ML20206C539

Onsite Regular & Backshift Insp Rept 50-29/88-16 on 880802- 1003.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Inspector Findings,Operational Safety Verification, Radiological Controls,Plant Events & Maint Observations

ML20206C539
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	11/02/1988
From:	Haverkamp D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206C536	List: IR 05000029/1988016 ML20206C539
References
50-029-88-16, 50-29-88-16, NUDOCS 8811160317
Download: ML20206C539 (17)

Text

. .

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Report No.: 50-29/88-16 Docket No.: 50-29 License No.: OPR-3 Licensee: Yankee Atomic Electric Company 580 Main Street Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398 Facility Name: Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: August 2 - October 3, 1988 Inspectors: Harold Eichenholz, Senior Resident Inspector Cynthia A. Carpenter, Resident Inspector Approved By: .

8/ ge_kg u /L /ff Donald R. Haverkamp, Chief (/' Date Reactor Projects Section No. 3C Inspection Summary: Inspection on August _2, 1988 - October 3, 1988 Report No. 50-29/88-16 Areas Inspectedl Routine onsite regular and backshift inspection by resident inspectors (195 hours0.00226 days <br />0.0542 hours <br />3.224206e-4 weeks <br />7.41975e-5 months <br />). Areas inspected included licensee action on previous inspector findings, operational safety verification, radiological controls, events requiring telephone notification to the NRC, plant events, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, on-site review committee activities, plant information reports, new fuel receipt and inspections and plant operation during extended high ambient temperatures.

Results: No violations were identified by the inspector. Regarding an overall facility assessment for this inspection period, the NRC continues to note generally strong performance in plant operations, security, maintenance and surveillance activities. This assessment continues to be attributable to know-ledgeable licensee personnel and strong management oversight and involvement.

With the exception of a failure to ensure the conduct of a timely post water hammer walkdown of extraction steam piping by engineering personnel, the opera-tor's response to erratic response of the heater drain tank and feedwater heater level control systems was a noteworthy strength (Section 7). The manner in which the licensee responded to, and resolved, the operational and mainten-ance issues associated with anomalous instrument behavior of one of the main coolant system safety valves was viewed as a licensee strength (Sections 4 and 8).

8811160317 001104 PDR ADOCK 05000029 PNU 0

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

1. Persons Contacted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. Summary of Facility and NRC Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . 1

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (IP 92702). . 2

4. Operational Safety Verification (IP 71707). . . . . . . . . . 2

a. Daily Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

b. System Alignment Inspection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

c. Biweekly and Other Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

d. Backshift Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

5. Radiological Controls (IP 71707). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

6. Events Requiring Telephone Notification to the NRC (IP 93702) ........................ 7

7. Plant Events (IP 93702, 62703). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

a. Coastdown Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

b. Plant load Reduction for Turbine and Main Steam Valve Testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

8. Maintenance Observations (IP 62703) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

9. Surveillance Observations (IP 61726, 62703) . . . . . . . . . 12

10. On-Site Review Committee Activities (IP 40700). . . . . . . . 12

11. Plant Information Reports (IP 90712). . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

12. New Fuel Receipt and Inspections (IP 60705) . . . . . . . . . 13

13. Plant Operation During Extended High Ambient Temperatures (IP 71707). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l~

14. Open Items. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

15. Management Meetings (IP 30703). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted Yankee Nuclear Power Station N. St. Laurent, Plant Superintendent T. Henderson, Assistant Plant Superintendent R. Mellor, Technical Director The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspec- '

tion, including members of the operations, radiation protection, chemis-try, instrument and control, maintenance, reactor engineering, security, training, technical services and general office staffs.

l

2. Summary of Facility and NRC Activities At the start of the inspection period on August 2,1988, the plant was at f full power. In the early part of August, 1988, load reductions were necessary to maintain the circulating water temperature within EPA dis-charge limits. On August 12,1988 at 7:00 p.m., the plant began normal coastdown operations from Cycle XIX. Plant conditions remained stable until September 17,1988 when a plant load reduction was initiated to approximately 65*4 of rated power to perform testing of the main turbine throttle and main steam non-return valves. During the throttle valve testing, problems with feedwater heater level control and heater drain pumps occurred that resulted in the initiation by the plant operators of emergency load reduction in response to experiencing water hammer in the extraction steam piping. Following operator actions and maintenance on the feedwater heater level control system and verification of stable plant conditions, a load increase was initiated. The plant returned to normal coastdown operations on September 18, 1988, with the reactor power limited to 71% of rated power at the end of the inspection period.

During the week of August 15-18, 1988, an NRC Region I (NRC:RI) health physics specialist inspector completed a pre-outage inspection of the licensee's radiation protection program (Inspection Report 50-29/88-17).

Also during the week of August 15-18, 1988, two NRC:RI chemistry specialist inspecto s performed a confirmatory measurements inspection of the licensee's chemistry and health physics program as well as the whole body counter (Inspecticn Report 50-29/88-15). During the week of September 12-16, 1988, an NRC:RI operator licensing examiner completed operating licensing examin.Fion 50-29/88-18. On September 9, 1988, a special inspection of the licensee's shipment of irradiated control rods to Barnwell, South Carolina was cenducted (Inspection Report 50-29/88-19).

I

o 4

2

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation 50-29/88-09-01: Failure to maintain written minutes of PORC meetings and written determinations required by Technical Specifica-tion (TS). Because the licensee had taken immediate corrective actions and actions to preclude recurrence that were both timely and adequate, no response to the Violation was required. Procedure AP-0003, Rev.11, Plant Operation Review Committee, was revised in May, 1988 to reflect a timeline for the timely issuance of PORC minutes. The inspector's review of recently issued meeting minutes determined that the licensee is issuing them in a timely manner and in accordance with established administrative controls.

This item is closed.

(Closed) Unresolveo Item 50-29/8/-15-03: Determine the adequacy of licen-see TS interpretation No. 28 on location of flux tube plug. TS 3.4.5.2.e states that main coolant system leakage shall be limited to a maximum of two leaking incore detection system thimbles by having them isolated by valving out of service and not plugged. The licensee's interpretation states that plant operation may continue with more than two leaking incore detection system thimbles provided the thimble is isolated by vaiving out of service and plugged downstream of the isolation valve. The NRC's office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Project Manager for the Yankee Nuclear Power Station informed the inspector on September 28, 1988, that it was the NRC staff's position that the interpretation was appropriate because 1) it provides two barriers against the escape of primary coolant inside containment, and 2) in the unlikely event of a leak occurring between the plug and the valve the other sections of TS 3.4.5.2 would control required licensee actions.

This item is closed.

4. Operational Safety Verification

a. Daily Inspection During routine f acility tours, the inspector checked the following items: shif t manning, access control, adherence to procedures and limiting conditions for operations (LCOs), instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control rod positions, containment tem-perature and pressure, control room annunciators, radiation monitors, radiation monitoring, emergency power sourco operability, control room and shif t supervisor log, tagout log and operating orders. No inadequacies were identified except as noted below.

3 (1) During a tour of the control room on August 19, 1988, the inspector noted that the safety injection tank low temperature panalarm was lit. When the control room operator was questioned as to what the actual temperature of the safety injection (SI) tank was, the reactor operator did net know, but stated the on-shif t auxiliary operator (AO) knew the temperature and that the temperature was within the technical specification (TS) required band. The inspector considers this example to be indicative of a previous SALP concern with respect to weakness in licensed operators maintaining a proper questioning attitude. IS's require the SI tank temperature to be between 120 degrees ( ) F and 130 F. Following verification that conditions were within TS requirements, the inspector had no further questions on this matter.

(2) hotwithstanding inspector observations pertaining to the lit panalarm, an excellent level of performance of the licensee in maintaining the control room annunciators in as close to a "black-board" status as possible was noted throughout the inspection period.

(3) The inspector reported in Inspection Report 50-29/88-09 Section 4 (a)(1) that the licensee had identified a procedural inade-quacy involving a steam generator tube rupture event, in that the Nos. 2 and 3 steam generators would become cross connected through their respective emergency steam supplies to the steam-driven emergency feed water pump. The procedure OP-3107, Rev.

17, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, failed to provide adequate instruction for proper isolation of the affected Nos. 2 or 3 steam generators (SG) following a tube rupture. The licensee changed the procedure by adding steps that if the Nos. 2 or 3 SG l is faulted, the appropriate steam supply valve (MS-V-693 or MS-V-694) to the steam-driven emergency feedwater pump must be closed to prevent spread of radioactivity.

The above steps were added to case I of the procedure, which is '

used if the faulted SG has been identified. However, if loop isolation is unsuccessful, the procedure proceeds with rapid cooldown and depressurization of the main coolant system and resetting safety injection. If main coolant system pressure

, continues to decrease and does not stabilize, or if pressure t l

stabilizes and safety injection flow is greater than 50 gallons per minute, the procedure sends the operator to case II. Case II is loss of faulted steam generator integrity. Step 1 at-tempts to restore and maintain cain coolant system inventory.

Step 2 has the operator verify faulted SG secondary integrity by verifying the emergency atmospheric steam dump, the non-l

_- , , - .-- __ _, - -_ - __. . ~ . _ _ - - - _ _ _ - - _ .

4 return valve and the faulted steam generator safety valves are closed. Due to the fact that the Nos. 2 and 3 steam generators are essentially cross-connected through the common emergency steam supply to the steam-driven emergency feedwater pump, the inspector questioned the licensee as to whether the steam supply valve (MS-V-693 or MS-V-694) on a steam generator tube rupture should also be considered a part of SG secondary integrity, and therefore verified closed. The licensee agreed to review and resolve the inspector's concern. This matter is considered an open item (50-29/88-16-01).

(4) On September 15, 1988, at approximately 1:00 a.m. , control room personnel observed that the acoustic accelerometer instrumenta-tion channel (PR-ZC-2A) used on pressurizer code safety valve PR-SV-181 went abruptly 100% upscale and then returned to zero.

This instrumentation channel provides position indication infor-mation for the safety valve. Since the instrumentation channel behavior resulted in an annunciator alarm, alarm response pro-cedure OP-3636, Rev. 3, PR-SV-181 Open, was used to respond to the situation. The alarm condition was not confirmed using main cooling system, containment, and safety valve discharge line instrumentation. Control room operators declared the channel inoperable in accordance with TS 3.3.3.5, which provides for a 48-hour action statement to make the channel operable or initi-ate a plant shutdown. Maintenance Request (MR) 88-1545 was issued to initiate investigation and repair activities. Follow-ing maintenance activities, the control room operators declared the channel operable at 8:00 p m. the same day. Further dis-cussion on the maintenance activities is contained in Section 8 of this inspection report.

Because the licensee was not fully confident that they isolated the root cause of the anomolous instrumentation behavior, they developed an action plan to respond to the potential for con-tinuing problems and a rational for instrumentation operability.

This plan included providing information to the plant operators on how to respond to continued, but spurious, upscale indica-tions, and conducting vapor container entries to facilitate verification that tapping on the discharge piping of the safety valve will result in expected instrumentation response and ensure continued operability. Additional preplanning activities included developing maintenance instructions for replacement of instrumentation channel components in the vapor container and developing licensing bases for an emergency TS change to pre-clude a plant shutdown in the event that the channel is declared inoperable and repair activities cannot be completed in a timely manner.

i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

5 Following the initial response to this conditien, the licensee was viewed by the inspector to take a pro-active approach to the situation. A proper safety perspective was maintained by the licensee throughout their deliberations and instituted correc-tive actions. During the remainder of the inspection period, one upscale alarm condition occurred on September 19, 1988.

Although MR 88-1566 was issued, a determination of continued instrumentation operability was made. The inspector identified no deficiencies in licensee actions and had no further questions on this matter at this time,

b. System Alignment Inspection Operating confirmation was made of selected piping system trains.

Accessible valve positions and status were examined. Power supply and breaker alignments were checked. Visual inspections of major components were performed. Operability of instruments essential to system performance was assessed. The following systems were checked during plant tours and control room panel status observations:

Class 1E electrical distribution system Emergency diesel generator units Non-return valves Spent fuel cooling system Low pressure and high pressure injection systems No inadequacies were identified.

c. Biweekly and Other Inspections (1) General Facility Observation i During plant tours, the inspector observed shift turnovers, com-pared boric acid tank sample analyses and tank levels to Tech-nical Specifications requirements, and reviewed the use of radiation work permits and radiation protection procedures.

Area radiation levels and air monitor use and operational status were reviewed. Verification of tagouts indicated the action was properly conducted. No inadequacies were identified.

(2) Fire Protection and Housekeeping No inadequacies were noted regarding licensee housekeeping or fire protection practices. A strong commitment to proper house-keeping conditions and practices by the plant staff is routinely observed by the inspector.

No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.

a 6

(3) Observations of Physical Security Improvements in station management oversight of security activ-ities continues to be observed by the inspector. The following actions have been taken by the licensee during this inspection period to enhance the existing security program and its effec-tiveness.

(a) Reorganization of the security department and transition to the new security contractor was completed.

(b) To facilitate the reorganization, a revision to the secur-ity plan was issued and all plant employees were presented the security program changes as part of requalification general employee training.

(c) As a result of recent NRC rulemaking proceedings, new search requirements were instituted following training of plant and security personnel.

(d) A security training officer was hired; training was con-ducted for security personnel on CAS/SAS enhancements that resulted from the licensee's response to the Regulatory Effectiveness Review; and training was provided to selected security shif t supervisors in power plant fundamentals, MR processing, procedure writing, and weapons requalification.

(e) Besides completing the annual interface meeting with local i law enforcement agencies in the area, the licensee has demonstrated initiative by enhancing the liaison between the plant security organization and the FBI field office in Boston, Ma. Joint efforts between the two organizations are envisioned in the futura as a result of the licensee initiatives,

d. Backshift Inspection The inspector t.onducted bar.kshif t, weekend or holiday inspeccions on August 2, 13, September 19, 20, and October 3. Operators and shif t supervisors were attentive and responded appropriately to annuncia-tors and plant conditions. No violations were identified during backshift inspections.

5. Radiological Controls Radioloe,1 cal controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-ing period. Standard industry radiological work practices and conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were observed. Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of nonradiological areas throughout the facility were taken by the inspector.

7 On August 13, 1988, the inspector observed four individuals within the spent fuel pool building and inside an area posted "RWP Required for Entry" without a valid Radiation Work Permit. During August 15-18, 1988, a routine NRC radiological safety inspection was conducted. The inspec-tor's observations were transferred to the radiation protection specialist conducting the inspection for determination of appropriate inspection findings. Details of this event are contained in Inspection Report 50-29/88-17.

As part of the licensee's ef forts to upgrade the implementation of their ALARA program the inspector noted that a 2 and 1/2 hour training session in ALARA was provided to the maintenance support department engineers on September 28 and 29,1988. According to the plant training supervisor, the purpose of the training was to enhance the engineer's knowledge of ALARA principles as part of upgrading the implementation of the ALARA pro-gram. The training was conducted by the licensee's Yankee Nuclear Services Division radiation protection group.

l During the week of August 24-26, the licensee shipped two casks containing crushed irradiated control rods to Barnwell, South Carolina for burial.

Upon receipt survey of the exterior of the shipping casks, the contractor, Chem Nuclear Systems, Inc. found surface contamination levels in excess of those set forth in 10 CFR 71.87 (1). Further details are provided in Inspection Report 50-29/88-19.

The inspector had no further questions of the licensee in this program area.

6. Review of Events Requiring Telephone Notification to the NRC The circumstances surrounding the following events, which required NRC notification via the dedicated ENS-line were reviewed. A summary of the inspector's findings follows or is documented elsewhere as noted below:

At 9:50 a.m. on August 30, 1988, the NRC was notified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(v) that the ENS line had been declared out-of-service in both directions at 8:55 a.m., as a result of AT&T working on the lines. During the daily ring down at 4:30 a.m., the NRC Ooerations Center-to-licensee ring down was not working; however the licensee-to-NRC ring down tested satisfactorily. By 9:50 a.m. ,

the licensee was able to make an ENS call to the NRC Operations Center via the dedicated ENS line. The NRC-to-licensee ring down remained unavailable until September 8,1988, when the dedicated ENS line w 4s fully back in service. Except for the time period of 8:55 a.m. to 9:50 a.m. on August 30, the licensee has been able to contact the NRC via the ENS line. The NRC used the commercial tele-phone line as their backup.

, _ _ - . ____________________________ =_ _=______ _ ___ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ ___ _ _ _ _ _ .

8 At 3:35 p.m. on September 8,1988, the NRC was notified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(v) that the Nuclear Alert System (NAS) was determined to be out-of-service from 3:10 p.m. to 3:20 p.m. the same day. The NAS is the yrimary system used for offsite notification of the states of Vermont and Massachusetts.

The licensee was attempting to perform the once per-shift test of the Nuclear Alert System, when at the same time New England Power Service Company (NEPSCO) was performing testing on the system. Testing con-sists of placing a tone on the system to verify operability; with the tone on the system, the licensee was unable to call the State Police Station when they attempted to, resulting in a significant loss of of fsite notification capability. The licensee plans to urge NEPSCO to notify the plant when the test of the system is to be performed.

At 10:05 p.m. on September 25, 1989, the NRC was not.ified in accord-ance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(v) that the safety parameter display system (SPOS) was declared out of service due to equipment malfunc-tion at 12:00 p.m. The hardware problem was corrected by the licen-see's maintenance contractor for the system at 5:38 p.m. on September 28, 1988. The NRC was notified when the system was returned to service.

No inadequacies were identified regarding these event notifications.

7. Plant Events

a. Coastdown Operations Beginning August 12, 1988, the plant operated continually in Mode 1 end-of-cycle coastdown. Coastdown is defined to begin when the main coolant system boron concentration is less than 0.1 ppm and all rods are full out of the core. Coastdown operations will continue until the plant is ready to commence shutdown for refueling operations.

During the coastdown, main coolant temperatures will slowly decrease.

On September 8,1988, the cold leg tempereture alarm point of 490*F had been reached. Prior to entering end of cycle coastdown, the cold log temperature was approximately 515 F.

On September 8,1988, the plant operations manager issued a memor-andum to the !&C supervisor explaining that periodically during the coastdown it will be necessary for the I&C department to reduce by approximately 5'F the cold leg temperature low alarm setpoint. This memorandum, an accompanying safety evaluation, and revisions to pro-cedures OP-6202, Rev. 9, Main Coolant Cold Leg Harrow Range Tempera-ture Channel Calibrations and OP-4708, Rev. 13, Determination of Shutdown Margin, were reviewed by the Plant Operation Review Conmit-tee on September 9, 1988. No inadequacies were identified by the inspector as a result of reviewing licensee response to end-of-cycle coastdown operation.

9 1

(b) Plant load Reduction for Turbine and Main Steam Valve Testing On September 17, 1988, at 00:01 a.m., the licensee commenced a planned load reduction to 65% of rated power in order to conduct sur-veillance testing activities. Testing activities were performed in accordance with procedures OP-4225, Rev. 19, Turbine Throttle Valve and Control Valve Surveillance and OP-4261, Rev. 5, Main Steam Non-Return Valve Operability Test. The schedule of activities for the load reduction were specified to the plant operators in Special Order No. 106. In addition, this special order provided guidelines for reactor operation that reflect reactivity manipulations that would result from changes in main coolant temperature and xenon.

During control valve testing activities at approximately 2: 40 a.m.,

problems with the heater drain tank (HDT) level control system were noted. Plant operators placed the heater drain tank level controller in MANUAL while continuing to investigate the cause of the swing in the tank level. Attempts to place the controller into AUTO resulted in a whter hammer in the No. 2 (-traction line. At 5:05 a.m. , the trap bypasses in the No. 2 extraction line were opened, which allevi-ated the water hammer condition. A ten-minute emergency load reduc-tion to 52% of rated power was effected by the shift supervisor.

Level swings were noted in the No. 2 feedwater heater (FWH) sight-glass, which were corrected by repairs to a leaking temporary patch on the vent line between the Nos. 2 and 3 FWHs. Placing the HDT level controller in AUTO resulted in a water Fammer within the FWH No. 3's extraction steam line. At 6:20 a.m., an emergency load reduction to 40% of rated power was effected and resulted in the plant secondary systems becoming stabilized. Followirg the comple-tion of repairs of the piping that had the leaking patch and trouble-shooting and calibration on level instrumentation, a load increase was initiated at apprcximately 9:20 a.m. The completion of the tur-bine throttle valve testing was deferred to a later date.

Upon following up this event, the inspector determined that no thorough walkdown of extraction steam piping which had experienced the water hammer was conducted by licensee engineering personnel.

Although operations and maintenance department personnel did perform a review of the affected syste'n's components, the inspector expressed concern to the Operations Department that engineering expertise in conducting the post-water hammer review was appropriate prior to increasing plant power level. On September 19, 1988, the Maintenance Support Department's Inservice Inspection (ISI) coordinator completed a thorough walkdown of the extraction steam piping without identify-ing any signs of piping deflections or deformed support components.

The licensee is in the process of preparing a Plant Information Report (No. 88-10) to document their analysis of the ot.currence and corrective actions. On September 18, 1933, the plant returned to normal coastdown operations.

The inspector had no further questions on this matter at this time.

1

\

10

8. Maintenance Observation The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, administrative and main-tenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualification, radio-logical controls for worker protection, fire protection, retest require-ments and reportability per Technical Specifications. The following activities were included:

MR 88-1305; No. 3 steam generator bypass feed valve BF-FEV-1200A body-to-bonnet leak MR 88-1348; Fire suppression damper in control room fresh air supply will not operate MR 88-1453; Acoustic accelerometer, PR-ZC-2A, alarms low intermit-tently MR 88-1489; No. 2 service water pump excessive gland leakage MR 88-1545; Acoustic accelerometer, PR-ZC-2A, indicates intermittent opening of safety valve PR-SV-181 MR 88-1566; Acoustic accelerometer, PR-ZC-2a, spikes up-scale MR 88-1f 60; Cracked and leaking weld on safety injection tank Tk-28 Based upon a review of licensee activities in this area, the inspector noted the following; At the beginning of the inspection period the licensee instituted the provisions of procedure AP-0205, Rev. 13, Maintenance Request. The issuance of th e procedure followed completion of personnel training on the proced 4ral requirements of the revised and enhanced mainten-ance program. The licensee's development and implementation of pro-cedures af fs.cting safety-related maintenance, test, and inspection activities is being followed by Unresolved Item 50-29/88-07-01. The inspector noted during plant tours that equipment requiring mainten-ance have deficiency tags attached. The licensee is closely monitor-ing proper implementation of the use of the deficiency tags. The inspector had no further questions on this item.

11 As noted in Section 4.a (4) of this Inspection Report, equipment per-formance problems - experienced with the acoustic accelerometer for the pressurizer code safety valve, PR-SV-181. MRs 85-1453,

-1545, and 1566 were issued on September 1, 15, and 19, 1988, respec-tively. Although licensee personnel were unable to identify the root cause of the problem, they were able to demonstrate that even with the infrequent anomolous channel behavior a high degree of confidence in channel operability was obtainable. Discussions between the equipment manufacturer and the I&^. department resulted in developing maintenance guidance on replacement of likely instrumentation com-ponents in the event that equipment performance degrades below cur-rently acceptable levels.

The inspector reviewed procedure AP-6007, Rev. 6, I&C Corrective Maintenance, which was prepared to provide maintenance personnel with the iscessary preplanned instructicns to control envisioned work activity. These instructions were determined by the inspector to be appropriate to the circumstances and of high quality. In addition, the method being used by the licensee to check installed instrumen-tation operability by tapping of the safety valve discharge piping to assess operability was in conformance with manufacturer's instruc-tions. The inspector had no further questions on this item.

Regarding MR 88-1660, the maintenance support supervisor and one of his ergineers were conducting an inspection under the safety injec-tion tank on September 23, 1988, and identified a cracked and leaking weld on the bottom head to shell weld. It was determined to be a transverse crack approximately 0.4" in length, that existed entirely in the weld metal. The inspector reviewed a Yankee Nuclear Services Division engineering evaluation (YNSD), YRP 1099/88, which indicated that: (1) the crack or some vestige of it was in existence at original construction, (2) the fissure was probably very tight and has been eroded / corroded to some degree over the years (approximately 30 years) to emanate with a small weep; and (3) shell stresses in the area of the crack are acceptable. The YNSO recommendation to the plant was to visually monitor the fissure / leak on a daily basis to ensure little to no propagation over a two week period, and if no propagation is noted, inspect on a weekly basis until the outage (November 12,1988). The monitoring was initiated and performed by the site QC group, as requested by the maintenance support depart-ment. At its meeting on September 27, 1988, the condition was dis-cussed and reviewed by the Plant Operation Review Committee. Special Order No.88-115 was issued by the operations department for detail-ing the existing conditions, notification responsibilities in event of degrading conditions, and inspection responsibilities of the

, auxiliary operators. Current licensee plans call for emptying the tank and performing weld repairs during the upcoming outage.

The inspector will ccotinue to review this matter during routine facility inspections and had no further questions of the licensee on this matter at this time.

12

9. Surveillance Observations The inspector observed tests or parts of tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and LCOs, test results (if completed, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolu-tion. The following tests were reviewed:

OP-4201, Rev. 15, Power Range Channel Calibration Heat Balance OP-4648, Rev 7, Pressurizer Safety and Power Operated Relief Valve Position Indication Chanrel Calibration OP-4216, Rev. 23, Testing of the Containment Hydrogen Venting and Recirculation System OP-4673, Rev. 6, Radwaste Cover Gas Oxygen Analyzer Channel Calibra-tion (WD-G-303)

OP-4232, Rev.19, Vapor Cor.tiner Inspection No unacceptable conditions were identified as a result of reviewing the licensee's activities in this program area.

10. Onsite Peview Committee Activitits The inspector attended a regularly scheduled meeting of the Yankee Nuclear Power Station on-site review committee (PORC) on September 6, 1983, to ascertain that the provisions of T.S. 6.5.1 were met. No inadequacies were identified.

11. Plant Information Reports Plant information reports (PIRs) prepared by the licensee per AP-0004 were reviewed. The inspector determined whether the conditions were reportable as defined in the TS and whether the licensee's systsm of problem identi-fication and corrective action is being effectively utilized. The follow-j ing PIRs were reviewed:

PIR No. Occurence Date Report Da:e Subject 88-06 5/19/88 7/31/88 Vacuum primary pump con-trol switch misposit-ioned, security event 88-07 5/31/88 7/13/88 Cracked bonnet on the activity decay and dilu-tion tank isolation valve

.s

. . - . i r

l ~

! 13  ;

l l

l PIR 88-061 This event was reviewed in Inspection Report 50-29/88-09, l l Section L. Appropriate licensee corrective actions were specified to  :

! .further clarify the definition of tampering and to provide for more appro- I priate response to future events of this type. l l PIR 88 07: This event was reviewed in Inspection Report 50-29/88-10, ^

Sections 5 and 8. The PIR providet good documentation of the licensee's response to the event, including corrective actions implemented.

The inspector identified no violations regarding the licensee's actions associated with the events and noted that the licensee determined the  !

causes of the occurrences and specified appropriate short-term and long- "

! term corrective actions.

I l 12. New Fuel Receipt a-d Inspections The inspector reviewed the results of the new fuel receipt inspections performed by the licensee to verify that inspections had been performed in accordance with OP 7200, Rev. 9, Receiving, Unloading and Inspecting New Reactor Fuel. The documentation for fuel shipment received on-site on September 26, 1988, consisting of six new assemblies was reviewed. The inspector witnessed portions of unloading and storage of new fuel includ-ing Quality Control and Radiological Control involvement. Shipping con-tainers were noted to be properly sealed upon arrival.

The inspector informed the licensee's reactor enginearing manager about a minor concern pertaining to the need to clarify the unloading and inspec-tion sequencing instructions to reflect improved licensee practicr. The inspector determined that personnel were knowledgeable in procedures j governing the handling of new fuel.

i The inspector had no additional comments.

13. plant Operation During Extended High Ambient Temperatures Extended periods of high ambient temperatures existed at the plant during July and August, 1988. The inspector reviewed the nature and extent of impact that this condition had on the plant equipment and operations.

Additionally, the licensee's actions in resnonse to the cor .'ition were assessed.

On an overall basis, the extended high ambient temperature condition did not appear to have direct impact on normal plant operations. The maximum average vapor container (VC) temperature recorded for the months in ques-tion was 99*F. These values were well below the Technical Specification limit of 120'F. Average VC temperature trend data maintained by the licensee indicate that msximum summertime temperature was in a range of 93 to 95'F in the years 1983 to 1987. On June 15, 1988, the reactor engi-neering department issued a performance a9alysis on the VC air coolers.

This analysis was generated to resolve Itcensee concerns that VC air

i 14 4

l cooler performance has deteriorated. A licensee program of cleaning and/ I or replacing VC air coolers was developed. To improve monitoring of per- ,

formance, an improved database of related operating parr, meters was imple- '

mented. During the Cycle XIX-XX refueling outage, which is scheduled to start on November 12, 1988, the licensee will replace heat exchangers on i two of the four VC air coolers and clean the service water inlet lines to all coolers. The normal manner in which the licensee approaches its  :

responsibility to monitor equipment and system performance, and if neces- '

sary identify the need to implement corrective actions, precluded the need to establish new programs to respond to concerns for operating the plant during extended high ambient temperature conditions.

During the July-August, 1958 period, it became necessary for the lic e m f J

to effect plant load reductions due to high circulating water temperature.

Although this condition was coupled to the hot weather, the increased circulating water inlet temperature was more the result of reduced opera- ,

tion of the upstream Harriman Hydroelectric Station, which normally results in increased temperature in the plants adjoining She rman i j Reservoir. Even with the elevated reservoir temperatures during the hot j weather, there were no detrimental operating ef fects on the service water system.

The inspector identified no safety concerns in the manner in which the licensee reviewed or operated the plant during the period of extended high

ambient temperatures, i 14. Open Items An open item is a matter that requires further rev)w and evaluation by the inspector, including an item pending specific act'on by the licensee j and a previously identifdad violation, deviation, utresolved item and programmatic weakness. Open items are used to documen ., track and ensure a%quate follow-up by the inspector. An open item is d scussed in Section j 4 of this report.

15. Management Meetings During the inspection period, the following management meetings were con-

ducted or attended by the inspector as roted below

I --

The inspector attended an exit meeting on August 18, 1938 by a region-based health physics specialist at the conclusion of Inspec-tion 50-29/88-17, which was a radiation protection pre-outage inspection.

4 i

1

15 The inspector attended an exit meeting on August 18, 1988 by two region-based chemistry specialists at the conclusion of Inspection 50-29/88-15, which consisted of confirmatory measurements of the licensee chemistry and health physics programs as well as the whole body cov ter.

The inspector attended an exit meeting on September 9,1988, by a region based specialist at the conclusion of Special Inspection 50-29/68-19, radwaste/ transportation inspection and circumstances connected with a contaminated radioactive waste shipment to Barnwell, S.C.

The inspector attended a, exit rneeting neld on September 15, 1988, by i

an NRC:RI operator licensing examiner at the conclusion of operator licensing examination :.0-29/88-18 to discuss results and identify strengths / weaknesses in the licensee's operator l' insing .Nining 1 program.

At periodic intervals during the course of the inspi. ' ' an period, meetings were held with senior facility managenent to discuss the in;pection scope and preliminary findings of the resident inspector.

4 1

1 i

4

,_ ,, - _ . _ . . . - , _-, , . . ..,--,__ ,,