Regulatory Guide 1.102
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| Issue date: | 09/30/1976 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research |
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| -nr RG-1.102 Rev 1 | |
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Revision 1 September 1976 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGULATORY GUIDE
OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.102 FLOOD PROTECTION FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
A. INTRODUCTION
induced floods and water waves take into consideration the results of geologic and seismic investigations and that Criterion 2, "Design ofBases for Protec these design bases be taken into account in the design of Design tionGeneral
.Against Natural Phenomena," Appendix A, the nuclear power plant.
"General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to Regulatory Guide 1.59, "Design Basis Floods for
10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utiliza Nuclear Power Plants," describes acceptable methods of tion Facilities," requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety be designed to with determining the design basis flood conditions that nuclear power plants located on sites along streams must stand the effects of natural phenomena such as floods, withstand without loss of safety-related functions. It tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to also discusses the phenomena producing comparable performntheir safety functions. Criterion 2 also requires that the design bases for these structures, systems, and design basis floods for coastal, estuary, and Great Lakes components reflect: sites. The guide states that examples of the type of flood protection to be provided for nuclear power plants will
1. Appropriate consideration of the most severe be the subject of a separate regulatory guide.
natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding region, with sufficient This guide describes types of flood protection accept margin for the limited accuracy and quantity of the able to the NRC staff for the safety-related structures,
2 historical data and the period of time in which the data systems, and components identified in Regulatory Guide have been accumulated; 1.29.* In addition, this guide describes acceptable
2. Appropriate combinations of the effects of normal
"Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification," Identi fies structures, systems; and components of light-water-cooled and accident conditions with the effects of the natural nuclear power plants that should be designed to withstand the phenomena; and effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and remain func tionaL These structures, systems, andI components- are those
3. The importance of the safety functions to be necessary to ensure (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor performed. and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents Paragraph 100.10(c) of 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to Site Criteria," requires that physical characteristics of the guideline exposures of 10 CFR Part 100. These structures, systems, and components should also be designed to withstand the site, including seismology, meteorology, geology, conditions resulting from the design basis flood and remain and hydrology, be taken into account in determining the functional.
acceptability of a site for a nuclear power reactor.
It is expected that safety-related structures, systems, and components of other types of nuclear power plants will be Appendix A, "Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria identified in futur6 regulatory guides. In the interim, Regula for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 100 tory Guide 1.29 should be used as guidance when identifying identifies the investigations necessary for a detailed safety-related structures, systems, and components of other study of seismically induced floods and water waves. types of nuclear power plants that need to be protected from floods by methods such as those suggested in this guide.
The appendix requires that design bases for seismically USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C. U5. Attention: Dockoting end Regulatory Guides we issued to describe and make available to the public secesection.
methods aiceptable to the NRC staff of Implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in ovalu- The guides are issued in the following ton broad divisions:
sting specific problems Or postulated accidents. or to provide guidance to appli I. Power Reactors S. Products cents. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, and compliance
2. Research and Test Reactors 7. Transportation with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities S. Occupational Health the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. 4. Environmentel and Siting 9. Antitrust Review S. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General Comments and suggestions for improvements in these guides are encouraged at all times. and guides will be revised. as appropriate. to accommodate com Copies of pub4ished guides may be obtained by written request indicating the ments and to reflect new information or experience. This guide was revised as a divisions desired to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C.
result of substantive comments received from the public and additional st&ff
2=5. Attention: Director. Office of Standards Development.
review.
methods of protecting nuclear power plants from the Methods of flood protection for nuclear power plants effects of Prbbable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) falling fall into one of the following three types (ocal flooding directly on the site.* induced by severe local precipitation will be discussed
B. DISCUSSION
later): K
1. Dry Site Nuclear power plant structures, systems, and com ponents important to safety should be designed to The plant is built above the DBFL, and therefore withstand, without loss of capability to perform their safety functions, the most severe flood conditions that safety-related structures, systems, and components are can reasonably be postulated to occur at a site as a result not affected by flooding.
of severe hydrometeorological conditions, seismic ac tivity, or both. The flood protection features necessary 2. Exterior Barrier to protect the safety-related structures, systems, and components should be designed for the range of precipi Safety-related structures, systems, and components tation, wind, and seismically induced flood conditions are protected from inundation and static and dynamic identified in Regulatory Guide 1.59. The water-induced forces thereof by engineered features external to the effects, both static and dynamic, on the flood protection immediate plant area. Such features may, when properly features are considered to constitute normal environ designed and maintained, produce the equivalent of a mental forces for use in the design of such features. The dry site, although care must be taken to ensure that forces are developed from the hydrologic engineering safety-related structures, equipment, and components analysis of the flood conditions. are not adversely affected by the differential hydraulic head.
For purposes of this guide, the Design Basis Flooding Level (DBFL) is defined as the maximum water eleva tion attained by the controlling flood, including coinci 3. Incorporated Barrier dent wind-generated wave effects. The wind-generated wave component of elevation is generally controlled by Safety-related structures, systemsi and components fetch and water depth and may differ at locations are protected from inundation and static and dynamic around the plant. Further distinction must be made effects by engineered features in the structure/
between estimates of"structural" effects (i.e., static and environment interface.
dynamic forces) and flooding or inundation effects.
Additionally, the controlling flood event may be differ Regulatory Position 2 of Regulatory Guide 159 K,
ent for evaluating structural effects than for evaluating provides that those structures, systems, and components inundation effects. For example, the Probable Maximum necessary for safe shutdown and maintenance thereof Flood (PMF) may produce the highest water level and should be protected against the DBFL. The position also static forces on a given structure, but the total static and suggests that, if sufficient warning time Is shown to be dynamic forces on the structure may be greater during a available to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condi smaller (in elevation) flood wave from the seismically tion, some of the other safety-related structures, sys induced failure of an upstream dam. tems, and components identified in Regulatory Guide
1.29 do not require protection against a flood as severe For structural purposes, the significant wave height is as the DBFL Use of this method of protection as an used; for inundation considerations, the one-percent acceptable alternative requires development of emer wave height Is used. Sgniflcant wave height (HA) is the gency procedures and technical specifications. Substanti average of the highest one-third of wind-generated waves ation of the adequacy of the time available will require, In a representative -.pectrum. One-percent wave height in part:
(HI), sometimes erroneously called the mximum wye height, is the average of the highest 1 percent of
- iwind-generated waves in a representative spectrum. Use I. Estimating the time required to bring the plant of the relation H1 = 1.67Hs is acceptable for determin from full-power operation to a safe shutdown mode.
Iing the one-percent wave height.
2. Establishing the warning indicators that will initi
- Suggested criteria for the consideration of localized severe ate shutdown procedures. Flood stage and rate of rise precipitation are contained it Section 2.4.2.3 of Regulatory are common and generally acceptable indicators. How Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants." The definition of ever, sites along streams downstream from the conflu Probable Maximum Precipitation Is contained in "Regulatory ence of major tributaries may require an assessment of Guide 1.59. flooding potential from floods that are less than the
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3. Documenting that sufficient time will remain after impact of the design wave. The seawall dissipates wave the warning for the safe shutdown to be accomplished energy by throwing the water upward and downward.
before water-.can flood any safety-related structures, The upward deflection may result in wind-blown over systems, or components. topping; the downward deflection can cause severe erosion at the toe of the seawall.
The regulatory positions of this guide identify several key items to be considered in developing acceptable (3) Bulkhead Similar to a seawall. The prime flood-related emergency procedures. purpose is to restrain the land area. A bulkhead should not be'used where it may be subject to direct wave attack.
Local PMP may produce flooding at sites otherwise considered'immune from flooding. The intensity of this rainfall and the usual design of the drainage system may (4) Revetment. "A facing of stone, concrete, result in ponding in the plant yard that could produce etc., built to protect a scarp, embankment, or. shore the DBFL. Also, roofs may receive more precipitation structure against erosion by wave action or currents."*
than the roof drains are designed to discharge. Revetments are alternatives to seawalls and bulkheads.
They protect the shore from direct wave attack by Final plant grading is usually designed to cause absorbing the wave energy in their interstices and on the ponded water to flow away from safety-related build surface of the revetment material. In this regard, riprap is more effective than smoother surfaces. Wave runup on ings. IEven so, some temporary ponding is to be expected. Such ponding is generally accommodated by the revetment is a function of incident wave height, revetment slope, and the nature of the revetment locating penetrations above the level of temporary ponding. Plant structures, systems, and components material. Rough surfaces reduce runup. When riprap is subject to ponding are also subject to the static and used, the placement of the material is critical to the dynamic forces of the ponded water. These forces are effectiveness of the feature. Filling of the interstices usually less, however, than the forces from other design with finer material destroys much of the energy basis events. absorbing capabilities of the installation and may result in overtopping a structure that is otherwise adequate to
C. REGULATORY POSITION
prevent such overtopping.
1. The following paragraphs provide working defini (5) Breakwater. "A structure protecting a tions of the various types of flood protection acceptable shore area, harbor, anchorage, or basin from waves."
to the NRC staff. Breakwaters may be connected to the shore or may be located entirely offshore. Wave energy is dissipated in a. Dry Site the same manner as it is by revetments. Offshore breakwaters are used principally to reduce the wave The dry site may be the result of natural terrain effects that might otherwise reach safety-related struc or it may be constructed using engineered fill. The latter tures, facilities, or components. Shore-connected break type refers to the "plant island" concept, rather than the waters may serve the same purpose and also may be used minor fill used to dress plant grade. When fill is required to train discharge or intake water flow paths to limit to raise the plant access level above design basis flood recirculation.
conditions, the fill is safety related and must be protected from flood effects in the same manner as c. Incorporated Barriers safety-related dams, dikes, etc.
Protection is provided by special design of walls b. Exterior Barriers and penetration closures. Walls are usually reinforced concrete designed to resist the static and dynamic forces
(1) Levee. "A dike or embankment to protect of the DBFL and incorporate special waterstops at land from inundation." Levees are generally earthen construction joints to prevent inleakage. Penetrations structures, trapezoidal in cross section, and protected include personnel access, equipment access, and through from erosion by armor on the face exposed to waves and wall piping. Pipe penetrations are usually sealed with current..
(2) Seawall or Floodwall. "A structure separat *Definition from the U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Center, "'Shore Protection Manual," Kingman Building, Fort ing land and water areas, primarily designed to prevent Belvoir, Virginia 22060. Copies may be obtained from the erosion and other damage due to wave action."* Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of Seawalls are massive structures designed to take the full fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.
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special rubber boots and flanges. Personnel access selected warning indicators. The procedures should closures that have been found acceptable include sub consider the total DBFL; however, the indicators (usu.
marine doors and hatches. The hydraulic and seismic' ally flood stage and rate of rise) should be based on the design bases for all types of closures, including water stillwater level (i.e., DBFL less wind-generated wave stops, boots, and flanges, are the same as for the wall effects). This precludes the masking of flood potential (i.e., water tightness and resistance to static and dynamic by less than design basis wind at the time of observation.
forces). In addition, the doors should open outward to ensure closure if the door is inadvertently opened during d. A communication system should be established the flood event. Additionally, the plant should be to alert both onsite and offsite company personnel of designed and operated to keep doors necessary for flood flood conditions that may require subsequent shut protection closed during normal operation. Penetrations down of the plant. Such a system may use offsite thit are too large to close with a single door (e.g., facilities and services, such as upstream river gages and equipment and fuel loading access) generally require flood forecasting services, as well as direct communica stop logs or flood panels for closure. The design bases tion between onsite and offsite company personnel.
for these features are the same as above, as is the need to maintain them normally in a closed position. e. The procedures in 2.c should specify that onsite plant personnel will initiate a safe shutdown on their Temporary flood barriers, such as sandbags, own volition when the limiting values of the indicators plastic sheeting, portable panels, etc., which must be are attained. Only those warning systems located at the installed prior to the advent of the DBFL, are not site and under control of plant personnel should be acceptable for issuance of a construction permit. How needed to determine the limiting values of the indica ever, unusual circumstances could arise after constriic tors.
tion that would warrant consideration of such barriers.
One example of unusual circumstances that might justify 3. Analysis supporting the invulnerability of safety use of temporary barriers is a post-construction change related structures, systems, and components from the in the flood-producing characteristics of the drainage effects of local PMP should be performed using the point area, as discussed in Regulatory Position 3 of Regulatory rainfall value of the PMP for the site area.
Guide 1.59, "Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants." In such circumstances, and with strong justifica. a. Regulatory Guide 1.59 provides guidance on tion, the staff may accept temporary barriers. obtaining PMP estimates. An analysis of the estimated depth of ponding in the plant area should also be made.
2. Past experience suggests the need for guidance in establishing the shutdown technical specifications or b. Roofs are usually provided with drains designed emergency operating procedures necessary to utilize to discharge precipitation intensities considerably less Regulatory Position 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.59. The than that of the PMP. The following methods of following should be used in establishing the necessary preventing undesirable buildup of standing water on the procedures: roofs of safety-related buildings have been found accept a. Stage (elevation)-time relations able to the NRC staff:
should be devel oped using the appropriate flood hydrograph (with
(1) The parapets (a common architectural fea coincident wind-generated wave effects) and site char. ture of nuclear power plant structures) may be deleted acteristics. River sites downstream from the confluence on one or more sides of the building. This is the most of major tributaries may require assessment of the flood'
common method.
potential from less severe flood events that may exhibit faster rates of rise than the PMF.
(2) The parapet height may be limited to b. The flood stage, including design basis wind preclude buildup of water in excess of the structural generated wave effects and the time of occurrence capacity of the roof for design loads.
within the flood event, at which any safety-related structure, system, or component (as defined in Regula.
tory Guide 1.29) may become degraded or inoperative (3) Scuppers may be installed through the should establish the completion time for all shutdown parapets to discharge the standing water over the edge of the building.
procedures.
c. Estimates of the time required for safe shut. (Note that limiting the parapet height or lip of the down should be based on average rather than best-time scupper to, for example, 6 inches above the roof will not operator performance. This time interval should be less necessarily limit the depth of water on the roof to 6 Sthan the time for occurrence of the event in Regulatory inches. Consideration should be given to the hydraulic Position 2.b to establish the limiting values of the head necessary to initiate flow.)
1.1024
This guide reflects current NRC staff practice. There c. The load induced by the maximum depth of fore, except in those cases in which the license applicant standing water on the roofs (including antecedent or or licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method coincident snow or ice) during the design basis event for complying with specified portions of the Commis
1 should be less than the structural capacity of the roof sion's regulations, the method described herein is being for design loads, and the discharge capacity of roof and will continue to be used in the evaluation of drains should be compared with the design basis dis submittals for operating license or construction permit charge. applications until this guide is revised as a result of suggestions from the public or additional staff review.
0. IMPLEMENTATION
The purpose of this section is to provide information to license applicants and licensees regarding the NRC
staff's plans for using this regulatory guide.
I/
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