IR 05000029/1988008
| ML20155D947 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1988 |
| From: | Lazarus W, Tuccinardi T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155D930 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-88-08, 50-29-88-8, NUDOCS 8806150455 | |
| Download: ML20155D947 (7) | |
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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-29/88-08 Docket No.
50-29 License No.
DPR-3 Category C
Licensee:
Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name: Yankee Atomic Power Station Inspection At:
Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: April 26-28, 1988 Inspectors:
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PP T. Y E yal%i,' Emergency Prfetaredness date Specialtit, FRSSB, DRSS C. Conklin, EPS, FRSSB, DRSS W. Lazarus, EPS, FRSSB, DRSS R. Christopher, EPS. FRSSB, DRSS
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H. Eichenholz, SRI Yankee C. Carpenter, RI Y kee 5[J/8 N
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A Approved b W W Laz freparedness date Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 26-28, 1988 (Inspection Report No.
[50-29/88-08)
Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on April 26, 1988. The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC regional and resident personnel.
Results:
No violations were identified.
The licensee's emergency response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
8806150455 880607 PDR ADOCK 05000029 Q
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Details 1.0: Persons Contacted W. Riethle, Manager, Radiation Protection Group W. McGee, Public Affairs Director J. Gilman, Radiation Protection Group J. Hawxhurst, Radiation Protection Group
.J. Kay, Technical Services Manager A. Kadak. Vice President J. Gedutis, Senior Chemist R. Mellor, Technical Director T. Henderson, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. Robinson, Director, Environmental Engineering G. Babineau, Radiation Protection Manager A. Tatro, Training Instructor B. Wood, Administration Manager D. McDavitt, Radiation Protection Engineer G. Morgan, Technical Services K. Jurentkuf', Plant Operations Manager B. Drawbridge, Vice President N. StLaurent, Plant Superintendent
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The above listed persons were present at the exit meeting.
In addition, other licenset personnel were contacted, interviewed and observed during the inspection.
2.0 Emergency Exercise The Yankee Atomic Power Station unannounced, backshift exercise was conducted on April 26, 1988, from 4:30 to 11:00 p.m.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and State of Vermont participated fully.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the States of Vermont, New Hampshire and New York
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conducted field monitoring activities and a ingestion pathway exercise on Apri1 27, 1988.
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2.1 Pre-exercise Actisities L
The exercise objectives, submitted to NRC Region I on January 20,
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1988, were reviewed and determined to adequately test the licr see's Emergency Plan. On March 2, 1988, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.
Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's
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emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the
scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario l'
which allowed adequate testing of major portions of the Emergency l
Plan (EP) and the implementing procedures, and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
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NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on April 26, 1988.
Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee in the areas of technical support and radiological data. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers woula intercede in exercise activities to prevent disruption of normal plant operations.
2.2 Scenario The exercise scenario included the following key events:
1.
Loop 1 pressure indicate failure; 2.
Plant mode reduction in ccordance with Technical Specifications; 3.
Switchgear Room Fire Suppression System "TROUBLE" indication; 4.
Fire Emergency; 5.
RCS pump begins to vibrate; 6.
Control rod drop incident; 7.
Second control rod drop incident causes a reactor scram signal initiation; the reactor fails to scram, however, a manual scram of the reactor from Switchgear Room is successful; 8.
Loss of feedwater, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)
radiation alarms, and safety relief sticks; 9.
Release to atmosphere begins several minutes later; 10.
Release of radioactive materials to environment and 11.
Relief valve closed and plant stabilized, commence recovery.
2.3 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the emergency response organization activation and augnientation, the emergency response facilities (ERFs) activation and operations, and the actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the ERFs. The following activities were observed.
1.
Recognition of initiating conditions, correlation of these with Emergency Action Levels (EAls), selection and use of emergency operating procedures, and completion of notification to offsite
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governmental authorities; c
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Staffing and activation of ERFs; 3.
Communication between and within ERFs;
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4.
Formulatic1 of Protective Action Recommendations; 5.
Performance of technical ~ support, simulated repair and corrective actions; 6.
Capability of the Health Physics organization to maintain radiological controls;
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Communications with offsite agencies; and-8.
Interaction between Emergency Director, and state and county representatives in the EOF.
3.0 Exercise Observation 3.1 Exercise Strengths 1*
The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities, were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions of-the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions.
1.
Excellent communication with, and utilization of, offsite teams
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for offsite survey data and plume tracking.
2.
Frequent and quality briefings were conducted in the Technical Support Center (TSC), and overall, TSC command and control was
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excellent.
3.
Plant methods, procedures, and performance of emergency notificattons was very good.
3.2 Exercise Weaknesses The NRC identified the following exercise weaknesses which need to be evaluated and corrected by the licensee.
The licensee conducted an adequate self critique of the exercise that also identified some
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of these areas.
1.
Communication between the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs)
was weak. Numerous instances of poor communication were in evidence, both between and within ERFs as evidenced by the following examples:
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s When discrepancies were found at the Emergency Operations
Facility between the METPAC dose assessments model and field survey team results, a conservative decision to use the field team data was made. However, the rationale for this decision was never communicated to the Technical Support Center (TSC) or Control Room (CR). TSC and CR should be kept abreast of offsite issues. The recording of offsite radiological data in the TSC is also referenced in procedure OP3324, "TSC Operations".
TSC was not kept abreast of the scenario event "loss of
Knowledge-of the loss of feedwater should have-used the TSC staff to examine and project affects on the reactor.
Though this event made little difference on the progress of the scenario, the TSC was not aware of this and a loss of feedwater could have had major effects.
The Engineering Support Center (ESC) had indication of
minor core damage prior to the declaration of the General Emergency (GE).
This knowledge was never available to the staff in the TSC.
Had the TSC examined these indications, the GE may have been declared earlier.
The CR was not kept abreast of what issues were being
examined in the TSC or in the EOF.
Since the CR is in fact running the plant, they should be kept advised of corrective measures being considered in the TSC, and the effects of the accident offsite.
The area of communications between ERFs will be examined in a subsequent inspection (50-29/88-08-01).
2.
The Recovery Manager in the EOF used forms for notificath of state and local officials that were not in the official "EOF Operation Procedure".
The licensee stated that the forms it had used had beer, agreed upon by the licensee, and state and local officials, but had not yet been included in the E0F Operation Procedure.
The inclusion of the authorized notifica-tion forms in current procedures will be examined in a subsequent inspection (50-29/88-08-02).
3.3 Other Areas Requiring Follow-up u
1.
Recovery Manager (RM) performs routine administrative functions as well as the "orange phone" communications. This often left the RM unavailable to confer with his staff, as well as interact with state officials in the E0F. The licensee stated that this arrangement was made with the affected states. Howaver, the RM could be relieved of many of these administrative duties, allowing him time to maintain better command of the E0F as well as interact with state and local official _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Protective Action Recommendations (PAR's) were not developed and presented in a structured manner. As an example, while the licensee was relaying a PAR to state officials, new information resulted in an attempt to anclyze and charge the PAR on the spot. Although the licensee acd stste officials stayed with the o-iginal PAR, several minutes were spent discussing a change in thi PAR. Additionally, tSa RM was not included in the discussion, nor was the data validated.
3.
The TSC has no method of tracking technical issues being examined by che TSC staff.
For example, when the ESC suspected that there mav have been fuel overheat and potential degradation, the issue was not pursued by TSC staff nor was a record of the data kept for follow-up.
4.
The scenario had the potential to adversely affect licensee performance.
In particular, plant data did not accurately reflect operator actions, and there were significant differences between projected ve: sus actual field measurements.
4.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) 50-29/87-03-02 (IFI) Field team results were not displayed or distributed to response personnel in the EOF.
I During the exercise, data flow from the field teams through the communications system to health physics (HP) personnel was observed.
The data flowed well and HP personnel were supplied with a constant stream of information. The data was analyzed and used to modify Protective Action
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Recommendation decisionmaking.
The states were constantly involved and did in fact receive the data and its implications.
Dose assessors aggressively pursued disparities between projected and actual doses, and made conservative decisions in view of these differences.
Plume tracking during the scenario was made difficult by constant scenario wind shifts, however, offsite teams performed well in spite of the difficulty.
Based
on these observations, this item is closed.
5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on April 28, 1988, during which key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise.
The licensee indicated that these observations would be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions taken.
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The licensee was informed no violations were observed. Althcugh weak-nesses were identified as noted in detail 3 above, the NRC team deter-
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mined, that within the scope and limitation of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated they could implement their Emergency Plan and emergency procedures
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in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated they would evaluate them and take appropriate action regarding the items identified.
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