ML20086C194

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 136,130,157 & 153 to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,respectively

ML20086C194
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden, Quad Cities
Issue date:	06/23/1995
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20086C176	List: ML20086C173 ML20086C194
References
NUDOCS 9507060323
Download: ML20086C194 (16)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:... _~ ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 136 AND 130 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-19 AND DPR-25 DOCKET NOS. 50-237 AND 50-249 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number. UNIT 2 UNIT 3 REMOVE REMOVE TN$f3J 3/4.10-1 3/4.10-1 3/4.10-1 3/4.10-2 3/4.10-2 3/4.10-2 3/4.10-3 3/4.10-3 3/4.10-3 3/4.10-4 3/4.10-4 3/4.10-4 3/4.10-5 3/4.10-5 3/4.10-5 3/4.10-6 3/4.10-6 3/4.10-6 3/4.10-7 3/4.10-7 3/4.10-7 3/4.10-8 3/4.10-8 3/4.10-8 3/4.10-9 3/4.10-10 3/4.10-11 3/4.10-12. 3/4.10-13 3/4.10-14 3/4.10-15 3/4.10-16 B 3/4.10-9 B 3/4.10-9 8 3/4.10-1 B 3/4.10-10 B 3/4.10-10 B 3/4.10-2 8 3/4.10-11 B 3/4.10-11 B 3/4.10-3 8 3/4.10-12 8 3/4.10-12 I 9507060323 950623 PDR ADOCK 05000237 P PDR

w - REFUELING OPERATIONS-Moda Switch 3/4.10.A 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS A. Reactor Mode Switch A. Reactor Mode Switch The reactor mode switch shall be 1. The reactor mode switch shall be ' OPERABLE and locked in the Shutdown or verified to be locked in the Shutdown Refuel position. When the reactor mode or Refuel position as specified: = switch is locked in the Refuel position: a. Within 2 hours prior to: c 1. A control rod shall not be withdrawn unless the Refuel position one-rod-out 1. Beginning CORE interlock is OPERABLE. ALTERATION (s), and 2. CORE ALTERATION (s) shall not be 2. Resuming CORE performed using equipment associated ALTERATION (s) when the with a Refuel position interlock unless reactor mode switch has been at least the following associated Refuel unlocked. position interlocks are OPERABLE for such equipment. b. At least once per 12 hours. a. All rods in. 2. Each of the required reactor mode b. Refuel platform position. switch Refuel position interlocks'd shall c. Refuel platform hoists fuel-loaded, be demonstrated OPERABLE by d. Fuel grapple position. performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 24 hours prior to the start of and at least once i APPLICABILITY: per 7 days during control rod withdrawal or CORE ALTERATION (s), OPERATIONAL MODE 5"*. as applicable. a j 3. Each of the required reactor mode ACTION: switch Refuel position interlocks'd that is affected shall be demonstrated 1. With the reactor mode switch not OPERABLE by performance 'of a locked in the Shutdown or Refuel CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST prior to position as specified, suspend CORE resuming control rod withdrawal or ALTERATION (s) and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel

position, a

See Special Test Exceptions 3.12.A and 3.12.B b The reactor shall be maintained in OPERATIONAL MODE 5 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed. c The reactor mode switch may be placed in the Run or Startup/ Hot Standby position to test the switch interlock functions provided that all control rods are verified to remain fully inserted by a second licensed operator or other . technically qualified individual. DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-1 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130

REFUELING OPERATIONS Moda Switch 3/4.10.A 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 2. With the one-rod-out interlock CORE ALTERATION (s), as applicable, inoperable, lock the reactor mode following repair, maintenance or switch in the Shutdown position. replacement of any component that could affect the Refuel position 3. With any of the above required Refuel interlock. position equipment interlocks inoperable, suspend CORE ALTERATION (s) with equipment associated with the inoperable Refuel position equipment interlock. i l DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-2 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130

i 4 REFUELING OPERATIONS Instrumintition 3/4.10.B - 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS - B. ' instrumentation B. Instrumentation At least 2 source range monitor * (SRM) Each of the required SRM channels shall be CHANNEL (s) shall be OPERABLE and demonstrated OPERABLE by: inserted to the normal operating level with: 1. At least once per 12 hours: 1. Continuous visual indication in the control room, a. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK. 2. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE b. Verifying the detectors are inserted ALTERATION (s) are being performed to the normal operating level, and and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and c. During CORE ALTERATION (s), i verifying that the detector of an 3. Unless adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN OPERABLE SRM CHANNEL is has been demonstrated per located in the core quadrant where Specification 3.3.A and the "one-rod-CORE ALTERATION (s) are being out" Refuel position interlock has been performed and another is located in demonstrated OPERABLE per an adjacent quadrant. Specification 3.10.A, the " shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS 2. Performance of a CHANNEL i circuitry prior to and during the time FUNCTIONAL TEST: any control rod is withdrawn". a. Within 24 hours prior to the start of CORE ALTERATION (s), and APPLICABILITY: b. At least once per 7 days. OPERATIONAL MODE 5, unless the following conditions are met: 3. Verifying that the channel count rate is at least 3 cps *: 1. No more than two fuel assemblies are i present in each core quadrant a. Prior to control rod withdrawal, associated with an SRM; b. Prior to and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATION (s), l c. At least once per 24 hours. a The use of special movable detectors during CORE ALTERATION (s)in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors is permissible as long as these special detectors are connected to the normal SRM circuits. b Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.10.1 and 3.10.J i c May be reduced to 0.7 cps provided signal to noise ratio is greater than or equal to 2.0 DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-3 Amendment Nos. 136 8 130

REFUELING OPERATIONS Instrum:nt: tion 3/4.10.B 1 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 2. While in the core, these two fuel 4. Verifying, within 8 hours prior to and at i assemblies are in locations adjacent to least once per 12 hours during the tirne the SRM; and any control rod is withdrawn

• that the

" shorting links" have been removed 3. In the case of movable detectors, each from the RPS circuitry unless adequate i group of fuel assemblies shall be SHUTDOWN MARGIN has been separated by at least two fuel cell demonstrated per Specification 3.3.A locations from any other fuel and the "one-rod-out" Refuel position assemblies. interlock has been demonstrated OPERABLE per Specification 3.10.A. ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATION (s) and fully insert all insertable control rods. b Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.10.1 or 3.10.J DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10 4 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130

REFUELING OPERATIONS CR Positi n 3/4.10.C l-3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS C. Control Rod Position C. Control Rod Position 1 All control rods shall be fully inserted. All control rods shall be verified to be fully inserted, except as specified: APPLICABILITY: 1. Within 2 hours prior to: OPERATIONAL MODE 5 during CORE ALTERATION (s)*'. a. The start of CORE ALTERATION (s). b. The withdrawal of one control rod ACTION: under the control of the reactor mode switch Refuel position one-With all control rods not fully inserted, rod-out interlock. suspend all other CORE ALTERATION (s), except that one control rod may be 2. At least once per 12 hours. withdrawn under control of the reactor mode switch Refuel position one-rod-out interlock. l a Except control rods removed per Specification 3.10.1 or 3.10.J or one control rod withdrawn under control of the reactor mode switch refuel position one-rod-out interlock. b See Special Test Exception 3.12.8 DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-5 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130 l 1

.h, .l REFUELING OPERATIONS D:czy Tims 3/4.10.D 3.1'O - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

D.

Decay Time D. Decay Time i i ' The reactor shall be subcritical for at least The reactor shall be determined to have l 24 hours, been subcritical for at least 24 hours by- .j verification of the date and time of l suberiticality prior to movement of. L irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure -i APPLICABILITY: i - vessel. j OPERATIONAL MODE 5, during movemer.t of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure l vessel. t ACTION: With the reactor subcritical for less than 24 - l hours, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. j i i i J 1 I l DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-6 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130 l J

REFUELING OPERATIONS-Communicatiens 3/4.10.E. I 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ~ E. Communications : E. Communications Direct communication shall be maintained . Direct communication between the control between the control room and refueling . room and refueling platform personnel shall platform personnel, be demonstrated within one hour prior to the start of and at least once per 12 hours - during CORE ALTERATION (s). APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL' MODE 5, during CORE ALTERATION (s)"'. ACTION: When direct communication between the - control room and refueling platform _ personnel cannot be maintained, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATION (s). a-Except movement of control rods with their nor:nal drive system. DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-7 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130

' ;o; f L REFUELING OPERATIONS Crena Trav11. 3/4.10.F.

• i x

I .I i. 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -f 3.10 l LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

F..

Crane Travel. F. Crane Travel j All movements of a spent fuel shipping 1. The spent fuel shipping cask' cask above the 545 foot elevation of the " Restricted Mode". path control system Reactor Building shall be controlled by the of the reactor building crane shall be. < Restricted Mode" path control system of demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days j the reactor building crane. prior to and at least once per 7 days l during spent fuel shipping cask

movement over the refueling floor.

l l APPLICABILITY: l 2. The redundant crane including the rope, - At all times. hooks, slings, shackles and other l operating mechanisms shall be. l ' inspected prior to spent fuel shipping ACTION: cask handling operations and the' rope will be replaced if any of the following With the requirements of the above conditions exist: i specification not satisfied: [ a. Twelve randomly distributed 1. Operation may continue with a failed broken wires in one lay or four j controlled area limit switch for 48 broken wires in one strand of one hours provided an operator is on the rope lay. j refueling floor to assure the reactor building crane is operated within the b. Wear of one-third of the original. - restricted zone painted on the floor, or diameter of outside individual wire, j 2. Place the crane load in a safe condition.

c.. Kinking, crushing, or any other _-

l damage resulting in distortion of l The provisions of Specification 3.0.C are .the rope. j not applicable.

d.. Evidence of any type of heat l

damage. j e. Reductions from' nominal diameter ~ of more than 1/16 inch for a rope j diamster from 7/8 inch to 1-1/4 l inch inclusive. 3. The spent fuel cask will be lifted free of all support by a maximum of 1 foot and ' ll left hanging for 5 minutes prior to i spent fuel cask handling operations. DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-8 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130

~, ?' ' REFUELING OPERATIONS R:cetor W;ttr Lcv;l 3/4.10.G i 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS G.' Water Level-Reactor Vessel G. Water Level - Reactor Vessel J At least 23 feet of water shall be The reactor vessel water level shall be maintained over the top of the reactor determined to be at least its minimum pressure vessel flange. required depth within 2 hours prior.to the start of and at least once per 24 hours during handling of fuel assemblies or APPLICABILITY: control rods within the reactor pressure j vessel. During handling of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel while in OPERATIONAL MODE 5 -{ when the fuel assemblies or control rods r being hanoled are irradiated or th'e fuel assemblies or control rods seated within the reactor vessel are irradiated. ACTION: i With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all i operations involving handling of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel after placing all fuel I assemblies and control rods in a safe condition. 4 .j i i ) i i DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-9 Amendment Nos. 135 & 130

A A, LREFUELING OPERATIONS Pool Water Level 3/4.10.H -l ~ 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H. f Water Level-Spent Fuel Storage Pool-H. Water Level - Spent Fuel Storage Pool-At least 23 feet of water shall be The water level in the spent fuel storage I maintained over the top of irradiated fuel pool shall be determined to be at least at'its assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage minimum required depth at least once per 7. i pool racks. days. L b. b APPLICABILITY: I Whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel storage pool. 'i ACTION: With the requirements of the above' specification not satisfied, suspend all movement of fuel assemblies and crane' .i operations with loads in the spent fuel i storage pool area after placing the fuel assemblies and crane load in a safe -condition. The provisions of Specification 3.0.C are not applicable. i i 1 l DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-10 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130 l H .i j

REFUELING OPERATIONS CR R:m:: val 3/4.10.1 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1. Single Control Rod Removal I. Single Control Rod Removal One control rod and/or the associated Within 4 hours prior to the start of removal control rod drive mechanism may be of a control rod and/or the associated removed from the core and/or reactor control rod drive mechanism from the core pressure vessel provided that at least the and/or reactor pressure vessel and at least following requirements are satisfied until a once per 24 hours thereafter until a control control rod and associated control rod drive rod and associated control drive mechanism mechanism are reinstalled and the control are reinstalled and the control rod is fully rod is fully inserted in the core. inserted in the core, verify that: 1. The reactor mode switch is OPERABLE 1. The reactor mode switch is OPERABLE and locked in the Shutdown position or per Surveillance Requirement 4.1.A.1 in the Refuel position per Table 1-2 and or 4.10.A.2, as applicable, and locked Specification 3.10.A. in the Shutdown position or in the Refuel position with the "one-rod-out" 2. The source range monitors (SRM) are Refuel position interlock OPERABLE per OPERABLE per Specification 3.10.B. Specification 3.10.A. 3. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN 2. The SRM CHANNEL (s) are OPERABLE requirements of Specification 3.3.A are per Specification 3.10.B. satisfied, except that the control rod selected to be removed; 3. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.3.A are a. May be assumed to be the highest satisfied per Specification 3.10.l.3. worth control rod required to be assumed to be fully withdrawn by 4. All other control rods in a five-by-five the SHUTDOWN MARGIN test, and array centered on the control rod being removed are either: b. Need not be assumed to be immovable or unscrammable. a. Fully inserted and electrically or hydraulically disarmed, or 4. All other control rods in a five-by-five j array centered on the control rod being b. The four fuel assemblies i removed are either: surrounding the control rod or control rod drive mechanism to be a. Fully inserted and electrically or removed from the core and/or hydraulically disarmed, or reactor vessel are removed from the core cell b. The four fuel assemblies j surrounding the control rod or 5. All other control rods are fully inserted. control rod drive mechanism to be removed from the core and/or reactor vessel are removed from the core cell. ] l DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-11 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130 l 1

7,.% CR R2m:vil 3/4.10.1 - REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION-4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS r

5.

All other control rods are fully inserted. ~ APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL MODE (s) 4 and 5. ACTION: [ With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend removal of the control rod and/or associated control 1 . rod drive mechanism from the core and/or l reactor pressure vessel and initiate ACTION i to satisfy the above requirements. l l l r i i l I r l l 1 DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-12 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130 1

REFUELING OPERATIONS Multipla CR R;moval 3/4.10.J 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS J. Multiple Control Rod Removal J. Multiple Control Rod Removal Any number of control rods and/or control 1. Within 4 hours prior to the start of rod drive mechanisms may be removed removal of control rods and/or control from the core and/or reactor pressure rod onve mechanisms from the core vessel provided that at least the following and/or reactor pressure vessel and at requirements are satisfied until all control least once per 24 hours thereafter until rods and control rod drive mechanisms are all control rods and control rod drive reinstalled and all control rods are fully mechanisms are reinstalled and all inserted in the core. control rods are fully inserted in the core, verify that: 1. The reactor mode switch is OPERABLE and locked in the Shutdown position or a. The reactor mode switch is in the Refuel position per Specification OPERABLE per Surveillance 3.10.A, except that the Refuel position Requirement 4.1.A.1 or 4.10.A.2, "one-rod-out" interlock may be as applicable, and locked in the bypassed, as required, for those control Shutdown position or in the Refuel rods and/or control rod drive position per Specification 3.10.A. mechanisms to be removed, after the fuel assemblies have been removed as b. The SRM CHANNEL (s) are specified below. OPERABLE per Specification 3.10.B. 2. The source range monitors (SRM) are OPERABLE per Specification 3.10.B. c. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.3.A 3. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN are satisfied. requirements of Specification 3.3.A are satisfied. d. All other control rods are either fully inserted or have the 4. All other control rods are either fully surrounding four fuel assemblies inserted or have the surrounding four removed from the core cell. fuel assemblies removed from the core cell. e. The four fuel assemblies surrounding each control rod and/or 5. The four fuel assemblies nurrounding control rod drive mechanism to be each control rod or control rod drive removed from the core and/or mechanism to be removed from the reactor vessel are removed from core and/or reactor vessel are removed the core cell. from the core cell. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL MODE 5. DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-13 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130

t -j ~ f TREFUE NG' OPERATIONS Multipla CR Rimavil' 3/4.10.J ; i ~ 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION j.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ' E^ { w ACTION:

2.. Following replacement of.all control-s rods and/or control rod drive.

. With the requirements of the sbove mechanisms removed in accordance -specification not satisfied, suspend removal with this specification, perform a of control rods and/or control rod drive functional test of the "one-rod-out" - I mechanisms from the core and/or reactor Refuel position interlock,'if this function' pressure vessel and initiate ACTION to had been bypassed. satisfy the above requirements. l i e I i i ~k i ) I i 1 1 DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-14 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130 l

w .x i ' REFUELING OPERATIONS SDC High Wcter L2 vel 3/4.10.K 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 5 K. Shutdown Cooling and Coolant Circulation - K. Shutdown Cooling and Coolant Circulation - i High Water Level. High Water Level At_least one shutdown cooling (SDC) loop At least one SDC loop shall be verified to shall be OPERABLE and in operation *, with be in operation and circulating reactor-at least: coolant at least once per 12 hours. 1.- One OPERABLE SDC pump, and 2. One OPERABLE SDC heat exchanger. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL MODE 5, when irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the water levelis 223 feet above the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange. i ACTION: I 1. With no SDC loop OPERABLE, within one hour and at least once per 24 hours thereafter, demonstrate the operability of at least one alternate method capable of decay heat removal. Otherwise, suspend all operations involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load and establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 4 hours. 2. With no SDC loop in operation, within one hour establish reactor coolant l circulat!sn by an alternate method, monitor reactor coolant temperature at least once per hour, and verify reactor = coolant circulation at least once per 12 hours. a The shutdown cooling pump may be removed from operation for up to 2 hours per 8-hour period. i DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-15 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130 I ~

~ REFUELING OPERATIONS SDC Low WLtsr Lsval 3/4.10 L i p 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l L. ' Shutdown Cooling and Coolant Circulation - L. Shutdown Cooling and Coolant Circulation - l l Low Water Level Low Water Level Two shutdown cooling (SDC) loops shall be . At least one SDC loop shall be verified to f OPERABLE and at least one loop shall be in be in operation and circulating reactor operation"', with each loop consisting of at coolant at least once per 12 hours. I least-i l' i 1. One OPERABLE SDC pump, and l 2. One OPERABLE SDC heat exchanger. P APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL MODE 5, when irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the water levelis <23 feet above the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange. l ACTION: 1. With less than the above required SDC loops OPERABLE, within one hour and at least once per 24 hours thereafter, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of at least one alternate method capable of j decay heat removal for each inoperable SDCloop. 2. With no SDC loop in operation, within i one hour establish reactor coolant. j circulation by an alternate method, monitor reactor coolant temperature at least once per hour, and verify reactor + coolant circulation at least once per 12 hours. [ l t a i l a. .The shutdown cooling pump may be removed from operation for up to 2 hours per 8-hour period. j DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 3/4.10-16 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130

i REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3/4.10 BASES 3/4.10. A Reactor Mode Switch Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity. The addition of large amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures, which are in turn backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of the refueling platform. When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform from being moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuelis on a hoist. If the refueling platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is blocked by the interlocks. With the mode switch in the refuel position only one control rod can be withdrawn. 3/4.10.B instrumentation The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core, whenever reactor criticality is possible. The source range monitors (SRM) are provided to monitor the core during periods of station shutdown and to guide the operator during refueling operations and reactor startup. Requiring two OPERABLE source range monitors in and adjacent to any core quadrant where fuel or control rods are being moved assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant during such alterations. Requiring a minimum of 3 counts per second whenever criticality is possible provides assurance that neutron flux is being monitored. The SRM system is designed to provide a signal-to-noise ratio of at least 3:1 and a count rate of at least 3 counts per second. For a signal-to-noise ratio of 2:1, the count rate must be at least 0.7 counts per second. Criticality is considered to be impossible if there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant and if these are in locations adjacent to the source range monitors (i.e., spatially separated). Special movable detectors may be used during CORE ALTERATION (s) in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors. These special detectors must be connected to the normal SRM circuits such that the applicable neutron flux indication, control rod blocks and scram signals can be generated. The special detectors provide more flexibility in monitoring reactivity changes during fuel loading since they can be positioned anywhere within the core during refueling provided they meet the location requirements of the specification. When the Reactor Protection System shorting links are removed, the source range monitors provide added protection against local criticalities by providing an initiating signal for a reactor scram on high neutron flux. DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 8 3/4.10-1 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130

REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3/4.10 I BASES 3/4.10.C Control Rod Position The requirement that all control rods be inserted during other CORE ALTERATION (s) ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without an inserted control rod. 3/4.10.D Decay Time The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to fuel movement ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. 3/4.10.E Communications The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status regarding core reactivity conditions during movement of fuel within the reactor pressure vessel. 3/4.10.F Crane Travel The operation of the reactor building crane in the Restricted Mode during spent fuel shipping cask handling operations, assures that the cask remains within the controlled area once it has been removed from its transport vehicle. The surveillance requirements specified assure that the crane is adequately inspected in accordance with the accepted ANSI Standard (B.30.2.0) and the manufacturer's recommendations to determine that the equipment is in satisfactory condition. The testing of the controlled area limit switches assures that the crane operation will be limited to the designated area in the Restricted Mode of operation. Requiring the lifting and holding of the cask for 5 minutes during the initial lift of cask handling operations puts a load test on the entire crane lifting mechanism as well as the braking system. Performing this test when the cask is being lifted initially assures that the system is OPERABLE prior to lifting the load to excessive height. 3/4.10.G Water Level - Reactor Vessel l 3/4.10.H Water Level-Spent Fuel Storage Pool ) The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove - 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. This minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis. DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 B 3/4.10-2 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130

4 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3/4.10 BASES 3/4.10.1 Sinale Control Rod Removal 1 3/4.10.J Multiple Control Rod Removal These specifications ensure that maintenance or repair of control rods or control rod drives will be performed under conditions that limit the probability of inadvertent criticality. The requirements for simultaneous removal of more than one control rod are more stringent since the SHUTDOWN MARGIN specification provides for the core to remain subcritical with only one control rod fully withdrawn. Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling i equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. l These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the reactor core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN exists. Verification that all the other control rods are fully inserted is required to assure the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is within the limits. Verification that the five-by-five array of control rods are inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn control rod is not available is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod is permitted to be withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. When all four fuel assemblies are removed from a core cell, the control rod may be withdrawn with no restrictions. With no fuel assemblies in the core cell, the associated control rod has no reactivity control function and is not required to remain inserted. Prior to reloading fuel into the core cell, the associated control rod must be inserted to ensure that an inadvertent criticality does not occur. 3/4.10.K Shutdown Coolina and Coolant Circulation - Hiah Water Level 3/4.10.L Shutdown Coolina and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling loop be OPERABLE and in operation or that an alternate method capable of decay haat removal be demonstrated ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140*F as required during REFUELING. The requirement to have two shutdown cooling loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating loop will not result in a complete loss of shutdown cooling capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop, adequate time is provided to initiate alternate methods capable of decay heat removal or emergency procedures to cool the core. DRESDEN - UNITS 2 & 3 B 3/4.10-3 Amendment Nos. 136 & 130

4 e2 No p M1 UNITED STATES g g j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t WASHINGTON, D.C. 20N50001 A...../ COMMONWEALTH EDIS0N COMPANY AND IOWA-ILLIN0IS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-254 OUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 157 License No. DPR-29 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated February 16, 1993, as supplemented by letter dated May 2,1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;- l C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; i and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-29 is hereby i amended to read as follows: i

_2_ 'B. Technical ' Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 157, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications. 3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and. shall be implemented no later than June 30, 1996. FOR THE. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION / Robert M. Pulsifer, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: June 23, 1995 l e l j

i _ gh' \\ .j - g. ~ 3 UNITED CTATES E j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20066-0001 \\...../ COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY m IOWA-ILLIN0IS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-265 OVAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 153 License No. DPR-30 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated February 16, 1993, as supplemented by letter dated May 2,1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-30 is hereby 4 amended to read as follows: j l 1

- 2.- B. Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 153, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications. j 3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented no later'than June 30, 1996. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i Robert M. Puls fer, Project Manager Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

l Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: June 23, 1995 1 i l i i

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 157 AND 153 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-29 AND DPR-30 DOCKET NOS. 50-254 AND 50-265 Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number. UNIT 1 UNIT 2 REMOVE REMOVE INSERT 3.10/4.10-1 3/4.10-1 3/4.10-1 3.10/4.10-2 3/4.10-2 3/4.10-2 3.10/4.10-3 3/4.10-3 3/4.10-3 3.10/4.10-4 3/4.10-3a 3/4.10-4 3.10/4.10-5 3/4.10-4 3/4.10-5 3.10/4.10-6 3/4.10-5 3/4.10-6 3.10/4.10-7 3/4.10-6 3/4.10-7 3.10/4.10-8 3/4.10-8 3.10/4.10-9 3/4.10-9 i 3.10/4.10-10 3/4.10-10 l 3/4.10-11 l 3/4.10-12 3/4.10-13 3/4.10-14 3/4.10-15 3/4.10-16 B 3/4.10-1 B 3/4.10-2 B 3/4.10-3 1 l f t i;

REFUELING OPERATIONS Mod] Switch 3/4.10.A 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS A. Reactor Mode Switch A. Reactor Mode Switch The reactor mode switch shall be 1. The reactor mode switch shall be OPERABLE and locked in the Shutdown or verified to be locked in the Shutdown Refuel position. When the reactor made or Refuel position as specified: switch is locked in the Refuel position: a. Within 2 hours prior to: 1. A control rod shall not be withdrawn unless the Refuel position one-rod-out 1. Beginning CORE interlock is OPERABLE. ALTERATION (s), and 2. CORE ALTERATION (s) shall not be 2. Resuming CORE performed using equipment associated ALTERATION (s) when the with a Refuel position interlock unless reactor mode switch has been at least the following associated Refuel

unlocked, position interlocks are OPERABLE for such equipment.

b. At least once per 12 hours. a. All rods in. 2. Each of the required reactor mode b. Refuel platform position. switch Refuel position interlocksshall c. Refuel platform hoists fuel-loaded. be demonstrated OPERABLE by d. Fuel grapple position. performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 24 hours prior to the start of and at least once APPLICABILITY: per 7 days during control rod withdrawal or CORE ALTERATION (s), OPERATIONAL MODE 5*'. as applicable. 3. Each of the required reactor mode ACTION: switch Refuel position interlocks that is affected shall be demonstrated 1. With the reactor mode switch not OPERABLE by performance of a locked in the Shutdown or Refuel CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST prior to position as specified, suspend CORE resuming control rod withdrawal or ALTERATION (s) and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position. a See Special Test Exceptions 3.12.A and 3.12.B b The reactor shall be maintained in OPERATIONAL MODE 5 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed. c The reactor mode switch may be placed in the'Run or Startup/ Hot Standby position to test the switch interlock functions provided that all control rods are verified to remain fully inserted by a second licensert operator or other technically qualified individual. QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-1 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153

-t.. i REFUELING OPERATIONS Moda Switch 3/4.10.A 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 2. With the one-rod-out interlock CORE ALTERATION (s), as applicable, inoperable, lock the reactor mode following repair, maintenance or switch in the Shutdown position, replacement of any component that could affect the Refuel position 3. With any of the above required Refuel interlock. position equipment interlocks inoperable, suspend CORE ALTERATION (s) with equipment associated with the inoperable Refuel position equipment interlock. t 3 l i i i l QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-2 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153

i

' REFUELING OPERATIONS Instrumtntation 3/4.10.8 '3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS B. Instrumentation B. Instrumentation At least 2 source range monitor * (SRM) Each of the required SRM channels shall be CHANNEL (s) shall be OPERABLE and demonstrated OPERABLE by: inserted to the normal operating level with: 1. At least once per 12 hours: 1. Continuous visual indication in the l control room,- a. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK.- 2. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE b. Verifying the detectors are inserted ALTERATION (s) are being performed to the normal operating level, and i and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and c. During CORE ALTERATION (s), verifying that the detector of an 3. Unless adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN OPERABLE SRM CHANNEL is has been demonstrated per located in the core quadrant where Specification 3.3.A and the "one-rod. CORE ALTERATION (s) are being out" Refuel position interlock has been performed and another is located in demonstrated OPERABLE per an adjacent quadrant. I Specification 3.10.A, the " shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS 2. Performance of a CHANNEL ~ circuitry prior to and during the time FUNCTIONAL TEST: any control rod is withdrawn". l a. Within 24 hours prior to the start of CORE ALTERATION (s), and APPLICABILITY: b. At least once per 7 days. OPERATIONAL MODE 5, unless the following conditions are met: 3. Verifying that the channel count rate is at least 3 cps *: 1. No more than two fuel assemblies are w present in each core quadrant a. Prior to control rod withdrawal, associated with an SRM; b. Prior to and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATION (s), c. At least once per 24 hours. a The use of special movable detectors during CORE ALTERATION (s)in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors is permissible as long as these special detectors are connected to the normal SRM circuits. b Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.10.1 and 3.10.J c May be reduced to 0.7 cps provided signal to noise ratio is greater than or equal to 2.0 QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-3 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153

REFUELING OPERATIONS Instrum::ntation 3/4.10.B 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 2. While in the core, these two fuel 4. Verifying, within 8 hours prior to and at assemblies are in locations adjacent to least once per 12 hours during the time the SRM; and any control rod is withdrawn" that the " shorting links" have been removed 3. In the case of movable detectors, each from the RPS circuitry unless adequate group of fuel assemblies shall be SHUTDOWN MARGIN has been separated by at least two fuel cell demonstrated per Specification 3.3.A locations from any other fuel and the "one-rod-out" Refuel position assemblies. interlock has been demonstrated OPERABLE per Specification 3.10.A. ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATION (s) and fully insert all insertable control rods. i b Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.10.1 or 3.10.J i QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10 4 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153

m, p a, ) l REFUELING OPERATIONS - CR Polition 3/4.10.C J ' 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEll' LANCE REQUIREMENTS ] C. Control Rod Position C. Control Rod Position All control rods shall be fully inserted. All control rods shall be verified to be fully inserted, except as specified: ' APPLICABILITY: .. Within 2 hours prior to: 1. OPERATIONAL MODE 5 during CORE ' ALTERATION (s)P. a. The start of CORE Al.TERATION(s).' l i b. The withdrawal of one control rod 1 ACTION: under the control of the reactor mode switch Refuel position one-With all control rods not fully inserted, rod-out interlock. suspend all other CORE ALTERATION (s), I except that one control rod may be 2. At least once per 12 hours. withdrawn under control of the reactor mode switch Refuel position one-rod-out interlock. i ? i l t l l i 4 I I i j a Except control rods removed per Specification 3.10.1 or 3.10.J or one control rod withdrawn under control of the reactor mode switch refuel position one-rod-out interlock. i b See Special Test Exception 3.12.B l QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-5 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153 .ii

~ I REFUELING OPERATIONS D; cay Tima 3/4.10.D 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS D. Decay Time D. Decay Time The reactor shall be suberitical for at least The reactor shall be determined to have 24 hours, been subcritical for at least 24 hours by verification of the date and time of suberiticality prior to movement of APPLICABILITY: irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. OPERATIONAL MODE 5, during movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. ACTION: With the reactor subcritical for less than 24 hours, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. 34,106 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153 QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 /

-l j 'a REFUELING OPERATIONS' Communications 3/4.10.E l p '3.10 - LIMITING' CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION : 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E. Communications E. Communications Direct communication shall be maintained Direct communication between the control l . between the control room and refueling. room and refueling platform personnel shall l ~ platform personnel. be demonstrated within one hour prior to the start of and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATION (s). APPLICABILITY. ? OPERATIONAL MODE 5, during CORE l ALTERATION (s)*'. j [ ACTION: I When direct communication between the control room and refueling platform personnel cannot be maintained, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATION (s). j l l i f i [ i t t v a .Except movement of control rods with their normal drive system. I QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-7 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153 l i e

REFUELING OPERATIONS Cr ne Trav;l 3/4.10.F 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS F. Crane Travel F. Crane Travel All rnovements of a spent fuel shipping 1. The spent fuel shipping cask cask above the 623 foot elevation of the " Restricted Mode" path control system Reactor Building shall be controlled by the of the reactor building crane shall be " Restricted Mode" path control system of demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days the reactor building crane. prior to and at least once per 7 days during spant fuel shipping cask movement above the 623 foot APPLICABILITY: elevation of the reactor building. At all times. 2. The redundant crane including the rope, hooks, slings, shackles and other operating mechanisms shall be ACTION: inspected prior to spent fuel shipping cask handling operations and the rope With the requirements of the above will be replaced if any of the following toecification not satisfied: conditions exist: a. Twelve randomly distributed 1. Operation may continue with a failed broken wires in one lay or four controlled area limit switch for 48 broken wires in one strand of one hours provided an operator is on the rope lay. ) refueling floor to assure the reactor building crane is operated within the b. Wear of one-third of the original restricted zone painted on the floor, or diameter of outside individual wire. 2. Place the crane load in a safe condition. c. Kinking, crushing, or any other damage resulting in distortion of The provisions of Specification 3.0.C are the rope. not applicable. d. Evidence of any type of heat damage. ~ e. Reductions from nominal diameter of more than 1/16 inch for a rope diameter from 7/8 inch to 1-1/4 inch inclusive. 3. The spent fuel cask will be lifted free of all support by a maximum of 1 foot and j left hanging for 5 minutes prior to spent fuel cask handling operations. QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-8 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153

m: b JREFUELING OPERATIONS. Rs:ct:r Wcttr Lcvil 3/4.10.G 3.'10' LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 'G. Water Level-Reactor Vessel G. Water Level-Reactor Vessel At least 23 feet of water shall be . The reactor vessel water level shall be - maintained.over the top of the reactor determined to be at least its minimum pressure vessel flange. . required depth within 2 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours during handling of fuel assemblies or- ' APPLICABILITY: control rods within the reactor pressure vessel. During handling of. fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel while in OPERATIONAL MODE 5 when the fuel assemblies or control rods [being handled are irradiated or the fuel assemblies or control rods seated within the reactor vessel are irradiated. ' ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not saticfied, suspend all operations involving handling of fuel assemblies or control rods within the - reactor pressure vessel after placing all fuel assemblies and control rods in a safe condition. -i l s QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-9 Amendment Nos.157 & 153 l i.

I -l ~."" iREFUELING OPERATIONS Po:1 Watzr Laval 3/4.10.H. i 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION -4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 'l H.~. Water Level - Spent Fuel Storage Pool - - H. Water Level - Spent Fuel Storage Pool At least 23 feet of water shall be The water level in the spent fuel storage 'l maintained over the top of irradiated fuel pool shall be determined to be at least at its assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage minimum required depth at least once per 7 j pool racks. days. APPLICABILITY: -i Whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel storage pool. i ACTION: With the requirements of the above j specification not satisfied, suspend all j movement of fuel assemblies and crane operations with loads in the spent fuel storage pool area after placing the fuel assemblies and crane load in a safe condition. The provisions of Specification 3.0.C are not applicable. l i i i I i i i QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-10 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153

c REFUELING OPERATIONS - CR Removal 3/4.10.1 1 ' 3'.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1. Single Control Rod Removal 1. Single Control Rod Removal One control rod and/or the associated Within 4 hours prior to the start of removal' control rod drive mechanism may be of a control rod and/or the associated removed from the core and/or reactor control rod drive mechanism from the core pressure vessel provided that at least the and/or reactor pressure vessel and at least following requirements are satisfied until a once per 24 hours thereafter until a control control rod and associated control rod drive rod and associated control drive mechanism mechanism are reinstalled and the control are reinstalled and the control rod is fully - rod is fully inserted in the core. inserted in the core, verify that: 1. The reactor mode switch is OPERABLE 1. The reactor mode switch is OPERABLE l and locked in the Shutdown position or per Surveillance Requirement 4.1.A.1 in the Refuel position per Table 1-2 and or 4.10.A.2, as applicable, and locked Specification 3.10.A. in the Shutdown position or in the i Refuel position with the "one-rod-out" 2. The source range monitors (SRM) are Refuel position interlock OPERABLE per OPERABLE per Specification 3.10.8. Specification 3.10.A. ) 3. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN 2. The SRM CHANNEL (s) are OPERABLE requirements of Specification 3.3.A are per Specification 3.10.B. I satisfied, except that the control rod selected to be removed; 3. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.3.A are a. May be assumed to be the highest satisfied per Specification 3.10.l.3. j worth control rod required to be i assumed to be fully withdrawn by 4. All other control rods in a five-by-five the SHUTDOWN MARGIN test, and array centered on the control rod being removed are either-b. Need not be assumed to be l immovable or unscrammable. a. Fully inserted and electrically or hydraulically disarmed, or 4. All other control rods in a five-by-five array centered on the control rod being b. The four fuel assemblies removed are either: surrounding the control rod or control rod drive mechanism to be a. Fully inserted and electrically or removed from the core and/or hydraulically disarmed, or reactor vessel are removed from the core cell. b. The four fuel assemblies surrounding the control rod or 5. All other control rods are fully inserted, control rod drive mechanism to be removed from the core and/or reactor vessel are removed from the core cell. i ) QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-11 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153 1

p, ll n-s. .l REFUELING OPERATIONS 1. CR R:msval 3/4.10.1: [ ] i 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION. 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS - 5.' All other control rods are fully inserted. j 4-APPLICABILITY: l l OPERATIONAL MODE (s) 4 and 5. l ..j . I ACTION: l With the requirements of the above ~ specification not satisfied, suspend removal of the control rod and/or associated control . rod drive mechanism from the core and/or reactor pressure vessel and initiate ACTION .to satisfy the above requirements. l 1 i 1 i i - QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-12 Amendment Nos.157 & 153 c ..e. y ,,,g se M v

.v REFUELING OPERATIONS Multipla CR R;m::v:1 3/4.10.J 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS J. Multiple Control Rod Removal J. Multiple Control Rod Removal Any number of control rods and/or control 1. Within 4 hours prior to the start of rod drive mechanisms may be removed removal of control rods and/or control from the core and/or reactor pressure rod drive mechanisms from the core vessel provided that at least the following and/or reactor pressure vessel and at requirements are satisfied until all control least once per 24 hours thereafter until rods and control rod drive mechanisms are all control rods and control rod drive reinstalled and all control rods are fully mechanisms are reinstalled and all inserted in the core, control rods are fully inserted in the core, verify that: 1. The reactor mode switch is OPERABLE i and locked in the Shutdown position or a. The reactor mode switch is in the Refuel position per Specification OPERABLE per Surveillance 3.10.A, except that the Refuel position Requirement 4.1.A.1 or 4.10.A.2, "one-rod-out" interlock may be as applicable, and locked in the bypassed, as required, for those control Shutdown position or in the Refuel rods and/or control rod drive position per Specification 3.10.A. mechanisms to be removed, after the fuel assemblies have been removed as b. The SRM CHANNEL (s) are specified below. OPERABLE per Specification 2. The source range monitors (SRM) are OPERABLE per Specification 3.10.B. c. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.3.A 3. The SHUTDOWN MARGIN are satisfied. requirements of Specification 3.3.A are 3 satisfied. d. All other control rods are either fully inserted or have the i 4. All other control rods are either fully surrounding four fuel assemblies inserted or have the surrounding four removed from the core cell. fuel assemblies removed from the core cell. e. The four fuel assemblies surrounding each control rod and/or 5. The four fuel assemblies surrounding control rod drive mechanism to be each control rod or control rod drive removed from the core and/or mechanism to be removed from the reactor vessel are removed from core and/or reactor vessel are remteved the core cell. from the core cell. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL MODE 5. QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-13 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153

.+ -: [ ' REFUELING OPERATIONS Mu'Itipla CR R:msvtl 3/4.10.J - p L-F. - 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION - 4.10 - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l ~! ACTION: 2. Following replacement of all control j - rods and/or control rod drive -l With the requirements of the above mechanisms removed in accordance . specification not satisfied, suspend removal . with this specification, perform a i of control rods and/or' control rod drive functional test of.the "one-rod-out" mechanisms from the core and/or reactor Refuel position interlock, if this function. pressure vessel'and initiate ACTION to .had been bypassed, satisfy the above' requirements. l i I i l i I QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-14 Amendment Nos. 157 4 153

'~g I' , REFUELING OPERATIONS - RHR High Wct2r Lsv:13/4.10.K l J 7 3.10 - LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.10 -' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j K. Residual Heat Removal and Coolant K. Residual Heat Removal and Coolant

l Circulation - High Water. Level-Circulation - High Water Level

{ ' At least one shutdown cooling mode loop 1. At least one shutdown cooling mode 2 of the residual heat removal (RHR) system-loop of the RHR system shall be l l shall be OPERABLE with at least: verified to be capable of circulating l - reactor coolant at least once per 12 1. One OPERABLE RHR pump, and hours. 2. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. 2. Monitor the reactor coolant ei H temperature at least once per hour. APPLICABILITY: j i OPERATIONAL MODE 5, when irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the water - j levelis 223 feet above the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange. i ACTION: I With no RHR shutdown cooling mode loop --OPERABLE, within one hour and at least .l once per 24 hours thereafter, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of at least one alternate

i method capable of decay heat removal.

l Otherwise, suspend all operations involving _j - an increase in the reactor decay heat load and establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 4 hours. I ? f J l 9 QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-15 Amendment Nos. 157L& 153 l

' REFUELING OPERATIONS - RHR Low Wstrr LsvIl 3/4.3.L i - 3.10. LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION ' 4.10.- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l L. Residual Heat Removal and Coolant. L. Residual Heat Removal and Coolant j Circulation - Low Water Level Circulation - Low Water Level Two shutdown cooling mode loops of the 1. At least one shutdown cooling mode. residual heat removal (RHR) system shall be loop of the RHR system shall be OPERABLE, with each loop consisting of at verified to be capable of circulating least: reactor coolant at least once per 12 l hours. ]

1. ' One OPERABLE RHR pump, and 2.

Monitor the reactor coolant 2. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. . temperature at least once per hour. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL MODE 5, when irradiated. l fuel is in the reactor vessel and the water levelis <23 feet above the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange. ACTION: With less than the above required shutdown cooling mode loops of the RHR j system OPERABLE, within one hour and at j least once per 24 hours thereafter, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of at least one alternate method capable of decay heat I removal for each inoperable RHR shutdown i cooling mode loop. i i i i I e 1 . QUAD CITIES UNITS 1 & 2 3/4.10-16 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153 1 l l i'

REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3/4.10 BASES 3 /4.10. A Reactor Mode Switch Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel position, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity. The addition of large amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures, which are in turn backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of the refueling platform. When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform from being moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuelis on a hoist. If the refueling platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is blocked by the interlocks. With the mode switch in the refuel position only one control rod can be withdrawn. 3/4.10.B Instrumentation The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core, whenever reactor criticality is possible. The source range monitors (SRM) are provided to monitor the core during periods of station shutdown and to guide the operator durir.g refueling operations and reactor startup. Requiring two OPERABLE source range monitors in and adjacent to any core quadrant where fuel or control rods are being moved assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant during such alterations. Requiring a minimum of 3 counts per second whenever criticality is possible provides assurance that neutron flux is being monitored. The SRM system is designed to provide a signal-to-noise ratio of at least 3:1 and a count rate of at least 3 counts per second. For a signal-to-noise ratio of 2:1, the count rate must be at least 0.7 counts per second. Criticality is considered to be impossible if there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant and if these are in locations adjacent to the source range monitors (i.e., spatially separated). Special movable detectors may be used during CORE ALTERATION (s) in place of the normal SRM neutron detectors. These special detectors must be connected to the normal SRM circuits such that the applicable neutron flux indication, control rod blocks and scram signals can be generated. The special detectors provide more flexibility in monitoring reactivity changes during fuel loading since they can be positioned anywhere within the core during refueling provided they meet the location requirements of the specification. When the Reactor Protection System shorting links are removed, the source range monitors provide added protection against local criticalities by providing an initiating signal for a reactor scram on high neutron flux. QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4.10-1 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153

REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3/4.10 BASES _ _ _ _... _ - _ _ _. _ _.... _. _. ~. _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3/4.10.C Control Rod Position The requirement that all control rods be inserted during other CORE ALTERATION (s) ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without an inserted control rod. 3/4.10.D Decay Time The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to fuel movement ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. 3/4.10.E Communications The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status regarding core reactivity conditions during movement of fuel within the reactor pressure vessel. 3/4.10.F Crane Travel The operation of the reactor building crane in the Restricted Mode during spent fuel shipping cask handling operations assures that the cask remains within the controlled area once it has been removed from its transport vehicle. The surveillance requirements specified assure that the crane is adequately inspected in accordance with the accepted ANSI Standard (B.30.2.0) and the manufacturer's recommendations to determine that the equipment is in satisfactory condition. The j testing of the controlled area limit switches assures that the crane operation will be limited to the l designated area in the Restricted Mode of operation. Requiring the lifting and holding of the cask for 5 minutes during the initiallift of cask handling operations puts a load test on the entire crane j lifting mechanism as well as the braking system. Performing this test when the cask is being lifted initially assures that the system is OPERABLE prior to lifting the load to excessive height. 3/4.10.G Water Level - Reactor Vessel 3/4.10.H Water Level-Spent Fuel Storage Pool The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. This minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis. QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4.10 2 Amendment Nos. 157 & 153

'O REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3/4.10 BASES 3/4.10.1 Sinale Control Rod Removal 3/4.10.J Multiple Control Rod Removal These specifications ensure that maintenance or repair of control rods or control rod drives will be performed under conditions that limit the probability of inadvertent criticality. The requirements for simultaneous removal of more than one control rod are more stringent since the SHUTDOWN MARGIN specification provides for the core to remain subcritical with only one control rod fully withdrawn. Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the reactor core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN exists. Verification that all the other control rods are fully inserted is required to assure the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is within the limits. Verification that the five-by-five array of control rods are inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn control rod is not available is required to ense e that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod is permitted to be withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. When all four fuel assemblies are removed from a core cell, the control rod may be withdrawn with no restrictions. With no fuel assemblies in the core cell, the associated control rod has no reactivity control function and is not required to remain inserted. Prior to reloading fuel into the core cell, the associated control rod must be inserted to ensure that an inadvertent criticality does not occur. 3/4.10.K Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - Hiah Water Level 3 /4.10.L Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - Love Water Level The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling mode loop of the residual heat removal (RHR) system be OPERABLE or that an alternate method capable of decay heat removal be demonstrated ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140*F as required during REFUELING. The requirement to have two shutdown cooling mode loops of the RHR system OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating loop will not result in a complete loss of shutdown cooling capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop, adequate time is provided to initiate alternate methods capable of decay heat removal or emergency procedures to cool the core, QUAD CITIES - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4.10-3 Amendrnent Nos. 157 & 153

e p* A UNITED STATES j j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION X WASHINGTON D.C. 20066-0001 os...../ SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT 'O. 136 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-19. N i AMENDMENT NO. 130 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-25. I AMENDMENT NO.157 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29. AND AMENDMENT NO.153 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY MiD IOWA-ILLIN0IS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNITS 2 AND 3 1 1 OUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-237. 50-249. 50-254 AND 50-265 1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 16, 1993, as supplemented by letter dated May 2, 1995, Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed, the licensee) submitted an amendment requesting to upgrade sections of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, and the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The changes have been requested as part of their Technical Specification Upgrade Program (TSUP). As a result of findings by a Diagnostic Evaluation Team inspection performed by the NRC staff at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station in 1987, the licensee made a decision that both the Dresden Nuclear Power Station and sister site Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, needed attention focused on the existing custom TS. The licensee made the decision to initiate a TSUP for both Dresden and Quad Cities. The licensee evaluated the current TS for both stations against the Standard Technical Specifications (STS), contained in NUREG-0123, " Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants BWR/4." Both Dresden and Quad Cities are BWR-3 designs and are nearly identical plants. The licensee's evaluation identified numerous potential improvements such as clarifying i requirements, changing TS to make them more understandable to eliminate the need for interpretation, and deleting requirements that are no longer considered current with industry practice. As a result of the evaluation, Comed elected to upgrade both the Dresden and Quad Cities TS to the STS contained in NUREG-0123.

a q s. W i - .t The TSUP for Dresden and Quad Cities is not a complete adaptation of th'e STS. The TSUP focuses on (1) integrating additional;information such as equipment l operability requirements during' shutdown conditions, (2) clarifying l requirements such as limiting conditions for operations and action statements utilizing STS terminology, (3) deleting superseded requirements and

i modifications.to the TS based on the licensee's-responses to Generic Letters' (GL), and (4) relocating specific items to more appropriate TS locations.

'i The application dated February 16, 1993, as' supplemented May 2,1995, proposed : 1 to upgrade only those sections of the' TS to be included in TSUP section 3/4.10 j (Refueling Operations) of the Dresden and Quad Cities TS. The staff reviewed the proposed changes and evaluated all deviations and i changes between the proposed TS, the STS, and the current TS. In no case did the licensee propose a change in the TS that would result in the relaxation'of-the current design requirements as stated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSAR) for Dresden or Quad Cities.: I In response to the staff's recommendations, the licensee submitted identical TS for Quad Cities and Dresden except for plant-specific equipment and design differences. Technical differences between the units are identified as appropriate in the proposed amendment. ) I 2.0 EVALUATION Review Guidelines - The licensees' purpose for the TSUP was to reformat the existing Dresden and Quad Cities TS into'the easier to use STS format. Plant specific data, values, parameters, and equipment specific operational requirements contained in the current TS for Dresden and Quad Cities were retained by the licensee in the TSUP. The STS contained in NUREG-0123 were developed by the NRC and industry because of the shortcomings associated with the custom TS which were issued to plants licensed in early 1970's (i.e., Dresden (1971) and Quad Cities (1972)). The STS developed by the NRC and industry provided an adequate level.of protection for plant operation by assuring required systems are operable and have been proven to be able to perform their intended functions. The limiting conditions for operation (LCO), the allowed out-of-service times, and the required surveillance frequencies were developed based on industry operating experience, equipment performance, and probabilistic risk assessment analysis during the 1970's. The STS were used as the licensing basis for plants licensed starting in the late 1970's. For the most part, Comed's adoption of the STS resulted in more restrictive LCOs and surveillance requirements (SR). In some cases, however, the STS provides relief from the Dresden and Quad Cities current TS requirements. In all these cases, the adoption of the STS requirements for LCOs or SR does not change the current design requirements of either plant as described in each plant's UFSAR. In addition, the success criteria for the availability and operability of all required systems contained in the current TS are maintained by the adoption of the'STS requirements in the proposed TSUP TS. i

i l i ! 1 .I 'In addition to adopting the STS guidelines and requirements in the TSUP, Comed has also evaluated GLs concerning line item improvements for TS. These GLs: were factored into TSUP to make.the proposed TS in the TSUP reflect industry. <t lessons. learned in the 1980's and early.1990's. i ~ Deviations between~the proposed specifications, the STS, and.the current TS j were reviewed by the staff to determine if they were due to plant specific features or if they posed a technical deviation from the.STS guidelines. ~ Plant specific data, values, parameters, and equipment specific operational j requirements contained in the current TS-for Dresden and Quad Cities were j retained by the licensee in the upgraded TS. I Administrative Chanaes - Non-technical, administrative changes were' intended to incorporate human factor principles into the form and structure of the STS so that they would be easier for plant. operation's personnel. to use. 'These

changes are editorial:in nature or involve the reorganization or reformatting i

of requirements without affecting technical content of the' current TS or operational requirements. Every section of the proposed TS reflects this type of change. More Restrictive Reauirements - The proposed TSUP TS include certain more restrictive requirements than are contained in the existing TS. Examples of more restrictive requirements include the following: placing an LCO on plant . equipment which is not required by the present TS to be operable; adding more restrictive requirements to restore inoperable equipment; and adding more restrictive SR. 'Less Restrictive Reauirements - The licensee provided a justification for less restrictive requirements on-a case-by-case basis as discussed.in this SE.- When requirements have been shown to provide little or no safety benefit, their removal from the TS may be appropriate. In most cases, these relaxations had previously been granted to individual plants on a plant-specific basis as the result of (a) generic NRC actions, and (b) new NRC staff - positions that have evolved from technological advancements and operating experience. The Dresden and Quad Cities plant design was reviewed to determine if the specific design basis was consistent with the STS contained in NUREG-0123. All changes to the current TS and deviations between the licensees' proposed i TS and the STS were reviewed by the staff for acceptability to determine if adequate justification was provided (i.e., plant specific features, retention of existing operating values, etc.). Deviations the staff finds acceptable include: (1) adding clarifying statements, (2) incorporating changes based on GL, (3) reformatting multiple steps included under STS action statements into single steps with unique identifiers, (4) retaining plant specific steps, parameters, or values, (5) moving ACTION statements within a TS, (6) moving ACTION statements from.an existing TS to form a new TS section, and (7) omitting the inclusion of STS steps that are not in existing TS.

-~ 3 4 _ Relocatnn of Technical Specifications - The proposed TS may include the - relocation of some requirements from the TS to licensee-controlled documents. Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act requires applicants for nuclear power-plant operating licenses to state Technical Specifications _to be included as. part of the license..The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TS are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. That regulation requires that the TS include' items in five specific categories, including (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings;-(2) limiting conditions for operation;-(3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features;. and (5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS. -The Commission has provided guidance for the contents of TS in its " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors," 58 Fed. Reg. 39132 (July 22, 1993), in which the Commission indicated that compliance with the Final Policy Statement satisfies Section 182a of the Energy Reorganization Act. The Final Policy Statement identified four criteria to be used in determining whether a particular matter is required to be included in the TS, as follows: (1) Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident or Transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (3) a structure, system, or component that is part of a primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident of Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (4) a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety. As a result, existing TS requirements which fall within or satisfy any of the criteria in the Final Policy Statement must be retained in the TS, while those TS requirements which do not fall within or satisfy these criteria may be relocated to other, licensee-controlled documents. The following sections provide the staff's evaluations of the specific proposed TS changes. 3.0 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED TSUP TS SECTION 3/4.10 " REFUELING OPERATIONS" Proposed Section 3/4.10 contains the requirements to assure that criticality is prevented during refueling. The proposed TS incorporate the requirements of the current TS Section 3/4.10 for both Dresden and Quad Cities and the requirements of STS Section 3/4.9. The proposed TS are evaluated below. 3.1 Section 3/4.10.A: Reactor Mode Switch Proposed TSUP TS Section 3/4.10.A, " Reactor Mode Switch," incorporates the requirements of STS Section 3/4.9.1 and current TS Section 3.10.A. Plant specific values for the listed parameters are included to be consistent with

-i -s-j I the UFSARs for the plants. Proposed Actions, Applicability, and SR, are reformatted according to STS guidelines and format. 3.1.I'LGQ The proposed LCO has been formatted in accordance with the guidelines of the

STS and includes-the existing LCO requirements from the current Dresden and Quad Cities TS. Proposed TS Section 3.10.A requires that the reactor mode switch be operable and locked in the Shutdown or Refuel positions, based on i

STS guidance. The current TS requires the reactor mode switch to be in the i Refuel position only. The proposed TS specifies that the mode switch must be in the Refuel position during core alterations. This is consistent with the requirements of current TS 3.10.A. The proposed TS includes restrictions to ensure that the mode switch is in the proper position for each refueling activity to preclude inadvertent criticality. The proposed TS incorporates i the requirements from the current TS concerning refueling interlocks when the reactor mode switch is locked in the Refuel position. The proposed TS enhances the current Dresden TS by specifying the refueling interlocks that must be operable and required actions to be taken when they are inoperable. The current Quad Cities TS already contain the required refueling interlocks which were maintained in the proposed TS. Because the proposed TS maintains operability of the necessary refueling interlocks when they are required and the current requirements are maintained, the proposed changes are acceptable. i The proposed TS deviates from STS guidelines by not including the refueling l interlock for " service platform hoist fuel-loaded." This requirement ensures l that proper restrictions exist on refueling service platform movement during i refueling operations. The current equipment at Dresden and Quad Cities Stations does not perform these functions. The service platform at Dresden and Quad Cities is not usually used in refueling operations and is not involved at all in the movement of fuel or control rods. Therefore, this j interlock is unnecessary for Dresden and Quad Cities. The proposed TS r requirements are consistent with the current physical configuration and the current TS requirements for the Dresden and Quad Cities Stations. The staff, therefore, finds the proposed deviation from the STS acceptable. 3.1.2 Anolicability The proposed applicability of TS 3.10.A clarifies the current requirements. The proposed applicability is Mode 5 except during Special Test Exception 3.12.A, " Primary Containment Integrity" and 3.12.B, " Shutdown Margin Demonstrations." These exceptions are consistent with the definition of Mode 5 in Section 1.0 of the proposed TS. The current TS specifies the applicability as the mode switch in Refuel during core alterations with necessary exceptions for control rod maintenance. These exceptions for control rod maintenance have been relocated in the proposed TS to Sections 3.10.I'and 3.10.J. The proposed applicability clarifies the current TS and is acceptable.

X .l ieJ fd i / 3.1.3 Actions The current TS do not specify actions ~to be taken if 3.10.A is not met. The.. proposed action statements are adopted from STS guidelines. The proposed-l actions are applicable'to the Dresden and Quad Cities plant designs and provide enhanced guidance to operations personnel. 'Therefore, the change from current TS is acceptable. 1 3.1.4 Surveillance Reauirements l Proposed TS 4.10.A.1 is a new requirement that requires the reactor mode switch to be verified to be locked in the shutdown or refuel position prior to - core alterations in' addition to once per 12 hours. This is an enhancement of_ the current TS and is based on STS guidance. Therefore, the proposed TS is acceptable. Proposed TS 4.10.A.2 and 4.10.A.3 contain a footnote which allows the reactor mode switch to be placed in the Run or Startup/ Hot Standby position to test I the switch interlock functions provided all control. rods are verified to i remain fully inserted by a second licensed operator or.other technically-qualified individual. The current TS for Quad Cities contain this exception. i This exception also applies to Dresden and, therefore, is acceptable for addition into the proposed TS for Dresden and Quad Cities. 3.1.5 Conclusion j Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds'that the proposed TS Section 3/4.10.A, " Reactor Mode Switch" has been reformatted adopting the STS 1 guidelines. The staff has reviewed the proposed TS against the STS guidelines and current TS requirements and finds that the deviations from STS guidelines. are acceptable and the proposed TS do not relax any existing TS requirements. j Therefore,.the-staff finds the proposed TS Section 3/4.10.A acceptable'. l 3.2 Section 3/4.10.B: Instrumentation Proposed TSUP TS Section 3/4.10.B, " Instrumentation," incorporates the requirements of STS Section 3/4.9.2 and the current requirements in section 3/4.10.B of the Dresden and Quad Cities TS. Proposed LCO required Actions, Applicability, surveillance requirements and corresponding surveillance frequencies, are reformatted according to STS guidelines and format. 3.2.1 LGQ Proposed TS Section 3.10.B includes additional requirements not contained in the current TS. Proposed TS Section 3.10.B.1 is a new requirement to have. -continuous visual source range monitor (SRM) indication in the control room. This is an enhancement of the current TS and is consistent with STS guidelines. The STS guidelines also include audible SRM indication in the-control room and on the refueling floor. The current design at Dresden and Quad Cities Stations does not include audible indications for SRMs in the Control Room and on the refuel floor and, therefore, this requirement is not

. included in the proposed TS. During refueling operations, Dresden and Quad Cities refueling procedures require shutdown margin verification after each fuel move. The verification requires control room operators to monitor the visual SRM indication in the Control Room. If an incident did occur following a fuel movement, operators would be alerted and take quick action to resolve the problem. The proposed TSUP requirements are consistent with the current physical configuration at Dresden and Quad Cities Stations. The staff, therefore, finds the proposed deviation from the STS guidelines acceptable. Proposed TS Section 3.10.B.3 is a new requirement to remove the " shorting links" from the reactor protection system (RPS) circuitry prior to control rod withdrawal unless adequate shutdown margin has been demonstrated and the "one-rod-out" refuel position interlock has been demonstrated operable. When the RPS shorting links are removed, the SRMs provide added protection against local criticality by providing an initiating signal for a reactor scram on high neutron flux. This requirement is an enhancement of the current TS and is acceptable. 3.2.2 Acolicability The proposed applicability for TS Section 3.10 is operational Mode 5 with one exception: no more than two fuel assemblies are present in each quadrant, the assemblies are located adjacent to the SRM and, if movable detectors are used, each group of fuel assemblies is separated by at least two fuel cells. These conditions are retained from current TS. This is a deviation from STS guidelines which does not include the exception to Mode 5 applicability. The exception is retained to allow reactor core loading or unloading without the use of neutron sources to achieve the minimum required SRM count rate. The proposed applicability statement is derived from current TS and, therefore, the deviation from the STS is acceptable. 3.2.3 Actions The current TS contain no action statements for Section 3/4.10.B. The proposed action statement for TS 3.10.B is adopted from STS guidelines and requires that all operations involving core alterations be suspended and all insertable control rods be fully inserted if the LCO can not be satisfied. The proposed requirement is applicable to Dresden and Quad Cities plant designs and provides enhanced guidance to operations personnel. Therefore, this change is acceptable. 3.2.4 Surveillance Reauirements Proposed TS 4.10.B.1 is a new surveillance requirement adopted from STS guidelines. The periodic verification of operability by the performance of a channel check, the verification of appropriate SRM detector insertion level, and the verification of appropriate spacing between fuel and SRM channels provW additional assurance that inadvertent criticality events are averted. This is an enhancement of current TS consistent with STS guidelines and is i acceptable.

w q r 1.l 1 a L - Proposed TS 4.10.B.4 is a new surveillance requirement adopted from STS l . guidelines. It requires verification-that the " shorting links" have been~ ) removed from the RPS circuitry unless adequate shutdown margin has been i demonstrated and the "one-rod-out" refuel position interlock has been demonstrated operable. The STS requirement does not contain this exception. j ~ The requirement to remove the " shorting links" is redundant to the-1 demonstration of shutdown margin (SDM) and the demonstration of the one-rod < - out interlock. The purpose of. removing the " shorting links"'is to provide l additional protection against an inadvertent local criticality. However, if l SDM has been demonstrated and the one-rod-out interlock is operable, the ' probability of an inadvertent criticality has been averted. Therefore, the j deviation:from the STS is acceptable. Proposed TS 4.10.B.4 is an enhancement-1 of the current TS and is therefore acceptable. Proposed TS 4.10.B.3 contains a new footnote (c) which allows for an SRM count ~ rate of 0.7 counts per second.(cps) provided the signal-to-noise ratio is ;t i 2.0. This has been left as an open item. The inclusion of the provision j would represent a relaxation of the current Dresden and Quad Cities TS. The r licensee is currently reviewing this footnote and it.will remain an open item l contingent upon 'its review and approval in the clean _ up package. j 3.2.5 Conclusion l Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the proposed TS for Section 3/4.10.B, " Instrumentation" has been reformatted adopting the STS - guidelines. The staff has reviewed the proposed TS against the STS guidelines l and current TS requirements and finds that the deviations from the STS l guidelines are acceptable. The proposed TS do not relax any existing TS requirements with the exception of the open item regarding SRM count rate. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS Section 3/4.10.8 acceptable, j i 3.3 Section 3/4.10.C: Control Rod Position ] Proposed TSUP TS Section 3/4.10.C, " Control Rod Position," is a new TS section l that incorporates the requirements of-STS Section 3/4.9.3. The current TS for i Dresden and Quad Cities associated with refueling' operations do not have { requirements for control rod position. The proposed TS Section 3/4.10.C' provides additional assurance that the control rod positioning during refueling operations'is adequately controlled. The staff has reviewed the. proposed TS and finds that it is an enhancement of the current TS and is acceptable for incorporation into the Dresden and Quad Cities TS. 3.4 Section 3/4.10.D: Decay Time i Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.D, " Decay Time," is a new TS section that incorporates the requirements of STS Section 3/4.9.4. Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.D ensures that sufficient control is.present to prevent core alterations prior to the decay of short lived fission products. This is an. 3 enhancement to the current TS and is therefore acceptable, i

1 i 3.5 Section 3/4.10.E: Communications Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.E, " Communications," is a new TS section which ] incorporates the requirements of STS Section 3/4.9.5. Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.E requires that direct communication be maintained between the control l room and refueling floor personnel while in Mode 5 during core alterations. The proposed applicability contains a footnote which deviates from STS guidelines. The proposed TS footnote (a) modifies the applicability statement with an exception for core alterations by movement of control rods with their normal drive system. The STS guidelines include an additional exception for movement of incore instrumentation during core alterations. The definition of core alterations in the proposed TS already excludes abnormal movement of the SRMs, so this exclusion did not need to be included in the footnote. The staff, therefore, finds the proposed deviation from STS guidelines acceptable. Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.E provides enhanced guidance to site operations personnel. The proposed requirements are adopted from STS guidelines and are applicable to the Dresden and Quad Cities plant designs. Therefore, proposed TS 3/4.10.E is acceptable. 3.6 Section 3/4.10.F: Crane Travel Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.F, " Crane Travel," has been left as an open item. The licensee will re-submit this section in the clean-up package and will include the current Dresden TS Section 3/4.10.H, " Loads Over Spent Fuel Storage Pool" requirements for both Dresden and Quad Cities. The current TS Section 3/4.10.F, " Spent Fuel Cask Handling" will be relocated to administrative controls. The revised TSUP Section 2/3.10.F will be based on STS Section 3/4.9.7 and will incorporate the loadings of the current TS requirements (loads no heavier than the weight of a single fuel assembly and handling tool). These changes will be left as an open item, contingent upon their review and approval in the TSUP clean-up package. 3.7 Section 3/4.10.G: Water Level - Reactor Vessel Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.G, " Water Level - Reactor Vessel," is a new TS section which incorporates the requirements of STS Section 3/4.9.8. Current Dresden and Quad Cities TS do rot contain provisions for reactor vessel water level during handling of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel while in operational Mode 5. Proposed TS Shetion 3/4.10.G, based on STS guidelines, is added in order to address the necessary requirements for these conditions. The proposed TS deviates slightly from STS guidelines in that the applicability is expanded to include the handling of irradiated control rods in addition to irradiated fuel assemblies. The proposed TS contains more conservative restrictions than the STS and is an enhancement of the current requirements. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS Section 3/4.10.G acceptable for Dresden and Quad Cities Stations.

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e' j - 10. ' q 1 3.8-Section 3/4.10.H: Water Level - Snent-Fuel Storaae Pool i I Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.H, " Water Level - Spent Fuel Storage Pool," incorporates the requirements of STS Section 3/4.9.9 and current TS Section l 3.10.C.- Proposed'LCO 3.10.H implements STS guidelines to maintain at least 23' feet of water above the tcp cf fuel stored in the fuel storage pool. The proposed applicability' implements STS provisions of whenever irradiated fuel is stored { in the fuel _ storage pool.. Since present provisions do not contain remedial action statements, STS guidelines are adopted. The current Dresden and Quad Cities surveillance requirement to record the .l fuel storage pool level at least once a day is relaxed to adopt the STS i requirement for recording fuel storage pool level at least once per 7 days. The spent fuel pool does not have penetrations for water to be inadvertently - lost - water inventory can only be lost by evaporation, a crack in the liner or by some other catastrophic event. The difference in the level-of the fuel storage pool over a six day period from evaporation is insignificant. Therefore, the change in the periodicity does not reduce the existing margin of safety and the' relaxation is acceptable. j The proposed TS is otherwise an enhancement to the current TS in that the current TS provide-no operator guidance in the event a degraded condition is found. The proposed TS corrects this omission by requiring specific actions. This change is an enhancement to the current TS and is acceptable. Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that'the proposed TS for Section 3/4.10.H, " Water Level - Spent Fuel Storage Pool" has been reformatted adopting STS guidelines. The staff has reviewed the proposed TS against the STS guidelines and current TS requirements 'and finds that-the deviations from - i STS guidelines are acceptable and the relaxation of current TS requirements i does not reduce the existing margin of safety. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS Section 3/4.10.H acceptable. 3.9.Section 3/4.10.I: Sinale Control Rod Removal Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.I, " Single Control Rod Removal," incorporates the requirements of STS Section 3/4.9.10 and current TS Section 3/4.10.D. Plant j specific values for the listed parameters are included to be consistent with the UFSAR for the plants. l 3.9.1 LC,Q_ t Current-TS Section 3.10.D allows two control rods to be removed for maintenance provided the reactor mode switch is locked in Refuel, shutdown margin requirements are met, and the required SRMs are operable. Proposed TS ? Section 3/4.10.I implements STS guidelines which are more restrictive than present provisions. The proposed specification will allow only one control rod and/or control rod drive mechanism to be removed for maintenance at a time. This is a more conservative requirement and is acceptable. l

. The proposed TS also changes the current requirements by allowing the reactor mode switch to be in either Refuel or Shutdown position based on STS guidelines. This is consistent with the proposed applicability of operational Modes 4 or 5. The proposed TS requires the mode switch to be locked in either the Shutdown or Refuel position per Table 1-2 and Specification 3.10.A. TSUP Table 1-2, which was approved by amendment numbers 131, 125, 152, and 148 to the Dresden and Quad Cities TS, provides the conditions for operational modes and contains footnotes specifying that the reactor mode switch may be placed in the Refuel position while a single control rod drive is being removed from the reactor vessel or while a single control rod is being recoupled or withdrawn provided the one-rod-out interlock is operable. The restrictions contained in this LCO provide acceptable plant conditions to perform the required maintenance in the specified modes. The addition of the sis allowance for the reactor modo switch to be in the Shutdown or Refuel position for this maintenance adds operational flexibility without reducing any protective features. In order to withdraw control rods, the reactor mode switch must still be placed in the Refuel position. Control rod drive mechanisms can be removed with the reactor mode switch in either the Shutdown or Refuel position. This change from current requirements is acceptable. The current TS requirements allow the one-rod-out interlock to be bypassed. This has been eliminated since the proposed TS only allows one rod to be removed. This is a conservative change from the current requirements and is acceptable. The current TS require a minimum of eight control rods surrounding each drive out of service to be disarmed electrically. The proposed TS, based on STS guidelines, require a SX5 array of control rods centered on the control rod being removed to be fully inserted and disarmed. If this is not satisfied, the four fuel assemblies surrounding the rod must be removed from the core. These changes provide additional restrictions to reduce the plant's vulnerability to an inadvertent criticality when removing control rods for maintenance. This is an enhancement of the current TS and is acceptable. 3.9.2 Apulicability The proposed applicability is operational Modes 4 and 5. The current TS require the mode switch to be locked in Refuel. The proposed restrictions on a single control rod removal are sufficient to allow this maintenance to be performed in the specified operational modes. Because it does not reduce existing plant safety margin, this change to the current TS is acceptable. 3.9.3 Action Proposed Action 3/4.10.I is adopted from STS guidelines since the current TS do not contain remedial action requirements. The proposed required actions are more restrictive than the current TS requirements and represent more conservative operation. The proposed requirements are applicable to the Dresden and Quad Cities plant design and provide enhanced guidance to operations personnel. Therefore, this change to the current TS is acceptable.

} ~ j.t l ' ' 3.9.4-Surveillance Reauirements Proposed TS 4.10.I incorporates the requirements of the current TS provisions. ) and provides additional restrictions and guidance. ~ The proposed TS requires j - tests to be performed to demonstrate compliance with the conditions of the LCO l within 4 hours prior to the start of a control' rod and/or control rod drive i mechanism removal from the core and/or reactor pressure vessel,- and at-least i once per.24 hours thereafter until a control rod and' associated control rod drive mechanism are reinstalled and the control rod is inserted in the core. i The current TS do not specify a time period to complete the surveillances. In addition, the proposed TS includes additional. verification that the reactor - mode switch is operable, shutdown margin requirements are met, rods in a- ? five-by-five square array are inserted and disarmed.or the affected core cell is defueled, and that all other control rods are inserted. This change is an i enhancement to the current TS and is acceptable. j 3.9.5 Conclusion Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the proposed TS Section i 3/4.10.I, " Single Control Rod Removal," has been reformatted ' adopting the STS j guidelines. The staff has reviewed the proposed TS against the STS guidelines and current TS requirements and finds that the deviations from STS guidelines i are acceptable. The proposed TS do not relax any existing TS requirements. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TSUP TS Section 3/4.10.I acceptable. i 3.10 Section 3/4.10.J: Multiple Control - Rod ' Removal Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.J " Multiple Control Rod Removal," incorporates the j requirements of STS Section 3/4.9.10.2 and current TS Section 3/4.10.E. -l 3.10.1 LCO and Anolicability The proposed TS contains provisions addressing the removal for maintenance of-i more than one control rod and/or control rod drive mechanism. The proposed TS l provides a more complete set of requirements for this maintenance task than i are contained in the current TS. The proposed LC0 allows any number of control rods and/or control rod drive mechanisms.to be removed from the core and/or reactor vessel provided certain conditions are met. These conditions i include having an operable reactor mode switch locked in the Shutdown or Refuel position, SRMs operable per Specification 3.10.B. shutdown margin requirements met, all other control rods inserted or their core cells i defueled, and the core cell being worked on defueled. i The proposed TS represent a change from the current TS by allowing the reactor mode switch to be in either Shutdown or Refuel position. This is consistent with the proposed applicability of Mode 5 in which the mode switch position may be either Shutdown or Refuel. The restrictions in the proposed TS will i ensure that inadvertent criticality is avoided. The additior, of the STS allowance for the reactor mode switch to be in the Shutdown or Refuel position for this maintenance adds operational flexibility without reducing any i protective features. In order to withdraw control rods, the reactor mode l l 'T i+- .p ,y

k x - 13.- j f A'_ . switch must.still be placed in the Refuel position. Control rod drive i mechanisms can be removed with the reactor mode switch in either the Shutdown .or Refuel-position. The proposed changes-are consistent with the STS e guidelines and do not reduce the existing plant safety margin and are l -acceptable. j 3.10.2' Action M The proposed action for TS Section 3.10.J incorporates-STS guidelines. The l current TS do not contain remedial action requirements. The proposed action i is applicable to the Dresden and Quad Cities plant design and provides ~ enhanced guidance to operations personnel. The proposed TS change is-consistent with STS guidelines and is an enhancement of the current TS. i ' Therefore, the change is acceptable. 3.10.3 Surveillance Reauirements l 5 Proposed TS 4.10.J is based on STS guidelines and replaces the current TS. provisions. The current TS only requires certification that a control rod's i control cell contains no fuel assemblies prior to control rod withdrawal for-extended core maintenance. The proposed TS will verify all conditions = specified in the LCO within 4 hours prior to the start of removal of control rods: and/or control rod drive mechanisms from the core and/or reactor pressure vessel and at least once per 24 hours thereafter until all control' rods 'and control rod drive mechanisms are reinstalled-and all control rods'are inserted in the core. The conditions verified include that the reactor mode switch is j operable and locked'in the Shutdown or Refuel position, the SRM channels are operable per TS.3.10.B. shutdown margin requirements are met, all other control rods are either inserted or have the surrounding four fuel assemblies removed from the core cell, and the core cell on which maintenance'is being performed is defueled. The proposed TS is an enhancement of current TS 1 requirements and is therefore acceptable. l The proposed TS do not incorporate STS TS 4.9.10.2.1.f. This TS requires that all fuel loading operations be suspended unless all control rods-are inserted in the core. The proposed TS action statements ensure adequate controls arec in place to maintain shutdown margin requirements and the additional TS'is not necessary. This deviation from STS is acceptable. l 3.10.4 Conclusion l Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the proposed TSUP TS ] .Section 3/4.10.J. " Multiple Control Rod Removal," has been reformatted i adopting the STS guidelines. The staff has reviewed the proposed TS against the STS guidelines and current TS requirements and finds that the deviations from STS guidelines are acceptable and the proposed TS do not relax any existing TS requirements. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TSUP TS Section 3/4.10.J acceptable. ,-e -,,n.- -e

i . i l 3.11 Section 3/4.10.K: Shutdown Coolino and Coolant Circulation - Hiah Water Level (Dresden) Section 3/4.10.L: Shutdown Coolina and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level (Dresden) Section 3/4.10.K: Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - Hiah i Water Level (Quad Cities) Section 3/4.10.L: Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level (Quad Cities) Dresden and Quad Cities use different systems for shutdown cooling and, therefore, the proposed TS are slightly different. Dresden has a separate shutdown cooling system with three pumps and three heat exchangers per unit to i remove decay heat from the reactor. Quad Cities utilizes the residual heat removal (RHR) system to remove decay heat. The predominate difference within the proposed specifications is that the Dresden system is capable of being throttled and, therefore, can be configured to maintain a constant temperature. The RHR system at Quad Cities was not designed to permit throttling flow to maintain constant temperatures. i 3.11.1 Section 3/4.10.K. Shutdown Coolino and Coolant Circulation - Hiah Water Level and Section 3/4.10.L. Shutdown Coolina and Coolant i Circulation - Low Water Level (Dresden) l Proposed TS Sections 3/4.10.K and 3/4.10.L are new sections added to the TS in accordance with STS Sections 3/4.9.11.1 and 3/4.9.11.2 to ensure that the required shutdown cooling subsystems are available for decay heat removal. The proposed changes are consistent with STS guidelines and do not reduce the existing plant safety margin. Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.L is identical to Section 3/4.10.K except that two shutdown cooling loops are required to be operable in accordance with the STS guidelines. Proposed TS 3.10.K, Action 2, and TS 2.10.L, Action 2, deviate from STS guidelines by including an additional requirement. The proposed actions require that, with no shutdown cooling loop in operation, in addition to establishing reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method and monitoring reactor coolant temperature once per hour, reactor coolant circulation must be verified at least once per 12 hours. This is more conservative than the STS guidelines and is included to correlate the action statements to the surveillance requirement. This is an enhancement of the STS guidelines and is acceptable. Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the proposed TS Sections 3/4.10.K and 3/4.10.L for Dresden have been reformatted adopting the STS guidelines. The staff has reviewed the proposed TS against the STS and current TS requirements and finds that the deviations from STS guidelines are acceptable and the proposed TS is an enhancement of current TS requirements. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS Sections 3/4.10.K and 3/4.10.L for i Dresden acceptable.

. 3.11.2 Section 3/4.10.K. Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - Hiah Water Level and Section 3/4.10.L. Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level (Ouad Cities) Proposed TSUP TS 3/4.10.K and 3/4.10.L are added to the TS in accordance with STS guidelines to ensure that the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are available for decay heat removal. Proposed specification 3/4.10.L is identical to specification 3/4.10.K except that two shutdown cooling loops are required to be operable in accordance with the STS guidelines. The proposed LCOs deviate from the STS guidelines in that the proposed LCOs only require the RHR shutdown cooling equipment to be operable and not necessarily in operation. Quad Cities shutdown cooling system was not designed to be throttled. The system configuration does not allow either the shutdown cooling flow or the service water cooling flow to be throttled sufficiently to maintain constant temperature. The system is cycled on and off as needed to maintain the reactor coolant temperature below the required limits. Nearly continuous operation can not be maintained without over-cooling the system. Therefore, STS requirements are inappropriate as the system can not be maintained in operation. The proposed LCOs are consistent with Quad Cities design and do not reduce existing plant safety margins. Therefore, this deviation from STS is acceptable. The proposed TS do not include Action b from STS guidelines. Action b requires that, with no RHR shutdown cooling mode loop in operation, reactor coolant circulation must be established within one hour by an alternate method and reactor coolant temperature must be monitored at least once per hour. This deviation from STS is based on the design of the Quad Cities RHR system. Each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem at Quad Cities is considered operable if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. However, at Quad Cities, the RHR system is not capable of throttling flow to maintain constant temperature in the reactor. The requirements of proposed Action 1, that the operability of at least one alternate method capable of decay heat removal be demonstrated within one hour, meets the intent of STS Action b for the Quad Cities design. In addition, the licensee added additional TS 4.10.K.2 and 4.10.L.2 which require monitoring of reactor coolant temperature once per hour. This deviation from the STS guidelines is acceptable. Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the proposed TSUP TS Sections 3/4.10.K and 3/4.10.L for Quad Cities have been reformatted adopting the STS guidelines. The staff has reviewed the proposed TS against the STS and current TS requirements and finds that the deviations from STS guidelines are acceptable and the proposed TS are an enhancement of current TS

i 9 a , requirements. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS Sections 3/4.10.K and 3/4.10.L for Quad Cities acceptable. 3.12 Relocation of current TS 3/4.10.G: Fuel Storaae Reactivity limit Section 3/4.10.G, " Fuel Storage Reactivity Limit," of the current Dresden TS has been relocated to Section 5.6 of the proposed TS for Dresden and Quad Cities in accordance with STS guidelines. The acceptability of Section 5.6 of the proposed TSUP will be evaluated along with the other proposed TS for Section 5.0. This is an administrative change only which moves current TS 3/4.10.G to proposed TS 5.6. This change is acceptable. 3.13 TSUP Ooen Items The following items should be left as open items. contingent upon implementation and correction in the TSUP clean-up amendment. 1. The inclusion of footnote (c) in TSUP Section 4.10.B. " Instrumentation." 2. Proposed TS Section 3/4.10.F. 3.14 lechnical Soecification Bases The staff has reviewed the proposed Bases for TSUP TS Section 3/4.10. The proposed Bases have been prepared using the guidelines of the STS. The staff, therefore, finds these proposed Bases acceptable.

4.0 CONCLUSION

- PROPOSED TSUP TS SECTION 3/4.10. " REFUELING OPERATIONS" i

The proposed TSUP TS Section 3/4.10, " Refueling Operations," clarifies the requirements of the current TS through the adoption of the STS format, adds more restrictive requirements, and incorporates changes to correct inconsistencies with the STS. The proposed TSUP TS for Section 3/4.10 will be clearer and easier to use as a result of the adaptation of the STS format. The staff has reviewed the proposed TS against the STS and current TS and finds that the changes proposed in this amendment will not result in a decrease in safety, or an increase in the probability of an analyzed or unanalyzed accident. The revised TS changes do not reduce the existing margin of safety set forth by the current TS. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS changes for Section 3/4.10 to be acceptable.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR

l l l l l Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC. staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no i significant change in the types, of any effluent that~ may be released offsite, and.that there is no significant increase in-individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a l . proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards j - consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 27337). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for i categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments. l .l

7.0 CONCLUSION

2 The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the-public.will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such .I activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, { and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common { defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Principal Contributors: J. Stang Date: June 23, 1995 t l ) l l l I}}