ML20203D427
| ML20203D427 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1986 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203D424 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-85-98, NUDOCS 8607210208 | |
| Download: ML20203D427 (55) | |
See also: IR 05000322/1985098
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
INSPECTION REPORT 50-322/85-98
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
ASSESSMENT PERIOD: MARCH 1, 1985 - FEBRUARY 28, 1986
BOARD MEETING DATE: APRIL 21, 1986
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B607210208 960714
ADOCK 0b000322
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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1.0
INTRODUCTION..............................................
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1.1 Purpose and 0verview.................................
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1.2 SALP Board and Attendees.............................
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1.3
Background...........................................
2.0
CRITERIA..................................................
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3.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS........................................
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3.1 Facility Performance.................................
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3.2 Overall Facility Evaluation..........................
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4.0 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS...............................
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4.1 Plant Operations and Startup Testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4.2 Radioloqical
Controls................................
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4.3 Maintenance and Surveillance.........................
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4.4 Emergency Preparedness...............................
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4.5 Security and Safeguards...............
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4.6 Outage and Modifications.............................
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4.7 Training and Qualification Effectiveness.............
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4.8 Licensing Activities.................................
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4.9 Assurance of Quality.................................
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5.0 SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES.......................'......
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5.1 Investigations ar.d Allegations Review................
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5.2 Escalated Enforcen.ent Action.........................
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5.3 Management Conferences...............................
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5.4 Li ce n see Ev e nt Re po rts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.5 Operating Reactor Licensing Action s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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TABLES
Table 1 Tabular Listing of LERs by Functional Area............
T1-1
Table 2 LER Synopsis..........................................
-T2-1
Table 3 Inspection Hours
Summary..............................
T3-1
Table 4 Enforcement Summary...................................
T4-1
Table 5 Inspection Activities.................................
T5-1
Table 6 Reactor Trips and Plant Shutdowns.....................
T6-1
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
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1.1 ~ Purpose and Overview
The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an inte-
grated NRC staff effort to collect available observations and data
on a periodic basis and evaluate licensee performance based upon
this informatidn. SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory pro-
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cesses used to ensure compliance to NRC rules and regulations. SALP
is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational ba-
sis for allocating NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance
to licensee management to promote quality and safety of plant con-
struction and operation.
A NRC Shoreham SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed in
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Section 1.2 below, met on April 1986, to review the collection of
performance observations and data and assess LILCO's performance in
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accordance with the guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic
Assessment of Licensee Performance." A summary of the guidance and
evaluation criteria is provided in Section 2.0 of this report.
This report is the SALP Board's assessment of LILCO's performance at
the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station for the period March 1, 1985,
through February 28, 1986.
1.2 SALP Board Members
Chairman:
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R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
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Members:
W. Kane, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects
H. Kister, Chief, Projects Branch 1, Division of Reactor Projects
W. Butler, Director, BWR Project Directorate 4, NRR
R. Bellamy, Chief, Emergency Preparedness & Radiological Controls
Branch, Division of Radiation Safeguards & Security
J. Durr, Chief, Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety
J. Strosnider, Chief, Reactor Projects Section IB
J. Berry, Senior Resident Inspector, Shoreham
R. Caruso, Licensing Project Manager,.NRR
Other Attendees:
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C. Warren, Resident Inspector', Shoreham
D. Florek, Lead Reactor Engineer, Test Programs Section, DRS
R. Fuhrmeister, Reactor Engineer, Reactor Projects Section IB
R. Lo, Licensing Project Manager (Designee), NRR
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1.3 Background
Long Island Lighting Company was issued Construction Permit CPPR-95
for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (Docket No. 50-322) on April
14, 1973. 'The permit authorized construction of a 2436 MWt General
Electric BWR/4 reactor with a Mark 11 pressure suppression-type con-
tainment. General Electric was selected as the NSSS supplier and
Stone and Webster Engineering Corp.
as the architect engineer for
the project.
Construction was completed by a unified construction
organization, 'tiermed UNICO, consisting of the licensee, their archi-
tect engineer, and General Electric personnel.
Construction was completed in early 1984. Operating License NPF-19
was issued on December 7, 1984, authorizing fuel loading and low
power cold criticality testing at up to 0.001% rated thermal power
or 24.36 kWt.
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The facility achieved initial criticality on February 15, 1985.
Operating License NPF-36 was issued on July 3,1985, authorizing
facility operation up to 5% rated thermal power.
The licensee com-
pleted low power testing on October 8, 1985.
Licensee Activities
At the end of the previous assessment period, the facility achieved
initial criticality and commenced low power physics testing author-
ized by Operating License NPF-19.
Initial criticality, and shutdown
margin testing was completed at the end of that period.
During the first quarter of this assessment period, the licensee
completed Control Rod Drive (CRD) open vessel retesting, and per-
formed reactor startups and shutdowns for training.
Licensing hear-
ings and litigation on the 5% license took place.
On July 3,1985 the licensee received Operating License NPF-36, au-
thorizing facility operation up to 5% power. The reactor achieved
criticality on July 7, 1985 and the licensee commenced low power
testing.
Low power testing continued through July 14, 1985 when a
mechanical malfunction caused a scram on low reactor water level.
The reactor was restarted, and on July 18, 1985 was manually shut-
down to investigate deviations in reactor vessel water level indica-
tion. The reactor was restarted on July 29, 1985 after repair of
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the water level instrumentation, and the low power testing program
continued with rated temperature and pressure being achieved on Au-
gust 7, 1985. The reactor was shutdown for rod sequence exchange on
August 24, 1985.
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On August 30, 1985 the reactor was again made critical. A personnel
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error during the replacement of desiccant in an air dryer caused a
reactor scram on loss of instrument air on August 31, 1985.
Low
power testing resumed on September 3, 1985. A personnel error
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caused the it.ird reactor scram during a surveillance test on Septem-
ber 6, 1935.
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-The licensee declared an Unusual Event on September 8,1985 due to
deviations in the reactor water level narrow range indication. The
reactor was shutdown on September 10, 1985 for investigation and
repair of the problem. Between September 10 and 18, 1985 the
licensee investigated the deviation problem.
Resolution of the de-
viation problem involved the addition of ant,ther pipe support on the
reference leg;' The licensee then resumed low power testing and the
main turbine was initially rolled to synchronous speed on October 6,
1985. The licensee completed low power testing on October 8, 1985,
and the reactor was shutdown.
After completion of the low power test program the licensee entered
an outage to replace thesstartup neutron sol'rces in the reactor ves-
sel, and to complete modifications required for environmental quali-
fication of electrical equipment.
Source replacement was completed
on October 26, 1985.
On November 4, 1985, during inspection of the HPCI turbine exhaust
check valves, it was discovered that the valves had failed. One of
the two RCIC check valves, during their removal, was also discovered
to have failed. The cause of these failur2s was determined to be the
lack of an adequate locking mechanism on the capscrews which held
the valve disc mechanism to the valve bonnet.
In subsecuent inves-
tigation the licensee determined that this problem was due to im-
proper assembly by the valve manufacturer.
The licensee completed all modifications required for environmental
qualification on December 30, 1985. At that time the licensee de-
cided to keep the facility in an outage condition, and to implement
permanent fixes to the reactor vessel water level reference legs.
The need for these permanent changes resulted from the level devia-
tions which had occurred during the 5% Test Program. The modifica-
tion involved the shortening of the steam piping from the reactor
vessel to the reference leg condensing chambers, and the addition of
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more insulation to the piping.
At the end of this assessment period, the facility was in the final
stages of the outage, with pre-startup preparations in progress.
Table 6 provides a description, including the cause, of all reactor
trips and plant shutdowns during this assessment period.
Inspection Activities
During this one year assessment period, 3,067 hours7.75463e-4 days <br />0.0186 hours <br />1.107804e-4 weeks <br />2.54935e-5 months <br /> of direct NRC
inspection were expended at Shorehara.
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Of the total hours during this one year assessment period,1,802
were performed by Region I-based specialist inspectors and 1,265 by
resident inspectors stationed at the site. A senior resident in-
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spector was on-site-throughout the assessment period, and another
resident inspector reported on site in January 1986. A significant
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amount of inspection effort during this period was devoted to the
low power test program and subsequent neutron source and reference
leg replacement outages. Due to limited inspection activities in the
fire protection, area, it is not included as a separate functional
area in this report.
Inspection activity in the fire protection
area is included in the Plant Operations and Startup Testing func-
tional area.
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Tabulations of inspection activities and associated enforcement ac-
tions are cor.tained in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
The percentage of total
inspection time devoted to a functional area, tabulated in Table 3,
is included at the heading of each area analyzed in Section 4.
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This report also discusses " Training and Qualification Effective-
ness" and " Assurance of Quality" as separate functional areas. Al-
though these topics, in themselves, are assessed in the other
functional areas through their use as evaluation criteria, the two
areas provide a synopsis. For example, the effectiveness of manage-
ment involvement in assuring quality work has been assessed on a
day-to-day basis by resident inspectors and as an integral aspect of
specialist inspections. Although quality work is the responsibility
of every employee, one of the management tools to measure this ef-
fectiveness is reliance on quality assurance inspections and audits.
Therefore, the licensee's use of QA/QC functions is one factor, but
not the sole factor, used in assessing "Assarance of Quality." Oth-
er major factors that influence quality such as involvement of
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first-line supervision, safety committees, and worker attitudes,
also are discussed in the respective functional area.
- The functional. areas in this report have~been modified to accommo-
date Shoreham's unique operational status. The areas of maintenance
and surveillance have been combined into one area, argi plant opera-
tions has been combined with startup test activities into one area.
The topic of fire protection is not addressed as a separate
functional area since no team inspections were performed. The
relevant inspector observations regarding fire protection and
housekeeping are included in the appropriate areas.
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2.0 CRITERIA
Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional area's which vary,
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depending on whether the facility is in the construction, preoperational,
or operating phase.
Each functional area normally represents areas
significant to nuclear safety and the environment, and are normal
programmatic areas. Special areas may be added to highlight significant
observations.
One or more of the'following evaluation criteria were used to assess each
functional area:
1.
Management involvement and control in assuring quality.
2.
Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.
3.
Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
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4.
Enforcement history.
5.
Reporting and analysis of reportable events.
6.
Staffing (including management).
7.
Training and qualification effectiveness.
To provide a consistent evaluation of licensee performance, attributes
associated with each criterion and describing the characteristics appli-
cable to Category 1, 2, and 3 performance were applied as described in
NRC Manual Chapter 0516, Part II and Table 1.
Based upon the SALP Board assessment each functional area evaluated is
classified into one of the following three performance categories. The
definitions of these performance categories are:
Category 1: Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.
Licensee manage-
ment attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear
safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used such that a
high level of performance with respect to operatin.al' safety or construc-
tion is being achieved.
Category 2: NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels.
Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are con-
cerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and are rea-
sonably effective such that satisfactory performance with respect to
operational safety or construction is being achieved.
Category 3: Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.
Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers
nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appeared
strained or not effectively used such that minimally satisfactory
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performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being
achieved.
The SALP Board has also assessed the licensee's performance during the
last quarter of the assessment period to the overall performance for the
entire SALP period. That comparison was used to trend licensee perfor-
mance as:
Improving:
Licensee performance has generally improved over the last
quarter of the current SALP assessment period.
Consistent: Licensee performance has remained essentially constant over
the last quarter of the current SALP assessment period.
Declining:
Licensee performance has generally declined over the last
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quarter of the current SALP assessment period.
Natwithstanding the allowance permitted by a Category I rating to reduce
NRC attention, NRC oversight at Shoreham will be maintained at a high
level if a full power license is issued.
Due to the nature and scope of
activities during power ascension and start-up testing, NRC inspection
oversight will not be reduced; it is NRC policy to conduct annual
appraisals for plants in such a phase for two years after operations
start.
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3.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
3.1 Facility Performance
CATEGORY
CATEGORY
LAST
THIS
PERIOD
PERIOD
(3/1/84 -
(3/1/85 -
RECENT
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FUNCTIONAL AREA
2/28/85)
2/28/85)
TREND *
1. Plant Operations
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2
Consistent
& Startup Testing
2.Radiclogical Controls
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Declining
3. Maintenance &
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Surveillance
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2
Consistent
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No Basis
1
Consistent
S. Security & Safeguards
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1
Consistent
6.0utage & Modifications
N/A
2
Consistent
7. Training & Qualification
Effectiveness
N/A
3
Declining
8. Licensing Activities
2
3
Consistent
9. Assurance of Quality
N/A
2
Declining
- Trend during the last quarter of the current assessment period.
- The previous SALP rated ' Plant Operations' and 'Preoperational
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and Startup Testing' as separate functional areas.
Each was
assessed as Category 1.
3.2 Overall Facility Evaluation
The functional area ratings assigned in this SALP period show a
pattern of inconsistency in the licensee's operation of Shoreham.
While the licensee has demonstrated in several areas the ability
to achieve high standards of performance, areas of significant
weakness exist at the same time.
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In comparing the ratings in this SALP period with those of the pre-
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vious period, one must keep in mind that this period's ratings in-
volve an evaluation of licensee performance during a period of
initial operational activity and significant-outage activity, as
compared to the previous period of inactivity in most areas other
than licensing. Additionally, the ratings this period represent a
period of transition for the plant and its personnel. The SALP
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Board acknowledges the difficulty of that transition, especially as
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compounded by the atmosphere of uncertainty in which employees must
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work. This uncertainty creates a situation where the morale of the
personnel at the plant is constantly chall_enged.
Despite these difficulties, the licensee has demonstrated that, when
appropriate levels of management attention, resources and commitment
are applied, quality performance can be achieved. This is evidenced
by the satisfactory completion of the 5% startup test program, actions
in closecut of-findings of the special Post Accident Sampling System
inspection, support for litigation issues, and personnel performances
of the onsite portion of the FEMA Full-Scale exercise. However, con-
tinued instances of personnel inattention to detail, failure to adhere
to procedures, inadequate responsiveness to QA audit findings, and
the recent problems in the Radiochemistry section all indicate a
need for an increased level of management attention to plant
activities.
Preoccupation of management personnel with licensing issues to the
detriment of other plant activities has been a weakness noted in
previous rating periods, and indications are that this problem has
not yet been fully resolved. As a consequence, management has been
required to resc1ve several problems in a reactive mode rather than
through a proactive system thich identifies and corrects potential
problems in a timely manner. Additionally, attention needs to be
increased in the area of planning for potential attrition of experi-
enced staff. Although efforts in some areas (specifically the
Operations Division) to pre plan for possible attrition are noted
in this report, these efforts are not evident throughout the
licensee's organization.
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4.0 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
4.1 Plant Operations and .itartup Testing
(1831 hrs., 60%)
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A.
Analysis
Startup Testing
In this assessment period, the startup testing activities asso-
ciated with the heatup phase of testing were completed.
This
testing involved the initial heatup of the reactor coolant to
rated conditions and culminated in the initial roll of the main
turbine to rated speed.
Initial criticality was accomplished
in the previous assessment period.
Except for closecut of test
exceptions, the low power testing activities associated with a
5% low power license were completed during this assessment.
The startup testing activities during this assessment period
were more complex and more intense than during the prior as-
sessment period.
The licensee management resolved a number of
NRC concerns identified during low power testing:
The administrative program was revised to intensify the
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management involvemer.t in the review and approval of com-
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pleted test results, definition of acceptance criteria
prior to proceeding to the next test condition, and
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licensee actions relating to resolution of significant
test exceptions.
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There were several observations of friction and apparent
lack of cooperation between various groups in the testing
and operational activities, and the test briefings for
operations personnel were initially weak in the discussion
of potential plant problems. .The licensee's management
took prompt action to resolve these differences and im-
provement was observed as the low power testing program
progressed. The importance of good test briefings should
be continually stressed throughout the remainder of
startup test activities.
The timeliness of the review of completed test activities
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was initially identified as an area for improvement. Dur-
ing the low power testing the licensee improved the review
process and dedicated more personnel to perform this
activity.
The QA/QC coverage of the startup activities was adequate. QC
inspectors were observed performing surveillances during numer-
ous startup tests. They have also participated in the review
process for all completed testing.
The planned QA/QC coverage
for the remainder of the test program is adequate and involves
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the continuation of extensive surveillances of the performance
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of testing and the review of all test results.
Management involvement in the startup program was evident.
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- They witnessed major testing evolutions and were observed to be
directly involved in the resolution of major plant problems
such as the the reactor water level divergence problem between
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the A & B. side and the condensate booster pump minimum flow
valve control air supply line rupture problem. The licensee
activities relating to the reactor water level problem involved
multi-disciplined personnel and was well controlled. The prob-
lem was sufficiently resolved to permit continuance of the
heatup phase testing and hardware modifications were made dur-
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ing the recent outage.
Plant Operations
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in this rating period, the major licensee activity in the area
of plant operations involved the conduct of the low power test-
ing program, up to 5% power.
The performance of plant personnel in this testing program was
generally considered to be good, although errors by licensed
operators occurred. The two most significant of these errors
involved the opening of two 18" Primary Containment Purge
Valves, in violation of procedures, and the partial draining of
the reactor vessel to the suppression pool due to improper
valve manipulation.
Two problems also occurred as a result of activities of non-
licensed operations personnel. The first of 1"ese involved a
failure to ensure Suppression Pool levr,1 was rreper to allow
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maintenance activity on an RHR valve. Due tc tSe level being
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too high, approximately 7,000 gallons of water was spilled into
the Reactor Building upon valve disassembly. The second problem
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related to failure of personnel to properly complete Station
Equipment Clearance Permits in accordance with Station Proce-
dures. In each instance, licensee corrective actions were ap-
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propriate. However, the need for greater attention to detail,
and the adherence to procedures by personnel are areas in which
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the licensee needs to focus greater attention. This issue was
raised in the previous assessment period as a need for improve-
ment.
Staffing of licensed operators at the plant remained at a sta-
ble level throughout the rating period.
It is significant to
note, that while other areas of the plant experienced large
turnovers of personnel, the licens~ed personnel staffing level
remained stable. Overtime for licensed personnel was main-
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tained well within the guidelines of NRC Generic Letter 82-12,
and no errors or omissions by personnel appeared to be
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attributable to fatigue due to overtime. The licensee now ful-
ly staffs six shifts in~the Operations section, and has a class
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of license candidates in training.
The licensee has also ag-
gressively recruited and hired a large number of Equipment
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Operator trainees to ensure against future shortages due to
attrition.
In response to NRC initiatives, the licensee took two steps
during this rating period to reduce the administrative burden
on licensed personnel in the control room. One was the creation
of a second day shift watch engineer position. The second was
the staffing of a permanent Shift Production Assistant posi-
tion. This person provides clerical assistance to licensed
personnel on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis. The environment in the main con-
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trol room is an area where improvements could be made. Specif-
ically, there are too many people allowed in the control room
and the attendant noise level is distracting.
The licensee also established and staffed a System Engineer
Section in the Operations Division during this assessment peri-
od.
This section recently developed and implemented two com-
puter databases for use by operations personnel in tracking
plant status. These initiatives in providing management tools
for li:ensed operators to better track plant status is
noteworthy.
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The Systems Engineer section has also provided hands on de-
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tailed systems training to operations personnel.
This contin-
uing training, conducted in addition to licensed operator
initial and requalification programs, demonstrates the
licensee's continued commitment to on going training for li-
censed personnel. This area, specifically the licensed opera-
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tor Requalification Program, has been judged to be a strength
in previous assessment periods, and this new licensee initia-
tive in the area of licensed operator training' reinforces that
judgement.
Operator Licensing activity during this period involved the
conduct of NRC license examinations at Shoreham in September
1985.
Five Senior Reactor Operator and four Reactor Operator
candidates were administered written and oral examinations.
All candidates passed the examinations and were granted licens-
es. As a result of the high failure rate noted during exami-
nations in February 1985, LILCO management had committed to
increasing its monitoring and supervision of future operator
licensing classes. These most recent results indicated that
the licensed operator training program is adequate when given
proper management attention.
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Housekeeping at the facility during this period continues to be
excellent.
In particular, during the second half of this
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period, while the facility was involved in numerous maintenance
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and modification activities, the licensee was successful in
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maintaining a high standard of plant cleanliness.
One team inspection was conducted to followup the issues iden-
tified during inspections performed in the previous assessment
period in'the area of safe shutdown capability of the plant in
the event of a fire. Technically sound and thorough approaches
and timely resolution of issues were observed. The fire protec-
tion staffing was observed to be ample and knowledgeable. Ag-
gressive action had been taken on previously identified problems.
Observation of the activities of the Review of Operations Com-
cittee (ROC) and Nuclear Review Board (NRB) during this rating
period indicate that the licensee is effectively utilizing
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these oversight committees for independent review of plant ac-
tivities. NRB involvement in plant audits is evident.
B.
Conclusion
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Rating:
2
Trend:
Consistent
C.
Board Recommendation
Licensee:
Focus greater attention to ensuring personnel
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adherence to procedures
NRC:
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4.2 Radiological Controls
(317 hrs.,10%)
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A.
Analysis
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There were six region based inspections during this assessment
period; five routine and one special. -Inspection efforts this
period focused on licensee corrective action for post-accident
sampling and analysis program deficiencies to support operation
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beyond 5% power; non-radiological chemistry; radioactive waste
transportation program establishment and implementation;
preoperational and startup testing; and licensee action on clo-
sure of previous NRC findings.
Other areas reviewed included
Radiological Controls Organization and staffing; personnel
training and qualification; and external and internal exposure
controls. Special reviews were conducted in the area of radio-
chemistry as a result of allegations of program deficiencies
received by the NRC.
Weaknesses identified during the last assessment period were
the need to clearly define the responsibilities and authorities
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of the site and corporate Radiological Controls Organization
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positions. Also, a need was identified for a walk-through of
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radiation protection program elements to identify progranmatic
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weaknesses and inconsistencies.
The licensee has established in a timely fashion clearly de-
fined function responsibilities for each position within the
site and corporate radiological controls organization. Howev-
er, levels of delegated authority for each position have yet to
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be established.
Program walk-throughs were not conducted as
recommended.
-
The overall performance in this area relative to the last as-
sessment period has degraded. Weaknesses identified show a
-
lack of management attention to assure that identified problems
are corrected. Also inadequate and inconsistent control and
oversight of day-to-day activities in this area is apparent.
The degradation is primarily present in the
chemistry / radiochemistry area with some examples in the area of
radiation protection and radwaste transportation.
'
l
Radiation Protection
i
'
.
Due to the low radiation and radioactive material source term
at the station, implementation of the external and internal
"
exposure control programs was not significantly challenged dur-
1
ing this period. With some exceptions discussed later, the-
radiation protection program is' adequately defined by accept-
able policies and procedures. Management is generally respon-
i
sive to NRC findings in this area. NRC identified problems are
resolved in a timely, technically sound manner. A technically
,
6
'
.
- - -
. . , . , . -
_ ~ , . _ .
_ _ _ .
.
.
,
.
.
14
.
.
competent staff is available.to implement the program, although
staff shortages in the technical support area and ALARA coordi-
nator positions are areas where attention needs to be in-
. .
creased. One apparent weakness is a lack of significant
operating experience by senior supervisory personnel in the
group. The licensee is addressing the matter by using an expe-
rienced contracted individual to augment the organizations ex-
perience and fill a key position that has been open for some
time. This is an acceptable interim solution but should not
be viewed'as a long term answer.
Regarding training and qualifications, the initial training
program for radiation protection personnel is generally well
defined and makes a positive contribution to performance of
work with few personnel errors. However, there is no continu-
ing retraining program to notify radiation protection personnel
<
of safety significant procedure changes or new procedures in a
~
timely manner. This weakness is attributed to inadequate pro-
gram development in this area.
The licensee has established an effective general employee
training and retraining program in this area. Training records
are complete, well maintained and available. Management has
provided adequate training resources and training facilities.
To minimize impact on the radiation protection group during the
period of low power operations, the high radiation area access
control program required by Technical Specification was delet-
ed. Although no uncontrolled high radiation areas were identi-
fied, the deletion of the program illustrates a lack of
attention to maintenance of minimum program elements required
by technical specifications. Also, the deletion of the program
-
creates a lack of program maintenance and continuity which is
important in familiarizing and educating plant personnel with
regard to requirements in this area.
Program elements lacking
o- inadequate included: procedures for high radiation area key
control; inadequate procedures for access to traversing incore
probes and sub pile room; and inadequate procedures for access
to the drywell during fuel movement. The licensee initiated
action to establish and up grade procedures in this area in a
timely manner when it was brought to management's attention.
Additional attention by management'1s needed to ensure continu-
ity and adequacy of station radiation protection program ele-
ments required by license conditions.
A review of licensee actions to resolve program deficiencies in
the area of NUREG-0737 post-accident sampling and analysis
found that the licensee took timely, technically sound action
to resolve the deficiencies. The resolution of the findings
was effectively managed in that a task force approach was used.
Records of corrective actions were complete, well maintained
and available.
Technically qualified personnel were utilized.
.
.
15
.
'
While some problems were encountered in the area of licensee
interpretation of requirements, corrective measures were imple-
mented in a timely manner. Overall, the licensee was very re-
sponsive to NRC findings in this area.
Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation
Review of the Radioactive waste shipping program found it to'be
generally adequate and properly implemented. Responsibilities
of personnel involved with radioactive waste shipping activi-
ties were clearly described.
Radioactive waste personnel were
trained in applicable requirements. Training records were com-
.
plete and well maintained.
Shipping procedures were adequate.
The Quality Assurance oversight of radioactive waste transpor-
tation activities was found lacking. Individuals performing
audits of activities in this area had not received adequate
training or qualification.
In addition, audit reports of
radwaste activities failed to provide adequate indication that
the licensee had conformed with the applicable specific quality
assurance criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B despite the fact
that report summaries indicated that conformance had been veri-
fied. This is evidence of weakness in the program for self-
identification of problems.
Chemistry, Radiochemistry and Effluent Controls and Monitoring
The chemistry group is satisfactorily organized for the manage-
ment of the station's chemistry, radiochemistry, and effluent
monitoring and control programs.
However, weaknesses in the
area of:
staffing, program oversight and control, procedure
adequacy, corrective action program, and corporate support of
plant programs has resulted in major programmatic concerns not
l
being identified and corrected in a timely fashion.
NRC in-
.
volvement was needed to assure identification and implementa-
tion of lasting, comprehensive corrective action.
In the area of staffing, 40% of the professional positions
within the site chemistry group are filled by contractors.
Some key positions have been filled by contractors for an ex-
tended period of time. The group experiences the highest
turnover rate among the station groups.
Regarding the training and qualification of chemistry person-
nel, reviews found that an adequate, documented program exists
to select, train, and qualify chemistry technicians. However,
a special inspection of training and qualification of chemistry
technicians, performed in response to allegations received by
the NRC, found that the chemistry. technician training program
j
,
e
ar-
e-
~y.-
-
_
. , . -
-s,,
sec
,--.9.+.
.-evwI
- -
.
.
. .
. . _ . .
-
- . - .
-__ _
_
.
.
,
..
.
16
.
was not properly _ implemented. Open book exams and the personal
judgement of a chemistry foreman were used to qualify techni-
i
cians rather than the procedurally required check-outs or task
evaluations. Based on NRC observations, it appeared that sub-
stantive action was not taken by licensee management to address
the root cause of the problem until the NRC became involved.
In the area of chemistry and radiochemistry program establish-
ment, the program was generally defined by technically accept-
able procedures. However, procedures for quality. assurance
i
were generally inadequate indicating a clear lack of apprecia-
tion by management of the need for accurate, reproducible mea-
surements.. Program procedures were not established in a manner
to quickly identify and resolve out-of-specification
1
chemical / radiochemical measurement data. The deficiencies in
l
the area of quality. assurance are ascribed to inadequate proce-
l
dures, a lack'of sufficient technical expertise within the
chemistry staff, and a lack of adequate program review and
!
oversight by the corporate Radiation Protection Division.
The deficiencies discussed above were identified during a LILCo
quality assurance audit conducted in May and June of 1985.
'
However, NRC inspection ravealed that the deficiences still
j
existed in February 1986 and that little progress in imple-
menting effective fixes had been made.
Even after a Corrective
Action Request was issued by the Quality Controls Division, the
issue was still not promptly and effectively addressed. The
Quality Controls Division and Quality Assurance Department's
handling of this issue was ineffective.
Similarly, plant man-
.
agement was aware of these problems but did not take the neces-
sary actions to achieve a timely and effective resolution.
Summary
The radiation protection and radwaste shipping programs were
not significantly challenged during this assessment period.
However, deficiencies identified indicate a need to improve
oversight and control of these program elements. Problems
identified in the chemistry and radiochemistry programs
!
indicate a major programmatic breakdown of the chemistry /
radiochemistry program.
Inadequate oversight and followup to
.
self-identified problems clearly c~ontributed to the problem.
!
B.
Conclusion
'
Rating:
3
Trend:
Declining
.
s
I
- - - - - - . -.
- --
,, --.
- , , -
,-c
- - - - , - . -
---
-
--,
a
.s.
--
e
.
.
.
..
17
C.
Board Recommendation
Licensee
Establish and implement effective oversight and
.
control of the chemistry and radiochemistry pro-
grams and assure that the lessons learned from-
the breakdown are applied to other areas.
Fully staff the chemistry group and radiation
.
protection groups with qualified permanent
personnel
-
NRC:
Conduct an inspection of this area within four
.
months of this SALP to determine the adequacy of
licensee corrective actions.
.
G
N
.
9
.
i
- _ _ _
= _ ,
W@wy
w,
_ _
'
.
.
..
.
18
'.
,
4 .- 3 Maintenance and Surveillance
(250 hrs., 8%)
A.
Analysis
During the previous assessment period, it was noted that the
licensee should increase attention to the area of preventive
maintenance to reduce the backlog in the preventive maintenance
It was noted that understaffing appeared to be a
program.
prime contributor to this problem.
..
The area of preventive maintenance continued to be a problem at
the beginning of this rating period. One problem was the docu-
mentation of actual maintenance work outstanding on incomplete
items lists. The list was observed to not be up to date and
contained numerous items that had actually been accomplished.
In the second half of this period, progress in correcting this
situation was' evident.
The maintenance group has also been observed to be backlogged
in its evaluation of identified generic problems for applica-
bility to Shoreham Station.
In one instance identified by an
inspector, the failure of a feedwater minimum flow valve, due
to vibration induced loss of its antirotation device, may have
been prevented by the timely review of IE Notice 83-70, Supple-
ment 1, " Vibration-Induced Valve Failures", which had not be n
a
evaluated due to the backlog.
The licensee has assigned addt-
tional manpower to address this problem.
Management followup of identified maintenance problems could be
more expeditious and thorough. When an inoperative minimum
flow valve in the "B" RHR loop lead to the discovery that four
bolts which secure the valve operator had sheared off, the
scope and priority given to inspecting other valves for similar
problems was inadequate. While the limited inspection did re-
.
veal a broken mounting bolt on the "A" RHR loop minimum flow
valves, it was not until an NRC inspector identified a similar
problem with a third RHR valve that the scope of the inspection
was increased, additional personnel assigned and an earlier
than planned shutdown begun.
The final results of the in-
creased inspection revealed seven RHR valves with icose mount-
ing bolts, one with a sheared moun, ting bolt, one with a loose
handwheel, and one with a missing handwheel.
In addition, it
was not until four failures occurred in the control air supply
'
line to the condensate suction booster pump minimum flow valve
and a reactor scram occurred on low level, that management was
fully involved in the resolution of the problem. However, once
management was involved the problem was resolved.
During the previous assessment period, the procurement of spare
parts was noted to be a problem. The lack of readily available
spare parts and components continues to be a problem.
.
,
_
_. _,
.
.
19
'
,
Conversely, in some cases people were not aware that needed
spare parts were already in the warehouse system and this led
to delays in planned activities and job completion. ~
During this assessment period, maintenance management institut-
ed an organization called the Shoreham Information Management
System (SIMS). This group is comprised of representatives of
all on-site departmente and organizations.
It's purpose is to
coordinate and develop an integrated data base which will be
utilized by all organizations associated with Shoreham.
The interface between the maintenance division and other plant
divisions in the resolution of technical problems is evident.
A recent example 5f this was the coordination of the Computer
Section and Security in resolving major computer program errors
in the Security Computer. This resulted in an improved avail-
ability of the Security Computer to 99.4%. This improved
availability reduced the need for compensatory measures by the
licensee in the security area, thereby reducing personnel
constraints.
j
During the previous assessment period it was noted that the
licensee needed to increase attention to a developing problem
with the frequenr.y of unnecessary challenges to safety protec-
tion systems initiated by surveillance activities. During this
rating period, the problem of challenges to safety systems dur-
ing surveillance activities has not improved.
There were six instances in which maintenance or surveillance
activities caused an inadvertent plant shutdown signal to be
generated. Three of these resulted in reactor scrams from low
power. In one case, the incorrect desiccant was installed in an
air dryer, due to an inadequate procedure and personnel unfa-
miliar with this routine activity, resulting in low air pres-
sure and control rod drifts requiring a manual scram.
In two
cases, automatic scrams occurred due to spurious low reactor
water level signals induced during the course of routine sur-
veillance activities.
A number of other personnel errors, creating challenges to ESF
systems, occurred during surveillance activities while the
plant was in the neutron source outage.
Licensee management
initiated a comprehensive review to determine if root causes
existed for these errors. The licensee met with NRC Region I
on January 28, 1986 to discuss this matter. Although no spe-
cific causes could be determined, the licensee did identify
contributing factors to the problem of personnel errors. The
NRC considers lack of attention to' detail by personnel perform-
,
ing surveillance activities to be a contributing factor.
The
licensee's actions in investigating this matter were prompt,
comprehensive, and thorough.
Proposed corrective actions,
j
.
_
-
.
.
.
.
..
20
'.
l
which included evaluation of work scheduling, revision to sur-
'
veillance procedures, hardware modifications, and increasing
personnel awarness to the need for attention to detail were
appropriate. _The effectiveness of these corrective actions
will be monitored in the next rating period.
B.
Conclusion
Rating:
2
.
Trend:
Consistent
C.
Board Recommendations
Licensee:
Review the system for the procurement and
.
contr.ol of spare parts
Increase management attention to the area of
.
reducing the number of challenges to ESF systems
resulting from personnel error
NRC:
None
.
'
.
w
-
-
(-
e
-
,,
n.--
_
_
_
_ _ _ _
.
.
..
21
.
4'. 4 Emergency Preparedness
(331 hrs., 11%)
A.
Analysis
~
During .the previous assessment period, no rating was-given in-
the functional area of Emergency Preparedness due to limited
observations. During this assessment period, the only activi-
ty, other than the observation of training drills by the resi-
dent inspectors, related to Emergency Planning was the conduct
of a FEMA Full Scale Exercise on February 13, 1986. This drill
was conducted without the participation of New York State or
Suffolk County officials. The observations by NRC inspectors
were limited to the on-site portions of the exercise (including
the EOF).
Although this was the first exercise that has been formally
observed by the NRC at Shoreham, the NRC observation team noted
that the utility staff is thoroughly trained and practiced and
is part of a well established emergency preparedness program.
The effectiveness of the plan and its implementing procedures
was evident during the exercise as noted by the efficient man-
ner in which the utility staff ime' 2mented Emergency Plan ac-
tions in response to scenario events. Plant procedures and
policies were strictly adhered to throughout the exercise.
The on-site portion of the emergency preparedness program
(including the EOF) appears to be well established and operat-
ing smoothly. High level management is actively involved in
the program and has managed to keep enthusiasm of emergency
team members high despite uncertainties with the implementation
of the the off-site portions of the plan.
The licensee's on-site Emergency Preparedness organization was
activated to the alert level at one time during this assessment
period. This activation occurred during Hurricane Gloria. The
licensee's actions with regard to plant safety during this ac-
tivation were considered very good.
Observation of licensee Emergency Preparedness training drills
on a regular basis by the resident inspector (s) showed that
Senior Management was completely involved in the training of
plant staff. Third party and Quality Assurance Department
audits of these drills allowed independent assessments to be
made. Corrective actions, in responte to areas for improvement
identified by NRC or third parti ~es, were promptly and effectively
initiated.
The licensee had committed itself to a quality Emergency Pre-
paredness organization,.and this commitment has resulted in the
level and type of training and management involvement which
-
- -
-
-
..
.
.
-
.
.
.
..
.
22
.
results in a successful program.
It is clear that the exten- .
sive management attention given to this functional area result-
ed in a high quality performance being demonstrated at all
.
levels of the onsite organization.
,
B.
Conclusion
Rating:
1
Trend:
Consistent
C.
Board Recommendation
Licensee:
None
.
NRC:
None,
.
i
.
4
.
s
f-~"~-
-v-,,
,- - , , . . - - .
-
, _
, . , ,,
_
.
--
-- -
.
. _ .
.
.-.
.
-
--.. _
. _- -- _
.
.
..
1
23
~
4
4'. 5 Security and Safeguards
(207 hrs., 7%)
,
A.
Analysis
'During the previous assessment, no significant weaknesses were ~
identified, and the licensee's performance in this area was
assessed as Category 1.
One special and two routine unan-
nounced physical security program inspections were performed by
Region-based inspectors. Routine resident inspections contin-
ued throughout the assessment period. No violations were iden-
tified during this rating period.
Licensee management continues to be effective in carrying out-
the security program. This is evidenced by the ability of the
security organization to cope with changing conditions with
ragard to law enforcement, modified protected area boundaries,
,
and additional vital areas.
Further evidence of management attention to the security pro-
l
gram is demonstrated by the audit and appraisal programs that
have been implemented.
In addition to the internal audit by
licensee QA personnel, the licensee provides for a comarehen-
1
'
'
sive audit of the security program by an independent group of
consultants.
In such an audit conducted during this assessment-
period, each deficiency identified received a comprehensive
response by the Site Security Supervisor and prompt corrective
action was initiated and completed where necessary. The
licensee's desire for an effective program is also demonstrated
by continued improvements in the program, as evidenced by the
licensee's plans to move the Central Alarm Station and Secon-
l
l
dary Alarm Station (CAS/SAS) operations to larger quarters and,
in the case of SAS, to a more favorable location. The location
of the SAS in the control room has been an NRC concern f6r sev-
eral years in that the SAS is located in the control room prop-
er where it can be a distraction to the operator. The plans
also include upgrading the hardware'and software systems asso-
,
ciated with the alarm stations.
Staffing of the program was
exemplified by the use of well qualified and dedicated
personnel.
There were four events that required reporting in accordance-
with 10CFR73.71 during the assessment period. Each time, the
licensee handled the event methodically and efficiently, and in
accordance with the NRC-approved security plan and implementing
!
procedures. The events were promptly reported to NRC and com-
plete information was provided.
The security staffing is adequate', but a short' age in clerical
help appears to have resulted in security supervisors and
training personnel taking time from their primary functions and
occasionally using overtime to perform record keeping and
.
I
e
r'.
r
y
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.
m.
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.
.
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24
.
.
.
~
filing duties. Continued use of supervisors and training per-
sonnel in this manner requires management attention to assure
,
this does not prove detrimental to the security program.
,
-
The licensee's security force contractor has provided an effec-
tive training staff to maintain security force personnel train-
ing at an acceptable level. The licensee's security staff
ensures the program effectiveness through review and approval
of the training program and routine audits. As stated in the
previous.SALP assessment, the licensee chose to implement the
security program at an early date to ensure time for adequate
training and qualification of the security force. The NRC spe-
cial inspection conducted in March, 1985 demonstrated the value
of this early implementation, in that the inspection found, in
re-examining a statistically selected sample of the security
force, that they were well qualified for the duties to which
they were assigned; This review was further strengthened by
the fact that no violations of NRC requirements were identified
during the assessment period.
During the assessment period, the licensee submitted a revision
4
to the security plan to provide for emergency backup power gen-
erators in the event they would be needed for low power licens-
ing.
Although the power sources were ultimately not needed,
the submittal afforded the NRC adequate time for review and was
considered complete and acceptable for implementation.
The area of Security and Safeguards, like Emergency Prepared-
ness, is one in which the licensee has demonstrated the ability
to perform at a high level of quality. The Security and Safe-
guards area is one in which the licensee's performance indi-
cates effective actions in identifing and correcting potential
problem areas at their own initiative.
B.
Conclusion:
Rating-
1
Trend:
Consistent
C.
Board Recommendation
Licensee:
None
.
NRC:
None
.
.
=
m
ry
-
. - - -
w
--
,
w
g*.
w
- - . _
w
'
.
.
.1
25
j
.
4.6 Outage and Modifications
(131 hrs., 4%)
A.
Analysis
~
Outage and Modification. activities are routinely monitored by
resident inspectors.
In addition, one inspection of the
licensee's modification program was conducted by two
region-based inspectors. A significant number of inspection
hours related to tnis area are included under plant operations.
This functional area was not evaluated in previous assessment
periods due to Shoreham's status as a construction facility.
During this assessment period, the licensee completed over 60
modification activities in a period of five months. These ac-
tivities include; neutron source replacement, completion of EQ
modifications, and, modifications to the reactor vessel water
,
2
level systemc As a' result of these activities, for most of the
last half of this assessment period, the facility was in an
outage condition.
The licensee has a separate organizational division for Outage
j
and Modifications which reports to the Plant Manager. The di-
vision consists of an Outage Section, Modifications Section,
and Planning & Scheduling Section, as well as a section devoted
specifically to the Colt diesel generator project.
The licensee has been unable to fully staff the Outage and Mod-
ifications Division with LILCO employees, and while it is the
smallest division (with 42 authorized positions), it has the
highest vacancy rate for licensee employees (33.3%). The
licensee has filled the vacancies with contractor personnel.
The use of large numbers of contractor personnel creates a sit-
uation where attrition and contractor rotation introduces in-
consistency in performance.
Turnover of licensee employees
within the Outage and Modifications Division is the lowest in
i
the plant (3.5%), and aggressive attempts to increase the number
~
of full-time licensee employees is evident.
Management involvement in Outage and Modification activities is
evident. The Division Manager is frequently observed in the
field checking the status of on going jobs, and observing work
in progress. Additionally, the presence of Division Managers
,
at daily planning and scheduling meetings is evident, with the
1
presence of the Maintenance and the Outage & Modifications Di-
vision Managers being especially noteworthy. Plant Manager
involvement in these meetings is frequent. The presence and
involvement of these management personnel has frequently been
observed to be instrumental in the resolution of problems and
reprioritization of schedules.
,
-
m*
.
. - -
-
.
.
. . .
. .
-
\\
j
.
.
..
26
'
.
_
l
,
'
Tha technical resolution of engineering difficulties during
modification activities is a strength in the licensee's Outage
I
'
and Modification Program.- Nuclear Engineering-Department and
Stone & Webster Site Engineering Office personnel attend daily
-
planning and scheduling meetings, and the NED Manager frequent-
-
ly is present. Coordination among plant staff, NEO, and Stone
& Webster in resolving problems is a strength of the licensee's
program.
Frequently, issues are discussed and resolved on the
spot at the daily meetings. NED and Stone & Webster's review
of modification activities is thorough and comprehensive.
Fre-
quent NED assistance in the. resolution of procurement or docu-
,
mentation problems is evident.
An inspection of activities related to modification activities
conducted in the second half of this rating period found the
implementation to be generally good. The detail and clarity of
modification procedures, knowledge of personnel, involvement
and interface of modification and engineering staff, interface
of Quality Control, and extensive Review of Operation Committee
review of modification packages were observed as strengths in
i
the licensee's program. A need for improvement by the licensee
in the areas or control of tags during modification activities,
record retention, and attention to detail in the closecut of
modification packages were also identified.
4
Outage and Modification Division Management has establis.hed a
firm commitment to training and qualification within the divi-
sion. Two of the four Outage and Modification Division Section
Heads are presently in training to receive SRO licenses, and a
third presently holds an SRO license. This knowledge of plant
operations, systems, and technical specification requirements
is beneficial in the coordination of work activities.
In addi-
tion, the Modifications Section is involved in frequent train-
ing sessions which involves areas such as; Administrative
'
controls, hands-on experience, the'ory, and technical issues.
The Modification Section also conducts training sessions for
!
NED, QC, and operations personnel.
Prior to the beginning of the Source Replacement Outage in Oc-
'
tober, the licensee sent the Outage Engineer to the Susquehanna
,
Steam Electric Station for 2 months to observe the activities
i
of their outage group. This training and familiarization ap-
peared to be extremely beneficial and is considered to be one
i
of the reasons that the outage was conducted in a successful
The licensee uses a number of computer systems and
manner.
tracking programs to schedule work activities and coordinate
outage management. These systems allow management to track
completion of scheduled activities and resolve problems which
l
are delaying work activities.
I
,
-
-
- - - - - -
- -
e-
- - -
e,
-
-
-w
as
f- w
mw-yp,
e
,p,p-ee----'g
y-e
-
+
7-+.yg-w
p.yp--,-c--p.w.
-
---,--p-----y
-
v-
-
-wy-
--.w.
.
.
.
27
.
The licensee's performance in the area of Outage and Modifica-
tions to date has been effective. However, the organization
has yet to be challenged at a level which is equivalent to that
which will occur during refueling outages, or during modifica-
tions under a full power operating license. -The framework for
an organization which will function effectively during full
power operations exists. The licensee should increase atten-
tion to staffing, and continue the positive steps in the area
of training-to ensure that the organization can make the tran-
sition with little or no problem.
.
B.
Conclusion
Rating: 2
Trend:
Consistent
C.
Board Recommendation
Licensee: Continue efforts to complete staffing
NRC:
None
,
a
l
l
-
. - . - _ _ .
_
.
- -. -
--.
-
-
.
,
..
.
28
.
'.
_
4.7 Training and Qualification Effectiveness
A.
Analysis
_
-
During this assessment period Training and Qualification-effec-
tiveness is being considered as a separate functional area for
the first time. Training and qualification effectiveness con-
tinues to be an evaluation criteria for each functional area.
The various aspects of this functional area have been consid-
ered and discussed as an integral part of other functional ar-
eas and the respective inspection hours have been included in
each one. Consequently, this discussion is a synopsis of the
assessments related to training conducted in other areas.
Training effectiveness is normally measured primarily by the
observed performance of licensee personnel, but in the case of
Shoreham, with its' extended period of low power operation and
outage, this is not possible. Therefore, to a greater degree,
this assessment has been a review of program adequacy.
l
The discussion below addresses three principle areas: licensed
operator training, non-licensed staff training, and status of
INPO training accreditation.
The training of non-licensed personnel is an area where a sig-
nificant increase in the level.of management attention is war-
ranted. Significant problems were noted by the NRC in a special
inspection of the Radiochemistry program at the plant. These
included inadequate records, violations of Station Procedures
for qualification, and improper on-the-job training. Additional-
ly, in areas other than Radiochemistry, the licensee's Quality
Assurance Department has discovered numerous problems with train-
ing and qualification. Training of non-licensed personnel has
~
been almost completely left to plant technical sections, and
Training Division oversight and assistance to these sections is
~
-
not evident. The~ reliance upon the Technical Sections for
training activities has created an additional burden for the
plant staff, which in many cases is already overburdened and
understaffed. This split of responsibility has also created
conflicts between plant and training division records, and has
created situations where the training department has become
simply a repository for training . files. Training Division
review, audit, or Quality Control of these records is not
i
evident.
Although the licensed operator training program has greatly
improved since the last SALP period, the areas of non-licensed
operator training and management. involvement in training are
considered to be areas of significant weakness. Although Divi-
sion Management and section supervisory personnel attempt to
individually ensure that effective and valid training is
,
1
.
-
.
,.--w-n,w
c.-,,,
au
,,- - - ,
. , , - - -
-,
_
,
_ _ - - . - - -
- , . -
.,
__
-___
__
.
.
29
-
offered to their personnel, the lack of Training Division and
Senior Management attention to training has created inconsis-
tency, and in one case, allowed -improper implementation of a
training progran to occur. At the end of this rating period,
the licensee had begun increasing attention to the area of
training by establishing a new position of Corporate Director
of Training who will report directly to the Executive
Vice-Fresident. NRC will be closely monitoring this area dur-
ing the next SALP period to determine whether effective correc-
tive actions are being made.
The performance of licensed personnel in the control room dur-
ing testing, and during transient events initiated by equipment
malfunctions demonstrated the ability to handle the plant in a
competent and professional manner. Knowledge"of system opera-
tional characteristics, familiarity with procedures, and ac-
tions on transient response were evident, and are indicative of
effective and valid training and requalification for licensed
operators. Nonetheless, attention must be given by licensed
operators to plant conditions and operating procedures during
all modes of reactor operation so as to avoid the types of
,
'
problems discussed in Section 4.1, Plant Operations and Startup
Testing.
'
During-this assessment period, the Quality Assurance Department
instituted an Operational Training Program for QA, Safety, and
Compliance personnel. This program is taught by a licensed
SRO. The purpose is to increase the systems and operations
knowledge of the attendees to allow them to more effectively
perform their jobs. The program includes examinations which
must be successfully completed at stages in the program in or-
der to continue. This initiative demonstrates a strong commit-
ment to training by the QA Department.
The licensee is pursuing the training program accreditation
-
with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. Accreditation
should be complete within 2 years of fuel load in accordance
.
'
with the NRC Policy Statement on training.
Fuel load occurred
at the plant in December 1984. No programs have been accredited
to date. The first four programs, in the operations area, are
scheduled for Self-Evaluation Report submittal in August 1986.
The remaining programs will be submitted in late 1986 or early
1987.
.
B.
Conclusion
!
Rating:
3
Trend:
Declining
.
P
J
!
-
m.--
_
,,
,.._
. , ,
, , .
9
y
2--
e.
---v--
-
P-e--
.
.
.
30
.
_
C.
Board Recommendation
Licensee:
Direct management attention to establishing good
.
training in all plant areas
'
Reassess the reasons for the contrast between
.
the training in areas such as Emergency Planning
and Security versus other plant areas
NRC:
Conduct a management meeting with the licensee
.
in July or August to discuss the adequacy of
training and qualification.
Conduct a six month appraisal of the Training
.
and Qualification area "
Conduct a special inspection into Training and
.
. Qualification cctivities at Shoreham
,
6
9
%
>
,e
, -
v--
-- ~ - - - ,
,, - - , - -
_ _ - _ _ _ - _
.
'i
31
4.8 Licensing Activities
-
A.
-Analysis
,
During the previous-assessment period, the need for the
-
~ licensee to devote more attention to non-critical path activi-
ties, and to prevent hearings and litigation issues from inter-
fering with plant staff normal responsibilities were noted.
Additionally, the existence of a restraint on the interchange
of information between the licensee and the NRC staff due to
the atmo'phere of litigation which surrounds all activities
s
related to Shoreham was noted. This situation continues to
exist, despite a significant reduction in the licensing tempo
,
during the rating period.
The licensee's management continued to participate directly in
the most major critical path licensing activities during this
period, most notably emergency planning, the TGI EDGs, and the
GDC-17 exemption. Because these issues were, and in the case
of emergency planning still are, on the critical path for li-
censing, this management involvement made a positive contribu-
tion in assuring quality.
During the staff's review of the
equipment qualification exemption request, the licensee's man-
agement was instrumental in providing additional information in
a timely fashion. Similarly, the Vice President for Nuclear
Operation has personally participated in the emergency planning
i
process, including the performance of the drill on February 13,
1986.
The technical review of the TDI EDGs has also received continu-
ous management involvement and support which has been the prin-
cipal reason for its success. When the favorable ASLB decision
on the TOI EDGs was issued, senior LILCD engineering managers
participated personally in the development of the license con-
ditions and technical specificati'ons needed to implement the
ASLB decision.
Similarly, in the spring,of 1985, LILCO management placed the
full resources of the company behind the resolution of security
concerns associated with the GDC-17 exemption process.
Notwithstanding the above, however, it was noted that the "sig-
nificant hazards" analyses accompanying requests for license
amendments have been perfunctory and conclusary, rather than
true analyses. In this regard, the licensee's performance is
typical of many others (see Generic Letter 86-30).
Future li-
cense amendment requests should include sufficient detail for
the reviewer to understand the details of the request and the
basis for it without resorting to a review of the entire FSAR.
.
~
___
.
.
32
4
During the low power testing program a concern was raised by
NRC regarding the licensee's interpretation of reporting
requirements prior to receiving NRC concurrence on this inter-
'
pretation. This involved a power spike greater than 5% power
due to equipment malfunction. Although Facility Operating Li-
cense NPF-36 limited the plant to 5% power, and required re-
porting (via the ENS line) to the NRC operations of violations
of this limit, the licensee initially felt a report wasn't re-
quired. The basis for this belief was an, at that time unan-
swered, letter to.the NRC regarding the need for ENS reporting
of unintentional violations of license conditions.
It was only
after insistent prodding by the Senior Resident Inspector and
the Licensing Project Manager that the licensee reported the
event. The performance of the licensee in this matter was not
indicative of satisfactory responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
This incident also demonstrates a need for licensee management
to be less concern'ed with public and press reaction to poten-
tial reportable events. A similar attitude was evident among
licensee management when it became necessary for the licensee
to report non-conformance with a license condition on comple-
tion of EQ modifications by the November 30, 1985 NRC deadline.
The licensee's technical response to tne resolution of most
issues continues to be generally sound. NRC staff reviews dur-
ing this rating period have concentrated on the resolution of
portions of larger issues left over from the previous rating
period. The licensee's management and staff continue to demon-
strate a good understanding of these issues. Specifically, the
licensee's performance regarding the TDI EDGs has been excel-
lent.
In the area of fire protection, the licensee's response
to the issue of the control of associated circuits for the ADS
valves was especially conservative, compared to other
,
licensees.
However, the licensee's initial response to human factor con-
cerns raised by the NRC staff related to TDI EDG loading was
deficient, and the staff had to prod the licensee to perform a
proper task analysis.
As was noted in the previous assessment period, LILCO is will-
ing and able to marshal whatever resources are necessary to
resolve issues that remain on the critical path for licensing.
The two prime examples of this are the TDI EDG effort and the
off-site emergency planning organization, which encompasses
over 2000 LILCO employees from throughout the company. Howev-
er, the licensee responsiveness to other initiatives, which are
not on the critical path, whether NRC initiated or licensee
initiated, is still low.
This.was evident in the time required
to respond to open fire protection issues, the issue of the
operability of the HPCI, RCIC, and RWCU isolation valves, and
the TDI EDG human factors task analysis.
-
-
-
w
.
.
33
.
~
Another example of an issue whose resolution has been delayed
is the Probabalistic Risk- Assessment (PRA). During the origi-
nal licensing board hearings in 1983, LILCO committed to pro-
vide the staff with the results of its PRA, including the
~
-
consequence analysis section. The licensee submitted the first
two parts of the PRA in 1984, but has not, to date, submitted
the consequence analysis section, despite continual verbal re-
minders from the staff. This has delayed completion of the
staff review for over two years.
The delays discussed above can be traced to two fundamental
causes. First, an atmosphere of litigation continues to sur-
round this project.
It has created an over cautious attitude
about what is written into formal submittals to the NRC, and
how it is written. Consequently, a protracted review process
has been established which inevitably produces delays.
In some
cases, it has also reduced the usefulness of letters to the
NRC, because of resultant ambiguities.
A second cause appears to be understaffing in the licensee's
licensing organization. Three experienced licensing engineers
have left that organization in the last year, with a resultant
ir. crease in workload for the remaining two engineers.
If and
when Shoreham is eventually licensed for full power operations,
the workload of this group will increase substantially.
Licensee management must take aggressive action to correct this
situation to prevent future serious problems.
B.
Conclusion
Rating: 3
.
Trend:
Consistent
C.
Board Recommendation
.
Licensee:
The licensee should improve its responsiveness
.
to NRC initiatives which do not directly affect
'
the licensing schedule. Submittais should be
more thorough, detailed, and specific. Techni-
.
cal Specification changes should be accompanied
by true analyses, rather than by perfunctory
conclusions.
NRC:
Senior NRC management should discuss with senior
licensee management their overly cautious attitude
about releasing information, so that the flow of
necessary information is not impeded.
.
.
.
.
34
.
1
~
4.9 Assurance of Quality-
-
_
A.
Analysis
Management involvement and control in assuring quality con-
tinues to be one of the evaluation criteria for each functional
_
During this assessment period Assurance of Quality is
area.
being considered as a separate functional area for the first
time.
The varidus aspects of Quality Assurance and Control (QA and
QC) program requirements have been considered and discussed as
in integral part of each functional area and the respective
inspection hours are included in each area.
It should be noted
that QA is only one management tool available to provide feed-
back to management on the quality of work. Consequently, this
discussion is.a sydopsis of the assessments relating to the
quality of work conducted in other areas and is not intended to
be restricted to a discussion of QA or QC.
The assurance of quality in plant operations is an area where
the licensee has demonstrated contradictory performance.
Secu-
rity and Safeguards, and Emergency Planning are two areas which
demo 1 strate that the licensee has the ability to devote the
necessary time, attention, and resources to assure quality ac-
tivities. However, these areas contrast clearly with training,
licensing, and Radiological controls, in that no such commit-
ment to quality activities is evident in those areas. Addi-
tionally, areas in this report which detail weaknesses in
procedural adherence, control of activities, spare parts pro-
curement and control, and personnel inattention to detail,
point up deficiencies in the licensee's overall implementation
of quality activities.
It is evident that when the licensee operates in a proactive
-
posture, with appropriate management and supervisory attention,
quality work is the result.
It is equally evident that when
management attention is lacking, or when priorities are shift-
ed, problems develop. The licensee must adjust the attention?
of management to ensure that an appropriate level of involve-
ment exists in all areas to ensure that quality performance is
achieved.
At the end of this assessment period, as a result of the prob-
lems in the radiochemistry area, the licensee had begun steps
to increase the presence of management personnel in the plant.
Daily interaction and contact between management and employees
-
is important in monitoring the quality of work performed andAc-
assuring a positive attitude toward assurance of quality.
tion by the licensee in this area is warranted.
_
V
_ __
35
During the previous assessment period a need for improvement
-
was noted in the timeliness and completeness of response to QC
Audit findings, and the failure to accomplish the necessary
corrective and/or preventive actions within committed times.
During the later portion of this assessment period, these con-
cerns were again identified in a special inspection of problems
in the Radiochemistry Section, in that audit corrective actions
were not vigoursly pursued to progressively higher levels of
management for resolution.
Quality' assurance department involvement in plar.t activities is
evident, as observed during routine resident inspector tours,
and during outage and maintenance activities. An inspection of
the modification program by regional based inspectors in the
later part of this period noted that the Quality Controls Divi-
sion's independence in the selection of hold points, and the
use of different inspectors for package, work, and completed
job review was a strength in the program.
Needs for improvement in the licensee's Quality Controls organ-
ization were noted in an inspection of the area of radioactive
waste activities. The licensee implemented immediate correc-
tive actions for this concern.
Irrespective of the licensee's
responsiveness and corrective actions, these areas indicate a
need by the licensee to devote additional management attention
to the details of the day to day operation of the quality func-
tion at Shoreham.
The assurance of quality by those organizations involved di-
rectly in plant activities, irrespective of the licensee QA
Department, is an area which was noted as a strength in the
previous SAlp period.
In that rating period the Operations and
Maintenance Departments were specifically mentioned as being
noteworthy in their attitude that the assurance of quality for
their departments activities was'their responsibility.
The
-
decreased level of performance in plant operations, training,
and quality assurance during this rating period, indicate a neen
for re-emphasis on this area. The need for management to in-
'
crease involvcment in the assurance of quality for their own
departments activities is evident.
B.
Conclusion
Rating: 2
j
Trend:
Declining ( Although indicated as declining, the trend
associated with this functioral area can more accurately be
described as variable.)
,
9
%
T
&
.
.
.
36
.
C.
Board Recommendation
Licensee:
Assess and implement corrective actions to
.
reduce the inconsistent nature of the degree of
quality implementation inplant programs
Review the administrative burden of the Division
.
Managers.
NRC:
Conduct a management meeting with the licensee
.
to discuss assurance of quality activities
Conduct a six month appraisal of the Assurance
.
of Quality area
,
b
4
4
s
I
-
-
-
-
--
-- -
_-
.
,
, , _
._ ,
__
. _
_ - - _ - _ - _ .
.
.
37
,
,
,
,
5.0 SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES
5.1 Investigation and Allegation Review
Three allegations were received during this rating period. One was
-
unsubstantiated.
A second involved concerns related to activities in the Radiochemis-
try Section. An investigation in this area by the NRC Office of In-
vestigation vas begun at the end of this rating period, and is
ongoing. Enforcement action related to this allegation is pending.
The third involved calibration of certain instrumentation and con-
trols, as well as training and qualification of instrumentation
technicians and supervisors. This allegation was the subject of a
special inspection conducted in April and May of 1985. Concerns
'
regarding this allegation were resolved.
5.2 Escalated Enforcement Actions
Escalated Enforcement action reiated to activities in the Radio-
chemistry area, including management and QA involvement is pending.
5.3 Management Conferences
Date
Subject
March 1, 1985
Discuss performance of the Cold License class in
Februa ry.
April 1-2, 1985
Review the Shoreham Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
June 7, 1985
SALP Management meeting
January 28, 1986 Personnel errors and licensee action regarding
check valve failures.
In addition, members of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board toured
tha plant site on March 25, 1985 in connection with hearings on the
.
,-
.
.
.
.
.
38
.
5.4 Licensee Event Reports
.
1.
Tabular Listing
A.
Personnel
Error..........
..
32-
B.
Design / Man./Censt./ Install..
15
C.
External Cause...............
1
D.
Defective Procedure..........
3
E.
Management / Quality Assurance
Deficiency..................
0
X.
0ther........................
7
,.
---
Total...................
58
LERs Reviewed
85-006 to 86-004
2.
Casual Analysis
a.
Personnel errors - there were thirty two LERs involving
personnel error. They were: 85-006,85-007, 85-010,85-011, 85-014,85-017, 85-018,85-019, 85-020,85-022,
85-026,85-030, 85-031,85-029, 85-033,85-034, 85-035,85-037, 85-042,85-043, 85-044,85-047, 85-048,85-050,
85-053,85-054, 85-055,85-056, 85-057,85-058, and
86-004. Of these personnel errors, twenty-two resulted in
challenges to ESF Systems, including four reactor trips
,
from power.
-
The subject of personnel errors, and challenges to safety
systems as a result of such errors, was raised with the
licensee by the Senior Resident Inspectcr on December 20,
1985, and was the subject of an NRC/ Licensee Management
meeting at the plant site on January 28, 1986.
Licensee
actions to minimize personnel errors will be monitored
during the next rating period.
,
b.
External causes - one LER,85-046, was the result of Hur-
ricane Gloria, which hit the plant site on September 27,
,
'
1985, causing spurious ESF actuations and resulting in
missed fire watches.
I
1
c.
Bomb Threats - three of the LERs,85-021, 85-059, and
86-003 were the result of b6mb threats that the licensee
has received.
l
i
,
'
-
.w
.
3
- . .
.
.
.
. .
39
.
5.5 Operating Reactor Licensing Actions
1.
Schedular Extensions Granted
_
Equipment Qualification - for ventilation damper actuators
a.
and H2 Recombiners until December 31, 1985.
-
b.
Inerting Containment - until 120 EFPD have been expended.
2.
Reliefs Granted
None
3.
Exemptions Granted
a.
Seismic Qualification of Radiation Monitors
b.
Containment Isolation Valves
c.
Appendix J
MSIV Leak Rate Testing
d.
Remote shutdown capability
e.
Initial Containment Inerging
f.
Environment Qualification
4.
License Amendment Issued
Amendment No. 1 - issued December 6, 1985 - to extend deadline
for completion of EQ work.
5.
Orders Issued
Numerous orders were issued by the ASLBs, ASLAB, and the
Commission related to the ongoing licensing hearings.
.
G
v
,
.
.
..
,
T1-1
.
Table 1
LISTING OF LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
'
March 1, 1985 - February 28,1986)
FUNCTIONAL AREA
NUMBER /CAUSE CODE
TOTAL
A. Plant Operations'
12/A 10/B 1/C 3/X
26
& Startup Testing
B. Radiological Controls
1/D
1
C. Maintenance & Surveillance
17/A,5/B,2/D
24
'
0
E. Security & Safeguards
3/A 4/X
7
I
0
F Outage & Modifications
G. Training & Qualification
0
Effectiveness
0
H. Licensing Activities
0
I. Assurance of Quality
Cause codes:
A - Personnel Error
'
B - Design, Manufacturing, Construction or Installation
Error
-
C - External Cause
D - Defective Procedure
E - Management / Quality Assurance Deficiency
,
X - Other
\\
-
\\
\\
.
_
-.
.
..
- - - -
.
.
T2-1
.
Table 2
LER SYNOPSIS (3/1/85 - 2/28/86)
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
-
LER NO
SYNOPSIS85-006
ECCS Actuation on Personnel Error
85-007
Firewatches Late in the Control Room
85-008
Auto Start of Emergency Diesel Generator 103
Steam Leak Detection Div. II Ambient Temperature Hi Alarm
85-009
Activation
Inadvertent RHR Loop B Trip in Statdown Cooling
Auto Actuation of Control Room Air C-cditioning
85-012
Deficiencies in the Background Screening Process with
Temp Force Inc. Employees85-013
HPCI Inverter Circuit Failure
85-014
Late Fire Watch Patrol in EOG Rooms Due to Personnel
Unable to Gain Access85-015
Intake Canal, Ultimate Heat Sink Accumulated Sediment
Beyond Allowable Limits85-016
Automatic Actuation of Control Room Air Conditioning
85.-017
Two Full Scrams and NSSSS 1/2 Isolation Due to I&C
Technicians Working on an Instrument Rack
85-018
ESF Actuation Occurred as a Result of a High Flux
Signal on IRM Channel 'D'85-019
TPCN Was Not Approved Within the Tecn Spec Allowable
Time Frame
85-020
ESF Actuation Caused by RPV. Low Water Level Signals- 85-021
Bomb Threat
85-022
High Pressure Scram Caused by Malfunctioning RWCU
Blowdown Which Was~Being Used to Control RPV Pressure
l
+
i
.
.
- ~ .
T2-2
'.
LER NO
SYNOPSIS85-023
RWCU Actuation Caused by Electromagnetic
Interferences Possibly Due to Work Activities85-024
ESF Actuation Caused By Low Reactor Water Level
85-025
Missed Daily Channel Checks Due to Improper
Implementation of a Station Modification
85-026
Personnel Hatch Failed Full Volume Test
85-027
RWCU Isolation Due to Blown Fuse in Differential
Circuitry
85-028
Missed Fire Watches in the Chiller and the HVAC
Equipment Rooms Due to Damaged Door Latch
85-030
Initiation of CRAC/RBSVS "A" Side Due to Technician
Bumping Jumper
85-031
RPV Low Level Scram Due to Water Draining Into the
Suppression Pool when Suppression Pool Suction Valve
Was Opened While the SDC Suction Valve Was Closing
85-029
Degraded Vital Security Area
85-032
HPCI Isolation Due to High Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure
85-033
Inadvertent Split of RBCLCW Into Its Accident Mode
("B" Side)85-034
Diesel 101 Service Water Stand Pipe Hinged Cap Wedged
Shut
85-035
Reactor Manual Trip Due to Lo'ss of Instrument Air
85-036
RWCU Isolations Due While Operator Was Adjusting
Blowdown Flow
85-037
Reactor Trip While Valving in of Instrument Connected
to Variable Leg
85-038
"B" Reference Leg Spiked High Due to Excess
Condensate in the Steam Line to the Condensing
Chamber
85-039
CRAC Initiations During RBSVS Testing
85-040
RBSVS/CRAC Initiation Due to Voltage Dip Caused by
Thunderstorms85-041
Bomb Threat
.
..
T2-3
.
LER NO
SYNOPSIS85-042
Mechanical Disturbances Caused Low Level Trip
85-043
Reactor Scram Due to Valving in of Test Stand to
-
~
Variable Leg
-
85-044
RWCU Isolation Due to Technician Error While Working
on a Surveillance Procedure
85-045
LPCI Declared Inoperable While HPCI was Out of Service
85-046
ESF Actuations and Suspendad Fire Watches Due to
Hurricane " Gloria"85-047
Auto Start of Emergency Diesel Generator Due to
Equipment Ope'rator Error
85-048
RBSVS "B" Side Initiation Due to I&C Technician Error
85-049
LLRT Exceeds Allowable Technical Specification Limit
85-050
RBSVS/CRAC "B" Side Initiation Due to Technician
Error
85-051
HPCI Check Valve Malfunction Due to Their Valve
Mechanisms Separating From the Valve Bonnets85-052
RPS Actuation When Switching From RPS " Alt" to RPS
"A" Bus85-053
TpCN-85-721 Not Approved in Time Limit Specified in
Technical Specifications85-054
Loss of RPS Bus "A" When Equipment Operator Opened
-
RPS Bus "A" Circuit Breaker Inadvertently
85-055
Equipment Required to be Environmenta11y Qualified by
November 30, 1985 was not Completed
85-056
Security Guard Found Sleeping at His Post
85-057
RBSVS Initiation Due to Technician Error (Dropped
Screwdriver)85-058
NSSSS Isolations Due to I&C Technician Error
85-059
Loss of "B" RPS Bus Due to the EPA Breaker Being Found
in the Off Position
Containment Atmosphere Sample Not Analyzed in
Accordance with Technical Specifications
~
>
-]
..
-.
.
-
.
. _ . . _ _ _ _ _
.
.
..
T2-4
'
.
i
\\
-
'
LER NO
SYNOPSIS
4
86-002
Missed Fire Watch in LPCI MG Set Room 111 Due to
Inoperable Door
,
Bomb Threats
Security Guard Failure to Log Personnel Entry
. . .
h
'.
I
I
l
'
.,
!
!
.
)
"
l
. - . .
.
.
..
_
_ _ _
,
-. - _
_ . , _ _
_ . . - . . _
._.
_.
.
.
..
T3-1
.
.
Table 3
INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY (3/1/85-2/28/86
.
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
_
FUNCTIONAL AREA
HOURS
% OF TIME
A.
Plant Operations
& Startup Testing............
1831*
60%*
B.
Radiological Controls........
317
10%
C.
Maintenance & Surveillance...
250
8%
0.
Emergency Preparedness.......
331
11%
E.
Security & Safeguards........
207
7%
F.
Outage & Modifications.......
131**
4%**
G.
Training & Qualification
Effectiveness................
H.
Licensing Activities.........
I.
Assurance of Quality.........
T0TAL........................
3067
100%
- Hours expended in facility license activities and operator
license activities are not included with direct inspection
effort statistics
- Inspection hours by Resident Inspectors in this functional area
are included in the plant operations functional area
- Hours expended in these functional areas not included with
direct inspection effort statistics as they are included in
other funr.tional areas
.
%
l
-
.
.
- .-.
T4-1
'
.
-
Table 4
ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY (3/I/85-2/28/86)
.
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
i
A.
Violations vs. Functional Area
SEVERITY LEVELS
FUNCTIONAL AREA
I II
III IV
V
DEV TOTAL
A.
Plant Operations &
Startup Testing
2
2
O
B.
Radiological Controls
,
C.
Maintenance & Surveillance
I
1
0
5
0.
0
E.
Security & Safeguards
0
F.
Outage & Modifications
G.
Training & Qualification
0
Effectiveness
0
H.
Licensing Activities
0
I.
Assurance of Quality
TOTALS BY SEVERITY LEVEL
0
0
0
I
2
0
3
B.
Summary
REPORT NO.
SEVERITY FUNCTIONAL
AND DATES
LEVEL
AREA
VIOLATION
85-30
V
Plant Operations
Failure to
07/29-08/12/85
& Startup Testing
implement s/u
program in
accordance with
procedures
.
-
- ,--
a
w
+-
-n,.-
p
mm
--
--,-y
q.
- -~
-
y
y
______ ____ -
.
.
.
.
T4-2
.
.
_
Table 4 (Cont'd)
-
._
REPORT NO.
SEVERITY FUNCTIONAL
AND DATES
LEVEL
AREA
VIOLATION
~ 85-42
IV
Maintenance &
Failure to con-
11/1-30/85
Surveillance
duct maintenance
activities with
adequate proced-
ural controls
'
85-42
V
Plar.t Operations
Failure to ad-
here station
11/1-30/85
procedures
86-03
Pending
Radiological
Pending
. 01/27-02/14/86
' Controls
.
5
1
i
,
y--
---
w- . .-, -
w----.+.i-
-.
y
.,p4.,
.
-.,o
-
_
9.*r
--e7^-^--*--
W"
N
- "T"*""*F
i
.
.
-
.
.
.
T5-1
.
.
Table 5
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES (3/1/85-2/28/86)
-
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
REPORT NO. &
INSPECTION OATES
INSPECTOR
AREAS INSPECTED
85-13
03/04/85-02/08/85
Specialist
SER and Facility
License requirements
related to Electrical
power supplies
.
85-14
03/04/85-03/08/85
Specialist
Startup Test Program
85-15
03/05/85-03/07/85
Specialist
Non-radiological
Chemistry Program
85-16
03/04/85-03/08/85
Specialist
Security Program
85-18
03/01/85-03/31/85
Resident
Routine
85-19
04/30/85-05/04/85
Specialist
Security Program
85~-20
04/01/85-05/15/85
Resident
Routine
85-21
04/09/85-05/10/85
Project Engineer
Allegation Followup
85-22
04/10/85-05/10/85
Project Engineer
Allegation Followup
i
85-23
04/29/85-05/01/85
Team Inspection
i
capability in the event
of fire
-
85-24
05/16/85-06/18/85
Resident
Routine
=
1
~
r
t
-
-
-
~
--
i
.
'
'
. .
T5-2
.
Table 5 (cont'd)
__
REPORT NO. &
INSPECTION DATES
INSPECTOR
AREAS INSPECTED
_
,
85-25
06/10/85-06/14/85
Specialist
Security Progrtm
85-26
06/12/85-06/14/85
Specialist
Radiological Controls
Program
85-27
06/28/85-08/02/85
Resident
Routine
85-28
06/24/85-06/28/85
Specialist
Startup Test Program
Activities
85-29
07/06/85-07/26/85
Specialist
Startup Test Program
Activities
85-30
08-03/85-08/31/85
Resident
Routine
85-31
07/29/85-08/12/85
Specialist
Startup Test Program
Activities
85-32
08/12/85-08/30/85
Specialist
Startup Test Program
Activities
'
85-33
08/26/85-08/30/85
Specialist
Security Program
85-34
09/16/85-09/20/85
Specialist
Operator Licensing
Examinations
85-35
08/30/85-09/13/85
Specialist
Startup Test Program
i
Activities
85-36
09/01/B5-09/30/85
Resident
Routine
85-37
09/16/85-10/08/85
Specialist
Startup Test Program
'
Activities
,
.
.
..
. ..
.
m
-
.
.
-, .
,
"
T5-3
.
.
.
Table 5 (Cont'd)
_
REPORT NO. &
INSPECTION DATES
INSPECTOR
AREAS INSPECTED
-
85-38
10/21/85-10/25/85
Specialist
Radiological Controls
85-39
10/01/85-10/31/85
Resident
Routine
85-40
10/15/85-10/18/85
Specialist
Non-radiological
Chemistry Program
85-42
11/01/85-11/31/85
Resident
Routine
85-43
12/01/85-12/31/85
Resident
Routine
86-01
,
01/01/86-01/31/86
Resident
Routine
86-02
02/12/86-02/14/86
Specialist
Emergency Planning -
Observation of FEMA
Full Scale Exercise
86-03
Team Inspection-
Allegation followup -
01/27/86-02/14/86
Specialist & Resident
Radiochemistry Program
86-04
02/10/86-02/14/86
Specialist
Security Program
86-05
02/01/85-02/28/85
Resident
Routine
1
86-06
02/25/86-02/28/86
Specialist
Transportation and
Radwaste Programs
.
i
I
--
_ .
_.
.
.
.-
T6-1
.
.
Table 6
_
REACTOR TRIPS AND PLANT SHUTDOWNS
PDWER
DATE
LEVEL
DESCRIPTION
CAUSE & AREA *
04/29/85
Reactor trip due to
Personnel error -
false low RPV water
during a surveill-
level signal
ance test, technician
valved in pressure
transmitter causing an
indicated level
AREA - Maint. & Surv.
05/09/85
Re' actor trip due to
Personnel error -
upscale spike on IRM
maintenance per-
channel 'D'
sonnel bumped
incore instrumen-
tation cables
j
,
'
AREA - Maint. & Sury.
05/21/85
Reactor trip due to
Personnel error -
false low RPV water
during testing,
level signal
a technician
valved in a level
transmitter creating an
oscillation in the
variable leg line.
AREA - Maint, & Surv.
06/06/85
Reactor trip due to
Equipment Failure -
high RPV pressure
During a leak
test on the vessel
using the CRD system &
RWCU biowdown valve,
a defective feedback
arm on blowdown valve
controller caused valve
to close enough to
increase RPV pressure
AREA - N/A
07/07/85
Startup
N/A
-
- Note - the cause attributed to these shutdowns is the NRC assessment of
cause, and may not agree with the licensee's assessment.
.
1
. - _ _ __.
.
.
.
.: -
T6-2
-
,
'.
Table 6 (Cont'd)
POWER
DATE_
LEVEL
DESCRIPTION
CAUSE & AREA *
07/13/85
'5%
Reactor trip during
Equipment Failure -
low power testing on
Failure of air
-
low vessel level
line on FW minimum
flow valve
AREA - N/A
07/16/85
Startup
N/A
07/17/85
< 5%
Shutdown for RPV level
Planned
instrumentation work
07/23/85
Startup
N/A
07/25/85
(5%
Shutdown for RPV level
Planned
instrumentation work
07/26/85
Reactor trip due to
Personnel error -
low RpV water level
an operator opened
RHR Suppression vool
suction valve prior to
shutdown cooling valve
being closed
AREA - Plant Ops
07/29/85
Startup
N/A
08/24/85
(5%
Shutdown for rod
Planned
sequence exchange
and minor
maintenance
08/30/85
Startup
N/A
08/31/85
1.0%
Reactor trip on loss
Personnel error -
of instrument air
improper replacement
of desiccant
in air dryer unit
AREA - Maint. & Sury.
09/03/85
Startup
N/A
09/06/85
1.1%
Reactor trip during
Personnel error -
surveillance test
false low RPV
water level signal
during testing
AREA - Maint. & Sury.
- Note - the cause attributed to these shutdowns is the NRC assessment of the
cause, and may not agree with the licensee's assessment.
1
l
.,-:
T6-3
.'
Table 6 (Cont'd)
POWER
DATE
LEVEL
DESCRIPTION
CAUSE & AREA *
09/07/85
Startup
N/A
09/08/85
1.25%
Reactor trip manually
Equipment failure -
initiated
RPV level
indicators went
offscale high due to
RPV reference leg
problems
AREA - N/A
09/09/85
< 5%
Shutdown for
Planned
investigation and
repair of RPV water
level deviations
09/11/85
Startup
N/A
09/12/85
2.0%
Reactor trip due to
Personnel error -
low water level
work activity
indication
caused hydraulic
oscillation on
level line, creating
false low level signal
AREA - Maint. & Sury.
09/18/85
Startup
N/A
09/26/85
< 5%
Reactor shutdown
Maintenance
activities and
Hurricane Gloria
10/03/85
Startup
N/A
10/08/85
45%
Reactor shutdown
Completion of 5%
test program
Note - the cause attributed to these shutdowns is the NRC assessment of the
cause, and may not agree with the licensee's assessment.
L__