ML20207D359
| ML20207D359 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1986 |
| From: | Bell J, Clemons P, Dan Collins, Cook R, Cowgill C, Moslak T, Myers L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207D295 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-320-86-06, 50-320-86-6, NUDOCS 8607220081 | |
| Download: ML20207D359 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000320/1986006
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Report No.
50-320/86-06
Docket No.
50-320
License No. DPR-73
Priority
Category
C
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Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation
P.O. Box 480
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2
Inspection At: Middletcwn, Pennsylvania
inspection Conducted: May 10, 1986 - June 11, 1986
Inspectors:
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Approved By:
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date signed
Inspection Summary:
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Areas Inspected:
Routine safety inspection by site and regional inspectors of
plant operations (long term shutdown) incitding reviews of radioactive waste
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packaging and transportation program, failure of a Jib Crane resulting in a
personnel injury, implementation of an In-Service Inspection program for Type
B and C valves, radiation worker training program, radiation protection
program staffing, l.icensee assessment of Quality Assurance activities for
1985, events resulting in contamination of plant areas, the status of
defueling operations and licensee actions on previous inspection findings.
Results: Two violations were identified. One violation resulted for failure
to conduct a quality control program to assure that waste packages did not
exceed free standing water requirements (paragraph 3b).
The second violation
resulted for failure of the Quality Assurance Department to review certain
procedures regarding the preparation of radioactive waste for shipment
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(paragraph 3c).
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DETAILS
1.0 Ongoing Recovery Operations
Routine Plant Operations
Inspections of the facility were conducted to assess compliance with the
requirements of the Technical Specifications and Recovery Operations Plan
in the following areas:
licensee review of selected plant parameters for
. abnormal trends; plant status from a maintenance / modification viewnoint,
including plant cleanliness, control of switching and tagging, and fire
protection; licensee control of routine and special evolutions, including
control room personnel awareness of these evolutions; control of
documents, including log keeping practices; radiological controls, and
security plan implementation.
Random inspections of the control room during regular and backshift hours
were routinely conducted. The Shift Foreman's Log and selected portions
of the Control Room Operator's Log were reviewed for the period May 10
included the Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS)g the inspection period
through June 11, 1986. Other logs reviewed durin
Operations Log,
Radiological Controls Foreman's Log, and Auxiliary Operator's Daily Log
Sheets.
Operability of components in systems required to be available for
response to emergencies was reviewed to verify that they could perform
their intended functions. The inspectors attended selected licensee
planning meetings. Shift staffing for licensed operators, non-licensed
personnel, and fire brigade members was determined to be adequate.
No violations were identified.
2.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Violation 50-320/85-21-06 Unplanned intake of radioactive
materials and the assignment of 40 MPC-hr exposure to a worker.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken to prevent a
recurrence of the event and the methods used to assign the 40 MPC-hr
exposure to the worker. The principal cause of the event was a breakdown
in communications between Radiological Control technicians and other
workers. Cyclic training included a seminar which studied the event with
emphasis on clear, concise and effective communications in setting up a
job and providing protection to workers. The inspector reviewed the
seminar plan and attendance records and determined them to be adequate.
The assignment of 40 MPC-hrs to the worker was reviewed and found to be
adequate. The corrective actions are completed.
The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item 50-320/85-21-09 Knowledge and training of
Radiological Control Field Operations personnel concerning follow-up of a
personnel contamination event.
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Cyclic training of Radiological Control technicians and supervisors
included a seminar that addressed follow-up measurements and evaluations
to be made after a personnel contamination event. The seminar used the
event as the basis for study and review of the methods of characterizing.
internal contamination for determining an intake to a worker,
requirements for prompt whole body counting and reporting of such events
to management.
The inspector reviewed the seminar plan and the
attendance records and found them to be adequate.
The inspector had no further questions.
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3.0 Radioactive Waste Packaging and Transportation Program
a.
Management Control
The inspector reviewed the radwaste organization to ensure that
proper lines of authority and responsibility existed.
Procedure No.
4230-ADM-1000.01, "TMI Unit 2 Waste Management Organization,
Responsibility and Authority" states that the Manager, Waste
Management, is responsible for all normal administrative functions
having to do with his organization.
He has delegated responsibility
for radwaste operations to the Radwaste Support Manager and the
Waste Management Manager. The Radwaste Support Manager is
responsible to assure that the onsite storage, packaging, and
shipment of all radioactive materials from TMI are done in
accordance with regulatory requirements. The Supervisor, Waste
Disposal, has been charged with responsibility day-to-day radwaste
operations to ensure proper storage, packaging, shipment, and
disposal of radioactive waste from TMI in accordance with applicable
procedures, regulations, and licenses.
Within the scope of this review, no violations were identified.
b.
Quality Control
The licensee made numerous shipments of dewatered radioactive resin
to a burial site in the State of Washington. The shipments were
reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20.311.
The licensee's performance relative to these criteria was determined
by discussions with Waste Management personnel; the Supervisor,
Waste Disposal; the Quality Assurance / Quality Control Monitor; and
by reviewing appropriate documents.
Within the scope of this review, the inspector identified the
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following inadequacy:
The inspector determined that several shipments of radioactive waste
composed of dewatered resins in EPICOR liners were made to a burial
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site in the State of Washington during 1985.
The inspector determined by questioning the Quality
Assurance / Quality Control Monitor that he had not performed any
quality control functions on any dewatered resin shipments during
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1985. The inspector determined that the Waste Management personnel
charged with the responsibility for performing dewatering operations
had not performed quality control functions on the operations they
were responsible for, and neither had they been charged with the
responsibility to perform the quality control function in the areas
in which they were responsible for doing the work.
10 CFR 20.311(d)(3), " Transfer for disposal and manifests" requires that a
licensee who transfers radioactive waste to a land disposal facility
conduct a quality control program to assure compliance with 10 CFR 61.56.
10 CFR 61.56 requires that freestanding and non-corrosive
liquids not exceed one percent of the volume of solid wastes. The
failure to conduct a quality control program is a violation of 10 CFR20.311(d)(3).
(320/86-06-01)
c.
Review and Approval of Procedures
'
The adequacy and effectiveness of the licensee's procedures were
reviewed against criteria contained in Technical Specification 6.8,
" Procedures."
The licensee's performance relative to the criteria was determined
from discussions with Waste Management personnel, Operations Quality
Assurance personnel, and by reviewing appropriate procedures.
Within the scope of this review. the inspector identified the
following:
Section 4.6.6.2 of Procedure No. 4000-ADM-1218.02, "TMI-2 Document
Evaluation, Review and Approval," Revision No. 6-00, dated July 22,
1985, requires Quality Assurance concurrence on all procedures,
classified Important to Safety, dealing with final preparation for
shipment of radioactive material, including dewatering.
The inspector determined that two procedures classified as Important
to Safety were not reviewed and concurred in by Quality Assurance.
Procedure No. 4215-0PS-3526.18, " Dewatering of EPIC 0R Liners at
EPIC 0R II," Revision 1-00, dated August 6, 1985 and Procedure No.
,
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4215-0PS-3233.08, "EPICOR II 4x4 and 6x6 Liner Supplemental
Dewatering," Revision 1-00, dated February 3,1986, have not been
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reviewed and concurred in by the Quality Assurance Department.
The failure to properly review and approve dewatering procedures is
a violation of the requirements of Technical Specification 6.8.
(320/86-06-02)
d.
Shipment of Radioactive Material
!
The licensee's program for the transportation of radioactive
material was reviewed against the criteria in 10 CFR 71.12, " General
License: NRC Approved Packages."
The li-:ensee's performance relative to these criteria was determined
by interviewing the Supervisor, Waste Disposal, and by reviewing
appropriate shipping dncuments.
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Within the scope of this review, the following was identified:
On December 5,1985, the licensee shipped 275.61 curies of
radioactive material in a cask identified as a Hittman HN-500 cask.
This identification was listed on the U. S. Ecology disposal
manifest and the licensee's Bill of Lading. The licensee also
identified the Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9073. C of C 9073
does not identify the Hittman HN-500 cask as an approved package.
The licensee showed the inspector documents that identified the cask
as a Model 0H-142 MKI cask which is authorized by C of C 9073. The
inspector discussed with the licensee the importance of identifying
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the correct model number on shipping manifests. The licensee
representative acknowledged the inspector's statements and stated
that the correct numbers would be used in the future.
The inspector had no further questions regarding this matter,
e.
Audits
The licensee's program for the auditing of transport packages was
reviewed against the criteria contained in Criterion II " Quality
Assurance Program," and Criterion XVIII, " Audits," of the licensee's
Quality Assurance Program.
The licensee's performance relative to these criteria was determined
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by discussion with the TMI-2 Audit Supervisor, and by reviewing
appropriate documents.
Within the scope of this review, no violations were identified.
4.0 Defueling Operations
Defueling efforts during this reporting period were aimed at improving
visibility in the reactor coolant system (RCS). This was accomplished by
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adding hydrogen peroxide as a biocide to the RCS. A feed and bleed
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technique was used to drain down four 15,000 gallon batches, while an
equivalent amount of treated water was added as make-up. Use of hydrogen
peroxide, in conjunction with filtering, has improved the visibility to
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approximately 6 to 8 feet in the reactor vessel.
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On June 4, 1986, the NRC approved the use of a heavy duty tong tool,
heavy duty spade bucket and a hydraulic impact chisel fcr testing. To
date, the licensee has tested the heavy duty spade bucket. Tests were
inconclusive due to bending of the spade bucket vertical jaw.
Defueling support operations were periodically observed by the Resident
Inspector via closed circuit T.V. from the Defueling Coordination Center
during the reporting period.
No violations were identified during the conduct of these operations.
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5.0 Jib Crane Failure
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On May 12, 1986, an operator was injured in the Reactor Building when a
trolley / winch assembly disengaged from the No. 1 Jib Crane on the
Shielded Work Platform.
The operator's injury was limited to a
laceration of the scalp.
No loss of consciousness occurred., The
operator was escorted from the Reactor Building and taken to a hospital
for examination.
The licensee conducted an investigation to determine the cause and what
corrective action should be taken to preclude a recurrence. The
inspector followed the licensee's actions.
A critique was held within twenty-four hours of the accident with the
workers, supervisors, and site management. At the critique, it was
determined that the (injured) operator had just completed transferring a
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load from the No. 1 Jib Crane to the No. 2 Jib Crane when the No. 1
trolley / winch assembly (weight a 200 lbs.) came apart and fell from the
support I-beam first striking the operator, who was standing on a ladder
approximately 6 feet below it, and then falling into the reactor vessel.
The operator was making the load transfer because the wheels on the No.1
trolley had spread disabling the trolley. An attempt was made to
retrieve the components that had fallen into the reactor vessel to
determine the failure mode; however, only the larger components were
obtained. Smaller components (e.g. , cotter pins, spacer rings, nuts,
bolts, etc.) could not be retrieved because of limited visibility.
Based on the information and components available, the licensee concluded
that the failure occurred when a cotter pin fell out of a keeper pin
causing the trolley / winch assembly to dicassemble.
Imediate actions taken by the licensee included removing both Jib Cranes
from service, conducting an engineering evaluation of corrective actions,
and contacting the crane manufacturer (Harrington Hoist) regarding
generic trolley design issues.
Through discussions with licensee representatives the inspector
determined that the only corrective action implemented was to replace the
cotter pin with a bolt, nut and lock wire combination to secure the
keeper pin in the trolley / winch assembly on the two Jib Cranes on the
work platform in the Reactor Building and the two Jib Cranes on the
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Defueling Test Assembly in the Turbine Building.
The inspector expressed the following concerns regarding licensee
corrective actions:
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neither cotter pin replacement nor an evaluation was performed on
other Jib Cranes used in other plant areas (e.g., Spent Fuel Pool,
Truck Bay, Auxiliary Building). These cranes could experience
similar failures.
the monthly inspection of the Jib Cranes in the Reactor Building is
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limited to operational checks performed by an inspector using the
pendant controls at a considerable distance from the operating
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components.
No close, frequent, hands-on inspection is performed of
the trolley / winch assembly.
Licensee personnel acknowledged the inspector's concerns and stated that
more extensive action is being evaluated. Licensee performance in
cperating and maintaining plant Jib Cranes will be monitored in future
NRC inspections.
(320/86-06-03)
6.0 In-Service Inspection (ISI) Program
The licensee is implementing an ISI program to determine the operational
readiness of Category B and C valves in safety related systems. This
program is established in response to an NRC letter dated April 27, 1981
from the Director of the TMI Program Office which stated in part that,
"... Category 8 and C valves in safety related systems in-service
should be exercised at least once per 92 days where practical to
determine their operational readiness.
Relief from the test
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requirements for Category B and C valves in safety related systems
specified above will have to be submitted on an individual valve
basis."
Prior to the accident of March 28, 1979, Technical Specifications
required ISI of approximately 326 valves when the plant was in
Operational Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4.
For the non-operational, recovery mode,
the licensee has identified approximately 244 valves which do not need to
be tested and 82 valves which will be tested in accordance with Section
XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The determination not to
test specific valves was based upon the following criteria:
The system is out-of-service for the recovery period
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The valves-have been previously exempted from testing by the NRC
The valves do not perform a safety related function
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Testing would require personnel to received a significant radiation
dose
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Testing could contaminate clean systems or be impractical due to
present system configuration.
The inspector determined that a period of approximately five years
elapsed before the licensee took action to implement an ISI program. The
item is considered unresolved pending further review and examination by
the NRC.
(320/86-06-04)
7.0 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
On May 22, 1986, a meeting was held with licensee management at the NRC
Region I office to discuss the SALP report. The report summarized the
licensee's overall safety performance at the Three Mile Island (TMI)
Nuclear Station, Unit 2, for the period May 1,1984 through February 28,
1986. The report addressed those activities required for defueling the
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reactor, decontaminating plant areas, and implementing plant
modifications required for the safe movement of fissile and radioactive
waste material generated as a result of the March 1979 accident.
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At the meeting, licensee management discussed plans to improve staff
performance in the areas of Plant Operations and Design Engineering with
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particular emphasis placed on upgrading the adequacy of new procedures.
8.0 Quality Assurance Annual Assessment for 1985
On May 12, 1986, in accordance with Quality Assurance (QA) Plan
requirements, the licensee's QA organization presented its yearly
assessment of the effectiveness of the QA program to senior management.
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The inspector attended this presentation. Managers of sections within
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the QA department, including QA Engineering, Site Welding, Quality
Control, Operations QA, Site Audits, and QA System Engineering,
identified their respective program's strengths and weaknesses, then made
recommendations for improving performance. Examples of the recommended
actions included:
establish a design program-to manage minor modifications made to
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existing systems
improve the organization and methods of the tie-in control and
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return-to-service programs
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reduce the redundancy and duplication of procedures
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increase the communications and interfacing of the TMI site with
vendor facilities.
The inspector determined that presentations were candid and that the
assessment was accurate and consistent with findings identified in NRC
inspections.
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9.0 Health Physics and Environmental Review
a.
Plant Tours
,
The NRC site Radiation Specialists performed plant inspection tours
which included all radiological control points and selected
radiologically controlled areas. Among the areas inspected were:
the Auxiliary, Fuel Handling, and Diesel Generator Buildings;
Radiochemistry Laboratories; Solid Waste Storage Facility; Interim
Waste Storage Facility; Waste Handling and Packaging Facility (under
construction); Respirator Cleaning and Laundry Facility; and the
Radiological Controls Instrument Facility.
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Among the items inspected were:
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Access control to radiologically controlled areas, including
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high radiation areas and rad tag key areas
Adherence to Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements
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Proper use and storage of respirators and associated equipment
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Adherence to radiation protection procedures
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Use of radiological instruments
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Radioactive waste reduction, cleanliness and housekeeping; and
Fire protection.
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The inspectors reviewed the conduct of operations during normal
hours, backshifts, and weekends. Log books maintained by
Radiological Controls Field Operations, Radiological Engineering and
Fuel Handling Senior Reactor Operators were reviewed. All notebooks
contained appropriate entries and showed evidence of management
review.
No violations were idantified.
b.
Radiological Shipments
The inspectors examined shipments from the site on May 14 and June
2, 1986 for the following:
External vehicle contamination
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External package contamination
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External radiation levels at vehicle surfaces, two meters away,
and inside the tractor cab
Radiation levels at package surfaces
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Verification of recipient license
Verification of shipping documents; and
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Appropriate markings and placarding.
No violations were identified.
c.
Measurement Verifications
Measurements of levels of radiation and contamination were made by
the inspector using NRC-calibrated instrumentation. The results
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verified the findings of licensee surveys. The measurements were
made on shipments and areas within the radiologically controlled
,
areas of the plant. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the
licensee's measurements of radioactivity in water discharges to the
river and compared licensee results with the results obtained by EPA
from samples at the plant discharge.
No violations were identified,
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d.
Records Review
The inspector reviewed selected radiological records during the
period to assure the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's
documentation of occupational exposure.
The records reviewed
included Radiation Work Permits, Dosimetry Investigative Reports,
Incident Evaluation Reports, Radiological Awareness Reports, and
Dosimetry Exception Reports.
No violations were identified.
e.
Reactor Building Work
The inspectors monitored the licensee's conduct of work in the
reactor building (RB) throughout the inspection period. The
following were reviewed by representative sampling during the
period:
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The RB entry was planned and coordinated so as to ensure that
ALARA review, personnel training, and equipment testing had
been conducted.
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Radiological precautions were planned and implemented;
ir.cluding specific work instructions, alarming self-reading
dosimeters and breathing zone air samplers.
Individuals making entries to the RB had been properly infonned
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of conditions, properly trained and understood emergency
procedures.
Unique tasks were performed using specifically developed
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procedures, and mock-up training had been conducted when
warranted.
Entries 916 through 942 were conducted during the reporting period.
The reactor building entries were conducted around the clock for the
most part. Defueling activities were conducted over two shifts and
maintenance was performed on the third shift.
No violations were identified.
f.
Planned Decontamination Activities
On May 28, 1986, members of the licensee's staff briefed the TMICPD
staff with respect to radioactivity and radiation dose rate
characterization, current and planned decontamination and dose
reduction activities, cumulative and individual dose figures, ALARA
concept implementation, and scheduling of activities in the reactor
building.
It is anticipated that future briefings will occur at
approximately three month intervals.
Current progress on plant
decontamination is satisfactory. TMICPD will monitor ongoing
activities.
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g.
Staffing and Workload
The inspector reviewed the hours of work for Radiological
Technicians and Supervisors with respect to the requirements of
4000-POL-2002.01, Revision 1-01, dated June 9, 1986, " Unit 2
Standards of Conduct." This policy superseded procedure
4210-ADM-3020.01, " Conduct of Operations." The inspector determined
that the new policy statement incorporates the criteria of NRC Generic Letter 82-02 " Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours."
The inspector determined that the technician hours of work and
staffing level for activities in both the reactor building and in
the balance of the plant were adequate to meet requirements.
No violation was identified.
10.0 Radiological Controls Training
a.
Requalification Training
During this review, the inspector observed the instruction of
Radiological Field Operations technicians in the filter change-out
of an airborne radioactivity monitor (Eberline Model AMS-3). -The
inspector concluded that the training was effective, having the
appropriate scope ano lepth.
However, the inspector noted the
following areas for improvement.
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A " dry-run" change-out should be performed in a clean area
prior to changing out an operating AMS-3 in a radiation area.
Such preparatory training would reduce the possibility of
cross-contaminating clean, operating equipment, during
training.
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"0" ring seals were missing from the AMS-3 that was being
changed out. Closer attention should be made by technicians to
insure "0" rings are installed on the AMS-3 filter holder.
Licensee personnel acknowledged the inspector's concerns and
stated that they would be subsequently addressed.
Inspectors
will continue to monitor licensee progress in this matter.
(320/86-06-05)
No violations were identified.
b.
Respiratory Protection Mainterance Training
The inspector reviewed the requirements of Procedure
9000-ADM-4020.01, " Respiratory Protection Program," and found that
the program of training described for the individuals who maintain
and inspect respiratory protective equipment to be acceptable. The
supervisor currently provides 0JT, maintains records of specific
training and schedules vendor training. The required annual
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frequency has been met. Training records formerly maintained by the
Radiological Training Group are now maintained by the Maintenance
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Group Supervisor.
Vendor certificates comprise the bulk of the
records. Although training records were adequate, no consolidated
record of training for specific individuals exists at present.
A February 18, 1986 memorandum to the Plant Training Department from
the Respiratory Protection Supervisor requests that a formal program
be established for the maintenance technicians. The requested
program would develop within the Training Group the qualifications
to instruct and qualify technicians in respiratory equipment
maintenance thus reducing the dependence on vendor training
schedules. The program would enable better use of classroom and
instructor time, and would integrate this specialized training
program into the plant non-licensed training program.
No violations were identified,
c.
Supervisor and Technician Training
Theoretical and practical training, scheduling, oral boards, and
qualification record maintenance is the responsibility of the
Radiological Training group within the Radiological Controls
Department.
Initial training for an entry level Radiological
Controls technician (RCT) is 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of instruction. Each
technician must pass the written examination, complete practical
factors training and qualify for the oral board exam. Upon
completion of the oral board, the technician is classified as RCT
"A", "B", "C", or Group Radiological Control Supervisor (GRCS),
depending upon his experience and qualifications.
Requalification
is required biannually. This is accomplished through written and
oral examinations.
The training and qualification records of 12 randomly selected
RCTs/GRCSs were reviewed with respect to criteria in GPUN Radiation
Protection Plan, 4000-ADM-4010.01 and Procedure 9000-ADM-2622.01
" Radiological Field Operations Personnel Qualification / Training
Standard."
The inspector attended RCT job turnover briefings, job briefings on
sealing of floor penetrations on the 305' elevation of the reactor
building, and mockup training in the removal of ' internal vent valves
from the reactor vessel. This training was consistent with criteria
in 4000-ADM-2600-019, " Job Briefing and Mockup Training."
Within the scope of this review, no violations were identified.
d.
Personnel Interviews
During May and June 1986, the inspector formally interviewed six
members of the TMI-2 Radiological Field Operations staff (four
senior technicians and two GRCSs) concerning their impressions of
the present training programs based on their work experiences.
Each
individual was also asked about his or her knowledge of the content
and requirements of licensee procedures and Federal regulations, as
well as the individual's knowledge and practice of generally
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accepted good radiological safety practices. All individuals
interviewed responded adequately. Similarly, all of those
interviewed indicated that the training of radiation protection
personnel was generally adequate. Some individuals expressed a
desire for additional practical factors (on-the-job) training. The
results of the interviews were discussed with appropriate
radiological controls training personnel,
e.
Informing Personnel of Procedure Changes
The licensee's Radiological Controls Department uses various methods
to make people in the field aware of changes to procedures.
One
method is specified in Procedure 9000-ADM-4000.04, Rev. O,
" Radiological Controls Notification of Change." The procedure
states that Section Heads, after designating who shall review
changes to particular procedures, should ensure that the reviews are
conducted within seven days.
The inspector noted that several procedures were overdue for
completion of review. The inspector noted that a March 12, 1986
procedure change had not been reviewed by all the dosimetry
technicians by May 27, 1986. There were three procedures with April
1986 effective dates in the instrument repair shop area on May 27,
1986 which had not been reviewed by all required persons.
At the
Health Physics office in Unit 2 a large number of procedures, some
dating to January and February 1986, were not signed off by the
required persons. The inspector asked about these problems.
Radiological Controls Supervisors stated that important procedure
revisions were covered in staff meetings. The inspector interviewed
selected Rad Con technicians to determine if they were aware of
changes. All persons interviewed were familiar with recent
revisions. The. inspector expressed concern that the procedure
review was not being accomplished as stated.
The inspector will continue to follow this matter to determine any
adverse impact on radiological controls.
(320/86-06-06)
11.0 Events Resulting in Contamination of Plant Areas
a.
Liquid Spill
On May 20, 1986 at approximately 2:30 PM, a contamination event
occurred in the 305' elevation of the Turbine, Auxiliary, and Fuel
Handling Buildings. The contamination was caused by a leak from a
chemical waste container containing radioactive material being
transported from the Babcock and Wilcox Hot Laboratory to a waste
sink in the model room of the Fuel Handling Building. The highest
contamination level detected was 50,000 cpm /100 cm2
The areas
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involved were isolated, surveyed and decontaminated immediately
following reporting of the leak by the workers transporting the
chemical waste. A control point was established at the exit from
the Protected Area to monitor individuals for contamination.
Several workers who transversed the corridor of the Auxiliary
Building before the area was isolated were found to have
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contaminated shoes at the control point. The shoes were
decontaminated and returned. There was no airborne contamination as
a result of this event.
Licensee investigation determined that the closure seal leaked from
one of the two 5-gallon carboys containing radioactive liquid waste
including reactor coolant system samples. This leakage then
passed through holes torn in the polyethylene bags containing the
carboys. The carboys were separately double bagged with heavy
polyethylene bags and then taped to a twc-wheel hand cart.
The bags
were most likely torn while going through one of the four doors or
passing some of the equipment along the pathway.
Incident / Event
Report 86-047 was initiated and a critique was held to determine the
cause of the event and corrective actions. The corrective actions
were to 1) place the carboys in a rigid container sufficient to
contain the volume of the carboys, 2) transport the container by a
four-wheel cart, and 3) assure that the carboy closure seals are
properly seated.
The inspector considered the corrective actions to be appropriate.
b.
Airborne Contamination from Plant Nitrogen System
On May 31 and on June 9,1986, the 281' elevation of the Auxiliary
Building was contaminated by a release from the internally
contaminated plant nitrogen system.
Releases occurred when relief
valves, NM-R-8 and NM-R-9, lifted due to overpressurization of the
The plant nitrogen system is used to provide
overgas to Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks (RCBT) during drain downs.
The valves relieve locally to the atmosphere of the Auxiliary
Building on the 281' elevation creating airborne contamination. The
first event caused the 281' elevation to be declared an Airborne
Radioactivity Area for about five hours. The release was stopped
when operations secured the plant nitrogen system.
Incident / Event
<
Report Number 86-050 was initiated June 6,1986. The interim
corrective action was to enclose the relief valves with a filtered
housing and to install a bag filter of sufficient capacity on the
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atmospheric discharge vent. The modification of the relief valve
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housings had been completed but the bag filter had not been
installed on the atmospheric discharge vent when the second event
occurred.
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Decontamination efforts to recover all of the 281' elevation were
proceeding when the second event occurred while processing the "B"
RCBT through the Submerged Demineralizer System. The second event
was more limited in effect than the first event.
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A critique was held on June 10, 1986 which discussed the causes of
the two events and reviewed the short term corrective actions and
suggested long term corrective actions. The bag filter was
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installed June 10, 1985. The inspector will monitor the adequacy of
the long term corrective actions.
(320/86-06-07)
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12.0 Inspector Follow Items
Inspector follow items are inspector concerns or perceived weaknesses in
the licensee's conduct of operation (hardware or programmatic) that could
lead to violations if left uncorrected.
Inspector follow items are
addressed in paragraphs 2.0, 5.0, 10.0 and 11.0.
13.0 Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are findings about which more information is needed to
ascertain whether they are violations, deviations, or acceptable.
An unresolved item is addressed in paragraph 6.0.
14.0 Exit Interviews
The inspectors met periodically with licensee representatives to discuss
inspection findings. On May 30, 1986, the regional inspector summarized
the inspection findings to the following personnel:
J. Byrne, Manager, TMI-2 Licensing
W. Conaway, Radwaste Support Manager
L. Edwards, Quality Assurance Lead Monitor
R. Hahn, Supervisor, Waste Disposal
S. Levin, Director, Site Operations
J. Renshaw, Manager, Waste Management
R. Rogan, Director, Licensing and Nuclear Safety
On June 11, 1986, the site inspectors summarized the inspection findings
to the following personnel:
J. Byrne, Manager, TMI-2 Licensing
W. Craft, Manager, Radiological Controls Field Operations
C. Dell, Licensing, Technical Analyst
S. Levin, Director, Site Operations
M. Pastor, Defueling Operations Director
W. Ream, Lead Mechanical Engineer
R. Warren, Manager, Plant Engineering
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the
licensee by the TMICPD staff except for procedure reviews pursuant to