ML20138Q893
| ML20138Q893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Neely Research Reactor |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1985 |
| From: | Decker T, Marston R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138Q872 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-160-85-04, 50-160-85-4, NUDOCS 8512300063 | |
| Download: ML20138Q893 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000160/1985004
Text
g3 Rico UNITED STATES
/ 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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't ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
\*****/ DEC 181985
Report No.: 50-160/85-04
Licensee: Georgia Institute of Technology
225 North Avenue
Atlanta, GA 30332
Docket No.: 50-160 License No.: R-97
Facility Name: Georgia Institute of Technology
Inspection Conducted: October 28 - November 1, 1985
Inspecthrh[N 6 /2/4/85
R. R..Marston' ~ ~p'
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Dit e' Signed
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Accompanying Personnel: A. Gooden
. Hogan (IE HQs)
Approved by: MC _ /,d ! f 8 7
T. R. Decker, Section Chief D6te' Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, anncunced inspection involved 108 inspector-hours on site
in the areas of an emergency preparedness appraisal.
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Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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TABLE 4 0F CONTENTS
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"v INTRODUCTION ,
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i- 1.0 EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION
1.1 Onsite !$
1.1.1- Functional Area: and Assignments
1.1.2 Interviews and Walkthroughs ,
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1.2 Offsite s
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1.2.1 FunctionaldreasandAssignments A .
1.2.2 InterviewsSand Walkthroughs 1,
2.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE -
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,21 Notification and Acy vation of Emergency Organi;ation
/ 2.1.1 P rocedt.red * -
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2.1.2 Communica'tions
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'2.2 Classification and Assessment (
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2.2.1 Identification and Classification " 1
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2.2.2 Assessment Action / 3 '
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2.2.3, Interviews and Wa Rthroughs T
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2.3 Protective /CorrectiveActjans '/ tig ,; .; !
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2.3.2 Evacuation and Accountabilit'y q '.
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2.3.3 Personnel Exposure ControF "!'
2.3.4
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First Aid and Rescue
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! 3.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS * ; -q
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3.1pTraining and lletraining Program
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Maintenance'of Procedures and Pj\( '
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INTRODUCTION ,
3 ; The purpose of this appraisal was to perform h c'omprehensive evaluation of the
l licensee's emergency preparedness prograp. Tnts appraisal included an evaluation
- of the adequacy and offectiveness oh arais for which explicit regulatory
$ requiremints may not currently exist.] V' .
The appraisal scope and findings were'summapized on November 1, 1985, with those
h personsindicatedinSection4.0ofthh[repbrt. '
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1.0 EMEk'4ENCY ORGANIZATION
1.1 Osite Organization ,
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. 1.1,1 Functional Areas-
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Th'is area was reviewed with resp)ect to the requirements of
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.A.2, and the criteria of ANSI /ANS
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\'1 15.16-1982, Se'ction 3.3.
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,. a. The' inspector reviewed the Emergency Plan (EP) and
. discussed the emergency organization with licensee
representatives. The inspector verified that the
licensee dt atified the functional areas of: Director
x ofEmergen{cy perations (Emergency Director), Coordinator
To of Emergenc Preparedness (Emergency Coordinator),
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Pubi Information Liaison (Nuclear Research Center
y Mana.icgement 'through the University News Bureau), Radi-
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ological Assessment Coordinator (Radiological Safety
Office), , Individual authorized to terminate emergency
and initiate recovery-(Emergency Director), Individual
authcrizetl ito permit reentry (Emergency Director), and
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Individuals authorized sto permit volunteer workers to
, incur radiation exposurelin excess of normal occupational
a limits (Emergepcy Director with concurrence of Radi-
- 'ological Sa fety Officer (RS0)). . In addition, the
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'3l' - licWee defined the specific assignments, authorities,
- anhesponsibilitiesintheonsiteemergencyorganization.
These .id? ntifications and definitions were found in
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i Section;3.0 of the Erergen'cy P7an.
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Noviolktionsordeviationswere' identified.
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b. ,The inspector determined through discussion with licensee
g representativds and ireview of the EP, -Section 3.0, that -
n line 6ti succession was -provided - for the following
't: p pcsitions: Emergency Director, Public Information-
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-Liaison, and Radiological Assessment Coordinator. A
line of succession was not provided "for thCEmergency
t. 6, ; Coordinator since the responsibilities of this position ~s
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} insolved ' maintaining and. updating emergency phns and
1 'q - 3 iniplementing procedures. 3
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No violations or deviations were identified.
c. The inspector determir,- through interviews with
licensee personnel thc- all members of the onsite
emergency organization had work experience ap repriate
to their designated emergency assignments. {
No violations or deviations were itentified. l
d. Interviews with five members of the onsite emergency
organization showed that they understood the interfaces
between and among the onsite functional areas. An
organization chart showing these interfaces was included l
in the Emergency Plan as Figure 4.
No violations or deviations were identified.
e. The Director of the Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC)
stated that he had authority to spend certain money
under emergency conditions. He also stated that he had
direct access to the University's Vice President for
Research and the Assistant to the President to secure
additional funds.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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f. The F.P, Section 7.1 stated that, "The NNRC emergency ;
i organization, including offsite support, is capable of
l functioning around the clock in the event of prolonged
emergencies." The Center Director stated that no
specific plans had been made, but the staff could work
shift work for the duration of the emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
1.1.2 I'nterviews and Walkthroughs
The inspector conducted interviews and walkthroughs with five
members of the onsite organization. They 'all appeared to
understand their responsibilities and authorities for their
functional areas of-responsibility.
No violations or deviations were identified.
1.2 Offsite Support
1.2.1 Functional Areas and Assignments
a. The EP,' Sections 3.1 and 3.2, identified notification
requirements and support provided by Federal, State, and
local offsite agencies. Fire protection was provided
by .the. Atlanta Fire Department, police protection was
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provided by the Georgia Tech Police, and through them,
the Atlanta Police Department. Ambulance and medical
support was provided by Grady Hospital.
b. Federal and State emergency plans discussed support from
the local agencies cited above. A letter of agreement
was in effect with Grady Hospital, Police and fire
protection would be provided through agreements with the
Georgia Tech and Atlanta Police, and Atlanta Fire Depart-
ments, respectively.
c. The letter of agreement with Grady Hospital was dated
June 6, 1984. Other support was provided under the
agencies' emergency plans.
d. Licensee representatives stated that emergency training
had been provided to the Atlanta Fire Department and the
Georgia Tech Police. The Fire Department and Hospital /
Ambulance Service participated in appropriate drills.
No violations or deviations were identified.
1.2.2 Interviews and Walkthroughs
a. The inspector interviewed representatives of the various
support groups specified in the Emergency Plan. All
support groups appeared to be aware of their responsi-
bilities. Inspection disclosed, however, that the only
group which received comprehensive training regarding
their duties and responsibilities was the Georgia Tech
Police. ,
b Personnel from the various support groups were asked
to evaluate the adequacy of the training received
pertaining to emergencias at the NNRC. The fire support
cantact stated that they needed additional training.
Training for medical and ambulance ' personnel consisted
of participating in drills involving simulated contaminated
injuries. Other offsite groups had not participated in
drills or classroom training. The Georgia Tech Police
stated that they had been provided adequate training.
See Section 3.1 of this report for an evaluation of the
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training program.
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2.1 NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION
This area was inspected with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E.IV.D, and the criteria of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982.
2.1.1 Procedures
The inspector reviewed Sections 7.1 and 7.4 of the Emergency
Plan, " Activation of the NNRC Emergency Organization," and
" Reporting of Emergencies," respectively. The plan specified
that the Emergency Director is responsible for initiating the
emergency plan and notifying the emergency organization and
offsite support personnel, as appropriate. Information to be
provided to the NRC was also defined in the Plan. Detailed
information on notification was provided in the Emergency
Plan, Section 7.4, " Reporting of Emergencies." There were
no specific notification instructions in ,the Emergency
Procedures, however.
The following item is identified for improvement:
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Developing a procedure which describes notification
methods including the following: the title of the
person responsible; the agencies which must be notified
for each class of emergency; the time period during
which notification must be mede; and the information to
be provided (50-160/85-04-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
2.1.2 Communications
The primary methods of notification consisted of a public
address system (for duty hours in the Center) and telephones
(for off-duty hours, and to make notifications). The emer-
gency organization notification rosters were posted on
bulletin boards throughout the building. The licensee
had not checked the status of all of _ the emergency action
telephone numbers to ensure that they were updated and
correct.
The Emergency Command Center (ECC) had a telephone-but not a
readily available backup means 'of communication within the
. facility. Internal communication between the ECC and emer-
gency teams would_ be by word of mouth. Offsite communi-
. cations would be backed up by the Georgia Tech Police radios
when-the Georgia Tech Police respond.
?!arious types of alarms were used by the Georgia Tech reactor
. facility. The criticality alarms, low pool water level alarms, ,
low zine bromide __ level alarms in the hot cell windows, and
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the fire and intrusion alarms were activated at the Georgia
Tech Police Department. Procedures specified actions to be
taken upon initiation of various alarms. The alarms were
tested periodically to assure operability.
Based on the above findings, the following items should
be considered for improvement:
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Performing quarterly updates and documentation of the
emergency organization rosters should be required
(50-160/85-04-02).
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Provision for backup internal communication .at the ECC
should be established (50-160/85-04-03).
No violations or deviations were identified.
2.2 Classification and Assessment
2.2.1 Identification and Classification
This area of the licensee's program was inspected with
raspect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and
the criteria of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982, Section 3.4.
2.2.1.1 Procedures
a. The inspector reviewed the EP and Emergency
Procedures, and discussed this ares with
licensee representatives. The Eu rgency
Procedures consisted of eight parts. Part I
was a general procedure and Parts II through
VIII- addressed specific types of emergencies,
and were primarily operational-type emergency
procedures.
The " implementing" procedures were found as
parts of the Emergency Plan. Sections 4.0
through 4.5 discussed and defined the emergency
classification system used at the Research
Center. .An Operational Event was defined as a
class less severe than Notification of Unusual
Event. Notification of unusual Event, Alert,
and : Site Area Emergency . classifications were
also discussed. Section 4.5. stated that a
General Emergency was not a credible accident
at the Center. Section 5.0 discussed Emergency
Action Levels (EALs) and referenced Table I,
" Emergency Classification Guide," which
related the Emergency Class, Action Level, and
-Purpose for the classes from Operational. Event
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through Alert. Section 7.0, " Emergency
Response," discussed activation of the emer-
gency organization, assessment actions, and
protective actions for each classification
discussed in Table I.
The EALs appeared to be consistent with those
^
in Table I, " Emergency Classes," found in
ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982. EALs for thyroid doses
at the site boundary _ were included for only
the Alert classification. Licensee repre-
sentatives stated that iodine releases were
not considered to be a serious threat for
this reactor.
The EALs in Table I were generally based on
information readily available to the respon-
sible individuals. Where practical, the
EALs also related to facility parameters,
effluent release levels, and equipment
conditions for each emergency class.
The Emergency Procedures and Section 7.0 of
the Plan discussed emergency actions for each
emergency classification. Radiological surveys
and media sampling were also discussed in
Section 7.0 of the Plan, and specifically in
the RSO's Health Physics Procedures.
The EP and Emergency Procedures also made
reference to after hours. emergencies. Certain
emergency alarms were provided at the Georgia '
Tech Police headquarters.
Based on the above findings, the following
Emergency Plan deficiency was identi.fied:
The Emergency Plan was inconsistent
because a Site Area Emergency was defined
in Section 4.0; however, respective EALs
-were not identified'in Table I. Further,
response to this classification was not-
discussed in Section 7.0 (50-160/85-04-04).
Your response to the subject item will
be reviewed. This -finding will also be
reviewed during subsequent inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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2.2.1.2 Equipment
Through discussions with licensee representa-
tives, observation, and inspection of equipment,
the inspector determined that the radiological
and nonradiological monitors and indicators
described in the Emergency Plan and Emergency
Procedures were in place and operable. The
equipment was described as being necessary for
emergency detection and classification.
The monitors appeared to have operating
characteristics capable of assessing potential
accident conditions. The Kanne A Stack Monitor
recorder was labeled to indicate radionuclide
concentrations in the stack effluent. Other
recorders had appropriate trip, alert, or
alarm levels assigned.
Records were reviewed for the calendar
year-to-date which showed that operability
and calibration checks were performed on the
equipment, and that equipment condition or
status was documented. Licensee representa-
tives stated that Technical Specifications
required replacement of inoperable instruments,
and repair of same.
Laboratory facilities and portable sampling
and survey equipment were available for post
accident sampling and analysis. A licensee
representative stated that a backup laboratory
was available at another Engineering Building
on campus and that State Mobile Lab facilities
could be used in an emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
2.2.2 Assessment Actions
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR
50, Appendix E, and the criteria of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982,
Section 3.7.
The inspector reviewed the Emergency Plan, Section 7.0,
the Emergency Procedures, and the Health Physics Procedures.
These references described the methods, systems, and equipment
for collecting and processing information and data required
to define the basis for decisions to escalate or de-escalate
emergency response actions. Monitoring of radiation dose
rates and contamination levels were described in the
Emergency Procedures and Health Physics Procedures.
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Section 7.0 of the Emergency Plan and the Health Physics
Procedures described monitoring at the site boundary. This
section also stated that the emergency organization was
capable of operating for a protracted period of time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
2.2.3 Interviews and Walkthroughs
The inspector interviewed two Radiation Safety Officers, the
Reactor Supervisor, and a Senior Reactor Operator.
The individuals responsible for emergency detection, classi-
fication, and continuing assessment appeared to be familiar
witn the plan and procedures. During walkthroughs, the
individuals .were able to adequately perform emergency
detection and classification.
The individuals interviewed stated that. they were trained
through a variety of methods including lectures, seminars,
tours, and drills.
No violations or deviations were identified.
2.3 Protective / Corrective Actions
2.3.1 Facilities and Equipment
2.3.1.1 Emergeacy Command Center
The Emergency Command Center (ECC) was inspected
against the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
and the criteria . of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982. The ECC
was discussed in Section 8.1 of the Emergency Plan.
The ECC was located in.the NNRC machine shop on the
, ground level immediately adjacent to the assembly
area. It was at the farthest location from any
potential source of radioactivity. A tour of this
, area revealed that although telephones were
available in the ECC, no procedures or copy.of the
Plan were located in the ECC but would need to be
brought by the staff. (Other problems with' the ECC
were discussed in section 2.1, Communications).
Based on the above findings, the following item is
recommended for improvement:
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Placing copies of the Emergency Plan ' and
Procedures in the ECC (50-160/85-04-05).
No violations or deviations were ' identified.
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2.3.1.2 Protective Equipment
The adequacy of protective equipment was determined
by a tour of the health physics office and an
inventory check of the emergency supply cabinets.
The licensee maintained two emergency supply
cabinets; one near the reactor airlock door and one
in the ECC. Each cabinet appeared to be adequately
stocked with equipment for onsite personnel and
provisions were made for providing equipment, such
as dosimetry and protective clothing for offsite
support groups who might be required to enter a
radiation or contaminated area. In addition, the
Atlanta Fire Department and the Georgia Tech Police
maintained radiation monitoring devices for use
during an emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
2.3.1.3 Decontamination Capabilities
Decontamination was discussed in Section 8.4 of the
Emergency Plan, " Decontamination Facilities." The
inspector reviewed this portion of the plan and it
appeared to be adequate.
Decontamination facilities and procedures were
available throughout the laboratory and reactor
buildings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
2.3.1.4 Equipment Maintenance and Calibrations
Emergency equipment and supplies were discussed in
Sections 8.2 and 10.5 of the Emergency Plan. The
Emergency Plan required that the emergency kits
be inventoried annually. Radiation monitoring
equipment was checked quarterly for operability and
calibrated semiannually. Calibrations of facility
air monitors were performed annually and calibrations
of area radiation monitors were performed monthly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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2.3.2 Evacuation and Accountability
2.3.2.1 Evacuation
Part I of the Emergency Procedures, " General Rules
and Guides for Reacting to Emergencies," discussed
guidelines for an orderly evacuation of facility
personnel and visitors. It discussed conditions
for partial and complete evacuation during an
emergency. However, evacuation routes were not
clearly posted. An evacuation alarm was in place
at the facility and was tested for operability
periodically.
.
Based on the above findings, the following item
should be considered for improvement:
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Posting evacuation routes with maps showing
the location of the assembly area throughout
the facility. Old evacuation routes should be
removed (50-160/85-04-06).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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2.3.2.2 Accountability
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2.3.2.3 Assembly Areas
Accountability was discussed briefly in the Emer-
gency Plan and Part I of the Emergency Procedures.
The northwest corner of the parking lot, just
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outside the ECC was designated as the assembly
area. Segregation of potentially contaminated
individuals at the assembly - area was discussed
in- Sections 7.5.4 - and 7.6. A of the Plan. The
inspector reviewed this procedure .and determined
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that there was insufficient detail of the account-
ability methods.
.
Based on the above findings, the following item
should be considered for improvement:
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Including a description of- accountability
methods and the title of the - responsible
person in the procedures (50-160/85-04-07).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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2.3.2.4 Personnel Monitoring
Sections 7.5.4 and 7.6.4 of the Emergency Plan
briefly described the responsibility for segre-
gating contaminated personnel following facility
evacuation. Detection equipment was available at
the ECC for accomplishing this responsibility. A
review of the procedures describing actions to be
taken after building evacuation determined that
personnel monitoring was not discussed.
Based on the above findings, the following appraisal
deficiency was identified:
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Develop and implement an Emergency Procedure
which discusses monitoring of personnel at the
assembly area and isolation and decontamina-
tion, if necessary (50-160/85-04-08).
This item constitutes an appraisal deficiency.
Your response will be reviewed. This item
will also be reviewed during subsequent
inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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2.3.3 Personnel Exposure Control
The licensee developed new emergency procedures describing
protective actions to be taken by any individuals in the
building during an emergency. The inspector toured the
facility and discovered that outdated emergency procedures
were posted on fire alarms, doors and bulletin boards.
Exposure guidelines were included in section 7.2, " Protective
Action Values," which discussed emergency exposure limits for
personnel in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits. Dosimetry was
provided for all personnel with access to radiation areas.
Extra dosimetry was available at the ECC-for support personnel.
The licensee had the capability for monitoring personnel
doses during emergencies; however, the procedures did not
address provisions for performing this activity.
Provisions for isolation and access control were discussed in
section 7.3 of the Plan. Health physics personnel were
responsible for supervising isolation and access control to
restricted areas to minimize exposures to radiation and to-
minimize the spread of radioactive contamination.
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Based on the above findings, the following items are
recommended for improvement:
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Removing outdated emergency procedures from doors,
bulletin boards and fire alarms. Posting current
directions with emergency notification rosters in
, appropriate' locations (50-160/85-04-09).
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Developing methods and plans for keeping track of
personnel dose during emergencies and making them
available in the ECC (50-160/85-04-10).
No violations or deviations were identified.
2.3.4 First Aid and. Rescue
First aid equipment was kept in the emergent / supply
cabinets, and 'the equipment appeared to be adequate. First
aid was also covered in Section 8.3 of the Emergency Flan.
Accidents resulting in personnel injury without contamination
would be handled by the Georgia Tech Police who would
administer first aid. In the event of an injury with contamina-
tion, the individual would be transported to Grady Memorial
Hospital in Grady's Ambulance Service for treatment and
decontamination.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
3.1 Emergency Training and Retraining Program
The inspector reviewed this area of the licensee's program with respect
to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F, and criteria of
ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982, Section 3.10.1.
This part of the program was inspected through review of licensee
records, discussion with licensee representatives, and discussion with
representatives of offsite support agencies. The training / retraining
was conducted through lectures and weekly seminar sessions, tours,
self-study, and attendance at a Radiation Safety Short Course.
The attendance sheet for onsite training held in October 1985 showed
that four members of the onsite organization did not attend the
training on Emergency Procedures. In addition, there was a lack of
formal documentation of the training program. No lesson plans or
outlines were maintained.
Review of records and interviews with personnel showed that not all
offsite support agencies were trained as stated in Section 10.1 of the
Six members of the Georgia Tech Police force were trained October 10,
1985. Previous training was conducted in August 1984.
Eight members of the Atlanta Fire Bureau's Hazardous Materials Team
were trained during October 1985. The nearest and most likely first
response Engine and Ladder Company was not trained, however.
No personnel from Grady Hospital (emergency room or ambulance) have been
trained at the Center. Hospital representatives stated that the
hospital has its own in-service training program to familiarize
personnel in handling radioactive materials. Licensee representatives
stated that ambulance personnel would not enter the containment area,
.
and that Center personnel would remove a victim to a pickup point.
The inspector also noted that no formal documentation system existed
for recording training and retraining of onsite and offsite personnel
with emergency assignments. Refer to Section 1.2.2.b above regarding
training of onsite and offsite support personnel and agencies.
The above . findings and those of Section 1.2.2.b of this report are
inconsistent with Section 10.1 of the Emergency Plan, and 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E,Section IV.F. The referenced requirements specify training
of both onsite and offsite personnel and agencies. Accordingly, the
requirement is specified to include formal and practical training. The
latter includes periodic drills and exercises. This finding
constitutes an Appraisal Deficiency:
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Emergency response training to onsite and offsite response
personnel provided for all likely emergency response
personnel in accordance with requirements (50-160/85-04-11).
In addition, the following item should be considered for improvement:
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Establishing a formal documentation system for emergency organiza-
tion training and retraining (50-160/85-04-12).
3.2 Drills
This area of the licensee's program was inspected pursuant to the
requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F, and the criteria of
ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982, Section 3.10.1.
The inspector reviewed the established drill and exercise program with
licensee personnel. The most recent drill involving offsite participa-
tion was held in July 1984. This drill involved the Georgia Tech Police
and the Grady Hospital ambulance and medical staff. A scenario was
developed and a student observer evaluated the response. However,
no documentation existed to show that a critique was held.
Licensee representatives stated that evacuation drills were held
frequently to test the evacuation plan and warning systems. The Center
Director and the RSO were responsible for ensuring that drills were
held and for following up on corrective actions. Communicatior, drills
had not been held with the Georgia Emergency' Management Agency (GEMA)
or Department of Natural Resources / Environmental Protection Division
(DNR/EPD).
A written scenario was available for the July 1984 drill. No comments
from drill critiques were available. '
Contrary to requirements that an annual drill be conducted, the
licensee's approved EP was accepted with a commitment to a biennial
drill.
Based on the above findings, the following Emergency Plan Deficiency
was identified:
The Emergency Plan, Section 10.2 required that drills be conducted
biennially rather than annually as specified 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E,Section IV.F (50-160/85-04-13).
Your response to this finding will be reviewed. This item will
also be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
In addition, the following item should be censidered for improvement:
R________________1__.____________________
. . _ . . . . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . ._ _ . -
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Documenting drill critiques and providing for incorporation of
lessons learned into plan or procedures (50-160/85-04-14).
t
No violations or deviations were identified.
!
3.3 Maintenance of Procedures and Plan
3.
This area was inspected pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, IV.G, and the criteria of ANSI /ANS 15.16-1982,
l Section 3.10.2.
!
~
The EP, Section '10.4, described the licensee's review and update
process, but no procedure was in effect. The Nuclear Safeguards
, Committee, the Center Director, and the RSO shared responsibility for
.
the biennial review. There was no document control system established
for plan distribution. The Center Director determined that only the
Georgia Tech Police and Atlanta Emergency Management Agency required
. copies.
Based on the above findings, the following items should be considered
for improvement:
-
Developing a procedure for update and revision of the Emergency
Plan (50-160/85-04-15).
-
Developing a document control and distribution system for the
i Emergency Plan which includes dating the Plan and Procedures, and
providing copies to applicable personnel and agencies (50-160/'
85-04-16).
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e
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4.0 PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee Contacts
- R. A.'Karam, Neely Nuclear Research Center Director
- R. M. Boyd, Radiological Safety Of#icer
L. D. McDowell, Reactor Supervisor
W. H. Downs, Senior Reactor Operator
S. N. Millspaugh, Deputy Radiological Safety. 0fficer
P. Sharpe, Health Physicist
Offsite Contacts
P. Deal, i*aining Officer, Atlanta-Fulton County Emergency Management Agency
Lt. A. P. Miller, Fire Protection Communications, Atlanta Fire Bureau
Lt. H. C. Seales, Training Assistant, Atlanta Fire Bureau
C. P. Blackman, Environmental Specialist, Department of Natural Resource /
. Environmental Protection Division
Dr. A. G. Yancey, Medical Director, Grady Memorial Hospital ,
Major W. W. Holly, Director of Special Operations, Atlanta Police Bureau
Chief J. Vickery, Chief of Police, Georgia Tech Police
C. Harmon, Staff, Georgia Tech News Bureau
,