ML20207E162
| ML20207E162 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1999 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207E166 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9906040180 | |
| Download: ML20207E162 (152) | |
Text
[;
- Attachment Upgraded Quad Cities IPEEE -Internal Fires Analyci3 R;vizion 01, M:y 1999 l
l l
i' l
l t
I l
I l
I l
l l
1 l
i
..9906040180 990527 4
1 l
f-p 4.0 INTERNAL FIRES ANALYSIS _
in June of 1991, the NRC issued Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20 (Ref. 4-1),
asking all licensees holding operating licenses and construction permits for nuclear power reactor facilities to perform an Individual Plant Examination of External Events
, (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities. The five extemal events requested to be assessed included intemal fires. Both the Generic Letter and NUREG-1407 (Ref. 4-2)
- state these objectives for the IPEEE:
. 1. To develop an appreciation _of severe accident behavior;
- 2. To understand the most likely severe accident sequences that could occur under full-power operations;
- 3. To gain a qualitative understanding of the overall likelihood of core damage and.
radioactive release; and
- 4. If necessary to reduce the overall likelihood of core damage and radioactive release by modifying hardware and procedures that would help prevent or mitigate severe accidents.
Although neither the Generic Letter nor NUREG-1407 prescribe a specific methodology
- for assessment of internal fires, they do require that these steps be included:
- 1. Identification of critical areas of vulnerability;
- 2. Calculation of the frequency of fire initiation in each area;
- 3. Analysis of the likelihood of critical safety functions disabled by a fire;
- 4. Assessment of fire-induced accident sequences leading to core damage;
- 5. Evaluation of the containment mitigating function un' er fire; and d
- 6. Assessment of issues identified in the Fire Risk Scoping Study (FRSS) (Ref. 4-3).
. In recent years, Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE) (Ref. 4-4) and Fire PRA (Ref. 4-5) methodologies have been developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for evaluation of fire risk at nuclear power plants. While FIVE is a screening method to identify critical fire scenarios, the Fire PRA method provides the robust tools needed for more realistic assessment of core damage risk associated with these scenarios. Both methods draw from earlier methodologies such as those described in NUREG/CR-2815 (Ref. 4-6) and NUREGICR-4840 (Ref. 4-7), and benefd from the insights gained from over 1000 reactor-years of operating experience and J
various fire tests conducted by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), National Institute of 4
Standards and Technology.(NIST), and others. Both these methodologies explicitly contain the steps requested and are capable of achieving the goals set in the Generic Letter for the Fire IPEEE.'
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-1 L.:'
1 Comed elected to use FIVE (Ref. 4-4), supplemented by the EPRI Fire PRA methodology, for assessment of intemal fire risk at Quad Cities because of its ability to
' best achieve the objectives of the IPEEE. FIVE provides effective methods for screening out fire compartments that are not risk-significant. The methods in the Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5) allow for development of a plant fire risk model i
that integrates all aspects of the plant fire protection design and practice, and at the
- same time makes use of the available data on fire history and tests. The detailed and integrated nature of the method helps to better understand the most likely severe accident sequences and identify the most effective solutions to prevent or mitigate severe accidents resulting from fires.
Comed previously submitted the results of a fire risk analysis for Quad Cities (Ref. 4-25). Comed has since upgraded this fire risk analysis by developing and applying j
additional plant specific information related to spatial location, failure modes, and failure consequences of critical cables and circuits, modifying the analysis to realistically treat the use of plant operating procedures, and incorporating the upgraded plant PRA model. The upgraded analysis eliminated numerous sources of conservatism and produced much more accurate and usable fire risk assessment. The conservatism in the original Fire IPEEE is discussed further in Section 4.8.1. The upgraded analysis also affected the applicability of the Request for Additional Information (RAl) items
~
contained in a letter dated November 26,1997 (Ref. 4-23). The following table summarizes the ten questions related to the original Fire IPEEE and the response to the questions based on the upgraded analysis, and provides a reference to the section of this submittal where additional information is provided.
Q1 Provide the basis for dismissing fire-induced initiators other than general transients and loss of offsite power.
1 Response: The upgraded fire risk analysis considered seven potential fire-induced initiators.
The specific initiator selected for a given fire scenario was based on a review of the equipment and cables disabled by the fire. Refer to Secton 4.4.4.5 for additional details.
Q2 Was the timing of fire-induced damage considered when allowing credit for automatic suppression of the fire?
Response: Credit for automatic fire suppression systems was provided only if the response time analysis for the system showed an actuation time less than the target damage time. An exception to this case occurs in the cable tunnels. In this compartment, sprinklers are installed between the trays and are located only several inches above the cable mass. The upper trays have solid bottoms. In this situation, an analysis was not explicitly preformed.
Refer to Sections 4.3.1.2, 4.5, 4.6.2.16, and 4.6.2.39 for additional details.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1,05/25/1999 page 4-2 o
E L
Q3 Selection and application of Heat Loss Factor (HLF).
Response: The upgraded fire analysis applied a HLF of 0.70 in the fire modeling analyses that were performed However, in the case of the multi-compartment analysis which evaluates the potential for the movement of the hot gas layer from a buming compartment to an adjacent cooler compartment, a HLF of 0.85 was used. Only the volume of the exposing compartment is considered in the analysis. The volume of the exposed compartment is not credited. Refer to Sectons 4.3.1.2 and 4.6.3 for additional details.
Q4 Applicaton of experimental results.
Response: The extent of fire propagation considered in the upgraded fire analysis relied on I
the fire modeling relationships developed in the EPRI FIVE Methodology. The analysis applied a simplified approach that assumed no delay in fire propagation from the source to targets, except in those cases where suppression system actuation is credited. Refer to Sectons 4.3 and 4.5 for additional details.
QS Control Room Analysis.
Response: Refer to Section 4.6.4 for a detailed discussion.
Q6 Recovery of automatic fire suppression systems and manual suppression actions.
1 Response: The upgraded fire analysis did not credit recovery of automatic fire suppression systems failures. Refer to Sectons 4.5 and 4.6 for additional details.
Q7 Screening of Enclosed Ignition Sources.
Response: The upgraded fire analysis did not screen 'high energy' enclosed ignition sources such as large liquid filled transformers, motor control centers, or switchgears.
Propagaton of postulated fires involving these equipment was considered in the fire modeling analyses that were performed. in addition, a horizontal propagation of a 4kV switchgear fire due to an explosive event was also considered. This is discussed further in Secton 4.3.
Q8 Control Cabinet Heat Rate - 65 Btu /s versus 550 Btu /s.
I Response: The upgraded fire analysis used a generic cabinet heat rate of 400 Btu /s for those cases where vertical propagation was not assumed to occur deterministically. The resultant target damage distance was greater than the vertical target spacing that was 4
observed for the typical cabinet. Since targets above the cabinet are already treated as being ir6peded, the application of a heat rate of 550 Btu /s is not expected to have any measurable impact on the reported CDF. Refer to Section 4.3 for additional details.
Og Screening of fixed and transient ignition sources.
Response: The upgraded fire analysis included a specific focused analysis of fire induced circuit failures for those compartments where a concentration of critical circuits could be expected The areas that were evaluated included the cable tunnels, the auxiliary relay room, and the cable spreading room. Additional focused studies were performed for other compartments if they contained circuits whose fire induced failure could cause spurious actuation of the ADS valves. This is discussed further in Section 4.3.2.
Q10 Provide a list of multi-compartment fire scenarios that were screened out based upon a lack of hot gas layer formation.
1 l
Response: The multi-compartment analysis and detailed results summary are provided in Section 4.6.3.
4 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-3
l The remainder of Section 4 contains the documentation for assessment of internal fires at Quad Cities. Table 4-1 provides the key for the information on this assessment, as requested in the Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, pages 23 and 24 (Ref,4-1).
1 Table 4-1 Key for Information Requested by Generic Letter in the Fire IPEEE Submittal Requested information Section of the Fire IPEEE
- 1. A description of the methodology and key assumptions Section 4.0 contains a summary used in performing the fire IPEEE and a discussion of the description of the methodology. Details status of. Appendix R modifications.
of the individual steps, assumptions, and bases are documented in Sections 4.3,4.4 & 4.5.
l Status of Appendix R modifications is discussed in Section 4.1.
2.
A summary of walkdown findings and a concise description Section 4.1 of the walkdown team and the procedure used.
3.
A discussion of the criteria used to identify critical fire areas Section 4.2.1 identifies single areas and a list of critical areas, including (a) single areas in which and Section 4.6.3 contains evaluation equipment failure represents a serious erosion of safety of the double or multiple areas, margin, (b) same as (a), but for double or multiple areas sharing common barriers, penetration seals, HVAC ducting, etc.
4.
A discussion of the criteria used for fire size and duration The criteria for fire size and duration is and the treatment of cross-zone fire spread and associated discussed in Section 4.3. Treatment of major assumptions.
cross-zone fire spread and assumptions are documented in Section 4.6.3.
5.
A discussion of the fire initiation database, including the Discussion of the fire initiation plant-specific database used. Describe the handling database, including plant-specific data, method, including major assumptions, the role of expert is provided in Section 4.2.2.
Judgment, and identification and evaluation of sources of Discussion of plant-specific design and data uncertainties. A discussion of each case where the operation data is included in Section plant-specific data used is less conservative than the 4.4.2, cable location in Section 4.4, database used in approved fire vulnerability methodologies, detection and suppression in Section l
4.5. In no case is less conservative plant-specific data used.
l l
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-4 k
I-1 l
Table 4-1 Key for information Requested by Generic Letter in the Fire IPEEE Submittal l
Requested Information Section of the Fire IPEEE 6.
A discussion of the treatment of fire growth and spread, the Sections 4.3 and 4.5 provide a discus-spread of hot gases and smoke, and the analysis of sion of the method for analysis of i
detection and suppression and their associated single-area fire growth, detection and
)
assumptions, including treatment of suppression-induced suppression. Treatment of multi-damage to equipment.
compartment and Control Room fires growth, detection and suppression are discussed in Sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4, respectively. Assessment of suppres-sion-induced damage to equipment is addressed under FRSS issues and documented in Section 4.9.2.
- 7. A discussion of fire damage Modeling, including definition of Section 4.4.
the fire-induced failures related to fire barriers and control Fire barrier failures are discussed in i
systems and fire-induced damage to the cabinets. A discussion of how human intervention is treated and how Section 4.6.3 as part of the multi-fire-induced and non-fire-induced failures are combined.
compartment analysis.
Identify recovery actions and types of fire mitigating actions taken credit for in these sequences.
i 8.
Discuss the treatment of detection and suppression Discussion of fire detection and including fire fighting procedures, fire brigade training, and suppression is provided in Section adequacy of existing fire brigade equipment, and treatment 4.6.2,4.6.3 and 4.6.4 for single area, of access routes versus existing barriers.
multiple areas, and Control Room, respectively. Fire Brigade Training and equipment is addressed under FRSS issues in Section 4.9.2.
9.
All functional / systemic event trees associated with fire-Discussion of the fire-initiated se-initiated sequences.
quences is provided in Section 4.4.4.
- 10. A description of dominant functional / systemic sequences Discussion of the dominant fire-induced leading to core damage, along with their frequencies and sequences is provided in Section 4.6.2.
percentage contribution to overall fire core-damage The results of the fire-induced frequencies. Sequence selection criteria are provided in GL sequences are summarized in Section 88-20 and NUREG-1335. The description of the sequences 4.6.5.
should include a discussion of specific assumptions and human recovery actions.
- 11. The estimated core-damage frequency, the timing of the Section 4 associated core damage, a list of analytical assumptions including their bases, the sources of uncertainties.
l
- 12. Any fire-induced containment failures identified aa being Section 4.7 different than those identified in the intemal events analysis 7
j and other containment performance insights.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-5 1
l
Table 4-1 Key for information Requested by Generic Letter in the Fire IPEEE Submittal Requested information Ser:aon of the Fire IPEEE
- 13. Documentation with regard to fire risk scoping study issues FRSS issues are addressed in Section addressed by the submittal, the bases and assumptions 4.9. Evaluation results and potential used to address these issues, and a discussion of the improvements associated with decay findings and conclusions.
heat removal are addressed in Section Evaluation results and potential improvements associated with the decay heat removal function should be specifically highlighted.
the licensee should describe sensitivity studies related to the use of the initial hazard supplemental plant walkdown results and subsequent evaluations. The licensee should examine the aforementioned list to fill in those items missed in the existing fire PRA.
The sequence of major analyses developed during the project and their contents are as i
' follows:
A. Identification of Fire Compartments Plant fire areas and compartments were defined based on guidance described in FIVE. Compartments containing safe shutdown (SSD) circuits and equipment, as well as other equipment important to plant safety (such as offsite power) were selected for further evaluation. Qualitative screening was limited to fire areas that did not contain Appen& R credited post fire safe shutdown features and were not expected to cause a plant trip or require a shutdown, and fire compartments which satisfied the FIVE screening criteria.
The upgrade effort determined that the subdivision of the Appendix R (Ref. 4-
)
- 8) fire zones reflected in the original analysis was not compatible with the j
level of resolution available for the necessary cable spatial data. As a consequence, the upgrade effort relied on Appendix R fire zone definitions which resulted in fewer fire compartments. The adequacy of the boundaries for each of the fire compartments was evaluated against the FIVE criteria for barriers during the development of fire compartment definitions, as part of the fire modeling analysis, and again as part of the multi-compartment analysis.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-6
p B. Develop Compartment Fire Frequencies Fire compartment ignition frequencies were determined for each fire compartment that was not qualitatively screened. Compartment frequencies i
- were determined by counting each individual fire ignition source located in each compartment and applying the process described in FIVE Phase 11, Step 1, to determine a frequency for each source. The sum of the source frequencies in each compartment represented the compartment fire frequency.
The analysis upgrade effort recalculated the fire compartment ignition frequencies and found differences with that used in the original analysis. The differences were due to errors in the application of the baseline ignition frequencies from FIVE and the incorrect calculation of the weighting factor for plant-wide ignition sources. The fire ignition frequencies for the majority of the fire compartments were reduced by a factor of approximately 2. This is discussed further in Section 4.2.2.
C. Develop Preliminary Screening The purpose of this activity was to eliminate from further consideration compartments where the potential fire Core Damage Frequency (CDF) is less than 10 /yr. This is an order of magnitude lower than the FIVE screening criteria, but is consistent with the Fire PRA implementation Guide screening
. criteria. The screening basically assumed that any fire in the compartment will damage all PRA targets. The process used the aforementioned compartment fire frequencies and the Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP) determined from the plant Fire PRA Model. Adjustment of the ignition frequency by using severity factors, or credit for automatic or manual fire suppression was not applied for any of the screened cases. CDF is determined from compartment fire frequency times CCDP.
D. Detailed Fire Modeling / Analysis of Single Fire Compartments This analysis evaluated the fire compartments which remained unscreened after the preliminary screening. The approach used for each fire compart-l ment CDF was: 1) evaluate each individual fire source that can damage credited fire PRA targets; 2) define fire scenarios taking into account fire protection features such as detection and suppression; 3) determine a CCDP for the specific PRA targets damaged; and 4) calculate a scenario specific CDF. The sum of the scenario CDFs represents the final compartment CDF.
The upgraded fire analysis did not screen any fire compartments in which fire modeling was performed regardless of the calculated CDF contribution.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report i
Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-7
E. Analysis of Multi-Compartment Fires This analysis was performed to evaluate the potential for core damage in the event that the fire barriers credited in the single compartment analyses were unable to prevent fire propagation (and equipment damage) in adjacent compartments. The analysis evaluated the risk significance of postulated fire scenarios that represent challenges to fire barrier integrity. The methodology used in this analysis was based on the Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref.
4-5).
4,1 REVIEW OF PLANT INFORMATION AND WALKDOWNS Extensive plant information was used to perform the Quad Cities Fire PRA. When necessary this information was supplemented by additional investigation and walkdowns. The following sources of information were used in this analysis.
A. Fire Hazards Analysis (Ref. 4-8) was used to obtain:
- 1) Plant layout to define the fire areas and compartments;
- 2) Cable combustible loading data for calculating cable / junction box ignition frequency;
- 3) Barrier data, i.e., rating, how many doors and dampers, etc. to calculate barrier unavailability; and
- 4) Detection and suppression data for fire modeling.
B. Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis (Ref. 4-8) was used to determine:
- 1) Systems and components used for Appendix R safe shutdown;
- 2) Location and function of the Appendix R SSD cables and circuits; and
- 3) Post-fire manual actions.
C. The SLICE Database (Ref. 4-9) was used to confirm cable location data obtained from the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. It was also used in conjunction with plant electrical drawings to identify and locate additional power cables and circuits.
D. The Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station IPE (Ref. 4-10) was used to develop the probabilistic model to quantify fire-induced conditional core damage probabilities.
E. The Transient Combustible Control Program (Ref. 4-11) was reviewed to ensure appropriate definition of the transient fire scenarios.
Quad Cities IPEEE Subm ttal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-8
s n F. Plant Drawings were used in nearly every task to obtain and/or confirm data including: plant layout, enclosure data, location of fire hazards and protective systems, location of the cables and circuits, etc.
G. Plant Emergency Operating Procedures (Ref. 4-12) and Safe Shutdown Procedures (Ref. 4-13) were used to identify and model post-fire manual actions.
H.' Walkdowns were conducted by Quad Cities engineers along with contractors to obtain and/or confirm data. The walkdown teams varied depending on the informa-tion to be collected or confirmed. However, the team always included fire protection and/or system engineers with thorough knowledge of the fire PRA methods and different aspects of Quad Cities' fire protection systems design and operation, as well as safe shutdown analysis.
The following is a list of the walkdowns performed and their purpose.
- 1) During January through April 06 a walkdown was conducted to obtain and verify compartment data contained within the Fire Hazards Analysis. The ignition-source count was determined during this walkdown.
- 2) In June 96 the seismic walkdown team reviewed the seismic ruggedness of systems containing flammable liquids and storage cabinets containing flammable liquids. The results were used to determine the potential for seismically-induced fires.
- 3) During September / October 96 a walkdown of all unscreened compartments was conducted to determine location of the fixed ignition sources with respect to potential targets, location of the detection and suppression systems with respect to the source and target and placement of the combustibles near the fire barriers. This information was used in the preliminary screening analysis.
I During September through November 96 additional walkdowns of the 37 unscreened compartments was completed to determine additional characteristics for fire Modeling analysis.
1
- 4) Supplemental walkdowns were performed during August through November 1998 as part of the effort to upgrade the fire analysis. These walkdowns re-evaluated the characterization of postulated fire scenarios, the location of critical j
targets, and potential interactions involving other than electrical cabling. The j
walkdown identified concems related to soldered copper instrument air piping and the proximity of the Emergency Diesel Generator air intakes to the station auxiliary transformers. A walkdown of the control room was also conducted to determine: a) control room panels function (s), ignition source loading and l
separation, b) location of the detectors, and c) control room ventilation and j
smoke removal capabilities.
g Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report j
Rev.1, 5/25/99 I
page 4-9
/
1
N t) '
4.2 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS -
This section presents the evaluation of potential fire hazards at Quad Cities. It begins with defining the fire areas and compartments. It then characterizes the fire hazard by
- determining the types of fires and their frequency in each of the compartments.
4.2.1 Fire Aron and Compartment Designations 4.2.1.1 Methodology Fire area and compartment designations were developed based on the guidance provided in the FIVE methodology (Ref. 4-4). Each fire area, as defined in FIVE, Definition 2.2, was found to be sufficiently consistent with the Appendix R fire area definitions to support qualitative screening. A fire area was screened if it did not contain any Appendix R safe shutdown features and a postulated fire did not result or cause a plant trip initiator. The unscreened fire areas were then examined to subdivide them into fire compartments. Qualitative screening of fire compartments required that the compartment boundaries satisfy the FIVE criteria. Fire compartment screening also required that the compartment not contain Appendix R safe shutdown features.
i 1
The original fire analysis was based on 99 fire areas, which was then subdivided into 153 fire compartments. During the course of the re-analysis, it was determined that this level of resolution did not have any notable impact on the analysis results as compared to a case that was based on the existing Appendix R Fire Zone definitions. In order to i
simplify the process of integrating the fire compartment definition with the available
> cable data, the analysis upgrade effort' elected to rely on the Appendix R fire area and zone definitions with very limited subdivision into smaller compartments. Subdivision -
into smaller compartments was performed only ifit allowed the qualitative screening of a compartment. This resulted in many fire compartments identified in the original j
analysis being subsumed into larger fire compartments and resulted in a net reduction in the number of fire compaitments. The re-analysis effort is based on the Quad Cities plant being divided into 16 fire areas which are then subdivided into 119 fire i
compartments. The following provides a reconciliation of the fire compartment designators used in the original fire analysis with that used in this re-analysis.
]
Table 4-2 Disposition of Original Analysis Fire Compartments t
Compartment ID - -
Compartment Description Disposition Original Analysis 1.1.1.1.S,1.1.1.1.N Unit 1 Torus Area Divided into 1.1.1.1.S and 1.1.1.1.N as separate compartments 1.1.1.1.S[S1]
Unit 1 Torus Area [ Elevator Pit]
Retained
(
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-10
m a
I L
J Table 4-2 Disposition of Original Analysis Fire Compartments l
l' Compartment ID-Compartment Description Disposition i
l Original Analysis i
1.1.1.2 Unit 1 RB Ground Floor Retained i
1.1.1.2[S1]
Unit 1 RB Ground Floor [TIP Room]
Combined with 1.1.1.2 1.1.1.2[S2)
Unit 1 RB Ground Floor [Drywell Combined with 1.1.1.2 PersonnelInterlock) 1.1.1.2[S3)
Unit 1 RB Ground Floor [1/2 EDG Combined with 1.1.1.2 Interlock) l 1.1.1.2[S4]
Unit 1 RB Ground Floor [1/2 Trackway Combined with 1.1.1.2 l
Interlock) 1.1.1.2[S5]
Unit 1 RB Ground Floor [MSIV Room)
Combined with 1.1.1.2 1.1.1.3 Unit 1 RB Second Floor Retained a
1,.1.1.3[S1]
Unit 1 RB Second Floor [ Cleanup Phase Combined with 1.1.1.3
}
Separator South) l 1.1.1.3[S2]
Unit 1 RB Second Floor [ Cleanup Phase Combined with 1.1.1.3 Separator North) 1.1.1.3[S3]
Unit 1 RB Second Floor [ Regen /Non Combined with 1.1.1.3 Regen HX) 1.1.1.3[S4]
Unit 1 RB Second Floor [ Clean-Up Pump - Combined with 1.1.1.3 West) 1.1.1.3[S5)
Unit 1 RB Second Floor [ Clean-Up Pump Combined with 1.1.1.3 East) i 1.1.1.4 Unit i RB Third Floor Retained i
1.1.1.4[S1]
Unit 1 RB Third Floor (Clean-Up Valve Combined with 1.1.1.4 Alley]
1.1.1.4[S2) '
Unit 1 RB Third Floor [ Storage Room)
Combined with 1.1.1.4 1.1.1.4[S3)
Unit 1 RB Third Floor [CRD Repair Area)
Combined with 1.1.1.4 1.1.1.5.A Unit 1/2 TB RB Vent Floor Retained l
1.1.1.5[E]-
Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor [ East)
Reassigned as 1.1.1.5 1.1.1.5[S1)
Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor [ Storage Area)
Reassigned as 1.1.1.5 1.1.1.5[S2]
Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor [ Storage Area)
Reassigned as 1.1.1.5 1.1.1.5[S3)
Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor [ Lead Storage Reassigned as 1.1.1.5 Area) 1.1.1.5[W)
Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor [ West)
Reassigned as 1.1.1.5 l
1.1.1.6 Unit 1 and 2 RB Refuel Floor Retained Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-11 L
1 Table 4-2 Disposition of Original Analysis Fire Compartments Compartment ID-Compartment Description Disposition Original Analysis 1.1.1.6.A Unit 1/2 TB Vent Floor Retained 1.1.2.1.N[S1]
Unit 2 Torus Area [ Elevator Pit]
Retained 1.1.2.1.S.1.1.2.1.N Unit 2 Torus Area Divided into 1.1.2.1.S and 1.1.2.1.N as separate l
compartments 1.1.2.2 Unit 2 RB Ground Floor Retained 1.1.2.2[S1]
Unit 2 RB Ground Floor [TIP Room]
Combined with 1.1.2.2 i
1.1.2.2[S2)
Unit 2 RB Ground Floor (Drywell Combined with 1.1.2.2
)
PersonnelInterlock) 1.1.2.2[S3]
Unit 2 RB Ground Floor [MSIV Room)
Combined with 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 RB Second Floor Retained 1.1.2.3[S1]
Unit 2 RB Second Floor [ Cleanup Phase Combined with 1.1.2.3 Separator North]
1.1.2.3[S2)
Unit 2 RB Second Floor [ Cleanup Phase Combined with 1.1.2.3 Separator South) 1.1.2.3[S3]
Unit 2 RB Second Floor (Regen /Non Combined with 1.1.2.3 Regen HX]
1.1.2.3[S4]
Unit 2 RB Second Floor [ Clean-Up Pump Combined with 1.1.2.3 East]
1.1.2.3[S5]
Unit 2 RB Second Floor (Clean-Up Pump Combined with 1.1.2.3 West) 1.1.2.4 Unit 2 RB Third Floor Retained 1.1.2.4[S1]
Unit 2 RB Third Floor [ Clean-Up Valve Combined with 1.1.2.4 Alley) 1.1.2.4[S2)
Unit 2 RB Third Floor [ Interlock Area]
Combined with 1.1.2.4 I
1.1.2.4[S3]
Unit 2 RB Third Floor [ Storage Room)
Combined with 1.1.2.4 1.1.2.4[S4)
Unit 2 RB Third Floor [Decon Area]
Combined with 1.1.2.4 1.1.2.5[E)
Unit 2 RB Fourth Floor [ East]
Reassigned as 1.1.2.5 1.1.2 f(S1]
Unit 2 RB Fourth Floor [ Lead Storage Reassigned as 1.1.2.5 Area) 1.1.2.5[W]
Unit 2 RB Fourth Floor [ West]
Reassigned as 1.1.2.5 1.2.1 Unit 1 Drywell All Levels Retained 1.2.2 Unit 2 Drywell All Levels Retained l
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-12
Table 4-2 j
Disposition of Original Analysis Fire Compartments 4
i Compartment ID-Compartment Description Disposition Original Analysis 2.0 i
Unit 1/2 Control Room Retained 3.0.
Unit 1/2 Cable Spreading Room Retained 4.0.
Unit 1/2 Old Computer Room Retained i
5.0 Unit 1/2 Safe Shutdown Make-Up Pump Retained Room 6.1.A Unit 1 Battery Switchgear Room Retained 6.1.B Unit 1 Battery Charger Room Retained 6.2.A Unit 2 Battery Charger Room Retained 6.2.8 Unit 2 Battery Switchgear Room Retained i
6.3 Unit 1/2 Auxiliary Electric Room Retained 7.1 Unit 1 Battery Room Retained 7.2 Unit 2 Battery Room Retained
' 8.1 Unit 1/2 Clean and Dirty Oil Storage Retained 8.2.1.A,8.2.3.A Unit 1 Cond Pit and CRD Pumps Divided into 8.2.1.A and 8.2.3.A as separate compartments 8.2.1.B,8.2.2.A Unit 2 Cond Pit and CRD Pumps Divided into 8.2.1.B and 8.2.2.A as separate compartments I
8.2.1.C Unit 1 Location Under Hotwell Retained 8.2.1.D Unit 2 Location Under Hotwell Retained 8.2.3.B,8.2.2.B Unit 1 and 2 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel Divided into 8.2.3.B and 8.2.2.B as separate compartments 8.2.4 Unit 1 Cable Tunnel Retained 8.2.5 Unit 2 Cable Tunnel Retained 8.2.6.A,8.2.6.C, Unit 1&2 TB Ground Floor Divided into 8.2.6.A,8.2.6.C, 8.2.6.E-and 8.2.6.E as separate compartments 8.2.6.A[S1)
Unit 1 TB Ground Floor [ Mask issue)
Combined with 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.A[S2]
Unit 1 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 1 Interlock)
Combined with 8.2.6.A Quad Cities.lPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-13
Table 4-2 Disposition of Original Analysis Fire Compartments Compartment ID -
Compartment Description Disposition Original Analyals
~
8.2.6. B,8.2.7.B Unit 1 LP and D' Heater Bays Divided into 8.2.6.B and 8.2.7.B as separate compartments j
8.2.6.C[S1)
Unit 1/2 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 1 Cond Combined with 8.2.6.C Demin South) l 8.2.6.C[S2)
Unit 1/2 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 1 Cond Combined with 8.2.6.C
]
Demin North) i 8.2.6.C[S3]
Un!'.1/2 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 2 Cond Combined with 8.2.6.C Demin South) 8.2.6.C[S4]
Unit 1/2 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 2 Cond Combined with 8.2.6.C Demin North)
)
i 8.2.6.C[S5)
Unit 1/2 TB Ground Floor [X-Ray Film Combined with 8.2.6.C Lab]
8.2.6.C[S6)
Unit 1/2 TB Elevator Shaft and HPCI Combined with 8.2.6.C Tunnel 8.2.6.D,8.2.7.D Unit 2 LP and D Heater Bays Divided into 8.2.6.D and 8.2.7.D as separate i
compartments 8.2.6.D[S1]
Unit 2 LP and D Heater Boys [ Oil Storage Retained Area)
]
8.2.6.E[S1]
Unit 2 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 2 Interlock)
Combined with 8.2.6.E 8.2.7.A Unit 1 TB Mezzanine Level Retained 8.2.7.C Unit 1/2 TB Mezzanine Level Retained i
8.2.7.E Unit 2 TB Mezzanine Level Retained j
8.2.8.A Unit 1 MG Set Area South Retained 8.2.8.B,8.2.8.C Unit 1 and 2 MG Set Area Center Divided into 8.2.8.B and 8.2.8.C as separate compartments 8.2.8.D Urtit 2 MG Set Area North Retained 8.2.8.E Unit 1/2 Turbine Deck Retained 8.2.8.E[S1)
Unit 1/2 Turbine Deck [ Battery Room]
Combined with 8.2.8.E l
8.2.8.E[S2)
Unit 1/2 Turbine Deck [ Office Area)
Combined with 8.2.8.E 8.2.10 Unit 1/2 TB West TB Fan Floor Retained 9.1 Unit 1 EDG Room Retained Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-14 i
Table 4-2 l
Disposition of Original Analysis Fire Compartments
' Compartment ID -
Compartment Description Disposition Original Analysis i
9.1[S1]
Unit 1 EDG Room [ Day Tank Room]
Combined with 9.1 9.2 Unit 2 EDG Room Retained 9.2[S1]
Unit 2 EDG Room [ Day Tank Room)
Combined with 9.2 9.3 Unit 1/2 EDG Room Retained 9.3[S1]
Unit 1/2 EDG Room [ Day Tank Room]
Combined with 9.2 11.1.1.A Unit 1 RHRSWVault South Retained 11.1.1.B Unit 1 RHRSWVault Center Retained 11.1.1.C Unit 1 RHRSW Vault North Retained 11.1.2.A Unit 2 RHRSW Vault North Retained i
11.1.2.B Unit 2 RHRSW Vault Center Retained 11.1.2.C Unit 2 RHRSW Vault South Retained j
11.1.3 Unit i HPCI Room Retained 11.1.4 Unit 2 HPCI Room Retained 11.2.1 Unit 1 Comer Room SW Retained i
i 11.2.2 Unit 1 Corner Room SE Retained 11.2.3 Unit 1 Corner Room NW Retained 11.2.4 Unit 1 Comer Room NE Retained 11.3.1 Unit 2 Comer Room SW Retained 11.3.2 Unit 2 Comer Room SE Retained 11.3.3 Unit 2 Comer Room NW Retained 11.3.4 Unit 2 Corner Room NE Retained 11.4.A Cribhouse Basement Retained 11.4.B Cribhouse Ground Floor Retained 13.1 Unit 1/2 Guardhouse Retained 14.1 Unit 1/2 Radwaste Collection and Retained Handling Area 14.1.1[S1]
Unit 1 Area Outside of Offgas Retained Recombiner Room 14.1.1[S2]
Unit 11-B Offgas Condenser Room Retained Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-15
Table 4-2 Disposition of Original Analysis Fire Compartments Compartment ID-Compartment Description Disposition Original Analysis 14.1.1[S3]
Unit 1 Area Outside of Offgas Retained Recombiner Room 14.1.1[S4]
Unit 1 B Recombiner Room Retained 14.1.1[S5]
Unit 1 A Recombiner Room Retained 14.1.1[S6]
Unit 1 B SJAE Room Reassigned as 14.1.1 14.1.1[S7]
Unit 1 A SJAE Room Reassigned as 14.1.1 14.1.2[S1]
Unit 2 Area Outside of Offgas Retained Recombiner Room 14.1.2[S2]
Unit 2 2-A Offgas Condenser Room Retained 14.1.2[S3]
Unit 2 B Recombiner Room Retained 14.1.2[S4]
Unit 2 A Recombiner Room Retained 14.1.2[S5]
Unit 2 B SJAE Room Reassigned as 14.1.2 14.1.2[S6]
Unit 2 A SJAE Room Reassigned as 14.1.2 14.1.2[S7]
Unit 2 Area Outside of Offgas Retained Recombiner Room 14.3.1 Unit 1/2 Maximum Recycle Radwaste Retained Building 15.1 Unit 1/2 Security Diesel Generator Retained Building 16.1 Unit 1 HRSS Building Retained 16.2 Unit 2 HRSS Building Retained 17.1.1 U-1 Main Power Transformer 1 Retained 17.1.2 U-1 Auxiliary PowerTransformer 11 Retained 17.1.3 U-1 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer Retained 12 17.2.1 U-2 Main Power Transformer 2 Retained 17.2.2 U-2 Auxiliary PowerTransformer 21 Retained 17.2.3 U-2 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer Retained 22 18.1 Unit 1/2 Technical Support Center TSC Retained 19.1 Unit 1/2 Service Building ist Floor /LTD Retained Building Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-16
+
n I
l l
1 j
l 4
l Table 4-2 l
Disposition of Original Analysis Fire Compartments '
Compartment ID -
Compartment Description Disposition Original Analysis 19.2 Unit 1/2 Service Building 2nd Floor Retained 19.2[S2)
Unit 1/2 Service Building [3rd Floor)
Retained l
i l
19.3 Unit 1/2 Control Room Air Handling Unit Retained l
Rmm 20.1 Unit 1/2 Spray Canal Lift Station Retained 21.1 Unit 1/2 Secondary Alarm Station SAS Retained j
22.1
. Unit 1/2 Off Gas Filter Building Retained 23.1 Unit 1/2 Central Alarm Station CAS Retained i
24.1 Unit 1/2 Heating Boiler Building Retained j
25.0 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchyard Retained 25.1 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchgear Relay House Retained 25.2 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchgear Building Retained i
None Station Blackout Building - Fire Zone 26.1 Added None Station Blackout Building - Fire Zone 26.2 Added None Station Blackout Building - Fire Zone 26.3 Added 4.2.1.2 Results A total of 16 fire areas were used to describe the Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 plant site.
Six of these areas were qualitatively screened on the basis of no Appendix R safe shutdown features and no plant trip initiator given a postulated fire. These six fire areas were the Offgas Filter Building, the Radwaste Building, the Service Building office area, the Unit 1 Drywell, the Unit 2 Drywell, and the Station Blackout Diesel Building. The drywell areas were screened on the basis of the inerted atmosphere. The Station Blackout Building was screened on the basis of no impact on critical plant system or plant trip initiator. Additional qualitative screening was performed for individual buildings not directly connected to the power plant itself such as the Guardhouse, the TSC, Heating Boiler Building, etc. A total of 79 fire compartment remained unscreened following this qualitative process. Additional details related to this initial screening are presented in Section 4.6.1.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-17
f' 4.2.2 Fire Hazard Characterization
'4.2.2.1 Methodology Fire compartment ignition frequency walkdowns were done for unscreened fire compartments based on guidance provided in FIVE, (Ref. 4-4), and the Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5). The process consisted of reviewing the FHA to identify likely ignition sources within each fire compartment. If accessible, a walkdown for each fire compartment was completed. If a fire compartment was not accessible, an alternate method was used to determine the ignition sources within the room (i.e.,
interviews with personnel knowledgeable of plant configuration). The quantity of cables within each fire compartment was allocated using plant information.
4.2.2.1.1 Ignition Frequency Walkdowns For fire compartments that were accessible for entry, two engineers performed the detailed walkdowns. For compartments that were not accessible, but the opposite unit counterpart compartment was accessible, the number of ignition sources was consid-ered the same unless specifically noted. For compartments that were inaccessible on both units (such as demin resin vaults), interviews with Radiation Protection personnel and System Engineers were performed. For some compartments to which access was restricted, photographs and plant drawings were used to count the components.
Ignition sources were itemized and totaled using the following methods:
A. Electrical Cabinets. MCCs and Buses were included by counting the cubicles.
Spare cubicles contained in the MCCs and Buses were not counted since they did not contain any ignition source within the cubicle. Terminal boxes, junction boxes, and switches were not considered as electrical cabinets since the fire frequency of splices and junctions are inherent to the cable loading category. The cable loading would include these sources. The Transverse incore Probe (TIP) Machines, as well as sampling station panels, were considered electrical cabinets.
B. Pumos. With the exception of various pumps that were incorporated into a larger item and therefore counted in another category (for example, the fuel priming pump on the diesel generators are considered in the diesel generator Ignition frequency),
all pumps were recorded by EPN or unique identifier.
C. Diesel Generators. The Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generators, and the Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel Generators were considered in this category.
D. Batteries. Main station batteries designated with an EPN were counted. Each bank of cells was counted as a single battery. Batteries incorporated into emergency lighting units, miscellaneous fire protection cabinets, etc. were not considered.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-18
p E. Turbine-Generator (T/G) Exciter. Only the Unit 1 and Unit 2 T/G Exciters on the
- Turbine Deck were considered in this category.
F. Fire Pumos.iOnly the 1/2A and 1/2B Fire Pumps in the Crib House were considered in this category..
L G. Turbine-Generator Oil. This frequency was apportioned evenly among compartments containing T/G oil or seal oil piping routed through them or into'them.
H. Main Feed Pumps. For each unit, the three Main Feed Pumps were considered in this category, l.
Boilers.' Boilers considered in this' category are the heating boilers in the Heating Boiler Building.
J. Transformers. This included plant lighting transformers, as well as large power transformers. Oil circuit breakers (OCBs) in the 345 kV Switchyard were considered
. to have the same ignition frequency as transformers to simplify the analysis effort.
K. Fire Protection Panels. Individual Star Relay Panels were included in the total of this category.-
L. Reactor Protection System Motor-Generator (MG) Sets. The Recirc MG Sets were counted in this category, as well as the Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) MG Sets located in the Auxiliary Electric Room.
M. Ventilation Subsystems. A/C Units, large fan motors, room cooler subsystems, and refrigeration units were recorded by EPN or unique identifier. Small fan units for the j
,. plant steam heating units were not considered in this category. However, the steam j
' piping to these units were considered in the hot pipes category, N, Batterv Charoers. Main station battery chargers were included. Small battery
)
chargers that are intrinsic to lighting units, etc., were not considered in this category.
O. Hydroaen Recombjog_rg. The main Offgas Hydrogen Recombiners were the only items identified in this category.
P. Turbine / Generator Hydronen. Compartments that were identified to contain T/G hydrogen piping were marked as containing T/G Hydrogen.
- Q. Hydronen Tanks. All hydrogen tanks and stockpiles are located external to the plant and were not considered. No hydrogen tanks were counted in this category.
i individual hydrogen bottles located in the plant were considered in the miscellaneous hydrogen category.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1,5/25/99 1
page 4-19
R. Miscellaneous Hydroaen. Compartments that were identified to contain hydrogen piping, hydrogen bottles, etc., were marked as containing miscelianeous hydrogen.
S. Air Comoressors. Main station air compressors were included. Air compressor units that are intrinsic to other components, such as the diesel generator air starting units, were not included in the total of this category.
T. Elevator Motors. The turbine and reactor building elevators and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 manlifts were included in this category of elevator motors.
U. Drvers. No dryers were identified in the.,lant. Compressed air dryer units were considered part of their air compressor units.
V. Weldina. Extension Cords. Heaters. Hot Pioes. Overheatina. Welding, extension cords, and heaters were counted in a compartment if no plant procedures or i
guidelines specifically forbid welding, extension cords, or heaters. Hot pipes were counted if any pipes were identified in the compartment in excess of 200*F (including plant heating steam). In cases where overheating was considered a possibility based on engineering judgment and knowledge of the systems, such as the presence of motor heaters, recombiners, or tank heaters, the heaters category was marked "yes".
The length of power, control, and instrument cable was generally taken from the FHA (Ref. 4-8). The SLICE database (Ref. 4-g) was the source of FHA cable loading. In certain cases, cable loading for sections of fire zones was apportioned throughout the
, compartments based on the floor area ratios. In compartments that were fairly small, with short lengths of cable trays and were part of a relatively large fire zone, the length of tray and an average cable loading was estimated to arrive at a total cable length for the compartment.
Where the walkdown confirmed there are no cables, the length was recorded as "zero".
In compartments that were defined as a conglomerate of more than one FHA fire zone, the total cable length was derived by simply adding the FHA cable lengths for the combined zones.
, During the walkdowns, each fire compartment was thoroughly inspected and all damaging fire ignition sources were counted. All fire ignition sources that met the following criteria were excluded from the ignition frequency calculation because they were 'non-damaging' ignition sources (i.e., those sources that cannot degrade safety-related components or cables, nor propagate to other combustibles):
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/gg page 4-20
A. Completely closed electrical cabinets (except MCCs and Switchgears);
or B. Ignition sources with no safety-related cables or other intervening combustibles located within the zone of influence (i.e., distance within which damage can occur).
4.2.2.1.2 Ignition Frequency Calculations After all of the fire compartments were walked down, a fire ignition frequency was calculated for each fire compartment per the methodology given in FIVE Section 6.3.1.
The methodology assigned ignition frequencies to each compartment in proportion to the number and types of plent equipment and components located therein. The ignition frequency calculations took into account both fixed and transient ignition sources.
Procedural steps 1.1 through 1.3 were followed.
Stao 1.1 Assian a Location. From the FIVE Phase I work performed by Quad Cities Site Engineering, a matrix listing all fire areas and compartments was developed. This matrix was used to assign a location (room or building) which best corresponded (per FIVE definitions) to the fire compartment being analyzed.
Steo 1.2 Determine a Weiahtina Factor (Wg for the Location. These factors were calculated (per Reference 4-4,) by dividing the number of units per site (2 for Quad Cities) by the number of like locations at both units. This method was used for all plant locations except the Diesel Generator (DG) Room and the Switchgear Room. FIVE requires that W for the DG Room be L
calculated by dividing the number of diesels by the number of diesel generator rooms or areas. The method for calculating W for the L
Switchgear Rooms is explained later in this section.
i Steo1.3 Determine a Weiahtina Factor for Each Tvoe of lanition Source (Wg). This sub-step in FIVE Phase ll, Step 1, required the identification of ignition sources present in each fire compartment and plant location. The fixed fire ignition source count was performed during the plant walkdowns.
I The FIVE method for calculating W,and W, for Switchgear Rooms assumes that the electrical cabinets are distributed uniformly among all the Switchgear Rooms. Because the number of electrical cabinets differs between the Switchgear Rooms, a different method was used to obtain more accurate Fire ignition Frequencies for the Switchgear Rooms.. W, was calculated by dividing the number of electrical cabinets in a Switchgear Room by the number of electrical cabinets in all of the Switchgear Rooms Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-21
for Quad Cities Unit 1 and 2. W,was set equal to 2 (2 being the number of units at Quad Cities).
Transient weighting factors were assigned according to the room contents per the guidance in FIVE, Attachment 10.3. Compartments with components requiring lubrication (pumps, etc.) were considered susceptible to overheating transients. Any compartment with normal occupancy and/or plant traffic was considered susceptible to extension cord and heater transients. Compartments containing steam lines were
~
considered susceptible to hot pipe transients. Neither candles nor cigarettos are allowed in the plant, therefore they were not considered credible transient ignhn sources.
The fire frequency associated with junction boxes containing non-qualified cable was assigned to the compartments in proportion to the amount of cable insulation found in i
the compartment. Cable insulation information was taken from the FHA (Ref. 4-8, Vol.1).
4.2.2.2 Results l
The fire analysis upgrade effort re-calculated the fire ignition frequency for the 79 unscreened fire compartments. The resultant ignition frequencies were different than the values used in the original analysis. These differences were caused by various
_ errors in the original use of FIVE values and the weighting factor for plant wide ignition l
1 sources. For example, the original analysis partitioned the ignition frequency l
contribution from plant-wide ignition sources using the number of compartments in the associated fire area rather that the number of compartments in all locations. Other errors involved the magnitude of the ignition frequency for certain classes of ignition sources being either higher or lower than the reference values provided in FIVE (Ref. 4-4). The cumulativelmpact of these issues resulted in fire ignition frequencies that were generally lower than that considered in the original Fire IPEEE. There were, however, several cases where the fire ignition frequency increased or were essentially unchanged.
1 Although this re-analysis effort relied upon a different set of fire compartment boundaries, the data and analysis used in the original analysis were retained and
' modified as necessary to be incorporated into the upgraded analysis. Table 4-3 '
presents the original and revised fire ignition frequencies using the original analysis compartment designators for comparison purposes.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-22 p
a
Table 4-3 Fire Compartment ignition Frequency Table - Quad Cities Compartment ID Compartment Description Orig F1 Revised Fi 1.1.1.1.S,1.1.1.1.N Unit 1 Torus Area 2.14E-03 1.12E-03 1.1.1.1.S[S1]
Unit 1 Torus Area [ Elevator Pit]
1.59E-03 5.87E-04 1.1.1.2 Unit 1 RB Ground Floor 7.54E-03 6.76E-03 1.1.1.2[S1]
Unit 1 RB Ground Floor [TIP Room) 1.60E-03 5.87E-04 1.1.1.2[S2]
Unit 1 RB Ground Floor [Drywell Personnel 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 Interlock) 1.1.1.2[S3)
Unit 1 RB Ground Floor [1/2 EDG interlock) 2.30E-03 1.35E-03 1.1.1.2[S4]
Unit 1 RB Ground Floor [1/2 Trackway Interlock) 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 1.1.1.2[SS)
Unit 1 RB Ground Floor [MSIV Room) 1.87E-03 8.83E-04 1.1.1.3 Unit 1 RB Second Floor 1.50E-02 1.83E-02 1.1.1.3[S1)
Unit 1 RB Second Floor [ Cleanup Phase 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 Separator South)
I 1.1.1.3[S2)
Unit 1 RB Second Floor [ Cleanup Phase 3.04E-03 1.42E-03 Separator North) 1.1.1.3[S3]
Unit 1 RB Second Floor [ Regen /Non Regen HX) 1.59E-03 6.04E-04 1.1.1.3[S4]
Unit 1 RB Second Floor (Clean-Up Pump West) 2.31E-03 1.00E-03 1.1.1.3[S5]
Unit 1 RB Second Floor [ Clean-Up Pump East) 2.31E-03 1.00E-03 j
1.1.1.4 Unit 1 RB Third Floor 5.29E-03 3.45E-03 1.1.1.4[S1]
Unit 1 RB Third Floor [ Clean-Up Valve Alley) 3.04E-03 1.42E-03 1.1.1.4[S2]
Unit 1 RB Third Floor [ Storage Room]
1.59E-03 5.87E-04 1.1.1.4[S3]
Unit i RB Third Floor [CRD Repair Area) 1.69E-03 7.69E-04 1,1,1.5.A Unit 1/2 TB RB Vent Floor 2.75E-03 1.76E-03 1.1.1.5[E)
Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor [ East) 1.92E-03 9.35E-04 1.1.1.5[S1]
Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor [ Storage Area) 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 1.1.1.5[S2]
Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor [ Storage Area) 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 1.1.1.5[S3]
Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor [ Lead Storage Area) 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 1.1.1.5[WJ Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor [ West) 3.13E-03 1.86E-03 1.1.1.6 Unit 1 and 2 RB Refuel Floor 9.00E-03 7.78E-03 1.1.1.6.A Unit 1/2 TB Vent Floor 2.19E-03 1.20E-03 1.1.2.1.N[S1)
Unit 2 Torus Area [ Elevator Pit) 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 1.1.2.1.S,1.1.2.1.N Unit 2 Torus Area 1.98E-03 9.41E-04 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-23
\\
j
I:
i Table 4-3 Fire Compartment ignition Frequency Table - Quad Cities Compartment ID Compartment Description Orig Fi Revised Fi 1.1.2.2 Unit 2 RB Ground Floor 7.24E-03 6.65E-03 1.1.2.2[S1]
Unit 2 RB Ground Floor [TIP Room) 1.60E-03 5.97E-04 1.1.2.2[S2]
Unit 2 RB Ground Floor [Drywell Personnel 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 Interlock]
1.1.2.2[S3]
Unit 2 RB Ground Floor [MSIV Room) 1.87E-03 8.83E-04 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 RB Second Floor 1.36E-02 1.68E-02 1.1.2.3[S1]
Unit 2 RB Second Floor [ Cleanup Phase 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 i
Separator North) 1.1.2.3[S2)
Unit 2 RB Second Floor (Cleanup Phase 3.04E-03 1.42E-03 Separator South) 1.1.2.3[S3]
Unit 2 RB Second Floor (Regen /Non Regen HX) 1.59E-03 6.04E-04 i
1.1.2.3[S4]
Unit 2 RB Second Floor [ Clean-Up Pump East]
2.31E-03 1.00E-03 1.1.2.3[S5]
Unit 2 RB Second Floor [ Clean-Up Pump West) 2.31E-03 1.00E-03 1.1.2.4 Unit 2 RB Third Floor 5.00E-03 3.18E-03 j
1.1.2.4[S1]
Unit 2 RB Third Floor [ Clean-Up Valve Alley) 3.04E-03 1.42E-03 1.1.2.4[S2)
Unit 2 RB Third Floor (Interlock Area) 1.63E-03 6.56E-04 1.1.2.4[S3]
Unit 2 RB Third Floor [ Storage Room]
1.59E-03 5.87E-04 1.1.2.4[S4]
Unit 2 RB Third Floor [Decon Area) 2.43E-03 1.33E-03 1.1.2.5[E)
Unit 2 RB Fourth Floor [ East) 1.92E-03 '
9.45E-04 1.1.2.5[S1)
Unit 2 RB Fourth Floor [ Lead Storage Area]
1.59E-03 5.87E-04 1.1.2.5[W)
Unit 2 RB Fourth Floor [ West) 3.09E-03 1.53E-03 11.1.1.A Unit 1 RHRSW Vault South 2.49E-03 1.45E-03 11.1.1.B Unit 1 RHRSWVault Center 2.71E-03 1.64E-03 11.1.1.C Unit 1 RHRSWVault North 2.10E-03 1.08E-03 11.1.2.A Unit 2 RHRSWVault North 2.49E-03 1.45E-03 11.1.2.B Unit 2 RHRSW Vault Center 2.32E-03 1.27E-03 11.1.2.C Unit 2 RHRSWVault South 2.10E-03 1.08E-03 11.1.3 Unit i HPCI Room 6.35E-03 3.57E-03 11.1.4 Unit 2 HPCI Room 6.31E-03 3.52E-03 11.2.1 Unit 1 Comer Room SW 4.09E-03 1.79E-03 11.2.2 Unit 1 Comer Room SE 3.37E-03 1.78E-03 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-24
l l
Table 4-3 Fire Compartment Ignition Frequency Table - Quad Cities l
Compartment ID Compartment Description Orig Fi Revised Fi 11.2.3 Unit 1 Comer Room NW 4.32E-03 2.55E-03 11.2.4 Unit 1 Comer Room NE 3.37E-03 1.78E-03 11.3.1 Unit 2 Comer Room SW 3.40E-03 1.82E-03 11.3.2 Unit 2 Comer Room SE 3.38E-03 1.79E-03 11.3.3 Unit 2 Comer Room NW 4.05E-03 2.14E-03 11.3.4 Unit 2 Comer Room NE 3.37E-03 1.78E-03 11.4.A Cribbouse Basement 1.29E-02 1.19E-02 11.4.B Cribhouse Ground Floor 2.15E-02 2.07E 02 14.1.1[S1]
Unit 1 Area Outside of Oflgas Recombiner Room 2.44E-03 1.55E-03 14.1'[S2]
Unit i 1-B Offgas Condenser Room 1.59E-03 6.04E-04 14.1.1[S3]
Unit 1 Area Outside of Offgas Recombiner Room 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 14.1.1[S4]
Unit 1 B Recombiner Room 1.62E-03 6.64E-04 14.1.1[S5)
Unit 1 A Recombiner Room 1.62E-03 6.64E-04 14.1.1[S6]
Unit 1 B SJAE Room 1.70E-03 6.95E-04 14.1.1[S7]
Unit 1 A SJAE Room 1.59E-03 6.04E-04 I
14.1.2[S1]
Unit 2 Area Outside of Ofigas Recombiner Room 2.44E-03 1.55E-03 14.1.2[S2].
Unit 2 2-A Offgas Condenser Room 1.59E-03 6.04E-04 i
14.1.2[S3]
Unit 2 B Recombiner Room 1.62E-03 6.64E-04 1
14.1.2[S4)
Unit 2 A Recombiner Room 1.62E-03 6.64E-04 14.1.2[SS)
Unit 2 B SJAE Room 1.59E-03 6.04E-04 14.1.2[S6]
Unit 2 A SJAE Room 1.70E-03 6.95E-04 14.1.2[S7)
Unit 2 Area Outside of Offgas Recombiner Room 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 17.1.1 U-1 Main Power Transformer 1 9.59E-03 1.92E-03 17,1.2 U-1 Auxiliary PowerTransformer 11 9.59E-03 1.92E-03 17.1.3 U-1 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer 12 9.59E-03 1.92E-03 17.2.1 U-2 Main Power Transformer 2 9.59E-03 1.92E-03 17.2.2 U-2 Auxiliary PowerTransformer 21 9.59E-03 1.92E-03 17.2.3 U-2 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer 22 9.59E-03 1.92E-03 2.0 Unit 1/2 Control Room 2.08E-02 1.93E-02 25.0 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchyard 1.57E-02 1.78E-03 Quad Cities'iPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-25
v Table 4-3 I
Fire Compartment ignition Frequency Table - Quad Cities i
Compartment ID Compartment Description Orig Fi Revised Fi 25.1 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchgear Relay House 5.54E-03 7.19E-03 25.2 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchgear Building 1.39E-03 4.66E-03 3.0 Unit 1/2 Cable Spreading Room 9.45E-03 8.37E-03 4.0 Unit 1/2 Old Computer Room 2.81E-03 3.13E-03 5.0 Unit 1/2 Safe Shutdown Make-Up Pump Room 2.57E-03 1.59E-03 6.1.A Unit i Battery Switchgear Room 8.79E-03 5.04E-03 l
6.1.B Unit 1 Battery Charger Room 1.05E-02 6.80E-03 i
6.2.A
/
Unit 2 Battery Charger Room 9.14E-03 5.40E-03 6.2.B
/
Unit 2 Battery Switchgear Room 9.50E-03 5.76E-03 6.3 Unit 1/2 Auxiliary Electric Room 1.11 E-02 2.05E-02 7.1 Unit 1 Battery Room 3.22E-03 3.34E-03 7.2 Unit 2 Battery Room 3.22E-03 3.34E-03 8.1 Unit 1/2 Clean and Dirty Oil Storage 4.54E-03 3.49E-03 8.2.1.A,8.2.3.A Unit 1 Cond Pit and CRD Pumps 1.20E-02 2.62E-03 8.2.1.B,8.2.2.A Unit 2 Cond Pit and CRD Pumps 1.20E-02 2.63E-03 8.2.1.C Unit 1 Location Under Hotwell 1.59E-03 6.04E-04 j
8.2.1,D Unit 2 Location Under Hotwell 1.59E-03 6.04E-04 8.2.10 Unit 1/2 TB West TB Fan Floor 7.51E-03 5.56E-03 j
8.2.3.B,8.2.2.B Unit 1 and 2 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel 1.81E-03 7.70E-04 8.2.4 Unit 1 Cable Tunnel 2.57E-03 1.58E-03 8.2.5 Unit 2 Cable Tunnel 6.01E-03 5.01E-03 8.2.6.A,8.2.6.C, Unit 1&2 TB Ground Floor 3.34E-02 3.23E-02 8.2.6.E 8.2.6.A[S1]
Unit 1 TB Ground Floor [ Mask issue) 1.59E-03 6.06E-04 8.2.6.A[S2]
Unit 1 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 1 Interlock]
1.61E-03 6.30E-04 8.2.6.B,8.2.7.B Unit 1 LP and D Heater Bays 5.04E-03 4.08E-03 8.2.6.C[S1]
Unit 1/2 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 1 Cond Demin 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 South) 8.2.6.C[S2]
Unit 1/2 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 1 Cond Demin 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 l
North]
8.2.6.C[S3]
Unit 1/2 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 2 Cond Demin 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 South]
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-26
i Table 4-3 Fire Compartment ignition Frequency Table - Quad Cities Compartment ID Compartment Description Orig Fi Revised Fi 8.2.6.C[S4]
Unit 1/2 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 2 Cond Domin 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 North]
8.2.6.C[S5]
Unit 1/2 TB Ground Floor [X-Ray Film Lab) 2.19E-03 1.20E-03 8.2.6.C[S6].
Unit 1/2 TB Elevator Shaft and HPCI Tunnel 1.61 E-03 1.17E-03 8.2.6.D,8.2.7.D Unit 2 LP and D Heater Bays 4.66E-03 3.70E-03 8.2.6.D[S1)
Unit 2 LP and D Heater Bays [ Oil Storage Area) 1.59E-03 6.04E-04 i
8.2.6.E[S1)
Unit 2 TB Ground Floor [ Unit 2 Interlock]
1.61 E-03 6.30E-04 8.2.7.A Unit 1 TB Mezzanine Level 1.97E-02 1.90E-02 8.2.7.C Unit 1/2 TB Mezzanine Level 1.19E-02 1.17E-02 8.2.7.E Unit 2 TB Mezzanine Level 2.33E-02 1.90E-02 8.2.8.A Unit 1 MG Set Area South 4.68E-03 5.37E-03 8.2.8.B,8.2.8.C Unit 1 and 2 MG Set Area Center 8.11E-03 see below 8.2.8.B Unit 1 MG Set Area North na 4.82E-03 '
l 8.2.8.C Unit 2 MG Set Area South na 4.82E-03 8.2.8.D Unit 2 MG Set Area North 4.03E-03 4.93E-03 8.2.8.E Unit 1/2 Turbine Deck 3.04E-02 2.87E-02 8.2.8.E[S1)
Unit 1/2 Turbine Deck [ Battery Room]
3.21E-03 4.08E-03 8.2.8.E[S2)
Unit 1/2 Turt>ine Deck [ Office Area) 2.98E-04 3.98E-04 j
9.1 -
Unit 1 EDG Room 3.14E-02 3.53E-02 9.1[S1)
Unit 1 EDG Room [ Day Tank Room) 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 9.2 Unit 2 EDG Room 3.14E-02 3.53E-02 9.2[S1]
Unit 2 EDG Room [ Day Tank Room) 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 9.3 Unit 1/2 EDG Room 3.14E-02 3.53E-02 9.3[S1]
Unit 1/2 EDG Room [ Day Tank Room) 1.59E-03 5.87E-04 4.3.
FIRE GROWTH AND PROPAGATION 4.3.1 Detailed Fire Modeling The unscreened fire compartments were initially evaluated based on an assumed exposure fire wherein all cables and equipment within the boundaries defined by the compartment were assurned to be damaged. In many cases, the resultant calculated CDF contribution satisfied the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. No further analysis was Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-27
F performed for screened fire compartments other than the multi-compartment analysis as described in Section 4.6.3 Unscreened fire compartment were analyzed further to develop a more realistic treatment of credible fire events. These analysis refinements included performing fire modeling analyses using the guidance provided in the EPRI FIVE Methodology (Ref. 4-4) and the EPRI Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5).
The modeling effort was based on extensive plant walkdowns, and review of controlled drawings and related fire protection documents. Ignition sources were examined in the field to determine if they were capable of propagating a fire. Fire scenario geometry reflecting the locations of the ignition sources, PRA targets, and intervening combust-ibles was determined in the field. Data determined in the field also included identifi-cation of fire protection features such as suppression, detection, and other features which serve to protect PRA targets.
4.3.1.1 Development of Fire Scenarios A fire scenario is a physical description of the ignition and development of a fire and the resulting potential consequences. Characterizing a fire scenario involves defining the amount of material involved in the fire, the intensity of burning, and the timing and physical placement of the fire with respect to PRA targets (equipment and circuits).
Fire scenarios are defined based on the data collected in the field. A scenario includes the following:
A. Location of the ignition source and its burning characteristics; B. Location and geometry of intervening combustible materials (close enough to be ignited by the ignition source), and their burning characteristics; C. Location of the PRA targets; 4
D. Type of raceway containing the PRA targets (i.e., solid bottom cable tray, conduit);
E. Geometry of the compartment; and F. Fire protection features in close proximity to the source and targets.
Fire modeling of scenarios initially assumed that suppression systems were not functioning. This approach provided an assessment of the potentialimpact on PRA targets from a fire in the event it was not suppressed. Suppression systems were subsequently credited, where appropriate and justified, in calculating the potential for damage to PRA targets as addressed in Section 4.6.2.
.4.3.1.2 Calculating Fire Exposure Fire exposure temperatures were calculated at the PRA targets based on fire modeling correlations described in FlVE (Ref. 4-4), and supplemented by fire modeling data Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-28
presented in the Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5). The correlations define pre-flashover exposure temperatures in the following regions of fire influence:
A. Targets directly above the source, i.e., those targets exposed to convective heating from the plume; B.iTargets located to the side of the fire source and close to the ceiling, i.e., those targets exposed to the ceiling jet;
)
C. Targets located in close proximity to the fire source, i.e.,' those targets exposed to radiative heating from the exposure fire; and i
D. Targets outside the plume and below the ceiling Jet, i.e., those targets exposed i
to the hot gas layer (HGL).
The -input. variables in the correlations include distances, ignition source, and i
intervening combustible burning characteristics. The key inputs to the EPRI FIVE fire modeling worksheets are described below:
)
A. Target Damage Threshold: 425 F - the plant cables consist of IEEE 383 and non-lEEE 383 qualified cables. The damage threshold from the FIVE Methodology (Ref. 4-4) for non-lEEE 383 cables was selected.
B. Heat Loss Factor: 0.70 -the recommended value from FIVE is applied. In the
)
case of the multi-compartment analysis, a Heat Loss Factor of 0.85 is used. This J
is discussed further in Section 4.6.3.
l 2
i C. Critical Radiant Flux: 0.5 Btu /s/ft and 1.0 Btu /s/ft"- for non-qualified and all other components, respectively.
D. Target Thermal Response Parameter: 16 - PE/PVC Electrical Cables - limiting.
E. Rated Actuation Temperature of Detector / Suppression: 185 F.
H F. Time Constant of Detection Device: 180 seconds - midpoint of range for bulb type devices (Ref. 4-4).
G. Ambient Temperature: 90 F - this assumed value was used for the maximum expected ambient temperature during normal plant operations. For purposes of suppression modeling, the minimum ambient temperature was assumed to be 75 F. The time for suppression actuation is dependent on the time to raise the ambient temperature to the actuation temperature of the detector. The lower the ambient temperature the longer the time for actuation.
4.3.2 EquipmentandMaterialBurning Characteristics The burning characteristics of equipment and materials involved in the fire scenarios are characterized by a heat release rate (HRR) and heat content (Q ). FIVE (Ref. 4-4) and the Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5, Appendix E ) were the primary Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-29
r sources for this information. The following paragraphs address the equipment / material
{
burning characteristics for the fire types which have been specifically selected to represent Quad Cities (English Units - BTUs, feet).
4.3.2.1 Oil Spill Fires Oil spill fires were treated using the guidance provided in FIVE (Ref 4-4) and the EPRI Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5). 18% of the postulated oil spill fires were-treated as "large" oil spills. The remaining 82% were treated as "small" oil spi _Ils. In the i
case of air compressors, the guidance provided in the EPRI Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5) recommends 2% of oil spills should be treated as "large". However, the Quad Cities fire analysis did not credit this lower severity factor. The selection of these severity factors was consistent with the information in the EPRI Fire Events Database (Ref. 4-26).
A postulated "large" oil spill fire was evaluated based on the volume of oil contained within an individual cavity of a component, such as a pump or motor, being evaluated j
as an ignition source. This did not necessarily involve the total volume of oil for the entire _ component. A small oil spill was assumed to involve the larger of 2 quarts or 10% of the large oil spill.
In cases where the largest oil spill associated with a component was of the same order of magnitude as a small fire as defined here, such as an electric motor containing % to 1 gallon of oil, the small fire scenario considered failure of the individual component itself with no fire propagation.
The parameters for all postulated oil spills are provided below. These parameters are based on heavy fuel oil for heat characteristics and DTE 797 for spill characteristics.
These bases were selected in order to provide bounding results for the fire modeling analyses.
l
- 1) Mobile DTE 797:
a)- Unconfined spill thickness: 0.013 inch b) Spill Specific Area: 120 ft fg i
- 2) Fuel Oil, Heavy:
a) Net Heat of Combustion: 17,111 Btu /lbm b) Ideal Unit Mass Loss Rate: 0.007 lbm/s-ft2 c) Estimated Combustion Efficiency: 0.9 d) Approximate Unit Heat Release Rate: 110 Btu /s-ft2 e) Density: 60lbm/ft3
'4.3.2.2 Electrical Fires Electrical fires were evaluated using criteria and methods consistent with FIVE (Ref. 4-
- 4) and the EPRI Fire PRA implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5). Five types of electrical fires were evaluated. These types were low voltage cabinets and panels, Motor Control Centers (MCCs), low voltage Buses, medium voltage Switchgears, and Transformers.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-30
Low Voltaae Cabinets and Panels: This classification addressed miscellaneous electrical enclosures containing low voltage circuits (less than 600 Volts).
These enclosures are not susceptible to explosive type events. Enclosures in this category include control panels and cabinets, termination cabinets, and enclosed power distribution panels not addressed by the other classifications. Fire propagation is not considered to be credible if the panel is substantially sealed, if fire propagation is considered credible a 400 BTU /s heat rate and 15 minute fire duration were used.
Motor Control Centers: This classification addressed both AC and DC MCCs. Fires in MCCs typically involve individual cubicle fires. However, the treatment of a postulated MCC fire assumed the functional failure of the entire MCC (loss of power). Walkdown inspections of the MCCs which were located below raceways containing circuits associated with credited safe shutdown functions found that the cable entries were sealed. Cables which entered the top of the MCC were provided with individual fittings.
While these fittings were not considered to be a rated fire barrier, the lack of a concentrated mass of combustibles through a common penetration greatly reduced the likelihood of fire propagation. As such, propagation of a postulated fire beyond the boundaries of the MCC is not considered likely. However, in order to address potential uncertainty,10% of postulated fires were assumed to propagate vertically beyond the boundaries of the MCC and potentially challenge targets directly above the MCC.
Low Voltaae Buses: This classification addressed 480 VAC and DC buses. Fires in these enclosures typically involve individual cubicle fires. However, the treatment of a postulated bus fire assumed the functional failure of the entire bus (loss of power).
Walkdown inspections of the bus enclosures found that the cable entries are sealed.
As such, propagation of a postulated fire beyond the boundaries of the enclosure is not considered likely.
However, in order to address potential uncertainty,10% of postulated fires were assumed to propagate vertically beyond the boundaries of the enclosure and potentially challenge targets directly above.
Medium Voltaae Switchaears: This classification addressed 4.16kV switchgear. Fires in switchgears typically involve individual cubicle fires. However, the treatment of a postulated switchgear fire assumed the functional failure of the entire switchgear.
Walkdown inspections of the switchgears found that the cable entries are sealed. As such, propagation of a postulated fire beyond the boundaries of the switchgear is not considered likely.
However, in order to address potential uncertainty, 20% of postulated fires were assumed to propagate beyond the boundaries of the switchgear.
This included horizontally through the switchgear front due to an explosive event.
Horizontal propagation through the back of the switchgear was not considered to be a credible consequence of a fire event.
Transformers: This classification addresses 4kV, 480VAC and off-site (UAT/ RAT) transformers. The 4kV/480V transformers are filled with Pyranol which was previously Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-31
evaluated and determined to be not combustible. As such, the fire hazard which is presented is not significant when compared to a combustible oil filled transformer. The upgraded fire analysis took credit for this noncombustible oil and did not assume any oil based fire involving the transformers filled with Pyranol. A postulated transformer fire assumed the functional failure of the entire transformer.
The evaluation of the Unit Auxiliary and Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (UAT/ RAT) fires found that a severity factor of 57% is applicable based on a review of data in the EPRI Fire Events Database (Ref. 4-26). However, a postulated UAT/ RAT fire could result in smoke intrusion to the Emergency Diesel Generator air intake system.
Such a propagation mechanism is not believed to be accurately represented by the 57%
severity factor. Therefore, UAT/ RAT fires were evaluated without consideration of severity factors.
Self-Initiated : Cable Fires:
' A review of the Quad Cities Appendix R related documentation and discussions with design engineering staff determined that the majority of the cabling in the plant is not IEEE 383 qualified. The upgraded fire analysis evaluated the implication of this by explicitly evaluating cable tray fires in selected plant areas where a concentration of critical cables could be expected. The intent was to bound the potential consequences so that explicit treatment would not have to be performed for all fire compartments. The fire compartments that were selected were the Cable Tunnel (Unit 2 analysis only), the Auxiliary Relay Room, and the Cable Spreading Room. Additionally, many Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) cables are routed through the plant and were determined to be not exposed to any significant ignition sources. Recognizing the potential risk significance of spurious ADS actuation scenarios, a series of self-initiated cable tray fire scenarios was developed to investigate the potential risk significance of fire induced spurious ADS actuation. The scenarios involving self-initiated cable fires resulting in failure in all circuits in the raceway were analyzed with a severity factor of 0.18. This factor was developed based on a review of incidents in the EPRI Fire Events Database (Ref. 4-26).
4.3.2.3 Transient Fires Transient fires can be postulated to occur. However, such fires require both an ignition source and combustibles. The fire modeling analyses presented in this report explicitly evaluated in-situ ignition sources and combustibles. Transient ignition sources were not explicitly treated. Transient ignition sources such as that associated with hot work are controlled by plant procedures'which include a requirement that a fire watch be posted. - The likelihood that a significant fire resulting from a transient ignition source that causes damage to critical targets due to failure of pre-work controls and the fire watch is judged to be low enough to be excluded from explicit treatment. Other potential transient ignition sources such as those considered in the development of the compartment ignition frequencies were also screened. This is based on the specific fire modeling analyses and walkdown inspection that were performed. The fire modeling analyses evaluated the consequences of postulated fires involving in-situ sources. The Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-32
1 l.
treatment of these sources included the explicit consideration of non-severe fire events.
The combination of the scenarios for the severe and non-severe fire events bounds the
. potential impact of the screened transient ignition sources.
Another potential source of a transient related fire involves combustible material storage.. However, such a fire requires the presence of an ignition source of sufficient intensity to cause ignition and continued combustion. The bounding treatment of fires in this report is considered to be sufficient to address this issue given the lack of significant transient combustible storage adjacent to ignition sources observed during plant walkdowns. In addition, it was observed that containers intended for normal occupancy refuse were metal and fitted with FM approved self-extinguishing covers. As such, this transient combustible source was screened.
4.3.3 Fire Gmwth and PmpageGon Characteris6cs The modeling generally assumed that fires reached their peak heat release rate imme-diately upon ignition. This minimized the time for automatic and manual suppression to react and therefore produced bounding results.
Propagation of cable fires was approximated as follows:
i A. : Vertical runs of cable, if ignited, were assumed to propagate up to the room boundary or until the cable changed direction and traversed horizontally.
B. Fires in horizontal tray stacks (ladderback trays) were assumed to propagate upward from tray to tray as described in Appendix ! of the Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5).
The potential for a given fire generating a hot gas layer within its respective fire compartment was not postulated for those spaces that have substantial ventilation openings. Only those openings that provide an ascending vertical vent path were i
considered. Available ventilation pathways as well as potential fire induced boundary
. failures were also evaluated in the multi-compartment analysis as discussed in Section 4.6,0. In order to ensure that the potential for localized heating outside the fire plume arw ceiling jet region was considered for substantially ventilated compartments, a i
minimum allowable margin of 50 'F between the calculated target temperature and the damage threshold was used in lieu of the hot gas layer analysis developed in the FIVE
.worksheets.
l 4.4 EVALUATION OF COMPONENT FRAGILITIES AND FAILURE MODES The potential damage to a component that could' result due to a postulated fire was determined in several steps. First, the scope of plant systems, associated equipment, and functions credited for post fire plant trip response was determined using the plant fire PRA model. A review of plant design drawings and cable databases, including Appendix R data sources was then performed to identify those cables and circuits whose failure given a postulated fire event would result in the equipment failure (s)
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-33 i
E treated in the PRA model and their location in the plant. This data was then linked to the fire compartment designators and the fire PRA model. The analysis assumed that fire induced cable or circuit failure resulted in loss of associated equipment functionality unless supplemental evaluations are performed to confirm and justify no loss of equipment function.
4.4.1 Cable /CircuitLocation This section of the report describes the development of the cable / circuit and equipment location database. The database was used to identify the spatial distribution of plant system features credited for post fire plant shutdown that could be exposed to fire induced damage. The scope and description of the credited plant systems is discussed i
in Section 4.4.4.2.
l The original Quad Cities Fire IPEEE developed this data to a fire compartment level of
' detail. This level of detail did not support additional analysis refinement that could have been performed via fire modeling. As such, the original analysis assumed that any fire induced damage to any circuit resulted in loss of all cables and circuits within the fire compartment.- The fire PRA upgrade effort described in this submittal included the refinement of the cable and circuit data so that their specific locations in the various fire compartments were integrated into the analysis. This allowed the analysis to more realistically treat the consequences of postulated fire events.
4.4.1.1 Scope The scope of this report is limited to those plant systems credited for performing post fire plant shutdown functions as described in Section 4.4.4.2. These systems can be grouped into three categories - inventory control systems, decay heat removal systems, and support systems. The cables and circuits necessary for these systems to function were identified using a variety of data sources.
4.4.1.1.1 Methodology The cable / circuit and equipment data was developed by using the information available from a variety of sources and documents located at Quad Cities Station. The information was evaluated for accuracy and verified with as many -sources as possible.
How each data source was used is discussed in the following sections.
l 4.4.1.1.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment List The Safe-Shutdown Equipment List (SSDEL) was developed and other related Appendix R documents were also updated as part of an integrated Fire Protection improvement Program (FPlP). This effort included an expansion of the scope of systems credited in the Appendix R Program as well as a re-examination of the cable routing information. This information was incorporated into the fire PRA upgrade. The SSDEL was compared to the scope of equipment considered in the fire PRA model.
This comparison determined whether the credited function for the component was consistent between the Appendix R Program requirements and fire PRA model.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report i
Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-34 l
u The cable and circuit information associated with the Appendix R Program are contained in a computerized database called SLICE. The SLICE data files were used to identify the cables associated with the Appendix R equipment, their location in terms of fire compartments, and their individual routing throughout the plant. The scope of plant systems whose cable information was obtained directly from the FPIP effort were:
z l
High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) l Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) e Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump (SSMP) e Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
' Core Spray (CS)
Residual Heat Removal (RHR)- Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode e
RHR-Suppression Pool Cooling mode RHR-Shutdown Cooling mode Support Systems -i.e., AC/DC power, RHRSW, etc.
4.4.1.1.3 Electrical Elementsty/ Schematic Diagrams The scope of plant systems credited in the fire PRA model included selected non-Appendix R systems. The cable and circuit information for these additional systems was identified by examining the electrical diagrams. The fire PRA model was reviewed
. to identify the non-Appendix R plant system components and functions. The appropriate Quad Cities design drawings were then reviewed to identify the circuits and cables whose fire induced failure may result in the failure of the component. This cable mapping process included those cables whose failure individually would result in component failure, it also included those cables whose failure must occur in combination with other circuit failures in order to cause component failure. It was recognized that this mapping process would result in cases where the data would indicate component failure when an insufficient set of cables were concurrently impacted. Supplemental reviews were performed on a fire compartment and scenario basis following initial fire PRA model quantification to identify and modify the treatment of these occurrences on an as-needed basis.
The scope of plant systems whose cable information was obtained by specific review of drawings were Feedwater (FW), Condensate (Cond), Control Rod Drive (CRD),
Torus /Drywell Vent (TDV), and their associated support systems. The scope of support systems included the offsite power supply circuit.
4.4.1.1.4 SLICE Engineering Tool The SLICE Engineering Tool (Ref. 4-9) consists of a computer database and computer i
program that provides information about the electrical cables installed at Quad Cities.
The database contains cable information such as associated SSD equipment, cable routing, fire zones, etc.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-35
- The SLICE database files include detailed routing information for each of the cables considered in this analysis. This routing information was used along with plant design documents, and walkdown inspections to determine the location of the cables. The location information was developed on two different levels of detail. The initial data set associated fire compartment designators to each of the cables. In this manner initial quantifications on a compartment basis could be performed. This data was then refined on an as-needed basis to develop the specific raceway routing points within a fire compartment that contain the various cables of concern to support fire modeling analyses.
4.4.1.1.5 Plant Walkdowns The fire protection engineers completed site walkdowns as part of the fire ignition frequency task within the original IPEEE Project. The walkdowns were primarily used to. identify fire ignition frequencies for the project but the walkdowns did provide additional information on equipment locations.
Additional plant walkdowns were performed to support the fire modeling effort and the
. multi-compartment analysis. These walkdowns focused on the arrangements of fire ignition sources, fuels, combustibles, targets, and the features and characteristics of the compartment boundaries. Many of the Quad Cities fire compartments in the Turbine Building were treated as ventilated spaces. While this provides the means for heat and smoke removal, it also creates the potential for postulated fires to impact targets in an adjacent compartment. The walkdowns examined these ventilation pathways to ensure that any targets or interactions with the adjacent compartment were properly addressed.
4.4.1.2 Development of the FRANC Cable Data Files The cable data developed as described in the prior section was used to develop one of the Fire Risk Analysis Code (FRANC) data files (Ref. 4-27). For each piece of equipment credited in the fire PRA model, a data link was made to relate the set of cables whose fire induced failure would directly impact the equipment functionality. For each of these cables, another link to the fire compartments through which it is routed 2
was also provided. The process of assigning fire compartment designators was structured to ensure that terminal end locations of the cable were properly reflected.
For example, the routing information for a bottom entry cable into a motor control center may not properly show the fire compartment which contains the actual motor control center. The methodology addressed this potential. The resultant file contained necessary data relationships to provide a list of equipment potentially disabled for a fire
'in any given fire compartment.
4.4.1.3 FRANC Cable Data File implementation The' FRANC cable data file was linked to another data file which contained the fire PRA model basic events. The FRANC program in concert with the Fully Optimized Risk &
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-36
o.
Reliability Quantification Engine (FORTE) program (Ref. 4-28), performs quantifications of the fire PRA model by either setting the linked basic events to 'true' or 1.0, based on user inputs.
4.4.2 CableCircuit Fire Induced Failure niodes l
The upgraded fire analysis considered three potential fire induced cable failure modes -
. open circuit, short circuit, and hot shorts. A key feature of the analysis is that spurious equipment actuation is considered for all three failure modes.
Open circuit - postulated open circuit conditions would result in the interruption of power or control signals. In this case, components would align themselves in a de-energized state. Valves which require power to maintain a desired position would be assumed to 3
change state. Relays which are normally energized would de-energize. The consequences of this relay action may include spurious actuation of mechanical system components. In no case were fire induced failures credited to assist components in achieving the desired state for this analysis. The open circuit failure mode was treated using a scenario specific conditional failure probability of 1.0.
Short circuit - postulated short circuit conditions were defined as those fire induced failures wherein the conductors of an individual cable become ' connected' together in any combination. The failure modes which were considered included shorting of all conductors in power circuits, and the selected shorting of conductors within individual control cables to cause spurious equipment actuation. For example, a control cable between a motor control center and the control room was treated using failure modes which included the shorting of conductors to generate a spurious valve open or close signal. As in the prior case, fire induced cable failures were not credited to assist components achieve the desired state for this analysis. This failure mode was treated using a scenario specific conditional failure probability of 1.0.
Hot short - this cable failure mode is a special case of the more general short circuit failure mode. This case involves an instance wherein the energized conductor (s) of a given cable become connected to the de-energized conductor (s) of another cable causing undesired spurious actuation of equipment associated with the second cable.
This failure mode is very unlikely since it also requires that these ' shorted' conductors not include certain other conductors such as neutral or ground, and be connected long enough to cause the affected component to change state. As such, the application of a non-unity conditional failure probability is appropriate. While an explicit analysis to determine this value for each case was not performed, a simplified assessment was performed to provide a reasonable range of possible values.
The simplified assessment concluded that the lower and upper bound conditional probabilities were 3.9E-2 and 1.0E-1, respectively. It was noted that the hot short conditional probability of 6.8E-2 presented in NUREG/CR-2258 (Ref. 4-24) is approximately the mean of the upper and lower bound values. The upgraded fire risk Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-37 i
l analysis applied the 6.8E-2 conditional probability for postulated fire induced hot shorts on a very limited basis.
4.4.3 Equipment Damage Criteria Threshold values for damage and ignition of cable targets and intervening combustible materials are specified in the Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5) and the NUMARC Thermo-Lag Combustibility Screen Guide (Ref. 4-14). The Quad Cities plant cables consists of IEEE 383 and non-lEEE 383 qualified cables. The damage threshold for non-lEEE 383 qualified cables were used to evaluate the response of all cable targets in the upgraded fire analysis.
A. Damage temperature for non-qualified cable 425 F B. Ignition temperature for non-qualified cable 425*F C. Critical Heat Flux for non-qualified cable 0.5 Btu /s/ft2 D. Thermal response of non-qualified cable 16 (Btu /sec-ft )1/2 2
4.4.4 Fire PRA Afodel 4.4.4.1 Purpose This section describes the method used to determine fire-induced conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for each of the fire compartments that were not qualitatively screened. The CCDPs were used in conjunction with the fire compartment fire ignition frequencies to determine the calculated core damage frequency (CDF) contributions.
The key differences in the fire PRA model developed for this upgraded analysis and that applied in the original Fire IPEEE are the treatment of operator actions and the treatment of postulated fire initiated events. The original analysis results were based primarily on the implementation of the Appendix R based post-fire safe shutdown procedures which address a bounding exposure fire event. The original analysis did not fully credit the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). The upgraded analysis relied on implementation of the EOPs. As a result, all but one of the postulated fire scenarios in this upgraded analysis were quantified based only on the provisions of the EOPs. The Appendix R post-fire safe shutdown procedures are credited only for the bounding control room fire event. The original Fire IPEEE also considered only a limited set of fire initiated events. The upgraded fire analysis expanded the scope of initiating events to more realistically analyze the potential challenges.
4.4.4.2 Description of the Fire PRA Model The Quad Cities fire PRA model was developed from the plant internal events PRA model. The development began with the selection of the potential fire initiated events.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report l
Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-38
1 it was determined that the intemal events PRA model structure was adequate to address all postulated fire induced initiating events except for an event involving spurious actuation of all ADS valves. This was treated by creating a new initiating event, %TP, for multiple spurious ADS valve openings. The' event tree sequences for the %TP initiator were developed based on the structure for a large LOCA event from 7
the plant intemal events PRA model.
The set of fire initiated events that were addressed in the fire PRA model are listed below.
. - %TT - Turbine Trip
%TC - Loss of Main Condenser e
%TIA-Loss of Instrument Air:
%TI - Single Spurious ADS Valve Opening
%TP - Multiple Spurious ADS Valve Opening
. % LOOP - Single Unit Loss of Offsite Power
' %DLOOP - Dual Unit Loss of Offsite Power The determination of the appropriate initiating event given a postulated fire was determined as described in Section 4.4.4.5.
The systems in operation and use at Quad Cities were considered in the development
' of the fire PRA model. The front-line systems modeled and included were:
A.- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System B. Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump (SSMP) System C. Feedwater and Condensate (FW) System D. Control Rod Hydraulic (CRD) System E. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System F. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
L G.' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System - LPCI and Suppression Pool Cooling Modes H.1 Core Spray (CS) System
- 1. Containment Vents including the Torus and Drywell vent paths
)
I The scope of front-line systems was supplemented with the necessary set of support systems. These support systems included the offsite power supply connections as well as the Emergency and Station Blackout Diesel Generators. The performance of these plant systems was modeled by fault trees to depict combinations of hardware faults, j
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report I
Rev.1, 5/25/99 i
page 4-39 1
I
)
l l
human errors, test and maintenance unavailabilities, and other events that can lead to a failure.
l.
i.
4.4.4.3 Cable and Equipment Spatial Location Information l
The system functions and associated equipment treated in the Quad Cities fire PRA 1
model were linked to spatial location information developed as described in Section 4.4.1. This data relationship allowed the analysis to identify those fire PRA model
[
functions that were adversely impacted by a postulated fire event. The analysis was l
structured such that individual basic events in the fire PRA model were set to 'true' in L
the quantification for individual fire scenarios.
The analysis process considered basic events to be 'true' if the associated equipment -
or attendant cable (s) was within the critical spacing determined by the fire modeling i
analyses. If fire modeling was not performed for a given fire compartment, all basic j
events associated with that compartment were set to 'true'. While many of the model basic events were treated in this fashion, some mechanical equipment, such as piping, heat exchangers, tanks, valves without extemal automatic operators, were not considered to be susceptible to fire damage. Component failures associated with equipment in this category were left at their random failure probabilities.
4.4.4.4 Operator Actions i
The fire PRA model incorporated all of the operator actions included in the plant internal l
events PRA model. A review of these operator actions was performed to identify those I
actions which occur within the control room and those which occur outside the control room. The incorporation of these operator actions effectively structured the model to be consistent with the plant normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedure l
provisions. The additional recoveries that are potentially available via the Appendix R post-fire safe shutdown procedures were not explicitly incorporated into the model structure and were credited only for the bounding control room fire scenario.
All of the operator actions incorporated in the fire PRA model were reviewed to i
- determine the timeline associated with the action and binned into six groups. Three bins were defined for actions which occur in the control room with three additional bins for actions outside the control room. One bin was defined for actions that must be completed within 30 minutes, another for the 30 to 60 minute time interval, and a final bin for actions with greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> available to complete the action.
4.4.4.4.1 Operator Actions in the ControlRoom Operator actions which are per' formed in the main control room were not considered to
. be adversely impacted by postulated fire events outside the control room. In the event of a postulated fire in the control room, operator actions may be affected. This was treated in the analysis assuming that any operator action with a required response time of 30 minutes or less fails given a postulated control room fire. The fire PRA model Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-40
[.
contained only two operator actions which occur in the control room with a required
, response time of less than 30 minutes.
1RHOPSTRTCTSPH-Operator Fails To Initiate Containment Sprays OP-PREV-BLWDWN Op Act: Prevent Reactor Blowdown Due To Open ReliefValves 1
4.4.4.4.2-Operator Actions Outside the Control Room The fire PRA model included events representing human actions which may be taken outsidelthe control room to mitigate the effects of system failures. These included' actions such as local. equipment actuation or manual alignment of backup systems. In the _ event of a fire, smoke and heat may delay or prevent the operator from performing the intended action. ~ Therefore, an initial screening quantification was performed with all ex-control room human actions assigned an HEP of 1.0. This provides a bounding result in that this assumes there is no possibility of success regardless of the location of the fire and required action. 'The results of the-initial screening quantification j
determined that two operator actions outside of the control room were risk significant.
)
i Crosstie of the Unit 1 and 2 RHRSW system e
Aligning the reserve RPS power supply source I
These two actions were evaluated on a fire scenario basis to determine whether it was appropriate to credit the operator action with a non-unity failure probability. All other operator actions outside of the control room were maintained in the analysis with a HEP of 1.0. The extensive use of a HEP of 1.0 for potential operator actions outside the control room is conservative but does not have a significant impact on the overall analysis results. This is because these events do not appear in the dominant cutsets j
for the analysis.
i The HEP value calculated for the internal events analysis for the two operator actions outside the control room was considered to be applicable to the fire analysis without -
- modification if three conditions were satisfied.
- 1. At least 30 minutes was available for completion of the action,
~ 2. the action was not taken in the same building as the fire location, and
- 3. the fire was not in the pathway from the control room to the location of the required action.
4.4.4.4.2.1 Unit 1/2 RHRSW Crosstie
. The Unit 1/2 RHRSW crosstie valve for train A (1/2-1099-1A) is located in the Unit 1 Reactor Building, and the Unit 1/2 RHRSW crosstie valve for train B (1/2-1099-18) is
. located in the Unit 2 Reactor Building. This crosstie is bi-directional. It can be used to Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-41
1 direct Unit 2 RHRSW flow to the Unit 1 RHR Heat Exchangers or the Unit 1 RHRSW flow to the Unit 2 RHR Heat Exchangers. Separate HEPs were included in the PSA model for implementation of the Train A and Train B RHRSW crosstie because of their l
separate spatial location. A common cognitive HEP was also included for the operator l
to recognize the need to crosstie the RHRSW system.
A review of the available operator pathways from the control room to the Reactor Building concluded that this operator action would be available for all postulated fire locations except Reactor Building fires. Therefore, the crosstie for train A was disabled for all Unit 1 Reactor Building fires while the train B crosstie was disabled for all Unit 2 Reactor Building fires.
The analysis also considered potential dependency between the RHRSW crosstie HEPs and other HEPs. It was determined that a dependency existed with the operator action for switching AC buses. Using Unit 1 as an example, this basic event allows switching the power sources of Bus 13 and Bus 14 from reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) 12 to Bus 13-1 and Bus 14-1, respectively. Bus 13 and Bus 14 supply power to RHRSW Trains A and B, respectively. Therefore, there is the potential for cutsets to i
contain both the HEP for switching AC buses and the RHRSW crosstie. Cutsets with I
this combination of HEPs were treated as dependent HEPs and replaced with a single HEP in a post processor (Qrecover). This replacement was also performed for the Unit 2 quantifications.
4.4.4.4.2.2 Alignment of Reserve RPS Power l
Another operator action which occurs outside the control room is the transfer of the RPS buses from their reserve power supplies. This action is performed in the Auxiliary l
Relay. Room and is needed to support the Torus /Drywell Vent function. The HEP for this action was set to 1.0 for fires in the Auxiliary Electric Room as well as fire zones that must be entered to go from the control room to the Aux. Electric Room.
4.4.4.5 Fire initiated Events i
The postulated fire initiated event was determined based on an assessment of the fire induced failures. This was done by identifying fire affected circuits and equipment. The fire PRA model was structured to address the following initiating events.
%TT - Turbine Trip e
%TC - Loss of Main Condenser
.%TIA - Loss of instrument Air j
%Tl - Single Spurious ADS Valve Opening 1
e
%TP - Multiple Spurious ADS Valve Opening
% LOOP - Single Unit Loss of Offsite Power
%DLOOP - Dual Unit Loss of Offsite Power e
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-42 4
i
- The default initiating event for all CCDP/CDF quantifications was %TC - Loss of Main Condenser. However, many of the fire compartments required ~a different initiating eveat. For example, the majority of the Turt>ine Building was evaluated using the %TIA initiator because of the soldered copper piping used for the Instrument Air system. A postulated fire could significantly degrade or cause the failure of soldered joints. Such a failure could result in failure of the entire air system. The %TIA initiator also causes loss of the main condenser and feedwater systems, as well as the Torus /Drywell Vent.
The majority of the Reactor Building was evaluated using the %TC initiator. The %TI, i
%TP, % LOOP, and %DLOOP initiators were selected based on the routing of cables i
whose fire induced failure would cause these events.
A specific study was performed to assess the risk significance of the %TP initiator. This initiator would be caused by fire induced spurious actuation of multiple ADS valves.
The control circuit design for the Quad Cities ADS system was reviewed to identify those circuits whose fire induced failure could cause spurious valve operation. The specific routing of the cables was obtained from the SLICE database and explicitly integrated into the upgraded fire analysis.
4.5 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION 4.5.1 Automatic System Perf6rmance A listing of automatic detection and suppression systems in the compartments analyzed is provided in Table 4-4. Incorporation of the effects of the detection and suppression systems in the analysis was based on data provided in FIVE (Ref. 4-4) and the Fire PRA implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5) and are summarized in Table 4.5. Automatic suppression was evaluated in those instances where there was a chance for the suppression system to actuate an(i extinguish a fire before damage would occur to a PRA target, for example, where a pump fire might damage a PRA target in the overhead. Sprinkler and spray systems are also credited for cooling hot gases and
- mitigating damaging HGL scenarios. CO systems were not expected to cool hot
)
2 gases, and were not credited in mitigating HGL damage.
I Table 4-4 Compartment Fire Detection and Suppression Fire Area-Description Detection Suppression 1.1.1.2.
Unit 1 Reactor Building Ground Floor det psup 1.1.1.2[Si}
Unit 1 Reactor Building Ground Floor [TIP Room) none none 1.1.1.3 Unit 1 Reactor Building Second Floor det none Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-43
. Table 4-4 Compartment Fire Detection and Suppression Fire Area Description Detection
. Suppression 1.1.2.2[S1]
Unit 2 Reactor Building Ground Floor [TIP Room]
none
.none 1.1.1.1.S,1.1.1.1.N Unit 1 Torus Area.
pdet psup 1.1.2.1.S,1.1.2.1.N.
Unit 2 Torus Area pdet psup 4.0 -
Unit 1/2 - Old Computer Room det none 6.1.A Unit 1 Battery Switchgear Room, TB-Ill det none 6.1.B Unit 1 Battery Charger Room, TB-lli det none 6.2.A Unit 2 Battery Charger Room, TB-l det none
]
6.2.B Unit 2 Battery Switchgear Room, TB-l det none 6.3 -
U 1/2 Auxiliary Electre Room det none 7.1 Unit 1 Battery Room det none 7.2 Unit 2 Battery Room det none 8.2.7.A Unit 1 Turbine Building Mezzanine Level pdat.
peup 8.2.7.C U % Turbine Building Mezzanine pdet psup 8.2.7.E U 2 Turbine Building Mezzanine pdet-psup 8.2.8.A Unit 1 MG Set Area (South) pdat i
psup 8.2.8.D Unit 2 MG Set Area (North) pdat psup 8.2.8.E Unit 1/2 Tustine Deck pdet psup g.2 -
Unit 2 Emergency DieselGenerator det sup 11.2.1 Unit 1 Comer Room (S.W.)
pdet none 11.2.2 Unit 1 Comer Room (S.E.)
det sup 1.1.3.1 Unit 2 Comer Room (S.W.)
det none 11.2.3 Unit 1 Comer Room (N.W.)
det none 11.3.2.
Unit 2 Corner Room (S.E.)
det sup 11.2A.
Unit 1 Comer Room (N.E.)
det none 11.3.4.
Unit 2 Comer Room (N.E.)
det none-j 8.2.1.B, 8.2.2.A '
Unit 2 Condensate Pit and CRD Pump Area pdet sup i
8.2.1.A. 8.2.3.A '
Unit 1 Condensate Pit and CRD Pump Area pdet sup 8.2.6.B. 8.2.7.B.
Unit 1 LP & D Heater Bay, TB-Ill pdet sup Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-44 l
J L i._
l l
l Table 4 Compartment Fire Detection and Suppression Fire Area Description Detection Suppression 8.2.6.D, 8.2.7.D Unit 2 LP & D Heater Bay, TB-1 pdet sup 8.2.8.B 8.2.8.C Unit 1/2 MG Set Area (Center) pdet psup 8.2.6.A. 8.2.6.C. 8.2.6.E Unit 1/2 Turbine Ground Floor pdet psup Leaend:
det = full compartment detection pdet = partial detection psup = partial suppression sup = fullcompartment suppression Table 4-5 Suppression System Response Parameters Detector Time Constants (Ref. 4-4)
Wet Pipe Solder Type 60- 120 seconds e
Wet Pipe Bulb Type 120-240 seconds e
Automatic Suooression System Unavailability Suppression system reliabilities provided in the Fire PRA implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5) were used.
Table 4-6 Compartment Fire Detection and Suppression Suppression Type System Unreliability Wet Pipe Sprinkler 2.0E-02 Preaction Sprinkler
' 5.0E-02 Deluge Sprinkler 5.0E-02 4.5.2 nianualFire Suppression l
Manual suppression was not credited as being effective in preventing damage to critical f
targets. This is because of the time delay between detection of the fire and the time
{
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-45
]
)
rect.M. for the fire brigade to respond. The main control room was an exception to thic L % because it is continuously manned. Another case would involve the fire watch that would be posted during planned hot work activities. In these cases, the.
effectiveness of the manual fire suppression activities were expected to be very high.
4.8 ANALYSIS OF PLANT SYSTEMS, SEQUENCES, AND PLANT RESPONSES FIVE (Ref. 4-4) was used for initial screening, determination of ignition source frequen-cies, fire compartment interactions analysis, plant walkdowns, and fire modeling. The EPRI Fire PRA implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5) was used to supplement the guidance for detailed analysis of unscreened areas. A preliminary screening process was used j
to eliminate from further consideration those compartments that have negligible fire risk i
potential. Subsequent detailed analyses evaluated the unscreened compartments in more detail.
The overall analysis approach involved three phases.-_ The first phase involved application of the qualitative FIVE Phase i screening criteria. This was followed by an initial quantitative screening which assumed all cables, circuits, and equipment within the boundaries of a fire compartment were disabled due to a postulated fire. Fire compartments with a calculated CDF contribution of less than 1.0E-7/yr were screened.
The remaining fire compartments were analyzed using a graded approach that involved a combination of supplemental circuit function reviews and fire modeling. The CDF q
contributions from all scenarios associated with unscreened fire compartments were retained and included in the total plant CDF reported herein regardless of the calculated contribution associated with an individual scenario.
The subsections that follow provide a brief discussion of the results obtained for the screening analysis and the subsequent detailed analyses for individual fire compartments, the Control Room, and multi-compartment fire scenarios.
4.6.1 ' Preliminary Screening Analysis Fire areas and compartments were screened from further consideration based on guidance provided in FIVE (Ref. 4-4). Fire areas that did not contain Appendix R safe shutdown equipment or cables, AND would not cause or necessitate a reactor trip in the event of fire were screened from further evaluation. Unscreened fire areas where j
then evaluated using the FIVE Methodology (Ref. 4-4) and subdivided into fire j
compartments. The fire compartments were defined using the Appendix R fire zone definitions in order to maintain consistency with available plant documentation. Fire compartments were screened if the boundaries satisfied at least one of the FIVE boundary criteria AND did not contain Appendix R safe shutdown features. All fire l
areas and compartments were also evaluated separately in the Multi-Compartment Analysis (Section 4.6.3) to assess the risk significance of potential fire induced boundary failure.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-46
1
)
4.6.1.1
- Qualitative Screening of Fire Compartments The qualitative screening process began with the division of the plant into the 16 fire areas defined in the Appendix R Program. These sixteen fire areas were then evaluated using the FIVE screening criteria. This criteria requires that the area be bounded by rated wall, floor, and ceiling, and any postulated exposure fire within a fire area not result in a safety challenge (plant trip or loss of critical system functions). Six of the 16 fire areas were screened on this basis as shown in Tables 4-7 and 4-8.
Table 4-7 Fire Area Scrooning Results Fire Area Fire Area Description Screened Crib House Cribhouse N
OG BLDG Offgas Filter Building Y
OUTSIDE -
Areas Outside the Plant N
RB-1 Unit 1 Reactor Building N
RB-1/2 Unit % Reactor Building N
RB-2 Unit 2 Reactor Building N
RW Radwaste Building Y
SB-l Service Building, Critical Areas N
SB-Il Service Building, Offices Y
SBO Station Blackout Building Y
TB-l Unit 2 Turbine Building N
TB-ll Unit 1/2 Turbine Building N
TB-Ill Unit 1 Turbine Building N
TB-IV Unit 1/2 Turbine Building, Turbine deck N
U1 PC Unit 1 Prirnary Containtnent Y
U2 PC Unit 2 Primary Containment Y
i l
1 I
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-47 l
l r
r f
Table 4-8 Fire Areas Qualitatively Screened Fire Area Discussion OG-Offgas Filter Building The Unit 1/2 Off Gas Filter Building is located at the remote Fire Zone 22.1 northwest corner of the Protected Area. It contains no plant trip initiators nor safe shutdown equipment or cables. Because the Off Gas Building is remotely located far from the plant, it is not considered to be an exposure hazard to the plant. Therefore, this compartment has not been further evaluated for fire spread and ignition sources.
RW-Radwaste Building The Unit 1/2 Radwaste Building attached to the west wall of the Fire Zones 14.1 and 14.3.1 Turbine Building. All shared boundaries with the Turbine Building are substantial, being 3 feet thick concrete, except for one unlabeled door. There are no significant combustib!es;in the vicinity of the unlabeled door, nor is there any continuity of combustibles through the door or any other penetrations. The building contains I
no safe shutdown equipment, cables, nor plant trip initiators. All normal shutdown methods would be available in the case of a fire in this building SB-ll-Service Building -
The Unit 1/2 Service Building is attached to the southern end of the Offices Turbine Building and control room complex. All shared boundaries Fire Zones 19.1,19.2, with the Turbine Building and control room are substantial, being at least 1*-6" thick concrete, except for an unlabeled door to the 9.2[S2),19.3, and trackway from the Service Building. There are no significant combustibles in the vicinity of the untabeled doors, nor are there any continuity of combustibles through the door or any other penetrations. The zones / compartments within this building contain no safe shutdown equipment, cables, nor plant trip initiators. A!!
normal shutdown methods would be available in the case of a fire in this compartment.
SBO-Station Blackout The SBO Building is a separate building located east of the Reactor Diesel Generator Building. The SBO building is a free standing structure that shares Building no common boundaries with any other fire area. A postulated fire Fire Zones 26.1,26.2, and anywhere in this building results in loss of only the SBO diesels.
Since no other plant system features are impacted or otherwise 26'3 degraded, this area was screened.
U1 PC-Unit 1 Primary Primaiy Containment is enclosed by complete three-hour barriers Containment with the exception of a SBGT penetration to the Reactor Building Third Floor Compartment 1.1.1.4. Ignition sources were not e one.2.1 counted in this compartment based on the fact that primary containment is inerted, thus, a fire cannot occur in this compartment and all methods of shutdown are available.
t Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-48
Table 4-8 Fire Areas Qualitatively Screened Fire Area.
Discussion U2 PC-Unit 2 Primary Primary Containment is enclosed by complete three-hour barriers Containment with the exception of a SBGT penetration to the Reactor Building e one 1.2.2 Third Floor Compartment 1.1.2.4. Ignition sources were not counted in this compartment based on the fact that primary containment is inerted, thus, a fire cannot occur in this compartment and all methods of shutdown are available.
The remaining 10 fire areas were subdivided into fire compartments using the Appendix R fire zone definitions. The Appendix R fire zone definitions were used because the existing data structure for cable location information was based on these definitions. It was recognized that use of these definitions required careful tracking to ensure that all compartments were properly considered for potential fire related consequences, including propagation to adjacent compartments.
This second level qualitative screening required that a fire compartment be bounded by walls, floors, and ceilings that satisfy the FIVE boundary criteria and contain no Appendix R safe shutdown equipment or cables. This criteria is consistent with the EPRI FIVE Methodology as described in Step 6 of the Phase 1 screening process.
Twenty seven fire compartments were screened in this fashion and are listed in Table 4-9. The 6 fire areas which were screened as discussed above consisted of 13 fire compartments resulting in a total of 40 out of 119 fire compartments being screened on a qualitative basis. The remaining 79 fire compartments required quantitative analysis as discussed in Section 4.6.1.2.
Table 4-9 Fire Compartments Qualitatively Screened Fire Compartment Compartment Description 1.1.1.1.S[S1]
Unit 1 Torus Area [ Elevator Pit]
1.1.2.1.N[S1]
Unit 2 Torus Area (Elevator Pit]
8.2.6.D[S1]
Unit 2 LP and D Heater Bays [ Oil Storage Area]
8.2.10 Unit 1/2 TB West TB Fan Floor 13.1 Unit 1/2 Guardhouse 14.1.1[S1]
Unit 1 Area Outside of Offgas Recombiner Room 14.1.1[S2]
Unit 11-B Offgas Condenser Room 14.1.1[S3]
Unit 1 Area Outside of Ofigas Recombiner Room Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-49
Table 4-9 Fire Compartments Qualitatively Screened Fire Compartment Compartment Description 14.1.1[S4]
Unit 1 B Recombiner Room 14.1.1[S5]
Unit 1 A Recombiner Room 14.1.2[S1]
Unit 2 Area Outside of Offgas Recombiner Room 14.1.2[S2]
Unit 2 2-A Offgas Condenser Room 14.1.2[S3]
Unit 2 B Recombiner Room 14.1.2[S4]
Unit 2 A Recombiner Room 14.1.2[S7]
Unit 2 Area Outside of Offgas Recombiner Room 15.1 Unit 1/2 Security Diesel Generator Building 16.1 Unit 1 HRSS Building 16.2 Unit 2 HRSS Building 17.1.1 U-1 Main Power Transformer 1 17.2.1 U-2 Main Power Transformer 2 18.1 Unit 1/2 Technical Support Center TSC 20.1 Unit 1/2 Spray Canal Lift Station 21.1 Unit 1/2 Secondary Alarm Station SAS 24.1 Unit 1/2 Heating Boiler Building 25.0 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchyard 25.1 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchgear Relay House 25.2 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchgear Building 4
4.6.1.2 Quantitative Screening of Fire Compartments The original Quad Cities Fire IPEEE applied a two step quantitative screening process that included the consideration of fire severity factors and credit for fire suppression.
The upgraded fire analysis simplified the process by applying a single bounding scenario for each fire compartment and did not apply severity factors nor credit for automatic fire suppression system operation.
The fire ignition frequencies were developed during walkdowns of the fire compart-ments. During the walkdown, fire ignition sources were identified and counted. The information was then assimilated into overall plant fire ignition source frequencies and Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-50
fire compartment ignition source frequencies. This information then determined the fire ignition frequency for each fire compartment as described in Section 4.2.2.-
The CCDPs were developed usin0 equipment and cable information about each fire compartment. All equipment and cables contained within a given fire compartment were considered damaged and a CCDP for the fire compartment was determined. The core damage frequency (CDF) was then calculated using the fo! lowing equation:
CDFw = CCDP
- FF w
where:
. CDF is the core damage frequency for the compartment.
FF is the fire ignition frequency for the compartment. It includes all the ignition sources identified in the fire ignition frequency development task.
. CCDP is the conditional core damage probability. In this equation it represents the failure of all equipment identified within the fire compartment.
Fire compartments with a calculated CDF contribution of less than 1E-07/yr. were screened and no longer considered in the evaluations. No other refinements were applied as part of the screening process. Compartments that were screened can be expected to have a realistic CDF contribution significantly lower than the 1E-07/yr.
screening criteria because of the bounding assumption in the overall screening methodology.
The quantification for Quad Cities Unit 1 found that 52 of the 79 fire compartments that were not qualitatively screened could be quantitatively screened on this basis of a bounding calculated CDF contribution of less than 1.0E-7/yr. The 52 screened fire compartments are listed in Table 4-10. The table provides the screening CDF for each
.of these fire compartments. Unscreened fire compartments (those with an initially calculated CDF contribution greater than 1.0E-7/yr.) do have a reported CDF. An entry of 'Ns' is provided instead. The remaining 27 fire compartments were evaluated further using fire modeling tools as discussed in Section 4.6.2.
The quantification for Quad Cities Unit 2 found that 55 of the 79 fire compartments that were not qualitatively screened could be quantitatively screened on the basis of a bounding calculated CDF contribution of less than 1.0E-7/yr. These 55 screened fire compartments are also listed in Table 4-10. The remaining 24 fire compartments were evaluated further using fire modeling tools as discussed in Section 4.6.2.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-51 l
r Table 4-10 Quantitative Screening Results Fire Compartment Description Unit 1 CDF Unit 2 CDF Compartment 1.1.1.1.N Unit 1 Torus Area-North Ns 2.64E-10 1.1.1.1.S Unit 1 Torus Area-South Ns 1.42E-10 1.1.1.2 Unit 1 RB Ground Floor Ns 1.09E-09 1.1.1.3 Unit 1 RB Second Floor Ns Ns 1.1.1.4 Unit 1 RB Third Floor Ns 4.28E-10 1.1.1.5 Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor 5.65E-10 1.07E-09 1.1.1.5.A Unit 1/2 TB RB Vent Floor -
4.15E-10 4.15E-10 1.1.1.6 Unit 1 and 2 RB Refuel Floor 1.15E-10 1.84E-09 1.1.1.6.A Unit 1/2 TB Vent Floor 2.83E-10 2.83E-10 1.1.2.1.N Unit 2 Torus Area-North 1.17E-10 Ns 1.1.2.1.S Unit 2 Torus Area-South 1.17E-10 Ns 1.1.2.2 Unit 2 RB Ground Floor 2.62E-10 Ns 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 RB Second Floor 1.49E-08 Ns 1.1.2.4 Unit 2 RB Third Floor 3.95E-10 6.64E-08 1.1.2.5 Unit 2 RB Fourth Floor 3.80E-10 3.80E-10 2.0 Unit 1/2 Control Room Ns Ns 3.0 Unit 1/2 Cable Spreading Room Na Ns 4.0 Unit 1/2 Old Computer Room Ns Ns 5.0 Unit 1/2 Safe Shutdown Make-Up Pump Room 4.95E-11 2.23E-10 6.1.A Unit 1 Battery Switchgear Room Ns 3.69E-08
]
6.1 B Unit 1 Battery Charger Room Ns 4.48E-08 6.2.A Unit 2 Battery Charger Room 3.36E-08 4.71E-08 6.2.B Unit 2 Battery Switchgear Room 6.93E-08 Ns l
6.3 Unit 1/2 Auxiliary Electric Room Ns Ns 7.1 Unit 1 Battery Room 2.87E-08 2.08E-08 7.2 Unit 2 Battery Room 2.08E-08 2.87E-08 8.1 Unit 1/2 Clean and Dirty Oil Storage 5.17E-11 8.24E-10 8.2.1.A Unit 1 Cond Pit Ns 1.64E-09 8.2.1.B Unit 2 Cond Pit 6.13E-08 Ns Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-52 m
rp
'\\
Table 4-10 Quantitative Screening Results Fire Compartment Description Unit 1 CDF Unit 2 CDF Compartment 8.2.1.C Unit 1 Location Under Hotwell 1.30E-08 1.43E-10 8.2.1.D Unit 2 Location Under Hotwell 1.41E-08 5.90E-10 8.2.2.A Unit 2 CRD Pumps Ns 1.17E-08 8.2.2.B Unit 2 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel 4.27E-10 4.27E-10 8.2.3.A Unit 1 CRD Pumps Ns
' 1.64E-09 8.2.3.B Unit i Radwaste Pipe Tunnel 4.27E-10 4.27E-10 8.2.4 Unit 1 Cable Tunnel Ns 7.37E-08 8.2.5 Unit 2 Cable Tunnel Ns Ns 8.2.6.A Unit 1 TB Ground Floor Ns Ns 8.2.6.B Unit 1 LP and D Heater Bays 5.05E-09 6.90E-10 8.2.6.C Common Area TB Ground Floor Ns Ns 8.2.6.D Unit 2 LP and D Heater Bays 5.07E-10 3.62E-09 8.2.6.E Unit 2 TB Ground Floor -
Ns Ns 8.2.7.A Unit 1 TB Mezzanine Level Ns Ns 8.2.7.B Unit 1 LP and D Heater Bays Ns 2.76E-08 8.2.7.C Unit 1/2 TB Mezzanine Level Ns Ns 8.2,7.D Unit 2 LP and D Heater Bays 7.63E-09 Ns 8.'2.75 Unit 2 TB Mezzanine Level Ns Ns 8.2.8.A Unit 1 MG Set Area South Ns 8.70E-10 8.2.8.B Unit 1 MG Set Area Center Ns 5.64E-09 8.2.8.C Unit 2 MG Set Area Center 2.46E-08 Ns 8.2.8.D Unit 2 MG Set Area North 6.80E-10 Ns 8.2.8.E Unit 1/2 Turbine Deck 6.77E-09 3.47E-08 j
9.1 Unit 1 EDG Room 1.36E-09 5.32E-09 9.2 Unit 2 EDG Room 5.32E-10 4.46E-09 9.3 Unit 1/2 EDG Room 5.32E-10 5.28E-09 11.1.1.A Unit 1 RHRSWVault South 2.13E-10 1.80E 10 11.1.1.B Unit 1 RHRSW Vault Center 2.04E-10 2.04E-10 11.1.1.C Unit 1 RHRSWVault North -
1.34E-10 1.34E-10 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-53 L
l Table 4-10 l
Quantitative Screening Results Fire Compartment Description Unit 1 CDF Unit 2 CDF Oompartment 11.1.2.A Unit 2 RHRSW Vault North 1.80E-10 1.80E-10 11.1.2.B Unit 2 RHRSW Vault Center 1.58E-10 1.58E-10 1
11.1.2.0 Unit 2 RHRSW Vault South 1.34E-10 1.34E-10 i
11.1.3 Unit i HPCI Room 5.58E-10 4.51 E-10 11.1.4 Unit 2 HPCI Room -
4.37E-10 5.50E-10 11.2.1 Unit 1 Corner Room SW 6.67E-08 4.22E-10 l
11.2.2 Unit 1 Comer Room SE 3.46E-09 2.44E-10 11.2.3 Unit 1 Corner Room NW 1.17E-09 3.40E-10 j
11.2.4 Unit 1 Comer Room NE 3.90E-09 2.44E-10 11.3.1 Unit 2 Comer Room SW 2.43E-10 7.62E-08 11.3.2 Unit 2 Comer Room SE 2.96E-11 Ns 11.3.3 Unit 2 Corner Room NW 2.66E-10 9.62E-10 j
11.3.4 Unit 2 Comer Room NE 2.94E-11 4.19E-08 11.4.A Cribhouse Basement 1.48E-09 1.48E-09 t
11.4.B Cribhouse Ground Floor 2.57E-09 2.57E-09 14.1.1 Unit 1 A and B SJAE Rooms 5.25E-08 5.76E-10 14.1.2 Unit 2 A and B SJAE Room 5.25E-08 5.76E-10 17.1.'2 U-1 Auxiliary PowerTransformer.11 Ns 2.64E-10 17.1.3' U-1 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer 12 Ns 6.40E-10 17.2.2 U-2 Auxiliary PowerTransformer 21 1.53E-08 Ns 17.2.3 U-2 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer 22 1.53E-08 Ns Number of Screened Compartments 52 55 Number of Unscreened Compartments 27 24 l
l l
4.6.1.3 Summary of Screening Results The evaluation of the 119 fire compartments determined that many of them could be screened using qualitative and quantitative screening criteria. The results are summarized in Table 4-11. The application of the screening criteria and the associated bounding assumptions are such that potentially risk significant core damage sequences would not be inadvertently excluded from detailed analysis. The unscreened fire Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report l
Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-54
compartments were then analyzed in greater detail using fire modeling tools and cable function evaluations to develop discrete fire scenarios. This is discussed in Section l
4.6.2. The fire compartments retained for more detailed analysis are listed in Table 4-l 12 and are identified by an entry of 'No' for the applicable Unit.
Table 4-11
- Summary of Screening Results 1
Unit 1 Unit 2 Number of fire compartments 119 119 1
Number of compartments associated with qualitatively screened fire 13 13 areas (Table 4-8)
I l
Number of compartments qualitatively screened (Table 4-9) 27 27 Number of compartments quantitatively screened (Table 4-10) 52 55 Number of compartments remaining unscreened (Table 4-11) 27 24 Table 4-12 Unscreened Fire Compartments Fire Compartment Description Unit 1 Unit 2 l
Compartment Screened Screened J
1.1.1.1.N Unit 1 Torus Area-North No Yes 1.1.1.1.S Unit 1 Torus Area-South No Yes 1.1.1.2 Unit 1 RB Ground Floor No Yes 1.1.1.3 Unit 1 RB Second Floor No No 1.1.1.4 Unit 1 RB Third Floor No Yes 1.1.2.1.N Unit 2 Torus Area-North Yes No l
1.1.2.1.S Unit 2 Torus Area-South Yes No 1.1.2.2 Unit 2 RB Ground Floor Yes No 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 RB Second Floor Yes No 2.0 Unit 1/2 Control Room No No l
3.0 Unit 1/2 Cable Spreading Room No No 4.0 Unit 1/2 Old Computer Room No No 6.1.A Unit 1 Battery Switchgear Room No Yes 6.1.B Unit 1 Battery Charger Room No Yes 6.2.B Unit 2 Battery Switchgear Room Yes No Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-55
Table 4-12 Unscreened Fire Compartments Fire Compartment Description Unit 1 Unit 2 Compartment Screened Screened 6.3 Unit 1/2 Auxiliary Electric Room No No 8.2.1.A Unit 1 Cond Pit No Yes 8.2.1.B Unit 2 Cond Pit Yes No 8.2.2.A Unit 2 CRD Pumps No Yes 8.2.2.B Unit 2 Radwaste Pipe Tunnel Yes Yes 8.2.3.A Unit 1 CRD Pumps No Yes 8.2.4 Unit 1 Cable Tunnel No Yes 8.2.5 Unit 2 Cable Tunnel No No 8.2.6.A Unit 1 TB Ground Floor No No 8.2.6.C Common Area TB Ground Floor No No 8.2.6.E Unit 2 TB Ground Floor No No 8.2.7.A Unit 1 TB Mezzanine Level No No 8.2.7.B Unit 1 LP and D Heater Bays No Yes 8.2.7.C Unit 1/2 TB Mezzanine Level No No 8.2.7.D Unit 2 LP and D Heater Bays Yes No 8.2.7.E Unit 2 TB Mezzanine Level No No 8.2.8.A Unit 1 MG Set Area South No Yes 8.2.8.B Unit 1 MG Set Area Center No Yes 8.2.8.C Unit 2 MG Set Area Center Yes No 8.2.8.D Unit 2 MG Set Area North Yes No 11.3.2 Unit 2 Comer Room SE Yes No 17.1.2 U-1 Auxiliary Power Transformer 11 No Yes 17.1.3 U-1 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer 12 No Yes 17.2.2 U-2 Auxiliary PowerTransformer 21 Yes No 17.2.3 U-2 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer 22 Yes No I
)
4.6.2 Analysis of Single Compartment Fires This section summarizes the analysis refinements that were performed for the unscreened fire compartments. These refinements involved a combination of fire modeling analyses and focused circuit function reviews. The results of these Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-56 1
l
.b refinements are summarized in the following sections. The discussions are presented
' by unit in the order as they appear in Table 4-12. The Unit 1 fire compartment refinements discussions are followed by the Unit 2 discussions. The results for all unscreened fire compartments for Unit 1 are summarized in Table 4-14. The Unit 2 summary is provided in Table'4-16.
i 4.6.2.1 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartments 1.1.1.1.N and 1.1.1.1.S The initial quantification for these two fire compartment resulted in calculated CDF contributions greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. A review of the cable mapping and circuit functions was performed to verify that the postulated fire induced consequences were realistic. The cable function review concluded that postulated -
i failure of the cables located in these fire compartments was disabling both trains of Core Spray. ' A review of the associated circuits and their routing in the torus compartment determined that the redundant cables were located on opposite sides of the compartment. Given the lack of significant ignition sources and combustible load, it
-was concluded that credible fire events could only impact one train of Core Spray. Two scenarios were developed to evaluate the postulated failure of each train of Core Spray concurrent with all other circuits in the compartment.
4.6.2.2 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 1.1.1.2 The initial quantification for this fire compartment resulted in a calculated CDF contribution greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. This fire compartment is the first floor of the Reactor Building. The Reactor Building, in general, contains very few ignition sources or significant sources of combustible materials. The ground (first),
mezzanine (second), main (third) and reactor (fourth or refuel) floors of the Reactor Building share a common ventilation path through the >400 ft open equipment hatch.
This ventilation path was not credited in the fire modeling analyses.
A review. of the configuration, equipment, cables, and fire ignition sources in this compartment concluded that the development of seven explicit fire scenarios to bound
- the analysis was appropriate.
The walkdown inspection of this fire compartment concluded that three ignition sources
- required fire modeling. These sources were the Drywell/ Suppression Pool Pump Back
, Air Compressor, MCC 18/19-5, and MCC 42R-2-1. The analysis for the CDF contribution due to the MCC fires was based on loss of the MCC along with failure of the circuits in the cable tray directly above the MCC. The analysis of this fire compartment also included a specific investigation of the risk significance of fire induced spurious actuation of the ADS valves.
4.6.2.3 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 1.1.1.3 The initial quantification for this fire compartment resulted in a calculated CDF contribution greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. This fire compartment is the mezzanine floor of the Reactor Building. The Reactor Building, in general, contains Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-57
I very few ignition sources or significant sources of combustible materials. The ground (first), mezzanine (second), main (third) and reactor (fourth or refuel) floors of the Reactor Building share a common ventilation path through the >400 ft open equipment 2
- hatch. This ventilation path was not credited in the fire modeling analyses.
A review of the configuration, equipment, cables, and fire ignition sources in this compartment concluded that the development of 16 explicit fire scenarios to bound the y
analysis was appropriate.
The walkdown inspection of this fire compartment concluded that each of the MCCs in the compartment required fire modeling. The analysis for the CDF contribution due to the MCC fires was based on loss of the MCC along with failure of the circuits in the cable tray directly above the MCC. Separate scenarios were also generated to address i
the RBCCW pump / motor as well as specific evaluation of the ADS circuits.
i 4.6.2.4 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 1.1.1.4 The initial quantification for this fire compartment resulted in a calculated CDF contribution greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7. A review of the configuration, equipment, and cables in this fire compartment concluded that a significant fire cannot occur. The analysis of this compartment was based on a very simplified qualitative assessment that justified the exclusion of torus /drywell vent (TDV) related circuits. As such, the refined analysis for this compartment assumed all circuits and equipment in -
the compartment were disabled except the TDV valves.
4.6.2.5 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 2.0 This fire compartment is the main control room. The discussion and results of the main control room analysis are presented in Section 4.6.4.
4.6.2.6 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 3.0 This fire compartment is the cable spreading room (CSR). Walkdown inspection of the CSR determined that the configuration and features of the room were such that
- postulated fires which propagate to cause significant damage are unlikely. The CSR is extremely lightly filled with cable trays and cables as compared to other nuclear power plants. Whereas a typical CSR design may have a network of 4 to 8 trays stacked from floor to ceiling, and installed throughout the room, the Quad Cities CSR has only 2 to 3 trays in a stack with only a small percentage of the room filled with the trays. There are a number of electrical cabinets located in the CSR, but they were all determined to be sufficiently sealed such.that propagation of a panel fire to the cable trays was not considered to be a credible event. It was determined that only four of the cabinets include circuits whose failure could cause a plant trip and failure of credited systems.
The cable spreading room also contains cable trays containing ADS circuits whose fire induced failure could cause spurious valve actuation. A specific scenario was developed Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-58
r i
for these trays. Another scenario was developed to bound the potentia! consequences of a postulated fire involving the remaining trays.
4.6.2.7 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 4.0 This fire compartment is the old computer room. The initial screening quantification for this compartment did not satisfy the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. A review of the circuits and systems postulated to be disabled found that both HPCI and RCIC were impacted. Further examint. tion found that the HPCI and RCIC circuits were routed in raceways on opposite sides of the compartment. Given the lack of ignition sources in this compartment, a fire which engulfs the entire compartment was not considered to be credible. The analysis was refined to exclude the postulated RCIC system failure.
4.6.2.8 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 6.1.A This fire compartment is the Unit 1 Battery Switchgear room. The walkdown inspection i
of this compartment determined that there are two cabinets that are substantially sealed.
These two cabinets are a battery charger and a distribution panel.
The analysis considered two fire scenarios - one for each of these cabinets. Each scenario assumed the functional failure of the equipment and the failure of all circuits in the cables trays located above them.
4.6.2.9 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 6.1.B i
This fire compartment is the Unit 1 DC Panel room. Walkdown inspection of this compartment determined that the cabinets located in this compartment are substantially sealed. These cabinets consist of battery chargers and distribution panels. The analysis considered individual fire scenarios for each cabinet.
Each scenario assumed the functional failure of the equipment and the failure of circuits in the cables trays located above them, 4.6.2.10 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 6.3 The examination of the Quad Cities Unit 1/2 Auxiliary Electric Room was performed to develop the credible fire scenarios for the upgraded fire analysis.
The overall methodology involved identifying each discrete cabinet, determining the plant system functions associated with the devices and features within the cabinet based on the cables terminated therein, and assessing the likelihood for fire propagation between cabinets, and to overhead raceways based on the structural features of the cabinets.
The configuration of the room and the low heat rate of the cabinet fire did not result in a hot gas layer damage potential within the room.
Several cabinets in this compartment are not considered to be sealed and are either open or have ventilation louvers that could create a propagation path to overhead cable trays.
The analysis of these cabinets assumed that any postulated fire propagates to the tray directly above.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-59
4.6.2.10.1 Cabine! Ignition Frequency The total fire ignition frequency for this fire compartment is 2.05E-2. The fire ignition frequency for an individual cabinet or group of cabinets is determined by taking the fraction of cabinet of interest and multiplying it to the total frequency of 2.05E-2. The auxiliary relay room was treated on the basis of 131 cabinets. The number of sections associated with each cabinet was not intended to represent the number of compartments within the cabinet. Instead, the number of sections was used as a means to evaluate the relative size of each of the cabinets with each cabinet section corresponding to a cabinet width of approximately 30"- 36". The ignition frequency of an individual cabinet is 1.56E-4/yr.
4.6.2.10.2 Individual Cabinet Details The information which was developed for each of the control cabinets is presented in Table 4-13. In certain cases, the cabinet configuration is such that fire propagation beyond the panel boundaries to the overhead cable trays is credible. In these cases, the consequences of this propagation is determined by identifying the affected cable trays, referring to the SLICE database to obtain the associated cables, and relating these cables to PSA model basic events.
Table 4-13 Auxiliary Relay Room Cabinets Fire Scenario Summary Cabinet ID Sections Scenario Propagation Fire Consequences 2201-70A 1
B No Loss of ATWS/RPT functions Note 2 2201-70B 1
B No Loss of ATWS/RPT functions Note 2 2202-70A 1
M Yes Loss of ATWS/RPT functions - also potential Note a propagation to tray 423 2202-708 1
M Yes Loss of ATWS/RPT functions - also potential Note 3 Propagation to tray 423 901-27 3
O Yes No impact on credited systems - potential Note 3 propagation to tray 441 901-28 4
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 901-29 5
D No Loss of Unit 1 UAT/ RAT Note 1 901-31A 6
N Yes Loss of Unit 1 Main Condenser-also potential propagation tray 437 901-318 901-31C 901-310 901-31E 901-31F Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-60
l Table 4-13
]
Auxiliary Relay Room Cabinets Fire Scenario Summary CabinetID Sections Scenario Propagation Fire Consequences 901-32 3
F No Loss of Unit i ECCS Div i CS and RHR systems and Note 1 ADS i
901-33 3
G No Loss of Unit 1 ECCS Div 11 CS, RHR, and HPCI Note 1 systems 901-34 7
R Yes No impact on credited systems - potential Note 3 propagation to trays 408 and 410 901-38 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 901-39 2
H No Loss of Unit 1 HPCI Note 1 901-40 2
C No Loss of Unit 1 Main Condenser due to MSIV closure Note 1 901-41 2
C No Loss of Unit 1 Main Condenser due to MSIV closure Note 1 901-46 1
i No Loss of Unit 1 LPCI and Div I RHR Note 1 901-47 1
J No Loss of Unit 1 LPCI and Div 11 RHR l
Note 1 901-48 1
P Yes Loss of Unit 1 RCIC and potential propagation to tray Note 3 444 901-49 1
K No Loss of Unit 1 Essential Services Bus Note 1 901-50A 1
L No Loss of Unit 1 instrument Bus Note 1 901-50B 1
L No Loss of Unit 1 instrument Bus Note 1 901-51 1
N Yes Loss of Unit 1 Main Condenser and potential Note 3 propagation to tray 437 901-52A 1
B No Loss of Unit 1 RPS Bus 1 A Note 1 901-52B 1
B No Loss of Unit 1 RPS Bus 1B Note 1 901-63A 2
K No Loss of Unit 1 Essential Services Bus inverter -
Note 1 treated based on loss of the ESS Bus 901-63B 2
K No Loss of Unit 1 Essential Services Bus inverter-Note 2 treated based on loss of the ESS Bus 901-63C 1
K No Loss of Unit 1 Essential Services Bus Attemate Note 1 Feeder-treated based on loss of the ESS Bus 902-27 3
S Yes No impact on credited systems - potential Note 3 propagation to trays 421 and 430 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-61
Table 4-13 Auxiliary Relay Room Cabinets Fire Scenario Summary Cabinet ID Sectons Scenario Propeg.E,n Fire Consequences 902-28 4
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 902-29 4
D No Loss of Unit 2 UAT/ RAT-treated based on Unit 1 Note 1 LOOP event 902-31A 6
C Yes Loss of Main Condenser - also potential propagation to tray 435. However, propagation to tray 435 does i
not adversely impact any credited plant system.
l 90241B l
902-31C l:
902-31D 902-31E 902-31F 902-32 3
B No Loss of Unit 2 ECCS Div i CS and RHR systems and Note 1 ADS - treated in Unit 1 analysis based on %TT and noloss of credited systems 902-33 3
B No Loss of Unit 2 ECCS Div 11 CS, RHR, and HPCI Note 1 systems -treated in Unit 1 analysis based on %TT and noloss of credited systems l
902-34 7
C Yes No impact on credited systems - potential Note 3 picp.g.Ewi 415. However, propagaton to tray 415 does not adversely impact any credited plant system.
Assumed fire results in loss of main condenser.
902-38 1
B No Noimpact on credited systems l
Note 1 i
902-39 2
B No Loss of Unit 2 HPCI-treated in Unit 1 anaysis based Note 1 on %TT and noloss of credited systems 902-40 2
C No Loss of Unit 2 Main Condenser due to MSIV closure Note 1
- treated in Unit 1 analysis based on %TC and no loss of credited systems j
902-41 2
C No Loss of Unit 2 Main Condenser due to MSIV closure Note 1
- treated in Unit 1 analysis based on %TC and no i
loss of credited systems 90246 i
B No Loss of Unit 2 LPCI and Div i RHR - treated in Unit 1 Note 1 analysis based on %TT and no loss of credited systems 902-47 1
B No Loss of Unit 2 LPCI and Div ll RHR - treated in Unit Note 1 1 analysis based on %TT and no loss of credited systems 902-48 1
O Yes Loss of Unit 2 RCIC and potential propagation to tray Note 3 425 - treated in Unit 1 analysis based on %TC and noloss of credited systems 902-49 1
K No Loss of Unit 2 Essential Serv'oes Bus - treated in Note 1 Unit 1 analysis based on loss of Unit 1 ESS Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-62 f
4.
i
E Table 4-13 Auxiliary Relay Room Cabinets Fire Scenario Summary CabinetID Sections Scenario Propagation Fire Consequences 902-50A 1
L No Loss of Unit 2 instrument Bus - treated in Unit 1 Note 1 analysis based on loss of Unit 1 instrument Bus 902-50B 1
L No Loss of Unit 2 Instrument Bus-treated in Unit 1 Note 1 analysis based on loss of Unit 1 Instrument Bus 902-51 1
N Yes Loss of Unit 2 Main Condenser and potential Note 3 Propagation to tray 437 902-52A 1
B No Loss of Unit 2 RPS Bus 1 A Note 1 902-52B 1
B No Loss of Unit 2 RPS Bus 1B Note 1 902-63A 2
K No Loss of Unit 2 Essential Services Bus inverter.
Note 1 treated based on loss of the Unit 1 ESS Bus 902-63B 2
K No Loss of Unit 2 Essential Services Bus inverter-Note 2 treated based on loss of the Unit 1 ESS Bus 902-63C 1
K No Loss of Unit 2 Essential Services Bus Altemate Note 1 Feeder-treated based on loss of the Unit i ESS Bus 912-400 1
E Yes Loss of Main Condenser - also potential propagation to trays 444,445, and 446 912-401 1
E Yes Loss of Main Condenser-also potential propagation to trays 444,445, and 446 912-402 1
E Yes Loss of Main Condenser - also potential propagation to trays 444,445, and 446 912-403 1
E Yes Loss of Main Condenser - also potential propagation to trays 444,445, and 446 912-404 1
N Yes No impact on credited systems - potential propagation to tray 437. To reduce the number of required cases, this cabinet will be treated based on a fire induced loss of the Main Condenser so that it can be combined with other cases involving tray 437.
912-6 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 Data 2
B No No impact on credited systems Acquisition Note 1 Cabinet EPA 1A-1 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 1 A-2 1
B No Noimpact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 1AB-1 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-63
c Table 4-13 Auxiliary Relay Room Cabinets Fire Scenario Summary CabinetID Sections Scenario Propagation Fire Consequences EPA 1AB-2 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 1B-1 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 1B-2 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 2A-1 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 2A-2 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 2AB-1 1
B No Noimpact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 2AB-2 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 2B-1 1-B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 2B-2 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 ESS-ABT 1
K No Loss of Essential Services Bus Note 1 ESS-ABT 1
K No Loss of Essential Services Bus Note 1 RLC #61 1
B No Noimpact on credited systems Note 1 RLC #62 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 Notes:
1.
The cabinet / panel is a stand-alone unit with no unsealed openings that present a fire propagation path of concem.
2.
The cabinet /panelis generally sealed. Limited openings / vents do exist, but there are no targets (combustibles) located above the cabinet / panel.
3.
The cabinet / panel is generally sealed. Limited openings / vents do exist and there are targets (combustibles) located above the cabinet /panet. The targets are identified in the Fire Consequences column.
In addition to the scenarios described in the Table 4-13, three additional cases were considered because of specific issues related to potential fire induced spurious actuation of ADS valves, and a bounding auxiliary relay room fire.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-64
' GCENARIO F2067 T - Same as Scenario FZ067 N Except %TP initiator - This scenario involves a special study which considers the potential for multiple fire induced hot shorts which could cause spurious ADS actuation. A detailed review of the ADS cabling routing l
through the Auxiliary. Relay Room against those scenarios where fire propagation to cable trays is possible concluded that trays 437 and-441 required detailed review.
The evaluation of this scenario involves the exact same analysis parameters as considered for Scenario N, except the %TP initiator is used and a severity factor of 4.62E-3 is applied to address the two independent hot shorts that must occur. Each hot short is considered to occur with a conditional probability of 6.8E-2.
SCENARIO FZ067 U - Same as Scenario FZ067 Q Except %TP initiator - This scenario involves a special study which considers the potential for multiple fire induced hot shorts which could cause spurious ADS actuation. A detailed review of the ADS cabling routing through the Auxiliary Relay Room against those scenarios where fire propagation to cable trays is possible concluded.that trays 437 and 441 required detailed review.
The evaluation of this scenario involves the exact same analysis parameters as considered for Scenario Q, except the %TP initiator is used and a severity factor of 4.62E-3 is applied to address the two independent hot shorts that must occur. Each hot short is considered to occur with a conditional probability of 6.8E-2.
SCENARIO FZ067 V - Bounding Fire Event - This scenario involved a special study which considers the potential for fires to propagate beyond the boundaries of panels for cases where propagation was not considered. it also addressed the consequences of self-initiated cable tray fires. The ignition frequency for this scenario was developed by applying a severity factor of 0.10 and credit for fire brigade response of 0.10 for those fires postulated to originate in cabinets. Self-initiated cable tray fires were evaluated on the basis of a 0.18 severity factor. The consequence of such a fire was assumed to result in a loss of offsite power, and complete loss of one division of ECCS. Division I of ECCS was selected so that functional loss of ADS would also occur.
4.6.2.11 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.1.A The initial quantification for this fire compartment resulted in a calculated CDF contribution greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7. A review of the configuration, equipment and cables in this fire compartment concluded that the development of 5 explicit fire scenarios to bound the analysis was appropriate.
Walkdown inspection of this fire compartment concluded that each pair Condensate Main and Booster pumps represented a fire threat that required evaluation. The postulated fires were evaluated using severity factors to partition the events into small and large fires. Quantifications were preformed for both classes of fires. The area is j
also provided with an automatic fire suppression system which was not credited in the l
analysis.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-65
4.6.2.12 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.2.A The. initial quantification for this fire compartment resulted in a calculated CDF contribution slightly greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. Since the bounding value was only slightly greater than the screening criteria, no further refinements were
. performed.
. 4.6.2.13 Unit 1 Analysis - Fim Compartment 8.2.3.A The. Initial quantification for this fire - compartment resulted in a calculated. CDF contribution greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr.
A review of this compartment concluded that the only credible fire scenario of concern involved the CRD pumps. The fire modeling analysis of this scenario concluded that credible fires j
would result in loss of the CRD pumps only. The analysis did not apply severity factors i
and did not credit the automatic fire suppression system.
4.6.2.14 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.4 This fire compartment is the Unit 1 Cable Tunnel which runs below the ground floor of the Turbine Building. The tunnel contains stacks of cable trays and conduits. No significant ignition sources exist in the tunnels.
The tunnels are not significantly ventilated as floor, ceiling and wall penetrations are sealed and access doors are closed.
I 1
~
The cable trays in the cable tunnel are solid bottom trays with extensive fire suppression throughout. Even though no significant ignition sources were present, individual cable tray fire scenarios were developed by assuming a self-induced fire in a I
tray. No propagation was considered due to the extensive suppression system. A i
severe fire scenario was developed considering ignition of multiple cable trays and suppression system unavailability.
The ignition frequency for each scenario was calculated by dividing the total ignition j
frequency for the compartment due to cables by the number of horizontal cable tray runs and applying the result to each scenario. This over estimated the overall ignition frequency because this same value was applied to the risers as well as horizontal runs.
4.6.2.15 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.5 This fire compartment is the Unit 2 Cable Tunnel which runs below the ground floor of the Turbine Building. The tunnel contains stacks of cable trays and conduits. No significant ignition sources exist in the tunnels.
The tunnels are not significantly ventilated as floor, ceiling and wall penetrations are sealed and access doors are closed.
The cable. trays in the cable tunnel are solid bottom trays with extensive fire suppression throughout.1 Even though no significant ignition sources were present, individual cable tray fire scenarios were developed by assuming a self-induced fire in a tray. No propagation was considered due to the extensive suppression system. A Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-66
severe fire scenario was developed considering ignition of multiple cable trays and suppression system unavailability.
The ignition frequency for each scenario was calculated by dividing the total ignition frequency for the compartment due to cables by the number of horizontal cable tray runs and applying the result to each scenario. This over estimated the overall ignition frequency because this same value was applied to the risers as well as horizontal runs.
4.6.2.16 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.6.A This fire compartment is the Unit 1 RFP area.
This area was a significant risk contributor in the original Fire IPEEE.
While this area is still the dominant risk contributor, its calculated CDF contribution has been reduced significantly.
This significant reduction is the result of more detailed information of cable functions and locations in terms of individual raceways. Whereas the original analysis concluded that a fire involving the RFPs would require shutdown from outside the main control room using the Appendix R fire procedures, the upgraded analysis verified that shutdown using the EOPs would occur. An operator action to implement the Unit 1 to Unit 2 RHRSW crosstie was required. This operator action is performed in the Reactor Building and a pathway is available that does not involve the Turbine Building. This action is needed to recover the RHRSW system to support the decay heat removal (containment cooling) function.
This fire compartment has substantial ventilation pathways which include a stairway and a 14.5' x 59' open equipment hatch. These openings were not a concern with i
respect to fire propagation because there were no combustibles or targets in the vertical pathway or the upper region of the building where the combustion products could collect.
The analysis for this fire compartment relied on detailed fire modeling analyses. A total of 17 fire scenarios were developed to evaluate the individual fire events. Fire severity factors were applied as appropriate.
In all cases, the non-severe fire is explicitly evaluated. The installed automatic fire suppression system was credited for only the RFP 1 A fires because of the spacing of the critical targets.
4.6.2.17 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.6.C This fire compartment is in the Turbine Building ground floor common area and was a significant risk contributor in the original Fire IPEEE. The upgraded analysis shows this compartment is not a dominant risk contributor. The availability of detailed information of cable functions and locations in terms of individual raceways allowed the upgraded analysis to treat the fire induced consequences in a more realistic fashion.
The analysis for this fire compartment relied on detailed fire modeling analyses. A total of 7 fire scenarios were developed to evaluate the individual fire events. Fire severity factors are applied as appropriate.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-67
4.8.2.18 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.6.E This fire compartment is in the Unit 2 RFP area. This fire compartment contains three groups of significant ignition sources and very few targets of concern. One potentially risk significant target, the normal Unit 2 DC power supply feeder to the Unit 1 Turbine Building DC bus, is routed through this area. The routing of this conduit was physically inspected and determined to be potentially damaged by the Reactor Feed Pump and Condensate Makeup pump fires.
The significant ignition source groups were the RFPs, the 4kV switchgear buses, and the remaining panels in the compartment. Because of the limited targets of concern located in this compartment, a simplified approach was taken to minimize the number of scenarios needed. One scenario was developed to represent those fires which disable the DC power supply feeder while another was used to address all remaining fire scenarios. Both scenarios assumed all other equipment and cables associated with this fire compartment were disabled.
4.6.2.19 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.7.A This fire compartment is the south end mezzanine level of the Turbine Building and contains multiple electrical cabinets and switchgears. The area is ventilated through permanent floor openings and stairways. These ventilation paths were not credited in the fire modeling analyses. The analysis of this compartment was based on individual scenarios to represent fires involving the switchgears and MCCs. Additional scenarios were developed to evaluate self-initiated cable fires since ADS related circuits are i
routed through this compartment.
This area was one of the significant risk contributors in the original Fire IPEEE. While this area is still a notable risk contributor, its calculated CDF contribution has been reduced significantly.
This significant reduction is ' the result of more detailed j
information of cable functions and locations in terms of individual raceways. Whereas the original analysis concluded that a fire involving the switchgear buses would require shutdown from outside the main control room using the Appendix R fire procedures, the upgraded analysis verified that shutdown using the EOPs would occur. An operator action to implement the Unit 1 to Unit 2 RHRSW crosstie was required because of a fire scenario involving the loss of both Bus 13 and 14. This failure causes the loss of all Unit 1 RHRSW pumps. As discussed in Section 4.6.2.16, the operator action is performed in the Reactor Building and a pathway is available that does not involve the Turbine Building.
4.8.2.20 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.7.B This fire compartment is the Unit 1 Heater Bay and combines the ground floor and mezzanine level of the Turbine Building. The compartment is a locked high radiation area and contains no significant ignition sources. However, many ADS cables are routed through this fire zone. The cable routings are not exposed to any significant ignition sources. Recognizing the potential risk significance of spurious ADS actuation Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-68 i
f and ADS failure event scenarios, a single self-ignited cable tray fire scenario was
- developed to bound this risk significance.
l 4.6.2.21 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.7.C M:
This fire compartment is in the Turbine-Building menanine floor common area and contains multiple pumps and electrical cabinets. -The area is ventilated through permanent floor openings and stairways. These ventilation paths were not credited in the fire modeling analyses. The analysis of this compartment was based on individual fire scenarios to address the buses, transformers, and motors. This fire compartment also contained ADS related circuits. - Therefore, a separate scenario was developed to address fire involving cable trays containing these circuits. A total of 7 scenarios were developed.
4.6.2.22 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.7.E This fire compartment is the north end menanine level of the Turbine Building and i
contains multiple electrical cabinets and switchgears. The area is ventilated through permanent floor openings and stairways. These ventilation paths were not credited in the fire modeling analyses. The analysis approach for this compartment is similar to 7
that applied for fire compartment 8.2.7.A which is the mirror image location in Unit 1. A total of 3 scenarios were developed for this compartment.
. 4.6.2.23 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.8.A This fire compartment is the east side main (turbine) level of the Turbine Building and contains the Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator Set.1B and Switchgear Bus 14-1..The area is open to the main turbine deck. This ventilation path was credited in the fire modeling analyses. Two fire scenarios were developed to addresses fires involving the MG set and the switchgear, j
1 This area was one of the significant risk contributors in the original Fire IPEEE. While i
this area is still a notable risk contributor, its calculated CDF contribution has been I
reduced significantly.
This significant reduction is the result of more detailed information of cable functions and locations in terms of individual raceways as well as i
more refined fire modeling.
4.6.2.24 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.8.B This fire compartment is.the east side main (turbine) level of the Turbine Building and contains the Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator Set 1A and switchgears.
The area is open to the main turbine deck. This ventilation path was credited in the fire modeling ' analyses.
The analysis of this compartment was based on individual scenarios to evaluate the MG set, the 4kV switchgear, and the two 480V buses.
This area was one of the significant risk contributors in the original Fire IPEEE. While this area is'still a notable risk contributor, its calculated CDF contribution has been reduced. significantly.
This significant reduction is the result of more detailed Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-69
L i
information of cable functions and locations in terms of individual raceways as well as more refined fire modeling.
4.6.2.25 Unit 1 Analysis - Fire Compartments 17.1.2 and 17.1.3 These fire compartments are the Unit Auxiliary and Reserve Auxiliary Transformer areas. The initial quantification of these fire compartments resulted in a calculated CDF contribution greater than the 1.0E-7/yr. screening criteria.. An examination of these compartments and the interactions with other plant features such as the EDG air intake concluded that the screening analysis provided a realistic result. The EDG combustion air intake duct is located on the roof of a Turbine Building extension while these transformers are located along the wall.
A postulated transformer fire could be expected to generate significant combustion byproducts.
The dispersion of these byproducts was not explicitly analyzed, but is was judged that these byproducts could 1
be drawn into the EDG intake. As such, no further refinements were pursued.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-70
t 91 ro97 p/ -54 7
7 7
1 8
1 9
9 9
8 9
8 7
9 9
0 7
0 6
8 e2 0
0 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
1 0
0 R/e F
5 g D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
la
,a 6
8 1
1 0
6 0
6 7
4 2
1 5
2 4
4 8
5 5
0 C
t 1 p 4
4 0
9 2
9 7
0 7
2 5
1 1
6 6
9 0
3 0
1 t
i 5
5 1
8 1
6 1
1 3
2 7
1 2
7 8
2 1
1 1
6 m v.
4 4
4 7
5 7
5 6
4 5
6 5
4 6
6 7
4 7
3 4
b e P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
uR D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
S C
5 9
9 4
2 4
6 0
2 1
3 1
7 3
6 3
9 4
5 5
E C
7 7
3 2
2 2
0 2
1 0
8 0
7 9
8 3
8 2
7 5
E 9
9 6
1 1
1 5
1 1
1 6
1 9
6 7
1 4
1 4
2 EP 8
2 8
8 0
0 2
0 8
I FS 1
8 1
1 1
1 8
1 1
se 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
it iC d
P a
S u
N Q
yc 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 o e t
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
i iunq 0
0 5
5 2
1 7
3 7
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
3 0
3 ge 6
6 7
7 8
6 8
8 8
2 1
1 2
1 1
2 2
3 2
3 ir 5
5 8
8 9
5 1
8 1
2 1
1 2
1 1
2 2
1 2
1 F
h h
e le le le le le le le l
le le l
e t
t v
v v
v v
v v
v v
v v
u r
r r
r e
e e
e e
e e
e e
e e
r t
o o
o o
o o
L L
L L
L L
L L
L L
L n
N S
e lo lo lo lo e
e e
e e
e e
e e
e e
mn F
F F
F n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n t io a
a d
d d
d m
in i
in i
in i
in i
in i
in n
n n
n n
n rat e
e n
n n
n m
o m
a a
a a
a a
a a
a a
a p
r r
u u
u u
o o
z z
z z
z z
z z
z z
z o
z z z
z z
z z
z z
z z
pi s
mc A
A o
o o
o o
R o
e e
e e
e e
e e
e e
e r
l r
r r
r a
os s
s i
G G
G G
R V
R M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
u u
t Ce r
r I
P D
o o
B B
B B
P S
I B
B B
B B
B B
B B
B B
e e
I D
i T
T R
R R
R T
M T
R R
R R
R R
R R
R R
R r
F 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 s
t f t f t
t i
ilna ilna it it it it it it it it it it it it i
in it it it it s
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n y
UH UH U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U lanA t
t n
n n
p p
t o
e e
m m
m m
e n
it m
C C
ly i
e o
o r
e ir n
p e
e n
F r
t s
in i
k k
c V
O R
i e
e F
r f
f H
i e
e c
c D
a g
r e
e F
a D
R R
a a
T e
R ra g
e B
B r
p n
n A
L r
l g
e m
io o
it a
1 S
S 1
L la r
o p
p 5
le D
g r
a r
a it m
m 2
D m
L a
A n
A A
A B
6 1
c c
o 9
1 n
n n
u e u 1
1 1
1 1
4 3
S L
e 1
R n
C e
u u
Pr Pri
/
s u
s W
A W c
F F
i 8
2 u
T u
8 8
8 9
9 9
B 8
e S
P F PF 1
4 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
i le e
SeSll C
C io o
C C
r V
i C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
r r
F b
lb
/ gI a WaWm C C
p S
p C
C C
C C
C C
C B
C B
u I
u r
a a
d C
C DL DS M
M S
M S
M M
M M
M M
M M
R M
R en n
e ec B
B 8
C D
E G
J B
C D
E F
G H
1 J
K L
i e
S rc t
4s n
1 n e
4 U m
N.
S.
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
et 1
1 r
r 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 e1 ia 1
1 Fp 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 l
t 1
bi m
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 a n o
1 1
TU C
tr92 o97 p/ -54 0
0 8
9 9
0 6
6 6
7 2
0 1
8 7
9 9
7 1
2 0
e2 1
1 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
R/e F
G g D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E l
5 6
7 3
2 8
2 2
9 0
5 8
5 2
9 3
0 3
0 0
8 a
,a C
t 1 p 8
4 3
2 7
2 3
3 0
5 4
6 4
6 4
6 5
6 2
4 6
2 2
1 1
2 4
3 3
2 1
3 2
1 7
2 4
6 8
8 9
3 it m v.
7 7
6 5
4 7
3 3
2 4
8 6
8 5
4 5
5 3
7 8
6 b e P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 uR D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E S
C 4
4 2
6 2
4 3
3 4
6 2
3 1
1 2
3 5
6 1
1 2
E C
4 2
9 0
1 2
7 7
0 4
7 3
4 2
1 5
1 8
7 1
2 E
1 1
6 5
1 1
1 1
1 7
1 1
2 4
4 1
2 2
2 3
1 EP I
0 0
0 8
8 F
9 9
9 1
1 s
S e
0 0
0 0
0 it iC d
P a
S u
N Q
yc 3
3 3
4 4
3 3
3 4
4 4
4 4
3 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
o ie E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
tiunq 0
0 0
5 5
5 2
2 1
1 1
1 3
1 3
2 2
2 2
2 2
Ige 2
2 2
3 3
4 9
9 0
0 0
0 0
8 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
r 2
2 2
1 1
3 1
1 2
2 2
2 6
1 6
3 3
3 3
3 3
F le le le l
le e
v v
v v
v 1
e e
e e
e 1
t L
L L
L L
n r
e e
e e
e e
r t io in in in i
in o
e n
n mn n
n n
n lo m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m r
y o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
r a
a a
a a
F o
r at n
s ia2 o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o p
z z
z z
z f
s pi z
z z
z z
ia n
ix r lo lo lo lo lo lo lo l
lo lo lo l
lo mc e
e e
e e
l 1
R R
R R
R R
R R
R R
R R
R r
l a
o o
ia os M
M M
M M
M r
ue r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
t Ce T
Am n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
D B
B B
B B
B e
e D
i R
R R
R R
R y
er o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
F 1
1 1
1 1
1 ia vfo r
r C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
r s
s l
e n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n i
it it it it it it ix s n ia ia ia ia ia in ia ia ia ia ia ia ia s
n n
n n
n n
u e a a
r y
U U
U U
U U
A RT M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
M M
lan e
W A
r n
lu o
i G
G P
F t
n i
e a
D D
T C
A W,
m ip e
i F
E E
V 1
C t
r e
P 1
c e
i F
t r
r r
l V
R n
O O
1 v
C t
s i
F l
D H
e B
B i
i 1
H i
B r
e F
l a
p l
a m
T R
V S
S iv i
i D,
D l
v v
a D
la m
S n
2 2
D D
D R
+
C P
R t
o m
S S
S e
S S
I S
C P
A A
O C
P a
S 6
D D
m it it m
i n
n C
C C
C I
O 1
SW O A
M W C
r o
A A
in U
U C
C P
C C
7 O
i A,
D H
S v
,S L
V S
F
/
n 3
1 C
e s
s a
r r
t o
o 6,
L D I W E
E H
E R
c A
8 9
u u
n f
f 8
8 1 C 2
5 8
1 e
S 1
1 1
8 C
C C
ir io o
it i
3 3
3 3
4 5
o t
r d
C d
d r
i C
u u
e e
1 1
t 1
1 1
n F
C C
C p
p o
r r
0 0
0 0
0 0o 0
0 1 B 1
1 1
0 2
2 2
2 1
1 1
d M
M M
S S
N C
C 9
9 9
9 9
9C 9
9 9T 9
9 9
9 en n
e ec M
N O
P Q
B B
8 B
C D
E F
G H
1 J
K L
M N
e S
rc t
4s n
1 n e
4 U m
3 3
3 3
3 4
2 3
et r
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 r
e1 ia Fp 1
1 1
1 1
1 7
7 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
l t
bi m
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
a n o
TU C
r 93 t
o97 p/ -54 6
0 6
7 8
0 7
8 7
7 1
1 0
0 8
8 9
0 2
0 0
e2 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
1 0
0 0
1 1
1 1
R/e F
5 g D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E la
,a 6
5 2
6 2
1 6
3 8
6 8
2 5
3 6
0 2
6 9
3 3
C t 1 p 5
5 5
0 8
9 6
2 7
7 5
6 4
1 7
0 8
1 4
9 9
it m v.
6 7
1 3
1 4
2 3
7 6
4 4
1 5
7 1
7 7
7 1
1 0
7 2
3 6
7 4
6 4
4 7
7 8
7 5
5 5
6 8
6 6
b e P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 uR
+
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
S C
0 6
7 2
0 7
2 1
4 0
4 5
6 6
1 0
7 3
9 4
4 E
C 0
3 8
9 7
5 3
6 1
6 2
2 1
5 5
6 6
5 3
2 2
E 1
2 2
1 5
1 6
8 4
3 1
1 2
1 5
1 1
1 2
1 1
EP 0
8 8
I F
S 1
1 1
se 0
0 0
i t
i C
30 d
P a
S E
u 0
N Q
4 3
y c
2 3
4 4
3 3
4 3
3 3
4 4
3 3
3 4
4 4
4 4
4 n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
o e E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
itiu nq 3
0 5
5 0
3 1
5 8
8 9
9 3
9 1
6 9
9 3
6 6
ge 9
2 9
8 2
1 2
7 8
8 6
6 7
2 4
2 6
6 1
5 5
ir 1
3 2
8 3
3 4
3 1
1 3
3 6
3 1
6 4
4 3
1 1
F m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
tn o
o o
o e
o o
o o
m o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o mn m
R R
R R
o R
R R
R R
R R
R R
R R
R R
R R
t io o
o le le te le l
te n
n iU ik ik it i
c c
rat o
g g
g g
R e
c c
c c
c c
c pip R
in in in i
r n
n n
n n
n t
t n
k n
n s
r mc d
d d
d e
a a
a a
a a
c c
t t
'E 's
- e e
- e le l
c c
c c
c l
a os lo a
a a
a t
i r
e e
e e
u P
P P
P P
P le le e
t Ce E
E E
E E
E E
E E
t r
r r
r p
C C
C C
C C
D n
p p
p p
e e
o S
S S
S m
D D
D D
D D
y y
y y
y y
y y
y D
i C
o a
ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r F
l i
i ix ix x
x x
s n
le le le le C
1 1
1 1
1 1
il i
l l
l l
li i
li t
t t
l b
b b
b d
in it it in in it ix x
x x
i ia a
a a
a l
U U
U U
U U
A A
A A
A A
A A
A n
n n
u u
u u
u u
u u
u sy M
C C
C C
O la r
n e
P o
6 4
r t
A e
T it S
a 4
n v
in 4
D R
R tn io e
I r
m ip e
e T
s 4
A H
H S
e 4
t e
R R
mt i
i t
r r
s T
n s
+
rc on F
F e
y 1
r e
oe e
d a
S S
i 1
t s
C C
iv iv b
le in e
Rm l
b b
e o
T C
C D
D n
r a
D loo a
a a
u it n
I C
C C
p n
r no C
o E
E
+
+
m io r
t d s
C C
C ia g
C r
l r
r t
I I
I i
n I
g a
ia o
iv i
P P
P a
nn le d
d p
F h
l ln o
C h
1 g
v n
oa n
e e
ir n
C D
D H
L L
C e
Cb a
it tiP T
C P
P M
C r
a M
it n
I 5
g p
a c
l e
S l
/a P n
r aw V Ig IgO g
C 2
B B
B 0
h o
o P
a f
f f
f f
f g
o o
o o
o f-O lo T
T T
5 C
r r
R 1
2 P
s O
p s
s s
s s
F ee I
f-i a
leL n o
A 5
5 0
5 s
2 o
s s
s s
s vri S le 2
2 5
/
2 o
o O
r o
o o
o o
d OF M
S S% A N
1 1
1 2
1 1
N L
L P
L L
L L
L en n
e ec O
B C
D E
B B
C B
C D
E B
C D
E F
G H
i J
e S
rc t
4s n
1 n e
4 U m
A.
A.
B.
B.
B.
B.
et 0
0 0
0 0
0 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
r r
e1 i a Fp 2
3 3
3 3
4 1
1 1
1 1
1 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
l 6
6 6
6 6
6 t
bi m
a n o
TU C
t 94 ro97
/ -
p54 8
1 1
6 1
9 7
7 1
9 9
8 1
2 2
9 1
e2 0
1 1
0 1
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 1
1 1
0 1
R/e F
5 g D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E l
7 6
8 9
3 7
1 4
1 7
9 0
3 5
5 4
2 a
,a C
5 7
2 0
6 6
6 9
3 6
8 8
4 3
3 9
9 it t 1 p 4
9 5
1 2
2 3
6 7
5 1
7 3
4 4
1 7
m v.
5 7
7 4
7 5
4 4
7 4
4 4
7 7
7 5
7 b e P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 uR D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E S
C 9
6 9
0 9
1 0
1 6
1 1
9 7
4 4
5 4
E C
0 5
6 7
6 7
7 3
5 7
7 7
7 2
2 5
2 E
2 1
1 7
1 1
7 6
1 8
8 3
9 1
1 5
1 E
3 3
P 0
0 I
8 8
8 8
2 F
E E
S 2
2 e
1 1
1 1
8 s
0 0
0 0
0 i
6 6
t 4
4 iC d
P a
S u
N Q
yc 3
4 4
3 4
4 4
3 4
3 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
o ie E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
tiunq 9
6 3
1 6
6 9
0 9
1 9
6 5
5 5
5 8
Ige 1
2 1
4 5
5 6
1 6
4 6
0 9
9 9
9 7
r 2
6 3
1 1
1 4
1 4
1 4
2 1
1 1
1 7
F p
p p
p p
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m m
m tn u
u u
u u
e o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o P
P P
P P
mn t io R
R R
R R
R R
R R
R R
R e
e e
e e
r t
t t
t t
at c
c c
c c
c c
pip iE n
n n
i i
ik ic ic c
ic ic a
a a
a a
s s
s s
s r
t t
t h
k h
U n
k E
n n
n n
n s
t mc E
E le le le d
d d
d d
c c
c c
c c
c c
c c
e e
e e
e l
t Ce E
le le le le le le le ia os E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
n n
n n
n D
o o
o o
o e
e y
y y
y y
y y
y y
y y
y C
C C
C C
D i
a ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
F l
l l
l l
l l
l l
m m
m m
m i
i 1
1 1
1 s
i l
ix x
x x
ix x
x x
x r
i x
i l
i i
i l
i i
i i
i x
io t
io io t
t io t
io t
s u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u no no no no no y
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
A A
UR UR UR UR UR la e
e e
e o
o r
i i
i l
r r
r n
t t
i F
F F
l d
d F
A n
n n
n a
e e
e e
m o
o a
a n
+
it it g
g g
g t
o r
a a
8 1
r r
r r
S n
it e
p s
3 e7 g
g 1
0 2
a a
a a
u 2
s3 a
a 4
4 4
L L
L L
p m
ir
+ 4 n4 p
p 4
m c
B s
s A
B C
D Ty e
o o
y y
y p
p p
p Pu t
s t
d y r
e n
Pa n a P P
a a
a r
r m
m m
m e
a D
s e
Rt ot t
t t
r r
r r
r p
u m
So Co
+
+
u u
u u
t
/
m io B
o o
o t
t t
S S
e P
P P
P a
u t
t n
C C
s Wn r
r a
S in I
I n
n n
D D
i e
e e
e n
r t
o R
R io A
A F
n S
s To ao C
C it it t
e o
o t
t t
t a
a a
a d
C e
E i
At Mi n
i t
c a
a 5
4 a
a a
s s
g s
s s
s n
e S
o o
o g gfo2 o4 g
g g
u u
in n
n n
n o
f f
f f
f o
i s
s sp sp s
s p
p p
io io d
e e
e e
r a
a 4
4 a
a a
C r
r n
d d
d d
F s
s so so sy sy o
o0 o0 u
u u
n n
n n
ye o
o or or oa oa r
r1 r3 p
p o
o o
o o
ni r d
L L
LP LP Lt Lt P
P4 P4 S
S B
C C
C C
AF r
r en n
e e
K L
M N
O P
Q R
S T
U V
B C
D E
F c
e S
rc t
4s n
1 n e
4 U m
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
et 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 1
1 1
1 1
r r
e1 ia Fp 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 2
2 2
2 2
l t
bi m
8 8
8 8
8 a n o
TU C
tr95 o97 p/ -
54 7
1 9
8 8
7 6
9 8
9 7
8 7
7 7
7 8
6 7
7 7
7 e 2 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 R/e F
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E l
5 g a
,a 0
3 8
3 3
9 9
0 1
5 8
7 6
3 6
9 5
8 8
9 2
1 C
8 4
2 7
7 1
1 2
3 3
6 0
5 2
3 3
2 3
2 3
7 4
t 1 p 2
2 1
1 1
1 2
1 1
1 3
1 1
1 2
4 6
1 2
4 2
2 it m v.
5 7
6 4
4 4
2 6
5 6
3 5
4 4
2 4
5 3
4 4
4 4
b e P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
uR D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
S C
3 5
2 8
8 3
7 0
2 1
0 8
5 1
4 0
3 3
6 0
1 2
E C
3 2
0 0
0 4
3 5
2 4
3 6
7 7
1 5
8 7
8 5
4 0
E 2
1 8
1 1
7 1
7 8
8 2
6 9
7 4
5 7
1 2
5 3
3 EP I
F 8
S 1
se 0
it iC 2
d P
0-a S
E u
N 00 Q
2 yc 2
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 3
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 io e
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
it u nq 0
5 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
O 0
0 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 ge 2
9 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
S.
6 6
5 9
9 9
9 9
9 9
ir 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 F
t t
t n
n n
e e
emn m
m l
le le le le le le le le le le l
le le le l
le le le l
e e
e e
t io e
e n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n r
s s
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
at p a
a u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u pi B
B T
T T
T T
T T
T T
T T
T T
T T
T T
T T
T s
r mc l
r r
a os e
e e
e e
e le le le le le le le le e
e le le e
le le le i
t Ce p
p lb lb lb lb b
b b
b b
b b
b lb lb b
b l
b b
b b
D p
p a
a a
a a
a a
a a
a a
a a
a a
a a
a a
a e
e U
U C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C D
i 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 r
F s
i it it it it it it i
it it it i
it it it it it it i
in it it it t
t t
t s
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n y
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
U U
lanA n
t o
n it e
p io r
m ir a
c n
t s
r e
ec a
D p
S m
io e
r i
s r
a F
p 1
2 3
4 7
0 e
1 2
3 1
2 3
4 o
C e
g m
M M
M M
T 7
0 9
2 1
4 3
i 9
9 9
0 0
0 0
n M
M M
M M
M M
r 3
3 3
3 3
0 1
9 9
9 8
8 F
c i
u n
8 8
8 8
8 1
e S
d P
3 3
3 3
3 K
R R
R R
R R
e 4
4 4
5 5
5 5
r 9
9 9
9 9
9 9
r r
r r
r r
r n
D y
y y
y y
y e
e e
e e
e y
y y
y y
y y
e iF u
v o
R a
a a
a a
a is is is is is is a
a a
a a
a a
r r
r r
r r
e r
r r
r r
r r
d B
C T
T T
T T
T R
R R
R R
R S
T T
T T
T T
T en n
e ec A
B B
C D
E F
G H
I J
K L
M R
B C
D E
F G
H e
S rc t
4s n
1 n e
4 U m
A.
A.
et 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 2
3 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 r
r e1 ia Fp 2
2 l
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
t bi m
8 8
a n o
TU C
t 96 r
o/97-p54 e2 8
8 9
7 6
9 8
9 5
7 1
1 8
9 8
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 0
0 0
1 R/e F
l 5 g D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
7 9
0 1
3 4
4 0
6 3
2 2
0 5
9 7
a
,a C
t 1 p 6
3 2
2 0
7 2
0 6
9 8
8 7
2 5
5 im v.
t 4
4 3
2 1
2 3
2 1
9 3
3 8
2 1
1 5
5 4
4 4
5 5
5 2
4 6
6 4
5 4
7 b e P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
uR D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
S C
6 0
7 7
7 5
5 5
5 4
1 1
7 5
8 4
E C
8 5
7 3
3 9
9 1
4 0
2 2
3 9
0 2
E 5
5 1
9 9
2 2
2 3
9 1
1 9
2 2
1 EP 8
8 2
2 8
2 0
0 2
2 0
I FS 1
1 8
8 1
8 2
2 8
8 8
se 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
it i
C 20 d
P 8
a S
E 9
u 0
N 0
Q 0
2 yc 4
4 3
3 3
5 3
5 3
3 4
4 5
5 5
4 n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 o e E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E itiunq 8
8 1
4 4
9 4
9 8
4 8
8 9
9 9
8 ge 9
9 0
3 3
2 3
2 6
3 5
5 2
2 2
5 ir 7
7 5
1 1
9 1
9 2
1 1
1 9
9 9
1 F
t g
g g
g g
g g
g g
g g
g g
n n) n)
n) n)
n) n)
n) n)
n) n)
n) n)
in )h ih ih ih ih ih ih ih ih ih ih ih ih emn le le le l
u dt dt l
dt dt dt liu iu l
u l
u ldt dt dt l
l l
dt dt l
ldt l
dt dt u iu iu iu l
u iu iu iu t io n
n n
iuo uo uo iuo iuo iuo uo uo uo iuo uo uo uo r
n n
n at p u
u u
BS BS BS BS BS BS BS BS BS BS BS BS BS pi s
r T
T T
e (r e (r e (r e (r e (r e (r e (r e (r e (r e (r e (r e (r e (r mc l
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
io n
io io n
n a
os le le e
io io io io io io i
io io io io t
Ce b
b lb bo bo bo bo bo bo bo bo bo bo bo bo bo rl rl rl r l rl rl rl r l rl r l r l rl rl D
a a
a uF uF uF uF uF uF uF uF uF uF uF uF uF e
e C
C C
Td Td Td Td Td Td Td Td Td Td Td T d Td D
i 2
2 2
1 r
F n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
s u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
i it it it t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
io io io io io io io io io io io io io s
n n
n nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr y
U U
U UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG lanA e
e e
n e
e i
i i
r r
r t
r r
o i
i F
F F
n it e
p h
F F
p p
p m
ir i
e e
e m) m m
t c
w g
g i
ui u
u r
r r
F l
t s
e e
a e
a e
Pa P
P r
e i
i L
i L
e i
r ir l
p f
r r
r r
e e
i.
l i
ie a
D F
F A
F B
g F
i i
l r
o e
l 1
l 1
a l
F F
OpO O
F p
r m
i gn la la L
la e
e eu e
e l
r la o
n r
aio m P
a 5
e m
P U
U C
m g
g bS b
b r
r r
u/
u u
m T
2 i
L s S
S 1
S a
a L w L L
C e
0 0
F s
M M
/
L L
S c
e S
9 K
e Ae A B
B C
AigB )C) 5 2
1 2
D 1
D 1
1 1
l l
1 r
1 r 1
r 1
1 l
1 la la 1
1 i
y y
e p
N P
N P
P s
s v
P pP PcPm Pm F
a a
s r
r e
F uF O
F O
F F
u u
F xF F
u E
S S
d T
T S
RS R
C R
C R
R B
B R(R(
R(
B e
n n
e e
J K
B C
D G
H J
K L
M N
O P
Q i
c e
S r
c t
4s n
1 n e
4 U m
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
et 5
5 5
e1 ia 2
2 2
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 r
r 8
8 8
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 Fp l
t bi m
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 an o
TU C
\\
tr 97 o/97 p54 1
7 6
8 7
7 0
8 8
8 7
6 7
6 9
e2 1
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
R/e F
la
,a 5 g D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E 2
6 5
5 3
4 4
8 3
4 4
3 9
1 1
C 6
6 1
1 9
0 9
1 1
5 5
7 0
3 1
it t 1 p 8
1 1
1 4
3 3
2 8
5 2
1 9
2 1
m v.
7 2
2 2
3 4
7 5
5 5
5 4
4 2
6 b e P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 uR D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E S
C 2
5 4
5 9
9 6
7 0
2 0
6 5
7 4
E C
8 4
4 4
1 1
3 2
9 2
9 8
4 4
5 E
6 3
3 3
1 8
2 5
4 5
4 3
1 1
3 EP 0
8 8
8 0
0 I
F 8
1 1
1 2
8 s
S e
0 0
0 0
0 0
it iC 2
2 0
0 d
P a
S E
E u
0 0
N 0
0 Q
2 2
yc 4
3 4
5 4
4 3
4 3
3 3
3 3
4 4
n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
o ie E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
tiunq 8
4 6
9 4
1 7
4 6
6 8
8 9
5 2
Ige 5
3 8
2 1
7 6
1 6
0 1
4 2
8 9
r 1
1 1
9 4
3 1
4 1
1 5
4 6
7 3
F g
g g
g g
g g
g g
g g
in i
d l
l ld l
in) n) lo lo n
n n
n d
d i
i i
n in r
r t
g g
o o
n dt l
d d
i d
e in) n) n)
n) l li iu iu iu iu iu d h h
ih ih ih iu u
ih dt dt ldt mi d
t F
F iu liu iu l
t iuo e e
n liu l
ir l
r uo uo uo uo B
B B
B B
B B
r t ii c
uo apiv BS BS SS BS e
e e
e e
e e
BN BN i
in n
s mu e (r e (r e (r e (r ibo bo ibo ibo ibo bo br n
i r r
r r
i r i
n n
n n
n n
e (r e (r n n
r l
n n
n n
n a
a io io io io n
i o io io a
os r
r r
r r
r r
z z
t Ce bo bo bo b o uo uo uo uo uo uo uo bo b o z
z r l r l r
l rl l
l l
l l
l l
rl rl D
uF uF uF uF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF uF uF e
e e
e Td Td Td Td 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d Td Td M)M)
D ir
/
/
/
/
n n
n n
n /n n
n /n n /n 2n 2 n h
h F
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 t 1 t s
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u i
it t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t o io io io io io io io io io io io io io io s
nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr n
n S
S y
UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG UG U(U(
la n
p 2
8 A
m C
n p
u s
D t
o m
P e
e n
it u
s r
1 r
r l
e i
1 s
i lis e
ip P
Oi ir s
F 1
e U
F m
e s
ir r
1 o
e i
a F r
c l
eF i
s 2
io F
N g
o 5
t s
e, O
b r
F r
r r
e e
ils un o
s 2
a P
r a
e a
D i
Fia b L io s s
1 r
e r
r l
n F
s L
i e
r p
F s
e o
p e
e R
e F
o eF u
e s e i
s s
m a
S F
r r
4 m
i l
gn L
gs r
F n
c i
1 l
r l
a la r
r e p p
s a
o n
m aio C a
/i p o m
m e
o P
g a
g m
p m p
r d
r e L r
C la i
g in C
e S
n L s 1
n e
n r
u p
a S
c As BF Au C
u P
m A
ic ia ac n
e e
S 2
1 S P
p h
it 3
3 1 r 1
p e
A lla C
c r
1 o
r c
a 1
1 C
S t s F
s Pp P g P e, m
mp s s
i I
u Fu FaFr 2
H m
A ler e it r
/
e A
i w
e m u u
i
/
d B
RS RL RF 1
E S
l S
EF R
S RI B
B en n
e ec R
S T
U B
C D
E F
G H
B C
B C
e S
rc t
4s n
1 n e
4 U m
A.
A.
A.
A.
C.
C.
C.
C.
C.
C.
C.
E.
E.
A.
A.
et 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
7 7
r r
e1 ia Fp 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
l t
bi m
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 a n o
TU C
r
t 98 ro/97-p54 0
0 9
0 8.
8 0
9 6
7 0
1 6
1 9
e2 1
1 0
1 0
0 1
0 0
0 1
1 0
1 0
R/e F
_E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
5 g D
E E
E E
E l
4 8
7 5
0 3
6 0
1 6
3 1
3 2
4 a
,a C
9 4
2 7
5 0
1 4
4 8
5 6
4 4
0 it t 1 p 5
7 1
1 2
2 9
1 1
7 1
6 1
2 1
~
m v.
6 6
6 7
5 5
7 5
2 2
7 7
2 7
5 b e P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 uR D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E S
C 0
8 7
4 5
8 9
8 7
7 8
2 7
4 5
E C
9 6
2 2
3 8
8 8
8 3
0 3
0 2
9 E
1 1
1 1
4 3
6 3
2 1
2 1
4 1
2 E
P 0
I F
8 8
8 8
8 8
1 1
1 1
1 s
S e
0 0
0 0
0 0
it iC d
P a
S u
N Q
yc 4
4 4
3 4
4 3
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
o ie E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
tiunq 2
5 4
1 5
3 3
0 3
8 5
1 5
5 5
Ige 9
4 9
4 7
2 3
0 7
1 3
0 9
9 9
r 3
4 9
1 5
5 1
2 2
3 7
5 1
1 1
F r
r r
r r
o o
o o
o r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r )mlo lo lo lo lo tn o
o o
o o
o _ o o
o o
e lo lo lo lo lo lo lo lo lo lo i F F
F F
F ri n F
F F
F F
F F
F F
F i e e
e e
e rt io c,
i i
i in in n
n n
n n
r e
e e
e e
e e
e e
e p
in n
n n
n n
n n
n nS n
n n
at pi l
-s r
n i
i i
in i
i i
i ina z z
z z
z n
n n
n n
n n
l a
a a
a a
s nc a
a a
a a
a a
a a
ar z
z z
z z
ia us z
z z
z z
z z
z z
ztn e e
e e
e t
Ce z
z z
z z
z z
z z
z e M)M)M)M)M)
D e
e e
e e
e e
e e
e e
e M)M)M)M)M)M)M)M)M)M-C la 2a 2a 2 la 2 la D
i 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t r
2 l
l h
h h
h h
h h
h h
h
/ r
/
r
/r
/ r
/ r F
s u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u n
n n
n n
i it t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t o io io io io io io io io io ie ie ie ie ie s
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n S
S S
S S
S S
S S
S C nC nC nC nC y
U(
U(
U(
U(U(U(U(U(U(
U(U(
U(U(U(U(
la nA s
B B
s p
n e
o m
A A
i t
r n
it u
s 1
2 F
s s
e p
s P
e e
e e
s s
r e
m irc 3
i g
i i
i p
-v g
r r
r t
s F
i F
F F
m n
n r
6 lo le le R
u u
a r
e e
1 6
L a
D ir 1
o b
b M
P P
p F
/
s r
r 5
Cs a
a F
e e
e p
m io l
1 1
r re C S C S X i
m r
a la r
2 r
ei D
D F
lo lo o
1 2
2 2
m al eA dA d
o o
u t F d
n m
e n
2 C
C P
C e
S 5
f i
is a
c 5
5 1
8 9
X WO is t
t s
s W nu nu 7
t t
e S
4 1
1 1
1 oB Igo Igo 7
1 ee ee s
r i
r C
Si Si C
r r
r 1
r i
1 C
C C
C C
i f-
- F
- F C s
a& leplep u
C Gl Gl B
F s
t u f u s
u C
C C
C C
A i
i u
t d
B M
M M
M M
B S1 SS SS B
M MO MO T en n
e ec D
E F
G H
I J
K L
B B
C D
E F
e S
rc t
4s n
1 n e
4 U m
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
A.
B.
C.
C.
C.
C.
C.
et 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
r r
e1 i a Fp 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
l t
bi m
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 an o
TU C
t 99 ro/-97 p 54 9
7 9
1 1
8 9
7 8
8 6
9 e2 5
0 0
0 1
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
R/e F
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
l 5 g 2
6 8
5 9
2 5
1 9
4 1
2 0
a
,a C
7 0
3 9
5 1
3 0
2 1
9 4
6 t 1 p t
4 6
6 7
7 5
3 1
9 2
2 3
6 im v.
5 2
6 7
7 5
5 5
5 5
2 5
b e P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
uR D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
S C
5 7
2 8
8 2
2 3
9 0
7 0
E C
9 3
1 3
3 7
7 1
5 8
9 8
E 2
1 8
1 1
1 1
7 6
1 6
1 E
F P
D I
2 8
8 2
F 8
1 1
8 C
s S
0 0
0 0
1 ie t
T iC INU d
P a
L S
u N
AT Q
OT yc 4
4 4
4 4
3 4
3 3
3 4
4 n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 io e
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
it u nq 5
6 6
6 0
8 5
1 1
9 2
2 Ige 9
4 8
7 5
9 9
4 4
1 3
3 r
1 2
7 5
5 2
1 1
1 1
2 2
F r
r o
o r
r r
e F
lo o
a a
a a
a a
a t
l F
lo lo lo n
o o
o e
e e
e e
e e
r r
r r
r r
mn e
e F
F F
A A
W A
A A
A o
r r
r r
r r
r at in in tri e
e e
a a
a a
a a
a n
n n
n n
p e
e e
e e
e e
pi a
a i
i i
g g
g g
g g
g s
r n
n n
i h
-i i
h h
h mc z
z z
z a
a a
l a
os e
e z
z z
d c
d d
c c
c i
t Ce M)M) e e
e i
iw il ii i
i it z
z z
i t
t t
D e
e l
l w
w w
w w
w D
i 2a 2a M)M)M)S)S)S)S)S)S)S) r
/ r
/r F
1 t 1 t 2 h 2 h 2 h h
h h
h h
h h
1 t 1 t 1
1 1
1 1
t t
t s
n n
t t
t t
t u
u t
t r t r r
t t r t r t r i
it r
t t r t
t e ie io io io io io io io io io io s
nC nC n NnN nN n
n S
S nN nN nN nN nN y
U(
U(U(U(U(U(U(U(U(U(U(U(
l an s
s e
e A
s i
F r
r e
F i
t o
i e
e e
r c
n it r
r r
F s
i e
e i
F r
r e
ip la i
O i
l F
i l
e F
m m
m c
l r
r l
i r
r t
s m
F s
i o
o O
O e
f f
r e
S e
i e
s s
r e
l a
D lb F
g g
la s
n n
p r
a a
r m
io p
a D
i L
T T
e a
m m
C S 4 a
r r
2 e
r i
L S
r r
a u
d A d F
B d
d F
A A
o n
P e
n 2
2 n
n C
e 1
1 1
1 a
a 1
W it s a 8
9 t
t t
c nu e
S r
C Igo 3
2 2
4 e
8 9
3 e
e 2
1 S
1 1
1 S
S C
f-ir C
C i
u s s
s s
s F
lep u
B C
C G
G G
u u
u u
d T
SS B
M M
B M
B B
B M
M e
n n
e ec G
H B
C D
B C
B C
D E
F e
S rc t
4s n
1 n e
4 U m
C.
C.
E.
E.
E.
A.
A.
B.
B.
B.
B.
8 et 7
7 7
7 7
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 r
r e1 i a Fp 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 l
t bi m
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
a n o
TU C
L 4.6.2.26 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 1.1.1.3 l
The initial quantification-for this fire compartment resulted in a calculated CDF
. contribution slightly greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. Since the bounding value was only slightly greater than the screening criteria, no further refinements were performed.
4.6.2.27 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 1.1.2.1.N and 1.1.2.1.8 The initial quantification for these two fire compartments resulted in calculated CDF contributions greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. A review of the cable mapping and circuit functions was performed to verify that the postulated fire induced i
consequences were realistic. The cable function review concluded that postulated failure of the cables located in these fire compartments was disabling both trains of Core Spray. A review of the associated circuits and their routing in the torus compartment determined that the redundant cables were located on opposite sides of the compartment. Given the lack of significant ignition sources and combustible load, it was concluded that credible fire events could only impact one train of Core Spray. Two scenarios were developed to evaluate the postulated failure of each train of Core Spray concurrent with all other circuits in the compartment.
4.6.2.28 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 1.1.2.2 The initial quantification for this fire compartment resulted in a calculated CDF contribution greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. This fire compartment is the first floor of the Reactor Building. The Reactor Building, in general, contains very few ignition sources or significant sources of combustible materials. The ground (first),
i mezzanine (second), main (third) and reactor (fourth or refuel) floors of the Reactor Building share a common ventilation path through the >400 fta open equipment hatch.
1 This ventilation path was not credited in the fire modeling analyses.
A review of the configuration, equipment, cables, and fire ignition sources in this compartment concluded that the development of explicit fire scenarios to bound the analysis was appropriate.
Walkdown inspection of this fire compartment concluded that three ignition sources required fire modeling. These sources were the Drywell/ Suppression Pool Pump Back Air Compressor and MCC 28/29-5. The analysis for the CDF contribution due to the MCC fires was based on loss of the MCC along with failure of the circuits in the cable tray directly above the MCC. The analysis of this fire compartment also included a specific investigation of the risk significance of fire induced spurious actuation of the ADS valves.
1 I
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-80 L
)
4.6.2.29. Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 1.1.2.3 The initial quantification for this fire compartment resulted in a calculated CDF contribution greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. This fire compartment is the mezzanine floor of the Reactor Building. The Reactor Building, in general, contains very few ignition sources or significant sources of combustible materials. The ground (first), mezzanine (second), main (third) and reactor (fourth or refuel) floors of the Reactor Building share a common ventilation path through the >400 ft" open equipment hatch. This ventilation path was not credited in the fire modeling analyses.
A review of the configuration, equipment, cables, and fire ignition sources in this compartment concluded that the development of explicit fire scenarios to bound the analysis was appropriate.
Walkdown inspection of this fire compartment concluded that each of the MCCs in the compartment required fire modeling. The analyses for the CDF contribution due to the MCC fires was based on loss of the MCC along with failure of the circuits in the cable tray directly above the MCC. Separate scenarios were also generated to address the RBCCW pump / motor as well as specific evaluation of the ADS circuits.
4.6.2.30 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 2.0 This fire compartment is the main control room. The discussion and results of the main control room analysis is presented in Section 4.6.4.
q 4.6.2.31 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartmant 3.0 This fire compartment is the cable spreading room GSR). Walkdown inspection of the i
CSR determined that the configuration and features of the room are such that postulated 1
fires which propagate to cause significant damage are unlikely. The CSR is extremely lightly filled with cable trays and' cables as compared to other nuclear power plants.
Whereas a typical CSR design may have a network of 4 to 8 trays stacked from floor to ceiling, and installed throughout the room, the Quad Cities CSR has only 2 to 3 trays in a stack with only a small percentage of the room filled with the trays. There are a number of electrical cabinets located in the CSR, but they were all determined to be sufficiently sealed'auch that propagation of a panel fire to the cable trays was not considered to be a credible event. It was determined that only four of the cabinets include circuits whose failure could cause a plant trip and failure of credited systems.
The cable spreading room also contains cable trays containing ADS circuits whose fire induced failure could cause spurious valve actuation. A specific scenario was developed for these trays. Another scenario was developed to bound the potential consequences of a postulated fire involving the remaining trays.
4.6.2.32 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 4.0 This fire compartment is the old camputer room. The initial screening quantification for this compartment did not satisfy the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. Since the bounding Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-81
I value was only slightly greater than the screening criteria, no further refinements were performed.
4.6.2.33 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 6.2.B This fire compartment is the Unit 2 DC Panel room. Walkdown inspection of this compartment determined that the cabinets located in this compartment are substantially sealed. These cabinets consist of battery chargers and distribution panels. The analysis considered individual fire scenarios for each cabinet.
Each scenario assumed the functional failure of the equipment and the failure of all circuits in the cables trays located above them.
4.6.2.34 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 6.3 The examination of the Quad Cities Unit 1/2 Auxiliary Electric Room was performed to develop the credible fire scenarios for the upgraded fire analysis.
The overall methodology involved identifying each discrete cabinet, determining the plant system functions associated with the devices and features within the cabinet based on the cables terminated therein, and assessing the likelihood for fire propagation between cabinets, and to overhead raceways based on the structural features of the cabinets.
The configuration of the room and the low heat rate of the cabinet fire did not result in a hot gas layer damage potential within the room.
I Several cabinets in this compartment are not considered to be sealed and are either open or have ventilation louvers that could create a propagation path to overhead cable trays.
I The analysis of these cabinets assumed that any postulated fire propagates to the tray directly above.
4.6.2.34.1 Cabinet Ignition Frequency i
The total fire ignition frequency for this fire compartment is 2.05E-2. The fire ignition
)
frequency for an individual cabinet or group of cabinets is determined by taking the fraction of cabinet of interest and multiplying it to the total frequency of 2.05E-2. The auxiliary relay room was treated on the basis of 131 cabinets. The number of sections associated with each cabinet was not intended to represent the number of compartments within the cabinet. Instead, the number of sections was used as a means to evaluate the l
relative size of each of the cabinets with each cabinet section corresponding to a cabinet width of approximately 30"- 36". The ignition frequency of an individual cabinet is 1.56E-4/yr.
l l
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-82 1
V l
4.6.2.34.2 Individual Cabinet Details The information which was developed for each of the control cabinets is presented in Table 4-15. In certain cases, the cabinet configuration is such that fire propagation beyond the panel boundaries to the overhead cable trays is credible. In these cases, the i
consequences of this propagation is determined by identifying the affected cable trays, referring'to the SLICE database to obtain the associated cables, and relating these l
cables to PSA model basic events.
1 i
l Table 4-15 l
l Auxiliary Relay Room Cabinets Fire Scenario Summary CabinetID Sections Scenario Propagation Fire Consequences 2201-70A 1
B No Loss of ATWS/RPT functions Note 2 2201-70B 1
B No Loss of ATWS/RPT functions Note 2 4
2202-70A 1
M Yes Loss of ATWS/RPT functions - also potential Note 3 propagation to tray 423 2202-70B 1
M Yes Loss of ATWS/RPT functions - also potential Note 3 propagation to tray 423 901-27 3
Q Yes No impact on credited systems - potential Note 3 propagation to tray 441 901-28 4
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 901-29 5
D No Loss of Unit 1 UAT/ RAT - treated based on a Unit 2 Note 1 LOOP event.
901-31A 6
N Yes Loss of Main Condenser-also potential propagation tray 437 j
901-31B 901-31C 901-31D 901-31E 901-31F 901-32 3
B No Loss of Unit 1 ECCS Div I CS and RHR systems Note 1 and ADS -treated in Unit 2 analysis based on %TT and no loss of credited systems 901-33 3
B No Loss of Unit 1 ECCS Div 11 CS, RHR, and HPCI Note 1 systems - treated in Unit 2 analysis based on %TT and no loss of credited systems Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-83
Table 4-15 Auxiliary Relay Room Cabinets Fire Scenario Summary CabinetID Sections Scenario Propagation Fire Consequences j
901-34 7
R Yes No impact on credited systems - potential Note 3 propagation to trays 408 and 410 which does not impact credited systems 901-38 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 901-39 2
B No Loss of Unit i HPCI-treated in Unit 2 analysis Note 1 based on %TT and no loss of credited systems 901-40 2
C No Loss of Main Condenser due to MSIV closure -
j Note 1 treated in Unit 2 analysis based on %TC and no loss of credited systems 901-41 2
C No Loss of Main Condenser due to MSIV closure -
Note 1 treated in Unit 2 analysis based on %TC and no loss of credited systems 901-46 1
B No Loss of Unit 1 LPCI and Div i RHR - treated in Unit Note 1 2 analysis based on %TT and no loss of credited i
systems 901-47 1
B No Loss of Unit 1 LPCI and Div 11 RHR - treated in Unit Note 1 2 analysis based on %TT and no loss of credited systems 901-48 1
P Yes Loss of Unit 1 RCIC and potential propagation to Note 3 tray 444 901-49 1
K No Loss of Unit 1 Essential Services Bus - treated in Note 1 Unit 2 analysis based on loss of Unit 2 ESS 901-50A 1
L No Loss of Unit 1 instrument Bus - treated in Unit 2
)
Note 1 analysis based on loss of Unit 2 Instrument Bus 901-50B 1
L No Loss of Unit 1 instrument Bus - treated in Unit 2 Note 1 analysis based on loss of Unit 2 Instrument Bus 4
901-51 1
N Yes Loss of Unit 1 Main Condenser and potential Note 3 propagation to tray 437 901-52A 1
B No Loss of Unit 1 RPS Bus 1 A Note 1 901-52B 1
B No Loss of Unit 1 RPS Bus 1B Note 1 901-63A 2
K No Loss of Unit 1 Essential Services Bus inverter -
Note 1 treated based on loss of the Unit 2 ESS Bus 901-63B 2
K No Loss of Unit 1 Essential Services Bus inverter-Note 2 treated based on loss of the Unit 2 ESS Bus i
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-84 L
Table 4-15 Auxiliary Relay Room Cabinets Fire Scenario Summary
' Cabinet ID Sections Scenario Propagation Fire Consequences 901-63C 1
K No Loss of Unit 1 Essential Services Bus Alternate Note 1 Feeder treated based on loss of the Unit 2 ESS Bus 902-27 3
S Yes No impact on credited systems - potential Note 3 propagation to trays 421 and 430 902-28 4
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 902-29 4
D No Loss of Unit 2 UAT/ RAT Note 1 902-31A 6
C Yes Loss of Main Condenser-also potential propagation to tray 435. However, propagation to tray 435 does not adversely impact any credited plant system.
902-31B 902-31C 902-31D 902-31E 902-31F 902-32 3
F No Loss of Unit 2 ECCS Div i CS and RHR systems l
Note 1 and ADS 902-33 3
G No Loss of Unit 2 ECCS Div ll CS, RHR, and HPCI Note 1 systems 902-34 7
T Yes No impact on credited systems - potential Note 3 propagation 415. However, propagation to tray 415 results in damage to a RCIC related circuit.
Treated based on fire induced failure of RCIC and loss of Main Condenser 902-38 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 j
902-39 2
H No Loss of Unit 2 HPCI Note 1 902-40 2
C No Loss of Unit 2 Main Condenser due to MSIV Note 1 closure 902-41 2
C No Loss of Unit 2 Main Condenser due to MSIV Note 1 closure 902-46 1
1 No Loss of Unit 2 LPCI and Div I RHR Note 1 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-85
Table 4-15 Auxiliary Relay Room Cabinets Fire Scenario Summary Cabinet ID Sections Scenario Propagation Fire Consequences 902-47 1
J No Loss of Unit 2 LPCI and Div ll RHR Note 1 902-48 1
O Yes Loss of Unit 2 RCIC and potential propagation to Note 3 tray 425 902-49 1
K No Loss of Unit 2 Essential Services Bus Note 1
- 90. iOA 1
L No Loss of Unit 2 Instrument Bus Note 1 902-50B 1
L No Loss of Unit 2 Instrument Bus Note 1 902-51 1
N Yes Loss of Unit 2 Main Condenser and potential Note 3 propagation to tray 437 902-52A 1
B No Loss of Unit 2 RPS Bus 1A Note 1 902-52B 1
B No Loss of Unit 2 RPS Bus 1B Note 1 902-63A 2
K No Loss of Unit 2 Essential Services Bus inverter-Note 1 treated based on loss of the ESS Bus 90243B 2
K No Loss of Unit 2 Essential Services Bus inverter-Note 2 treated based on loss of the ESS Bus 902-63C 1
K No Loss of Unit 2 Essential Services Bus Altemate Note 1 Feeder-treated based on loss of the ESS Bus 912-400 1
E Yes Loss of Unit 2 Main Condenser - also potential propagation to trays 444,445, and 446 912-401 1
E Yes Loss of Unit 2 Main Condenser - also potential propagation to trays 444,445, and 446 912 402 1
E Yes Loss of Unit 2 Main Condenser - also potential propagation to trays 444,445, and 446 912-403 1
E Yes Loss of Unit 2 Main Condenser-also potential propagation to trays 444,445, and 446 912-404 1
N Yes No impact on credited systems - potential propagation to tray 437. To reduced the number of required cases, this cabinet will be treated based on a fire induced loss of the Main Condenser so that it can be combined with other cases involving tray 437.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-86
i Table 4-15 Auxiliary Relay Room Cabinets Fire Scenario Summary Cabinet ID Sechons Scenario Propagation Fire Consequences 912-6 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 Data 2
B No No impact on credited systems Acquisition Note 1 Cabinet EPA 1 A-1 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 1A-2 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 1AB-1 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 1 AB-2 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 1B-1 1
B No Noimpact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 1B-2 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 2A-1 1
B No Noimpact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 2A-2 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 2AB-1 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 2AB-2 1
B No Noimpact on credited systems Note 1 EPA 28-1 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 ESS-ABT 1
K No Loss of Essential Services Bus Note 1 ESS-ABT 1
K No Loss of Essential Services Bus Note 1 RLC M1 1
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 RLC M2 i
B No No impact on credited systems Note 1 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-87 t
l Notes:
1.
The cabinet /panelis a stand-alone unit with no unsealed openings that present a fire propagation path of concem.
2.
The cabinet / panel is generally sealed. Limited openings / vents do exist, but there are no targets (combustibles) located above the cabinet / panel.
3.-
The cabinet /panelis generally sealed. Limited openings / vents do exist and there are targets (combustibles) located above the cabinet / panel. The targets are identified in the Fire Consequences column.
In addition to the scenarios described in the Table 4-15, one additional scenario is considered to evaluate a postulated bounding auxiliary relay room fire.
SCENARIO FZ067 U - Bounding Fire Event - This scenario involves a special study which considers the potential for fires to propagate beyond the boundaries of panels for cases where propagation was not considered, it also addresses the consequences of self-initiated cable tray fires. The ignition frequency for this scenario was developed by applying a severity factor of 0.10 and credit for fire brigade response of 0.10 for those fires postulated to originate in cabinets. Self-initiated cable tray fires are evaluated on the basis of a 0.18 severity factor. The consequences of such a fire is assumed to result in a loss of offsite power, and complete loss of one division of ECCS. Division I of ECCS was selected so that functional loss of ADS would also occur.
SCENARIO FZ067 V - This scenario is similar to Scenar:o FZ067 U except the %TP
.nitiator is used. This scenario involves a special study which considers the potential for multiple fire induced hot shorts which could cause spurious ADS actuation. A detailed review of the ADS cabling routing through the Auxiliary Relay Room against those scenarios where fire propagation to cable trays is possible concluded that trays containing the ADS circuits are not affected. This scenario evaluates a self-initiated cable fire. Since the postulated event includes the failure of all other circuits in the cable tray, a fire severity factor of 0.18 is applied.
4.6.2.35 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.1.B l
The initial quantification for this fire compartment resulted in a calculated CDF contribution greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7. A review of the configuration, equipment, and cables in this fire compartment concluded that the development of I
explicit fire scenarios to bound the analysis was appropriate.
l The walkdown inspection of this fire compartment concluded that each pair of Condensate Main and Booster pumps represented a fire threat that required evaluation.
j The postulated fires were evaluated using severity factors to partition the events into j
small and large fires. Quantifications were performed for both classes of fires. The i
area is also provided with an automatic fire suppression system which was not credited i
in the analysis.
j i
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report
)
Rev.1, 5/25/99 W
page 4-88 j
4.6.2.36 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.5 This fire compartment is the Unit 2 Cable Tunnel which runs below the ground floor of the Turbine Building. The tunnel contains stacks of cable trays and conduits. No significant ignition sources exist in the tunnel.
The tunnel was not significantly ventilated as floor, ceiling and wall penetrations were sealed and access doors were closed.
The cable trays in the cable tunnel are solid bottom trays with extensive fire suppression throughout. Even though no significant ignition sources were present, individual cable tray fire scenarios were developed by assuming a self-induced fire in a tray. No propagation was considered due to the extensive suppression system. A severe fire scenario was developed considering ignition of multiple cable trays and suppression system unavailability.
The ignition frequency for each scenario was based calculated by dividing the total ignition frequency for the compartment due to cables by the number of horizontal cable tray runs and applying the result to each scenario. This over estimated the overall ignition frequency because this same value was applied to the risers as well as horizontal runs.
4.6.2.37 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.6.A
]
This fire compartment is in the Unit 1 RFP area. This fire compartment contains three j
groups of significant ignition sources and very few targets of concern. One potentially risk significant target, the normal Unit 2 DC power supply feeder to the Unit 1 Turbine Building DC bus, is routed through this area. The routing of this conduit was physically inspected and determined to be potentially damaged by the Reactor Feed Pump and Condensate Makeup pump fires.
The significant ignition source groups are the RFPs, the 4kV switchgear buses, and the remaining panels in the compartment.
Because of the limited targets of concern 4
located in this compartment, a simplified approach was taken to minimize the number of scenarios needed. One scenario was developed to represent those fires which disable the DC power supply feeder while another was used to addresses all remaining fire scenarios. Both scenarios assumed all other equipment and cables associated with this fire compartment were disabled.
4.6.2.38 - Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.6.C This fire compartment is in the Turbine Building ground floor common area and was a significant risk contributor in the original Fire IPEEE. The upgraded analysis shows this compartment is not a dominant risk contributor. The upgraded analysis has only a-single fire scenario that appears in the top 90% of the risk contributors. This result is different than that obtained for the Unit 1 analysis.
The availability of detailed information of cable functions and locations in terms of individual raceways allowed the upgraded analysis to treat the fire induced consequences in a more realistic fashlon, it Quad Cities IPEEE Submhtal Report i
Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-89 r..-
l
.t
also allowed the analysis to identify the set of trays containing critical circuits for HPCI, SSMP, and one train of CS and RHR that are in close proximity to an air compressor.
The equivalent circuits for Unit 1 are located such that they are not exposed to any significant fire threat. The asymmetry of the cable routing for Unit 2 resulted in a postulated air compressor fire being risk significant. The remainder of the fire scenarios for this compartment were developed using detailed fire modeling analyses.
4.6.2.39 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.6.E This fire compartment is the Unit 2 RFP area and was a significant risk contributor in the original Fire IPEEE.
While this area is still the dominant risk contributor, its calculated CDF contribuhn has been reduced significantly. This significant reduction is the result of more detailed information of cable functions and locations in terms of individual raceways. Whereas the original analysis concluded that a fire involving the RFPs would require shutdown from outside the main control room using the Appendix R fire procedures, the upgraded analysis verified that shutdown using the EOPs would occur. An operator action to implement the Unit 1 to Unit 2 RHRSW crosstie was required. As discussed in Section 4.6.2.16, the operator action is performed in the Reactor Building and a pathway is available that does not involve the Turbine Building.
This fire compartment has substantial ventilation pathways which included a stairway and a 14.5' x 59' open equipment hatch. These openings are not a concern with respect to fire propagation because there were no combustibles or targets in the vertical pathway or the upper region of the building where the combustion products could collect.
The analysis for this fire compartment relied on detailed fire modeling analyses.
Several fire scenarios were developed to evaluate the individual fire events.
Fire severity factors were applied as appropriate, in all cases, the non-severe fire is explicitly evaluated. The installed automatic fire suppression system is credited for only the postulated small RFP oil fires because of the spacing of the critical targets. The analysis of the suppression system effectiveness for the three RFPs found acceptable response times relative to target damage time for the postulated small oil fire. The automatic suppression system actuation was not credited for the large oil spill fires.
4.6.2.40 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.7.A This fire compartment is the south end mezzanine level of the Turbine Building and
. contains multiple electrical cabinets and switchgears. The area is ventilated through permanent floor openings and stairways. These ventilation paths were not credited in the fire mcdeling analyses. The analysis of this compartment was based on individual scenarios ta represent fires involving the switchgears and MCCs. The overall approach was the same as that applied for the Unit 1 quantification.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-90
4.6.2.41 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.7.C This fire compartment is in the Turbine Building mezzanine floor common area and contains multiple pumps and electrical cabinets.
The area is ventilated through
- permanent floor openings and stairways. These ventilation paths were not credited in the fire modeling analyses. The analysis of this compartment was based on individual fire scenarios to address the buses, transformers, and motors.
4.6.2.42 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.7.D This fire compartment is the Unit 2 Heater Bay and combines the ground floor and mezzanine level of the Turbine Building. The compartment is a locked high radiation area and contains no significant ignition sources. However, many ADS cables are routed through this fire zone. The cable routings were not exposed to any significant ignition sources. Recognizing the potential risk significance of spurious ADS actuation and ADS failure event scenarios, a single self-ignited cable tray fire scenario was
' developed to bound this risk significance.
4.6.2.43 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.7.E This fire compartment is the north end mezzanine level of the Turbine Building and contains multiple electrical cabinets and switchgears. The area is ventilated through permanent floor openings and stairways. These ventilation paths were not credited in
' the fire modeling analyses. The analysis approach for this compartment was similar to that applied for fire compartment 8.2.7.A which is the mirror image location in Unit 1.
4.6.2.44 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.8.C This fire compartment is the east side main (turbine) level of the Turbine Building and contains the Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator Set 1A and switchgears.
The area is open to the main turbine deck. This ventilation path was credited in the fire modeling analyses.
The analysis of this compartment was based on individual scenarios to evaluate the MG set, the 4kV switchgear, and the two 480V buses.
4.6.2.45 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 8.2.8.D This fire compartment is the east side main (turbine) level of the Turbine Building and contains the Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator Set 1B and Switchgear Bus 23-1. The area is open to the main turbine deck. This ventilation path was credited in the fire modeling analyses.
Two fire scenarios were developed to address fires involving the MG set and the switchgear.
- 4.6.2.46 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartment 11.3.2
-The initial quantification for this fire compartment resulted in a calculated CDF i
contribution slightly greater than the screening criteria of 1.0E-7/yr. Since the bounding value was only slightly greater than the screening criteria, no further refinements were performed.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-91
y 4.6.2.47 Unit 2 Analysis - Fire Compartments 17.2.2 and 17.2.3 These fire compartments are the Unit Auxiliary and Reserve Auxiliary Transformer areas. The initial quantification of these fire compartments resulted in a calculated CDF contribution greater than the 1.0E-7/yr. screening criteria. An examination of these compartments and the interactions with other plant features such as the EDG air intake concluded that the screening analysis provided a realistic result. The EDG combustion air intake duct is located on the roof of a Turbine Building extension while these transformers are located along the wall.
A postulated. transformer fire could be expected to generate significant combustion byproducts.
The dispersion of these l byproducts was not explicitly analyzed, but is was judged that these byproducts could be drawn into the EDG intake. As such, no further refinements were pursued.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-92 c
7 7
7 9
9 9
0 7
8 9
0 8
9 0
8 7
6 6
6 7
2 0
t 93 r
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 1
o99 F
D E
E E E E
E E
E E E
E E E
E E
E E E E
E E
E p/
54 2
8 9
9 3
3 8
0 9
4 6
2 9
0 7
4 2
2 9
0 5
8 e2 C
3 5
5 1
8 1
0 7
9 1
1 3
2 6
7 0
3 3
0 5
4 6
R/e 1
4 4
5 8
1 2
6 3
2 4
3 5
2 9
3 3
3 2
1 3
2 5 g la
,a t 1 p 6
4 4
6 6
7 7
4 6
7 7
5 5
7 4
4 3
3 2
4 8
6 P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
it m v.
D E
E E
E E
E E E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E be C
2 3
5 3
9 6
6 2
5 0
8 0
5 6
8 0
3 3
4 6
2 3
uR C
2 7
7 9
9 3
3 5
0 7
8 5
1 3
1 7
7 7
0 4
7 3
S 7
9 9
5 8
2 2
1 9
9 1
1 2
2 6
1 1
1 1
7 1
1 EEE F
P S
I sie it C
P d
S a
N uQ y
n c 2
4 4
4 4
3 4
3 3
3 3
3 4
3 4
3 3
3 4
4 4
4 n
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
o ie E E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E E
E E
E E
E E
tiu nq 3
1 1
5 2
9 3
1 1
1 1
1 6
0 8
9 2
2 1
1 1
1 Ige 8
7 7
7 8
7 8
4 4
2 2
2 4
1 5
7 9
9 0
0 0
0 r
1 4
4 8
9 4
8 4
4 2
2 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
2 2
2 2
F n
m 2
o o
2 o
it
)
)
r p
f l
R e
f ri la a m
r c
l s
e H H r
r r
r r
r r
r e
r o o o o o o o o h
o o o
m o
e v
t r
r r
r lo l
l lo lo lo l
lo 1
f h'o D
e o
2 s
r u o o o o F F
F F
F F
F F
L o
C n
tn e N S lo lo lo lo e e e e e e e e a
s t
r e
n n a a d d
d d
n in i
i i
i in i
s F
F F
F in n
n n n n
n n
n n
n n
n a
- i. T m
m m
m m
i
(
(
t a e e n
n n
n a a a a a a a a e w
y o
o o
o r
o o
o o
r h
s a
n n n n n n n n n
's ia r
r u
u u u tu n
l R
R R
R p
A A o o o o l
e r
r r
r e e e e e e e e o a x lo lo lo lo i
ia m
M s s G G G G M M M M M M M M S r
u u u t
o r
r r
r r
r T A e
C B
o o B B
B B
B B
B B
B B
B B B) t t
t t
n n
n n
R y
e o o
o o
D R T T R R R R R RR R R R R R R e
H v C C
C C
r s
i 1
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2R lia r
r e n n
n n
F is it it it it it it it i
it it it i
it it it t
i s ia ia ia ia t
t x
n8 u e i
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n y
U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U(
A R M M
M M
2 la n
n n
3 n
o o
o n
A it h
h c
c c
o t
t t
i n
n G G e e
e hc n
u e e s
s s
D D b b
b e
m
- p io m m
i E
E u
u u
s e
u o
b r
e e k
S S
S u
r n
f i
c s
s a
O O u
a i
f a
o o
n n
t 3
3 3
S n
B B
e e e b i
8 i
r r
r e
s a
p p
R a
c S S 2
2 2
2 a
c R R p
p D
S mi e
o o e
n 0
0 0
0l n
S 1
1 9I 9I 9
9 I r
u u
n n 2
e mo io e o o uF c
r r
t v
v.
r i
Pr 5
4 c S e
it i
leiv lei. le lei r
i b
t S
r S D i
U U nDnD n
nD a
F c c o 9 m G G r
n n
e g A F C
n n n Ps 2
g o
1 1
3 m
in u i
f f loc loc lop loc a
a a
a-n P S,P S PI e
g u u
/
n o S
r s
g r
r
/s P
n 8
9 B
8 A
n o o e
c i
F F
n 8
i R
C C
C S
o W v-r S
d e e 2
i 2
2 2
2 2
f ia o d i
it a
t V
s r
r i
rH r
n l
D C
m I
C C C C C n m ir n d
d F
u b lb n
nE nE n
nC t
t t
t u
u e e o a a 2 u C e S C C C C C a e p
o r
r o-o-
o-oE d
B C C UC M R M M M M M M T R S B
C C C1 C1 C2 C -
r en n
e e
e c
A B B
B C D E 8 C D E F
G H A
A A B C
D E
i r
S c
't 6s i
1 n r+
N. S.
4U 3
2 2
2 2
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
2 2
3 i
1 1
1 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 3
2 2
0 0
0 0
e tr r
e2 i a 2
2 Fp 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 7
7 2
2 2
2 l
t 1
1 bi m
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
a n o
1 1
TU C
c
1 8
7 8
9 7
1 2
0 6
8 0
8 7
7 6
7 1
0 r
t 94 1
0 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
1 1
o/-99 F
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E E E p54 5
2 9
2 0
3 0
0 6
6 2
4 7
3 6
3 2
3 2
e2 C
4 6
4 0
5 6
2 4
6 5
8 4
9 9
1 0
8 8
8 R/e 1
7 2
1 6
8 8
9 3
6 1
7 3
9 4
1 2
4 1
5 g la
,a t 1 p 8
5 4
5 5
3 7
8 6
0 6
7 4
4 4
3 4
7 7
t P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 im v.
+
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E E E
E E
E E
E E E E b e C
1 1
2 6
5 6
1 1
1 0
0 6
5 8
3 4
5 5
4 uR C
4 2
1 3
1 8
7 1
2 0
7 3
3 6
3 6
4 2
2 S
2 4
4 3
2 2
2 3
1 1
5 2
1 8
1 2
1 1
1 E
E 1
1 0
0 E
F E
E I
P S
0 0
0 0
se 1
2 it i
3 C
0 P
S E
d N
0 a
4 u
3 Q
yc 4
3 4
4 4
4 4
4 42 3
3 4
4 3
3 3
4 3
n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
o e E
E E
E E
E E E E
E E E E
E E
E E E E
itiu nq 3
1 3
2 2
2 2
2 2
3 0
0 5
5 3
5 5
6 7
Ige 0
8 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
9 2
2 9
8 1
9 9
8 4
rF 6
1 6
3 3
3 3
3 3
1 3
3 2
8 3
1 1
3 1
no itp ircseD m m m m m
m m
m tn o o o o o o o o m o o o o e
m m m
m m
m m
m m m
R R R R o o o o o m
R R R R o o o
o o
o o o o o o
le le le l
tr o o o
o o
o o o o o g
g g
g d
i in in R
e s
a R R R
R R
R R R R R i
d d
d e a a a a n
n l
p lo lo lo lo lo lo lo lo t
lo a a a a r
n n
n n
ia m
u t
r r
r r
r r
r r
r e e e e u P P
P P
t o
t t
t t
t t
t t
b t
e C
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
p p
p p
C C C C r
r r
r p
D o o o
o o
o o o u o S S S S m D D D D e
C C C
C C
C C C C C o
s ir e le le e C 2 2
2 2
s in in ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia a a a a l
U U U U F
n n
n n
n n n n lb b b
lb i
a a d
it in it it t
n n
n y
M M M
M M
M M M M M C C C C O
la n
n, C
n D
o k
in r
t e
C h
t e
P g
M A
R c
c.
A, U
C P e
T C
e r
t n
C s
s S
la V S F
S v
a L
g n
o I
7 b
t u
A M W e n
e it C
u u
e e io l
d e
i AW H S m
ip R
6 t
c 4
5, S
S D
8 mt i
F n
r n
l r
l S 2 5
8 1
on F
i a a iu 2 s
r r
8 8
1 t
o oe e
P B
i r
s 2 W, e
r r
a e
2 2
2l p
D 0
0 0 I 2
2 2
2 1
n e
b le c
t e e a 1
1 1
1 0 Rm i
lb b S is n
g 0
n 9 9 d 9v. 9 9C 9
9 9
9 lo un i
r e
m n
a a a D
b a c o
io le le o i
C l
le l
le t d C e C C i
B u h S
led le le r
e e
e r
r r
ra n nC n+ n nB n
n n n n a d
d F
T T C g
C n
a a a
a aT a
a a a o m
ip us e
P P W, PP P
P r
e e P
P P P Ci T
lo t
g C C C in O
W, lop lo l
lo law g
t I
e c
nP in o
l /
g C in i
a D
D D n
r S
lo oF loo ivv. loc l
I IgO d a
I f
l O n V V V ia F
n nV nL uD nC nO n
n n ee lo V i
r r
r r
r r
r r
t t
t L i t
t t
t t
r f-m u 5 e 0
5 o oP o-v-
oB oO o o o vr n S le i
eL o 2i 5
2 e
r d
C CH C1 C2 CR CL C C C OF A M S S% B 1 F 2
1 R
en n
e e
e c
F G
H 1
J K
L M N O B C D E A B C D E r
S c
t 6 s n
1 n a
4U n
B.
B. 8 B.
e u
e2 i t 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
r i
2 2
2 2
Fp 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 3
3 3
3 4
l t
6 6
6 6
bi m
a n o
TU C
m
7 1
0 8
1 9
0 2
0 0
8 0
6 0
7 1
1 0
6 t 95 r
0 1
1 0
1 0
1 1
1 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
1 1
0 o/99 F
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
p54 1
8 7
5 8
0 4
7 9
9 7
8 6
3 9
4 2
0 1
e2 C
2 9
1 7
5 8
2 3
8 8
5 4
3 9
7 1
4 6
2 R/e 9
9 5
7 8
3 6
5 1
1 4
1 1
1 6
2 6
2 2
l 5 g a
,a t 1 p 4
8 7
5 7
6 6
8 6
6 5
7 3
7 3
7 7
7 3
t P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 im v.
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E E
E b e C
0 8
6 0
7 1
3 2
1 1
9 6
5 7
5 7
7 6
1 uR C
9 4
3 5
3 1
3 7
2 2
0 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
7 S
5 1
2 5
1 8
1 1
1 1
2 2
4 1
4 1
1 2
4 EE 1
0 E
F E
P S
0 I
0 se 8
i t
iC P
d S
a N
u Q
yc 3
3 3
3 4
4 4
4 4
4 3
4 4
3 4
4 4
3 4
n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
o ie E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
tiunq 5
3 9
1 6
9 9
3 6
6 9
6 3
1 6
6 9
0 9
ge 9
7 1
4 2
6 6
1 5
5 1
2 1
4 5
5 6
1 6
I rF 6
2 1
6 4
4 3
1 1
2 6
3 1
1 1
4 1
4 1
no itp ircseD m
m m
m m m
m m
m m
m m m m m m m m m
tn o
o o o o o
o o o o o
o o o o o o o o
e o
o o o o o
o o o o o
o o o o o o o o
m R
R R R R R
R R R R R
R R R R R R R R
t l
c s
a e
ic ic ic ic ic ic ic ic c c
c ic c ic c ic ic ir r
i n
n r
n r
r r
r i
r r
r r
r r
r r
r p
n t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t l
a c c c c c
c c c c c
c c c c c c c c
ia m
P le le le le le l
le le le le le le le le le le le le e
t o
E E E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E E
E E E
e C
C D
D y
y y
y y
y y
y y
y y
y y
y y
y y
y r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r e
F ia ia ia ia ia ia ia il l
l l
l ia i
ia ia ia ia r
a ia ia ia ia a
s i
2 l
l i
i x
x x
x x
x x
x x
x x
s it i
i l
l l
i li ix i
ix i
i li i
li i
i ix x
x x
x i
l l
l l
l i
n u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u u u u u u
y U
A A A A A
A A A A A
A A A A A A A A
lan r
I m
A ll o
iv iv.
s e
a t
e t
d d
m ia D D c
s n
n n
o S
it i
s y
t n
a a
n R R v
u m S r
e it le I
r r
r 8
1 e
e6 3
H H e
B i
n T
s s4 w
I R R S
T e e C t
s t
I 1
0 2
/
p m
4 4
4 n P n
s C 4
t c
a T
n n4 I
I d
d it r
la e R e
y e
e s
s r
s P
d d d v.
n n
m d
S R y
y y
I t
n n n iv i
a a n
S a
e 1
a a a
n C u
p D
is o
o a D D
I C
W o I
o o o
e r
r r
r s
s T C C it t
t t
n I
s t
o C C 5, S S S I
P P
E n
C m
io D
it n
n4 C D C C
L L
I A
ia e e o it it n
t t
t n R U r
B o
a a
i i4 n n n
C n
T g
a a,
E E
H CA C P
l l
h h
h M
h h
i o
o e
e e e
C a M M4 la la t
t t
t t
t s
s p
4 e
c a
a a
r S
D o o P o4 o o oe o o o o
o o o o o f
f f u f t f
f f
f f
f f
f f
g g
g V
r a a a
i P
s O ss si sin s s
s s
s s
s s
s p
p p
F r
5 e s
sy su sb s
s s
s s s s
s s
s o o0 o0 d
2i o o O oa op oa o o o l
LB L
L L
L L
P P4 P4 r
ou o o o o o r
r1 r3 F
N L
L Lt L s L c L
L LI r
1 en n
e e
e c
F B C D E F
G H
i J
K L
M N O P Q R S
r S
c t
6 s n
1 n e
4 U m
et B.
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
r r
e2 i a 2
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
Fp l
t 6
bi m
a n o
TU C
0 7
7 1
1 1
1 0
0 8
0 8
7 7
6 9
8 6
9 6
7 7
9 6
8 8
r t
96 1
0 0
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 o/99 F
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E p54 7
4 4
8 9
3 2
7 1
6 6
3 4
2 6
0 4
2 9
4 1
5 7
1 3
4 e2 C
4 3
1 2
7 4
9 3
7 5
4 7
1 5
0 4
5 6
5 5
4 5
6 2
9 1
R/e 1
2 2
7 4
3 7
4 2
4 1
7 3
2 1
1 7
1 9
2 3
1 1
2 2
7 5g la
,a t 1 p 7
3 3
6 7
7 7
7 6
4 7
4 3
2 3
6 4
1 5
2 3
4 6
3 4
4 P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
it m v.
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E E E
E E
E E E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E b e C
3 3
9 7
2 7
4 6
1 7
7 7
9 2
6 2
9 7
3 4
0 4
3 5
0 2
uR C
3 1
0 0
8 7
2 3
1 8
9 1
2 9
3 7
0 8
9 0
4 3
8 0
2 9
S 1
1 5
2 6
9 1
2 1
1 5
3 1
2 4
5 3
1 3
1 1
6 6
9 1
2 E
E 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 E
F E
E E
E E
E E
P S
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 I
8 8
8 8
2 8
8 se 1
1 1
1 8
1 1
it i
2 2
C 0
0 P
S E
E d
N 0
0 a
0 0
u 2
2 Q
y c
3 4
4 4
4 4
4 3
4 4
4 4
4 3
4 4
4 3
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 o e E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E itiu t
nq 0
6 3
5 0
5 8
5 4
4 4
4 4
0 4
4 4
0 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 Ige 1
0 3
9 9
9 7
8 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 1
2 2
1 3
1 7
1 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 rF n
o m
m m m m itp o o o o o ir o o o o o c
R R R R R s
e p
p p
p p
D m
m m m m
m m m
u u
u u
u n
o o o t
e o
o o P P
P P P le le le le le le le l
le le le le l
le le le le le e
e m
R R R e e e e e n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n n n n
n t
t t
t t
s a
ic c c a a a a a n n n
n n n n n
n n
n n n n
n n n
n tr s
s s
s s
u u u u u
u u u
u u u u u u u u u u r
n i
i t
t t
n n
n n
n T T T T
T T T T T T T
T T T T T T
T l
p c
c c e e e e e ia m
le le le d e le e le le e le le e le le le t
o E
E E
i d
d d
d le le le le le le lb b lb b b
lb b b
lb b b
b r
n n
n n b b
b b
b b
e C
o o o o o a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a D
y y
y C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C e
r r
r s
ir ia ia ia F
i i
l 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
l l
i t
it it it in it it it it it i
i it it in i;
it it in it it it it i
x x
x t
t t
t t
s u
u u in n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n y
A A A U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U lan y
C C
a T
T A
r t
t n
n o
r s
s e
it e
s y
y p
s m
ir n
s r
r p
a a
t c
e n
s m s
io T
T t
r s
d e
p u
p r
7 1
a e
n v
m P m
s a 5
5 p
D o
E u C u
p n
P m e 9
9 m
io C
e S P u
c 9
e e
r n
r o
a i
D A B D P S
0 r
1 2
i 3
4 5
ir 3
1 2
4 4
9 C
n ia F
A 1
0 F
F f
i u F F
F i
in 5 8
2 M M M M M T
M M M M T 4
0 e e e e g
e M
g s
i ir i
F ia r
r g
g 7
r r
r 1
1 K
1 1
1 1
1 1
7 7
7 7
0 e
c n
1 o
n n
5 e e e
l R
5 R
5 5
i 9
9 9
d 9
9 9
9 9
K 5
5 5
i 5
5 5
5 5
2 R
r S
o d
9 F
s n io 9
9 9
d i
s5 u
u g
g g la m e y
e y
y y
y y
y y
y y
y y
e n
n y
r r
r r
r u
u a
d o1 o
p a a a m e is a is a a a a a a a a r
a a a is r
r r
o r
r r
o r
r r
r r
r L4 B
S L
L L
S R R T R T T
B T
T T
B T
T T
T T
T T
R e
n n
e e
A B
D G
e c
T U V B C D E F
B C D E
F G
H 1
J K
L M N O A
B D
G r
S c
t 6 s n
1 n e
4U n
B. 8 B. 8 B.
e^u 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 i
3 3
3 1
a 1
1 1
1 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 e2 ir 6
6 6
2 2
2 2
2 F p-l 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 t
bi i
8 8
8 8
8 r
a n o
TU C
7 7
9 0
8 8
8 7
6 8
8 1
2 7
9 9
6 9
8 8
rt 97 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 o/99 F
D E
E E E E E
E E
E E
E E
E E E
E E
E E
E p54 7
4 6
8 5
6 3
6 5
4 3
3 7
2 0
8 2
0 1
4 e2 C
0 1
5 1
0 7
0 3
0 2
2 0
0 0
0 4
1 3
1 1
R/e 3
5 9
3 7
2 1
3 1
1 1
3 1
1 4
1 3
7 6
1 l
5 g a
,a t 1 p 3
3 5
6 4
4 5
3 3
5 5
7 7
5 5
7 2
5 4
5 P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
it m v.
D E
E E
E E E
E E
E E
E E E
E E
E E
E E
E b e C
6 1
2 0
9 3
1 8
1 6
5 4
4 8
5 6
9 5
4 6
uR C
2 1
9 3
8 1
2 3
3 0
0 2
2 3
1 3
1 1
6 7
S 1
2 3
1 2
1 4
1 4
5 5
1 1
2 2
2 4
2 1
2 EE 1
1 1
0 0
0 E
F E
E E
P S
0 0
0 I
8 8
2 se 1
1 8
it i
2 C
0 P
S E
d N
0 a
0 u
2 Q
yc 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 3
3 4
3 4
4 4
4 n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 io e
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
it u nq 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 0
0 6
8 4
4 1
4 ge 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
3 8
2 1
1 7
1 I
rF 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
4 1
6 4
4 3
4 r
r r
o o
o o
o n
l lo l
o F
F F
d d
d d
n n
n n
it d
d d
p n
n n
u u
u u
o o
o o
ir u
u u
r r
r r
c o
o o
G G
G G
s r
r r
e G
G G
g g
g g
D g
g g
i in i
in n
n t
e e
e in in d
d d
d n
n i
d d
i l
l l
l e
le le l
le le le l
le le le l
le le d l
l u
iu iu iu m
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n n liu iu iu B
B B
B t
n n
n n
n n n
n n
n n
n n
s a
u u
u u u u
u u u u u u u B B
B e
e e
e r
p T T T T T T
T T
T T T
T T e
e e
in i
i i
n n
n l
ia m
e le e le le le le le e le l
e le i
n in b
b b
b e
n r
r r
r t
o lb b lb b b
b b
b lb b b
lb b b
ib b
u u
u u
e C
a a a a a a a a a a a a a u u
u T
T T
T r
r r
D C C C C C C C C C C C C C T)
T)
T) 2 2
2 2
e r
h h
h
/
/
/
/
s i
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 r 1 r 1 r 1 r F
in n
n n n n n n n n n
n u
u u
is it it it it t
it it it it it it it i
io io io no io i o io it o t
t t
t t
t t
n n
n n
S S
S l
no no l
l no y
U U U U U U U U U U U U U U(
U(
U(
UF UF UF UF l
lan PT e
e A
i F
r r
F i
t n
n ito s
e l
e y
g la s
m ip a
m e
r r
r s
s a
r t
c T
e io L
S iF r
s r
r r
r a
e 1
i a
o o
1 F
p D
59 p
n s
s s
e s
s e
r m
o e
m c
e e
i s
r o
i r
r F
r i
P r
u S
p p
o a
1 3
5 7
9 1
2 6
9 1
2 5
F s
1 1
1 1
1 2
2 2
2 3
3 2
s g
m m
p e
C n
0 g
e U
n o
o m
e r
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 p
e c
K d
i M
in C
C u
n r
P m
r S
R R R R R R R R R R R 2
i F
ia A
I C
C u P n
m I
A o
i r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
n d
F e e e e e e e e e e e y
s s
i is is is is is is is is i
is a r
o F o
e 2
2 H
d R R R R R R R R R R R T B
R C
R 1
1 E
l e
A
/
/
n n
F H
e e
P Q R S T U V W X Y Z B
C D
B C
D E
e c
F H
r S
c t
6 s n
1 n e
4U m
A.
A.
A.
C.
C.
C.
C.
et 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
5 5
e2 i a 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 r
r Fp 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 l
t bi m
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 a n o
TU C
8 8
9 5
6 6
8 C
9 0
1 1
1 0
1 t 98 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 1
1 1
1 1
ro/99 F
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
p54 1
0 0
1 3
6 0
1 8
3 7
7 2
9 5
e2 C
0 0
9 1
3 8
9 0
0 3
5 5
6 6
5 R/e 4
1 4
1 7
3 3
1 7
9 6
1 8
4 5
5 g la
,a t 1 p 5
5 6
2 2
2 4
5 5
5 6
7 7
6 7
t P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 im v.
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
b e C
2 2
2 5
4 4
6 1
1 5
8 4
2 7
4 uR C
4 4
6 1
8 6
6 3
8 9
0 2
8 2
2 S
2 2
4 2
2 1
1 4
3 2
2 1
6 1
1 EE 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 E
F E
E E
E E
E E
E E
P S
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 I
8 8
2 2
2 0
0 0
0 se 1
1 8
8 8
2 2
8 8
it 1
1 1
iC 0
0 0
P S
E E
E d
N 0
0 0
a 0
0 0
u 2
2 2
Q y
c 3
4 3
3 3
3 3
3 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
o ie E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
tiunq 6
4 6
7 3
3 3
3 6
8 8
8 8
8 7
Ige 6
1 0
8 4
4 4
4 8
5 5
5 5
6 4
r 1
4 1
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
3 4
F r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
n l
lo lo l
lo l
lo lo lo lo lo lo o
d d
d F
F F
F F
F F
F F
F F
F n
n n
it ip u
u u
d d
d d
d d
d d
d d
d d
o o
o n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n r
r r
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
rcs G
G G
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
o o
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
e g
g g
G G
G G
G G
G G
G G
G G
D in i
d in in i
d l
iu iu iu iu iu iu iu n
n d
d i
g g
g g
g g
g g
g g
g g
tn l
l n
in i
d d
i d
d in i
n in i
n i
in n
n n
e liu iu iu d
d l
d l
l ld l
l d
d m
B B
B l
ld l
iu iu l
l iu iu iu tr e
e e
B B
B B
B B
B B
B B
B B
s a
n in i
e e
e e
e e
e e
e e
e e
n p
l a
m i
b b
in in n
n n
in in in in i
in in i
b n
r r
r t
o u
u u
b b
i ib ib b
b b
b b
b b
b e
C T
T T
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
r r
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
u u
D 2
2 2
T)
T)
T)
T)
T)
T)
T)
T)
T)
T)
T)
T) e
/
/
/
r r 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h s
i 1 r 1
r 1
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t
F s
it o io it o r
t t r t r i
t r r
r r
t t r l
l no it t
t t
t r t r r
r t
o io io io io io io io io io io io no no l
n N nN nN nN nN nN n N nN nN n N nN nN y
UF UF UF U(
U(
U(
U(
U(
U(
U(
U(
U(
U(
U(
U(
la n
A t
n s
n o
e r
e it s
i p
i e
F o
o o
r m
ir A
ir e
/
/
/
s 2
r r
s e
i w
w w
e t
c F
8 F
e e
e e
i e
e e
e r
a e
cs 2
e i
i i
i F
r r
r r
p D
iv e #
r r
r r
m i
r 1
g F
F F
F p
i F
F F
r r
i i
i a
e l
l F
r o
io eF o
1 Sr s
L g
la l
l m
a o s r
n a la 1
n n u e
e l
l r
C n
&s e
5 B
a mo mo mo P g
g la la 1
m m
2 2
r r
r 2
L Sis Sis Sis U L
L S
S a
a e
gs p
2 e
c ne m
le p
p p
d 2
2 2
2 s
s s
5 5
A C
Ae Be Ce M
r S
ir s
1 2
1 2
2 2
2 2
2 r 2r 2 r gp o
iF am C n
P P
Pp Pp Pp n
s s
s s
r C
C a
F F
Fu Fu F u o
u u
u u
C C
po d
SC I
P R
R RS RS RS C
B B
B B
M M
A en n
e e
e c
F G
H B
C D
E F
G H
I J
K L
M r
S c
t 6 s n
1 n e
4U m
C.
C.
C.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
E.
et 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
r r
e2 i a Fp 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
l t
bi m
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 a n o
TU C
8 7
9 1
1 9
1 1
2 1
0 1
1 9
1 9
8 0
8 8
9 0
6 9
r t
99 G
0 0
1 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
0 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
0 o/99 F
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E p
54 5
0 9
7 7
7 4
2 7
2 7
9 3
8 2
6 0
4 4
1 9
1 0
6 e2 C
3 8
7 4
0 2
9 2
9 1
6 3
4 1
4 7
6 2
0 2
5 5
3 7
R/e 3
3 2
4 6
1 7
7 4
9 6
9 2
1 2
5 8
9 2
2 1
8 3
1 la
,a 5 g t 1 p 3
4 6
7 7
6 7
7 7
7 6
7 7
5 7
5 3
6 5
5 6
6 2
6 P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
it m v.
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E b e C
5 0
1 2
3 2
8 8
8 4
2 2
3 7
4 5
5 8
1 2
4 0
7 6
uR C
1 3
2 4
9 1
3 3
3 2
0 3
9 3
2 9
1 6
7 0
5 9
4 7
S 2
3 1
1 1
8 1
1 1
1 1
1 6
3 1
2 2
1 3
4 3
1 1
2 EE 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 E
F E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
P S
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 I
8 2
2 0
0 0
8 8
8 8
0 0
0 s
1 8
8 8
8 2
1 1
1 1
8 8
2 ite i
1 1
l C
0 0
P S
E E
d 0
0 a
N 8
8 u
9 9
Q yc 5
3 3
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 3
4 n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 o
ie E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E tiunq 7
3 7
2 2
5 5
3 0
5 5
2 5
5 5
5 2
0 0
0 1
1 2
0 Ige 6
4 8
9 9
8 7
2 0
3 5
1 9
9 9
9 2
5 5
5 6
6 1
4 r
8 1
2 3
3 7
5 5
2 7
6 7
1 1
1 1
2 5
5 5
5 5
1 6
F r
r r
o o
o n
lo lo lo o
F F
F la l) l) la l) l) l)
)
)
a a a a a
r r
r r
r r
r
)
)
)
)
)
)
t t
t t
t t
t it d
d d
h h
h h
h h
n n
n n
n n
n
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ip n
n n
t t
t t
t t
e e e e e e e t
t t
t t
t t
t h
h h
h h
h h
h r
u u
u u
u u u u
u r
r r
r r
r r
r c
o o
o o
o o o o o C C C C C C C o
o o o o o o o s
r r
r
(
(
(
(
(
(
S S S S S S (r N
N N N N N N N e
G G
G r
r r
r r
r
(
(
(
(
(
(
o o o o o o o (r
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
D r
r r
r r
r o
o r
r r
r r
r r
g g
g o
o o o o o l
lo l
lo lo lo lo o o o o o o o o tn in i
i o
n n
e l
l d
lo lo lo lo lo lo F F
F F
F F
F lo lo lo lo l
lo lo lo d
d m
iu i
l F
F F
F F
F e e e e e e e F F
F F
F F
F F
u iu e
e e e e e B
B B
n n
n n
n i
i in in in i
in n) n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n e
e e e e e e e t
n n
n n
s a
in in i
i in i
a a a a a a a in in i
i i
in i
i r
p e
e e
n n
n n
z z z z z z z no n
n n
n n
n n
l i
n n
n a
a a a a a z z z z z z z ai a a a a a a a a
m i
i i
z z
z z z z e e e e e e
e zc z z z z z
z z
t t
o b
b b
z z
z z z z r
r r
ze z z z z z z z e
C u
u u
e e e e e e M M M M M M M eS e e e e e e e
D T)
T)
T)
M M M M M M 2 2
2 2
2 2
2 Ml M M M M M M M e
r
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
a s
i 2 h 2 h 2 h 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
2r 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
t t
t F
r r
t s
it t r i
t t
t o io io in it it it it it it it it t
it i
it n
n n
n n
n n n
n n in n n
n ne it it it it it it it in t
n n n n
n n
n n
N N
N y
U(
U(
U(
U U U U U U U U U U U U U UC U U U U U U U lan A
it h
s B
B p
t n
w m
A A n
o s
u 1
2 e
itp h
e P
s s B B
n ir it r
b c
w F
e g
p p
i e
r l
i in m
m A A i
e l
r r
s i
u u
F a
e i
a e
e F lo P P i
F g
1 2
e e p
D F
m i
F r
r r
r F
i e
o s
s i
e p
p F
r r
m ir g
C 7
7 e e o
S l
S l
r S
r
=
la m
m la la L
e C
n A
mo Cn la ll a
r 1
2 lo lo D
l l
a o
a D
n a
e r
r o
L o o u
u 2i m
m 2
2 a m m 2 C C P P A 1
2 2
m m
t Sis &s S
S 4
r 4
i e
s f
f s
s 1
8 9 W X X 7
t t
S S 2
F e
c u
Ae Bs W W 5
8 9
u
/
e 3 4
/
r S
1 1
2 e e s
s C C io 2
2 2
3 4
3 5
F io 2 r 2 r 3
r C S S C C 1
1 i
2 2
2 2
r p
p C C o C C C 1
u Pp Pp s
s s
r t
u s
s s
s p
F u F u u
u u C C a
C G G t
u u
B B
p C C C u
u u
u d
S RS RS B
B B
M M S B
B M M M T T
S M M M B B
B B
=
e n
n
=
e e
e c
O P
Q B
C D E F
G B C D E F
G H B B C D E F
G H
=
r S
c t
6 s n
1 n e
4 U m
E.
E.
E.
A.
A. A.
A. A. A. C. C. C.
C. C. C. C. D.
E. E. E. E. E. E. E.
et 6
6 6
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 r
r e2 ia Fp 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 l
t bi m
6 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
a n o
TU C
1 0
1 6
9 7
8 0
0 8
9 t
5 r 90 1
1 1
0 0
0 0
1 1
0 0
D E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E o/90 F
3 p5 1
4 0
5 3
2 2
0 1
8 2
8 C
9 2
2 9
3 0
3 4
6 3
0 1
e24 R/
7 7
5 3
2 4
1 9
3 9
7 1
l 5 e a
,g t 1 a 7
6 7
2 5
5 5
5 7
5 7
tim v. p P
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 D
E E
E E
E E E E
E E E b e C
4 6
4 0
7 5
9 7
6 0
6 uR C
2 7
2 0
2 2
5 2
3 8
3 S
1 2
1 7
2 7
6 2
2 1
2 E
F E
1 1
1 0
0 0
D E
C P
F E
E E
S 0
0 0
2 I
0 8
2 T
s 2
1 8
IN ie U
itC L
P A
d S
T a
N O
u T
Q yc 4
4 4
4 4
3 3
5 3
3 3
n n 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
o ie E
E E
E E
E E E E
E E
tiunq 0
3 2
2 2
1 1
0 0
7 6
Ige 4
4 6
3 3
4 4
5 1
0 5
rF 6
9 2
2 2
1 1
1 4
4 4
no it
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
p h
h h
h h
h h
h h
h h
t t
t t
t t
t t
t ir r
r r
u u
u u u u r
r t
t c
o o o o o o o o o o o s
N N N S S S
S S
S N N e
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
D r
r r
o o o a a a a a a a a e e e e e e e e tn lo lo lo r
r r
r r
r r
r e
F F
F A A A A A A A A m
r r
r r
r r
r r
e e e a a a a a a a a t
s a
in in i
g g
g g
g g
g g
r n
n e e e e e e e e p
n n
i i
h h
h l
i a a a h
h a
m z
z z c c d d d c c c t
o z z z
t i
i it ii it it t
e C
e e e wi t
i i
w w
w w
w w
w D
M M M S S
S S S S S S
e r
s i
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 F
is it i
it in it it it i
it in it t
t t
t n
n n
n n
n n
n n
y U U U U U U U U U U U lanA s
s e
t n
e e ir n
o e e i
F r
r F
i F
i F
r r
e it i
F r
r p
s 1
m ir e s i
O 2
i r
s O
l e e s 3 s
t c
i io l
i m m io r
o a
e F
r r
r r
r a e o o a
s a
p D
e n
g f
f n
u n
a g
e r
s s
e B e
o io r
c a m n
n m
r a S L
S a a e c c
r r
i S & S r
a e
L g B B
T T
F g A g
r C
n i
6 e
F n
2 2
1
/
t t
i 2
n n
2 in e
c i
2 2
ia S S 2
2 2
in t
in r
S 6
5 e e 8
9 4
e ia a S F
s s
m s
s s
m m
u u e G G u u u e G e d
B B
R M M B
B B R M R en n
e e
J K B C D E F
G B C I
e c
S rc t
6s n
1 n e
4U m
E. E. E.
C. C.
C. C. C. C. D. D.
et 7
7 7
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
r r
e2 ia Fp 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
l t
bi m
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 a n o
TU C
1 4.6.3 Analysis of Afulti-Compartment Fires iThe multi-compartment analysis (MCA) evaluated the risks associated with fires in-i Lvolving more than one compartment. The analysis investigated the potential for a fire starting in any single compartment spreading to or damaging equipment in an adjacent compartment. The analysis used a graded screening approach that considered the potential for severe fires that challenge the integrity of barriers, the frequency of occurrence, and, if necessary, the challenge to plant safe shutdown capability assuming loss of equipment in both compartments. The probability of failure of two j
successive barriers was assumed to be very low and, therefore, not considered in this 1
analysis.
i 4.8.3.1 Methodology The following method was used to evaluate fire risk resulting from propagation beyond an original compartment's boundaries. The analysis steps listed below are described in i
detailin the sections that follow.
A. Identify compartment pair combinations.
B.' Perform preliminary screening as follows:
- 1) Identify compartment combinations where fire spread to the adjacent compartment does not result in additional significant consequences to plant risk. If there are no additional significant consequences in the exposed compartment, the risk for the compartment pair was already adequately addressed in the single-compartment analysis. Therefore, the pair was not evaluated in the multi compartment analysis.
- 2) Screen compartment combinations in which damaging (i.e., temperature of 425'F) Hot Gas Layer (HGL) does not form.
- 3) Screen compartment combinations if no plant trip initiator occurs in either compartment and there is no safe shutdown equipment in either compartment.
C. Determine preliminary CDFs for the compartment combinations and apply screening criteria:
- 1) Assign ignition frequencies to unscreened compartment combinations.
Screen those with frequencies of 1.0E-6/yr or lecs. The 1.0E-6/yr, screening value was selected based on the FIVE Methodology (Ref. 4-4). The screening value is one order of magnitude higher than that used for the individual compartment analysis. This is considered acceptable given the Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-101 1
bounding methodology that is applied and the fact that manual suppression is not credited in the MCA.
- 2) Evaluate reliability of barriers between the exposing and exposed I
compartments. Develop initiating event frequency and screen those combinations with a frequency of 1.0E-6/yr. or less.
- 3) Assign automatic suppression system unavailabilities in compartments, I
where appropriate. Refine initiating event frequency and screen those combinations with a frequency of 1.0E-6/yr. or less.
i
- 4) Assign CCDPs to unscreened compartment combinations. Although the methodology that was applied included provisions to develop detailed analyses for CCDP and CDF, its application was not necessary because all compartment combinations successfully screened.
4.6.3.1.1 Compartment Combinations Based on information provided in the IPEEE Fire Compartment Walkdown Reports for Quad Cities (Ref 4-15) and the FPR (Ref. 4-8), 994 compartment pairs were initially identified for the MCA. Each pair consists of an exposing compartment (where fire originates) and an exposed compartment. In this way, the analysis explicitly considered propagation both into and out of a compartment. Propagation and/or damage in exposed compartments was assumed to result primarily from the spread of hot gases through barrier openings. Due to availability of multiple barriers and the low likelihood that hot gases would spread through successive barriers, the analysis considered only
- pairs of compartments sharing a common boundary.
4.6.3.1.2 Preliminary Screening Before beginning a quantitative evaluation of the compartment pairs, some qualitative screening was performed. Qualitative screening considered the additional conse-
- quences of fire spread to the adjacent compartment, as well as whether or not it is physically possible for hot gases to spread and accumulate in the adjacent compart-ment. The preliminary screening based on qualitative criteria is described in the following sections.
4.6.3.1.2.1 Screening Based on Consequences Compartment pairs were screened qualitatively if it could be determined that there were no additional consequences from failure of the exposed compartment. These criteria were met if one of the following conditions was true:
A.' If the combined failures in both compartments would not result in a plant trip initiator or loss of safe shutdown equipment.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-102
B. If the scope of equipment and cable failures associated with the combined compartments was the same as that considered in the single compartment assessment. That is, the consequences of the postulated multi-compartment scenario was the same as the single compartment assessment.
- The application of the preliminary screening criteria resulted in the screening of the fire compartments within several fire areas as discussed below. The results are also summarized in Table 4-18.
Cribhouse - The Cribbouse is a separate structure that shares no common boundaries with any other plant structure. The Cribhouse consists of two fire compartments -
11.4.A and 11.4.B. The scope of plant system equipment and cables located in-
. compartment 11.4.B is a subset of that located in compartment 11.4.A. As such, the consequences of a postulated multi-compartment is bounded by the existing single compartment assessment for.11.4.A. Therefore, this combination was screened.
Offgas Filter Building -The Offgas Filter Building is a separate structure that shares no common boundaries with any other plant structure. The building consists of only a single fire compartment. As such, there were no applicable multi-compartment scenarios.
Outside - This fire area addresses multiple separate structures and areas not covered
. by the other fire areas. As such, each fire compartment is substantially separated from
. any other fire compartment precluding any multi-compartment scenarios.
SBO -The Station Blackout Diesel Generator Building is a separate structure that shares no common boundaries with any other structure. The three fire compartments which define this area were all qualitatively screened based on no loss of critical safe shutdown systems and no plant trip initiator. Therefore, this building was screened.
4.6.3.1.2.2 Screening Based on the Possibility of a Damaging Hot Gas Layer The occurrence of a postulated fire in a given fire compartment may result in a significant challenge to the integrity of the boundaries which define the compartment.
The postujated failure of the boundary would Ellow hot gases to propagate to an adjacent compartment. lf the temperature of these hot gases were equal to or greater than the damage threshold, a target in the adjacent compartment could be adversely impacted. However, if the calculated temperature of the hot gases were less than the damage threshold, then damage would not occur even if the barrier where to be breached.- The relatively low damage threshold temperature of 425 'F used in this j
study also tends to minimize the challenge to barrier integrity.
Another consideration in the HGL calculation is the relative elevations of the adjacent compartments. The analysis included a calculation of the HGL depth. Potential l
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 l
page 4-103 s
1 interactions with adjacent compartments with a ceiling elevation below this level were screened because the temperature at the adjacent compartment's ceiling would be j
below the damage threshold of 425 'F.
The Multi-Compartment analysis had benefit of the detailed fire modeling performed while developing individual compartment fire scenarios for the upgraded fire analysis.
This modeling determined that electrical cabinet and trash fires at Quad Cities were incapable of producing a potentially damaging HGL condition. This fire modeling also concluded that lubricating and cooling oil tanks and piping could be excluded from consideration because they are not ' exposed' and the extremely low probability of spill due to a random failure concurrent with an independent fire event.
In general, the conditions necessary for a realistic threat of a multi-compartment scenario involve a significant concentration of combustible materials in close proximity to a credible ignition source of sufficient severity that ignition would result in the combustion of materials at a rate sufficient to cause a sustained fire. The review of design documents and walkdowns determined that many of the fire compartments had features that would preclude the formation of a potentially damaging hot gas layer, or were otherwise configured such that a fire of sufficient severity to cause a multi-compartment scenario was not considered to be credible. It was concluded that only those compartments which contained combustible fluids which could reasonably be-expected to be released as a consequence of a postulated fire event or had concentrated combustible materials in close proximity to a significant ignition source were credible locations for multi-compartment scenarios.
Analysis of the potential for HGL formation was peformed by calculating a HGL depth with the following equation derived from the EPRI FIVE Methodology, Attachment 10.4, equation 6:
)
i
- U" H=
A x 9.54ln
+1 where:
H=
HGL Depth (ft)
HRP = Heat Release Potential (From Combustible Loading Calc)
Xe =
Heat Release Factor (85%)
A=
Compartment Floor Area (ft')
Tw= Cable Damage Threshold Temperature (425'F)
T. = Initial Compartment Temperature (90'F)
Credit for hot gas exhaust paths was taken for unconfined compartments. Unconfined compartments were defined as those compartments with substantial openings and pathways that would allow gases and combustion products to diffuse into an adjacent space. When such credit was taken, targets within the exhaust path were considered Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-104
as well as the volume of the adjacent space (s) to ensure that a hot gas layer concem in the combined space did not occur. ' Multi-compartment scenarios were not screened if targets in. addition to those damaged by the initiating fire were identified in the exhaust path.
The use of a heat loss factor of 85% for the multi-compartment analysis is considered appropriate. This is because the phenomena being evaluated involves a sequence of j
events that requires the occurrence of a fire, the development and continuation of that fire, the heating of a compartment to a degree that the temperature being experienced 4
. by the boundaries challenges the integrity of the boundary, the subsequent postulated failure of the boundary, and the continued heating of the originating compartment such that hot gases and other combustion products propagate into an adjacent compartment and cause damage or significant degradation to critical targets in adjacent compartments. The time required for all of these to occur is judged to be sufficient to establish heat transfer path mechanisms to the compartment b~andaries. The analysis for many of the fire compartments concluded that critical HGL conditions do not exist.
In these cases, multi-compartment scenarios were deemed to be not risk significant and were screened 4.6.3.1.3 Determine Preliminary Core Damage Frequencies for Unscreened Compartments Unscreened compartments were subjected to additional evaluation to determine a preliminary CDF for the compartment pair. These evaluation steps are described in the sections that follow.
4.6.3.1.3.1 Frequencies Assigned to Compartment Combinations For each compartment pair remaining unscreened, fire frequencies developed as described in Section 4.2.2 were applied. The frequency assigned for the exposing compartment was determined based on those ignition sources considered capable of causing a fire of sufficient magnitude to generate critical HGL conditions. In addition.
appropriate fire severity factors were applied.
4.6.3.1.3.2 Barrier Failure Probabilities Assigned to Compartment Combinations.
Barrier failure probabilities were based on generic barrier failure estimates provided in the Fire PRA implementation Guide, Section 4, Step 8.3 (Ref. 4-5). This analysis reflects Quad Cities-specific barrier configurations as obtained from reviewing plant fire area drawings. The barrier failure probabilities provided in the referenced report are presented in Table 4-17 and supplemented by plant walkdowns and databases.
]
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-105
Table 4-17 Barrier Failure Probabilities Barrier Type Failure Probability (Ref.4-6)
Type 1 - fire, security, 7.4E-03 and water tight doors Type 2-fire and 2.7E-03 ventilation dampers Type 3-penetration 1.2E-03 seals, fire walls The probability of failure for a given barrier was determined by examining it's attributes l
and applying the values presented above. The risk significance of a postulated case involving the failure of two successive barriers was considered to be very low and not considered in this analysis.
4.6.3.1.3.3 Automatic Suppression Failure Probabilities Assigned to Compartment Combinations Suppression system unreliabilities provided in Section 4 of the Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5) were used in this analysis.
Full coverage water suppression systems cool the hot gases in either compartment and therefore could protect equipment in exposed compartments, even though they do not suppress the fire in the exposing compartment. However, because of uncertainty in the timing of suppression system actuation versus potential target damage, full coverage automatic water suppression systems (wet pipe sprinklers, preaction sprinklers, and water spray systems) were credited only in certain exposing compartment.
4.6.3.2 MULTI-COMPARTMENT ANALYSIS RESULTS Table 4-18 summarizes the multi-compartment analysis results for each of the Quad Cities fire compartments. The original Fire IPEEE analysis reported numerous compartment interactions with calculated CDF contributions of greater than 1.0E-6/yr.
The upgraded analysis concluded that multi-compartment scenarios are not a risk significant concern. The key difference between the two analyses which leads to these diverse conclusions is the availability of detailed fire modeling information.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-106 L
Table 4-18 Multi-Compartment Analysis Results No.
Exposing Fire Compartment Description Multi-Compartment Compartment Analysis Result i
1.1.1.1.N Unit 1 Torus Area-North Screened - Note 3 2
1.1.1.1.S Unit 1 Torus Area-South Screened - Note 3 3
1.1.1.1.S[S1]
Unit 1 Torus Area [ Elevator Pit]
Screened - Note 3 4'
1.1.1.2 Unit 1 RB Ground Floor Screened - Note 3 5
1.1.1.3 Unit 1 RB Second Floor Screened - Note 3 6
1.1.1.4 Unit 1 RB Third Floor Screened - Note 3 7
1.1.1.5 Unit 1 RB Fourth Floor Screened - Note 3,7 8
1.1.1.5.A Unit 1/2 TB RB Vent Floor Screened-Note 3 9
1.1.1.6 Unit 1 and 2 RB Refuel Floor Screened - Note 3 10 1.1.1.6.A Unit 1/2 TB Vent Floor Screened-Note 3 11 1.1.2.1.N Unit 2 Torus Area - North Screened - Note 3 12 1.1.2.1.N[S1)
Unit 2 Torus Area [ Elevator Pit]
Screened - Note 3 13 1.1.2.1.S Unit 2 Torus Area - South Screened - Note 3 14 1.1.2.2 Unit 2 RB Ground Floor Screened - Note 3 15 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 RB Second Floor Screened - Note 3 16 1.1.2.4 Unit 2 RB Third Floor Screened - Note 3 17 1.1.2.5 Unit 2 RB Fourth Floor Screened - Note 3,7 18 1.2.1 Unit i Drywell All Levels Screened - Note 1 19 1.2.2 Unit 2 Drywell All Levels Screened - Note 1 20 2.0 Unit 1/2 Control Room Screened - Note 3 21 3.0 Unit 1/2 Cable Spreading Room Screened-Note 3 22 4.0 Unit 1/2 Old Computer Room Screened-Note 3 23 5.0 Unit 1/2 Safe Shutdown Make-Up Pump Screened - Note 4 Room 24 6.1.A Unit 1 Battery Switchgear Room Screened - Note 3 25 6.1.B Unit 1 Battery Charger Room Screened - Note 3 26 6.2.A Unit 2 Battery Charger Room Screened - Note 3 27 6.2.B Unit 2 Battery Switchgear Room Screened - Note 3 28 6.3 Unit 1/2 Auxiliary Electric Room Screened - Note 3 29 7.1 Unit 1 Battery Room Screened - Note 3 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-107 i
n Table 4-18 :
Multi-Compartment Analysis Results No.
Exposing Fire Compartment Description Multi-Compartment Compar1 ment Analysis Result 30 7.2 -
Unit 2 Battery Room Screened - Note 3 31 8.1 Unit 1/2 Clean and Dirty Oil Storage Screened - Note 3 32 8.2.1.A Unit 1 Cond Pit Screened-Note 3 33 8.2.1.B-Unit 2 Cond Pit Screened - Note 3 34 8.2.1.C Unit 1 Location Under Hotwell Screened-Note 3 35 8.2.1.D Unit 2 Location Under Hotwell Screened - Note 3 36 8.2.2.A Unit 2 CRD Pumps.
Screened - Note 3 1
37 8.2.2.B Unit 2 Radweste Pipe Tunnel Screened - Note 4 38 8.2.3.A Unit 1 CRD Pumps Screened - Note 3 39 8.2.3.B Unit 1 Radweste Pipe Tunnel Screened - Note 4 40 8.2.4 Unit 1 Cable Tunnel Screened-Note 3 41 8.2.5 Unit 2 Cable Tunnel Screened-Note 3 i
'42-8.2.6.A Unit 1 TB Ground Floor Screened-Note 3 43 8.2.6.B Unit 1 LP and D Heater Bays Screened-Note 3 44 8.2.6.C Common Area TB Ground Floor Screened-Note 3 45 8.2.6.D Unit 2 LP and D Heater Bays Screened-Note 3 46 8.2.6.D[S1]
Unit 2 LP and D Heater Bays [ Oil Storage Screened - Note 3 Area) 47 8.2.6.E Unit 2 TB Ground Floor Screened-Note 3 48 8.2.7.A Unit 1 TB Mezzanine Level Screened-Note 3 49 8.2.7.B Unit 1 LP and D Heater Bays Screened-Note 3 50 -
8.2.7,C Unit 1/2 TB Mezzanine Level Screened-Note 3 51 8.2.7.D Unit 2 LP and D Heater Bays Screened - Note 3 52 8.2.7.E Unit 2 TB Mezzanine Level Screened - Note 3
]
53 8.2.8.A Unit 1 MG Set Area South Screened-Note 4 54 8.2.8.B Unit 1 MG Set Area Center Screened-Note 4 i
55.
8.2.8.C Unit 2 MG Set Area Center Screened-Note 4 1
56 -
8.2.8.D Unit 2 MG Set Area North Screened-Note 4 1
'. 57 8.2.8.E Unit 1/2 Turbine Deck Screened - Note 7 58 8.2.10 Unit 1/2 TB West TB Fan Floor Screened-Note 3 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-108 g
Table 4-18 Multi Compartment Analysis Results No.
Exposing Fire Compartment Description Multi-Compartment Compartment Analysis Result 59 9.1 Unit 1 EDG Room Screened-Note 4 60 9.2 Unit 2 EDG Room Screened-Note 4 61-9.3 Unit 1/2 EDG Room Screened-Note 4 62 11.1.1.A Unit 1 RHRSWVault South Screened-Note 4 63 11.1.1.B Unit 1 RHRSWVault Center -
Screened - Note 4 64 11.1.1.C -
Unit 1 RHRSWVault North Screened-Note 4 65 11.1.2.A Unit 2 RHRSWVault North Screened - Note 4
.66 11.1.2.B Unit 2 RHRSW Vault Center '
Screened - Note 4 67~
11.1.2.C Unit 2 RHRSWVault South Screened - Note 4 68 11.1.3 Unit 1 HPCI Room Screened - Note 4 69 11.1.4 Unit 2 HPCI Room Screened - Note 4 70 11.2.1 Unit 1 Comer Room SW Screened - Note 4 71 11.2.2 Unit 1 Comer Room SE -
Screened-Note 3 72 -
11.2.3, Unit 1 Comer Room NW Screened - Note 4 73 11.2.4 Unit 1 Comer Room NE Screened-Note 3 74 11.3.1 Unit 2 Comer Room SW Screened-Note 4
-75 11.3.2 Unit 2 Comer Room SE Screened-Note 3 76 11.3.3 Unit 2 Comer Room NW Screened-Note 4 77 -
11.3.4 Unit 2 Comer Room NE Screened-Note 3 78 11.4.A Cribbouse Basement Screened-Note 5 79 11.4.B Cribhouse Ground Floor Screened-Note 5 80 13.1 Unit 1/2 Guardhouse Screened - Note 2
, 81 14.1 Unit 1/2 Radwaste Collection and Handling Screened - Note 4 Area 82 14.1.1 Unit 1 A and B SJAE Rooms Screened-Note 7 83 14.1.1[S1]
Unit 1 Area Outside of Offgas Recombiner.
Screened - Note 3 Room 84 14.1.1[S2]
Unit i 1-B Offgas Condenser Room Screened - Note 3 85 14.1.1[S3]'
Unit 1 Area Outside of Offgas Recombiner Screened-Note 3 Room 86 14.1.1[S4]-
Unit i B Recombiner Room Screened-Note 3 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 l
page 4-109 1
El Table 4-18.
Multi 4ompartment Analysis Results No..
Exposing Fire
. Compartment Description Multi-Compaitment Compartment Analysis Result 87 14.1.1[S5].
Unit 1 A Recombiner Room Screened-Note 3 88 14.1.2-Unit 2 A and B SJAE Room Screened -Note 7 69 14.1.2[S1]
Unit 2 Area Outside of Offgas Recombiner Screened - Note 3 Room 90 14.1.2[S2]'
Unit 2 2-A Offgas Condenser Room Screened - Note 3 91 14.1.2[S3]-
Unit 2 B Recombiner Room Screened-Note 3 92 14.1.2[S4]
Unit 2 A Recombiner Room Screened -Note 3 93 14.1.2[S7]
Unit 2 Area Outside of Offgas Recombiner Screened-Note 3 Room 94 14.3.1 Unit 1/2 Maximum Recycle Radweste Screened-Note 4 Building 95' 15.1 Unit 1/2 Security Diesel Generator Building Screened - Note 2 96 16.1 Unit 1 HRSS Building Screened-Note 2 97-16.2 Unit 2 HRSS Building Screened-Note 2 98 17.1.1 U-1 Main Power Transformer 1 Screened-Note 6 99 17.1.2 U-1 Auxiliary PowerTransformer 11 Screened-Note 6 l
100 17.1.3 U-1 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer Screened - Note 6 12 101 17.2.1 U-2 Main Power Transformer 2 Screened-Note 6 102-17.2.2 U-2 Auxiliary Power Transformer 21 Screened-Note 6 103 17.2.3 U-2 Reserve Auxiliary Power Transformer Screened-Note 6 22 104 18.1 Unit 1/2 Technical Support Center TSC Screened - Note 2 105 19.1 Unit 1/2 Service Building ist Floor /LTD Screened -Note 3 Building
'106 19.2 Unit 1/2 Service Building 2nd Floor Screened - Note 3 107 19.2[S2]
Unit 1/2 Service Building [3rd Floor]
Screened-Note 3 108 19.3-Unit 1/2 Control Room Air Handling Unit Screened-Note 3 Room 109 20.1' Unit 1/2 Spray. Canal Lift Station Screened-Note 2
-110 21.1 Unit 1/2 Secondary Alarm Station SAS Screened-Note 2
'111 22.1 Unit 1/2 Off Gas Filter Building Screened-Note 2 112 23.1 Unit 1/2 Central Alarm Station CAS -
Screened-Note 3 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99
)
page 4-110
r i-l l
TaNe 4-18.
Multi Compartment Analysis Results No.
Exposing Fire
. Compartment Description Multi-Compartment Compartment Analysis Result 113 24.1 Unit 1/2 Heating Boiler Building Screened-Note 2 114 25.0 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchyard Screened - Note 2,6 115 25.1-Unit 1/2 345kV Switchgear Relay House Screened-Note 2 116 25.2 Unit 1/2 345kV Switchgear Building Screened -Note 2 117 26.1 Station Blackout Diesel Building Screened - Note 2 118 26.2-Station Blackout Diesel Building Screened - Note 2 119 26.3 Station Blackout Diesel Building Screened-Note 2 Notes:
1.
Compartment screened based on inert atmosphere.
2.
Compartment screened based on it being located in a fire area that was qualitative screened and that the fire area shared no common boundaries with any other fire area of concem.
3.
Compartment screened based on calculated HGL temperature being below the damage threshold of -
425 'F. This includes cases where the compartment did not contain an ignition source of sufficient magnitude to cause critical HGL conditions.
4.
Compartment screened based on calculated initiator frequency being below 1.0E-6/yr. This initiator frequency included consideration of severity factors, automatic suppression system failure if applicable, and barrier failure probability.
5.
Compartment screened based on the scope of equipment and cables potentially impacted given a postulated multi-compartment scenario is bounded by the analysis of the exposing compartment alone.
6.
Compartment screened based on compartment being location outdoors which precludes the formation
' of a HGL.
l
- 7. ; Compartment screened based on no c f.:c,al components in adjacent compartment, or insufficient HGL depth.
4.6.4 Analysis of ControlRoom Fires This section' documents the analysis of Control Room fires at Quad Cities. A fire in the
. Control Room has the potential to result in risk in two distinctive ways. In the most severe case, a fire can develop and fail to be suppressed before sufficient concen-trations of smoke develop, thus requiring abandonment of the Control Room.- In this case the remote shutdown capability of the plant would be used for safe shutdown.
~ in less severe cases, a fire is successfully suppressed before abandonment of the Control Room becomes necessary, in these cases, f;re may have damaged controls in Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-111 u.
one or more cabinets. Operators may attempt to shut down the reactor using the remaining capability that can be operated from the Control Room, or using the remote I
shutdown capability of the plant.
The analysis of these scenarios, which followed the guidelines in Appendix M of the Fire PRA implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5), is described in the following section.
4.6.4.1 Analysis The main Control Room is located at the 623 foot elevation of the Service Building.
The Control Room (fire zone 2.0) is part of fire area SB-1 and is enclosed by 3-hour rated fire barriers, it has a floor area of approximately 4,200 square feet, and a ceiling height of 12 feet. The ceiling is part of the roof of the Service Building and is construct-ed of 2-feet thick concrete. In the main control board (MCB) enclosure the ceiling height is reduced to 8 feet due to the HVAC plenum above. The ventilation system to the Control Room provides 13,700 cubic feet of air per minute (16 room changes per hour). The ventilation system ducts are provided with smoke detectors which, upon detection of smoke, automatically switch to a smoke purge operating mode. In addition, the designed airflow pattern is such that air is exhausted from within the MCB area which tends to minimize the impact of MCB fires on control room habitability.
The updating of the original Fire IPEEE analysis for the Control Room involved a general modification of the overall analysis approach to simplify the analysis, it also resolved an apparent non-conservatism in the original analysis wherein the HVAC system operation was credited to preclude control room abandonment scenarios for certain postulated cabinet fires. The principal steps of the analysis were:
A. Identify the plant system functions associated with each of the Control Room cabinets; B. Apportion the Control Room ignition frequency to individual Control Room cabinets; C. Determine the scope of plant system functions impacted by postulated Control Room fires that are successfully suppressed and did not require abandoning of the Control Room; D. Quantify CDF contribution for unscreened fire scenarios that did not require abandoning the Control Room; and E. Quantify CDF contribution for scenarios requiring abandoning the Control Room.
These steps are discussed in detail ir;.ction 4.6.4.2.2. Section 4.6.4.1.1 presents the key assumptions for the analysis.
l Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-112
r one or more cabinets. Operators may attempt to shut down the reactor using the remaining capability that can be operated from the Control Room, or using the remote shutdown capability of the plant.
f The analysis of these scenarios, which followed the guidelines in Appendix M of the Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5), is described in the following section.
L 4.6.4.1 Analysis The main Control Room is located at the 623 foot elevation of the Service Building.
The Control Room (fire zone 2.0) is part of fire area SB-1 and is enclosed by 3-hour rated fire barriers. It has a floor area of approximately 4,200 square feet, and a ceiling I
height of 12 feet. The ceiling is part of the roof of the Service Building and is construct-ed of 2-feet thick concrete. In the main control board (MCB) enclosure the ceiling height is reduced to 8 feet due to the HVAC plenum above. The ventilation system to the Control Room provides 13,700 cubic feet of air per minute (16 room changes per.
hour). The ventilation system ducts are provided with smoke detectors which, upon detection of smoke, automatically switch to a smoke purge operating mode. In addition, the designed airflow pattem is such that air is exhausted from within the MCB area.
i which tends to minimize the impact of MCB fires on control room habitability.
-The updating of the original Fire IPEEE analysis for the Control Room involved a general modification of the overall analysis approach to simplify the analysis. It also resolved an apparent non-conservatism in the original analysis wherein the HVAC l
system operation was credited to preclude control room abandonment scenarios for i
certain postulated cabinet fires. The principal steps of the analysis were:
A. Identify the plant system functions associated with each of the Control i
Room cabinets; B. Apportion the Control Room ignition frequency to individual Control Room cabinets; C. Determine the scope of plant system functions impacted by postulated Control Room fires that are successfully suppressed and did not require abandoning of the Control Room; D. Quantify CDF contribution for unscreened fire scenarios that did not require abandoning the Control Room; and E., Quantify CDF contribution for scenarios requiring abandoning the Control Room.
These steps are ' discussed in detail in Section 4.6.4.2.2. Section 4.6.4.1.1 presents the L
key assumptions for the analysis.
1 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-112 i-
4.6.4.1.1 Key Assumptions and Bases The following are key assumptions made in the analysis:
A.-
Assumption: Abandonment of the Control Room was assumed to occur at the time smoke visibly obscured the control panels.
A1. Basis: General discussions with operations staff indicated a preference to remain in the Control Room to continue safe shutdown activities. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL's) tests (Ref. 4-16 and 4-17) indicate that eventually smoke will descend to a level that affects operators' ability to perform their tasks (page 3 of
' Ref. 4-16 (Executive Summary)). Even if an air breathing apparatus is used, smoke will accumulate in~ a sufficient concentration to affect the ability to see controls on the MCB. Temperatures in the Control Room will remain below 150'F throughout this time (page 2 of Ref. 4-17, Executive Summary), thereby not causing widespread effects on solid state controls.
B.
Assumption: The abandonment time was assumed to be similar to representative SNL cabinet fire tests as reported in the Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-
- 5).
B1. Basis: The free volume of the Control Room is about the same size as the free volume of the SNL test facility. The smoke ejection rate of the HVAC system is about twice the highest rate used in the SNL tests. In addition, the ventilation system ducts are provided with smoke detectors. In the event of a fire, smoke detectors automatically switch the air handling unit to the smoke purge mode.
During this mode 100% outdoor air is provided, recirculation of smoke into occupied areas is prevented, and 100% of the return air is exhausted to the outdoors. Therefore, the abandonment time is the same or longer than the representative SNL tests.
C.'
Assumption: Each cabinet was assumed to contain sufficient cable or combust-ible loading so that enough smoke could be generated to cause Control Room abandonment if suppression was not successful.
C1. Basis: This assumption is bounding because the representative SNL tests used cabinets with combustible loads that appeared larger than those observed in the
- Quad Cities Control Room cabinets including the MCB. Those Quad Cities cabinets with light cable loading may not be capable of generating enough smoke to cause abandonment.
D.
Assumption: Postulated cabinet fires can be screened as non-risk significant if the fire is suppressed prior to causing loss of Control Room habitability, and the functional loss of the cabinets and associated circuits does not impact any systems credited in the fire PRA or does not cause a plant trip.
. D1 Basis: Multiple safe shutdown paths are addressed in the fire PRA model. The availability of all paths would lead to a CCDP of less than 1.0E-6. Combining this Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-113
E t
with the fire ignition frequency of less than 1.93E 2 for any fire in the Control Room results in a CDF contribution of approximately 2E-8/yr.
E. ~ Assumption: Fire propagation to an sdjacent cabinet is prevented if the fire is suppressed within the time frame associated with Control Room abandonment and there is a double wall and intervening air gap that separates adjacent cabinets.
E1, Basis:. SNL cabinet fire tests indicate damage will not occur to meters, relays, and switches in adjacent cabinets when a double wall separates them (Ref. 4-18).
Damage could occur to solid state equipment because temperatures sometimes exceed 150*F. However, SNL tests 21 through 24 of Ref. 4-17 indicate that the smoke obscuration of the enclosure occurs at or before temperatures in the adjacent cabinet reach 150'F.
F.
Assumption: Fire damage to the RPS circuits result in a scram.
F1. Basis: All RPS circuits are normally energized, thereby requiring a hot short to prevent a single circuit from de-energizing. Therefore, RPS redundancy requires multiple hot shorts to preclude reactor scram. Therefore, fire-induced Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) is considered unlikely with negligible contribution to fire risk.
4.6.4.1.2 Analysis Summary The examination 'of the Quad Cities main control room panels was performed using the plant simulator and the actual control room itself. The simulator was used to obtain information necessary to establish the scope of postulated plant system failures that should be considered given a panel fire. The determination of plant system failures was based on an examination of the controls and indications that were present. A walkdown of the actual control room panels was also performed to support the determination of the extent of a postulated fire event. The walkdown also determined a weighting factor based generally on panel or cabinet length to support the partitioning of the total control room
- fire ignition frequency. The guidance provided in the Fire PRA Implementation Guide was used to determined whether a postulated control room panel fire would remain confined within the panel boundaries. A postulated fire which is not severe or is suppressed before control room becomes uninhabitable is not assumed to propagate to an adjacent panel if they are separated by a substantial solid metal barrier. Small penetrations _or openings in these barriers that do'not contain significant combustible materials are not assumed to
. compromise the adequacy of the boundary. The results of these walkdown is presented in Table 4-19.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-114
i i
Table 4-19 Control Room PanellCabinet Walkdown Results Panel ID.
Description 6P e P nt Impacted Fire PRA Systems Unit p
901-3 Main Control Board 2
Y ADS, HPCI,1 Div. ll RHR and CS, Hard Pipe Vent, and Main Condenser (MSIV closure). SSMP is also potentially affected if the postulated fire causes spurious operation of two valves.
901 4 Main Control Board 2
Y RCIC 901 5 Main Control Board 2
Y CRD and Hard Pipe Vent 901-6 Main Control Board 2
Y Main Condenser, FW, and Condensate 901 7 Main Control Board 2
Y Main Condenser 901-8 Main Control Board 2
Y AC Power 902-3 Main Control Board 2
Y ADS, HPCI,1 Div. ll RHR and CS, Hard Pipe Vent, and Main Condenser (MSIV closure). SSMP is also potentially affected if the postulated fire causes spurious operation of two valves.
902-4 Main Control Board 2
Y RCIC 902-5 Main Control Board 2
Y CRD and Hard Pipe Vent 902-6 Main Control Board 2
Y Main Condenser, FW, and Condensate 902-7 Main Control Board 2
Y Main Condenser 902-8 Main Control Board 2
Y AC Power 901-2 Area Radiation Monitors N
None 901-10 Radiation Monitors N
None 901 11 Radiation Monitors N
None 901-13 TIP 1
N None 901-14 Radiation Monitors N
None 901 15 Div. I PCIS and RPS 1
Y None Relays 901-16 Control Rod Drive Test 1
Y None Panel 901-17 Div. I PCIS and RPS 1
Y None Relays 901-18 FW and RR instrument 1
Y Loss of FW Rack 901-19 ECCS Instrument Rack 1
Y Miscellaneous Instrumentation 901-20 Terminations 1
Y 901-21 Temperature and 1
N None Acoustical Monitors 901-36 Neutron Monitors 2
Y None 901-37 Neutron Monitors 2
Y None Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-115
l Table 4-19 Control Room Panel / Cabinet Walkdown Results Panel 10.
Description 8p ce P nt impacted Fire PRA Systems U
901 54 Offgas and H2 (water i
N None i
chemistry) 901-55 Containment Atmosphere 1
N None Monitoring 901-56 Containment Atmosphere 1
N None Monitoring
. 901-74 SBO Diesel 1
N SBO Diesel Generator 902 2 Area Radiation Monitors N
None 902-10 Radiation Monitors N
None 902-11 Radiation Monitors N
None 902-13 TIP 1
N None 902-14 Radiation Monitors N
None 1
Y None
)
Relays 902-16 Control Rod Drive Test 1
Y None Panel 902-17 Div. I PCIS and RPS 1
Y None Relays 902-18 FW and RR Instrument 1
Y Loss of FW Rack j
902-19 ECCS Instrument Rack 1
Y Miscellaneous Instrumentation 902-20 Terminations 1
Y 902-21 Temperature and 1
N None Acoustical Monitors 902-36 Neutron Monitors 2
Y None 902-37 Neutron Monitors 2
Y None 902-54 Offgas and H2 (water 1
N None i
chemistry) 902-74 SBO Diesel 1
N SBO Diesel Generator 912-1 Support Systems 1
Y Loss of IA, SA, RBCCW, TBCCW, and SW 912-2 Offsite Power 1
Y Loss of all offsite power 912-4 Radiation Monitoring 1
N None 912-5 HVAC Control Panel 1
Y Loss of RB, TB, and CR HVAC i
912-7 Cmtainment O2 1
N None i
Monitoring 912-8 SSMP 1
N SSMP TOTAL NUMBER OF 64 PANELS i.
I Note : The space units column is used to weight each of the cabinets and panels solely for the purposes of parsing the total control room ignition frequency.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-116
r The walkdown results indicate that the control room could be treated based on a total of 64 panel space units. The total ignition frequency contribution from the control room panels and cabinets is 1.93E-2/yr. Therefore, the ignition frequency contribution for each cabinet or panel space unit is 1.93E-02/64 = 3.02E-04 This contribution was multiplied by the number of panel ' units' identified in the Table 4-19.
' Table 4-20 provides the description for each of the fire scenarios that were analyzed.
Those cases where a fire was determined to cause a plant trip required a quantification.
A separate quantification for a bounding fire was also performed and addressed failure to suppress the fire leading to loss of control room habitability. The ignition frequency for this last case was the total ignition frequency for the control room so that those cases that did not cause a plant trip were properly treated for their potential challenge to control room habitability.
Two of the control room panels contained intemal barriers which substantially subdivided them into smaller sections. These panels are 901-3/902-3 and 901-8/902-8.
901-3/902 the analysis of this panel was performed using three subsections.
Subsection 1 was treated based on loss of Division I of ECCS, ADS, and the Hard Pipe Vent. Subsection 1 was also evaluated for a postulated fire induced spurious actuation of ADS. Subsection 2 was treated based on loss of HPCI. Subsection 3 was treated based on loss of Division 11 of ECCS.
901-8/902 the analysis of this panel was performed using two subsections.
Subsection 1 was treated based on loss of offsite power and Division ll of the onsite AC power distribution system Buses 14/14-1 (24/24-1). Subsection 2 was treated based on loss of Division I of the onsite AC power distribution system Buses 13/13-1 (23/23-1).
Table 4-20 Control Room Fire Scenarios Panel Description Cornments CDF ID.
901-3 Main Control Board Subsection 1 -Case 1 Failure of ECCS Div. I, ADS functional failure, 2.09E-06 and loss of Torus /Drywell Vent - see note 4 Subsection 1 -Case 2 Sarne as case 1 except fire induced spurious 1.50E-07 actuation of all ADS valves postulated - see note 4 Subsection 2 Failure of HPCI 3.45E-12 Subsection 3 Failure of ECCS Div. Il 2.68E-10 901-4 Main Control Board Failure of RCIC 1.45E-11 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4117 L
l Table 4 !
Control Room Fire Scenarios -
' Panel-Description Comrnents CDF
-- lD. -
.901-5 Main Control Board Panels 901-5,6, and 7 combined because of 7.68E-08 identical fire induced consequences. Scenario considered failure of Feedwater, Condensate, Control Rod Drive, TDV, and Main Condenser 901 6 Main Control Board See above 901-7 Main Control Board See above 901-8 Main Control Board j
Subsection 1 Non-recoverable Loss of Offsite Power and 2.49E-07 loss of Div, il AC power and associated EDG l
- Buses 14/14-1, Subsection 2 Loss of Div.1 AC power and associated EDG 4.63E-09
- buses 13/13-1 902-3 Main Control Board Same as 901-3 Subsection 1 -Case 1 See note 4 2.09E-06 Subsection 1 -Case 2 See note 4
.1.50E-07 Subsection 2 Same as 901-3 3.45E-12 Subsection 3 Same as 901-3 2.68E-10 902-4 Main Control Board Same as 901-4 1.45E-11 902-5 Main Control Board Same as 901-5 7.62E-08 902-6 Main Control Board Same as 901-6 902-7 Main Control Board Same as 901-7 i
902-8 Main Control Board Same as 901-8 Subsection 1 2.49E-07 Subsection 2 Same as 901-8 1.02E-08 901-2 Area Radiation Monitors Note 1 901-10 Radiation Monitors Note 1 901-11 Radiation Monitors Note 1 901-13' TIP Note 1 901-14' Radiation Monitors Note 1 901-15 Div. I PCIS and RPS Note 2 Relays 901 Control Rod Drive Test Note 2 Panel-Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-118
.o
I Table 4-20 Control Room Fire Scenarios Panet Description Comments CDF 10.
901-17 Div. : PCIS and RPS Note 2 Relays 901 FWand RR Instrument Loss of Feedwater 3.68E-10 Rack 901-19 ECCS Instrument Rack Note 2 901 20 Terminations Note 2 901-21 Temperature and Note 1 Acoustical Monitors 901-36 Neutron Monitors Note 2 901-37 Neutron Monitors Note 2 901-54 Offgas and H2 (water Note 1 chemistry) 901-55 Containment Note 1
)
Atmosphere Monitoring 901-56 Containment Note 1 Atmosphere Monitoring 901-74 SBO Diesel Note 3 902-2 Area Radiation Monitors Same as 901-2 902-10 Radiation Monitors Same as 901-10 902-11 Radiation Monitors Same as 910 -
902-13 TIP Same as 901-13 902-14 Radiation Monitors Same as 901-14 902-15 Div. I PCIS and RPS Same as 901-15 Relays 902-16 Control Rod Drive Test Same as 901-16 Panel 902-17 Div. I PCIS and RPS Same as 901-17 Relays 902-18 FW and RR instrument Same as 901-18 3.66E-10 Rack 902-19 ECCS Instrument Rack Same as 901-19 902-20 Terminations Same as 901-20 902-21 Temperature and Same as 901-21 Acoustical Monitors Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-119 L
m Table 4-20 i
Control Room Fire Scenarios
)
Panel Description Comments CDF ID.
902-36 Neutron Monitors Same as 901-36 902-37 Neutron Monitors Same as 901-37 j
902-54 Offgas and H2 (water Same as 901-54 chemistry) 902-74 SBO Diesel Same as 901-74 912-1 Support Systems Loss of Support Systems-Instrument Air, 6.50E-09 Service Air, Turbine Building Closed Cooling Each Unit Water, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water, and Service Water 912-2 Offsite Power Dual Unit Non-Recoverable Loss of Offsite 8.63E-7 U**'
Each Unit 912-4 Radiation Monitoring Note 1 912-5 HVAC Control Panel Loss of HVAC Induced Failure of HPCI and 8.20E-11 Each Unit 912-7 Containment O2 Note 1 Monitoring 912-8 SSMP Loss of Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump System 9.40E-12 Each Unit na Bounding Control Room Suppression failure probability of 3.4E-3 and 6.56E-6 Fire severity factor of 0.10 applied. The severity Each Unit factor is incorporates a panel severity factor of 0.20 and a CCDP for shutdown from outside the control room of 0.50.
I Note 1:
Postulated fire does not cause a plant trip and no post fire safe shutdown functions are immediately disabled. These scenarios are qualitatively screened. Treatment of this fire for potential challenges to control room habitability is addressed in final bounding fire scenario.
i Note 2:
Postulated fire may cause a plant trip, but no post fire safe shutdown functions are immediately disabled. These scenarios are qualitatively screened. Treatment of this fire for potential challenges to control room habitability is addressed in final bounding fire scenario.
l Note 3:
Postulated fire does not cause a plant trip, but post fire safe shutdown functions are impacted.
l The affected system is not a risk significant system with respect to the specific scenario being considered and is qualitatively screened on that basis. Treatment of this fire for potential challenges to control room habitability is addressed in final bounding fire scenario.
Note 4:
The two scenarios for this panel are mutually exclusive. A postulated fire will either cause the functional failure of ADS or cause spurious actuation of ADS. Only the greater of the two values need be included in the CDF total. However, to simplify the overall process, both scenarios are numerically included in the reported values.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-120
4.6.5 Summary of the Fire-Induced Core Damage Results The following is a summary of the fire-induced core damage results for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2. These results include analysis findings from fire modeling of single fire compartments, the multi-compartment analyses, and the Control Room analysis.
The Core Damage Frequencies (CDFs) resulting from these analyses for Quad Cities Station are:
Unit 1 CDF Unit 2 CDF 6.60E-5 7.13E-5 The dominant fire scenarios which constitute 90% of the reported total are provided in Tables 4-21 and 4-22 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-121
t 92 R
o/92 la b r
o n
2 1
2 2
6 1
4 6
2 5
7 8
9 6
3 9
4 9
3 6
p5 t
1 e24 T
u 5
5 0
5 9
3 6
9 2
4 6
8 0
2 4
5 7
8 0
1 C
2 3
4 4
4 5
5 5
6 6
6 6
7 7
7 7
7 7
8 8
R/
l 5 e a
,g b
t 1 a i
it r
m v. p tno 2
9 0
0 4
5 3
2 6
3 2
1 1
7 6
6 6
5 4
3 b e C
5 9
5 5
4 3
3 3
2 2
2 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
uR 2
S E
5 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 7
7 7
E 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 F
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E PE D
E E
E E
E 6
6 2
2 1
1 9
9 3
2 3
1 8
5 9
5 3
3 9
3 C
6 5
3 3
9 3
1 0
7 5
4 4
3 1
0 0
0 9
0 6
I s
1 6
3 3
2 2
2 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 9
9 8
e it n
i
)
C
)
)
)
)
o h
)
t h
h h
h h
i t
t t
t t
u r
u u
u r
t d
u o
o o
o o
o a
b S
N S
S S
N u
(
i n
(
(
(
(
(
Q r
i r
r r
r r
r o
o o
o o
o t
ip lo 2
lo l) n lo l
lo lo o
o iu F
1 F
a F
F F
F r
C s
d r
)
)
t
)
e n
e h
h d
n h
d d
d d
t n
e t
n n
n n
k D
u m
tr u
u C
u u
u u
u o
r o
o o
s o
o l
o o
o t
e
(
o N
S r
R n.
G r
S i
r r
r r
G v
f 1
G o
r e
G G
G
(
(
(
s 1
-n ro g
m lo r
g n
a o
g m
L g
g g
g t
n a
r e
i o
F o
in o
e in i
d n
n i
i r
e r
lo le m
iu n
n
=.
d o
i p
ld m
T i
A F
l R
e F
le ld o
i ld l
iu o
l n
d R
n i
l m
n d
iu o
y i
r n
o n
n iu e
n u
iu n
r v
a e
n o
B g
in in T
e d
in a
u B
4 a
n u
B o
e n
u n
z B
B B
o ia i
R l
n g
in T
R n
i s
e C
e iv u
r r
R e
d z
z e
e e
c h
a n
a z
a n
e i
x a
e n
n n
r t
le lo ib e
e z
le ib le M
ib ib b
r l
c z
i o
s i
b L
A T
i z
b tr z
b E
e F
u n
w e
a n
u p
M e
a u
B u
u u
n r
r r
t r
r r
r D
T u
e yr S
M C
o T
S 2
M C
T y
R T
T T
o C
v r
r ia C
s i
ia C
/
y 1
n e
l 1
1 1
2 le 1
1 2
1 l
t t
t 1
1 1
2 b
it ia e
u it it it in it b
it it it it ix i
i i
it ia x
n n
n n
n a
n a
n n
n n
u n
n n
n d
U M
R A
U U
U M
U C
U U
U U
A U
U U
U M
e tro S
o t
s S
n e
D e
b r
F A
i t
t i
r l
u e
s p
F a
c e
i s
g a
0 n
i O
o g
p m
r 9
s F
i r
i r
p p
e P
B u
a c
I i
p L
P C
i r
o u
e T
S p
D T
s v
G G
A m
+r e
e e
e D
D i
i s
r r
1 1
D S
E E
F F
e e
s e
P s
s u
e U
e m
O O
l e
F F
n F
l e
ir r
s io i
o B
B O
g r
p r
r i
i i
i i
n e
o r
F N
O d
F e
e o
a o
i r
v P
e n
r i
R S
S e
a i
F le u
i n
e r
P l
e r
e g
l t
r n
2 2
g L
D b
b b
o e
i F
s P
F a
c R
a e
a u
C r
g l
la i
O r
e a
o e S
n S
L r
m it it a
4 r
l r
t n
n L
1 C
lo 3
ia m
m C
L a
la C
n L
F O
e n
c C
on U
U A
d r
d o
d n
T C
a e
C e
M C
g L
S S
n D
S Co 1
r r
1 M
1 e
1 ll d o
o a
3 E
e it it 9
/
/
7 A
A C
in B
n f
f 8
g n
t t
n 4
B f
e 3
e o3 1
ia 2
3 h
g g
9 1
aa it it 1
1 S
1 3
c S
r 4
rb d
d y
it le I
I f-y P
s C
P P
m P
f-e i
a e
e G
s a
1 u
r 0
w G
le r
sy C
F F
e F
F v/
r r
2 a
F oa R
Ow C
C M
B T
9 S
S M
S T
R Lt M
R R
R 9
1 r
1 t
n i
e c
J O
B B
E B
F B
B C
D L
D T
N K
C K
C K
n U
S t
1 n
2 e
m A.
3 2
B.
A.
E.
C.
A.
A.
3 A.
A.
E.
-4 et 4
5 6
0 1
1 8
7 0
6 0
7 7
2 6
3 1
6 6
6 0
r r
e i a 2
Fp 2
2 7
7 2
2 8
2 2
3 2
2 8
2 6
1 2
2 2
2 l
b m
8 1
1 8
8 8
8 8
8 1
8 8
8 a
o T
C
b t
b r 93 i
i lat o92 lar r
o n 8
0 0
1 0
8 6
4 1
o n 5
8 0
4 1
7
/
t t
t To 2
4 5
6 7
7 8
9 0
To 5
5 5
0 5
9 p5 1
1 2
3 4
4 4
e24 C
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
9 C
R/
l 5 e b
b a
,g t 1 a n
ir t
t m v. p i
tn no 5
3 2
4 7
7 o
2 2
1 0
9 8
8 7
7 C
5 0
b e C
9 5
4 4
uR 1
1 1
1 0
0 0
0 0
1 1
S E
5 6
6 6
6 6
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 0
0 0
0 0
0 E
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 F
FD E
E E
E E
E E
E E
D E
E E
E E
E E
1 3
6 6
2 2
P 6
8 4
6 8
8 6
3 9
C C
8 7
9 7
0 4
4 9
3 1
3 5
8 3
3 I
1 7
6 3
3 3
s 7
7 6
6 6
5 5
4 4
ie n
h h
h it
)
)
)
C o
n t
t t
r r
r o
o o
o d
it i
u t
N N
N a
u n
(
(
(
b la o
b io r
r r
u n
r r
o r
o o
o Q
i t
o t
l t
ip lo lo lo 2
i t
it n
r o
ip
)
F r
F F
F 2
n e
la d
s d
d d
r c
C n
c r
r C
s t
n o
e n
n n
e e
h n
f la o
o o
o r
f u
C D
u u
u m
t e
la k
D uo C
H H
G r
t r
r r
k o
s n
G G
G t
(
f 1
i n
S s
e r
h h
s 2
R e
(
o t
g o
o in R
m g
g g
n i
t u
r m
ro m
m m
lo r
i in a
r n
n t
i d
d g
r e
t d
l l
m l
T m
n a
lo o
o o
F S
N iu le n
d r
l g
a iu iu o
iu y
r F
o o
o e
p p
i R
R R
n m
B B
o B
a fo d
m e
le n
le n
o n
c i
a a
B n
i r
n d
o R
i s
n e
e e
u n
C e
e l
n ix a
r r
e l
n e
C i
n t
n n
a n
n n
z A
A i
T e
z P
le b
e e
i i
o u
r c
a a
c a
z s
s r
le c
i b
b r
ib r
t A
T P
e u
u u
b s
F u
u n
u s
i z
E r
r r
r e
F e
C C
M r
r o
o T
a e
T T
o T
e yr D
M )n D
y C
v D
2 T
T 2
C D
2 2
2 r
ia r
n e
l a
/
/
y 1 io ne it i
1 1
1 1
1 2
it it ia it s
i 1
t il t
it i
in it it y
n n
n e
ux b
it c x
in n
n n
n b
U U
M U
R A
t t
n u
d US U
A U
U U
U U
U e
d t
e r
t o
r S
o S
S S
D D
A A
s s
n 0
n u
0 u
n o
o o
e 9
it io 1
io 0
it ir is 4
r 9
F s
r p
p u
u ir e
r p
e d
d o
ir p
d p
p e
e n
t t
c S
c r
p T
s a
S n
n o
s e
p lb lb e
e e
T e
v u
a a
8 s
D s
0 s
m m
e D
e S
i D
s o
r i
ir in F
io o
D is e
r s
ir i
4 e
s e
i S
r e
m w
G G
F s
F
/
r f
f r
s a
i o
r o
a y
e e
i n
le a
le o
o n
F e
o e
D D
r R
R s
r e
b t
b s
r e
i R
i E
E e
r r
i a
c a
o a
n n
c g
F F
t e
a S
r n
I d
d n
S C
C C
it it p
n a
e lo e
!a a
a t
o o
r n
n e
n 1
r m
M e
L g
t d
l o
C d
c c
m c
e n
it r
n m
O C
e n
n P
M it u
u o
9 c
B a
o n S
it a
n F
F C
4 S
Co S
B B
L n
e B
g B
le le 9
A C
d r
Ig T
a T
Ig n
A S
S f-p f-b b
IA e
2 2
laa 2
2 2
l y
r i
5 o
0 P
P rb P
F le 2
r 5
le a
a 2
a i
e
/
r F
F F
v/
F it it a
S 1
P 2
S C
C T
n n
1 1
2 R
R Ow R
U U
t n
in e
t n
c B
B R
C H
B B
B B
e i
U S
n c
B C
O D
A A
U S
t 1
n t
2 e
2 n
4 et 8
B.
C.
S.
N.
C.
m B.
2 e
m E.
E.
E.
3 2
1 1
5 7
3 7
6 2
ia 4
et r
r 6
6 0
6 2
2 e
ia r
Fp 2
1 6
1 1
1 r
6 6
2 2
8 e
Fp 2
2 2
2 7
7 l
1 1
b m
8 8
l B
1 1
1 1
b m
8 8
8 a
o T
C a
o T
C
b l i r94 t
atr o n 4
8 9
4 5
6 5
8 7
2 7
1 5
8 0
0 9
6 o92 t
/
To 4
8 2
6 9
2 5
7 9
1 2
4 5
6 8
9 9
0 p5 1
e24 C
5 5
6 6
6 7
7 7
7 8
8 8
8 8
8 8
8 9
R/5e l
g
,a a
t 1 a b
t i
m v. p i
i 6
4 1
6 1
1 9
3 9
5 5
4 4
3 2
0 9
7 be uC 4
4 4
3 3
3 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
0 uR S
E 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 7
7 7
7 7
7 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 E
F D
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E 0
2 3
4 1
1 9
2 6
6 5
3 3
1 3
9 0
4 P
C 3
1 9
5 2
2 0
6 3
0 0
0 9
2 6
7 7
1 I
3 3
2 2
2 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
9 9
8 6
6 5
se it i
n C
o i
d t
r a
u n
o b
o lo u
r p
F Q
b i
t n
d n
e n
)
)
o s
h u
h e
t o
t C
D o
r u
rG o
r k
d N
S o
r s
o g
(
l
(
o i
i r
n a
m m
m m
m m
F R
-i o
h e
o l
m le
- u o
k o
o o
W-l iu A
le e
o le le o
o F
o o
o e
le r
o n
g o
m R
in n
B r
n R
n n
R n
n R
R R
n e
a n
c n
o o
n c
n n
le i
n R
n z
u u
n u
u n
te o
c a
n i
n m
e o
u n
u o
g d
u n
m g
T T
R T
T T
n t
z T
t t
n C
a c
d c
a a
c e
t i
e le le o
e le e
le P
M le l
s F
e T
7 b
E b
t lb E
lb b
e P
lo e
i.,
l r
r a
e e
z r
c i
z u
l r
E b
r t
a a
n a
a a
C p
C n
B a
0 C
M 2
y C
o C
y C
C D
S D
o y
R C
e
/
a C
a C
ia r
r r
D 2
1 2
2 h
2 2
h 2
2 2
le 2
x x
t r
l 2
2 n
y it it it it i
t ia it i
t it it b
i i
ix it it n
n n
n u
in n
u in n
n a
n a
u n
n b
U U
U U
A U
M U
A U
U U
C U
M A
U U
d I
e t
iv r
D oS SC CE P
n e
e O
0 o
1 r
i O
r 9
h i
F p
n C
F o
T e
l L
p n
e h
e i
c g
l it r
a o
s F
e a
m Un r
T e
D e
e s
L S
m g
ir b
s le le u
e la v
r F
p u
y T
S a
P n
n D
s i
a r
t s
i.
i r
i e
L li T
r O
3 T
R a
C a
2 y
r o
6 F
o e
a 0
5 P
T P
S t
/
n 2
1 S
i 2
t t
r c
e s
s C
p a
S g
s g
l 9
9 W
i is 1
I o
P 9
u r
r e
a e
T D
D C
n e
e L
p L
d le i
A B
i T
a e
3 l
a r
r 3
B e
R r
r t
9 T
F n
G 1
e n
F e
M 2
c m
B M
c T
a 4
1 1
S 2
o 2
7 u
7 P
g h
C g
C P
h t
1 1
t 1
e 3
e 5
d 5
in
/
C n
8 t
f 5
R D
i D
lo o
2 R
i y
I 9
tu d
o 9
f 9
n d
r 2
A S
i r
V n
V r
r e
n s
y e
t s
C e
y i
u s
a s
5 u
5 n
s C
is F
s I
G a
ire a
u o
o r
i 2
o 2
o o
u 2
r r
/
M T
F T
C B
L T
R 1
B 1
C L
M R
2 B
1 t
n G
i e
n c
G B
B S
M B
M E
X B
E F
K O
B Q
i G
U S
t 2
n 2
e m
E.
C.
C.
3 5
5 0
5 5
5 B.
B.
5 4
et 7
6 8
2 2
2 2
2 2
3 2
2 6
1 8
3 3
0 0
3 2
r ria 6
2 6
2 e
Fp 2
2 2
8 8
8 8
8 6
6 lb m
8 8
8 1
a o
T C
4.7 ANALYSIS OF CONTAINMENT PERFORMANCE Although a fire PRA is performed with a focus on core-damage frequency, because of the key role played by the containment in preventing the release of radioactive material, it was appropriate to review containment performance. Appendix 2 of Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, provides guidance for the review of containment performance for
~ fire initiating events. The emphasis of this analysis was on modes of failure unique to fire.-
Physically, the primary containment is comprised of a reinforced concrete structure '
lined with a continuous welded steel plate. The containment function is provided by the steel liner, with the concrete structure providing strength. The containment building is penetrated to allow the passage of pipe and cable for power operation and accident prevention / mitigation. Three hatches in the drywell portion and two in the torus provide access for maintenance and inspection. " Containment"is provided by the containment
- structure, the hatches, penetration seals, and piping and associated isolation valves.
Fire impact on the containment structure itself is expected to be minimal. The containment hatches at Quad Cities do not rely on active means (air, electricity) to function. Because of the type of construction and the low combustible loading nearby, no fire damage is expected to the hatches. The piping / cable penetrations are made of steel and cast in place in the containment walls. Fire is not expected to fail the steel penetrations.
The containment fire area was eliminated during the screening phase of the fire analysis according to the approach suggested by FIVE (Ref. 4-4). FIVE references the EPRI Fire Events Database (Ref. 4-26) which provides evidence that containment fires at power have been few. Many of those that have occurred were due to reactor coolant pump oil collection system problems that have been eliminated by design improve-ments mandated by Appendix R. Also, except for brief periods after a reactor startup or before a shutdown, the primary containment is kept inert with nitrogen. As a result, a fire inside containment is not expected to be risk significant.
Thus, the remaining issues that must be addressed to assess the impact on containment performance by intemal fires were:
)
A. containment bypass, B. containment heat removal, and C. ' containment isolation.
'4.7.1 ContainmentBypass A review was performed of the high pressure / low pressure interfacing systems LOCA paths identified in the Quad Cities IPE for a determination of the possible impact due to Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-125 E
i i
fire. The interfacing systems LOCA paths are listed and categorized in the IPE Inter-f facing Systems LOCA Plant Response Tree and Success Criteria Notebook (Ref. 4-19),
j In accordance with Appendix N of the EPRI Fire PRA Implementation Guide (Ref. 4-5),
any path that contains two or more non-fire-susceptible closed valves can be screened from further evaluation. All of the interfacing system LOCA paths, except the following, have at least two non-fire-susceptible closed valves and were screened from further evaluation.
j A. RHR shutdown cooling lines (two series normally closed MOVs MO1(2)-1001-47
& 50),
B. LPCI injection lines (normally closed MOVs MO1(2)-1001-29A & B and inboard check valves), and C. Core Spray injection lines (MO1(2)-1402-25A & B and inboard check valves).
MO1(2)-1001-47 in the RHR shutdown cooling lines have the power cables disconnected at the motor operator and the breakers racked out and locked during power operation. Therefore all these scenarios include one random failure (leakage / rupture of the check valve or the locked closed MOV) and one spurious actuation of a closed MOV.
The fire ignition frequencies for the zones containing cables for the RHR and Core Spray MOVs of interest were all less than 2.0E-2, as discussed in Section 4.6.2.
Probability of a hot short given damage to a circuit is estimated as 0.068 in NUREG/CR-2258 (Ref. 4-24), page 112. A random failure probability for a check valve or a manual valve (used for the locked closed MCV) failing to close of 8.0E-5/ demand from Table 4.4.1-6 in the Quad Cities IPE Submittal Report (Ref. 4 'iO). Combining the upper bound fire ignition frequency of 2.0E-2, spurious actuation of a cable given fire damage to the cable (0.068), and the random failure of a check valve or manual valve to rupture (8.0E-5/d) results in an upper bound CDF value for the fire induced ISLOCA event of 1E-7/Rx-year per line.
This estimate was considered bounding because:
A. the fire frequency used to estimate the ISLOCA CDF frequency assumed any fire anywhere in the zone damaged the cable associated with the MOV (this was particularly conservative in the large zones where the fire frequency tends to be higher);
B. an analysis was not performed to determine if a temporary spurious actuation could be recovered or a seal-in circuit existed which would keep the valve open even after the circuit failure progressed to an open circuit; and C. an analysis was not done to determine whether the MOVs could be closed against RCS pressure and flow postulated in an ISLOCA event; and Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-126
D. this evaluation included no consideration of the likelihood of the low pressure
, piping to survive the overpressurization and the timing involved.
- 4.7.2 Containment Performance i
Section 6.3.9 of FIVE provides guidance on the evaluation for potemial impact of a fire
" on containment heat removal and isolation. The fire effects on containment perform-ance must be evaluated if the likelihood of loss of safe shutdown capability for a fire compartment is greater than 1.0E-06 per reactor year. Fire compartments that did not screen (see Section 4.6) were reviewed for potential impact on containment perform-ance.
The containment performance evaluation included a containment isolation failure analysis to determine whether a fire-induced failure was likely to cause a breach in the containment boundary by failure to isolate beyond what was considered in the IPE. It also included an evaluation of containment heat removal capability to determine whether fire-induced failures would reduce the mitigating capacity of the containment and result in its breach, as a result of loads generated by the core damage event.
These two aspects of containment performance are discussed below.
4.7.2.1 Containment Heat Removal During core cooling both RCIC and the relief valves (used for coolant makeup and heat removal) discharge steam in the suppression pool resulting in heatup of the sup-pression pool. The RHR pumps are used for suppression pool cooling to maintain the suppression pool temperature within the acceptable limits for successful heat removal using RCIC and relief valves with the RHR service water pumps providing the heat sink to the RHR heat exchangers. The same pumps (with different injection paths) are used for containment heat removal in suppression pool cooling or drywell/ torus spray mode.
- The success criteria for the containment cooling function (i.e., Containment Heat Removal) required one RHR pump and one RHR Service Water pump supplying that loop's RHR heat exchanger with the bypass valve closed (from the IPE Submittal Report Section 4.1.4, Table 4.1.4-1 (Ref. 4-10), and the IPE Transient Event Success 1
Criteria Notebook Section 2.14, (Ref. 4-20)).
This evaluation did not identify any containment failure mode significantly different from those found in the iPE intamal events evaluation. However, the containment heat removal will be affected in compartments where RHR or RHR service water system is affected. The fire modeiing (see Section 4.6) identified the compartments where these systems, and therefore containment heat removal function, may be affected.
4.7.2.2 Containment isolation Quad Cities normally operates with an inerted containment (nitrogen). The drywell and torus Group 1,2, and 3 piping penetrations are continuously isolated, except for those required for normal operation, i.e., the MSIVs in the main steam lines, the valves in the Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-127
y I
e
. Nitrogen Makeup system, and the valves in the Reactor Water Cleanup system
. (RWCU).
The Quad Cities IPE concluded that isolation failures are not considered likely failure modes and were not considered in the Quad Cities IPE event trees. The reason for this is that the containment, during normal operations, is nitrogen inerted. In order for the containment to remain inert, it must also remain isolated. Therefore, there are no sys-
~ tems which have to isolate upon initiation of a severe accident event that probabilistically threaten containment. The likelihood of multiple valves failing to close in conjunction with piping failure on at least one side of the containment is probabilistically insignificant.
Consequently, there were no containment isolation failures identified in the IPE.
The Appendix R analysis similarly concluded that the probability of both isolation valves in a line being affected by a fire such that they spuriously open was too low to warrant i
further consideration Even should the required circuit damage occur, the outboard isolation valve may be closed manually by operations staff. The EOPs direct the operators to verify containment isolation. !f the fire was in the vicinity of a spuriously.
operating isolation valve, the time required for reactor water level to boil off to the point that core damage occurs is sufficient to suppress the fire and manually close the valve.
Containment isolation was therefore assured by the procedures.
4.7.3 Summary The Quad Cities containment structure is comprised of a reinforced concrete structure lined with steel. Other elements that perform " containment" functions include the equipment hatches and electrical / mechanical penetrations. All of these elements were determined to have minimal vulnerability to risk from internal fires. Potential containment vulnerability due to bypass or failure of isolation was also evaluated.
Results of the evaluation demonstrate that the impact of fire on containment performance was well within accepted limits and considered acceptable.
4.8 ANALYSIS RESULTS AND INSIGHTS
. The upgraded Quad Cities Fire analysis provided results that are significantly different
)
than the original analysis in terms of both the reported CDF contributions and risk insights. The total calculated CDF contribution due to fires from the upgraded fire analysis is almost 2 orders of magnitude lower than that presented in the original I
submittal. In addition, several fire scenarios which were previously screened, or otherwise determined to not be risk significant, in the original analysis were identified as
-important fire scenarios in the upgraded analysis. The combination of all of these factors results in a significant altering of the fire risk insights from that portrayed in the original Fire IPEEE sutmittal. The following sections discuss the key differences in the analysis results.
1 Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-128
L 4.8.1 Reduc 6on in Overall CDF The upgraded fire analysis produced a calculated CDF contribution due to fires that was approximately two orders of magnitude lower than that presented in the original Fire IPEEE submittal. A comparison of the Unit i upgraded fire analysis results and the original Fire IPEEE results is provided in Table 4-23. Only the dominant contributors to 1 -
' the original and upgraded analysis results are presented. In addition, the analysis results have been grouped to be consistent with the presentation of results in the original Fire IPEEE submittal.
i The significant reduction is due primarily to the incorporation of detailed cable spatial information into the upgraded analysis. The availability of comprehensive spatial information for critical cables allowed the fire modeling results to provide a more i
realistic characterization of the consequences of postulated fire events. This I
application of the cable spatial information is best described by comparing the results of the upgraded analysis with the results from the original Fire IPEEE for the Group A fire compartments. The original Fire IPEEE defined Group A fire compartments as those whose calculated CDF contribution was greater than 1.0E-4/yr. The Group A compartments collectively constituted 72% of the report CDF contribution for Unit 1 in L
the original Fire IPEEE submittal.
The original Fire IPEEE analysis for the Group A fire compartments, and to some degree all of the unscreened fire compartments, suffered from the lack of detailed cable l_
spatial information. While the data did associate critical cables with fire compartments,
)
it did not provide additional details necessary to locate the cable within the compartment. Because of this limitation, the integration of the fire modeling results into the analysis could not distinguish between individual circuit and equipment failures. As j
a consequence, the original Fire IPEEE assumed that if any postulated fire damaged d
any circuit, all circuits within the fire compartment were considered to be damaged.
l The upgraded fire analysis had the benefit of more detailed cable spatial information.
This detailed information allowed the analyst to determine the location of any given
~ cable within a fire compartment based on conduit or tray node. In addition, the upgraded analysis performed supplemental cable function reviews to determine whether the scope of circuits potentially impacted by the postulated fire event would actually cause the equipment or systems failures indicated by the data relationships.
Using this information, the upgraded analysis was able to confirm that the scope of cable damage did not result in the same scope of systems failures considered in the original analysis and that abandonment of the control room was not required. While various plant systems were disabled, control room functionality to perform inventory -
control and decay heat removal functions were determined to be available. The ability to remain in the control room allowed the upgraded analysis to be based on the normal,
' abnormal, and emergency plant operating procedures. This is contrasted with the original analysis that relied almost exclusively on the Appendix R safe shutdown procedures.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report
' Rev.~ 1, 5/25/99 page 4-129 L
t 90 n
r o
o/93 itu p5 1
e24 b
1 0
0 0
0 3
8 8
5 7
1 9
2 1
3 0
7 9
2 3
1 1
1 R/
i 3
r tn 3
0 0
0 1
0 3
3 4
9 2
0 5
3 4
9 1
0 3
2 2
2 3
5 e 9
la
,g o
t 1 a C
t m v. p i
3 7
0 8
5 5
4 4
4 4
4 5
4 4
4 4
5 5
4 4
4 4
3 b e la 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
uR nF iD E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
S g
8 0
3 1
1 4
5 3
2 3
1 4
2 5
9 5
1 5
4 4
4 4
8 iC rO 7
6 3
0 6
5 0
0 4
2 1
7 8
6 2
8 9
0 7
2 1
1 3
E 1
9 3
9 5
1 2
2 2
5 1
4 2
1 2
4 8
5 1
1 1
1 5
E E
n P
o I
itu s
ib 8
1 0
0 9
8 7
6 5
1 6
3 2
2 8
8 4
2 2
0 0
0 0
ite r
t 0
5 5
5 4
4 4
3 3
3 2
2 2
2 2
1 1
1 0
0 0
0 6
i n
3 1
9 C
oC dau d
5 5
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
7 7
7 0
0 1
5 eF 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 1
1 0
Q siD E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
E E
v 3
0 2
2 5
5 3
7 1
4 3
0 6
5 5
1 9
6 9
1 4
9 0
eC 0
0 3
3 2
1 1
3 3
0 7
5 4
4 8
2 0
8 1
9 2
3 6
R 2
1 3
3 3
3 3
2 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 9
7 1
4 1
5 6
)no
)
)
)
)
)
h h
h h
k h
h t
c t
t t
t s
u r
r e
u u
o o
o S
o o
iR S
N N
la
(
(
S S
r
(
(
(
o e
r r
r r
r r
o o
lo t
o o
o r
n o
2 l) n F
lo F
lo e
lo lo iF io l
1 a
F d
F C
F F
t r
e ip d
r
)
)
t
)
n s
r n
e h
h n
d h
u d
h d
d t
e n
t n
t n
n c
tr u
u o
i u
m o
o C
u le G
o o
o o
s r
u u
u u
t se o
r o
o i
(
r o
N S
r v
S r
S r
r r
t C
D G
1 f
1 s
o G
e (r g
G G
G n
(
(
(
n r
r e
r o
m m
i g
o o
g g
m d
e g
n a
m o
lo g
L n
n r
a e
o o
d i
l F
m u
Z l
m m
T l
le A o
lo F
in e
lo o
n o
o in in t
a o
i e
r r
l d
o iu iu e
d o
iu iu B
l F
l d
l p
r d
e F
e d
in R
R l
n F
o o
l d
a R
Q e
iu o
r y
n n
r n
iu o
r n
n a
e a
e i
r a
e n
n R
B B
m l
i B
o f
a u
u e
ic n
i B
z i
n in e
B in o
r e
e C
n n
l g
r a
F R
s l
T T
g n
u o
e n
i A,. in z
e z
n e
d i
n a
r e
i b
e a
z in e
a a
n n
lo a
x h
a b
i z G u
b in n
r u
e le c
c z
e b
M z
P e
u b
z r
t i
ib u
n a
a it l
T A
lb b
E z
r z
g t
w e
M B
e C
p T
u e
B r
r r
r p
r r
i ru y
M 2
T R
M D
S 2
T M
R m
u u
F ir T
o y
e C C
S T
T r
r v
O C
ia r
1 2
1 ia
/
/
o d
1 li s
l 1
1 2
1 1
1 le 1
2 1
1 C
1 i
e n
e t
n ia u
e it it it ix it it it it it in a
it it it it o
it n
n n
u n
n n
n n
n n
n n
l n
it n
x t
b d
it n
e U
M A
R U
U U
A U
U U
U U
U C
U U
U U
O U
U e
d rc e
s s
V n
i I
U v
S S
f e
1 1
D M
la n
o R
it o
R O
O A
+
t fo ip C
B B
s s
r P
o S
S p
e e
n s
e n
n f
i s
TI T
r c
s x
s ir r
o e
i l
d d
lc la P
s lc s
D F
a a
l F
r e
cn n
F a
n e
s s
R C
s i
r e
e a
io d
i 1
1 i
ir e
4 e
n i
u i
f G
G g
r r
r l
f i
r ta s
s s
s s
1 s
s s
s s
F s
s ia la la p
a le i
E E
io io i
i d
io n
o D
D o
o r
a io in io io io io io l
l r
m e
F r
r r
r g
r r
r r
r r
r n
c R
a a
a a
a a
e a
ia a
a a
i n
n I
2 1
a n
a a
C n
s s
n n
n n
n g
n o
S P
e lb le e
e e
e 3
e h
e n
n n
e m
n e
e e
e e
C C
F c
b c
c c
c 1
c c
c e
c c
c ia c
c 1
1 R
S a
a S
S S
S S
i S
R S
S S
m S
S R
t l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
s s
s 3
l l
is is l
l l
l u
l w
l l
l l
l e
l l
o u
u 2
A A
D D
A A
A A
B A
S l
A A
A A
R A
A N
B B
A
-4 A.
2 3
4 5
B.
A.
C.
E.
3 A.
B.
C.
E.
B.
2 A.
A.
e e e l
r n 6
0 1
1 2
2 8
3 7
7 6
1 7
0 6
6 7
1 0
6 6
b F
1 3
2 2
2 1
4 2
2 io a
Z 2
2 7
7 2
6 2
2 2
1 2
8 8
6 8
1 1
8 8
8 8
1 8
8 8
8 1
8 8
T
4.8.1.1 Fire Compartmenta 8.2.6.A, C, and E The original Fire IPEEE evaluation of fire compartments 8.2.6.A,8.2.6.C and 8.2.6.E resulted in a cumulative CDF contribution of 2.80E-3/yr. and 2.93E-3/yr, for Units 1 and 2, respectively. This is in contrast with the upgraded fire analysis results of 2.42E-5/yr.
L and 2.61E-5/yr for Units 1'and 2, respectively. The upgraded results are approximately two orders of magnitude lower than the original analysis.
The original analysis performed fire modeling analyses which included consideration of
_ potential oil spill fires. The results of the fire modeling analyses concluded that cables in the raceways above the feed water pumps and switchgears could be damaged. ' As discussed above, the methodology applied in the original Fire IPEEE assumed all circuits within the fire compartment were damaged.
The original Fire IPEEE analysis for fire compartments 8.2.6.A, C, and E assumed fire induced loss of HPCI, RCIC, both trains of RHR, and two EE Gs. The original analysis did not credit the Core Spray System. Because of the scope of postulated equipment failures, abandonment of the control room was indicated due to loss of functionality.
This strategy resulted in the application of a conditional core damage probability of 0.403 for shutdown from outside the main control room.
The upgraded fire analysis had the benefit of more detailed cable information. The review of this information determined that postulated fires would not result in the loss of HPCI because of its specific routing through the heater bay. The cable function review also determined that the postulated fire induced failure of circuits would not result in the loss of RHR train A. However, a postulated fire involving the Unit 1 Reactor Feed Pumps could disable all Unit 1 RHRSW pumps. This is recoverable by an operator action to crosstie the Unit 2 RHRSW system. The operator action is performed in the
. Reactor Building and a pathway is available that does not pass through the fire compartment where the postulated fire has occurred. The realistic treatment of the fire induced failures resulted in the development of fire scenarios that did not require abandonment of the control room. These scenarios have a calculated conditional core
- damage probability (CCDP) that varies from 4.19E-2 to 1.24E-7, depending on the specific scenario being considered for the fire compartment.
The original Fire IPEEE analysis also characterized postulated air compressor fires as l
' risk significant. The upgraded Unit 1 analysis did not identify any fire scenarios involving an air compressor that was risk significant. While the upgraded analysis did j
determine that postulated fires would impact cables, the fire induced failure of these circuits did not result in a risk significant scenario. However, an asymmetry in the cable routing design for Unit 2 resulted in a single air compressor fire being characterized as a risk significant contributor. The asymmetry is the cable routing design resulted in HPCI, SSMP, and one train of CS and RHR for Unit 2 being located near an air compressor outside the SSMP room. This type of interaction did not occur in Unit 1.
I Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report
)
l Rev.1, 5/25/99
]
page 4-131 j
1
l l
The two order of magnitude reduction in the CDF for these fire compartments is primarily the result of the CCDP for the dominant contributor, large Reactor Feed Pump oil fires, decreasing from 0.403 in the original analysis to 4.19E-2 in the upgraded analysis. The upgraded analysis also explicitly treated non-severe fires as compared to I
the original analysis where they were implicitly screened.
4.8.1.2 Fire Compartment 8.2.7.A and 8.2.7.E The original Fire IPEEE evaluation of fire compartments 8.2.7.A and 8.2.7.E resulted in a cumulative CDF contribution of 5.24E-4/yr. and 4.35E-4/yr. for Units 1 and 2, respectively. This is in contrast with the upgraded fire analysis results of 3.78E-6/yr.
and 3.35E-6/yr. for Units 1 and 2, respectively. The upgraded results are greater than two orders of magnitude lower than the original analysis.
The original analysis results are dominated by a postulated fire involving 4kV switchgear buses 13 and 14 (23 and 24). The original Fire IPEEE analysis assumed fire induced loss of both buses, a dual unit LOOP, and loss of critical DC control power.
Because of the loss of buses 13 and 14 (23 and 24), loss of all RHRSW for the unit experiencing the fire occurs. The original analysis treated such a condition by requiring abandonment of the control room to implement actions necessary to achieve safe shutdown. This strategy resulted in the application of a conditional core damage probability of 0.403 for shutdown from outside the main control room.
The upgraded fire analysis was based on a overall post fire safe shutdown strategy that relied on the normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures. The consequences of loss of RHRSW for a given unit can be recovered by the RHRSW crosstie as discussed in Section 4.8.1.1. The realistic treatment of the fire in term of plant operator response resulted in the development of fire scenarios that did not require abandonment of the control room. These scenario have a calculated conditional core damage probability (CCDP) that varies from 2.87E-2 to 1.24E-7, depending on the specific scenario being considered for the fire compartment.
The two order of magnitude reduction in the CDF for these fire compartments is primarily the result of the CCDP for the dominant contributor, large switchgear bus fires, decreasing from 0.403 in the original analysis to 2.87E-2 in the upgraded analysis. The upgraded analysis also explicitly treated non-severe fires as compared to the original analysis where they were implicitly screened.
4.8.1.3 Fire Compartment 8.2.7.C The original Fire IPEEE evaluation of fire compartment 8.2.7.C resulted in a CDF contribution of 5.23E-4/yr. for Unit 1 and 2, each. This is in contrast with the upgraded fire analysis results of 2.04E-6/yr. and 7.84E-9/yr. for Units 1 and 2, respectively. The upgraded results are greater than two orders of magnitude lower than the original analysis.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-132
L
]
The original analysis results are dominated by a postulated fire involving the two turbine oil reservoirs. The original analysis assumed that a fire involving the oil pumps on top of the reservoirs would ignite the 13,000 gallons of oil in the reservoir. The consequences of such a fire were treated by assuming a fire induced dual unit LOOP, loss of HPCI, both trains of RHR, RCIC and two EDGs. The original analysis treated such a condition as requiring abandonment of the control room to implement actions l
necessary to achieve safe shutdown. This strategy resulted in the application of a conditional core damage probability of 0.403 for shutdown from outside the main control l
room.
The upgraded fire analysis did not consider the ignition of 13,000 gallons of oil in the l
reservoir as a credible consequence of a postulated pump / motor fire. This because of the design of the motor enclosures. As such, the upgraded analysis considered an entirely different scope of postulated fire events that were not explicitly treated in the original analysis. The upgraded fire analysis also based the overall post fire safe shutdown strategy on the normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures.
The modified scope of fire scenarios in the upgraded analysis did not require i-abandonment of the control room. The calculated conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for these scenarios varied from 4.07E-2 to 1.24E-7, depending on the specific scenario for the fire compartment.
The greater than two order of magnitude reduction in the CDF for these fire compartments was primarily the result of characterizing the dominant contributor in the original analysis, large turbine oil reservoir fire, as an incredible event., This allowed the maximum CCDP to be decreased from 0.403 in the original analysis to 4.07E-2 in the upgraded analysis. The upgraded analysis also explicitly treated non-severe fires as compared to the original analysis where they were implicitly screened.
4.8.2I Analyalsinsights The upgraded fire analysis produced significantly different results as compared to the original Fire IPEEE. These differences are evidenced by the much lower calculated i
l' CDF contribution due to postulated fire events and the distribution of the risk contributors amongst the fire compartments. A review of the upgraded analysis results provides risk insights that are considered to be a much more accurate characterization of the Quad Cities station.
The upgraded analysis highlighted eleven insights.
l
.1. The calculated CDF contribution due to postulated fire events is consistent with other Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) plants.
- 2. A large oil fire involving the Reactor Feedwater Pump is the dominant risk contributor. This is because of the location of the cables and circuits associated Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-133 L
p with the RHRSW system. The loss of the RHRSW system requires that an operator action be taken to implement the RHRSW crosstie. An additional potential decay heat removal mechanism using the Torus /Drywell Vent is not available due to the loss of the instrument air system.
- 3. The operator action to perform the RHRSW crosstie is a risk significant recovery action. This action needs to be performed without entry into, or passage through the Turbine Building.
' 4. - The dominant core damage sequence is loss of decay heat removal. Opportunities to recover decay heat removal functions will have significant risk reduction potential.
For example, an option which is being explored is providing nitrogen backup to the torus /drywell vent (TDV) valves to eliminate the instrument air dependency. Another option could include provisions to allow the TDV valves to open with electric power dependency. Another potentialimprovement involves enhancements to the fire protection features in the RFP pump areas which could decrease the likelihood that postulated fire events would completely disable all four RHRSW pumps on a particular unit.
- 5. The design of the ADS system at Quad Cities incorporates a panelin the Reactor Building containing several system relays. One of these relays is associated with the manual actuation circuitry. The wiring for these relays is routed back to the control room. As a consequence, a fire induced short circuit of the conductors within the associated cables could cause spurious valve actuation. Fortunately, these cables are routed in such a fashion that they are not exposed to any significant extemal fire threat and were not a dominant risk contributor.
- 6. A postulated fire involving the Unit and Reserve Auxiliary Transformers could -
challenge the availability of the Emergency Diesel Generators. This is because of the location of the combustion air intake for the diesel. The EDG combustion air intake duct is located on the roof of a Turbine Building extension while these 4
transformers are located along the wall. A postulated transformer fire could be expected to generate significant combustion byproducts. The dispersion of these byproducts was not explicitly analyzed, but is was judged that these byproducts could be drawn into the EDG intake. The displacement of oxygen by these
~ byproducts would effectively derate the EDG loading capability, or cause engine failure. This scenario represents approximately 10% of the total reported CDF for each unit.-
7, The most risk significant control room fire scenario which did not require the control room to be' abandoned involves a postulated fire in panel 901-3/902-3. Such a fire challenges the functionality of ADS, one train of RHR, and the torus /drywell vent
- valves,
- 8. Postulated fire induced spurious equipment actuation was explicitly addressed in the upgraded fire analysis. The risk significance of this postulated failure mode was assessed by deterministically modifying the risk model for the Unit 1 analysis to Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-134 L
E 1
preclude any fire induced spurious actuation. This effectively structures the analysis to evaluate a virtual plant modification to eliminate any potential for spurious actuations. The results of this sensitivity study showed a total CDF reduction of l
17%. Approximately 1% of this reduction was related to eliminating spurious ADS actuation.
i
- 9. Exemptions related to Appendix R were examined to estimate their risk impact. In general, the assessment considered a virtual plant modification that would eliminate the need for the exemption. An extremely simplified approach was applied and generally assumed that CDF contributions for scenarios that were related to the exemption would become zero. Even with this very conservative approach, the j
majority of the exemptions were found to have an impact of less than 0.1%. A bounding estimate of the cumulative risk impact of Appendix R exemptions is 6%
per unit.
10.The lower damage threshold for non-lEEE 383 qualified cables limited the effectiveness of installed automatic fire suppression systems. Although a specific sensitivity study was not performed, it is expected that the results of the dominant risk contributor (Reactor Feed Pump oil fire) would be reduced if IEEE 383 qualified cables had been installed. Enhancements to the fire protection features in the RFP i
area could mitigate the impact of the non-lEEE 383 cables as described in item 4, above.
11.The original Fire IPEEE submittal reported a lower CDF contribution fer Unit 2 as compared to Unit 1. This is in contrast to the upgraded fire analysis results which j
indicate the opposite. In addition, a review of the dominant risk contributors presented in Tables 4-21 and 4-22 shows two notable asymmetries in the risk profile. The risk contribution from RFP fires in Unit 2 is approximately 10% higher than in Unit 1. This is because of the specific cable routing of the power supply circuit to MCC 29-2 in Unit 2 which is challenged by postulated Unit 2 RFP fires.
The equivalent MCC in Unit 1 (MCC 19-2) is not exposed to such a challenge. The Unit 2 results also show a 4% risk contribution from a postulated air compressor fire in fire compartment 8.2.6.C because of the proximity of cable trays containing critical circuits for HPCI, SSMP, and one train of CS and RHR. Such an exposure does not exist in the Unit 1 analysis.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-135
i
)
i 4.9 TREATMENT OF FIRE RISK SCOPING STUDY ISSUES Ths purpose of this section is to provide Quad Cities responses to the Fire Risk Scop-ing issues addressed in EPRI FIVE (Ref. 4-4). Except for minor updates to procedure references, the responses contained herein are the same as originally submitted (Ref.
4-25).
The EPRI FIVE documentation discusses the following five issues:
4 1.
Seismic / fire interactions; 2.
Fire barrier qualification; 3.
Manual fire fighting effectiveness; f
4.
Total environment equipment survival; and 5.
Control systems interaction.
These issues, which were originally taken from the Fire Risk Scoping Study (NUREG/
CR-5088) (Ref. 4-3) performed by SNL (the Sandia Fire Risk Scoping Study issues),
are discussed below.
4.9.1 Method The Quad Cities response to the Fire Risk Scoping Study (FRSS) issues was developed from a variety of sources including:
A. Interviews with Quad Cities staff, B. Review of Quad Cities procedures, and
- C. Review of Quad Cities fire protection documentation.
The responses are provided below. For each issue, the question from FIVE is repeated, followed by the Quad Cities response.
4.9.2 Response to issues 4.9.2.1 SeismiclFire Interactions The issue of seismic / fire interactions centers on the following three areas of interest:
- 1. Seismically-induced fires. In particular, this concern centers on fires caused by flammable gas or liquid storage containers or systems that could rupture during a seismic event.
- 2. Seismic actuation of fire suppression systems. In particular, this concern centers on the failure of electrical or other components due to water sprays.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-136 L
- 3. Seismic degradation of fire suppression systems. In particular, this concern reviews the plant design for fragility of fire suppression systems to a seismic event.
Each of these areas is described in detail.
4.9.2.1.1 Seismically-Induced Fires As part of the seismic assessment walkdown, verify hydrogen or other flammable gas or liquid storage vessels in area with seismic safe shutdown or safety-related equipment are not subject to leakage under seismic conditions. Examples would be improperly anchored hydrogen or oxygen bottles, hydrogen tanks used for primary coolant chemistry control, etc.
Response
The fire-seismic walkdowns documentedin Section 3.4.6 reviewed potential flammable gas and liquid storage vessels in the Reactor, Turbine, and Cribbouse Buildings. Although no majorconcems were identified, the selectedimp;ovements describedin Section 7 resolve this issue.
4.9.2.1.2 Seismic Actuation of Fire Suppression Systems As part of the seismic assessment, verify that the design of the water suppression system considers the effects, if appropriate, of inadvertent suppression system actuation and discharge on that equipment credited as part of the seismic safe shutdown path in a margins assessment that was not previously reviewed relative to the 3
internal flooding analysis or concerns such as those discussed in NRC I&E Information Notice 83-41.'
Response
A detailed evaluation ofIN 83-41 issues was performed at Quad Cities and is documented in Reference 4-21. The review determined that fire i
suppression system actuation willnot adversely effect safe shut-down equipment.
Related issues associated with seismically induced actuation of suppression systems which were identified in IN 94-12 were evaluated for applicability to Quad Cities. These issues, which were addressedin the Quad Cities response to IN 94-12 and further examined during the fire-seismic walkdowns, yielded the following results:
A. Mercury Relays: Mercury relays were identifiedin CO, system panels.
To prevent spurious operation, these relays were replaced with seismically qualified relays and otherplant modifications were made.
During the seismic walkdowns, a functional relay review was performed which concluded that no instances of " bad actor" relays Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-137 L.
)
which could contribute to inadvertent actuation were present at Quad Cities.
B. Seismic Dust / Smoke Detectors: The only automatic suppression system which was actuated by smoke detectors alone was a water curtain between 6te zones 8.2.8.B and 8.2.8.C. This water curtain is no longerin service and was replaced by a seismic 6te rated wall.
\\
The only open head suppression systems in service at Quad Cities are
\\
the CO, systems in the dieselrooms, waterdeluge systems on transformers outside the yard area and a Halon system in the Computer Room. The CO, systems in the diesel compartments are the only ones thatprotect safety-related equipment and are cross-zoned heat and smoke. The CO, systems are therefore, not j
susceptible to actuation by smoke detectors alone.
C, WaterDeluge Systems: The Quad Cities response to IN 83-41 evaluated the effects of water spray.
D. Fire Suppressant Availability During a Seismic Event: The seismic walkdowns, which included all areas of the Reactor, Turbine, and Cribhouse Buildings, concluded that the fire waterpiping system would not fail at moderate earthquake levels.
E. SwitchgearFires: There are some cases where electrical cables and j
raceways are located close to the top of electrical cabinets and could become directlyinvolvedin a fire. These cases are evaluatedin Section 4.
i F. Electro-Mechanical Components in Cable Spreading Rooms: The
\\
seismic walkdowns verified that all equipment in the Cable Spreading Rooms at Quad Cities was seismically supported and therefore not capable ofinitiating or damaging safe shutdown equipment or circuits.
i 4.9.2.1.3 Seismic Degradation of Fire Suppression Systems As part of the seismic assessment walkdown, verify that plant fire suppression systems have been' structurally installed in accordance with good industrial practice and reviewed for seismic considerations, such that suppression system piping and components will not fail and damage safe shutdown path components, nor is it likely that leaking or cascading of the suppressant will result.
Resoonee The seismic walkdowns concluded that no potentialinteractions between SMA success path equipment and Hre piping exist at Quad Cities. Fire suppression systems at Quad Cities are, therefore, not expected to failin Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25199 i
page 4-138 a
(
a seismic event and safe shutdown path components will not be damaged.
4.9.2.2 Fire Barrier Qualifications
- The concern for fire barrier qualification centers on the following four (4) areas of interest:
- 1. Fire Barrier Surveillance Program;
- 2. Inspection and maintenance of fire doors;
- 3. Installation, inspection, surveillance and maintenance of penetration seal assemblies; and
- 4. Inspection, testing and maintenance of fire dampers.
Each of these areas of interest is described in detail below.
4.9.2.2.1 Fire Barriers Fire barriers and components such as fire dampers, fire penetration seals, and fire doors for fire barriers are included in the Plant Surveillance Program.
Resoonse Fire barriers protecting safety-related or safe shutdown areas and the penetrations in those barriers (penetration seals, Rre doors and Hre dampers) are addressedin the Quad Cities Administrative Requirements.
forFire Protection, QCAP 1500-01.
A random sample of barders and penetrations are visually inspected every operating cycle. If a barrierorpenetration is foundinoperable, compensatory measures are implemented.
Fire barriers credited in the Quad Cities Fire PRA, which are not designated as rated barriers in the Fire Protection Report, have been visuallyinspected during the development of the analysis to verify that they are adequate to prevent the spread of fire and hot gases.
To ensure that the fire propagation beyond the banier has been consideredin the analysis, a detailed multi-compartment analysis was l
performed which postulates barrier failure and fire propagation into adjacent compartments. Refer to Section 4.6.3 for additional details. The contribution to Core Damage Frequency from this analysis is incorporated in the over-allplant fire risk.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report l
Rev.1, 5/25I99 page 4-139 L
I-L l
4.9.2.2.2 Fire Doors A fire door inspection and maintenance program should be implemented at the plant.
Response
Fire doors are visually inspected at the same time as other fire barrier penetration sealing devices. Visualinspection of fire doors is addressed in surveillance procedure QCTS 0850-01, Surveillance of Penetration Fire Stops.
A detailed functionalinspection of fire doors is performed once per Operating Cycle as addressedin surveillance procedure QCMMS 4100-61, Fire DoorInspection.
4.9.2.2.3 Penetration Seal Assemblies A.
A penetration seal inspection and surveillance program should be implemented at the plant.
Responso Visualinspection of a random sample of the penetration seal assemblies is performed every operating cycle. This is addressed in procedure QCAP 1500-01.
B.
Fire barrier penetration seals have been installed and maintained to address concerns such as those identified in NRC Information Notice 88-04.
Response
A random sample of the penetration seals are inspected every operating cycle to verify that the materials have not degraded and that they are operable.
The installed configurations have been reviewed against approved design drawings. Seals were verified to be in accordance with the designs, were modified to comply with the drawings or werejustified as installed.
4.9.2.2.4 Fire Dampers A.
An inspection and maintenance program for fire dampers should be implemented at the plant.
Resnonse All fire dampers protecting safety-related areas are visually inspected at least once every two years in accordance with QCTS 0850-04, Fire Damper VisualInspection Surveillance.
Additionally, fire dampers which function in gaseous suppression systems l
are functionally tested with the alarm panelfsuppressant actuation system in accordance with applicable procedures.
l l
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report l
Rev.1, 5/25199 page 4-140 L
c B,
Damper installations address concerns such as those identified in NRC
. Information Notice 89-52, " Potential Fire Damper Operational Problems," dated June 8,1989, and NRC Information Notice 83-69, " Improperly installed Fire
. Dampers at Nuclear Power Plants," dated October 21,1983.
Response
Fire dampers in HVAC ducts that penetrate fire barders were reviewed for compliance with criteria in NFPA 90 andJustiRcation forsigni6 cant.
deviations was developed (see Vol.1 of FHA (Ref. 4-8)).
f 4.9.2.3 Manual Fire Fighting Effectiveness The concern for manual fire fighting effectiveness centers on the following six (6) areas of interest.
- 1. Fire reporting, including the use and availability of portable fire extin-guishers and plant procedures for reporting fires, including plant communication.
- 2. Fire brigade makeup and equipment.
- 3. Fire brigade training in the classroom.
- 4. Fire brigade practice in hands-on structural fire training and in the use of equipment.
- 5. Fire brigade drills.
- 6. Fire brigade training records.
Each of these areas of interest is described in detail below.
'4.9.2.3.1 Reporting Fires A.
Appropriate plant personnel are knowledgeable in the use of portable fire extinguishers.
Response
The Fire Training Instructors provide General Employee Fire Extinguisher Training as required per QAP 1170-17, Fire Protection Program.
Additionally, for work involving cutting, grinding or welding, 6te watches are extinguisher trained in accordance with QCAP 1500-12, and the brigade is extensively trained as directed by the Commonwealth Edison Fire Protection Program (QAP 1170-17).
B.
. Portable extinguishers are located throughout the plant.
Response
Portable hre extinguishers are located throughout the plant. These locations are identihed in the Quad Cities Pre-Fire Plans.
- Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-141
U C.
A plant procedure is in use for reporting fires in the plant.
Response
AIIplant personnel are directed, during Nuclear General Employee Training, on the actions to be taken in the event of a fire. Procedure QAP
' 1170-03, Fires, describes those actions.
D. A plant communication system that includes contact to the Control Room is operable at the plant.
Response
Systems available to communicate with the Control Room at Quad Cities include:
- 1. Telephone system j
- 2. Soundpoweredphones
- 3. ' Fire brigade radios 4.9.2.3.2 Fire Brigade Makeup and Equipment A.
A fire brigade that is made up of at least five (5) trained people on each shift should be maintained at the plant.
o Resoonee Quad Cities procedure QAP 1170-17, Fire Protection Program, speci6es that the 6te brigade is made up of at least Hve trained personnel at all times.
s B.
The fire brigade leader and at least two other brigade members on each brigade
{
shift should be knowledgeable in plant systems and operations.
Response
Quad Cities procedure QAP 1170-17, Fire Protection Program, specifies that at least three of the Hve brigade members shall have knowledge of plant systems and operation. QAP 0300-03, ShiR Manning, the fire brigade consists of the Shim Supervisor, a cognizant Radwaste Supervisor, and three non-licensed equipment operators.
i C.
Each brigade members should receive an annual review of physical condition to i
evaluate his ability to perform fire fighting activities.
Response
QAP 1170-17, Fire Protection Program, specifies that brigade members shallhave annualphysical examinations which show them capable of unrestricted activity. Additionally, in accordance with QAP 1170-17, practice sessions are held once per year on actual 6te extinguishment with SCBA and strenuous conditions.
- Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-142 L:
I D.
A minimum amount of equipment should be provided for the on-site fire brigade:
1.
Personal protective equipment should be provided such as SCBA, turnout coats, boots, gloves, and hard hats.
Resoonee Quad Cities has two brigade assembly areas, each with complete fire fighting equipment required for the brigade as listed in the Fire Protection Report (Ref. 4-8).
2.
Emergency communications equipment should be provided for fire brigade use.
4 Resoonee Systems available to communicate with the Control Room dudng a fire include (per QAP 1170-17):
- 1. Telephone system
- 2. Plant P.A. system
- 3. Fire brigade radios 3.
Portable lights should be provided for fire brigade use.
i Resoonse The Fire Brigade is provided with sufficient equipment to perform manual fire suppression operations, as required. The Fire Brigade is provided with portable lights for each brigade member, and additionallights are available at the brigade assembly area. These lights are checked periodically to ensure proper operation.
4.
Portable ventilation equipment should be provided for fire brigade use.
Resoonse Smoke ejector are available to the Fire Brigade Equipment as described in the Fire Protection Report (Ref. 4-8), Vol 1, Fire Hazards Analysis, Section 2.5.3, 5.
Portable extinguishers should be provided for fire brigade use.
Resoonse Portable fire extinguishers are located throughout the plant as described in the Quad Cities Pre-Fire Plans. A numberof extinguishers are also included in the Fire Brigade Equipment Inventory maintained in the brigade assembly areas.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-143 L.
4.9.2.3.3 Fire Brigade Training Brigade members should receive an initial classroom instruction program consisting of the following:
' A. A review of the plant fire-fighting plan and identification of each individual's responsibilities.
B. Identification of typical fire hazards and associated types of fires that may occur in the plant.
C. Identification of the location of fire-fighting equipment and familiarization with the layout of the plant, including access and egress routes.
D. Training on the proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the correct method of fighting each type of fire. The types of fires covered should include fires in energized electrical equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, and fires involving flammable and combustible liquids and gases.
E. Training on the proper use of communication, lighting, ventilation and emergency breathing equipment.
F. Training on techniques for fighting fires inside buildings and confined spaces.
G. A review of fire fighting strategies and procedures.
Rosconse Quad Cities Fire Brigade Training is performed in accordance with the Commonwealth Edison Production Training Center, Fire Brigade Initial and Continuing Training Program, Administration and Course Management Information (ACMI), Ref. 4-22. Training requirements are outlined in Quad Cities procedure QAP 1170-17, Fire Protection Program.
Items A through G are included in the training course modules identi6ed in Attachment I(Lesson Plan List) to the ACMI.
4.9.2.3.4 Fire Brigade Practice Fire brigade members should receive hands-on structural fire-fighting training at least once a year to provide experience in actual fire extinguishment and the use of emergency breathing apparatus.
Response
As prescribed in QAP 1170-17, Fire Brigade Training is in accordance with the ACMI which specificallyincludes structuralfire-fighting, as weIIas fire extinguishment, and use of SCBA.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-144 t
o i
4.9.2.3.5 Fire Brigade Drills A.
Fire brigade drills are performed in the plant so that each fire brigade shift can practice as a team.
Response
In accordance with QAP 1500-11, Fire Drills, drills are normally *On-Site Drills" as planned by the Station Fire Marshall. Each Rre brigade member should participate in each drill on their shift.
B.
Drills should be performed at regular intervals for each shift fire brigade.
)
Response
In accordance with QAP 1500-11, Fire Drills, drills are performed at least once per quarter for each shift Hre brigade.
C.
At least one unannounced fire drill for each shift fire brigade should be peiformed per year.
^
Resoonee In accordance with QAP 1500-11, Fire Drills, at least one Rre drillperyear will be unannounced for each shift Rre brigade.
D.
- At least one drill per year should be performed on a "backshift" for each shift fire brigade.
Resoonee in accordance with QAP 1500-11, Fire Drills, one Rre drillperyear will be perfonned on a 'backshift"for each shift Rre brigade.
E.
Drills should be preplanned to establish training objectives and critiqued to determine how well the training objectives were met.
Response
In accordance with QAP 1500-11, Fire Drills, drills shallbe planned by the Station Fire Marshal. A critique of the drill willbe made to property i
evaluate brigade performance.
i F.
At least triennially, an unannounced drill should be performed for and critiqued -
by qualified individuals, independent of the licensee's staff.
i Resoonee in accordance with QAP 1500-11, Fire Drills, every three years, a Hre drill critique will be performed by an independent agency.
G.'
-- Pre-fire plans should be developed for safety-related areas of the plant (at a minimum).
Response
Quad Cities' Pre-Fire Plans are developed for all areas of the plant.
H.
The pre-fire plans should be updated and used as part of the brigade training.
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report I
Rev.1, 5/25199 page 4-145 b.1
)
Resoonee The requirement for Pre-Fire Plans is contained in QAP 1170-17, Fire Protection Program. Pre-Fire Plans are updated annuallyin accordance with QAP 1170-16.
The brigade is trained on the Pre-Fire Plans in accordance with the ACMI.
Included in the ACMI Lesson Plan List is training on the Pre-Fire Plans,.
and, for continuing training, there is a session plan which includes plant modiHcations that would impact the Pre-Fire Plans.
l.
Fire brigade equipment is maintained in good condition and ready for use by the fire brigade.
Reeponse Fire brigade equipment is maintained in the brigade assembly areas.
Periodic surveillance of the equipment is performed per station procedures. Per QAP 1170-17, Fire Protection Program, SCBA is maintained by Radiation Protection.
4.9.2.3.6 Fire Brigade Training Records Records are provided for each fire brigade member, demonstrating that the minimum level of training and refresher training has been provided.
Resoonee Training records forindividual fire brigade members are maintained as required by QAP 1170-17, Fire Protection Program, andin accordance with the ACMI.
4.9.2.4 Total Environment Equipment Survival The general issue of total environmental equipment survival centers on the following
- three (3) areas ofinterest
- 1. Adverse effects of combustion products on plant equipment;
- 2. Spurious or inadvertent fire suppression system actuation; and
- 3. Impact on effectiveness of operator actions.
Each of these areas ofinterest is discussed in detail.
4.9.2.4.1 Potential Adverse Effects on Plant Equipment by Combustion Products A.
The FIVE methodology does not currently provide for an evaluation of non-
)
i thermal environmental effects of smoke on equipment. See Section 4.23.2 of EPRI TR-100370, Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE), (Ref. 4-4).
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-146 L
Resoonse For the purposes of this evaluation, the potential detrimental short-or long-tenn effects _of combustion products on the ability of safe shutdown equipment to continue to function in smoke filled environments or the evaluation of smoke transport throughout the building is not being considered. The present state of knowledge regarding the actual effects of combustion products is inadequate to allow any specific treatment of the issue at this time. However, the detrimental short-term effects of l
smoke on equipment are not believed to be significant.
l t
l B.
Plant staff should be aware of and sensitive to the potential impact of smoke and products of combustion on human performance in safe shutdown operations in i
application of FIVE.
l
Response
Nuclear General Employee Training includes training in the impact of smoke and use of SCBA for all nuclear workers. Additionally, the majority i
of non-licensed operators are also brigade members and are therefore weII trained in working in fire environments.
4.9.2.4.2 Spurious orInadvertent Fire Suppression Actuation Verify that the design of fire suppression systems considers the effects, if appropriate, of inadvertent suppression system actuation and discharge on equipment credited for safe shutdown for concerns such as those discussed in NRC I&E Information Notice 83-41.
Response
As discussed in Section 4.8.2.1.2, a detailed review was performed for the i
. effects ofinadvertent actuation at Quad Cities and is documented in Reference 4-21.
4.9.2.4.3 OperatorAction Effectiveness A.
There are safe shutdown procedures that identify the steps for planned shutdown when necessary, in the event of a fire, i
Response
QCARP 0000-01 provides specific steps forplanned safe shutdown in the event of a severe fire in any one plant area.
B.
Operators should receive training on the safe shutdown procedures.
Responee Quad Cities Licensed and Non-licensed Reactor Operators receive training on plant safe shutdown procedures under training performed in accordance with the ACMI. Training on the safe shutdown procedures is as a result of theirJob Task Analysis (prescribed by the ACMI). Quad Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-147 v
1
Cities-specific operator training is perfom1ed in accordance with the applicable series QTI-100 and QTI-200 series procedures.
C.
If, in performance of these procedures, operators are expected to pass through or perform actual actions in areas that may contain fire or smoke, suitable SCBA equipment and other protective equipment are available for operators to perform their functions.
Resoonse QCARPs do not contemplate entry into fire or smoke-affected comparf-ments. If such entry is required, SCBA and otherprotective equipment is available.
4.9.2.5 Control Systems Interactions This issue centers on the concern that safe shutdown circuits are physically independent of, or can be isolated from, the Control Room for a fire in the Control Room fire area.
Rosconse Quad Cities performs local manual actions to isolate safe shutdown circuits from the effects of fire. As directedin QCARP 0000-01 plant j
operators make manual switching actions to isolate electrical equipment for local control and de-energize power supplies for manual operation of valves to prevent spurious operation and ensure proper alignment.
l 4.9.3 Conclusion The FRSS issues have been addressed at Quad Cities. The plant fire protection features, staff qualifications, and fire-fighting equipment support the assumptions made in performing the Quad Cities fire PRA analyses.
4.10 USl A-45 AND OTHER SAFETY lSSUES I
Unresolved Safety issue A-45, Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Requirements, has been evaluated at Quad Cities. It was discussed in the Quad Cities IPE submittal, Section 4.6.4 (Ref. 4-10); the IPEEE seismic analysis, Section 3.2, of this report; and the SSA in the FPR (Ref. 4-8). In the original IPEEE fire and upgraded fire analyses, fire areas were identified on their basis of contribution to core damage frequency. The significance of an area is not tied to the decay heat removal issue, however, resolution of the issues arising from an identified significant area will resolve the specific issue to i
USI A-45. It was determined that the impact of a fire on the decay heat removal requirements will be met by the implementation as described in the Quad Cities FPR (Ref. 4-8).
GI-57, " Effects of Fire Protection System Actuation on Safety-Related Equipment, was investigated previously at Quad Cities. This issue has been evaluated twice. First, this l
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-148 t-j
F
)
issue was evaluated in 1985 and is documented in the FPR (Ref. 4-8). Second, the issue was evaluated from a seismic interaction point of view during the seismic analysis and is discussed in Section 3.4.6.2 of this report.
i i
i 1
i l
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-149 L
)
g 4-7 :i 4.11' REFERENCES 4-1 Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, " Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10CFR50.54(f)," United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 28,1991.
4-2
' NUREG-1407. " Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities,"
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1991.
4-3 NUREG/CR-5088, " Fire Risk Scoping Study," Sandia National Laboratories, January 1989.
4-4 Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE) Methodology Plant Screening Guide, Professional Loss Control, EPRI TR-100370, April 1992.
4-5 W. J. Parkinson, et. al., Fire FRA Implementation Guide, TR-105928, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, Final Report, December 1995.
4-6 NUREG/CR-2815, "Probabilistic Safety Assessment Procedures Guide,"
Brookhaven National Laboratory, August 1985.
4-7
. NUREG/CR-4840, " Recommended Procedures for the Simplified Extemal Event J
Risk Analyses for NUREG-1150," Sandia National Laboratories, September 1989.
4-8 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Fire Protection Report, CRN 98-09.
4-9 Sargent & Lundy Interactive Cab!s Engineering (SLICE) Database Report and File, File NDIT 5040-QH-562-00.
4-10 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 Individual Plant Examination (IPE) Submitta/ Report, Commonwealth Edison, December 1993.
4-11 'QCAP 1500-15, " Flammable and Combustible Materials Control," Rev. 4.
4-12 QCAP 0200-10, " Emergency Operating Procedure (QGA) Execution Standards,"
Rev 20.
4-13 QCARP 0000-01, implementating Procedure for Appendix R Safe Shutdown, Rev. 5, October 29,1998. 14" Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Evaluation Methodology Plant Screening Guide, NUMARC, September 1993. 15 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Fire IPEEE Project, Task 3, Fire Ignition Frequency Development, Rev 0, June 13,1996.
j Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-150
)
E 4-16 J. M. Chavez, An ExperimentalInvestigation ofIntemally Ignited Fires in Nuclear PowerPlant Control Cabinets, Part I, Cabinet Effects Tests, NUREGICR-4527 f
Vol.1, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC, April 1988.
4-17 J. M. Chavez, S. P. Nowlen, An ExperimentalInvestigation ofIntemally Ignited Fires in Nuclear Power Plant Control Cabinets, Part II, Room Effects Tests, l
NUREG/CR-4527 Vol. 2, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington L
DC, November,1988.
4-18 NUREGICR-5384, S.P. Nowlen, A Summary of Nuclear Power Plant Fire Safety j
Rosearch at Sandia National Laboratories, 1975-1987, Albuquerque, New l
Mexico: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sandia National Laboratories, i
SAND 89-1359, December 1989.
1 4-19 Individual Plant Evaluation Partnership, " Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 Notebook for Initiating Events," Revision 0, October 1993.
4-20 Individual Plant Evaluation Partnership, " Quad Cities Nuc; ear Power Station Units 1 and 2 Transient Event Success Criteria Notebook," Revision 0, October 1993.
4-21 "An Analysis of the Effects of Fire Suppression System Actuation on Nuclear l
Safety Related Equipment at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2,"
for Commonwealth Edison, July 1985.
4-22 Fire Brigade Initial and Continuing Training Program, Administration and Course Management Outline, Commonwealth Edison Production Training Center, Rev.
1, March 1992.
4-23 Letter from R.M. Pulsifer (NRC) to I. Johnson (CynF.d), " Request for Additional Information on Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal (T/ ~ Mos. mag 65 and M83666)",
dated November 26,1997 l
j 4-24 NUREGICR-2258, M. Kazarians, G. Apostolakis, Fire Risk Analysis for Nuclear Powerplants, September 1981.
l 4-25 E.S. Kraft (Comed) letter, ESK 97-029, to USNRC dated February 17,1997, l
l
" Final Report - Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE)".
4-26 Letter from B. Najafi (SAIC) to B. Lamb (Comed), "EPRI Fire Events Database -
l Transmittal of New Revision", August 19,1997.
4-27 Fire Risk Analysis Code (FRANC), Version 2.2ax, Science Applications International Corporation.
4-28 Fully Optimized Risk and Reliability Quantification Engine (FORTE), Version 1.1,
(
1998, Dr. Woo Sik Jung, Korea Power Engineering Company (KOPEC).
Quad Cities IPEEE Submittal Report Rev.1, 5/25/99 page 4-151
)