IR 05000029/1990009
| ML20055G801 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1990 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055G800 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-90-09, 50-29-90-9, NUDOCS 9007240187 | |
| Download: ML20055G801 (16) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
b Report'No:
50-29/90-09 Docket two:
50-29 Licensee No:
DPR-3 L
Licensee:
Yankee Atomic Electric Company 580 Main Street Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398
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Facility Name: Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted:
May 15 - June 18, 1990 Ins'ectors:
T. Koshy, Senior Resident Inspector M. Mark jle R sident Inspector
Approved By:
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. Joh t n, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A Dats Inspection Summary: Ik pection on May 15 - June 18,1990 (Report No, h0-29/90-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection on daytime and backshifts by two resident inspectors of: operational safety; plant operations; radiological controls; maintenance and surveillance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering /
technical support; assessment / quality verification and, periodic reports.
Results:
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General Conclusions on Adequacy,'Strergth or Weakness in Licensee Programs L
Maintenance support department sA50) and Yankee Haclear Services Division-
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_(YNSD) personnel were effectiv'e in providing a timely, technically sound
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resolution of the No. 3 HPSI pump equalizing line weld defect in support of plant operations (Section 4.3)..The injection of ammonia into the main coolant-system to reduce crud prior to refueling is a noteworthy initi-
-ative. Although current NRC licensed operator staffing is adequate, lic-ensee near-term plans to develop new NRC licensed reactor operators is questionable in satisfying staffing needs if attrition were to occur (Sec-tion 4.2).
Radiation protection personnel demonstrated noteworthy job oversight skills in limiting the impact of an unplanned exposure with a soil moisture / density gauge (Section 5.1).
A breakdown in security pro-gram implementation resulted in the unauthorized access of a firearm (shotgun) into the protected area (Section 8.1).
No violations or un-resolved items were identified.
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9007240187 900716 PDR ADOCK 03000029
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Plant Operations (Modules 71707,93702)
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L Yankee Nuclear Power Station (YNPS, Yankee or the Plant) continued coastdown l
toward the core XXI refueling outage scheduled to begin June 23, 1990. The
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F licensee was prompt and effective in assessing the weld defect and in resolving i
questions of pump operability. Although current NRC licensed operator staffing
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is adequate, near term plans to develop R0 licensed personnel is questionable if personnel attrition occurs. Ammonia injection into tne main coolant system
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to reduce crud prior to refueling is a noteworthy initiative.
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R_adiological Controls (Module 71707)
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'L On May 18, 1990, an unplanned personnel exposure occurred with a soil moisture /
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density gauge.
RP technician personnel demonstrated noteworthy job oversight.
i skills in implementing prompt corrective action.
Details of the incident and material license holder were provided to the NRC Region I Division of Radiation l
Safety and Safeguards (DRSS), Nuclear Materials Safety Branch for evaluation.
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-Maintenance and Surveillance (Modules 61726,62703,62700)
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Surveillance activities performed by instrumentation and control (I&C) personnel I
C were effective.
Construction of the new safety injection tank is progressing
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with completion scheduled to occur during the 1990 refueling outage.
i Emergency Preparedness (Module 82301,82203)
i The: licensee conducted an EP drill on June.14,1990, to improve communications and address weaknesses noted in the previous EP exercise.
On May 17, 1990, a medical drill was conducted to demonstrate cnsit and offsite EP response cap-ability.
Security (Module 71707)
-On May 19, 1990, the licensee identified an unauthorized firearm (shotgun) that had been brought into the Protected Area undetected by security. A NRC:RI security inspector was dispatched to_the site, The findings of this inspection are documented in NRC inspection report 50-29/90-08.
Engineering and Technical Support (Modules 62703,37700)
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Maintenance support department (MSD) personnel in conjunction with a Yankee Nuclear Sersices Division (YNSD) metallurgy specialist were effective in pro-
-viding a pron.ot, technically sound engineering assessment of the weld defect on
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the No. 3 HPSI oump in support of plant operations.
Safety Assessment /Qelity Verification Modules 71707,40500,92701,92700)
The licensee adequately resolved 10 CFR 21 concerns regarding torquing values, procedures and training relative to a water cleanup system (WCU) heat exchanger provided by Senior Engineering Company, formerly Southwest Engineering Company.
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'ai TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Persons Contacted.........................................,...........
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12.1 Summary of-Facility Activities......................................
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Operational Safety Verification (IP.71707)...........................
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3.1 Plant Operations Review..........................................
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-3.2 Safety System Review............................................
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- 3.3 Review of Temporary Change s, Switching, and Tagging.............
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PlantOperations(IP'71707,93702)...................................
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N 4.1 Plant:Coastdown to Refueling....................................
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4.2 Operations Staffing..........................................a..
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B, 4.3 Weld Leak No. 3.High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Pump t
Equalizing Line...............................................
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4.4:' Ammonia Addition to the Main Coolant System.....................
1-4.5 No, 3 Station Battery Cable Connections.........................
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Radi ol ogi cal Control s ( I P 71707 ).....................................
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S'.1 Unplanned Exposure with Moisture / Density Gauge..................
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-Maintenance / Surveillance ~(IP 61726,62703,62700)....................
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' 6.1 Safety Injection Tank Cons.
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j 6.2 Safe Shutdown' System Survei.,
Test..........................
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-6.3 Main Steam Line Non-Return Va'1v
.roke Test.....................
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6.4" Control Room Emergency Air Cleaning System (CREACS) '
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Insta11ation..................................................
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c 6.5 Closed 85-15-02 VETIP,...........................................<
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Emergency Preparedness (IP 82301, 82203).............................-
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7.1 Medical Dri11....................................................
L 7;2. Emergency Preparedness Dri11.....................................
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S e c u r i ty ( I P 717 0 7 )..................................................
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'8.1 Observation of Physical Security................................
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8 ~ 2 = Unauthor.1 zed. Fi rearm in the Protected Area......................
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Engineering / Technical Support (IP 62703, 37700)....................
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9.1 Closed 88-14-01 CILRT...........................................
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. Table oflContentsi.
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110. : Safe *J Assessment /Qualifty Verification (IP 71707, 40500, 92701,
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12 J 10;1 Closed 90-88-01.10 CFR 21 Report'.....'...................'.......
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10.2 LER 90-503,......................................................
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Review of Periodic Reports (IP-90713)................................
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J12. Management Mee A gs (IP 30703).......................................
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- The NRC 'Insp ection Manual inspection procedure (IP) or temporary instruction (TI) or_ the Region I temporary. instruction.(RILTI) that was used as inspection 3;
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' guidance is listed-for each applicable report section.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted 5,
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Yankee Nuclear Power Station
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T. Henderson, Plant Superintendent E
R. Mellor, Technical Director
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. Yankee Atomic' Ele'etric Company (YAEC)
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N. St. Laurent, Manager of Operations j
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u The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspec-
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tion, including members of the operations, radiation protection, chemistry.
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instrument and control, maintenance, reactor engineering, security, train-
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ing, technical services and general office staffs.
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Summary of Facility Activities l
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Yankee Nuclear Power Station.(YNPS, Yankee or cne plant) contined coast-
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. down-toward the core XXI refueling outage. At the conclusion of ti,e in-
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spection period, the plant was at 80'. rated power, j
On May 24, two NRC Region I specialist inspectors conducted a safeguards inspection to assess licensee activities involving an unauthorized firearm
'in the protected area.--
On-June S, Mr. Jon R. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, of the Division of Reactor Projects conducted a site visit,. met with senior lic-
ensee management and performed backshift' inspection at the YNPS,
Effective June 18, Mr. E. H. Gray completed his assignment as the cognizant i
NRC Region.I. Division of Reactor Projects-(DRP) Section Chief for YNPS.
On-June 19, Mr..Phil Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3 in NRC
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Region 5 assumed cognizant DRP Section Chief responsibilities for YNPS.
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. Effective July'16, Mr._ John F. Rogge, Regional Coordinator in the Office-
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spector in NRC Region II-will assume continuous responsibility as DRP Sec-tion Chief for YNPS.
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3.-
Operational Safety Verification
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3.1.-Plant Operations Review
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The. inspector observed plant operations during regular and backshift tours of the following areas:
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Control Room Safe Shutdown System Building Primary Auxiliary Building Fence Line (Protected Area)
Diesel Generator Rooms Intake Structure Vital Switchgear Room Turbine Building Cable Tray House Spent Fuel Pit (SFP) Building o
Safety Injection Building The following items were checked during daily. routine facility tour :
shift staffing, access control, adherence to procedures and limiting conditions of operation (LCOs), instrumentation, recorder traces,
protective systems, control room annunciators, area radiation and process monitors, emergency power source operability, operability of
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the' Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), control room logs, shif t supervisor logs, and operating orders.
On a weekly basis, selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) trains were verified to be operable.
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The condition of plant equipment, radiological controls, security and safety were assessed. On a biweekly frequency, the inspector re-viewed safety-related tagouts, chemistry sample results, shift turn-overs, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup and the posting of notices to workers.
Plant housekeeping and fire protec-tion were also evaluated.
Inspections of the control room were performed on weekend and back-shifts-as follows: May 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28 and June 5,14 and 16.
Deep backshift inspection was performed from 7:15 a.m. to 11:15 a.m.
on May 19 and from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on June 16.
Holiday in-spection was performed from 7:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on May 28.
Operators and shift supervisors were alert, attentive and responded appropriately to annunciators and plant conditions.
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Cognizant shift personnel were knowledgeable of plant conditions and ongoing maintenance and surveillance activities.
Shift turnovers were conducted professionally with effective control exercised over
^ control room access.
Shift documentation adequately characterized eperating history and the observed off-normal conditions.
Equipment problems were resolved in a timely mar,. r.
Operators were cognizant of plant operating requirements during the coastdown phase.
3.2 Safety System Review The emergency diesel generators, EDG fuel oil, residual heat removal, and safety injection systems were reviewed to verify proper alignment and operational status.
The review included verification that (i) accessible major flow path valves were correctly positioned, (ii) power supplies were energized, (iii) lubrication and component cooling were proper, and (iv) components were operable based on a visual inspection of equipment for leakage and general conditions.
System walkdowns to assess the material condition of the ECCS HPSI I
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p and LPSI and the low pressure safety injection accumulator were per-formed.
Selected accessible valves were verified to be.in the cor-rect position and locked when required by plant procedures.
During a routine tour on June 13, 1990, the inspector noted a leak on
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the No. 3 HPSI pump equalizing line.
This observation and the licen -
see's resolution are discussed in Section A.3 of this report. Other-wise, safety systems were observed to be in generally good condition.
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3.3 Review of Temporary Changes, Switching, and Tagging l-Temporary change requests (TCRs), which were approved in support of
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implementing lifted leads and jumper requests and mechanical bypasses.
l were reviewed to verify that: controls established by AP-0018, " Tem-h porary Change Control," were met; no conflicts with the Technical
Specifications were created; the requests were properly approved prior
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to installation; and a safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR
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50.59 was prepared if required.
Implementation of the requests was reviewed on a sampling basis.
The switching and tagging. log was reviewed and tagging activities were inspected to verify plant equipment was controlled in accordance-with the requirements of AP 0017, " Switching and Tagging of Plant Equipment."
i Licensee administrative control of off-normal system configurations by the use of TCR and switching and tagging procedures, as reviewed above, was in compliance with procedural instructions and was con-sistent with plant safety.
No unacceptable conditions were identi-fied.
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Plant Operations 4.1 Plant Coastdown to Refueling At the beginning of this inspection, the plant was at 86*4 rated power
'and coasting down to the core XXI~ refueling outage.
The outage is scheduled for a seven week duration.
In rJdition to routine refueling activities, the outage will include an upgrade of the excore instru-
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mentation system, initial implementation of a motor operator valve
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refurbishment and testing program, installation and testing of a new i
safety injection tank, pressurizer ultrasonic testing, and steam gene-f rator inservice inspection (ISI) and girth weld inspections, At the conclusion of the inspection, the plant was at 80*4 rated power.
4.2 Operations Staffing
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's training sche:iule and conducted discussions with cognizant licensee personnel to assess the adequacy of licensee plans for personnel development leading to the NRC l-m
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operator licenses. The licensee currently has thirteen senior reactor operator (SRO) and twelve reactor operator (RO) NRC licensed individuals.
The operations department work schedule entails five rotating shifts where two crews exchange shift responsibility, one crew is in training and the remaining two are scheduled off duty.
Each shift is comprised of two SR0s and two R0s and two auxiliary operators (A0s).
There are three extra SR0s and two extra R0s to supplement the rotating shifts as needed.
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The licensee's proposed training schedule includes both SRO and RO.
classes. The SRO class is scheduled to begin in January 1992, with NRC examination of approximately six candidates projected for November 1992.
The RO class is scheduled to begin in October 1990, with NRC examination of eight to ten candidates scheduled for November 1991.
The inspector discussed this issue with senior licensee management on June 5, 1990, and questioned whether the projected training and licensing schedule will be timely in view of possible future attri-
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tion of licensed operators.
The licensee stated that the proposed schedule-was considered adequate to support ongoing staffing needs.
4.3 Weld Leak on No. 3 High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Pump Equalizing Line During-a routine plant tour en June 13, 1990, the inspector noted an
apparent leak on the No. 3 HPSI pump equalizing line.
Specifically, the inspector observed a small " boron flower" on a weld in the pump equalizing line elbow.
The equalizing line is Type 316 stainless steel.
The licensee performed an immediate assessment.
The maintenance sup-port department (MSD) in conjcnction with a metallurgy specialist from Yankee Nuclear Services Division (YNSD) determined the water was.
weeping from a discontinuity (crater pit) in the weld start /stop area.
The observed leakage was too small to establish a leak rate. Opera-tions department personnel performed OP-4204, Rev. 40, " Test or Operation of the Safety Injection Pumps and Determination of ECCS Subsystem Leakage." During pump operation, no increased leakage was observed.
The licensee concluded the pump was operable.
The engi-neering evaluation concluded the defect occurred during weld f abri-cation and was not the result of fatigue or age-related wear. Addi-tionally, the licensee considered the defect isolated in nature, and concluded that further engineering inspections were not warranted for the No. 3 HPSI equalizing line welds or similar welds on the Nos. I and 2 HPSI pumps. Maintenance Request No. 90-1100 was issued to ef fect repairs during the core XXI refueling outage which is scheduled for June 23, 1990.
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The licensee was prompt and effective in assessing the weld defect.
The engineering assessment and surveillance testing adequately re-solved questions regarding pump operability.
A visual examination verified similar conditions did not exist on the other HPSI pumps.
Radiation protection ersonnel effectively implemented radiological e
controls in support of the examination and testing.
4.4 Ammonia Addition to the Main Coolant System (MCS')
On June 4, 1990, the licensee initiated injection of' ammonium hydroxide (NH40H) to the MCS and mixed bed ion exchanger to elevate system pH
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to clean crud from the internal surfaces several weeks before the reactor is shutdown. The licensee issued Special Order No. 90-93
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which detailed operator guidance in implementing reactor engineering memorandum RE 90-82, " Reactivity Considerations for MCS Ammonia Addi-tion," and chemistry procedure OP-9418, Original Revision, "Ammoni-
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ation of the Primary Coolant."
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The licensee observed no anomalous reactivity changes. Ammonia con-centration in the MCS was constant at 10-11 ppm NH3 throughout the evolution with a pH of approximately 10.
Normal MCS pH during power operation is approximately 7,5.
The addition of ammonia to the MCS constituted a noteworthy initi-
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reduce system dose rates and overall occupational exposure for the duration of the refueling outage.
Results indicating the effective-ness of the process will be available when the reactor is shutdown.
No unacceptable conditions were identified during inspector reviews of operating chemistry data.
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4.5 No. 3 Station Battery Cable Connection During a routine plant tour, the inspectors noted that the intercon-necting cables between the No. 3 station batteries had a questionable bending radius. The lim see contacted the cable manufacturer and confirmed that the cont, oration met the 5 times bending radius re-
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quirement. However, the licensee determined that the current con-figuration is such that the weight of the cable could eventually de-crease the bending radius.
The licensee plans to change the cable orientation to prevent this potential problem, 5.
Radiological Controls
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Radiological controls were reviewed on a routine basis relative to industry radiological standards, administrative and radiological control procedures, and regulatory requirements.
Selected work evolutions were observed to determine the adequacy of program implementation commensurate with the
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radiological hazards and importance to safety.
Independent surveys were performed by the inspector to verify the adequacy of radiological controls and-instructions to workers.
Radiation protection (RP) program implementation was gen 2 rally good.
Radiation work permits (RWPs), radiological surveys and air sampling ade-quately characterized the radiological hazards. Work controls implemented by the RP staff were effective in providing a high level of radiological safety.
No deficiencies were identified in radiological posting and labeling.
5.1 Unplanned Exposure with Moisture / Density Gauge i
On May 18,'1990, the RP technician assigned to the safety injection
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(SI) tank construction project identified an individual improperly
handling a soil moisture / density gauge.
Specifically, the RP tech-
nician observed a contractor technician of Soil and Material Testing, Inc. (SMT) remove the soil testing device from the ground and clean
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the exposed radiological source (10 mci CS-137, 50 mci Am-Be) within his hand. The RP technician immediately stopped the job and instructed the individual to secure the source in the storage box, t
Licensee corrective actions included performing a dose assessment of the individual's exposure, leak testing the moisture / density sealed sou-ce, informing the < jntractor and evaluating the contractor's mate.Mals license, and terminating the subject individual's access
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. authorization. The licensee's dose assessment determined the source
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dose rate was 1.6 Rem / hour gamma'and 40 Rem / hour neutron.
The time of exposure was estimated to be 3 seconds. Thus, the calculated ex-posure was 1.3 mrem gamma and 33 mrem neutron.
Although the exposure
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was not significant, the licensee considered the observed practice
. unacceptable and cause for significant concern.
The' licensee was
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dissatisfied with the individual's demonstrated knowledge. Addi-tionally, the contractor did not provide the individual-with a radio-logical survey instrument, supplies to properly post the work area, or field procedures for proper device operation.
The evolution was per-formed using the licensee's radiological instrumentation, supplies and
equipment.
SMT completed the soil testing the next day after provid-
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ing a new technician and assuring proper qualification and training.
Inspector review noted that licensee actions were prompt and effec-tive. The cognizant RP technician demonstrated noteworthv job over-a sight skills, The radiological assessmen_t was technically sound and conservative. Weaknesses noted in SMT performance were provided to the NRC Region I Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS),
Nuclear Materials Safety Branch for evaluatio _ _ _
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Maintenance / Surveillance The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and surveillance activi-ties to verify safety and compliance with regulations, administrative and maintenance and surveillance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, safety tag use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualification, radiological controls for worker protection, fire protec-tion, retest requirements, LCOs, evaluation of test results, removal and restoration of equipment, deficiency review, resolution and reportability per Technical Specifications.
6.1 Safety injection Tank Construction The licensee is constructing a new safety iniection tank to replace the leaking aluminum tank.
The inspector observed selected concrete pouring activities and reviewed the licensee's program to verify re-quirements for pouring viscosity and the adequacy of compacting.
Yhe welding of the tank plates was also obse.-i at selected intervals.
The inspector reviewed the onsite quality control to assess welding rod use and weld inspection.
The licensee's controls on this modi-fication were adequate.
An NRC:RI spacialist inspection in this area is documented in Inspection Report No. 50-29/90-11.
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6.2 Safe Shutdown Sys3em Surveillance Test The inspector observed the perfurmance of OP-4253, Revision 7, " Safe Shutdown System Operability Test."
This is a dedicated system with an independent diesel generator and the capability to provide borated primary make up water to the main coolant system and feedwater to the steam generators for seismic safe shutdown capability.
The inspector reviewed the pretest condition and the valve lineup to ensure adequate procedure implementation.
The oil levels and equip-ment conditions were sati sf actory.
The operations staff completed the procedural steps with no unacceptable or anomalous conditions observed.
Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) calibrations were valid.
The inspector observed that personnel were effectively per-forming predictive maintenance vibration monitoring of the pumps.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
All acceptance criteria were adequately satisfied.
6.3 Non-Return Valve (NRV) Stroke Test The insper. tor observed the quarterly main steam line nonreturn valve (NRV) testing performed on June 22, 1990.
The Technical Specifica-tions (TS) require these valves to be stroked through 10 percent travel to ensure operability.
Each valve can be closed from train A or train B for the automatic isolation of the main steamlines.
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During Lthe_ performance' of this test, No. 4 NRV did not operate from the B train.
The operations staff promptly declared the valve in-Loperable and entered the TS action statement.
The-I&C staff observed-that_the test. alarm did-not operate and diagnosed the problem to be j
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an inadequate wiring contact in the test circuit.
This condition
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would not have prevented normal operation of the valve on an auto -
close demand signal.
The wiring contacts were torqued and-the NRV
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.wasuretested.
The valve properly stroked and the licensee exited
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from.the action statement.
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=The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions and determined that NRV operability was not compromised.
The licensee's-operability assess-
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6,4 Control Room Emergency Air Cleaning Systen (CREACS) Installation i
During a plant tour, the inspector _noted that-two CREACS supports
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were not securely fastened or anchored to the _ floor. The: licensee t
verified the. inspector's observation and promptly issued a_ maintenance
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equest to effect proper support. The CREACS is not a seismically
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Tified system at YNPS.
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Although licensee corrective actions were prompt and effective, the as-found installation constituted incomplete design package.implemen-
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,tation.
The licensee is evaluating the circumstances related to the.
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installetion and testing.
The inspector had no further questions.
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This item related to the lack of a program to adequately control ven-
s dor._information for the proper maintenance of safety-related equip-i ment.
This subject was subsequently reviewed in NRC:RI Inspection Report 89-05.
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A. July 21, 1989 letter to the NRC presented'the schedule for imple-menting a VETIP. program. This program _ included the development of a
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master inventory procedure AP-0075, " Vendor Equipment Technical In-
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formation Program,"_which delineates the required review and control of vendor manuals. A review of safety-related procedures was con-
ducted-by a licensee contractor to determine-.the adequacy of main-tenance information and to update the-procedures as required.
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The Nuclear Safety Audit Review Committee (NSARC) reviewed the licen-see's status on implementation of the VETIP program and identified no j
deficiencies. All affected procedures have been identified and t
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planned revis;ons are scheduled to be made.
The licensee has assigned a cognizant individual.to maintain the program.
The implementation of a VETIP program is complete.
This item is closed.
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7.
7.1-Emergency Preparedness brill
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.During' this inspection period, the licensee conducted a series' of
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refresher training sessions for the staff. The. training was struc-tured toLemphasize the solutions to weaknesses observed during the
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previous NRC inspection and by the licensee's self-evaluation.
The licensee conducted a drill at 8:15 a.m. on June 14, 1990.
It involved the participation of the Operations Support Center (OSC),.
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Technical Support Center (TSC), Forward Control Point, Emergency Off-j site' Facility (EOF) and Engineering Support Center.
The participants
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were'prestaged at specified locations, and scenario data were pre-sented by designated controllers.
The inspector reviewed the conduct of the drill from the TSC and con-trol-room. Communication within the TSC, management direction of the z
emergency response, and protective actions were timely and effective.
'Some minor difficulties were-observed in establishing facsimile com -
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munication devices.
The inspector noted that the TSC logbook was not
initially available for use during the drill.
Initial records were written on loose' paper and later incorporated as the logbook.
Licen-see evaluation of the drill is continuing.
j 7.2-Medical Drill l
On May_17, 1990, the licensee conducted a Medical Emergency Drill.
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The objectives were to demonstrate' onsite injury assessment capability, j
. triage, stabilization and prevention of the spread of contamination, J
. adequacy of communication, and the performance of the ambulance and
1 medical-services.
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The simulated injured individual was located at the vapor container access point to simulate a difficult. area for emergency access as
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might;be expected during an outage.
The onsite team arrived approxi-mately 10 minutes after announcement of the injury.
The patient was
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transported to the ambulance in approximately 45 minutes.
The am-l
_ bulance service from North Adams was utilized to assess response time.
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=The response time and the conduct of the responding emergency team q
were satisfactory, i
The inspector observed that the request to the control room for "more help" did not specify that outside medical assistance was needed, a
However, the control room staff conservatively requested ambulance i
service.
The licensee's critique was evaluating the performance of onsite and offsite response teams.
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8.
. Security
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.8.1 ' Observations of Physical Security Selected aspects of plant physical security-were reviewed during
. regular and backshif t hours to verify that controls were in accord-i
.ance with the security plan and approved procedures. This review-i
.t included the following security measures: guard staffing, vital and E
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. protected area barrier integrity,.mcintenance of isolation zones, and
implementation of access-controls including. authorization, badging, i
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escorting, and searches.
No inadequacies were identified.
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8.2 Unauthorized Firearm in the Protected Area On May 19, 1990, at approximately 4:45 p.m.,
security officers at Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station discovered a 12 gauge single-shot shotgun behind the-seat of a contractor's truck (while conducting a
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routine vehicle' search).
The security officers.immediately confis-cated the shotgun and denied the vehicle operator access to the Pro-
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tected Area. No ammunition was found in.the vehicle and the weapon was not loaded.
Prior to security's conducting the search, the vehicle operator,had signed a form.which stated that no firearms were in the
' vehicle. A review of vehicle access records indicated that the vehicle ~
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i and operator had entered the Protected Area, under escort, at approxi-
'mately 7:42 a.m. and departed at 11:05 a,m. the same day.
The gun
.'was not discovered when the vehicle was searched at that time.
During
'the course of questioning,<the driver stated that-the weapon had been-
-behind the seat, with numerous other items, for approximately a year and:he had forgotten it was there.. The Yankee Rowe Security Shift Supervisor stated that there wa, no apparent intent by.the operator
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to covertly bring the weapon into the Protected Area.
The supervisor
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indicated that~ the firearm was under numerous other tools and was
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nearly rusted closed.
Further search did not reveal any ammunition-in'the vehicle. ~The NRC was informed of this event by the licensee,
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by-telephone, at 5:35 p.m. (EST) on-May 19, 1990.
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NRC Region.I specialists conducted an inspection of this event and~
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--lteensee corrective actions.
The findings of this inspection are
. documented in NRC:RI Inspection Report 50-29/90-08.
9.
' Engineering / Technical Support 9.1 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (88-14-01)- Licensee to Establish
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Guidelines for CILRT Report Writing This item is related to adequacy of CILRT documentation and program-matic guidance in preparing the report.
The NRC identified a need for the lionsee to improve as-found and as-left test data documenta-
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tion as well as guidance for the analysis and interpretation of test results.
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i The licensee revised station procedure 0P-1708, Rev. 2, " Vapor Con-tainer Type A Test," to address the noted deficiencies._ Specifically,
-procedure Attachment 0, " Guideline for Preparation of the Integrated
. Leak Rate. Test (!LRT) Report," was revised.
Inspector review showed s
that the; revised attachment provided adequate guidance and detail for
~the documentation of test results and-the associated analysis. This
item is closed.
10.
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification 10.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (90-88-01) 10 CFR 21 Report For Safety
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. Class 2, U tube Heat Exchanger.
This item relates to the licensee-identified deviation involving improperly torqued f asteners on' the
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Water Clean-up System (WCU) heat exchanger channel cover. As-found
torque conditions were in excess of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel l
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Code,Section VIII, Division I values. The licensee subsequently a
discovered that no torquing procedure was used and that torque values
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l were not documented. Additionally, the licensee had difficulty in-resolving technical-problems with the.onsite hydrostatic. testing.
.
The licensee issued a 10 CFR 21 report detailing the specifics of the
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equipment deviation and the services provided by Senior Engineering L
- Company, fo merly Southwest Engineering Company. The audit performed
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by the Yankee Nuclear Services Division (YNSD) Vendor QA group re-
suited-in Senior Engineering Company establishing torquing procedures l
and associated training.
Licensee QA determined that the contractor-j program was acceptable, in the event Senior Engineering. Company
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should be selected for future. orders. The licensee adequately re-i solved technical problems involving onsite hydrostatic testing.
This
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item-is closed.
)I 10.2 LER S90-S03, " Unauthorized Firearm in the ProtectedJArea", addresses R
the May 19, 1990, incident wherein a security guard discovered a 12-f
. gauge shotgun in ir..,perable condition behind the seat of a contrac-
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tor's truck while conducting a routine vehicle search. A review of i
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vehicle access records indicated that the vehicle and operator had
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R entered the Protected Area under escort the same day without the gun having been discovered.
The driver of the vehicle stated that the
.l gun had been there along with numerous other items for approximately
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one year. No deficiencies were identified in she licensee's response to this incident or in the report made pursuant to 10 CFR 73 or 10
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CFR 50.73. Details of this incident are documented in Section 8.2-of
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this report.
.11.
Review of Periodic Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewer periodic reports submitted pursuant g
to Technical Specifications.
This review verified, as applicable:
(1) that the reported information was valid and included the NRC-required
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data; (2) that test results and supporting information were consistent
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pL planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the problem.
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LThe inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should'be-classified as an abnormal occurrence.
The following reports were reviewedt-
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' ' Monthly Statistical: Report for plant operations for the months of
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April and May, 1990.
.1$. Mapagement Meetings-
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At' periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were' held "ith
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y senior plant management to discuss the findings. 'A summary *
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for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion e c-tion and prior to report issuance. No proprietary informati.
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fied as being. included within the scope of this inspection, i
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