 143.21 202.74 1.885 0.771 10 11.76 0.866 9.3 0 0 68.04

PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Flooding Injection Core Time Temperature Rate Carryover Height Downcomer Flow Total Accumulato SPIL Entha (seconds) (F) (in./sec) Fraction (ft) Height (ft) Fraction (ft3/sec) r (ft3/sec) (ft3/sec (BTU/l 25.8 181.9 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 89.66 26.6 179.4 22.596 0 0.66 1.51 0 7643.2 7643.2 0 89.66 26.8 178.1 24.692 0 1.05 1.43 0 7595.9 7595.9 0 89.66 28.1 177.4 2.48 0.308 1.5 5.21 0.327 7263.9 7263.9 0 89.66 28.9 177.5 2.403 0.401 1.6 7.45 0.342 7118.5 7118.5 0 89.66 32.6 178.3 4.486 0.637 2.01 16.12 0.584 5867.9 5867.9 0 89.66 33.9 178.5 4.212 0.674 2.17 16.12 0.583 5677.4 5677.4 0 89.66 37.3 179.6 3.785 0.715 2.51 16.12 0.578 5305.2 5305.2 0 89.66 43.5 182.5 3.372 0.739 3 16.12 0.565 4779.2 4779.2 0 89.66 44.9 183.3 3.303 0.741 3.1 16.12 0.562 4678.7 4678.7 0 89.66 46 183.9 3.455 0.743 3.18 16.12 0.576 5034 4496.4 0 87.35 50.5 186.6 3.275 0.749 3.5 16.12 0.569 4763.8 4219.4 0 87.19 51 186.9 2.694 0.748 3.53 16.12 0.468 3157.1 2593.8 0 85.8 52 187.6 3.52 0.75 3.6 15.93 0.589 531.6 0 0 68.04 57.9 192.2 3.109 0.753 4.01 14.79 0.582 545.9 0 0 68.04 67 200.7 2.641 0.754 4.54 13.63 0.569 562.7 0 0 68.04 76.2 210.1 2.319 0.756 5 12.99 0.557 573.9 0 0 68.04

Flooding Injection Core Time Temperature Rate Carryover Height Downcomer Flow Total Accumulato SPIL Entha (seconds) (F) (in./sec) Fraction (ft) Height (ft) Fraction (ft3/sec) r (ft3/sec) (ft3/sec (BTU/l 89 221.6 2.032 0.759 5.56 12.66 0.543 583.9 0 0 68.04 100.3 229.8 1.881 0.763 6 12.71 0.534 589.6 0 0 68.04 115 238.7 1.796 0.767 6.53 13.04 0.528 591.1 0 0 68.04 128.8 245.9 1.758 0.772 7 13.45 0.526 591.7 0 0 68.04 145 253.1 1.74 0.779 7.53 14.02 0.526 591.8 0 0 68.04 160 258.8 1.737 0.785 8 14.56 0.527 591.6 0 0 68.04 177 264.5 1.744 0.793 8.52 15.19 0.53 591.1 0 0 68.04 193.1 269.1 1.779 0.8 9 15.67 0.54 589.7 0 0 68.04 197 270.1 1.782 0.802 9.12 15.75 0.542 589.3 0 0 68.04 211 273.5 1.764 0.808 9.52 15.95 0.549 588.9 0 0 68.04 228.6 277.1 1.701 0.817 10 16.08 0.553 589.6 0 0 68.04

PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Flooding Injection Downco Carryove Core mer Accumula Time Tempera Rate (in./ r Height Height Flow Total tor (ft3/ SPIL Enthalp (seconds) ture (F) sec) Fraction (ft) (ft) Fraction (ft3/sec) sec) (ft3/sec) (BTU/lb 25.8 181.8 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 89.66 26.6 179.3 22.686 0 0.66 1.52 0 7674.2 7674.2 0 89.66 26.8 178 24.761 0 1.06 1.44 0 7626.9 7626.9 0 89.66 28.2 177.4 2.45 0.31 1.5 5.33 0.328 7289.3 7289.3 0 89.66 28.9 177.5 2.377 0.399 1.59 7.5 0.343 7149 7149 0 89.66 32.7 178.4 4.444 0.639 2.01 16.12 0.585 5877.2 5877.2 0 89.66 33.9 178.6 4.184 0.673 2.16 16.12 0.584 5706.7 5706.7 0 89.66 37.4 179.8 3.747 0.715 2.5 16.12 0.578 5323.2 5323.2 0 89.66 43.7 183 3.335 0.739 3 16.12 0.566 4790.1 4790.1 0 89.66 44.9 183.6 3.278 0.742 3.09 16.12 0.563 4703.9 4703.9 0 89.66 45.9 184.2 3.748 0.744 3.16 16.12 0.598 5709.1 4341.3 0 84.48 50.3 187 3.567 0.749 3.5 16.12 0.591 5444.5 4065.9 0 84.19 52 188 2.033 0.742 3.6 16.12 0.408 1492.5 0 0 68.04 61.5 194.2 1.955 0.746 4 16.12 0.404 1495 0 0 68.04 74 204 1.888 0.751 4.5 16.12 0.406 1497.4 0 0 68.04 87.1 214.3 1.824 0.757 5 16.12 0.409 1500 0 0 68.04 101 223.7 1.761 0.762 5.5 16.12 0.411 1502.5 0 0 68.04

Flooding Injection Downco Carryove Core mer Accumula Time Tempera Rate (in./ r Height Height Flow Total tor (ft3/ SPIL Enthalp (seconds) ture (F) sec) Fraction (ft) (ft) Fraction (ft3/sec) sec) (ft3/sec) (BTU/lb 115.7 232 1.714 0.766 6 16.12 0.414 1502.5 0 0 68.04 131 239.5 1.666 0.771 6.5 16.12 0.416 1502.5 0 0 68.04 147.1 246.1 1.619 0.775 7 16.12 0.419 1502.5 0 0 68.04 165 252.3 1.567 0.78 7.53 16.12 0.423 1502.4 0 0 68.04 181.9 257.3 1.518 0.785 8 16.12 0.426 1502.4 0 0 68.04 201 262.1 1.465 0.791 8.51 16.12 0.43 1502.4 0 0 68.04 221.2 266.3 1.407 0.798 9 16.12 0.435 1503.1 0 0 68.04 245 270.4 1.339 0.808 9.54 16.12 0.441 1503.9 0 0 68.04 267.9 273.7 1.276 0.82 10 16.12 0.447 1504.6 0 0 68.04

PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Flooding Injection Core Downcom Accumula Enthal Time Temperat Rate (in./ Carryove Height er Height Flow Total tor (ft3/ SPIL (BTU (seconds) ure (F) sec) r Fraction (ft) (ft) Fraction (ft3/sec) sec) (ft3/sec) lbm) 22.6 163.9 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 89.66 24.2 164.1 45.616 0 0.19 4.04 0 7106.5 7106.5 0 89.66 24.3 163.8 44.997 0 0.56 3.54 0 7094.6 7094.6 0 89.66 24.5 163.6 38.631 0 1.11 2.82 0 7053.3 7053.3 0 89.66 25.4 164 -2.788 0.109 1.32 4.82 0 6842.5 6842.5 0 89.66 26.6 164.6 2.444 0.268 1.46 7.48 0.034 6643.5 6643.5 0 89.66 27.6 165.2 2.15 0.394 1.59 9.58 0.149 6489.2 6489.2 0 89.66 29.6 166.3 2.029 0.526 1.77 13.77 0.181 6212.7 6212.7 0 89.66 30.6 166.9 2.076 0.566 1.85 15.72 0.192 6080.5 6080.5 0 89.66 33.7 168.7 1.942 0.632 2.06 16.12 0.218 5720.7 5720.7 0 89.66 42.7 174.6 1.703 0.694 2.5 16.12 0.214 3742.3 3742.3 0 89.66 43.7 175.3 1.689 0.697 2.54 16.12 0.214 3687.5 3687.5 0 89.66 44.7 176 1.785 0.701 2.59 15.99 0.248 0 0 0 0 55.7 184.4 1.623 0.721 3.03 15.98 0.226 602.2 0 0 68.04 69.7 195.9 1.563 0.733 3.53 16.09 0.234 604 0 0 68.04 83.7 205.8 1.507 0.741 4 16.12 0.24 606 0 0 68.04 99.7 215.3 1.447 0.748 4.5 16.12 0.245 608.3 0 0 68.04

Flooding Injection Core Downcom Accumula Enthal Time Temperat Rate (in./ Carryove Height er Height Flow Total tor (ft3/ SPIL (BTU (seconds) ure (F) sec) r Fraction (ft) (ft) Fraction (ft3/sec) sec) (ft3/sec) lbm) 111.7 221.5 1.416 0.752 4.86 16.12 0.248 608.8 0 0 68.04 117.7 224.3 1.401 0.754 5.04 16.12 0.249 608.9 0 0 68.04 135.7 231.9 1.359 0.759 5.54 16.12 0.253 609.5 0 0 68.04 153.7 238.3 1.319 0.764 6.02 16.12 0.257 610.1 0 0 68.04 173.7 244.3 1.276 0.769 6.53 16.12 0.26 610.7 0 0 68.04 193.7 249.5 1.233 0.775 7 16.12 0.264 611.3 0 0 68.04 217.7 254.6 1.183 0.782 7.54 16.12 0.269 612 0 0 68.04 241.7 258.9 1.134 0.79 8.03 16.12 0.273 612.7 0 0 68.04 267.7 262.7 1.08 0.8 8.53 16.12 0.277 613.4 0 0 68.04 295.7 264.4 1.03 0.807 9.01 16.12 0.28 614.2 0 0 68.04 327.7 263.9 0.981 0.807 9.53 16.12 0.283 615.2 0 0 68.04 358.8 264 0.932 0.809 10 16.12 0.284 616.1 0 0 68.04

TABLE 6.2-21C DELETED BY PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 PRINCIPAL PARAMETERS Flooding Downco Injection Carryov Core mer Time Temperatu Rate (in./ er Height Height Flow Total Accumula SPIL Enthalp (seconds) re (F) sec) Fraction (ft) (ft) Fraction (ft3/sec) tor (ft3/sec (ft3/sec) (BTU/lb 42.3 226.6 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 89.66 43 223.1 22.118 0 0.64 1.46 0 7438.4 7438.4 0 89.66 43.2 221.2 24.102 0 1.03 1.38 0 7396.3 7396.3 0 89.66 43.6 220.1 2.668 0.108 1.31 1.99 0.231 7298 7298 0 89.66 43.7 220 2.73 0.127 1.33 2.29 0.25 7283.4 7283.4 0 89.66 44.7 219.6 2.348 0.315 1.5 5.45 0.336 7069.3 7069.3 0 89.66 45.3 219.5 2.293 0.384 1.57 7.1 0.346 6967.6 6967.6 0 89.66 49.3 218.2 4.535 0.641 2.01 16.12 0.597 6135.6 5614.6 0 87.83 50.3 217.7 4.304 0.67 2.14 16.12 0.597 6008 5486.1 0 87.78 53.9 216.5 3.849 0.717 2.5 16.12 0.593 5649.2 5119.7 0 87.63 60 215.8 3.457 0.74 3 16.12 0.585 5182.1 4640.3 0 87.4 65.3 216 3.232 0.748 3.38 16.12 0.577 4859.4 4308.9 0 87.21 66.3 216.1 3.49 0.739 3.44 16.08 0.579 522.5 0 0 68.04 67 216.1 4.763 0.725 3.51 15.83 0.606 345.7 0 0 68.04 68.3 216.2 6.177 0.714 3.69 14.87 0.616 126.3 0 0 68.04 70.6 216.6 5.518 0.718 4 13.25 0.636 127.6 0 0 68.04 75.3 218.2 3.771 0.733 4.52 10.8 0.661 444.4 0 0 68.04

Flooding Downco Injection Carryov Core mer Time Temperatu Rate (in./ er Height Height Flow Total Accumula SPIL Enthalp (seconds) re (F) sec) Fraction (ft) (ft) Fraction (ft3/sec) tor (ft3/sec (ft3/sec) (BTU/lb 83 222.4 2.574 0.75 5 9.64 0.686 554.2 0 0 68.04 93.3 229 2.186 0.756 5.5 9.06 0.71 578.1 0 0 68.04 105.1 235.5 2.011 0.76 6 8.88 0.734 585.6 0 0 68.04 119.3 242 1.882 0.765 6.55 8.98 0.755 590.3 0 0 68.04 131.9 247 1.827 0.769 7 9.19 0.768 591.1 0 0 68.04 147.3 252.3 1.77 0.773 7.53 9.49 0.782 592 0 0 68.04 161.7 256.6 1.731 0.777 8 9.81 0.792 592.3 0 0 68.04 179.3 261.1 1.695 0.783 8.55 10.24 0.801 592.6 0 0 68.04 194.2 264.5 1.672 0.788 9 10.64 0.805 592.8 0 0 68.04 213.3 268.3 1.653 0.796 9.55 11.2 0.805 593.1 0 0 68.04 229.6 271.1 1.645 0.803 10 11.73 0.801 593.3 0 0 68.04

TABLE 6.2-21E DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS MASS BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Time 0.0 23.60 23.60 + (1) 166.81 Mass Contributor (thousands lbm) seconds seconds seconds seconds Initial 745.02 745.02 745.02 745.02 Added Mass Pumped Injection 0.00 0.00 0.00 76.19 Total Added 0.00 0.00 0.00 76.19 Total Available 745.02 745.02 745.02 821.21 TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Time 0.0 23.60 23.60 + (1) 166.81 Mass Contributor (thousands lbm) seconds seconds seconds seconds Reactor Coolant 517.42 115.62 115.62 168.29 Distribution Accumulator 227.59 130.10 130.10 0.00 Total Contents 745.02 245.72 245.72 168.29 Break Flow 0.00 499.27 499.27 622.51 Effluent ECCS Spill 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.38 Total Effluent 0.00 499.27 499.27 652.89 Total Accountable 745.02 744.99 744.99 821.18 (1) The + is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.

TABLE 6.2-21F DOUBLE ENDED HOT LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS ENERGY BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Time 0.0 23.60 23.60 + (1) 166.81 Energy Contributor (millions BTU) seconds seconds seconds seconds Initial Energy 908.77 908.77 908.77 908.77 Pumped Injection 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.88 Added Energy Decay Heat 0.00 8.39 8.39 30.64 Heat from Secondary 0.00 -3.60 -3.60 -3.60 Total Added 0.00 4.79 4.79 32.92 Total Available 908.77 913.56 913.56 941.69

Time 0.0 23.60 23.60 + (1) 166.81 Energy Contributor (millions BTU) seconds seconds seconds seconds Reactor Coolant 308.19 22.16 22.16 30.96 Accumulator 20.41 11.67 11.67 0.00 Core Stored 24.75 9.61 9.61 4.44 Distribution Thin Metal 15.31 7.41 7.41 0.00 Thick Metal 141.38 140.53 140.53 118.14 Steam Generator 398.74 390.63 390.63 380.31 Total Contents 908.77 582.02 582.02 533.84 Break Flow 0.00 330.94 330.94 404.45 Effluent ECCS Spill 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.79 Total Effluent 0.00 330.94 330.94 407.24 Total Accountable 908.77 912.96 912.96 941.08 (1) The + is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.

TABLE 6.2-21G DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS MASS BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Time 25.80 25.80 + (1) 228.59 Mass Contributor (thousands lbm) 0.0 seconds seconds seconds seconds Initial 745.02 745.02 745.02 745.02 Added Mass Pumped Injection 0.00 0.00 0.00 106.79 Total Added 0.00 0.00 0.00 106.79 Total Available 745.02 745.02 745.02 851.81 TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Time 0.0 25.80 25.80 + (1) 228.59 Mass Contributor (thousands lbm) seconds seconds seconds seconds Reactor Coolant 517.42 52.93 85.97 147.00 Distribution Accumulator 227.59 170.42 137.38 0.00 Total Contents 745.02 223.35 223.35 147.00 Break Flow 0.00 521.65 521.65 693.30 Effluent ECCS Spill 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Effluent 0.00 521.65 521.65 693.30 Total Accountable 745.02 745.00 745.00 840.30 (1) The + is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.

TABLE 6.2-21H DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS ENERGY BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Time 0.0 25.80 25.80 + (1) 228.59 Energy Contributor (millions BTU) seconds seconds seconds seconds Initial Energy: 908.77 908.77 908.77 908.77 Pumped Injection 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.27 Added Energy: Decay Heat 0.00 8.55 8.55 33.65 Heat from Secondary 0.00 9.48 9.48 9.48 Total Added 0.00 18.03 18.03 50.40 Total Available 908.77 926.80 926.80 959.17

Time 0.0 25.80 25.80 + (1) 228.59 Energy Contributor (millions BTU) seconds seconds seconds seconds Reactor Coolant 308.19 12.13 15.09 37.42 Accumulator 20.41 15.28 12.32 -0.00 Core Stored 24.75 13.24 13.24 4.68 Distribution: Primary Metal 156.69 149.41 149.41 130.62 Secondary Metal 102.48 101.96 101.96 93.51 Steam Generator 296.26 309.11 309.11 279.23 Total Contents 908.77 601.13 601.13 545.46 Break Flow 0.00 325.09 325.09 410.88 Effluent ECCS Spill 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Effluent 0.00 325.09 325.09 410.88 Total Accountable 908.77 926.22 926.22 956.34 (1) The + is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.

TABLE 6.2-21I DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS MASS BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Time 0.00 25.80 25.80 + (1) 267.91 Mass Contributor (thousands lbm) seconds seconds seconds seconds Initial 745.02 745.02 745.02 745.02 Added mass Pumped Injection 0.00 0.00 0.00 333.27 Total Added 0.00 0.00 0.00 333.27 Total Available 745.02 745.02 745.02 1078.29 TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Time 0.00 25.80 25.80 + (1) 267.91 Mass Contributor (thousands lbm) seconds seconds seconds seconds Reactor Coolant 517.42 52.93 86.02 148.85 Distribution: Accumulator 227.59 170.42 137.33 -0.00 Total Contents 745.02 223.35 223.35 148.85 Break Flow 0.00 521.65 521.65 917.94 Effluent ECCS Spill 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Effluent 0.00 521.65 521.65 917.94 Total Accountable 745.02 745.00 745.00 1066.79 (1) The + is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.

TABLE 6.2-21J DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION BREAK WITH MAXIMUM ECCS FLOWS ENERGY BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Time 0.00 25.80 25.80 + (1) 267.91 Energy Contributor (million BTU) seconds seconds seconds seconds Initial Energy: 908.77 908.77 908.77 908.77 Pumped Injection 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.67 Added Energy: Decay Heat 0.00 8.55 8.55 37.82 Heat from Secondary 0.00 9.48 9.48 9.48 Total Added 0.00 18.03 18.03 69.97 Total Available 908.77 926.80 926.80 978.75

Time 0.00 25.80 25.80 + (1) 267.91 Energy Contributor (millions BTU) seconds seconds seconds seconds Reactor Coolant 308.19 12.13 15.09 37.11 Accumulator 20.41 15.28 12.31 -0.00 Core Stored 24.75 13.24 13.24 4.49 Distribution: Primary Metal 156.69 149.41 149.41 128.76 Secondary Metal 102.48 101.96 101.96 94.48 Steam Generator 296.26 309.11 309.11 282.03 Total Contents 908.77 601.13 601.13 546.87 Break Flow 0.00 325.09 325.09 429.02 Effluent ECCS Spill 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Effluent 0.00 325.09 325.09 429.02 Total Accountable 908.77 926.22 926.22 975.89 (1) The + is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.

TABLE 6.2-21K DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS MASS BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Time 0.00 22.60 22.60 + (1) 358.84 Mass Contributor (thousands lbm) seconds seconds seconds seconds Initial 745.02 745.02 745.02 745.02 Added mass Pumped Injection 0.00 0.00 0.00 191.41 Total Added 0.00 0.00 0.00 191.41 Total Available 745.02 745.02 745.02 936.43 TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Time 0.00 22.60 22.60 + (1) 358.84 Mass Contributor (thousands lbm)) seconds seconds seconds seconds Reactor Coolant 517.42 33.30 71.45 132.05 Distribution: Accumulator 227.59 159.70 121.56 -0.00 Total Contents 745.02 193.01 193.01 132.05 Break Flow 0.00 552.00 552.00 792.81 Effluent ECCS Spill 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Effluent 0.00 552.00 552.00 792.81 Total Accountable 745.02 745.01 745.01 924.86 (1) The + is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.

TABLE 6.2-21L DOUBLE ENDED COLD LEG BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS ENERGY BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Time 0.00 22.60 22.60 + (1) 358.84 Energy Contributor (million BTU) seconds seconds seconds seconds Initial Energy: 908.77 908.77 908.77 908.77 Pumped Injection 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.02 Added Energy: Decay Heat 0.00 6.84 6.84 45.87 Heat from Secondary 0.00 10.30 10.30 10.30 Total Added 0.00 17.13 17.13 69.19 Total Available 908.77 925.91 925.91 977.96

Time 0.00 22.60 22.60 + (1) 358.84 Energy Contributor (millions BTU) seconds seconds seconds seconds Reactor Coolant 308.19 8.04 11.46 31.83 Accumulator 20.41 14.32 10.90 -0.00 Core Stored 24.75 12.90 12.90 4.30 Distribution: Primary Metal 156.69 150.13 150.13 135.84 Secondary Metal 102.48 102.69 102.69 97.39 Steam Generator 296.26 311.93 311.93 291.94 Total Contents 908.77 600.01 600.01 561.30 Break Flow 0.00 325.32 325.32 414.10 Effluent ECCS Spill 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Effluent 0.00 325.32 325.32 414.10 Total Accountable 908.77 925.32 925.32 975.40 (1) The + is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.

TABLE 6.2-21M DELETED BY PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 TABLE 6.2-21N DELETED BY PACKAGE FSC MP3-UCR-2013-008 TABLE 6.2-21O 3.0 FT2 PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS MASS BALANCE TOTAL AVAILABLE Time 0.00 42.25 42.25 + (1) 229.61 Mass Contributor (thousands lbm) seconds seconds seconds seconds Initial 745.02 745.02 745.02 745.02 Added mass Pumped Injection 0.00 0.00 0.00 103.27 Total Added 0.00 0.00 0.00 103.27 Total Available 745.02 745.02 745.02 848.29 TOTAL ACCOUNTABLE Time 0.00 42.25 42.25 + (1) 229.61 Mass Contributor (thousands lbm) seconds seconds seconds seconds Reactor Coolant 517.42 99.03 99.08 153.05 Distribution: Accumulator 227.59 127.88 127.82 -0.00 Total Contents 745.02 226.91 226.91 153.05 Break Flow 0.00 518.10 518.10 684.23 Effluent ECCS Spill 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Effluent 0.00 518.10 518.10 648.23 Total Accountable 745.02 745.01 745.01 837.27 (1) The + is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.

TABLE 6.2-21P 3.0 SQUARE FEET PUMP SUCTION SPLIT BREAK WITH MINIMUM ECCS FLOWS ENERGY BALAN TOTAL AVAILABLE Time 0.00 42.25 42.25 + (1) 229.61 Energy Contributor (million BTU) seconds seconds seconds seconds Initial Energy 908.77 908.77 908.77 908.77 Pumped Injection 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.03 Added Energy Decay Heat 0.00 12.46 12.46 35.10 Heat from Secondary 0.00 10.56 10.56 10.56 Total Added 0.00 23.02 23.02 52.69 Total Available 908.77 931.80 931.80 961.47

Time 0.00 42.25 42.25 + (1) 229.61 Energy Contributor (million BTU) seconds seconds seconds seconds Distribution: Reactor Coolant 308.19 20.00 20.01 37.82 Accumulator 20.41 11.47 11.46 -0.00 Core Stored 24.75 13.04 13.04 4.63 Primary Metal 156.69 148.51 148.51 129.65 Secondary Metal 102.48 103.14 103.14 94.90 Steam Generator 296.26 313.61 313.61 285.26 Total Contents 908.77 609.77 609.77 552.26 Break Flow 0.00 321.44 321.44 406.28 Effluent ECCS Spill 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Effluent 0.00 321.44 321.44 406.28 Total Accountable 908.77 931.21 931.21 958.54 (1) The + is used to indicate that the column represents the bottom of core recovery conditions which occurs instantaneously after blowdown.

TABLE 6.2-22 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 CONDITIONS ASSUMPTIONS Nominal NSSS Power, Mwt: 3725 Power Lever (%)

Parameters 100.4 70 30 0 NSSS Power, Mwt 3739 2566 1100 37 RCS Average Temperature (F) 594.5 584.75 571.75 557.0 RCS Flowrate (gpm) (Thermal Design Flow) 363,200 363,200 363,200 363,200 RCS Pressurizer Pressure (psia) 2250 2250 2250 2250 Pressurizer Water Volume (% span) (1) 60.0 49.5 35.5 25.0 Feedwater Temperature,F 445.3 407 343 100 Steam Generator Pressure (psia) 1019 1059 1109 1102 Steam Generator Level (% NRS) 62.2 62.2 62.2 62.2

1. The pressurizer water volume does not reflect the pressurizer water level program of 64% at full power. However, the difference is not significant.

TABLE 6.2-24 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-25 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 FEEDWATER LINE BREAK Vent Paths Connecting Nodes Pressure (psid) Time (Seconds) 1 1 to 2 -0.09 0.088 2 2 to 3 0.06 0.046 3 3 to 4 0.14 0.097 4 4 to 5 0.05 0.149 5 5 to 6 -0.1 0.101 6 2 to 5 -0.11 0.116 7 1 to 6 -0.17 0.128 8 1 to 7 -0.15 0.032 9 1 to 23 0.43 0.053 10 2 to 8 -0.16 0.075 11 3 to 9 0.14 0.056 12 3 to 23 0.41 0.057 13 4 to 10 -0.13 0.039 14 4 to 26 0.14 0.053 15 5 to 11 -0.13 0.037 16 5 to 26 0.15 0.053 17 6 to 12 -0.15 0.034 18 6 to 26 0.14 0.049 19 7 to 8 -0.14 0.073 20 8 to 9 -0.09 0.16 21 9 to 10 -0.11 0.119 22 10 to 11 -0.04 0.032 23 11 to 12 0.11 0.079 24 8 to 11 -0.1 0.122 25 7 to 12 0.17 0.083 26 7 to 13 -0.3 0.027 27 8 to 14 -0.24 0.027 28 9 to 15 -0.16 0.033

Vent Paths Connecting Nodes Pressure (psid) Time (Seconds) 29 14 to 23 0.44 0.084 30 10 to 16 -0.17 0.034 31 11 to 17 -0.14 0.026 32 12 to 18 -0.2 0.025 33 13 to 14 0.14 0.035 34 14 to 15 0.17 0.025 35 15 to 16 0.14 0.085 36 16 to 17 -0.14 0.055 37 17 to 18 -0.13 0.094 38 14 to 17 -0.2 0.058 39 13 to 18 -0.33 0.058 40 13 to 23 0.56 0.033 41 13 to 19 -3.08 0.01 42 14 to 23 0.44 0.084 43 14 to 19 -3.08 0.01 44 15 to 23 0.4 0.038 45 17 to 19 -3.13 0.01 46 16 to 23 0.44 0.068 47 17 to 24 -0.84 0.018 48 17 to 23 0.41 0.057 49 18 to 25 -0.95 0.017 50 19 to 20 -3.18 0.018 51 20 to 21 4.35 0.007 52 21 to 22 -0.13 0.012 53 20 to 22 4.28 0.007 54 20 to 23 4.6 0.009 55 21 to 23 0.97 0.015 56 22 to 23 1.08 0.014 57 19 to 24 2.99 0.01

Vent Paths Connecting Nodes Pressure (psid) Time (Seconds) 58 24 to 25 -0.19 0.016 59 25 to 19 -2.94 0.01 60 24 to 21 0.53 0.034 61 25 to 22 -0.55 0.012 62 26 to 23 0.26 0.069

Vent Path Connecting Node Node Vent Path Vent Path Forward K- Reverse K-No. Node Vol. (ft3) No. Area (ft2) From To factor f L/D factor f L/D Inertia (ft-1) 1 2,685 1 143.0 1 21 2.20 1.55 0.039 2 639 2 28.7 1 21 2.31 1.76 0.292 3 641 3 22.1 1 21 2.17 1.83 0.273 4 1,860 4 11.4 2 1 1.69 1.84 0.379 5 1,480 5 56.2 5 1 1.31 1.40 0.119 6 789 6 78.9 4 1 1.30 1.32 0.088 7 2,222 7 19.7 3 1 0.84 1.12 0.454 8 2,911 8 108.7 2 3 0.17 0.11 0.049 9 919 9 68.7 2 5 0.30 0.29 0.116 10 659 10 134.9 4 5 0.23 0.22 0.063 11 2,534 11 97.1 3 4 0.24 0.34 0.091 12 3,890 12 27.1 2 6 0.43 0.51 0.383 13 810 13 91.8 5 7 0.23 0.23 0.148 14 367 14 116.6 4 8 0.27 0.27 0.109 15 1,204 15 36.5 3 9 0.28 0.29 0.347 16 1,840 16 55.1 6 7 0.91 0.78 0.066 17 415 17 135.5 7 8 0.63 0.59 0.039 18 1,764 18 69.1 8 9 0.68 0.87 0.058 19 1,191 19 105.3 6 9 0.41 0.40 0.039

Vent Path Connecting Node Node Vent Path Vent Path Forward K- Reverse K-3)

No. Node Vol. (ft No. Area (ft2) From To factor f L/D factor f L/D Inertia (ft-1) 20 89 20 1.3 6 10 1.63 1.64 4.371 21 2.3E6 (1) 21 2.3 7 11 1.65 1.65 2.258 22 2.5 8 12 1.42 1.40 2.882 23 20.5 8 12 1.69 1.66 0.356 24 1.2 9 13 1.69 1.70 4.434 25 16.6 12 21 3.01 2.94 0.017 26 81.9 10 11 0.72 0.59 0.055 27 177.8 11 12 0.55 0.50 0.038 28 124.8 12 13 0.46 0.59 0.043 29 81.9 10 13 0.43 0.44 0.055 30 23.6 10 14 0.72 0.68 0.493 31 86.1 11 15 0.67 0.65 0.134 32 135.3 12 16 0.64 0.63 0.088 33 27.5 13 17 0.72 0.69 0.409 34 59.9 14 15 0.28 0.28 0.115 35 97.9 15 16 0.28 0.27 0.089 36 78.5 16 17 0.28 0.27 0.093 37 59.9 14 17 0.09 0.07 0.097 38 40.3 14 18 0.09 0.09 0.221

Vent Path Connecting Node Node Vent Path Vent Path Forward K- Reverse K-3)

No. Node Vol. (ft No. Area (ft2) From To factor f L/D factor f L/D Inertia (ft-1) 39 47.7 15 18 0.39 0.36 0.145 40 69.6 16 18 0.39 0.47 0.095 41 45.1 17 18 0.09 0.09 0.198 42 146.1 18 19 0.47 0.38 0.068 43 30.3 19 21 1.80 1.04 0.397 44 38.7 19 21 1.63 0.81 0.396 45 85.8 19 21 1.06 0.53 0.049 46 6.3 20 2 0.88 0.51 0.319 47 10.0 20 5 0.94 0.52 0.182 48 11.3 20 4 0.95 0.53 0.158 49 6.1 20 3 0.88 0.51 0.332 NOTE:

1. Node No. 21 = Remainder of containment

Vent Path Connecting Node Vent Path Vent Path Area Forward K-factor Node No. Node Vol. (ft3) No. (ft2) From To f L/D Inertia (ft-1) 1 3,461.1 1 152.7 1 2 0.36 0.07 2 3,943.0 2 146.4 2 3 0.29 0.06 3 1,090.0 3 28.2 3 4 0.90 0.21 4 2,116.8 4 239.7 4 5 0.13 0.04 5 3,530.6 5 180.7 5 6 0.33 0.05 6 2,155.3 6 97.5 2 5 0.72 0.08 7 1,692.0 7 172.3 1 6 0.10 0.10 8 3,062.0 8 275.1 1 7 0.07 0.04 9 609.4 9 28.2 1 23 1.70 0.62 10 1,024.8 10 298.9 2 8 0.13 0.04 11 2,299.2 11 84.8 3 9 0.11 0.13 12 1,412.6 12 21.1 3 23 2.18 0.16 13 4,351.2 13 85.2 4 10 0.53 0.06 14 4,970.4 14 102.0 4 26 0.71 0.05 15 1,030.0 15 162.1 5 11 0.79 0.04 16 1,437.0 16 109.7 5 26 0.74 0.04 17 4,158.0 17 128.4 6 12 0.22 0.07 18 2,465.0 18 53.1 6 26 1.05 0.05

Vent Path Connecting Node Vent Path Vent Path Area Forward K-factor Node No. Node Vol. (ft3) No. (ft2) From To f L/D Inertia (ft-1) 19 337.5 19 79.7 7 8 0.67 0.09 20 2,652.0 20 77.7 8 9 0.58 0.08 21 515.0 21 29.6 9 10 0.63 0.22 22 437.0 22 123.5 10 11 0.26 0.05 23 2,268,896.0 23 65.8 11 12 0.87 0.06 24 170.8 24 61.8 8 11 0.86 0.10 25 142.1 25 67.8 7 12 0.57 0.12 26 1,874.7 26 78.8 7 13 1.27 0.05 27 184.0 8 14 0.83 0.04 28 9.9 9 15 1.63 0.15 29 24.1 14 23 3.41 0.80 30 42.9 10 16 1.00 0.18 31 164.9 11 17 0.75 0.05 32 108.4 12 18 0.69 0.09 33 208.1 13 14 0.34 0.06 34 134.1 14 15 0.57 0.05 35 47.6 15 16 0.74 0.11 36 215.6 16 17 0.25 0.03 37 195.3 17 18 0.44 0.03

Vent Path Connecting Node Vent Path Vent Path Area Forward K-factor Node No. Node Vol. (ft3) No. (ft2) From To f L/D Inertia (ft-1) 38 118.9 14 17 0.80 0.06 39 96.5 13 18 0.70 0.07 40 24.1 13 23 2.32 0.14 41 38.5 13 19 0.47 0.09 42 66.9 14 23 2.25 0.09 43 37.4 14 19 0.49 0.08 44 46.1 15 23 1.76 0.19 45 2.1 17 19 1.43 0.09 46 2.8 16 23 1.64 1.62 47 39.5 17 24 0.47 0.09 48 10.4 17 23 1.64 0.45 49 32.8 18 25 0.44 0.12 50 60.5 19 20 1.00 0.04 51 10.9 20 21 1.15 0.23 52 10.9 21 22 1.15 0.15 53 10.9 20 22 1.14 0.23 54 222.9 20 23 1.04 0.01 55 30.5 21 23 1.04 0.06 56 22.7 22 23 1.04 0.08

Vent Path Connecting Node Vent Path Vent Path Area Forward K-factor Node No. Node Vol. (ft3) No. (ft2) From To f L/D Inertia (ft-1) 57 9.7 19 24 1.66 1.23 58 9.7 24 25 1.66 1.23 59 9.7 25 19 1.66 1.23 60 31.6 24 21 0.72 0.11 61 26.2 25 22 0.77 0.12 62 135.0 26 23 1.31 0.01

TABLE 6.2-29 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 TABLE 6.2-30 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 THE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE Time (seconds) Mass (lb/sec) Energy (Btu/sec) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00251 5,552.0269 3,407,459.1 0.00502 5,756.6695 3,521,419.7 0.00751 5,692.3083 3,481,431.7 0.01002 5,615.6477 3,434,822.8 0.01251 5,582.0416 3,413,212.8 0.01502 5,605.9056 3,424,644.6 0.02003 6,046.9291 3,672,276.0 0.02505 6,094.2687 3,696,132.7 0.03004 6,377.2227 3,855,480.7 0.04002 6,514.3568 3,928,774.1 0.05005 6,255.1735 3,776,488.6 0.06003 6,324.9883 3,813,926.4 0.07006 6,345.5081 3,823,800.3 0.08003 6,287.2107 3,788,875.9 0.09001 6,040.9120 3,647,320.8 0.10002 6,273.5718 3,779,631.7 0.12009 6,432.5725 3,869,357.9 0.14010 6,098.8357 3,678,308.6 0.16011 6,193.9722 3,732,419.8 0.18008 6,019.7962 3,633,080.8 0.20010 6,057.0812 3,654,147.2 0.22504 6,074.9929 3,664,250.0 0.25009 6,018.4816 3,632,004.7 0.27506 6,082.1145 3,668,255.0 0.30004 5,925.2478 3,578,895.3 0.32505 5,865.6482 3,545,003.7 0.35027 5,801.4291 3,565,194.6

Time (seconds) Mass (lb/sec) Energy (Btu/sec) 0.37512 5,838.4907 3,529,217.1 0.40002 5,902.6209 3,565,586.7 0.42510 5,873.3889 3,548,782.6 0.45005 5,788.4098 3,500,382.8 0.47514 5,794.9974 3,503,947.8 0.50011 5,760.3602 3,484,023.4 0.60004 5,749.2097 3,476,806.0 0.80005 5,685.6760 3,438,625.3 1.00005 5,671.7795 3,428,642.4 1.20005 5,642.6635 3,410,212.5 1.60010 5,570.3163 3,365,947.1 2.00000 5,535.8334 3,343,985.3

TABLE 6.2-32 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 THE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE Time (seconds) Mass (lbm/second) Energy (Btu/second) 0.00000 0.000 0.0 0.00251 17553.572 11425912.1 0.00501 17422.259 11340996.7 0.00752 17572.430 11432981.5 0.01002 20028.958 12977551.1 0.01250 23244.639 14998787.0 0.01501 22780.360 14701069.2 0.02002 21536.201 13910281.5 0.02505 21788.970 14067164.2 0.03001 22096.827 14258323.5 0.04009 22163.796 14296831.3 0.05009 22168.798 14297542.4 0.06003 21954.868 14161109.2 0.07002 21486.333 13865676.4 0.08008 21559.658 13911478.1 0.09006 21177.338 13670129.2 0.10011 21246.037 13713337.4 0.12009 21458.639 13844705.0 0.14000 19982.682 12915684.7 0.16005 19494.776 12609669.5 0.18004 18528.597 12003609.1 0.20000 18050.370 11704301.2 0.22518 17998.648 11671729.9 0.25009 17696.522 11481210.8 0.27509 17106.076 11111087.8 0.30009 16635.338 10816078.7 0.32509 16555.410 10765008.1 0.35025 16519.049 10741215.6

Time (seconds) Mass (lbm/second) Energy (Btu/second) 0.37504 16482.635 10717232.9 0.40004 16457.392 10700396.5 0.42502 16449.951 10694803.9 0.45018 16448.886 10693186.5 0.47503 16430.154 10680270.7 0.50029 16372.015 10662341.9 0.60013 16348.315 10623178.6 0.80022 16274.598 10566348.5 1.00824 16153.704 10479400.0 1.20066 16042.294 10398834.0 1.60001 15843.660 10253285.2 2.00022 15596.981 10076714.8 0.00000 15596.981 10076714.8 0.01000 0.000 0.0 0.00000 0.000 0.0

Vent Path Connecting Spray Line Break in Surge Line Break in Surge Line Break in Nodes Node 15 Node 5 Node 20 ent ath Pressure Time Pressure Time Pressure Time o.) From To (psid) (sec) (psid) (sec) (psid) (sec) 1 21 0.22 0.132 15.41 0.188 15.37 0.192 1 21 0.22 0.132 15.41 0.188 1537 0.192 1 21 0.22 0.132 15.41 0.188 15.37 0.192 2 1 0.23 0.072 8.45 0.075 8.13 0.085 5 1 0.20 0.110 14.61 0.010 8.02 0.084 4 1 0.22 0.080 8.33 0.081 7.97 0.083 3 1 0.22 0.073 8.50 0.082 8.08 0.085 2 3 -0.02 0.163 4.27 0.012 0.47 0.022 2 5 -0.04 0.197 -12.22 0.008 1.97 0.016 4 5 0.10 0.161 -13.05 0.008 -0.40 0.015 3 4 -0.07 0.160 -2.97 0.012 2.09 0.015 2 6 -0.25 0.102 7.77 0.016 8.97 0.018 5 7 -0.30 0.103 14.61 0.010 7.65 0.019 4 8 -0.23 0.048 8.65 0.019 7.40 0.019 3 9 -0.21 0.099 11.16 0.022 8.70 0.017 6 7 0.07 0.123 -3.35 0.053 -0.77 0.037 7 8 0.18 0.104 3.26 0.052 0.19 0.048 8 9 0.14 0.086 -1.39 0.034 -0.68 0.021 6 9 0.06 0.105 -2.37 0.033 -0.17 0.034 6 10 -4.37 0.057 20.76 0.216 20.83 0.227

Vent Path Connecting Spray Line Break in Surge Line Break in Surge Line Break in Nodes Node 15 Node 5 Node 20 ent ath Pressure Time Pressure Time Pressure Time o.) From To (psid) (sec) (psid) (sec) (psid) (sec) 7 11 -4.40 0.058 20.84 0.210 20.85 0.220 8 12 -3.90 0.074 20.73 0.222 20.80 0.227 8 12 -3.90 0.074 20.73 0.222 20.80 0.227 9 13 -3.70 0.063 20.76 0.219 20.83 0.232 12 21 4.37 0.074 2.09 0.216 2.06 0.136 10 11 -0.95 0.020 -0.11 0.054 -0.33 0.081 11 12 1.57 0.058 0.34 0.069 -0.41 0.054 12 13 -0.72 0.060 0.31 0.050 0.33 0.052 10 13 -1.21 0.041 0.22 0.067 0.21 0.074 10 14 -3.83 0.015 0.68 0.065 0.60 0.066 11 15 -5.91 0.010 0.59 0.065 0.44 0.068 12 16 -3.00 0.023 0.51 0.053 0.56 0.055 13 17 -4.20 0.022 0.53 0.124 0.69 0.063 14 15 -4.85 0.007 -0.09 0.080 -0.22 0.140 15 16 5.80 0.009 -0.25 0.098 -0.31 0.100 16 17 1.68 0.032 0.21 0.099 0.20 0.101 14 17 -3.01 0.024 0.07 0.124 0.13 0.126 14 18 2.95 0.013 0.36 0.131 0.39 0.125 15 18 5.90 0.010 0.41 0.130 0.39 0.115 16 18 1.69 0.057 0.53 0.100 0.56 0.102 17 18 -1.85 0.033 0.42 0.131 0.37 0.102 18 19 2.51 0.024 0.75 0.144 0.70 0.146 19 21 2.55 0.107 1.25 0.163 1.25 0.165 19 21 2.55 0.107 1.25 0.163 1.25 0.165 19 21 2.55 0.107 1.25 0.163 1.25 0.165

Vent Path Connecting Spray Line Break in Surge Line Break in Surge Line Break in Nodes Node 15 Node 5 Node 20 ent ath Pressure Time Pressure Time Pressure Time o.) From To (psid) (sec) (psid) (sec) (psid) (sec) 20 2 0.05 0.520 3.20 0.007 185.86 0.044 20 5 0.05 0.520 -10.87 -0.013 185.79 0.047 20 4 -0.06 0.159 3.91 0.008 185.76 0.046 20 3 0.05 0.520 5.01 0.009 185.78 0.044

(CONTINUED)

Vent Path Connecting Nodes Surge Line Break in Node 4 Surge Line Break in Node 2 ent ath No.) From To Pressure (psid) Time (sec) Pressure (psid) Time (sec) 1 21 15.46 0.187 15.50 0.191 1 21 15.46 0.187 15.50 0.191 1 21 15.46 0.187 15.50 0.191 2 1 8.45 0.083 24.83 0.008 5 1 8.38 0.083 8.61 0.081 4 1 11.86 0.010 8.23 0.086 3 1 8.41 0.074 19.55 0.014 2 3 -4.40 0.012 19.37 0.006 2 5 -3.10 0.012 23.32 0.007 4 5 10.48 0.008 -3.84 0.012 3 4 -9.73 0.007 17.85 0.013 2 6 11.31 0.022 23.99 0.007 5 7 9.13 0.020 7.16 0.016 4 8 12.16 0.010 9.90 0.022 3 9 7.19 0.017 19.03 0.013 6 7 1.30 0.034 3.43 0.054 7 8 3.41 0.035 1.31 0.051 8 9 3.21 0.053 4.99 0.021 6 9 2.36 0.033 -2.49 0.021 6 10 20.97 0.220 20.98 0.217 7 11 20.95 0.217 20.76 0.229 8 12 20.91 0.207 20.72 0.222 8 12 20.91 0.207 20.72 0.222 9 13 20.93 0.221 20.99 0.215 12 21 2.14 0.127 2.05 0.139

Vent Path Connecting Nodes Surge Line Break in Node 4 Surge Line Break in Node 2 ent ath No.) From To Pressure (psid) Time (sec) Pressure (psid) Time (sec) 10 11 -0.33 0.076 0.21 0.044 11 12 -0.54 0.047 0.28 0.083 12 13 -0.45 0.063 0.27 0.063 10 13 -0.33 0.047 -0.20 0.053 10 14 0.67 0.057 0.41 0.045 11 15 0.71 0.112 0.36 0.132 12 16 0.72 0.048 0.54 0.060 13 17 0.73 0.060 0.51 0.052 14 15 -0.15 0.131 -0.12 0.128 15 16 -0.32 0.086 -0.29 0.107 16 17 0.28 0.081 0.19 0.105 14 17 -0.15 0.086 -0.24 0.111 14 18 0.38 0.117 0.36 0.103 15 18 0.40 0.116 0.38 0.122 16 18 0.56 0.086 0.58 0.108 17 18 0.40 0.090 0.52 0.110 18 19 0.74 0.092 0.68 0.089 19 21 1.25 0.154 1.24 0.164 19 21 1.25 0.154 1.24 0.164 19 21 1.25 0.154 1.24 0.164 20 2 5.24 0.009 -19.84 0.007 20 5 3.97 0.008 3.98 0.026 20 4 -7.73 0.013 5.17 0.010 20 3 3.16 0.008 -13.39 0.013

TABLE 6.2-34 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 GUILLOTINE BREAK OF THE PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE USED FOR A 196.6 SQUARE INCH HOT LEG LDR IN THE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE)

Time (seconds) Mass (lbm/sec) Energy (BTU/sec) 0.00000 0.000 0.0 0.00251 17553.572 11425912.1 0.00501 17422.259 11340996.7 0.00752 17572.430 11432981.5 0.01002 20028.958 12977551.1 0.01250 23244.639 14998787.0 0.01501 22780.360 14701069.2 0.02002 21536.201 13910281.5 0.02505 21788.970 14067164.2 0.03001 22096.827 14258323.5 0.04009 22163.796 14296831.3 0.05009 22168.798 14297542.4 0.06003 21954.868 14161109.2 0.07002 21486.33 13865676.4 0.08008 21559.658 13911478.1 0.09006 21177.338 13670129.2 0.10011 21246.037 13713337.4 0.12009 21458.639 13844705.0 0.14000 19982.682 12915684.7 0.16005 19494.776 12609669.5 0.18004 18528.597 12003609.1 0.20000 18050.370 11704301.2 0.22518 17998.648 11671729.9 0.25009 17696.522 11481210.8 0.27509 17106.076 11111087.8 0.30009 16635.338 10816078.7 0.32509 16555.410 10765008.1

USED FOR A 196.6 SQUARE INCH HOT LEG LDR IN THE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE) (CONTINUED)

Time (seconds) Mass (lbm/sec) Energy (BTU/sec) 0.35025 16519.049 10741215.6 0.37504 16482.635 10717232.9 0.40004 16457.392 10700396.5 0.42502 16449.951 10694803.9 0.45018 16448.886 10693186.5 0.47503 16430.154 10680270.7 0.50029 16372.015 10662341.9 0.60013 16348.315 10623178.6 0.80022 16274.598 10566348.5 1.00824 16153.704 10479400.0 1.20066 16042.294 10398834.0 1.60001 15843.660 10253285.2 2.00022 15596.981 10076714.8 0.00000 15596.981 10076714.8 0.01000 0.000 0.0 0.00000 0.000 0.0

TABLE 6.2-36 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 SES IN THE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE Time (sec) Mass Flow (lb/sec) Energy (Btu/lb) 0.0 12439 6.946 E6 2.0 12434 6.946 E6

TABLE 6.2-36B DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 TABLE 6.2-37 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 TABLE 6.2-37A DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 TABLE 6.2-37B DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 PRESSURIZER SURGE LINE LDR Vent Path Connecting Nodes nt Path umber) From To Pressure (psid) Time (seconds) 1 1 2 0.84 0.06 2 2 3 1.17 0.049 3 3 4 - 3.51 0.024 4 4 5 2.34 0.027 5 5 6 2.0 0.017 6 2 5 - 2.6 0.018 7 1 6 - 2.76 0.026 8 1 7 1.52 0.038 9 1 23 4.84 0.121 10 2 8 1.53 0.034 11 3 9 2.8 0.036 12 3 23 5.22 0.139 13 4 10 -5.47 0.015 14 4 26 2.5 0.024 15 5 11 - 7.58 0.008 16 5 26 2.32 0.018 17 6 12 3.21 0.029 18 6 26 1.25 0.056 19 7 8 - 1.11 0.017 20 8 9 - 1.87 0.025 21 9 10 - 5.73 0.015 22 10 11 - 6.49 0.007 23 11 12 7.12 0.008 24 8 11 - 7.95 0.009 25 7 12 - 3.15 0.015 26 7 13 1.68 0.053 27 8 14 1.89 0.054

Vent Path Connecting Nodes nt Path umber) From To Pressure (psid) Time (seconds) 28 9 15 2.46 0.05 29 14 23 4.55 0.142 30 10 16 5.78 0.016 31 11 17 7.81 0.008 32 12 18 2.98 0.015 33 13 14 0.88 0.058 34 14 15 0.97 0.048 35 15 16 - 2.97 0.026 36 16 17 1.74 0.028 37 17 18 1.61 0.018 38 14 17 - 2.25 0.021 39 13 18 - 2.52 0.028 40 13 23 4.35 0.12 41 13 19 1.25 0.055 42 14 23 4.55 0.142 43 14 19 0.89 0.037 44 15 23 4.46 0.157 45 17 19 2.58 0.021 46 16 23 4.91 0.09 47 17 24 1.3 0.031 48 17 23 4.68 0.152 49 18 25 1.33 0.027 50 19 20 3.3 0.146 51 20 21 - 1.56 0.167 52 21 22 0.3 0.022 53 20 22 - 1.57 0.165 54 20 23 0.44 0.111 55 21 23 1.96 0.168

Vent Path Connecting Nodes nt Path umber) From To Pressure (psid) Time (seconds) 56 22 23 1.97 0.163 57 19 24 - 2.05 0.022 58 24 25 1.35 0.021 59 25 19 1.66 0.032 60 24 21 1.9 0.147 61 25 22 1.9 0.154 62 26 23 4.25 0.155

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL LINE LDR Vent Path Connecting Nodes nt Path umber) From To Pressure (psid) Time (seconds) 1 1 2 - 1.35 0.021 2 2 3 1.79 0.049 3 3 4 - 5.12 0.02 4 4 5 - 5.34 0.008 5 5 6 5.54 0.009 6 2 5 - 6.26 0.01 7 1 6 - 4.56 0.02 8 1 7 0.89 0.036 9 1 23 4.96 0.111 10 2 8 1.29 0.021 11 3 9 0.84 0.093 12 3 23 5.33 0.133 13 4 10 3.18 0.017 14 4 26 2.48 0.021 15 5 11 5.58 0.009 16 5 26 5.29 0.008 17 6 12 3.28 0.018 18 6 26 1.44 0.02 19 7 8 1.15 0.046 20 8 9 1.35 0.05 21 9 10 - 4.34 0.024 22 10 11 3.4 0.026 23 11 12 2.02 0.016 24 8 11 - 2.81 0.018 25 7 12 - 3.17 0.026 26 7 13 2.05 0.04 27 8 14 1.85 0.033

Vent Path Connecting Nodes nt Path umber) From To Pressure (psid) Time (seconds) 28 9 15 2.68 0.035 29 14 23 4.2 0.151 30 10 16 5.11 0.025 31 11 17 2.95 0.018 32 12 18 3.41 0.026 33 13 14 0.44 0.049 34 14 15 0.84 0.053 35 15 16 - 1.62 0.083 36 16 17 0.72 0.085 37 17 18 0.5 0.079 38 14 17 - 1.03 0.032 39 13 18 - 1.15 0.033 40 13 23 4.34 0.164 41 13 19 1.25 0.051 42 14 23 4.2 0.151 43 14 19 0.86 0.078 44 15 23 4.21 0.125 45 17 19 1.61 0.037 46 16 23 4.83 0.084 47 17 24 0.91 0.047 48 17 23 4.44 0.146 49 18 25 1.06 0.041 50 19 20 3.14 0.165 51 20 21 - 1.52 0.082 52 21 22 - 0.26 0.07 53 20 22 - 1.46 0.142 54 20 23 0.47 0.051 55 21 23 1.89 0.152

Vent Path Connecting Nodes nt Path umber) From To Pressure (psid) Time (seconds) 56 22 23 1.86 0.144 57 19 24 - 0.88 0.039 58 24 25 0.38 0.081 59 25 19 0.71 0.035 60 24 21 1.81 0.142 61 25 22 1.87 0.136 62 26 23 4.59 0.091

TABLE 6.2-40 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 TABLE 6.2-41 DELETED BY PKF FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 TABLE 6.2-42 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES Design Pressure Maximum Calculated Compartment (psid, uniform) Pressure (psid, local) fueling Cavity (1) 11.6 N/A - Note 2 per Reactor Cavity 120.0 N/A - Note 2 wer Pressurizer Cubicle 27.3 24.58 - Note 3 per Pressurizer Cubicle 7.7 5.83 - Note 4 am Generator Cubicle 21.7 17.99 - Note 3 am Generator Enclosure above 9.2 4.6 - Note 5 erating Floor TE:

The controlling load combination for the refueling cavity wall design is for the cavity filled with water during refueling, which results in a design pressure of 11.6 psid.

The cold leg LDR break was eliminated due to the application of Leak Before Break (LBB) technology.

Value based upon break from pressurizer surge line DER.

Value based upon break from pressurizer spray line DER.

Value based upon break from feedwater line SES.

TABLE 6.2-44 OMITTED TABLE 6.2-45 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-46 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-47 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-48 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-49 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-50 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-51 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-52 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-53 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-54 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-55 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-56 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-57 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-58 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 BLE 6.2-59 BALANCE OF PLANT PARAMETERS USED IN STEAM LINE BREAK MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE CALCULATION Main Feedwater System

a. Feedwater line volume between steam generator and feedwater isolation valve (FWIV) (ft3) 438
b. FWIV and FCV closure times (seconds) 7.0 Auxiliary Feedwater System
a. Flow to broken loop SG, limited by cavitating venturis (lbm/sec):

Double-ended ruptures and split rupture 39.0

b. Assumed time of manual termination (min) 30 Main Steam System
a. Total piping volume (ft2) 10,111
b. Volume between the break and the nearest MSIV For broken loop MSIV functioning (ft3) 947 For failure of broken loop MSIV (ft3) 8,074
c. Steam line minimum cross-sectional area (ft2) 1.4 (1)
d. MSIV closure time (sec) 12.0 (2)
e. Instrument response and signal processing delay (sec) 1.8 For the Double Ended Rupture (DER) cases, the forward-flow cross-sectional area from the faulted steam generator is limited by the integral flow restrictor of 1.4 ft2, which is less than the actual area of 4.12 ft2 for the main steam line piping inside containment.

Includes instrument response and signal processing delay.

TABLE 6.2-60 DELETED Data ench Spray Pumps mber 2 pe Horizontal centrifugal ted flow (gpm) 4,000 ted head (ft) 291 rsepower (normal Bhp) 386 terial 316 SS ntainment Recirculation Pumps mber 4 ted flow (gpm) 3,950 ted head (ft) 342 rsepower (normal Bhp) 443 terial 304 SS fueling Water Storage Tank mber 1 lume (gal.) (see Figure 6.3-6) 1,166,000 min 1,207,000 max ron concentration (ppm) 2,700 min 2,900 max sign pressure Hydraulic head sign temperature (F) 150 erating pressure (psig) Hydraulic head erating temperature (F) 40-75 terial SA240-TP304 sign code ASME III, Class 2

Data sodium Phosphate Baskets mber 12 nimum volume (to mark), each (cu. ft.) 81.17 nimum density of TSP (lb/cu. ft.) 54.0 ray Headers CRS QSS vations (ft) 145 ft. 3 in. 141 ft. 9 in. 168 153 erating floor elevation = 51 feet 4 inches) imuth coverage (degrees) 360 360 360 360 ameter (ft) 105 107.5 44 91 e diameter 12 12 6 10

. of nozzles per header 160 160 70 192 ss mean diameter of spray droplets 1,037 1,037 1,037 1,037 icrons) at 40 psi ximum diameter that will 3/8 3/8 3/8 3/8 s through nozzles mp screens esh (in.) 1/16 ntainment Recirculation Coolers mber 4 pe Conventional shell and tube heat exchanger ell source Containment recirculation water be source Service water

MALFUNCTIONS Components Malfunction Comments and Consequences The casing is designed for 150F temperature. Design pressure is 200 psig a maximum test pressure is 300 psig. These conditions exceed those which would occur during operating conditions. The casings are made from stainle steel (SA351-CF8M). This metal has corrosion-erosion resistance and Quench Spray Pumps Pump Casing Ruptures produces sound castings. The pumps conform to Seismic Category I and ASME Code Section III, Class 2 design requirements. The pumps are enclosed in cubicles and protected from internally generated missiles. Ruptu of the pump casing by a missile is not considered credible. Rupture of the pump casing is therefore not considered credible.

The quench spray system has two redundant parallel pumps. Sufficient Quench Spray Pumps Pump fails to start capacity is provided by one pump in case of failure of the other pump.

The quench spray system has two redundant parallel pumps. Sufficient Quench Spray Pump Valve fails to open capacity is provided by one pump in case of failure of the other pump Discharge Isolation Valve discharge isolation valve.

The valve body is designed for 200 lb. The castings are made from stainles Quench Spray Pump Rupture of valve body steel; this material has corrosion resistance and produces sound castings.

Discharge Isolation Valve Rupture of the valve body is not considered credible.

Swing check valve in Quench Spray Pump Check Valve is checked periodically. In addition, redundant parallel quench spray pump discharge line sticks Valve subsystem is operable, in case of failure of valve to open.

closed The piping is fabricated of Type 304 stainless steel; this metal has corrosio Quench Spray Piping Rupture of piping erosion resistance. Piping is designed for Seismic Category I. Pipe rupture not considered credible.

Containment Recirculation Four containment recirculation pumps are provided. Only two out of four Pump fails to start Spray Pump must operate.

Components Malfunction Comments and Consequences Four containment recirculation spray coolers are provided. The containmen recirculation spray coolers are designed to the ASME Section III, Code Cla 2/3, and Seismic Category I requirements. Rupture is considered unlikely. T Containment Recirculation service water discharge from each train of the coolers is monitored for Tube or shell rupture Spray Coolers radiation; a high radiation level indicates a tube rupture in a train. In the eve of a rupture, motor-operated valves are provided to isolate the train and prevent further leakage. Also, a redundant containment recirculation spray subsystem can be used.

The pump casing is fabricated of Type 304 stainless steel. This metal is Containment Recirculation Rupture of pump casing corrosion resistant. The pump casings are missile-protected and set in Pump concrete. Rupture of the pump casing is not considered credible.

Piping is fabricated of Type 304 stainless steel and designed to ASME III Containment Recirculation Code Class 2. Piping is also missile-protected. Rupture of piping is not Rupture of piping Spray Piping considered credible. However, in case of pipe rupture for pipe lines to and from containment recirculation pumps, isolation valves are provided.

Valve body is designed for 275 lb. The castings are made from stainless ste Containment Recirculation This material has corrosion erosion resistance and produces sound castings Spray Pump Discharge Rupture of valve body The valves are missile-protected. Rupture of valve body is not considered Isolation Valve credible.

Redundant valves are provided where valves are required to open on a CD Motor-Operated Valves Loss of power to one signal. Electric power to these valves is supplied from separate buses. Othe (where opening is required valve due to failure of valves are left open during normal plant operation to ensure against failure for QSS) electric bus open.

Automatic Electric and Control Instrumentation Failure of one train Redundant train actuates redundant equipment.

Trains to Actuate Engineered Safety Features Equipment

Components Malfunction Comments and Consequences Three layers of screening are provided in the suction of containment Spray Nozzle Spray nozzles plugged recirculation pumps. The strainers and the screen mesh are small enough to prevent passage of any material which could plug the spray nozzles.

The strainers have been evaluated for possible failure mechanisms. It was Strainer clogged or concluded that there are no reasonable postulated failures of the strainer. In Containment Sump Strainer damaged accordance with Section 3.1.1.3, the strainer is considered especially qualifi for service.

PRINCIPAL COMPONENT AND DESIGN PARAMETERS Design Parameters tration Units uipment Mark No. 3HVR*FLT3A/3B antity 2 ximum capacity (cfm/unit) 9,800 PA Filter Maximum capacity 9,800 Pressure drop, clean/change out (in wg) at rated capacity of 1,500 1.30/1.75 cfm/element Pressure drop at maximum capacity flow rate of 1,633 cfm/

1.42 element arcoal Absorber Rated capacity for 5 cells at 2,000 (cfm) each 10,000 Pressure drop, clean (in wg) 2.5 tration Fans uipment Mark No. 3HVR*FN12A, 12B antity 2 Type Centrifugal Capacity (cfm) 9,500 Fluid Air Operating temperature (F) 120 Drive Direct Static pressure (in wg) 25.8 Motor horsepower 75

Containment Enclosure Building Design Parameters e volume (ft3) 8.16 x 105 ssure, in wg

1. Normal operation 0 (atmospheric pressure)
2. Post-accident Negative pressure: To ensure a negative pressure in the containment Enclosure Building, negative pressure is measured at the Auxiliary Building 24 foot 6 inches elevation and maintained per technical specifications at greater than or equal to 0.4 inches of water gauge.

ak Rate from Primary Containment to the Enclosure See Table 15.6-9 ilding at Post-accident Pressure (%/day) ide Air Temperature (F) 140 tside Air Temperature (F) 86 ickness of Primary Containment Wall (in.) 54 Inside panel 18 gage galvanized ickness of Enclosure Building Wall (in.)

steel Outside panel 18 gage painted steel efficient of Linear Expansion of Primary Containment ll (in/in-F) 6 x 10-6 dulus of Elasticity of Primary Containment Wall (psi) 3 x 106 ermal Conductivity of Primary Containment Wall 1.05 u/hr/ft2/F/ft) ermal conductivity of Enclosure Building Wall 26.2 u/hr/ft2/F/ft)

TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (12)

Valve Position Valve Actuation (1)

Containment Length of Pipe Penetration Isolation Closure from Bypass Vent, Drain, Test Nominal FSAR Arrangement ESF Type C Valve No. / Valve No. / Actuation Power Primary Secondary Time (1) Containment Leakage and Revision 3606/29/23 Essential No. of Line Size Figure Fig. No. System Leakage Valve Type / Valve Type / Power Signal Source Mode Mode (Sec) Outside to Penetration Instrumentation Service Penetration Penetrations (in.) Fluid No. 6.2-47 GDC Yes/No Test (I/II) Oper. Type (1) Oper. Type (1) Normal Shutdown Accident Failure (2) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) Valve (ft) Yes/No Isolation Valves E/NE No. Inside (I) (1) Outside (0) (1)

Class A Penetrations Reactor coolant NE 12B 1 3/4 Liquid 9.3-2 A 55 No I 3SSR*CTV26 / 3SSR*CTV27 / Open Shut (3) Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3SSR*V799, hot legs sample Globe / Globe / Solenoid Manual 3SSR*V800 Solenoid Pressurizer NE 12A 1 3/4 Gas 9.3-2 A 55 No I 3SSR*CTV20 / 3SSR*CTV21 / Open Shut (3) Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3SSR*V811 vapor space Manual sample Globe / Globe / Solenoid 3SSR*V812 Solenoid Pressurizer relief NE 12C 1 3/4 Gas 9.3-2 A 56 No I 3SSR*CV8026 3SSR*CV8025 / Open Shut (3) Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3SSR*V788 tank (PRT) gas / Manual sample Globe / Globe / Solenoid Solenoid Reactor coolant NE 13A 1 3/4 Liquid 9.3-2 A 55 No I 3SSR*CTV29 / 3SSR*CTV30 / Open Shut (3) Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3SSR*V787 cold legs sample Manual Globe / Globe / Solenoid 3SSR*V795 Solenoid Safety injection NE 13D 1 3/4 Liquid 9.3-2 A 55 No I 3SSR*CTV32 / 3SSR*CTV33 / Open Shut (3) Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3SSR*V792 accumulators Manual sample Globe / Globe / Solenoid Solenoid MPS-3 FSAR N2 to safety NE 14 1 1 Gas 6.2-37 GG 56 No II 3SIL*CV8968 3SIL*CV8880 / Shut Shut Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 16 Yes 3SIL*V916 injection / Manual accumulators Globe / Air Globe / Air Pilot 3SIL*V989 Pilot Primary grade NE 15 1 3 Liquid 9.2-11 NN 56 No II 3PGS*CV8046 3PGS*CV8028 / Open Open Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3PGS*V948 water to PRT / Manual 3PGS*V673 Globe / Air Globe / Air Pilot Pilot 3/4 3PGS*RV77 / Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A. N.A.

Actuated Relief Seal water E 16, 17, 4 2 Liquid 9.3-7 S (4) No N.A (20) 3CHS*V394, 3CHS*MV8109A, Open Shut / Open N.A. / FAI N.A. N.A. / A, Backflow N.A. / N.A. / NSR 10 No 3CHS*V517 55 Shut (3) /

injection to 18, 19 434, 467, 501 / B, C, D / Open B, A, B / Remote Manual reactor coolant Manual pumps Check / N.A. Globe / Motor 3CHS*V808 3CHS*V451 3CHS*V820 6.2-278 3CHS*V414 3CHS*V827 3CHS*V484

TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (CONTINUED) (12)

Valve Position Valve Actuation (1)

Containment Length of Pipe Penetration Isolation Closure from Bypass Vent, Drain, Test Nominal FSAR Arrangement ESF Type C Valve No. / Valve No. / Actuation Power Primary Secondary Time (1) Containment Leakage and Essential No. of Line Size Figure Fig. No. System Leakage Valve Type / Valve Type / Power Signal Source Mode Mode (Sec) Outside to Penetration Instrumentation Service Penetration Penetrations (in.) Fluid No. 6.2-47 GDC Yes/No Test (I/II) Oper. Type (1) Oper. Type (1) Normal Shutdown Accident Failure (2) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) Valve (ft) Yes/No Isolation Valves Revision 3606/29/23 E/NE No. Inside (I) (1) Outside (0) (1) 3CHS*V814 Seal water return NE 23 1 (5) 2 Liquid 9.3-8 T 55 No I 3CHS*MV811 3CHS*MV8100 / Open Open Shut FAI CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3CHS*V547 from reactor 2/ Manual coolant pumps Globe / Motor Globe / Motor 3CHS*V758 3/4 3CHS*RV8113 Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A. Yes N.A.

/ Actuated Relief / N.A.

Reactor coolant E (6) (5) (7) 3 Liquid 9.3-8 G 55 No II 3CHS*CV816 3CHS*CV8152 / Open Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3CHS*V995 24 1 Shut (3) letdown 0/ Manual Globe / Air Globe / Air Pilot Pilot 2 1/2 3CHS*RV8117 Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A. Yes N.A.

/ Actuated Relief / N.A.

Reactor coolant E 26 1 3 Liquid 9.3-8 H 55 No I 3CHS*V58 / 3CHS*MV8105 / Open Shut (3) Shut N.A. / FAI N.A. / SIS N.A. / A Backflow N.A. / N.A. / 40 10 No 3CHS*V385 charging / Remote (8)

Automatic Manual Check / N.A. Gate / Motor 3CHS*V839 PRT & NE 27 1 (5) 3 Liquid 9.3-5 NN 56 No II 3DGS*CTV24 3DGS*CTV25 / Shut (2)/ Shut (3) Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3DGS*V824 Containment / Open Manual drains transfer pumps discharge Globe / Air Globe / Air Pilot Pilot MPS-3 FSAR 3/4 3DGS*RV51 / Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A.

Actuated Relief Containment NE 28 (5) 2 Liquid 9.3-6 NN 56 No I 3DAS*CTV24 3DAS*CTV25 / Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 14 Yes 3DAS*V924 1 Shut (2) / Shut (3) drains sump / Open Manual pump discharge Globe / Air Globe / Air Pilot Pilot 3/4 3DAS*RV87 / Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A.

Actuated Relief PRT & NE 29 1 3/4 Gas 9.3-5 NN 56 No I 3VRS*CTV20 3VRS*CTV21 / Open Open Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3VRS*V991 containment / Manual drains transfer tank vent Diaphragm / Diaphragm / Air Air Pilot Pilot Containment NE 35, 36 2 2 Gas 9.4-5 J2 56 (4) No N.A. / I None 3CVS*CTV20A, Shut (3) Shut (3) Shut (3) N.A. / FC N.A. / CIA N.A. / A, Automatic Remote N.A. / 60 16 Yes N.A.

vacuum pump B; 21A, B A; B,B Manual 6.2-279 suction

/ Globe / Air Pilot

TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (CONTINUED) (12)

Valve Position Valve Actuation (1)

Containment Length of Pipe Penetration Isolation Closure from Bypass Vent, Drain, Test Nominal FSAR Arrangement ESF Type C Valve No. / Valve No. / Actuation Power Primary Secondary Time (1) Containment Leakage and Essential No. of Line Size Figure Fig. No. System Leakage Valve Type / Valve Type / Power Signal Source Mode Mode (Sec) Outside to Penetration Instrumentation Service Penetration Penetrations (in.) Fluid No. 6.2-47 GDC Yes/No Test (I/II) Oper. Type (1) Oper. Type (1) Normal Shutdown Accident Failure (2) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) Valve (ft) Yes/No Isolation Valves Revision 3606/29/23 E/NE No. Inside (I) (1) Outside (0) (1)

Chilled water NE 38, 72 2 (5) 8 Liquid 9.2-3 NN 56 No I 3CDS*CTV91 3CDS*CTV38A, Open Shut (3) Shut FC CIA B, B / A, Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3CDS*V929 supply A, B / B/ A Manual Butterfly / Air Butterfly / Air 3CDS*V936 Pilot Pilot 3/4 3CDS*RV105A, Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A.

B/ Actuated Relief Chilled water NE 45, 116 2 (5) 10 Liquid 9.2-3 NN 56 No I 3CDS*CTV40 3CDS*CTV39A, Open Shut (3) Shut FC CIA B/A Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3CDS*V930 return A, B / B/ Manual Butterfly / Air Butterfly / Air 3CDS*V934 Pilot Pilot 3/4 3CDS*RV106A, Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A.

B/ Actuated Relief Instrument air NE 54 1 2 Gas 9.3-1 B 56 No II 3IAS*MOV72 3IAS*PV15 / Open Open Shut FAI / FC CIA B/A Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3IAS*V998

/ Manual Globe / Motor Globe / Air Pilot Fire protection NE 56 1 (5) 6 Liquid 9.5-1 FF 56 No I 3FPW*CTV49 3FPW*CTV48 / Open Open Shut FC CIA B/A Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3FPW*V665

/ Manual Butterfly / Air Butterfly / Air 3FPW*V641 Pilot Pilot 3FPW*V661 / 3FPW*V666 / Shut (3) Shut (3) Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Manual N.A. N.A. 10 Yes N.A.

(A.C.)

Globe / Globe / MPS-3 FSAR Handwheel Handwheel 3/4 3FPW*RV87 / Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A. N.A.

Actuated Relief Containment NE 63 1 1 Gas 6.2-53 B 56 No I 3CMS*MOV2 3CMS*CTV23 / Open Open Shut (3) FAI / FC CIA B/A Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3CMS*V009 atmosphere 4/ Manual monitor discharge Globe / Motor Globe / Air Pilot Containment NE 32 1 1 Gas 6.2-53 J1 56 (4) No N.A. / I None 3CMS*CTV20, Open Open Shut (3) N.A. / FC N.A. / CIA N.A. / A, Automatic Remote N.A. / 60 10 Yes atmosphere 21 / B Manual monitor suction Globe / Air Pilot Safety injection NE 99 1 (5) 3/4 Liquid 6.3-2 F 56 No I 3SIH*RV8870 3SIH*CV8964 / Shut (3) Shut (3) Shut FC CIA B Automatic Remote N.A. / 60 10 Yes 3SIH*V937, test and /Relief Globe / Air Pilot Manual 3SIH*V793, accumulator fill 3SIH*V984, line 3SIH*V938, 3SIH*V985 3SIH*CV8871 3SIH*CV8888 / Shut (3) Shut (3) Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 N.A.

/ Manual 6.2-280 Globe / Air Globe / Air Pilot Pilot

TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (CONTINUED) (12)

Valve Position Valve Actuation (1)

Containment Length of Pipe Penetration Isolation Closure from Bypass Vent, Drain, Test Nominal FSAR Arrangement ESF Type C Valve No. / Valve No. / Actuation Power Primary Secondary Time (1) Containment Leakage and Essential No. of Line Size Figure Fig. No. System Leakage Valve Type / Valve Type / Power Signal Source Mode Mode (Sec) Outside to Penetration Instrumentation Service Penetration Penetrations (in.) Fluid No. 6.2-47 GDC Yes/No Test (I/II) Oper. Type (1) Oper. Type (1) Normal Shutdown Accident Failure (2) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) Valve (ft) Yes/No Isolation Valves Revision 3606/29/23 E/NE No. Inside (I) (1) Outside (0) (1)

Nitrogen supply NE 124 1 1 Gas 9.5-5 HH 56 No II 3GSN*CTV10 3GSN*CV8033 / Shut Shut Shut FC CIA A/B Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 Yes 3GSN*V970 header 5/ Manual Globe / Air Globe / Air Pilot Pilot Post-accident NE 115 1 (5) 3/4 Liquid 9.3-10 MM 55 No I 3SSP*CTV7 / 3SSP*V13 / Shut Shut Shut FC CIA A Automatic Remote 60 / N.A. 10 Yes 3SSP*V021 sample Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. / Manual Manual /

A.C. N.A.

Globe / Globe / 3SSP*V022 Solenoid Handwheel 3SSP*V105 3SSP*V106 3/4 3SSP*RV62 / Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A.

Actuated Relief Post-accident NE 120 (5) 3/4 Liquid 9.3-10 MM 55 No I 3SSP*CTV8 / 3SSP*V14 / Shut Shut Shut FC CIA A Automatic Remote 60 / N.A. 10 Yes 3SSP*V023 1

sample return Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. / Manual Manual /

A.C. N.A.

Globe / Globe / 3SSP*V101 Solenoid Handwheel 3SSP*V155 3SSP*V156 3/4 3SSP*RV63 / Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A.

Actuated Relief MPS-3 FSAR Reactor plant NE 39, 40 2 10 Liquid 9.2-2 KK 56 No I 3CCP*V18, 3CCP*MOV45A, Open Open Shut N.A./FAI NA / CIB A, B Automatic Remote N.A. / 60 10 No 3CCP*V397 component V60 / B/ Manual cooling supply headers Check Butterfly / Motor 3CCP*V437 Reactor plant NE 41, 42 2 (5) 10 Liquid 9.2-2 LL 56 No I 3CCP*MOV48 3CCP*MOV49A, Open Open Shut FAI CIB A, B / B, Automatic Remote 60 / 60 10 No 3CCP*V398 component A, B / B/ A Manual cooling return headers Butterfly / Butterfly / Motor 3CCP*V436 Motor 3/4 3CCP*RV275A, Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A. N.A.

B/ Actuated Relief Residual heat E 91, 92 (4) (7) 12 Liquid 6.2-37 DD 55 No N.A (20) 3RHS*MV870 3RHS*MV8701B, Shut Open (3) Shut FAI N.A. A, B / B, Remote Manual NSR 10 No 3RHS*V009 2

removal pumps 1A, 8702B / 8702A A Manual (A.C.)

suction from hot (A.C.)

legs Gate / Motor / Gate / Motor 3RHS*V026 6.2-281 4 3RHS*RV8708 Shut Shut Shut (3) Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A. 10 No A, B / Actuated

TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (CONTINUED) (12)

Valve Position Valve Actuation (1)

Containment Length of Pipe Penetration Isolation Closure from Bypass Vent, Drain, Test Nominal FSAR Arrangement ESF Type C Valve No. / Valve No. / Actuation Power Primary Secondary Time (1) Containment Leakage and Essential No. of Line Size Figure Fig. No. System Leakage Valve Type / Valve Type / Power Signal Source Mode Mode (Sec) Outside to Penetration Instrumentation Service Penetration Penetrations (in.) Fluid No. 6.2-47 GDC Yes/No Test (I/II) Oper. Type (1) Oper. Type (1) Normal Shutdown Accident Failure (2) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) Valve (ft) Yes/No Isolation Valves Revision 3606/29/23 E/NE No. Inside (I) (1) Outside (0) (1)

Class B Relief / N.A.

Penetrations Main steam lines E 1, 2, 3, 4 (5) (7) 30 Gas 10.3-1 M 57 No N.A. (Typ) None (closed) 3MSS*CTV27A, Open Shut (3) Shut FC SLI AB, AB, Automatic Remote 10 30 No N.A.

4 B, C, D / AB, AB Manual (Modes 1, 2

& 3)

Globe / Steam 120 Mode Pilot 4) See Note 10 N.A. (Typ) 3MSS*HV28A, Shut (3) Shut (3) Shut FC SLI AB, AB, Automatic Remote 10 39 No N.A.

B, C, D / AB, AB Manual Globe / Air Pilot 3MSS*RV22, 23, Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A. 17 No N.A.

24, 25, 26A, B, C, Actuated D/

Relief N.A. (Typ) 3DTM*AOV29A, Open Shut Shut FC SLI A,B Automatic Remote 10 34 No N.A.

B, C, D / Manual Globe / Air Pilot N.A. (Typ) 3MSS*PV20A, B, Shut Shut Shut FC SLI B,A, Automatic Remote NSR 37 No N.A.

C, D / B,A Manual Globe / Air Pilot N.A. (Typ) 3MSS*MOV74 Shut Shut Shut FAI N.A. B,A, Remote Manual NSR 42 No N.A.

A, B, C, D B,A Manual

/ Globe / Motor MPS-3 FSAR Main feedwater NE 5, 6, 7, 4 (7) 20 Liquid 10.4-6 N 57 No N.A. (Typ) None (closed) 3FWS*CTV41A, Open Shut (3) Shut FC SIS, FWI B Automatic Remote 5 10 No N.A.

lines 8 B, C, D / Manual Gate / Hydr. Pilot Steam generator NE 47, 48, 4 (7) 4 Liquid 10.3-1 E 57 No N.A. (Typ) None (closed) 3BDG*CTV22A, Open Shut (3) Shut FC Note 17 AB, AB, Automatic Remote 10 10 No N.A.

blowdown lines 49, 50 B, C, D / AB, AB Manual (6)

Globe / Air Pilot Steam generator NE 122A, 3/4 Liquid 9.3-2 JJ 57 No N.A. None (closed) 3SSR*CTV19A, Open Open Shut FC Note 18 B, B Automatic Remote 10 10 No N.A.

blowdown B, C, D B, C, D / B, B Manual sample lines Class C Globe /Solenoid Penetrations High-pressure E 51 1 (5) 3 Liquid 6.3-2 Q 55 (4) Yes N.A (20) 3SIH*V5 / 3SIH*MV8801A, Shut Shut Open N.A. / FAI N.A. / SIS, N.A. / A, Backflow N.A. / N.A. / 40 10 No 3SIH-V883 boron injection B CLIP signal B / Remote (8) to cold legs Automatic Manual Check / N.A. / Gate / Motor 3SIH-V990 N.A (20) 3SIH*CV8843 Shut (3) Shut Shut FC CIA A Automatic Remote 60 No N.A.

/ Manual Globe / Air Pilot 6.2-282

TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (CONTINUED) (12)

Valve Position Valve Actuation (1)

Containment Length of Pipe Penetration Isolation Closure from Bypass Vent, Drain, Test Nominal FSAR Arrangement ESF Type C Valve No. / Valve No. / Actuation Power Primary Secondary Time (1) Containment Leakage and Essential No. of Line Size Figure Fig. No. System Leakage Valve Type / Valve Type / Power Signal Source Mode Mode (Sec) Outside to Penetration Instrumentation Service Penetration Penetrations (in.) Fluid No. 6.2-47 GDC Yes/No Test (I/II) Oper. Type (1) Oper. Type (1) Normal Shutdown Accident Failure (2) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) Valve (ft) Yes/No Isolation Valves Revision 3606/29/23 E/NE No. Inside (I) (1) Outside (0) (1)

Residual heat E 93, 94 2 (5) 10 Liquid 6.2-37 U 55 (4) Yes N.A (20) 3SIL*V6, 7, 3SIL*MV8809A, Shut / Shut (3) Open N.A. / FAI N.A. N.A. / A, Backflow N.A. / N.A. / NSR 10 No 3SIL-V877 removal pumps 12, 13 / B/ Open Open B / Remote Manual discharge to cold Manual legs Check / N.A. Gate / Motor 3 SIL*V818, 3SIL-V928, 3SIL-V930, 3SIL-V931, 3SIL-V937, 3SIL-V938, 3SIL-V939 N.A (20) 3SIL*CV8890 Shut (3) Shut Shut FC CIA A Automatic Remote 60 No A, B / Manual Globe / Air Pilot Residual heat E 95 1 (5) 8 Liquid 6.2-37 V 55 (4) Yes N.A (20) 3SIL*V26, 28 / 3SIL*MV8840 / Shut Shut Shut N.A. / FAI N.A. N.A. / B Backflow N.A. / N.A. / NSR 10 No 3SIL*V879 removal pumps / Remote Manual discharge to hot Manual legs Check / N.A. Gate / Motor 3SIL*V920, 3SIL*V921, 3SIL*V922 N.A (20) 3SIL*CV8825 Shut (3) Shut Shut FC CIA A Automatic Remote 60 No

/ Manual Globe / Air Pilot MPS-3 FSAR Safety injection E 96, 97 2 (5) 4 Liquid 6.3-2 R 55 (4) Yes N.A (20) 3SIL*V27, 29, 3SIH*MV8802A, Shut Shut Open N.A. / FAI N.A. N.A. / A, Backflow N.A. / N.A./ NSR 10 No 3SIH*V113, pumps discharge SIH*V110, 112 B / B / Remote Manual 3SIH*V114, to hot legs / Gate / Motor Manual 3SIH*V115, Check / N.A. 3SIH*V116, 3SIH*V117, 3SIH*V118, 3SIH*V119, 3SIH*V120, 3SIH*V794, 3SIH*V795, 3SIH*V842, 3SIH*V843, 3SIH*V844, 3SIH*V845, 3SIH*V846, 3SIH*V915, 3SIH*V916, 3SIH*V917, 3SIH*V918, 3SIH*V919, 3SIH*V920, 3SIH*V921, 3SIH*V922, 6.2-283 3SIH*V969, 3SIH*V971

TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (CONTINUED) (12)

Valve Position Valve Actuation (1)

Containment Length of Pipe Penetration Isolation Closure from Bypass Vent, Drain, Test Nominal FSAR Arrangement ESF Type C Valve No. / Valve No. / Actuation Power Primary Secondary Time (1) Containment Leakage and Essential No. of Line Size Figure Fig. No. System Leakage Valve Type / Valve Type / Power Signal Source Mode Mode (Sec) Outside to Penetration Instrumentation Service Penetration Penetrations (in.) Fluid No. 6.2-47 GDC Yes/No Test (I/II) Oper. Type (1) Oper. Type (1) Normal Shutdown Accident Failure (2) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) Valve (ft) Yes/No Isolation Valves Revision 3606/29/23 E/NE No. Inside (I) (1) Outside (0) (1)

N.A (20) 3SIH*CV8881, Shut (3) Shut Shut FC CIA A Automatic Remote 60 No 3SIH*V842, 8824 / Manual 3SIH*V843 Globe / Air Pilot Safety injection E 98 1 (5) 4 Liquid 6.3-2 Z 55 (4) Yes N.A (20) 3SIH*V22, 24, 3SIH*MV8835 / Shut / Shut / Open Open N.A. / FAI N.A N.A. / A Backflow N.A. / N.A. / NSR 10 No 3SIH*V121 pumps discharge 26, 28 /Check / Gate / Motor Open / Remote Manual to cold legs N.A. Manual 3SIH*V122 3SIH*V123 3SIH*V124 3SIH*V125 3SIH*V126 3SIH*V127 3SIH*V128 3SIH*V848 3SIH*V849 3SIH*V850 3SIH*V851 3SIH*V852 3SIH*V853 3SIH*V854 3SIH*V855 3SIH*V907 MPS-3 FSAR 3SIH*V908 3SIH*V909 3SIH*V910 3SIH*V911 3SIH*V912 3SIH*V913 3SIH*V914 3SIH*V967 N.A (20) 3SIH*CV8823 Shut (3) Shut Shut FC CIA A Automatic Remote 60 No

/ Manual Globe / Air Pilot Quench spray E 100, 2 12 Liquid 6.2-36 W 56 (4) Yes I 3QSS*V4, 8 / 3QSS*MOV34A, Shut Shut Open N.A. / FAI N.A. / CDA N.A./ A, Backflow N.A. / N.A. /NSR 12 Yes 3QSS*V948 pumps discharge 101 B/ B / Remote Automatic Manual Check / N.A. Butterfly / Motor 3QSS*V950 Containment E 102,103 4 12 Liquid 6.2-37 AA 56 (4) Yes N.A (20) None 3RSS*MOV23A, Open Open Open FAI CDA A, B, Automatic Remote NSR 10 No N.A.

recirculation , B, C, D, / A, B Manual 6.2-284 pump suction 104,105 Butterfly / Motor (9)

TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (CONTINUED) (12)

Valve Position Valve Actuation (1)

Containment Length of Pipe Penetration Isolation Closure from Bypass Vent, Drain, Test Nominal FSAR Arrangement ESF Type C Valve No. / Valve No. / Actuation Power Primary Secondary Time (1) Containment Leakage and Essential No. of Line Size Figure Fig. No. System Leakage Valve Type / Valve Type / Power Signal Source Mode Mode (Sec) Outside to Penetration Instrumentation Service Penetration Penetrations (in.) Fluid No. 6.2-47 GDC Yes/No Test (I/II) Oper. Type (1) Oper. Type (1) Normal Shutdown Accident Failure (2) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) Valve (ft) Yes/No Isolation Valves Revision 3606/29/23 E/NE No. Inside (I) (1) Outside (0) (1)

Containment E 107, 4 10 Liquid 6.2-37 X 56 (4) Yes N.A (20) 3RSS*V3, 6, 9, 3RSS*MOV20A, Shut/Open Shut/Open Open N.A. / FAI N.A. / CDA N.A. / Backflow N.A. / N.A. / NSR 10 No 3RSS*V950 recirculation 108, 12 / B, C, D / A, B, / Remote pump discharge 109, A, B Automatic Manual 110 Check / N.A. Butterfly / Motor 3RSS*V951 (9) 3RSS*V952 3RSS*V953 Auxiliary E 79, 80, 4 4 Liquid 10.4-6 N 57 Yes N.A. (Typ) None (closed) 3FWA*MOV35A, Open Open Open FAI N.A. B, A, Remote Manual NSR 11 No 3FWA*V878 feedwater lines 81, 82 B, C, D / A, B Manual Gate / Motor 3FWA*V880 3FWA*V937 3FWA*V941 3FWA*V944 3FWA*V948 N.A. (Typ) 3FWA*HV36A, Open Open Open (10) N.A. B, A Remote N.A. NSR 10 No N.A.

F0 B, C, D, / A, B Manual Globe / Solenoid Main steam to E 74, 75, 3 (7) 3 Gas 10.3-1 M 57 Yes N.A. None (closed) 3MSS*MOV17A, Shut Shut(3) Open N.A./FAI N.A. B, A, A Backflow Manual N.A. / NSR 26 No 3MSS*V900 auxiliary 76 (6) B, D / / Remote feedwater pump Manual turbines Non return / 3MSS*V902 Motor MPS-3 FSAR 3MSS*V904 N.A. None (closed) 3MSS*V885 Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. Manual N.A. 26 No N.A.

3MSS*V886 3MSS*V887 Globe N.A. (Typ) 3DTM*AOV63A, Open Shut Shut FC SLI A Automatic Remote 10 14 No. N.A.

B, D / Manual Globe / Air Pilot Hydrogen E 111, 2 2 Gas 6.2-36 CC (4) Yes N.A. / I None 3HCS*V2, 3, 9, Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. (A.C.) N.A. N.A. 19 Yes N.A.

56 Shut(3) recombiner 112 10 / Manual suction Diaphragm /

Handwheel Hydrogen 113, 2 2 Gas 6.2-36 C 56 Yes I 3HCS*V7, 3HCS*V6, V13 / Shut Shut Shut(3) N.A. N.A. N.A. Backflow N.A. N.A. 12 Yes 3HCS*V018 recombiner 114 V14 / / Manual discharge (A.C.)

Check / N.A. Diaphragm / 3HCS*V022 Handwheel Containment E 9A, 4 3/4 Gas 11.5-2 K RG Yes N.A. None 3LMS*MOV40A, Open Open Open FAI N.A. A, B, Remote Manual NSR 14 No N.A. 6.2-285 leakage 13C, 1.11 B, C, D / A, B Manual monitoring open 68, 33A taps

TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (CONTINUED) (12)

Valve Position Valve Actuation (1)

Containment Length of Pipe Penetration Isolation Closure from Bypass Vent, Drain, Test Nominal FSAR Arrangement ESF Type C Valve No. / Valve No. / Actuation Power Primary Secondary Time (1) Containment Leakage and Essential No. of Line Size Figure Fig. No. System Leakage Valve Type / Valve Type / Power Signal Source Mode Mode (Sec) Outside to Penetration Instrumentation Service Penetration Penetrations (in.) Fluid No. 6.2-47 GDC Yes/No Test (I/II) Oper. Type (1) Oper. Type (1) Normal Shutdown Accident Failure (2) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) Valve (ft) Yes/No Isolation Valves Revision 3606/29/23 E/NE No. Inside (I) (1) Outside (0) (1)

Class D Globe / Motor Penetrations Containment NE 37 1 8 Gas 9.4-5 BB 56 No I 3CVS*AOV23 3CVS*V20 / Shut Shut (3) Shut FC / N.A. N.A. Non- Remote N.A. NSR / N.A. 10 Yes 3CVS*V976 vacuum ejector / Class IE Manual suction / N.A. (A.C.) /

Manual (A.C.)

Butterfly / Air Butterfly / Manual Pilot Operator Service air line NE 52 1 2 Gas 9.3-1 D 56 No I 3SAS*V875 / 3SAS*V50 / Shut Shut (3) Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Manual N.A. N.A. 10 Yes 3SAS*V882 (A.C.)

Globe / Globe /

Handwheel Handwheel Refueling cavity NE 59 1 3 Liquid 9.1-6 D 56 No I 3SFC*V991 / 3SFC*V992 / Shut Shut (3) Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Manual N.A. N.A. 10 Yes 3SFC*V864 purification inlet (A.C.)

Gate / Gate / Handwheel Handwheel Refueling cavity NE 60 1 4 Liquid 9.1-6 D 56 No I 3SFC*V990 / 3SFC*V989 / Shut Shut (3) Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Manual N.A. N.A. 10 Yes 3SFC*V863 purification (A.C.)

outlet Gate / Gate / Handwheel Handwheel Reactor coolant NE 62 1 2 Liquid 9.3-8 EE 55 No I 3CHS*V372 / 3CHS*V371 / Shut Shut (3) Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Backflow N.A. N.A. 10 No 3CHS*V389 loop fill / Manual (A.C.)

Check / N.A. Globe / 3CHS*V837 MPS-3 FSAR Handwheel 3/4 3CHS*RV8351 Shut Shut Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Self- N.A. N.A.

/ Actuated Relief Containment NE 86 (5) 42 Gas 9.4-5 P 56 No II 3HVU*CTV33 3HVU*CTV32A / Shut Open Shut FC Rad. B/A Automatic Remote N.A. 13 Yes 3HVU*V963 1

purge air supply A/ Monitor Manual Alarm (11) (A.C.)

Butterfly / Air Butterfly / Air Pilot Pilot II 3HVU*V5 / Shut Open Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Manual N.A. N.A. 13 Yes (A.C.)

Butterfly /

Handwheel Containment NE 85 1 42 Gas 9.4-5 L 56 No II 3HVU*CTV33 3HVU*CTV32B / Shut Open Shut FC Rad. B/A Automatic Remote N.A. 10 Yes 3HVU*V962 purge air B/ Monitor Manual exhaust Alarm (8) (A.C.)

Butterfly / Air Butterfly / Air Pilot Pilot Demineralized NE 70 1 2 Liquid 9.2-2 D 56 No I 3CCP*V886 / 3CCP*V887 / Shut Open Shut N.A. N.A. N.A. Manual N.A. N.A. 10 Yes 3CCP*V882 6.2-286 water supply Gate / Gate / Handwheel (A.C.)

inside Handwheel containment

TABLE 6.2-65 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION (CONTINUED) (12)

Valve Position Valve Actuation (1)

Containment Length of Pipe Penetration Isolation Closure from Bypass Vent, Drain, Test Nominal FSAR Arrangement ESF Type C Valve No. / Valve No. / Actuation Power Primary Secondary Time (1) Containment Leakage and Essential No. of Line Size Figure Fig. No. System Leakage Valve Type / Valve Type / Power Signal Source Mode Mode (Sec) Outside to Penetration Instrumentation Service Penetration Penetrations (in.) Fluid No. 6.2-47 GDC Yes/No Test (I/II) Oper. Type (1) Oper. Type (1) Normal Shutdown Accident Failure (2) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) (I/O) Valve (ft) Yes/No Isolation Valves Revision 3606/29/23 E/NE No. Inside (I) (1) Outside (0) (1)

Steam generator NE 123 4 3/4 Liquid 10.3-3 N 57 No N.A. (Typ) None (closed) 3SGF*AOV24A, Shut Shut (3) Shut FC N.A. / FWI A, B / A, Automatic Remote N.A. / 60 10 No N.A.

chemical feed B, C, D / B Manual lines Globe / Air Pilot Containment NE 121 1 2 Gas 9.4-5 Y 56 No I 3CVS*MOV25 3CVS*V13 / Shut Shut Shut (3) FAI / N.A. N.A. Non- Remote Manual NSR / N.A. 10 Yes 3CVS*V981 vacuum pump / Class IE Manual (A.C.)

discharge / N.A. (A.C.) /

Manual (A.C.)

Globe / Motor Diaphragm /

Handwheel NOTES:

1. Motor - Motor-operated valve, remote manual operation from control room or operated by engineered safety features actuation signal with remote manual operation from control room provided as backup.

Air Pilot - Air-operated valve (solenoid activated).

Automatic - Valve-operated by engineered safety features actuation signal with remote manual operation from control room provided as backup.

Remote Manual - Remote, manual operation from control room.

Manual - Local manual operation only.

A.C. - Operation of valve subject to administrative control; locked closed.

Closed - Separated from containment atmosphere or reactor coolant system by membrane barrier.

I - Test pressure is applied in the same direction as that existing when the valve is required to perform its safety function.

II - Test pressure is applied between two isolation valves such that the outermost valve is Type I tested and the innermost or inside containment valve (Globe) is unseated by the test pressure, but seated by accident pressure.

Rad. - Radiation.

NSR - No stroke time required. This applies to valves which open, go open, or are opened during an accident; or valves which are normally shut and stay shut during an accident. Valves which are normally shut and receive an accident closure signal are not considered NSR.

N.A. - Not applicable, or closure time not applicable for the following reasons:

(1) there are no boundary valves applicable to this location, MPS-3 FSAR (2) boundary valves are either manual, relief, or check valves.

Solenoid - Solenoid-operated valve.

2. FC - Fails Closed, FAI - Fails As Is, FO - Fails Open.
3. Open during applicable system operation.
4. Exception to criteria, see Section 6.2.4.2.
5. Branch lines are located between the main line containment isolation valves. See Section 6.2-47 for details.
6. E/NE based on NRC SRP Section 6.2.4, Item 11.5.h; pending issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.141, Rev. 1.
7. Containment penetration is equipped with penetration cooler.
8. The time listed includes the time required to detect the accident, (ECCS initiation, sensor and control system response time) and the affects of emergency power restoration delays (EDG start and sequencing delays). To determine maximum stroke time, these time delays must be subtracted from the times listed.
9. Signal description found in Section 7.3.
10. In Mode 4, with the RCS temperature greater than or equal to 320F, the MSIVs are required to close within 120 seconds. In Mode 4, with the RCS temperature less than 320F, the MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated.
11. Description in Section 9.4.6.3.
12. During movement of fuel within the containment building, there is a 30 minute closure time requirement based on administrative controls, required per Technical Specification 3.9.4.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18. Sequenced Safeguard Signal (CDA, SIS, LOP), any steam generator 2/4 low-low level, AMSAC, Reactor Plant Sampling System Radiation High, Condenser Air Removal Radiation High. 6.2-287
19. Sequenced Safeguard Signal (CDA, SIS, LOP), any steam generator 2/4 low-low level, AMSAC.
20. These penetrations are in systems that are water-filled and/or normally operating under accident conditions, therefore not subject to Type C testing.

TABLE 6.2-66 OMITTED Design Parameters sitive Displacement Blowers (3HCS*C1A, B)

Horsepower 5 Electric Power (KW) 3.73 RPM 3,600 Voltage 460, 3-phase sign Requirements Pressure (psig) 50 Temperature (F) 260 Maximum continuous vacuum (in Hg) 15 Maximum continuous pressure (psi) 15 Maximum intermittent pressure (psi) 18 Required flow 55 (SCFM at 12.9 psia containment pressure at 140F) (1) ctric Heater Assembly (2) 3HCS*E1A, B Gas heater coil (304 SS) 2 inch Schedule 40 Number of heater elements 15 Power per element (kW) 2.4 Sheath temperature (F max.) 1,600 Voltage 277 s Cooler Assembly 3HCS*CND 1A, B Fan type Centrifugal Gas cooler coil (304 SS) 2 inch Schedule 40 Capacity (CFM)(3) 2,300 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) (4) 63,000 Gas outlet temperature (F) (5) 150 S&W Spec. 2214.900-075 ADO No. 2, dated 1/23/74.

The incoming gas stream is preheated to 1,200F.

Flow rates were tested, justified, and accepted (E&DCR N-ME-02591).

Approximate duty confirmed by E&DCR N-ME-02591 The gas outlet temperature is the critical parameter for the gas cooler assembly. Cooling flow capacity (CFM),

cooling capacity (Btu/hr), and process flow rate are acceptable variables as long as the return gas stream temperature is 150F.

TABLE 6.2-68 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 TABLE 6.2-69 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 Type Leakage Comments on Penetration Test Alignment for Penetration Number Performed Type A Test (Note 8) osed Systems (GDC 57) e system piping inside the containment forms the pressure retaining boundary. The system is exposed to the containment atmosphere for ILRT. However, per NRC letter dated February 1991 (Staff position regarding leakage out of containment Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN

-455 and STN 50-456, STN 50-457), the possibility of containment leakage through steam nerator secondary side exists during an ILRT. Therefore, during an ILRT, the secondary side of h steam generator for these systems is maintained at atmospheric pressure and the water level maintained lower than the entrance to the steam line (that is, the leak path out through the am and past the MSIV should not be blocked with water). The leak path is further vented wnstream to the atmosphere, as is normally done to systems during ILRTs, as follows: The SIV may be left open, or, with the MSIV closed, a vent may be opened between the steam nerator and the MSIV or from the steam generator secondary side itself. Correction of the pe A test result for the isolation valve leakage is not required for these penetrations.

in Steam 1, 2, 3, 4 Note 3 Systems inside of containment aligned Note 3 for normal full power operation. No system edwater 5, 6, 7, 8 venting to containment atmosphere or draining required. Note 2.

xiliary Feedwater 79, 80, 81, 82 Note 3 am Generator Blowdown Samples 122a, b, c, d Note 3 am Generator Blowdown 47, 48, 49, 50 Note 3 in Steam to Auxiliary Feed Pumps 74, 75, 76 Note 3 am Generator Chemical Feed 123 Note 3

Type Leakage Comments on Penetration Test Alignment for Penetration Number Performed Type A Test (Note 8)

F or post-accident systems outside of containment that are exposed to containment pressure the Type A test e isolation valves in these penetrations are maintained open for the Type A test to expose the tem to containment pressure. No venting or draining of the system outside of containment is cessary. Correction of the Type A test results for the isolation valve leakage is not required. If system is not exposed to containment for the Type A test, system or isolation valve leakage, appropriate, will be added to the Type A results.

Note 5 In addition to the normal full power system lineup, additional valves may ntainment Leakage Monitoring 9a, 13c, 33a, 68 be opened outside of containment to allow for measuring of pressure for the Type A test. Note 4.

A Systems aligned for 102, 103, 104, circulation Spray Suction normal full power 105 operation. Note 9 A Systems aligned for 107, 108, 109, circulation Spray Discharge normal full power 110 operation. Note 9 111, 112, 113, A, C drogen Recombiner Note 7 114 F or post-accident systems that are normally filled with water and operating under st-accident conditions ese systems need not be vented or drained for the Type A test in accordance with 10 CFR 50, pendix J III.A.1(d). These penetrations will have water flowing into containment at a pressure her than peak accident pressure or will have pressure on the outside of the containment lation valves higher than peak accident pressure and therefore are not a credible leakage path.

rrection of the Type A test results for the isolation valve leakage is not required.

al Water Injection A 16, 17, 18, 19 Note 9 Reactor Coolant Pump) gh-Pressure Safety Injection 51 A Note 9

Type Leakage Comments on Penetration Test Alignment for Penetration Number Performed Type A Test (Note 8) stems that are required to be vented and drained (if a liquid system) for the Type A test general, venting means that the inboard isolation valve is exposed to containment pressure and wnstream of the outboard valve is vented to atmosphere. In some systems, the system design vides this venting and no further actions are required. Draining means that water is not sent on either side of an isolation valve so that the valve sealing surface is exposed to air.

ntainment Atmospheric A, C 32, 63 nitoring rogen to Safety Injection A, C 14 cumulator mary Grade Water 15 A, C 12a, 12b, 13a, A, C mpling Connections 13d mpling Connection from PRT 12c A, C al Water Return A, C 23 om Reactor Coolant Pump) actor Coolant Letdown 24 A, C actor Coolant Charging 26 A, C seous Drains 27 A, C rated Drains 28 A, C seous Vents 29 A, C A, C The inboard isolation valve is blocked open for the type A test to allow pressurization and depressurization of the containment. This ntainment Purge Supply 86 is more conservative than having both isolation valves closed and no correction to the type A test results is necessary.

Type Leakage Comments on Penetration Test Alignment for Penetration Number Performed Type A Test (Note 8) ntainment Purge Exhaust 85 A, C A This system is normally in service sidual Heat Removal (RHR) 91, 92 unless the unit is defueled. Note 9 A This system is normally in service sidual Heat Removal Cold Legs 93, 94 unless the unit is defueled. Note 9 R to Hot Legs 95 A Note 9 mineralized Water Supply within A, C 70 ntainment fety Injection to Hot Legs 96, 97 A Note 9 fety Injection to Cold Legs 98 A Note 9 fety Injection Test 99 A, C ench Spray 100, 101 A, C ntainment Vacuum Discharge 121 A, C ntainment Vacuum Pump Suction 35, 36 A, C ntainment Vacuum Ejector Suction 37 A, C illed Water Supply 38, 72 A, C actor Plant Component Cooling A, C 39, 40 pply actor Plant Component Cooling A, C 41, 42 turn illed Water Return 45, 116 A, C vice Air 52 A, C Note 6 trument Air 54 A, C e Protection 56 A, C el Pool Purification 59, 60 A, C op Fill 62 A, C

Type Leakage Comments on Penetration Test Alignment for Penetration Number Performed Type A Test (Note 8) rogen Supply 124 A, C st-Accident Sample Supply 115 A, C st-Accident Sample Return 120 A, C TES:

Systems operating under normal operating or post-accident conditions which are usually filled with water, 10 CFR 50, Appendix J III.A.1(d).

Not open directly to containment atmosphere under post-accident conditions, 10 CFR 50, Appendix J III.A.1(d).

Valves in main steam, feedwater, and blowdown piping of pressurized water reactors do not require Type C testing per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

The containment leakage monitoring system must be in operation to perform Type A test Does not rupture as a result of loss-of-coolant accident. Instrument piping Class 2.

Penetration may be aligned to perform Type A verification test as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J III.A.3(b). Therefore, the inside containment isolation valve may be open during the Type A test, which is more conservative than with both valves closed Either the containment isolation valves for this post-accident system will be opened for the Type A test to expose the recombiner and hydrogen analyzer system to the containment atmosphere or the system leakage will be added to the results of the Type A test.

As required for system operability and to maintain the plant in a safe condition, some systems may be maintained in service and the isolation valves not positioned, vented and/or drained for the Type A test. If the penetration is in an alignment different than required in this table, the Type A test results will be corrected for the local measured leakage for these isolation valves.

These penetrations are in systems that are water-filled and/or operating under accident conditions, therefore not subject to Type C testing.

LARGER)

Removable Encapsulated (1)

Pipe Thickness Size Linear System and Line No. (inches) (inches) Feet Removable Encapsulated(1) in Feedwater System FWS01607302 3 16 6 FWS01607402 3 16 6 FWS02001802 3 20 235 FWS02002202 3 20 80 FWS02002602 3 20 80 FWS02003002 3 20 235 in Steam System MSS03009202 4 30 174 MSS03009302 4 30 82 MSS03009402 4 30 82 MSS03009502 4 30 174 actor Coolant System RCS00802401 3 8 16 RCS00802501 3 8 26 RCS00802901 3 8 16 RCS00803001 3 8 26 RCS00803401 3 8 16 RCS00803501 3 8 26 RCS00803901 3 8 16 RCS00804001 3 8 26 RCS01012201 3 10 7 RCS01013201 3 10 7 RCS01013801 3 10 7

Removable Encapsulated (1)

Pipe Thickness Size Linear System and Line No. (inches) (inches) Feet RCS01014601 3 10 7 RCS01210301 3.5 12 13 RCS01212301 3.5 12 13 RCS01406401 3.5 14 77 RCS02900101 4 29 11 RCS02900201 4 29 12 RCS02900601 4 29 11 RCS02900701 4 29 12 RCS02901101 4 29 11 RCS02901201 4 29 12 RCS02901601 4 29 11 RCS02901701 4 29 12 RCS03100301 4 31 28 RCS03100801 4 31 28 RCS03101301 4 31 28 RCS03101801 4 31 28 RCS27500401 4 27.5 9 RCS27500501 4 27.5 17 RCS27500901 4 27.5 9 RCS27501001 4 27.5 17 RCS27501401 4 27.5 9 RCS27501501 4 27.5 17 RCS27501901 4 27.5 9 RCS27502001 4 27.5 17 RHS01203301 2.5 12 65 RHS01203501 2.5 12 78

Removable Encapsulated (1)

Pipe Thickness Size Linear System and Line No. (inches) (inches) Feet RHS01204302 2.5 12 10 RHS01204402 2.5 12 6 fety Injection System SIL01000902 2 10 6 SIL01001202 2 10 9 SIL01004501 2 10 18 SIL01004701 2 10 18 SIL01004901 2 10 18 SIL01005101 2 10 18 General Anti-Sweat (Fiberglass) (2)(3) illed Water System CDS010-45-4 1.5 10 185 CDS010-74-4 1.5 10 185 CDS010-46-4 1.5 10 185 CDS010-75-4 1.5 10 185 CDS010-104-2 1.5 10 10 CDS010-56-2 1.5 10 10 CDS008-44-2 1.5 8 5 CDS008-105-2 1.5 8 5 TES:

The density of the fiberglass within the removable encapsulated insulation is 2.4 lbm/ft3. The fiberglass is Owens Corning TIW, Type 2.

The density of the fiberglass used on the chilled water system piping is 5.25 lbm/ft3. The fiberglass is manufactured by the Certainteed Insulation Group.

Foam plastic insulation is used in cases where close proximity of adjacent piping does not allow the use of fiberglass insulation.

TABLE 6.2-72 DELETED TABLE 6.2-73 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-74 DELETED BY CHANGE PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 TABLE 6.2-75 DELETED BY FSARCR 02-MP3-017 TABLE 6.2-76 DELETED BY FSARCR 02-MP3-017 TABLE 6.2-77 DELETED ANALYSIS nimum initial total pressure 10.4 psia nimum initial containment pressure 120F ximum initial relative humidity 100 percent nimum RWST water temperature 40F mber of inadvertently activated quench spray pumps 2 ximum quench spray system flow (two pumps operating) 6,010 gpm (1) tside air temperature 0F condary containment temperature 28F ench spray thermal effectiveness 100 percent at transfer coefficients on the heat sinks 1.8 Btu/hr-ft2-F (1) Maximum spray flow predicted by analysis.

FIGURE 6.2-1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RESPONSE - DOUBLE ENDED LOCA (BREAK LOCATION)

FIGURE 6.2-2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RESPONSE - PUMP SUCTION LOCA (BREAK SIZE)

FIGURE 6.2-3 CONTAINMENT VAPOR TEMPERATURE RESPONSE - LOCA FIGURE 6.2-4 CONTAINMENT LINER TEMPERATURE RESPONSE FIGURE 6.2-5 CONTAINMENT DEPRESSURIZATION RESPONSE - LOCA FIGURE 6.2-6 CONTAINMENT SUMP TEMPERATURE RESPONSE FIGURE 6.2-7 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE FROM 1.4 SQUARE FOOT MSLB AT 0% POWER NO ENTRAINMENT -

LIMITING PEAK PRESSURE CASE

FIGURE 6.2-8 CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE FROM 1.4 SQUARE FOOT MSLB AT FULL POWER, NO ENTRAINMENT - LIMITING PEAK TEMPERATURE CASE

FIGURE 6.2-9 CONTAINMENT LINER TEMPERATURE FROM 1.4 SQUARE FOOT AT 0% POWER, NO ENTRAINME

- PEAK TEMPERATURE CASE

FIGURE 6.2-10 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 FIGURE 6.2-11 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 FIGURE 6.2-12 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 FIGURE 6.2-13 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 FIGURE 6.2-14 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 FIGURE 6.2-15 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 FIGURE 6.2-16 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 IGURE 6.2-17 PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION VIEW WITH NODAL ARRANGEMENT

FIGURE 6.2-18 PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 95.3 FEET

FIGURE 6.2-18A PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 74.2 FEET

FIGURE 6.2-18B PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 51.3 FEET

FIGURE 6.2-18C PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 25.7 FEET

FIGURE 6.2-18D PLAN VIEW FOR THE PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 12.75 FEET

IGURE 6.2-19 STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION WITH NODAL ARRANGEMENT

GURE 6.2-20 PLAN VIEW FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 3 FEET 8 INCHES

GURE 6.2-21 PLAN VIEW FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 28 FEET 6 INCHES TE:

es 13 through 18 are located directly above nodes 7 through 12 respectively.

GURE 6.2-22 PLAN VIEW FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT ELEVATION 51 FEET 4 INCHES TE es (19), (24), and (25) are at elevation 47 feet 0 inches below nodes 20 through 22.

FIGURE 6.2-23 UPPER REACTOR CAVITY SUBCOMPARTMENT PLAN ELEVATION AND NODAL ARRANGEMENT TE:

e 11 remainder of containment.

GURE 6.2-24 PRESSURIZER SUBCOMPARTMENT NODALIZATION DIAGRAM TE:

led numbers represent junctions between Nodes.

FIGURE 6.2-25 STEAM GENERATOR SUBCOMPARTMENT NODALIZATION DIAGRAM es:

ode 23, remainder of containment.

FIGURE 6.2-26 STAGGERED MESH APPROXIMATION FOR NODES AND INTERNAL JUNCTIONS

FIGURE 6.2-27 GENERAL FLOW CHART FOR THREED FIGURE 6.2-28 PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE Note:

Spray line break in Node 15.

FIGURE 6.2-28A PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE Note: Spray line break in Node 15.

FIGURE 6.2-29 PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE e: Surge line break in Node 5.

FIGURE 6.2-29A PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE Note: Pressurizer uplift and differential pressure across skirt (surge line break Node 20).

FIGURE 6.2-29B PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE Note: Surge line break in Node 2.

FIGURE 6.2-29C PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE Note: Peak load across pressurizer (surge line break Node 5).

FIGURE 6.2-29D PRESSURE RESPONSE PRESSURIZER CUBICLE Note: Peak load across pressurizer (surge line break Node 4).

FIGURE 6.2-30 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 FIGURE 6.2-31 PRESSURE RESPONSE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE NOTES:

Pressurizer surge line break in node 11.

Maximum P = 8.09 psi across steam generator (nodes 11 - 7).

Maximum P = 8.11 psi across steam generator cubicle wall (nodes 11 - 23, containment).

FIGURE 6.2-32 PRESSURE RESPONSE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE NOTES:

Residual heat removal line break in node 5.

Maximum P = 6.42 psi across steam generator (nodes 5 - 1).

Maximum P = 6.45 psi across steam generator cubicle wall (nodes 5 - 23, containment).

FIGURE 6.2-33 DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 FIGURE 6.2-34 PRESSURE RESPONSE STEAM GENERATOR CUBICLE NOTES:

Feedwater line split break in node 19.

Maximum P = 2.60 psi across steam generator (nodes 19 - 21).

Maximum P = 3.15 psi across steam generator cubicle wall (nodes 19 - 23).

FIGURE 6.2-34A DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 FIGURE 6.2-34B DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 FIGURE 6.2-34C DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 FIGURE 6.2-34D DELETED BY PKG FSC MP3-UCR-2009-006 FIGURE 6.2-35 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 FIGURE 6.2-36 P&ID QUENCH SPRAY AND HYDROGEN RECOMBINER figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

FIGURE 6.2-37 (SHEETS 1-3) P&ID LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION/

CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

FIGURE 6.2-38 TYPICAL CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE SUMP FIGURE 6.2-39 SPATIAL DROPLET SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF SPRACO 1713A NOZZLE APPLYING SURFACE ARE CORRECTION AND SPRAYING WATER AT 40 PSIG UNDER LABORATORY CONDITIONS

FIGURE 6.2-40 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION PUMPS CHARACTERISTIC CURVES FIGURE 6.2-41 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 HEADER AT ELEVATION 141 FEET 9 INCHES FIGURE 6.2-43 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SPRAY COVERAGE BEND LINE (ELEVATION 104 FEET), ELEVATED TEMPERATURE (275°F), SPRAY HEADER AT ELEVATION 145 FEET 3 INCHES

FIGURE 6.2-44 UNOBSTRUCTED QUENCH SPRAY COVERAGE AT THE BEND LINE (ELEVATION 104 FEET),

ELEVATED TEMPERATURE (275°F), SPRAY HEADERS AT ELEVATION 153 FEET AND 168 FEET

FIGURE 6.2-45 DELETED BY CHANGE: PKG FSC 07-MP3-038 FIGURE 6.2-46 AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM AND SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION &

RELEASE SYSTEM

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 2 OF 14)

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 3 OF 14)

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 4 OF 14)

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 5 OF 14)

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 6 OF 14)

TES igure shows penetration Z-96. Penetration Z-97 has one LMC valve and a pipe cap.

igure shows penetration Z-96. These LMC valves do not exist on penetration Z-97.

ifferential Pressure tap for flow measurement.

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 7 OF 14) enetration Z-94 has two LMC valves installed as shown. Penetration Z-93 has one LMC valve a pipe cap or plug.

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 8 OF 14) e: Motor operated valve opens on CDA signal, closes on low RWST level.

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 9 OF 14) e 1. Differential pressure taps for flow measurement.

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 10 OF 14)

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 11 OF 14)

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 12 OF 14) e: Closes on motor driven aux feedwater pump start.

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 13 OF 14)

TE:

NETRATION Z-115 DOES NOT HAVE CAPS ON THE LMC CONNECTIONS.

FIGURE 6.2-47 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (SHEET 14 OF 14)

TES:

RELIEF IS NOT REQUIRED/INSTALLED ON PENETRATION Z-29 THIS SKETCH DEPICTS MANY PENETRATIONS. THE VALVE TYPE AND POSITION OWN ARE NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENTATIVE.

FIGURE 6.2-48 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 FIGURE 6.2-49 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 FIGURE 6.2-50 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 FIGURE 6.2-51 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 FIGURE 6.2-52 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 FIGURE 6.2-53 P&ID CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

FIGURE 6.2-54 QUENCH SPRAY PUMPS CHARACTERISTIC CURVES FIGURE 6.2-55 DELETED BY FSARCR 05-MP3-010 FIGURE 6.2-56 CONTAINMENT INTERNAL STRUCTURE OPENINGS TES:

ueling cavity and pressurizer shed and steam generator shield walls above operating floor not wn for clarity.

nings are shown schematically and do not indicate exact sizes and shapes.

FIGURE 6.2-57 EXPECTED LONG-TERM CIRCULATION PATTERNS IN CONTAINMENT TES:

ueling cavity and pressurizer shed and steam generator shield walls above operating floor not wn for clarity.

nings are shown schematically and do not indicate exact sizes and shapes.

FIGURE 6.2-58 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONITORING SYSTEM FIGURE 6.2-59 DELETED FIGURE 6.2-59A DELETED BY FSARCR 02-MP3-017 FIGURE 6.2-60 DELETED FIGURE 6.2-61 DELETED BY PKG FSC 07-MP3-024 FIGURE 6.2-62 DELETED BY PKG FSC 07-MP3-024 1 DESIGN BASES emergency core cooling system (ECCS) is designed to cool the reactor core and provide tdown capability subsequent to the following accident conditions:

1. Pipe breaks in the reactor coolant system (RCS) which cause a discharge larger than that which can be made up by the normal makeup system, up to and including the instantaneous circumferential rupture of the largest pipe in the RCS.
2. Rupture of a control rod drive mechanism causing a rod cluster control assembly ejection accident.
3. Pipe breaks in the steam system, up to and including the instantaneous circumferential rupture of the largest pipe in the steam system.
4. A steam generator tube rupture.

primary function of the ECCS is to remove the stored and fission product decay heat from the tor core during accident conditions.

ECCS provides shutdown capability for the accidents above by means of boron injection. A le active failure in the short term or single active or passive failure in the long term is included CCS design. The system can meet its minimum required performance level with on site or off electrical power concurrent with single active or passive failure.

ECCS consists of the centrifugal charging (CHS), safety injection (SI), and residual heat oval (RHS) pumps, accumulators, containment recirculation pumps (CR), containment rculation coolers, RHS heat exchangers, and the refueling water storage tank (RWST), along h the associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and other related equipment.

tion 1.3.1 compares the Millstone 3 ECCS with similar facility designs.

design bases used for designing and selecting the functional requirements of the ECCS are ved from Appendix K limits as delineated in 10 CFR 50.46. The subsystem functional meters are selected to integrate so that the Appendix K requirements are met over the range of cipated accidents and single failure assumptions.

tions of the ECCS also operate in conjunction with the other systems of the cold shutdown gn. The primary function of the ECCS during a safety grade cold shutdown is to ensure a ns for injecting and throttling boration and makeup flow via the charging pumps. Certain ating HELB events, postulated to occur in the operating CHS pump discharge piping, when bined with a single active failure of the standby CHS pump to start, may lead to a loss of all rging. In addition, all charging may be lost as a result of certain postulated fire conditions (see R Section 9.5.1 and the FPER for SIH system performance requirements). For these

iability of the ECCS has been considered in selection of the functional requirements, selection he components, and location of components and connected piping. Redundant components are vided where the loss of one component would impair reliability of the system. Valves are vided in series where isolation is desired and in parallel when alternate flow paths are to be blished for assurance of ECCS performance. Redundant sources of the ECCS actuation signal available so that the proper and timely operation of ECCS is not inhibited. Sufficient rumentation is available so that a failure of an instrument does not impair readiness of the em. The active components of the ECCS are powered from separate safety related buses ch are energized from off site power supplies.

ddition, the emergency diesel generators assure redundant sources of auxiliary on site power have adequate capacity for all ECCS requirements. Each diesel is capable of driving all ps, valves, and necessary instruments associated with one train of the ECCS.

rious movement of a motor operated valve due to the actuation of its positioning device cident with a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) has been analyzed and found to be a very low bability event.

wever, to comply with BTP-EICSB-18, power lockouts are provided in the control room for h valve whose spurious movement could result in degraded ECCS performance.

elevated temperature of the sump solution during recirculation is well within the design perature of all ECCS components. In addition, consideration has been given to the potential corrosion of various types of metals exposed to the fluid conditions prevalent immediately r the accident or during long-term recirculation operations.

piping and supports of the ECCS have been evaluated for system operation at the elevated peratures associated with the spectrum of LOCAs and MSLBs. The limiting large break ign Basis Accident is the double ended rupture at the reactor coolant pump (RCP) suction DER). This is the most limiting accident due to the rapid increase to a high sustained tainment saturation temperature. While the containment will reach a higher saturation perature for a break in the hot leg, both the containment pressure and temperature will be uced more rapidly following the initial reactor coolant system (RCS) blowdown phase than for RCP suction break since the hot leg break will not result in energy flow from the steam erators into containment. Analysis of a spectrum of small breaks indicates that the CDA oint, where the sprays are initiated, may not be reached. The limiting fluid temperature in the ng will, therefore, occur following a small break LOCA. Furthermore, piping down stream of CRS heat exchanger may be exposed to sump water temperatures if a service water pump fails tart. Pump heat is included in the determination of the pumped fluid (and piping) temperature.

ironmental testing of ECCS equipment, which is required to operate following a LOCA, is ussed in Section 3.11.

ding is also discussed in Section 3.4.

2 SYSTEM DESIGN ECCS components are designed such that a minimum of three accumulators, one charging p, one safety injection pump, one RHR pump, one containment recirculation pump, and one tainment recirculation cooler - together with their associated valves and piping - assure quate core cooling in the event of a design basis LOCA. The redundant on site emergency erator assures adequate emergency power to all electrically operated components in the event a loss of off site power occurs simultaneously with a LOCA, even assuming a single failure in emergency power system such as the failure of one diesel to start.

Emergency Core Cooling System contains suction and discharge connections that facilitate able diesel driven BDB RCS FLEX Injection pump deployment. These connections are nse-in-depth design features that are available for coping with an extended loss of AC power AP) event. The location of these BDB RCS FLEX suction and discharge connections are wn on Figure 6.3-2, Sheet 2.

2.1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams process flow diagrams of the ECCS are shown on Figure 6.3-1. The piping and rumentation diagrams associated with the ECCS are shown on Figures 6.2-37 and 6.3-2.

inent design and operating parameters for the components of the ECCS are given in le 6.3-1. The codes and standards to which the individual components of the ECCS are gned are listed in Table 3.2-1.

component interlocks used in different modes of system operation are listed below:

1. The safety injection signal (SIS) is associated with the following components and initiates the indicated action:
a. Charging pumps start on SIS.
b. RWST suction valves to charging pumps open on SIS.
c. Charging pumps to RCS cold leg injection headers parallel isolation valves open on SIS coincident with a cold leg injection permissive [(P-19) -

pressurizer pressure low].

d. Normal charging path valves close on SIS.
e. Charging pump miniflow valves close on SIS.
f. Alternate Charging Pump Miniflow Lines open on SIS.
h. The RHR pumps start on SIS.
i. Any closed accumulator isolation valves open. (See Section 6.3.2.2.6.)
j. Volume control tank (VCT) outlet isolation valves close on SIS.
2. Switchover from injection mode to recirculation involves the following interlocks:
a. The RHS pumps are stopped automatically when one out of two level switches associated with each pump sense a low-low level in the RWST.
b. Interlocks are provided to assure isolation of the RHS and proper alignment of the containment recirculation system for core cooling.
c. The safety injection pump and charging pump recirculation suction isolation valves can be opened provided that the safety injection pump and the alternate charging pump miniflow lines have been isolated.
d. After approximately 3 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, cold leg recirculation is terminated and hot leg recirculation is initiated. The ECCS is realigned to supply water to the RCS hot legs in order to prevent boron precipitation in the reactor vessel should the break be in one of the cold legs.

2.2 Equipment and Component Descriptions component design and operating conditions are specified as the most severe conditions to ch each respective component is exposed during either normal plant operation or during ration of the ECCS. For each component, these conditions are considered in relation to the e to which it is designed. By designing the components in accordance with applicable codes, with due consideration for the design and operating conditions, the fundamental assurance of ctural integrity of the ECCS components is maintained. Components of the ECCS are gned to withstand the appropriate seismic loadings in accordance with their safety class as n in Table 3.2-1.

major mechanical components of the ECCS follow. ECCS component parameters are vided in Table 6.3-1.

2.2.1 Accumulators accumulators are pressure vessels partially filled with borated water and pressurized with ogen gas. During normal operation each accumulator is isolated from the RCS by two check es in series. Should the RCS pressure fall below the accumulator pressure, the check valves n and borated water is forced into the RCS. One accumulator is attached to each of the cold

nections are provided for remotely adjusting the level and boron concentration of the borated er in each accumulator during normal plant operation as required. The accumulator water level be adjusted either by draining to the boron recovery system boron recovery tanks via the ctor Plant Gaseous Drains system, or by pumping borated water from the RWST to the umulator. Samples of the solution in the accumulators are taken periodically for checks of on concentration (Section 9.3.2).

umulator pressure is provided by a supply of nitrogen gas and can be adjusted as required ng normal plant operation; however, the accumulators are normally isolated from this ogen supply. Gas relief valves on the accumulators protect them from pressures in excess of gn pressure.

accumulators are located within the containment between the primary and crane walls for sile protection.

umulator gas pressure is monitored by indicators and alarms. The operator can take action as uired to maintain plant operation within the requirements of the technical specification ressing accumulator operability.

2.2.2 Tanks ueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

RWST is used to provide a sufficient supply of borated water to the safety injection, charging, residual heat removal pumps during the injection mode of ECCS operation. All valves ween the RWST and the safety injection system are normally aligned and open, or immediately ive an SIS to effect proper position and alignment to assure an immediate supply of water to safeguards equipment when required. Redundant level indicators and alarms are provided h readouts on the main control board to:

1. Maintain the level within the minimum and maximum technical specification range.
2. Allow the operator to complete switchover from the injection to recirculation phase.
3. Indicate when the tank is empty.

rther discussion of the RWST level indications is provided in Section 6.3.5.4.

RWST also supplies water to the quench spray pumps (Section 6.2.2) and provides borated er to fill the refueling cavity for refueling operations.

CS Pumps p characteristic curves are shown on Figures 6.2-40, 6.3-3, 6.3-4, and 6.3-5 with pump er requirements given in Table 6.3-1. The pump characteristic curves shown in Figures 6.2-6.3-3, 6.3-4, and 6.3-5 are those used in the safety analyses. Since these curves represent the lyzed pump requirements, they will differ from design and test curves.

safety intent of Regulatory Guide 1.1 is met by the design of the ECCS such that adequate net itive suction head (NPSH) is provided to system pumps. In addition to considering the static d and suction line pressure drop, the calculation of available NPSH in the recirculation mode mes that the vapor pressure of the liquid in the sump is equal to the containment pressure.

s assures that the actual available net positive suction head is always greater than the ulated net positive suction head.

minimum NPSH available to the ECCS pumps during the injection mode is conservatively ulated at a lower bound RWST level for pump operation. This level corresponds to the time od when switchover to cold leg recirculation is complete. Refer to Section 6.3.2.8 for a ussion of the assumptions used in determining this level.

tion and minor losses in the suction piping are determined by detailed plant specific system lysis. The calculated system losses are maximized by basing them on full ECCS operation at maximum flow conditions. The required NPSH is selected from the pump manufacturers test ve at the maximum predicted flow rate, using conservative assumptions. This combination of nding assumptions is conservative for determining the available NPSH and the resulting gin over the required NPSH.

expression used for determining the NPSH for the ECCS pumps is:

Available NPSH = Pt + Z - Hf - Pv where:

Pt = absolute pressure on the liquid in the RWST Z = elevation head of water at the pump suction Hf = calculated friction and minor losses in the suction piping Pv = vapor pressure of the pumped liquid er to Table 6.3-11 for the results of the NPSH analysis.

values given in Table 6.3-11 are limiting for the evaluation of NPSH for the ECCS pumps.

owing switchover to cold leg recirculation, adequate available NPSH is provided to the rging and safety injection pumps by the discharge head of the containment recirculation ps. The RHS pumps do not operate after switchover.

uired NPSH and the conservatism in calculated pipe loss.

ential pumps runout due to suction pressure boost during recirculation mode is precluded by throttling of the ECCS branch line throttling valves.

idual Heat Removal Pumps (RHS) pumps are started automatically on receipt of an SIS signal. The pumps deliver water he RCS from the RWST during the injection phase. Each pump is a single stage vertical ition centrifugal pump.

inimum flow bypass line is provided down stream of the RHS heat exchangers for the pumps ecirculate and return the pump discharge fluid to the pump suction should these pumps be ted with their normal flow paths blocked. Once flow greater than approximately 1,633 gpm is blished to the RCS, the bypass line is automatically closed. This line prevents dead heading of pumps and permits pump testing during normal operation.

RHS pumps are discussed further in Section 5.4.7. A pump performance curve is given on ure 6.3-3. This pump performance curve is the one used in the Safety Analysis, therefore, the p heads analyzed will differ from the actual design values given in Table 5.4-8.

pumps have a self-contained mechanical seal which is normally cooled by the component ling water system. However, after a LOCA, cooling water is not supplied or required, because pumps are pumping water having a maximum temperature of 75F. The RHS pumps are not zed in the recirculation phase.

trifugal Charging Pumps he event of an accident, two charging pumps are started automatically on receipt of an SIS and automatically aligned to take suction from the RWST during injection. However, the charging ps will not automatically inject into the reactor coolant cold legs unless there is also a cold leg ction permissive [(P-19) - pressurizer pressure low] signal present to open the charging pumps CS cold leg injection headers parallel isolation valves. During recirculation, suction is vided from the containment recirculation pump discharge.

charging pumps deliver flow to the RCS at the prevailing RCS pressure. Each centrifugal rging pump is a multistage centrifugal diffuser design (barrel type casing) with vertical suction discharge nozzles. The pumps lubricating oil coolers are cooled by the charging pumps seal ling subsystem (Section 2.2.4).

inimum flow bypass line is provided on each pump discharge to recirculate flow to the pump ion after cooling via the seal water heat exchanger during normal plant operation. The imum flow bypass line contains two valves in series which close on receipt of the SIS. Two rnate miniflow paths are provided for the two operable charging pumps when the normal

mal path is closed. The normally closed isolation valve is on the same electrical power train as pump it is protecting. The series redundant valve configuration ensures that each miniflow can be isolated prior to initiation of cold leg recirculation via the charging pumps. Electrical rlocks are provided preventing initiation of cold leg recirculation via the charging pumps if the iflow isolation valves are open. The SI signal also closes the valves to isolate the normal rging line and volume control tank and opens the charging pump/refueling water storage tank ion valves to align the high head portion of the ECCS for injection. After cold leg injection missive (P-19) is enabled, the SI signal will align the cold leg injection valves to inject rging pump flow to the RCS. The charging pumps may be tested during power operation via minimum flow bypass line.

ump performance curve for the centrifugal charging pump is presented on Figure 6.3-4.

ety Injection Pumps he event of an accident, the safety injection pumps are started automatically on receipt of an safety injection pumps deliver water to the RCS from the RWST during the injection phase from the containment sump via the containment recirculation pumps during the recirculation se. Each high head safety injection pump is driven directly by an induction motor. The pump icating oil coolers are cooled by the safety injection pump seal cooling subsystem ction 9.2.2.5).

inimum flow bypass line is provided on each pump discharge to recirculate flow to the RWST he event that the pumps are started with the normal flow paths blocked. This line also permits p testing during normal plant operation. Two parallel valves in series with a third, nstream of a common header, are provided in this line. These valves are manually closed m the control room as part of the ECCS realignment from the injection to the recirculation de. A pump performance curve is shown on Figure 6.3-5.

tainment Recirculation Pumps containment recirculation pumps (Section 6.2.2) are provided for containment structure ressurization and later during the recirculation mode for core heat removal. The pumps vide safety injection via the charging and safety injection pumps during recirculation.

2.2.4 Containment Recirculation Coolers containment recirculation coolers (Section 6.2.2) are shell and tube type heat exchangers ing to cool recirculated water flowing through the shell side from the containment rculation pumps. Service water acts as the cooling medium flowing through the tube side of cooler.

design parameters for all ECCS valves are consistent with the design parameters of their ective systems as described in Table 6.3-1. Relief valve design parameters are listed in le 6.3-2.

IEEE 323 Environmental Qualification Program for all ECCS valves was completed prior to al criticality.

design features used to minimize valve leakage include:

1. Valves which are normally open, except check valves and those which perform a control function, with backseats to limit stem leakage.
2. Normally closed globe valves installed with recirculation fluid pressure under the seat to prevent stem leakage of recirculated (potentially radioactive) water.
3. Enclosed relief valves with a closed bonnet.

tor Operated Gate Valves seating design of selected motor operated gate valves is of the Crane flexible wedge design.

s design releases the mechanical holding force during the first increment of travel so that the or operator works only against the frictional component of the hydraulic imbalance on the and the packing box friction. The disc is guided throughout the full disc travel to prevent ttering and to provide ease of gate movement. The seating surfaces are hard faced to prevent ing and to reduce wear.

ere a gasket is employed for the body-to-bonnet joint, it is either a fully trapped, controlled pression, spiral wound gasket or it is of the pressure seal design.

motor operator incorporates a hammer-blow feature that allows the motor to impact the discs y from the backseat upon closing or from the main seat upon opening of the valve. The mer-blow feature not only impacts the disc but allows the motor to attain its operational speed r to impact. Valves which must function against system pressure are designed so that they ction with a pressure drop equal to full system pressure across the valve disc.

nual Globe, Gate, and Check Valves e valves employ a wedge design and are straight through. The wedge is either split or solid.

gate valves have backseat and outside screw and yoke construction.

be valves, (T and Y style) are outside screw and yoke construction.

iced through the bonnet.

gaskets of the stainless steel manual globe and gate valves are similar to those described ve for motor operated valves. Carbon steel manual valves are employed to pass nonradioactive ds only and, therefore, do not contain the double packing provision.

umulator Check Valves (Swing-disc) accumulator check valve is designed with a low pressure drop configuration with all rating parts contained within the body.

ign considerations and analyses, which assure that leakage across the check valves located in h accumulator injection line does not impair accumulator availability, are as follows:

1. During normal operation, the check valves are in the closed position with a nominal differential pressure across the disc of approximately 1,650 psi. Since the valves remain in this position except for testing or when called upon to open following an accident, and are, therefore, not subject to the abuse of flowing operation or impact loads caused by sudden flow reversal and seating, they do not experience significant wear of the moving parts, and are expected to function with minimal back-leakage. This back-leakage can be checked via the test connection as described in Section 6.3.4.
2. When the RCS is being pressurized during the normal plant heatup operation, the check valves are tested for leakage. This test confirms the seating of the disc and whether or not there has been an increase in the leakage since the last test. When this test is completed, the accumulator-discharge-line motor operated isolation valves are opened and the RCS pressure increase is continued. There should be no significant increase in leakage from this point on, since increasing reactor coolant pressure increases the seating force.
3. The experience derived from the check valve employed in the emergency injection systems indicate that the system is reliable and effective; check valve leakage has not been a problem. This is substantiated by the satisfactory experience obtained from operation of plants where the use of check valves is identical to this application.
4. The accumulators can accept some in-leakage from the RCS without affecting availability. Continuous in-leakage would require, however, that the accumulator water column be adjusted accordingly with Technical Specification requirements.

ief valves are installed in various sections of the ECCS to protect lines which have a lower gn pressure than the RCS. Each relief valve has a closed bonnet and screwed cap to contain leakage of system fluid that may occur along the valve spindle when the valve is lifting. This vents release of system fluids to the building environment. Stainless steel materials are used the valve body, disc, bonnet, spindle, spring assembly, and cap for compatibility with system ds. Table 6.3-2 lists the systems relief valves with their capacities and setpoints.

terfly Valves h main RHR line has an air-operated butterfly valve at the outlet of the RHS heat exchanger ch is normally open and is designed to fail in the open position. The actuator is arranged such air pressure on the diaphragm overcomes the spring force, causing the linkage to move the erfly to the closed position. Upon loss of air pressure, the spring returns the butterfly to the n position. These valves are left in the full open position during normal operation to maximize from this system to the RCS during the injection mode of the ECCS operation. These valves used during normal RHR system operation to control cooldown flowrate.

difications to the RHS system have been made to preclude overheating of the RHS heat hanger (shell side) cooling water piping (CCP system) in the event of a loss of Instrument Air ng a Normal or safety grade cold shutdown (SGCS) cooldown. The RHS heat exchanger et butterfly valves have been provided with actuator throttle limiters that have been set to vent full opening of the valves in the event of a loss of the (non-safety) Instrument Air. Upon a of air, the outlet valves will fail open to the preset open position to allow continued cooldown hout adversely affecting CCP piping with an RCS temperature as high as 350F. The changes e no effect on the RHS injection flowpath when RHS is used during the SI phase following a CA. See FSAR Section 6.3.2.2.5.

h RHR heat exchanger bypass line has an air-operated butterfly valve which is normally open is designed to fail open. These valves are used during normal cooldown to avoid thermal ck to the residual heat exchanger.

difications to the RHS system have been made to preclude overheating of the RHS heat hanger (shell side) cooling water piping (CCP system) in the event of a loss of Instrument Air ng a Normal or safety grade cold shutdown (SGCS) cooldown. The RHS heat exchanger ass butterfly valves have been modified to fail open in the event of a loss of Instrument Air.

n a loss of air, the bypass valves will fail full open to allow continued cooldown without ersely affecting CCP piping with an RCS temperature as high as 350F. The changes have no ct on the RHS injection flowpath when RHS is used during the SI phase following a LOCA.

FSAR Section 6.3.2.2.5.

cific ECCS parameters are given in Table 6.3-1.

part of the plant shutdown administrative procedures, the operator is required to close these es. This prevents a loss of accumulator water inventory to the RCS and is done after the RCS been depressurized below the safety injection unblock setpoint and prior to the time RCS sure reaches safety injection accumulator pressure. The redundant pressure and level alarms ach accumulator would remind the operator to close these valves, if any were inadvertently open. Power is disconnected after the valves are closed.

ing plant startup, the operator is instructed, via operating procedures, to energize and open e valves prior to the RCS pressure reaching the safety injection unblock setpoint. Monitor ts in conjunction with an audible alarm alert the operator should any of these valves be left vertently closed once the RCS pressure increases beyond the safety injection unblock oint. Power is disconnected after valves are opened.

accumulator isolation valves are not required to move during power operation or in a post-dent situation. For a discussion of limiting conditions for operation and surveillance uirements of these valves, refer to Section 3/4.5.1 of the Technical Specifications.

further discussions of the instrumentation associated with these valves, refer to Sections 6.3.5, 1.1.2, and 7.6.4.

2.2.7 Motor Operated Valves and Controls otely operated valves for the injection mode which are under manual control (i.e., valves ch normally are in their ready position and do not require an SIS) have their positions cated by monitor lights on a common portion of the control board. If a component is out of its per position, its monitor lights indicate this on the control panel. At any time during operation n one of these valves is not in the ready position for injection, this condition is shown visually he board, and an audible alarm is sounded in the control room.

ECCS delivery lag times are given in Chapter 15. The accumulator injection time varies, as size of the postulated break varies since the RCS pressure drop varies proportionately to the k size.

dvertent mis-positioning of a motor operated valve due to a malfunction in the control uitry, in conjunction with an accident, has been analyzed and found to be a very low bability event. However, to comply with BTP-EICSB-18, power lockouts are provided in the trol room for each valve whose spurious movement could result in degraded ECCS ormance.

le 6.3-3 lists motor operated isolation valves in the ECCS showing interlocks, automatic ures, and position indications.

licable industry codes and classifications for ECCS are discussed in Section 3.9.3.

2.4 Material Specifications and Compatibility ical material specifications used for the ECCS components are listed in Table 6.3-4. Materials selected to meet the applicable material requirements of the codes in Table 3.2-1 and the owing additional requirements:

1. All parts of components in contact with borated water are fabricated of or clad with austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion resistant material.
2. All parts of components in contact (internal) with sump solution during recirculation are fabricated of austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion resistant material.
3. Valve seating surfaces are hard-faced with Stellite number 6 or equivalent to prevent galling and to reduce wear.
4. Valve stem materials are selected for their corrosion resistance, high tensile properties, and resistance to surface scoring by the packing.

2.5 System Reliability iability of the ECCS is considered in all aspects of the system from initial design to periodic ing of the components during plant operation. The ECCS is a two-train, fully redundant dby safeguard feature. The system has been designed and proven by analysis to withstand any le credible active failure during injection or active or passive failure during recirculation and ntain the performance objectives desired in Section 6.3.1. Two trains of pumps, heat hangers, and flow paths are provided for redundancy as only one train is required to satisfy the ormance requirements. The initiating signals for the ECCS are derived from independent rces as measured from process variables (e.g., low pressurizer pressure) or environmental ables (e.g., containment pressure). Redundant as well as functionally independent variables measured to initiate the safeguards signals. Each train is physically separated and protected re necessary so that a single event cannot initiate a common failure. Power sources for the CS are divided into two independent trains supplied from the emergency buses from either on or off site power. Sufficient emergency generating capacity is available to provide required on power to each train. The emergency generators and their auxiliary systems are completely pendent and each supplies power to one of the two ECCS trains.

reliability program extends to the procurement of the ECCS components such that only gns which have been proven by past use in similar applications are acceptable for use. The lity assurance program as described in Chapter 17 assures components have been ufactured and tested to the applicable codes and standards.

ECCS is designed with the ability for online testing of most components so the availability operational status can be readily determined.

ddition to the above, the integrity of the ECCS is assured through examination of critical ponents during the routine inservice inspection.

1. Active Failure Criteria The ECCS is designed to accept a single active failure following the incident without loss of its protective function. The system design tolerates the failure of any single active component in the ECCS itself or in the necessary associated service systems at any time during the period of required system operations following the incident.

A single active failure analysis is presented in Table 6.3-5 and a failure mode and effects analysis is presented in Table 6.3-10. These demonstrate that the ECCS can sustain the failure of any single active component in either the short or long term and still meet the level of performance for core cooling.

Since the operational status of the active components of the ECCS following a steam line rupture is identical to that following a LOCA, the same analysis is applicable and the ECCS can sustain the failure of any single active component and still meet the level of performance for the addition of shutdown reactivity.

Portions of the ECCS are also relied upon to provide boration and makeup during a safety grade cold shutdown as discussed in Section 9.3.4.2.6. The capability of the ECCS to sustain an active failure and still perform in conjunction with other systems of the cold shutdown design is presented in Table 5.4-9, Residual Heat Removal System - Cold Shutdown Operations-Failure Modes and Effects Analysis,.

2. Passive Failure Criteria The structural failure of a static component that limits the components effectiveness in carrying out its long term design function is considered a passive failure. Examples include cracks in pipes, sprung flanges, valve packing leaks or pump seal failures.

A single passive failure analysis is presented in Table 6.3-6. It demonstrates that the ECCS can sustain a single passive failure during the long term phase and still retain an intact flow path to the core to supply sufficient flow to maintain the core covered and effect the removal of decay heat. The procedure followed to establish the alternate flow path also isolates the component which failed.

failure as it specifically applies to failure to passive components in the ECCS.

Thus, for the long term, the system design is based on accepting either a passive or an active failure.

undancy of Flow Paths and Components for Long Term Emergency Core Cooling esign of the ECCS, Westinghouse utilizes the following criteria:

1. During the long term cooling period following a LOCA, the emergency core cooling flow paths are separable into two subsystems, either of which can provide minimum core cooling functions and return spilled water from the floor of the containment back to the RCS.
2. Either of the two subsystems can be isolated and removed from service in the event of a leak outside the containment.
3. Adequate redundancy of check valves is provided to tolerate failure of a check valve during the long term as a passive component.
4. Should one of the two subsystems be isolated in this long term period, the other subsystem remains operable.
5. Provisions are also made in the design to detect and collect leakage from components outside the containment.

s, for the long-term emergency core cooling function, adequate core cooling capacity exits h one flow path removed from service.

sequent Leakage from Components in ECCS System h respect to piping and mechanical equipment outside the containment, considering the visions for visual inspection (if access is available) and leak detection, leaks will be detected ore they propagate to major proportions. A review of the equipment in the system indicates the largest sudden leak potential would be the sudden failure of a pump shaft seal. Evaluation eak rate assuming only the presence of a seal retention ring around the pump shaft showed s less than 50 gpm would result. Piping leaks, valve packing leaks, or flange gasket leaks e been of a nature to build up slowly with time and are considered less severe than the pump failure.

ger leaks in the ECCS are prevented by the following:

1. The piping is classified ANS Safety Class 2 and, therefore, must comply with the corresponding quality assurance program associated with this safety class.

earthquake.

3. The system piping is located within a controlled area on the plant site.
4. The piping system receives periodic inservice inspection and pressure tests and is accessible for periodic visual inspection.
5. The piping is austenitic stainless steel which is not susceptible to brittle fracture during operating conditions.

ed on this review, the auxiliary and engineered safety features buildings and related equipment designed to be capable of handling leaks up to a maximum of 50 gpm. Means are also vided to detect and isolate such leaks in the emergency core cooling equipment cubicles within roximately 30 minutes in the ESF building and within approximately one hour for leaks in the iliary building. In the pipe tunnel area of the fuel building and in the 4 foot 6 inches common outside the RSS and RHS pump cubicles in the ESF building, detection and isolation for CS fluid leakage is not required because conservative piping design precludes leakage tulation. All ECCS piping within these areas meets the low stress limits required of MEB 3-1 break exclusion areas for moderate energy piping.

ddition, the piping, valves, and components within these areas are subjected to a periodic age test program in accordance with the TMI Task Action Plan Item III.D.1.1 R Confirmatory Item No. 66).

ential Boron Precipitation on precipitation in the reactor vessel can be prevented by a back- flush of cooling water ugh the core to reduce the concentration of boric acid in the water remaining in the reactor sel.

o flow paths are available for hot leg recirculation of sump water. Each safety injection pump discharge to two hot legs with suction taken from the containment recirculation pump harge.

s of one pump or one flow path does not prevent hot leg recirculation, since two redundant paths are available for use.

ety Grade Cold Shutdown Function ing a safety grade cold shutdown, the ECCS high head injection header provides one of the redundant flow paths for boration and make-up. The other redundant flow path is the rging bypass line which is part of the chemical and volume control system. Provisions are also uded in the ECCS design to ensure that the accumulators can be either isolated or vented so

2.6 Protection Provisions provisions taken to protect the system from damage that might result from dynamic effects ciated with postulated rupture of piping, are discussed in Section 3.6. The provisions taken to ect the system from missiles are discussed in Section 3.5. The provisions to protect the system m seismic damage are discussed in Sections 3.7, 3.9, and 3.10. Thermal stresses on the RCS discussed in Section 5.2.

2.7 Provisions for Performance Testing t lines are provided for performance testing of the ECCS system as well as individual ponents. These test lines and instrumentation are shown on Figures 6.2-36, 6.2-37, 6.3-2, 9.3-8. All pumps have miniflow lines for use in testing operability. Additional information on ing can be found in Section 6.3.4.2.

2.8 Manual Actions manual actions are required of the operator for proper operation of the ECCS during the ction mode of operation, except to isolate within 90 minutes a potential charging pump rnate minimum flow line break between isolation valves 3CHS*MV8512 A/B and the RWST.

s action is credited to protect system hydraulic performance assumed in design analyses.

ing the injection mode, the ECCS pumps (charging, safety injection, and residual heat oval) and quench spray pumps operate automatically, drawing water from the RWST and vering it to the RCS and quench spray headers, respectively. The switchover to the rculation mode is initiated automatically and completed manually by operator action from the n control room. The operator actions required for switchover are delineated in Table 6.3-7.

residual heat removal pumps stop automatically upon receipt of an RWST low-low level al coincident with the safety injection signal. A one-out-of-two protection logic (see ure 7.6-3) is used to trip each pump.

ST level indication is available to the operator to monitor the water level and prepare for tchover to the recirculation mode. The RWST level indication system (see Figure 7.6-3) sists of four level channels with each channel assigned to a separate process control protection Four RWST level transmitters provide level signals to four level indicators (through isolation ices) on the main control board. Two of these level channels are recorded on the main control rd, and two of the channels provide indication (through isolation devices) on the auxiliary tdown panel, to indicate and record zero to 100 percent level in the RWST. The level cation logic is separate from the pump trip logic described above.

RWST low-low level signal is also alarmed to inform the operator to initiate the manual ons required to realign the charging, safety injection, and containment recirculation pumps for recirculation mode.

minimum elapsed time from a LOCA to the receipt of the RWST low-low level signal has n calculated to be approximately 33 minutes. The analysis conservatively assumes the owing:

1. The ECCS and quench spray pumps are assumed to start coincident with the LOCA and to deliver at a constant rate throughout the injection mode period.
2. The containment and RCS pressures are assumed to be 0 psig to maximize flow out of the RWST.
3. The pump flow rates are the maximum calculated (system runout) flow rates, assuming two pumps of each type are operating. These flow rates are approximately:

Quench spray pump (2) - 6,500 gpm Charging pump (2) - 880 gpm Safety injection pump (2) - 830 gpm Residual heat removal pump (2) - 10,000 gpm The total flowrate out of the RWST during the injection mode of operation is conservatively assumed to be 18,400 gpm for analysis purposes.

4. The RWST volume available during the injection mode is that contained between the Technical Specifications minimum volume requirement of 1,166,000 gallons (modes 1 through 4) and the low-low level setpoint with allowance for positive instrument error at the low-low level setpoint. An RWST volume of 1,166,000 gallons corresponds to a level approximately 3 inches below the RWST makeup alarm setpoint and permits a working allowance of approximately 5,100 gallons.

Instrument uncertainty for the RWST makeup alarm has been accounted for to provide assurance that this alarm will be generated prior to the RWST level decreasing below 1,166,000 gallons. The volume of water contained between the Technical Specifications requirement of 1,166,000 gallons and the low-low level setpoint (tank elevation = 25 feet 5 inches) is approximately 646,000 gallons.

When instrument error at this setpoint is considered, this volume of water is reduced to approximately 614,000 gallons.

The minimum time that would elapse from initiation of a LOCA to initiation of switchover to the recirculation mode is then 614,000 gallons divided by 18,400 gpm, or approximately 33 minutes. This is the minimum time available for the operator to prepare for switchover. Refer to Figure 6.3-6 for a presentation of RWST water levels and volumes.

ed on MNPS-3 simulator experience, a period of 25 minutes is considered conservative for rators to complete manual switchover to recirculation. This procedure (Table 6.3-7) is ated promptly when the alarm signals automatic trip of a residual heat removal pump at the ST low-low level setpoint.

two residual heat removal pumps have independent instrumentation and are not expected to ive low-low trip signals at the same time. The second residual heat removal pump is servatively assumed to draw 5500 gpm until it is manually tripped by procedure which is med to occur five minutes after the alarm. This action significantly reduces the outflow from RWST. The outflow is further reduced as each charging and safety injection pump is aligned he containment sump.

er termination of the residual heat removal pumps the outflow from the RWST is assumed to onstant at approximately 8300 gpm until switchover is complete. Thus, no credit is taken for uction in outflow as each charging and safety injection pump is realigned to the containment p.

amount of water drawn from the RWST during the 25 minutes after the low-low level alarm pproximately 234,000 gallons. Assuming the low-low level alarm occurs at the lowest extreme he instrument uncertainties, the minimum RWST water level will be approximately 12.4 feet.

ve tank bottom. This level provides adequate NPSH for the charging and safety injection ps when both power trains and all ECCS pumps operate.

ne power train fails, the operating charging and safety injection pump each deliver higher flow require higher NPSH than when both trains operate. This condition results in less NPSH gin than when both trains are powered. The minimum remaining RWST water level for this is approximately 15.9 feet. above tank bottom which provides adequate NPSH for the rging and safety injection pumps when only one train operates.

owing the completion of the switchover sequence, two of the four containment recirculation ps would take suction from the containment sump and deliver borated water to the suction of two charging pumps and the two safety injection pumps, which deliver directly to the RCS legs. As part of the switchover procedures, the suctions of the charging and safety injection ps are cross-connected in the event of failure of either recirculation pump.

tion 7.5 lists the process information available in the control room to assist the operator in orming the switchover actions.

3 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION pter 15 Accidents That Result in ECCS Operation onjunction with the following discussion, refer to Chapter 15.

a. Inadvertent opening of a steam generator relief or safety valve.
b. Steam system piping failure.
2. Decrease in heat removal by the secondary system.
a. Feedwater system pipe break.
3. Decrease in reactor coolant system inventory.
a. Steam generator tube rupture.
b. Loss-of-coolant accident from a spectrum of postulated piping breaks within the system.
c. Spectrum of rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) ejection accidents.
4. Increase in reactor system (RCS) inventory.
a. Inadvertent operation of the ECCS during power operation.

ety injection system actuation may occur from any of the following:

1. Low pressurizer pressure signal.
2. Low steamline pressure signal.
3. High containment pressure.
4. Manual actuation.

will rapidly close the feedwater control valves, close the feedwater isolation valves, and trip main feedwater pumps.

ther, the actuation signal will divert the suction of the charging pumps from the volume control to the refueling water storage tank.The valves isolating the charging pumps from the ction header will then automatically open, if the cold leg injection permissive [(P-19) -

surizer pressure low] signal is present. When the injection header isolation valves open, the rging pumps pump 2700 ppm borated water from the RWST, through the header and injection and into the cold legs of each loop. The safety injection pumps also start automatically, but vide no flow when the RCS is at normal pressure. The passive accumulator system and the low d system also provide no flow at normal RCS pressure.

sting Criteria Used to Judge the Adequacy of the ECCS

1. Peak clad temperature calculated shall not exceed 2,200F.
2. The calculated total oxidation of the clad shall nowhere exceed 0.17 times the total clad thickness before oxidation.
3. The calculated total amount of hydrogen generated from the chemical reaction of the clad with water or steam shall not exceed 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the clad cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the clad around the plenum volume, were to react.
4. Calculated changes in core geometry shall be such that the core remains amenable to cooling.
5. After any calculated successful initial operation of the ECCS, the calculated core temperature shall be maintained at an acceptable low value and decay heat shall be removed for the extended period of time required by long life radionuclides remaining in the core.

evaluation of single failures is provided in Section 6.3.2.5. A detailed description of the above dents including methods of analysis assumptions, and results are provided in Chapter 15.

4 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS 4.1 ECCS Performance Tests operational Test Program at Ambient Conditions iminary operational testing of the ECCS system was conducted during the hot-functional ing of the RCS following flushing and hydrostatic testing, with the system cold and the reactor sel head removed. Provision was made for excess water to drain into the refueling canal. The CS was aligned for normal power operation. Simultaneously, the safety injection block tches reset and the breakers on the lines supplying off site power are tripped manually so that ration of the emergency diesels is tested in conjunction with the safety injection system. This provided information including the following facets:

1. Satisfactory SIS generation and transmission.
2. Proper operation of the emergency generators, including sequential load pickup.
3. Valve operating times.
4. Pump starting times.
5. Pump delivery rates at runout conditions (one point on the operating curve).

mponents

1. Pumps - Separate flow tests of the pumps in the ECCS systems were conducted during the operational startup testing (with the reactor vessel head off) to check capability for sustained operation. The centrifugal charging, safety injection, residual heat removal, and containment recirculation pumps discharged into the reactor vessel through the injection lines, the overflow from the reactor vessel passing into the refueling canal. Each pump was tested separately with water drawn from the RWST. Data was taken to determine pump head and flow at this time. Pumps were then run on miniflow circuits and data taken to determine a second point on the head flow characteristic curve.
2. Accumulators - Each accumulator is filled with water from the RWST and pressurized with the MOV on the discharge line closed. The valve is then opened and the accumulator allowed to discharge into the reactor vessel as part of the operational startup testing with the reactor cold and the vessel head off.

o, see Chapter 14 for a description of the testing program.

4.2 Reliability Tests and Inspections odic testing of the ECCS components and all necessary support systems is performed in ordance with applicable plant procedures. Valves which operate after a LOCA are operated ugh a complete cycle, and pumps are operated individually in this test on their miniflow lines ept the charging pumps which are tested by their normal charging function. If such testing cates a need for corrective maintenance, the redundancy of equipment in these systems mits such maintenance to be performed without shutting down or reducing load under certain ditions. These conditions include considerations such as the period within which the ponent should be restored to service and the capability of the remaining equipment to provide minimum required level of performance during such a period. The operation of the remote valve and the check valve in each accumulator tank discharge line may be tested by opening remote test line valves just downstream of the stop valve and check valve respectively. Flow ugh the test line can be observed on instruments and the opening and closing of the discharge stop valve can be sensed on this instrumentation.

ere series pairs of check valves from the high-pressure to low- pressure isolation barrier ween the RCS and safety injection system piping outside the reactor containment, periodic ing of these check valves must be performed to provide assurance that certain postulated ure modes do not result in a loss of coolant from the low pressure system outside containment h a simultaneous loss of safety injection pumping capacity.

safety injection system test line subsystem provides the capability for determination of the grity of the pressure boundary formed by series check valves. The tests performed verify that

r each refueling just prior to plant startup, after the RCS has been pressurized.

es in which the series check valves are to be tested are the safety injection pump cold leg ction lines and the residual heat removal pump cold leg injection lines.

mplement the periodic component testing requirements, Technical Specifications apter 16) have been established. During periodic system testing, a visual inspection of pump s, valves packings, flanged connections, and relief valves is made to detect leakage. Inservice ection provides further confirmation that no significant deterioration is occurring in the ECCS d boundary.

ign measures have been taken to assure that the following testing can be performed:

1. Active components may be tested periodically for operability (e.g., pumps on miniflow, certain valves, etc).
2. An integrated system actuation test can be performed when the plant is cooled down and the residual heat removal system (RHRS) is in operation. The ECCS is arranged so that no flow is introduced into the RCS for this test.
3. An initial flow test of the full operational sequence can be performed.

design features which assure this test capability are specifically:

1. Power sources are provided to permit individual actuation of each active component of the ECCS.
2. The safety injection pumps can be tested periodically during plant operation using the minimum flow recirculation lines provided.
3. The RHS pumps are used every time the RHS is put into operation. They can also be tested periodically when the plant is at power using the miniflow recirculation lines.
4. The centrifugal charging pumps are either normally in use for charging service or can be tested periodically on miniflow.
5. Remote operated valves can be exercised during routine plant maintenance.
6. Level and pressure instrumentation is provided for each accumulator tank for continuous monitoring during plant operation.

motor operated valves.

8. A flow indicator is provided in the safety injection pump header and in the RHR pump headers. Pressure instrumentation is also provided in these lines.
9. An integrated system test can be performed when the plant is cooled down and the RHRS is in operation. This test does not introduce flow into the RCS but does demonstrate the operation of the valves, pump circuit breakers, and automatic circuitry including diesel starting and the automatic loading of ECCS components of the diesels (by simultaneously simulating a loss of off site power to the vital electrical buses).
10. A test can be performed during plant mode 5 with the RHRS in operation, and with the ECCS pumps aligned to take suction from the RCS through the RHRS and to return the water through the safety injection branch lines. This arrangement permits a safety injection flow balancing test without introduction of any RCS inventory change.
11. A special design feature is provided to prevent the injection lines throttling valves from being set at a position that may cause excessive wear by erosion and/or from clogging by debris (passed by sump screen), during post-LOCA long term recirculation. This provision adds resistance in the injection lines in a form of restriction orifices (ROs) and flow element orifices. The added resistance reduces the amount of throttling required at each valve. Consequently the valves are set during the final balancing tests with flow path openings large enough to preclude both high fluid velocities that cause erosion and potential debris entrapment.

pter 16, Technical Specifications, gives the selection of test frequency, acceptability of ing, and measured parameters. A description of the inservice inspection program is also uded in Chapter 16. ECCS components and systems are designed to meet the intent of ASME e Section XI for inservice inspection.

5 INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS rumentation and associated analog and logic channels employed for initiation of ECCS ration is discussed in Section 7.3. This section describes the instrumentation employed for nitoring ECCS components during normal plant operation and also ECCS post-accident ration. All alarms are annunciated in the control room. The controls and instrumentation for containment recirculation system are discussed in Section 7.3.

d Leg Injection/Normal RHR Return Line Temperature fluid temperature of the coolant being returned to the RCS during safety injection and normal R operation is recorded in the control room.

ueling Water Storage Tank Temperature (RWST) d temperature in the RWST is recorded in the control room.

tainment Recirculation Coolers Outlet Temperature perature of the containment recirculation water at the outlet of the coolers is indicated in the trol room.

S Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature fluid temperature at the inlet of each residual heat exchanger is recorded in the control room.

re is also a locally mounted temperature at the outlet of each residual heat exchanger.

5.2 Pressure Indication ety Injection Header Pressure ety injection pump discharge header pressure is indicated in the control room.

umulator Pressure licate pressure channels are installed on each accumulator. Pressure indication in the control m and high and low pressure alarms are provided by each channel.

t Line Pressure cal pressure indicator used to check for proper seating of the accumulator check valves ween the injection lines and the RCS is installed on the leakage test line.

idual Heat Removal Pump Discharge Pressure idual heat removal discharge pressure for each pump is indicated in the control room. A high sure alarm is actuated by each channel.

trifugal Charging Pump Inlet/Discharge Pressure cal pressure indicator is located at the suction and discharge of each charging pump.

charge pressure indication is provided for each recirculation pump in the control room.

5.3 Flow Indication rging Pump Injection Header Flow ction header flow to the reactor cold legs is indicated in the control room.

ety Injection Pump Header Flow w through the safety injection pump header is indicated in the control room.

idual Heat Removal Pump Injection Flow w through each RHS injection header leading to the reactor cold or hot legs is indicated in the trol room.

t Line Flow al indication of the leakage test line flow is provided to check for proper seating of the umulator check valves between the injection lines and the RCS.

ety Injection Pump Minimum Flow w indication for the safety injection pump minimum flow line is provided locally.

idual Heat Removal Pump Minimum Flow owmeter installed in each RHS pump discharge header provides control for the valve located he pump minimum flow line.

5.4 Level Indication ueling Water Storage Tank Level refueling water storage tank (RWST) instrumentation provides five distinct setpoints for level trol. The high-high level setpoint provides an alarm to protect against possible overflow of the ST. The low and high level setpoints provide an alarm to initiate and terminate manual make-o assure that a sufficient volume of water is always available in the RWST in conformance h the Technical Specifications. The high-high, high, and low setpoints are not safety-related.

safety-related low-low level setpoint stops the RHR pumps and starts the CRS pumps. This oint is alarmed to alert the operator to realign the ECCS from the injection to the recirculation de following an accident. A safety-related tank empty setpoint stops the quench spray pumps.

ddition, four safety-related level indicator channels, which indicate in the control room, are vided for the RWST.

umulator Water Level licate water level channels are provided for each accumulator. Both channels provide cation in the control room and actuate High and Low water level alarms.

tainment Structure Sump Water Level o containment structure sump water level indicator channels are provided. Both indicate in the trol room.

5.5 Valve Position Indication ve positions which are indicated on the control board are done so by a off normal system; should the valve not be in its proper position, a yellow light will be lit and thus give a highly ble indication to the operator.

umulator Isolation Valve Position Indication accumulator motor operated valves are provided with red (open) and green (closed) position cating lights located at the control switch on the main control board and on the auxiliary tdown panel for each valve. These lights are powered from a source that is separate from the trol power for the valve, and are actuated by valve motor-operated limit switches.

onitor light that is on when the valve is not fully open is provided in an array of monitor lights he main control board that are all off when their respective valves are in proper position for orming safeguard operations. This light is energized from a separate monitor light supply and ated by valve stem limit switches.

alarm annunciator point is activated by both a valve motor operator limit switch and by a e position limit switch activated by stem travel whenever an accumulator valve is not fully n for any reason with the system at pressure (the pressure at which the safety injection ation signal is unblocked at the P-11 setpoint. A separate annunciator point is used for each umulator valve. This alarm will be recycled at approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> intervals to remind the rator of the improper valve lineup.

6 REFERENCE FOR SECTION 6.3 1 WCAP-7907, 1972, Burnett, T.W.T. et al., Loftran Code Description, Westinghouse Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

TABLE 6.3-1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENT PARAMETERS umulators Number 4 Design Pressure (psig) 700 Design Temperature (F) 300 Operating Temperature (F) 70 Nominal Operating Pressure (psig) 650 Total Volume (ft3) 1,350 each

3) 900 each Nominal Water Volume (ft Volume N2 Gas (ft )3 450 Boric Acid Concentration, maximum (ppm) 2,900 Boric Acid Concentration, minimum (ppm) 2,600 Relief Valve Setpoint (psig) 700 rging Pumps Number 3 Design Pressure (psig) 2,800 Design Temperature (F) 300 Design Flow Rate (gpm) (1) 150 Design Head (ft) 5,800 Maximum Runout Flow Rate (gpm) for B Pump 560 for A and C Pumps 570 Head at Maximum Flow Rate (ft) 1,400 Discharge Head at Shutoff (ft) 6,000 Motor Rating (bhp) (2) 600 Required NPSH (ECCS) Maximum Predicted Flowrate (ft) (3)

(3)

Available NPSH

PARAMETERS (CONTINUED) ety Injection Pumps Number 2 Design Pressure (psig) 1,750 Design Temperature (F) 300 Design Flow Rate (gpm) 425 Design Head (ft) 2,850 Maximum Flow Rate (gpm) 675 Head at Maximum Flow Rate (ft) 1,480 Discharge Head (ft) 3,545 Motor Rating (bhp) (2) 450 (3)

Required NPSH (3)

Available NPSH idual Heat Removal Pumps (See Section 5.4.7 for design parameters)

Required NPSH (3)

(3)

Available NPSH idual Heat Exchangers (See Section 5.4.7 for design parameters) tainment Recirculation Pumps Number 4 Design Pressure (psig) Suction 60/30 inches Hg Discharge 295 Design Temperature (F) 260F Design Flow Rate (gpm) 3,950 gpm Design Head (ft) 148 psi/342 ft Maximum Flow Rate (gpm) 3,000 gpm tainment Recirculation Coolers See Section 6.2.2 for design parameters ueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

See Section 6.2.2 for design parameters TES:

Includes miniflow 1.15 Service factor not included See Table 6.3-11

Fluid Inlet Process Set Back Pressure Fluid Temperature Pressure Constant Required Description Discharged , F (normal) (psig) psig Capacity Accumulator N2 Supply Nitrogen 120 700 0 2,743 sc Header Relief to Atm. (Non-radioactive)

(8857) (Non-radioactive)

SI Pump (Hot/Cold) Legs Relief to DGS (8853 Dilute H3B03 50 2235 4 20 gpm A, B / 8851)

RHR Pump (Hot/Cold) Legs Relief to DGS Dilute H3B03 50 600 6 (8842, 8856A) 20 gpm (884 / 8856 A, B) 5 (8856B)

SI Pump Suction Relief to DGS (8858) Dilute H3B03 50 220 4 20 gpm SI Pump Suction Relief to DGS (8925A/B) Dilute H3B03 50 220 4 1 gpm Accumulator N2 Relief to Containment (8855 Nitrogen 120 700 0 1,500 sc A, B, C, D)

Hydro Test Discharge Relief to Plant Drainage Dilute H3B03 100 3325 0 25 gpm (DNF) (8885)

VALVE AUTOMATIC POSITION LOCATION IDENTIFICATION INTERLOCKS FEATURES INDICATION ALARM Accumulator Isolation 8808 A, B, C, D Opens on SIS or MCB Yes, out pos valves high pressurizer pressure with control switch in AUTO (Ref.

Section 7.3.1.1.5)

Safety injection pump 8806 and None None MCB Yes, out pos suction from RWST 8923 A & B RHR suction from 8812 A & B 8812A or 8812B cannot be None MCB Yes, out pos RWST opened unless recirculation pumps discharge valves 8837A or 8837B are closed and valve 8804A or 8804B is fully closed.

Safety injection pumps 8804B Cannot be opened unless valve None MCB Yes, out pos suction from 8837B or 8838B is fully open, recirculation pump B 8702A or 8702B or 8702C are fully closed, SI pump miniflow valve 8813 or (8814 and 8920) is (are) fully closed, and valves (8511A and 8512A) or (8511B and 8512B) are fully closed.

Safety injection hot leg 8802 A & B None None MCB Yes, out pos injection RHR hot leg injection 8840 None None MCB Yes, out pos

VALVE AUTOMATIC POSITION LOCATION IDENTIFICATION INTERLOCKS FEATURES INDICATION ALARM Centrifugal charging 8804A Cannot be opened unless valve None MCB Yes, out pos pumps suction from 8701A or 8701B or 8701C is recirculation pump A fully closed, valve 8813 or valves (8814 and 8920) is (are) fully closed, valve 8837A or 8838B is fully open, and valves (8511A and 8512A) or (8511B and 8512B) are fully closed.

CVCS suction from LCV-112 D & E Opens on SIS or on MCB RWST low low VCT level CVCS normal suction LCV-112 B & C Closes on SIS or MCB Yes, out pos low low VCT level provided that the associated CVCS suction valve from the RWST is open (112D for 112B and 112E for 112C)

Safety injection pump 8835 None None MCB Yes, out pos to cold leg CVCS normal charging 8105 and 8106 None Closes on SIS MCB None flow discharge line Charging pump 8110, None Closes on SIS MCB Yes, out pos miniflow 8111 A, B, & C Charging pump suction 8468 A & B None None MCB Yes, out pos

VALVE AUTOMATIC POSITION LOCATION IDENTIFICATION INTERLOCKS FEATURES INDICATION ALARM Charging pump 8438 A, B & C None None MCB Yes, out pos discharge Charging and safety 8807 A & B None None MCB Yes, out pos injection pump header and 8924 from RHR RHR to RCS cold legs 8809 A & B None None MCB Yes, out pos Safety injection pump (8814 and 8920) None None MCB Yes, out pos miniflow or 8813 RHR cross connect 8716 A & B None None MCB Yes, out pos Safety injection pump 8821 A & B None None MCB Yes, out pos cross connect Recirculation pumps 8837 A & B Valve 8837A cannot be opened None MCB Yes, out pos A & B discharge unless RHR pump suction crossconnects to valves 8701A or 8701B or charging and SIH 8701C are fully closed and the pumps RHR valve from the RWST 8812A is closed. Valve 8837B cannot be opened unless RHR pump suction valves 8702A or 8702B or 8702C are fully closed and the RHR valve from the RWST 8812B is closed.

VALVE AUTOMATIC POSITION LOCATION IDENTIFICATION INTERLOCKS FEATURES INDICATION ALARM Recirculation pumps 8838 A & B RHR suction valves from None MCB Yes, out pos C & D discharge from RWST (8812A or 8812B) must the containment be closed before recirculation recirculation sump pumps discharge valves may be operated.

Charging pump 8801 A & B Cold leg injection permissive Opens on SIS with MCB Yes, out pos discharge (P-19) must be enabled before P-19 header to cold legs an SI signal can automatically open the valves.

NOTE:

MCB - Main Control Board

SYSTEM COMPONENTS COMPONENT

  • MATERIAL cumulators Carbon steel, clad with austenitic stainless steel mps Charging Austenitic stainless steel Safety Injection Austenitic stainless steel Residual Heat Removal Austenitic stainless steel sidual Heat Exchangers Shell Carbon steel Shell end cap Carbon steel Tubes Austenitic stainless steel Channel Austenitic stainless steel Channel cover Austenitic stainless steel Tube sheet Austenitic stainless steel lves tor-operated valves Containing radioactive fluids Pressure Containing parts Austenitic stainless steel or equivalent Body-to-bonnet Bolting and nuts Not all bolting is low alloy - within S&W scope Seating surfaces Stellite No. 6 or equivalent Stems Austenitic stainless steel or, 17-4 PH stainless tor-operated valves Containing nonradioactive Boron - free fluids Body, bonnet and flange Carbon steel Stems Corrosion resistant steel aphragm valves Austenitic stainless steel Accumulator check valves Parts contacting borated water Clapper arm Austenitic stainless steel Shaft 17-4 PH stainless lief valves Stainless steel bodies Stainless steel Carbon steel bodies Carbon steel All nozzles, discs, spindles and guides Austenitic stainless steel

COMPONENT

All piping transporting borated water Austenitic stainless steel TE:

See Section 6.2.2 for materials in containment recirculation system.

Component Malfunction Comments Safety Injection Mode

1. Pumps
a. Centrifugal charging Fails to start Two provided, evaluation based on operation of one.
b. Safety injection Fails to start Two provided, evaluation based on operation of one.
c. Residual heat removal Fails to start Two provided, evaluation based on operation of one.
2. Automatically operated valves
a. Charging pump discharge to RCS cold leg injection Fails to open Two parallel; one valve in either line required to ope headers
b. Recirculation pumps A and B suction line to Fails to remain open Two parallel lines; only one valve in either line requi containment sump remain open.
c. Charging pumps
1) Suction line from refueling water storage tank Fails to open Two parallel valves; only one valve required to open.
2) Normal charging path to the RCS Fails to close Two valves in series; only one valve required to clos
3) Miniflow bypass line Fails to close Two valves in series; only one valve required to clos
4) Alternate miniflow bypass line Fails to open Two valves in series (one normally closed, the other normally open) in redundant trains electrically tied to pump it is protecting; only one charging train require operate.
5) Suction from volume control tank Fails to close Two valves in series; only one valve required to clos Recirculation Mode
1. Valves operated manually from the control room
a. Residual heat removal pumps suction line from Fails to close Check valve in series with one gate valve; operation refueling water storage tank only one valve required.

Component Malfunction Comments

b. Safety injection pump suction line from refueling Fails to close Check valve in series with one gate valve; operation water storage tank only one valve required.
c. Charging pump suction line from refueling water Fails to close Check valve in series with two parallel gate valves; storage tank operation of either the check valve or both of the gat valves is required.
d. Safety injection pump suction line at discharge Fails to open Separate and independent high head injection paths t residual heat exchanger safety injection pumps and charging pumps taken su from discharge of residual heat exchangers; operatio only one valve required.
e. Residual heat removal cross connect line Fails to close Two valves in series; operation of one required.
f. Safety injection pump miniflow lines Fails to close Two parallel valves provided in series with a third; operation of either both parallel valves or series valv required.
g. Safety injection/charging cross connect line in 1) Fails to open 1) Two parallel valves provided; operation of either o suction header required.
2) Fails to 2) Redundant and separate cold leg injection paths as remain open adequate flow to the core.
h. Safety injection hot leg isolation valves Fails to open Two flow paths available; adequate flow to core is as by any one.
i. Safety injection/residual heat removal cold leg Fails to close Redundant train valves provided with suitable isolation valves arrangements to preclude pump runout.
j. Containment recirculation pump discharge valve Fails to open Two flow paths available; adequate flow to core prov by either path.
k. Recirculation pumps A & B suction lines from Fails to remain open Two parallel lines; only one normally open valve in e containment sump line required to remain open.

Component Malfunction Comments

l. Charging alternate miniflow lines Fails to close Two redundant trains with two valves in series powe with the opposite train valve; only one train required close.

Failure Indication of Loss of Flow Path Alternate Flow Path Train A SIH piping, pump seal, or Main board alarm for the accumulation of Loss of ECCS Train A. Hot leg recirculation v RHS piping in either Alpha SIH or water in the ESF building Alpha RHR cubicle. 3RSS*P1B and 3SIH*P1B. Cold leg recircula Alpha RHS cubicle. via 3RSS*P1B through 3SIL*MV8809B. All recirculation pumps to sprays.

Train B SIH piping, pump seal or Main board alarm for the accumulation of Partial loss of ECCS Train B. Hot leg recircula RHS piping in either Bravo SIH or water in the ESF building Bravo RHR cubicle. via 3RSS*P1A and 3SIH*P1A through suctio Bravo RHS cubicle. cross-connect. Cold leg recirculation via 3RSS*P1A and any charging pump. All recirculation pumps to sprays.

Train A RSS piping or pump seal Main board alarm for the accumulation of Loss of RSS Train A. Hot leg recirculation in RSS Train A cubicle. water in the ESF building Alpha RSS cubicle. RSS Train B and either SIH pump. Cold leg recirculation via RSS Train B and any charg pump through suction cross-connect line. RSS Train B pumps to sprays.

Train B RSS piping or pump seal in Main board alarm for the accumulation of Loss of RSS Train B. Hot leg recirculation RSS Train B cubicle. water in the ESF building Bravo RSS cubicle. RSS Train A and either SIH pump. Cold leg recirculation via RSS Train A and any charg pump through suction cross-connect line. RSS Train A pumps to sprays.

Common charging recirculation Main board alarm for the accumulation of Loss of cold leg recirculation via charging pum suction or discharge piping or water in the Auxiliary Building piping tunnel. Hot leg recirculation via RSS Train B and b charging pump seal in Auxiliary SIH pumps. Cold leg recirculation via 3RSS*

Building. through 3SIL*MV8809A. All recirculation pu to sprays.

NOTE:

  • Long term passive failure during recirculation mode where hot leg recirculation alignment has previously been established.

TABLE 6.3-7 SWITCHOVER PROCEDURE

  • rom Injection to Cold Leg Recirculation following manual operator Actions are required to terminate the injection mode and establish recirculation mode. It should be noted that RHR pumps have been stopped automatically on ipt of a RWST Low-Low Level. The same RWST Low-Low level signal also automatically ts the RSS Pumps.

p 1 RESET ESF Actuation signals - SI, CDA, LOP, CIA, CIB (As Required) p 2 CHECK RWST Low-Low - Automatic Actions

a. RHR Pumps Off
b. PLACE RHR switch to PTL
c. RSS Pumps Running (3RSS*P1A/B/C/D). [C/D RSS pumps are only required to be running if Ctmt Pressure is GREATER THAN 17.5 psia.]

p 3 Align RHR and RSS Systems for Cold Leg Recirculation

a. a. VERIFY Cold Leg Capability:
1. Recirc Spray Pumps available
2. Power for cold leg recirculation
b. OPEN recirculation spray heat exchanger SW inlet isolation valves (3SWP*MOV54A/B)
c. OPEN recirculation spray header isolation valves (3RSS*MOV20A/B)
d. CHECK Recirculation Spray Pumps A/B - Running
e. CLOSE RHR Cold Leg Injection Valves (3SIL*MV8809A/B)
f. CLOSE RWST/RHR Pump suction Valves (3SIL*MV8812A/B)
g. CLOSE RHR Pump Cross-Over Valves (3RHS*MV8716A/B)
h. CLOSE SI Pump Recirculation Valves to RWST (3SIH*MV8813/8814/8920)
i. CLOSE Charging Pump Miniflow Isolation Valves (3CHS*MV8511A/B, 3CHS*MV8512A/B)
j. CHECK RSS Pumps in operation - AT LEAST THREE (3) MINUTES
k. OPEN Recirculation Spray RHR Isolation Valves (3RSS*MV8837A/B)
l. OPEN RHR to CHG and SI Suction Isolation Valves (3SIL*MV8804A/B)
m. OPEN SI/CHG Pump Cross-Connect Valves (3SIH*MV8807A/B)
n. VERIFY a flow path from Ctmt Sump to the RCS - AT LEAST ONE ESTABLISHED
o. VERIFY at least one CHARGING AND one SI Pump - RUNNING p 4 Complete Cold Leg Recirculation Alignment
a. CLOSE RWST/SI Pump Suction (3SIH*MV8806)
b. In cabinets 3RPS*RAKOTA2/RAKOTB2 SEPARATE the gray boot connector for 3CHS*LCV112D/E
c. CLOSE RWST/CHG Pump Suction Valves {3CHS*LCV112D/E) rom Cold Leg Recirculation to Hot Leg Recirculation p 1 Align Safety Injection System for Hot Leg Recirculation.
a. Stop safety injection pump A.
b. Close safety injection pump cross tie isolation valve for separation of safety injection pumps (3SIH*MV8821A).
c. Open hot leg isolation valve (3SIH*MV8802A).
d. Start safety injection pump A.
e. Stop safety injection pump B.
f. Close the B safety injection pump cold leg injection valve (3SIH*MV8821B).
g. Close the safety injection cold leg master isolation valve (3SIH*MV8835).
h. Open the safety injection pump B hot leg injection valve (3SIH*MV8802B).
i. Start safety injection pump B.
j. Verify discharge flow for safety injection pumps A and B.

TE:

Sequence of changeover operations from the injection phase to the recirculation phase with all pumps operating.

EVALUATION NORMAL OPERATING ACCIDENT COMPONENT ARRANGEMENT ARRANGEMENT fueling water storage Lined up to suction of centrifugal Lined up to suction of k charging, safety injection, residual centrifugal charging, safety heat removal, and quench spray injection, residual heat pumps. removal, and quench spray pumps.

arging pumps Lined up to suction of volume Lined up to inlet-valves for control tank for charging service realignment to meet single failure criteria.

sidual heat removal Lined up to cold legs of reactor Lined up to cold legs of mps coolant piping reactor coolant piping during the injection phase.

sidual heat exchangers Lined up to cold legs of reactor Lined up to cold legs of coolant piping reactor coolant piping during the injection phase.

ntainment recirc. pump Lined up to containment Lined up to containment d cont. recirculation recirculation headers recirculation headers. After olers switchover, pumps and heat exchangers are realigned to suction of charging/SI pumps and containment recirculation heaters.

ABLE 6.3-9 NORMAL OPERATING STATUS OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS FOR CORE COOLING mber of Safety Injection Pumps Operable 2 mber of Charging Pumps Operable 2*

mber of Containment Recirculation Pumps (Available for recirculation modes) 4 mber of Residual Heat Removal Pumps Operable 2 mber of Containment Recirculation Coolers (Available for recirculation modes) 2 ueling Water Storage Tank Volume, nominal (gal) 1.2 million on Concentration in Refueling Water Storage Tanks, minimum (ppm) 2700 on Concentration in Accumulator, minimum (ppm) 2600 mber of Accumulators 4 minal Accumulator Pressure (psia) 665 minal Accumulator Water Volume (ft3) 900 tem Valves, Interlocks, and Piping Required for the Above Components which are Operable All TE:

Pump 3 available after manual insertion of breaker.

COMPONENTS ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
1. Motor operated gate Fails to close on Injection-cold legs of Failure reduces redundancy of Valve position indication (open to Valve is electrically interlocked valve LCV-112B demand RC loops providing VCT discharge closed position change) at CB. Valve isolation valve LCV-112D. Val (LCV-112C analogous) isolation. No effect on safety for close position monitor light and alarm closes on actuation by a SIS si system operation; isolation valve for group monitoring of components provided isolation valve LCV-(LCV-112C) and check valve at CB. is at a full open position.

8440 provides backup tank (Analogous train LCV-112C is discharge isolation. electrically interlocked with L 112E.)

2. Motor operated gate Fails to open on Injection-cold legs of Failure reduces redundancy of Valve position indication (closed to Valve is electrically interlocked valve LCV-112D demand RC loops providing fluid flow from RWST open position change) at CB. Valve the instrumentation that monito (LCV-112E analogous) to suction of HHSI/CH pumps. open position monitor light and alarm fluid level of the VCT. Valve o No safety effect on system for group monitoring of components upon actuation by a SIS signal operation. Alternate isolation at CB. upon actuation by a Low-Low valve (LCV-112E) opens to Level VCT signal.

provide backup flow path to suction of HHSI/CH pumps.

3. Centrifugal charging Fails to deliver Injection and Failure reduces redundancy of HHSI/CH pump discharge header One HHSI/CH pump is used fo pump 3 working fluid recirculation cold providing emergency coolant to flow (FI-917) at CB. Open pump normal charging of RCS durin Two Charging pumps are legs of RC loops the RCS at prevailing incident switchgear circuit breaker close plant operation. Pump circuit required and RCS pressure. Fluid flow from position monitor light for group breaker aligned to close on actu automatically start HHSI/CH Pump will be lost. monitoring of components at CB. by SIS signal.

3CHS*P3A and Minimum flow requirements at Common breaker trip alarm at CB.

3CHS*P3B are normally prevailing high RCS pressures aligned electrically, will be met by the redundant 3CHS*P3C, considered HHSI/CH Pump delivery.

an installed spare, is not normally electrically connected

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
4. Motor operated globe Fails to close on Injection-cold legs of Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that Valves are normally open and c valve 8110 (8111A, B, C demand RC loops providing isolation of HHSI/CH stated for Item 2. upon actuation by a SIS.

analogous) pump miniflow line. No effect on safety for system operation.

Alternate isolation valve (8111 A,B&C) in miniflow line provides backup isolation.

5. Motor operated gate Fails to close on Injection-cold legs of Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that Valves are normally open and c valve 8105 (8106 demand RC loops providing isolation of HHSI/CH stated for Item No. 1. upon actuation by a SIS.

analogous) pump discharge to normal charging line of CVCS. No effect on safety for system operation.

Alternate isolation valve (8106) provides backup normal CVCS charging line isolation.

6. Motor operated globe Fails to open on Injection-cold legs of Failure eliminates minimum flow Same method of detection as that Valves 8511A and 8511B are valve 8511A (8511B demand RC loops protection of associated HHSI/ stated for Item No. 1. electrically interlocked with analogous) CH train. Redundant HHSI/CH isolation valves (8804A and 88 train minimum flow protected by and VCT suction isolation valv separate minimum flow line (LCV112B and LCV112C). Va (8511B). Protection of a single opens upon actuation by a SIS HHSI/CH is required to ensure signal. Valve 8511A cannot be availability of an ECCS train. opened unless valves 8804A an 8804B are fully closed and LCV112B or LCV112C are 85 and fully closed, respectively.

(Valve 8511B analogous.) Valv 8804A or 8804B cannot be ope unless valves 8511A and 8512 8511B and 8512B are fully clo and several other trained valve in their respective positions.

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
7. Motor operated gate Fails to open on Injection-cold legs of Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that Valves are normally closed and valve 8801A (8801B demand RC loops fluid flow paths from HHSI/CH stated for item No. 2. upon actuation by a SIS in analogous) pumps to the RCS. No effect on conjunction with a P-19 permis safety for system operation. Note: The failure of a Train A signal is the same as the failure valve 8801A.
8. Item deleted
9. Item deleted
10. Motor operated globe a. Fails to Injection cold legs of a. Failure reduces working fluid a. Valve position indication (open to Valve is regulated by signal fro valve FCV-610 close on demand RC loops delivered to RCS from RHR closed position change) at CB. RHR flow indicator switch located a (FCV-611 analogous) Pump PIA. Minimum flow pump return line to cold legs flow RHR pump discharge. The con requirements for LHSI will be indication (FI-618) at CB. valve opens on a minimum flow met by LHSI/RHR Pump PIB and closes on a maximum flow delivering working fluid to RCS. as stated in FSAR Section 5.4.
b. Fails open Injection-cold legs of b. Failure results in an b. Same as that stated above for on demand RC loops insufficient fluid flow through failure mode fails open except LHSI/RHR Pump PIA for a small closed to open position change LOCA or steam line break indication at CB.

resulting in possible pump damage. If pump becomes inoperative, minimum flow requirements for LHSI will be met by LHSI/RHR Pump PIB delivering working fluid to RCS.

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
11. Residual heat Fails to deliver Injection-cold legs of Failure reduces redundancy of RHR pump return line to cold legs The RHR pump is sized to deli removal Pump working fluid RC loops providing emergency coolant to flow indication (FI-618) and low flow reactor coolant through the RH 3RHS*PIA (3RHS*PIB the RCS from the RWST at low alarm at MCB. RHR pump discharge heat exchanger to meet plant analogous) RCS pressure. Fluid from LHSI/ pressure (PI-614) at CB. Open pump cooldown requirements and is RHR Pump PIA will be lost. switchgear circuit breaker indication during plant cooldown and star Minimum flow requirements for at CB. Circuit breaker close position operations. The pump circuit LHSI will be met by LHSI/RHR monitor light for group monitoring of breaker is aligned to close on Pump PIB delivering working components at CB. Common breaker actuation by a SIS.

fluid. trip alarm at CB.

12. Safety injection Pump Fails to deliver Injection-cold legs of Failure reduces redundancy of SI pumps discharge pressure (PI-919) Pump circuit breaker aligned to 3SIH*PIA (3SIH*PIB working fluid RC loops providing emergency coolant to at CB. SI pump discharge flow close on actuation by a SIS.

analogous) the RCS from the RWST at high (FI-918) at CB. Open pump RCS pressure. Fluid flow from switchgear circuit breaker indication HHSI/SI Pump PIA will be lost. at CB. Circuit breaker close position Minimum flow requirements for monitor light for group monitoring of HHSI will be met by HHSI/SI components at CB. Common breaker pump PIB delivering working trip alarm at CB.

fluid.

13. Motor operated gate Fails to open on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that Refer to Table 6.3-3 for related valve 8837A (8837B demand legs of RC loops providing fluid from the stated for item No. 2. information.

analogous, 1-8838A Containment Sump to the RCS analogous, 1-8838B during recirculation. Fluid flow analogous) from recirculation pump PIA will be lost. Minimum flow requirements at the prevailing RCS pressure will be met by recirculation pump PIB or C or D. Any one containment recirculation pump is sufficient to provide ECCS cooling. No effect on safety for system operation.

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
14. Motor operated gate Fails to close on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that Refer to Table 6.3-3 for related valve 8812A (8812B demand legs of RC loops providing dual train operation stated for Item No. 1. information.

analogous) from the containment recirculation sump. Fluid flow utilizing train A will be lost.

Minimum flow requirements at the prevailing RCS pressure will be met by train B. No effect on safety for system operation.

15. Motor operated gate Fails to close on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that valve 8716A (8716B demand legs of RC loops providing LHSI/Recirculation stated for Item No. 1.

analogous) pump train separation pump train separation for recirculation of fluid to cold legs of RCS. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate isolation valve (8716B) provides backup isolation for LHSI/Recirculation pump train separation.

16. Motor operated gate Fails to close on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that Valve is electrically interlocked valve 8813 demand legs of RC loops providing isolation of HHSI/SI stated for Item No. 1. isolation valves 8804A and 880 pumps miniflow line isolation and may not be opened unless from RWST. No effect on safety valves are closed.

for system operation. Alternate isolation valve (8814 and 8920) in each pumps miniflow line provided backup isolation.

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
17. Motor operated globe Fails to close on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that Same remark as that stated for valve 8814 (8920 demand legs of RC loops providing isolation of HHSI/SI stated for Item No. 1. No. 16.

analogous) Pump miniflow isolation from RWST. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate isolation valve (8813) in main miniflow line provides backup isolation.

18. Motor operated gate Fails to open on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that Refer to Table 6.3-3 for related valve 8804A demand legs of RC loops providing NPSH to suction of stated for Item No. 2. information.

HHSI/CH pumps from Containment/Recirculation pump. No effect on safety for system operation. Minimum NPSH to HHSI/CH pump suction will be met by flow from Containment/ Recirculation pump PIB via the cross tie line and opening of isolation valve 8807A or 8807B and isolation valve 8804B.

19. Motor operated gate Fails to open on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that Refer to Table 6.3-3 for related valve 8804B demand leg of RC loops providing NPSH to suction of stated for Item No. 2. information.

HHSI/SI pumps from LHSI/

Recirculation Pump. No effect on safety for system operation.

Minimum NPSH to HHSI/SI pump suction will be met by flow from LHSI/RHR pump A via cross tie line and opening of isolation valve 8807A or 8807B and isolation valve 8804A.

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
20. Motor operated gate Fails to open on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as stated valve 8807A (8807B demand legs of RC loops providing fluid flow through for Item No. 2.

analogous) cross tie between suction of HHSI/CH pumps and HHSI/SI pumps. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate isolation valve (8807B) opens to provide backup flow path through cross tie line.

21. Motor operated gate Fails to close on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that valve 8806 demand legs of RC loops providing flow isolation of stated for item No. 1.

HHSI/SI pump suction from RWST. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate check isolation valve (8926) provides backup isolation.

22. Motor gate valve Fails to close on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that LCV-112D (LCV-112E demand legs of RC loops providing flow isolation of stated previously for failure of item analogous) suction of HHSI/CH pumps from during injection phase of ECCS RWST. No effect on safety for operation.

system operation. Alternate check isolation valve (8546) provides backup isolation.

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
23. Recirculation Pump Fails to deliver Recirculation-cold or Failure reduces redundancy of Recirculation pump discharge flow A (Pump B analogous, working fluid hot legs of RC loops providing recirculation of coolant indication (FI-38A/FI-38B) is Pump C analogous, Pump to the RCS from the Containment monitored at MB2. RSS pumps 1A/

D analogous) Sump. Fluid flow from 1B running status lights for group IV Containment/ Recirculation are available at MB2. Common RSS Pump A will be lost. Minimum Pump Auto Trip/Overcurrent and recirculation will be met by Components Off Normal alarms are Containment/ Recirculation available at MB2. Common Control Pump B, or Pump C, or Pump D Power Not Available alarm is delivering working fluid. Any available at MB8.

one recirculation pump is sufficient to provide ECCS cooling.

24. Safety injection Pump Fails to deliver Recirculation-cold or Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that No. 1 (Pump No. 2 working fluid hot legs of RC loops providing recirculation of coolant stated previously for failure of item analogous) to the RCS from the Containment during injection phase of ECCS Sump to cold legs of RC loops operation.

via HHSI/SI pumps. Fluid flow from HHSI/SI Pump No. 1 will be lost. Minimum recirculation flow requirements for HHSI flow will be met by HHSI/SI pump No. 2 delivering working fluid.

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
25. Motor operated gate Fails to close on Recirculation-cold or Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that valve 8809A (8809B demand hot legs or RC loops providing recirculation of coolant stated for Item No. 1.

analogous) to the RCS from the Containment Sump to hot legs of RC loops.

Fluid flow from Containment/

Recirculation Pump PIA will continue to flow to cold legs of RC loops. Minimum recirculation flow requirements to hot legs of RC loops will be met by Containment/

Recirculation Pump PIB recirculating fluid to RC hot legs directly and via HHSI/SI pumps.

If valve fails to close the flow rate through the containment recirculation heat exchanger could exceed 4600 gpm. The maximum continuous flow allowed through the heat exchanger. Redundancy is provided and minimum recirculation flow required to the hot and cold legs will be met by Containment/Recirculation Pump PIB.

26. Item deleted

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
27. Motor operated globe Fails to close on Recirculation-cold Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that Valves 8511A and 8511B are valve 8511A (8511B demand legs of RC loops providing isolation of HHSI/CH stated for Item No. 1. electrically interlocked with analogous) train A alternate miniflow isolation valves (8804A and 88 isolation from RWST. No effect and VCT suction isolation valv on safety for system operation. (LCV112B and LCV112C). Va Redundant in series alternate 8511A cannot be opened unles minimum flow isolation valve valves 8804A and 8804B are f (8512B, 8512A analogous) closed and LCV112B or LCV1 provides backup isolation. are 85% and fully closed, respectively. (Valve 8511B analogous.) Valves 8804A or 8 cannot be opened unless valves 8511A and 8512A or 8511B an 8512B are fully closed and sev other trained valves are in their respective positions.
28. Item deleted
29. Motor operated gate Fails to close on Recirculation-hot Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that valve 8821A (8821B demand legs of RC loops providing flow isolation of stated for Item No. 1.

analogous) HHSI/SI pump to cold legs of RC loops. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate isolation valve (8835) provides backup isolation against flow to cold legs of RC loops.

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS
30. Motor operated gate Fails to open on Recirculation-hot Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that valve 8802A (8802B demand legs of RC loops providing recirculation of coolant stated for Item No. 2. In addition, SI analogous) to the hot legs of RCS from the pump discharge pressure (PI-919) and Containment Sump via the flow (FI-918) at CB.

A&B Safety Injection Pumps.

Minimum core cooling sump recirculation flow requirements to the hot legs of RCS loops will be met via the B SI Pump recirculating fluid to the RCS hot leg loops 1 and 3, through the open isolation valve 8802B.

31. Motor operated gate Fails to close on Recirculation-hot Failure reduces redundancy of Same method of detection as that valve 8835 demand legs of RC loops providing flow isolation of stated for Item No. 1.

HHSI/SI pump flow to cold legs of RC loops. No effect on safety for system operation. Alternate isolation valve (8821A and 8821B) in cross tie between HHSI/SI pumps provides backup isolation against flow to cold legs of RC loops.

ECCS FAILURE OPERATION EFFECT ON SYSTEM FAILURE DETECTION COMPONENT MODE PHASE OPERATION

  • METHOD REMARKS NOTE:

Charging (A/C) Pumps Charging (B Pump) SI RHS Elevation head (feet) (Z) 9.1 9.1 13.1 36.7 Pipe losses (feet) (Hf) 4.8 4.6 3.2 18.5 Pt - Pv (feet) 32.5 32.5 32.5 32.5 Available NPSH (ft) 36.8 37.0 42.4 50.8 Pump flow (gpm per pump); Maximum 560 550 675 5500 Predicted Flow Pump flow (gpm per pump); Maximum 500 500 415 5014 Predicted System Flow Required NPSH (feet) a 23.0 18.0 18.0 25.0 Available minus required NPSH (feet) (NPSH 13.8 19.0 24.4 25.8 margin)

a. The required NPSH is selected from the pump manufacturers test curve at the maximum predicted flow rate, using conservativ assumptions. This combination of bounding assumptions is conservative for determining the available NPSH and the resulting margin over the required NPSH.

FIGURE 6.3-1 SAFETY INJECTION / RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM (SHEET 1 OF 2)

FIGURE 6.3-1 SAFETY INJECTION / RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM (SHEET 2 OF 2)

NOTE:

1. This diagram is a simplification of the system intended to facilitate the understanding of the process. For details of the piping, valve instrumentation. etc. refer to the piping and instrumentation diagram. Refer to process flow diagram tables for the condition at each numbered point.

Modes of Operation CS process flow diagrams are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to esent the flow rates used in various accident analyses; such flow rates are provided in Chapter where appropriate. The process flow diagrams are developed to provide representative system ormance data. This data consists of process flow data (i.e., pressure, temperature, and flow) valve alignments for three principal modes of ECCS operation.

following general assumptions were utilized to develop the process flow data for the cipal modes of ECCS operation.

1. The system operating conditions presented for the injection and recirculation modes are based on the assumption that reactor coolant system is fully depressurized and is in equilibrium with the containment at zero psig.
2. The accumulator delivery is considered as an independent mode of operation and the process conditions presented are based on the assumption that the accumulators are fully discharged and depressurized to zero psig. Containment atmosphere may be higher than zero psig, however, the results are the same.

Mode A - Injection s mode presents the process conditions for the case of maximum safeguards, i.e. all pumps rating, following accumulator delivery. Two residual heat removal (RHR) pumps, two safety ction (SI) pumps, and two centrifugal charging (CC) pumps operate, taking suction from the eling water storage tank and delivering to the reactor through the cold leg connections. Note the flow from each pump is less than its maximum runout since the pump discharge piping is ed by the two pumps of each subsystem. Note also that the SI pump branch connections to the dual heat removal lines are located close to their discharge into the accumulator lines, thereby imizing head loss in RHR branch line due to the combined flows of the RHR and SI pumps.

RHR line resistance was assumed to be the minimum of allowable band presented in the ting pressure drop and elevation head design requirements, allowing maximum RHR injection Mode B - Cold Leg Recirculation s mode presents the process conditions for the case of cold leg recirculation assuming tainment recirculation (CR) pump A or B operating, safety injection pumps A or B operating, centrifugal charging (CC) pumps A or B operating.

his mode the safeguards pumps operate in series, with only the CR pump capable of taking ion from the containment sump. The recirculated coolant is then delivered by the CR pump to h of the SI pumps which deliver to the reactor through their cold leg connections and to both of

Mode C - Hot Leg Recirculation s mode presents the process conditions for the case of hot leg recirculation, assuming tainment recirculation pump A operating, centrifugal charging (CC) pump A operating, and ty injection (SI) pumps A and B operating.

his mode, the safeguards pumps again operate in series with only the CR pump taking suction m the containment sump. The recirculated coolant is then delivered by the CR pump to both of CC pumps which continue to deliver to the reactor through their cold leg connections and to h of the SI pumps which deliver to the reactor through their hot leg connections. The following is based, however, on one CC pump and two SI pumps in operation.

VALVE ALIGNMENT CHART OPERATIONAL MODES Valve No. A B C 1 O C C 2 O C C 3 O C C 4 O C C 5 O C C 6 O O C 7 O O O 8 C C O 9 C C C 10 C C C 11 C C C 14 C C C 15 C C C 16 O O O 17 O O O 18 O O O 19 O O O 20 C O O 21 C O O 22 O C C 23 O C C 24 O C C 25 C C C 26 O C C 27 C C C 28 O C C 29 C O O 30 C C C 31 C C C 32 O O O 33 O O C 34 O O O 35 O O O O = Open C = Closed

MODE A - INJECTION PHASE (MAXIMUM SYSTEM FLOW CONDITIONS FOLLOWING ACCUMULATOR DELIVERY)

Flow Pressure Temperature Volume (1) ation Fluid (psia) (°F) (Gpm) (lb/sec) (gal) 1 Refueling Water ATM Tank 40 - -

2 Refueling Water 27 40 10,452 1,453 -

3 Refueling Water 34 40 9,619 1,337 -

4 Refueling Water 34 40 9,619 1,337 -

5 Refueling Water - 40 8,856 1,222 -

6 Refueling Water 26 40 834 116 -

8 Refueling Water > 30 40 763 106 -

9 Refueling Water > 22 40 417 58 -

0 Refueling Water 22 40 417 58 -

1 Refueling Water 1,312 40 417 58 -

2 Refueling Water < 15 40 24 3 -

3 Refueling Water 22 40 417 58 -

4 Refueling Water 1,312 40 417 58 -

5 Refueling Water < 15 40 14 2 -

6 Refueling Water 15 40 38* 5.2 -

7 Refueling Water 1,280 40 796 110 -

8 Refueling Water 48.5 40 199 27 -

9 Refueling Water 15 40 2,413 335 -

0 Refueling Water - 40 2,413 333 -

1 Nitrogen 0 50 0 0 -

2 Nitrogen 0 50 0 0 850

5 Refueling Water 0 40 4,428 611 -

6 Refueling Water 138 40 4,428 611 -

7 Refueling Water - 40 975 135 -

8 Refueling Water 47 40 4,428 611 -

9 Refueling Water 86 40 3,453 476 -

0 Refueling Water 101 40 0 0 -

1 Refueling Water - 40 975 135 -

2 Refueling Water 86 40 4,428 611 -

MODE A - INJECTION PHASE (MAXIMUM SYSTEM FLOW CONDITIONS FOLLOWING ACCUMULATOR DELIVERY)

Flow Pressure Temperature Volume ation Fluid (psia) (°F) (Gpm)(1) (lb/sec) (gal) 3 Refueling Water 86 40 0 0 -

4 Reactor Coolant - 40 0 0 -

5 Refueling Water 0 40 4,428 611 -

6 Refueling Water 138 40 4,428 611 -

7 Refueling Water - 40 975 135 -

8 Refueling Water 47 40 4,428 611 -

9 Refueling Water 86 40 3,453 476 -

0 Refueling Water 101 40 0 0 -

1 Refueling Water - 40 975 135 -

2 Refueling Water 86 40 4,428 611 -

4 Refueling Water 101 40 0 0 -

5 Refueling Water 101 40 0 0 -

6 Refueling Water Low 40 0 0 -

7 Refueling Water Low 40 0 0 -

8 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

9 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

0 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

1 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

2 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

3 Refueling Water > 29 40 763 106 -

4 Refueling Water 26 40 0 0 -

5 Refueling Water 1,747 40 381 53 -

6 Refueling Water 26 40 0 0 -

7 Refueling Water 19 40 381 53 -

8 Refueling Water 19 40 382 53 -

9 Refueling Water 1,746 40 382 53 -

0 Refueling Water 1,740 40 122 17 -

1 Refueling Water 1,740 40 122 17 -

2 Refueling Water 1,694 40 641 89 -

4 Refueling Water 1,662 40 641 89 -

5 Refueling Water 1,324 40 160 22 -

MODE A - INJECTION PHASE (MAXIMUM SYSTEM FLOW CONDITIONS FOLLOWING ACCUMULATOR DELIVERY)

Flow Pressure Temperature Volume ation Fluid (psia) (°F) (Gpm)(1) (lb/sec) (gal) 6 Refueling Water 15 40 160 22 -

At reference conditions 40°F and 0 psig nimum allowable volume at normal operating conditions

MODE B - COLD LEG RECIRCULATION (A-TRAIN OPERATING)

Flow Pressure Temperature Volume ocation Fluid (psia) (°F) (Gpm)(1) (lb/sec) (gal) 1 Refueling Water ATM Tank 40 - - < 5,000 2 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

3 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

4 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

5 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

6 Recirc Coolant 15 149 0 0 -

8 Refueling Water 15 40 0 - -

9 Recirc Coolant 102 149 0 0 -

10 Recirc Coolant 104 149 654 89 -

11 Recirc Coolant 903 149 654 89 -

12 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

13 Refueling Water 104 40 0 0 -

14 Refueling Water 104 40 0 0 -

15 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

16 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

17 Recirc Coolant 853 149 654 89 -

18 Recirc Coolant 39 149 164 22 -

19 Recirc Coolant 15 149 164 22 -

20 Recirc Coolant 15 149 169 22 -

21 Nitrogen 0 Ambient 0 0 -

22 Nitrogen 0 Ambient 0 0 -

23 Nitrogen 0 Ambient 0 0 -

24 Recirc Coolant - 212 0 0 -

25 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

26 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

27 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

28 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

29 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

30 Refueling Water 28 149 0 0 -

31 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

32 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

33 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

MODE B - COLD LEG RECIRCULATION (A-TRAIN OPERATING)

Flow Pressure Temperature Volume ocation Fluid (psia) (°F) (Gpm)(1) (lb/sec) (gal) 34 Reactor Coolant - 212 0 0 -

35 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

36 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

37 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

38 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

39 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

40 Recirc Coolant 112 149 1,200 164 -

41 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

42 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

44 Refueling Water 107 149 0 0 -

45 Recirc Coolant 109 149 1,200 164 -

46 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

47 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

48 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

49 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

50 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

51 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

52 Recirc Coolant - 149 0 0 -

53 Recirc Coolant 109 149 0 0 -

54 Recirc Coolant 109 149 1,200 164 -

55 Recirc Coolant 895 149 545 74 -

56 Recirc Coolant 109 149 654 89 -

57 Recirc Coolant 101 149 545 74 -

58 Refueling Water 101 149 0 0 -

59 Refueling Water 101 149 0 0 -

60 Recirc Coolant 876 149 87 12 -

61 Recirc Coolant 876 149 87 12 -

62 Recirc Coolant 857 149 458 62 -

64 Recirc Coolant 841 149 458 62 -

65 Recirc Coolant 673 149 114 16 -

66 Recirc Coolant 15 149 114 16 -

At reference conditions 149°F and 0 psig nimum allowable volume at normal operating conditions

ODE C - HOT LEG RECIRCULATION (1CR, 1CC AND 2SI PUMPS OPERATING)

Flow Pressure cation Fluid (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm)(1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 1 Refueling Water ATM Tank 40 - - < 5,000 2 Refueling Water 55 40 0 0 -

3 Refueling Water 61 40 0 0 -

4 Refueling Water 61 40 0 0 -

5 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

6 Recirc Coolant 50 149 0 0 -

8 Refueling Water 56 40 0 0 -

9 Recirc Coolant 46 149 643 88 -

10 Recirc Coolant 46 149 643 88 -

11 Recirc Coolant 867 149 643 88 -

12 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

13 Recirc Coolant 47 149 643 88 -

14 Recirc Coolant 869 149 643 88 -

15 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

16 Refueling Water 15 40 0 0 -

17 Recirc Coolant 15 149 0 0 -

18 Recirc Coolant 17 149 0 0 -

19 Recirc Coolant 15 149 0 0 -

20 Recirc Coolant 15 149 0 0 -

21 Nitrogen - Ambient 0 0 -

22 Nitrogen 0 Ambient 0 0 -

23 Nitrogen 0 Ambient 0 0 -

24 Recirc Coolant - 212 0 0 -

25 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

26 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

27 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

28 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

29 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

30 Recirc Coolant 52 149 0 0 -

31 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

32 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

33 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

ODE C - HOT LEG RECIRCULATION (1CR, 1CC AND 2SI PUMPS OPERATING)

Flow Pressure cation Fluid (psia) Temperature (°F) (Gpm)(1) (lb/sec) Volume (gal) 34 Refueling Water - 212 0 0 -

35 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

36 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

37 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

38 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

39 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

40 Recirc Coolant 59 149 1,826 249 -

41 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

42 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

44 Recirc Coolant 50 149 0 0 -

45 Recirc Coolant 56 149 1,826 249 -

46 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

47 Refueling Water - 40 0 0 -

48 Recirc Coolant 824 149 643 88 -

49 Recirc Coolant 15 149 322 44 -

50 Recirc Coolant 828 149 643 88 -

51 Recirc Coolant 15 149 322 44 -

52 Recirc Coolant - 149 0 0 -

53 Recirc Coolant 56 149 0 0 -

54 Recirc Coolant 54 149 1,826 249 -

55 Recirc Coolant 874 149 540 74 -

56 Recirc Coolant 54 149 1,287 175 -

57 Recirc Coolant 46 149 540 74 -

58 Refueling Water 46 149 0 0 -

59 Refueling Water 46 149 0 0 -

60 Recirc Coolant 858 149 86 12 -

61 Recirc Coolant 858 149 86 12 -

62 Recirc Coolant 840 149 453 62 -

64 Recirc Coolant 824 149 453 62 -

65 Recirc Coolant 660 149 113 15 -

66 Recirc Coolant 15 149 113 15 -

At reference conditions 149°F and 0 psig nimum allowable volume at normal operating conditions

FIGURE 6.3-2 (SHEETS 1-2)P&ID HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

FIGURE 6.3-3 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP PERFORMANCE CURVE FIGURE 6.3-4 CHARGING PUMP CURVE ASSUMED FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS IGURE 6.3-5 HIGH HEAD SI PUMP CURVE ASSUMED FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS FIGURE 6.3-6 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK WATER LEVELS habitability systems for the control room envelope include radiation shielding, redundant air ply and filtration systems, redundant air conditioning systems, fire protection, personnel ective equipment, first aid, food, water storage, emergency lighting, and sanitary facilities.

tion 9.4.0 gives the design bases and description of the control building heating, ventilation air conditioning (HVAC) system. This section describes the environment, supplies, and ipment criteria necessary to ensure control room habitability for the operation of Millstone 3 er normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe mode during and following a postulated gn basis accident (DBA) or toxic gas release.

1 DESIGN BASES habitability system design is predicated on the following criteria.

1. All spaces in the control building that require operator occupancy during an isolation or accident condition are located within the control room envelope.
2. The control room is inhabited at all times. Food and potable water are provided in sufficient quantities to sustain 7 people for 5 days. Sanitary facilities and medical supplies are provided.
3. General Design Criterion (GDC) 2 for protection against natural phenomena (Section 3.1.2.2).
4. GDC 3 for fire hazard (Section 3.1.2.3).
5. GDC 4 for protection against temperature, pressure, humidity, and accident conditions (Section 3.1.2.4).
6. GDC 19 and 10 CFR 50.67 for providing adequate radiation protection under accident conditions (Section 3.1.2.19).
7. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.52 for air filtration requirement (Section 1.8 and Section 6.5.1.2).
8. RG 1.95 for protecting control room operators from a postulated chlorine release.
9. RG 1.78 for assumptions for evaluating the habitability of the control room following postulated chemical release.
10. GDC 64 for monitoring radioactivity releases (Section 3.1.2.64).
11. 10 CFR 50.63 (Loss of all Alternative Current Power) for maintaining the control room temperature below 110F following a Station Blackout.

monitoring CRH systems, including the control room envelope (CRE) boundary; and developing compensatory measures and mitigating actions to address degraded or nonconforming conditions in CRH systems.

13. Regulatory Guide 1.197 for CRE integrity testing, including test methods, acceptance criteria and periodicity, and compensatory actions in the event of excessive CRE unfiltered air inleakage.

2 SYSTEM DESIGN 2.1 Control Room Envelope control room envelope contains the control room area, shift managers office, tagging office, wing gallery and ramp, toilet, kitchenette, instrument rack and computer room, piping/duct se, and the mechanical room. Within the control room envelope, all essential equipment essary to operate the nuclear power plant and maintain a habitable environment during a tulated DBA is provided. Figure 6.4-1 shows the control room layout.

mechanical room space includes the following equipment:

1. Control Room Area Air Conditioning Units
2. Instrument Rack and Computer Room Air Conditioning Units
3. Purge Supply and Exhaust Fans
4. Control Room Emergency Ventilation Filters and Fans
5. Control Building Isolation Valves (CBIV)
6. Control Room Pressurization Air Storage Tanks
7. Control Room Toilet and Kitchenette Exhaust Fans instrument rack room includes the following equipment:
1. Main Control Board Termination Cabinets
2. Auxiliary Relay Rack
3. Stop Valve Logic Cabinet
4. Test Cabinets
6. Protection Set Panels
7. Auxiliary Relay Cabinet
8. Solid State Protection Cabinet
9. Computer - Demultiplexer
10. Computer Termination Cabinet
11. Balance of plant (BOP) Instrument Panels
12. Control Board Demultiplexer
13. Control Set Panels
14. Annunciator Logic
15. Loose Parts Monitoring control room area includes the following equipment:
1. Main Control Board
2. Computer Communication Console
3. Emergency Operator Console
4. Operators Console
5. Primary Relay Panel
6. Turbine Supervisory Instrument Cabinet
7. Seismic and Main Fire Protection Panels
8. Main Ventilation and Air Conditioning Panel
9. Radiation Monitor Panel
10. Nuclear Instruments Panels
11. Digital Fault Recorder

o redundant systems provide ventilation to the control room envelope. The system figuration and components are shown on Figure 9.4-1.

main control room ventilation and air conditioning system automatically maintains the design perature within the main control room. Component failures in one system automatically ate the redundant system.

er to all electric motors and controls associated with the safety-related air conditioning and surization systems is supplied from Class 1E power sources. Essential lighting in the control m also receives power from these sources. In addition, DC batteries (Section 8.3.2) provide er for emergency lighting in the control room.

st of major components serving the habitability system including their design capacities and meters are shown in Table 6.4-1.

emergency ventilation filters, air conditioning units, chilled water piping, ducts, controls, and ding isolation valves are designed to Safety Class 3 requirements.

emergency air bottle pressurization system is seismically supported and designed to erican Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B and PV Code Section VIII, Division 1 and erican National Standards Institute (ANSI) B31.1 standards.

ure 6.4-1 shows the control room layout including doors, corridors, stairwells, shielded walls, location of equipment. The control room architectural features include an acoustic ceiling and et floor covering.

locations of potential radiological and toxic gas releases relative to the control building and control room envelope air intake are shown on Figure 6.4-2.

h control room emergency ventilating filtration assembly consists of moisture separator, tric heater, prefilter, upstream high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, charcoal adsorber, downstream HEPA filter.

moisture separator is designed and tested in accordance with USAEC Report MSAR-71-45.

electric heating coil is provided to reduce the relative humidity of the inlet air stream from 100 ent to less than 70 percent. The element is protected with integral automatic (primary) and ual (secondary) reset thermal cut out switches for over temperature protection.

prefilter is a Group III, extended dry media type and rigid frame in accordance with NL-NSIC-65.

able of removing 99.97 percent of the 0.3 micron or larger particles which impinge on them.

charcoal adsorbers are high efficiency gasketless type filters. The charcoal is stored in 4 inch rs in vertical modules, and each module is refillable without being removed from the unit

e. The filter unit is designed for a nominal face velocity of 40 fpm and a residence time of second. Each ventilation filtration assembly contains 405 pounds of commercially pure in coconut shell activated impregnated charcoal in accordance with American Society for ting and Materials (ASTM) D3803.

design testing and maintenance of the control room envelope filtration unit is in accordance h RG 1.52 (Section 6.5.1.2).

nitors and alarms are provided for the detection of smoke.

acent to the control room, within the control room area, are a kitchenette and toilet facility.

kitchenette has an electric range, refrigerator, sink, 12 feet of shelf space, and approximately ubic feet of storage area. Emergency food, water, and a medical kit are stored in the kitchen in sufficient quantities to sustain 7 people for 5 days. The potable water storage capacity is 1 on per day per person. The capacity is based on data obtained from Shelter Design and lysis (OCD 1969) at a temperature of 75F. The actual daily water requirement is roximately 2.8 quarts to avoid dehydration.

itional design features included in the control room envelope layout to ensure habitability by imizing fire hazards are as follows:

1. The control building is of fire resistant construction using noncombustible building materials.
2. Jackets of power and control cables are of flame retardant material, and fillers are flame retardant and nonwicking.
3. Furniture used in the control room is of metal construction.
4. Combustible supplies, such as logs, records, procedures, and manuals, are limited to the amounts required for operation.
5. All areas of the control room are readily accessible in case of a fire.
6. Carbon dioxide and dry chemical portable extinguishers are provided.
7. Acoustic ceiling tiles and floor carpet are selected to meet National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) fire retardancy requirements. Ceiling tiles are specified for maximum flame spread 25, smoke developed 50 and fuel contribution 20 ratings

2.3 Leaktightness leak paths from the control room envelope consist of leakage through concrete walls and struction joints, duct penetrations, doors, isolation valves, electrical sleeves, and exfiltration ugh negative pressure ducts located in the mechanical room serving other areas in the control ding outside the envelope. Control room leakage assumptions used in habitability calculations presented in Chapter 15.

duct penetrations through the control room envelope are sealed.

e penetrations are cast in the concrete or cast in fire and pressure seals designed for tightness and do not constitute a leak path at the pressure differential noted.

electrical sleeves are cast in the concrete and are not considered a leak path source. The les which pass through the sleeves are sealed. An allowance has been made to account for any ices that may result in leakage paths.

2.4 Interaction with Other Zones and Pressure-Containing Equipment control room envelope is served by the control room area air conditioning units and rument rack and computer room air conditioning units.

duct and pipe penetrations and electrical sleeves at the envelope boundaries are sealed as cribed in Section 6.4.2.3.

in lines located in the mechanical room are trapped with a loop seal. To maintain seal integrity, mestic water line provides a continuous trickle flow to each drain.

service water lines enter the control building through the foundation floor. The lines from the nt of entry in the control building to the machinery equipment room floor are encased within a nch diameter, welded joint carbon steel pipe. The enclosure pipe forms part of the control m envelope boundary. The enclosure pipe is sealed at all levels but is left open above floor ation 64 feet 6 inches. Thus, the enclosure pipe also serves as a temporary reservoir for water ls.

cable penetrations located in the control room floor are designed to withstand 0.5 psig.

control room envelope air intake and exhaust outlets are located approximately 70 feet above und level.

air conditioning units use chilled water to cool and dehumidify the air in the control room elope. The water is chilled by two 100 percent capacity centrifugal type chillers. The trifugal chillers are not located within the control room envelope.

trol room envelope. The halon fire protection piping located in the underfloor of the computer instrument rack room is not pressurized. The halon bottles are located in the turbine building age area on the top of the control building. The halon pipe lines are seismically supported only hin the instrument rack room. There are no carbon dioxide supply pipes in the control room elope. The air bottle pressurization system relief valves vent to atmosphere.

2.5 Shielding Design design of the control room envelope includes adequate shielding to maintain acceptable ation levels in the control room under accident conditions as discussed in Section 12.3.1.3.1.

ccordance with GDC 19 and 10 CFR 50.67 (Section 3.1.2.19), personnel exposure is limited rem TEDE for the duration of any accident postulated in Chapter 15.

postulated accident radioactivity sources affecting the control room envelope are stated in pter 15.

limiting Millstone 3 accident to evaluate control room shielding for doses to the control room onnel is the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The effects of the LOCA as described in tion 15.6.5 are evaluated to determine the doses which the control room personnel might ive.

purposes of analysis, it is assumed that the accident occurs with loss of off site power.

itionally, for Millstone 3, a seismic event is also assumed.

3 SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES control room, the instrument rack room, and the computer room air conditioning systems are able of maintaining the ambient air temperature in their respective areas under normal and dent conditions at 75 2F and less than 60 percent relative humidity, except for the hanical room. The ambient air temperature in the mechanical room is maintained under mal and accident conditions below 104F in the summer and above 54F in the winter. Control m temperature will remain below a 110F habitability limit for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> following a Station ckout event and concurrent loss of all air conditioning.

air conditioning system for each area has two 100 percent capacity redundant trains except the air distribution ductwork within each area which is common to both trains. In the event of ngle component failure on an operating train, the standby train automatically starts.

door air is supplied to the control room envelope at a constant rate of 1,450 cfm during normal t operation. Mechanical exhaust is provided from the control room toilet and kitchenette aust fan at a rate of 595 cfm. Thus, a positive pressure is maintained during normal operation.

m emergency ventilation system starts in the pressurized filtration mode. The air conditioning s serving the control room envelope continue operating to maintain required humidity and perature. The control room pressure envelope maintains a positive pressure relative to ounding area.

calculated ventilation filter flow rate is 1,225 cfm (clean) and 1,000 cfm (dirty). The actual rate is in accordance with performance testing requirements which ensures that filter flow s are maintained within an acceptable tolerance of design flow. The recirculation air rate from control room to either filter return can be varied between 0 to 915 cfm.

undant Seismic Category I radiation monitors are located at the outdoor air intake. If high ation is detected in the intake air stream, the air intake valves receive a signal to open and the trol room emergency ventilation system starts in the pressurized filtration mode. A smoke ctor is also provided at the air intake and, if smoke is detected, the alarm is annunciated in the trol room for operator action. The radiation monitor high alarm setting is discussed in the hnical Specifications.

4 DESIGN EVALUATION control room air conditioning system maintains a suitable environment for personnel and ipment during normal and emergency conditions. Components of the air conditioning and led water systems are designed to Category I criteria and are enclosed in a Category I control ding with the exception of the air conditioning unit electric heaters which are Seismic egory II. Electric heat is not required during design basis events.

intake and exhaust openings are tornado missile protected. Outdoor air is filtered by one of the rgency ventilation filter assemblies.

4.1 Radiological Protection positive pressure in the control room envelope provides a continuous purge of the control m atmosphere and protects against infiltration of smoke or airborne radiation from the ounding areas. Cables and pipes entering the control room envelope are sealed to aid the surization of the control room.

capability is provided to isolate the control room from the outside atmosphere for high tainment pressure conditions or when the airborne radiation level of the outside atmosphere eeds a predetermined value. Other control building isolation (CBI) signals are described in tion 9.4.0. An emergency ventilating subsystem is started upon the CBI signal. This system introduces air into the control room after the air has been filtered by a prefilter, carbon orber, and HEPA filters.

control building, exterior walls and roof are constructed of 24 inch thick reinforced concrete rotect personnel within the building from exterior radioactivity. Section 12.3.1.3 describes the

pter 15. Radiation doses have been calculated for direct radiation from the containment, the rnal cloud and the halogen build-up on the control room filters. Dose calculations also include tributions from inleakage to the control room from containment and engineered safety features F) system leakage. The control room dose is less than the limit specified in 10 CFR 50.67. The trol room area is thus continuously habitable under any condition of operation.

4.2 Toxic Gas Protection re are no analyzed chemical spills that could affect the control room habitability. The effects pills of chemicals along transportation routes are evaluated in Section 2.2.3.2. For Control m habitability, Figure 6.4-2 shows the Control Room intake and hazardous material storage tions. The evaluation of control room habitability is performed using Regulatory Guides 1.78 1.95 (Section 1.8). At the discretion of the operator, the control room can be isolated in the of chemical spills in the vicinity of the plant.

shown in Section 2.2, no off site storage or transport of chlorine is close enough or frequent ugh to be considered a hazard. There is no on site chlorine that is considered a hazard under ulatory Guide 1.78. A sodium hypochlorite biocide system is used, thus eliminating an on site rine hazard. Therefore, special provisions for protection against chlorine gas are not provided he control room habitability design.

5 TESTING AND INSPECTION pressurization system was pneumatically tested for tightness of installation. It is not credited adiological accident analyses.

mulated CBI signal closes all control building automatic isolation butterfly valves located in ductwork to the atmosphere and the control room emergency ventilation system starts in the surized filtration mode. All doors serving the control room envelope must be closed.

following inspections are performed for control room habitability.

1. Check bottled water supply monthly and refill as necessary.
2. Check food and medical supplies monthly and replace as necessary.
3. The Control Room Habitability Program requires assessment of CRE habitability and measurement of the unfiltered air inleakage into the CRE at the frequencies stated by Regulatory Guide 1.197. The periodic CRE habitability assessment includes a review of maintenance, inspections and testing of systems and components affecting control room habitability, including the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System and CRE boundary components. CRE integrated inleakage testing is performed periodically to provide measurement of unfiltered air inleakage into the CRE.

6 INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS trols, alarms, and indicators are provided to allow manual operation. Temperature, pressure flow monitors, equipment ON-OFF status lights, and damper and valve position status lights also provided to assist the operator.

rumentation is provided to monitor the control room air for particulate and gas radiation.

cators are provided on the radiation monitoring panel in the control room. High radiation is unciated on the radiation monitoring panel.

side supply air is monitored by redundant instruments for radiation. High radiation is unciated on the radiation monitoring panel.

control room emergency ventilation system is automatically started in the pressurized ation mode when high radiation is detected in the outside air supply, or with a containment sure Hi-1 signal. The control room emergency ventilation system can be started manually on main control board or at the main ventilation and air conditioning panel. The control room rgency ventilation system is also started in the pressurized filtration mode at the main control rd or at the main ventilation and air conditioning panel when safety injection is initiated ually.

outside supply air is also monitored by a smoke detector that annunciates on the fire ection panel and the main board when smoke is detected.

ign details and logic of the above instrumentation are discussed in Section 7.3.

7 REFERENCES FOR SECTION 6.4 1 Conventional Building for Reactor Containment. 1965 NAA-SR-10100. Atomics International, Washington, D.C.

2 Office of Civil Defense. 1969. Shelter Design and Analysis. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., TR-20-(Vol. 3), Chapter IX, Figure 9.1.

CHARACTERISTICS FOR HABITABILITY SYSTEMS Components Design Capacity Design Parameters ntrol Room Area Air-Conditioning Unit 21,725 cfm at 5.95 in. wg s.p.(1)

Cooling Coil 551,000 Btu/hr ASME III, Class 3 Heating Coil 70 kW UL 1096 Filter 90-95% EFF DOP ARI 430 & 850 trument Rack and Computer Room 32,300 cfm at 11.23 in. wg s.p.

r-Conditioning Unit Cooling Coil 662,500 Btu/hr ASME III, Class 3 Heating Coil 50 kW UL 1096 Filter 90-95% EFF DOP ARI 430 & 850 ntrol Room Pressurizing System Air Storage Tank 23.27 cu ft (liq) ASME VIII, Div 1 Piping 2,450/250 psig ANSI B31.1 Valve 2,450/250 psig ANSI B31.1 ntrol Room Emergency 1,000 cfm to at -15 in. wg s.p.

ntilation Filter Unit 1,225 cfm Moisture Separator 99% EFF MSAR-71-45 (at 10 to 100 micron)

HEPA 99.97% EFF DOP MIL-STD-282 Charcoal (2) 99% EFF (Iodine ANSI N509/

Adsorption) ASTM D3803 Prefilter 80% EFF NBS ASHRAE 52-68 Heater 9.4 kW ntrol Room Emergency 1,070 cfm at 12.6 AMCA Std 210 ntilation Filter Fan in. wg s.p.

ntrol Building Isolation Valves (3)

Supply 4,250 cfm ASME III, Class 3 Exhaust 4,000 cfm ASME III, Class 3 Exhaust 595 cfm ASME III, Class 3 ntrol Building Chilled Water Pump 450 gpm at70 ft ASME III, Class 3 ntrol Building Water Chiller 250 tons ASME III, Class 3 ES:

S.P. refers to static pressure.

Testing of used charcoal, post Generic Letter 98-02 (Ref. Amendment 184) uses ASTM D3803-89 testing standards assuring charcoal efficiency of 97.5% or greater.

Closure time for all except the control building inlet valves is 3 seconds. The leakage rate in the closed condition at 0.125 in. wg is insignificant.

Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 (d) (1)

FIGURE 6.4-1 CONTROL ROOM AREA Revision 3606/29/23 MPS-3 FSAR 6.4-12

Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 (d) (1)

FIGURE 6.4-2 CONTROL ROOM INTAKE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIAL STORAGE LOCATIONS Revision 3606/29/23 MPS-3 FSAR 6.4-13

ion product removal and control systems are required to mitigate the release of fission ducts into the atmosphere. The systems are classified as nuclear safety related and are prised of the following:

1. engineered safety features filter systems;
2. containment spray systems; and
3. fission product control systems.

1 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) FILTER SYSTEMS ventilation filter systems identified below are classified as ESF filter systems:

1. control room emergency ventilation system described in Section 9.4.0;
2. charging pump, component cooling water pump, and heat exchanger exhaust ventilation system described in Section 9.4.2; and
3. supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) described in Section 6.2.3.

1.1 Design Bases ESF filter systems are designed in accordance with the following criteria.

1. General Design Criterion 19, for providing adequate protection to permit access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions, except as stated in Section 3.1.2.19.
2. 10 CFR 50.67, as related to releases to the environment of airborne radioactive material following accidents.
3. General Design Criterion 61, for providing appropriate filtering systems for fuel storage and handling areas to provide adequate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions, except as stated in Section 3.1.2.61.
4. Regulatory Guide 1.26, for the quality group classification of systems and components, except as stated in Section 3.2.2.
5. Regulatory Guide 1.29, for the seismic design classification of system components, except as stated in Section 3.2.1.

er design bases are described in:

1. Section 6.2.3 for the supplementary leak collection and release system;
2. Section 9.4.0 for the control room emergency ventilation system;
3. Section 9.4.2 for the charging pump, component cooling pump, and heat exchanger exhaust ventilation system.

conditions that establish the need for each of the ESF filter systems are:

Filtration System Operating Conditions

1. Control room emergency ventilation system All accidents in Table 15.0-8 that evaluate control room dose
2. Charging pump, component cooling pump, Loss-of-coolant accident and heat exchanger exhaust ventilation system (auxiliary building filters are used in conjunction)
3. SLCRS Loss-of-coolant accident 1.2 System Description le 6.5-1 provides a comparison between the design features and fission product removal ability of each ESF filter system with the positions detailed in Regulatory Guide 1.52, ision 2.

control room emergency ventilation system is designated to maintain the control room at a itive pressure during accident conditions to prevent fission product infiltration.

charging pump, component cooling pump, and heat exchanger ventilation system is designed roduce an airflow direction from the auxiliary building general areas into component cooling p and heat exchangers areas during a LOCA to prevent areas of low radiation to be affected reas of high radiation.

SLCRS system operated in conjunction with the charging pump, component cooling pump, heat exchanger exhaust ventilation system including auxiliary building filters, is designed to ntain a negative pressure in the containment enclosure building and associated contiguous ctures (auxiliary building, ESF building (partially), main steam valve building (partially), and rogen recombiner building (partially)) during LOCA. This is accomplished by exhausting air m these areas and passing it through a charcoal filter assembly before releasing to atmosphere.

combined flow rates for the fuel building exhaust and auxiliary building exhaust are nitored by flow instrumentation located in the plant ventilation vent (see Section 9.4.2). The RS flow is monitored by flow instrumentation located in the common discharge ducting nstream of the system filtration units (see Section 6.2.3.3). Monitoring of the ventilation flow s is via the RMS computer workstations located in the control room. Recording of these flow s is also performed by the RMS computer system.

w rates for the control room pressurization filtration units are measured during surveillance ing.

1.3 Safety Evaluation ESF filter systems conform to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 as shown in le 6.5-1. All necessary equipment and surrounding structures are Seismic Category I.

ergency power is provided from Class 1E power supplies. Redundancy of equipment and er supplies enable the systems to sustain a single active failure without loss of function during postulated accident conditions.

filter systems are evaluated in Sections 15.6 and 15.7 to demonstrate adequate removal of oactive airborne material under the postulated accident conditions.

1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements ections and testing of ESF filter systems are consistent with the requirements outlined in C Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.

t programs consist of predelivery shop and qualification tests, initial in-place acceptance tests, post-operation surveillance testing.

er housing leak tests, performed in accordance with ANSI-N510, are conducted at the shop during in-place acceptance testing. These tests demonstrate leakage rates of less than 0.1 ent of rated design flow at design pressure.

h HEPA filter is factory tested to demonstrate a minimum efficiency of 99.97 percent when ed with a 0.3 micron DOP aerosol at 100 percent and 20 percent of rated flow. After delivery installation each HEPA bank is tested with DOP in accordance with ANSI N510 to confirm a etration of less than 0.05 percent at rated flow.

bon media qualification and batch tests for the charcoal filters are performed prior to shipment emonstrate compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 requirements. After the orber cells are charged with the qualified carbon, the adsorber section is leak tested with freon ccordance with ANSI N510. This test is performed to confirm that bypass leakage through the orber section is less than 0.05 percent.

t canisters are provided to allow periodic removal of carbon samples for laboratory testing to ure that adequate capacity exists for the collection of radioiodines.

fans were operationally tested following installation.

tem availability is assured by the surveillance requirements imposed by the applicable plant hnical Specifications.

1.5 Instrumentation Requirements h ESF filter system is provided with instrumentation as described in this section.

cal pressure differential indicating switch is installed across each filter element including the ter. A pressure drop in excess of the setpoint of this switch results in control room unciation for the respective filter element. Each filter section is monitored by the plant puter for high differential pressure.

ative humidity of the air entering the charcoal adsorbers is indicated locally.

h electric heater is protected from over temperature by a temperature switch having an matic reset and a local manual reset. Each heater is interlocked with a fan running signal. The r fan must be running for the heater to operate. Low airflow in a running filter bank starts the dby filter bank. Status lights on the main heating and ventilation panel in the control room cate when a heater is ON or OFF.

discharge of all carbon adsorber sections is equipped with a continuous thermistor sensor.

trol room fire detection annunciation and local indication result when air temperatures exceed predetermined setpoint. The high and high-high temperature alarm setpoints are 190F and F for the SLCRS and fuel building ESF filters, 240F and 270F for the auxiliary building filters, and 225F and 250F for the control room ESF filters. This temperature monitoring em is provided with supervisory circuits.

w indicators and recorders are not necessary, but Technical Specifications for these systems uire periodic flow verification. Flow verification for the control room, SLCRS and the iliary building filters is on a monthly basis.

1.6 Materials engineered safety feature filter systems are composed of the following materials:

1. Ductwork - galvanized sheet metal;
2. Filter housings - carbon steel;
4. HEPA Filter Element Frame - Type 409 stainless steel;
5. Charcoal cell - stainless steel; and
6. Housing and components of the control room emergency ventilation system -

carbon steel and galvanized sheet metal.

2 CONTAINMENT SPRAYS AS A FISSION PRODUCT CLEANUP SYSTEM quench spray system (QSS) and the containment recirculation spray system (CRS), discussed etail in Section 6.2.2, are safety-related systems that provide chemically treated water spray to containment during the unlikely event of a LOCA to depressurize the containment and to imize the release of radioactive iodine to the environment. This section describes the iodine oval capability of the sprays. The analysis of the radiological consequences of the LOCA is n in Section 15.6.

2.1 Design Bases following are the design bases of the QSS and the CRS for removing iodine from the tainment atmosphere:

1. General Design Criterion 41, as it relates to the design which permits containment atmosphere cleanup.
2. General Design Criterion 42, as it relates to the design which permits inspection of containment atmosphere cleanup systems.
3. General Design Criterion 43, as it relates to the design which permits testing of containment atmosphere cleanup systems.
4. The system is capable of functioning effectively with the single failure of an active component in the spray system, any of its subsystems, or any of its support systems.
5. The amount of radioactive iodine in the containment following a design basis accident (DBA) is reduced so that the outleakage will result in a TEDE below the limits of 10 CFR 50.67 as supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.183.
6. The spray systems are designed to obtain adequate coverage of the containment volume in order to limit the site boundary dose following a DBA to a value less than that established in 10 CFR 50.67 as supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.183.
8. The QSS and CRS remove elemental and particulate iodine from the containment atmosphere.
9. The quench spray contains a solution of boric acid with a pH as low as 4.15. The containment recirculation spray contains neutralized boric acid and trisodium phosphate with a pH between 7.0 and 10.5 at all times.
10. The final pH of the sump water after the addition of all the refueling water storage tank (RWST) water is above 7.0.
11. Baskets are provided in the containment on the (-)24 foot 6 inches elevation for the long-term storage of trisodium phosphate crystals in a state of continual readiness to be dissolved in rising water after spray actuation.
12. The QSS and CRS are designed to initiate automatically by an appropriate accident signal. The QSS is capable of continuous operation until the refueling water storage tank is emptied while the CRS is capable of continuous operation for long-term cooling (Section 6.2.2).

2.2 System Design QSS consists of two parallel flow paths. Each flow path consists of one spray pump and ciated piping valves. Both flow paths provide quench spray to opposite sides of the two spray ders. The QSS design is discussed in detail in Section 6.2.2, and component data are given in le 6.2-61.

CRS consists of two 360 degree spray headers shared by two 100 percent redundant systems. Each subsystem consists of two pumps that take suction from the containment sump, pump the water through a containment recirculation cooler into both spray headers. The CRS gn is detailed in Section 6.2.2.

quench spray and recirculation spray nozzles are manufactured by Spray Engineering mpany (SPRACO) and are Model 1713A. Section 6.2.2 discusses the quench and recirculation y header designs and the regions of the containment that are sprayed.

mass mean droplet diameter used in the iodine removal analysis is 1,037 microns at 40 psi for Model 1713A nozzle. Figure 6.2-39 (Section 6.2.2) shows a histogram of droplet size ribution.

QSS is capable of operating continuously until the RWST is emptied. The system meets the undancy requirements of an ESF and will satisfy the system performance requirements despite most limiting single-active failure in the short term or the most limiting single-active or sive failure in the long term.

technical specifications for the QSS are discussed in Chapter 16.

CRS is capable of operating continuously for long-term cooling. The system meets the undancy requirements of an ESF and will satisfy the system performance requirements despite most limiting single-active failure in the short term or the most limiting single-active or sive failure in the long term. The chronology of operation of QSS and CRS is discussed in tion 6.2.2. The surveillance testing of the CRS is discussed in Section 6.2.2.

2.3 Design Evaluation 2.3.1 Iodine Removal Coefficients calculated iodine removal coefficients are given in Section 15.6.

2.3.2 Range of Spray pH rder to ensure adequate iodine removal effectiveness and compatibility of the spray solution h the safety-related materials inside the containment, the pH of the containment recirculation y is maintained between 7.0 and 8.0 at all times.

conditions utilized in calculating the minimum expected CRS spray pH for the system are en in Table 6.1-2. The spray pH will remain in the range given in the table for all operating des of the system after all the RWST water was admitted into the containment. The values of parameters used in calculating the limiting pHs are those technical specification limits which to minimize or maximize pH as appropriate.

2.3.3 Ultimate Sump pH minimum expected ultimate sump pH is given in Table 6.1-2 along with the boric acid and odium phosphate sources considered in the analysis. The values of the parameters listed in this e are consistent with the appropriate technical specification limits which minimize the pH. A e history of the sump solution pH following a LOCA is presented on Figure 6.5-1.

2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements inspection and testing of the quench and containment recirculation spray systems is described ection 6.2.2.4.

2.5 Materials boric acid solution show little change at high temperatures (130C) with or without radiation gleton 1967; Fittel and Row 1971; Greiss and Bacarella 1969). The boric acid and TSP tion is not susceptible to significant radiolytic or pyrolytic decomposition under conditions nd in nuclear power plant containments.

ion product control systems are considered to be those systems whose performance controls release of fission products following a design basis accident (DBA). These systems are lusive of the containment isolation system and any fission product removal systems, although may operate in conjunction with them.

3.1 Primary Containment itional information for the parameters used in determining the radiological consequences of dents is shown in Table 15.6-9.

primary containment is equipped with a QSS. This spray system is designed to remove heat erated within the primary containment following a design basis accident (DBA). In addition, spray system serves as a fission product control system and is described in detail in tion 6.5.2.

3.2 Secondary Containment secondary containment at Millstone 3 consists of a containment enclosure structure ction 3.8.4) and the contiguous buildings. Following a DBA, these areas are maintained under ative pressure with the use of the SLCRS described in Section 6.2.3. The SLCRS exhausts the rom these areas, filtering and removing particulate and gaseous iodine from the air, before harging to the atmosphere via the Millstone stack. Detail of the filtration system is given in tion 6.5.1.

4 REFERENCES FOR SECTION 6.5 1 ANSI/ANS Standard 56.5. 1979. PWR and BWR Containment Spray System Design Criteria.

2 DiNunno, J. J.; Anderson, F. D.; Baker, R. E; and Waterfield, R. L. 1962. Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) Document TID-14844.

3 Eggleton, A. E. J. 1967. A Theoretical Examination of Iodine-Water Partition Coefficients. UKAEA, AERE-R4887.

4 Fittel, H. E. and Row, T. H. 1971. Radiation and Thermal Stability of Spray Solutions.

Nuclear Technology, p. 442.

5 Griess, J. C., and Bacarella, A. A. 1969. Design Considerations of Reactor Containment Spray System - Part III, The Corrosion of Materials in Spray Solutions.

ORNL-TM-2412, Part III, p. 15.

POSITIONS Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Supplementary L Control Room Emergency Ventilation Exchanger Exhaust Collection and Rel Criteria System System System Regulatory Position 1:

Environmental Design Criteria

a. System design based on In compliance In compliance In compliance conditions resulting from postulated DBA
b. Shielding of adsorber section In compliance In compliance In compliance from other ESF systems
c. Adsorber design based on In compliance In compliance In compliance iodine concentrations
d. Compatibility with other ESF In compliance In compliance In compliance systems The atmosphere cleanup systems will be compatible with other engineered safety features. However, there is no need for them to be compatible with the containment spray systems as they are not located within the containment structure.
e. Component design for In compliance In compliance In compliance maximum and minimum predicted temperatures

Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Supplementary L Control Room Emergency Ventilation Exchanger Exhaust Collection and Rel Criteria System System System Regulatory Position 2: System Design Criteria

a. Redundancy of systems and In compliance In compliance In compliance (Demi used sequence of filter elements in lieu of prefilters)
b. Physical separation of In compliance Redundant systems are separated In compliance In compliance Redun redundant systems by 10 feet distance Redundant systems are systems are separate separated by 12 inch 12 inch concrete slab concrete slab.
c. Seismic category of system In essential compliance. All components In essential compliance. In essential complian components seismically qualified. All components All components seismically qualified. seismically qualified
d. Pressure surge protection Not applicable. Units are located in control Not applicable. Units Not applicable. Unit building, therefore not subject to any pressure located in auxiliary located in auxiliary surges from any postulated accidents. building, therefore not building, therefore n subject to surges in subject to pressure su reactor containment due in reactor containme to LOCA. due to LOCA.
e. System construction material In compliance In compliance In compliance compatibility with radiation

Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Supplementary L Control Room Emergency Ventilation Exchanger Exhaust Collection and Rel Criteria System System System

f. Maximum flow rate and HEPA In compliance 1,225 cfm filter train with single In compliance 30,000 In compliance 9,800 filter array HEPA. cfm filter train. Three filter train. Three hig high by seven wide two wide HEPA arra HEPA array.
g. Instrumentation Partial compliance. See Section 6.5.1.5. Partial compliance. See Partial compliance. S Section 6.5.1.5. Section 6.5.1.5.
h. Design of power supply and Partial compliance. See Section 1.8 for Partial compliance. See Partial compliance. S instrumentation exceptions Section 1.8 for Section 1.8 for excep exceptions
i. Automatic actuation of system Noncompliance. Manual actuation from control In compliance In compliance room at 1 hr. after control building isolation signal
j. Radiation exposure ALARA In compliance with clarification. See In compliance with In compliance with Section 1.8. clarification. See clarification. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.
k. Minimization of atmospheric In compliance In compliance In compliance effects on system performance
l. Leak testing of filter housings In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8. In compliance with In compliance with and ductwork exception. See exception. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.

Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Supplementary L Control Room Emergency Ventilation Exchanger Exhaust Collection and Rel Criteria System System System Regulatory Position 3: Component Design Criteria and Qualification Testing

a. Demister design, construction, In compliance In compliance In compliance and testing
b. Air heater design, construction, In compliance In compliance In compliance and testing
c. Prefilter design, construction, In compliance In compliance (See Sect. C.2.a) and testing
d. HEPA filter design, In compliance with clarification. See In compliance with In compliance with construction, and testing Section 1.8. clarification. See clarification. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.
e. Filter and adsorber mounting In compliance with clarification. See In compliance with In compliance with frame design and construction Section 1.8. clarification. See clarification. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.
f. Filter and adsorber bank In compliance In compliance In compliance arrangement

Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Supplementary L Control Room Emergency Ventilation Exchanger Exhaust Collection and Rel Criteria System System System

g. Filter housing design Partial compliance. In accordance with ANSI In compliance Millstone In compliance Millst 509 except access is not provided with hinged 3 complies with ANSI 3 complies with ANS doors or inspection windows. Access is via 20 N509-1980 paragraph N509-1980 paragrap inch x 40 inch bolted panels. No internal 4.6.2.2 with respect to 4.6.2.2 with respect t lighting. Minimum access to units required due designing inlet units and designing inlet units to the locations and function. See Section 1.8. components which can designing inlet units Millstone 3 complies with ANSI N509-1980 be isolated from the fan components which c paragraph 4.6.2.2 with respect to designing to withstand a peak isolated from the fan inlet units and components which can be negative pressure by withstand a peak neg isolated from the fan to withstand a peak ensuring that such pressure by ensuring negative pressure by ensuring that such isolation is precluded via such isolation is isolation is precluded via the design control the design control logic precluded via the des logic between the fans and the between the fans and the control logic betwee inlet dampers. fans and the inlet Compliance with dampers. Complianc designing inlet units and with designing inlet components, as noted in and components, as n paragraph with respect to in the same paragrap the plugging of such with respect to the components, is plugging of such demonstrated via routine components, is surveillance and demonstrated via rou subsequent filter surveillance and replacement as subsequent filter necessary. replacement as neces

Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Supplementary L Control Room Emergency Ventilation Exchanger Exhaust Collection and Rel Criteria System System System inlet dampers. Compliance with designing inlet Even though doors are Even though doors a units and components as noted in the same not available to access not available to acce paragraph with respect to the plugging of such both sides of each bank both sides of each ba components, is demonstrated via routine of components, components, Millsto surveillance and subsequent filter replacement Millstone 3 complies complies with the int as necessary. Even though doors are not with the intent of the of the requirements o available to access both sides of each bank of requirements of Paragraph 5.6 of AN components, Millstone 3 complies with the Paragraph 5.6 of ANSI N509-1976 to provid intent of the requirements of Paragraph 5.6 of N509-1976 to provide access to each side o ANSI 509-1976 to provide access to each side access to each side of each component of t of each component of the ESF ventilation each component of the ESF ventilation filtra filtration systems filter housings for ESF ventilation filtration systems filter housin maintenance and testing. systems filter housings for maintenance and for maintenance and testing.

testing.

h. Water drain design In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8. In compliance with In compliance with exception. exception.

See Section 1.8. See Section 1.8.

i. Adsorber medium In compliance In compliance with In compliance exception.

See Section 1.8.

j. Adsorber cell design In compliance In compliance In compliance

Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Supplementary L Control Room Emergency Ventilation Exchanger Exhaust Collection and Rel Criteria System System System

k. Iodine desorption and adsorbent Partial compliance. Conservative calculations Partial compliance. Partial compliance. S auto-ignition show that maximum decay heat generation is Same features as control features as control ro insufficient to produce iodine desorption. Units room emergency emergency ventilatio provided with control room annunciation if ventilation system. See system. See Section adsorber temperature exceeds a specified Section 1.8.

temperature. See Section 1.8.

l. System fan flow and pressure In compliance with exceptions. See Section 1.8. In compliance with In compliance with capability exceptions. exceptions.

See Section 1.8. See Section 1.8.

m. Capability of fan to operate In compliance In compliance In compliance under postulated environmental conditions
n. Ductwork design, construction, Partial compliance. Duct welding will be Partial compliance. Partial compliance. S and testing performed in accordance with AWS D9.1-80 Same as control room as control room units See Section 1.8. units. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.
o. Ductwork layout In compliance In compliance In compliance
p. Damper design, construction, In compliance with exceptions. See Section 1.8. In compliance with In compliance with and testing exceptions. See exceptions. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.

Regulatory Position 4:

Maintenance

Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Supplementary L Control Room Emergency Ventilation Exchanger Exhaust Collection and Rel Criteria System System System

a. Component accessibility Partial compliance. See Section 1.8. Partial compliance. Partial compliance. S Service area outside Section 1.8.

housing of 2 feet- 6 inch is adequate. See Section 1.8.

b. Filter spacing Noncompliance. See Section 1.8. Noncompliance. See Noncompliance. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.
c. Test ports In compliance In compliance In compliance
d. Monthly operation of filter In compliance with clarification. See In compliance with In compliance with trains with heaters energized Section 1.8. clarification. See clarification. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.
e. Installation of final filter In compliance In compliance In compliance devices after active construction Regulatory Position 5: In Place Testing
a. Visual inspection before in In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8. In compliance with In compliance with place testing in accordance with exception. See exception. See ANSI N510 - 1975 Section 1.8. Section 1.8.
b. Air flow distribution HEPA and In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8. In compliance with In compliance with adsorber exception. See exception. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.

Charging Pump, Component Cooling Pump, and Heat Supplementary L Control Room Emergency Ventilation Exchanger Exhaust Collection and Rel Criteria System System System

c. HEPA filter DOP testing in In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8. In compliance with In compliance with accordance with ANSI N510 exception. See exception. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.
d. Charcoal adsorber leak testing In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8. In compliance with In compliance with with refrigerant in accordance exception. See exception. See with ANSI N510 Section 1.8. Section 1.8.

Regulatory Position 6: Laboratory Testing Criteria for Activated Carbon

a. Regulatory requirements for In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8. In compliance with In compliance with carbon exception. See exception. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.
b. Laboratory efficiency testing of In compliance with exception. See Section 1.8. In compliance with In compliance with carbon exception. See exception. See Section 1.8. Section 1.8.

FIGURE 6.5-1 POST DBA MINIMUM CONTAINMENT SUMP PH 1 INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM ccordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g), ASME Section XI and Regulatory Guide 1.26, Millstone t 3s Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program outlines requirements for performing inservice minations of ASME Code Class 2 and 3 components (and their supports) containing water, m or radioactive material other than radioactive waste management systems.

ISI Program for the first ten year interval was approved in Safety Evaluation Report dated ruary 8, 1991. Subsequent updates of the ISI Program are submitted for NRC review and roval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g).

ISI Program addresses the following subjects:

Components Subject to Examination Examination Categories and Methods Inspection Interval Dates Evaluation of Examination Results System Pressure Tests Augmented ISI to Protect Against Postulated Piping Failure Relief Requests st of the Class 2 and Class 3 systems that are required to be included in the Inservice ection (ISI) Program are listed in Table 6.6-1. Other systems considered to be safety related Section 3.2 but which do not meet the requirements for testing per Regulatory Guide 1.26 are ed, commensurate with their safety function, outside the ISI Program.

2 ACCESSIBILITY ess to Class 2 and 3 components has been provided for so that Code examinations of licable components can be performed, to the extent practicable. If certain examinations cannot ully accomplished inservice, then suitable alternate examinations and inspections are made to plement the Code examinations. Accessibility was demonstrated during the Class 2 and 3 ervice inspections, and departures from Code or Regulatory requirements were formally umented in the inservice inspection program implementing documents.

3 AUGMENTED INSERVICE INSPECTION TO PROTECT AGAINST POSTULATED PIPING FAILURES lstone 3 has been designed to ensure that the containment vessel and all essential equipment hin or outside the containment have been adequately protected against the effects of blowdown nd reactive forces including pipe whip which may result from postulated ruptures of h-energy piping systems. Section 3.6 discusses the effects of piping system rupture in greater il.

ection interval, augmented examinations will be performed on welds in the pipe break lusion area in accordance with the risk-informed methodology established in ASME Code e N-716-1, Alternative Classification and Examination Requirements,Section XI, Division 1.

face and volumetric inspections will be performed on piping greater than 4 inches nominal e size and surface only examinations will be performed on piping less than or equal to 4 inches inal pipe size. These inspections will be performed in accordance with the weld area and ume requirements specified in the edition of the ASME Code,Section XI, which is in effect for inspection period in which the examination is performed.

TABLE 6.6-1 INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM CLASS 2 & 3 SYSTEMS CLASS 2 SYSTEMS Chemical Volume Control (CVC)

Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)

Feedwater (FWS)

Main Steam (STG)

Quench Spray (QSS)

Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Containment Recirculation Spray (CRS)

High Pressure Safety Injection (HPI)

Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPI)

Steam Generator Blowdown (BDG)

CLASS 3 SYSTEMS Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)

Control Building Chilled Water (CBW)

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (SFC)

Service Water (SWS)

Charging Pump Cooling (CCE)

Safety Injection Pump Cooling (CCI)

Reactor Plant Component Cooling (CCR)

Chemical Volume Control (Boric Acid) (CVC)

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