ML23193A871
| ML23193A871 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/2023 |
| From: | Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML23193A862 | List:
|
| References | |
| 23-169 | |
| Download: ML23193A871 (1) | |
Text
Millstone Power Station Unit 2 Safety Analysis Report Chapter 5: Structures
Table of Contents tion Title Page GENERAL........................................................................................................... 5.1-1 1 Classes Of Structures .................................................................................. 5.1-1 1.1 Class I Structures ........................................................................................ 5.1-1 1.2 Class II Structures ....................................................................................... 5.1-2 2 Codes And Specifications ........................................................................... 5.1-2 3 Regulatory Guides ...................................................................................... 5.1-3 CONTAINMENT GENERAL DESCRIPTION ................................................. 5.2-1 1 Construction Materials................................................................................ 5.2-2 1.1 Corrosive Protection ................................................................................... 5.2-3 2 Design Bases............................................................................................... 5.2-4 2.1 Bases for Design Loads .............................................................................. 5.2-4 2.1.1 Dead Loads ................................................................................................. 5.2-4 2.1.2 Live Loads .................................................................................................. 5.2-5 2.1.3 Loss-of-Coolant Accident Loads ................................................................ 5.2-5 2.1.4 Thermal Loads ............................................................................................ 5.2-5 2.1.5 Earthquake Loads ....................................................................................... 5.2-6 2.1.6 Wind and Tornado Loads ........................................................................... 5.2-6 2.1.7 Hydrostatic Loads ....................................................................................... 5.2-7 2.1.8 External Pressure Loads.............................................................................. 5.2-7 2.1.9 Prestressing Loads ...................................................................................... 5.2-7 2.1.10 Test Loads................................................................................................... 5.2-7 2.2 Load Combinations..................................................................................... 5.2-7 2.2.1 Load Prior to Prestressing........................................................................... 5.2-8 2.2.2 Loads at Transfer of Prestress..................................................................... 5.2-8 2.2.3 Loads Under Sustained Prestress ................................................................ 5.2-9 2.2.4 At Design Loads ......................................................................................... 5.2-9 2.2.5 At Factored Loads..................................................................................... 5.2-11 2.2.6 Prestress Losses ........................................................................................ 5.2-14 2.2.7 Capacity Reduction Factors ...................................................................... 5.2-15
tion Title Page 2.3 Structural Analysis.................................................................................... 5.2-15 2.3.1 Critical Areas of Analysis......................................................................... 5.2-16 2.3.2 Analytical Techniques .............................................................................. 5.2-16 2.3.3 Buttress and Tendon Anchorage Zone Analyses ...................................... 5.2-18 2.3.4 Stresses Near Large Openings .................................................................. 5.2-19 2.3.5 Seismic Analysis....................................................................................... 5.2-20 2.3.6 Wind and Tornado Analyses..................................................................... 5.2-20 2.3.7 Results of Structural Analyses .................................................................. 5.2-22 3 Steel Liner Plate And Penetration Sleeves ............................................... 5.2-22 3.1 Construction Materials.............................................................................. 5.2-23 3.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 5.2-23 3.3 Design Loads ............................................................................................ 5.2-23 3.4 Permissible Stresses and Strains ............................................................... 5.2-24 3.5 Design of Liner Plate Anchorage.............................................................. 5.2-25 3.6 Design of Weldments................................................................................ 5.2-26 4 Interior Structures ..................................................................................... 5.2-26 4.1 General...................................................................................................... 5.2-26 4.2 Construction Materials.............................................................................. 5.2-27 4.3 Design Loads ............................................................................................ 5.2-27 4.3.1 Dead Loads ............................................................................................... 5.2-28 4.3.2 Live Loads ................................................................................................ 5.2-28 4.3.3 Earthquake Loads ..................................................................................... 5.2-28 4.3.4 Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA) Loads ............................................... 5.2-28 4.4 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 5.2-29 4.4.1 At Design Loads ....................................................................................... 5.2-30 4.4.2 At Factored Loads..................................................................................... 5.2-30 4.4.3 Thermal Gradients .................................................................................... 5.2-31 4.4.4 Differential Pressures................................................................................ 5.2-32 5 Specific Design Topics ............................................................................. 5.2-33 5.1 Missile Protection ..................................................................................... 5.2-33 5.1.1 Design Criteria Inside the Containment.................................................... 5.2-33
tion Title Page 5.1.2 Design Criteria Outside the Containment ................................................. 5.2-35 5.1.3 Turbine Missile Consideration.................................................................. 5.2-36 5.2 Post-Tensioning Sequence ........................................................................ 5.2-37 5.3 Differential Displacement Between Structures......................................... 5.2-37 5.4 Polar Crane for the Containment .............................................................. 5.2-38 5.5 Containment Maintenance Truss .............................................................. 5.2-38 5.6 Unit 2 Stack .............................................................................................. 5.2-38 5.7 Pipe Whip Protection Criteria................................................................... 5.2-39 5.7.1 Methods of Protection Against Pipe Whip ............................................... 5.2-39 5.7.2 Design Procedures for Restraints and Barriers ......................................... 5.2-40 5.8 Jib Crane for Containment ........................................................................ 5.2-42 6 Containment Penetrations ......................................................................... 5.2-42 6.1 Types of Penetrations................................................................................ 5.2-42 6.1.1 Electrical Penetrations .............................................................................. 5.2-42 6.1.2 Piping Penetrations ................................................................................... 5.2-43 6.1.3 Equipment Hatch and Personnel Lock...................................................... 5.2-43 6.1.4 Fuel Transfer Tube.................................................................................... 5.2-44 6.2 Design of Penetrations .............................................................................. 5.2-44 6.2.1 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 5.2-44 6.2.2 Design of High-Temperature Penetrations ............................................... 5.2-45 6.2.3 Penetration Materials ................................................................................ 5.2-45 6.2.4 Provisions for Isolation Valves................................................................. 5.2-46 6.3 Installation of Penetrations ....................................................................... 5.2-46 6.4 Testability of Penetrations ........................................................................ 5.2-47 7 Containment Isolation System .................................................................. 5.2-47 7.1 Design Bases............................................................................................. 5.2-47 7.1.1 Functional Requirements .......................................................................... 5.2-47 7.1.2 Design Criteria .......................................................................................... 5.2-47 7.2 System Description ................................................................................... 5.2-49 7.2.1 System....................................................................................................... 5.2-49 7.2.2 Components .............................................................................................. 5.2-51
tion Title Page 7.3 System Operation...................................................................................... 5.2-51 7.3.1 Emergency Operation ............................................................................... 5.2-51 7.4 Availability and Reliability....................................................................... 5.2-52 7.4.1 Special Features ........................................................................................ 5.2-52 7.4.2 Tests and Inspections ................................................................................ 5.2-55 8 Containment Testing And Surveillance .................................................... 5.2-56 8.1 Integrated Leak-Rate Surveillance Test Program ..................................... 5.2-56 8.1.1 Total Time Method for Calculating Containment Leakage Rate ............. 5.2-58 8.1.2 Mass Point Method for Calculating Containment Leakage Rate ............. 5.2-58 8.2 Structural Integrity Test ............................................................................ 5.2-58 8.3 Post-Operational Leakage Monitoring...................................................... 5.2-59 8.4 Tendon Surveillance ................................................................................. 5.2-59 8.4.1 Program Description ................................................................................. 5.2-59 8.4.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide ......................................................... 5.2-60 9 References................................................................................................. 5.2-60 ENCLOSURE BUILDING.................................................................................. 5.3-1 1 General Description .................................................................................... 5.3-1 2 Construction Materials................................................................................ 5.3-2 3 Design Bases............................................................................................... 5.3-2 3.1 Bases for Design Loads .............................................................................. 5.3-2 3.1.1 Dead Loads ................................................................................................. 5.3-3 3.1.2 Live Loads .................................................................................................. 5.3-3 3.1.3 Earthquake Loads ....................................................................................... 5.3-3 3.1.4 Wind and Tornado Loads ........................................................................... 5.3-3 3.2 Design Load Combination and Structural Analysis ................................... 5.3-4 3.2.1 At Design Loads ......................................................................................... 5.3-4 3.2.2 At Factored Loads....................................................................................... 5.3-4 3.2.3 Seismic Analysis......................................................................................... 5.3-5 4 Through-Line Leakage Evaluation ............................................................. 5.3-5 AUXILIARY BUILDING ................................................................................... 5.4-1
tion Title Page 1 General Description .................................................................................... 5.4-1 1.1 Fuel Storage Facility ................................................................................... 5.4-1 1.1.1 New Fuel Storage........................................................................................ 5.4-1 1.1.2 Spent Fuel Storage ...................................................................................... 5.4-1 1.1.3 Compliance with Safety Guide 13 .............................................................. 5.4-2 2 Construction Materials................................................................................ 5.4-2 3 Design Bases............................................................................................... 5.4-3 3.1 Bases for Design Loads .............................................................................. 5.4-3 3.1.1 Dead Loads ................................................................................................. 5.4-3 3.1.2 Live Loads .................................................................................................. 5.4-4 3.1.3 Thermal Loads ............................................................................................ 5.4-4 3.1.4 Earthquake Loads ....................................................................................... 5.4-4 3.1.5 Lateral Pressure Loads................................................................................ 5.4-4 3.1.6 Wind and Tornado Loads ........................................................................... 5.4-4 3.1.7 Pipe Restraint Loads ................................................................................... 5.4-5 3.1.8 Pipe Whipping Loads.................................................................................. 5.4-5 3.1.9 Cask Drop Loads ........................................................................................ 5.4-5 3.1.10 Fuel Transfer Tube Bellows ....................................................................... 5.4-6 3.2 Design Load Combinations ........................................................................ 5.4-7 3.3 Structural Analysis.................................................................................... 5.4-10 3.3.1 Seismic Analysis....................................................................................... 5.4-10 3.3.2 Wind and Tornado Analysis ..................................................................... 5.4-10 3.3.3 Cask Drop in Spent Fuel Pool................................................................... 5.4-10 3.3.4 Stainless Steel Liner Plate for Spent Fuel Pool ........................................ 5.4-11 3.3.5 Fuel Transfer Tube.................................................................................... 5.4-11 3.3.6 Spent Fuel Pool Missile Protection........................................................... 5.4-12 TURBINE BUILDING........................................................................................ 5.5-1 1 General Description .................................................................................... 5.5-1 2 Construction Materials................................................................................ 5.5-1 3 Design Bases............................................................................................... 5.5-2
tion Title Page 3.1 Bases for Design Loads .............................................................................. 5.5-2 3.1.1 Dead Loads ................................................................................................. 5.5-2 3.1.2 Live Loads .................................................................................................. 5.5-3 3.1.3 Thermal Loads ............................................................................................ 5.5-3 3.1.4 Earthquake Loads ....................................................................................... 5.5-3 3.1.5 Wind and Tornado Loads ........................................................................... 5.5-3 3.1.6 Crane Loads ................................................................................................ 5.5-4 3.2 Design Load Combinations ........................................................................ 5.5-4 3.3 Structural Analysis...................................................................................... 5.5-5 3.3.1 Seismic Analysis......................................................................................... 5.5-5 3.3.2 Wind and Tornado Analysis ....................................................................... 5.5-5 INTAKE STRUCTURE ...................................................................................... 5.6-1 1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION....................................................................... 5.6-1 2 Construction Materials................................................................................ 5.6-1 3 Design Bases............................................................................................... 5.6-2 3.1 Bases for Design Loads .............................................................................. 5.6-2 3.1.1 Dead Loads ................................................................................................. 5.6-2 3.1.2 Live Loads .................................................................................................. 5.6-2 3.1.3 Earthquake Loads ....................................................................................... 5.6-3 3.1.4 Lateral Pressure Loads................................................................................ 5.6-3 3.1.5 Wind and Tornado Loads ........................................................................... 5.6-3 3.1.6 Hurricane Wave Loads ............................................................................... 5.6-3 3.2 Design Load Combinations ........................................................................ 5.6-4 3.3 Structural Analysis...................................................................................... 5.6-4 3.3.1 Seismic Analysis......................................................................................... 5.6-5 3.3.2 Wind and Tornado Analysis ....................................................................... 5.6-5 3.3.3 Hurricane Wave Analysis ........................................................................... 5.6-5 EXTERNAL CLASS I TANKS .......................................................................... 5.7-1 1 General Description .................................................................................... 5.7-1 2 Construction Materials................................................................................ 5.7-1
tion Title Page 3 Design Bases............................................................................................... 5.7-1 3.1 Bases for Design Loads .............................................................................. 5.7-2 3.1.1 Dead Loads ................................................................................................. 5.7-2 3.1.2 Live Loads .................................................................................................. 5.7-2 3.1.3 Earthquake Loads ....................................................................................... 5.7-2 3.1.4 Wind and Tornado Loads ........................................................................... 5.7-2 3.2 Design Load Combinations ........................................................................ 5.7-3 SEISMIC DESIGN .............................................................................................. 5.8-1 1 Input Criteria............................................................................................... 5.8-1 1.1 Design Response Spectra............................................................................ 5.8-1 1.2 Synthetic Time History ............................................................................... 5.8-2 2 Soil-Structures Interaction .......................................................................... 5.8-4 2.1 Soil-Foundation Interaction ........................................................................ 5.8-4 2.2 Dynamic Soil Pressure on Structures.......................................................... 5.8-5 2.3 Underground Structures .............................................................................. 5.8-6 3 Seismic Structural Analysis ........................................................................ 5.8-6 3.1 Methods of Analysis ................................................................................... 5.8-6 3.2 Procedure for Analysis................................................................................ 5.8-7 3.2.1 Structural Responses................................................................................... 5.8-7 3.2.2 Combination of Vertical and Horizontal Responses................................. 5.8-10 3.2.3 Torsional Effect Considerations ............................................................... 5.8-10 3.2.4 Natural Frequencies and Response Loads ................................................ 5.8-11 3.3 Damping Values ....................................................................................... 5.8-11 4 Seismic System Analysis .......................................................................... 5.8-12 5 Seismic Equipment Analysis .................................................................... 5.8-13 5.1 Static Tests ................................................................................................ 5.8-15 5.2 STERI Evaluations ................................................................................... 5.8-15 5.3 GIP NARE Evaluations ............................................................................ 5.8-15 6 Seismic Instrumentation Program............................................................. 5.8-16 6.1 Conformance with NRC Requirements .................................................... 5.8-16
tion Title Page 6.2 Description of Program............................................................................. 5.8-16 6.3 Action Following an Earthquake .............................................................. 5.8-18 7 References................................................................................................. 5.8-19 CONSTRUCTION PRACTICE AND QUALITY ASSURANCE ..................... 5.9-1 1 Applicable Construction Codes .................................................................. 5.9-1 2 Quality Assurance Program ........................................................................ 5.9-2 3 Construction Materials Inspection And Installation ................................... 5.9-2 3.1 Concrete ...................................................................................................... 5.9-2 3.1.1 Aggregates .................................................................................................. 5.9-2 3.1.2 Cement ........................................................................................................ 5.9-3 3.1.3 Fly Ash........................................................................................................ 5.9-3 3.1.4 Water and Ice .............................................................................................. 5.9-4 3.1.5 Admixtures.................................................................................................. 5.9-4 3.1.6 Concrete Mix Design .................................................................................. 5.9-4 3.1.7 Concrete Production and Testing................................................................ 5.9-5 3.2 Reinforcing Steel ........................................................................................ 5.9-7 3.2.1 Reinforcing Steel Materials ........................................................................ 5.9-7 3.2.2 Reinforcing Steel User Test Sampling........................................................ 5.9-8 3.2.3 Splicing Reinforcing Bars........................................................................... 5.9-9 3.3 Post-Tensioning System ........................................................................... 5.9-12 3.3.1 Tendons..................................................................................................... 5.9-12 3.3.2 Anchorages ............................................................................................... 5.9-13 3.3.3 Sheathing .................................................................................................. 5.9-14 3.3.4 Corrosion Protection ................................................................................. 5.9-14 3.4 Structural and Miscellaneous Steels ......................................................... 5.9-15 3.5 Steel Liner Plate and Penetration Sleeves................................................. 5.9-16 3.5.1 General...................................................................................................... 5.9-16 3.5.2 Fabrication and Erection ........................................................................... 5.9-16 3.5.3 Inspection and Testing .............................................................................. 5.9-17 3.5.4 Quality Control of Field Welding Electrodes ........................................... 5.9-19
tion Title Page 3.6 Interior Coatings (Original Construction)................................................. 5.9-20 3.6.1 Containment Steel Liner Plate Coatings ................................................... 5.9-20 3.6.2 Containment Interior Coatings.................................................................. 5.9-21 3.7 Interior Maintenance Coatings (first implemented during Mid cycle 13, 1997) .
5.9-21 3.7.1 Stainless Steel Surfaces ............................................................................ 5.9-22 3.7.2 Galvanized Surfaces ................................................................................. 5.9-22 3.7.3 Carbon Steel Surfaces ............................................................................... 5.9-22 4 Quality Control Procedures For Field Welding And Nondestructive Examinations ............................................................................................ 5.9-23 4.1 Scope......................................................................................................... 5.9-23 4.2 Qualifications for Welding Inspectors ...................................................... 5.9-23 4.3 Welding Performed by Bechtel Construction Personnel .......................... 5.9-23 4.3.1 Welding Procedures .................................................................................. 5.9-23 4.3.2 Welder Qualification................................................................................. 5.9-23 4.4 Welding Performed by Bechtel Subcontractors........................................ 5.9-24 4.4.1 Welding Procedures .................................................................................. 5.9-24 4.4.2 Welder Qualification................................................................................. 5.9-24 4.5 Instructions for Field Welding Inspectors ................................................ 5.9-24 4.5.1 Welding Procedures .................................................................................. 5.9-24 4.5.2 Postweld Heat Treatment.......................................................................... 5.9-25 4.5.3 Visual Inspection of Weldments............................................................... 5.9-25 4.5.4 Magnetic Particle Inspection .................................................................... 5.9-26 4.5.5 Dye Penetrant Inspection .......................................................................... 5.9-26 4.5.6 Radiographic Inspection ........................................................................... 5.9-27 4.5.7 Other Welding Inspections ....................................................................... 5.9-27 4.5.8 Repairs ...................................................................................................... 5.9-27 4.5.9 Records ..................................................................................................... 5.9-27 DESCRIPTION OF FINITE ELEMENT METHOD USED IN CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS......................................................................................................... 5.A-1
.1 Introduction................................................................................................ 5.A-1
.3 Computer Program..................................................................................... 5.A-1
.4 Comparisons With Known Solutions ........................................................ 5.A-2
.5 References.................................................................................................. 5.A-3 JUSTIFICATION FOR LOAD FACTORS AND LOAD COMBINATIONS USED IN DESIGN EQUATIONS OF CONTAINMENT .............................................5.B-1
.1 General........................................................................................................5.B-1
.2 Dead Loads .................................................................................................5.B-1
.3 Live Loads ..................................................................................................5.B-1
.4 Seismic Loads .............................................................................................5.B-1
.5 Wind and Tornado Loads ...........................................................................5.B-2
.6 Loss-of-Coolant Incident ............................................................................5.B-2
.7 References...................................................................................................5.B-2 JUSTIFICATION FOR CAPACITY REDUCTION FACTORS () USED IN DETERMINING CAPACITY OF CONTAINMENT ........................................5.C-1 EXPANDED SPECTRUM OF TORNADO MISSILES ................................... 5.D-1
.1 References.................................................................................................. 5.D-9
.A The Development of the Wind-Field, Tangential Velocity ................... 5.D.A-1 COMPUTER PROGRAM LIST AND DESCRIPTIONS...................................5.E-1 1 COMPUTER PROGRAM APPLICABILITY AND VALIDATION..............5.E.1-1 2 COMPUTER PROGRAM TEST PROBLEM SOLUTIONS ..........................5.E.2-1 3 COMPUTER PROGRAM TEST PROBLEM SIMILARITIES ......................5.E.3-1 CONTAINMENT WATER INTRUSION INTO TENDON GALLERY DURING CONSTRUCTION (1) .................................................................................................................. 5.F-1
List of Tables mber Title 1 Containment Structure Analysis Summary 2 Containment Structure Analysis Summary - Dead Load, Initial Prestress and Live Load (D+KF+L) 3 Containment Structure Analysis Summary - Dead Load, Initial Prestress and Live Load (D+F+L+1.15P) 4 Containment Structure Analysis Summary - Dead Load, Initial Prestress and Live Load, Operating Temperature and OBE (D+F+L+T0+E) 5 Containment Structure Analysis Summary - Dead Load, Prestress, Live Load, 100% Accident Pressure and Accident Temperature (D+F+L+1.0P+T1) 6 Containment Structure Analysis Summary - Dead Load, Prestress, Operating Temperature, Thermal Expansion Forces of Pipes, Pipe Rupture Forces and DBE (D+F+T0+H+R+E1) 6A Deleted by FSARCR 04-MP2-016 7 Containment Structure Analysis Summary - Dead Load, Prestress, 100% Accident Pressure, Thermal Expansion Forces of Pipes, Pipe Rupture Forces and DBE (D+F+1.0P+H+T1+E1) 8 Containment Structure Analysis Summary - Dead Load, Prestress, 125% Accident Pressure, 125% Thermal Expansion Forces of Pipes, Accident Temperature and 125% DBE (D+F+1.25P+1.25H+T1+1.25E) 9 Containment Structure Analysis Summary - Dead Load, Prestress, 150% Accident Pressure, and Accident Temperature (D+F+1.5P+T1) 10 Spectrum of Potential Missiles From Inside the Containment 11 Containment Structure Isolation Valve Information 12 Containment Penetration Piping 13 Major(1) Containment Isolation Valves 14 Typical Leak Rate Measurement System Instrumentation 15 Typical Containment Resistance Temperature Detectors and Dewcell Sensor Volume Weight Fractions 1 Maximum Actual Stresses - Turbine Building 1 Material Damping Values 1 Aggregate Tests
mber Title 2 Cement Tests 3 Fly Ash Tests 4 Typical Chemical Analysis of Fly Ash Used 5 Allowable Void Limits for Cadwelding
-1 Impactive Velocities (fps) of Missiles of Different CdA/W Factors as Picked from the Ground by the Design Tornado
-2 Kinetic Energy per Ft2 of Impact Area
-3 Radius vs. Velocity FPS/MPH (D=0.882 psi/V1 = 27 mph)
-4 Radius vs. Velocity FPS/MPH (D=3 psi/V1 = 60 mph)
-5 Velocities of Various Missiles
-6 Test Data Summary
.A-1A Relative Conservatism in Steps A, B, and C
.A-2A
.A-3A
List of Figures mber Title
-1 Containment Structure Details
-2 Containment Structure Details 3 Design Thermal Gradient 4 Equipment Hatch Details 5 Personnel Lock Details
-6 Liner Plate 7 Leak Chase Channels 8 Typical Penetrations 9 Bracket Details 10 Liner Plate Details 11 Reactor Vessel Support Details
-12 Lower Steam Generator Support Details 13 Upper Steam Generator Support Details 14 Primary and Secondary Shield Wall 15 Detail - Seismic Restraint
-16 Finite Element Mesh of Bottom of Containment Shell 17 Finite Element Mesh of Top of Containment Shell 18 Finite Element Mesh of Containment Shell for Stressing Sequence 19 Containment Structure Stress Analysis Summary, Dead Load and Initial Prestress, Live Load
-20 Containment Structure Stress Analysis Summary, Dead Load, Live Load, Prestress and Test Pressure 21 Containment Structure Stress Analysis Summary, Dead Load, Live Load, Prestress, Operating Temperature and DBE 22 Containment Structure Stress Analysis Summary, Dead Load, Live Load, Prestress, 100% Accident Pressure and Accident Temperature 23 Containment Structure Stress Analysis Summary, Dead Load, Prestress, Operating Temperature, Thermal Expansion Forces of Pipes, Pipe Rupture Forces and DBE
List of Figures (Continued) mber Title
-24 Containment Structure Stress Analysis Summary, Dead Load, Prestress, 100%
Accident Pressure, Thermal Expansion Forces of Pipes, Accident Temperature and DBE
-25 Containment Structure Stress Analysis Summary, Dead Load, Prestress, 125%
Accident Pressure, 125% Thermal Expansion Forces of Pipes, Accident Temperature and 125% OBE
-26 Containment and Structure Stress Analysis Summary, Dead Load, Prestress, 150%
Accident Pressure and Accident Temperature 27 Isolation Valve Arrangements 28 Isolation Valve Arrangements 29 Isolation Valve Arrangements 30 Isolation Valve Arrangements 31 Isolation Valve Arrangements 32 Isolation Valve Arrangements 33 Isolation Valve Arrangements 34 Isolation Valve Arrangements
-35 Reactor Coolant System Plan
-36 Reactor Coolant System Elevation 37 Deleted by FSARCR 04-MP2-016 1 Enclosure Building 2 Enclosure Building Layout 3 Waterproof Membrane Details 4 Waterproof Membrane Details 5 Spent Fuel Cask Travel Limits 1 Probable Missile Trajectories Inside Auxiliary Building 2 Missile Resistant Siding Detail 3 Location of Missile Resistant Siding 1 Joint Detail at Turbine Pedestal 2 Joint Detail at Col. Line E
List of Figures (Continued) mber Title 1 Intake Structure Layout 2 C. W. System - Plan 1 Recommended Damped Response Spectra 9%g Acceleration, Operating Basis Earthquake 2 Recommended Damped Response Spectra 17%g Acceleration, Design Basis Earthquake 3 Recommended Damped Response Spectra 9%g Acceleration, Operating Basis Earthquake (Soil Surface) 4 Recommended Damped Response Spectra, 17%g Acceleration, Design Basis Earthquake (Soil Surface) 5 Comparison of Smooth Response Spectra vs. Response Spectra from the Anamet Time History Design Earthquake (Critical Damping = 0.5%)
6 Comparison of Smooth Response Spectra vs. Response Spectra from the Anamet Time History Design Earthquake (Critical Damping = 1%)
7 Comparison of Smooth Response Spectra vs. Response Spectra from the Anamet Time History Design Earthquake (Critical Damping = 2%)
8 Comparison of Smooth Response Spectra vs. Response Spectra from the Anamet Time History Design Earthquake (Critical Damping = 5%)
9 Response Spectra from the Time History Design Earthquake with Various Frequency Intervals 10 Comparison of Response Spectra with 1952 Taft and 1940 El Centro Earthquake 11 Foundation Outline 12 Sections A-A & B-B 13 Auxiliary Bay of Turbine Building 14 Containment Mass Model
-15 Mode Shapes for the Containment Building 16 Containment Building Design Earthquake 9% Ground Acceleration 17 Containment Building Design Earthquake 17% Ground Acceleration
-18 Containment Structure Elevation 53 feet 0 inches
-19 Containment Structure Elevation 97 feet 0 inches
-20 Containment Structure Elevation 152 feet 6 inches
List of Figures (Continued) mber Title 21 Containment Internals Model 22 Mode Shapes & Frequencies Containment Internals - North-South 23 Mode Shapes & Frequencies Containment Internals - North-South OBE (DBE) 24 Mode Shapes & Frequencies Containment Internals - East-West 25 Containment Internals - East-West OBE (DBE) 26 Containment Internals Elevation 0 feet 0 inches - OBE (North-South) Reactor Vessel Support 27 Containment Internals Elevation 0 feet 0 inches - OBE (East-West) Reactor Vessel Support 28 Containment Internals Elevation 14 feet 6 inches - OBE (North-South) Pressurizer Support 29 Containment Internals Elevation 14 feet 6 inches - OBE (East-West) Pressurizer Support 30 Containment Internals Elevation 38 feet 6 inches - OBE (North-South) Safety Injection Tank Support 31 Containment Internals Elevation 38 feet 6 inches - OBE (East-West) Safety Injection Tank Support 32 Containment Internals Elevation 43 feet 0 inches - OBE (North-South) Steam Generator Upper Support (Snubbers) 33 Containment Internals Elevation 43 feet 0 inches - OBE (East-West) Steam Generator Upper Support (Snubbers) 34 Containment Internals Elevation 50 feet 0 inches - OBE (North-South) Steam Generator Upper Support (Shear Keys) 35 Containment Internals Elevation 50 feet 0 inches - OBE (East-West) Steam Generator Upper Support (Shear Keys) 36 Containment Internals Elevation0 feet 0 inches - OBE (North-South) Steam Generator Lower Support 37 Containment Internals Elevation 0 feet 0 inches - OBE (East-West) Steam Generator Lower Support 38 Auxiliary Building Model 39 Mode Shapes & Frequencies Auxiliary Building - North-South 40 Auxiliary Building - North-South OBE (DBE)
List of Figures (Continued) mber Title 41 Mode Shapes & Frequencies Auxiliary Building - East-West 42 Auxiliary Building - East-West OBE (DBE) 43 Auxiliary Building Elevation 14 feet 6 inches 44 Auxiliary Building Elevation 38 feet 6 inches 45 Auxiliary Building Elevation 71 feet 6 inches 46 Warehouse Model 47 Mode Shapes & Frequencies Warehouse Bldg. - East-West 48 Mode Shapes & Frequencies Warehouse Bldg. - North-South 49 Warehouse Bldg. - OBE (DBE) 50 Warehouse Elevation 38 feet 6 inches 51 Turbine Building Model 52 Mode Shapes & Frequencies Turbine Bldg. - North-South 53 Turbine Bldg. OBE (DBE) East-West 54 Mode Shapes & Frequencies Turbine Bldg. - East-West 55 Turbine Bldg. OBE (DBE) North-South 56 Turbine Building Elevation 31 feet 6 inches 57 Turbine Building Crane - OBE 58 Intake Structure Model 59 Intake Structure OBE (DBE) 60 Mode Shapes & Frequencies Intake Structure 61 Intake Structure Elevation 14 feet 0 inches OBE
-1 Thick Walled Cylinder With Internal Pressure
-1 Tangential Velocities as Derived from Hoecker's Pressure - Time Profile
-2 Monthly Weather Review - Hoecker
-3 Test Data Summary
.A-1 Plan of Spent Fuel Area
.A-2 Spent Fuel Pool Section View
.A-3 Missile Strike Angle to Missile Proof Siding
GENERAL design bases for structures required for the normal operating conditions are governed by the ding design codes and specifications listed in Section 5.1.2. The basic design criterion for the gn basis accident and seismic conditions specified that there shall be no loss of any function he structures which can cause danger to the safety of the public. It should be noted that the s Category and Class are used interchangeably throughout the MP2 FSAR in defining mic design classifications of Structures, Systems and Components.
1 CLASSES OF STRUCTURES ctures are grouped into two classes, depending on how their functions relate to public safety plant operation.
1.1 Class I Structures ss I structures are those structures whose loss of function could:
- a. Cause or increase the severity of an accident.
- b. Preclude establishing and maintaining safe shutdown.
- c. Result in a release of radioactivity to the site boundary in excess of the 10 CFR l00 guidelines.
ss I structures are designed to withstand the appropriate seismic and other applicable loads hout loss of function. These Class I structures are sufficiently isolated or protected from Class ructures to ensure that their integrities are maintained at all times.
following are Class I structures:
- a. The containment shell and internals
- b. The enclosure building
- c. The auxiliary building
- d. The warehouse (eastern portion of the auxiliary building)
- e. The turbine building, except turbine pedestals
- f. The intake structure
- g. The supports for all Class I system components
1.2 Class II Structures ss II structures are those whose failure would not result in the release of radioactivity beyond site boundary in excess of the 10 CFR 20 annual limits and would not prevent safe shutdown he reactor. The failure of Class II structures, however, may interrupt power generation.
structures that are not listed under Class I are Class II structures.
2 CODES AND SPECIFICATIONS following codes and specifications, where applicable, were used as the bases for the design construction of all structures. Modifications to these codes and specifications are noted in the ropriate sections that describe the details of the structures, materials, and construction tices. Later editions of the AISC Manual of Steel Construction (7th, 8th, and 9th edition -
owable Stress Design) and ACI 318 Code (1971, 1977, 1983, 1989, and 1995) were used for design and construction of new and modified portions of structures.
sequent editions of the AISC Manual of Steel Construction and the ACI 318 Code, as erned by the plant design change process, may be used for the design and construction of new modified portions of structures.
- a. Uniform Building Code (l967 Edition)
- d. Manual of Steel Construction (AISC, 6th Edition, 1963)
- e. State of Connecticut Building Code
- f. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (1968 Edition)
- g. ASTM Standards - Materials and testing procedures used are referenced in the appropriate sections. Whenever possible, ASTM or ASME material and testing procedures are used. Materials and testing procedures for new and modified portions of structures conform to ASTM or ASME Standards as implemented by plant design change documents.
following Regulatory Guides that were in effect at the time of application for an Operating ense were used, where applicable, to establish the bases for the design and construction of all ctures. Every effort was made to follow the guidance of the documents. Any areas where the dance was not followed are detailed in the specified subsections.
egulatory Guide Number Title Subsection 0 Mechanical (Cadwell) Splices in 5.9.3.2.3 Reinforcing Bars of Concrete Structures 1 Instrumentation Lines Penetrating Primary 5.2.7.2.1 Reactor Containment 3 Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis 5.4.1.1.3 5 Testing of Reinforcing Bars for Concrete 5.9.3.2.2 Structures 9 Nondestructive Examination of Primary 5.9.3.5.3 Containment Liners 5 In-service Surveillance of Ungrouted 5.2.8.4 Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures 2 Instrumentation for Earthquakes 5.8.6 8 Structural Acceptance Test for Concrete 5.2.8.2 Primary Reactor Containments
containment system used for Millstone Unit 2 consists of a concrete cylindrical structure, inafter referred to as the containment, and a steel framed structure called the enclosure ding, which completely surrounds the containment. The spaces between the enclosure ding and the containment, together with selected areas of the auxiliary building such as the etration rooms and rooms containing the engineered safety features, are referred to as the losure building filtration region (EBFR). In the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA),
EBFR is maintained at a slight vacuum by the enclosure building filtration system. Air from EBFR is processed through charcoal filters and released through the Millstone stack.
containment consists of a prestressed, reinforced concrete cylinder and dome connected to supported by a massive reinforced concrete foundation slab. The cylindrical portion is tressed by a post-tensioning system composed of horizontal and vertical tendons, with the zontal tendons placed in three 240 degree systems using three buttresses as supports for the horages. The dome has a three-way post-tensioning system. The concrete foundation slab is ventionally reinforced with high strength reinforcing steel. A continuous access gallery is vided beneath the base slab for installation of vertical tendons. A one-quarter inch thick ded steel liner is attached to the inside surface of the concrete shell to ensure a high degree of
-tightness. The floor liner is installed on top of the structural slab and is then covered with crete.
containment completely encloses the reactor, reactor coolant system, and portions of the iliary and engineered safety features systems. It ensures that an acceptable upper limit for age of radioactive materials to the environment will not be exceeded even if gross failure of reactor coolant system occurs.
cipal nominal dimensions of the containment are as follows:
Inside diameter (feet) 130 Inside height (feet) 175 Cylindrical wall thickness (feet) 3.75 Dome thickness (feet) 3.25 Foundation slab thickness (feet) 8.5 Liner plate thickness (inches) 0.25 Internal free volume (cubic feet) 1,899,000 containment is shown in Figures 5.2-1 and 5.2-2.
following materials are used in the construction of the containment.
- a. Structural and Miscellaneous Steel Rolled shapes, plates, and bars ASTM A-36 Crane rails ASTM A-1 High strength bolts ASTM A-325 or ASTM A-490 Stainless steel ASTM A-240, Type 304
- b. Concrete Base slab (psi) 5000 Cylindrical wall and dome (psi) 5000 Tendon access gallery (psi) 3000 Floor slabs above floor liner (psi) 3000 Primary shield walls and steam generator pedestals (psi) 5000 All other internal structures (psi) 4000
- d. Prestressing Steel Tendons, Anchorage, and Sheaths Wires ASTM A-421, Type BA Bearing plates Armco VNT Stressing washers ASTM A-4330 Shims Armco VNT Sheaths Galvanized corrugated steel tubing, 22 Gauge
- e. Containment Steel Liner Plate one-quarter inch plates ASTM A-285, Grade A Insert plates ASTM A-516, Grade 60 Penetration sleeves:
Pipes ASME SA-333, Grade 6 Plates ASME SA-516, Grade 60
- f. Interior Coating (Original Construction)
Steel liner plate Primer Carbo-Zinc 11 Finish coat Phenoline Number 305 Concrete and masonry surfaces Surfacer Keeler & Long, Number 6548 epoxy block filler Primer Keeler & Long Number 7107 epoxy white primer Finish coat Keeler & Long, epoxy enamel
- g. Interior Maintenance Coatings (First implemented in Mid Cycle 13, 1997)
All coating materials applied to surfaces inside or to be installed in the reactor containment are epoxy materials tested to withstand Millstone Unit 2 design basis loss of coolant accident (DBA-LOCA) conditions. The coating materials and their application comply with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.54. Each coating was tested in accordance with ASTM D3911, Evaluating Coatings Used in Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants at Simulated Design Basis Accident (DBA)
Conditions, to the DBA conditions represented by the pressure (70 psig) and temperature (340F) curve of Figure 1, therein. Prior to exposure to the simulated DBA conditions, each coating was irradiated to an accumulated dose of at least 1x109 Rads in accordance with ASTM D4082, Effect of Gamma Radiation on Coatings for Use in Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants.
- h. Waterproofing Membrane The waterproofing membrane that was installed during construction of the containment is a continuous plain sheet of polyvinyl chloride applied to the concrete surface with an adhesive. The membrane was applied after the forms were stripped. The membrane is composed of an elastomeric material having thickness of 40 mils (minimum), a minimum tensile strength of 2,000 psi, a minimum elongation of 200 percent at 75-80F, and the water absorption is less than 0.1%. The extent of the waterproofing membrane is shown in Figures 5.3-2 through 5.3-4 of the FSAR. All joints are lapped and the adhesive is applied continuously to the contact surface.
1.1 Corrosive Protection reinforcing steel and tendon sheaths are cast in the concrete walls and base slab, which is a osion inhibitive environment. The steel liner is in direct contact with, and anchored to, the r surface of the concrete wall. Concrete will passivate the steel surfaces, thereby lowering the
inishes the possibility of galvanic corrosion. It is therefore believed that there is no need for a odic protection system for these steel members.
efined petroleum oil based product is used as a protective compound for the tendons. The trical resistivity of this compound is relatively high, which makes it a poor electrolyte. This vents the possibility of galvanic corrosion that could be detrimental to the tendons.
e: For description of water intrusion into the tendon gallery during construction and methods epair, see Appendix 5.F.
2 DESIGN BASES design of the containment structure provides the required features as outlined in Criteria 1, 2,
, 5, 16, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50.
2.1 Bases for Design Loads containment is designed for all credible loads and load combinations. These load binations consist of loads under normal operation, loads during a LOCA, test loads, and loads to adverse environmental conditions. The following loads are considered:
- a. Dead loads
- b. Live loads
- c. Loads caused by the pressure and temperature transients of a LOCA
- d. Thermal loads
- e. Earthquake loads
- f. Wind and tornado loads
- g. Uplift loads due to buoyant forces
- h. External pressure loads
- i. Prestressing loads
- j. Test loads 2.1.1 Dead Loads d loads consist of the weight of the containment wall, dome, base mat, interior framing and s, and all interior structures and equipment. Equipment dead loads are those specified on the
2.1.2 Live Loads e loads in the containment include design floor loads, equipment live loads, and all loads smitted through the supports of the enclosure building. A snow load of 60 psf is used for the of the enclosure building.
interior floors and slabs have the following live loads:
Floor grating 250 psf Concrete floor slabs 1000 psf Equipment live loads As specified on drawings supplied by the manufacturers of the various pieces of equipment 2.1.3 Loss-of-Coolant Accident Loads design pressure and temperature of the containment are greater than the peak pressure and perature that would result from a postulated complete blowdown of the reactor coolant. This ld cover a rupture of the reactor coolant system up to and including the severance of the largest tor coolant pipe.
supports for the reactor coolant system are designed to withstand the blowdown forces and to rict the structural deformations associated with the sudden severance of the reactor coolant ng.
nsient pressures and corresponding temperatures resulting from a LOCA or main steam line k accident are presented in Section 14. These serve as the basis for a containment design sure of 54 psig.
variations of temperature with time and the forces resulting from the expansion of the liner e with the temperature associated with a LOCA are considered.
2.1.4 Thermal Loads spaces between the containment and the enclosure building are maintained at a minimum perature between 55 and 70F by unit heaters, as discussed in Section 9.9.2. Under normal rating conditions, a temperature gradient exists when the exterior structure of the concrete ndrical wall is at 55 to 70F, while the interior surface is at an operating ambient temperature 20F.
wever, to be conservative, a design temperature of 20F (average minimum temperature at the
) is applied at the exterior surfaces of the concrete cylindrical wall in analyzing the perature gradient under the normal operating conditions.
2.1.5 Earthquake Loads thquake loads are predicated on an operating basis earthquake (OBE) at the site having a zontal ground surface acceleration of 0.09 g. In addition, a design basis earthquake (DBE),
ing a horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.17 g, is used to check the design to ensure loss of structural functions would not occur. The seismic design spectrum curves are given in tion 5.8.1.1. A vertical component two-thirds of the magnitude of the horizontal component at ground surface is applied simultaneously as a static coefficient throughout the height of the cture. A dynamic analysis, utilizing the response spectrum technique, is used to obtain the hquake loads for design.
2.1.6 Wind and Tornado Loads d loads for the containment are determined on the basis of the ASCE Paper 3269, Wind ces on Structures, using the highest wind velocity at the site for a 100 year recurrence period.
ASCE Paper 3269 is used mainly to determine the shape factors. Based upon the site location the structure classification, the design wind velocity is taken to be 115 mph with gusts up to mph.
containment has been analyzed for tornado loads (not coincident with a LOCA or hquake) on the following basis:
- a. Differential bursting pressure between the interior and exterior of the containment is assumed to be 3 psi pressure occurring in the three seconds (1 psi/sec), followed by a calm for two seconds and a re-pressurization.
- b. Lateral loads on the containment are based on a tornado funnel which is conservatively assumed to have a peripheral tangential velocity of 300 mph and a forward translation of 60 mph. These velocities are added together, resulting in a design basis tornado wind velocity of 360 mph. The applicable portions of the wind design methods described in the ASCE Paper 3269 are used, particularly for the shape factors. The provisions in the paper for gust factors and variations in wind velocity with respect to height are not applied. The wind velocity is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the height of the structure.
- c. A tornado-borne missile as defined in Section 5.2.5.1.2.
h the exception of the missile impact area, the allowable stresses necessary to resist the effects ornadoes are 90 percent of the yield strength of the reinforcing steel and 85 percent of the mate strength of the concrete.
iscussion of the probability of tornado occurrence is presented in Section 2.3 of the Millstone t 3 FSAR (Reference 5.2-13).
yant forces resulting from the displacement of ground or flood water by the structure are ounted for in the design of the structure.
following water levels are considered:
Ground water Elevation (+) 5-0 Flood water Elevation (+) 18-1 2.1.8 External Pressure Loads external design pressure, equivalent to a barometric pressure rise to 31 inches of mercury after containment is sealed at 29 inches of mercury, is considered. For this condition, a differential sure of 2 psi from the exterior to the interior of the containment is assumed and applied as an rnal pressure on the containment.
s external design pressure is also adequate to permit the containment to be cooled to 50F from nitial maximum operating temperature of 120F.
2.1.9 Prestressing Loads ere applicable, prestressing forces are considered in the loading combinations. These include axisymmetric loads of normal compressive forces in the containment wall and dome, and the l effects at the anchorage zones from stressing and shimming the tendons.
2.1.10 Test Loads he completion of construction, the containment and its penetrations are tested at 115 percent he design pressure. This test pressure is considered in the load combinations to ensure the ctural integrity of the containment.
2.2 Load Combinations ensure the structural integrity, both the working stress method and the ultimate strength hod are used in the design of the containment for various loading combinations. The tainment is examined with respect to strength, the nature, and the amount of cracking, the nitude of deformation, and the extent of corrosion so as to ensure proper performance. The cture is designed to meet the performance and strength requirements under the following ditions:
- a. Prior to prestressing
- b. At transfer of prestress
- c. Under sustained prestress
- e. At factored loads design criteria are in accordance with ACI-318-63 unless stated otherwise herein. Members ject to stresses produced by temperature forces combined with other loads in design load binations may be proportioned for reinforcing steel stresses 33-1/3% greater than those cified.
2.2.1 Load Prior to Prestressing er this condition, the structure is designed as conventionally reinforced concrete. It is gned for dead loads, live loads (including construction loads), and wind loads. Allowable sses are in accordance with ACI-318-63.
2.2.2 Loads at Transfer of Prestress containment is checked for prestress loads and the resulting stresses are compared with those wed by ACI-318-63, with the following exception:
The membrane compressive stresses are limited to 0.30 fci whereas in combination with flexural compressive stresses, the maximum allowable compressive stresses are limited to 0.60 f'ci in accordance with the ACI Code.
local stress concentrations with nonlinear stress distribution, as predicted by the finite element lysis, a compressive stress of 0.75 fc is permitted when reinforcing steel is utilized to ribute and control these localized strains. These high stresses are allowed since they occur y in small localized areas which are confined by material at lower stresses, and would have to onsiderably greater than the allowable stresses of the material before significant local plastic ding takes place.
mbrane and flexural tensile stresses in concrete are permitted provided that they do not ardize the integrity of the steel liner plate. Membrane tensile stresses in concrete are mitted to occur during the post-tensioning sequence, but are limited to 1.0 fci. When there are ural tensile stresses but no membrane tensile stresses, the section is designed in accordance h Section 2605(a) and the ACI Code. The stresses in the liner plate due to the combined mbrane tensile stress and flexural tensile stresses are limited to 0.5 fy. The effects of the tressing sequence are considered.
ign criteria for shear are in accordance with ACI-318-63, Chapter 26, as modified by the ations shown in Section 5.2.2.2.5. For ultimate strength design, a load factor of 1.5 is used.
design conditions and the allowable stresses for this case are the same as those stated in tion 5.2.2.2.2 except that the allowable tensile stresses in nonprestressed reinforcing are ted to 0.5 fy and no membrane tensile stresses in concrete are permitted. When membrane sses are combined with flexural stresses, tension is permitted provided it does not jeopardize integrity of the liner plate. Where the flexural tensile stresses exist, the section is designed in ordance with Section 2605(b) of the ACI Code.
2.2.4 At Design Loads containment is designed by the working stress method for the following loading binations:
D + F + L Construction case D + F + L + To + E Operating case D + F + L + P + Ti Design incident case D + F + L + Ts + E Prolonged shutdown case D + F + L + 1.15 P Test case re:
D = dead loads L = live loads F = prestressing loads P = design pressure Ti = thermal loads due to the loss-of-coolant incident To = thermal loads due to the operating temperature Ts = thermal loads due to transient wall temperature over a prolonged shutdown (20F at exterior face, 70F at center, 50F at interior face)
E = operating basis earthquake loads (0.09 g) g term effects of creep and shrinkage in concrete are considered in all loading combinations.
en determining the value of the modulus of elasticity of concrete to be used in the containment lysis, instantaneous loads such as internal pressure are differentiated from sustained loads such ead, prestress, and thermal loads. This distinction is necessary to evaluate the effects of creep shrinkage deformations on the concrete.
Ei E cs = E ci -----------------
E +Es i re:
Ecs - sustained concrete modulus of elasticity Eci - instantaneous concrete modulus of elasticity Es - concrete strain from sustained loads Ei - concrete strain from instantaneous loads modifications described above are used in the analysis of the containment shell for both the gn and factored load conditions.
modification is made to Poissons ratio for concrete for either sustained or instantaneous s.
ficient prestressing is provided in the cylindrical and dome portions of the containment to inate membrane tensile stresses under design load combinations. Flexural tensile cracking is mitted, but is controlled by unprestressed reinforcing steel.
er the design load combinations, the same performance criteria as specified in tion 5.2.2.2.2 are applied with the following exceptions:
- a. When the net membrane compressive stresses are below 100 psi, they are neglected and a cracked section is assumed in the concrete for the computation of unprestressed reinforcing steel for flexural tension. Flexural tensile stress of 0.5fy in unprestressed reinforcing steel are allowed.
- b. When the maximum flexural tensile stress does not exceed 6 f c and the extent of the tension zone is no more than one-third the depth of the section under consideration, unprestressed reinforcing steel is provided to carry the entire tensile forces in the tension block. Otherwise, a cracked section is assumed in the design of the unprestressed reinforcing steel. When the tensile stresses due to the bending moment are additive to the thermal tensile stresses, the allowable tensile stresses in the unprestressed reinforcing steel is 0.5 fy.
- c. The problems of shear and diagonal tension in a prestressed concrete structure are considered in two parts: membrane principal tension and flexural principal tension.
Since sufficient prestressing is used to eliminate membrane tensile stresses at design loads, membrane principal tension is not a critical design case. Membrane
Flexural principal tension is associated with bending in planes perpendicular to the surface of the shell and shear acting along these planes (radial shear). The present ACI-318-63 provisions of Chapter 26 for shear are adequate for design purposes with the modifications as discussed in Section 5.2.2.2.5.
ck control in concrete is accomplished through the use of reinforcing steel in accordance with ACI-ASCE Code Committee Standards. These criteria are based on recommendations of the stressed Concrete Institute. The minimum reinforcing provided in terms of the gross concrete s-sectional area is as follows:
- a. 0.25 percent at the tension face for small members.
- b. 0.20 percent for medium size members.
- c. 0.15 percent for large members.
- d. 0.25 percent at the exterior faces of the containment.
2.2.5 At Factored Loads d factors are the coefficients by which loads are multiplied for analysis purposes to ensure that load-deformation behavior of the structure is elastic with low strain. The load factor approach sed in the design as a means of making a rational evaluation of the isolated loads which must considered to assure an adequate safety margin for the structure. This approach permits the gner to place the greatest conservatism on those loads which have the most variation and ch most affect the overall safety of the structure. Consequently, a smaller load factor is used the fixed gravity loads and larger load factors are employed for the LOCA, earthquake, and ado loads. Justification of the load factors is discussed in Appendix 5.B.
design of the containment satisfies the following load factors and load combinations:
1/ [(1.00 0.05) (D) + 1.5P + 1.0TI + 1.0F] Eq (1) 1/ [(1.00 0.05) (D) + 1.25P + 1.0TI + 1.25H + 1.25E + 1.0F] Eq (2) 1/ [(1.00 0.05) (D) + 1.25H + 1.0R + 1.0F + 1.25E + 1.0To] Eq (3) 1/ [(1.00 0.05) (D) + 1.25H + 1.0F + 1.25W + 1.0To] Eq (4) 1/ [(1.00 0.05) (D) + 1.0P + 1.0TI + 1.0H + 1.0E + 1.0F] Eq (5) 1/ [(1.00 0.05) (D) + 1.0H + 1.0R + 1.0E + 1.0F + 1.0To] Eq (6) re:
C = required capacity of the structure to resist factored loads
D = dead loads of structures and equipment plus any other permanent loads which contribute stresses, such as hydrostatic pressure or soil pressure. In addition, portions of the live loads are added when these include items such as piping, cables, and trays suspended from floors. An allowance is also made for future additional permanent loads.
P = design accident pressure loads F = final prestress loads R = forces or pressures on structure due to the rupture of any one pipe H = forces on structure due to the thermal expansion of pipes TI = thermal loads due to the temperature gradient through the walls, based on temperature corresponding to unfactored design accident pressure To = thermal loads due to the normal operating temperature gradient through the walls E = operating basis earthquake loads E = design basis earthquake loads W = normal wind or tornado loads (use 1.0 factor for tornado loads) ation (1) assures that the containment has the capacity to withstand pressure loadings at least ercent greater than those calculated for the postulated LOCA alone.
ation (2) assures that the containment has the capacity to withstand loadings at least 25 ent greater than those calculated for the postulated LOCA with a coincident operating basis hquake.
ation (3) assures that the containment has the capacity to withstand earthquake loadings 25 ent greater than those calculated for the operating basis earthquake coincident with the ciated rupture of any one of the attached piping.
ation (4) assures that the containment has the capacity to withstand wind loadings at least 25 ent greater than the design wind loadings or full tornado loadings.
ations (5) and (6) assure that the containment has the capacity to withstand either a postulated CA or the rupture of any one of the attached piping coincident with the design basis hquake.
yield strength of the structure is defined as the upper limit of the proportional stress-strain avior of the effective load carrying capacities of the structural materials. The stresses from e load combinations, with the load factors given therein, are less than the yield strength of the cture. For steel (both prestressed and unprestressed), the upper limit is taken to be the ranteed minimum yield strength, as specified in the appropriate ASTM specifications. For crete, it is the ultimate values of shear (as a measure of diagonal tension) and bond as specified
peak strain in the concrete due to secondary moments, membrane loads, local loads, and mal loads is limited to 0.003 inch/inch.
predicted strain in the steel liner plate for all loading combinations does not exceed 5 inch/inch.
cipal concrete tension due to the combined membrane tension and membrane shear, excluding ural tension due to bending moments or thermal gradients, is limited to 3((fc)1/2).
cipal concrete tension due to the combined membrane tension, membrane shear, and flexural ion caused by the bending moments or thermal gradients is limited to 6((fc)1/2). When the cipal concrete tension exceeds the limit of 6(fc)1/2, reinforcing steel is provided in the owing manner:
- a. Thermal flexural tension - Reinforcing steel is provided in accordance with ACI-505. The minimum area of steel provided is 0.25 percent of the gross concrete cross-sectional area in each direction.
- b. Bending moment tension - Sufficient reinforcing steel is provided to resist the moment on the basis of the cracked section theory. The exception is when the bending moment tension is additive to the thermal tension, the allowable tensile stress in the reinforcing steel is 0.5 fy.
ar stress limits and reinforcing for radial shear are in accordance with Chapter 26 of ACI-318 h the following exceptions:
- a. Formula 26-12 of the Code is replaced by:
Vci = Kbd(fc)1/2 + Mcr(V/M) + Vi re:
K = 1.75 - (0.036/np+ 4.0 np but not less than 0.6 for p >0.003.
p < 0.003, the value of K is zero.
n = (505/(fc)1/2)
(A s/bd)
= (1/y)(6((fc)1/2) + fpe + fn + fi)
fpe = compressive stresses in concrete due to prestress only applied normal to the cross-section after all losses (including the stresses induced by any secondary moments), at the extreme fiber of the section at which tensile stresses are caused by live loads. (fpe is negative for tensile stresses; positive for compressive stresses) fn = stresses due to applied axial loads (fn is negative for tensile stresses; positive for compressive stresses) fi = stresses due to the initial loads at the extreme fiber of a section at which tensile stresses are caused by the applied loads (including the stresses induced by any secondary moments, fi is negative for tensile stresses; positive for compressive stresses)
V = shear at the section under consideration due to the applied loads M = moment at the critical section under consideration, in the direction of decreasing moment, due to the applied loads. The critical section is considered to be at a distance of 1/2 (d) from the support, where d is the effective depth of the concrete section.
Vi = shear due to the initial loads (positive when the initial shear is in the same direction as the shear due to the applied loads).
The lower limit given by the ACI-318-63 on Vci as 1.7bd(fc)1/2 is not applied.
- b. Formula 26-13 of the Code is replaced by:
= 3.5bd(fc)1/2 [1 + (fpe + fn)/(3.5(fc)1/2)]1/2 + Vp Eq (8) re Vp = radial shear component of effective prestress due to the curvature of tendon at the ion considered, and the term, fn, is as defined in Equation (7). All other notations are in ordance with Chapter 26 of ACI-318-63.
ation (7) is based on test and work done by Dr. A. H. Mattock of the University of hington. Equation (8) is based on the commentary for the Proposed Redraft of Section 2610 CI-318 by Dr. A. H. Mattock, dated December 1962.
en these equations indicate that the allowed shear stress in concrete is zero, radial shear ties provided to resist all the calculated shear.
2.2.6 Prestress Losses ccordance with ACI-318-63, the design provides for prestress losses caused by the following cts:
- a. Seating of anchorage
- c. Creep of concrete
- d. Shrinkage of concrete
- e. Stress relaxation of steel
- f. Frictional losses due to intended or unintended curvature in the tendon of these losses have been predicted with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
he present application, the environment of the prestressing system and concrete is not reciably different from that found in conventional prestressed concrete structures such as ges and buildings. Data from research and practical experience with this type construction e made it possible to evaluate conservatively the allowances for all the prestress loss due to ous causes.
2.2.7 Capacity Reduction Factors capacity of all load-carrying structural elements is reduced by a capacity reduction factor ()
iven below. The justification for these numerical values is given in Appendix 5.C. These ors provide for the possibility that small adverse variations in material strengths, kmanship, dimensions, control, and degree of supervision, while individually within required rances and the limits of good practice, may occasionally combine to result in undercapacity.
capacity reduction factors used are as follows:
= 0.90 for concrete in flexure
= 0.85 for tension, shear, bond, and anchorage in concrete
= 0.75 for spirally reinforced concrete compression members
= 0.70 for tied compression members
= 0.90 for fabricated structural steel
= 0.90 for mild reinforcing steel
= 0.95 for prestressed tendons in direct tension 2.3 Structural Analysis containment is analyzed by a finite element computer program for individual loading cases of d loads, live loads, winds and tornadoes, temperatures, pressures, and prestresses. A dynamic lysis for seismic loads is performed. The results of the various loadings are superimposed ording to the design and factored equations as stipulated in Sections 5.2.2.2.4 and 5.2.2.2.5.
2.3.1 Critical Areas of Analysis main areas for design analysis are:
Restraints at the top and bottom of the cylinder Restraints at the edge of the dome Ring girder Behavior of the base slab relative to an elastic foundation Transient temperature gradients in the steel liner plate and concrete Large penetrations Tendon anchorage zones Concentrated loads Seismic loads 2.3.2 Analytical Techniques analysis of the containment consists of two parts: the axisymmetric analysis and the axisymmetric analysis. The axisymmetric analysis is performed by utilizing a finite element puter program for the individual loading cases of dead loads, live loads, temperatures, sures, and prestresses. The axisymmetric finite element representation of the containment mes that the structure is axisymmetric and does not take into account the buttresses, etrations, brackets, and anchors. These items, together with the lateral loads due to hquakes, winds, tornadoes, and various concentrated loads, are considered in the axisymmetric analysis.
2.3.2.1 Axisymmetric Analysis axisymmetric analysis is performed by using a finite element computer program developed Dr. E. L. Wilson under the sponsorship of the National Science Foundation. Such a method of lysis is normally used for thick-walled structures where a conventional shell analysis may d less accurate results. Good correlation has been demonstrated between the finite element lysis method and the test results for thick wall model vessels.
finite element technique is a general method of structural analysis in which a continuous cture is replaced by a system of elements connected at a finite number of nodal points. In lying this method to an axisymmetric solid structure, such as a containment shell, the tinuous structure is replaced by a system of rings of quadrilateral cross-sections which are rconnected at the circumferential joints. Based on energy principles, a set of force equilibrium ations is formulated in which the radial and axial displacements at the circumferential joints
finite element mesh used to describe the structure is shown in Figures 5.2-16 through 5.2-18.
upper and lower portions of the containment are analyzed separately to permit use of a ater number of elements for those areas of the structure which are of major concern, e.g., the girder area and the haunch connecting the cylindrical shell to the base slab. The finite ment mesh of the base slab is extended into the foundation to give consideration to the elastic re of the foundation material and its effect upon the behavior of the base slab. The tendon ess gallery is designed as a separate structure.
finite element analysis produces stresses due to axisymmetric loads. The stresses from the hquake loads, as well as wind and tornado loads, are obtained by the nonaxisymmetric lysis and then superimposed on the stresses obtained from the finite element analysis. The l summation of all the stresses is used in the design of the base slab, shell, and dome. The liner e is considered as an integral part of the structure and is included in the finite element mesh of containment.
rmal loads result from temperature differentials across the cylindrical wall. The design perature gradients for the containment are shown on Figure 5.2-3. In the finite element lysis, when temperatures are specified at every nodal point, thermal stresses are obtained at the ter of each element.
computer program used in the finite element analysis is capable of handling the following uts:
Eight different materials Nonlinear stress-strain curves for each material Axisymmetric loadings of any shape program outputs are:
C D
P auxiliary computer program plots the isostress curves based on the outputs of the ementioned program.
nonaxisymmetric configurations and loadings require various methods of analysis. The criptions of the methods used, as applied to the different parts of the containment, are given in following sections.
2.3.3 Buttress and Tendon Anchorage Zone Analyses containment has three buttresses. At each buttress, two out of any group of three hoop ons are spliced by anchoring on the opposite faces of the buttress, and the third tendon is tinuous through the buttress.
ween the opposite anchorages in the buttress, the compressive forces exerted by the spliced ons are twice as great as elsewhere on the shell. This value, combined with the effect of the on which is not spliced, is 1.5 times the prestressing force acting outside of the buttresses.
thickness at the buttress is about 1.5 times that of the wall. Thus, the hoop stresses as well as hoop strains and radial displacements can be considered as being nearly constant all around structure.
vertical stresses and strains, caused by the vertical post-tensioning, become constant a short ance from the anchorages because of the stiffness of the cylindrical shell. The stresses and ins remain nearly axisymmetric despite the presence of the buttresses. The effect of the resses on the overall vessel behavior is negligible, whether the structure is under dead loads or tress loads.
analysis of the anchorage zone stresses at the buttresses is the most critical of the various s of anchorage areas on the shell. The local stress distribution in the immediate vicinity of the ring plates is investigated using the following procedures:
- a. The Guyons Equivalent Prism Method: This method is based on the experimental photoelastic results as well as the equilibrium considerations of homogeneous and continuous media. It also considers the relative bearing plate dimensions of the anchorages. (Reference 5.2-1)
- b. The experimental test data presented by S. J. Taylor of the March 1967 London Conference of the Institute of Civil Engineers (Group H, Paper 49): these data are used to evaluate the effect of the biaxial stresses at the anchorages, including the effects of the trumpet welded to the bearing plate.
- c. F. Leonhardts formula for determining the bursting force in the anchorage zone of a prestressed concrete member (Reference 5.2-2).
- d. The three-dimensional stress distribution in the anchorage zones is analyzed in sufficient detail to permit a rational evaluation of the stress concentrations. A conical wedge segment is used as the basic design element and the radial splitting tension is determined as a tangential distribution function. The summation of the splitting stresses through the entire volume of the leading zone establishes the
combinations of the values are analyzed and the most critical values selected.
Note: For description of water intrusion into the tendon gallery from around the bearing plates during construction and methods of repair, see Appendix 5.F.
nsient thermal gradients are used in the analysis and the resulting stresses are superimposed on bursting stresses obtained from the triaxial stress analysis.
possibility of a torsional load being applied to the anchors because the tendon wires are ted was considered. It was determined that no such load occurs since the ram pull rod is free otate during the stressing operation.
design of the anchorage zone reinforcing is based on the results of these analyses, and the owing considerations:
- a. Bechtel Topical Report BC-Top-7, Full Scale Buttress Test for Prestressed Nuclear Containment Structures.
- b. Design of similar anchorages.
- c. Rebar spacing determined to allow ease in placing of sound concrete behind the anchorage bearing plates.
- d. Review of the reinforcing details from earlier projects undertaken by the consulting firm of T. Y. Lin, Kulka, Yang and Associates.
2.3.4 Stresses Near Large Openings analytical solutions for determining the state of stresses in the vicinity of large openings are ed on the procedure described in the Welding Research Council (WRC) Bulletin Number 102, tled State of Stress in a Circular Cylindrical Shell with a Circular Hole. (Reference 5.2-3) analysis of the containment, as a whole, was first carried out without considering any nings. This analysis has been done by using the finite element program.
containment, considering openings, is then analyzed as follows:
- a. Formulate differential equations for the shell in a complex variable form with the center of the hole as the origin.
- b. Solve the differential equations.
- c. Evaluate parameters in the solution.
- e. Calculate membrane forces, moments, and shears around and at the edge of the opening.
- f. Increase and reinforce the wall thickness around the opening to carry the higher forces, moments, and shears. The effects of stress concentration due to the thickening of the wall are considered.
- g. Evaluate the effects of prestressing that are not handled in the WRC Bulletin Number 102.
- h. Check the design to ensure that the strength of the reinforcement provided is adequate to replace the strength removed by the opening. This check is done to assure a good degree of compatibility between the general containment shell and the areas around the opening.
analyze the thermal stresses around the openings the following procedure is used. At the edge he opening a uniformly distributed moment equal but opposite to the moment existing on the of the shell is applied. The opening is then analyzed using the methods of the WRC Bulletin mber 102. The effects are superimposed on the stresses calculated by the finite element hod.
membrane stresses resulting from the seismic loads around the openings are modified by ropriate stress concentration factors.
ical details of reinforcing around the equipment hatch and personnel lock are shown on ures 5.2-4 and 5.2-5.
2.3.5 Seismic Analysis seismic loads on the containment are determined from a dynamic analysis of the structure.
method of analysis is presented in Section 5.8.3.
2.3.6 Wind and Tornado Analyses design wind loads on the containment are a function of the kinetic energy per volume of the ving air mass. The product of one-half of the air density and the square of the resultant design city results in a pressure corresponding to the design wind.
ermination of the design wind pressure on the containment is in accordance with the ASCE er 3269, Wind Forces on Structures.
pressure corresponding to the standard air at 0.07651 pcf at 15C and 760 mm of mercury in s of the velocity at the appropriate height zone is given by:
ilarly, the design pressure, including the effect of the shape coefficient, Cd, is given by:
p = q x Cd = 0.002558V2 Cd design wind velocity for the containment, with the enclosure building attached to it, is taken e 115 mph with gusts up to 140 mph. The shape coefficient for the enclosure building is found e:
Cd = 1.30 design wind pressure based on the above shape coefficient and the wind velocity of 140 mph P = 65.2 psf design pressure is assumed to be constant throughout the height of the enclosure building and eing resisted entirely by the containment.
design tornado loads on the containment are analyzed on the following basis.
- a. Tornado loads are not coincident with an accident or earthquake.
- b. Differential bursting pressure between the inside and outside of the containment is assumed to be 3 psi pressure occurring in three seconds (1 psi/second), followed by a calm for two seconds and a repressurization outside.
- c. The wind force on the containment is considered as a uniform static load caused by a tornado funnel having a peripheral tangential velocity of 300 mph and a translational velocity of 60 mph. These velocities are combined, resulting in a design wind velocity of 360 mph. The applicable portions on wind design methods described in the ASCE Paper 3269 are used, particularly for shape factors. The provisions in the ASCE Paper 3269 for gust factors and variation of wind velocity with height do not apply. The wind velocity is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the height of the structure.
- d. The metal sidings (but not the supporting frame) of the enclosure are designed to be blown away by the differential bursting pressure, thereby, subjecting the containment to the lateral forces resulting from the 360 mph wind.
- e. Tornado-borne missiles is defined in Section 5.2.5.1.2.
- f. Except for local crushing at the missile impact area, the allowable stresses available to resists the effects of tornadoes are 90 percent of the yield strength of the reinforcing steel and 85 percent of the ultimate strength of the concrete.
Cd = 0.70 re:
h = containment height above ground t = projection of buttress d = maximum outside diameter of the containment maximum pressure is found to be 274 psf (negative) and occurs at 90 degrees to the direction ind. Since the analysis of the containment is limited to uniform pressure loading, 80 percent he maximum pressure is assumed to act uniformly across the horizontal projection of the tainment. This is believed to be a conservative approach.
2.3.7 Results of Structural Analyses led plots for the results of structural analyses on moments, shears, normal forces, and ections of all loading conditions are shown in Figures 5.2-19 through 5.2-26. Corresponding sses at various locations on the containment are shown in Tables 5.2-1 through 5.2-9.
ormations are consistent with the elastic strains; i.e., design is not governed by deformation.
deformations will not affect the continued functional capability of the containment structure ny other Class I structure which might interact with it. Measurable relative displacements are ected between the containment and other components and structures due to the loads imposed.
se displacements have been accounted for by providing expansion joints or, in the case of t pipes, imposing those deflections on the interfacing components.
3 STEEL LINER PLATE AND PENETRATION SLEEVES containment steel liner plate and penetration sleeves are designed to serve as the primary age barrier for the containment. Typical details of the liner are shown on Figures 5.2-6 and
- 7. The design considered the composite action of the liner and the concrete structure and udes the transient effects of the liner due to temperature changes during construction, normal ration, and the LOCA. The changes in strain to be experienced by the liner due to these cts, as well as those at the pressure testing of the containment, are considered.
stability of the liner is achieved by anchoring it to the concrete structure. At all penetration ves, the liner is thickened to reduce stress concentrations, based on the 1968 ASME Code, tion III, for Class B vessels. The thickened portions of the liner are then anchored to the crete. All weldments associated with the penetration sleeves are designed to resist the full lied loads. Typical details of the penetration sleeves are shown on Figure 5.2-8.
ection III, Nuclear Vessels, 1968 Edition through the summer 1969 addenda of the ASME e, except the external bolting attachments to the equipment hatch which were designed to t the requirements of Section III, Subsection NE, 1986 Edition.
solated areas, the liner has an initial inward curvature due to fabrication and erection rances and inaccuracies. The anchors are designed to resist the forces and moments induced n a section of liner between anchors has initial inward curvature while the adjacent panels e no such imperfections. As a result, inward deformation of the liner between anchors may ur under both operating and accident conditions. The liner and the anchors are designed with icient ductility to undergo displacement to relieve the loads without rupturing under these ditions.
h the exception of the containment spray piping supports, an insert plate is provided to smit the load through the liner at each location where a load is transferred to the walls, slabs, ome of the containment. The insert plate is anchored to the concrete by appropriate anchors shear connections. Examples of such insert plates are the polar crane brackets and the floor m brackets at the operating deck. Typical details of these brackets are shown in Figure 5.2-9.
3.1 Construction Materials erials used for the construction of the steel liner plate and penetration sleeves are listed in tion 5.2.1.
3.2 Design Criteria design criteria applied to the containment steel liner plate to meet the specified leak rate er the operating and accident conditions are as follows:
- a. The liner is protected from damage by potential missiles generated from a LOCA and main steam pipe break.
- b. The liner strains are limited to those values that have been shown by past experience to result in leaktight pressure vessels and piping.
- c. The liner is prevented from developing distortions sufficient to impair leak tightness.
3.3 Design Loads liner is designed with the capability to resist, without rupture, the compressive stresses due to following loads:
- a. Construction loads, particularly those which are applied to the liner before the concrete is placed.
- c. Thermal gradients.
- d. Thermal shock loads due to cold sprays.
- e. Local loads, such as structural supports, pipe supports, and restraints, etc.
- f. Prestress loads.
- g. Creep and shrinkage loads.
fatigue analysis of the liner plate is made on the basis of the following considerations:
- a. Thermal cycling due to annual outdoor temperature variations. The number of cycles for this loading is 40 for the plant life of 40 years. (Daily temperature variations do not penetrate a significant distance into the concrete shell to appreciably change the average temperature of the shell relative to the liner, and therefore, are not considered.)
- b. Thermal cycling due to the containment interior temperature variations during heatup and cooldown of the reactor system. The number of cycles for this loading is assumed to be 500.
- c. Thermal cycling due to the LOCA is assumed to be one cycle.
3.4 Permissible Stresses and Strains basis for establishing the allowable liner strains is the 1968 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel e,Section III, Nuclear Vessels, Article 4.
thermal stresses in the liner fall into the categories as considered in Article 4 of Section III.
allowable stresses in Figure N-415 (A) of the Code are for alternating stress intensity for on steels, with the temperature not exceeding 700F.
fulfill the criteria set forth in the 1968 ASME Code, Paragraph N-412 (m) 2, the liner is rained against significant distortion of an angle grid anchor system. Materials are expected to xposed to a maximum temperature of approximately 289F under a LOCA condition which is l below the 700F limit. The liner design also satisfies the criteria for limiting the strains on basis of fatigue consideration. Figure N-415 (A) of Paragraph N-412 (n) of the ASME Code its appropriate limitations are used as the bases for establishing the allowable strains for the r.
ce the graph in Figure N-415 (A) does not extend below 10 cycles, 10 cycles were used for the CA conditions instead of one cycle.
allowable strain from Figure N-415 (A), based on 10 significant thermal cycles on the LOCA ditions, would be approximately two percent. However, the maximum allowable membrane
maximum allowable compressive strain is set for the test condition because it is expected the e will be less than that experienced under the LOCA conditions. The maximum allowable ile strain is 0.2 percent for the test conditions; the predicted value is nearly zero.
3.5 Design of Liner Plate Anchorage anchors are designed to preclude failure when subjected to the most severe loads or ormations. They are designed so that a missing or defective anchor will not jeopardize the rall integrity of the liner and anchorage system.
following factors are considered in the design of the anchorage system:
- a. The initial inward curvature of the liner between anchors due to fabrication and erection tolerances and inaccuracies.
- b. Variations of anchor spacing.
- c. Misalignment of liner seams.
- d. Variations of plate thickness.
- e. Variations of the yield strength of the liner plate materials.
- f. Variations of the Poissons ratio for the liner plate materials.
- g. Variations of the anchor stiffness.
anchorage system satisfies the following conditions:
- a. The anchors have sufficient strength and ductility so their energy absorbing capability is sufficient to restrain the maximum force and displacement resulting from the condition where a panel with an initial outward curvature is adjacent to a panel with an inward curvature.
- b. The anchors have sufficient strength to resist the bending moment that results when a panel with an initial outward curvature is adjacent to a panel with an inward curvature.
- c. The anchors have sufficient strength to resist the radial pullout forces.
proprietary topical report, Consumer Power Company Palisades Nuclear Power Plant tainment Building Liner Plant Design Report B-TOP-1, constitutes the basic design roach used in Millstone Unit 2.
- a. The welding of the stiffeners is 3/16-6 x 12 rather than 3/16-4 x 12. This does not invalidate the analysis, because the spring constants used in the analysis are similar.
- b. The stiffeners on the thickened plates are not welded with a double fillet weld as stated in the topical report. The 3/16-6 x 12 welding is used on all stiffeners. The topical report indicates that additional welding is not required to resist the loads.
- c. The 1/4 inch liner material is ASTM A-285 Grade A. This plate has a specified yield strength of 24,000 psi which is lower than the values used in Topical Report, B-TOP-1. This would only tend to decrease the loads on the anchors, as stated in Section 3.4 of the report.
- d. A self supporting dome is used on Millstone Unit 2. It is stiffened in two directions instead of one as stated in Section 2.2.2 of the report. Details of the dome are shown on Figure 5.2-6.
3.6 Design of Weldments agraphs of UW-8 to UW-19, Subsection B,Section VIII of the 1968 ASME Code are used as a de in the design of the weldment.
ection and testing of liner plate weldments during and after erection are discussed in tion 5.9.3.5.3.
lity control of field welding electrodes are presented in Section 5.9.3.5.4.
lity control procedures for field welding and nondestructive examination are defined in tion 5.9.4.
4 INTERIOR STRUCTURES 4.1 General ign of the containment interior structures evolves from four basic systems: reactor coolant, n steam, engineered safety features and fuel handling.
structures which house or support the basic systems are designed to sustain the loading cases utlined in Sections 5.2.4.4.1 and 5.2.4.4.2.
design bases are as follows:
- a. The structures are capable of sustaining all operating loads, seismic loads, and thermal deformations.
to any other system is prevented. In addition, a single failure in one of the cooling pipes of the nuclear steam supply system is restricted such that propagation of the failure to the other cooling piping is prevented.
ctural details for the supports for major Class I equipment such as the reactor vessel and steam erators, are shown in Figure 5.2-11 through 5.2-13. Typical details for the primary and ondary shield walls are shown on Figure 5.2-14.
4.2 Construction Materials following materials are used in the construction of the containment interior structures:
crete:
Primary shield walls 5,000 psi Steam generator supports 5,000 psi Secondary shield walls 4,000 psi Refueling pool walls 4,000 psi Reinforcing steel ASTM A-615, Grade 60 Carbon steel plates ASTM A-302, Grade B, A-441, and A-569 Stainless steel plates ASTM A-240, Type 304 Stainless steel tubes ASTM A-358, Type 304 Structural and miscellaneous steel ASTM A-36 and A-441 Anchor bolts ASTM A-307, A-325, and A-490 4.3 Design Loads following loads are considered in the design of the interior structures:
- a. Dead loads
- b. Live loads
- c. Earthquake loads
- d. Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) loads
- e. Pipe rupture loads
d loads consist of the weight of the concrete, structural steel, equipment, major piping, and trical conductors. Equipment dead loads are those specified on the drawings supplied by the ufacturers of the various pieces of equipment. Major equipment supported by the interior ctures are reactor vessel, steam generators, pressurizers, and the reactor coolant pumps.
4.3.2 Live Loads e loads for the design of the interior structures are:
Floor and equipment area 250 psf Containment laydown area 1,000 psf ipment live loads are those specified on the drawings supplied by the manufacturers of the ous pieces of equipment.
4.3.3 Earthquake Loads thquake loads are predicated upon an operating base earthquake at the site having a horizontal und acceleration of 0.09 g and a vertical acceleration of 0.06 g. In addition, a design basis hquake having a ground acceleration of 0.17 g and a vertical acceleration of 0.11 g is used to ck the design to ensure that there will be no loss of function.
mic response spectrum curves are given in Section 5.8.1.1, for both horizontal and vertical und motions.
4.3.4 Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA) Loads maximum forces which result from a pipe rupture are based on the following:
- a. A single break in any pipe under consideration is assumed to occur at one time.
- b. The maximum area of the break is assumed to be an opening in the pipe equivalent to its cross-sectional area.
- c. The maximum force is based on a free discharge from an open-ended pipe.
minimum design pressure and temperature of the interior structures are equal to, respectively, peak pressure and temperature occurring as a result of the complete blowdown of the reactor lant due to a rupture of the reactor coolant system. This could be up to and including the othetical double-ended rupture of the largest pipe in the primary coolant system. The owing effects associated with a LOCA are considered:
- a. Thrust loads resulting from the rapid mass release from a pipe break in the reactor system or other systems, if the break occurs during a design incident.
- c. Jet forces resulting from the impingement of the escaping mass upon the adjacent structure.
- d. Pipe whipping following a pipe break in the reactor coolant system.
- e. Rapid rise in ambient temperature and accompanying rise in ambient pressure.
- f. Missiles as described in Section 5.2.5.1.1.
k-before-break (LBB) analyses of the reactor coolant system (RCS) main coolant loops, the surizer surge line, and unisolable RCS portions of the safety injection and shutdown cooling ng allows the exclusion of the dynamic effects associated with pipe ruptures in the above ng segments from the design basis. Dynamic effects of pipe rupture include the effects of pipe pping, subcompartment pressurization and discharging fluids.
4.4 Design Criteria stablishing the structural design criteria for the interior structures, consideration was given to ructure which would withstand the differential pressure within the cavities in the event of an dent, and to minimizing the effects of the pipe rupture force by the use of supports and raints.
ACI-318-63, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, and AISC Manual of el Construction, 6th Edition, are used as design criteria for reinforced concrete and structural l, respectively, except as noted in the following:
Localized concrete yielding is permitted when it can be demonstrated that the yield capacity of the component is not affected, and that this small localized yielding does not generate missiles which could damage the structure. Full recognition is given to the time increments associated with these postulated failure conditions, and yield capacities are appropriately increased when a transient analysis demonstrates that the rapid strain rate justifies this approach. The walls are also designed to provide adequate protection for potential missile generation which could damage the containment liner.
The yielding of concrete discussed above concerns itself with localized stress concentration under the load associated with a LOCA. The load due to pipe whipping followed a pipe break in the reactor coolant system is considered a concentrated load and is analyzed to ascertain that its local effect on the concrete surface will not result in changes in the member capacity. These high local stresses are not identified because of simplifications made in the design analysis. These high stresses are allowed because they occur in a very small percentage of the cross-section, are confined by material at lower stress, and would have to be considerably greater than the values allowed before significant local plastic yield would result.
lting from any high energy pipe rupture. The high concrete stress is limited to the area of act and is confined by concrete in compression at lower stresses, and is estimated servatively to be not more than one inch in thickness within the secondary wall boundary.
ce the area of high concrete stresses is in compression, no significant concrete cracking is ected. Pipe rupture is postulated at locations which result in the most critical conditions for gning the structures. A typical case is shown in Figures 5.2-35 and 5.2-36. Under this load, bined with other loads in the design load combination, a strip of concrete wall of width L as wn in Figure 5.2-36 was analyzed. A continuous span of secondary shield wall, supported at buttresses and fixed at the refueling pool walls was assumed. Reinforcing steel was portioned according to the results obtained.
strength of the structures at working stress and overall yielding is compared to various ing combinations to ensure safety. The structures are designed to meet the performance and ngth requirements under the following conditions:
- a. At design loads.
- b. At factored loads.
4.4.1 At Design Loads s loading is the basic working stress design. The structure is designed for the following ing cases:
- a. D+L
- b. D+L+H
- c. D+L+H+E re:
D = dead loads L = live loads H = thermal loads under operating conditions E = operating basis earthquake 4.4.2 At Factored Loads structure is checked for the factored loads and load combinations as follows:
- a. C = 1/ (1.25D + 1.25L + 1.0 R + 1.25E)
- b. C = 1/ (1.25D + 1.25L + 1.25 H + 1.25E)
- d. C = 1/ (1.0D + 1.0L + 1.0 H + 1.0E)
- e. C = 1/ (1.0D + 1.0L + 1.0 P + 1.OTI + 1.0E) re:
C = required capacity of the structure to resist factored loads
= capacity reduction factor D = dead loads L = live loads H = thermal loads under operating conditions P = differential pressure due to a double-ended pipe rupture TI = loads due to thermal gradient produced by a double-ended pipe break E = operating basis earthquake loads E = design basis earthquake loads R = loads due to pipe rupture (includes both jet and pressure differential forces) 4.4.3 Thermal Gradients thermal gradients in the interior structures are maintained at a low level so they have very ll structural effects on the concrete walls. Nevertheless, these effects are considered in the gn.
- a. Primary shield walls.
Based on the reactor vessel and cooling piping heat loads and 100 percent of cooling air, the temperature within the primary shield walls is approximately 7F higher than the air temperature, due to nuclear heating. Cooling air from the CAR coolers is supplied to the bottom of the reactor cavity, primary shield walls, reactor vessel supports and the ex-core detectors. Calculations, which support the permanent reactor cavity seal project and neutron shield modification, have estimated that the cavity cooling air limits the maximum temperature of the primary shield walls to less than 150F.
- b. Secondary shield walls, steam generator pedestals, and refueling pool walls.
The ventilation system will eliminate the temperature gradients across the secondary shield walls, the refueling pool walls, and the operating floor. The ambient temperature inside the containment varies between 105F and 120F under operating conditions.
differential pressure-time curves across the primary shield wall and the annular space ween the reactor coolant pipe and the pipe sleeve extending through the reactor cavity wall logical shield) have been excluded from the design basis, as all high energy lines within the tor vessel cavity have supporting NRC approved leak before break analyses. The Bechtel PRA computer program (NS731-NE576) is used to calculate the differential pressure-time ves across the secondary shield walls. The calculations are based on conservation of mass, mentum, and energy.
ensuing flow from the compartment follows the orifice flow relations with the entrance and tion losses included in the flow coefficient for each case.
The following is a summary for the input parameters used for the computer analysis of steam generator compartment pressurization:
Containment free volume (cubic feet) 1.899 x 106 Initial containment temperature (F) 120 Initial containment pressure (psia) 14.7 Initial containment humidity (% 30 East Steam Generator Compartment Volume (cubic feet) 62,000 Vent Area (square feet) 2,800 West Steam Generator Compartment Volume (cubic feet) 54,100 Vent Area (square feet) 2,620 ther steam line nor feedwater line breaks were analyzed in the steam generator compartments.
refore a double-ended guillotine break in the hot leg, with a restricted break area of 10.78 are feet, is considered, which provides the bounding rate of energy and mass releases.
Pressurizer Compartment was originally designed for a 22 psi differential pressure based on ontiguous boundary with the east steam generator cavity. However, due to a modified, semi-n blockhouse design that was implemented to support the replacement of the original surizer and the adoption of Leak-Before-Break methodology to eliminate pressurization cts due to the primary coolant piping, the design differential pressure for this structure is ently based on a double-ended feedwater break. Utilizing a break size comparison between less energetic feedwater break case (2.97square feet) and the previously analyzed hot leg k case (10.78 square feet) provides a bounding estimate for the differential pressure effects m the feedwater break.
PRA, result in differential pressures across compartment walls that are inherently larger than actually occur. Consequently, no additional safety margins are necessary.
COMPARTMENT PRESSURES DIFFERENTIAL (PSI) DESIGN DIFFERENTIAL (PSI) am Generator Cavity (East) 8.7 22 am Generator Cavity (West) 9.95 22 ssurizer 2.4 3 5 SPECIFIC DESIGN TOPICS 5.1 Missile Protection 5.1.1 Design Criteria Inside the Containment h pressure reactor coolant system components, which could be the source of missiles, are ened either by the concrete shield walls enclosing the reactor coolant loops, by the concrete rating floors, or by special missile shields to block the passage of any missiles and prevent m from striking the wall and dome of the containment. All potential missile sources are nted so that the missiles are intercepted by the shields or structures provided. A shield is vided over the control rod driving mechanism to block the passage of any missiles generated result of a postulated fracture of the nozzle.
sile protection inside the containment is provided to comply with the following criteria:
- a. The containment liner is protected from a loss of function due to damage by missiles as might be generated in a LOCA for piping break sizes up to and including the double-ended severance of the largest reactor coolant pipe.
- b. The engineered safety features, systems, and components required to maintain the integrity of the containment are protected from a loss of function due to damage by the following missiles:
- 1. Valve stems
- 2. Valve bonnets
- 3. Instrument thimbles
- 4. Various types and sizes of nuts and bolts
following methods are used to implement the missile protection criteria:
- a. Components of the reactor coolant system are examined to identify and classify missiles according to the sizes, shapes, and kinetic energy so as to analyze their effects.
- b. Missile velocities are calculated considering both the fluid and mechanical driving forces that exist during missile generation.
- c. The reactor coolant system is surrounded by reinforced concrete and steel structures which are designed to withstand the forces associated with the double-ended rupture of a reactor coolant pipe and to stop the missiles.
structural design of the missile shields takes into account both the static and the impact loads is based upon the state-of-the-art of missile penetration data.
k Before Break (LBB) analyses of the reactor coolant system (RCS) main coolant loops, the surizer surge line, and unisolable RCS portions of the safety injection and shutdown cooling ng allows the exclusion of the dynamic effects associated with pipe ruptures in the above ng segments from the design basis. Dynamic effects of pipe rupture include the effects of pipe pping, subcompartment pressurization and discharging fluids.
tain postulated incidents such as the massive, rapid failure of the reactor vessel, steam erators, pressurizers, and the main coolant pump flywheels and casings are considered edible because of the material characteristics, inspections, quality control during fabrication, the conservatism in design as applied to the particular components. These same factors also ly to the stems and bonnets of both motor-operated shutdown cooling suction valves located de containment. Both valves have been subjected to detailed structural and functional lysis, and the stem and bonnets have been found to not be credible missiles.
stablishing the credibility of any missile source, the use of redundancy of load paths, such that single failure could lead to a missile ejection, has been credited as the basis for adequate ection from missile generation. In the case of missiles originating from valves, the valve stem onsidered a potential missile only when it is not back seated and where no air or motor rator exists that would interfere with the ejection of the valve stem. Valve bonnets are not sidered as a source of missiles when the flanges and bolts are designed in accordance with ME Section III and the torque is controlled during the tightening process by approved plant cedures. Valve bonnet missiles are also not considered credible when the bonnet is welded to valve body or in cases where the bonnet is integral with the body of the valve. While the ure of single bolts and nuts is considered credible, they are considered a negligible concern to the small amount of stored elastic energy that they process.
sile protection outside the containment is provided to comply with the following uirements:
- a. The containment steel liner plate and penetrations are protected from the loss of function due to damage by tornado borne missiles.
- b. All engineered safety features piping which penetrates the containment, and which is required to maintain the containment integrity, is protected from a loss of function due to tornado borne missiles.
- c. All components required to maintain the containment integrity, or whose failure would result in the uncontrolled release of radioactivity, are protected from a loss of function due to damage by tornado borne missiles.
tection is provided for the following three types of tornado borne missiles:
- a. A fir plank, 4 inches by 12 inches by 12 feet., weighing 105 pounds and traveling end-on at a speed of 250 mph.
- b. A passenger auto (4,000 lb.) impact velocity of 50 mph not more than 25 feet above grade with a contact area of 20 square feet.
- c. A 3 inch by 10 foot long (ASA Schedule 40) pipe (72 pounds) traveling end-on at a speed of 100 mph at any elevation on the structure.
endix 5.D addresses an expanded spectrum of tornado missiles which are additionally sidered in the design of Tornado Missile Protection that was requested by the NRC. The gn criteria presented in Appendix 5.D is an expansion of the tornado missile protection eria of this Section and does not delete any previous requirements. The fir plank of this Section the wooden beam of Appendix 5.D are the same missiles.
lysis of the effect of the impact of the missiles on structures is based on the methods presented he NavDocks P-51, Design of Protective Structures-a New Concept of Structural Behavior, lished by U.S. Bureau of Yards and Docks, August 1950, Washington, D.C.
visions to tie down all slabs, blocks, or partitions outside of containment which are potential mic or tornado missiles are described as follows:
- 1. Slabs and Blocks - Slabs and blocks which are potential seismic or tornado missiles are those items which fall into the category of hatch covers or removable partitions and lie within the Class I structures in areas containing Class I equipment or components.
All removable wall panels are tied structurally to the building by retaining members and reinforcing within the wall panel. In all cases, removable wall panels
as vents during build-up and decay of pressures which would possibly occur during a tornado, are secured with fastening devices which will resist all design forces due to such loading. Hatch covers which serve as vents are designed to open to relieve internal pressures, but are provided with mechanical retaining devices which prevent the element from becoming a missile during seismic or tornado occurrences.
- 2. Partitions - The partitions and walls that are located within areas housing Class I equipment or components are reinforced vertically and horizontally and are anchored around the perimeter of the elements to the building structure. All partitions within these areas are constructed of either reinforced concrete or reinforced concrete masonry units. The design provides structural adequacy to sustain appropriate seismic or differential pressures resulting from a tornado occurrence.
Earthquake loads are defined in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.8 of the FSAR.
Tornado pressure design criteria is defined in Section 5.2.2 of the FSAR.
5.1.3 Turbine Missile Consideration provisions to control turbine overspeed for the Millstone Unit Number 2 turbine generator are umented in Amendment 11 to the Millstone Unit Number 2 Preliminary Safety Analysis ort. Amendment 11 was filed with the Commission on June 12, 1970. Based on the overspeed ection and controls provided, the applicants conclude that the probability of destructive rspeed as a possible cause of turbine failure is extremely low.
bine missiles were discussed in Amendment 7 to the Millstone Unit Number 2 Preliminary ety Analysis Report filed with the Commission on April 24, 1970.
MP2 LP rotors, which were of the original shrunk-on wheel design, were replaced during 5 with monoblock rotors. The monoblock design eliminates the keyway between the rotor t and the shrunk-on wheels. In accordance with NRC approved GE methodology (ref.
REG-1048), the dominant mode of wheel failure and resulting missile generation was tified to be brittle fracture, due to keyway stress corrosion cracking occurring at or near mal operating speed. The requirement for the unfavorably oriented turbine (the case of MP2),
NUREG-1048 is that the probability be less than 10-5 per year. Since the monoblock rotor gn eliminates the brittle fracture mode, the probability for a burst and a missile at normal rating speed is negligible. The remaining probability is a function of a ductile failure that is endent upon the probability of a turbine overspeed event. The probability of a complete trol system failure was determined to be 1.7x10-6 with a GE Mark I control system (reference R M2-03001, Rev. 0, Attachment 2). As part of the GE Mark VIe turbine controls digital rade (reference Design Change MP2-10-01016, Attachment 15), GE determined that the
er to Figure 1.2-15 of the FSAR, Section E-E through the turbine building. When viewed m the south, the turbine generator unit rotates in a counter-clockwise direction. As can be seen his figure, the safety-related structures such as the containment, diesel generator rooms, iliary and control buildings, are protected from low angle missiles by the massive turbine erator pedestal. The probability of a high angle missile returning under gravity forces to strike portion of the plant is extremely low. This coupled with a review of the plant layout taining the components and systems required to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition hout off site power available indicates that turbine generated missile damage will not preclude safe shutdown of the plant.
5.2 Post-Tensioning Sequence detailed stressing sequence is based on the design requirements to limit the membrane ion in the concrete to 1.0(fci)1/2 and to minimize unbalanced loads which would produce erential stresses in the structure. Finite element mesh of the containment shell used to establish post-tensioning sequence is shown on Figure 5.2-18.
htel provides the post-tensioning system vendor with the prestressing force requirements, the cipated concrete elastic shrinkage and creep, and the numerical order in which the tendons are e stressed. The vendor then incorporates all this information, along with losses due to tendon xation, friction, and anchorage losses, if any, to establish the initial jacking force for each uential operation.
ce measurements are obtained by measuring the elongation of the prestressing tendons and paring it with the calculated forces indicated by the jack-dynanometer or pressure gauge. The er represents the pressure in the jack with a tolerance of 2 percent. The calibration of the e-jack pressure gauge or dynanometer combination is traceable to the National Bureau of ndards and is so certified prior to the application of prestressing forces. Pressure gauges and s so calibrated are always used together.
ing stressing, records are kept on the pressures applied and the corresponding elongations ined. Jack-dynanometer or gauge combinations are checked against elongation of the tendons any discrepancy exceeding 5 percent of the computed values utilizing the average load gation curve is corrected and documented.
5.3 Differential Displacement Between Structures ifferential settlement of one-eighth inch between the containment and the auxiliary building ndations is assumed for design. Effects of the dynamic displacement of adjacent structures due eismic disturbances are included in the analysis described in Section 5.8. It also includes the king of structures on dynamic elasticity of the foundations. The maximum and minimum es of displacement are taken as the separation of structures due to movement in opposite ctions, both vertically and horizontally. The maximum differential movement at the level of
ation were calculated to be three-eighth and one-eighth inches, respectively, when subject to a gn-basis earthquake. Provisions for 1.5 inches at all junctions between the containment cture and the auxiliary building were considered to be a conservative value. Provisions are e at all junctions between the containment and the auxiliary building to permit the differential vement to take place with no significant transfer of loads to the containment.
ng flexibility analyses include the effect of the differential movement between structures, as l as the effect of seismic acceleration on the piping and its contained masses.
5.4 Polar Crane for the Containment polar crane is designed to meet the loading requirements of the applicable portions of the ctric Overhead Crane Institute (EOCI) Specification Number 61 for Electric Overhead veling Cranes, except that the earthquake loading is the seismic response of the containment he crane supports. In addition, the crane bridge and trolley are provided with mechanical des to prevent possible derailment at the design basis earthquake. Furthermore, the polar crane esigned so that even in the unlikely event of the failure of a rail, the crane will remain on the ports.
ical details for the polar crane supports are shown in Figures 5.2-9 and 5.2-15.
5.5 Containment Maintenance Truss aintenance truss is provided in the containment for use in the maintenance of containment y piping and ease of inspection of the interior of the dome liner plate.
supported at the top by a large pin embedded in the containment dome. The bottom of the s rests on the polar crane runway rail. The truss is moved around the containment by the polar e.
truss is a Class I item designed for all postulated load conditions that are used for the tainment design.
5.6 Unit 2 Stack Unit 2 stack extends approximately 12 feet above the enclosure building and serves as a tilation discharge duct. It is designed to the following factored load equations. The seismic onse of the stack is taken as that of the enclosure building in which the stack is attached:
C = 1/ [(1.00 + 0.05) (D) + 1.25 E]
C = 1/ [(1.00 + 0.05) (D) + 1.25 W]
C = 1/ [(1.00 + 0.05) (D) + 1.0 E]
C = required capacity of the structure to resist factored loads capacity reduction factor D = dead loads of structure E = operating basis earthquake E = design basis earthquake W = wind or tornado loads 5.7 Pipe Whip Protection Criteria ails may be found in Section 6.1.4.1.1.1.
5.7.1 Methods of Protection Against Pipe Whip tection against critical pipe failures as defined in Section 6.1.4.1 of critical safety-related ets is assured by one of the following means:
- a. Plant layout is arranged such that the targets are physically separated from the effects of potential pipe failures. (See Section 6.1.4.1.1.2.)
- b. Either functional structure (such as walls, floors, etc.) or specially designed barriers are provided. Such barriers are also used to protect against the effects of jet impingement forces.
- c. In areas where unrestrained motion of a pipe failure as defined in Section 6.1.4.1.1.2 could hit a safety-related target, pipe restraints are employed.
Spacing of the restraints is as follows:
(i) Along a continuous run of restraints the spacing of restraints shall be:
L = (4Mp/Fj) where:
L = center-to-center span of restraint Mp = plastic moment of the pipe, considering the effect of longitudinal stresses resulting from the internal pipe pressure. Allowable stress is taken 1.2 times the lower limit yield stress as defined in ASME Section III, Nuclear Power Plant Components, Paragraph NB-3225.
Fj = jet impingement force as defined in Subsection d.
L = (Mp/Fj)
- d. If an analysis demonstrates a component can withstand the loading generated by either the jet impingement force, or the effect of a pipe whip impact, protection is assured.
The jet impingement load acting on a target shall be taken as:
Fj = (DLF) PKATE re:
Fj = jet impingement force DLF 2.0, Dynamic Load Factor to account for the amplification resulting from the sudden impulse nature of the jet force. The use of DLF values lower than 2.0 require justification.
P = the steady state blowdown pressure established for the specific break location, with consideration of internal fluid parameters based on the maximum Normal Operating Condition and piping internal friction, as appropriate.
K = 1.0, for cold water and non-flashing/subcooled fluid blowdown.
K = jet dispersion correction factor for steam and steam/water mixtures.
= [1 + (2x/De) tan ]-2, for x < 5 De
= 0.131, for x 5 De x = distance from pipe break to target De = effective diameter of break taken as internal area of pipe
= dispersion half angle-taken as 10 ATE = effective impingement area of target; i.e., area perpendicular to axis of jet spray.
The value depends upon the relative size and orientation of the jet and the target. For pipes and targets with curved surfaces, an appropriate shape factor may be used.
5.7.2 Design Procedures for Restraints and Barriers
- a. Pipe Restraints:
Reaction forces on restraints resulting from pipe breaks are taken to be:
Fr = 2.0 P x A
P = maximum normal operating pressure A = internal cross-sectional area of pipe The factor of two accounts for the dynamic amplification resulting from the sudden impulse nature of the jet force and its effect on supporting restraints. A lower value may be used if justified.
All restraints are designed using the working stress method. Allowable bending and tension stresses are taken as 1.2 times the lower limit yield stress, after the ASME Section III, Nuclear Power Plant Components, Paragraph NB-3225.
Other stresses are based upon AISC, Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings, 1963, Section 2.0. However, allowable stresses for welds and bolt loads are reduced to 90 percent the specified allowable values.
The structures supporting the pipe restraints are designed for the reaction load (Fr) as described in Section 5.2.2 for the Containment, Section 5.2.4 for the Containment Internals, and Section 5.4.3 for the Auxiliary Building.
- b. Pipe Impact Impact from unrestrained pipe motion is analyzed as follows:
The pipe is assumed to swing about its nearest restraint in a configuration that produces the worst analytical condition. Impact energy is taken to be:
EI = KE - EH re:
KE = (jet force) x (arc of swing)
EH = (plastic moment of pipe) x (angle of swing)
This information is then utilized to compute the structural effects on barriers. To account for local deformation the methods presented in the NAVDOCKS P-51, Design of Protective Structures - a New Concept of Structural Behavior, published by the U.S. Bureau of Yards and Docks, August 1950, Washington, D.C., and the Stanford Research Institute Formula as presented in Reference 5.2-5.
ign criteria for barriers are based upon energy methods, utilizing ductility ratios of 10 and 5, ectively, for steel and concrete in tension or flexure. The method of analysis is similar to that ented in Reference 5.2-6. Allowable stresses are taken as defined in AISC, Specification for Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings, Section 2.0 and
Containment Internals, and Section 5.4.3 for the Auxiliary Building.
5.8 Jib Crane for Containment Jib Crane for Containment is designed and fabricated in accordance with the requirements of ME NOG-1 Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, ltiple Girder), 2004 Section 4100 and 4300 for structural and seismic analysis, Section 4200 materials, welded and bolted connections, and Section 7000 for inspection and nondestructive mination testing. Areas not covered by ASME NOG-1-2004 conform to the requirements of M 70-2010 to the extent applicable to a jib crane.
mounting structure attaching the crane to the pressurizer cubicle Is designed to meet specific mic requirements (Seismic II/I) such that in the event of a design basis earthquake, the crane retain its structural integrity. A boom support structure, also designed to meet seismic criteria smic II/I), provides the support to secure the crane boom in the stored position to the top of pressurizer cubicle In the event of a design basis earthquake. The design of the Jib Crane for tainment on the pressurizer cubicle is based on the following criteria.
The crane is only operated during outage conditions. This dictates that the 3 psi accident condition for which the pressurizer cubicle is designed will not occur concurrently with the crane operation of the Jib Crane.
During plant operation, the crane is in a stored position, tied down, and that seismic considerations are accounted for.
The crane is operated only during outage conditions and utilizes predefined safe load paths approved in station heavy load procedures which were developed to meet NUREG 0612 requirements. Components/parts need not be operational following a seismic event, but are designed to retain structural integrity during an OBE or SSE.
6 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS 6.1 Types of Penetrations penetrations are pressure resistant, leak-tight, welded assemblies, which are fabricated, alled, inspected, and tested in accordance with the ASME Nuclear Vessel Code,Section III, 1 and the ANSI Nuclear Piping Code B 31.7.
6.1.1 Electrical Penetrations electrical penetration assemblies through the wall of the containment structure form part of containment pressure boundary and carry the (NPT) stamp in accordance with ASME tion III (1971). The low voltage power and control modules are mounted in a stainless steel der plate and are designed to meet or exceed all requirements of IEEE Standard 317, 1976.
E 317, 1971, Electrical Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear led Power Generating Stations. In addition to complete electrical prototype tests as described ection 8.7.2.2, prototype tests are performed which include leakage integrity of 1 x 10-6 dard cc/second of dry helium under post-accident environmental conditions, seismic integrity, mocycling, and simulated field installation. Replacement medium voltage electrical etration modules are designed to meet or exceed all requirements pursuant to IEEE 317, 1976.
ctrical aspects of these penetrations are described in Section 8.7.2.2.
6.1.2 Piping Penetrations gle barrier piping penetrations are provided for all piping passing through the containment ls. Carbon steel pipe sleeves of adequate diameter to allow passage of pipe and insulation re required are supplied.
closure, forming the single barrier, consists of modified pipe caps, double-flued heads, or ure plates welded to the wall sleeves. The applicable closure types are shown on Figure 5.2-8.
design data for the containment wall sleeves are included in Section 5.2.3.
6.1.3 Equipment Hatch and Personnel Lock equipment hatch, 19 feet in diameter, is provided to permit the transfer of equipment up to and uding the size of the reactor vessel head, into and out of the containment. It is fitted with a ble-gasketed flange around the dished door to minimize leakage in the unlikely event of a CA. Typical details of the equipment hatch are shown in Figure 5.2-4 and 5.2-10.
ddition to the (20) internal bolting assemblies used to secure the equipment hatch during mal operating modes, the equipment hatch has also been outfitted with four external swing attachments which are welded to the equipment hatch ring flange and hatch barrel liner plate.
external attachments provide a method of securing the hatch from the outside during
-power operation.
ersonnel lock is also provided for access into and out of the containment. The personnel lock quipped with double doors and a quick acting type, equalizing valve which connects the lock h the interior and exterior of the containment to equalize the pressure in the two systems when onnel are either entering or leaving the containment.
two doors in the personnel lock are interlocked to prevent both being opened simultaneously, to ensure that one door is completely closed before the opposite door can be opened. Remote cating lights and annunciators in the control room indicate the operational status of the door.
vision is made to bypass the interlock system and leave the doors open during plant cold tdown. The lock interior is provided with lighting and a communication system, each rating from an external supply.
be pressurized and checked to assure leak tightness in accordance with the Technical cifications.
ddition, the Personnel Lock has been designed to withstand the pressurization of the lock mber to the pressure of 54 psig. During the test, the door on the containment side of the mber is held closed by a special yoke installed only for the test. This pressurization of the mber assures the leak-tightness of the door penetrations and the outside lock door under the k pressure conditions.
ical details of the personnel lock are shown on Figures 5.2-5 and 5.2-10.
6.1.4 Fuel Transfer Tube el transfer tube is provided for fuel movement between the refueling canal in the containment the transfer canal in the auxiliary building.
penetration consists of a 36 inch diameter stainless steel tube installed inside a 42 inch sleeve.
transfer tube is fitted with a double-gasketed blind flange in the refueling pool and a standard valve in the transfer canal. This arrangement prevents leakage through the transfer tube in the nt of an accident. The 42 inch sleeve is welded to the containment liner. A bellows expansion t is provided on the 42 inch sleeve to compensate for differential movement. Typical details of fuel transfer tube are shown in Figure 5.2-10.
6.2 Design of Penetrations 6.2.1 Design Criteria piping passing through the containment walls are permanently welded to the wall sleeves, ming an extension of the containment:
preserve the integrity of the containment, provisions are incorporated to prevent internal and rnal forces exerted by connecting piping on the wall sleeves from fracturing or breaching the tainment pressure boundary. Additionally, protection against missiles is provided for the etration piping and valving inside and outside the containment.
ther protection of each line, necessary to preclude the loss of pipe structural integrity between etration and the first valve, is accomplished by shortening the exposed length of pipe and alling the first valve as close as possible to the internal or external wall of the structure, ending upon valve operating and maintenance clearances. Design bases which apply to the vision of automatic and manual isolation valves in the penetration lines are contained in tion 5.2.6.2.4.
h-temperature piping penetrations consist of two for feedwater, two for main steam, and two steam generator blowdown. These have a maximum operating temperature range between F and 550F. Thermal insulation is provided in the air gap between the pipe and penetration r sleeve. The combination of insulation and penetration cooling is designed to restrict imum temperature in the concrete to 150F.
the condition created by loss of penetration cooling, the maximum steady state temperature in concrete is 300F at the penetration surface and decreases to 120F at a maximum radial depth 8 inches in the containment wall (Section 9.9.4.4.1). This thermal gradient produces localized pressive stresses in the concrete immediately surrounding the penetration and low tensile sses distributed some distances from the sleeve. These compressive stresses plus the restraint vided by the prestress loads minimize the effect of elevated temperatures on the concrete ference 5.2-4).
ddition, the normal operating temperature of 150F continues to cure and dry concrete near high-temperature penetrations. Since dry concrete is only slightly affected by high peratures, normal operation is beneficial and reduces strength losses from a temperature rise.
this basis, the concrete in the localized area around the penetrations can withstand 300F hout significant strength loss.
6.2.3 Penetration Materials materials for containment penetrations, which include mechanical, electrical, and access etrations, conform to the requirements of the ASME Nuclear Vessel Code and ANSI B31.7-68 uding Code Case 1427.
required by these codes, carbon steel penetration materials, which form the containment sure boundary meet the necessary Charpy V-notch impact test values at a temperature 30F w the lowest service temperature. Impact testing for mechanical piping systems is performed 20F, for uniformity.
- a. Mechanical Penetration Material Specification Penetration Sleeve (Pipe) SA-333, Grade 6 (Rolled Plate) SA-516, Grade 60 Penetration Reinforcing Rings ASTM A-516, Grade 60 Penetration Sleeve Reinforcing ASTM A-516, Grade 60 Bar Anchoring Rings and Plates ASTM A-516, Grade 60 Rolled Shapes (Nonpressure Boundary) ASTM A-36 System Piping ASTM A-333, Grade 6 SA 335 GR P22
ASTM A-376 TP 316 ASTM A-376 TP 304 ASTM A-155 Gr KCF 70 ASTM A-106, Grade B Isolation Valves ASTM A-182, Grade F316 ASTM A-105, Grade II ASTM A-351, Grade CF8, CF8M ASTM A-216, Grade WCB ASTM A-350, Grade LFI ASTM A-516, Grade 70 ASTM A-515, Grade 70
- b. Electrical Penetrations The penetration sleeves to accommodate the electrical penetration assembly canisters are SA-333 Grade 6 carbon steel, pipe schedule 80.
- c. Access Penetration Materials The containment equipment hatch insert, flanges, and head are fabricated of ASTM A-516 Grade 60 carbon steel plate.
The personnel lock is fabricated on ASTM A-516 Grade 60 carbon steel plate.
6.2.4 Provisions for Isolation Valves se piping systems which penetrate the containment are provided with isolation valves which form with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, General Design, Criteria 54, 55, 56, and 57.
se provisions are described in detail in Section 5.2.7.
6.3 Installation of Penetrations etration sleeves are welded to the liner plate and embedded in the concrete containment wall hown in Figure 5.2-8. All welding and approved welding procedures used are in conformance h the requirements of ASME Section IX and ASME Section III, 1971, Nuclear Vessels.
ng systems passing through the sleeves are installed as shown in Figure 5.2-8. The single ier closure provided is welded to the sleeve, using the same requirements noted previously.
containment penetrations are subject to an initial leak rate test and periodic leak rate testing in ordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
visions have been made to pressurize the containment pressure boundary for leak rate testing escribed in Section 5.2.8.1.
ve arrangements incorporate provisions for leak testing of the piping systems penetrations, the tainment and the isolation valves for these systems, in accordance with Criterion 54 of CFR Part 50, Appendix A, as necessary to perform the leak rate testing required by CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
se provisions are defined in Sections 5.2.7.1 and 5.2.7.2.
7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM 7.1 Design Bases 7.1.1 Functional Requirements containment isolation system functions to provide a double barrier to prevent leakage through containment fluid penetrations. As a result, no single, credible failure, or malfunction of an ve component can result in loss-of-isolation capabilities or intolerable leakage.
7.1.2 Design Criteria following criteria have been used in the design of the containment isolation system according 0 CFR Part 50:
- a. Piping systems penetrating primary reactor containment shall be provided with leak detection and isolation.
- b. Piping systems shall be designed with a capability to test periodically the operability of the isolation valves and associated apparatus and to determine if valve leakage is within acceptable limits as necessary per the testing requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
- c. Each line that is part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and penetrates primary reactor containment shall be provided with containment isolation valves unless it can be demonstrated that the containment isolation provisions for a specific class of lines, such as instrument lines, are acceptable on some other defined basis. The valves are:
- 1. One locked closed isolation valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside the containment; or
- 3. One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside the containment. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve outside the containment; or
- 4. One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside the containment. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve outside the containment.
- d. Each line that connects directly to the containment atmosphere and penetrates primary reactor containment shall be provided with containment isolation valves unless it can be demonstrated that the containment isolation provisions for a specific class of lines, such as instrument lines, are acceptable on some other defined basis. The valves which are used are:
- 1. One locked closed valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside the containment; or
- 2. One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside the containment; or
- 3. One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside the containment. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve outside the containment; or
- 4. One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside the containment. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve outside the containment.
- e. Each line that penetrates the primary reactor containment and is neither part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere shall have at least one containment isolation valve which shall be either automatic, or locked closed, or capable of remote manual operation. This valve shall be outside containment and located as close to the containment as practical. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve.
- f. Isolation valves outside of the containment shall be located as close to the containment as practical. The automatic isolation valves shall be designed to take the position that provides greater safety upon loss of actuating power.
- g. Other appropriate requirements to minimize the probability or consequences of an accidental rupture of these lines or of lines connected to them shall be provided as necessary to assure adequate safety. Determination of the appropriateness of these requirements, such as higher quality in design, fabrication, and testing, additional provisions for in-service inspection, protection against most severe natural
characteristics of the site environs.
7.2 System Description 7.2.1 System tainment isolation data is listed in Table 5.2-11. The containment isolation system is shown ematically in Figures 5.2-27 through 5.2-34.
containment isolation system closes all fluid penetrations not required for operation of the ineered safety feature systems, to prevent the leakage of radioactive materials to the ironment. Fluid penetrations serving engineered safety feature systems also meet the design s double barrier criteria, but are not closed by the containment isolation signal.
location and types of containment isolation valves meet the requirements of Appendix A of CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56, and 57 as noted below in parentheses.
fluid penetrations which may require isolation after an accident are categorized (and listed in le 5.2-11 under the column heading Pene. Category type) as follows:
e P - Lines that connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary (Criterion 55 of 10 CFR Part Appendix A).
se lines are provided with two isolation valves. One valve is inside the containment and the er is outside, located as close as practical to the containment structure. For safety injection/
tdown cooling where flow direction is inward, the inside valve is a check valve and the outside ation valve is capable of remote operation. Otherwise, the inside valves are either remotely rated or locked closed valves. The outside valves are always either remotely operated or ed closed.
e O - Lines that are open to the containment internal atmosphere (Criterion 56 of 10 CFR Part Appendix A).
se lines are provided with similar containment isolation valve arrangements as described for e P penetrations.
e N - Lines that are neither connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor open to the tainment atmosphere but do form a closed system within the containment structure (Criterion f 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A).
se lines are provided with single isolation valves located outside the containment as close to containment structure as practical. These valves are either remotely operated or are locked ed manual valves.
lant nor the containment atmosphere. All Type N penetrations listed in Table 5.2-11 are gorized based on this definition and are GDC compliant. However, some of the systems ciated with Type N penetrations (primary make-up water system, nitrogen supply system, te gas header, and RBCCW system) are not in strict compliance with the criteria for a closed em as defined by the current standards (SRP 6.2.4 and ANS 56.2/ANSI N271-76). The ent standards for a closed system inside containment call for them to be Class 2. The RBCCW em is fabricated to Safety Class 3 requirements in accordance with the acceptance criteria for systems in effect at the time it was designed. NRC has accepted that for a low energy system h as RBCCW, the differences in safety classes 2 and 3 in terms of fabrication and surveillance uirements is sufficiently small that there is good likelihood that the system will remain intact ng an accident (NRC Letter from John F. Stolz to Edward J. Mroczka, dated January 15, 1991, uance of Exemption to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Sections III.A and III.C for the Millstone lear Power Station, Unit Number 2 (TAC Number 75970)).
to the various acceptable options in arranging containment isolation valves, the specific valve ngements have been given for each penetration in Figures 5.2-27 through 5.2-34. Complete criptions of these isolation valve arrangements are summarized in Table 5.2-11 indicating each etration by number, the valve arrangement identification, the penetration category, the testing uirements, the size and type of the valves, the mode actuation, and the valve positions in ect to normal and/or isolation conditions including the positions during air or power failure.
piping penetrations forming an extension of the containment are designed in accordance with SI B-31.7, Nuclear Piping Code, Class I or II as a minimum and are installed in accordance h ASME Section III, Nuclear Power Plant Components Code. These penetrations are cribed in Section 5.2.6.1.2 and 5.2.6.3. The piping is subjected to a stress report as prescribed SME,Section III, which includes its being subjected to a seismic analysis in accordance with State of Connecticut Building Code, Class I, as described in Section 5.2.4.3.3. The penetration ubjected to the missile and whip protection criteria described in Section 5.2.5.
tainment isolation valves are designed in accordance with the Draft ASME Code for Pumps Valves for Nuclear Power or ASME Section III (1971 Edition). Isolation valves are subjected stress report or analysis which includes seismic analysis as prescribed in Section 5.2.4.3.3.
allation of these valves is subjected to the same requirements imposed on the containment etration piping as described above.
re is sufficient redundancy in the instrumentation circuits of the engineered safety features ection system to minimize the possibility of inadvertent tripping of the isolation system.
ther discussion of this redundancy and the instrumentation signals which trip the isolation em is presented in Section 7.3.
containment pressure instrumentation is physically located close to the containment and alled using short couplings between the containment penetrations and instrumentation vided. All instrumentation provided is designed as a pressure containing device, whereby ure of the sensing bellows will not release radioactivity to the environment but will be
eptable level while in the unlikely event of instrument line or transmitter housing failure, the age is reduced to the minimum extent practical. One shutoff valve is provided in each line for purposes.
instrument lines, up to and including the pressure retaining parts of instruments, are Seismic ss I, subject to quality assurance surveillance, and conservatively designed to a quality ivalent to the containment penetrations or better. All containment pressure instrumentation ipment is located in an enclosed area and protected against physical damage due to pipe whip missiles. Provisions are included in plant design for periodic visual in-service inspection of s from the outside of containment up to an including the pressure instruments. The single ual shutoff valve in each line will enable periodic pressurization of the impulse line from the toff valve up to and including the pressure transmitter for leak testing and instrument bration.
containment atmosphere sampling lines are designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide containment penetrations except the containment sump recirculation lines, Numbers 12 and and the containment pressure transmitter penetration lines, Numbers 47, 69, 70, and 71, ply with NRC General Design Criteria 55, 56, and 57 or to Regulatory Guide 1.11. Valving de the containment is eliminated on these penetrations because of the critical nature of these etrations.
containment sump recirculation lines are embedded in concrete inside the containment and ected by a guard pipe outside the containment to maintain the containment boundary and em integrity. The system is required to function during the post-accident condition; therefore, alving inside the containment existed, it would be required to be open.
containment pressure transmitter installation is described in Table 5.2-11 and is illustrated in ure 5.2-34 (Arrangement 30).
7.2.2 Components major system components and materials of fabrication for the containment isolation system indicated in Tables 5.2-12 and 5.2-13 for piping and valves, respectively.
7.3 System Operation 7.3.1 Emergency Operation the unlikely event of a LOCA, containment isolation system automatically isolates the essential process lines coincident with the containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS) as cribed in Section 7.3. Containment penetrations that are opened directly to the containment, h as the normal sump drain, are also automatically isolated by the CIAS as described in
S.
cess lines which are essential for post-accident operation, such as the safety injection, are matically opened by the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). The only lines that matically open on Containment Spray Actuation Signal are the containment spray headers.
only lines that automatically open on Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal are the tainment sump recirculation lines.
7.4 Availability and Reliability 7.4.1 Special Features containment isolation valves are designed to ensure leak-tightness and reliability of operation.
e, globe, ball and check valves used for containment isolation meet the leak tightness uirements of MSS-SP-61 except that the maximum seat leakage rate is less than 2.0 cc/hour inch of seat diameter. Butterfly valves used for isolation are purchased and tested to ensure ntially zero seat leakage preinstallation under the test pressure conditions. Subsequent to allation, leak tightness is confirmed by testing as described in Section 5.2.7.1.2.b. The uired valve closing times are achieved by appropriate selection of the valve operator type and tainment isolation valve operators that receive the automatic CIAS, and are of the piston (air nder) or diaphragm operator type are selected based on the design of the operators being able of meeting a closure time of 5 seconds. The MSIVs (2-MS-64A and 64B) closure times described in Section 10.3.2.
four containment air purge supply and exhaust valves (2-AC-4, -5, -6 & -7) do not receive a S signal but receive a signal to close in response to a high containment radiation when the t is in modes 5 and 6. These valves are locked closed, pneumatically isolated and electrically onnected when the plant is in modes 1 through 4. This is accomplished by closing the rument air isolation valves and pulling the control power fuses for each of the valves. The ciated instrument air isolation valves and fuse blocks are then locked. By locking them closed his manner, these valves are considered sealed closed isolation valves.
tor-operated containment isolation valves have no closing stroke time requirements assumed he accident analysis. The containment spray header and LPSI Injection Header motor-operated ation valves have opening stroke time requirements that support the system response times med in the accident analysis. Refer to the Technical Requirements Manual for the listed em response times. Stroke time requirements are established for motor-operated containment ation valves in accordance with the Inservice Test Program to ensure the valve operation is nitored for degradation.
age path.
containment penetrations which are open to the atmosphere are listed in Section 5.3.4. For e connected piping systems which will withstand and contain the post-accident atmosphere ide containment, the closure time of the associated isolation valves is not dictated by potential tainment leakage to the site boundary. Any leakage from the Containment Air Purge, rogen Purge, Hydrogen Sample, and Containment Air Monitoring lines is contained within Enclosure Building Filtration System as stated in Section 5.3.4.
closure time for the containment purge valves is based on 5 seconds. This was demonstrated esting by the valve manufacturer.
position of greatest safety for air-operated valves is the position the valve will assume upon of air instrument supply.
tor-operated valves on the shutdown cooling line fail as is in the event of loss of electrical er supply. Since these valves are closed during operation (reactor coolant system pressure ter than 300 psig), the as is position is the safest position.
he event of electrical power loss to the motor-operated containment isolation valves, the es are supplied by emergency power to achieve the greatest safety position.
assigned locations of containment penetrations are designed to ensure adequate separation of undant piping and valving. The penetrations leaving the containment below grade are located he penetration rooms of the auxiliary building while the penetrations above grade are located he enclosure building. The applicable portions of these structures are designed to protect rnal equipment from potential tornadoes and missiles.
st remotely operated containment isolation valves have provisions for remote manual ration from the main control room. Valves 2-MS-65A, 2-MS-65B, 2-MS-202, and 2-SI-651 e disconnect switches in their power circuits to ensure the valves are in their proper position in event of an Appendix R fire, and to prevent spurious movement during specific operational des as shown and detailed in Table 5.2-11. Position indicators (open or closed) are also vided in the control room to assure valve position during an emergency.
isolation valves which are not required to maintain their full operational capabilities during after a LOCA or Seismic event are designed to fail in the safe position. These valves are vided with air operators and a spring return to the safe position. The reliability of these valves roven by seismic analysis and/or testing of the valve, operator, solenoid, and limit switches er the seismic loadings described in Section 5.8. To assure that the valves will operate under system flow conditions, the air operator and spring are sized to operate at maximum erential pressure across the valve.
motor-operated valves from the emergency diesel generators during an onsite and/or offsite er-loss to assure that these valves are always capable of full operation. The reliability of the or-operated valves to function during the seismic disturbance or LOCA is proven by seismic lysis and testing. To demonstrate that the motor operator has sufficient torque to operate the es, the valves are open and/or closed under full disc differential pressure.
nually-operated containment isolation valves are positioned using approved operating cedures, a portion of which is a Valve Check List which states the required position(s) of the e for various plant conditions such as startup or shutdown. As appropriate, the list indicates if valve is locked open or locked closed. The position of manually-operated containment ation valves is verified using appropriate valve list(s) before the plant leaves the cold tdown condition.
isolation valves required for essential post-accident processes having air operators are vided with emergency reserve air supply tanks which are capable of actuating the valves eral times. This is necessary because of the postulated failure of the station and instrument air em during an emergency. However, the twelve RBCCW CAR cooler inlet and outlet tainment isolation valves are not equipped with reserve air supply tanks. The RBCCW System designed (back fitted) with the 12 containment isolation valves as a defense in depth design ure for containment integrity to meet the requirements of GDC 57. These valves fail open ich is their accident position) on loss of air. They are located outside containment and are ipped with a hand wheel as a secondary mode of operation.
n receiving a manual CIAS or SIAS (either manual or automatic) actuation signal, isolation es required to isolate the containment from the surrounding environment and other systems hin the station, close automatically. Valve operators are sized to close these isolation valves ore any significant amount of radioactivity can be released from the containment. In most ems, standard valve operators are sufficient.
containment isolation valve operators have a certified proven record of reliability under rating conditions similar or more severe than those to which exposed during unit operation.
se have been tested by the manufacturer to ensure the integrity in the event of inadvertent ure under operating conditions.
worst environment to which containment isolation valves may be subjected is that described Section 14.8.2 Containment Analysis. In addition, static, dynamic, and seismic loads, as cribed in Section 5.8 and exposure to physical damage are taken into account. Valves have n designed to perform their intended function under these conditions and this forms their gn basis.
mage due to severe natural environment such as freezing is not considered credible since all s which house containment isolation valves are maintained at temperatures above freezing.
ief valves are also required to prevent over-pressuring lines due to uncontrolled thermal ansion of the process fluid.
etration Number 10, Figure 5.2-29, transports reactor coolant during shutdown cooling, mally at 300 psig, but it is also subject to the maximum pressure of reactor coolant system ng normal plant operation. To prevent over-pressuring the piping external to the containment to isolation valve leakage, a relief valve set at 300 psig is required. This relief valve is inside containment and discharges to the liquid radwaste system, as shown in Figure 6.1-1.
etration Number 11, Figure 5.2-31, is for the Safety Injection tank testing and RCS check e leakage bleed. The relief valve is set at 450 psig to protect the piping from over-pressure.
s relief valve is also inside the containment and discharges to the Quench Tank, as shown in ure 6.1-1.
safety injection test line, penetration Number 11, conforms to General Design Criteria mber 57 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. This line is isolated from the reactor coolant pressure ndary by two valves, both closed, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.55a (January 1972 edition),
note 1(b) for exclusion from the reactor coolant system. Therefore, the safety injection test is neither open directly to the containment atmosphere nor part of the reactor coolant pressure ndary, as provided by Criterion Number 57.
etration Numbers 19 & 20, Figure 5.2-33, are for the main steam lines with relief valves uired to protect the steam generator from over-pressure. There are 8 relief valves per main m line for a total of 16 relief valves with nominal set points at 985 psig and the maximum sure settings at 1,035 psig. A detailed description of these valves is given in Section 4.3, le 4.3-3 of the FSAR. The relief valves are located outside the containment to facilitate ection, testing, and maintenance and to protect the containment from over-pressure due to ef discharge.
etration Numbers 12 & 13, Figure 5.2-30, provide containment sump recirculation for long-operation of ECCS and containment spray post accident. Piping equipped with rupture disks connected to the body drains of containment isolation valves 2-CS-16.1A & B. The rupture s discharge is contained within the closed piping system. The rupture disks prevent the sibility of the motor-operated valves becoming pressure locked in the closed position due to mal expansion of trapped fluid in the valve bodies prior to initiation of sump recirculation.
7.4.2 Tests and Inspections isolation valves are shop tested and examined by the manufacturer in accordance with the erning code requirements to assure the integrity of the pressure retaining boundary. In ition, all valves are performance tested for seat leakage on an individual valve basis to assure ability.
hod of operation and material used. Throughout the plant life, these valves are tested odically as required per 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J and those which cannot be tested during ration (those which must remain open or closed) are tested during the scheduled shutdowns plant outages.
tainment fluid penetration isolation valves are incorporated with provisions for periodic leak testing provided they are required to be tested per 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
CCW CAR cooler inlet outlet containment isolation valves (2-RB-28.1A to D, 2-RB-28.2A to nd 2-RB-28.3A to D) are exempt from Appendix J Type C testing (NRC Letter from John F.
z to Edward J. Mroczka, dated January 15, 1991, Issuance of Exemption to 10 CFR Part 50, endix J, Sections III.A and III.C for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Number 2 C Number 75970)). They do not have leakage criteria. The leakage criteria for CIVs on ed systems that are exempt from Appendix J testing and whose primary safety function is to ain open or open is based on the functional leakage requirements, which is limited to as low easonably attainable.
containment isolation valves located outside the containment are accessible for maintenance inspection during normal plant operation. The isolation valves located within containment are essible during normal plant shutdown for maintenance and inspection.
line testing procedures and preoperation or acceptance testing of isolation valves are ussed with the respective process systems in Chapters 6, 9, and 10.
8 CONTAINMENT TESTING AND SURVEILLANCE 8.1 Integrated Leak-Rate Surveillance Test Program ontainment test program has been established to assure reactor containment building will quately protect the public from core damage accidents and achieve compliance with CFR 50, Appendix J, of the Code of Federal Regulations.
tainment leak tests are performed periodically per the requirements of Appendix J.
objective of these tests is to demonstrate that leakage through the primary reactor tainment and systems, and components penetrating the primary containment, do not exceed allowable leakage rate specified in the Plant Technical Specifications (less than 0.75 La).
containment penetrations are aligned in a post-LOCA configuration (i.e., plant systems etrating the containment boundary isolated, via normal closure modes, drained of water and ted inside and outside of isolation valves) to the extent practical. A pressurization system is set nd connected to the containment through a temporary piping path. The pressurization system sists of a group of oil-free air compressors, dryer units, after-coolers, interconnecting spool es, and valves.
ata acquisition system (with backup capability) is used to record ILRT containment-related parameters, e.g., containment air pressure, temperatures, and dew point temperatures. The acquisition system typically consists of a portable computer, a data logger, and a printer. The data is processed via a quality related ILRT computer program.
en test prerequisites and initial conditions are satisfied, the containment is pressurized to htly greater than accident pressure with external leak checks performed to identify any tainment leakage. When test pressure is reached, containment pressurization is stopped and ated. The containment air mass system is then allowed to thermodynamically stabilize. Once ilization is attained, the data acquisition system records the test data and computes the ILRT age rate, Lam.
Type A test and the supplemental verification test are performed according to the uirements of the MP2 Technical Specification and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
o methods are available to calculate the containment leakage rate; mass point and total time.
mass point method uses formulas from ANS 56.8 (Reference 5.2-8) and the total time method m BN-TOP-1 (Reference 5.2-9) lity-related software employing these techniques calculates the least-squares fit and upper fidence limit containment leakage rate, Lam. It automatically checks it against the acceptance eria (0.75 La).
software program containment model inputs are based upon quality-related engineering ulations: containment-free air volume V, Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD), and wcell sensor volume weight fractions (refer to Table 5.2-15 and Reference 5.2-12 for details),
the superimposed leakage rate, Lo.
ingle failure RTD and Dewcell analysis calculation is completed and reweighted plan is blished, per the guidance of EPRI (Reference 5.2-10).
r to depressurization of the containment, a verification test is completed. The verification test uces a known leakage rate, Lo, and a composite leakage calculation of Lc is made to verify that test instrument data acquisition system was operating satisfactorily
+ Lam - 0.25 La Lc Lo + Lam + 0.25 La) and yielding accurate results.
e this is verified, the containment is then slowly depressurized to normal atmospheric ditions and restoration is started.
Total Time Method of the Absolute Method consists of calculating air lost from the tainment using pressure, temperature, and dew point observations made during the ILRT using Ideal Gas Law. The measured leakage rate at any time (t) is determined by calculating the ent leakage rate based on the most recent data and the data taken at the start of the test. The ulated leakage rate is then determined by plotting the measured leakage rate as a function of e and then performing a least-squares fit of the measured leakage rate values. The calculated age rate is expressed as a percentage of containment mass lost in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
s is the primary calculation (data analysis) for use during a short duration test (i.e., test ation less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />). Bechtel Topical Report BN-TOP-1, Rev. 1, 1972, Testing Criteria Integrated Leakage Rate Testing of Primary Containment Structures for Nuclear Power nts (Reference 5.2-9) and ANSI N45.4-1972, Leakage Rate Testing of Containment ctures for Nuclear Reactors (Reference 5.2-15), provide details on this method of rmining the containment leakage rate.
8.1.2 Mass Point Method for Calculating Containment Leakage Rate Mass Point analysis technique consists of calculating the air mass within the containment cture over the test period using pressure, temperature, and dew point observations made ng the ILRT using the Ideal Gas Law. The leakage rate is then determined by plotting the air s as a function of time using a least-squares fit to determine the slope. The leakage rate is ressed as a percentage of air mass in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. This is the primary calculation (data lysis) for test durations of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or greater. This analysis technique is described in ANSI/
S 56.8, Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements (Reference 5.2-8).
8.2 Structural Integrity Test r to operation the containment was subjected to a pressure test equivalent to 115 percent of the tulated maximum accident pressure in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.18. This test vides a direct verification of the structural integrity of the containment as a whole, i.e., it is al to or better than that required to sustain the forces imposed by the accident loading dition.
structure was pressurized to 115 percent of the postulated accident pressure (62.4 psig) during integrated leak rate test. Radial measurements were made along six equally spaced meridians cations near the base, at mid-height of the cylinder, and at the spring line as well as the top of dome. Radial deflections were also taken at 12 positions around the equipment hatch.
cks greater than 0.005 inch were mapped near the base wall intersection, at mid-height, just w the ring girder, at the intersection of a buttress and the wall, and at the dome. At each tion an area of at least 40 square feet was mapped.
cture is more than adequate to withstand the design internal pressures.
8.3 Post-Operational Leakage Monitoring procedure deviates from the Regulatory Guide 1.18 in that the tangential deflections at 12 itions around the equipment hatch were not measured since tangential deflections were not dicted. Tangential deflections measured during test on similar structure were of minimal ificance.
8.4 Tendon Surveillance 8.4.1 Program Description primary objective of the surveillance program for the containment structure concrete and ons during the lifetime of the plant is to ensure the strength and reliability of the post-ioning steel and other major components such as stressing washers, shims, and bearing plates.
surveillance program is intended to provide sufficient in-service historical evidence to ntain a high level of confidence so that the integrity of the containment structure may be erved.
s program consists of the following operations:
- a. Recording lift-off pressure readings and any significant visual difference of stressing washers, shims, bearing plates, and concrete cracks.
- b. Checking for possible corrosion of wires and anchorage components.
accomplish this surveillance program, a total of twenty-one (21) tendons were provided in ordance with the Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 1 as follows:
- a. Horizontal (hoop): Ten (10) tendons randomly selected but approximately equally distributed.
- b. Vertical: Five (5) tendons are located in the wall, approximately equally spaced around the containment.
- c. Dome: Six (6) tendons, two located in each 60 degrees group.
- d. For the fourth surveillance (tenth year), if no significant problems were indicated by the previous surveillances, the total number of surveillance tendons could be reduced to three from each group for a total of nine surveillance tendons.
uly 1990, Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3, was published. Revision 3 requires a random ction from all tendon groups. Under Revision 3, the third surveillance would have required a l of fourteen surveillance tendons to be inspected, while only nine would be required for the
eing performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 3. The sampling may be anded for any surveillance when it is deemed desirable or necessary.
requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a were amended by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission C) to incorporate Subsections IWE and IWL of Section XI of the ASME B&PV Code, on tember 9, 1996. Following this change, DENC revised the containment inservice inspection gram for MPS2 to implement the requirements of ASME Section XI, Subsections IWE and L. RG 1.35 was determined to be redundant with ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL and was onger needed. RG 1.35 was subsequently withdrawn by the NRC in August 2015.
8.4.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide tendon surveillance program was developed and complied with the Regulatory Guide 1.35.
wever, in 2000 ASME Section XI, Subsections IWE and IWL were also implemented. The C determined RG 1.35 was redundant with ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL and sequently withdrawn in August 2015. All inspections and testing are now performed in ordance with the requirements of ASME Section XI, IWL as amended by 10 CFR 50.55a.
9 REFERENCES 1 Guyon, T., Prestressed Concrete, Contractors Record and Municipal Engineering, Lennox House, London, 1953.
2 Leonhardt, F., Prestressed Concrete Design and Construction, Translated C. Van Amfrongen, Sec. Rev. Ed. Berlin, Wilhen Ernst Sohn, 1964.
3 Eringen, A. C., Naghdi, A. K., and Thiel, C. C., State of Stress in a Circular Cylindrical Shell with a Circular Hole, Welding Research Council (WRC) Bulletin Number 102, January, 1965.
4 Lankard, Birkimer, et. al, Effects of Moisture Content on the Structural Properties of Portland Cement Concrete Exposed to Temperatures up to 500F, Battelle Research, ACI Paper 1968.
5 Gwaltney, R. C., Missile Generation and Protection in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactor Plant, USAGC Report ORNL-NSIC-22, September, 1968.
6 Biggs, J. M., Introduction to Structural Dynamics, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1964, Chapter 5.
7 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.
8 ANS 56.8, Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements.
Plants.
10 EPRI Report NP-2726, Containment Integrated Leak-Rate Testing Improvements, November 1982.
11 T2621-P, MP2 Preoperational Test, April 15, 1975.
12 Engineering Calculation Number 95-ENG-1184-M2, MP2 Containment ILRT Sensor Volume Fractions.
13 Millstone Unit 3, Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 2.3-Meteorology.
14 Richard Jr., F. E., Hall Jr., J. R., and Woods, R. E., Vibrations of Soils and Foundations, Prentice Hall, Inc., NJ, 1970.
15 ANSI N45.4-1972, Leakage Rate Testing of Containment Structures for Nuclear Reactors.
TABLE 5.2-1 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
1 2
3 160 4 150 140 130 120 5
110 100 90 80 70 6 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
- 10 7
- 20 8
- 30
- 40 11 10 9 KEY ELEVATION SHOWING LOCATION OF REFERENCE SECTIONS es on Table Values values shown in the following tables are taken from the cracked section analysis for the tainment building. Earthquake forces are added to the forces from other loads and the resulting l is solved to obtain the stresses given.
allowable stresses are based on the criteria presented herein. The entire containment shell is structed using 5000 psi concrete and Grade 60 bonded reinforcing steel. The liner plate has a ranteed minimum yield strength of 24,000 psi.
ues in these tables correspond to Figures 5.2-19 to 5.2-26.
(D+KF+L)
Concrete Stress - Concrete Concrete Concrete Concrete Conc Flexural & Stress- Concrete Concrete Concrete Stress - Stress - Stress - Stress - Stre Membrane: Flexural & Stress - Stress - Actual Shear Reinforcing Reinforcing Liner Plate Liner Merdian Membrane: Membrane: Membrane: Allowable Shear Stress: Stress: Hoop Strain: Stra Portion Section (PSI) Hoop (PSI) Merdian (PSI) Hoop (PSI) Capacity Merdian (PSI) (PSI) Meridian % Hoo Allowable -3750 -3750 -1500 -1500 +30000 +30000 0.2% 0.
DOME 1 -977 -1497 -953 -1438 0.255 -7482 -11131 -0.036 -0.0 2 -1142 -665 -1098 -594 0.442 -8514 -5246 -0.043 -0.0 3 -1820 -436 -784 -204 0.557 -11052 -2705 -0.068 -0.0 RING 4 -610 -445 -558 -351 0.198 -2302 -1821 -0.023 -0.0 GIRDER WALL 5 -829 -942 -723 -788 0.709 -6322 -7079 -0.031 -0.0 6 -1011 -1629 -898 -1374 0.035 -6581 -9612 -0.038 -0.0 7 -973 -773 -961 -663 0.394 -7765 -5981 -0.036 -0.0 HAUNCH 8 -749 -292 -569 -278 0.364 -5680 -2313 -0.028 -0.0 BASE 9 -342 -106 -109 -63 0.379 +6781 +2106 -0.013 -0.0 SLAB 10 -108 -61 -64 -42 0.138 -807 -466 -0.004 -0.0 11 -36 -35 -29 -28 0.005 -276 -273 -0.001 -0.0
(D+F+L+1.15P)
Concrete Stress - Concrete Concrete Concrete Concrete Con Flexural & Stress- Concrete Concrete Concrete Stress Stress - Stress - Stress - Stre Membrane: Flexural & Stress - Stress - - Actual Shear Reinforcing Reinforcing Liner Plate Liner Merdian Membrane: Membrane: Membrane: Allowable Shear Stress: Stress: Hoop Strain: Str Portion Section (PSI) Hoop (PSI) Merdian (PSI) Hoop (PSI) Capacity Merdian (PSI) (PSI) Meridian % Hoo Allowable -3750 -3750 -1500 -1500 +30000 +30000 0.2% 0.
DOME 1 -70 -145 -24 -38 0.298 +1134 +3855 -0.003 -0.
2 -139 0 -88 +56 0.074 -355 +9394 -0.005 -0.
3 -173 -202 -89 -101 0.914 -1101 -1277 -0.006 -0.
RING 4 -320 -291 -278 -294 0.088 +13653 -1957 +0.006 -0.
GIRDER 5 -559 -412 -191 -410 0.114 +8692 -3304 +0.004 -0.
WALL 6 -318 -87 -265 -63 0.017 -1829 -374 -0.012 -0.
7 -1762 -981 -319 -646 0.400 +11847 -7212 +0.014 -.0 HAUNCH 8 -1779 -580 -231 -386 0.357 +19385 -4432 +0.020 -0.
9 -636 -626 +53 -3 0.585 +17764 +12418 -0.024 -0.
BASE 10 -1488 -613 +72 -18 0.154 +29512 +12153 -.0056 -0.
SLAB 11 -64 -63 -44 -43 0.015 -486 -480 -0.002 -0.
OPERATING TEMPERATURE AND OBE (D+F+L+T0+E) A Concrete Stress - Concrete Concrete Concrete Concrete Conc Flexural & Stress- Concrete Concrete Concrete Stress Stress - Stress - Stress - Stre Membrane: Flexural & Stress - Stress - - Actual Shear Reinforcing Reinforcing Liner Plate Liner Merdian Membrane: Membrane: Membrane: Allowable Stress: Stress: Hoop Strain: Stra Portion Section (PSI) Hoop (PSI) Merdian (PSI) Hoop (PSI) Shear Capacity Merdian (PSI) (PSI) Meridian % Hoo Allowable -3750 -3750 -1500 -1500 +40000 +40000 +/-0.2% +/-0.
DOME 1 -1400 -2124 -840 -1276 0.161 -1925 -3360 -0.063 -0.0 2 -1745 -1270 -906 -519 0.414 -281 +3032 -0.074 -0.0 3 -2737 -1456 -618 -302 0.485 +29937 +20938 -0.111 -0.0 RING 4 -690 -1662 -491 -542 0.018 -1371 +16143 -0.026 -0.0 GIRDER 5 -1610 -1930 -615 -708 0.523 +6967 +11510 -0.069 -0.0 WALL 6 -1816 -2557 -770 -1194 0.028 +7085 +13832 -0.077 -0.1 7 (-600) -1134 -1015 -546 (0.886) (+4492) +554 -0.136 -0.0
-3428 0.990 +20208 HAUNCH 8 (-1051) -845 -601 -356 0.595 (+14090) +4192 -0.104 -0.0
-2601 +39554 9 (-1142) (-274) -294 +7 0.615 (+10720) (+7443) (-0.051) (-0.0
-1098 -261 +10308 +7089 -0.049 -0.0 BASE 10 (-1064) (-628) -134 -5 0.350 (+12777) (+13656) (-0.050) (-0.0 SLAB
-858 -616 +10304 +13388 -0.040 -0.0 11 (-968) (-855) -308 -291 0.222 (+5539) (+3911) (-0.045) (-0.0
-978 -864 +5595 +3950 -0.045 -0.0
- a. Note: Values in parentheses reflect current controlling stresses/strains resulting from the revised seismic analysis performed in 1998-99.
ACCIDENT PRESSURE AND ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE (D+F+L+1.0P+T1)
Concrete Stress Reinforcing Stress Liner Plate Strai Flexural & Membrane Membrane Actual Shear Allowable MER. HOOP MER. HOOP Shear MER. HOOP Portion Section (PSI) (PSI) (PSI) (PSI) Capacity (PSI) (PSI) MER. % HOOP Allowable -3750 -3750 -1500 -1500 +40000 +40000 0.5% .5%
DOME 1 -238 -1312 -125 -204 0.400 +28479 +33263 -0.0104 -0.141 2 -419 0 -139 -32 0.321 +28276 +28784 -0.110 -0.086 3 -1089 -2238 -103 -284 0.543 +23322 +20642 -0.136 -0.177 RING 4 -1283 -2956 -305 -515 0.038 -3608 +8183 -0.155 -0.201 GIRDER 5 -2122 -2716 -223 -526 0.193 +27302 +5991 -0.079 -0.196 WALL 6 -2115 -2053 -304 -206 0.036 +14203 +14712 -0.173 -0.171 7 -1854 -2420 -385 -630 0.199 +5215 +1545 -0.163 -0.185 HAUNCH 8 -305 -2271 -264 -574 0.313 -2402 +840 -0.008 -0.135 9 -764 -853 +51 -75 0.432 +22444 +13189 -0.027 -.039 BASE 10 -1164 -847 +89 -110 0.119 +34050 +11248 -0.036 -0.039 SLAB 11 -708 -714 -265 -266 0.051 +2269 +2272 -0.034 -0.035
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL EXPANSION FORCES OF PIPES, PIPE RUPTURE FORCES AND DBE (D+F+T0+H+R+E1)A Concrete Stress Reinforcing Stress Liner Plate Strai Flexural & Actual Shear Membrane Membrane Allowable MER. HOOP MER. HOOP Shear MER. HOOP Portion Section (PSI) (PSI) (PSI) (PSI) Capacity (PSI) (PSI) MER. % HOOP ALLOWABLE -4250 -4250 -4250 -4250 +54000 +54000 0.5% 0.5%
DOME 1 -1400 -2124 -840 -1276 0.127 -1925 -3360 -0.063 -0.086 2 -1745 -1270 -906 -519 0.371 -281 +3032 -0.074 -0.057 3 -2737 -1456 -618 -302 0.430 +29937 +20938 -0.111 -0.063 RING GIRDER 4 -690 -1662 -491 -542 0.014 -1371 +16143 -0.026 -0.068 5 -1610 -1930 -615 -708 0.442 +6967 +11510 -0.069 -0.081 WALL 6 -1816 -2557 -770 -1194 0.023 +7085 +13832 -0.077 -0.104 7 (-949) -1134 -1091 -546 (0.720) (+7340) +554 -0.155 -0.052
-3935 0.941 +26160 HAUNCH 8 (-1601) -845 -641 -356 0.726 (+22520) +4192 -0.124 -0.037
-3142 +50111 9 (-1330) (-77) -314 +65 0.562 (+13639) (+11574) (-0.058) (-0.000
-1265 -72 +12887 +10817 -0.055 -0.000
AND DBE (D+F+T0+H+R+E1)A (CONTINUED)
Concrete Stress Reinforcing Stress Liner Plate Strai Flexural & Actual Shear Membrane Membrane Allowable MER. HOOP MER. HOOP Shear MER. HOOP Portion Section (PSI) (PSI) (PSI) (PSI) Capacity (PSI) (PSI) MER. % HOOP BASE SLAB 10 (-1230) (-710) -118 -3 0.334 (+16530) (+15531) (-0.056 (-0.035
-939 -657 +12618 +14381 -0.043 -0.032 11 -1043 (-873) -306 -283 0.224 +6958 (+4664) -0.047 (0.040)
-891 +4759 -0.041
- a. Note: Values in parentheses reflect current controlling stresses/strains resulting from the revised seismic analysis performed in 1998-99.
TABLE 5.2-6A DELETED BY FSARCR 04-MP2-016 PRESSURE, THERMAL EXPANSION FORCES OF PIPES, PIPE RUPTURE FORCES AND DBE (D+F+1.0P+H+T1+E1) A Concrete Stress Reinforcing Stress Liner Plate Strain Flexural & Membrane Membrane Actual Shear MER. MER. Allowable Shear Portion Section (PSI) HOOP (PSI) (PSI) HOOP (PSI) Capacity MER. (PSI) HOOP (PSI) MER. % HOOP ALLOWABLE -4250 -4250 -4250 -4250 +54000 +54000 0.5% 0.5 DOME 1 -238 -1312 -125 -204 +28479 +33263 -0.104 -0.14 2 -419 0 -139 -32 0.271 +28276 +28784 -0.110 -0.08 3 -1089 -2238 -103 -284 0.481 +23322 +20642 -0.136 -0.17 RING GIRDER 4 -1283 -2956 -305 -515 0.035 -3608 +8183 -0.155 -0.20 5 -2122 -2716 -223 -526 0.171 +27302 +5991 -0.079 -0.19 WALL 6 -2115 -2053 -304 -206 0.032 +14203 +14712 -0.173 -0.17 7 -691 -2420 -622 -630 0.921 +16649 +1545 -0.231 -0.18 HAUNCH 8 -1972 -2271 -405 -574 0.837 +17453 +840 -0.120 -0.13 9 (-1638) (-511) -52 +234 0.816 (+30071) (+33602) (-0.070) (+0.04
-1575 -487 +28914 +32002 -0.067 +0.04 BASE SLAB 10 (-3825) (-803) +172 +137 0.328 (+52609) (+32029) (-0.010) (-0.00
-1591 -750 +51617 +29934 -0.009 -0.00 11 -948 (-784) -253 -232 0.237 +6921 (+4659) -0.044 (-0.03
-800 +4754 -0.03
- a. Note: Values in parentheses reflect current controlling stresses/strains resulting from the revised seismic analysis performed in 1998-99.
PRESSURE, 125% THERMAL EXPANSION FORCES OF PIPES, ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE AND 125% DBE (D+F+1.25P+1.25H+T1+1.25E)A Concrete Stress Reinforcing Stress Liner Plate Strain Flexural & Membrane Membrane Actual Shear MER. MER. Allowable Shear Portion Section (PSI) HOOP (PSI) (PSI) HOOP (PSI) Capacity MER. (PSI) HOOP (PSI) MER. % HOOP ALLOWABLE -4250 -4250 -4250 -4250 +54000 +54000 0.5% 0.5 DOME 1 -233 -374 +51 +60 0.359 +34254 +44242 -0.079 0.097 2 -91 0 +50 +92 0.252 +44348 +38368 -0.033 -0.04 3 -325 -2125 +26 -269 0.456 +22511 +19599 -0.107 -0.17 RING GIRDER 4 -211 -2903 -260 -514 0.035 -2478 +5846 -0.008 -0.19 5 -699 -2559 -125 -468 0.070 +14752 +7094 -0.117 -0.19 WALL 6 -1247 -14 -191 +41 0.032 +20789 +39086 -0.141 -0.04 7 -2908 -2361 -454 -606 0.947 +11400 +1640 -0.202 -0.18 HAUNCH 8 -2292 -2264 -93 -525 0.859 +40726 +312 0.000 -0.13 9 (-1580) (-592) +9 +155 0.870 (+33430) (+28651) (-0.068) (+0.01
-1463 -564 +30954 +27287 -0.063 +0.01 BASE SLAB 10 (-1767) (-806) +67 +42 0.277 (+46578) (+23033) (-0.064) (-0.03
-1485 -753 +39141 +21526 -0.054 -0.03 11 (-961) (-829) -279 -263 0.177 (+5903) (+4143) (-0.044) (-.039
-933 -821 +5731 +4102 -0.043 0.039
- a. Note: Values in parentheses reflect current controlling stresses/strains resulting from the revised seismic analysis performed in 1998-99.
PRESSURE, AND ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE (D+F+1.5P+T1)
Concrete Stress Reinforcing Stress Liner Plate Strain Flexural & Membrane Membrane Actual Shear MER. HOOP Allowable Shear Portion Section MER. (PSI) HOOP (PSI) (PSI) (PSI) Capacity MER. PSI) HOOP (PSI) MER. % HOOP ALLOWABLE -4250 -4250 -4250 -4250 +54000 +54000 0.5% 0.5%
DOME 1 -249 -366 +226 +324 0.359 +45769 +54195 -0.029 -0.020 2 -114 0 +239 +216 0.239 +43842 +34850 -0.039 -0.058 3 0 -1995 +155 -252 0.456 +30200 +18706 -0.018 -0.168 RING GIRDER 4 -356 -2856 -215 -512 0.028 -2855 +3587 -0.003 -0.197 5 -47 -2452 -30 -409 0.019 +26249 +8102 -0.092 -0.186 WALL 6 -166 0 -78 +287 0.032 +28588 +33155 -0.100 -0.065 7 -895 -2298 -157 -581 0.424 +9106 +1776 -0.127 -0.180 HAUNCH 8 -607 -2255 -145 -549 0.503 +9998 -224 0.000 -0.124 9 -1121 -1094 +135 -115 0.629 +37848 +15961 -0.001 -0.048 BASE SLAB 10 -1597 -1004 -88 -208 0.284 +27145 +9735 -0.068 -0.045 11 -795 -797 -311 -313 0.023 +1981 +2002 -0.038 -0.038
Table 1: I. Reactor Vessel KINETIC ENERGY ITEM (ft-lb.) Weight (lb.) LEADING SECTION POINT OF IMPAC A. Closure Head Nut 2,022 116 Annular OD = 10-9/16 inch ID = Overhead missile shie 6.8 inch B. Closure Head Nut & Stud 4,932 710 Solid Circle 7 inch Diameter Overhead missile shi C. Instrumentation Assembly 12,700 335 Solid Disk 6.5 inch Diameter and Overhead missile shi 3 inch Thick D. Instrumentation from Flange Up 14,000 165 Solid Disk 6.5 inch Diameter and Overhead missile shi 3 inch Thick E. Instrument Flange Stud 14.3 6.5 Solid Circle 1.5 inch Diameter Overhead missile shi Table 2: II. Steam Generator KINETIC ENERGY ITEM (ft-lb.) Weight (lb.) LEADING SECTION POINT OF IMPA A. Steam Generator Primary Manway 48.53 9 Solid Circle 1.338 inch Diameter Containment Floor o Stud and Nut Secondary Shield W B. Steam Generator Secondary 10.0 5 Solid Circle 1.25 inch Diameter Steam Generator Manway Stud and Nut Blockhouse Wall C. Steam Generator Secondary 3.98 1.7 Solid Circle 0.82 inch Diameter Primary or Secondar Handhole Stud and Nut Shield Wall
Table 3: III. Pressurizer Kinetic Energy Item (ft-lb.) Weight (lb.) Leading Section Point of Impa A. Pressurizer Manway Stud & Nut 57.16 6.8 Solid Circle 1.0 inch Overhead Upper west wall
[NOTE: This missile envelops the missile shield Diameter Pressurizer Pressurizer vent port stud missile, Blockhouse which would strike the south wall.]
B. Pressurizer Temperature Element 290 3 Solid Disk 2.75 inch Overhead missile Pressurizer shield Diameter and 0.5 inch Blockhouse wall Overhead missile shield Thick roof slab or platform C. Pressurizer Instrument Nozzle and 1,125 11.1 Solid Disk 2.75 inch Overhead missile Pressurizer Instrument (Based on V & VII shield Diameter and 0.5 inch Blockhouse wall Nozzle & RTD cases.) Overhead missile shield Thick roof slab or platform D. Safety Valve Flange Bolt [NOTE: 15 3.7 Solid Circle 1.25 inch Overhead Pressurizer This missile envelops stud missiles missile shield Diameter Blockhouse Wall from either flange or from the bonnet Floor bolted connection.]
Table 4: IV.
Kinetic Energy Item (ft-lb.) Weight (lb.) Leading Section Point of Impa Control Element Drive Mechanism 47,800 2,100 Solid Circle 11 inch Overhead Overhead missile (Magnetic Jack missile shield Diameter shield
Table 5: V.
Kinetic Energy Item (ft-lb.) Weight (lb.) Leading Section Point of Impa Main Coolant Piping Temperature 1,125 11.1 Solid Disk 2.75 inch Overhead Secondary shie Nozzle with RTD missile shield Diameter and 0.5 inch wall Overhead missile shield Thick Table 6: VI.
Kinetic Energy Item (ft-lb.) Weight (lb.) Leading Section Point of Impac Surge and Spray Piping Thermal Wells 277 1/34 Solid Disk 2.75 inch Overhead Secondary shield with RTD Assembly missile shield Diameter and 0.5 wall inch Thick Table 7: VII.
Kinetic Energy Item (ft-lb.) Weight (lb.) Leading Section Point of Impac Main Coolant Pump Thermal Well with 1,125 11.1 Solid Disk 2.75 inch Overhead Secondary shield RTD missile shield Diameter and 0.5 inch wall Overhead missile shield Thick The basic formulas used for the calculation of missile penetration are those presented in NavDocks P-51, Design of Protective Structures - a Concept of Structural Behavior, published by the U.S. Bureau of Yards and Docks, August, 1950, Washington, D.C.
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident Number Service System Type 1 Category2 Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position 1 Demineralized PMW IA IN 1B Yes 2-PMW-43 Outside 2 inch Globe 1 2 inch Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed Revision 4106/29/23 N 12 Water No 2-PMW-165 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed Yes 2-PMW-3 Inside 2 inch Check 1 - - - - No -
2 Letdown Line CVCS IA P OUT 7 Yes 4 2-CH-516 Inside 3 inch Globe 1 2 inch Diaphragm CIAS Open Closed Yes Closed to Purification Demineralizer No 2-CH-006 11 Inside 2 inch Gate 1 Manual ---- Open As Is No Open Yes 2-CH-089 Outside 2 inch Globe 1 Diaphragm CIAS Open Closed Yes Closed No 2-CH-763, 2-CH-658, Inside 1 inch Gate 3 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed 2-CH-991 Closed No 2-CH-260, 2-CH-082, Inside 0.75 Globe 3 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed 2-CH-083 inch Closed No 2-CH-067 Outside 0.75 Gate 1 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed Yes 4 2-CH-515 Inside 3 inch Globe 1 Diaphragm SIAS Open Closed Yes Closed 3 Reactor CVCS IA P IN 9 Yes 4 2-CH-518, 2-CH-519 Inside 2 inch Globe 2 2 inch Diaphragm Remote Open Open Yes Open Coolant Charging Line Yes 4 2-CH-517 Inside 2 inch Globe 1 Diaphragm Remote Closed Closed Yes Closed MPS-2 FSAR Yes 4 2-CH-434 Inside 2 inch Gate 1 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed Closed Yes 2-CH-429 Outside 2 inch Gate 1 MOV Remote Open As Is Yes Open No 2-CH-004, 2-CH-003 Inside 0.75 Gate 2 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-CH-001, 2-CH-002, 2- Inside 0.75 Globe 4 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed CH- 443, 2-CH-714 inch Closed No 2-CH-710 Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed Closed Yes 4 2-RC-71 Inside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-CH-661 Inside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-CH-435 11 Inside 2 inch Spring 15 - - - - No -
Check Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
5.2-76
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position Yes 2-CH-986 Outside 3/4 inch Relief 1 - - - - No -
Revision 4106/29/23 x 1inch 4 Containment CSS IA O IN 17A Yes 2-CS-5A Inside 8 inch Check 1 8 inch - - - ---- No -
Spray Water Yes 2-CS-4.1A Outside 8 inch Gate 1 MOV CSAS Closed As Is Yes Open No 2-CS-049C Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-CS-049A Outside 1 inch Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed 5 Containment CSS IA O IN 17B Yes 2-CS-5B Inside 8 inch Check 1 8 inch - - - - No -
Spray Water Yes 2-CS-4.1B Outside 8 inch Gate 1 MOV CSAS Closed As Is Yes Open No 2-CS-101 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 6,8 Safety SIS IB P IN 10A No Penetration 6 Penetration 8 Outside 6 inch Globe 1 6 inch MOV SIAS Closed As Is Yes Open Injection Low (Penetration 6) 2-SI-645 2-SI-635
& High Pressure 2-SI-160 Outside 3 inch Gate 2 6 inch Manual - Locked As Is No Locked 2-SI-161 Closed Closed 2-SI-163 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 6 inch Manual - As Is No inch Locked Locked Closed Closed 10B No 2-SI-646, 2-SI-636, Outside 2 inch Globe 2 MOV SIAS Throttled As Is Yes Open MPS-2 FSAR (Penetration 8) 2-SI-647 2-SI-637 No 2-SI-733, Outside (Pene- Globe 2 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed 2-SI-041E tration 8 Closed only) 1inch No 2-SI-144 11 2-SI-134 11 Outside 6 inch Check 1 - - - - No -
No 2-SI-143 11, 2-SI-133 11, Outside 2 inch Check 2 - - - - No -
2-SI-1009 11 2-SI-1010 No 2-SI-095, Outside (Pene- Globe 2 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed 2-SI-1734 tration 6 Closed only) 1 inch No 2-SI-041F, 2-SI-041D, Outside 0.75 Globe 3 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed 2-SI-1735, 2-SI-110, inch Closed 2-SI-1742D 2-SI-742C Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List. 5.2-77
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position No 2-SI-145 11, 2-SI-135 11, Outside 0.75 Globe 2 Manual - Open As Is No Open Revision 4106/29/23 inch 2-SI-146 11 2-SI-136 11 No 2-SI-706D 2-SI-706C Inside 6 inch Check 1 - - - - No -
No 2-SI-848 S-SI-846 Outside 0.75 Globe Manual - Locked - No Closed inch Closed 7 Safety SIS IB P IN 10C No 2-SI-615 Outside 6 inch Globe 1 6 inch MOV SIAS Closed As Is Yes Open Injection Low
& High Pressure No 2-SI-616, 2-SI-617 Outside 2 inch Globe 2 MOV SIAS Throttled As Is Yes Open No 2-SI-114 11 Outside 6 inch Check 1 - - - - No -
No 2-SI-012 11, 2-SI-113 11 Outside 2 inch Check 2 - - - - No -
No 2-SI-041A, 2-SI-107, Outside 0.75 Globe 5 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed 2-SI-716, inch Closed 2-SI-715, 2-SI-742A No 2-SI-717, 2-SI-718 Outside 1 inch Gate 2 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-SI-115 11, 2-SI-116 11 Outside 0.75 Globe 2 Manual - Open As Is No Open inch No 2-SI-706A Inside 6 inch Check 1 - - - - No -
9 Safety SIS IB P IN 10D No 2-SI-625 Outside 6 inch Globe 1 6 inch MOV SIAS Closed As Is Yes Open Injection Low MPS-2 FSAR
& High Pressure No 2-SI-626, 2-SI-627 Outside 2 inch Globe 2 MOV SIAS Throttled As Is Yes Open No 2-SI-124 11 Outside 6 inch Check 1 - - - - No -
No 2-SI-123 11, 2-SI-011 11 Outside 2 inch Check 2 - - - - No -
No 2-SI-722, 2-SI-723, Outside 0.75 Globe 5 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed 2-SI-720, inch Closed 2-SI-721, 2-SI-742B No 2-SI-125 11, 2-SI-126 11 Outside 0.75 Globe 2 Manual - Open As Is No Open inch No 2-SI-706B Inside 6 inch Check 1 - - - No -
10 Reactor SIS IB P OUT 11 No 2-SI-709 Outside 12 inch Gate 1 12 inch Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Coolant Closed Shutdown Cooling Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List. 5.2-78
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position No 2-SI-651 Inside 12 inch Gate 1 MOV Remote7 Closed As Is Yes Closed Revision 4106/29/23 No 2-SI-101A Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-SI-102A Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-SI-043A Inside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 11 Safety SIS IA N OUT 20 Yes 2-SI-463 Outside 2 inch Gate 1 2 inch Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Injection Tank Closed Test Line 12 & 13 Containment SIS Special Special OUT 16 No Penetration Penetration Outside 24 inch Gate 1 24 inch MOV SRAS Closed As Is Yes Open Sump 12 13 Recirculation 2-CS-16.1A 2-CS-16.1B Line No 2-CS-127 11 2-CS-125 11 Outside 0.75 Gate 1 Manual - Locked Open As Is No Open inch No 2-CS-130 2-CS-135 Outside 0.75 Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-CS-131 11 2-CS-136 11 Outside 0.75 Gate 1 Manual - Locked Open As Is No Open inch No 2-CS-132 2-CS-137 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-CS-133 2-CS-138 Outside 0.75 Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed MPS-2 FSAR No 2-CS-134 2-CS-139 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-CS-140 11 2-CS-141 11 Outside 0.75 Check 1 - - Closed As Is No Closed inch 14 Containment RWS IA O OUT 13A Yes 2-SSP-16.2 Outside 3 inch Globe 1 3 inch Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed Sump to Aerated Drain Tank Yes 2-SSP-16.1 Inside 3 inch Globe 1 Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed No 2-SSP-51 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-SSP-73 Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
5.2-79
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position 15 & 16 Feedwater & FW II N IN 15A No Penetration Penetration Outside 18 inch Positive 1 18 inch Backflow - Open Closed Yes Closed Revision 4106/29/23 Auxiliary 15 16 Acting Feedwater 2-FW-5A 2-FW-5B Check Valve for Penetration No 2-FW-12A 2-FW-12B Outside 6 inch Positive 1 Backflow - Closed Closed Yes Closed 15 Acting Check Valve 15B for Pene- No 2-FW-16A 11 2-FW-16B 11 Outside 1 inch Check 1 - - - - No -
tration 16 No 2-FW-15A 2-FW-15B Outside 1 inch Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-FW-86 2-FW-182 Outside 1 inch Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-FW-261A Outside (Pene. Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed 15 only) Closed 19 & 20 Main Steam MSS III N OUT 23 No Penetration Penetration Outside 0.75 Stop 1 34 inch Air Cylinder MSI Open Closed Yes Closed 6 19 20 inch check 2-MS-64A 2-MS-64B No 2-MS-371 2-MS-369 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-MS-201 2-MS-202 Outside 4 inch Gate 1 MOV Remote 7 Open As Is Yes Open No 2-MS-3A 11 2-MS-3B 11 Outside 12 inch Gate 1 Manual - Open As Is No Open MPS-2 FSAR No 2-MS-190A 2-MS-190B Outside 8 inch Globe 1 Diaphragm Steam Closed Closed Yes Closed Genera-tor Pres-sure No 2-MS-265B 2-MS-266B Outside 1 inch Globe 1 Diaphragm MSI Open Closed Yes Closed No 2-MS-247, 2-MS-239, Outside 6 inch Relief 8 - - - - No -
2-MS-248, 2-MS-240, 2-MS-249, 2-MS-241, 2-MS-250, 2-MS-242, 2-MS-251, 2-MS-243, 2-MS-252, 2-MS-244, 2-MS-253, 2-MS-245, 2-MS-254 2-MS-246 No 2-MS-65A 2-MS-65B Outside 3 inch Globe 1 *** MOV MSI 7 Closed As Is Yes Closed No 2-MS-297 2-MS-296 Outside 1 inch Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List. 5.2-80
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position No 2-MS-265A 2-MS-266C Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual - Open As Is No Open 11 11 Revision 4106/29/23 No 2-MS-255 Outside (Pene- Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed tration Closed 19 only) 0.75 inch No 2-MS-258 Outside (Pene- Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed tration Closed 20 only) 1 inch No 2-MS-41A 11 2-MS-41B 11 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Open As Is No Open inch No 2-MS-461 11 2-MS-462 11 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Closed As Is No Closed inch No 2-MS-459 2-MS-458 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Locked inch Closed Closed 21 Reactor SS IA P OUT 19 No 2-LRR-265 11 Inside 0.5 inch Check 1 0.5 inch - - - - No -
Coolant &
Pressurizer Sampling Yes 2-LRR-61.1 Inside 0.5 inch Globe 1 Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed Yes 2-RC-45 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed inch MPS-2 FSAR Yes 2-RC-001, 2-RC-002 Inside 0.75 Globe 2 Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed inch Yes 2-RC-003 Inside 0.75 Globe 1 Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed inch No 2-RC-65 11 Inside 3/8 inch Globe 1 Manual - Open As Is No Open No 2-RC-434, 2-RC-435 Inside 3/8 inch Globe 2 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed 22 & 23 Steam SGBS IA N OUT 14 No Penetration Penetration Outside 2 inch Globe 1 2 inch Diaphragm AFAIS, Open Closed Yes Closed Generator 22 23 CIAS &
Bottom 2-MS-220A 2-MS-220B High Blowdown Contain-ment Radiation High Radiation Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
5.2-81
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position 24 Reactor Bldg. RBCC IA N IN 24 Yes 2-RB-30.1A Outside 8 inch Gate 1 8 inch MOV Remote Open As Is Yes Open Revision 4106/29/23 Closed W Cooling Water Inlet to Reactor Coolant Pumps and Other Components 8 No 2-RB-289 Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-RB-173A 11 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Open As Is No Open inch 25 & 26 Reactor RBCC IA N IN 21A No Penetration Penetration Outside 10 inch Butterfly 1 10 inch Air Cylinder. Remote Open Open Yes Open Building W 25 26 Closed 2-RB-28.1D 2-RB-28.1B Cooling Water to Containment Air Recirculation Units No 2-RB-282 2-RB-283 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-RB-345 Outside (Pene- Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed tration Closed MPS-2 FSAR 26 only) 1 inch 27 & 28 Reactor Bldg. RBCC IA N IN 21B No Penetration Penetration Outside 10 inch Butterfly 1 10 inch Air Cylinder Remote Open Open Yes Open Closed W 27 28 Cooling Water 2-RB-28.1A 2-RB-28.1C to Containment Air Recirculation Units No 2-RB-236 2-RB-237 Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
5.2-82
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position 29 Reactor RBCC IA N OUT 2 Yes 2-RB-37.2A Outside 8 inch Gate 1 8 inch MOV Remote Open As Is Yes Open Revision 4106/29/23 Building W Closed Cooling Water Outlet from Reactor Coolant Pumps and Other Components 8 No 2-RB-297A Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-RB-298 Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed 30, 31, 32 & Reactor Bldg. RBCC IA N OUT 22 No Penetration Penetration Outside 10 inch Butterfly 1 10 inch Air Cylinder SIAS Closed Open Yes Open 33 Closed W 30 32 Cooling Water 2-RB-28.3D 2-RB-28.3A From Containment Air Recirculation Cooling Penetration Penetration 31 33 2-RB-28.3B 2-RB-28.3C No Penetration3 Penetration Outside 6 inch Butterfly 1 6 inch Air Cylinder Remote Open Open Yes Open MPS-2 FSAR 0 32 2RB-28.2D 2RB-28.2A Penetration Penetration 31 33 l2RB-28.2B 2RB-28.2C 34 Nitrogen NS IA N 12 IN 18 Yes 2-SI-312 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 1 inch Diaphragm CIAS Open Closed Yes Closed Supply inch No 2-SI-045 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 35 Drain from RWS IA O OUT 13B Yes 2-LRR-43.2 Outside 3 inch Globe 1 4 inch Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed Primary Tank Yes4 2-LRR-43.1 Inside 3 inch Globe 1 Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed No 2-LRR-291 Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
5.2-83
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position No 2-LRR-293, 2-LRR-295 Outside 0.75 Globe 2 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Revision 4106/29/23 inch Closed 36 Instrument Air IA IA O IN 33 Yes 2-IA-566 Outside 0.5 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed 9 Closed Yes 2-IA-569 Inside 0.5 inch Check 1 - - - - No -
No 2-IA-572 Inside 0.5 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed closed 37 Instrument Air IA IA O IN 1A Yes 2-IA-27.1 Outside 2 inch Globe 1 2 inch Diaphragm Remote Open Closed Yes Open 9 No 2-IA-40 Outside 1 inch Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed Yes 2-IA-43 Inside 2 inch Check 1 - - - - No -
38 Station Air SA IA O IN 3 Yes 2-SA-19 Outside 2 inch Gate 1 2 inch Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-SA-28 Inside 1 inch Gate 1 2 inch Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed Yes 2-SA-22 Inside 2 inch Check 1 - - - - No -
39 Purge Air Inlet PA IC O IN 4 Yes 2-AC-4 Outside 48 inch Butterfly 1 48 inch Air Cylinder High Locked Closed Yes Closed Contain- Closed ment Radiation Yes4 2-AC-5 Inside 48 inch Butterfly 1 Air Cylinder High Locked Closed Yes Closed Contain- Closed ment MPS-2 FSAR Radiation No 2-AC-21 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual ---- Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 40 Purge Air PA IC O OUT 5 Yes 2-AC-7 Outside 48 inch Butterfly 1 48 inch Air Cylinder High Locked Closed Yes Closed Discharge Contain- Closed ment Radiation Yes4 2-AC-6 Inside 48 inch Butterfly 1 Air Cylinder. High Locked Closed Yes Closed Contain- Closed ment Radiation No 2-AC-31 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 42 Fuel Transfer FTS Special O IN/OUT 8 No, Type B N/A Inside Special Closure 36 inch - - Closed - - Closed Tube Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
5.2-84
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position No 2-RW-291 Inside 0.5 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Revision 4106/29/23 Closed No 2-RW-31 Inside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-RW-292 Inside 0.5 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed 43 Reactor CVCS IA P OUT 6 Yes 2-CH-506 Inside 0.75 Globe 1 0.75 inch Diaphragm CIAS Open Closed Yes Closed Coolant Pump inch Seals Controlled Bleed Off Yes 2-CH-198 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Diaphragm CIAS Open Closed Yes Closed inch Yes 2-CH-505 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed inch No 2-CH-758, 2-CH-768, Outside 0.75 Globe 3 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed 2-CH-701 inch Closed No 2-CH-767 11, 2-CH-766 11 Outside 0.75 Globe 2 Manual - Locked Open As Is No Open inch No 2-CH-744 Outside 0.75 Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 47, 69 70, Pressure IA Special IN/OUT 30 No Penetration Penetration Outside 0.5 inch Globe 1 0.5 inch Manual - Open As Is Yes Open 71 Monitoring 47 70 2-AC-97 11 2-AC-98 11 MPS-2 FSAR Penetration Penetration 69 71 2-AC-99 11 2-AC-96 11 51 Waste Gas RWS IA N 12 OUT 12 Yes 2-GR-11.2 Outside 3 inch Globe 1 3 inch Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed Header Yes 4 2-GR-11.1 Inside 3 inch Globe 1 Diaphragm CIAS Closed Closed Yes Closed No 2-GR-63 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 49 Fire Protection Fire IA O IN 34 Yes 2-Fire-108 Outside 6 inch Butterfly 1 6 inch Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-Fire-125 Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed Yes 2-Fire-109 Inside 6 inch Check 1 - - - As Is No Closed Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
5.2-85
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position 53 Reactor RBCC IA N IN 24 Yes 2-RB-30.1B Outside 6 inch Gate 1 6 inch MOV Remote Open As Is Yes Open Revision 4106/29/23 Building W Closed Cooling Water Inlet to Reactor Coolant Pumps and Other Components 8 No 2-RB-291 Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-RB-173B 11 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Open As Is No Open inch 54 Reactor RBCC IA N OUT 2 Yes 2-RB-37.2B Outside 6 inch Gate 1 6 inch MOV Remote Open As Is Yes Open Building W Closed Cooling Water Outlet from Reactor Coolant Pumps and Other Components 8 No 2-RB-300 Outside 1 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed MPS-2 FSAR No 2-RB-299A Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 85 Containment IA O IN/OUT 29 No, Type B N/A Inside 6 inch Blind 1 - - - - No -
Leak Rate Flange Pressurization No, Type B SF-01 Outside 6 inch Spectacle 1 6 inch - - - - No -
Flange No 2-AC-107 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 61 & 86 Containment CAS IC O OUT 26 Yes Penetration Penetration Outside 1.5 inch Butterfly 1 1 inch Diaphragm CIAS Open Closed Yes Closed10 Air Sample 61 86 2-AC-12 2-AC-47 Yes 2-EB-88 2-EB-89 Inside 1.5 inch Butterfly 1 Diaphragm CIAS Open Closed Yes Closed10 No 2-AC-101 2-AC-102 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
5.2-86
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position 62 & 87 Containment CAS IC O IN 28 Yes Penetration Penetration. Inside 0.5 inch Check 1 1 inch - - - - No -
Revision 4106/29/23 Air Sample 62 87 2-AC-54 2-AC-55 Yes 2-AC-15 2-AC-20 Outside 1.5 inch Butterfly 1 Diaphragm CIAS Open Closed Yes Closed10 No 2-AC-103 2-AC-104 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 67 Refueling RPCS IA O OUT 27A Yes 4 2-RW-232 Inside 4 inch Gate 1 4 inch Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Water Closed Purification Yes 2-RW-21 Outside 4 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-RW-158 Outside 0.75 Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 68 Refueling RPCS IA O IN 27B Yes 4 2-RW-154 Inside 4 inch Gate 1 4 inch Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Water Closed Purification Yes 2-RW-63 Outside 4 inch Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No 2-RW-159 Outside 0.75 Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 82 Hydrogen HC IA O OUT 25A Yes 4 2-EB-91 Inside 6 inch Butterfly 6 inch Air Cylinder CIAS & Closed As Is Yes Closed Purge High Contain-ment MPS-2 FSAR Radiation Yes 2-EB-92 Outside 6 inch Butterfly 1 Diaphragm CIAS & Closed Closed Yes Closed High Contain-ment Radiation Yes 4 2-EB-86 Inside 0.75 Gate 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed No 2-EB-120 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 83 Hydrogen HC IA O OUT 25B Yes 4 2-EB-100 Inside 6 inch Butterfly 1 6 inch Air Cylinder CIAS & Closed As Is Yes Closed Purge High Contain-ment Radiation Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
5.2-87
TABLE 5.2-11 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ISOLATION VALVE INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
Valve Valve Location Position Reference to Normal with Post Penetration Penetration Penetration Flow Valve Type C Testing Containment Penetration Method of Valve Power Position Incident 1 2 Number Service System Type Category Direction Arrangement Requirements3 Valve Identification Structure Size Type Number Line Size Actuation Signal Position Failure Indication Position Yes 2-EB-99 Outside 6 inch Butterfly 1 Diaphragm CIAS & Closed Closed Yes Closed Revision 4106/29/23 High Contain-ment Radiation No 2-EB-121 Outside 0.75 Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed inch Closed 65 & 72 Steam SGBS IA N OUT 14 No Penetration Penetration Outside 0.5 inch Globe 1 0.5 inch Diaphragm CIAS Open Closed Yes Closed Generator 65 72 Blowdown 2-MS-191A 2-MS-191B Sample 63 & 64 Containment ILRT IC O OUT 31 Yes Penetration Penetration. Outside 1 inch Globe 1 1 inch Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Pressure Test 63 64 Closed Connection 2-AC-114 2-AC-112 Yes 2-AC-117 2-AC-116 Inside 1 inch Globe 1 Manual - Locked As Is No Closed Closed No, Type B 1 inch -Blind 1 inch - Outside 1 inch Blind 2 1 inch - - - - No -
Flange TC Blind Flange Flange TC Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
NOTES:
- 1. See Figure 5.2-8.
- 2. See Section 5.2.7.2.1.
- 3. Containment Isolation Valve Test (Type C) per 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J. MPS-2 FSAR
- 4. Valve tested with pressure applied opposite to that applied during LOCA.
- 5. Valve 2-CH-435 no longer functions as a check valve; its internal disk and piston spring have been removed.
- 6. If steam generator pressure drops to< 572 psia.
- 7. Valves 2-MS-65A, 2-MS-65B, 2-MS-202 and 2-SI-651 have disconnect switches in their power circuits to ensure the valves are in their proper position in the event of an Appendix R fire (hot short issue). Once these valves have been positioned and the disconnect switch is placed in the off position, the valves will not respond to automated signals. See FSAR Section 9.10.6.3, item (2), and Appendix R Compliance Report.
- 8. Other components include Reactor Vessel Support Cooling Coils, CEDM Coolers, and the Quench Tank & PDT Heat Exchanger.
- 9. The post incident position 2-IA-566 and 2-IA-27.1 is the same as their normal position unless changed in accordance with plant procedures.
- 10. Valves 2-EB-88, 2-EB-89, 2-AC-12, 2-AC-15, 2-AC-20, 2-AC-47 may be opened to permit post-accident hydrogen sampling of the Containment atmosphere. Thus, the sample systems, excluding the Radiation Monitor skids RM8123 & RM8262, are included in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J testing at the accident pressure.
- 11. Valves within containment boundary that are instrument isolation valves or valves not required to go closed or be closed for isolation of the penetration.
- 12. The allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> as specified in Technical Specification action statement 3.6.3.1.d is applicable for all N Type penetrations except penetration numbers 1, 34, 51.
Note: When making changes to this table, also refer to the Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.6-1, Containment Isolation Valve List.
5.2-88
PIPE Penetration Line Number System Size Schedule Designation Material Class Code Fittings 1 DWS 2 inch 40S HCB-4 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 2 CVCS 2 inch 160 CCB-5 A-376 TP 316 2 B31.7 6000 pound Socket Wel 3 CVCS 2 inch 160 CCB-6 A-376 TP 316 2 B31.7 6000 pound Socket Wel 4 CSS 8 inch 20 GCB-11 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 Butt welded 5 CSS 8 inch 20 GCB-11 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 Butt welded 6 SIS 6 inch 120 CCA-6 A-376 TP 316 2 B31.7 Butt welded 7 SIS 6 inch 120 CCA-6 A-376 TP 316 2 B31.7 Butt welded 8 SIS 6 inch 120 CCA-6 A-376 TP 316 2 B31.7 Butt welded 9 SIS 6 inch 120 CCA-6 A-376 TP 316 2 B31.7 Butt welded 10 SIS 12 inch 20 GCB-1 A-376 TP 316 2 B31.7 Butt welded 11 SIS 2 inch 40S GCB-14 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 12 SIS 24 inch 10S HCB-1 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 Butt welded 13 SIS 24 inch 10S HCB-1 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 Butt welded 14 RWS 3 inch 10S HSB-1 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 Butt welded 15 FW 18 inch 60 EBB-6 A-106 GR B 2 B31.7 Butt welded 16 FW 18 inch 60 EBB-6 A-106 GR B 2 B31.7 Butt welded 19 MSS 34 inch 0.977 inch EBB-2 A-155 GR 2 B31.7 Butt welded wall KCF70 20 MSS 34 inch 0.977 inch EBB-2 A-155 GR 2 B31.7 Butt welded wall KCF70
PIPE Penetration Line Number System Size Schedule Designation Material Class Code Fittings 21 SS 0.75 inch 160 CCB-10 A-376 TP 316 2 B31.7 6000 pound Socket Wel 22 SGBS 2 inch 80 EBB-5 A-106 GR B 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 23 SGBS 2 inch 80 EBB-5 A-106 GR B 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 24 RBCCW 8 inch 40 HBB-5 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 25 RBCCW 10 inch 40 HBB-3 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 26 RBCCW 10 inch 40 HBB-3 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 27 RBCCW 10 inch 40 HBB-3 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 28 RBCCW 10 inch 40 HBB-3 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 29 RBCCW 8 inch 40 HBB-3 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 30 RBCCW 10 inch 40 HBB-3 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 6 inch 31 RBCCW 10 inch 40 HBB-3 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 6 inch 32 RBCCW 10 inch 40 HBB-3 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 6 inch 33 RBCCW 10 inch 40 HBB-4 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 6 inch 34 NS 1 inch 40S GCB-12 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 35 RWS 4 inch 10S HSB-2 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 Butt welded 36 IA 0.5 inch 40S HCB-31 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel
PIPE Penetration Line Number System Size Schedule Designation Material Class Code Fittings 37 IA 2 inch 80 HBB-13 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 38 SA 2 inch 80 HBB-12 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 39 PA 48 inch 0.375 inch HBB-7 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded wall 40 PA 48 inch 0.375 inch HBB-8 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 43 CVCS 0.75 inch 160 CCB-9 A-376 TP 316 2 B31.7 6000 pound Socket Wel 49 Fire 6 inch 40 HBB-19 SA-106 GR B 2 ASME Butt welded Protection 51 RWS 3 inch 40 HRB-1 A-106 GR B 2 B31.7 Butt welded 53 RBCCW 6 inch 40 HBB-5 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 54 RBCCW 6 inch 40 HBB-6 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 61 CAS 1 inch 40S HCB-9 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 62 CAS 1 inch 40S HCB-9 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 65 SBGS 0.5 inch 80 EBB-8 A-106 GR B 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 67 SFPCS 4 inch 10S HCB-10 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 Butt welded 68 SFPCS 4 inch 10S HCB-11 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 Butt welded 72 SGBS 0.5 inch 80 EBB-8 A-106 GR B 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 82 H2 Purge 6 inch 40 HBB-10 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded 83 H2 Purge 6 inch 40 HBB-10 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded
PIPE Penetration Line Number System Size Schedule Designation Material Class Code Fittings 85 Leak Rate 6 inch 40 HBB-1 A-333 GR 6 2 B31.7 Butt welded Test 86 CAS 1 inch 40S HCB-9 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel 87 CAS 1 inch 40S HCB-9 A-312 TP 304 2 B31.7 3000 pound Socket Wel Penetration 17 - Personnel Airlock.
Penetration 18 - Equipment Hatch.
Penetration 42 - Fuel Transfer Tube.
Penetrations 41, 46, 48, 50, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 66, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 88, 89 - SPARE.
Penetrations 47, 69, 70, 71 - Containment Pressure Transmission.
Penetration 75 - Electrical Penetrations 63, 64 - Test Connection.
Penetrations 6, 7, 8, 9 were constructed to Class 1 requirements but are considered Class 2 piping upstream of valves 2-SI-706A, B, C, D.
VALVE ID PENETRATION VALVE NUCLEAR NUMBER NUMBER SIZE TYPE BODY MATERIAL (2) CODE CLASS RATING 2-PMW-43 1 2 inch Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 150 pound 2-PMW-3 1 2 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 600 pound 2-CH-006 2 2 inch Gate A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-CH-516 2 3 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-CH-089 2 2 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-CH-515 2 3 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-CH-434 3 2 inch Gate A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-CH-429 3 2 inch Gate A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-CH-518 3 2 inch Globe A351, GR CF-8
- II 1500 pound 2-CH-519 3 2 inch Globe A351, GR CF-8
- II 1500 pound 2-CH-517 3 2 inch Globe A351, GR CF-8
- II 1500 pound 2-CH-435 3 2 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-CS-5A 4 8 inch Check A351, GR CF-8
- II 300 pound 2-CS-4.1A 4 8 inch Gate A351, GR CF-8
- II 300 pound 2-CS-5B 5 8 inch Check A351, GR CF-8
- II 300 pound 2-CS-4.1B 5 8 inch Gate A351, GR CF-8
- II 300 pound 2-SI-645 6 6 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-144 6 6 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-646 6 2 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-647 6 2 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound
VALVE ID PENETRATION VALVE NUCLEAR NUMBER NUMBER SIZE TYPE BODY MATERIAL (2) CODE CLASS RATING 2-SI-009 6 2 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-143 6 2 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-706D 6 6 inch Check A351, GR CF-8
- I 1500 pound 2-SI-160 6 3 inch Gate SA351, GR CF8M
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-161 6 3 inch Gate SA351, GR CF8M
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-615 7 6 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-114 7 6 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-616 7 2 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-617 7 2 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-012 7 2 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-113 7 2 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-706A 7 6 inch Check A351, GR CF-8
- I 1500 pound 2-SI-636 8 2 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-637 8 2 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-010 8 2 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-133 8 2 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-706C 8 6 inch Check A351, GR CF-8
- I 1500 pound 2-SI-635 8 6 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-134 8 6 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-625 9 6 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound
VALVE ID PENETRATION VALVE NUCLEAR NUMBER NUMBER SIZE TYPE BODY MATERIAL (2) CODE CLASS RATING 2-SI-124 9 6 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-626, 2- 9 2 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound SI-627 2-SI-123 9 2 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-011 9 2 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 1500 pound 2-SI-706B 9 6 inch Check A351, GR CF-8
- I 1500 pound 2-SI-709 10 12 inch Gate A351, GR CF-8
- I 1500 pound 2-SI-651 10 12 inch Gate A182, GR F-316
- I 1500 pound 2-SI-463 11 2 inch Gate A182, GR F-316
- II CL800 2-CS-16.1A 12 24 inch Gate A351, GR CF-8
- II 150 pound 2-CS-16.1B 13 24 inch Gate A351, GR CF-8
- II 150 pound 2-SSP-16.2 14 3 inch Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 150 pound 2-SSP-16.1 14 3 inch Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 150 pound 2-FW-5A 15 18 inch Check A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-FW-12A 15 6 inch Check A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-FW-5B 16 18 inch Check A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-FW-12B 16 6 inch Check A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-MS-64A 19 34 inch Check A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-MS-201 19 4 inch Gate A105, GR 2
- II 600 pound 2-MS-3A 19 12 inch Gate A105, GR 2
- II 600 pound
VALVE ID PENETRATION VALVE NUCLEAR NUMBER NUMBER SIZE TYPE BODY MATERIAL (2) CODE CLASS RATING 2-MS-190A 19 8 inch Globe A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-MS-265B 19 1 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 600 pound 2-MS-65A 19 3 inch Globe A105, GR 2
- II 600 pound 2-MS-64B 20 34 inch Check A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-MS-202 20 4 inch Gate A105, GR 2
- II 600 pound 2-MS-3B 20 12 inch Gate A105, GR 2
- II 600 pound 2-MS-190B 20 8 inch Globe A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-MS-266B 20 1 inch Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 600 pound 2-MS-65B 20 3 inch Globe A105, GR 2
- II 600 pound 2-LRR-61.1 21 0.5 inch Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 2500 pound 2-RC-001 21 0.75 Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 2500 pound inch 2-RC-002 21 0.75 Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 2500 pound inch 2-RC-003 21 0.75 Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 2500 pound inch 2-RC-45 21 0.75 Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 2500 pound inch 2-MS-220A 22 2 inch Globe A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-MS-220B 23 2 inch Globe A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-RB-30.1A 24 8 inch Gate A350, GR LF1
- II 150 pound
VALVE ID PENETRATION VALVE NUCLEAR NUMBER NUMBER SIZE TYPE BODY MATERIAL (2) CODE CLASS RATING 2-RB-28.1D 25 10 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.1B 26 10 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.1A 27 10 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.1C 28 10 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-37.2A 29 8 inch Gate A350, GR LF1
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.3D 30 10 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.2D 30 6 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.3B 31 10 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.2B 31 6 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.3A 32 10 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.2A 32 6 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.3C 33 10 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-RB-28.2C 33 6 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-SI-312 34 0.75 Globe A182, GR F-316
- II 150 pound inch 2-LRR-43.1 35 3 inch Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 150 pound 2-LRR-43.2 35 3 inch Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 150 pound 2-IA-569 36 0.5 inch Check A182, GR F-316 ASME II 600 pound 1983 2-IA-566 36 0.5inch Gate A182, GR F-316 ASME II 600 pound 1983
VALVE ID PENETRATION VALVE NUCLEAR NUMBER NUMBER SIZE TYPE BODY MATERIAL (2) CODE CLASS RATING 2-IA-27.1 37 2 inch Globe A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-IA-43 37 2 inch Check A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-SA-19 38 2 inch Gate A105, GR 2
- II 600 pound 2-SA-22 38 2 inch Check A105, GR 2
- II 600 pound 2-AC-4 39 48 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-AC-5 39 48 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-AC-6 40 48 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-AC-7 40 48 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-CH-506 43 0.75 Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 2500 pound inch 2-CH-198 43 0.75 Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 2500 pound inch 2-CH-505 43 0.75 Globe A351, GR CF8M
- II 2500 pound inch 2-FIRE-108 49 6 inch Butterfly A216, GR WCB ASME II 150 pound 1977 2-FIRE-109 49 6 inch Check A216, GR WCB ASME II 150 pound 1977 2-GR-11.2 51 3 inch Globe A216, GR WCB
- II 150 pound 2-GR-11.1 51 3 inch Globe A216, GR WCB
- II 150 pound 2-RB-30.1B 53 6 inch Gate A105, GR 2
- II 150 pound
VALVE ID PENETRATION VALVE NUCLEAR NUMBER NUMBER SIZE TYPE BODY MATERIAL (2) CODE CLASS RATING 2-RB-37.2B 54 6 inch Gate A105, GR 2
- II 150 pound 2-AC-12 61 1.5 inch Butterfly A515, GR 70
- II 300 pound 2-EB-88 61 1.5 inch Butterfly A515, GR 70
- II 300 pound 2-AC-15 62 1.5 inch Butterfly A515, GR 70
- II 300 pound 2-AC-54 62 0.5 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 600 pound 2-MS-191A 65 0.5 inch Globe A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-RW-232 67 4 inch Gate A182, GR F-316
- II 150 pound 2-RW-21 67 4 inch Gate A182, GR F-316
- II 150 pound 2-RW-154 68 4 inch Gate A182, GR F-316
- II 150 pound 2-RW-63 68 4 inch Gate A182, GR F-316
- II 150 pound 2-MS-191B 72 0.5 inch Globe A216, GR WCB
- II 600 pound 2-EB-91 82 6 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-EB-92 82 6 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-EB-100 83 6 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-EB-99 83 6 inch Butterfly A516, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-AC-47 86 1.5 inch Butterfly A515, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-EB-89 86 1.5 inch Butterfly A515, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-AC-20 87 1.5 inch Butterfly A515, GR 70
- II 150 pound 2-AC-55 87 0.5 inch Check A182, GR F-316
- II 600 pound
1 Major valves are principal valves used for containment integrity and process line function (does not include test, vent, drain valves).
2 ASTM material for valve body indicated. Designation is A or SA per controlling code.
- ASME Section III, 1971, or Draft ASME Pump and Valve Code Penetration numbers 41, 46, 48, 50, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 88, 89 -
SPARE Penetration number 85 - Leak Rate Testing Penetration numbers 63, 64 - Test Connection.
INSTRUMENTATION UANTITY DESCRIPTION 18 Temperature Monitoring System: Resistance Temperature Detector; Accuracy: 0.5F; Sensitivity: 0.1F.
6 Dewpoint Temperature Monitoring System: Accuracy: 2F; Sensitivity:
0.5F.
2 Flowmeters: Mass Flow Meters; Accuracy: 2.0% full scale; Sensitivity:
1.0% full scale.
2 Pressure Monitoring: Precision Pressure Gages; Accuracy: 0.02% of reading; Sensitivity: 0.001 psi.
TE: Instrumentation listed above are typically used during an ILRT. The instrumentation parameters are obtained from ANS 56.8 and are used as guidance in selecting acceptable instruments. Appropriate alternatives to the above instrumentation can be used for the ILRT.
Elevation Distance From RTD (feet) AZ (Degrees) Centerline (feet) Volume Fraction 9769 150 90 12 0.127 8110 95 220 65 0.091 9767 95 40 65 0.091 8111 90 310 60 0.091 8112 90 130 60 0.091 8084 40 5 45 0.071 8108 44 135 60 0.071 8109 44 265 60 0.071 8097 30 95 20 0.026 8098 30 235 20 0.020 8094 20 350 45 0.029 9770 18 220 55 0.028 9771 18 90 50 0.028 8087 3 5 32 0.020 9765 3 240 65 0.020 9766 3 125 65 0.021 8091 -15 330 35 0.052 9768 -10 115 50 0.052 TOTAL 1.000 Elevation Distance From Dewcells (feet) AZ (Degrees) Centerline (feet) Volume Fraction 8101 105 40 45 0.245 8090 105 220 45 0.245 5458 45 300 45 0.150 8102 45 120 45 0.150 8093 -4 220 45 0.105 5457 -4 40 45 0.105 TOTAL 1.000
FIGURE 5.2-1 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE DETAILS Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-103
FIGURE 5.2-2 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE DETAILS Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-104
Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-105 FIGURE 5.2-3 DESIGN THERMAL GRADIENT
Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-106 FIGURE 5.2-4 EQUIPMENT HATCH DETAILS
Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-107 FIGURE 5.2-5 PERSONNEL LOCK DETAILS
Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-108 FIGURE 5.2-6 LINER PLATE
Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-109 FIGURE 5.2-7 LEAK CHASE CHANNELS
Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-110 FIGURE 5.2-8 TYPICAL PENETRATIONS
Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-111 FIGURE 5.2-9 BRACKET DETAILS
Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-112 FIGURE 5.2-10 LINER PLATE DETAILS
FIGURE 5.2-11 REACTOR VESSEL SUPPORT DETAILS Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-113
FIGURE 5.2-12 LOWER STEAM GENERATOR SUPPORT DETAILS Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-114
FIGURE 5.2-13 UPPER STEAM GENERATOR SUPPORT DETAILS Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-115
FIGURE 5.2-14 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SHIELD WALL Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-116
FIGURE 5.2-15 DETAIL - SEISMIC RESTRAINT Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-117
FIGURE 5.2-16 FINITE ELEMENT MESH OF BOTTOM OF CONTAINMENT SHELL Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-118
FIGURE 5.2-17 FINITE ELEMENT MESH OF TOP OF CONTAINMENT SHELL Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-119
FIGURE 5.2-18 FINITE ELEMENT MESH OF CONTAINMENT SHELL FOR STRESSING SEQUENCE Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-120
FIGURE 5.2-19 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE STRESS ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
, DEAD LOAD AND INITIAL PRESTRESS, LIVE LOAD Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-121
FIGURE 5.2-20 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE STRESS ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
, DEAD LOAD, LIVE LOAD, PRESTRESS AND TEST PRESSURE Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-122
FIGURE 5.2-21 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE STRESS ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
, DEAD LOAD, LIVE LOAD, PRESTRESS, OPERATING TEMPERATURE AND DBE Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-123
FIGURE 5.2-22 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE STRESS ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
, DEAD LOAD, LIVE LOAD, PRESTRESS, 100% ACCIDENT PRESSURE AND ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-124
FIGURE 5.2-23 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE STRESS ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
, DEAD LOAD, PRESTRESS, OPERATING TEMPERATURE, THERMAL EXPANSION FORCES OF PIPES, PIPE RUPTURE FORCES AND DBE Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-125
FIGURE 5.2-24 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE STRESS ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
, DEAD LOAD, PRESTRESS, 100% ACCIDENT PRESSURE, THERMAL EXPANSION FORCES OF PIPES, ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE AND DBE Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-126
FIGURE 5.2-25 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE STRESS ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
, DEAD LOAD, PRESTRESS, 125% ACCIDENT PRESSURE, 125% THERMAL EXPANSION FORCES OF PIPES, ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE AND 125% OBE Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-127
FIGURE 5.2-26 CONTAINMENT AND STRUCTURE STRESS ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
, DEAD LOAD, PRESTRESS, 150% ACCIDENT PRESSURE AND ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.2-128
1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION enclosure building is a limited leakage steel framed structure with uninsulated metal siding an insulated roof deck. It also includes those portions of the auxiliary building adjacent to the tainment, as shown in Figures 5.3-1 and 5.3-2. The enclosure building completely surrounds containment above grade and is designed and constructed to ensure that an acceptable upper t of leakage of radioactive materials to the environment would not be exceeded in the unlikely nt of a loss-of-coolant incident.
use of a suitable formed gasket material at all joints will provide assurance that the required ree of air tightness and partial vacuum will be maintained within the enclosure building. Two tinuous lines of caulking are provided at all lap joints of both siding and decking, with the eption of the east and west wall blowout panels. A single line of caulking shall be provided at bottom end lap and side laps of the blowout panels. The caulking may be applied to either the rior building seam or the exterior building seam.
Principal dimensions of the enclosure building are as follows:
Length (feet) 153.0 Width (feet) 147.0 Height (feet) 147.0 Decking (gauge) 20 Siding (gauge) 22 enclosure building is supported partially on concrete grade beams and caissons, partially on roof of the auxiliary and turbine buildings, and partially on the dome of the containment. The rior of the enclosure building contains permanent ladders, stairways and catwalks which vide access to the upper exterior regions of the containment and to equipment in this building.
ddition, permanent work platforms are furnished for the periodic surveillance of the post-ioned prestressing tendons.
crete floor slabs are provided at grade between the enclosure building and the containment, also at Elevations 36-6 and 38-6. A waterproofing membrane is provided under the slabs at de and is extended down and around the containment below grade, as shown on Figure 5.3-3.
ween the waterproofing membrane and the containment wall, corrugated asbestos-cement ng is installed as shown in Figure 5.3-4, to provide a passage of least resistance for possible age from the containment below grade to the enclosure building.
re are two stacks that exhaust radioactive effluents from the Millstone Unit 2 operations.
ioactive effluents are piped to the Millstone stack that was provided for the Millstone Nuclear er Station, Unit 1. This stack provided for future expansion to accept effluent gases from the t 2 plant. The physical features of the stack are provided in Section 3.8 of the FSAR for the lstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3. Gas volume increase is less than one percent, resulting n exit gas velocity of 5,723 feet per minute. Section 3.8, of the Unit 3, FSAR lists the
safety related equipment.
only other stack that exhausts radioactive effluents to the atmosphere from Unit 2 is the stack ted atop the enclosure building. The stack is constructed of one-quarter inch steel plate and dard structural shapes. Overall height is 13 feet. This is a seismic Class I stack, designed in ordance with the criteria contained in Section 5.3.3 of the FSAR. The stack has a constant angular cross section which has dimensions of 4 feet 0 inches by 9 feet 6 inches. Exit velocity ffluents is 1,684 feet per minute with two fans operating and 2,526 feet per minute with three operating. During normal plant operation, two fans are operating.
2 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS following materials are used in the construction of the enclosure building:
tructural steel ASTM A-36 oncrete (psi)
Grade beams and Caissons 4,000 Slabs at grade 3,000 Floor slabs 3,000 einforcing steel ASTM A615, Grade 60 etal siding 22 gauge etal roof decks 20 gauge 3 DESIGN BASES design of the enclosure building provides the required features as outlined in General Design eria 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 60, Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50.
3.1 Bases for Design Loads following loads are considered in the design of the enclosure building:
- a. Dead loads
- b. Live loads including external pressures
- c. Earthquake loads
- d. Wind and tornado loads
dead loads consist of the weight of the steel frame, roof, metal siding, and access stairs and ers.
3.1.2 Live Loads design live loads for the enclosure building are as follows:
oof, snow loads (psf) 60 labs at grade Equipment hatch area AASHO H-20 truck load Other areas (psf) 500 External pressure (independent of wind and tornado loads) (psf) 10 ghts of equipment as indicated on drawings supplied by the manufacturer are included as live s.
3.1.3 Earthquake Loads earthquake loads are predicated on an operating basis earthquake (OBE) at the site having a zontal ground surface acceleration of 0.09 g. In addition, a design basis earthquake (DBE) ing a horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.17 g is used to check the design of the losure building to ensure no loss of structural function. The seismic design spectrum curves given in Figures 5.8-1 and 5.8-2. A vertical component two-thirds of the magnitude of the zontal ground surface component is applied at the base simultaneously.
ynamic analysis including the effects of the attachments to the other structures is used to arrive e equivalent static loads for the design.
3.1.4 Wind and Tornado Loads ds loads for the design of the enclosure building are based on a wind velocity of 115 mph with ts up to 140 mph. The ASCE Paper 3269 is used to determine the shape factors. However, the visions in the paper for gust factors and variations of wind velocity with respect to height are applied.
entire enclosure building is designed to resist the effects of the 140 mph wind.
nado loads on the enclosure building are based on a tornado funnel having a peripheral ential velocity of 300 mph and a translational velocity of 60 mph. These velocities are bined, resulting in a design basis tornado wind velocity of 360 mph. The enclosure building, cent to structures which house safety related equipment, is designed so that its structural ing will withstand tornado winds, but the siding will be blown away.
tion 5.2.5.1.2 of the FSAR. The siding when blown off may induce superficial damage to the cent structures, but the structural integrities of the adjacent structures will be maintained. The gn requirements for tornado loads for structures which house safety related equipment for tdown are given in Section 5 of the FSAR.
design of the enclosure building for tornado loads assumes that tornado wind is not cident with a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or earthquake.
3.2 Design Load Combination and Structural Analysis enclosure building is designed to meet the performance and strength requirements of the owing loading combinations:
- a. At design loads
- b. At factored loads design of structural steel is in accordance with the AISC Manual of Steel Construction. The gn of concrete is in accordance with the ACI Code 318-63.
3.2.1 At Design Loads enclosure building is analyzed for the following specific loading conditions:
+ L = Construction
+ l + E = Operating
+ L + W = Operating ere D = dead loads L = live loads E = operating basis earthquake loads (0.09 g)
W = wind or tornado loads 3.2.2 At Factored Loads enclosure building is analyzed for the factored load combination to ensure that its structural grity is not affected.
1 C = ---- 1.0 D + E
C = required capacity of the structure
= 0.90 for fabricated structural steel D = dead loads E = design basis earthquake (0.17 g) stresses of the members of the structure at factored loads are limited to the yield stresses of structural steels.
3.2.3 Seismic Analysis seismic analysis of the enclosure building is made on a mathematical model which consists of lumped masses of the containment structure and the enclosure building. The seismic response he combined model is obtained in accordance with the procedures outlined in Section 5.8.
4 THROUGH-LINE LEAKAGE EVALUATION evaluate the through-line leakage that can bypass the enclosure building filtration region FR), the fluid systems penetrating containment are categorized as follows:
- a. Piping Systems open to the containment post-accident atmosphere.
- b. Piping Systems which are closed and therefore not exposed to the containment post-accident atmosphere.
following assumptions are made to postulate the maximum hypothetical conditions:
- a. There is either a seismic occurrence and all Seismic Class 2 lines are broken, or there is no seismic occurrence and all Seismic Class 2 lines are intact.
- b. The single failure criterion applies to Seismic Class 1 components only.
condition of a seismic occurrence is not considered. Should the pipe break within the EBFR, potential containment leakage would be processed by the enclosure building filtration system FS) as per design. The EBFS has ample capacity for this event.
m the basis formulated, systems which are not normally opened to the containment osphere, or normally closed systems, either do not leak (assuming no seismic event) or are ted to the EBFR (assuming a seismic event). Normally, closed systems which may be opened he atmosphere during accident conditions, such as lines connected to the reactor coolant sure boundary, are not considered. These systems are either operating at a higher pressure or m closed loops. Therefore, assuming a single failure, these lines either prevent leakage by the her pressure or contain the leakage by the closed loop.
reas beyond the EBFR. These leakage pathways could result in Post-Accident Containment osphere bypassing the EBFR and discharging directly to the atmosphere thereby increasing site and off site doses under radiological accident conditions. Leakage through these pathways ferred to as bypass leakage.
a leakage pathway to viably result in bypass leakage, the pathway must be open to the tainment atmosphere post-accident and provide a means of transporting the containment osphere beyond the EBFR as well as a means for the containment atmosphere to escape the ng or duct. For containment penetrations that are confirmed to contribute to bypass leakage, age rates may be based on measured values as opposed to the recommended or maximum wable values used for testing.
ases where measured values are used, steps are taken to ensure that degradation of the valve ing capabilities are taken into account commensurate with the severity of service and the uired time intervals between valve maintenance.
evaluation concluded the following penetrations are considered to qualify as systems that are n both inside containment and outside containment, extend beyond the EBFR, and could tribute to bypass leakage:
Penetration System 14 Containment Sump Pump Discharge 37 Instrument Air System 38 Station Air System 42 Fuel Transfer Tube 61 Hydrogen Monitoring System 62 Hydrogen Monitoring System 67 Refueling Cavity Drain 68 Refueling Cavity Skimmer 85 Containment Pressure Test Connection 86 Hydrogen Monitoring System 87 Hydrogen Monitoring System off-site and control room dose analyses are based on a calculated maximum bypass leakage er to Section 14.8.4). For each verified bypass leakage pathway, a recommended leak rate is vided based on the limits used to satisfy the leakage limits established for the testing required 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. Total leakage from all verified bypass leakage pathways will be
age exceeds this value, repairs will be performed to reduce bypass leakage to an acceptable l.
provisions for initial and periodic leak testing of containment penetrations and maximum wable leakage are specified in Table 5.2-11 of the FSAR and Section 3.6.1.2.c of the hnical Specifications respectively.
1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION auxiliary building is a multistory, reinforced concrete structure with flat slabs and shear ls. Some open areas of the building are supported by structural steel columns to preserve space allow flexibility in the design. The portion of the building west of column line M.7 is founded bedrock approximately 60 feet below the ground surface, while the eastern end of the building upported by compacted structural backfill. These two portions of the building are separated m each other by an expansion joint at line M.7 to allow for differential movements.
auxiliary building is separated from the containment, which is to the north, by an expansion t and from the turbine building to the west by slotted connections. Although the control rooms Units 1 and 2 are combined in one area, the buildings are separated by Teflon lined sliding rings. These isolation joints provide the auxiliary building with structural independence from surrounding buildings in the lateral direction.
eral layouts at the various elevations and sections through the auxiliary building are shown on ures 1.2-7 and 1.2-14.
1.1 Fuel Storage Facility 1.1.1 New Fuel Storage new fuel storage is bounded by column lines 17.2 and 18.9 and column lines S and N.3 at vation 38-6.
1.1.2 Spent Fuel Storage nt fuel storage is provided between column lines 17.2 and 18.9 and column lines H.4 and L.5 levation (-)2-0. The storage area consists of a reinforced concrete pool lined with one-fourth thick stainless steel plate to Elevation 38-6. Normal water level is to Elevation 36-6. The nt fuel is protected from a main steam line rupture by a reinforced concrete wall which is ted north of and parallel to the pool.
eak chase system consisting of channels embedded behind the liner plate at all seams and nected to a collector system is used to monitor and control any possible leakage from the pool.
escription of the monitoring system is provided in Section 5.4.3.3.4.
overhead crane with the capacity of 125 tons is employed to handle the spent fuel cask. The e is designed to meet the single failure requirements in accordance with NUREG-0612 and REG-0554. A system of interlocks is also provided on the crane that defines a safe load path.
s safe load path is indicated on Figure 5.3-5.
design of the fuel storage structures complies with the structural requirements of Safety de 13.
2 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS following materials are used in the construction of the auxiliary building.
Structural and miscellaneous steel Rolled shapes, plates, and bars ASTM A-36 Crane rails Bethlehem Steel High strength bolts ASTM A-325 or A-490 Stainless Steel ASTM A-240 Type 304 Reinforcing steel Deformed bars ASTM A-615 Grade 60 Concrete, 28 day strength (psi)
Lean concrete backfill 2,000 Foundation mat slab Auxiliary Building 3,000 Warehouse portion of the Auxiliary Building 4,000 All other concrete 3,000 Interior coatings (Original Construction)
- 1. Concrete and masonry surfaces Primer Keeler & Long Number 7107 epoxy white primer Finish coat (floor and wainscot) Keeler & Long Number 7107 epoxy white enamel (tinted)
Finish coat (above wainscot) Keeler & Long Number 7107 epoxy white enamel
- 2. Carbon steel Primer (wainscot) Keeler & Long Number. 7107 epoxy white primer Finish coat (wainscot) Keeler & Long Number. 7475 epoxy white enamel (tinted)
Finish coat (above wainscot) Keeler & Long Tri-Polar Enamel Coating materials used in the auxiliary building represent current day technology and comply with current day environmental requirements regarding volatile organic compound (VOC) content and hazardous material constituents such as lead, asbestos, and hexavalent chrome.
Specific products are selected to provide service performance comparable to or improved over that of the original coating materials. Coating colors are chosen to help maintain a safe working environment.
3 DESIGN BASES design of the auxiliary building provides the required features as outlined in General Design eria 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 61, 62, 63, Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50.
3.1 Bases for Design Loads auxiliary building is designed for all credible combinations of loading, including loads under mal operation, loads during a steam line rupture, and loads due to adverse environmental ditions. The following loadings are considered:
- a. Dead loads
- b. Live loads
- c. Thermal loads
- d. Earthquake loads
- e. Lateral pressure loads
- f. Wind and tornado loads
- g. Pipe restraint loads
- h. Pipe whipping loads
- i. Cask drop loads
- j. Fuel transfer tube bellows 3.1.1 Dead Loads se loads consist of the weight of all structural materials, including all partitions, hangers, s, pads and pedestals, and equipment dead loads. These are specified on the drawings supplied he manufacturers of the equipment installed within the building.
e loads consist of design floor loads, pool and tank liquid weights, piping loads, and ipment live loads as specified on the drawings supplied by the manufacturers of the equipment alled within the building. A snow load of 60 psf is applied on the roof.
3.1.3 Thermal Loads rmal loads are those induced in the spent fuel pool floor and walls due to the thermal gradients ss these elements. Thermal gradients may be caused by an increase in water temperature ng operating conditions or by an accident. The interior temperatures of the pool are assumed e 150F at operating conditions and 212F during an accident. The ambient temperature rior to the pool is assumed to be 55F for computation of stresses.
3.1.4 Earthquake Loads se loads are as defined in Sections 5.2.2.1.5 and 5.8.
3.1.5 Lateral Pressure Loads static lateral soil pressure loads are as follows:
Active - above water table 55 (psf/ft) below water table 95 (psf/ft)
Passive - above water table 370 (psf/ft) below water table 200 (psf/ft) urcharge of 200 psf, or an 8,000 pound wheel load, is considered in all cases.
yant forces resulting from the displacement of ground water are supplied to the structure. The owing water levels are considered:
Ground water Elevation 5-0 Flood water Elevation 18-1 dynamic soil and hydrodynamic pressures are discussed in Section 5.8.2.2 and are considered ct on the structural elements below grade, where applicable.
3.1.6 Wind and Tornado Loads d loads for the auxiliary building are determined on the basis of the American Society of Civil ineers (ASCE) Paper 3269, Wind Forces on Structures, using the highest wind velocity at site for a 100 year recurrence period. The ASCE Paper 3269 is used mainly to determine the pe factors. Based upon the site location and the structure classification, the design wind city is taken to be 115 mph with gusts up to 140 mph.
- a. Differential bursting pressure between the interior and exterior of the structure is assumed to be three psi pressure occurring in three seconds (1 psi/second),
followed by a calm for two seconds and a re pressurization.
- b. Lateral loads on the structure are based on a tornado funnel which is conservatively assumed to have a peripheral tangential velocity of 300 mph and a translational velocity of 60 mph. The applicable portions of the wind design methods described in the ASCE Paper 3269 are used, particularly for the shape factors. The provisions in the paper for gust factors and variation of wind velocity with respect to height are not applied. The wind velocity is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the height of the structure.
- c. Tornado driven missiles as defined in Section 5.2.5.1.2.
h the exception of the missile impact area, the allowable stresses to resist the effects of adoes are 90 percent of the yield strength of the reinforcing steel and 85 percent of the mate strength of the concrete.
iscussion of the probability of tornado occurrence is presented in Section 2.3.
3.1.7 Pipe Restraint Loads se are the loads imparted to the structure from the pipe restraints produced by either a tulated pipe rupture or an earthquake. See Section 6.1.4 for pipe rupture criteria.
3.1.8 Pipe Whipping Loads se are the loads imposed on the structure due to whipping from a postulated pipe rupture. See tion 6.1.4 for pipe rupture criteria.
3.1.9 Cask Drop Loads upgrade of the MP2 Spent Fuel Cask Crane to single failure criteria has precluded the need to tulate a Spent Fuel Cask Drop accident. The crane upgrade will give positive control of the d loads even with the worst single failure. This section has been retained to provide the orical background for the design and analysis of the spent fuel pool.
following design criteria were used in the analysis of the spent fuel pool in the event that a k is accidentally dropped:
Length of cask (feet) 19 Diameter of cask (feet) 8 Distance of drop (feet)
In air 2.75 In water 35.5 shown on Figure 5.3-5, the only area of the spent fuel pool into which the cask could be pped directly is the cask laydown area. The cask laydown area is isolated from the spent fuel age area by two-foot thick, permanent, reinforced concrete walls and a temporary gate placed he fuel transfer slot. The base slab of the cask laydown area is composed of seven feet of forced concrete resting on a mass of monolithic concrete which, in turn, rests on bedrock.
refore, a cask dropped in this area would travel vertically downward as restrained by the ounding walls. Any damage would be limited to rupturing of the spent fuel pool liner and l superficial crushing of concrete in the area of impact of the end of the cask. Leakage through ruptured liner would be detected in the control room and would be stopped by closing the e that connects the leak collection channel for the ruptured zone(s) to the leak detection rumentation.
uring handling, the cask is dropped on or near point A, as shown on Figure 5.3-5, there ts a possibility that the cask could fall or tumble into the spent fuel storage area. The fall ld provide some local concrete crushing in the spent fuel pool and laydown area walls at ation (+) 38 feet 6 inches. The cask would then slide into the spent fuel storage area of the
- l. The cask would crush the spent fuel rack module(s) that it landed on, but the buoyant effect he water combined with the crushing of the rack would dissipate most of the kinetic energy of falling cask. Therefore, the probable damage would be limited to rupture of the spent fuel pool r and local crushing of concrete where the cask impacted. The dose impact of damage to spent stored in the pool (both intact and consolidated) would be mitigated by administratively trolling the age of the stored fuel in the affected area around the cask laydown area of the spent pool. Whenever a shielded cask is on the refueling floor, all stored fuel within a specified ance of the cask laydown area shall have decayed a minimum amount of time from subcritical tor operation in accordance with the Technical Specifications. The seven foot thick base and foot thick walls, of reinforced concrete, would remain intact. Leakage would be detected and ped as described above.
keup water would be available as discussed in Section 9.5.
3.1.10 Fuel Transfer Tube Bellows following loads were used in the design of the fuel transfer tube and bellows:
Design pressure, internal (psi) 60 Design temperature (F) 290
Axial movement, expansion or contraction (in.) 0.5 placements are selected to accommodate an assumed differential settlement of one-eighth inch ween the buildings. Since both the containment and auxiliary buildings are founded on rock, motion is minimal.
3.2 Design Load Combinations ensure the structural integrity of the auxiliary building, the working stress method of design is d for the various loading combinations. For the operating conditions, normal allowable sses given in the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Manual of Steel struction 1963, and the American Concrete Institute (ACI)-318-63, Building Code uirements for Reinforced Concrete are used. These allowable stresses are increased by 13 percent for the 115 mph base wind loads and the operating basis earthquake (OBE) loads.
the tornado wind and the design basis earthquake (DBE), the allowable stresses are 90 percent he yield strength of the reinforcing, and 85 percent of the ultimate strength of concrete.
load combinations are listed:
- a. D+L
- b. D + L + Ww
- c. D + L + Wt
- d. D+L+E
- e. D + L + E
- f. D + L + Pe + Wt + Hw
- g. D+L+T+E
- h. D + L + T + E
- i. D + L + Pe + E
- j. D + L + Pe + E
- k. D + L + Fp + E
- l. D + L + Fc
- m. D + L + Fr + E
D = dead loads L = live loads Ww = wind loads (115 mph base)
Wt = tornado loads (360 mph base E = OBE E = DBE Pe = soil pressure Fp = pipe whipping loads Fc = cask drop loads Fr = pipe restraint loads Hw = hydrostatic pressure T = thermal loads se load combinations are applied to the portions of the structure housing or associated with the ous systems as follows:
Item Cask crane structure a, b, c, d, e Chemical addition and sampling system a, c, d, e, f, i, j Chemical and volume control system (CVCS) a, c, d, e, f, i, j Containment spray pumps a, c, d, e, f, i, j Control room a, b, c, d, e Diesel generator room and day tanks a, c, d, e, f Electrical distribution system a, b, c, d, e New fuel storage a, b, c, d, e Reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system a, c, d, e, f, i, j Safety injection systems (SIS) a, c, d, e, f, i, j Spent fuel cooling system a, c, d, e, f, i, j Spent fuel pool a, b, c, d, e, g, h, k, l Waste processing systems a, c, d, e, f, i, j
raction diagrams are used to proportion reinforcing and concrete required to support a given with its corresponding eccentricity. Exterior walls having vertical and lateral loads are gned for bending and axial loadings, and the resulting combined stresses are kept within the e allowables. There are numerous walls, slabs, columns, and beams within the buildings, each ment of which was designed for the pertinent loading. Design stresses in the various ponents are recorded in the design calculations. The allowable loading, or combined loading, ends on the reinforcing which was added and varies considerably depending upon the applied ditions.
maximum combined stress ratio in the steel cask crane frame is 0.904, resulting from an axial ss of 3.53 ksi and a bending stress of 31.8 ksi. This stress occurs under loading combination e.,
ve.
addition to the various load combinations included, all Category I structures outside the tainment that could be pressurized in the event of a postulated pipe rupture are designed to sfy the following load combinations:
(1) U = D + L + T + Ra + 1.5Pa (2) U = D + L + T + Ra + 1.25Pa + Fr + Fc + Fj + 1.25E (3) U = D + L + T + Ra + Pa + Fr + Fc + Fj + E re:
U = total design load D = dead loads L = live loads Ra = pipe reactions under thermal condition generated by a postulated break Fr = equivalent static pipe restraint loads Fc = equivalent static pipe whipping loads, including the effects of missiles Fj = equivalent static jet impingement loads Pa = equivalent static differential pressure load generated by a postulated pipe break E = OBE loads E = DBE loads T = thermal loads under thermal conditions generated by a postulated break the above loading conditions, the allowable stresses are as follows:
90 percent of the yield strength for reinforcing steel 85 percent of the ultimate strength of concrete Steel Construction:
Allowable stresses specified in Part 2 of the AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Building, April, 1963.
3.3 Structural Analysis 3.3.1 Seismic Analysis mic analysis is performed in accordance with Section 5.8.
3.3.2 Wind and Tornado Analysis design wind loads on the auxiliary building are a function of the kinetic energy per volume of moving air mass. The product of one-half of the air density and the square of the resultant gn velocity results in a pressure corresponding to the design wind.
ermination of the design wind pressure on the structure is in accordance with the ASCE Paper 9, Wind Forces on Structures.
pressure corresponding to the standard air at 0.07651 pcf at 15C and 760 mm of mercury in s of the velocity at the appropriate height zone is given by:
q = 0.002558V2 ilarly, the design pressure, including the effect of the shape coefficient (Cd), is given by:
p = q x Cd = 0.002558V2Cd ng these equations and the wind velocities given in Section 5.4.3.1.6, the wind forces are ulated for the various parts of the auxiliary building and are then applied to the structure.
spent fuel pool is protected from the tornado missile, which is described in Section 5.4.3.1.6, a concrete roof over the cask crane frame and missile proof metal siding, as per tion 5.4.3.3.6.
3.3.3 Cask Drop in Spent Fuel Pool design criteria stated in Section 5.4.3.1.9 is applied using the following assumptions:
Strength of concrete (psi) 3,000 Modulus of concrete (E) (ksf) 4.78 x 105 striking velocity at collision is determined by the use of the formula as defined in the paper rnado Protection for the Spent Fuel Storage Pool by Miller and Williams, APED-5696 Class ovember 1968. The friction factor is ignored. A dynamic pressure factor (Cq) of unity is med in the analysis.
determine the effects of accidentally dropping the cask on the bottom of the spent fuel pool in cast laydown area, the kinetic energy was computed. This energy is considered to be ipated as elastic strain energy within the bounds of the lean concrete mass supporting the own area. The contact area between the cask and the concrete is small.
wever, the actual contact stress is calculated and found to be less than 1,000 psi. The impact of contact may cause some local damage to the liner plate and/or concrete. However, the extent he damage is small and will not result in any significant structural damage to the floor. The imum stress in the concrete occurs at Elevation (-)2-0 and diminishes rapidly as the stress ile extends downward.
3.3.4 Stainless Steel Liner Plate for Spent Fuel Pool te: Section 5.4.3.3.4 describes preoperational testing and repair of the spent fuel pool liner. It etained, without change, for a historical record. The spent fuel pool leak monitoring and ction system is described in Section 9.5.2.1.]
vision is made for ensuring the leak tightness of the spent fuel pool and refueling canal liner e.
test consists of two parts. In the first part of the test, a halogenated hydrocarbon gas is forced ugh the leak monitoring channels and a halogenated hydrocarbon detector is used to locate s in the liner plate weld seams inside the spent fuel pool. All leak indications are marked and ired after the halogenated hydrocarbon gas is removed from the leak monitoring channels. All d repairs are checked by a liquid penetrant test.
n completion of the repair, the pool is filled with water to the design level and monitored for ours.
o water is detected in the leak monitoring system, the pool is considered acceptable.
3.3.5 Fuel Transfer Tube expansion joint is installed in the fuel transfer tube. It is a bellows located in the fuel transfer al in the auxiliary building.
outside of the expansion joint in the transfer canal may be visually inspected by draining the sfer canal or by remote means. A test connection on the bellows provides a means of testing bellows integrity. Repair would require draining the transfer canal.
etail of the fuel transfer tube is shown in Figure 5.2-10.
3.3.6 Spent Fuel Pool Missile Protection ithhold under 10 CFR 2.390 (d) (1)
sile to directly impact the fuel assembly elements located at the bottom of the spent fuel pool.
ithhold under 10 CFR 2.390 (d) (1)
1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION turbine building is a rigid framed steel structure with metal siding and precast concrete panels he exterior. Blowout panels are located on the east wall, column line E on the upper portion he metal siding. The foundations for the frame are spread footings bearing on lean concrete kfill which extends to rock. The turbine-generator pedestal is a low-tuned mass concrete cture which is also founded on lean concrete backfill which extends to rock.
pedestal is separated from the surrounding floor slabs by teflon lined sliding bearings as cated on Figure 5.5-1. The turbine building main frame is connected to the Unit 1 turbine ding by sliding connections so that it is an independent structure.
shown on Figures 1.2-3, 1.2-4, and 1.2-5, the heater bay running between lines E and E.5, arates the turbine building from the auxiliary building. This bay is connected to the auxiliary ding for lateral support, but is separated from the turbine building main frame by sliding nections as indicated on Figure 5.5-2. Sections through the turbine building are shown on ures 1.2-15 and 1.2-16.
Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine buildings are on the same centerline so that the crane runway em is continuous through both units. A 195 ton overhead crane operates on the runway em. The crane is designed to meet the loading requirements of the applicable portions of ne Manufacturers Associated of America (CMAA) Specification 70.
2 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS following materials are used in the construction of the turbine building:
Structural and Miscellaneous Steel Rolled shapes, plates and bars ASTM A-36 Crane rails Bethlehem Steel High strength bolts ASTM A-325 or A-490 Reinforcing Steel Column ties in turbine pedestals ASTM A-615 Grade 40 All other deformed bars ASTM A-615 Grade 60 Concrete, 28 day strength (psi)
Turbine pedestals, operating floor slabs, and column footings 4000 All other concrete 3000
Concrete and masonry surfaces in switchgear room Floor Keeler & Long Number 7107 Epoxy Grey Interior maintenance coatings Coating materials used in the turbine building represent current day technology and comply with current day environmental requirements regarding volatile organic compound (VOC) content and hazardous material constituents such as lead, asbestos, and hexavalent chrome. Specific products are selected to provide service performance comparable to or improved over that of the original coating materials. Coating colors are chosen to help maintain a safe working environment.
3 DESIGN BASES design of the turbine building provides the required features as outlined in Criteria 2, 3, 4, 5, endix A of 10 CFR Part 50.
3.1 Bases for Design Loads hough only a portion of the turbine building houses Class I equipment and components, the re structural system is designed for a Seismic Class I loading.
design loads imposed on the structure are as follows:
- a. Dead loads
- b. Live loads
- c. Thermal loads
- d. Earthquake loads
- e. Wind and tornado loads
- f. Crane loads 3.1.1 Dead Loads se loads consist of the weight of all structural materials, including all partitions, hangers, s, pads, and pedestals. Equipment dead loads are those specified on the drawings supplied by manufacturers of the various equipment installed within the building.
se loads consist of design floor loads, tank liquid weights, piping loads, and equipment live s specified on the drawings supplied by the manufacturers of the various equipment installed hin the building.
now load of 60 psf is applied to the exposed roof over the area housing Class I equipment or ponents, and 40 psf for all other exposed roof area.
3.1.3 Thermal Loads ansion and contraction in structural members due to changes in temperature are considered.
visions for normal expansion and contraction are made by the use of slotted connections as uired.
3.1.4 Earthquake Loads mic analysis is as defined in Sections 5.2.2.1.5 and 5.8.
3.1.5 Wind and Tornado Loads d loads for the turbine building are determined on the basis of the ASCE Paper 3269, Wind ces on Structures, using the highest wind velocity at the site for a 100 year recurrence period.
ASCE paper is used mainly to determine the shape factors. Based upon the site location and structure classification, the design wind and velocity is taken to be 115 mph with gusts up to mph.
turbine building is analyzed for tornado loads on the following basis:
- a. Differential bursting pressure between the interior and exterior of the structure is assumed to be 3 psi pressure occurring in three seconds (1 psi/second), followed by a calm for two seconds and a re pressurization.
- b. Lateral loads on the structure are based on a tornado funnel which is conservatively assumed to have a peripheral tangential velocity of 300 mph and a translational velocity of 60 mph. These velocities are added together, resulting in a design basis tornado wind velocity of 360 mph. The applicable portions of the wind design methods described in the ASCE paper are used, particularly for the shape factors. The provisions in the paper for gust factors and variation of wind velocity with respect to height are not applied. The wind velocity is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the height of the structure.
- c. A tornado driven missile as defined in Section 5.2.5.1.2.
h the exception of the missile impact area, the allowable stresses to resist the effects of adoes are 90 percent of the yield strength of the reinforcing steel and 85 percent of the mate strength of the concrete.
3.1.6 Crane Loads se loads include the dead and live loads of the turbine building crane.
3.2 Design Load Combinations ensure the structural integrity of the turbine building, the allowable stresses specified in the 3 AISC Manual of Steel Construction, and the ACI-318-63 Building Code Requirements Reinforced Concrete, are used. These allowable stresses are increased by 33-1/3 percent for 115 mph base wind loads and the operating basis earthquake loads. For the tornado wind and design base earthquake, the allowable stresses are 90 percent of the yield strength of the forcing, and 85 percent of the ultimate strength of concrete.
following load combinations are considered:
- a. D + L + CD + CL
- b. D + L + C D + Ww
- c. D + L + C D + WT
- d. D + CD + L + E
- e. D + CD + L + E ere D = dead loads L = live loads CD = crane dead loads CL = crane live loads Ww= wind loads (115 mph base)
Wt = tornado loads (360 mph base)
E = operating basis earthquake E = design basis earthquake design loads and stresses for all concrete walls and columns are within the allowable values each wall or column. Design stresses are not applicable for the columns inasmuch as the raction diagrams are used to proportion reinforcing and concrete required to support a given with its corresponding eccentricity. Exterior walls having vertical and lateral loads are gned for bending and axial loadings and the resulting combined stresses are kept within the
ponents are recorded in the design calculations. The allowable loading, or combined loading, ends on the reinforcing which was added and varies considerably depending upon the applied ditions.
following loading combinations and reinforcing ratios (of moment/axial force and shear) wn in Table 5.5-1 governed the design.
3.3 Structural Analysis main frame of the turbine building and the turbine generator pedestal are designed for the combinations stated in Section 5.5.3.2 using working stress methods.
3.3.1 Seismic Analysis lysis of the turbine building for the effects of an earthquake is performed in accordance with tion 5.8.
se earthquake loads are superimposed on the other structural loads to obtain the loading binations as stated in Section 5.5.3.2.
3.3.2 Wind and Tornado Analysis design wind loads on the turbine building are a function of the kinetic energy per volume of moving air mass. The product of one-half of the air density and the square of the resultant gn velocity results in a pressure corresponding to the design wind.
ermination of the design wind pressure on the structure is in accordance with the ASCE Paper 9, Wind Forces on Structures.
pressure corresponding to the standard air at 0.07651 pcf at 15C and 760 mm of mercury in s of the velocity at the appropriate height zone is given by:
q = 0.002558 V2 ilarly, the design pressure, including the effect of the shape coefficient (Cd), is given by:
p = q x Cd = 0.002558V2Cd ng these equations and the wind velocities given in Section 5.5.3.1.5, the wind forces are ulated for the main frame and are then applied to the structure.
ss I systems and equipment are protected from a tornado missile by structural walls and slabs.
Moment/Axial Force As Loading required 1.0 As Shear Actual 1.0 Design Component Combination provided Allowable oting slab C 0.92 0.98 bstructure walls C 1.00 0.84 erating floor C 0.94 0.80 perstructure walls D 0.81 0.79 of Tornado Missile Protection Requirements
1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION intake structure, located west of the main plant, is a reinforced concrete structure founded on rock. It houses four circulating water pumps which supply water from Niantic Bay to the densers positioned under the turbine-generator. Also located in the structure are three service ling water pumps for the closed cooling water system. Access to these pumps is provided ugh hatches with removable covers.
design of the intake structure incorporates several features which will ensure the safe, tinuous operation of the circulating water system. These items are:
- a. Trash racks and traveling screens which protect the pumps and condensers from foreign bodies present in the water supply.
- b. A cutoff wall which extends 10 feet below the minimum water level to prevent the ecologically rich surface water from entering the system.
- c. Passages provided as exit routes for fish which enter below the cutoff wall.
- d. Vertical guides in the sides of each intake channel to receive stop-logs so that individual channels may be drained.
- e. A monorail and trolley provided to service the interior of the intake structure.
adjacent Class II building, which houses the chlorination equipment, is isolated from the ke structure by a joint filled with compressible material.
eral layouts of the intake structure and circulating water system are shown on Figures 5.6-1 5.6-2, respectively.
2 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS following materials are used in the construction of the intake structure:
Structural and miscellaneous steel Rolled shapes, plates and bars ASTM A-36 High strength bolts ASTM A-325 or A-490 Reinforcing steel ASTM A-615 Grade 60 Concrete, 28 day strength (psi) 4000 Interior coatings (Original Construction)
Surfaces below elevation 14-0 Woolsey antifouling paint
Interior maintenance coatings Coating materials used in the intake structure represent current day technology and comply with current day environmental requirements regarding volatile organic compound (VOC) content and hazardous material constituents such as lead, asbestos, and hexavalent chrome. Specific products are selected to provide service performance comparable to or improved over that of the original coating materials. Coating colors are chosen to help maintain a safe working environment.
3 DESIGN BASES design of the intake structure provides the required features as outlined in Criteria 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 46, Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50.
3.1 Bases for Design Loads intake structure is designed for all credible conditions of loadings including loads from mal operation and those due to adverse environmental conditions. The following loadings are sidered.
- a. Dead loads
- b. Live loads
- c. Earthquake loads
- d. Lateral pressure loads
- e. Wind and tornado loads
- f. Hurricane wave loads 3.1.1 Dead Loads se loads consist of the weight of all structural materials including partitions, hangers, trays, pads. Equipment dead loads are those specified on the drawings supplied by the ufacturers of the various types of equipment installed within the building.
3.1.2 Live Loads se loads consist of the design floor loads, tank liquid weights, piping loads, and equipment loads specified on the drawings supplied by the manufacturers of the various types of ipment installed within the building.
now load of 60 psf is applied to the exposed roof.
se loads are as defined in Section 5.8.
3.1.4 Lateral Pressure Loads lateral pressure loads include the active and the passive soil pressures where applicable. The yant and lateral forces of the displaced water are also considered.
3.1.5 Wind and Tornado Loads d loads on the intake structure are determined on the basis of the ASCE Paper 3269, Wind ces on Structures, using the highest wind velocity at the site for a 100 year recurrence period.
ASCE Paper is used mainly to determine the shape factors. Based upon the site location and structure classification, the design wind velocity is taken to be 115 mph with gusts up to 140 h.
intake structure is analyzed for tornado loads on the following basis:
- a. Differential bursting pressure between the interior and exterior of the structure is assumed to be 3 psi pressure occurring in three seconds (1 psi/second), followed by a calm for two seconds and a re pressurization.
- b. Lateral loads on the intake structure are based on a tornado funnel which is conservatively assumed to have a peripheral tangential velocity of 300 mph and a translational velocity of 60 mph. These velocities are added together, resulting in a design basis tornado wind velocity of 360 mph. The applicable portions of the wind design methods described in the ASCE Paper 3269 are used, particularly for the shape factors. The provisions in the paper for gust factors and variation of wind velocity with respect to height are not applied. The wind velocity is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the height of the structure.
- c. A tornado-driven missile as defined in Section 5.2.5.1.2.
h the exception of the missile impact area, the allowable stresses to resist the effects of adoes are 90 percent of the yield strength of the reinforcing steel and 85 percent of the mate strength of the concrete.
iscussion of the probability of tornado occurrence is presented in Section 2.3.
3.1.6 Hurricane Wave Loads se loads, resulting from a hurricane wave striking the front of the intake structure, are sidered.
structural integrity of the intake structure is ensured by using the allowable stresses as cified in the 1963 AISC Manual of Steel Construction, and the ACI-318-63, Building Code uirements for Reinforced Concrete, for the various loading combinations. A 33-1/3 percent ease in the allowable stresses is permitted for the combined stresses involving wind, hquake, or tornado.
following load combinations are used in the design:
- a. D+L
- b. D + L + Wt
- c. D + L + E
- d. D+L+W+H re:
D = dead loads L = live loads Wt = tornado loads W = wind loads E = design basis earthquake H = hurricane wave loads design loads and stresses for all concrete walls and columns are within the allowable values each wall or column. Design stresses are not applicable for the columns inasmuch as the raction diagrams are used to proportion reinforcing and concrete required to support a given with its corresponding eccentricity. Exterior walls having vertical and lateral loads are gned for bending and axial loadings and the resulting combined stresses are kept within the e allowables. There are numerous walls, slabs, columns, and beams within the buildings, each ment of which was designed for the pertinent loading. Design stresses for the various ponents are recorded in the design calculations. The allowable loading, or combined loading, ends on the reinforcing which was added and varies considerably depending upon the applied ditions.
maximum combined stress ratio in the building frame is 0.98, resulting from an axial stress of ksi and a bending stress of 25.1 ksi. This stress occurs under loading combination c above.
3.3 Structural Analysis intake structure is designed and analyzed using the working stress method.
analysis of the intake structure subjected to seismic loads is performed in accordance with the hod described in Section 5.8.
se earthquake loads are superimposed on the other structural loads to obtain the loading bination as stated in Section 5.6.3.2.
3.3.2 Wind and Tornado Analysis design wind loads on the intake structure are a function of the kinetic energy per volume of moving air mass. The product of one-half of the air density and the square of the resultant gn velocity results in a pressure corresponding to the design wind.
ermination of the design wind pressure on the intake structure is in accordance with the ASCE er 3269, Wind Forces on Structures.
pressure corresponding to the standard air at 0.07651 pcf at 15C and 760 mm of mercury in s of the velocity at the appropriate height zone is given by:
q = 0.002558 V2 ilarly, the design pressure, including the effect of the shape coefficient (Cd), is given by:
p = q x Cd = 0.002558V2 Cd ng the equations given and the wind velocities noted in Section 5.6.3.1.6, the wind forces are ulated and then applied to the structure.
the tornado loading condition, the hatches over the circulating water pumps and the traveling ens serve as blowout panels to relieve the pressure differential. Additional vents are also ed in the west wall and roof.
3.3.3 Hurricane Wave Analysis maximum hurricane wave is determined by the use of the U. S. Coastal Engineering Research ter Paper, Shore Protection Planning and Design, 1966. The static and dynamic forces from wave are applied to the front of the intake structure.
FIGURE 5.6-1 INTAKE STRUCTURE LAYOUT Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.6-6
Revision 4106/29/23 MPS-2 FSAR 5.6-7 FIGURE 5.6-2 C. W. SYSTEM - PLAN
1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION following tanks in the yard are classified as Seismic Class I structures:
- a. Refueling water storage tank
- b. Condensate storage tank condensate storage tank is located to the northwest, and the refueling water storage tank is ted to the northeast of the containment, respectively, as shown in Figure 1.2-2. These tanks supported on concrete foundations which rest on compacted structural backfill. The backfill is pacted to 95 percent of the maximum density as obtained by the Modified Proctor test in ordance with ASTM D-1557. The structural concrete foundations are proportioned such that applied contact pressure, from dead loads and live loads in each design loading combination ch result in uniform long-term settlement, does not exceed 3000 psf. The underlying porting material for the condensate storage tank and refueling water storage tank is isturbed glacial till and compacted glacial till, respectively. Allowable soil bearing pressures 2000 psf for undisturbed glacial till and 5000 psf for compacted glacial till are utilized in the ndation design. These allowable values may be increased by one-third for wind and seismic ditions.
2 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS ctural concrete for the foundations conforms to the requirements of Section 5.9.3.1 and has a gn strength of 3,000 psi at 28 days. Reinforcing steel conforms to Specification ASTM 15, Grade 60.
refueling water storage tank is fabricated from stainless steel conforming to ASTM A-240, e 304. Design and fabrication are in accordance with Section III of the ASME Code.
condensate storage tank was originally designed in accordance with the American Water rks Association Standard, AWWA D100. It is fabricated from carbon steel which conforms to cification ASTM A-285, Grade C. The applicable portions of API 650, Welded Steel Tanks Oil Storage, API 620, Recommended Rules for Design and Construction of Large, Welded, Pressure Storage Tanks, ACI 318-89, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced crete, ACI 349-80, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures, 1980 ASME Section III, Division I, Subsection NE for Class MC were used to design the ctural modifications necessary to support the addition of a nitrogen blanketing system.
3 DESIGN BASES design of the external Class I tanks provides the required features as outlined in Criteria 1, 37, endix A of 10 CFR Part 50.
external Class I tanks are designed for all credible combinations of loading including loads er normal operation and loads due to adverse environmental conditions. The following ings are considered:
- a. Dead loads
- b. Live loads
- c. Earthquake loads
- d. Wind and tornado loads 3.1.1 Dead Loads se loads consist of the weight of all structural materials.
3.1.2 Live Loads e loads consist of tank liquid weights and a snow load of 60 psf applied to the roofs for the densate storage tank, the live load included the internal operating pressure band of +1.0 psig to 4 psig which resulted from the addition of a nitrogen blanketing system.
3.1.3 Earthquake Loads se loads are defined in Section 5.8.
3.1.4 Wind and Tornado Loads d loads for the external Class I tanks are determined on the basis of the ASCE Paper 3269, nd Forces on Structures, based upon a design wind velocity of 115 mph with gusts up to 140 h.
condensate storage tank is analyzed for tornado loads on the following basis:
- a. Differential bursting pressure between the interior and exterior of the structure is assumed to be 3 psi pressure occurring in three seconds (1 psi/sec), followed by a calm for two seconds and a re pressurization.
- b. Lateral loads on the structure are based on a tornado funnel which is conservatively assumed to have a peripheral tangential velocity of 300 mph and a translational velocity of 60 mph. These velocities are added together, resulting in a design basis tornado wind velocity of 360 mph. The applicable portions of the wind design methods described in the ASCE paper are used, particularly for the shape factors. The provisions in the paper for gust factors and variation of wind
- c. Provision is made for protection of the condensate storage tank against tornado driven missiles as defined in Sections 5.2.5.1.2 and 10.4.5.3 so as to provide sufficient water for a safe shutdown.
3.2 Design Load Combinations load combinations considered in the design of these tanks are listed below:
- a. D+L
- b. D + L + Ww
- c. D + L + Wt (applicable to CST only)
- d. D+L+E
- e. D + L + E ere D = dead loads L = live loads Ww = wind loads (115 mph base)
Wt = tornado loads (360 mph base)
E = operating basis earthquake E= design basis earthquake sses from load combination a, b, c, and d do not exceed the allowable permitted by the ASME
- e. Standard Review Plan criteria were used for the condensate storage tank modifications ch resulted from the addition of a nitrogen blanketing system. Stresses from load combination not exceed the allowable stresses of 90 percent of the steel yield strength and 85 percent of concrete ultimate strength.
1 INPUT CRITERIA response spectrum technique is used to analyze Class I structures, systems and equipment n they are subjected to seismic motion. The response spectrum technique assumes a constant ping factor for each mode of the model of the major structural elements. The input ground ion is expressed in terms of a smooth design spectrum curve associated with the damping or. Small equipment, as well as piping and cables located within the structure, are neglected in model due to their relatively insignificant masses.
the design of the piping systems and equipment, design spectrum curves at each of their ports are generated from a synthetic time history ground motion.
1.1 Design Response Spectra operating basis earthquake (OBE) used in the design of this plant is based on a ground motion ing a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of 0.09 g and a vertical ground acceleration of g, acting simultaneously. For the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), a maximum horizontal und acceleration of 0.17 g and a vertical ground acceleration of 0.11 g are used. The design onse spectrum curves for structures supported on rock are shown on Figures 5.8-1 and 5.8-2, the design response spectrum curves for structures supported on compacted structural backfill shown on Figures 5.8-3 and 5.8-4.
ynthetic time history whose response spectrum curve corresponds to the design response ctrum curve is used to generate the response spectrum curves at different elevations within the cture. These are used in analyzing Class I equipment and piping at the respective locations.
mparisons of the response spectra derived from the time history and site seismic design onse spectra for the damping values of 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, and 5.0 in percent of critical damping are wn in attached Figures 5.8-5, 5.8-6, 5.8-7 and 5.8-8.
system period intervals at which the spectra values are calculated are as follows:
Frequency Range (cps) Frequency Increment (cps) 0.2 to 1 0.05 1 to 10 0.1 10 to 33 1.0 frequency increment shown above is always less than 10 percent apart between two secutive frequencies, except that for the first frequency range of 0.2 to 1.0 cps. To verify that 0.05 is a sufficiently small increment for this frequency range, the 2 and 5 percent damping onse spectra are computed at the smaller increment of 0.0125 cps, which is one-quarter of the inal one. Figure 5.8-9 shows these spectra in comparison with those based on 0.05 cps uency increment, and with the design spectra, indicating that the 0.05 cps increment is indeed
wn on Figure 5.8-5. A composite comparison of the design response spectrum curve with the W components of the 1952 Taft and the N-S components of the 1940 El Centro recorded hquakes, normalized to the same ground acceleration of 0.09 g with two percent of critical ping, is shown on Figure 5.8-10.
1.2 Synthetic Time History synthetic time history is generated as follows:
response of a set of linear single degree-of-freedom systems to seismic action is governed by equation:
- + 2 X* + 2 X = - u** t X Eq. (1) n n ere X** = relative acceleration X* = relative velocity X = relative displacement
= percent of critical damping n = natural frequency
ü(t) = forcing acceleration time history as a function of time t acceleration spectra is defined by:
t w t -
S a = X + u max = d u e - n sin d t - d max Eq. (2) o 2 12 re d = n 1 -
T = time variable a - is specified as an arbitrary function of and , it is desirable to determine the ü(t) that will duce the acceleration spectra.
M u** t = u**i cos i t + i Eq. (3) i=0 where M = number of Fourier Series terms absolute magnitude of the response of a single degree-of-freedom system to a sinusoidal eleration is represented by:
1 2n X = --------------------------------------------------------------------- Eq. (4) u**i max 1/2 2 2 i i 2 1 - -------- - + 2 ------
2 n n
uming that:
- = - X 2 cos t X Eq. (5) n n following is obtained:
M x 1 S**a = --**- + 1 u = 1 + ------------------------------------------------------------------ u**i Eq. (6) u 2 12 2i i 2 i = 0 -
1 - ------ + 2 -----
n n ation (6) will be satisfied by solving üi for the unknown coefficients. It is assumed that the ima will occur at the same time. A matrix equation is set for frequencies:
i+1 = 1.05i i = 1, 2, ...143 Eq. (7) re 1 = 0.1 cps damping values are as stated in Table 5.8-1.
e a solution vector has been determined from:
-1 u** = A S a Eq. (8)
grating Equation (1). The maximum acceleration spectra, Sai, is then compared to the inally assumed spectra, Sa** . Weighting functions are developed from the relationship:
o Sa**o i = f i = --------- Eq. (9)
Sa**i s, from the nth iteration the following is obtained:
u**n + 1 c* = u**n i n i Eq. (10) acceleration time history has been developed using this procedure. It has been determined that all frequencies considered, the bounds of Sa predicted by Equation (2) exceeded a 10 percent ation at certain frequencies.
2 SOIL-STRUCTURES INTERACTION 2.1 Soil-Foundation Interaction outlines of the foundations for Millstone Unit 2 structures are shown on Figures 5.8-11 to
- 12. These structures are supported by different materials.
structures which are supported on bedrock are:
- a. Containment
- b. Enclosure building
- c. Auxiliary building (except as noted below)
- d. Intake structure
- e. Turbine building (except as noted below) following structures are supported on compacted structural backfill:
- a. Warehouse portion of the auxiliary building.
- b. Auxiliary feedwater pump foundations located in the auxiliary bay of the turbine building.
-foundation interaction is considered by introducing equivalent springs and viscous dashpots the supporting mediums while the foundations are assumed to be rigid. The horizontal slational and rocking effects on structures are represented by equivalent spring stiffness. The
h dynamic soil modulus greater than 500 x 103 ksf). The rigidity of the rock is so much greater the structures it supports that rocking does not occur. The deflection patterns are such that e is no slope at the bases of the structures. Hence, for structures supported on rock, fixed-base mption is used in the mathematic models formulated for the structural analysis.
structures resting on compacted structural backfill, the equivalent spring stiffnesses for soil evaluated using the formulas developed by Richart, Hall and Woods (Reference 5.2-61).
ation joints are provided between the foundations of the main structures. The differential vement of adjacent structures due to seismic motion is evaluated, and the size of the isolation t is based on the anticipated horizontal movement of the foundations during the operating s earthquake and the safe shutdown earthquake. The isolation joint is filled with a pressible material to minimize the influence of the foundations of the main structures on each r.
2.2 Dynamic Soil Pressure on Structures horizontal earth pressures for the walls are evaluated for both the static and the dynamic ditions. The rigidity of the walls and the backfill that is placed after the walls are constructed framed at the top do not allow sufficient movement for the development of the active earth sure case. Therefore, the at-rest condition is developed.
equivalent fluid pressure is derived for the soil subject to seismic motion. The earth pressures determined based on the characteristics of the materials to be used for backfill from the site, ding, and pit excavation. The backfill used is sand and silty sand. The equivalent fluid unit ght above the water table is 55 lb/cubic feet. Below the water table equivalent fluid unit ght is 95 lb/cubic feet which includes both the water pressure and the lateral at-rest earth sure. Pressure distribution is assumed to be hydrostatic.
dynamic earth pressures are considered for this plant. The analysis is based on work by wmark, Ishii, Terzaghi, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. These references provide the sure coefficients which depend upon the magnitude of the acceleration factor of the hquake. Although there is uncertainty concerning the behavior of backfill during earthquakes, dynamic earth pressures can be approximated by the methods outlined in these references. The zontal earthquake acceleration is combined with the static earth pressure acting on the wall.
values of the dynamic pressures are dependent on the types of backfills. These references w that, for typical sandy or silty sand backfill materials, the dynamic earth pressures are ivalent to the static earth pressures plus the static earth pressures times 2 a, where a is the o between acceleration produced by an earthquake shock and gravitational acceleration. Based his information, the dynamic earth pressure is found to be equal to 1.34 times the static earth sure for the safe shutdown earthquake.
maximum soil reaction includes stresses due to the structural weight, the maximum rturning moment from the lateral analysis and the maximum inertia force from the vertical ponent of earthquake. The absolute sum of stresses due to the above effects will not exceed
2.3 Underground Structures mic analyses are performed on the following underground structures.
- a. One 36 inch carbon steel off-gas pipe from the auxiliary building to the Millstone stack.
- b. Two 24 inch cast iron headers from the Service Water System are routed from the intake structure to the auxiliary building.
- c. One 10 inch carbon steel condensate water pipe from the condensate storage tank to the condenser.
- d. Two electrical ducts encased in reinforced concrete from the intake structure to the turbine building.
Class I underground ducts subjected to earthquake motion are analyzed biaxially, i.e., along duct run and perpendicular to the duct run. Assuming that the ducts displace with the adjacent
, the relative movements of the ducts to their supports will be determined. With these lacements, soil duct support models are formulated to determine the induced stresses in the ts.
- a. Due to wave propagation
- b. At the supports due to differential movements of buildings and soil
- c. At bends 3 SEISMIC STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 3.1 Methods of Analysis seismic analysis of Class I structures, the response spectrum technique, using the design onse spectrum curves, is employed. For Class I equipment analysis, response spectrum curves e equipment bases are generated by the time history technique.
procedure used to account for the number of earthquake cycles during one seismic event udes consideration of the number of significant motion peaks expected to occur during the nt. The number of significant motion peaks during one seismic event would be expected to be ivalent in severity to no more than 40 full load cycles about a mean value of zero and with an litude equal to the maximum response produced during the entire event. Based upon this sideration and the assumption that seismic events equivalent to 5 Operating Basis Earthquakes
seismic analyses performed for Class I structures are based on elastic and linear behavior of components involved, and as such, do not include any gradual or accidental deterioration of structure. The blowdown forces associated with a concurrent loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) computed separately and combined with the seismic loads.
re are removable concrete slabs located in the containment building and auxiliary building.
se slabs are placed over low pressure radwaste equipment, such as filters and demineralizers, weigh approximately 4,000 pounds. The slabs will not receive a seismic acceleration in the ard direction sufficient to cause the slab to become a missile.
ovable blocks are self-locking and contain staggered horizontal and vertical joints. These k panels are designed to remain in place by use of retainers during a safe shutdown hquake.
3.2 Procedure for Analysis 3.2.1 Structural Responses 3.2.1.1 Response Spectrum Method seismic loads on the containment are determined from a dynamic analysis of the structure.
dynamic analysis is made on a mathematical model consisting of lumped masses and ghtless elastic columns acting as spring restraints. It is performed in the following two parts:
- a. Determination of the natural frequencies of the structure and its mode shapes.
- b. Determination of the model responses of the modes to the earthquake motions by the response spectrum method.
natural frequencies and mode shapes are computed from the equations of motion of the ped masses established by a stiffness or displacement method. They are solved by the raction techniques through the use of a computer program. The form of the equation is:
2 K n = M n re:
[K] = matrix of stiffness coefficients including the combined effects of shear, flexure, rotation and horizontal translation.
[M] = matrix of concentrated masses
[] = matrix of mode shape
e number of degrees of freedom (i.e., lumped masses) assumed in the idealized structure.
response of each mode of vibration to the safe shutdown earthquake is then computed by the onse spectrum technique, as follows:
- a. The base shear contribution of the nth mode V n = W n an W n n where Wn = effective weight of the structure in the nth mode 2
x xn W x W n = ------------------------------
2W x xn x re the subscript, x, refers to the levels throughout the height of the structure, and xn = mode shape for the mode under consideration an (n, n) = spectral acceleration of a single degree-of-freedom system with a damping coefficient of n obtained from the response spectrum.
n = angular frequency of the nth mode.
- b. The horizontal load distribution for the nth mode is then computed as:
V n xn W x Fx = ----------------------------
x xn W x Then, using the modal inertia force Fx, the shears Vx at each point for each mode are calculated. The moments for each mode are obtained by integrating the shear diagram of the structure from the top down if a cantilever model is used. For coupled systems, with interconnecting members between cantilever members, the modal inertia forces are applied at the mass points, and analysis is made to obtained shears and moments at each point. The design shears and moments for the structure are the absolute sums of modal shears and moments. The overturning moment of the structure is the moment obtained at the base of the model.
For structure founded on structural backfill, a rotational, a vertical and a horizontal spring are used to represent the soil properties. Formulas for computing the equivalent spring stiffnesses for the case of rectangular base mat are based on Richart, Hall and Woods.
Reference for the above article is given in Section 5.8.2.1.
endix F of the Design and Analysis Report (AEC Docket Number 50 - 245) which is a plement to the Millstone Unit 1 FSAR. The spectrum curves were derived based on a careful mination of available historical records in the vicinity of the site and the underlying soil dition. The spectrum curves provide maximum responses over the frequency range from 2 cps 0 cps in which the natural frequencies of the structures fall. Therefore, modal period variation he mathematical models for Class I structures due to variations in material properties would result in any significant increase in the resultant seismic loads.
3.2.1.2 Time History Method floor response spectrum curves are generated using time history modal analysis. Consider a osity damped, multi-degrees of freedom system subjected to the base acceleration ü(t); the ation of motion is given by:
T M x** + x* + K x = - M u** t Eq. (11) re T is the unit vector s equation can be uncoupled to a set of independent equations analogous to the equation for a le degree of freedom system. The multi-degrees of freedom system can then be defined ply in terms of its mode shapes, frequencies and mass distribution as follows:
M 1 x**i + 2 1 1 M 1 x* 1 + 2 M 1 x 1 = - M u** t T1 1
2 M n x**n + 2 n n M n x* n + n M n x n = - M u** t Tn of these equations can be rearranged as:
Tn
- 2 M u** t -
x n + 2 n W n x n + n = ---------------------------- Eq. (12) n Mn s set of equations can then be integrated numerically and independently. The spectrum values ny mass point can be obtained by direct application of Equation 12 to the digitized earthquake rd at equal time intervals of 0.01 second.
following tabulation shows a comparison of maximum seismic accelerations at selected cal locations in Class I structures as computed by the response spectrum and time history hods. The results based on the methods of sum of absolute values and square root of sum quares by response spectrum technique are both shown for comparison. From the table as
e the responses by the sum of absolute values were used.
ACCELERATION (gs)
Response Response Spectrum: Spectrum: TME STRUCTURE MASS POINT ABS SRSS HISTORY ntainment 7 0.265 0.170 0.192 ucture 14 0.425 0.306 0.393 ntainment 4(N-S) 0.337 0.289 0.275 ernals 6(N-S) 0.457 0.356 0.329 xiliary 5(N-S) 0.274 0.250 0.296 ilding 5(E-W) 0.285 0.254 0.325 3.2.2 Combination of Vertical and Horizontal Responses vertical ground design spectrum curves are derived as two-thirds of the horizontal values.
s two-third value is considered to be conservative based on the strong motion records from h the United States and foreign countries.
lyses for both the horizontal and vertical directions are performed using the ground design ctrum curves. The forces, moments and resulting stresses are combined directly, assuming a ultaneous occurrence of the vertical and horizontal motions. Vertical structural elements are sidered vertically rigid. Horizontal structural elements of the Class I structures were further stigated for vertical responses and were found to be rigid.
vertical ground response spectrum curve is used for equipment design. The equipment is ched to the rigid portions of the structure which have high natural frequencies. The ground ion would not be appreciably altered. The forces, moments and stresses on the equipment m both the vertical and horizontal motions are considered as acting simultaneously.
3.2.3 Torsional Effect Considerations torsional effect induced by the unsymmetric nature of the building was compensated for by sidering a static torsional moment acting at the elevation under consideration. The magnitude his moment is equal to the sum of the individual products of the inertia force and the entricity between the center of rigidity and center of gravity on and above that elevation.
ustify the above procedure, a torsional analysis was made on auxiliary building which is the t symmetric structure in this plant. A natural frequency of 10.4 CPS was obtained for the
ected to be higher than the translational natural frequencies. The justification of combining the oupled results is presented in Appendix C of the topical report BC-TOP-4, Seismic Analysis tructures and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1, dated September, 1972, Bechtel poration.
3.2.4 Natural Frequencies and Response Loads natural frequencies, loads in the form of mode shapes and total response loads, and the onse spectra at critical plant equipment elevations for the following structures are presented he forms of graphs. (See Figures 5.8-14 through 5.8-61.)
- 1. Containment and Intervals
- 2. Auxiliary Building
- 3. Turbine Building
- 4. Warehouse
- 5. Intake Structure 3.3 Damping Values erial damping values used in the seismic analyses of structures and systems are shown in le 5.8-1.
structures made of a single material, the damping values are selected from values listed in le 5.8-1 for the material under consideration. For structures made up of composite materials, damping values can be considered as a function of both the mass and the particular mode pe value to calculate the composite damping values. The following Mass Mode Weighting hod is used:
i = 1 Mi i i i =n c = ------------------------------------
i = 1 Mi i i =n
damping associated with mass point absolute value of the mode shape at mass point mass at mass point only structure composed of major subsystems that are made of different materials is the ehouse area of the auxiliary building. Results based on the energy method and Mass Mode ghting method were compared and negligible difference was obtained in this case.
a structure whose motion is primarily composed of translational (flexural) displacement and ndation rotation (rocking), the mode shape must be broken down into its translational and tional components, denoted as and f, respectively. Since the rotation is due to the fact that structure is supported on a flexible foundation, the foundation damping, denoted as will uence the total damping value. Denoting the damping of the structures material by f, the posite damping can be computed by the following equation:
+ f f c = --------------------------
+ f ce the only Class I structure supported on a flexible foundation is the warehouse portion of the iliary building, the above procedure is not used. A constant damping value of 2% is used for he modes and is a conservative approach.
4 SEISMIC SYSTEM ANALYSIS determine the seismic response of equipment, a time history analysis is performed on the ctural model, using an earthquake as the input ground motion. This analysis generates the r acceleration time- histories at the various mass points at which the equipment is located. The ipment response spectrum curve is then generated for each of the floor acceleration time-ories at various damping values and is used in the design of the equipment.
equipment response spectrum curves are broadened by a smooth curve extended 10 percent h way at the peak response associated with the natural frequencies of the structure. This sure reflects the expected variations in the natural frequencies of the structure due to ations in structural material properties.
determine the piping and instrumentation responses to an earthquake, Class I seismic piping ems are analyzed dynamically by means of a three dimensional model using two-thirds zontal ground response spectra for the vertical spectra. The valves are included in the model means of lumped masses and eccentric moments arms to account for the torsional effects of es in the seismic piping analysis. The locations of seismic supports and restraints for the ng system are determined so that the piping system will not be in resonance with the porting structures. The induced seismic effects of Class II piping on Class I piping systems are
dal responses are combined using the square-root-of-the-sum-of-the-squares method (except RCS piping and components discussed in Appendix 4.A). The results of each analysis are bined with the results of excitation in the vertical direction. The design internal force or ment, or displacement is the larger number obtained from either of these analyses. The sible combined vertical and horizontal amplified response loads for the design of piping and rumentation include the effects of the responses of building, floors, supports, equipment, and ponents.
piping system is analyzed for the relative seismic displacements between piping supports, floors and components, at different elevations within a building and between buildings.
sses in the piping system due to the most unfavorable directions of movements of supports are bined with thermal, seismic and operating stresses and used for piping design.
locations of seismic supports and restraints for seismic Category I piping, piping system ponents, and equipment, including placement of snubbers and dampers are determined so that resulting seismic stresses when combined with operating stresses will not exceed the wable stresses given by governing codes.
eld surveillance is conducted to assure that the supports, restraints, etc. have been installed in designated locations. Any change in location due to interference or other factors must be roved by engineers. For 2 inch and smaller Category I piping, a field installation manual is vided so that field engineers can properly design and locate pipe supports and restraints. Upon pletion the design is reviewed by the engineers.
seismic Category I buried piping, the pipe was assumed fixed at the end entering a structure extending infinitely into the soil. The horizontal and vertical movements at the entry point, lting from the seismic analysis of the structure, was then taken as end displacement in puting the stresses.
seismic Category I piping outside the containment structure, extending from one structure to ther, the differential movements at support points of the two structures were assumed to be out phase. The resulting stresses when combined with thermal stresses are within allowable sses.
5 SEISMIC EQUIPMENT ANALYSIS all purchased Class I equipment, the vendors are required to submit seismic calculations made ompliance with the equipment specification to demonstrate the capability of the equipment to sfy the functional requirements under specified seismic conditions. Equipment is not released perations without engineering approval of the calculations.
supports for all Class I equipment are designed for the induced seismic forces. There are no ificant gaps between the equipment and their supports, and, hence, they are not considered in seismic analysis of the equipment.
Lock Accelerations: Vertical (g) Accelerations: Horizontal (g) uipment Lock 0.06 0.20 rsonnel Lock 0.06 0.27 acceleration values are multiplied by the normal operating weight of the hatch lock, or parts he hatch lock, to obtain the horizontal and vertical components of the earthquake forces. Both zontal and vertical earthquake components are considered acting simultaneously with normal rating loads, without exceeding code allowable stresses at a temperature of 120F of the erials.
earthquake forces due to the safe shutdown earthquake are obtained by multiplying the ementioned accelerations by 1.95. The equipment hatch and personnel lock are designed to hstand the simultaneous action of design basis earthquake components and the accident loads, tated in Section 5.2.2.3.4, at a temperature of 289F, without exceeding material yield stresses without loss of function.
certain Class I systems and equipment, where analytical models and normal theory do not duce results of a significant confidence level, dynamic testing of prototypes or similar ipment is substituted to ensure functional integrity. Test data conform to one of the following:
- a. Performance data of equipment which, under the specified conditions, have been subjected to equal or greater dynamic loads than those to be experienced under the specified seismic conditions.
- b. Test data from previously testing comparable equipment which, under similar conditions, have been subjected to equal or greater dynamic loads than those specified.
- c. Actual testing of equipment in accordance with one of the following methods:
- 1. The equipment is subjected to an artificial time history response at the elevation of interest.
- 2. The equipment is subjected to a sinusoidal excitation, sweeping through the desired range of significant frequencies, using input acceleration amplitudes for the forcing function which simulates the specified seismic conditions.
- 3. The equipment is subjected to a transient sinusoidal motion synthesized by a pulse exciting a group of octave filters such that the response of the shaking table and the duration of loading simulates the artificial response spectrum curve at the elevation of interest.
Class II components and equipment are sufficiently separated from Class I components and ipment so that the Class II components and equipment will not damage the Class I ponents and equipment under seismic conditions.
5.1 Static Tests ports for lightly loaded safety related components rely on friction to resist vertical and seismic
- e. These components are not subject to thermal cycling or mechanical vibration.
iance on friction as the sole means of restraining vertical and seismic forces has been verified esting performed on safety related accumulator tanks.
iance on friction is considered appropriate, provided that the frictional forces include a margin afety consistent with the appropriate design criteria for the structure.
5.2 STERI Evaluations STERI process, Seismic Technical Evaluation of Replacement Items, EPRI TR-104871 ference 5.8-1) may be used to demonstrate that seismically rugged or insensitive replacement s exhibit seismic performance equivalent to original items. STERI evaluations document that seismic qualification status of the original items and host equipment is maintained by the acement items.
5.3 GIP NARE Evaluations an alternative to the methods described in preceding paragraphs, the Seismic Qualification ities Group Generic Implementation Procedure Revision 3, GIP-3 (Reference 5.8-2), as dified and supplemented by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Supplemental Safety luation Reports SSER Number 2 (Reference 5.8-3) and SSER Number 3 (Reference 5.8-4),
be used as an alternative to existing methods for the seismic design and verification of dified, new and replacement equipment classified as Seismic Class I (NARE).
y those portions of GIP-3 which apply to the seismic design and verification of mechanical electrical equipment, electrical relays, tanks and heat exchangers, and cable and conduit way systems shall be used. The other portions of the GIP are not applicable since they contain inistrative, licensing, and documentation information which is applicable only to the USI A-rogram. Plant procedures provide detailed GIP-3 implementation guidance.
GIP method should not be used on equipment systems for which seismic qualifications have n imposed or committed to IEEE 344-1975 as listed below.
- Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Sensing System (RCPSSS)
- Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Initiation System and Component Parts, except logic power supplies and in-containment mounted sensors
- Auxiliary Steam Line Break Detection/Isolation System (ASDI)
- Alternating Current Instrumentation and Control Components, specifically the inverter and static switches 6 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM 6.1 Conformance with NRC Requirements mic instrumentation for Millstone Point Unit 2 is provided on the basis of the existing NRC uirements specified in Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 1, (Instrumentation for Earthquakes),
endix A of 10 CFR 100 and upon the best available information on the ability of seismic rumentation to predict plant responses to seismic motion.
6.2 Description of Program following instrumentation is used to measure plant response to earthquake motion:
- a. Five triaxial time history accelerographs.
- b. Four peak accelerographs.
- c. One triaxial response spectrum recorder.
mber Accelerograph Location Elevation (-)24 feet 0 inches containment base slab at 215 degrees outside of the containment.
Elevation 75 feet 0 inches containment structure at 215 degrees outside of the containment.
Elevation 14 feet 6 inches warehouse area of the auxiliary building.
Elevation 18 feet 0 inches intake structure south wall.
Elevation 14 feet 6 inches ground level on pad 139 degrees southeast of condenser storage tank.
elerographs Numbers 1 and 2 represent two key locations in the model used in the tainment seismic analysis. They are located outside the containment structure such that they accessible for periodic servicing. Accelerograph Number 3 is located on the warehouse base
field accelerograph.
five triaxial time history accelerographs are combined within the basic accelerograph system.
atures central recording on magnetic tape cassettes with remote transducer unit and a separate gering unit. Both the transducer and the triggering unit which normally remain dormant are nected to a recording and playback system in the control room. Upon a seismic event, the em is activated within 0.1 second. Once the trigger is activated by a seismic event, the rators are alerted by visual and audible alarms. Signals from the transducer unit are fed into a ti-channel tape recording unit and recorded on a time/history basis with a common time al. The recording system, once triggered, will continue to operate for at least five seconds ond the last detection of a seismic signal of triggering intensity. At the end of the seismic nt, the recorded tapes are transferred to a strip chart through a playback system. The entire nt, from seismic trigger to visual accelerograph can be accomplished within a few minutes r an earthquake.
transducer unit contains three accelerographs mounted in a triaxial orthogonal array 90 rees apart. Sensitivity of the accelerograph is 0.001g to 1g with a natural frequency of at least Hz.
triggering unit which is located in the same area as the Number 1 accelerograph will activate riaxial time history accelerograph and the recording system. The triggering unit generates a gering signal by either an omni-directional horizontal or vertical component of a seismic eleration. Trigger sensitivity is adjustable from 0.005g to 0.02g for the vertical trigger and the zontal trigger has an adjustable gap from 0.005 inches to 0.06 inches. The trigger unit is ineered to discriminate against false starts from other operating inputs such as from traffic, ators, people, and rotating equipment. The triggering unit is initially set to trigger at 0.01g ical acceleration and 0.02 inch gap for the horizontal displacement. At this level no damage be done in the plant and no spurious triggering of the recording system is expected.
gering levels are determined on the basis of plant operating experience to ensure proper ration of this system.
umber Recorder Location Elevation (-)24 feet 0 inches containment base slab. (Outside Containment).
Elevation (-)0 feet 7 inches Steam generator Number 1 support.
Elevation 14 feet 6 inches Pressurizer support.
Elevation 38 feet 6 inches Safety injection tank support.
peak accelerographs are all located on the major Class I equipment which has designed onse spectrum readily available for comparison with the recorded acceleration level in the nt of an earthquake.
umber Spectral Recorder Location Elevation (-)24 feet 0 inches containment base slab. (Outside Containment) s location corresponds to the pertinent input vibratory motion assumed in the containment mic analysis.
triaxial response recorder is an Engdahl Model PSR 1200 Peak Shock Recorder. This is a hanical device which records the peak acceleration experienced at each of twelve frequencies three mutually orthogonal directions. This device contains metal reeds which vibrate when ited at their natural frequencies. The maximum excursion of each reed is scribed onto a plate a stylus mounted at the reed end. This plate is removed after a seismic occurrence and the th of the scribed line is measured and converted to its corresponding peak acceleration. The lve reeds are resonant at the following frequencies:
Reed Number Frequency (Hertz) 1 2.02 2 2.54 3 3.20 4 4.02 5 4.92 6 6.02 7 8.08 8 10.2 9 12.7 10 16.2 11 20.6 12 26.1 above values should be considered nominal values since the resonant frequency of these s may vary from calibration to calibration.
6.3 Action Following an Earthquake ivation of the seismic trigger on the accelerograph system will be annunciated in the control m.
he operator identifies abnormal or emergency conditions, he carries out appropriate cedures.
owing an earthquake, the operator will retrieve the recordings made by the peak recording ctral accelerograph for comparison of this data with the OBE for the plant site. The recordings m the strong motion accelerographs will also be analyzed to determine accurately the actual mic acceleration spectrum experienced. The results of this analysis will be considered urate, will override any preliminary indication by the peak shock spectral recorder, and by parison with the OBE will determine whether the plant should continue to operate, be tdown, or resume operations, as required by Appendix A of 10 CFR 100.
owing an earthquake of sufficient magnitude to shut the plant down, an extensive program then be performed to evaluate the adequacy of all safety related structures, systems and ipment. The data on the earthquakes frequency and amplitude recorded by the strong motion elerographs will be translated into computer codes best available at that time. For structure and em analyses using response spectrum techniques, the designed spectrum will be compared h that developed by the recorded time history. If the measured responses are less than the es used in the design for the SSE, the structure and system are considered adequate for future rations. Otherwise, the structure and system will be analyzed to check their adequacies. For em analysis such as the NSSS system using the time history technique, the recorded time ory will be used as a direct input. Time histories at different elevations will be generated using structure model. The fundamental frequency of the containment will be verified by the two elerographs installed on the containment structure. Results will be evaluated to check the quacy of the system.
7 REFERENCES 1 Seismic Technical Evaluation of Replacement Items, Ref: EPRI TR-104871 2 Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment, Revision 3, Seismic Qualification Utilities Group, May 16, 1997.
3 U.S. NRC Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Number 2 (SSER Number 2) on SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure, Revision 2, as corrected on February 14, 1992 (GIP-2). May 22, 1992.
4 U.S. NRC Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Number 3 (SSER Number 3) on the Review of Revision 3 to the Generic Implementation Procedure for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment Updated May 16, 1997 (TAC Number M93624),
December 4, 1997.
Critical Damping OBE (0.09 g ground DBE (0.17 g ground acceleration) acceleration) lded steel plate assemblies 1 1 lded steel framed structures 2 2 lted or riveted steel framed structures 2.5 2.5 inforced concrete equipment Supports 2 3 inforced concrete frames and buildings 3 5 stressed concrete structures 2 5 el piping 0.5 0.5 il (foundation) 2 5
ACCELERATION, OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE ACCELERATION, DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE ACCELERATION, OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE (SOIL SURFACE)
ACCELERATION, DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE (SOIL SURFACE)
HISTORY DESIGN EARTHQUAKE (CRITICAL DAMPING = 0.5%)
HISTORY DESIGN EARTHQUAKE (CRITICAL DAMPING = 1%)
HISTORY DESIGN EARTHQUAKE (CRITICAL DAMPING = 2%)
HISTORY DESIGN EARTHQUAKE (CRITICAL DAMPING = 5%)
INTERVALS EL CENTRO EARTHQUAKE FIGURE 5.8-11 FOUNDATION OUTLINE FIGURE 5.8-12 SECTIONS A-A & B-B
SUPPORT SUPPORT OBE (NORTH-SOUTH) PRESSURIZER SUPPORT OBE (EAST-WEST) PRESSURIZER SUPPORT TANK SUPPORT TANK SUPPORT UPPER SUPPORT (SNUBBERS)
UPPER SUPPORT (SNUBBERS)
UPPER SUPPORT (SHEAR KEYS)
UPPER SUPPORT (SHEAR KEYS)
LOWER SUPPORT LOWER SUPPORT
1 APPLICABLE CONSTRUCTION CODES following codes of practice are used to establish standards for construction procedures:
I 214-1 Recommended Practice for Evaluation of Compression Test Results of Field Concrete (ACI 214-65)
I 301-1 Specification for Structural Concrete for Buildings (ACI 301-66)
I 306-1 Recommended Practice for Cold Weather Concreting (AC 306-66)
I 315 Manual of Standard Practice for Detailing Reinforced Concrete Structures I 318-1 Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete (ACI 318-63)
I 347-1 Recommended Practice for Concrete Formwork (ACI 347-68)
I 305-1 Recommended Practice for Hot Weather concreting (ACI 605-59)
I 211-1 Recommended Practice for Selecting Proportions for Concrete (ACI6B-54)
I 304-1 Recommended Practice for Measuring, Mixing and Placing Concrete (ACI 614-59)
S Manual of Concrete Inspection Inspection Manual C Manual of Steel Construction S Code for Welding in Building Construction (D1.0-69)
S Specifications for Welded Highway and Railroad Bridges (D2.0-69)
ME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, Part UW - Requirements for Unfired Pressure Vessels. Fabricated by Welding.
D U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment Station ensional tolerances for construction, unless otherwise stated in design drawings, are in pliance with the ACI 301-66 and ACI 318-63 for placing reinforcing bars and concrete, and h the AISC Code of Standard Practice for erection of steel.
uality Assurance Program has been developed and implemented to assure conformance to ulatory requirements and accepted industry standards. This is generally explained in FSAR tion 12.8.
3 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS INSPECTION AND INSTALLATION ically, materials used in the construction of the structures are as follows:
- a. Concrete
- b. Reinforcing steel
- c. Structural and miscellaneous steel
- d. Prestressing steel tendons, anchorages and sheaths
- e. Steel liner plate
- f. Interior coatings basic specifications for material inspection and installation are discussed in the following ions.
3.1 Concrete concrete work is done in accordance with ACI 318-63, Building Code Requirements for nforced Concrete, and to ACI 301-66, Specifications for Structural Concrete for Buildings, ept as otherwise stated herein or in the appropriate job specifications or design drawings.
concrete is a dense, durable mixture of sound coarse aggregates, fine aggregates, cement, and er. In some areas, fly ash is substituted for portions of cement used in the concrete.
mixtures are added to improve the quality and workability of the plastic concrete during ement and to retard the set of the concrete. The sizes of aggregates, water-reducing additives, slumps are selected to maintain low limits on shrinkage and creep.
concrete is placed in a manner which assures sound concrete, free of cold joints and defects.
eful attention is given to the placing of concrete around tendon anchorage bearing plates in the tainment so that high quality concrete is obtained at these critical locations.
3.1.1 Aggregates regates comply with ASTM C-33, Specifications for Concrete Aggregates. Acceptability of aggregates is based on the User Tests listed in Table 5.9-1.
following aggregate testing are performed at least once per shift, when concrete is being ed, and more frequently when required at the direction of the Contractor.
ples are taken from weighing hoppers or the belt as directed by Contractor in the batch plant:
- a. Two sand samples for gradation.
- b. One coarse aggregate sample from each nominal size group for gradation.
- a. Test for flat and elongated particles as directed by Contractor.
- b. One sand organic test.
3.1.2 Cement ent is Type II, low-alkali cement as specified in Standard Specification for Portland ent, ASTM C-150, and is tested to comply with the requirements of ASTM C-114. The ection and testing of cement, in addition to the test performed by the cement manufacturers, is ormed in accordance with Table 5.9-2.
purpose of these tests is to ascertain conformance with ASTM C-150.
initial tests are performed by the supplier. The user tests are performed by an independent ratory for every 5000 cubic yards of concrete produced. During construction, the periodic s are made to check storage environmental effects on cement characteristics. These tests are in ition to visual inspection of material storage procedures.
3.1.3 Fly Ash ash conforms to ASTM C-618 Class F, Fly Ash and Raw or Calcined Natural Pozzolans for in Portland Cement Concrete, and is tested to comply with the requirements of ASTM 11, Sampling and Testing Fly Ash for Use as an Admixture in Portland Cement Concrete.
tests performed on the fly ash are listed in Table 5.9-3.
user tests in Table 5.9-3 are performed by an independent laboratory for every 100 tons vered to the job site. During construction, tests are made to check storage environmental cts on properties of fly ash. These tests are in addition to visual inspection of material storage cedures.
pical chemical analysis from each source of fly ash is presented in Table 5.9-4. Fly ash from SCO Devon Plant is used in the concrete work, while the fly ash from the RG&E Company sell plant is a standby and has not been used to date. The analyses on both fly ashes indicate
t set by the ASTM C-618.
3.1.4 Water and Ice er and ice used in mixing concrete are free from injurious amount of acid, alkali, organic ter, and other deleterious substances as determined by AASHO-T-26. Water does not contain urities in amounts that will cause either a change in the time of setting of Portland cement of e than 25 percent or a reduction in the compressive strength of mortar of more than 10 percent pared with results obtained with distilled water. In addition, mixing water (including ice for ling) complies with the following criteria:
riteria) Percent kalinity in terms of calcium carbonate 0.025 maximum tal organic solids 0.025 maximum tal inorganic solids 0.05 maximum tal chlorides 0.025 maximum se tests are performed quarterly.
3.1.5 Admixtures selected water-reducing agent MBHC, manufactured by the Masters Builders Company, sesses a shrinkage reduction effect similar to the type prescribed by ASTM C-494, ecifications for Chemical Admixtures for Concrete.
air entraining agent, Vinsol Resin, manufactured by the Masters Builders Company, is added he concrete mix to increase workability.
mixtures containing chlorides are not used.
3.1.6 Concrete Mix Design crete mixes are designed in accordance with ACI-211-1, Recommended Practice for cting Proportions for Concrete, using materials qualified and accepted for this work. Only crete mixes meeting the design requirements specified for the structures are used.
es are tested in accordance with the applicable ASTM Specifications as indicated:
ASTM Test 39 Compressive strength tests 143 Slump 192 Making and curing cylinder in laboratory 231 Air content 232 Bleeding the containment, concrete test cylinders are cast from the basic mix designed for the structure.
following properties were determined by Professor David Purtz at the University of ifornia, Berkeley.
- a. Compressive strength (ASTM C-39)
- c. Autogeneous shrinkage (ASTM C-342)
- e. Modulus of elasticity and Poisson's ratio (ASTM C-469)
- f. Uniaxial creep (ASTM C-512)
- g. Tensile strength (ASTM C-496) crete design compressive strength for the elements of the structures are defined in the ective sections under Construction Materials.
3.1.7 Concrete Production and Testing concrete batch plant is located on the site and operates in a fully automatic mode. The rated acity of the plant is 136 cubic yards per hour. A full time inspector from an independent testing ratory is assigned to the plant to continually monitor the concrete batching operation.
crete samples are taken from the mix as prescribed in ASTM C-172, Sampling Fresh crete. Cylinders for compression tests are prepared from these samples which are cured in ordance with ASTM C-31, Making and Curing Concrete Compressive and Flexural Strength t Specimens in the Field. Slump, air content, temperature, and unit weight are determined and rded when the compression cylinders are cast.
mp is measured at the batch plant for every 50 cubic yards of concrete mixed for delivery.
content tests are performed in accordance with ASTM C-231, Test for Air Content of Freshly ed Concrete by the Pressure Method.
mpressive strength tests are performed in accordance with ASTM C-39, Test for Compressive ngth of Molded concrete Cylinders. Evaluating of compressive strength tests is done in ordance with ACI 214, with the standard of control that which is required for excellent crete.
cylinders, three sets of two each, are prepared for each placement of concrete as shown in the owing tabulation:
Placing Class I (cubic yards) Class II (cubic yards)
Conventional, Plant 100 200 Conventional, Field 300 300 Pumping, Plant 100 200 Pumping, Field 100 300 o cylinders are tested for compressive strength at each time internal of 7, 28, and 90 days, ept that when correlation test data have been established for each design mix, test cylinders for 90 day interval are disregarded with the exception of prestressed concrete.
provide for accurate testing and concrete production, the equipment is calibrated using the owing schedule:
Equipment Calibration Schedule Testing Agency Items Calibration Interval atform Scales 6 months boratory Scales 3 months eters, Air 3 months
Items Calibration Interval linder Compression Machine 12 months ermometers 6 months ump Cone Examine for wear and replace as necessary Concrete Supplier Items Calibration Interval n Recorders Daily tching System, Low-Limit and High-Limit 1 month points for Cement Aggregate and Flyash 3.2 Reinforcing Steel 3.2.1 Reinforcing Steel Materials reinforcing steel, except column ties and beam stirrups for some areas of the structures, is ormed billet steel bars conforming to ASTM A-615, Grade 60. Spiral reinforcing steel forms to ASTM A-82.
l test reports are obtained from the reinforcing steel supplier for each heat of steel to ensure the physical and chemical properties of the steel are in compliance with the applicable ASTM cifications. User tests to determine the strength and ductility of the reinforcing steel are used to plement the standard mill tests. These are witnessed by an independent testing company.
cedures for obtaining samples for the reinforcing steel user test are defined in tion 5.9.3.2.2.
cedures for splicing reinforcing bars using the Cadweld process is defined in Section 5.9.3.2.3.
3.2.2.1 Procedures following procedure is used for sampling and testing reinforcing bars at the supplier's plant at lton, Pennsylvania. All tests are performed in accordance with ASTM A-615 except as erwise noted herein. Only full size specimens are utilized in the user test sampling.
- a. Upon receipt of a notice from the supplier that the stock reinforcing bars are available for sampling and testing, an inspector from an independent testing laboratory is sent to the plant to select random specimens and witness testing.
- b. The inspector obtains the information regarding the heat numbers and bar sizes which require sampling and testing, and verifies the information by the rolling marks on the bars, the sources, grades and sizes of bars being supplied.
- c. Specimens for tensile strength and cold bent tests are taken from the bars which have been selected at random by the inspector, in accordance with Sections 11.1 and 11.2 of ASTM A-615. The test specimens are then properly tagged and delivered to the supplier's metallurgical laboratory.
- d. After test specimens are taken, the stockpiled materials are marked by tags and held until the results of the user tests are available.
- e. When the results of the test specimens verify that the requirements of the specification have been met, the stockpiled materials are released for fabrication.
- f. If during the tests, a specimen develops flaws, it may be discarded and another substituted.
- g. If the test results of a specimen indicate that the tensile strength does not meet the minimum requirements, a second full size specimen from the same heat is taken and tested. If the second set of test results meets the minimum strength requirements, the tensile strengths from these two tests and the mill test are combined and averaged. If the average result meets the minimum strength requirements, the heat is accepted.
If the averaged results of all three tests do not meet the minimum strength requirements, the heat is rejected.
- h. Prior to shipping the fabricated materials to the site, the inspector returns to the plant for verification of the materials. Certified copies of the mill test reports, showing the physical properties and the ladle chemical analysis, are reviewed for compliance with the applicable ASTM Specifications.
3.2.2.2 Deviation from Safety Guide 15 procedure deviates from the Safety Guide 15 in that it allows a second tensile test to be ducted in the event that the first tensile test does not meet the minimum requirements.
wever, no tensile test failure was encountered during the user test and, consequently, the ond tensile test was never required.
3.2.3 Splicing Reinforcing Bars nforcing bars Number 11 and smaller are generally lap-spliced in accordance with ACI 318-63 ept in congested areas where some bars are Cadweld-spliced. Reinforcing bar greater than mber 11 are Cadweld-spliced exclusively.
nforcing bars are not spliced by welding.
3.2.3.1 Scope se procedures cover the mechanical splicing of deformed reinforcing bars using the Cadweld cess, for full tension loadings.
splices are made in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions as described in Erico ducts Bulletin RBIS-10M269 Cadweld Rebar Splicing, except as modified hereinafter.
anufacturer's representative, experienced in Cadweld splicing of reinforcing bars, is present at site at the outset of the work to demonstrate the equipment and techniques used for making lity splices. He is also present for the first 50 production splices to observe and verify that the ipment is being used correctly and that quality splices are being obtained.
3.2.3.2 Materials weld T-Series materials are used for full tension, reinforcing-to-reinforcing splices. These are d for full tension, reinforcing to structural plates or shapes, where indicated on design wings. C-Series splice materials are not used.
3.2.3.3 Qualifications of Operators r to production splicing reinforcing bars, each operator or crew, including the foreman or ervisor for that crew, prepares and tests a splice for each of the positions used in the production
- k. These splices are made and tested in strict accordance with these procedures, using ASTM 15, Grade 60 and the largest size bar spliced during production work. To qualify, the pleted splices shall meet the acceptance standards of Section 5.9.3.2.3.7 for workmanship, al quality and minimum tensile strength. A list of qualified operators and their qualification results are maintained at the jobsite.
- a. The splice sleeves, cartridges, asbestos wicking, ceramic inserts and graphite parts are stored in a clean, dry, temperature controlled area with adequate protection from the elements to prevent absorption of moisture.
- b. Splice sleeves are wrapped in a special rust inhibiting paper and are not unwrapped until ready to be used in the joining procedure.
- c. Each splice sleeve is visually examined immediately prior to its being used to ensure that there is no rust or other foreign material on the inside surface.
- d. The graphite pouring basins and crucibles are preheated with an oxyacetylene or propane torch to burn off moisture at the beginning of each shift when the molds are cold, when a new mold is put to use, or when the mold temperature is below ambient.
- e. All graphite parts (except crucible covers) are cleaned with a whisk broom, rag, coarse brush or rolled up newspaper before reusing. A wire brush is not used on graphite parts.
3.2.3.5 Reinforcing Bar End Preparation
- a. The bar ends to be spliced must be in good condition with full size, undamaged deformations.
- b. The reinforcing bar deformations, except longitudinal ribs, which become engaged in the Cadweld splice are not ground, flame cut or altered in any way. Oversize longitudinal ribs are ground down to match the diameter of the bar deformations, but are not ground to a diameter less than the bar deformations.
- c. For a minimum distance of two inches beyond where the ends of the sleeve are located, the bar ends are heated with an oxyacetylene rosebud torch to 300F minimum to remove all moisture and burn off any organic foreign material.
- d. After the heating operation, the bar ends are thoroughly cleaned by power brushing or sandblasting to remove all loose mill scale, concrete, dirt and other foreign material not removed by burning.
- e. A reference line is painted 12 inches from the end of each bar that is to be spliced to confirm that the bar ends are properly centered in the sleeve.
- f. Immediately before the splice sleeve is placed in final position, the previously cleaned bar ends are again surface preheated to 200 to 300F minimum with an oxyacetylene rosebud torch to ensure complete removal of moisture.
- h. When the temperature is below freezing or the relative humidity is above 65 percent, the splice sleeves are externally preheated with an oxyacetylene or propane torch after all materials and equipment are in position. The Cadweld operation is suspended during any form of precipitation.
- i. A hairpin piece of soft twisted wire may be inserted at the top of the horizontal splices between the bar and the sleeve. This provides an escape route for the gases generated during the casting of the filler material.
- j. The packing material at the ends of the horizontal splices and at the top of the vertical splices are not hard packed. Although the material is held firmly in place, it has to be loose enough to allow the escape of gases.
3.2.3.6 Splice Tensile Testing ected splices are tensile tested for each position, bar size and grade of bars. The test splices sist of sister splices, each three feet long, spliced in sequence in position and adjacent to the duction works. Production splices, cut from in-place reinforcement material, are included. The owing schedule is used:
- a. Test splices, reinforcing-to-reinforcing:
- 1. Production splice from the first 10 production splices.
- 2. One production and three sister splices from the next 90 production splices.
- 3. One production and two sister splices from the next and subsequent units of 100 splices.
- b. The splices to be used in reinforcing structural steel shapes and plates consist of four sister splices from each unit of 100 production splices or fraction thereof.
3.2.3.7 Splice Acceptance Standards
- a. All completed splices are visually inspected at both ends of the splice sleeves and at the tap hold in the center of the splice sleeves.
- b. Sound, nonporous filler metal should be visible at both ends of the splice sleeve and at the tap hole in the center of the splice sleeve. Filler metal is usually recessed one-quarter inch from the ends of the sleeve due to the packing material, and is not considered a poor fill.
the riser, is not considered demineralized and should be distinguishable from the general porosity described in Item b.
- d. There must be evidence of filler material between the sleeve and the bar for the full 360 degrees; however, the splice sleeves need not be exactly concentric or axially aligned with the bars.
- e. Both horizontal and vertical Cadweld splices may contain voids at either or both ends of the Cadweld splice sleeve. The allowable limits for end voids are as shown on Table 5.9-5. The area of the voids is assumed to be the maximum depth of the wire probe minus 3/16 inch multiplied by the width at the inside surface of the sleeve.
- f. The average tensile strength of the Cadweld spliced joints are equal to or greater than the minimum tensile strength for the particular grade of reinforcing steel as specified in ASTM A-615. The minimum acceptable tensile strength of any splice is 125 percent of the specified minimum yield strength for the particular bar size.
3.2.3.8 Deviation from the Safety Guide 10 s procedure deviates from the Safety Guide 10 in that only one qualification splice is required each crew member, including the foreman. The Safety Guide recommends that two lification splices be required.
the first 245 sister and production splices tested, only one failed below the specified minimum ngth of 125 percent of the yield strength of the reinforcing bar. This failure was attributed to a e in the bar which was used for identification purposes, and was not caused by the failure of splice itself.
exceptional performance of the test splices more than justifies the omission of a second lification splice.
3.3 Post-Tensioning System 3.3.1 Tendons tendons are composed of stabilized, low relaxation wires of one-quarter inch diameter with a ile strength of 240,000 psi in accordance with ASTM A-421. The pertinent features of the ons are as follows:
Number of wires 186 Ultimate tensile capacity (kips) 2190 Design tensile capacity (kips) 1315
pling and testing of the tendon material conform to ASTM A-421. The following procedure is d.
- a. One buttonhead test on each end of each reel of wire to establish the suitability and acceptance of the wire for buttonheading.
- b. One buttonhead rupture test from each reel of wire.
- c. Random samples test of each lot of wire in accordance with ASTM-421. With each sample of wire tested, a certificate was submitted stating the manufacturers minimum guaranteed ultimate tensile strength of the wire sampled. Stress-strain curves were plotted for each of these tests and the yield and tensile strength of the wire was verified.
3.3.2 Anchorages basic performance requirements for the end anchors of the tendons are stated qualitatively by Seismic Committee of the Prestressed Concrete Institute and published in their Journal of June 6 as follows:
All anchors of unbonded tendons should develop at least 100 percent of the guaranteed ultimate strength of the tendon. The anchorage gripping should function in such a way that no harmful notching would occur on the tendon. Any such anchorage system used in earthquake areas must be capable of maintaining the prestressing force under sustained and fluctuating loads and the effect of shock. Anchors should also possess adequate reserve strength to withstand any overstress to which they may be subjected during the most severe probable earthquake. Particular care should be directed to accurate positioning and alignment of end anchors.
end anchors used are capable of developing 100 percent of the minimum tensile strength of prestressing steel as defined by ASTM A-421.
end anchors are capable of maintaining integrity for 500 cycles of loads corresponding to an rage axial stress variation between 0.7 and 0.75 fs at a repetition rate of one cycle in 0.1 ond. This requirement sets minimum acceptable limits on fatigue effects due to notching by end anchor and tendon performance in response to earthquake loads.
number of cycles was set by increasing to 500 from the 100 predicted. The stress variation increased from a conservatively predicted 0.6 to 0.64 fs to the 0.7 to 0.75 fs. Further, the ber of cycles caused by the earthquake loads was predicted as only 30 of the total of 100 lting from using all the strong ground motions which exceed one/half of the peak ground ion of the earthquake.
l of the predicted stress variations of 0.04 fs. The predicted 0.04 fs stress variation, in turn, lted from the combinations of earthquake, wind, and incident loadings. Analyses made during investigation included consideration of tendon excitation, both parallel and perpendicular to tendon axis.
anchorage assemblies, including the bearing plates, are capable of transmitting the ultimate s of the tendons into the structure without brittle fracture at an anticipated lowest service perature of -30F.
anchorage assemblies used are capable to prelude brittle fracture at a design temperature of -
F.
3.3.3 Sheathing aths for the tendons are classified as concrete forms and are not subjected to any standard es. They provide a void in the concrete wherein the tendons were installed, stressed and sed after the concrete was placed.
sheaths are made from 22 gauge, galvanized ferrous metal, and have an internal diameter of inches clear of corrugations. Couplers are provided at all field splices and sealed by tape.
er sheathing installation, and prior to concrete placement, the sheathing is surveyed to assure urate alignment. An inspection is also performed to ascertain that all sheaths are continuous unblocked by obstructions.
ore installation of the tendons, the sheathing is carefully cleaned to remove all water and ris.
t tubing and temporary valves were provided to permit drainage at all low points.
ash caps at the ends of all sheaths, to prevent concrete and laitance from entering into the aths during construction, were provided.
3.3.4 Corrosion Protection able atmospheric corrosion protection was maintained for the tendons from the point of ufacture to the installed locations. The atmospheric corrosion protection provided assurance the tendon integrity was not impaired due to exposure to the environment.
r to shipment, they were all coated with a thin film of petroleum that contained rust inhibitors.
er the tendons were installed in the sheaths and stressed, the interior of the sheathing was ped full of a modified, thixotropic, refined petroleum oil-based product to provide corrosion ection. The tendons and end anchors were also surrounded with the corrosion-protection erial which was encapsulated in the sheathing and gasketed end caps that were sealed against bearing plates. When the sheaths and end caps are filled, the corrosion-protection material
ugh the upper grease cap fittings.
a result of the Millstone Unit Number 2 tendon surveillance program, sixteen horizontal ons have been identified as subject to ground water intrusion. To prevent ground water usion, the corrosion protection material is continuously supplied to the subject tendons at a sure slightly above hydrostatic pressure of the ground water. The tendons so pressurized are zontal tendons 12H01 through 12H06, 12H08 through 12H10, 31H01 through 31H04, 01, 32H02, and 32H03.
ting of the permanent corrosion-protection material indicates that there were no significant unts of chlorides, sulfides, or nitrates present. However, to further verify the chemical position of the filler material, test samples are taken from each shipment with at least one ple per factory batch. The samples were analyzed as follows:
- a. Water-soluble chlorides (C1) are determined in accordance with ASTM D512-67 with a limit of accuracy of 0.5 ppm.
- b. Water-soluble nitrates (NO3) are determined by the Water and Sewage Analysis Procedure of the Hach Chemical Company, Ames, Iowa.
- c. Water-soluble sulfides (S) are determined in accordance with American Public Health Association Standards (APHA) with a limit of accuracy of 1 ppm. The APHA Standards methods may be modified to use standard reagents and procedures such as those available from Hach Chemical Company.
significant traces of the impurities are allowed. The chemical composition of the filler erial, being about 98 percent petroleum jelly, indicates that it possesses the normal stability of ar hydrocarbons for the site temperature ranges.
TE: For description of water intrusion into the tendon gallery during construction and methods of repair, see Appendix 5.F.
3.4 Structural and Miscellaneous Steels structural and miscellaneous steels conform to the following ASTM specifications:
Rolled shapes, plates, tubing and bars A-36 Crane rails A-1 High strength bolts A-325 or A-490 Anchor bolts (nonwelding) A-575, Grade 1020 Stainless steel A-240, Type 304
ailing, fabrication, and erection of the structural and miscellaneous steels are in accordance h AISC Manual of Steel Construction.
ding is accomplished in accordance with AWS D1.0, Code for Welding in Building struction, and where applicable, AWS D2.0, Specifications for Welded Highway and lroad Bridges.
lity control procedures for field welding are defined in Section 5.9.4.
3.5 Steel Liner Plate and Penetration Sleeves 3.5.1 General containment is lined with a one-quarter inch welded steel plate to ensure leak tightness. The gn, construction, inspection, and testing of the liner plate are not covered by an recognized e or specification, since it is not a pressure vessel and serves only as a leak-tight membrane.
wever, components of the liner which must resist the full containment design pressure, such as penetration sleeves, are designed, fabricated, constructed, and tested to meet the requirements Paragraph N-1211 of Section III, Nuclear Vessels, 1968 Edition through the summer 1969 enda of the ASME Code, except where otherwise noted herein.
liner is designed to function only as a leak-tight membrane. It is not designed to serve as a ctural element to resist the tensile loads from an internally applied pressure such as might lt from a loss-of-coolant incident. Structural integrity of the containment is maintained by the stressed, post-tensioned concrete. Since the principal stresses of the liner due to thermal ansion are in compression, and no significant tensile stresses are expected from the internal sure loading, special nil ductility transition temperature requirements are not applied to the r plate materials. However, all materials for the liner components which must resist tensile sses resulting from internally applied pressure, such as the penetration sleeves are impact ed in accordance with the requirements of Paragraph N-1211 of Section III, Nuclear Vessels, 8 Edition through the summer 1969 addenda of the ASME Code.
erials used in the construction of the steel liner plate and penetration sleeves are defined in tion 5.2.3.1.
3.5.2 Fabrication and Erection asic requirement for the fabrication and erection of the steel liner plate is that all welding cedures and welding operators be qualified by tests as specified in Section IX of the 1968 ME Code.
etration sleeves are shop fabricated in accordance with the requirements of Paragraph N-1211 ection III, Nuclear Vessels, 1968 Edition through the summer 1969 addenda of the ASME
ause they are not included as part of the vessel under the ASME Code.
lity control procedures for field welding and nondestructive examination are defined in tion 5.9.4.
3.5.3 Inspection and Testing following inspection and testing are performed on the steel liner plate.
3.5.3.1 Radiography quality control purposes, completed liner plate weld seams are spot radiographed by the contractor in accordance with the following schedule.
- a. One 12 inch film is taken during the first 50 feet of each welders work, in each welding position.
- b. Thereafter, a minimum of 10 percent of the welding is progressively spot examined as welding is performed, using a 12 inch film. Locations for spot radiograph are designated by the engineer in such a manner that an approximately equal number of spot radiographs is taken from each welders work.
- c. If a radiograph discloses welding which does not meet the acceptance criteria, two additional spot radiographs, each 12 inches in length are taken in the same weld seam, at locations away from the original spot designated by the engineer.
If the two additional radiographs show welding which meets the acceptance criteria, the entire weld seam represented by the three radiographs is considered acceptable except at the area of defect. This area is removed and repaired.
- d. If either of the two additional radiographs show welding which does not meet the acceptance criteria, the entire portion of the weld seam represented by these radiographs is rejected and the defective welding removed and repaired.
- e. The repaired weld seams are completely reradiographed to ensure compliance with the acceptance criteria.
techniques used for radiographic examinations are in accord with Paragraph UW-51 of tion VIII of the 1968 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, using X-ray and fine grain
- s. The double film, single viewing technique is used for all radiography.
acceptance criteria for examinations are in accordance with Paragraph UW-52,Section VIII, he 1968 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. All radiographic films are submitted by the contractor to the engineer for review, interpretation and record.
de suggested minimum of two percent. The first 50 feet of welding performed by each welder spected instead of the first 10 feet, as suggested by the Safety Guide.
en radiographic inspection is not feasible, magnetic particle inspection is substituted.
k chase channel testing is performed in accordance with the suggested Safety Guide uirements with the exception that the system is pressurized for a minimum of 25 minutes and a imum of 30 minutes, instead of two hours as stated therein. This testing may be repeated at time during the plant life.
limited deviations from the Safety Guide do not in any way affect the functional integrity of steel liner plate.
3.5.3.2 Visual Examination and Dye Penetrant Testing weld seams are 100 percent visually examined in accordance with Section 5.9.4.5.3.
dments which on the basis of visual examination are judged to be of questionable quality by er the subcontractor or engineer, are also inspected by dye penetrant testing.
dye penetrant inspection is in accordance with Section VIII, of the 1968 ASME Boiler and ssure Vessel Code.
3.5.3.3 Magnetic Particle Testing ere nonradiographable welds are used, magnetic particle testing is substituted for radiography.
inimum of 10 percent of such welding, including splices with welded backing strips, is mined as the welding is performed.
magnetic particle testing is performed in accordance with Appendix VI of Section VIII of the 8 ASME Code, Dry Particle, Direct Current Production Method.
3.5.3.4 Vacuum Box Testing liner welds which must maintain leak-tightness integrity, including plates, shell plates, and e plates are tested by the subcontractor as the work proceeds, using a vacuum box that can be ed over the test area and evacuated.
psi minimum pressure differential with respect to the atmospheric pressure is maintained for a imum of 20 seconds, and verified by a gauge. The soap suds solution is continuously observed bubbles which indicate leaks, from the time evacuation of the box is started until 20 seconds r the required vacuum has been obtained.
ing.
ds which cannot be vacuum box tested due to configuration and space limitations are dye etrant tested in accordance with Section VIII, of the 1968 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel e.
3.5.3.5 Halogen Testing leak chase system over the floor liner plate is Freon tested. A standard high sensitivity ustrial halogen leak detector capable of detecting leakage in the order of 1 x 10-9 scc/second used.
leak chase system is initially charged with a tracer gas until a pressure of 15 psig is attained.
then pressurized with air until a test pressure of 60 psig is reached.
pressurized leak chase system is allowed to stand for 25 minutes minimum, before starting probe test. Pressure measurements are taken at the beginning and the end of the holding od. Any pressure decay greater than 2 psig on a 0 to 100 psig, 4.5 inch test gauge, is rejected.
r to each test, the leak detector is calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's instruction inst a standard leak of 1.0 x 10-5 scc/second With the control unit of the leak detector set on matic balance, the tip of the probe is placed on the weld seam to be tested and scanned at the of 1 ips. All leaks larger than 1.0 x 10-5 scc/second are located, removed, repaired and sted.
3.5.4 Quality Control of Field Welding Electrodes quality control procedure for the electrodes used in the field welding of the containment steel r plate is as follows:
- a. Approved procedures for handling and storing of welding electrodes are used.
- b. The subcontractors welding and quality control supervisors control the welding electrodes by:
- 1. Performing receipt inspection and verifying the electrode identification with the certificate of compliance.
- 2. Physically separating the various types of electrodes and ensuring that the approved storage requirements are met.
- 3. Instructing the welders on type(s) of electrodes and welding procedures to be used.
- 5. Surveying the work areas near the end of each work day to ensure electrodes are either discarded or returned to the proper storage facilities.
- c. Bechtel quality control inspectors monitor the liner erection and welding on a continuous basis. Weekly inspection reports are prepared.
3.6 Interior Coatings (Original Construction) of the coating materials given have been tested by their manufactures under simulated rating and incident conditions and certified to fully comply with all the requirements of the SI Standard N.101.2 (1972) Protective Coatings (Paints) for Light Water Nuclear Reactor tainment Facilities.
addition, all shipments of these materials are accompanied by vendor certifications of pliance.
3.6.1 Containment Steel Liner Plate Coatings face preparation of the interior (exposed) surfaces of the containment steel liner plate is omplished in the shop by blast cleaning each plate from edge to edge in accordance with the el Structures Painting Council (SSPC) Specification SSPC-SP-6-63, Commercial Blast aning. The plates are then primed with one coat of an inorganic zinc primer, Carbo-Zinc II, to hin two inches of the edges of the plate. The minimum dry film thickness (dft) of the primer is ils.
pplying the primer to the plates, the coating manufacturers written instructions and the SSPC-
-63, Solvent Cleaning are followed explicitly.
er the liner is erected, the field weld seams and the limited burnback of the Carbo-Weld 11 ting are power tool cleaned and recoated with Carbo-Zinc 11 of 3 mils dft.
as which are damaged by welding, such as arc strikes, or due to the removal of temporary chments for erection, are required and recoated so that they are equivalent to the original ditions.
sh coats for the steel liner plate are as follows:
- a. Wainscot Two coats of a modified, organic phenolics, Phenoline Number 305 finish, at 3 mils dft each coat.
- b. Above wainscot, including:
3.6.2 Containment Interior Coatings 3.6.2.1 Steel Surfaces Wainscot bon steel surfaces, including structural and miscellaneous steels, uninsulated piping, and ipment which are located in areas subject to hard usage or radioactive contamination, are blast ned in accordance with Steel Structures Painting Council Specification SSPC-SP6-63, mmercial Blast Cleaning.
hin eight hours after blast cleaning, the surfaces are primed with one coat of an inorganic zinc er, Carbo-Zinc 11, at 3 mils dft. This is followed by two coats of a modified phenolic, noline Number 305 Finish, at 3 mils dft.
lated piping is blast cleaned and primed the same as above, but receives no finish coating.
3.6.2.2 Steel Surfaces Above Wainscot bon steel surfaces above wainscot height are blast cleaned and primed the same as in tion 5.9.3.6.2.1 except that they receive one organic finish coat of Phenoline Number 305 at mils minimum dft.
3.6.2.3 Galvanized and Stainless Steel Surfaces are not Painted.
3.6.2.4 Concrete and Masonry Surfaces concrete and masonry surfaces, including floors, wainscot, walls, columns, pilasters, and ings are chemically cleaned by either caustic wash or acid etching, or by blasting. An organic acer, Keeler and Long Number 6548 Epoxy Block Filler is then applied over the surfaces at a kness of 5.5 mils dft, and one coat of organic Keeler and Long Epoxy Enamel at 2.5 mils dft.
3.7 Interior Maintenance Coatings (first implemented during Mid cycle 13, 1997) maintenance coating materials applied to surfaces inside or to be installed in the reactor tainment have been tested to withstand Millstone Unit 2 design basis loss of coolant accident A-LOCA) conditions. The coating materials and their application comply with the intent of ulatory Guide 1.54 within the following clarification and exception.
rification mpliance with Regulatory Guide 1.54 will not be invoked for equipment of a miscellaneous re and all insulated surfaces. It is impracticable to impose Regulatory Guide requirements on standard shop process used in painting valve bodies, handwheels, electrical cabinetry, control els, loud speakers, emergency light cases, and other miscellaneous equipment. Wrapped or d insulation captures and retains any coating which may come off equipment surfaces, thereby
eption lity Assurance Program recommendations stated in Regulatory Guide 1.54 are followed ept that inspection will be in accordance with Section 10 of ANSI N5.12-1974 in lieu of tion 7 of ANSI N5.9 as referenced in Section 6.2.4 of ANSI N101.4.
h coating was tested in accordance with ASTM D3911, Evaluating Coatings Used in Light-er Nuclear Power Plants at Simulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) Conditions, to the DBA ditions represented by the pressure (70 psig) and temperature (340F) curve of Figure 1, ein.
r to exposure to DBA conditions, each coating was irradiated to an accumulated dose of at t 1x109 Rads in accordance with ASTM D4082, Effect of Gamma Radiation on Coatings for in Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants.
coating manufacturers provide certification with each shipment that the supplied coating erials are identical to the batches of coating materials satisfactorily tested to DBA conditions.
ntenance coating materials applied to containment surfaces are used to repair and maintain the ting coatings, to coat existing surfaces that were intended to be, but were not previously ted, and to coat new surfaces to be installed into the containment. Application of the new ting materials requires complete prior removal of the existing coating from the surface within repair area. Overcoating the existing coatings with the new coating materials requires prior ing of the material combinations to radiation and simulated DBA conditions in accordance h Regulatory Guide 1.54.
3.7.1 Stainless Steel Surfaces nless steel surfaces are not painted.
3.7.2 Galvanized Surfaces vanized surfaces are spot repaired with a qualified organic coating material, as required, to ntain corrosion protection. Galvanized surfaces are not otherwise coated.
3.7.3 Carbon Steel Surfaces sting carbon steel surfaces are repair coated as required. New carbon steel surfaces are coated r to or upon installation into the containment. Carbon steel surfaces may remain uncoated n substantiated by appropriate engineering evaluation.
4.1 Scope se procedures outline the general quality control requirements for welding to ensure that all d welding is performed in full compliance with the applicable job specifications.
4.2 Qualifications for Welding Inspectors welding inspectors who inspect welds covered by this specification are qualified by meeting following minimum requirements:
- a. Inspectors must have a thorough knowledge of the various welding processes and techniques employed in field construction and be able to demonstrate the proper methods for shielded metal-arc welding, gas tungsten-arc welding, gas metal-arc welding, and oxyacetylene welding.
- b. A minimum of two years previous welding inspection experience or equivalent experience and training in welding fabrication and nondestructive testing is required for all inspectors.
- c. Inspectors are required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the responsible Bechtel Material, Fabrication and Quality Control Services Representative, their knowledge of the fundamentals, techniques, and applications of the inspection methods set forth in this standard, i.e., visual, vacuum box, magnetic particle, dye penetrant and radiographic inspections.
4.3 Welding Performed by Bechtel Construction Personnel 4.3.1 Welding Procedures welding performed by Bechtel construction personnel is in strict accordance with the roved Bechtel Welding Procedure Specifications. The appropriate Bechtel Welding Procedure cifications for field welds are prepared and qualified by the Bechtel Material, Fabrication and lity Control Services Department and issued to the field by the Bechtel Project Engineer.
4.3.2 Welder Qualification welders who are welding under Bechtel Welding Procedure Specifications are qualified by orming the test required in the applicable Bechtel Welder Performance Specification WQ-F-1 ferrous materials and WQ-NF-1 for nonferrous materials. These Bechtel specifications ompass the requirements of Section IX of the ASME Code. Number welder is permitted to orm production welding until he has passed the necessary tests and has the appropriate Welder ormance Qualification Test Record.
4.4.1 Welding Procedures welding performed by Bechtel subcontractors are in strict accordance with the applicable job cifications. All welding procedures used on the project are submitted to Bechtel Engineering approval. Production welding is not permitted without prior approval of these procedures. In cases, field welding inspectors are responsible for determining that the subcontractors ding is being performed in accordance with properly qualified and engineering approved ding procedure specifications.
4.4.2 Welder Qualification welders are welding operators employed by subcontractors who are making welds under a e or standard which requires qualification of welders are tested and qualified accordingly ore beginning production welding. Each subcontractor is responsible for testing and qualifying own welders. The Bechtel field welding inspector is responsible in all cases for determining the subcontractors welders have successfully passed the necessary qualification tests and that subcontractor has the proper qualification test records for each qualified welder on file at the ite.
4.5 Instructions for Field Welding Inspectors general instructions for field welding inspectors which follow cover welding performed by h Bechtel construction and Bechtel subcontractors.
4.5.1 Welding Procedures the responsibility of the field welding inspectors to assure that all welding is performed in ct accordance with the appropriate qualified welding procedure specifications. Specific items e checked follows:
- a. Determine that the proper welding procedure specification has been selected to match the base materials being welded and the welding processes being employed.
- b. Permit only welders who are properly qualified under the essential variables of each welding procedure specification to make welds under that procedure.
- c. Check to see that the welding electrodes, bare filler rod, consumable insert strips, and backing strips all match those which have been specified.
- d. Inspect weld joints as necessary prior to welding to ensure proper edge penetration, cleaning, and fit up.
- e. Check to see that the welding machine settings are correct and fall within the range of current and voltage specified.
- g. Inspect the inprocess welding for proper techniques, cleaning between passes, and appearance of individual weld beads.
4.5.2 Postweld Heat Treatment field welding inspectors inspect each postweld heat treatment (thermal stress relieving) ration to ensure conformance with the applicable job specifications. Specific items to be cked include the following:
- a. A sufficient number and proper location of thermocouples are selected to accurately record temperatures.
- b. The thermocouples are connected to temperature indicator recorders which provide a permanent record of the heating rate, holding temperature and time, and the cooling rate.
- c. Temperature charts are checked for proper heating rate, holding temperature, holding time, cooling rate, and to see that the proper weld identification is recorded on the chart.
4.5.3 Visual Inspection of Weldments field welding inspectors are responsible for carrying out the necessary welding surveillance nsure that all welding meets the following requirements for visual qualify and general kmanship. Visual inspections are performed during and after welding.
- a. All weld beads, passes, and completed welds are free of slag, cracks, porosity, incomplete penetration and lack of fusion.
- b. Cover passes are free of coarse ripples, irregular surfaces, nonuniform bead patterns, high crowns, deep ridges or valleys between beads, and that all blend smoothly and gradually into the surface of base metal.
- c. Butt welds are slightly convex, of uniform height, and have full penetration.
- d. Fillet welds are of specified size, with full throat and, unless otherwise specified, the legs are of approximately equal length.
- e. Repairing, chipping, or grinding of welds is done in such a manner as not to gouge, groove, or reduce the base metal thicknesses.
- f. Where different base metal thicknesses are joined by welding, the finished joint is tapered no steeper than one to four (1:4) between the thick and the thin sections.
field welding inspector is responsible for determining that all magnetic particle inspection is perly performed. He ensures that the proper techniques are followed and that the results perly interpreted. The field welding inspector requires that the subcontractors responsible ection personnel demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of the applicable cifications prior to performing any production testing.
cial attention is given to the following items for all magnetic-particle inspection:
- a. Determine that surfaces to be inspected have been properly cleaned and are free of crevices which could produce false indications by trapping the iron powder.
- b. Determine that the power source, current density, prod spacing and application of iron powder comply with the applicable requirements.
- c. Permit no arcing between the prods and weld surfaces.
- d. Interpret all linear or linearly disposed indications as defects.
- e. Probe questionable indications by thermal cutting, chipping, grinding, or filing to confirm the presence or absence of actual defects.
4.5.5 Dye Penetrant Inspection field welding inspector is responsible for determining that all dye penetrant inspection is perly performed. He ensures that the proper technique is followed and that the results are perly interpreted. The field welding inspectors require the subcontractor's responsible ection personnel to demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of the applicable cifications prior to performing any production testing.
cial attention is given to the following items for all dye penetrant inspection:
- a. Determine that surfaces to be inspected have been properly cleaned and are free of crevices which can product false indications by trapping the dye penetrant.
- b. Check to see that cleaner, dye penetrant, and developer are properly applied and the specified time intervals for dye penetration and developing are followed.
- c. Determine that indications are properly interpreted. Defects will be identified as red stains against the white developer background. Red lines or linearly disposed red dots are indicative of cracks. Porosity and pinhole leaks appear as local red patches or dots.
- d. Examine questionable indications by a 5X or stronger hand lens, and probe by grinding or filing to confirm the presence or absence of defects.
field welding inspector is responsible for determining that all radiographic inspection is perly performed. He ensures that radiographic techniques are followed and that the completed s are properly interpreted. The field welding inspectors require the subcontractors onsible inspection personnel to demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of the licable specifications prior to beginning the radiographic inspection. The field welding ector also reviews each completed radiograph.
cial attention is given to each of the following items for all radiographic inspection:
- a. Check the type of film intensifying screens, penetrameters, and sources of radiation for conformance to the job specifications.
- b. Check the relative location of film, penetrameters, identifying numbers, and radiation source for each typical exposure.
- c. Review all completed film for quality and interpretation of defects. Check the exposed and developed film for proper density and visibility of penetrameters.
Radiographic film of unacceptable quality or with questionable indications of defects are reradiographed.
4.5.7 Other Welding Inspections field welding inspectors are responsible for determining that all other types of welding ection, where specified, are properly performed.
4.5.8 Repairs the responsibility of the field welding inspectors to determine that all weld defects in excess pecified standards of acceptance are removed, repaired, and reinspected in accordance with applicable job specifications.
4.5.9 Records the responsibility of the field welding inspector to ensure that proper records of welding and destructive testing are kept on file at the jobsite.
STM Initial Users Periodic umber Title Results To Be Achieved Test Test Test 33 Specification for To conform with X X X concrete aggregates specification 40 Organic impurities in To conform with X X X sands for concrete specification 87 Effect or Organic To conform with X X Impurities in Fine specification Aggregate on Strength of Mortar 88 Soundness of Aggregates To conform with X X specification 117 Materials finer than Design mix calculations X X Number 200 sieve 127 Specific gravity and Design mix calculations X X absorption (coarse aggregates) 128 Specific gravity and To conform with X X absorption (fine specification aggregates) 131 Los Angeles Machine To conform with X X abrasion specification 136 Sieve analysis of fine To conform with X X and coarse aggregates specification 142 Clay lumps To conform with X X specification 227 Potential Alkali To conform with X X reactivity (mortar bar) specification.
289 Potential reactivity To conform with X X (chemical) specification 295 Petrographic To conform with X examination of specification aggregates
ASTM INITIAL USER'S PERIODIC umber TYPE OF TEST TEST TEST TESTS 109 Compressive Strength X X X 114 Chemical Analysis X X 115 Fineness-Turbidimeter X X 151 Auto-clave expansion (soundness) X X 183 Sampling X 185 Air content of mortar X 186 Heat of hydration X 191 Time of setting by Vicat needle X X X 204 Fineness by air permeability X 266 Time of setting by Gillmore needles X 451 False set (paste) X
ASTM INITIAL USER'S PERIODIC umber TYPE OF TEST TEST TEST TESTS 109 Compressive strength X X X 114 Chemical analysis X X 151 Autoclave expansion (Soundness) X X 188 Specific gravity X X 204 Fineness X X 311 Sampling and testing X X
NUSCO RG&E Co.
Chemical Analysis Devon Plant Russell Plant ASTM C-618 icon dioxide (SiO2) plus aluminum 93.22 86.20 70.0 ide (A12O3) plus iron oxide (Fe2O3) inimum %)
agnesium oxide (MgO) (maximum %) 1.20 1.22 -
lfur trioxide (SO3) (maximum %) 0.60 1.16 5.0 oisture content (maximum %) 0.13 0.13 3.0 ss on ignition (maximum %) 4.01 5.90 12.0 ailable alkalies as Na2O (maximum %) 0.77 0.73 1.5
Maximum Allowable Void Limits Vertical - Full Bar Size Void Area Standard Circumference Low, (3)
Number Splice Catalog Number Splices, (1) (2) (in2) (inches)
RBT-6101-(-H) 1.05-1.05 5/8 - 5/8 RBT6-7101 (-H) 1.05-1.03 5/8 - 9/16 RBT-7101 (-H) 1.03-1.03 9/16 - 9/16 RBT7-8101 (-H) 1.03-1.02 9/16 - 1/2 RBT-8101 (-H) 1.02-1.02 1/2 - 1/2 RBT-8-9101 (-H) 1.02-1.02 1/2 - 1/2 RBT-9101 (-H) 1.02-1.02 1/2 - 1/2 0 RBT9-10101 (-H) 1.02-1.03 1/2 - 7/16
-10 RBT-1091 (-H) 1.03-1.03 7/16 - 7/16
-11 RBT10-11101 (-H) 1.03-1.53 7/16 - 9/16 11 RBT-11101 (-H) 1.53-1.53 9/16 - 9/16 14 RBT-11-14101 (-H) 1.53-1.52 9/16 - 5/8 18 RBT11-18101 (-H) 1.53-1.99 9/16 - 1/2
-14 RBT-1476 (-H) 2.15-2.15 5/8 - 5/8
-14 RBT-14101 (-H) 2.15-2.15 5/8 - 5/8 18 RBT14-18101 (-H) 2.15-1.99 5/8 - 1/2 18 RBT-1876 (-H) 2.64-2.64 9/16 - 9/16 18 RBT-1891 (-H) 3.00-3.00 5/8 - 5/8 18 RBT-18101 (-H) 3.00-3.00 5/8 - 5/8 Void Area = W (D-3/16) (Normal void due to asbestos packing)
TES:
The maximum allowable void area computed separately for each end of the splice sleeve as shown in the sketch.
This column is used for all standard splices including vertical, horizontal, horizontal side fill, angled splices and B-series structure splices.
This column is used for vertical splices only with low filler metal around entire circumference. For spot voids in vertical splices, standard splices column is used.
.1 INTRODUCTION initial development of the finite element method was done by Turner, et al. (Reference 5.A-1) future application in aerospace technology. Turner, et al. later used the two-dimensional plate ments in the analysis of aircraft structures. These first applications of the method were used to lyze the plane stress problem. (References 5.A-1 and 5.A-2) Continued development of the hod has extended its applicability to the plane strain problem, flat plate bending, flat plate ility studies, three dimensional axisymmetric stress analysis and for general shell analysis.
ferences 5.A-3 through 5.A-6) Most recently, a textbook (Reference 5.A-7) by Zienkiewicz published which contains many examples of solutions to practical problems using finite ments. This text also presents an excellent treatment of this powerful approach to the solution roblems in continuum mechanics.
.2 ANALYTICAL METHOD finite element technique is a general method of structural analysis in which the continuous cture is replaced by a system of elements (members) connected at a finite number of nodal nts (joints). Conventional analyses of frames and trusses, for example, can be considered as the lication of the finite element method using one-dimensional elements. In utilizing the method n axisymmetric solid (e.g., a concrete containment), the continuous structure is replaced by a em of rings of circumferential joints. Based on the energy principles, a set of force ilibrium equations are formed in which the radial and axial displacements at the umferential joints are the unknowns of the system. A solution of this set of equations is rent in the solution of the finite element system.
re are many advantages to the finite element method, when compared to other numerical roaches. The method is completely general with respect to geometry and material properties.
mplex bodies composed of many different materials are easily represented; therefore, in the lysis of the containment, concrete, liner plate and foundation material can be realistically sidered. Also, axisymmetric thermal, mechanical and gravity loadings can be analyzed.
an be shown mathematically that the method converges to the exact solution as the number of ments in increased; therefore, any desired degree of accuracy may be obtained within the limits omputational capacity.
.3 COMPUTER PROGRAM initial development of the computer program used in the analysis of the containment was ducted at the University of California at Berkeley in 1962, under a National Science ndation Grant (G18986). Since that time the program has been further modified and refined Dr. Edward L. Wilson. The validity of the specific program used in the containment analysis been established by the analysis of axisymmetric solids with known exact linear solutions. It
.4 COMPARISONS WITH KNOWN SOLUTIONS exact analysis of the containment structure under consideration is impossible by classic hods. A preliminary approximate analysis of the structure was conducted based on the sical shell theory. In addition to the difficulty in representing the steel liner, thickened portions he shell and foundation materials, shell theory neglects the members thicknesses and shear ormations. Since the finite element approach includes the members thicknesses and shear ormation, an exact comparison with shell theory cannot be expected. However, forces obtained m the finite element method at sections not near discontinuities or the foundation do agree with results, based on the shell theory.
ure 5.A-1(c) illustrates the comparison of stresses from a classical problem for which an exact ed form solution exists and those obtained by the finite element method. The figure also ws the effect of the fineness of the finite element mesh on the degree of accuracy of the tion.
problem is the determination of the radial and tangential stresses in an infinitely long, thick-led cylinder of radius r and wall thickness of r/2, which is subjected to an internal pressure, p.
Figure 5.A-1(b)). The values of the stresses through the wall thickness can be determined by Lame solution. (Reference 5.A-8) The solution to this problem, using the finite element hod, was carried out by E. L. Wilson. (Reference 5.A-9) the containment, comparisons have been made between the finite element method and an lysis done in accordance with the general shell theory for homogeneous surfaces of revolution.
matrix of influence coefficients (the unknown forces deflections, moments and rotations the dome, ring and cylinder) has been solved for the condition of equal deflection and tions. Similar analytical methods have been used for the intersection of the base slab and the nder wall. The base slab has been analyzed as an elastic plate on an elastic foundation.
eneral, the results thus obtained are within five percent of those obtained by the more rigorous te element method for ring girder, dome, and cylinder wall of a similar containment.
a typical finite element analysis, the foundation material and base slab interaction is studied extending the mesh of the finite elements into the foundation material. Since the locations of boundaries of the finite element mesh within the soil mass are a function of the soil properties, ference 5.A-10) studies are performed to determine where these boundaries should be located.
er this has been determined, the final analyses of the containment by the finite element method follow. Agreement between the results of this approach and the results of hand calculations, ed on the assumption of an elastic plate on an elastic foundation, can be expected to be only roximate due to the difficulty of representing varying soil properties in the governing ndary conditions for the hand calculations.
rmined, but also the effects due to the thermal and pressure loadings have been studied in the horage regions. The plane strain analysis is a better approximation than plane stress for the e-dimensional problem. However, since the program is prepared for plane stress analysis, difications must be made in the elastic constants. The modulus of elasticity, E, is modified to
-v2); Poissons ration, v, is modified to v/(1-v) and the linear thermal coefficient of expansion s modified to (1+v).
.5 REFERENCES
-1 Turner, M. L., R. W. Clough, H. C. Martin, and L. J. Topp, Stiffness and Deflection Analysis of Complex Structures, Journal of Aeronautical Sciences, Volume 23, No. 9, September 1956, pp 805-823.
-2 Clough, R. W., The Finite Element In Plane Stress Analysis, Proceedings of the Second ASCE Conference on Electronic Computation, Pittsburgh, PA., September 1960.
-3 Wilson, E. L., Finite Element Analysis of Two-Dimensional Structures, Structures and Materials Research, Department of Civil Engineering, Report Number 63-2, University of California, June 1963.
-4 Hermann, L. R., Finite Element Bending Analysis for Plates, Journal of Engineering Mechanics Division, ASCE, Volume 93, No. EM5, October 1967, pp 13-26.
-5 Kapur, K. K., and B. J. Hartz, Stability of Plates Using the Finite Element Method, Journal of Engineering Mechanics Division, ASCE, Volume 92, Number. EM2, April 1966, pp. 177-195.
-6 Rashid, Y. R., Analysis of Axisymmetric Composite Structures by the Finite Element Method, General Atomic Division of General Dynamics Corporation, Johns Hopkins Laboratory for Pure and Applied Science, San Diego, California. USAEC Contract at (04-3)-1967, Project Agreement Number 17.
-7 Zienkiewicz, O. C., The Finite Element Method in Structural and Continuum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill, 1967.
-8 Seely, F. B., and J. O. Smith, Advanced Strength of Materials, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, pp 295-304.
-9 Wilson, E. L., Structural Analysis of Axisymmetric Solids, Preprint 64-443 from AIAA 2nd Aerospace Sciences Meeting, New York, January 25, 1965.
-10 Hoeg, K., J. T. Christian and R. V. Whitman, Settlement of A Strip Load on Elastic-Plastic Soil, MIT Department of Civil Engineering, July 1967.
.1 GENERAL load factors and load combinations in the design equations represent the consensus of the vidual judgments of a group of Bechtel engineers and consultants who are experienced in both ctural and nuclear power plant design. Their judgment has been influenced by current and past tice, by the degree of conservativeness inherent in the basic loads, and particularly by the babilities of coincident occurrences in the case of incident, wind and tornadoes, as well as mic loads.
following discussions explain the justification for the individual factors, particularly as they ly to containment structures.
.2 DEAD LOADS d loads in a large structure such as this are easily identified and their effects can be accurately rmined at each point in the structure. For dead loads in combination with the incident, mic, or wind and tornado loads, a load factor representing a tolerance of five percent is chosen ccount for dead load inaccuracies. The ACI Code allows a tolerance of +25 percent and -10 ent, but the code is written to cover a variety of conditions where weights and configurations materials in and on the structure may not be clearly defined and are subject to change during life of the structure.
.3 LIVE LOADS live loads that would be present along with the incident, seismic, or wind and tornado loads ld produce a very small portion of the stress at any point. Also, it is extremely unlikely that full live loads would be present over a large area at the time of an unusual occurrence. For e reasons, a low load factor is felt to be justified and the live loads are considered together h dead loads at a load factor of 1.05.
.4 SEISMIC LOADS operating basis earthquake that has been selected is considered to be the possible earthquake ch could occur during the life of the plant. In addition, a design basis earthquake which nes the maximum credible earthquake which could occur at the site, is also considered in the gn. Class I structures, systems, and equipment are designed so that no loss of function would lt from the design basis earthquake. Consequently, the probability of an earthquake causing a
-of-coolant incident is very small. For this reason, the two events, earthquake and the loss-of-lant incident is very small. For this reason, the two events, earthquake and the loss-of-coolant dent, are considered together, but at much lower load factors than those specified for each arate event.
.5 WIND AND TORNADO LOADS d and tornado loads are determined from the velocities of the design wind and design tornado, ectively. With the containment designed for the extreme wind, it is inconceivable that the d would cause a loss-of-coolant incident. Therefore, wind loads are not considered with the dent loads.
ad factor of 1.0 is applied to the tornado loads.
.6 LOSS-OF-COOLANT INCIDENT design pressure and temperature are based on the operation of partial safeguards equipment g emergency diesel power.
opean practice has been to use a load factor of 1.5 on the design pressure (Reference 5.B-1).
s factor is reasonable and has been adopted for this design.
ll cases the design temperature is defined as that corresponding to the unfactored pressure. At P, the temperature will be somewhat higher than the temperature at P. It would be unrealistic to ly a corresponding temperature factor of 1.5 since this could only occur with a pressure much ter than a pressure of 1.5 P.
.7 REFERENCES
-1 T. C. Waters and N. T. Barrett, Prestressed Concrete Pressure Vessels for Nuclear Reactors, Journal British Nuclear Society 2, 1963.
factors are provided to allow for variations in materials and workmanship. In the ACI Code
-63, varies with the types of stresses or members considered; that is, with flexure, bond or ar stress, or compression.
factor is multiplied into the basic strength equation or, for shear, into the basic permissible shear to obtain the dependable strength. The basic strength equation gives the ideal strength ming that materials are as strong as specified, sizes are as shown on the drawings, the kmanship is excellent, and that the strength equation itself is theoretically correct. The tical, dependable strength may be something less since all these factors vary.
ACI Code provides for these variables by suing these factors:
= 0.90 for concrete in flexure
= 0.85 for diagonal tension, bond, and anchorage
= 0.75 for spirally reinforced, concrete compression members
= 0.70 for tied compression members value is larger for flexure because the variability of steel is less than that of concrete and the crete in compression has a fail-safe mode of behavior; that is, material understrength may not se failure. The values for columns are lower (favoring the toughness of spiral columns over columns) because columns fail in compression where concrete strength is critical. Also, it is sible that the analysis might not combine the worst combination of axial load and moment.
ce the member is critical in the gross collapse of the structure, a lower value is used.
additional values used represent the best judgment of Bechtel as to how much erstrength should be assigned to each material and condition not covered directly by the ACI
- e. The additional values have been selected, based on material quality in relation to the ting values.
ventional concrete design of beams requires that the design be controlled by yielding of the ile reinforcing steel. This steel is generally spliced by lapping in an area of reduced tension.
members in flexure, ACI uses = 0.90. The same reasoning has been applied in assigning a e of = 0.90 to reinforcing steel in tension, which now includes axial tension. However, the e recognizes the possibility of reduced bond of the bars at the laps by specifying a of 0.85.
chanical and welded splices will develop at least 125 percent of the yield strength of the forcing steel. Therefore, = 0.85 is recommended for this type of splice.
only significantly new value introduced is = 0.95 for prestressed tendons in direct tension.
igher value than that specified for conventional reinforcing has been allowed because: during allation the tendons are each jacked to about 94 percent of their yield strength, so in effect h tendon has been proof tested; and, the method of manufacturing prestressing steel (cold wing and stress relieving) ensures a higher quality product than conventional reinforcing steel.
spectrum of tornado missiles is expanded to include the following:
- 1. Utility pole 13.5 inch diameter by 35 feet long with density of 43 lbs/ft3
- 2. 1inch solid steel rod 3 feet long with a density of 490 lbs/ft3
- 3. 6 inch, schedule 40 pipe, 15 feet long with a density of 490 lbs/ft3
- 4. 12 inch, schedule 40 pipe, 15 feet long with a density of 490 lbs/ft3 each of the above tornado-borne missiles, the following information is provided:
- 1. The maximum velocity and height attained. Assuming in the analyses that each of the missiles originates at ground level and at the highest structural elevation on the site capable of producing each missile.
- 2. The required thickness of a reinforced concrete missile barrier to stop the missiles without their penetrating the missile barrier. Discussing the adequacy of all tornado missile barriers protecting systems and components necessary for safe shutdown.
- 3. The required thickness of a reinforced concrete missile barrier to preclude the generation of secondary missiles within the structure.
- 4. The effects that secondary missiles could have on safety related equipment and systems in the event that they occur.
eveloping the above information, the analytical approach presented in BC-TOP-9, Design of cture for Missile Damage with the following exceptions is used, assuming the missiles do not ble and are at all times oriented such as to have the maximum value of CdA/W while in flight.
E TORNADO MODEL: The tornado model will be patterned after the Dallas tornado of il 2, 1957, as studied by Hoecker (Reference 5.D-1). The model is basically that given in AP-7897 (Reference 5.D-2) but with a more rigorous extrapolation to the parameters desired a design tornado than given by Bates and Swanson (Reference 5.D-3).
cker summarized his findings by the use of a pressure-time profile for an average slational velocity of 27 mph and as a function of percentage of total pressure drop.
ttachment A, it is shown that when this time-pressure profile is used to solve the cyclostropic d equation, the tangential wind velocities correspond with the experimental ones when a total sure drop of 60 mb, or 0.882 psi, and a translational velocity of 27 mph is substituted into the ation.
esponds closely to the assumptions which have been made in the past when describing the gn tornado.
two exponential equations used by Hoecker to determine the time-pressure profile cross each r at a radius of 1,240 feet instead of the 300 feet at which they cross when a translational city is 27 mph. Therefore, it is only necessary to use one equation since the starting tangential city corresponding to this distance is 66 mph, which is less than the minimum 75 mph sidered by Bates and Swanson.
incorporating these two assumptions, namely, that the vertical component is equal to one third he tangential and the radial component is a function of radial distances between minimum and imum tangential components being considered, a complete windfield was defined by using following equations:
Exp - 48.3 V 31 R V 3 D 3
1 V t = 249 ------------------------------------------------------------ (1) 3 R
1240 - R R V r = - ------------------------------- (2) 1240 - 300 V v = 1 3V t (3) ere:
Vt = tangential velocity (fps)
Vr = radial velocity (fps)
Vv = vertical velocity (fps)
V1 = translational velocity (fps)
D = total pressure drop (psf)
R = radius (feet) ation (1) has been left in a general form for use in future models to predict different total sure drops or translational velocities. However, at this time D is taken as 432 psf and
= 88 fps.
relative conservatism with reference to the actual Dallas tornado is shown in Figure 5.D-1.
assumption of constant velocities from the ground to a height of 500 feet is a degree of servatism which is justified by the expanded view of these velocities. This information has n published by Hoecker and is reproduced in Figure 5.D-2.
ed. Five missiles are now being considered.
the missiles are intended as prototypes of the many missiles generated by tornados.
sidering the present (1973) state of the art, a detailed physical description of a missile is of e value when designing the missile proof target. Empirical formulations have to be used in s where impactive energy and the impactive area are the points to be considered.
more logical approach is to assume a generalized range of missiles with the required drag ors impacting at given elevations with the highest possible velocity. The impactive kinetic rgy per square foot of impact area for each elevation would then be computed.
table is made with CdA/W factors from 0.10 to 0.15, which is the smallest measurement for an orne missile, it will be found that there is a drag factor that will give the highest velocity at h elevation. This is shown in Table 5.D-1.
interesting to show the small range and the gap left for the maximum drag factor proposed.
Wooden plank 0.06 Utility pole 0.026 Steel rod 0.031 6 inch pipe 0.029 12 inch pipe 0.021 active energy per unit area measured in lb/ft as shown on Table II is readily found as follows:
2 2 WV V K = ------------ = ----------
2g A 2g F ere:
K = impactive factor (lb/ft)
V = velocity at impact (fps)
A = area of impact (ft2)
F = CdA/W for Cd = 1 W = weight of missile (pounds) g = acceleration of gravity (ft/sec2)
etrations can be computed by the required empirical formulation which is workable in terms hese impactive factors.
THODS OF INJECTION AND PROPULSION: Bates and Swanson propose three methods of ction:
- a. Explosive injection
- b. Aerodynamic injection
- c. Ramp injection se are intended to limit the height at which a given object may be injected into a tornado. So y considerations and assumptions have to be made that they become of no practical value n it is to be assumed that the object will reach the highest point of a structure even if the sile has to be held at a convenient elevation for injection to occur.
n explosive injection occurs some distance away from a structure, it is concluded that the ct could clear the structure, if such an injection could occur. Aerodynamic injection will uire aerodynamic objects or else the injection is overestimated. Likewise, a ramp injection will end on the given ramp, a factor that is hard to generalize.
three methods of injection required many assumptions which make it difficult for eralization. A fourth method which would be called the Uplift Injection offers the antages of simplicity and applicability.
he uplift injection it is assumed that the wind finds its way beneath a surface and the object become airborne at the time when the vertical component of the wind produces an upward e equal to the weight of the object. While on the ground the object is assumed to be free to ve on the horizontal plane in a frictionless manner as the tangential and radial components of wind act on it.
en a missile flight is to be ascertained by applying the three components of the wind gential, radial and vertical) simultaneously, a random surface is assumed to be facing all three ponents. This random surface will produce what is called in WCAP-7897 an effective drag or to be applied in all directions and which is computed as follows:
Cylinder:
h + 0.66D -
C e = 0.389 P obj h D
w h + d -
C e = 0.483 P obj w h d re:
Ce = effective drag factor h = length, feet D = diameter, feet Pobj = density, lb/ft3 w = width, feet d = depth, feet date, this is the best method of computing an effective drag area for an object thrown into a ado.
ng these effective drag areas in the computer program, DALLAS MISS GEN, the following lts (velocities in ft/sec) were obtained:
Wooden Plank Utility Pole Steel Rod 6 inch Pipe 12 inch Pipe Elevation Ce = 0.03 Ce = 0.0082 Ce = 0.0097 Ce = 0.0015 Ce = 0.00078 223 182 192 98 ---
264 --- --- -- ---
279 --- --- -- ---
270 --- --- -- ---
261 --- --- -- ---
258 --- --- -- ---
se results show that only the wooden plank type missile could be sustained in the air. It ports WCAP-7897, Chapter 5: Investigation of Some Specific Missiles which clearly states:
e results of Figure 3 indicate that objects with a CdA/W less than 0.012 ft2/lb will not be ained by the vertical wind even if injected above immediate obstructions. (Figure 3 is tained in WCAP-7897.)
to assume an infinite number of missiles, all with possible effective drag factors.
required thickness of a concrete element that will just be perforated by a missile is given by:
427 W ----------- V s 1.33 T = ---------------------
1.8 1000 f c D re:
T = Thickness of concrete element to be just perforated (inches)
W = Weight of missiles (pounds)
D = Diameter of missiles (inches)
Note: For irregularly shaped missiles, an equivalent diameter is used. The equivalent diameter is taken as the diameter of a circle with an area equal to the circumscribed contact, or projected frontal area, of the non-cylindrical missile.
Vs = Striking velocity of missile (ft/sec) fc = Compressive strength of concrete (psi) s formula is known as the Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL) formula as presented in erence 5.D-5.
thickness, tp, of a concrete element required to prevent perforation must be greater than T. It ecommended to increase T by 25 percent, but not more than 10 inches, to obtain the tp, uired to prevent perforation.
tp = 1.25T T + 10 (in inches) results obtained by using the above formula are presented in Table 5.D-5. The concrete iers furnished to protect systems and components necessary for safe shutdown exceed the uired thickness to prevent perforation by the missiles.
lling of concrete from the side opposite the impact surface of the element is considered as a ondary missile. For an estimate of the thickness that will just start spalling, it is recommended the following equation be used:
Ts = 2T re:
Ts = Concrete element thickness that will just start spalling (inches)
thickness, ts, of a concrete element required to prevent spalling must be greater than Ts. It is mmended to increase Ts by 25 percent, but not more than 10 inches, to prevent spalling.
ts = 1.25Ts Ts + 10 (in inches) results obtained by using the above formula are presented in Table 5.D-5.
BRL formula was selected after a thorough study of all available formulae in the literature for crete perforation and spalling due to missile impact. As with all other available formulae, the L formula represents an empirical expression based upon high velocity test data and was eloped for use in the high velocity range (i.e., missile impact velocity in excess of 1,000 ft/
. The range of missile velocities considered in a nuclear facility is generally below 500 ft/sec.
rder to provide a confidence margin for the lower velocity range, and to assure that barrier kness would exceed that at which perforation or spalling impends, the design thickness was eased.
t data on the impact of a one-inch diameter steel rod having a velocity from 150 ft/sec to 320 ec on concrete barriers of 3 inches, 6 inches and 9 inches in thickness indicate that these mulae provide conservative results for both concrete perforation and spalling in the velocity ge as stated. A summary of the test results is presented in Table 5.D-6.
rocedure for determining thickness of spalling is presented in Reference 5.D-4. The spalling cts on concrete wall due to the impacts of wooden plank and utility pole were investigated
, in both cases, no spalling of concrete wall was indicated. Therefore, the secondary missiles not considered credible.
thickness, ts, of a concrete element required to prevent spalling is more than the thickness, of a concrete element furnished in the cases of wooden plank and utility pole, as indicated in le 5.D-5. The thickness, ts, provides a simplified approach of determining a thickness required a concrete barrier to stop a missile. A margin of safety, an increase of 25% of the calculated es with an upper limit of 10 inches, is a logical safety factor against spalling or perforation is further reinforced by the test data presented in Figure 5.D-3. The formula used to rmine the thickness of spalling does not consider reinforcing steel which tends to reduce the unt of spalling. If ts is less than Tm, as in the case of 3 inch steel rod and 6 inch pipe, no itional analysis is required.
determine the thickness of spalling, the following formula is presented in Reference 5.D-4.
282 N W V 1.8 X max = ---------------------
1.8 1000 f c d
X 3 V max 13 C 3 = 0.877 W -
X max V 13 t initial = C 2 X max -----
Cs 1 13 t = --- T + 0.877 W + t initial - X max 8
re:
V = velocity of missile, ft/sec W = weight of missile, pounds T = target thickness, inches d = diameter of missile, inches fc = concrete strength, psi t(initial) = thickness of initial spall, inches N = nose factor = 0.845 for hemi-spherical nose C2 = coefficient from Figure 4.10 of Reference 5.D-4 Cs = dilational velocity in concrete = 9,800 ft/sec Xmax = concrete thickness to just perforate, inches By substituting the following values into the equations, the value of t, total thickness of all spalling, for the wooden plank and the utility pole was determined to be insignificant.
<parameter> Wooden Plank Utility Pole eight 105 pounds 1,500 pounds locity 280 fps 182 fps rget Thickness 12 inches 24 inches ameter of Missile 7.82 inches 13.5 inches ncrete Strength 3,000 psi 3,000 psi
-1 W. H. Hoecker, Jr., Three Dimensional Pressure Pattern of the Dallas Tornado and Some Resultant Implications, Monthly Weather Review, 89, 12, 533, 1961.
-2 D. F. Paddleford, Characteristics of Tornado Generated Missiles, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, WCAP-7897, April 1969.
-3 F. C. Bates and A. E. Swanson, Tornado Design Considerations for Nuclear Power Plants, ANS Transactions, November 1967.
-4 Industrial Engineering Study to Establish Safety Design Criteria for Use in Engineering of Explosive Facilities and Operations Wall Response, a Report Submitted to Process Engineering Branch, A.P.M.E.D. Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, N. J., Ammann & Whitney Consulting Engineers, April 1963.
-5 Topical Report: Design of Structures for Missile Impact, Bechtel Corporation, BC-TOP-9, Revision 1, July 1973.
-6 G. W. Reynolds, Report to Bechtel Power Corporation, August 29, 1973.
-7 R. C. Gwaltney, Missile Generation in Light Water Cooled-Power Reactor Plants, ORNL-NSIC-22, September 1968.
-8 D. A. Miller and W. A. Williams, Tornado Protection for the Spent Fuel Storage Pool, APED 5696, November 1968.
-9 E. M. Brooks, Quantitative Models of Wind Velocity Components in a Tornado Vortex, St. Louis University Report No. 1 to the U.S. Weather Bureau, 1957.
THE GROUND BY THE DESIGN TORNADO Elevation CdA/W 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.015 10 142 148 153 161 171 183 200 223 244 219 20 167 175 184 194 206 226 244 264 246 ---
30 194 203 214 226 241 259 278 279 238 ---
40 223 233 246 259 274 291 300 270 238 a ---
50 253 263 276 290 305 313 301 261 ---
60 283 294 307 317 327 321 290 258 (a) ---
70 312 322 333 339 336 313 279 ---
80 339 347 352 349 331 300 273 ---
90 361 364 360 346 318 290 271(a) 100 375 369 355 331 304 283 ---
110 377 363 341 316 294 280 ---
120 367 346 324 303 287 280 (a) 130 349 327 309 293 284 ---
140 330 312 298 287 283 (a) ---
150 311 298 290 285 ---
160 297 290 284 285(a) ---
170 287 283 283 (a) ---
180 279 280 ---
190 276 280(a) ---
200 275 ---
- a. Missile reached the condensation funnel at some elevation above the previous one.
TABLE 5.D-2 KINETIC ENERGY PER FT2 OF IMPACT AREA Max Impact Velocity Cd A/W (fps) At Elevation (ft) Kinetic Energy/Ft2 (lb/ft) 0.015 219 10 49,640 0.02 246 20 44,747 0.03 279 30 40,290 0.04 301 40 35,171 0.04 301 50 35,171 0.05 321 60 32,000 0.06 336 70 29,217 0.07 349 80 27,019 0.08 360 90 25,155 0.09 369 100 23,492 0.10 377 110 22,070 the last figures for elevations above 110 feet.
TABLE 5.D-3 RADIUS VS. VELOCITY FPS/MPH (D=0.882 PSI/V1 = 27 MPH)
RADIUS VELOCITY FPS VELOCITY MPH 1500 32.63 22.25 1400 33.75 23.01 1300 35.00 23.86 1200 36.39 24.81 1100 37.96 25.88 1000 39.76 27.11 900 41.85 28.53 800 44.29 30.20 700 47.22 32.20 600 50.83 34.65 500 55.40 37.77 400 61.48 41.92 300 127.30 86.80 290 133.15 90.78 280 139.39 95.04 270 146.05 99.58 260 153.15 104.42 250 160.71 109.58 240 168.74 115.05 230 177.22 120.83 220 186.14 126.91 210 195.43 133.25 200 204.97 139.75 190 214.57 146.29 180 223.90 152.66 170 232.49 158.52 160 239.58 163.35 150 244.08 166.42
RADIUS VELOCITY FPS VELOCITY MPH 140 244.40 166.63 130 238.39 162.53 120 223.34 152.27 110 196.44 133.93 100 156.08 106.41 90 104.68 71.37 80 52.23 35.61 70 15.07 10.27 60 1.45 .99 50 .01 .01 40 0 0 30 0 0 20 0 0 10 0 0 ere: D = 0.882 psi
= 27 mph
TABLE 5.D-4 RADIUS VS. VELOCITY FPS/MPH (D=3 PSI/V1 = 60 MPH)
RADIUS VELOCITY FPS VELOCITY MPH 1500 88.63 60.43 1400 91.59 62.45 1300 94.88 64.69 1200 98.54 67.19 1100 102.67 70.00 1000 107.35 73.19 900 112.74 76.87 800 119.03 81.16 700 126.50 86.25 600 135.56 92.42 500 146.86 100.13 400 161.49 110.10 300 446.95 304.74 290 440.56 300.38 280 430.85 293.76 270 417.34 284.55 260 399.52 272.40 250 376.98 257.03 240 349.39 238.22 230 316.68 215.92 220 279.11 190.30 210 237.44 161.89 200 193.06 131.63 190 148.07 100.96 180 105.24 71.75 170 67.63 46.11 160 37.97 25.89 150 17.73 12.09
RADIUS VELOCITY FPS VELOCITY MPH 140 6.40 4.36 130 1.60 1.09 120 .23 .16 110 .02 .01 100 0 0 90 0 0 80 0 0 70 0 0 60 0 0 50 0 0 40 0 0 30 0 0 20 0 0 10 0 0 ere: D = 3 psi
= 60 mph
Maximum Maximum Missiles Velocity (fps) Height (ft.) tp (in.) ts (in.) tm (in.)
oden Plank 280 60 6.5 13.0 12.0 lity Pole 182 10 14.0 28.1 24.0 nch Steel Rod 192 10 8.7 17.4 24.0 nch Pipe 98 10 5.1 10.1 24.0 inch Pipe - - - - -
Minimum concrete thickness furnished.
Missile Velocity Penetration Test Target Test Date Thickness Length Weight Electronic Movies Depth Volume Number (July) (inches) (feet) (lbs) (ft/sec) (ft/sec) (inches) (in3) Spalling 1 2 9 3 8.05 203 1.71 21 None 2 3 6 3 8.04 213 211 1.60 11.6 Small & cracks 3 3 3 3 8.05 218 213 Perforated 6.1/30.5 Maximum front/back travel of 144 ft.
4 4 6 3 8.05 220 214 1.98 17.4 Large & cracks 5 4 6 1.4 3.78 322 312 1.68 21.6 Moderate &
cracks 6 4 9 3* 8.01 235 ** 214 2.34 22 None 7 5 9 *** 3 8.04 217 216 1.84 19.9 None 8 5 6 3 8.04 150 151 1.23 7.6 Small & cracks
- Rounded end.
- Believed to be bad reading due to rounded missile end.
- No reinforcing in slab.
ind-field may be generated by using the experimental findings of Hoecker (1) in the Dallas nado of April 1954, which was expressed in mathematical form as a pressure-time profile as ows:
p = [1 - Exp(-0.755/t)] D for 7.6 to 37.9 seconds (1) p = [1 - Exp(-48.3/t3)] D for 0 to 7.6 seconds (2) ended only for all positive values of the time t) ere:
t = time of arrival D = total pressure drop in psf his publication it is clearly established that the distance from axis (R) varied from a radius of 0 ft at 37.9 seconds to 300 ft at 7.6 seconds, in other words for a translational velocity (V1) of mph. That is to say a relation between t and R is readily found as follows:
t = (R/V1) (3) refore equations 1 and 2 may be written in terms of radius as follows:
p = [1-Exp(-0.775V1/R)]D (4) p = [1-Exp(-48.3V31/R3)]D (5) wind cyclostrophic equation was defined in the same publication as dp/dR = V2/R (6) ere the partial differentiation of pressure to radius is equated to the mass density of the wind times the square of the tangential velocity (V) divided by the radius (R).
differentiating equations 4 and 5 it is found dp/dR = -[Exp(-0.755 V1/R)](0.755V1/R2)(D) (7) dp- = - Exp - 48.3 V3 R 3 144.9 V3 R 4 D
1 1 (8) dR substituting in equation 6 the following expressions are obtained which will relate tangential cities to radius.
2 2 V-
- Exp - 0.755 V1 R 0.755 V1 R D = ------ (9)
-R 2
3 3 3 4 V-
- Exp - 48.3 V1 R 144.9 V1 R D = ------ (10)
-R assigning a constant value of 0.075/g for the mass density of air and solving for V, the owing expressions are obtained:
Exp - 0.755 V1 R V1 D V = 18 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- (11)
R 3 3 3 Exp - 48.3 V1 R V1 D V = 249 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- (12) 3 R
s equation will give us the tangential velocities as a function of the radius. Equation 11 and 12 applied, first to the Dallas Tornado where D = 60 mb = 0.882 psi and V1 = 27 mph; then to the ign Tornado where D = 3 psi and V1 = 60 mph. The results are shown in Tables 5.50-3 and
-4.
ations 11 and 12 coverage where R* = 1,240 feet when both equations give a tangential city of about 97 ft/sec about 66 mph which could be taken as the initial wind velocity to be sidered at a radius of 1,240 feet. This will add some conservatism to our computations while iating the use of two equations.
ther words: Starting at 1,240 foot radius with 66 mph wind is more conservative than starting 00 foot radius with 75 mph winds, as done by WCAP 7897.
DIAL WIND VELOCITY radial component of the wind will be computed using the same expression as that of WCAP ept that the radius of 66 mph instead of 75 mph is chosen. So that:
1240 - R V 2 = - --------------------------- R 1240 - 300 ere 300 is the radius of the maximum tangential velocity.
vertical wind component will be taken as one third of the tangential as done previously.
V3 = 1/3(V1)
CONSERVATISM CONSERVATISM IN THE WINDFIELD
- a. Three (3) psi Total Pressure Drop The equation of maximum tangential velocity was presented as follows:
3 3 V t = 249 Exp - 48.3 V1 R V1 R D (1) ere:
V1 = translational velocity (fps)
D = total pressure drop (psf)
R = radius (ft)
Substituting R/V1 = t, Equation (1) becomes 1
V t = 249 D -------------------------
3
- (2) 48.3 t 3 e t The last term in Equation (2) maximizes at t = 3.64 seconds when its value is equal to 0.08727. Therefore:
V t max = 249 0.08727 D (3)
From Equation (3), we relate the maximum velocities to the total pressure drops.
ressure Drop Pressure Drop Maximum Tangential Maximum Tangential (psi) (psf) Velocity (fps) Velocity (mph) 0.50 72 184.4 126 1.00 144 260.8 178 1.50 216 319.4 218
(psi) (psf) Velocity (fps) Velocity (mph) 2.00 288 368.8 251 2.50 360 412.3 281 3.00 432 451.7 308 The tornado model, as described above, is applicable only to the Dallas Tornado as studied by Hoecker (Reference 5.D-1). Nevertheless, E. M. Brooks (Reference 5.D-9) submitted to the U.S. Weather Bureau a report in which he equated kinetic energy per unit volume to one-half the work done on the unit volume. He computed the following values:
ressure Drop (inches Hg) Pressure Drop (psi) Tangential Velocity (mph) 5 2.5 285 6 3.0 316 7 3.5 348 There is exceptionally good agreement between these figures and those previously presented. One set is computed by extrapolating experimental evidence, and the other is computed theoretically.
The 308 mph and the 3 psi are the result of extrapolating Hoeckers pressure profile which shows a good agreement with experiments. Therefore, the most important parameter, the tangential velocity, is validated by both experiment and theory.
The degree of conservatism of this windfield should be recognized since the pressure drops recorded are less than the 3 psi proposed here. Dr. Reynolds, in his report (Reference 5.D-6), stated, As far as I know, no pressure drop of as much as an inch of mercury (about 0.5 psi) has been officially recorded. Although unofficially made, spectacular atmospheric pressure measurements have been reported for tornadoes.
- b. Translational Velocity of 60 mph The conservatism of assuming a three (3) psi total pressure drop is presented above and shows that the maximum tangential velocity of 308 mph with respect to three (3) psi total pressure drop is obtained. The same tangential velocity can be obtained for tornadoes with various translational velocity by varying the radius of a tornado. If 60 mph translational velocity is used, as in the case for Millstone Unit 2, the maximum tangential velocity for a missile is more than that associated with 27 mph translational velocity, as in the case of the Dallas tornado. Therefore, the
Assume a flight parameter = 0.10 Height Tangential Velocity with 60 mph Tangential Velocity with 27 mph 10 142 142 20 167 214 30 194 276 40 223 296 50 253 285 60 283 276 70 312 273 80 339 ---
90 366 ---
110 377 ---
CONSERVATISM IN THE COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE Maximum velocity and height associated with a flight parameter are obtained from the following procedures:
- a. Relative Wind Velocity It has been customary for WCAP (Reference 5.D-2) and others to consider the relative wind velocity with respect to the velocity of the flying object in the following manner:
Cd A
- = ----------
X - --- V V - U x (4)
W 2 r x ere:
2 2 2 Vr = Vx - Ux + Vy + Uy + Vz - Uz Vx,y,z = Wind velocities in the three coordinates Vr = Relative wind velocity
X = Acceleration Cd = 1 A= Projected area of missile in flight W = Weight of missile
= Density of missile It should be apparent that, as the object reaches the wind velocities, not only will the terms in parentheses in Equation (4) decrease, but the value of Vr also will decrease.
- b. Asolute or Actual Wind Velocities It isn't quite clear that the relative velocity of the fluid should be used when the moving body is assumed to be immersed in the fluid propelling it. Gwaltney (Reference 5.D-7), when considering an object propelled by steam, uses the absolute or actual velocity of the steam in the following manner:
Cd A
- = ----------
X - --- V V - U x (5)
W 2 a x ere:
Va = Absolute wind velocity Va = (V2x + V2y + V2x)1/2 Here, the absolute or actual velocity of the wind obviously will increase to its actual maximum value irrespective of the missile velocity. Consequently, the accelerations are greater.
- c. Missile is Assumed to Stay in the Windfield In the windfield presented by WCAP, at a time when the tangential velocity increases and the radial velocity decreases rapidly, the missile may leave the windfield. An analysis shows that the velocity at which the missile leaves the windfield is less than that calculated above by assuming the missile stays in the windfield. Therefore, it is more conservative to assume a missile strikes a target at its maximum velocity while it is within a windfield.
CONSERVATISM IN FLIGHT PARAMETER
However, the governing parameter, as far as penetration is concerned, is a function of the weight, velocity, and impactive area of a missile.
P = f(W,V/A) (6) ere:
P = Penetration W = Weight of missile A = Impactive area This function in most penetration formulae can be identified as the energy/area ratio.
When a flying object is following a spiral trajectory, it is difficult to calculate its velocity unless a common area is used. Dr. Bates (Reference 5.D-3) produced what he called the effective area to solve this problem. Justification for using the effective area in our computation is as follows:
The important thing to consider here is the significance of assuming one area for the flight parameter (even if it is the effective area) and another for impact. This situation is maximized in the following table:
Effective area in flight Minimum Maximum area in flight Maximum area on bject>
area on impact impact nk 711,000 lb/ft 29,200 lb/ft le 771,500 lb/ft 30,800 lb/ft d 848,000 lb/ft 24,900 lb/ft nch Pipe 732,900 lb/ft 25,700 lb/ft inch Pipe 414,800 lb/ft 27,800 lb/ft It is hypothetical to consider that a missile can maintain its maximum projected area flight and strike a target with its minimum area. Therefore, it is indicated from the above table that the assumption of using effective area in flight and minimum area on impact is a very conservative approach.
CONSERVATISM IN THE MAXIMUM HEIGHT
damaging effect of a missile depends on its impactive velocity and not the height it may reach.
The heights reported for Millstone are those at which the missiles are traveling at their maximum velocities.
m the analyses, we indicated that only the wooden plank would attain such a height incident with the height of the missile proof siding. However, from a hypothetical viewpoint, uld a missile be assumed to enter the spent fuel pool area through the missile proof siding, the owing analysis is performed.
Energy Taken by Metal Siding The formula used to determine the energy (ft-lb) taken by metal siding is given by Reference 5.D-7.
DS W E = --------------- 16 000t + 1500 ------- t 2
(7) 46500 Ws ere:
D = Diameter of missile (inches)
S = Yield strength of target (lb/in²)
t = Target thickness (inches)
W/Ws = Window factor = length of square side between rigid supports/length of a standard width (4 inches)
Striking Velocity of Missile at Water Surface E = Ei - E, V1 = (2Er/m)1/2 (9) ere:
E = Residual energy of a missile Ei = Initial energy of a missile m = Mass of a missile Impactive Energy on Fuel Rack The method used to determine the impactive energy on fuel rack is given in Reference 5.D-8.
Ef 1 w V1 - H
= --------- ----------------- - 1 e w + 1 (10)
W w 2g re:
EF = Kinetic energy at fluid depth H W = Weight (lb)
Cd A 2 E = ----------- ft lb W
A = Projected area (ft2) w = Fluid density (lb/ft3)
Cd = Drag coefficient g = Gravity (ft/sec2)
H = Fluid depth (feet)
The assumed missile, namely the 1 inch rod with impactive energy of 4600 ft-lb, is analyzed with various possible trajectories entering the spent fuel pool through the missile-proof siding as shown in Figures 5.D.A-1 and 5.D.A-2.
By substituting the following values into Equation 7, D = 1 inches S = 50,000 lb/in2 t = 0.2092 inches W/Ws = 2 then 1.075 E = ------------- 700.234
+ 627.6
(11) cos cos 2 cos where = angle of entry as demonstrated in Figure 5.D.A-3.
Er, with corresponding angles of entry, , are given in Table 5.D.A-2A, from which the following summary is drawn:
(a) At 0 entry.
The assumed missile would have no direct impact on the fuel pool. Free falling of the assumed missile is less critical than the trajectories considered below.
(b) At 45 entry.
From Table 5.D.A-2A, the residual energy for the missile is equal to 1,120 ft-lb.
The missile velocity at impacting the water surface as obtained by Equation 9 is calculated to be 95 fps. Assuming the missile impacts with its minimum cross sectional area on the pool and travels vertically downward, the kinetic energy per pound impactive at the fuel rack is calculated from Equation 10 to be E÷W = 66 Therefore E = 66(8) = 528 ft-lb for the impactive area of the rod. The kinetic energy per impactive unit area thus obtained (528 ft-lb/0.785 in2 = 672.6 ft-lb/in²)
is the same as the design capability of fuel rack. The fuel racks are designed to withstand a fuel assembly weighing 1,300 pounds dropped from approximately 26 feet (assuming no drag resistance from the water). The resulting impactive energy thus obtained is approximately 33,800 ft-lb which when applied over an eight inch diameter area atop of the fuel rack gives the same impactive energy per unit area as the rod.
(c) At angles greater than 45.
The residual energy of the missile impacting the siding at angles greater than 45 is less than that discussed in Item b above. As indicated in Table 5.D.A-2A, the missile would not penetrate the missile proof siding at an angle of about 55 or greater.
therefore concluded that even if the missile could attain such a height as to enter the spent area through the missile proof siding, no possible damage to the fuel element could occur.
ATTACHMENT A TABLE 5.D.A-1A RELATIVE CONSERVATISM IN STEPS A, B, AND C Maximum Velocities (fps) Maximum Heights (feet)
F.P. (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) 0.10 250 323 377 40.7 79.9 194.8 0.09 243 314 369 36.8 74.4 181.2 0.08 236 303 360 30.0 69.0 166.8 0.07 229 291 349 28.2 61.8 150.1 0.06 220 278 336 23.7 54.6 131.4 0.05 209 262 321 18.8 45.7 110.5 0.04 196 243 301 13.3 35.6 86.7 0.03 180 220 279 7.8 24.4 59.1 0.02 159 189 246 2.1 11.4 27.8 0.015 144 170 219 0.005 4.9 6.16 Relative wind velocity.
Absolute wind velocity. Missile on own path.
Absolute wind velocity. Missile following windfield.
ATTACHMENT A TABLE 5.D.A-2A RESISTANCE ENERGY RESIDUAL ENERGY, Er ANGLE OF ENTRY BY SIDING, E (FT-LB) (FT-LB) 0 1430 3170 20 1670 2930 30 2060 2540 45 3480 1120 50 4460 140 55 6030 -
60 8720 -
ATTACHMENT A TABLE 5.D.A-3A RESISTANCE ENERGY RESIDUAL ENERGY, Er ANGLE OF ENTRY BY SIDING, E (FT-LB) (FT-LB) 0 1430 3170 20 1670 2930 30 2060 2540 45 3480 1120 50 4460 140 55 6030 -
60 8720 -
BLOWDOWN LOADS following codes provide the basis for the hydraulic forces acting on the structures during the cooled and two phase periods of blowdown.
TERHAMMER
- a. Description Fundamental to the determination of the mechanical loads during blowdown is the hydrodynamic solution of the fluid decompression. The major loads imposed on the reactor vessel internals occur during the subcooled period of decompression.
The digital computer program WATERHAMMER(1) is used to describe this subcooled response. The WATERHAMMER code is a digital computer program developed under contract to the AEC for use on the LOFT program. It is based on assumptions of one dimensionality and ignores fluid friction at the walls. These assumptions result in simplified forms of the equations of mass and momentum. These equations are transformed to their wave conjugate form and solved by the superposition method. Details of the method of solution are presented in Reference 1. The basic assumptions, which provide for convenient solution by the wave equations (Hookes law treatment of fluid properties and neglect of conservation of energy) limit the extent of applicability of the solution to subcooled fluid conditions only.
- b. Reference
- 1. 65-28-RA, EARLY BLOWDOWN (WATERHAMMER) ANALYSIS FOR LOSS OF FLUID TEST FACILITY, by Stanislav Fabic, dated June 1965 and revised April 1967.
FLASH-4
- a. Description CEFLASH-4, is employed to provide information during the Two-phase transition period.
CEFLASH-4 is a C-E modified version of the FLASH-4 (1) code. This code, as shown in References 2 and 3, has demonstrated applicability for the two-phase transient. It is a multinode-multiflowpath code which simultaneously solves the finite difference form of the equations of mass, momentum, and energy conservation in conjunction with tabularized values of the fluid properties. The numerical solution technique employs a backward difference integration scheme which leads to numerically stable results for the depressurization predictions.
periods of blowdown.
- b. References
- 1. WAPD-TM-840, FLASH-4: A FULLY IMPLICIT FORTRAN IV PROGRAM FOR THE DIGITAL SIMULATION OF TRANSIENTS IN A REACTOR PLANT, by T. A. Porsching, J. H. Murphy, J. A. Redfield, and V. C. Davis, dated March 1969.
- 2. CENPD-26, Combustion Engineering Report, Description of Loss-of-Coolant Calculational Procedures, August 1971 (Proprietary).
- 3. CENPD-42, Combustion Engineering Report, Topical Report on Dynamic Analysis of Reactor Vessel Internals Under Loss-of-Coolant Accident Conditions With Application of Analysis to CE 800 Mwe Class Reactors, August 1972 (Proprietary).
REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS following codes were used in the analysis of the reactor vessel internals.
I/STARDYNE
- a. Description and Assumptions The program uses the finite-element method for the static and dynamic analyses of two and three dimensional solid structures subjected to any arbitrary static or dynamic loading or base acceleration. In addition, initial displacements and velocities may be considered.
The physical structure to be analyzed is modeled with finite elements which are interconnected by nodes. Each element is constrained to deform in accordance with an assumed displacement field that is required to satisfy continuity across element interfaces.
The displacement shapes are evaluated at nodal points. The equations relating the nodal point displacements and their associated forces are called the element stiffness relations and are a function of the element geometry and its mechanical properties. The stiffness relations for an element are developed on the basis of the theorem of minimum potential energy. Masses and external forces are assigned to the nodes. The general solution procedure of the program is to formulate the total assemblage stiffness matrix [K] and apply it to either of the following equations:
[k] () = (p) (1)
W2[m](q) - [k](q) = 0 (2)
() = the nodal displacement vector (p) = the applied nodal forces
[m] = the max matrix w = the natural frequencies (q) = the normal modes Equation (1) applies during a static analysis which yields the nodal displacements and finite elements internal forces. Equation (2) applies during an eigenvalue/eigenvector analysis, which yields the natural frequencies and normal modes of the structural system.
Using the natural frequencies and normal modes together with related mass and stiffness characteristics of the structure, appropriate equations of motion may be evaluated to determine structural response to a prescribed dynamic load.
The finite element used to date in CE analyses is the elastic beam member. The assumptions governing its use are as follows: small deformation, linear-elastic behavior, plane sections remain plane, no coupling of axial, torque and bending, geometric and elastic properties constant along length of element.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications The program is used to obtain the response of the reactor vessel internals due to prescribed seismic excitation. The structural components are modeled with beam elements. The geometric and elastic properties of these elements are calculated such that they are dynamically equivalent to the original structures. The response analysis is then conducted using both model response spectra and modal time history techniques. Both methods are compatible with the program.
- c. Reference MRI/STARDYNE-Static and Dynamic Structural Analysis System: User Information Model, Control Data Corporation, June 1, 1970.
HSD
- a. Description and Assumptions The program uses a finite-element technique for the dynamic analysis of complex axisymmetric structures subjected to any arbitrary static or dynamic loading or base acceleration. The three-dimensional axisymmetric continuum is represented either as an axisymmetric thin shell or as a solid of revolution, or as a combination of both. The axisymmetric shell is discreted as a series of frustums of cones and the solid revolution as triangular or quadrilateral toroids connected at their nodal circles.
all consistent with the assumed displacement field. To minimize computer storage and execution time, the non-diagonal consistent mass matrix is diagonalized by adding off-diagonal terms to the appropriate diagonal terms. These equations of motion are solved numerically in time domain by a direct step-by-step integration procedure.
The assumptions governing the axisymmetric thin shell finite element representation of the structure are those consistent with linear orthotropic thin elastic shell theory.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications ASHSD is used to obtain the dynamic response of the CSB/TS system due to a LOCA. An axisymmetric thin shell model of the structure is developed. The spatial Fourier series components of the time varying LOCA loads are applied to the modeled structure. The program yields the dynamic shell and beam mode response of the structural system.
- c. Reference Ghosh, S., Wilson, E. L., Dynamic Stress Analysis of Axisymmetric Structures Under Arbitrary Loading, Report Number EERC 69-10, U. of California, Berkeley, September, 1969.
S/STRUDL - II
- a. Description and Assumptions The ICES/STRUDL-II computer program provides the ability to specify characteristics of problems - framed structures and three-dimensional solid structures, perform analyses -
static and dynamic, and reduce and combine results.
Analytic procedures in the pertinent portions of ICES/STRUDL-II apply to framed structures. Framed structures are two or three dimensional structures composed of slender, linear members which can be represented by properties along a centroidal axis. Such a structure is modeled with joints, including support joints, and members connecting the joints. A variety of force conditions on members or joints can be specified. The member stiffness matrix is computed from beam theory. The total stiffness matrix of the modeled structure is obtained by appropriately combining the individual member stiffnesses.
The stiffness analysis method of solution treats the joint displacements as unknowns. The solution procedure provides results for joints and members. Joint results include displacements and reactions and joint loads as calculated from member end forces.
Member results are member end forces and distortions. The assumptions governing the beam element representation of the structure are as follows: linear, elastic, homogeneous, and isotropic behavior, small deformations, plane sections remain plane, and no coupling of axial, torque and bending.
The program is used to obtain stiffness properties of lower support structure and upper guide structure grid beams due to transverse loads. The results of the analyses are incorporated into overall reactor vessel internals models, which calculate the dynamic response due to seismic and LOCA conditions. These latter results, at a given time, are fed back into the grid beam models to yield dynamic stresses.
- c. Reference ICES/STRUDL-II, The Structural Design Language: Engineering User's Manual, Volume I, Structures Division and Civil Engineerings Systems Laboratory, Department of Civil Engineering, MIT, Second Edition, June, 1970.
OCK
- a. Description and Assumptions The computer program SHOCK solves for the response of structures which can be represented by lumped-mass and spring systems and are subjected to a variety of arbitrary type loadings. This is done by numerically solving the differential equations of motion for an nth degree of freedom system using the Runge-Kutta-Gill or a specialized Newmark integration technique. The equations of motion can represent an axially responding system or a laterally responding system; i.e., an axial motion, or a coupled lateral and rotational motion. The program is designed to handle a large number of options for describing load environments and includes such transient conditions as time-dependent forces and moments, initial displacements and rotations, and initial velocities. Options are also available for describing steady-state loads, preloads, accelerations, gaps, and nonlinear elements.
The output from the code consists of minimum and maximum values of translational and angular accelerations, forces, shears and moments for the problem time range. In addition, the above quantities are presented for all printout times requested. Plots can also be obtained for displacements, velocities and accelerations as desired.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications The program is used to obtain the transient response of the reactor vessel internals due to LOCA loads. Lateral and vertical lumped-mass and spring models of the internals are formulated.
Various types of springs - linear, compression only, tension only, or nonlinear springs - are used to represent the structural components. Thus, judicious use of load-deflection characteristics enables effects of components impacting to be predicted. Transient loading appropriate to the horizontal and vertical directions is applied at mass points and a dynamic response - displacements and internals forces - is obtained.
Gabrielson, V. K., SHOCK - A computer Code For Solving Lumped-Mass Dynamic Systems, SCL-DR-65-34, January, 1966.
MMSOR-DYNASOR
- a. Description and Assumptions SAMMSOR-DYNASOR provides the ability to perform nonlinear dynamic analyses of shell structures represented by axisymmetric finite-elements and subjected to arbitrarily varying load configurations.
The program employs the matrix displacement method of structural analysis utilizing a curved shell element. Geometrically nonlinear dynamic analyses can be conducted using this code.
Stiffness and mass matrices for shells of revolution are generated utilizing the SAMMSOR part of this code. This program accepts a description of the structure in terms of the coordinates and slopes of the nodes and the properties of the elements joining the nodes. Utilizing the element properties, the structural stiffness and mass matrices are generated for as many as twenty harmonics and stored on magnetic tape. The DYNASOR portion of the program utilizes the output tape generated by SAMMSOR as input data for the respective analyses.
The equations of motion of the shell are solved in DYNASOR using Houbolts numerical procedure with the nonlinear terms being moved to the right-hand side of the equilibrium equations and treated as generalized pseudo-loads. The displacements and stress resultants can be determined for both symmetrical and asymmetrical loading conditions.
Asymmetrical dynamic buckling can be investigated using this program. Solutions can be obtained for highly nonlinear problems utilizing as many as five circumferential Fourier harmonics.
- b. Extent of Programs Application This program is used to analyze the dynamic buckling characteristics of the core support barrel during a LOCA hot-leg break. The programs nonlinear characteristics provide this capability.
A finite element model of the CSB is formulated which is consistent with the computer program. Taking into account the initial deviation of the structure and the shell mode which is most likely to give the minimum critical pressure, the time-dependent pressure load is applied to the barrel. The maximum displacement occurring in the barrel is obtained. This result is used as a basis for an overload analysis to satisfy ASME Code requirements.
Tillerson, J. R. and Haisler, W. E., SAMMSOR II - A Finite Element Program to Determine Stiffness and Mass Matrices of Shells of Revolution, Texas A&M University, TEES-RPT-70-18, October, l970.
Tillerson, J. R. and Haisler, W. E., DYNASOR II - A Finite Element Program for the Dynamic Non-Linear Analysis of Shells or Revolution, Texas A&M University, TEES-RPT-70-19, October, 1970.
- a. Description and Assumptions The program performs finite element static analyses of axisymmetric solids. The continuous body to be analyzed is replaced by a system of ring elements with triangular or quadrilateral cross sections. The elements are interconnected at their apexes which are referred to as nodes. The displacement method of finite element analysis is used to derive the element stiffness matrix. This method proceeds by selecting a displacement expansion over the element, consistent with elemental boundary conditions, and assuming displacements in the interior of the element depend only on nodal quantities. The elemental stiffness matrices are computed and combined to yield the total stiffness matrix of the modeled structure. The principle of minimum potential energy is then applied to yield displacements and elemental forces (stresses). Since these elements are of relative arbitrary shape, the procedure can be applied to bodies of complex geometry. The program performs static analyses due to both boundary forces and thermal loads by converting these effects into equivalent nodal quantities.
Assumptions governing the use of the aforementioned finite elements are those consistent with linear elasticity theory of solid structures.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications and Assumptions The program is employed to determine the stiffness properties of flanged regions as related to axisymmetric loads. Specifically, the CSB upper and lower flanges with connecting cylinders and the UGSP flange with connecting cylinder were analyzed.
Displacements due to a known external load were determined. The resulting stiffnesses were incorporated into an overall model of the reactor vessel internals, which were employed in determining the dynamic response during vertical seismic and LOCA excitation. The results of the dynamic analyses were fed back into the flange analyses to determine their maximum stresses and deformations.
Instrumentation flanges, which are used as primary pressure boundaries were analyzed with the subject program to determine their acceptability with respect to ASME Section III criteria.
Wilson, E. L., Jones, R. M., Finite Element Stress Analysis of Orthotropic, Temperature-Dependent Axisymmetric Solids of Revolution, Aerospace Report Number TR-0158 (S3816-22)-1, September, 1967.
OS
- a. Description and Assumptions The program applies the finite element analysis to axisymmetric solids subjected to arbitrary nonaxisymmetric loadings by expanding the various kinematic and forcing functions into Fourier series.
The continuous body to be analyzed is replaced by a system of ring elements with triangular or quadrilateral cross sections and/or thin conical shell elements. The elements are interconnected at their apexes and ends (for the case shell elements) which are referred to as nodes. The displacement method of finite element analysis is used to derive the element stiffness matrices. This method proceeds by selecting a displacement expansion over the elements, consistent with elemental boundary conditions and assuming displacements in the interior of the element depend only on nodal quantities. The elemental stiffness matrices are computed and then combined to yield the total stiffness matrix of the modeled structure. The principle of minimum potential energy is then applied to obtain displacements and element forces (stresses). The program performs static analyses due to both boundary forces and thermal loads by converting these effects into equivalent nodal quantities. Since the elements employed are of relatively arbitrary shape, the procedure can be applied to bodies of complex geometry.
Assumptions governing the aforementioned analyses are those consistent with linear elasticity theory of solids and thin shell structures.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications The program is employed to determine the stiffness properties of flanged regions due to lateral loads. Specifically, the CSB upper and lower flanges with connecting cylinders and the UGSP flange with connecting cylinders were analyzed for lateral shear and bending moment loads. Displacements due to known magnitudes of these loads were determined.
The resulting stiffnesses were incorporated into overall models of the reactor vessel internals which were employed in determining the dynamic response during horizontal seismic and LOCA excitation.
The results of the dynamic analysis were fed back into the flange analyses to determine maximum stresses and deformations.
- c. Reference
California, Berkeley, California, June, 1967.
C/EASE
- a. Description and Assumptions The EAC/EASE computer program provides static structural analyses of linear, three-dimensional systems subjected to sets of arbitrarily prescribed mechanical and thermal loads and displacement boundary conditions. The analysis used in the program is an application of the direct stiffness method.
As the first step, the actual system is approximated by an assemblange of discrete structural elements interconnected at a finite number of points called nodes. The behavior of the discretized structure is an approximation to the response of the real system.
Next, each element is constrained to deform in accordance with an assumed displacement field that is required to satisfy continuity across element interfaces. The displacement shapes are evaluated at convenient locations within the element (usually at points on element boundaries), and their amplitudes are sometimes called generalized coordinates.
The equations relating generalized coordinates and their associated forces are called the element stiffness relations and are a function of the element geometry and its mechanical properties. The stiffness relations for an element are developed on the basis of a governing variational principle, the theorem of minimum potential energy.
The complete stiffness of the discretized structure is obtained in the following manner:
The element equations are combined into the system equations using the requirement that the summation of all internal forces contributed from those elements common to a particular node must be equal to the externally applied load at that joint. The resulting set of equations (appropriately modified for displacement boundary conditions) represent the equilibrium equations for the discretized structure connected only at the joints.
The solution of the equilibrium equations results in six displacement components at each node arising from the loads applied to the system. Having defined the displacements at all nodes in the system, the internal stresses are calculated from displacements for each element in the structure.
The elements used to model structures are the triangular plate membrane and bending elements. The stiffness relations for the elements are developed according to the following assumptions: small deformations, linear-elastic isotropic behavior, uniform element thickness, negligible through-the-thickness stress, normals to the original mid-surface do not distort and remain normal to the deflected mid-surface (applies to plate bending element).
The program is used to perform thermal stress analysis of the core shroud. A symmetrical section of the core shroud is modeled with triangular plate membrane and bending elements. The thermal load is applied by specifying temperatures at each of the nodal points. The results of the analysis are compared to stress criteria defined in Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
- c. Reference EAC/EASE - Elastic Analysis for Structural Engineering: User's Information Manual, Control Data Corporation, April, 1971.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM computer programs that were used in the dynamic seismic analysis of the reactor coolant em components, as discussed in Section 4.A.2.3, Appendix 4.A, of the FSAR, include:
S/STRUDL-11
- a. Description and Assumptions The ICES/STRUDL-II computer program provides the ability to specify characteristics of problems - framed structures and three-dimensional solid structures, perform analyses -
static and dynamic, and reduce and combine results.
Analytic procedures in the pertinent portions of ICES/STRUDL-II apply to framed structures. Framed structures are two or three dimensional structures composed of linear members which can be represented by properties along a centroidal axis. Such a structure is modeled with joints, including support joints, and members connecting the joints. A variety of force conditions on members or joints can be specified. The member stiffness matrix of the modeled structure is obtained by appropriately combining the individual member stiffnesses.
Masses may be specified for selected joint degrees-of-freedom represented in the total stiffness matrix. The total stiffness matrix is then condensed to yield a dynamic stiffness matrix in which only those joint degree-of-freedom for which mass is specified are retained. Using the (condensed) dynamic stiffness matrix and the associated diagonal mass matrix, an eigenvalue solution is performed by a diagonalization process (Jocobi's method) to yield the natural frequencies and mode shapes corresponding to the free vibrations of the structure.
Using the total stiffness matrix, the program will also solve the general statics problem to yield influence coefficients which relate member end forces and moments and support reactions to unit displacement imposed, in turn, at each of a designated group of joint degrees-of-freedom. In addition, the program will condense the total stiffness matrix to
corresponding to selected degrees-of-freedom of a second group of designated joints.
The stiffness analysis method of solution used in STRUDL treats the joint displacements as unknowns. The solution procedure provides results for joints and members. Joint results include displacements and reactions and joint loads as calculated from member end forces. Member results are member end loads and distortions. The assumptions governing the beam element representation of the structure are as follows: linear, elastic, homogeneous, and isotropic behavior, small deformations, plane sections remain plane, and no coupling of axial, torque and bending.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used to define the dynamic characteristics of the structural models used in the dynamic seismic analyses of the reactor coolant system components. The natural frequencies and mode shapes of the structural models and the influence coefficients which relate member end forces and moments and support reactions to unit displacements are calculated. The influence coefficients are calculated for each dynamic degree-of-freedom of each mass point and for each degree-of-freedom of each support point at which relative motion is imposed. In addition, stiffness coefficients are calculated which relate the forces corresponding to those joint degree-of-freedom for which mass is specified to the imposed displacements corresponding to those (support) joint degrees-of-freedom at which relative motion will be specified during subsequent seismic response calculations. As appropriate, these data are stored for later use in response spectra or time-history seismic response calculations (see Appendix 4.A of the FSAR).
- c. Reference ICES/STRUDL-II, The Structural Design Language: Engineering User's Manual, Volume I, Structures Division and Civil Engineering's Systems Laboratory, Department of Civil Engineering, MIT, Second Edition, June, 1970.
CALC
- a. Description and Assumptions Using normal mode theory and Newmarks Beta-Method, with Beta equal to 1/6, the C-E computer program TMCALC solves the differential equations of motion which represents the dynamic characteristics of a singly or multiply supported, multi-degree-of-freedom linear structural system subjected to seismic excitations. The program provides for separate, time-dependent, inputs at each support point at which relative motion produced by the seismic event may be imposed. In the step-by-step numerical integration process (Newmark's Beta-Method) employed by TMCALC, the time step selected is less than one-tenth of the period of the highest frequency mode.
- 1. Output from STRUDL:
- a. frequencies,
- b. mode shapes,
- c. stiffness coefficients which relate mass point degree-of-freedom forces to support point degree-of-freedom (relative) displacements.
- 2. Digitized time histories which describe the seismic event in terms of time-dependent motion imposed at the support points of the structural system. These consist of time histories of absolute accelerations at the reference support point of the system and corresponding time histories of relative displacements at all nonreference support points at which relative motion is imposed (see Appendix 4.A of the FSAR).
The output from TMCALC consists of complete time histories of absolute accelerations, relative velocities and relative displacements corresponding to each dynamic degree-of-freedom of each of the mass points of the structural system.
These data are calculated at each point in time during the integration process for the entire duration of the seismic event.
The formulation of the program assumes linear elastic behavior of the structure and a linear variation in accelerations over an integration time step.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used to calculate the dynamic response of structural models used in the dynamic seismic analysis of the reactor coolant system components. These data include time histories of absolute accelerations, relative velocities and relative displacements corresponding to each dynamic degree-of- freedom of the structural system. The data are stored for use in subsequent seismic response calculations.
- c. References
- 1. Przemieniecki, J. S., Theory of Matrix Structural Analysis, Chapter 13, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, New York, 1968.
- 2. Hurty, W. C., and Rubinstein, M. F., Dynamics of Structures, Chapter 8, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964.
- 3. Newmark, N. M., A Method of Computation for Structural Dynamics, Volume 3, Journal of Engineering Mechanics Division, A.S.C.E., July, 1959.
- a. Description and Assumptions The formulation of the computer program FORCE assumes a linear elastic structural system modeled as a three-dimensional assemblage of joints, or modes, which are interconnected by elastic structural elements or members. The program calculates a discrete time history of the loads, forces and moments, at each designated member end and the reactions at each designated support joint, induced by specified seismic conditions (see Section 4.A.2.3.4, Appendix 4.A of the FSAR). The program selects the maximum absolute values of each component of load at each member end and at each support joint, and the times at which the maximum values occur, over the entire duration of the specified seismic event.
As input, the program FORCE uses a matrix of influence coefficients calculated by ICES/
STRUDL-II, the dynamic response of the structure, i.e., the time history of relative displacements corresponding to each mass joint degree-of-freedom, as calculated by the program TMCALC, and the time histories of relative displacements prescribed for each support joint degree-of-freedom for the seismic event under consideration. With this input, the program FORCE forms appropriate linear combinations of the time-dependent relative displacements to yield a complete loads analysis of the deformed shape of the structure at each point in time over the entire duration of the seismic event.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used to calculate the time-dependent response of the reactor coolant system components to specified seismic conditions.
- c. References Przemieniecki, J. S., Theory of Matrix Structural Analysis, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, New York, l968.
AKE
- a. Description and Assumptions The computer program SHAKE performs a normal mode response spectrum analysis of a three-dimensional linear elastic structural system modeled as an assemblage of joints, or modes, which are interconnected by elastic structural elements, or members. In the formulation, mass is assumed lumped at selected joints, each of which may have up to three translational dynamic degrees-of-freedom.
Input to SHAKE consists of frequencies and mode shapes, corresponding to each normal mode of vibration of the structure, the relevant diagonal mass matrix, and the response spectrum value, acceleration, corresponding to the period of each normal mode. The
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program SHAKE is used to calculate the dynamic response, modal inertial loads, for the reactor coolant system components in those cases where spectrum analysis is applied (see Appendix 4.A of the FSAR). In turn, the modal inertial loads are applied to the structure, mode-by-mode, using the ICES/STRUDL-II program, which calculates the member end loads and support joint reactions for each mode, and combines the modal values to give the total response to the specified seismic event.
- c. References Hurty, W. C., and Rubinstein, M. F., Dynamics of Structures, Prentice Hall, Inc.,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - STATIC STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS C-21
- a. Description and Assumptions The program is designed to compute the reactions and stresses in complex piping systems, including closed-loop configurations, due to thermal expansion and contraction; pressure effects; concentrated loads such as valves, fittings and fixtures; and uniform loads such as weight. The computational method is a tensor analysis treatment of Castiglianos theorem and assumes linear elastic behavior.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used extensively to calculate the loads which act on the components and supports of the reactor coolant system for the various operating conditions. The calculated loads are included in the equipment specifications and, subsequently, used in the design calculations performed for the individual components.
- c. References
- 1. J. A. Olson and R. V. Cramer, Pipe Flexibility Analysis Program MEL21, Report Number 10-66, Rev. 1, A Modification of Program MEC21S, San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyard, Mare Island Site, Vallejo, California, August 26, 1969.
- 2. J. A. Olson and R. V. Cramer, Pipe Flexibility Analysis Program MEC21S, Report Number 35-65, San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California, November 22, 1965.
New Mexico, July 14, 1964.
ASME SECTION III, CLASS I COMPONENTS following programs were used to determine stresses in ASME Section III, Class I ponents.
- a. Description and Assumptions The program performs finite element static analyses of axisymmetric solids. The continuous body to be analyzed is replaced by a system of ring elements with triangular or quadrilateral cross sections. The elements are interconnected at the apexes which are referred to as nodes. The displacement method of finite element analysis is used to derive the element stiffness matrix. This method proceeds by selecting a displacement expansion over the element, consistent with elemental boundary conditions, and assuming displacements in the interior of the element depend only on nodal quantities. The elemental stiffness matrices are computed and combined to yield the total stiffness matrix of the modeled structure. The principle of minimum potential energy is then applied to yield displacements and elemental forces (stresses). Since these elements are of relative arbitrary shape, the procedure can be applied to bodies of complex geometry. The program performs static analyses due to both boundary forces and thermal loads by converting these effects into equivalent nodal quantities.
Assumptions governing the use of the aforementioned finite elements are those consistent with linear elasticity theory of solid structures.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used to determine stresses in the primary head-tube sheet-secondary shell regions of the steam generators.
- c. References Wilson, E. L., Jones, R. M., Finite Element Stress Analysis of Orthotropic, Temperature-Dependent Axisymmetric Solids of Revolution, Aerospace Report Number TR-0158 (S3816-22)-1, September, 1967.
AL SHELL - 2
- a. Description and Assumptions
properties. Thickness, radii of curvature, applied surface loads, temperature and material properties may vary along the generating curve of the shell, but not around its circumference. Circumferential uniformly distributed, line-loads and moments can be applied. In the formulation, the stiffness matrix is calculated from strain energy considerations by use of the principal of virtual work. Thick shell effects are included by using known results from the theory of beams to determine the appropriate contribution to the strain energy from the normal stress and shear deflections.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications The program is used to determine stresses and deformations in various axially-symmetric regions of Class I components.
- c. References Seal-Shell-2-A Computer Program for the Stress Analysis of a Thick Shell of Revolution with Axisymmetric Pressures, Temperatures, and Distributed Loads, by C. M. Friedrich, WAPD-TM-398, UC-38: Engineering and Equipment, TID-4500, 24th Edition.
ALYSIS OF AXISYMMETRIC SOLIDS
- a. Description and Assumptions The finite element method is applied to the determination of stresses and displacements in axisymmetric solids of arbitrary geometry subjected to thermal and mechanical loadings.
The formulation is based upon energy principals and assumes linear elastic, isotropic materials.
- b. Extent of Program's Application The program is applied in the analysis of the regions of reactor vessel-to-vessel head bolted closure, and other axisymmetric regions of Class I components.
- c. References E. L. Wilson, Analysis of Axisymmetric Solids, University of California, February, 1967.
N - 12100
- a. Description and Assumptions The CE computer program WIN-12100 is a general purpose thermal analysis program which determines transient and steady-state temperature distributions in physical systems.
temperature transients at the boundaries. The formulation of the program is based upon the general finite difference equation of heat flow which is solved by relaxation techniques.
Provisions are included to accommodate radiation, convection and conduction modes of heat transfer and to include internal heat generation.
- b. Extent of Program's Application The program is used extensively to determine the temperature distributions which are subsequently used in stress analysis of Class I components.
- c. References Computer Program Number WIN - 12100, Heat Transfer by Relaxation, T. R.
McCormack, Combustion Engineering, Inc., Windsor, Connecticut, 1968.
Stanley Hellman, George Habetler and Harold Babrov, Use of Numerical Analysis in Transient Solution of Two-Dimensional Heat Transfer Problems with Natural and Forced Convection, ASME Transactions, 1956.
P
- a. Description and Assumptions The program uses finite element techniques in obtaining numerical solutions to the general, three-dimensional, time-dependent differential equation of heat conduction. The formulation is general with respect to geometry, material properties and boundary conditions, permitting the solution of complex transient and steady-state heat transfer problems.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used to obtain temperature distributions in the reactor coolant pump case-cover assembly for subsequent use in stress analysis.
- c. References Peterson, F. E., Hui, H., Three Dimensional Transient Heat Transfer Using a Finite Element Procedure, Theoretical Basis and Sample Solutions, Engineering/Analysis Corporation, 1611 South Pacific Coast Highway, Redondo Beach, California, August, 1971.
LIDS II
- a. Description and Assumptions
accommodates both axisymmetric and non-axisymmetric loadings. The formulation assumes linear elastic behavior of materials.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used to determine both thermal and mechanical stresses in the axisymmetric regions of the reactor coolant pumps.
- c. References Crose, J. C. and Jones, R. M. Finite Element Stress Analysis of Axisymmetric and Plane Solids with Different Orthotropic, Temperature-Dependent Material Properties in Tension and Compression, TR-0059(56816-53)-1, The Aerospace Corporation, San Bernardino, California, June 1971.
- a. Description and Assumptions The program is a general purpose, three-dimensional, finite element formulation for the analysis of elastic structures of arbitrary shape sustaining arbitrary loadings and temperature distributions. The program BJS was adapted from the program SAP (September 1970 version) by the Engineering/Analysis Corporation, 1611 South Pacific Coast Highway, Redondo Beach, California for the Byron Jackson Pump Division, Borg-Warner Corporation, P. O. Box 2017, Terminal Annex, Los Angeles, California. The program assumes linear elastic behavior of materials and runs on the CDC-6600 Computer System.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used for stress analysis of the reactor coolant pump casings.
- c. References BJS A First Generation Three Dimensional Finite Element Computer Program for the Analysis of Structures of Arbitrary Geometry, Byron Jackson Pump Division, Borg-Warner Corporation, P. O. Box 2017, Terminal Annex, Los Angeles, California.
Wilson, E. L., SAP A General Structural Analysis Program, Structural Engineering Laboratory, University of California, Berkley, California (September 1970).
CLASS I PIPING SYSTEM following codes are used in the analysis of the Class I piping systems.
- a. Description and Assumptions Refer to Section II, Reactor Vessel Internals, of this question.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications program is used to obtain the responses of Class I piping system using three-dimensional del. The model response spectrum technique is used to compute forces, moments and lacements at each point specified in the piping system.
LPIPE
- a. Description and Assumption The program provides an elastic analysis of redundant piping systems subjected to thermal, static and dynamic loads. The system may contain a number of sections, a section being defined as a sequence of straight and/or curved members lying between two points.
The basic approach to be used in computing the response of piping systems to ground spectra consists of generating the dynamic properties of the system and applying the modal super-position method or normal mode method to obtain the structural response.
The two eigenvalve routines used in ADLPIPE are the Jocobi rotation scheme and the Givens-Householder scheme; the later has been modified to incorporate a suggestion made by Wilkinson.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used to obtain the modal responses of Class I piping by the response spectrum technique.
- c. References
- 1. Greenstadt, J., The Determination Characteristic Roots of a Matrix by the Jocobi Method, John Wiley, New York, 1959.
- 2. Wilkinson, The Algebraic Eigenvalve Problem.
PPIE II
- a. Description and Assumptions
being defined as a sequence of straight and/or curved members lying between two points.
The basic approach to be used in computing the response of piping systems to ground spectra consists of generating the dynamic properties of the system and applying the modal super-position method or normal mode method to obtain the structural response.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used to structurally analyze Class I piping systems. It performs static analysis as well as obtains modal responses by the modal analysis response spectra method and dynamic response to time history loads using the time history modal superposition method.
. CLASS I STRUCTURES following codes were used in the dynamic analysis of the Class I Structures.
309 STRESS
- a. Description and Assumption STRESS (Structural Engineering Systems Solver) is a programming system for the solution of structural engineering problems. It was originally developed at M.I.T. in 1964 and intended for IBM-7094 application. In 1968 Bechtel implemented the program into GE-600 Series. The program is capable of executing a large variety of structural problems in two or three dimensional structures with different joint conditions. The program is primarily used to obtain the stiffness characteristics of a structure. Stiffness matrix of the structure obtained is used in the dynamic analysis.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications The program is used to obtain the stiffness matrix of the containment structure and containment internal structures.
- c. Reference Fenves, S. J., Logcher, R. D., and Mauch, S. P., STRESS Reference Manual, The M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964.
611 TIME-HISTORY ANALYSIS
- a. Description and Assumptions
program is to formulate the equation of motion of the structure in terms of its mode shapes, frequencies and mass distribution as follows:
qj + 2Bjwjqj + Wj2qj = -FjUg (j=1,2....N) re:
N = member of modes q = generalized coordinates B = modal damping w = frequency T
Fj = ------------- M Mj
[Ø] = mode shape matrix
[M] = mass matrix M = mass Ug = input acceleration The above equation is solved using Runge-Kutta method.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used to generate acceleration time history at all Class I equipment locations in the containment, auxiliary building (including warehouse portion), turbine building and intake structure.
- c. References Hildebrand, F. B., Introduction to Numerical Analysis, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956.
Kuo, S. S., Numerical Methods and Computers, Addition Wesley Publishing Company, 1965.
Hurty, W. C., Rubinstein, M. F., Dynamics of Structures, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964.
Biggs, J. M., Introduction to Structural Dynamics, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964.
- a. Description and Assumptions The program provides a means for obtaining the natural frequencies, w, and modes shapes,
Ø, of structural models. The structural input consists of the models lumped masses and either the stiffness or flexibility matrix. If the flexibility matrix is entered, the program provides an option for automatic inversion to a stiffness matrix.
The program uses the method of diagonalization by successive rotations. A detailed description of the method can be found in Engineering Analyses, A Survey of Numerical Procedures, by S. Crandall, published by the McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1966.
The modes shapes can be printed out on an optional basis for normalization such that either [Ø]T [m\] [Ø] = [1] or with respect to a unit relative deflection of some arbitrary point. It is recommended to use the first scheme for complex structures where it is not known which mass point will show the largest activity. Otherwise the second scheme may result in the selection of a nodal point with virtually no activity. For purposes of plotting the modes and to provide a quick inspection of modal behavior, a third scheme is automatically provided to normalize each mode with respect to its largest relative value.
These modes should not be further utilized.
As a last step an orthogonality check is provided by forming the product [Ø]T [m\] [Ø].
The resulting product should show the off diagonal terms virtually zero in comparison to the main diagonal. This automatic check should always be reviewed.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications The program is used to obtain the mode shapes and frequencies containment structure and containment internal structures.
- c. Reference S. Crandall, S., Engineering Analyses, A Survey of Numerical Procedures, McGraw Hill, 1966.
641 RESPONSE SPECTRUM TECHNIQUE
- a. Description and Assumption The program assumes that the structure has been previously analyzed and that the natural frequencies, w, and mode shapes Ø, for the structure has been obtained. The earthquake input is described in terms of response spectrum curves associated with different damping
Fore each mode j, a modal inertial force at each mass point is calculated as follows:
Fj ij Mi-Fij = -------------------------
ij M i 2
ij Mi -
Fj = Aj 2 jM i i re:
2 ij Mi -
Fj = Aj 2 jM i i Aj = special acceleration for mode j Then static analysis is used to obtain modal shear, moment and displacement by applying the inertial force at each mass center. Model responses are combined on an absolute sum basis.
- b. Extent of Programs Application The program is used to obtain the model responses of the containment structure and containment internal structures by the response spectrum technique.
784 RESPONSE SPECTRUM TECHNIQUE
- a. Description and Assumption This program combines the previously described programs, CE 309, CE 617 and CE 641, and calculates the dynamic responses of a structure. The program utilizes the mathematical model of the structure which is represented by its cross sectional properties and lumped masses. The program then forms the structure stiffness matrix. By using the modified Jocobi method of symmetric matrix diagonalization, natural frequencies and normal modes of the structure are obtained. Using the natural frequencies and normal modes together with input acceleration, modal responses of the structure are calculated.
The program is used to obtain the modal responses of the auxiliary buildings (including warehouse portion) turbine building and intake building.
- c. References
- 1. Gere and Weaver, Analysis of Framed Structures, Van Nostrand, 1968.
- 2. Weaver, W. J., Computer Programs for Structural Analysis, Van Nostrand, 1967.
- 3. Biggs, J. M. Introduction to Structural Dynamics, McGraw Hill, 1964.
- 4. Ralston, A., Wilf, H. S., Mathematical Methods for Digital Computers, John Wiley & Sons, 1962.
792 RESPONSE SPECTRUM CALCULATION
- a. Description and Assumptions This program computes the response spectra for specified acceleration time histories which are generated by CE 611 Time History Analysis. The input acceleration time histories is digitalized at equal time intervals. The numerical method used for integration is based on the exact solution to the governing differential equation, assuming that the input acceleration time history varies linearly between consecutive data points.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications This program is used to generate response spectra at all equipment locations in the containment, auxiliary building (including warehouse portion), turbine building and intake structure.
- c. References Nigam, N. C., Jennings, P.C., Digital Calculation of Response Spectra from Strong-Motion Earthquake Records, CIT, 1968.
I. DELETED CLASS I STRUCTURES 316-4 Finite Element Stress Analysis (FINEL)
- a. Description and Assumptions
reinforcement elements, and isotropic triangles and quadrilaterals. Element stresses and joint displacements are solved due to applied loads or temperature distributions. Applied loads can be concentrated, distributed or inertial and must be axisymmetric for axisymmetric structures. The total load can be applied in small increments and the solution is iterated within each increment if necessary to establish equilibrium. The program will consider up to eight different materials and allows for material properties changing with temperature. Materials can have bilinear stress-strain curves to model elasto-plastic behavior. Prestress forces are simulated by using appropriate concentrated forces.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications The program is used to obtain stresses in the containment structure due to thermal and pressure loads.
779 Structural Analysis Program (SAP)
- a. Description and Assumptions This program performs the static and dynamic analysis of linear elastic three-dimensional structures using the finite element method. The finite element library contains truss and beam elements, plane and solid elements, plate and shell elements, axisymmetric (torus) elements, and special boundary (spring) elements.
Element stresses and displacements are solved due to either applied loads or temperature distributions. Concentrated loads, pressures or gravity loads can be applied. Temperature distributions are assigned as an appropriate uniform temperature change in each element.
Prestressing can be simulated by using artificial temperature change on rod elements.
The available dynamic response routines will solve for arbitrary dynamic loads or seismic excitations using either modal superposition or direct integration. The program also does response spectrum analysis.
- b. Extent of Programs Applications The program is used to obtain stresses in the concrete shell which is designed to protect the condensate storage tank from missiles.
BLOWDOWN LOADS computer programs WATERHAMMER and CEFLASH-4, described in Appendix 5.E were ved from programs in the public domain. Changes have been made to each to increase its ty and improve its treatment of the blowdown problem.(1, 2)
WATERHAMMER (3) code is recognized for its applicability to the analysis of the subcooled ompression. The code manual (Reference 3) demonstrates the program's validity through parison of its predictions to LOFT Semiscale experimental results.
FLASH-4 is the C-E modified version of the FLASH-4 code (4). The C-E modifications are ussed in Reference 1. CEFLASH-4 has been accepted by the AEC via the Interim Acceptance eria of December 1971 (5).
FLASH-4 program was written in FORTRAN IV for use on the CDC-6600 computer. It has n converted, at C-E such that it may also be run on the CDC-7600 computer.
ification of this conversion was obtained by running test cases when this change was made.
- a. References
- 1. CENPD-26, Description of Loss-of-Coolant Calculational Procedures, August 1971 (Proprietary).
- 2. CENPD-42, Topical Report on Dynamic Analysis of Reactor Vessel Accident Conditions With Application of Analysis to CE 800 MWe Class Reactors, August 1971 (Proprietary).
- 3. 65-28-RA, Early Blowdown (WATERHAMMER) Analysis For Loss-of-Fluid Test Facility, by Stanislav Fabic, dated June 1965 and revised April 1967.
- 4. WAPD-TM-840, FLASH-4: A Fully Implicit FORTRAN IV Program for the Digital Simulation of Transient In a Reactor Plant, by T. A. Porsching, J. H. Murphy, J. A. Redfield, and V. C. Davis, March 1969.
- 5. Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water Power Reactors, Federal Register, pp 24083, Volume 36, Number 244, Saturday, December 18, 1971.
following programs are in the public domain and have had sufficient use to justify their licability and validity.
I/STARDYNE June 1, 1970 Version program was developed by Mechanics Research, Inc., for use on the CDC-6600 Computer tem. The program is run on the CDC-6600 Computer System located at the Boston, ssachusetts data center.
S/STRUDL Version 1.4 s version of the program was developed by the McDonnell Automation Company/Engineering mputer International. This version was purchased by Combustion Engineering and is run on IBM-360 computer system.
C/EASE March 1970 Version program was developed by Engineering/Analysis Corporation for use on the CDC-6600 mputer System. The program is run on the CDC-6600 Computer System located at the Boston, ssachusetts data center.
AS Version I program was developed by E. L. Wilson and R. M. Jones and is documented in the following rence:
Wilson, E. L., Jones, R. M., Finite Element Stress Analysis of Orthotropic, Temperature-Dependent Axisymmetric Solids of Revolution, Aerospace Report Number TR-0158 (S3816022)-1, September 1967.
theoretical basis of the program was developed in the following reference:
Wilson, E. L., Structural Analysis of Axisymmetric Solids, AIAA Journal, Volume 3, Number 12, December, 1965, pp 2269-2274.
program is compatible with the CDC-6600 Computer System. It is run on the CDC-6600 mputer System located at Combustion Engineering's Windsor, Connecticut data center.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - DYNAMIC ANALYSIS following program is in the public domain and has had sufficient use to justify its licability and validity.
S/STRUDL Version 1.4
IBM-360 computer system. (See, also, Appendix 5.E.3)
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - STATIC STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS C-21 June 1970 Version program was developed by the Mare Island Naval Shipyard and is run on the CDC 6600/7600 puters.
ASME SECTION III, CLASS I COMPONENTS following programs are in the public domain and have had sufficient use to justify their licability and validity.
AS Version I program was developed by E. L. Wilson and R. M. Jones and is documented in the following rence:
Wilson, E. L., Jones, R. M., Finite Element Stress Analysis of Orthotropic, Temperature-Dependent Axisymmetric Solids of Revolution, Aerospace Report Number TR-0158 (S3816-22)-1, September 1967.
theoretical basis of the program was developed in the following reference:
Wilson, E. L., Structural Analysis of Axisymmetric Solids, AIAA Journal, Volume 3, Number 12, December 1965, pp 2269-2274.
program is compatible with the CDC-6600 Computer System. It is run on the CDC-6600 mputer System located at Combustion Engineerings Windsor, Connecticut data center.
AL-SHELL-2 program was developed by C. M. Friedrich and is documented in the following reference:
Seal-Shell-2-A Computer Program for the Stress Analysis of a Thick Shell of Revolution with Axisymmetric Pressures, Temperatures, and Distributed Loads, by C. M. Friedrich, WAPD-TM-398, UC-38: Engineering and Equipment, TID-4500, 24th Edition.
program is run on the CDC-6600 Computer Systems, located at Combustion Engineerings dsor, Connecticut data center.
lysis of Axisymmetric Solids - 1967 Version
Wilson, E. L., Structural Analysis of Axisymmetric Solids, AIAA Journal, Volume 3, Number 12, December 1965, pp 2269-2274.
program is run on the CDC-6600 Computer System located at Combustion Engineerings dsor, Connecticut data center.
LIDS II - June 1971 Version program was developed by the Aerospace Corporation and runs on the CDC-6600 Computer tem. The program is described in the following reference:
Crose, J. C. and Jones, R. M., Finite Element Stress Analysis of Axisymmetric and Plane Solids with Different Orthotropic, Temperature-Dependent Material Properties in Tension and Compression, TR-0059(56816-53)-1, The Aerospace Corporation San Bernardino, California (June 1971).
CLASS I PIPING SYSTEMS following programs are in the public domain and have had sufficient use to justify the licability and validity.
I/STARDYNE September 1, 1972 Version program was developed by Mechanics Research, Inc., for use on the CDC-6600 Computer tem.
LPIPE program was developed by Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts for use on the C-6600 and UNIVAC 1108 Computer Systems.
. CLASS I STRUCTURES e
BLOWDOWN LOADS itional demonstration of the WATERHAMMERs validity is given in CENPD-42 (1) which ents comparisons of the codes predictions to LOFT Semiscale and Battelle Northwest CSE erimental results.
FLASH-4 has also been tested against blowdown test data from the LOFT Semiscale and CSE eriments. The results of these comparisons are published in CENPD-26 and CENPD-42.
se comparisons support the validity of the CEFLASH-4 method of analysis.
- a. Reference
- 1. CENPD-42, Topical Report on Dynamic Analysis of Reactor Vessel Accident Conditions With Application of Analysis to CE 800 MWe Class Reactors, August 1971 (Proprietary).
REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS following programs solutions to a series of test problems have been demonstrated to be stantially identical to those obtained by computer program, SABOR-5-DRASTIC, developed e Aeronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
HSD MMSOR/DYNASOR comparison appears in Topical Report on Dynamic Analysis of Reactor Vessel Internals er Loss-of-Coolant Accident Conditions with Application of Analysis to CE 800 MWe Class ctors, Combustion Engineering Report CENPD-42, Combustion Engineering, Inc., Nuclear er Department, Combustion Division, Windsor, Connecticut, Appendix D.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - DYNAMIC ANALYSIS e
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - STATIC STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS e
ASME SECTION III, CLASS I COMPONENTS
- a. closed form solutions
- b. EASE, a computer program developed by the Engineering/Analysis Corporation
- c. SOLIDS II, TR-0059 (56816-53)-1, the Aerospace Corporation, San Bernardino, California
- d. SAP, Structural Engineering Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California following programs solutions to a series of test problems have been demonstrated to be stantially identical to those obtained by computer program MARC-HEAT, described in RC-CDC, User Information Manual, Volume I, CDC Publication Number 17309500.
N-12100 CLASS I PIPING SYSTEMS e
. CLASS I STRUCTURES 309 STRESS s program has been demonstrated to be substantially identical to those obtained by the original gram, STRESS, developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The traceability of program can be obtained at the Pacific International Computer Corporation.
BLOWDOWN LOADS or modifications were made to the WATERHAMMER code to increase its utility such as the ition of a plot routine, revision of the output edit format, and increase of the number of legs ch may be employed.
TERHAMMER was written in FORTRAN IV for use on the CDC-3600 computer. It has been verted, at C-E, for operation on both the CDC-6600 and CDC-7600 machines. A test case, n in the manual, was reproduced with the code and by hand techniques. Agreement was ellent.
REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS following programs solutions have been demonstrated to be substantially identical to those ined by hand calculations or from accepted experimental test or analytical results. The rences below each program indicate where details of these comparisons can be found.
OCK
- 1. Topical Report on Dynamic Analysis of Reactor Vessel Internals Under Loss-of-Coolant Accident Conditions with Application of Analysis to CE 800 MWe Class Reactors, Combustion Engineering Report CENPD-42, Combustion Engineering, Inc., Nuclear Power Department, Combustion Division, Windsor, Connecticut, Appendix B.
- 2. Gabrielson, V. K., SHOCK - A Computer Code for Solving Lumped-Mass Dynamic Systems, SCL-DR-65-34, January 1966, pp 58-79.
HSD
- 1. Topical Report on Dynamic Analysis of Reactor Vessel Internals Under Loss-of-Coolant Accident Conditions with Application of Analysis to CE 800 MWe Class Reactors, Combustion Engineering Report CENPD-42, Combustion Engineering, Inc., Nuclear Power Dept., Combustion Division, Windsor, Connecticut, Appendix A.
- 2. Ghosh, S., Wilson, E. L., Dynamic Stress Analysis of Axisymmetric Structures under Arbitrary Loading, Report Number EERC 69-10, University of California, Berkeley, September 1969, pp 69-81.
MMSOR/DYNASOR
- 1. Topical Report on Dynamic Analysis of Reactor Vessel Internals Under Loss-of-Coolant Accident Conditions with Application of Analysis to CE 800 MWe Class
Appendix C.
OS
- 1. Dunham, R. S., Nickell, R. E., et al., NAOS - Finite Element Analysis of Axisymmetric Solids with Arbitrary Loadings, Structural Engineering Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California, June 1967, pp 32-39.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - DYNAMIC ANALYSIS S/STRUDL-II basic version of this code, Version 1.4, is described under 5.31.1, above. To facilitate amic analysis, additional Input/Output options and an eigenvalue analysis routine have been rporated by Combustion Engineering. The validity of these additions have been carefully fied by appropriate test problems.
CALC program was developed by Combustion Engineering, Inc., and its validity has been carefully firmed. The various matrix manipulations employed by the program were confirmed by hand ulations and the numerical integration procedure, Newmark's Beta-Method, used in the lysis of the reactor coolant system components for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit mber 2, was confirmed by an alternate, independent, integration procedure which was, sequently, incorporated into the program.
alternate integration procedure employs a closed-form solution of the modal equations of ion over each time step of the integration process.
ut excitation is provided in digitized form and varies linearly between input points. The dity of the closed-form solution over a time increment was verified by hand calculations.
er incorporation of the alternate integration procedure, TMCALC was again used to calculate dynamic response of the reactor coolant system model shown in Figure 4.A-1, Appendix 4.A the FSAR. The results obtained, using the two, independent, integration routines are stantially identical.
RCE program was developed by Combustion Engineering, Inc., and its validity has been carefully fied by a series of test problems which were confirmed by hand calculations.
program was developed by Combustion Engineering, Inc., and its validity has been carefully fied by a series of test problems which were confirmed by hand calculations. The test blems include those presented in the paper, Response of Structural Systems to Ground ck, by Dana Young, presented at the Annual Meeting of the ASME, November 30, 1960.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - STATIC STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS e
ASME SECTION III, CLASS I COMPONENTS e
CLASS I PIPING SYSTEMS e
. CLASS I STRUCTURES following programs solutions have been demonstrated to be substantially identical to those ined by hand calculations from accepted experimental test on analytical results. The uments traceability of the following programs can be obtained at the Bechtel Power poration.
611 TIME-HISTORY ANALYSIS 617 MODES AND FREQUENCIES EXTRACTION 641 RESPONSE SPECTRUM TECHNIQUE 784 RESPONSE SPECTRUM TECHNIQUE 792 RESPONSE SPECTRUM CALCULATION
CONSTRUCTION (1) to the recurrent appearances of water in some of the tendon sheaths and on the gallery floor, a mal inspection was made by Engineering personnel to determine a method to stop the water age. This inspection was performed on October 28, 1971.
vertical tendon sheaths and trumpets were examined from the tendon access gallery, where er was observed running down the interior surfaces of the vertical tendon sheaths and dripping he floor from the bearing plates. The number of the trumpet/bearing plate assemblies affected 70 out of 124.
re were indications of light rusting on the interior surfaces of the trumpets and around the rims he holes in the bearing plates, which had been painted; and in some trumpets, deposits of erals were building up inside and around the edges of the holes. However, the galvanized aces of the inside of the tendon sheaths appeared to be free of rust and deposits.
eral deposits and damp areas were also noted in various locations along the gallery walls at struction joints.
ample of the dripping water was taken by the Site personnel and submitted laboratory analysis.
m the report it was observed that:
- 1. The water is very alkaline, with a pH = 11.68.
- 2. The water is very hard.
- 3. The iron content is very low.
o possible sources of water were investigated:
- 1. Curing water sprayed on the exterior concrete containment wall.
- 2. Ground water seeping into the concrete from below grade.
tendons have been affected by water leakage since no tendons were installed in any sheaths le leaking water was present. Extreme care had been exercised to ensure that all water leakage stopped in each tendon sheathing before installation of the tendon.
er consulting with American Drilling and Boring Company, they provided a proposed method topping the ground water via letter of April 4, 1972. After review and approval of procedures, k started on May 15, 1972.
(1)
TE: From response to NRC Question Number 5.57.
tainment Wall at approximate elevation (-)26 feet 0 inches, and injecting chemical grout into e holes under a maximum pressure of 30 psi. It was theorized that the grout would travel g the same path as the water and seal the joint against leaking. This scheme worked around y of the sheathings, but in other instances the grout would travel to and leak from a sheathing r the drilled hole to the extent that no pressure could be built up during the grouting operation.
hout a pressure build-up, the grout would not seal off the water. Approximately 40 of the 70 athings, which were leaking, were sealed by this method. On July 5, 1972, a second scheme sealing off the water was initiated. This scheme involved putting a plug in the sheathing above below the first sheathing joint, at elevation (-)22 feet 6 inches, and pumping the grout out ugh the joint. This scheme proved very successful and by July 29, 1972, the water leaking into remaining 30 tendon sheathings was essentially stopped. However, the very humid weather ng the weeks of July 30 and August 6, 1972, caused considerable condensation on the access ery ceiling and the grouting operation was delayed until additional ventilation fans were alled to supplement the two fans then in use.
August 14, 1972, with the use of one additional fan and with the arrival of less humid weather, access gallery ceiling had dried up enough for grouting to proceed. By August 25, 1972, the s had been stopped in all tendon sheaths except 31V36, 31V31, 31V20, and 23V26. Several her attempts, utilizing scheme two, failed to completely stop the water seepage into these four on sheathings. However, the water seepage was in all cases under no pressure and in ligible quantities.
arly December 1972, a third scheme for sealing the tendon sheathing was initiated. This eme involved the installation of a plug in the tendon sheath just above the bottom vertical mpet. The sheath was then filled with chemical grout to approximately elevation 14 feet 6 es. The top end of the sheath was then sealed with another plug and the air in the sheath was surized to approximately 40 psi. This pressure was held for 20 minutes to allow the grout to The plugs were then removed and the grout in the sheath was expelled using air pressure. All aining grout in the sheath was removed with a high pressure (6000 psi) water jet. Visual ection of the sheathing showed it to be free of grout.
of February 1973, there was only one location at which water was entering the access gallery.
s location is near the construction opening and the water leakage was through holes drilled to construction joint, through the gallery ceiling. These holes were not initially grouted in order e able to observe this leakage during the post-tensioning of the containment. On July 11, 1973, remaining holes were grouted.
of July 16, 1973, vertical tendon installation, stressing, and greasing were completed. At all tions where water was indicated inside the sheathings, the grouting operation completely sted all water seepage into the sheathings. Examination inside the sheathings prior to tendon allation and greasing showed a dry condition. Therefore, all tendons are installed in a non-osive environment.
6, the number of tendons in which water was found has been greatly reduced. No significant osion was identified beyond that noted at installation and reported during the fifth eillance.
FSAR Section 5.9.3.3.4, "Corrosion Protection", for additional data to prevent ground water usion.