IR 05000029/1986001

Insp Rept 50-029/86-01 on 860113-17.No Noncompliance or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Cycle 17/18 Refueling/ Startup Test,Including Precritical Tests,Power Escalation Tests & Administrative Controls of Test Procedures

ML20199E028
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	03/11/1986
From:	Cheh U, Eselgroth P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199E024	List: IR 05000029/1986001 ML20199E021
References
50-029-86-01, 50-29-86-1, NUDOCS 8603240497
Download: ML20199E028 (9)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-01 Docket No.50-029 _

License No. DPR-3 Category B Licensee: Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name: Yankee Nuclear Power Station-Inspe: tion At: Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: January 13-17, 1986 Inspectors:

nte Cheh Reactor ngineer, TPS Ih date

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Approved by: - 3 ~~ O ~ I P. WJ Es,e roth, Section Chief, TPS date Insp'ection Summary: Inspection on January 13-17, 1986 (Inspection Report No. 50-029/86-0 Areas ' Inspected: Routine,'unannou.ced inspection of cycle 17/18 refueling /

startup testin This included r.ecritical tests, power escalation tests, administrative controls for test procedures, test programs and QA involvement in the startup testin The inspection included 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> on site by a region-based NRC inspecto Results: No items of noncompliance were identifie ~

8603240497 860314 PDR ADOCK 05000029 O PDR m

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted-

• Normand N. St. Laurent, Plant Superin+.endent ~

• Bruce L. Drawbridge, Assistant Plant Superintendent

• Tim Henderson, Technical Director

• Rick Williams, Reactor Engineer Greg Maret, Reactor Engineer John S. Gedutis, Senior Chemist Dave Pike, QA Manager Mark Gilmore, QA Engineer Donald B. Vassar, Plant Operation Manager Edward A. Walsh, Shift Supervisor U.S. NRC

• Harold Eichenholz, Senior Resident Inspector

• denotes those present at the exit interview on January 17, 198 .0 Cycle 18 Startup Physics Testing Program The startup test program was conducted according to test procedures OP-1701, " Core 18 BOL Zero Power Physics Test" and OP-1702, " Core 18 Zero to' Full Power Physics Test." The test sequence outlined the steps in the testing program, set initial conditions.and prerequisites, specified calibration or surveillance procedures at appropriate points in the test sequence, and referenced detailed test procedures and data collection in~the Appendices. Initial Criticality of Cycle 18 was achieved on December 5, 1985. Zero Power Physics Tests (ZPPT) were completed on December 7, 1985. All test results met acceptance criteri The power ascension tests were completed about December 19, 1985. The inspector independently verified that the predicted value and acceptance criteria were obtained from " Yankee Nuclear Power Station Core 18 Performance Analysis," YAEC-1496 dated August 1985. The inspector reviewed test results and documents described in accordance with technically adequate procedures and as required by TS. The details and findings of the review are described in Sections 4 and .0 Cycle 18 Reload Safety Evaluation and Core Verification The Cycle 18 reactor core is comprised _of 76 fuel assemblies. During the Cycle 17/18 refueling, 40 fresh fuel assemblies were loaded into the cor The remaining 36 fuel assemblies were once-burned from Cycle 17 operatio The reload safety evaluation (RSE) along with the required Technical Specification (TS) change were submitted to the NRC for review. This reload submittal was found acceptable (Letter from George Lear -U.S.NRC)

to George Papanic (YAEC) dated November 27,1985).

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The inspector also independently verified that the operational limits changes associated with the new fuel loading have been incorporated in the procedures and plant computer. The inspector reviewed the licensee's core Verification Procedure OP-1700 Approved November 12, 1985 and conducted a confirmatory cycle 18 Fuel load Verification by comparing one-half of the Cycle 18 Core Map contained in the OP-1700, Revision 11, Attachment I (Page 1) dated November 18, 1985 against the corresponding Cycle 18 Refuel-ing Videotape 1 of 2. The inspector also confirmed that the licensee Reactor Engineering performed the Videotape Core Verification followed by an independent QA inspection. The fuel loading is in agreement with the core map. The inspector had no further question .0 Cycle 18 Startup Physics Testing Precritical Tests The inspector reviewed calibration and. functional test results to verify the following:

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Procedures were provided with detailed instructions;

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Technical contents of the procedures were sufficient to result in satisfactory components and tests;

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Instruments and calibration equipment used were traceable to the National Bureau of Standards;

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Acceptance and operability criteria were observed in compliance with T The following tests were reviewe .1 Control Rod Checks and Tests The rod drop measurement was performed per the Procedure No. OP-4703 Revision 10, Control Rod Drop Time Measurement approved December 1, 1985. The inspector verified by review of the test results performed on December 5, 1985 that control rods were tested for drop times and the individual control rod drop times were all-less than 2.5 seconds as required by.the TS. The inspector also reviewed several visi-corder traces and verified that the drop times had been interprete' d correctl No noncompliance was identifie .0 Cycle 18 Startup Physics Testing -Post Critical Tests The inspector reviewed selected test programs to verify the following:

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The test programs were implemented per the cycle 18 startup physics test program;

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St'epwise instructions of the test procedures were adequately provided including Precautions, Limitations and Acceptance Criteria in con-

, formance with the requirements of the T Provisions for recovering from anomalous conditions were provide Methods and calculations were clearly specified and the tests were

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performed accordingly.

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Review, approval and documentation of the results were in conformance with the requirements of the TS and the licensee's administrative control The following tests were reviewe .1 Zero Power Physics Test The licensee measured the just critical boron concentration, Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) and' Control Rod Group Worths per Procedure No. OP-1701, Revision 8, " CORE XVIII BOL ZERO POWER PHYSICS TEST" approved December 1, 1985. The inspector reviewed the data and noted the following results:

5.1.1 Critical Boron Concentration - hot zero power

Rod Position Predicted Value (PPM) Test Value(PPM)

All Rods Out (ARO) 2060 1 206 2089 C banks in 1828 183 1885 C A banks in 1642 164 1713 No noncompliance was identifie .1.2 Individual Control Rod Group Worths - hot zero power i Configuration Predicted Worth -Measured Worth (pcm) (pcm)

Bank C 1730 130 1765 Bank A (bank C in) 1380 104 1506 No noncompliance was identifie .1.3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)

The inspector reviewed the results of the Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) Measurements in accordance with the Yankee-Rowe Procedure No. OP-1701, Core XVIII Bol Zero Power Physics Test Revision 8 approved December 1, 198 )

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l The measured values of the MTC were -0.422 x 10-4 unit at AR0, l Ak/k/ F. -4.089 x 10-4 at C in and -8.741 x 10-4 unit at C+A in, respectively. .The results were within the TS requirement The inspector had no further question .2 Core Thermal Power Evaluation The licensee performs reactor thermal power surveillance once per shift by using form OPF-7302.4 using generator MWE output and con-denser back pressure. The inspector reviewed CP7302, Revision " Calorimetric" approved August 6, 1984. The inspector found that the heat balance equation neglected the main coolant pump-heat, letdown and charging flow enthalpy imbalance, blowdown and radiation heat loss. This matter was brought to the attention of licensee manage-ment for corrections and proper corrections have been mad During the Startup Testing Period of approximately 61%, 70% and 100%

power plateaus, the licensee performed heat balance comparisons between the plant computer outputs and hand calculations. The inspec-tor also performed an independent calculation. The hand calculated core thermal power of 595.15 unit MWT is based on the inspector's observation'of control room instrument readings. All comparisons were in good agreement as shown belo Test Power Date Level Method Results(MWT)

12-12-85 61% OP 7302., Rev. 8 (coa.puted) 366.72 Licensee Han'd Calculation 365.97 12-14-85 70% OP 7302, Rev. 8 (computed) 419.91 Licensee Hand Calculation 418.91 1-14-86 100% OP 7302, Rev. 8 (computed) 599.59 Licensee Hand Calculation 598.91 NRC Inspector Calculation 595.15 No compliance was identifie .3 Core Power Distribution The procedure and method used by the licensee to verify that the plant is operating within the power distribution limits as defined in the TS were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee personne The data taken by the Movable Detector System is obtained on the plant PDP-8 process computer. This information is fed into the cor-porate computer as input to the "INCORE" analysis code and short form summary results transmitted back to the site. The computer results were analyzed both by the station reactor engineer and corporate nuclear engineers for compliance with operating parameters and T . . . -

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The inspector reviewed the following incore flux runs:

Cycle Burnup Unit Power Level Unit Incore Run Date MWD /MTU (MWT)

.YR-18-009 1/7/86 .750 60 YR-18-008 12/31/85 197 57 YR-18-007 12/18/85 74 .j 420.0

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The inspector verified that engineering and nuclear uncertainties were applied to the results and current operating data was input into the computer. All fuel operation limits Fq, F" and PLHGR were-Ah

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within the TS limits. .The frequency of evaluation was also performed within the requirements of the T The inspector also verified that the procedure OP-4704,

" Hot Channel Calculations," Revision 13 clearly defined the Maximum Allowable Power is 600MWT in accordance with the TS

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definitio .4. Shutdown Margin (SDM) Determination The inspector reviewed the licensee's SDM determination procedure OP-4708 Revision 10 for technical adequacy. A group of SDM curves

, were developed for various mode operations. These SDM curves were drawn assuming the worst case in-cycle operation. Through discussion with control room operators, the inspector determined that the opera-tion staff were knowledgeable in the use of these curves. No noncom-pliance was. identifie .0 Fuel Degradation r

High primary coolant activities of 2E-2 and IE-1 pci/ml Dose Equivalent of

, I-131 (DEI) were sampled in the previous cycles 16 and 17, respectivel During the cycle 17/18 refueling an Ultrasonic Detection device by Brown Boveri was used to scan the.first cycle fuel only. Four fuel rods were found to be defective in 3 fuel assemblies as follows:

Fuel Assembly . Degraded Fuel Rod Core Position A-679 1 K-5 B-688 1 H-8 B-6961 2 C-9

The licensee representative stated that the 2nd Cycle Fuel Assemblies were not' scanned for the reasons as below: Time-constraints imposed on the 6-week long outag .-

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2. -The 2nd cycle fuel assemblies of the Cycle 17 core were discharged into the spent fuel poo . The 2nd cycle fuel assemblies did not affect the Core Cycle 18. The'

2nd cycle fuel assemblies are scheduled to be examined in March 198 Fuel assembly B-696I sustained the most damage with 2 fuel rods and inert rods degraded and some spacer grid materials were missin The damages were virtually identical to those of the Cycle 17 core;

~ space grids were torn up, some pellets were missing and scratch marks on Zircaloy inert fuel rods were noticed. Pictures by Exxon, were being processed, but not available on site yet as of the inspection dat The cause of Fuel Assembly B-696I and inert rods was attributed to

. flow-induced fretting as a result of the baffle / fuel assembly inter-action. However, the causes of the remaining fuel assembly damages were attributed to either debris-related failures'from pin damage or fretting at the spacer grid-contact points since the Core Cycle XV As documented in the NRC Inspection Report No. 50-029/85-18, the space grids at B-696I were damaged due to water jet streams. The degraded fuel rods in cycle 17 were replaced with inert rods prior to loading into the Cycle 18 Core Position In order to prevent flow-induced fretting wear and vibration pro-blems, Combustion Engineering, Inc. added space strips between space grids welded to the. surface of the inner rods, a guide bar at the end of the spacer strip to further strengthen the stiffness and flow-limiting plugs'at the bottom of the C-9 baffle space locations to limit the flo A discussion with the licensee's senior chemist confirmed that the initial iodine peaking up to 75% DEI of the.TS limit was due to minor defects of the fuel rods which caused moisture absorption / release and resulted in the iodine peaking. The specific activity has been held stable under normal letdown and purification as listed below:

Date I-131 (pci/ml) Dose Equivalent I-131(%) Letdown (gpm)

12/12/85 1-66E-3 /18/85 4.34E-3 /22/85 3.97E-3 /26/85 1.03E-2 /30/85 1.37E-1 1 /03/86 9.77E-3 /06/86 8.77E-3 /15/86 8.89E-3 Also, the following DEI and Charging Flow about one month after the startups of the core cycles 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 are listed for comparison:

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l Core Cycle DEI-131 Charging Flow 13 3.5E-2 20 14 5.0E-2 20 1 .0E-2 25 16 2.0E-2 25 17 1.0E-1 40 18 1.0E-2 25 s The above comparison shows that the Core Cycle-18 is identical.to

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Core Cycle 15 in iodine values (DEI) and the specific activity has been held stable below normal letdown and purification'as indicated above. No further fuel degradation.is noted from the above trends.

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The inspector had no further question .0 Training and Qualification

! The inspector review ~ed the qualification of the two members of the reactor engineering staff and noted that both of them were engineering school t graduates. The site reactor engineering manager had a bachelor's degree

'and 6-1/2-years experience and the reactor engineer had a master's degree and 2-1/2 years experience at the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Plant. In. addition, there are seven technical shift advisors in the Reactor Engineering. Five of them were engineering school graduates'with Bachelor's degrees and two

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had Master's degrees. .The personnel met.the training and qualification guidelines of ANSI 18.1-197 .0 Control Room Observations and Facility Tours The inspector observed. control room operations for control room manning and facility operation in accordanc'e with the Technical Specification requirements and administrative procedures. Inspection tours of the Turbine / Generator and new fuel / spent fuel storage areas were conducte .0 QA Interface in Cycle 18 Refueling /Startup Physics Testing The Linspector interviewed YAEC QA personnel on the subject of QA's role in the Cycle 18 Refueling /Startup Testing and reviewed OQA Surveillance reports: Y-SI-85-044, " Refueling, Component Inspection and Fuel Reconstitution" approved January 15, 1986, Y-0QA-SI-85-060, " Core Physics Testing at Yankee Rowe" approved January 15, 1986, and OP-4702 Revision 10, " Witness Testing of Valves TV-409 and TV-412 Lower PAB and Class C&B Testing" approved December 9, 198 =-.

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The scope of these specifications included fuel handling, core veri-fication, Zero Power Physics Test coverage and Power Ascension Test check No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Independent Verification The discussion of an independent verification performed by the inspector

.is contained on paragraph 5.2, abov .0 Exit Interview Licensee management was. informed-of the purpose and scope of the inspec-tion at the entrance. interview. The findings of the inspection were peri-odically discussed and were summarized at the conclusion of.the inspection on January 13, 1986. The licensee' indicated that the inspection informa-tion discussed at the exit meeting did not contain proprietary informatio Attendees at the exit interview are denoted in paragraph 1. At no time during this inspection was written materia 1'given to the licensee or any licensee representative.

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