IR 05000029/1986010

Insp Rept 50-029/86-10 on 860721-22.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program & Previously Identified Insp Findings

ML20212N330
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	08/14/1986
From:	Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212N324	List: IR 05000029/1986010 ML20212N323
References
50-029-86-10, 50-29-86-10, NUDOCS 8608280187
Download: ML20212N330 (5)

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'U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-10

Docket N {

License N DPR-3 Category C Licensee: Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1617 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 10701 Facility Name: Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: July 21-22, 1986 Inspectors: . .' CM T lt flo C. Z. Gordon, Emergency Preparedness ' date Specialist Approved by: -

1. 1</Me# [ // fo W. J/j/ azar,usJ Chief, Emergency

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Preparedress Section

_Ig yection Summary: Inspection on July 21-22, 1986 (Report No. 50-29/86-10)

Areas Inspected: Special, announced followup inspection of the emergency pre-paredness program to review previously identified inspection findings from Inspection Reports 84-03 and 86-0 Results: No violations were identified. Two areas which were identified during the June 11, 1936 exercise were discussed to provide clat ification. The first item relates to the licensee's procedure to make protective action re-

commendations to offsite authorities. The second item involves the manner in which turnover of Emergency Director duties occurs, and the definition of duties / responsibilities of key response organization member i 8608280187 860820 PDR ADOCK0500g9 G

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DETAILS Persons Contacted E. Barry, Shift Supervisor

• T. Henderson, Technical Director

• J. Kay,. Technical Services Manager A. Lepagc, Shift Supervisor

• D. McDay1tt, Emergency Planning Coordinator D. O'Donnell, Senior Traicing' Instructor

• Denotes those present at the exit intervie . License Action on Previously Identified Items The following items were identified in Inspection Report 84-03 and were reviewed during this inspection:  !

(Closed) 50-29/84-03-21: Provide sufficient information to demon-strate compliance with the guidance of Criteria G.1 and G.2 of !

NUP,EG-0654 (i.e., an example of the information to be transniitted annually to the public, explaining the rationale for protective actions). Commit that information will be distributed on an annual basi ,

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I Section 11.3.2 of the Emergency Plan, dated August 30, 1985 was re- !

vised to provide for annual distribution of public information !

brochures. The inspector reviewed the brochures developed for !

liassachusetts and Vermont and determined that they adequately cover I the criteria identified in Sections G.1 and G.2 of NUREG-065 (Closed) 50-29/84-03-22: Provide annual dissemination of information to transients within the plume EP !

The inspector reviewed a list of drop off points located throughout I the EPZ, held discussions with licensee personnel, and determined that i

public information for the transient population was adequately dis-tributed in calendar year 1985 and 1986,  !

i The following items were identified in Inspection Report 86-06 and were reviewed during this inspection to provide clarification:

(0 pen) 50-29/86-06-11: During escalation of the scenario, turnover between individuals in charge of the emergency was not explici Also, during any specific time of the accident it was not clear that overall direction and control was provided from one sourc .

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3 i The NRC team made this observation during the emergency exercise held on June 11, 1986. The inspector met with licensee representatives to discuss details and possible corrective actions to be taken. We found that the comment could be applied in three instances of the exercise: The onsite relationship between the Plant Emergency Dir-ector (Shift Supervisor) and TSC Coordinator (Plant Manager), the-turnover of full authority for direction and control from the site to the EOF, and the relationship between the EOF Coordinator and Recovery Manager (RM).

During the exercise it was identified that once the TSC Coordinator arrived at the control room /TSC area, he assumed the PED duties as described in Section 8.2.1,3 of the Emergency Plan without a clean turnover from the Shift Supervisor. These duties include recognizing Emergency Action Levels (EAL), emergency classification, notification of Massachusetts and Vermont, and notification of the NRC. During this inspection, the inspector discussed the role of the shift super-

- visor (as the PED) and his relationship with the TSC Coordinator, with individual shift supervisors and training department represent-atives, and determined that the training provided and knowledge ob-tained is adequate but is not clearly described in the Emergency Plan. The licensee stated that a revision to the Emergency Plan and procedures would be considered to clarify each members' onsite duties and responsibilities and further identify the manner in which the initial organization is executed (with the TSC as the' lead emergency response facility). A concern regarding the turnover from the site to the EOF and delegation of key duties within the EOF by the Re-covery Manager was also identified. The licensee indicated that turnover of duties was performed via signature oy the RM on a de-signated form contained in the core procedures. However, it was not clear to the NRC observation team that assumption of overall direct-ion and control provided by the Recovery Manager was complete since the TSC continued to carry out the emergency classifications and subsequent notification of offsite authorities. The EOF also re-mained in a reactive mode and aid little to actively pursue outcomes of worsening plant conditions (accident assessment in conjunction with the TSC) and increasing radiation levels (dose assessment).

In the exercise it was also identified that the relationship between the Recovery Manager and EOF Coordinator was established to allow key decisions to be made by either individual. The Recovery Manager maintains overall command and control, however direct interface with other personnel within the EOF is usually performed by the EOF Coordinator. In addition to supervising the E0F, the EOF Coordinator must take extra time to keep the RM informed of all decisions which could affect the licensee's overall response. Although this approach was effective during the exercise, it has the potential to result in confusion on those occasions when the Recovery Manager also inter-faces with state representative .

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In order to further clarify functions which should be either assumed, retained, or delegated by tae Plant Emergency Director, TSC Coord-inator, EOF Coordinator, and Recovery Manager, the inspector provided a list of critical tasks for the licensee to consider for assignment to each of these positions. These included providing protective action recommendations (PAR) to the States of Massachusetts and Vermont, approval of information releases to the media, classifi-cation of emergencies, ensuring notifications of offsite agencies are made, di ecting onsite evacuation, authorizing radiation exposures in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits (lifesaving situations), and approval of deviation from established emergency procedure Licensee repre-sentatives stated that the above information would be considered in a revision to the Emergency Plan. Licensee action should resolve this ite (0 pen) 50-29/86-06-12: Formulation of protective action recommen- '

dations (PAR) to offsite authorities is made solely on dose pro-jections, and.does not consider NRC guidance (plant conditions). The

" key-hols" concept is not used when developing a PAR, and prior to meeting with the States, a specific recommendation was not estab-lished. In addition, the licensee does not followup and obtain from the States the status of implemented protective action The inspector reviewed procedure OP-3310 " Evaluation of Radiological Data", held discussions with licensee representatives, and determined that the procedure and training provided to emergency personnel does not fully address the initiation of protective actions as soon as core damage is detected or projected. We explained our concern that protective action recommendations should be made as soon as an EAL for a Ganeral Energency classification is reached. This would likely result from actual or imminent substantial core degradation and not only be conditional upon having a radioactive release and subsequent dose projection. Also, Procedure OP-3310 does not consider each .

offsite individual at risk since recommendations for sheltering or evacuation are made solely for the towns of Monroe Bridge and Reads-boro but not to populations spread over a specific area (i.e., down-wind and adjacent sectors). The following guidance in this area was also provided to the licensee via IE Information Notice 83-28: For any General Emergency, immediately (within 15 minutes) re-commend shelter for 2-mile radius and 5-miles dowr. win ' For core melt sequences in which significant releases from con-tainment are not yet taking place and large amounts of fission products are not yet in the containment atmosphere, consider 2-mile precautionary evacuation in all direction Consider 5-mile downwind evacuation (45 to 90 sector) if large amounts

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4 of. fission products (greater than gap activity).are in the con-

, tainment atmospher Evacuation should be-recommended if an assessment of conditions indicates it can be implemented prior to a significant release and transport of radioactive material i to the affected areas. Recommend sheltering'in other parts of

! the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone under this circum-stanc . For core melt. sequences in which significant releases from con-

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tainment are not yet taking place and containment failure _ lead-ing to a direct atmospheric release is likely in the sequence

. but not imminent and large amounts of fission products in i addition to noble gases are in the containment atmosphere, con-sider precautionary evacuation to 5 miles in all directions, i Evacuation should be recommended if an assessment of conditions indicates it can be implemented pri:r to a significant release

and transport of radioactive material to the affected area ,

! For core melt sequences in which large amounts of fission pro-

ducts other than noble gases are in the containment atmosphere

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and containment failure is judged imminent, recommend shelter

. for those areas in which evacuation cannot be completed before transport of radioactivity to that location.

' For loss of physical control of the facility, consider 2-mile precautionary evacuation in all directions.

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i For dose projections in excess of Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) Prutective Action Guides (PAGs) recommend actions consistent with the guidance in Table 5.1 of the EPA manual for Protective Action Guide .

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Licensee representatives stated that they understood our concerns

, regarding issuance of protective action recommendations and agreed to take appropriate action through revisions to the Emergency Plan

, and Procedures.

! Exit Meeting

On July 22, 1986, the inspector met with the individuals listed in section 4 1 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The inspector

! recommended that the details discussed in regard to direction and control of the emergency organization and formulation and issuance of_ protective measures should be used as a guide in preparing the respense to our letter of July 16, 1986.

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