ML20202E297
| ML20202E297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1998 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202E267 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9802180115 | |
| Download: ML20202E297 (3) | |
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. 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR RE2ULATORY COMMIS810N WAsHINeToN, D.C. SteeH001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 4
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.164 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-19.
AMENDMENT NO.159 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-25.
AMENDMENT NO.179 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 29 AND AMENDMENT NO.177 ' TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 30 l
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY 6tlQ MIDAMERICAN ENERGY COMPANY QEE& PEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNITS 2 AND 3 QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-237. 50 249. 50-254 AND 50-265
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated September 30,1997, the Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed, the licensee) subr 'M a request for changes to the Technical Specification (TS) for the Dresden and Quad Citie N clear Power Stations. The proposed changes would add a new special test exception TS 3/4.12.C, " Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation." The proposed l
changes would also include corresponaing changes to the TS Index, Table 1.2, " OPERATIONAL MODES," and provide Bases for TS 3/4.12.C. The proposed changes would permit Dresden and Quad Cities to remain in OPERATIONAL MODE 4 when the average reactor coolant temperature is > 212 degrees Fahrenheit, and OPERATIONAL MODE 3 Limiting Conditions for Operation
- (LCO) formndary containment isolation, secondary containment integrity and filtration,
- secondary containment automatic isolation dampers, and Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) operability are being met. The amendment request was proposed based upon Section 3.10.1 of the improved Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1433).
2.0 EVALUATION The Dresden and Quad Cities TS define five OPERATIONAL MODES. OPERATIONAL MODE 4 requires the reactor mode switch to be in the shutdown position and the average reactor coolant temperature to be less than or equal to 212 degrees Fahrenheit. OPERATIONAL MODE 3 also requires the reactor mode switch to be in the shutdown position, but with the average reactor coolant temperature greater than 212 degrees Fahrenheit.
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^f 2-The Dresden and Quad Cities TS require that various TS be applicable in one or more of the five OPERATIONAL MODES. Additional TS become applicable when the plant enters OPERATIONAL MODE 3 from OPERATIONAL MODE 4. This change in OPERATIONAL MODE occurs when the average reactor coolant temperature is increased above 212 degrees Fahrenheit. TS of particular concem for entry into OPERATIONAL MODE 3 are TS 3.2.A,
" Isolation Actuation," Table 3.2.A-1, item 2, " SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INSOLATION," TS 3.7,N, " SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITV," TS 3.7.0, " Secondary Containment Aomatic isolation Dampers," and TS 3.7.P " Standby Gas Treatment System." TS 3.5.A, dmorgency Core Cooling System - Operating," requires two core spray (CS) system subsystems, the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, and the automatic dcpressurization system to be OPERABLE in OPERATIONAL MODE 3. TS 3.5.B. " Emergency Core Cooling System - Shutdown," requires at least two of the following four subsystem / loops be OPERABLE: One or both CS subsystems and one or both LPCI subsystem loops be OPERABLE in OPERATIONAL MODES 4 and 5, thereby permitting outage-related maintenance to be performed on the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) riot required to be OPERABLE.
TS 3.7.A requires PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY to be maintained in OPERATIONAL MODE 3, but PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not required in OPERATIONAL MODE 4.
The requirements of TS 3.7.A significantly restrict unobstructed access within the primary containment during operations in OPERATIONAL MODE 3. The licen:,ee desires to be able to perform certain outage activities on various systems while remaining consisten' with OPERATIONAL MODE 4 applicable requirements that are in effect immediately prior to and immediately following inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.
The reactor coolant system (RCS) is isolated during leak or hydrostatic tests. This isolation makes RCS temperature control difficult since the RCS is isolated from its heat sinks, and heat input to the RCS is caused by both decay heat and mechanical heat from the recirculation pumps. TS 3.6.K " Pressure / Temperature Limits," currently requires reactor pressure vessel temperatures approaching 212 degrees Fahrenheit wnen the RCS is pressurized for leak or hydrostatic testing. This minimum temperature for performing leak or hydrostatic tests will increase over time as fast neutron fluence to the reactor vessel increases with operating timt i
The leak or hydrostatic tests require several hours for completion. Operating experience has shown that the RCS temperature slowly increases during these tests and, dependent upon the amount of decay heat present, the RCS may exceed the 212 degrees Fahrenheit limit of OPERATIONAL MODE 4. Therefore, the licensee has proposed to increase the OPERATIONAL MODE 4 temperature limit to provide some additional margin within which to complete the leak or hydrostatic tests, with appropriate limiting conditions.
Permitting the average reactor coolant temperature to be increased above 212 degrees Fahrenheit while performing leak or hydro: static tests will not substantially affect the results of potential accidents which might occur with the slight increased average reactor coolant temperature since the leak and hydrostatic tests are performed with the RCS near water solid, at low oecay heat values, near OPERATIONAL MODE 4 conditions, and with all control rods fuity inserted. Therefore, the stored energy in the reactor core would be very low and the potential for causing fuel failures with a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimal. The restrictions provided in the prop sed new TS, Section 3/4.12.C, would require secondary containment integrity as well as OPERABLE automatic isolation dampers, OPERABLE Standby Gas
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3-Treatment System, and OPERABLE isolation actuation instrumentation for this equipment.
Therefore, any leakage of radioactive materials from the RCS would be filtered prior to release to L
the atmosphere, in the event of a large loss-of-coolant accident during a leak or hydrostatic test, the RCS w<v '1 rapidly depressurize, thereby permitting the low pressure ECCS equipment reqtilred by TS s.':,.2 to actuate and thereby keep the core floodod. This action would prevent the fuel from ove. heating and releasing radioactive materials. The RCS inspections required to be performed as part of the leak or hydrostatic tests v.*ould be expected to detect small leaks before g
a significant inventory of coolant was lost, g
Based on the foregoing analyses and that these changes meet the intent of NUREG-1433, the staff concludes that the proposed TS chcnges will ensure acceptable consequences of any postulated accidents, are enveloped by the previously accepted analyses, and are, therefore, acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the lilinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 61839). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in cornpliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the conimon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Prir,cipal Contributor. Robert M. Pulsifer ss Ik.
Date: January 5, 1998 1