ML20154S673

Affidavit of Gf Sessler.* Discusses June 1988 Graded Exercise for Plant.Prof Qualifications & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20154S673
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	09/28/1988
From:	Sessler G PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:
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ML20154S590	List: ML20154S587 ML20154S651 ML20154S667 ML20154S673
References
OL-1, NUDOCS 8810050125
Download: ML20154S673 (17)

Text

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e September 28, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

, , NUC5 EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFCTY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1 OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, at al. ) 50-444-OL-1

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 ) (Onsite Emergency and 2) ) Planning and Safety

) Issues)

)

AFFIDAVIT OF GREGG F. SESS LER I, Gregg F. Sessler, being on oath, depose and say as follows:

1. I am a Project Engineer in the Technical Support Group for New Hampshire Yankee. As indicated in the following paragraphs, I was the first shift Engineering Coordinator in the Technical Support Center (TSC) during the Seabrook Station Graded Exercise in June, 1988. I am a licensed professional engineer with extensive operating and engineering experience in pressurized water reactors and have a graduate degree in physics. In addition I had been qualified, while in the Navy, on three different reactor plants as Engineering Officer of the Watch which is equivalent to a shift superintendent in commercial reactors, googh [

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t' During the graded exercise I was personally involved with the engineering activities in the TSC. Furthermore, I am familiar with the operating modes, design characteristics / limitations, and physical arrangement of the plant systems and components involved in the exercise scenario. A statement of my professional qualifications is attached hereto and marked "A".

2. The NRC in Inspection Report No. 88-09 stated that:

"Results: No violations were identified.

Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public."

3. The above reference inspection report identified both strengths and weaknesses, one of the weaknesses or areas for corrective action identified in this inspection report is the factual basis upon which the Massachusetts Attorney General (MA AG) relied in filing its motion. The purpose of this affidavit is to address the Affidavit of Robert D. Pollard and the following excerpt from the inspection report relied upon by the MA AG.

"The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency operations Facility (EOF) staff displayed questionable engineering judgment and/or did not recognize or address technical concerns (50-443/88 01). For example:

"- A questionable fix for the Containment Building Spray System; and

"- No effort was noted to blowdown Steam 2-l

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Generators to lessen the heat load in containment."

4. As discussed in the following paragraphs, the efforts involving the restoration of the Containment Building Spray (CBS) system displayed good engineering judgment and a recognition of relevant technical concerns. This conclusion was reached as a result of my personal involvement as an exercise participant (i.e. Engineering Coordinator in TSC),

reviews of materials generated during the exercise, diccussions with controller and other exercise participants, and discussions with the NRC Inspector who made the observations.

5. In order to understand the actions taken, the plant status should first be reviewed. At the time an Alert was declared, the " A': train CBS pitmp wae, out of service and being repaired. These rupair efforts continued until the LOCA occurred. Because of the radiation levels associated with a LOCA, the equipment vaults, where the pump is located, had to no exited for personnel safety. Since the repair work was incomplete, the "A" train pump was still out of service.

Coincident with the postulated LOCA, there was also a postulated failure of the "B" train CBS pump to start.

Initial efforts by the Control Room to start the "B" train pump manually proved to be unsuccessful. With a loss of both redundant trains, the TSC with the assistance of other e

support groups undertook the following actions: (1) as a first priority, restore / repair the normal CBS flow path

} components; and (2) as a second priority, develop a contingency plan for an alternate CBS flow path which would be implemented in the event all efforts to restore normal CBS '

flow failed. Both of these efforts were initiated to restore containment spray to mitigate the impact of the ongoing i l r l release by increasing cooling to the containment (thereby [

reducing pressure) and removing some radiciodine from the '

containment atmosphere.

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6. As indicated above, the first priority efforts were underway to restore / repair the normal CBS components.

] Specifically a team from the Operational Support Center (OSC)  !

] was being assembled to troubleshoot the hypothetical electrical failure experienced by the "B" train pumps. This t repair effort used acceptable procedures, techniques and  ;

equipment. The spare parts used were acceptable for the intended use.

7. In parallel, I coordinated the development of the alternate CBS flowpath contingency plan. The alternate CBS flowpath concept was to use components and systems not necessarily associated with the normal CBS flowpath as a means of restoring the containment spray function. My efforts included reviews of available components, system

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interconnections, plant parameters, design characteristics, and operating modes.

8. During the development of the alternate flowpath the NRC Inspector, who had made the observation, asked several detailed questions concerning this solution. Within the constraints of the exercise on communicating with observers answers to his questions were provided. However, since the alternate flowpath effort was in fact a contingency plan, it was not appropriate at that time to caucus with the NRC as would have been required for a final plan prior to implementation. As such, the information available to the Inspector was not a complete description or analysis of the alternate flowpath.

\ 9. The alternate CBS flowpath developed was technically scund. It was a feasible means to provide water to the CBS l spray rings in containment and restore the containment spray

! function, albeit at reduced effectiveness, for accident i

mitigation if the normal flowpath was not returned to I operation. L 4

10. As can be seen from paragraph 5 above, it was l prudent to develop a contingency plan since there was a loss 1 f of both trains of CL; and because initial efforts by the \

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Control Room to manually restart proved uncuccessful, j Furthermore, the exercise controllers, in order to assure offsite response activities would continue commensurate with 4

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I exercise objectives, caused the repair activities of the "B" i j train pump to be continued (i.e., the controllers interceded  ;

and declared restart / repair efforts ineffectual approximately four times during the exercise). i 2

11. The alternate CBS flowpath, as a contingency plan,  !

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} would have been subjected to formal reviews, including those I l

i of the NRC, prior to its actual implementation. However, the  !

repair efforts for the "B" train CBS pump's electrical system [

were finally successful and containment spray initiated via the normal flowpath. Accordingly, the contingency plan never L i

proceeded into the review / implementation stage. I

12. As discussed in the following paragraphs t

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' depressurization of the steam generators was temporarily  !

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2 postponed to assess the radiological consequences of the  !

) blowdown and its impact on future accident mitigation

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] activities. This conclusion was reached based ere reviews of  ;

I materials generated during the exercico and discussions with '

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e controllers and other exercise participants. In addition, I i did further assessment of the effect dupressurizing the steam

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generator would have had on containment heat load and the  !

purpose for why this step is provided in the Energency Procedures. i'

13. It was recognized by the operators in the Control Room and the emergency responders in the TSC that a step in the applicable Emergency Operating Procedures called for a i

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controlled depressurization of the steam generators. It was also recognized, however, that this action could introduce I

accident level radioactive material to areas of the plant that at the time were unaffected (e.g., Primary Auxiliary Building) which could hamper later accident mitigation l afforts. l

14. Since it would not delay further actions under the Emergency Operating Procedures (i.e., one could continue onto the next step), it was decided that the depressurization of the steam generators could be temporarily postponed until the results of a steam generator secondary side sample were available. In addition, the steam generators were not required to cool down the plant.

15. Batore completion of sampling activities and any simulation of steam generator depressurization, the exercise for Day 61 was torninated.

16. Subsegunet to the exercise, I also assessed the 2 i

offect tnat copressuritation would have had on the heat load to the coritainment. Based on this analysis I concluded that

! the rate of heat transfer between the containment atmosphere i and the insulated steam generators was insignificant when compared to the energy already relehJed from the postulated accident. Further, the potential reduction did not warrant j immediate depressurization without further evaluation of j i

s potential radiological consequences to other areas of the plant and the public.

17. Subsequent to the exercise, I also reviewed the Westinghouse documents which provide the reasoning behind the various steps in the Emergency operating Procedures. The reason given for controlled depressurization of the steam generators is not reducing containment heat load but rather to permit further cooldown and depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Given the particular accident sequence of the exercise, the RCS had already been depressurized.

18. The Pollard Affidavit at 11 13 and 15 concluded that the blowdown would have contributed to reducing the radioactive releaste and that this blowdown would have contributed to achieving the goal of rapid reduction in containment temperature and pressure. In both cases the conclusions reached by Mr. Pollard are either wrong or speculative.

194 As indicated in paragraph 13 above, the reason depressurization was delayed was because of a concern that it could cause a further release of radiation, a factor Mr.

Pollard seems to ignoce. Therefore, at best,'Mr, Pollard is speculating on what effect the depressurization may have on radiological consequences.

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20. In regards to the depressurization of the steam ,

generators as a means of achieving the goal of rapid  ;

reduction in containment temperature and pressure, it was ,

recognized during the exercise and subsequently shown by me that the rate of heat transfer between the containment  ;

1, atmosphere and the insulated steam generators was 1 insignificant when compared to the energy released by the i postulated LOCA. Therefore steam generator secondary h- a i j depressurization would have had no practical effect in j

reducing containment temperature and pressure, much less bu

contributor to the rapid reduction in temperature and i

pressure. As such there would have been no real potential for reducing any radiological releases.

4-21s Based on the foregoing paragraphs, I have concluded that the observations of the NkC Inspector were a result of the unavailability of information d9 ring the exercise and i

that subsequent evaluations haves shcwn that the conclusion j

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i reached from these obcervations is not correct. There is no

, issue much less a significant safety issu Gregg Ff 'Sessler STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Rockingham, ss. September 28, 1988 Then appeared before me the above subscribed Gregg F.

Sessler, and made oath that he was the author of the i

foregoing affidavit and that the statements set forth therein i

are true to the best of his knowledge.

Before me,

(#NN>u e Ni s/t 'n q Notary P41611c '

MyCommissionExpires:sf[jf ////

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Sessler Attachment A, 1of4!

l GREGG F. SESS LER l

SUMMARY

OF -

QUALIFICATIONS:

Over seventeen years experience in the nuclear power field; a licensed professional engineer with a graduate degree in physics and an extensive background in PWR design, plant i engineering, and operations including six years in the naval nuclear propulsion  !

program.

EDUCATION AND TRAIMING: B.S. Naval Science; U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD. 1970; Major: Applied Science M.S. Physics; U.S. Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA. 1971; Specialty:

Nuclear Physics U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion School 1972; Bainbridge, MD and S3G Prototype Reactor West Milton, NY r

QJL%IIICATIOLIS: Professional Engineer in the State of New Hampshire, No. 6243 EAP.ERIf.EC 1982 Present Seabrook Station - Public Sqrvice Co. of -

New Huu;t, shire Proieqj;...ED2hD 1987-1231 -

4 Member of the Station oporation Review Committee (SORC), responsible for review of Station operating programs,

' procedures, and denign changes, and to j

advise Station nanagement on mattern related to nuclear safety. Vice Chairman

' of the Electric Council of New England (ECNE) Engineering Subcommittee, whose charter involves periodic meetings i

between New England and New York State nuclear power plant technical support groups to discuss operating experiences.

Perform independent reviews of 10 CFP

' 50.59 evaluations and have various collateral responsibilities involviny programs such as temporary modificatior.,

fire protection, and performance monitoring.

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o Sessler Attachment A, 2 of 4 l

e Technical Suncort Decartment Sucervisor -  ;

12ift Directed engineering support activities

~' for the plant operations group during tho  ;

transition from initial plant t construction to the plant operations i phase, involving initial core load and  :

licensing activities prior to power '

operation. Responsible for various ,

configuration management programs.

Participated in various licensing activities such as technical i

specification reviews. Coordinated the .[

design and construction of a major '

modification to the plant's reactor  :

coolant and steam generator sample (

systems following initial plant hot i functional testing. SORC member and ECNE

engineering subcommittee member.

Enaineerina Services Denartment S u ee rv i s or_,,- 1983-1986 Supervised a multi-discipline engineering

group of over 30 engineers as well as an  !

l additional large group of designers and i drafters. This group supported nany >

initial plant licensing activitics zuch ,

as environmental qualification (EQ), fire -

protection (10 CFR 50 Appondix R), and 1

ASME Section XI inservica

, inspection / testing (ISI/IST).

Responsible for the development of Station operating programs, such as

design control, tent control, special

proc.ess control, and fire protection. l Managed the development of Station drawinas critical to operations such as

, piping and instrumentation drawings, t (P&ID's), using an advhnced computerized draf ting / design (CADD) system. SORC i

member and ECNE subcommittee member. *

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I g Sessler AttGchment A, 3 e'.4 i

Senior Mechanical Encineer - 1982 Assisted the Engineering Services Department Supervisor in various engineering and technical projects supporting the plant operations group during initial plant construction.

Concentrated on nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) problems.

1978 to 1981 Beaver Vallev Unit No. 2 - Schneider Power Corcoration Chief Site Ennineer -

1980-1981 Managed an engineering department of over 90 personnel, including engineers, piping designers, and draftsmen, during the initial construction of Beaver Valley power Station Unit 2. Worked in close coordination with architect engineering and Duquesne Light company engineering personnel. Responsibilities included small bora piping design layouts piping design verifications isometric drawing preparation; ASME Section III/XI, ANSI B?l.1, and AWS welding programs; technical construction procedures; quality assurance recordo, and document control.

i Site cuauj;y;,J.ssurance Manaaer -

121.!L-LE2.2. '

Managed a quality assurance / quality i control group of ANSI Level II and III audit. and inspection personnel during the i initial construction of neaver Valley '

Unit 2. runctioned as a enmber of the Duquesne Light Company cite quality control organization staff.

Respor.sibilities including supervision of l mechanical / welding inspectors and .

nondestructive examination (NDE) personnel; performance of program audits, maintenance of the ASME Section III/XI Quality Assurance Manual, and coordination of inspections and audits by jurisdictional / enforcement authority personnel (ANI/NRC).

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.40sler Attachment A, 4 of 4j i

1972 to 1977 United States. Navy Served as an officer on two nuclear powered uhips, USS Bainbridge (CGN 25)  ;

1975-1977 and USS Whale (SSN 638) 1972-

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3974, in assignments that provided extensive experience in nuclear power ,

plant operations and maintenance. As a qualified engineering duty officer and engineering officer of the watch, responsibilities included supervision of nuclear propulsion plant operation, personnel training, and administration of '

repair and maintenance activitier. ,

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18 DCT -3 P3 :04 September 28, 1988 (JFht . ~,

00CKL1.w & LI UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BR ^k '

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1 NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) 50-444-OL-1

) (On-Site Emergency (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) Planning and Safety

) Issues)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Thomas G. Dignan, Jr. , one of the attorneys for the Applicants herein, hereby certify'that on September 28, 1988, I made service of the documents listed below by depositing copics thereof with Federal Express, prepaid, for delivery to (or where indicated, by depositing in the United States mail, first class postage paid, addressed to) the individuals listed below:

1) Applicants' Response to Motion to Admit Exercise Contantion er, in the Alternative, to Reopen the Recordt

2) Affidavit of Gary J. Kline

3) Affidavit of James A. MacDonald; and

4) Affidavit of Gregg F. Sessler.

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Administrative Judge Sheldon J. Robert Carrigg, Chairman Wolfe, Esq., Chairman, Atomic Board of Selectmen Safety and Licensing Board Panel Town Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atlantic Avenue i Commission North Hampton, NH 03862 East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Administrative Judge Emmeth A. Diane Curran, Esquire Luebke Andrea C. Ferster, Esquire 4515 Willard Avenue Harmon & Weiss Chevy Chase, MD 20815 Suite 430 2001 S Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20009 Dr. Jerry Harbour Stephen E. Merrill i Atomic Safety and Licensing Attorney General Board Panel George Dana Bisbee U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Assistant Attorney General (

Commission Office of the Attorney General '

East West Towers Building 25 Capitol Street 4350 East West Highway Concord, NH 03301-6397 Bethesda, MD 20814 Adjudicatory File Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire ,

Atomic Safety and Licensing Offic0 of General Counsel i Board Panel Docket (2 copies) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory .

U.S. Nucl3ar Regulatory Commission Commission One White Flint North, 15th Fl. e East West Towers Building 11555 Rockville Pike 4350 East West Highway Rockville, MD 20852 Bethesda, MD 20814  ;

• Atomic Safety and Licensing Robert A. Backus, Esquire Appeal Board Panol Backus, Meyer & Solomon t U.S. Nuclear Regelatory 116 Lowell Street Commission P.O. Box 516 i Washington, DC 20555 Manchester, NH 03105 Philip Ahrens, Esquire Mr. J. P. Nadeau ,

Assistant Attorney General Selectmen's Office Department of the Attorney 10 Central Road General Rye, NH 03870 Augusta, ME 04333 ,

Paul McEachern, Esquire Carol S. Sneider, Esquire i Matthew T. Brock, Esquire Assistant Attorney General  !

Shaines & McEachern Department of the Attorney General 4 25 Maplewood Avenue One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor l P.O. Box 360 Boston, MA 02108 I' Portsmouth, NH 03801 I

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i Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Mr. Calvin A. Canney Chairman, Board of Selectmen City Manager RFD 1 - Box 1154 City Hall Route 107 126 Daniel Street Kensington, NH 03827 Portsmouth, NH 03801

• Senator Gordon J. Humphrey R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esquire U.S. Senate Lagoulis, Clark, Hill-Whilton &

Washington, DC 20510 McQuire '

(Attn Tom Burack) 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950

• Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Mr. Peter J. Matthews One Eagle Square, Suite 507 Mayor r Concord, NH 03301 City Hall (Attn: Herb Boynton) Newburyport, MA 01950

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Mr. Thomas F. Powers, III Mr. William S. Lord Town Manager Board of Selectmen j Town of Exeter Town Hall - Friend Street i 10 Front Street Aaesbury, MA 01913 t Exeter, NH 03833 H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Charles P. Graham, Esquire Office of General Counsel Murphy and Graham Federal Emergency Management 33 Low Street Agency Newburyport, MA 01950 500 C Street, S.W. .

Washington, DC 20472 '

Gary W. Holmes, Esquire Richard A. Hampe, Esquire Holmes & Ells Hampe and McNicholas 47 Winnacunnet Road 35 Pleasant Street Hampton, NH 03841 Concord, NH 03301 i Mr. Richard K conovan Judith H. Mizner, Esquire Federal Emergency Management 79 State Street .

Agency Second Floor  !

Federal Regional Center Newburyport, MA 01950 '

130 228th Street, S.W. >

I Bothell, WA 98021-9796 i

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' Thomas G.-Dignan, Jr.

(*= Ordinary U.S. First Claes Mail.) l t

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