IR 05000160/1988001

Insp Rept 50-160/88-01 on 880317-18 & 0406-11.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Method for Identifying & Correcting Reactor Operations & Health Physics Safety Problems

ML20196A929
Person / Time
Site:	Neely Research Reactor
Issue date:	05/18/1988
From:	Fredrickson P, Verrelli D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196A926	List: IR 05000160/1988001 ML20196A923
References
50-160-88-01, 50-160-88-1, NUDOCS 8806300151
Download: ML20196A929 (6)

Text

- . .. . .- ..

.

'

g3pr00 UNITED STATES

.#j

.

'

.o

^g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11

[

S'

-jk 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30323 e

\...../

Report No.: 50-160/88-01 Licensee: Georgia Institute.of Technology 225 North Avenue Atlanta, GA 30332 Docket No.: 50-160 License No.: R-97 Facility Name: Georgia-Institute of Technology l Inspection Con ed: March 17-18, and pril 6 and 11, 1988 Inspector: I < !

P. E. F edrickson

/ V[M Date Signed

'

Approved by: Sc D "'^ s f!J8 DavfdM.Verrf1li,BranchChief Odte' Signed Div sion of Reactor Projects

_

SUMMARY Scope: This special, announced inspection involved inspection of the licensee's method for identifying and correcting reactor operations and health physics safety problem Results: Violations or deviations were not identified in the area inspecte jDR ADOCK 05000160 DCD +

.-

'

.

-

.

!

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees R. A. Karam, Director, Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC)

R. N. MacDonald, Associate Director, NNRC J. M. Puckett, Consultant R. M. Boyd, Senior Research Associate (former Manager of Office of Radiation Safety)

P. 8. Sharpe, Safety Engineering Assistant (former Health . Physicist) Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 18, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. . Dissenting comments were not received by the licensee. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. The following new item was identified during the inspection:

Inspector Followup Item 50-160/88-01-01, Load Testing of Overhead Crane, paragraph' .

'

Inspector Followup Item 501.G0/88-01-02, ~ Beam Port Experiments, paragraph . Resolution of Safety Issues The inspector reviewed the licensee's method for resolving safety issues raised within the NNRC organization. Up until July 1987, the licensee did not have any written policy or procedure on how reactor operations or health physics concerns would be brought to the attention of the NNRC management, nor how the solution to these issues would be' documente Similar to other non-power reactor facilities, a formal program was not in place; thus issues were surfaced and resolved in a basically informal manne On July 29, 1987, after the NNRC reorganization, a memo, subject

"Personal Logs", was issued by the NNRC Director. A portion of this memo did provide some direction by stating that personnel should-bring issues l either verbally or in writing to the Director. This memo did not address documentation of the problem resolutio l The inspector reviewed with the Director 26 issues that had been identi-fied at the NNRC from 1984 to 1988. These issues had been identified throug(h tion 01).a review Theseoftranscripts transcripts provided were by theofNRC's the results Office interviews of Investiga-conducted in early 1988. In selecting the items to review, the inspector did not differentiate between safety or non-safety concerns, nor whether. or not

. . - - , . . , , --

. - ._

.

- -

.

.

the issues affected the NRC licens If a technical problem was idend-fied in the transcripts, the issues were reviewe Because the purpose of the inspection was to review-the corrective action methods used to resolve problems occurring at the NNRC, problem areas were reviewed, independent of whether the transcript identified the corrective action to be satisfactory or no Twenty-two of these issues occurred prior to the July 1987 memo. Of the 26 issues, corrective actions on four of these issues were addressed in some fashion by a NNRC memo. All the others, while possibly addressed in individual logs, appeared to be identified and resolved in either a verbal fashion er informal documen-tation. Interviews conducted revealed that the Director was aware of 22 of the specific issues and that each case was addressed by the Directo The remaining four issues had either minimal safety significance or appeared to the inspector to have been resolved satisfactor One of the 26 issues related to the reactor building crane being maintained by the NNRC staff will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. Although the inspector did not have an indication that crane maintenance is unsatisfactory, the question of certified load

-

testing of research reactor overhead cranes was surfaced during the inspection. As the NNRC does not load test certify the overhead crane, a review of the need for this testing is identified as an Inspector Followup Item, 160/88-01-01, Load Testing of Overhead Cran '

In addition to reviewing issues identified in the 01 transcripts, the inspector also reviewed the licensee's files on issues brought to the attention of NNRC managemen The inspector reviewed 14 memos in which concerns were brought to the attention of the licensee. Thirteen of these were documented after the July 1987 memo. Only one of the 14 was also on the list of 26 01 transcript issue Technical Issues

Af ter reviewing the 26 issues with the Director, the inspector j selected eight technical issues to review in some detail by inter- i viewing other personnel involve Those issues were selected based on the following criteria: (1) the issue had potential safety significance and had not been detailed in an inspection report, or (2) the resolution of the issue was unclear or controversial. These issues are discussed below, j

,

(1) Lab Coats at Cobalt Pool. In mid-1986, a concern was raised involving wearing lab coats during a cobalt transport activit Lab coats were required by the health physics technician, but l the workers refused, due to elevated temperatures. The final ;

decision from the Director was to wear sleeveless lab coat :

The health physics technician expressed his disagreement to both the Director and his health physics supervisor. The ,

health physics supervisor did not stop work or recommend such I action to the Radiation Protection Committe I l

_ . . _

.

.

, .

,

.t-P

(2) Defective Hot Cell Manito In ear?y 1987, the Radiation Protection Committee suspended NNRC hot cell operations due to an unreliable radiation monitor and required replacement of this monito This monitor had been exhibiting an increasing fre-quency of failure during the previous year. Concerns over the monitor had been expressed to the Director by the health ~ physics staff, requesting a new model. Up until early 1987, frequent repair of the monitor appeared _to be the NNRC. solution. Accord-ing to the health physics supervisor, this monitor had exhibited unreliability since 1972 and that his efforts to have it re-placed by previous Directors had also been unsuccessfu In this case, based on a Radiation Protection Committee letter of March 4,1987, the Director could -have been more responsive in replacing the monitor. The monitor was replaced in April 198 The inspector could not identify that the Director had failed to address repair of an inoperable monito (3) Beam Port Shielding Calculations. In September 1986, a health physics technician expressed concerns over reactor' beam port experiment The concerns were that inadequate pre-experiment calculations resulted in higher than expected radiation levels, necessitating significant shielding additions, . reduced reactor power and decreased experiment time; and that different beam ports were utilized than were authorized on _the experiment '

approval for These concerns were expressed to the health physics supervisor and the Director. A response to. these concerns was sent by the health physics supervisor to the health physics technician, stating that this area needed to be more closely monitored, but no definitive solution was pro-vided by either the health physics supervisor or the Directo Discussion with the Director identified that the solutions were to raise reactor power slower than it had been- previously and to require the Director's approval on- all future radiation work permit The solution to the calculation problem was not documente Discussion with the health physics supervisor did not reveal any concern over these solutions. The unauthorized beam port usage was identified as a violation in Inspection Report 160/87-0 Although the inspector had no definitive concern over current beam port activities, due to the undocu-mented resolution of the calculation problem, inspection of beam port experiment activities is identified as an Inspector Followup Item 160/88-01-02, Beam Port Experiment (4) Waste Tank Agitation. Although the issue had been inspected during a previous NRC inspection report, the inspector reviewed this issue because a concern was expressed about the agitation system of the NNRC waste tank when, in fact the waste tank does not have an agitato Subsequent discussion revealed that

_ ~ - -

-

.

.

confusion over waste system operation resulted in this misinfor-mation. Resolution of the issue is discussed in Inspection c Reports 160/87-02 and 160/87-0 (5) ?a:.. ting. of Cobalt Pool . In early 1986, the cobalt storage pool needed ~to be repainte Operations personnel . wanted to use a forklift inside the pool to move the painters around, while health physics personnel opted for the use of ladders. The Director decided on' the use of the forklift. The inspector could not determine any significant health physics concern over i using the forn lift. Work was not stopped by the health physics supervisor nor did the Radiation Protection Committee stop wor ,

!

(6) Entry Into Isolated Containment Building. If the NNRC contain- !

ment building becomes ventilation-isolated, the building atmos- 1 phere requires special testing prior to entry._ In mid-1986, an i NNRC staff member failed to_ perform this test and was identified by a health physics technician. Interviews revealed that the health physic supervisor may have been notified. There was no i ir.dication that.the Director was informed. Forma' documentation !

of this event could not be located, i (7) Reactor Light On. In March 1986, a health physics technician observed the control _ room operator outside the control room, j with the Reactor Light on, thus concluding that the reactor was at powe The operator denied that the reactor _was operatin With the reactor key in position, the light comes o The technician did not appear to have any other basis for concluding that the reactor was operating. The Director interviewed the parties and concluded that the reactor was not operating.-

(8) Cobalt Encapsulation. In mid-1986, approximately 700,000 curies i of Co-60 was received from the Savannah River Plant. This !

cobalt was to be stainless steel-encapsulated expeditiously.due to concern over cobalt leakage and contamination of the storage pool. The Radiation Protection Committee expressed concern that the effort was taking too lon The inspector determined that although encapsulation may have been slower than the Committee

.

'

desired, this activity was under surveillance by the Comittee and any inappropriate action could have been rectifie After completing the review of these technical issues, the inspector determined the none of the 26 issues reviewed revealed a safety problem that either was significant or, if significant and known to the NNRC management, was not addressed satisfactorily by the manage-ment, or if not addressed to the satisfaction of those identifying the concern, could not have been addressed to an oversight committe Additionally, interviews with the health physics supervisor did not reveal any one specific additional issue that the Director did not take some action on to resolv . -_ _ __ - _ _- -- ~

.. r l

~

'

.

.

5 Personnel Issues

,

As a part of the resolution of technical issues, the inspector also

-

reviewed personnel actions taken when technical problems _were caused '

by personnel error. Interviews revealed that counseling appears to have been used in_ several instances involving the NNRC staff, but apparently retraining or disciplinary action was rarely, if ever, use Specifically, the inspector reviewed actions taken with respect to a striking of the hot cell window with a wrench in early 1985, an operator failing to isolate a reactor coolant line in.1986, a reactor excursion event in early 1987, a topaz irradiation experiment in mid-1987, and failure of operations personnel to wear dosimetry and protective clothin The Director provided documentation to support that the individual involved with the hot cell window had been counseled on his actions. All the other issues involved apparent informal counseling. The Director stated that the individual issues did not appear to warrant more than counseling and that the cumulative effect of the reviewed issues had not been evaluated by the NNRC managemen With respect to the corrective action program at the NNRC, the program appears to have been marginally successful. The informal undocumented system in use prior to July 1987, combined with .the strained working relationship at the NNRC (as discussed in Inspection Report 160/87-06)

contributed to actions being resolved sometimes slowly and also.contro-versial solutions not being raised to the proper level of management for resolution. The documented system using informal memos at the NNRC appears to have improved the corrective action program at the NNRC, whereby the staff has a mechanism to address issues and the management has the responsibility to reply and resolve the issue The personnel action effort at the NNRC appears to consist mainly of informal counseling sessions, if even that. The NNRC management appeared-to be able to recognize major personnel errors at the facility, but did not appear to have a defined threshold for when to take action beyond .

informal counseling for an event involving either one large error or  !

several events revealing a pattern of smaller errors. The ongoing NNRC  !

1988 Action Plan appears to address actions such as retraining to correct ]

trends in personnel errors and should improve the identification and correction of personnel error Violations or deviations were not identified in these area l l

l l

l

__ - --, __ .- -- - - . - _ __