ML20235E911
| ML20235E911 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 09/03/1987 |
| From: | Gray E, Lodewyk A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235E901 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-87-07, 50-29-87-7, NUDOCS 8709280318 | |
| Download: ML20235E911 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000029/1987007
Text
l
1
.
l
l
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-29/87-07
Docket No.
50-29
License No.
i
Licensee:
Yankee Atomic Electric Company
j
1671 Worcester Road
Framingham, Massachusetts 01701
Facility Name:-
Yankee Nuclear Power Station
Inspection At:
Rowe, Massachusetts
.
Inspection Conducted:
May 11-29, 1987
'
.7!./ 8 7
Inspector:
4
s'
A. J. Lodewyk, g ctor Engineer
date
Approved by:
") __
fd/87
F. H. Gray, Acting 4hief, Materials and
date
Processes Section
Inspection Summary: A routine, unannounced inspection was conducted by one
region-based inspector of activities associsted with the licensee's Inservice
Inspection Program and Steam Generator integrity.
Those areas examined onsite
l
,
l
included:
steam generator tube eddy current surveillance test sampling; eddy
l
current data analyses; secondary water chemistry controls and visual inspec-
i
tions; and, associated radiation protection measures and housekeeping. An
l
in-office review was also conducted relating to results of the steam generator
inspections and Licensee Event Report No. 50-29/87-06.
Results: During this inspection, one violation was identified relating to
failure to plug defective steam generatar tubes. Additional areas of concern
discussed include technical specification sampling criteria, steam generator
test equipment usage, and observed housekeeping practices.
l
i
1
1
I
l
8709280318 B70916
I
ADOCK 05000029
O
i
.
L_______
._
_
- _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - -_
-.
.
DETAILS
I
1.0 Persons Contacted
1
Throughout this inspection, various' site and engineering office repre-
1
sentatives were interviewed for information and auditing purposes.
Those persons contacted include the following:
Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)
1
- B. L. Drawbridge, Assistant Plant Superintendent
N. W. Featherston, Inservice Inspection Coordinator
C. Garrow, Reactor Engineer - Framingham
- T. K. Henderson, Technical Director
1
,
J. Lance, Engineering Branch - Framingham
S. M. Litchfield, Medical and Plant Safety Supervisor
D. F. May, Reactor Engineer (Eddy Current Test Coordinator)
- R. A. Mellor, Assistant Technical Director and Chemistry Manager
i
- N. N. St. Laurent, Plant Superintendent
- R..N. Williams, Reactor Engineering Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
'l
2
- H. Eichenholz, Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those persons present at the exit meeting conducted at the closa
of this inspection.
2.0 Steam Generator Preventive Maintenance
The licensee's steam generator (S/G) preventive maintenance program
(as it is related to maintaining S/G integrity and controlling station
secondary water chemistry) was reviewed relative to criteria, commitments,
and recommendations provided in:
Condition 2.C(5) of License No. DPR-3 regarding a secondary water
--
chemistry monitoring program
Facility Technical Specifications Section 3/4.10, " Steam Generators"
--
limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements
YAEC August 12, 1985 response to Generic Letter 85-02
--
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report NP-2704-SR, "PWR
--
Secondary Water Chemistry Guidelines," Revision 1 (1984)
1
NUREG-0844, "NRC Integrated Program for the Resolution of Unresolved
--
Safety Issues A-3, A-4, and A-5 Regarding Steam Generator-Tube
Integrity"
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ , - _ _ _
_ __
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
.
L
3
.
i
Licensee performance in S/G preventive maintenance was determined
'
by interviews with chemistry, radiation protection, maintenance,
1
engineering and contractor personnel; review of selected procedures,
i
reports and records; and observations of plant facilities and equipment
i
during facility tours. The review addressed the licensee's maintenance,
,
Inservice Inspection (ISI) and water chemistry program procedures,
]
policies and implementation.
2.1 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Sample
i
YAEC technical specifications require the steam generator tube
sample to consist of at least 3% of.the total number of steam
generator tubes, including a representative sample from areas pre-
viously experiencing degradation and randomly selected tubes.
The
intent of the technical specification sampling requirements is
twofold:
to identify defective tubes in previously known areas of
degradation; and, to detect any new, service induced modes of
degradation.
Previous inspection of the number 2 steam generator was conducted in
!
1984 from the cold leg side.
At that time, effective ECT was not
!
completed within the areas of steam generator tubes with primary side
l
magnetite deposits. ' Magnetite deposits are located in the lower
steam generator area, from the tube sheet up to approximately 50-60
inches above the tube sheet.
During the current 1987, Cycle 18/19 refueling outage, the licensee
completed eddy current testing (ECT) from the hot leg side of the
number 2 steam generator. The lic2nsee completed a 100% inspection
of the accessible hot leg side tubes.
The licensee considered inac-
cessible tubes to be (a) permanently plugged tubes, (b) tubes with
temporary template or equipment plugs, and (c) tubes outside the
,
i
reach of the SM-4 probe manipulator.
Also, the inner tube, small
U-bend radius does not always permit passage of an eddy current p' robe
from the Hot Leg to the Cold Leg for inspection.
The tube inspection
i
sample included previously identified areas of tube degradation such
j
as (a) pitt-like eddy current signals in the lower, kidney-shaped
i
region, and (b) degradation at the U-bend tube support bars.
The
inspection sample also included full length tube inspections intended
to identify any new modes of degradation that may have developed
',
since previous surveillance inspections.
Prior to the outage, the ECT contractors (Zetec) developed a testing
technique to rotate and phase-out magnetite / copper signals previously
i
experienced in S/G tubes with primary side corrosion deposits.
J
was performed using test frequencies of 600, 140, 45 and 10 KHz.
The
steam generator tubing is 0.75" 0.D. x 0.072" wall thickness and is
I
constructed of 304 Stainless Steel.
Onsite, the inspector observed
-
ECT data acquisition, verified field test frequencies, and confirmed
proper probe speeds.
Results of the 1987 tube inspections are shown
in Table I.
No significant changes in rate of tube degradation and
i
no new modes of degradation were identified by the licensee.
I
1
l
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -
_ _ -
_-
--_ -.
_
_
1
.
1
4
.-
TABLE I
STEAM GENERATOR NO. 2 1987
INSPECTION RESULTS
.
Hot Leg
Cold Leg
U-bend Supports
No. of tubes
1507
1193
1507
inspected
No. of. defective
7
12
2
tubes identified
No. of degraded
8
17
7
tubes identified
4
For determining Technical Specification resampling characteristics,
the licensee elected to re-analyze 1984 ECT data to' determine which
indications had grown less than 10%.
Re-analysis of this data de-
termined eight of the twenty-one defective indications should have
been identified and plugged previously.
(This concern is addressed
in section 2.2 of this report.) The remaining 13 defective tubes
placed the inspection results 1n Technical Specification category-
~
C-2, as more than 1 but less than 1% of the 1507 tubes inspected were
found to be defective.
Therefore, it was not necessary by technical
specifications to expand the inspection to other steam generators.
Based upon the above information, the licensee's steam generator tube
sampling for the 1987 outage meets the intent and criteria of the
current YNPS Technical Specifications.
However, following several
telephone conferences, cognizant YAEC, Regional and NRR staff agree
that the current Technical Specifications require' updating regarding
steam generator surveillance practices.
Licensee and NRC personnel
agreed that improvements can be made in the S/G technical specifica-
tions in areas such as inspection sample sizes and acceptance
criteria and definition of " full length" tube inspection.
Changes to
the station technical specifications are to be tracked, discussed,
reviewed and approved by NRC personnel through the facility licensing
process. The inspector had no further questions regarding this
matter at this time.
i
-,
1
- - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
--
_ _ - _
- - _ -
. _ - _ - - - - _ - .
. - . _ - - - - - - - _ _ - - _ - - -
.
5
.
2.2 Eddy Current Data Analyses-
As discussed in section 2.1 of this report, the licensee. initiated a
re-analyses of 1984 eddy current test data during the 1987 refueling
outage to establish Technical: Specification resampling requirements.
During.this review, inadequacies in previous data analyses were
discovered and the licensee proceeded to re-analyze all.of the
latest eddy current data for each steam generator. The re-analyses
were performed using the DDA-4' analysis system and identified a
number of previously unidentified, unacceptable eddy current
indications. The results of all the 1987 secondary, reanalyses
identified the following defective tubes subsequent to a primary
analyses:
Year of-
Additional No.
Primary
of defective tubes
Analyses
Identified in 1987 Reanalysis
steam generator no. I
1985
0
steam generator no. 2
1987
5
1984
9*
steam generator no. 3
1984
11
steam generator no. 4
1984
12
Total number of defective tubes identified
during this outages secondary reanalyses
37
=
- one defective tube was not identified during 1987 analyses as it
is a cold leg indication for which 1987 data was not obtained.
The remaining 8 defective tubes were identified again during
1987 testing and are included in the results discussed in
section 2.1 of this report.
In one instance, a defective (ECT indication >40% through-wall)
indication had been noted on the 1984 data strip chart.
However,
the defect had not been properly recorded and subsequently the
defective tube was not repaired.
Consequently, the tube remained
unplugged and the steam generators were placed in service for two
,
'
full operating cycles. This event violates YNPS Technical Specifi-
l
cation Section 4.4.10.4(b), acceptance criteria, which states the
i
facility steam generators are to be determined operable after plug-
I
ging all tubes exceeding the plugging limit (87-07-01). Also, this
l
event represents a lack of adequate' Quality Control during completion
of ECT and data analyses.
l
1
Prudent corrective actions taken by the licensee to assure the
t
integrity of the steam generator tubes include the 1987 re-analyses
of the most recent ECT data for the hot and cold legs of all four
o-________
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
_-_
'l
.
i
6
)
)
)
l
steam generators. The additional defective tubes which were identi-
fied during the 1987 re-analyses, were plugged during the current
cycle 18/19 refueling outage.
No tube leakage was' experienced during
j
the. previous operating cycles, thus indicating the integrity of the
primary reactor coolant pressure boundary had been maintained and
there was no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public.
l
Details of'this event are' discussed in Licensee Event Report
-
50-29/87-06.
The licensee has initiated an investigation. for generic
I
'
implications of these events and to determine if additional reporting
requirements are necessary under 10 CFR 21.
NRC Headquarters, regional and resident personnel will review future
j
,
implementation of corrective actions to prevent recurrence of this
.j
event.
)
1
2.3 Radiation Exposure
1
1
An inspection of the onsite training facilities and field eddy
current testing was performed to assess the. licensee's measures to
L
maintain personnel radiation exposures as-low-as-reasonably-
j
achievable during steam generator surveillance inspections. Training
j
of steam generator contract workers included review of onsite radia-
!
tion protection policies and practical steam generator mockup
j
testing. YAES utilizes a wooden simulation of the lower steam ge-
)
nerator region for practical training.
The mockup primarily consists
j
of a partial steam generator frame and a number of tube sheet holes.
Industry standard mockup models consist of a complete metal lower
steam generator and tube sheet.
Mockup training and testing is
intended to familiarize personnel with work activities such as equip-
ment installation procedures prior to entering high radiation areas.
During this outage, three separate personnel entries were required to
complete installation of the No. 2 steam generator eddy current test
equipment.
The large number of steam generator entries could be
attributed to the facilities less than standard mockup.
Through
j
discussions with counterparts and management relating to this sub-
,
.
l
Ject, the licensee indicated updated eddy current test equipment
would be evaluated for site-specific applicability and use during
future steam generator inspections.
Upgrades in ECT equipment would
,
not require entry into the steam generator lower plenum for equipment
l
installation, thus reducing personnel time within this high radiation
area.
Other ECT high radiation exposures are associated with those work
activities performed on the work platform situated directly outside
the steam generator manway. Although it is not yet a common
industry practice, the use of a temporary lead shield door on manways
,
I
has proven effective in reducing platform radiation fields at other
nuclear power plants.
l
_ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . -__
-
_
-
-,
.
7
,
The above practices were discussed with licensee representatives who
indicated a strong desire to keep personnel exposures low consistent
with ALARA principles.
Feasibility regarding implementation of these
techniques would be subject to YAEC engineering and management
review.
i
Inspector observation of steam generator platform work activities
I
'
'
included maintenance and cleaning of the ECT probe and probe pusher
by contractor technicians.
Frequent cleaning of the ECT equipment
was necessary as loose primary-side magnetite deposits _were being
dislodged by the probes centering fingers.
The dislodged magnetite
interfered with test probe manipulation and testing, requiring
technicians to remove the magnetite deposits which had accumulated on
test equipment.
During routine surveillance testing, the inspector
observed ECT technicians shaking the loose magnetite from the test
probe onto the work platform. At the inspector's request, the Radia-
tion protection Supervisor immediately obtained a survey of the work
platform floor.
The loose magnetite deposits were found to contain
high beta and low gamma radiation.
It was determined that the work
platform area background radiation level had not changed signifi-
cantly and that additional radiation cetectors (foot dosimetry) were
i
not necessary for the ECT technicians.
However, as the loose magne-
1
tite did create a potential airborne radiation source the technicians
j
were instructed to contain the removed magnetite flakes as much as
i
possible inside work buckets.
Further discussions with licensee
j
representatives determined the previous shift of.ECT technicians had
i
been instructed to contain the loose magnetite upon removal and the
l
instructions had not.been transfered as workers changed. The
licensee's radiation personnel took immediate action in addressing
j
and correcting the above concern.
'
The total radiation exposure obtained during steam generator inspec-
tion and maintenance activities was not available at this time.
The
expended man-rem will be subject to further NRC review upon comple-
,
tion of the steam generator work activities and subsequent reporting
'
to the NRC, as required.
'
2.4 Secondary System Water Chemistry Controls
License No. DPR-3, Section 2.C(5) requires YNPS to maintain a
secondary water chemistry monitoring program to inhibit steam
generator tube degradation.
Secondary system water chemistry
requirements have been subject to review in an attempt to improve
the environmental conditions associated with steam generators.
I
Procedure AP-9002, secondary water chemistry, was found to be
consistent with EPRI established guidelines.
Review of chemical
data records for the past operating cycle determined chemical con-
1
l
_ _ _ _
.
__
l
1
i
l
'
-
8
.
)
i
centrations were maintained within the administrative requirements.
In'particular, ammonia and dissolved oxygen concentrations have been
limited to minimize corresion of copper-bearing materials in the
secondary system.
In addition to chemical parameter limits, licensee
l
efforts to maintain good water chemistry include:
replacement of the
I
l
copper bearing Air-Ejector portion of the condensate system with 304
)
!
stainless steel; and, sample ECT of condenser tubes based upon
l
previously experienced leaks.
'
Overall, review of the licensee's secondary water chemistry program
has determined the licensee's activities meet the general license
requirement.
2.5 Secondary Side Steam Generator Inspections
Steam generator secondary side visual inspections are performed to
assure component weld integrity and to reduce the probability of
introducing loose parts to the steam generator tubes.
Loose parts
]
in the plant secondary system may act as missiles or result in wear
of the reactor coolant pressure boundary during normal plant opera-
tion.
Previous and present outage activities relating to the preven-
tion and detection of steam generator loose parts are discussed
below:
l
During the performance of secondary side inspections of the facility-
l
steam . generators in November,1985, the licensee identified weld
J
cracks on the No. 2 and 3 Steam Generator feed rings.
The cracks
were in the non-ASME Code welds in the "T" to the feed ring joint
and were circumferentia'l in nature. The 1985 visual inspections'
i
l
also noted that three.of the six original. "Z" feed ring support
i
brackets in steam generator no. 3 were missing.
The details of the
I
corrective actions take_n in response to these-defects are discussed
further in NRC inspection. report.no. 50-29/85-18.
Subsequent to the
defect corrective actions, extensive visual inspections were con-
ducted in the No. 2 and 3 steam generators in response to reports of
possible loose parts remaining in the secondary sides from associated
maintenance hetivities.
Corrective measures for this concern
included establishing procedure requirements for: housekeeping logs;
zone III personnel and equipment accountability; and, specific steam
generator access and work control.
During the 1987 outage, the inspector addressed the above concerns
by accompanying ISI personnel on the internal no. I and 3 steam
generator secondary side visual inspections.
Independent testing
and observations found no evidence of circumferential cracking in
,.
feed rings or any other new modes of degradation.
Housekeeping logs
I
and accountability procedures were strictly adhered to throughout
both steam generator inspections
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - -
- - - -
__
.
.
9
,.
Also, extensive radiation protection coverage was provided throughout
the secondary side visual inspection' activities.
Based upon these
inspection results, it appears the corrective actions taken to ad-
dress the November, 1985 visual inspection and maintenance house-
keeping concerns were adequate.
3.0 General Housekeeping _g
Throughout this inspection several plant tours were performed, specifical-
ly within the yard areas, the warehouse and the reactor refueling floor.
Areas were surveyed for housekeeping practices which, ove' 11, appeared to
be good, with the following exceptions.
l.
Early in the outage during a tour of the yard between facility buildings,
'
the inspector observed a number of radiation protection materials strewn
throughout the area. A sample of cotton gloves, rubber gloves, swipes
and booties were taken to the health physics access control point and
checked for contamination. All of the articles surveyed were found to be
radiologically clean. Although none of the samples were potential person-
nel hazards, the radiation protection supervisor and rerident inspector
agreed general housekeeping practices could be improved. The radiation
protection supervisor discussed this concern with appropriate licensee
personnel and subsequently, no further articles implying potential conta-
mination were found in the yard areas during this insper. tion.
l
Housekeeping practices on the reactor refueling floor was an area of
further concern to the inspector.
Although a large amount of maintenance
,
activities and radiation protection coverage was being performed, an
inordinate amount of debris and unused tools were found scattered through-
out the refueling deck floor.
Small articles included such items as nuts,
l
bolts, electrical extension cords, tape rolls, and storage buckets.
These
'
and other items were considered obstacles affecting inspector and worker
routine movement about the floor.
The reactor head had not been lifted at
j
the time of this inspection however a potential for inadvertently intro-
ducing unwanted equipment or personnel into an opened vessel was apparent
)
i
I
under these conditions.
Licensee senior management initiated immediate
corrective actions to address this concern, including revision of
Procedure No. OP-1100, to ensure all debris has been removed from the area
adjacent to vessel.
4.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) IFI (84-07-01). Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation review of
the licensee's proposed Technical Specifications and justification for
eddy current sample sizes. On May 25, 1984, the licensee provided justi-
fication to the NRC for modification of the YNPS Technical Specifications
relating to steam generator tube examination sample sizes.
This item is
closed based upon the licensee's withdrawal of the request for Technical
Specification change. The scope of the steam generator tube inspection
.
.
a
3
-i
.
.
10
j
i
j
l
during this outage was reviewed by NRC Region I and NRR and found accept-
able. The_ scope and results of the steam generator tube eddy current
"
examinations during this outage are further discussed in Section 2.1'.
The
licensee has indicated that a revised technical ~ specification change
,
request may be submitted in the future.
2
(Closed)IFI(85-18-03}. . The licensee's plans to ' resolve _the' steam
generator No. 2 magnetite formation interference with tube eddy current
i
testing.
Improvements in eddy current test technology (discussed further
I
in section 2.2) resolved the licensee's difficulties in examining portions
,
of tubes with magnetite deposits.
This item is closed.
j
i
5.0 Exit Interview
l
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on May 15, 1987.
The inspector
summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the onsite inspection at
that time. Other items addressed in this report are a result of licensee
event Report No. 50-29/87-06, subsequent telephone conferences and
io-office reviews.
At no time during this inspection was written material
provided to the licensee by the inspector.
'
.
i
l
,
L___.--____.______-_________