IR 05000029/1990013
| ML20056A938 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1990 |
| From: | Mann D, Oconnell P, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056A935 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-90-13, 50-29-90-13, NUDOCS 9008100182 | |
| Download: ML20056A938 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-029/90-13 Docket No.50-029 Licenso No.
DPR-3 Priority Category C
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Licensee: Yankee Atomic Electric Comoany 580 Main Street Bolton Massachusetts 01740-1398 Facility Name: Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Rowe. Massachusetts Inspection Conducted:
Julv 9 - 13. 1990 O M~.
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Inspected By:
P. O'Connell', Radiation Specialist Date
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[c D. Mann, Radiation Specialist Date b'b Od Approved By:
(M-AALL W.
Pasciak, Chief, Facilities Date Radiation Protection Section Insoection Summary: Inspection conducted on July 9 13, 1990.
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NRC Inspection Report No. 50-029/90-13.
Areas Insoected:
Routine announced inspection of the implementation-of the radiation protection program during the current refueling outage. The inspection consisted of a review of:
training and qualifications of contractor Radiation Protection Technicians, external exposure controls, and internal exposure controls.
The inspectors also provided input to the NRC Maintenance Team which was concurrently conducting NRC Maintenance Team Inspection 50-029/90-81.
Results:
Within the scope of this review, one non-cited violation was identified involving a failure to follow a radiation protection procedure.
9008100182 900003
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PDR ADOCK 05000029 C'
PDC I
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PETAILS 1.0 Individuals contacted 1.1 Licensee Personnel l
- G. Babineau, Radiation Protection Manager
- R. Clark, Manager, Training J. Geyster, Radiation Protection Engineer
- T. Henderson, Acting Plant Superintendent l
P. Hollenbeck, Radiation Protection Engineer l
- K. Jurenthaff, Plant Operations Manager
- J.
Kay, Technical Services Manager
- R. Mellor, Technical Director
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- R. Mitchell, Maintenance Manager
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T. Shippee, Radiction Protection Senior Engineer
- N. St. Laurent, Acting Manager of Operations S. Wisla, Radiation Protection Engineer 1.2 NEc Personnel
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- D. Caphton, Maintenance Team Leader T. Koshy, Senior Resident Inspector I
- M. Markley, Resident Inspector
- Denotes attendance at the exit meeting on July 13, 1990.
2.0 PurDose and Scone of Inspection This inspection was a routine announced inspection of the implementation of the Radiativa Protection (RP) Program during the current refueling outage.
The inspection consisted of a review of:
training and qualifications of contractor RP Technicians (RPTL), external exposure controls, and internal exposure controls.
The inspectors also provided input to the NRC Maintenance Team which was concurrently conducting NRC Maintenance Team Inspection No. 50-029/90-81.
3.0 Trainina and Qualifications The inspectors determined that the licensee was adequately instructing workers on methods to minimize personnel exposures by: review of the RP General Employee Training lesson plans, observation of worker practices inside the Radiation Controlled Area (RCA), and discussions with several workers.
The inspectors reviewed the training and lesson plans for the
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contractor RPTs. The training consists of a self-study review of station RP procedures followed by two days of training on specific topics.
In preparation for the outage, the RP Supervisor submitted a
list of topics to the Training L
Department.
These topics included areas where additional contractor RPT training was needed either because of recent procedural changes or to address weaknesses which had been noted in the past.
The inspectors reviewed the summaries of work experiences of several of the contractor RPTs. The summaries are provided by l
the vendor who supplies the contractor RPTs. By reviewing
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applicable records the inspectors determined that the
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l contractor RPTs had a rufficient level of work experience to
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be qualified as Senior RPTs in accordance with the licensee's program requirements.
4.0 External Ernosure Controls j
The inspectors conducted several tours of the facility and
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determined that areas were properly posted, barricaded, or l
locked.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for periodically ensuring the operability of portable radiation
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survey instruments, currently the survey instruments are l
calibrated semi-annually. Source checks are conducted by the
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individual using the survey instrument prior to each use.
i Hcwever, the source check is only conducted on the lowest l
scale for the instruments typically used, is. RO-2, RO-2A.
l The licensee conducts a source check on all the scales on a bi-weekly frequency Under the licensee's current program, the survey instruments typically used to perform high radiation area surveys and job coverage do not receive a
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source check on the appropriate scale prior to use.
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The inspectors noted that American National Standards
Institute (ANSI).N-323-1978, " Radiation Protection
Instrumentation Test and Calibration", recommends in Section
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4.6 " Periodic Performance Test", that reference readings
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should be obtained for one point on each scalt' or decada l
normally used. The licensee's program for sourae checking
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instruments was not consistent with the ANSI recommendation.
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The licensee stated that they would evaluate the adequacy of their program regarding the frequency for source checking survey instruments on the scales normally used, in particular for survey instruments used for surveys and job coverage of High Radiation Areas. This item will be reviewed during a future inspection.
While touring the RCA, the inspectors observed two pocket dosimeters on the roof of the fuel handling facility.
The inspectors returned the pocket dosimeters to the control point and reviewed documentati n to determine if the o
appropriate actions were tako. to estimate personnel exposures.
The licensee's Procedure OP-8409 " Lost (Damaged)
TLD/ Pocket Dosimeter" states in Section 5. A that the individual shall not be authorized to re enter the Radiation Controlled Area (RCA) until a determination of his exposure is made and appropriate forms, including OPF-8409.1 and exposure records, are updated.
The inspectors noted that, for one of the lost pocket dcsimeters, Form OPF-8409.1,
" Lost (Damaged) TLD/ Pocket Dosimeter Report", had not been completed prior to allowing the individual to re-enter the RCA. The RPT who reissued the pocket dosimeter had determined that the individual who lost his pocket dosimeter had just entered the RCA and had not entered any Radiation or High Radiation Areas. However, the RPT did not complete Form OPF-8409.1 as required by the procedure. This was identifisc as an apparent. violation of Technical Specification 6.11, " Radiation Protection Program", which requires, in part, that procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.
The licensee took prorpt corrective action by generating the proper forms, distributing a memo to the RPTs reiterating the proper procedure and outlining the steps that must be performed in accordance with the procedure, and initiating a Radiological Occurrence Report. The inspectors determined that, due to the minor safety significance and the prompt correction actions taken by the licensee, this violation met the criteria, specified in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, V.
G.,
for a non-cited violation. (50-029/90-13-01)
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5.0 Internal Exoosure Controls
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The inspectors reviewed-the licensee's program for tracking.
personnel etcarures to airborne radioactivity and determined
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that the lit: c+t.e has an adequate program to track the exposures. Review of personnel exposure records indicated
.that the licensee was implementing an effective program for_
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minimizing internal exposures.
The inspcctors noted that the licensee's procedure for
removing protective clothing (PCs) was different than general. industry practices. The. licensee's procedure for removing.PCs'when exiting contaminated areas specifies that all items, with the exception of the coveralls, are to be
removed prior to crossing the Step Off Pad (SOP). Typically,
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the coveralls are then removed at the control point.:The
' inspectors' asked the licensee the rational for allowing individut'.s to cross SOPS and walk through the RCA wearing potentially contaminated coveralls, and then remove the r
' coveralls without wearing any type of-gloves or cotton
liners..The licensee stated that the primary. reason for
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. wearing the. coveralls while crossing SOPS was.because
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individuals ~must walk outside when going:to and from the l
control point and, due to climate conditions, having
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individuals wear'only modesty garments would not be adequate, j
During the: refueling outage in late 1988 the licensee implemented the use of " clean" coveralls for exiting 1from
i the Vapor Containment (VC). Individuals removed their
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coveralls while inside the VC and donned the " clean"
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coveralls prior.to walking back to the control point. The 13aensee stated:that, due to space limitations, they could
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not implement a similar procedure for exiting contaminated areas in the-Auxiliary Building. The licensee stated that two sets of coveralls are typically worn when individuals
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work in a highly contaminated area and the outermost set is removed prior to individuals crossing the SOP.
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While the licensee's procedure of continuing.to wear coveralis after crossing SOPS is not consistent with~ typical'
t industry. contamination control practices, a. review of-personnel contamination reports and routine surveys indicated that this' practice did not appear to contribute to the number'of personnel contamination' incidents or in the.
spread-of contamination. This item-will be reviewed-during future inspections.
6.0 L Exit Meetina The inspector met with licensee management listed in Section 1.0 on July 13, 1990.. The findings of the inspection were
' discussed at that time.
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