ML20150F393

Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State &/Or Local Govts Decline to Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Planning

ML20150F393
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook, 05000000, Shoreham
Issue date:	02/23/1987
From:	Bronstein D, Sneider C ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:	NRC
References
FRN-52FR6980, RULE-PR-50 52FR6980-00021, 52FR6980-21, OL, NUDOCS 8807180274
Download: ML20150F393 (8)

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! STATEMENT OF COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS' +87 FE9 24 P2 35 ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON ON NRC STAFF'S DRAFT PROPOSED EMERGENCY PLANNING RULE CHANGE d

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Attorney General James M. Shannon regrets that the Commission has denied him the opportunity to address the Commission personally at the Staff briefing on the proposed emergency planning rule to be held on February 23, 1987.

Because the Massachusetts Attorney 4eneral's office has for thirteen years represented the Commonwealth in the Seabrook censtruction permit and operating license proceedings, the Attorney General is in a unique position to comment on this draft rule that is directly aimed at assuring the licensure of the Seabrook plant. On Feb uary 18, 1987, the Commission denied the Attorney General's request to appear before the Commission. Attorney General Shannon is therefore submitting this written statement urging the Commission to reject the Staff's draft rule change that is based on considerations of "equity" that simply do not apply for the Seabrook plant (one of only two plants -- Snoreham and Seabrook -- directly affected by the proposal), and that will, if adopted, most certainly result in an unacceptable lowering of safety.

For thirteen years, since the outset of the Seabrook licensing proceedings, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has argued that the Seabrook plant is sited too close to a massive, transient summer beach population for which adequate emergency e

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planning is not feasible. Even before the accident at Three Mile Island and the current emergency: planning requirements, the Commonwealth, along with the other intervenors in the proceeding, maintained tha't the utiliIy should be reqJired to demonstratethefeasibilityofevacuat)ingthesummerbeach

. population near Seabrook. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) LBP-76-26, 3 NRC 857, 922-26 (1976); ALAB-390, 5 NRC.733 (1977). After the accident at Three Mile Island, the Commonwealth joined the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League in its Petition to Show Cause why the Seabrook construction permit should not be suspended or revoked unless it could be-demonstrated that emergency planning was feasible for the Seabrook Station ten-mile emergency planning zone.

The commonwealth argued in 1979, and again in 1981, that adequate planning was not feasible. Moreover, the Commonwealth pressed for a determination of the emergency planning issues before allowing the utility to proceed with construction so as to avoid the risk that billions of dollars would be wasted should the plant be denied an operating license due'to its inability to comply with the emergency planning regulatiora.

The Commonwealth further argued that this emergency planning issue could not be decided fairly by the NRC if it waited until the operating license stage. See "Commonwealth of Massachusetts Memorandum in Support of Seacoast Anti-Pollution 4

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League's Request for an' Order to Show Cause Dated May 2, 1979,"

l dated November 16, 1979 ["Attachment A" hereto) at pp. 3-7; i

"Memorandum of ,the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Request for an Order to Show Cause Dated June 30, 1980," dated March 13, 1981 ["Attachment

, B" hereto) at pp. 3, 14, 17.

Nonetheless, the NRC refused to grant a hearing, stating unequivocally that a utility's investment in construction was not a proper factor for NRC consideration in determining whether to issue a license to operate. DD-14, 14 NRC 279, 286 (1981). Indeed, when the intervenors appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, the Commission stressed that it "does not and cannot consider the utility's investment" I and denied that such investment would in any way "influence its consideration of whether to grant an operating license."

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC, 690 F.2d 1025, 1033, 1030 (1982) (emphasis added) citing NRC Brief at 36-37. It was this representation by the NRC that was the deciding factor in the court's refus&1 to order a hearing. Id. at 1033-34.

However, now that the NRC is f aced with the very real possibility that the Seabrook plant, as well as Shoreham, may not receive a full-power operating license, the NRC Staff has l shifted its position by 180 degrees and is endeavoring to lower l

the emergency planning licensing standard not out of any '

consideration for safety, but solely out of a concern for a i

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utililty's investment in construction. See Draft Notice at

, p. 4. The Staff now deems it unfair to the utility that it not be given an operating license after expending so much money constructing the plant. However, the Commonwealth's refusal to i

submit emergency response plans is entirely consistent with the position it has taken for thirteen years. If equity were the real issue -- and not solely the economic interest of the utility -- the Staff, as well as the utility, would have agreed with Massachusetts years ago that the emergency planning issues should be decided before billions of dollers were expended in construction. Viewed in the light of this latest Staff

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proposal, the refusal to grant a hearing can only be seen as a reflection of the fear that if the emergency planning issues are decided properly, without consideration given to the utility's investment in construction, then this plant could not be licensed.

As the courts, as well as the NRC, have f requently made clear, it is the utility, and not the public, which must take the risk that a completed plant will not receive an operating license due to its inability to meet the NRC's ever-evolving safety standards. E.g., Power Reactor Development Co. v.

International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, 367 U.S. 396 (1961); Porter County Chapter of the I2ack Walton League v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363, 1376 (D.C. Cir.

1979); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC, 690 F.2d at 1033. While the Staff couches its lowering of safety standards .

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. < a in such euphimistic terms as "less coordinated planning," it is

indeed the public who will bear the risk should a plant be s licensed without the required assurance that adequate

. protective measures will be taken in the event of an emergency. The Staff is playing a game of "chicken," assuming that Governors deciding not to, participate in planning Will in fact *partic,ipate once a plant is licensed. But it is the public that is endangered when plants are licensed to operate with less than adequate emergency planning.

Moreover, the Staff's proposed rule has far-reaching -

consequences beyodd the two or three states that now, for good cause, are failing to cooperate in emergency planning. Indeed, what the Staff's proposal amounts to is a retu'en to the pre-Three Mile Island situation of voluntary emergency planning.

Indeed, the refusal of some states to participate in i

emergency planning is the direct result of the NRC's retreat 4

from the standards set after Three Mile Islar.d. Thus, the Staff in its briefing to the Commission states that all that is required for licensure is reasonable and feasible dose reduction. As the Staff (as well as the Seabrook utility) has previously articulated, this standard applied to the Seabrook case'would mean that as long as it is feasible to evacuate some people from the Seabrook beaches, the plans will have accomplished the goal of dose reuuction, and the plant may be 8

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licensed. Consequently, it would not matter that thousands of other beachgoers may not be able to evacuate in time to avoid'

. exposure to lethal doses of-radiation. Thus, the Licensing Board in the Seabrook case has rejected out-of-hand Massachusetts' sole contention proffered in the proceeding on the New Hampshire's emergency plan, that set forth expert

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testimony showing that adequate protective mes.sures could not be taken for the summer beach population. Any determination of adequacy the Board might make for licensure, therefore, will be made without any look at evidence of whether the plan's "protective" actions will even protect the public. Certainly, if the Commission expects states to cooperate in emergency planning, in a case where intervenors have argued for years that adequate emergency planning is not feasible, the Commission must demonstrate true concern for the public's safety and require more for licensure than merely the ability to achieve "feasible" dose reduction without any regard to the level of protection achieved.

Moreover, the Staff's major justification for the draft rule -- that the Commission never expected states not to cooperate in planning -- is simply not true. The Commission in its Statement of Consideration in support of its emergency planning regulations in fact expressly recognized that:

[T]here is a possibility that the operation of some reactors may be affected by this rule through inaction of State and local governments

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or an inability to comply with these rules. The Commission believes that the potential restriction of plant operation by State and local officials is not significantly different i ,

in kind or effect from the means already

available under existing law to prohibit reactor operation, such as zoning and land-use laws,

, certification of public convenience and necessity, State financial and rate considerations (10 CFR 50.33(f)), and Fe6eral environmental laws. The Commission notes, however, that such considerations generally relate to a one-time decision on siting, whereas this rule requires a periodic .enewal of State and local commitments to emergency planning."

45 Fed. Reg. 55402, 55404 (August 19, 1980) (emphasis added).

It is clear from the Statement that the Commission did anticipate that some states might not partihipate in planning and that it recognized the consequent possibility that some reactors might never receive a license to operate.

Nevertheless the Commission deemed emergency planning by state and local governments tc b such "an essential aspect in the protection of the public health and safety," 45 Fed. Reg. at 55404, that the Commission was willing to risk the fact that some reactors might not operate as a result of a state's failure to cooperate in planning.

There can simply be no basis for lowering the "essential" emergency planning standards set in 1980 for protecting the public health and safety. Certainly the economic interests of a utility cannot be an acceptable justification. Attorney General Shannon therefore urges the Commission to reject the Staff's proposal.

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. j. Respectfully submitted,

. JAMES M. SHANNON

, ,. ATTORNEY GENERAL By: b-Carol S. Sneider

, i. Donald S. Bronstein

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Assistant Attorneys' General Environmental Protection Division d One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108-1698

-: (617) 727-2265 Dated: -February 23, 1987 t

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Aka men + A UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -

.i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO: DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR REAC'IOR REGULATION RE: CONSTRUCTION PERMITS CPPR-135 CPPR-136 .

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In the Matter of )

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) .

NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al, ) Docket Nos. 50-443

) 50-444 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 anE 2) )

s..,. I COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE' S REQUEST FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DATED MAY 2, 1979 The Commonwealth of Massacnusetts, an intervenor in the construction permit licensing proceedings for the Seabrook Station, supports the request of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution -

League (SAPL) for an order to show cause why the Seabrook construction permits should not be suspended or revoked for the following reasons: 1) the failure of the NRC to evaluate and determine the feasibility of evacuation and emergency planning beyond the Seabrook low population zone (LPZ), and 2) the failure of the NRC to evaluate the cont,equences of a Class 9 accident in its environmental reviews. -

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SAPL has raised these issues in its Request for an Order to Show cause, dated May 2, 1979. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts joins the arguments presented by SAPL in support of its Request for an Order to Show Cause, dated May 2, 1979, 1

and by the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) .1/ As a contiguous state to New Hampshire, the Commonwealth joins in the concerns about adequate emergency planning articulated by the New Hampshire Attorney General in its Statement of Position.E/ This memorandum comments on recent events and presents the Commonwealth's views on critical issues of public health and safety.  :

I. THE NRC MUST CONSIDER THE FEASIBILITY CF EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY PLANNING BEYOND THE SEABROOK LPZ There is no question that the Commission must consider the feasibility of evacuatons beyond the present 1.25 mile LPZ for the Seabrook site. Since the issuance of the construction permits for Seabrook Units 1 n 2, new NRC requirements have been promulgated; they call for extension of the emergency 1/ See "NECNP Memo sndum in Support of Seacoast Anti Pollution League Requests for Orders to Show Cause" (July 30, 1979). SAPL also has requested an order to show cause, dated .

March 12, 1979, concerning the financial qualifications of Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSCO). The Commonwealth is on record as supporting this request. See "Response of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to SAPL's Request f or an Order to Show Cause" (March 26, 1979).

2/ See "Statement of Position with Respect to the Seacoast Anti-Pollu tion Lecgue 's Request for Show Cause Order Dated May 2,1979," N.H. Attorney General (October 12, 1979).

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planning zone. from the present LPZ to a radius of at least 10 i

miles around all reactor s'ites.1/ I The unique characteristics of the Seabrook area, 9

including the heavily populated beaches, limited eg ress rou tes.

4 and lack of shelter ' f acilities, create major obstacles to the i development of emergency plans that assure protection of the l

public in the event of a serious reactor accident. The licensee 's own evacuation studies, on which the present emergency planc c.e based, indicate that nearby beaches could not be evacuated in the time now recommended by the Staff.d/

Because NRC policy requires a determination of emergency planning feasibility at the construction permit stage, this

, must issue be resolved before further constraction renders an impartial decision impossible.

SAPL has presented a thorough background of the evacuation issue in its memorandum in support of its request for 2/ NRC policy Statement on Emergency Planning Zones, 44 F.R.

61123, Oct. 23, 1979; Information Reoort, SECY-79-450, p. 2, July 23, 1979; letter dated September 13, 1979, from Darrell G.

Eisenhut, Acting Director of the Division of Ope. rating Reac to r s, to all operating nuclear power plants, Enclosure 7; Proposed emergency planning regulations for expedited rulemaking.

d/ The staff is now requiring a commitment from licensees to provide prompt notification to offsite authorities and to assure that such authorities have the resources to provide early warning and clear instructions to the public in the plume exposure EPZ within 30 minutes following notification from the facility. See D.B. Vassallo, NRC-NRR, to R. M. Butler, Boston Edison Company, Oc tober 23, 1979 (NRC Docket No. 50-471).

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a show cause order. B r ie fly, from the initiation of the  ;

Seabrook construction permit proceedings, the NRC S ta f f has . _

maintained it has jurisdiction to require a demonstration of j the feasibility of evacuating persons beyond the LPZ because of the proximity of the Seabrook units to the coastal beaches and~

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, because of the limited road networks serving those~ beaches. .

1 This position was supported by NECNP, the httorney General of New Hampshire and the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor-  ;

Safety.E/ .

Although the Licensing Board admitted that evacuation beyond the LPZ would become advisable in the event of a Class 9 acc iden t, the Board ruled and the Appeal Board agreed that t

existing NRC regulations did not require a consideration of emergency protection measures beyond the LPZ.5/ The Commission subsequently rejected this narro'w interpretation of Appendix E by issuing a proposed amendment to the emergency planning regulations designed to overcome the limitations imposed by ALAB-390. The proposed rule provided immediate "interim guidance" and required an applicant to consider .

emergency planning beyond the LPZ," . . . based on the design E/ See Letter from ACRS reviewing Seabrook Application

(December 10, 1974).

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5/ See Public Service Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Units 1 and 2),

LBP 76-26, 3 NRC 857, 871-875, 922-926 (1976); ALAB-390, 5 NRC 733 (1971) ; Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

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features of the facility and the physical characteristics of .

the environs in t'he vicinity of the site."2/

In 1976 a joint NRC/ EPA Task Force was organized to develop a basis for emergency response planning near"nuclear power plants. The Task, Force concluded that the consequences of a spectrum of design-based and Class 9 accidents should form the bases for emergency planning zones (EPZ's) with a 10 mile radius for a radioactive plume inhalation exposure pathway, and with a 50 mile radius for an ingestion exposure pathway.E/

As a result of NRC investigations into the Three Mile Island (n4I) accident and comments on the Task Force Report, the staff recommended that the Commission adoption of new emergency

- planning requirements, including the 10 and 50 mile EPZ's.b!

On Sep tember 13, 1979, the staff issued these proposals as "Near Term Requirements for Improving Emergency Preparedness" for all nuclear reactor sites.10/ Recently the Commission 2/ 43 F.R. 37473, 37475 (August 23, 1978).

E/ "Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396 (December, 1978).

E/ Information Report, SECY 79-450 (July 23, 1979).

1E/ Letter f rom Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director of NRC Division of Operating Reactors, to all operating nuclear power plants (September 13, 1979).

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officially endorsed the EPZ planning guidance:

In endorsing this guidance, the Commission

, recognizes that it is appropriate and prucenc for emergency planning guidance to take into

' consideration the principal characteristics . . . of a spectrum of design basis and core melt accidents.

44 ' F.R. 61123 (October 23, 1979)

On September 19, 1979, the staff issued new "Draf t Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0610), which' replace the general classes of emergency action levels in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.101.11/ These guidelines, which are effective pending completion of the expedited rulemaking on emergency planning in January,1980, provide, inter alia, for specific actions to be taken by the licensee and local emergency personnel during a reactor acc iden t, including "actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integr ity," i. e. , Class 9 accidents. The NRC 's recommended protective action for the public during such an accident is immediate sheltering, pending a determination that evacuation is rec uired and can be completed prior to the transport of significant quantities of radioactivity to the affected area.

The sheltering facilities along the coast near the Seabrock Stacion are grossly inadequate to accomodate the 1

l 11/ The Commission has endorsed these "predetermined i protective action plans for the EPZ 's." 44 F.R. 61123 (October 23, 1979)

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] eh number of people .iusing the nearby coastal beaches. The s{ . Commission has recognized and discussed this problem, and the consequent need for feasible evacuation alternatives. In its I: August 1978 notice,of the proposed' amendment to Appendix E, the d

Commission endorsdb consideration of emergency planning beyond 4

3 the LPZ, noting that:

The NRC staff has found that there may be j circumstances for which the available strategies for

'! t king protective actions outside the facility site a boundaries are limited. As an example, this occurs' 3 when large numbers of persons may be engaged in

outdoor recreational activities in the vicinity of a plant, and it is clear that existing structures are

! insuf ficient ~ to provide needed temporary shelter.

In such an instance, the sta ff [ sic) considered it appropr ia te to emchasize evacuation. 43 F.R. 37475 TAugust 23 , 1978) (emphasis added).

The applicant or licensee, therefore, must demonstrate that the beaches within the emergency planning zone ,can be promptly evacuated to assure the safety of these people in the event of a significant radiological release.

.. There are two principle reasons why an evaluation of emergency action capabilities at Seabrook should be initiated

, promptly. First, since the staff must ultimately determine the feasibility of evacuating the beaches before Seabrook Station can begin operating, it is important that the analysis be ,

completed before further investment and construction are wasted. More importantly, NRC decisions and regulations require that emergency planning feasibility be addressed at the construction permit stage.

When reviewing an application for a construction permit, the Commission must at the very least determine whether I

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surrounding population densities, transportation routes, land use ind other unique site characteristics might combine to render any emergency plan ineff ective.12/

The issue,

. therefore, is emergency planning feasibility, which is a ,

site-specific matter that must be resolved by consideration of the demographic, meteorological and topological peculiarities of the area surrounding the proposed reactor. This subject is a necessary component of the larger issues of site suitability

, (see 10 C.F.R. 5100.10)), reac tor sa fety (see 10 C.F.R.

J $ 50.34 (a) (10] and Appendix E to 10 C..F.R. Part 50) and the NEPA

! alternative sites cost / benefit analysis (see Supplementary Information to the proposed amendment to Appendix E, 43 F.R.

37473, 37474 (August 23, 1978)), all of which must be resolved p f

prior to the issuance of a construction permit.13/

e- In eddition, an applicant for a construction permit is required under 10 C.F.R. S50.3 4 (a) to provide in its Preliminary Safety Analysis Reoort (PSAR) a discussion of its "preliminary plans for coping with emergencies. " While 12/ Southern California Edison Comoany, et al., (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3), ALAB-248, 8 AEC 957, 962-63 (1974); Consumers Power comoany, (Midland Plant Units 1 and 2) ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 342-43 (1973); 10 C.F.R. Part 50, .

Append ix E, Sec tions I-III .

12/ The proposed emergency planning regulations specifically require inclusion of a "preliminary evacuation feasibility analysis" in the PSAR prior to issuance of a construction permit. See Proposed Amendments to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, SII (H); Staff Paper for Commissioner review f rom R.B.

Minogue, Director, Of fice of Standards Development. OSD's proposed amendments to Appendix E were draf ted pursuant to the Commission's notice of expedited rulemaking on emergency _

planning, 44 F.R. 41483 (July 17, 1979) .

consideration of the operative details of such plans may be

. more appropriately deferred to the operating license stage,

, there must be at least some consideration given to the scope of

.. 4 these plans, and a threshold determination made whether the

plans eff ectively extend to that portion of the public that can be said to be at risk in the event of a serious reactor acc iden t. In short, if the feasibility issue is to be considered at al.1, it must be at some time prior to construction of a facility. To deal with this critical safety issue after a reactor is built illog ical, and it runs the considerable risk that the applicant's ongoing investment "in the project will impermissibly affect the decision-making process.1d/ '

The urgency of an evacuation feasibility analysis might not be so acu te were it not for the heavily utilized beache5,

. near Seabrook, the lack of adequate sheltering facilities and the limited egress routes. When issuing the proposed rule requiring consideration of emergency planning beyond the LPZ, the Commission explained that one of its major objectives was

. . . is to assure that emergency plans exist which' provide reasonable assurance that aopropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of an acc id en ta l release of radioactive ma ter ial from a nuclect power plant.

. The intent of the commission is to assure that the decisionmaking process for licensing nuclear power plancs will include an analysis by the applicant and a review by the Commission of each nuclear power plant license or permit application to 15/ See Seabrook , CLI-78-14, 7 NRC 952 (1978). -

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plan for taking suitable protective actions on a.

timely basis under accident conditions within and

. outside the proposed site. 43 F.R. 37474 (emphasis added).

The Commission has listed the physical characteristics in the vicinity of a site which it feels are relevant to the evaluation of proposed protective actions:

(t]he numbers and proximity to the site boundary of resident and transient persons and the relative

- speed with which warnings can be communicated to ,

them, the availability. and character of evacuation routes and means of transportation, the availability and locations of structures suitable for sheltering people . . .. Id.

More recently, the NRC Siting Policy Tank Force Report recommended:

That Part 100 require that the physical characteristics of the EPZ, including the population distribution in relation to transportation routes and other topographic features, be such as to provide reasonable assurance that a relatively prompt evacuation of the EPZ, including transients would be feasible in the event of an accident.

NUREG-06 25, p. 48.

The Seabrook environs present major obstacles to the development of emergency plans providing "reasonable assurance

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tha't appropriate measures" can be taken on a "timely basis" in the event of a serious reactor accident. Within a 5 mile radius, there is an estimated summer peak population of over 100,000, the majority of whom are clustered in the beach areas.1E/ It is not disputed that even when the seasonal population is time weighted, the population densities substantially exceed the population guidelines that normally 15/ S ea b roo k . LBP-76-26, 3 NRC at 871-875.

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trigger an evaluation of the risk of Class 9 conr.equences.15/ In addition, there are only 3 two-lane '

roads provid.ing egress from the entire beach region.

For an evacuation to be effective where little or no -

sheltering exists, people must be removed before the radioactive plume reaches the area. The NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, now endorsed by the Commission, estimates that a major release may begin within 30 minutes after an initiating event, and that a tesulting radioactive plume may travel five miles 30 minu tes to two hours, and ten miles in two to four hours.12/

In other words, the Task Force recommends for emergency planning guidance a plume speed of 2.5 to 10 mph.

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"'apton 99r '. ic only tuo miles east ~ncrtheact of the Seabrook Station, and this coastal beach runs south to Salisbury Beach, Massachusetts, only five miles from the reactor site. A plume traveling at a speed of 10 mph to the east-northeast could reach Hampton Beach within 15 minutes of a releaaa; a plume traveling to the south-southeast at the same speed could reach Salisbury Beach in about 30 minutes. Under poor dispersion conditions associated with low windspeeds (2.5 mph), it would be necessary to evacuate the beach area within five miles in only two hours. The Applicant Public Service 15/ See Seabrook Alternative Site Study, NUREG-0501, p. AI60 (December 1978); Final Supplement to Final Environmental Statement

p. 4- 55 (May (Pilgrim 1979) .Nuclear Power Station Unit 2), NUREG-0549, 12/ NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, NUREG-0396 at 20, see also Appendix I . .

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Company's own preliminary analysis of the road network and the

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beach popui stion east of the Seabrook site concluded it would take eight hours to evacuate any of the three 22.5 beach sectors to a distance of five miles from the reactor.E/

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P.S.Co. 's Supplemental Testimony presented one year 1ater reduced the 5 mile evacuation time estimates for 45 beach sectors to 3.75 to 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.E/ Thus, the applicant 's own testimony indicates that it is not likely that beach sectors could be evacuated before the arrival of a radioactive plume, under serious accident conditions. It can hardly be said that there is "reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of an accidental release . . ."

and that "suitable protective actions (can be taken) on a timely basis . . .". See 43 F.R. 37474.

SAPL and NECNP have requested the NRC to demonstrate that evacuation of persons within a 30 mile area surrounding the Seabrook site is feasible. While present Comission policy requires ev'acuation planning for about a 10 mile radius from the reactor site, the actual size and shape of this EPZ must be determined on a site-specific basis. See 44 F.R. 61123. The comonwealth believes that the intervenors' request is reasonable in light of current Commission policy and the high M/ Answer 13.9 to Staff Questions, Amendment 23 to the PSAR, p. S13-16, June, 1974.

M/ Applicant 's Director Testimony No. 7, p. ~

19, In the Matter of P.S.Co., Tr. p. 2495+, June 5, 1975.

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permanent and seasonal populations surrounding this coastal site. In order to evacuate a 10 mile sector, for example, it will be necessary to provide for prompt notification and traffic control in neighboring sectors within the 10 mile radius and in down-wind regions beyond the 10 mile radius. It therefore is necessary to analyze the major egress routes and population densities beyond ten miles in order to determine the feasibility of evacuating all persons within the EPZ. .

In this regard, the Commonwealth is critically concerned with the feasibility of evacuating Salisbury, which on a summer weekend has a population exceeding 50,000 persons. A ,

substantial portion of these people are day trippers on the beaches. In addition, the town of Newburyport, located just south of Salisbury, attracts many summer tourists to the Parker River National Wildlif e Refuge and Plum Isl'and, both recreation areas of which have limited access to the mainland. South and west of Salisbury are some of the Commonwealth's mo'st densely populated North Shore communities, many of which have historic i

and recreational tourist attractions, and limited road networks. The metropolitan Boston area is also within the 30-50 mile radius of the Seabrook site.SE/  ;

. I Finally, an important f actor in determining the size of l the evacuation zone is the probability cf spontaneous or  !

voluntary evacuation. This is especially true for the ,

2E/ Within a 30 mile radius of Seabrook, the sta ff has estimated there will be over 1.4 million people in 1985 and over 3 million in 2020. See Seabrook Alternative Site Study, NUREG-0501, P. A-60 (June 1978) .

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l Seabrook environs where there are large numbers of seasonal transients. A proper feasibility analysis must evaluate and 9

include the likelihood of substantial voluntary evacuation outside recommended evacuation areas which could interfere with

. the prompt evacuation of sectors withom the EPZ.21!

II. CLASS 9 ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES MUST BE CONSIDERED AT SEABROOK

. Recent events underscore the importance of a staff evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 accident at Seabrook Station in their NEPA cost / benefit analysis of -

alte rnative s . One factor in this cost / benefit analysis is the risk impo' sed on surrounding populations in the event of serious reactor accidents. Since SAPL and NECNP presented their requests for show cause orders, the staff and a Licensing Board have officially identified the accident at TMI as a Class 9 accident.21/ In addition, the Commission recently' upheld the staff policy of considering the environmental consequences 21/ When pregnant women and pre-schcol children within 5 miles of TMI were advised to evacuate, there was a substantial number of additional evacuees within and beyond the 5 mile radius. A public opinion poll of residents living within 15 miles. of TMI by the Social Research Center at Elizabe th town College, PA, (April 9, 1979) revealed that over half of all residents within 5 miles left the area and nearly one-third of the residents from 6 to 15 miles evacuated voluntarily.

22/ Pubic Service Electr ic and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating S tation, Unit 1) ("Salem") NRC Docket No. 50-272, ASLB Order (September 10, 1979; "NRC Staff Response to Board Question No. 4 Regarding Occurrence of a Class 9 Accident at Three Mile Island," Docket No. 50-272 (August 24, 1979).

y of Class 9 accidents under certain circumstances.22!

Furthermore, the Commission has just specifically endorsed the

, . consideration of class 9 characteristics for emergency planning guidance (44 F.R. 61123, October 23, 1979). Because the staff must consider the environmental consequences of a class 9 accident for emergency planning, the staff will not be unduly burdened by evaluating these risks in the NEPA cost / benefit analysis for alternative sites as well.

Initially the Staff was precluded from considering Class 9 accidents in its environmental reviews because the probability of their occurrence was said to be too remote. The regulatory basis for ignoring class 9 consequences was provided s by the proposed annex to Appendix D to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. The Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) provided some justification for this practice by quantifying the low probability of Class 9

'acc id ent s . ,

Nevertheless, in practice the staff increasingly began to consider the potentially catastrophic consequences of such

,1 acc iden ts . As early as 1973, the Staff rejected a proposed site at Newbold Island, because an alternative site was significantly less populous and therefore less vulnerable to the consequences of a major nuclear accident. Shortly thereaf ter, Regulatory Guide 4.7 was issued, containing specific guidelines on the population density surrounding l

22/ Of f shore Powe r Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants)

> Docket No. Sni 50-4 37, C L1- 7 9, (September 14, 1979). ("Offshore Power")

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c proposed nuclear reactor sites. Stating that "[a] reas of low population density ara proforred for nuclocr power station sites," Reg. Guide 4.7 specified that if projected population densities within a thirty-mile radius of the site exceeded 500 persons per square mile at the time of initial operation and 1,000 persons per square mile at its retirement, then "special attention should be given to the consideration of alternative sites with lower population densities. "

Then, in the early site review for the proposed Perryman reactor in 1977, the staff initiated a Class 9 accident- -

analysis af ter demographic studi.es revealed population densities in excess of the "trip levels" of Reg. Guide 4.7.

The staff formalized this policy in Commission Action Paper, SECY 78-137. Whenever the population trip levels of Reg.

Guide.4.7 are exceeded, an "assessment of the relative differences in Class 9 accidenc risks should be included as one element of the site comparisons." The staff 's concern "was not based on a uniquely high probability of accident but rather on unique circumstances which increase the potential consequences and thus the overall risk. "

In 1973 the NRC received the first application for a license to manuf acture a commercial floating nuclear power plant (FNP) . Because such plants involved so unique a departure from land based siting, the Staff undertook an extensive study of the concequences of a Class 9 accident (the Liquid Pathway Generic Study, NUREG-0440 (LPGS]), and in the FNP Final Environmental Statement found that 16 -

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r the unlikely but possible occurrence of a core me.it accident at estuarine and riverine areas could -

result in a direct release of radioactive material, such that the consequences to the environment would

, be unacceptable. FES III, p. XIV.

The(applicant then challenged the Staff's Class 9 analysis as prohibited by the proposed Annex to Appendix D. The Siaff argued before the Appeal Board that it was already estiblished policy, as revealed in its Standard Review Plan, to reject proposed sites in highly populated areas due to the potential consequences of Class 9 accidents. See ALAB-489 at 223 224.

The question was certified to the Commission which upheld the S"taff 's consideration of Class 9 consequences. In its-Brief to the Commission, the Staff explained:

The premise for the Annex's limitations on discussion of Class 9 accident risks must be that the risks for the reactor in question fall within the envelope of the risks for typical licensed power reactors. It just doesn 't make sense to presume

.that the Commission was fo'rever foreclosing any attempt to evaluate class 9 consequences even if it

,could be shown that those consequences, and there fore the risks, for a particular application, were quantitatively and qualitatively dif ferent from practically all plants within the general. envelope previously considered.

. . . Common sense dictates that there must be a point beyond which the consequences of a Class 9 accident become susceptible to candid evaluation in an environmental impact s ta temen t. And it should not matter whether the reactor in cuestion is a -

land-based clant or an FNP. Brief of the Staf f, page 36-47 (empnasis aadeo).

Relying on its inherent policy-making authority, the Commission held it could not' ignore what its own staff views as an environmental risk that requires specific mit igative ac tions. NEPA is based on the ~

philosophy that the federal government should consider all available information about the e b  %

9 , , - -.

reasonably likely environmental consequences of its proposed actions and should take appropriate measures to mitigate or eliminate the adverse

• impacts of those actions when practical. Offshore Powe r Systems , suo ra_ , Slip, Op. at 7.

The Commission announced its intention to leave the generic issue of consideration of Class 9 accidents at land-based reactors for rulemaking proceedings and concluded by asking the staff to:

1. Provide us with its recommendations on how the interim guidance of the Annex migh* be modified, on an interim basis and until the rulemaking on this '

subject is completed, to reflect develooments since 1971 and to accord more fully with current staff poli cy in this area; and

2. In the interim, . . . bring to our attention any*

individual cases in which (the S taf f) believes the environmental consecuences of Class 9 accidents should be considered. Id., at 9-10 (emphasis added).

By inviting the staff 's recommendation for interim guidance based on developments since the issuance of the proposed annex and on curr'ent staff policy, the Commission implicitly accepted the staff 's policy in f avor of considering Class 9 consequences at its discretion, and in particular where the population guidelines of Reg. Guide 4.7 are exceeded.

It is now cleac that the sole justification for the original policy of the proposed annex is no longer valid. The probability of a Class 9 accident has now unmistakably entered the realm of "reasonable likelihood". First, the Risk Assessment Review Group concluded in NUREG-CR-0400 that the quantitative risk assessment methodology developed in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) was sc'ientifically .

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indefensible, thereby undermining the quantitive basis for the

- low probability of Class 9 accidents.

Now, by order of the Licensing Board in Salem 3 the ,

accident at TMI has been officially recognized as a Class 9 accident. 21/ It is ' w ell established that the NRC must consider any events that are "reasonably probable."21/ The Appeal Board in Of fshore Power Systems, recognized that NEPA nanda&es assessment of those environmental consequences that are reasonably anticipatable . .

. Moreover, the decisions to tie the need to discuss reactor accidents . . . to a showing of a reasonable likelihood of occurrence (is) an approach that has gained judicial acceptance (cites omitted). ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 213 (1978).

• The occurrence of a Class 9 accident at Thtee Mile Island establishes that there is a "reasonable likelihood" that such -

severe accidents can occur. NEPA, therefore, requires an evaluation of Class 9 accident consequences.

,Furthermore, the NRC Siting Policy Task Force has just issutd its report (NUREG-0625) for review by the Commission.

One of three primary goals was as follows:

"To take into consideration in siting the risk associated with accidents beyond the design basis (Class 9) by establishing population density and distribution criteria . . . Althnech (Class 9) risk cannot be completely reduced to zero, it can be significantly reduced by selective siting.

NUREG-0625, p. iii (1979).

di/ See footnote 22, supra at 14.

21/ Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island) Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. (Vermont Yankee), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 49 (1978).

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'fspec ifically, the Task Force recommends revision of 10 C.F.R.

', -Part 100 to provide a fixed exclusion and protective action distance and population density and distribution criteria to ba developed by generic rulemaking proceedings. The Task Force 3 i .

, g re-affirms the staff policy toward consideration of Class 9

, c Fevents: .

The Task Force concludes that the protection from Class 9 accidents originally intended to be provided by the populacica center distance should be restored

. . . The rationale for recommending population density and distribution limits both within and

, beyond the EPZ is to provide some additional assurance that the societal risk from Class 9

. accidents for populations within about 20 miles of a nuclear plant is kept at reasonable levels. .

NUREG- 0 6 25, Supra at 48.

When the Commission recently endorsed the concept of EPZ's, it stated it is appropriate and prudent for emergency planning guidance to take into consideration the principal characteristics . . . of a spectrum of design basis

'and core melt accidents. 44 F.R. 61123 (Oc tober 23, 1979) (emphasis added).

In the "Supplementary Information" section of the notice of the proposed amendment to Appendix E, ti.e Commission stated the protection of the public beyond the exclusion zone wan one matter which may also be considered in identifying any potential emergency planning advantages or disadvantages of particular sites as part of the NEPA cost / benefit analysis of alternate sites. 43 F.R. 37474.

In summary, the sta ff 's Class ' 9 policy and the Comm.ission's concurrence is now clear. In its most recent alternative site study, (NUREG-0501) , the sta ff 's demographic analysis of Seabrook disclosed population densities in excess of Reg. Guide 4.7 tr ip levels for plant start-up and

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re tiremen t. The Staff 's refusal to consider Class 9

, consequences runs counter to its prior decisions made in -

, Newbold Island, Perryman, and Offshore Tower, and is directly contrary to the current staff policy elucidated in SECY 78-137 and the Siting Policy Task Force Report. In view of the Commission's endorsement of this staff policy and the consideration of emergency planning disadvantages "as part of the NEPA cost / benefit analysis of alternate sites," it is the duty of the Staff to undertake a complete Class 9 analysis in conjunction with the evacuation feasibility evaluation.

III. LEGAL AUTHORITY -

In consideration of the NRC's statutory duty to safeguard

, the public health and safety, it is the duty of the Staf f, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2.202, to issue a show cause order and -

institute proceedings to "evaluate the feasibility of evacuation and emergency planning beyond the LPZ at Seabrook and the environmental consequences of a Class 9 accident. It is well-established that emergency planning is a significant safety issue. See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Unit 2), ALAB-47 4, 7 NRC 746 (1978). The Commission has a statutory duty to promote the development of atomic energy "consisten t . . . with the health and safety of the public."

42 U.S.C. S2013(d). The Commission itself has emphasized that

'public safety is the first, last and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or license to operate a nuclear facility. Power Reactor Development Coro. v.

International Union of Electrical Radio and Mach ine ~

Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 402, 81 S. Ct. 1529, 1532 (1961).

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In this case, the Supreme Court stressed that even after licensing of a reactor, the Commission retains jurisdiction "to ensure that the highest safety standards are maintained." Id.

In discharging this duty to safeguard the public, the

' ~

! Commission has articulated the goal that emergency plans should provide "reasonable assurance" that "suitable protective actions" can be taken on a "timely basis."21/ There is no question that emergency plans that satisfy the Commission,'s statutory duty or goal do not presently exist. The only "suitable protective action" for people on the beaches i,n the event of a serious atmospheric release is evacuation. It is therefore the duty of the staff to assure that an emergoney plan can be developed which provides "reasonable assurance" that the beaches can be evacuated on a "timely basis."

Section 186(a) of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C.

s 52236(a)) authorizes the NFC to suspend or revoke "(a]ny license . . . because of conditions revealed . . . which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the .

District of Columbia circuit recently held that this clause applies to all licensing mattees, including health, safety, and environmental considerations . . . (and) reflects a deliberate policy choice on the part of Congress when it enacted section 186(a) to render licenses for nuclear facilities subject to i postlicensing review under evolving licensing standards, rather than under those standards applicable at the time the license in question was issued. Ft. Pierce Utilities Authority of the City 21/ See pp. 9-10, suora.

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t t , of Ft. Pierce v. U.S.A. and the NRC, Nos. 77-1925 and 77-2101, slip op, at 19-20 (D.C. Cir., March 23, 1979).

I Post-TMI investigations have resulted in significant new emergency planning licensing standards. The emergency plan for i

the Seabrook environs is now subject to postlicensing review under the new standards, and the staff should initiate this review promptly before further construction at Seabrook precludcs an impartial resolution of this critical safety.,

issue. It is the statutory duty of the staff to suspend or revoke the Seabrook construction permits upon finding that the present emergency plans cannot provide "reasonable assurance .

. . (that) suitable protective actions (can be implemented) on a timely basis under accident conditions." (See 43 F.R. 37474)

In consideration of the grave safety issue at hand and

, the likelihood that a timely evacuation of the beaches near Seabrook may not be possible, it is the duty of the Staff to issue a show cause order and institute a proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR S2.202 to resolve these major outstanding safety questions. ,

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IV CCNCLUSION s For the reasons stated above, the Comonwealth of l

1

{ -- Massachusetts supports the requests by the Seacoast I

Anti-Pollution League and the New England Coalition on Nuclear 3 Pollution that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,

immediately issue an Order to Show Cause why the Seabrook

- construction permits should not be suspended or revoked.

Respectfully submitted, w& w'5 Laurie Burt Assistant Attornef General

, Environmental Protection Division One Ashburton Placo - 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108 (6 17 ) 727-2265 DATED: 16 hLe 19 7%

~b o t h, MA 4

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

.I

TO: HAROLD R. DENTON t DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR

', REACTOR REGULATION 1 RE: CONSTRUCTION PERMITS CPPR-135 CPPR-136

)

i In the Matter of J )

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos.

NEW HAMPSHIRE,' et al. ) 50-443

) 50-444 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and2) )

)

MD40RANDUM OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETPS IN SUPPORT OF SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE' S REQUEST FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DATED JUNE 30, 1980.

INTRODUCTION The Commonwealth of Massachusetts ("Commonwealth")

participated in the construction permit licensing proceedings for the Seabrook Station in an eff ort to protect the intereets of its residents who either reside in communities or frequent beaches in the vicinity of that station. Because of these interests, the Commonwealth remains concerned about the issue of emergency evacuation at Seabrook.

- On June 30, 1980, the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League

( " SAPL" ) filed with the NRC a request that the Commissioners review a decision . rendered by the Director of the Office of Regulation ("Di r ec ter ") on February 11, 1980.

Nuclear Reacto In that decis'en the Director had denied a petition filed by l Alan , n ,, g

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>i SAPL on May 2, 1979, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.206 seeking an

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Order to Show cause why construction permits for the proposed nuclear power plant at Seabrook should not be suspended or

, revoked. As grounds for its petition SAPL cited, inter alia, i the failure of the licensee, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, to demonstrate during the construction permit i

, process the feasibility of evacuation beyond the low population Zone. -

The Commission, in October, 1980, decided not to review the Director 's denial of SAPL's petition, but directed the staff to treat the June 30th SAPL request for Commission review as a new petition for a Show cause Order under 52.206.

The Commonwealth supports the current SAPL request for an Order to Show Cause why the Seabrook construction permits should not be suspended or revoked 1/ for the followino reasons:

1. The Director denied SAPL's May, 1979 petition on the basis that it was premature to reopen the Seabrook construction permit proceedings until certain events had transpired. Those events having transpired, the Director should now approve the request f or an Order to Show Cause.

2. There has been no determination of the feasibility of safely evacuating the population within the 10-mile plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone of the Seabrook Station. Present evidence suggests that such evacuation may not be feasible.

3. It is in the interest of all parties that the .

feasibility of evacuation be assessed now, rather than at the operating license stage of review. If the present evidence suggesting that evacua : ion is 1/ The Commonwealth also filed a Memorandum in support of SAPL's May, 1979 r eq ue s t .

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4 not f easible is later confirmed, the applicant faces

( the loss of hundreds of millions,'perhaps billions,

, of dollars of wasted investment. At the same time, a

residents of and visitors to the EPZ face the possibility that the Licensing Board, moved by the expenditure of these sums, will permit operation despite the absence of truly adequate means of y

evacuation.

I. THE PRE-CONDITIONS TO ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER SET

~

FORTH BY THE DIRECTOR HAVE BEEN MET In his February 11, 1980 denial of SAPL's petition for an Order to Show Cause, the Director concluded that it would be "premature" to reopen the Seabrook construction permit proceedings pending (1) the receipt and evaluation of

' evacuation time estimates prepared by the licensee; (2) adoption of the then proposed rules amending 10 C'.F.R. Part 50 regarding emergency planning;2/ and (3) "guidance from the Commission" on reconsideration of construction permits.1!

In August of last year Public Service Company of New Hampshire submitted its evacuation time estimates to the Commission. In December, 1980, the Commonwealth rcceived notice that the Commission had completed an analysis of all evacuation time estimates which it had received. On August 19, 1980 the Commission published its final regulations on emergency planning, amending 10 C.F.R. Part 50, which regulations took eff ect on November 3, 1980.1/

2/ 44 Fed. Reg. 75167 (December 19, 1979). .

. 3/ Public Service Comoany of New Hamoshiia, et al., DD 80-6, Il NRC 371, at 373 (Feoruary 11, L980).

4/ 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (August 19, 1980).

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k Thus, the first two events which, in the opinion of the .

Director, had to occur before consideration of the emergency l planning issue would be timely have, in' f act, occurred. Since the Coemission has issued its final regulations on emergency planning , there is no reason to expect further formal "guidance" from the Commission regarding the reconsideration of construction permits. The Commission has not, so far as we are aware, given notice of any intention to issue further formal guidelines in this area. The Director should, therefore, now grant SAPL's petition for an Order to Show Cause.

II. MERE HAS BEEN NO DETERMINATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF EVACUATION WITHIN THE SEABROOK EPZ In its Final Regulations on Emergency Planning, amending 10 C.F.R. Part 50,1/ the Commission now requires appropriate emergency planning for the evacuation of persons beyond the low population zene of all light-water nuclear power plants, such as the Seabrook f acility. A plume exposure Emergency Planni 9c Zone having a radius of about ten miles must now be established around each such plant, with the exact size and shape of the EP to be decided on the basis of specific conditions at the site. Licensees must submit emergency plans providing for 5/ 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (August 19, ,980).

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evacuation within the plume exposure EPZ's as part of their o

final safety analysis reports, and those plans must be approved prior to issuance of operating licenses.

While the Final Regulations on Emergency Planning do not require that operators already holding construction permits demonstrate compliance with the new requirements before the operating license stage of review, the Commission expressly noted in a statement accompanying its publication of the proposed rules whicn preceded those final regulations6 / that it was "considering whether construction permits which have already been issued should be reconsidered because of the emergency planning considerations of the (proposed rules]."

The Director quoted this Commission statement in his decision denying the May, 1979 SAPL petition and further observed that in December, 1979 the NRC staff requested all 3.icensees of plants under construction to submit evacuation time estimates so that the Commission would be in a position to identify those plants where "unusual evacuation constraints exist and special planning measures should be considered."1/

Such "unusual evacuation constraints exist" in the case of the Seabrook plant. It is therefore one of the instances 6/ 44 Fed. Reg. 75167, (December 19, 1979).

7/ 11 NRC 371, at 373 (1980).

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anticipated by the Staff where construction permits should be reconsiderad and, if necessary, si cial planning measures ordered.

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From the beginning' of the Seabrook construction permit proceedings, the NRC Staff has maintained that it has the ,

s authority to require a> demonstration of the feasibility of evacuating persons beyond the LPZ 5ecause of the proximity of the Seabrook units to coastal beaches, the inadequacy of sheltering f acilities along the coast, and the limited road networks serving the beaches.8/ This position has been supported by NBCNP, the Attorney' General of New Hampshire, and the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety.1! There is thus a clear recognition of the unusual difficulties associated with evacuation of the beaches near the Seabrook f acility.

Within about a five-mile radius of the Seabrook units there is an estimated summer peak population of approximately 100,000 persons, with the majority being clustered in the beach areas lying from northeast to south-southeast of the site.1S/

It is undisputed that even when the seasonal population is 8/ See Public Service Company of New Hampshire ALAB - 390, 5 ERC 777, at 735-36 (1977).

9/ See Id. ; Letter f rom the Chairman of the ACRS to the Chairman of the AEC reviewing Seabrook application .

(December 10, 1974) [ Relevant language quoted at 5 NRC 75..]. 1 Public Service con.canv of New Hamoshire, et al.,

10/

LBP-76-26, 3 NRC 857, at f,71- 7 2 (June 29, 1976).

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l time-weigh ted, population densities at the Seabrook site exceed the "trip points" of Regulatory Guide 4.7 for both plant start-up and retirement.11/ And the Licensing Appeal Board has determined that the beach area located just over one and one-half miles from Seabrook is the nearest population center to the site, since it will "at times be the most densely populated area in the state."11/

SAPL has filed affidavits prepared by civil def ense directors and other officials of New Hampshire towns in the vicinity of the Seabrook f acility. Attached hereto are similar affidavits prepared by municipal officials in Massachusetts.

Based on their past experiences with large beach crowds and their knowledge of the limited access roads and traffic "choke" points which exist in their areas, these local officials have serious concerns about the feasibility of evacuating their communities in a timely fashion.

In June of 1975, extensive evidentiary hearings were conduc ted, over the obj ection of the Applicant, bef ore the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board on the issue of the feasibility of evacuating persons beyond the Seabrook LP3, and particularly from Hamptor. Beach. There was conflicting 11/ See Seabrook Alternative Site Study, NUREG-0501, at A-60 IDecember, 1978).

~

12/ See Public Service Comoany of New Hamoshire, ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, at 51 (1977).

+

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I testimony on the issue, which testimony was never resolved by

, the Licensing Board since it determined that emergency plans need not be developed for areas beyond the LP3.11! The

~

i conflicts in that testimony give further reason to question the feasibility of evacuation beyond the LPZ.

Mor eover , the licensee's own evacuation time estimates leave substantial doubt as to the feasibility of evacuation.

Public Service estimates that, on a summer weekend, it will take four hours and 20 minutes to evacuate a 180 degree sector to the north of the p' lant having only a two-mile radius.11/

That sector includes only one beach area, Ha'mpton Beach, and accounts for only 5,247 of the 9,177 estimated vehicles associated with that beach population.11/ Public Service provides a similar estimate -- 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 30 minutes--for evacuation of the ten-mile 90 degree northeast sec tor containing Hampton Beach.11/

Neither of these estimates includes the time required for comp e tent authorities to make decisions about the need for evacuation or to notify officials and the public of that need.

l l

13/ Public Service Company of New Hampshire, LBP-76-26, 3 RRC 537, 922-26 (1976).

li/ Public Service Company of New Hampshire,P 'reliminary Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near Seabrook Station, August 4, 1980, Table 4.

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15/ Id., Table 2.

l 16/ Id., Table 4.

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1 Nor do they include the time required for individuals to prepare to evacuate or for officials to confirm that evacuation has been completed.11! A recent NRC study , NUREG/CR-1745, attests to the significance of these omissions:

It is important to understand that estimates of the length of the time period f rom the decision te evacuate through clearances of the evacuation zone is (sic.] significantly aff ected by the time required for both notification and preparation. That is to say, the length c ' time that it takes to clear the area cannot be calculated with any degree of certainty without knowing how long it takes to notLfy the populace of an impending evacuation, and how long each person will consume in preparatier.18/

Even without accounting f or decision, notification, preparation, or confirmation time, the licensee's estimates exceed the time period during which f atalities and injuries will result from exposure to radionuclides on the ground in the event of an "atmospheric" Class 9 accident, according to NUREG-039 6.11I That document reveals that, asamning a unif orm population density of 100 persons per square mile and plume speed of 10 m.p.h. , an evacuation time of only .three hours will result in approximately three deaths and twelve i

l 12/ Id- at 11-18/ Analysis 'of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zor.es, NUREG/CR-1745, at 3-4 (November ,

1980).

l

( 19/ Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local i

Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans In Support of .

! Light Water Nuclear Power Plants , NUREG-0396, EPA 52011-78-016, D ect mb e r , 1978, Figu res T-17 and I-18.

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early injuries in the 0-5 mile range of the plant and approximately five early injuries in the 5-10 mile range.SS/

', If evacuation time reaches five hours (with, f or example, the addition' of notification time) , the results are approximately six deaths and twenty-eight early injuries l'n the 0-10 mile range.11/ Of course, NUREG-0396 makes no attempt to estimate-the long-term genetic or other health eff ects associated with such evacuation times.

Thus, even if evacuation can be accomplished within the times estimated by Public Service, there will be a significant number of early injuries and deaths in the event of an atmospheric Class 9 accident at Seabrook. And there is reason to suspect that actual evacuation times would be much longer.

The licensee's most recent evacuation time estimates are defective in several ways. As we have already mentioned,

. Public Service has failed to include in its estimates the time

'f required for decision, notification, preparation, and confirmation. Even more importantly, it has failed to provide 20/ Id.

21/ Id. The population density in the beach area near the

' 5eacrook site is much greater than the 100 persons per square mile assumed in NUREG-0396. As the Licensing Appeal Board has noted, "there is no doubt that, at peak periods . . . in excess of 25,000 people will be found in [that) densely populated Erea." Public Service Company of New Hamoshire, ALAB-422, 6

• NRC 33, at 51 (1977). Thus, all of the health and fatality i figures contained in NUREG-03P6 are understated so f ar as the - .

Seabrook site is concerned.

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t estimates based on simultaneous evacuation during the peak

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summer season of all of the beach areas lying from NE to SSE of f the site or e'ven simultaneous evacuation of Hampton Beach and i either of the other two beach areas, Seabrook Beach and Salisbury State Beach. This def eats the purpose of licensee evacuation time estimates, as stated in NUREG/CR-1745--namely, "to present time estimates in a f ormat that will aid a realistic assessment of the options."21/ The licensee has also failed to provide a time estimate for evacuation of" the entire 10-mile EPZ , as required by NURPG-0654.21/ And it has assumed that approximately one vehicle per household would be used in the evacuation. This assumption, according to NUREG /C R-1745, results 'in a low estimate of the number of automobiles being evacuated.SA/

Other significant deficiencies in the licensee's estimates include the following i

(1) admitted failure to account in its off-season estimates for evacuation of the forty schools and in any of its estimates for evacuation of the three 22/ Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones, NUREG/CR-1745, at 13 (Novemb er ,

1 1980). That document indicates that two evacuation times should be reported for each evacuation zone--one reflecting

'. evacuation of that zone alone and one reflecting simultaneous evacuation of all contiguous zones. Id. at 14.

23/ See Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Dmergency Response Plans and Preparedness in .

Support of Nuclear Power Plant, NUREG-0 6 5 4 , FEMA-REP-1, Rev . 1 (November, 1980), App. 4, at 4-4.

i

! l 24/ ' Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for i Emergency Planning Zones, NUREG/CR-1745, at 10 (November, 1980).

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l hospitals and oth i the ten-mile EPZ; / nstitutions15/ located within

$ (2) failure to account for the public

> transporation-dependent population; (3) failure to include major employers in its estimates of tummer transient automobile demand; and

~

(4) failure to consider the eff ect of voluntary evacuation beyond the ten-mile EPZ.

Given these deficiencies, it, seems likely that the licensee 's current evacuation time estimates are too low. This

~

is especially so in view of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's estimates that there are 7,180 people in the non-au tomobile owning population and 3,500 people in institutions, together constituting 10% of the total resident population within the Seabrook EPZ.S1!

It is also noteworthy that the evacuation time estimates provided by the licensee in its PSARE / are significantly See Seabrook Preliminary Safety Analysis Report ("PSAR"),

25/

at 2.f!I and Tables 2.1-5 and 2.1-6.

26/ NUREG/CR-1745 concludes that evacuation times for large special facilities, such as hospitals, may well be longer than

- the evacuation time for the general public. See Analysis of Techniques f or Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones, NUREG/CR-1745, at 15 (November , 1980 ) .

27/ The Dynamic Evacuation Analyses: Independent Assessment of Evacuation Times f rom the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zones of Twelve Nuclear Power Stations, FEMA-REP-(number not yet assigned), at 46. .

29/ Seabecok PSAR, Am endm ent 23, July, 1974, at S13 $13-16.

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higher than its current estimates, even though the earlier estimates relate to 22.5 degree sectors (rather than 90 degree or 180 degree sectors) and cover only a five-mile radius.11/

In its PSAR, the licensee estimates that it will take eight hours from the occurrence of the accident to clear three of the six beach sectors to the five-mile radius and that the other three sectors will require five and one-half to six hours.2E/

A FCMA study estimates that a minimum of six hours ,and 10 minutes will be needed to evacuate the entire EP2 on a summer A

Sunday, even if notification is completed within 15 minutes.21/ Tnat study further concludes that The behavior of drivers who are caught in congestion within direct sight of the Seabrook Station can only be guessed at this time. Any breakdown in orderly evacuation traffic flow will result in evacuation times greater than the ones estimated above. Total evacuation times could range from 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes to 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> 40 minutes for an evacuation in which traffic control is generally ineffective.21/

FEMA estimates, then, are also considerably higher than the licensee's current estimates. The early deaths and 29/ The ear?.ier figures

• do purport to include notification tTme.

30/ Seabrook PSAR, at S13-16.

31/ The Dynamic Evacuation Analyses: Independent Assessment of Evacuation Times from the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning tones of Twelve Nuclear Power Stations, FEMA-REP-(number not yet assigned), at 46.

32/ Id.

. injuries resulting f rom a Class 9 accident would, of course, be i significantly higher than the figures recited above if the

.t longer times estimated by FEMA or by the licensee in the 1974 amendment to its PSAR are actually required for evacuation.

III. THE FEASIBILITY OF EVACUATION SHOULD BE ASSESSED I MMEDI ATELY, The foregoing discussion demonstrates that there are indeed "unusual constraints" associated with evacuation of the Seabrook EPZ and serious questions about the feasibility-of safe evacuation of the area. That being the case, Seabrook is B an appropriate instance for immediate examination of the f easibility issue.

Both the "Moff ett Repor t"$1[ a'.d the Report of the .

P;esident's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island have roundly criticized the NRC's past practice of postponing full consideration of emergency planning issues until the .

operating license stage. The President's Commission wrote, The construction permit stage does not require a complete design plans, and therefore the full safety review does not occur until the operating license stage. By then, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent or committed in the construction process.

Therefore, the ultimate safety review may be influenced by economic considerations that can lead j

l i

l 33/ Emergency Planning Around U.S. Nuclear Powerplants:

suclear Regulatory Commission Oversight, Fourth Report by the .

Committee on Government Operations , 96 th Congress , 1st Session, House Report No.96-413 (August 8, 1979) I"Moffett Report"1.

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to a reluctance to order m the

operating license stage._3_ajor changes at Similarly, the Moffett Report observed that

(ilt is not until the plant is nearly built and the utility applies for an operating license that it must come forward with a fu11 blown emergency plan. By then, of course, the Commission may find itself in the untenable position of having to choose between scrapping a multi-billion dollar investment or allowingthe5) j eopa rd i zed ._3_

The Government Operations Committee concluded in the Mof f ett Report that there is "considerable doubt" about the feasibility of conducting evacuations in any densely populated areasl6/ and that evacuation of a sufficient area around a number of U.S. plants is clearly not feasible.21/ In an exchange, recounted in the Mof fett Report, between Congressman Moffett and then Chairman Hendrie, Congressman Moffett, speaking on behalf of the Environment, Energy and Natural Resources .9ubcommittee of the Government Operations Committee, called on the NRC to "take a hard look at the feasibility of evacuation in the case of plants located near major population areas and treat that examination as a "priority."18/ The Commission certainly does not fulfill this legislative mandate 34/ Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, at 52.

35/ Id. at 30. .

36/ Id. at 8.

32/ Id. at 48.

38/ Id. at 46-47.

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or meet the cr iticism,s of the Committee on Government Operations and the President's Commission by postponing .

! consideration of emergency planning at Seabrook..

Cases arising under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 4331 et seq., provide a useful parallel to this situation. Confronted with the problem of "sunk costs",.

courts insist or. early review of significant environmental issues. Thus, in upholding the grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining further constr 2ction of a bridge, the Second Circuit found in Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, at 497 (2nd Cir. 1975), that "(wl ithout prel:.minary injunctive relief construction might well reach the snage of completion where for economic and other reasons it would be impossible to turn back or alter the project in light of what an Environmental Impact Statement revealed, and thus the environment might thereby be irreparably damaged."39 Similarly, -the Fourth Circuit noted, in halting construction of an interstate highway pending a NEPA review cy the Secretary of Transportation, that (f]urther investment of time, effort, or money in the proposed route would make alteration or abandonment of the route increasingly less wise and, therefore, increasingly unlikely. If investment in the proposed route were to continue prior .to and during the Secretary's consideration of the environmental See also National Nildlife Federation v. Andels, 440 F.

31/

Supp. 1245, at 1256 (D.D.C. 1977).

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i E report, the op'tions open to the Secretary would

. d iminis h, and at some point his 4

j become a meaningless formality.4gonsideration would The Commission clearly has the authority to require that' ,

Public Service Company demonstrate the feasibility of

., evacuating the Seabrook EPZ now. At the time when emerg(acy

~

planning was limited to the low population zone, Commission decisions required a determination during construction permit

.i proceedinos that "timely evacuation (of the LnZ) is reasonably assured."$1/ The Commission's Final Regulations on Emergency Planning, while extending emergency planning requirements to Emergency Planning Zones, maintain the requirement that a determination of f easibility be made at the construction permit stage for new plants. The Regulations state that:

The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report shall contain sufficient information to ensure the compatibility of proposed' emergency plans for both onsite areas and the EPZ's with f acility design features, site layout, and site location with respect to such considerations as access routes, surrounding population d istributions, lang boundaries . . .12_

use, and local jurisdictional 40/ Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe,458 F.2d T323, 1333 (4 th Cir. 197 2 ) , cert. denied,409 U.S. 1000 (1972).

, See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley 468 F.2d 1164, 1183-84 (6 th Cir. 1972) . Latham v.

Author Volpe, 45 ity$ F.2d lill, 1121 (9 th Cir . 1971) .

, 41/ Consumers Power Company, (Midland Plant Units 1 and 2)

' AEAB-123, 6 AEC 331, at 342. (1973). See also Southern

< Calif ornia Ed ison Company, et al., (San Onof re Nuclear Generating Statiott Units 2 and 3), ALAB- 2 8 8 , 8 AEC 957, 961-63 _

(1974).

ia' 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Section II.

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Thus, the Commission cannot now issue construction permits I without determining that timely evacuation of the EPZ for the particular plant is feasible.

Section 186 (a) of'the Atomic Energy Actdd/ authorizes the NRC to suspend or revoke "(a]ny license . . . because of conditions revealed . . . which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit has held that this clause applies to all licensing matters, including health, safety, and environmental considerations . .. (and) reflects a deliberate policy choice on the part of Congress when it enacted section 186(a) to render licenses for nuclear f acilities subject to post-licensing review under evolving licensing standards, rather than under those standards applicable at the time the license in question was issued.d4/

It is clear, then, that the emergency plan for the Seabrook environs is now subject to post-licensing review under the new

. emergency planning standards.

In light of the gravity of the issue of safe evacuation, it is the responsibility of the Director to issue the show cause order requested by SAPL. Deferral of this major out-standing safety question to the operating license stage would be inconsistent with the primary obligation of the Commission and Staff to protect public health and safety.

4}/ 42 U.S.C. $2236(a).

44/ Ft. Pierce Util!!ies Authority of the City of Ft. Pierce

v. U.S.A. and the NRC, Nos. 77-1925 and 77-2101, slip opinion at 19-20 (D.C. Cir., March 23, 1979).

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Da ted : March 13, 1981 1 .

i Respectfully submitted, Paula Gold, Assistant Attorney General Chief, Public Protection Bureau Stephen M. Leonard, Assistant Attorney General "l Chief, Environmental Protection Division 4f~#*

Je, Ann Shotwo11 e se . , _ &

A'ssistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Public Protection Bureau Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2265 w >+.e- .a -+ >e +*-ee 4 m wWe-e* +- ^N* **9 9-t - - _ - -

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s; I AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE RIEL

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D( . I, George Riel, Police Chief of Newbury, do hereby depose 1

and say as follows:

7f The Town of Newbury is a Massachusetts town within l 1.

five air miles of the site of the nuclear reactor under a,

construction in Seabrook, New Hampshire.

t 2. The population of Newbury is 4,800 but increases to a

i well over 30,000 people on any given day in the summer on its 12 miles of beachess

3. There is only one road making Plum Island accessible to the mainland. It consists of two and one-half miles of two twelve-foot travel lanes. It then narrows into two ten-foot 1 anes as it feeds into the congested downtown area. '

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4. At least eig'ht times a year this sole access road to and from Plum Island is impassable due to flooding from high tides.

5. Any nuclear emergency evacuation attempts would i result in immediate congestion and bottlenecks throughout the

, entire town. All evacuation routes available (Routes lA, 1 and

95) would be congested with evacuating residents of Salisbury, f Merrimac, Aresbury, Newburyport, and other small communities, 1

making it that much more difficult for the residents of Newbury to evacuate the area, j

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6. There are four schools in Newbury, which would present special evacuatien problems.

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7. At the National Wildlife Refuge which covers 4,650 acres of the Town, there are twenty miles of regularly used foot trails which are inaccessible to vehicles or

~ i communica tions . There are no telephone or power lines in the , ,

Refuge.

8. There is a state-controlled Wildlif e Management Area 1 in the Town, 2,000 acres in size, which is also used regularly i

i at certain times of the year. It is also inaccessible to vehicles or communication. ,

9. The majority of the population of Newbury could be evacuated within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> if all went well. 100% evacuation to safety of the Newbury pop,ulation could be effected in

approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

10. As an official who would be involved in effectuating any actual evacuation, I f eel that the issue of emergency evacuation planing should be addressed at the earliest possible t ime .

i Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury this 6th day of March, 1981.

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4 i Commonwealth of Massachusetts Suffolk, ss.

George Riel appeared before me and swore that he has read this affidavit and that the statements contained in it are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Before me, .

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!NotaryPublic My Commission expires on

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,1 AFFID AVIT OF MAYNARD PEARSON I, Maynard Pearson, Civil Def ense Director for the Town of Amesbury, do hereby depose and say as follows: ,

1. The Town of Amesbury, Massachusetts is approximately 3-1/2 air miles from the nuclear reactor site at Seabrook, New Hampshire.

2. Its population of 16,000 increases by 500 to 700 people in the summer.

3. There are three highways leading out of town. .These are Interstates 95 and 495 and State Route 110.

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4. In an evacuation, there may be bottlenecking and congestion since there are too many small roads f eeding into the highways.

5. doncern about such congestion will increase if nearby New Hampshire towns develop plans to use the same evacuation routes we must Jse.

6. Amesbury has a hospital with 75-100 beds, six nursing homes and five schools.

7. A full evacuation of Amesbury residents would take six hours at best. It is possible that the time could be decreased by the use of adequate alarms which are not now available to us.

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8. As an official who would be involved in effectuating any actual evacuation, I f eel that the issue of emergency evacuation planning should be addressed at the earliest

• possible time.

Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury this 6th day of March, 1981.

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a Commonwealth of Massachusetts

, Suffolk, ss.

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$ Maynard Pearson appeared before me and swore that he has read this affidavit and that the statements contained in it are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. -

Before me,

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Notary Public l My Commission expires on t

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AFFIDAVIT OF EDWIN OLIVERA i I, Edwin olivera, Police Chief of the Town of Salisbury do l hereby depose and say as follows:

1. Salisbury is a Massachusetts town within ten miles of the site of the nuclear reactor under construction in Seabrook, New Hampshire.

2. Its permanent population of approximately 5,600 residents increases by over 10,000 people between Memorial Day and Labor Day. It is additionally visited by 1,000 - 5,000 motorisgp daily during the above summer vacation period.

3. This large increase in population and daily influx of J

beachgoers creates severe congestion along the single access road to our beach. This one-lane access road is fed by Routes 1, 110 and Interstates 495 and 95.

4. At this "feeding' point, Salisbury Square, there is a bottleneck which causes traffic congestion and back-up.

5. These same roads are also used by beachgoers on their way south f rom Hampton Beach. In an evacuation situation, the congestion will be worsened by this southward evacuation.

. 6. In normal peak season, traffic emergency vehicles suffer great delay and are caught up in the slow traffic.

7. In the Salisbury area, the state reservation camping area and the three trailer parks are frequented by, among others, French Canadians who do not understand English.

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8. The Greenleaf Manor Nursing Home and other housing

. for the elderly are within ten miles of Seabrook. The two schools in Salisbury are between five and seven miles from Seabrook.

9. I estimate that 100% evacuation of Salisbury would take at least eight hours.

10. Our biggest evacuation problem is access to and from the beach.

11. As an official who would be involved in effectuating any actual evacuation, I f eel that the issue of emergency evacuation planning should be addressed at the earliest possible time.

Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury this 6th day of March, 1981.

ACO. N - < u-

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Edwin Olivera appeared before me and swore that he has read this affidavit and that the statements contained in it are true to the best of his knowledge and belief. .

Before me, f _- -- l f f Notary Public t

My Commission expires en I  !

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.f i . CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .

t 7, JO ANN S HOTW ELL , hereby certify that t5s foregoing andum of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of I

• st Anti-Pollution League's Request for an Order .to Show

.ted June 30, 1980" was ' served upon the following by ng copies thereof in the United Staes Mail, postage t this 13th day of March,1981:  ?

. .4earne, Chairman Roy P. Lessy, Esquire V.c .c Gilinsky, Commis'sioner Of fice of the Executive Legal Richard T. Kennedy, Commissioner Direc tor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washing ton, D.C. '20555 Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Samuel Chilk, Secretary E. Tupper Kinder Esquire

. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20555 Environmental Protection Divisio!

Office of the Attorney General Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman 208 State House Annex Atomic Safety and Licensing Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Karen P. Sheldon, Esquire Sheldon, Harmon, Roisman, & Weis:

Dr. John H. Buck 1725 I Street., N.W. Suite 506 Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20006 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coum'n Atomic Safety and Licensing Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Michael C. Farrar, Esquire Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Dr. Ernest O. Salo U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Professor of Fisheries Research Washington, D.C. 20555 Institute College of Fisheries Ivan W. Smith, Esquire University of Washington Atomic Safety and Licensing Seattle, Washington Boa'd Panel U.S. uclear Regulatory Comm'n Thomas Dignan, Esquire Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Roptd and Gray 225 Franklin Street Dr. Marvin M. Mann Boston, Mass. 02110 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Leonard Bickwit, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Office of the General Counsel  ;

Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 j 1

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Docket and Service Section Robert A. Backus, Esq.

Office of the Secretary O'Neill, Backus, & Spielman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n 116 Lowell Street Washing ton, D.C. 20555 Manchester, New Hampshire s Joseph F. Tubridy, Esquire Dr. Kenneth A. McCollum 4100 Cathedral Avenue, N.W. 1107 West Knapp Street Washington, D.C. 20016 Stillwater, Okalhoma 74074 By:_ b-- # 4-_wC-([~

JO . ANN SHOTWELL Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection-Division Public Protection Bureau Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2265 8- . . - .- ..- - . _ . . . . . . _ _ -., _ _ ,-

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