IR 05000029/1989015

Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept 50-029/89-15 on 890731-0803.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Changes to Emergency Preparedness Program & Facilities, Equipment,Instrumentation & Supplies

ML20246C772
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	08/15/1989
From:	Conklin C, Lazarus W, Vito D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246C722	List: IR 05000029/1989015 ML20246C718
References
50-029-89-15, 50-29-89-15, NUDOCS 8908250118
Download: ML20246C772 (8)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /89-15

' Docket N ,

License N DPR-3 Priority Category C Licensee: Yankee Atomic Electric Comoany 580 Main Street Bolton, thssachusetts. 01740-1398 Facility Name: Yankee Atomic PJLw.str Station Inspection At: Rowe. Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: July 31 - Auaust 3.1989 Inspectors: r --r w r -

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Selfibr* Emergency Preparedness date C.ConkJin Specialis., FRSSB, DRSS I - dr $- /Y h

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IF. V'f toJEP5T FRSYB, DRSS date Approved by: / - , . /3 M W. g X aza6 9, Chief, Emergency Preparedness date Section '

Inspecticn Summary: Inspection on July 31 - Auaust 3.1989. Inspection Report No. 50 29/89 JR Areas Inspected: Routine, announced emergency preparedness inspection. The inspection areas included: Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program; Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies; Management Oversight and Control; Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training); Independent Reviews / Audits; and open items identified in previous inspection report Results: No violations were identified, gge2ggy[ h; Q

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L DETAILS'

l.0 Persons Contacted

• J. Kay,= Technical Services Manager p *D. McDavitt, Emergency Preparedness Engineer, YNSD

• A. Tatro, Plant Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

• D. O'Donnell, Senior Instructor, YNPS Training

• J. Robinson, Director, Environmental Engineering, YNSD

• G. Babineau, Radiation Protection Manage *N. St. Laurent, Acting Manager of Operations

• R. Mellor, Technical Director S. Schultz, Vice President,. Engineering Sciences, YNSD R. Marcello, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Group, YNSD J. Spitulnik, Senior Instructor, YNPS Training C. R; Clark, Training Manager M. Flaherty, Technical Assistant, Training

J. Geyster, Radiation Protection Dep P. Hollenbeck, Radiation Protection Dep D. Pierce, Sbift Supervisor J. McDowell, Senior Control Room Operator J. Paradis, Shift Technical Advisor J. Baupre,. Shift Technica1' Adviser D. Waller, Senior Control Room Operator R. Jodcin, Shift Supervisor

• Denotes those present at the exit meeting on August-3, 1989 Licensee Action on PreviouLin_1pection Findinas

' During the ' inspection, .the inspectors revieweo the licensee's progress in

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responding to items opened during previous inspections (Inspection Reports 50-29/87-05, 50-29/87-13, and 50-29/88-06. The status of these items is as follow (CLOSED) 87-05-01: Acceptability of TSC Habitabilit Functionally, the control room emergency filtratior: system was capable of providing a habitable environment in both the control room ano the TSC should an event require isolation of these facilities from external sources of air. Remaining NRC/NP.R questions in this area deal with system design and are being evaluated through NRC/NRR review of a license amendment request. At this time, no physical changes to the system are being pursued. As this design issue is being addressed separately by NRC/NRR, this item will be close (OPEN) 87-05-02: Several Reg. Guide 1.97 Variables Not Provided in TSC/E0 The licensee has evaluated this finding and has agreed to add several additional Regulatory Guide 1.97 variables to the SPDS. Improvements to the control room CCTV system are also contemplated. Design Change packages are under development so that these changes may be effected during the next

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operating cycle. This deviation will remain ope (CLOSED) 87-05-03:- Perform ReviewLand Analysis of Telecommunications system linking the Plant SPDS with the E0 'l The licensee has reviewed and analyzed the telecommunications system failures which occurred during the Emergency Response Facilities Appraisal (ERFA). The results of availability testing indicated that SPDS to EGF data flow was available greater than 99% of the time. In addition, a dial backup system was evailable should an actual event occur during communications system downtim (CLOSED) 87-05-04: Lack of Capability to Calculate Site Boundary Dose from the Control Room and the TS The inspectors compared the new interim dose assessment method (Zenith PC) to METPAC-calculations and determined them to be comparable. This comparison along with the nomograms in the control room and TSC make the calculation of site boundary dose possible through the proper use of available procedure Based on these findings, this item was close (CLOSED) 87-05-05: Lack of Capability to Calculate Release Rate, Whole Body and Thyroid Doses for a Release from the Safety Injection Buildin While there are 'no default isotopic values for use with the interim dose l asses; ment method (Zenith PL), the use of available nomograms make it possible to calculate release rates, whole body and thyroid doses in the control room and TSC. All of these calculations can be made by the METPAC computer in the EOF. The licensee has indicated that a future revision of the Zenith PC computer program (tentatively scheduled for December 1990)

will include the capability to calculate thyroid dose for an unmonitored release from the Safety Injection building. Based on these findings, this item was closed.

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- (CLOSED) 87-05-06: Lack of Capability to Utilize Post Accident Reactor Coolant Sample Results for Performing Dore Calculation The licensee has indicated that isotopic analysis input to dose assessment calculations would come primarily from either containment air samples or l primary vent samples. If it would become necessary to use post accident l-

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reactor coolant sample results for dose calculations, assistance would be requested fram the Engineering Support Center in Bolton, MA to appropriately correlate reactor coolant sample isotopics for use in dose calculations. The inspectors found this approach to be acceptable. Based on these findings, this item was closed.

l' - (CLOSED) 87-13-02: New Paging Notification System Implementation and l Testing to be Complete Since this item was opened, the licensee has decided to employ a different paging system which was to be implemented during the last quarter of 198 The implementation and performance of this system will be verified in a

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4 subsequent inspection. Based on these: findings, the initial item was no longer valid and.was closed.

I - (CLOSED) 88-06-01: ' Examine Assessment and Communications Systems' a::

? Related to Emergency Classification and Formalize Process for System Usage

and Failure Assessment; Examine and Repair Areas of System Exhibiting High il Failure The licensee' has evaluated the available communications systems and has l

revised Administrative Procedure AP-0711,. Communications Systems (Rev.3, 4/89) to ~ provide complete descriptions and prescribe the procedures for communicating with- onsite 'and offsite support organizations, including Federal' and- State authorities. AP-0711 also discusses what would be considered a significant lors of communications' systems so as to provide a point ~of reference for subsequent actions (10 CFR 50.72 deportability,.

problem evaluation). In addition, the licensee has' assigned the YNSD Network Operations Group with the responsibility for providingmanagement -

, oversight of the Nuclear Alert System (NAS). The goal was to provide for high system reliability, prompt reporting of system problems, and periodic reporting of problems and resolutions. Based on these findings, this item was closed; 3.0 Operational Status of the Emeroency Preparedness Proaram

. Chances to the Emeroency Preparedness Proaram While there have been changes in the management of YNPS Emergency Preparedness program since the last inspection, there have been no significant or major changes to the program itself. Program changes which have taken place nave been minor and have not had an adverse effect on the licensee's overall state of emergency preparednes Appropriate review and evaluation mechanisms are in place to assure that any changes to the emergency plan and procedures which could adversely affect the overall state of emergency preparedness will-be detected. All changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures receive review by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC), approval by station management, and distribution in accordance with approved procedures and NRC requirements prior to implerratatio During the inspection, the licensee presented an overall status of the emergency preparedness program, including corrective actions being taken on known problem area This presentation was accompanied by a detailed companion dncumen The licensee noted 1 that the constant evolution of the emergency preparedness area j prompted the development of this document and that their intention  ;

was to update the document periodicall The inspectors commended

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the licensee fcr their efforts in this are ]

Based on the above review, this area was acceptabl l

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' Facilities. Eauipment. Instrumentation and Sunolies l

The inspectors performed walk-throughs bf the Control Room, Technical

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Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Faciljty (F0F). The walk-throughs revealed no areas of concer During the TSC walk-throughs, the inspectors questioned the licensee as to the availability of a disk backup for the Zenith PC interim dose calculation computer should the hard disk (on which the pr2 gram was located) fail. The licensee stated that they were stressing ease of use in their interim dose essessment method and that the namograms would provide a readily available backup should the Zenith PC fai Nonetheless, the licensee agreed to evaluate and make available a disk backup, if appropriat The inspectors reviewed the results of recent performances of Procedures OP-3325, Emergency Facility Inspections and OP-33-26, Emergency Equipment Readiness Check These procedures were performed as required with appropriate discrepancy / correction sheets available for revie i Based on this review, this area was acceptabl '3 . 3 Manaaement Oversiaht and Cor, trol Since the last inspection, both the onsite emergency preparedness coordinator and the individual in charge of corporate support for the YNPS emergency preparedness program (Manager - YNSD Emergency Preparedness Group) have changed. The inspectors found

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both of these individuals to be qualified and enthusiastic about maintaining the progress of the progra During the course of the inspection, the inspectors noted several areas in which management control could be improved. Of particular concern are those areas which are not the responsibility of onsite emergency preparedness staff, i.e., those program efforts which are the responsibility of the corporate Yankee Nuclear Services Division (YNSD). Some of the areas discussed with the licensee were:

- the content and quality of drill / exercise follow-up reports;

- the formal recording of the transferral of independent audit results to the States pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(t); and

- formalization of the process for the disposition of training program testing result Although these concerns are not major, the inspectors discussed with the licensee the possibility of developing additional administrative procedures to delineate responsibilities, schedules, and format and content of repcrts and notifications for these and

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any other program maintenance items. Such procedures would provide; p further assurance that NRC requirements, as well as other emergency ( .

. program procedural guidance,'are met. They would also provide better ll

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definition for onsite/ corporate responsibilities and i_nterfaces.

The licensee stated ' that they will pursue the development of administrative procedures to accomplish these function The inspectors reviewed Operations Memorandum OP-MEM0 2E-4, Back Shift Augmentation, Rev.16, dated July 28, 1989 to' determine th licensee's capability to adequately staff the emergency' response organization as described in the Emergency Plan. The review revealed that while there was a sufficient depth of personnel to support emergency. operations, a number of emergency response organization positions can only be supported by oi.e primary and one backup individual. In a long-term response effort, maintenance of. a fully augmented ERO could be difficult considering the existing degree of personnel dept he licensee indicated - that -many additional personnel are available at the Yankee Nuclear' Services Division (YNSD) in Bolton, MA. While these individuals would not be expected to support staffing at the onset of an event, they could provide a sufficient . depth of personnel to support protracted emergency response activities. The licensee sgreed to pursue the EP training of YNSD personne Except as noted above, this area was acceptabl .4 Knowledce and Performance of Duties (Trainina).

The inspectors reviewed Procedure OP-3340, Emergency Preparedness -

Training, initial qualification and requalification lesson plans, practical walk-through mini-scenarios, and newly developed position objectives for each emergency response organization (ER0) positio The emergency plan and implementing procedures delineate the training requirement:; for the ERO, including a matrix of training requirements versus ERO position. The lesson plans are cceprehensive, current i and have appropriate reviews and approvals. The required annual training has been completed for 1989 with the exception of six (6) :i individuals. Training has not been completed for five of these individuals. The other individual failed the examination for his required ERO positio The inspectors indicated that these individuals should be removed from OP-MEM0 2E-4 until their required l training was complete Tne ' inspectors interviewed a select sample of individuals in the emergency response organization. Those interviewed included two individuals who would be called upon to perform dose assessment in the EO Also interviewed were six (6) individuals from the Operations staff (a Shift Supervisor, Senior Control Room Operator and Shift Technical Advisor from each of two operating shifts) who would be c611ed upon to provide direction at the onset of an emergency as well as to perform initial dose assessment. Scenarios

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were chosen to provide situations or ' fast-breaking events which

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. allowed the individuals to perform a number of emergency response functions. Event detection, recognition and classification .was prompt ar.d appropriate for the given situations. Notifications and any associated. Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) would have been timely'.

The' inspectors noted' that both the E0F dose assessors and -the operating shifts tended-to depend on predetermined PARS. .In the case of the operating shifts, initial predetermined PARS (sheltering of towns within 5 miles of the site) are prescribed'on the General Emergency notification instructions in the implementing procedure One of the shift supervisors insisted that the PAR prescribed on the General Emergency. notification instructions be given to the States, even though dose assessment results indicated that an evacuation would be more appropriate. This shift' supervisor. stated however, that he would provide.the States with the additional' information indicating evacuation after delivering the prescribed notification messag In the case of the EGF dose assessors, suggested PARS are provided on the printout generated by the METPAC dose assessment compute These ' PAR suggestions are based on an assumed 8-hour release duration. The dose assessors used the METPAC suggested PARS without consideration of plume arrival time or evacuation time estimate While the current procedures are adequate, those individuals who contribute to the development of PARS should be further trained to make use of the other information at their disposal besides default PAR information. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments and stated that training and/or procedures would be modified to enhance current PAR guidanc Based on the above review, this area was acceptabl i independent Reviews / Audits The inspectors reviewed Audit Plan Y-89-14, Audit Report Y-89-14,

.QA Surveillance 89-13, 89-18 and 89-19, end various memoranda documenting required reviews and approvals. The audit was performed on February 23- March 7,1989 by the YNSD Quality Assurance Grou The audit plan and report were indicative of a thorough and ,

comprehensive review of the licensee's emergency preparedness !

progra Areas identified for corrective action included i deficiencies in procedural documentation requirements and record control and retrievabilit The licensee has taken appropriate corrective actions on the weaknesses identified by the audi ;

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Based on these findings, this area was acceptabl !

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4.0 Exit Meetino  ;

The inspectors met with the licensee personnel listed in Section 1 of the  !

report at the conclusion of the inspection to discuss the findings presented in this repor The inspectors also provided a status of previously identified open item The licensee was informed that no violations were identified. The licensee l acknowledged the findings and agreed to evaluate them and institute l corrective actions as appropriat At no time durir.g the inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the license i l

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