ML20236A407
| ML20236A407 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Neely Research Reactor |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1988 |
| From: | Burch R, Hayes B, Vorse J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236A395 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#296-16926 2-88-003, 2-88-3, REN, NUDOCS 8903170176 | |
| Download: ML20236A407 (143) | |
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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
Title:
FRANK H. NEELY NUCLEAk RESEARCH CENTER:
ALLEGED HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION OF HEALTH PHYSICS TECHNICIANS Licensee:
Case Number:
2-88-003 Georgia Institute of Technology Report Date:
August 11, 1988 900 Atlantic Drive, Northwest Atlanta, GA' 30332 Control Office: 01:RII j
Status:
CLOSED Docket No.:
50-160 License No.:
R-97 Reported by:
Reviewed by:
/
L Md Robert' H/ Bufch, Investigator pes Y.~gfrse, Director s
Office of Investigations Office oV Investigations Field Office, Region II Field 0 e, Region II Participating Personnel:
prov by-George B. Kuzo, Senior Radiation Specialist, NRC Region II eff B. Hafes,
or Office of Inve tio I
l g@b G
I WARNING l
The attached documentation has not been reviewed pursuant to 10 CFR 62.790 (a) l exemption nor has any exempt material been deleted.
Do not disseminate or discuss its contents outside the NRC.
Treat as "0FFICIAL USE ONLY."
Copy of b
1 O
e SYNOPSIS This investigation was initiated upon the request of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Region II Regional Administrator (RA), the requestor, for the Office of Investigations (01) to inquire into and document alleged harassment and intimidation of Health Physics (HP) personnel at the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech), Frank H. Neely Nuclear Research Center (GTRR), the licensee, for reporting to and/or discussing with NRC officials apparent radiological health and safety issues. Additionally, the requestor asked OI to determine whether the licensee may have willfully misrepresented to the NRC facts pertaining to an irradiation experiment which resulted in an August 18, 1987, Cadmium-115 (Cd-115) contamination incident and the clean-up and decontamination activities that followed.
Further, it was requested that OI investigate allegations regarding other possible violations of regulations, license conditions and/or technical specifications, including the operation of the reactor without a licensed operator in the control room; concealing potential health and safety concerns from the NRC; deliberate tampering with safety equipment by Operations personnel to avoid containment isolation; and records improprieties involving facility files which are avail-I able to and utilized by NRC inspectors.
Finally, 0I was requested to determine the nature and extent of the acts of sabotage alleged by the director of the GTRR facility during a February 1988 hearing on a motion in the U.S. District Court, Atlanta, Georgia, to reinstate two HP employees who were involuntarily separated from their employment at the GTRR facility.
In December 1987, and January 1988, NRC inspection activities at the GTRR facility, which are documented in Inspection Report Number 50-160/87-08, revealed that possible incidents of harassment and intimidation of HP personnel had occurred and that health and safety concerns of these individuals reportedly were not always adequately addressed by management.
Further, these inspection activities revealed disharmony, hostility, and adversarial relations between the HP and Operations employees which had apparently intensified since July 1, 1987, when HP personnel were placed under the direct supervision and management of the director of the GTRR facility.
Previously, the Office of Radiological Safety (0RS) had independent status and reported to the President of Georgia Tech.
Initially, a review of the GTRR staff organization structure was conducted which revealed that, as early as 1973 a proposal to unite the ORS staff under the facility director met with stiff opposition from members of the now defunct Georgia Tech Radiation Safety Comittee and the State of Georgia Department of Human Resources.
Additionally licensee correspondence and documents disclosed that a successful effort to reorganize the GTRR staff, under the supervision and management of the director, was concluded on July 1, 1987, at which time the ORS began reporting directly to the manager of the facility.
It became apparent, as the investigation progressed, that one of the main causes of the staff disharmony, hostility, and confrontations related to the fact that ORS employees did not believe they were sufficiently independent from the GTRR facility director to perform their radiological health and safety duties and responsibilities and that the current relationship of the director with the ORS represented a conflict of interest.
Members of the ORS were interviewed during the investigation, prior to the involuntary separations of the two HP employees en February 11, 1988, and they each confirmed intense adversarial relations and hostilities between the F; ar.d Case Ho. 2-88-003 1
Operations personnel and an environment of disharmony, which clearly inten-sified after the staff reorganization of July 1, 1987, when the director of the GTRR facility became the manager and supervisor of HP employees.
Five of the six interviewees testified that, during the period beginning approximately six months prior to the staff reorganization and until the present time there were l
various threats and incidents of apparent harassment and intimidation to HP personnel from the facility management relating to the abolishment of t,1e ORS, the involuntary separation of these employees and the withholding of salary increases, all of which were reportedly designed by management to coerce the support of the ORS employees.
These individuals further testified that the facility's management appeared to favor Operations personnel even though one member of this staff repeatedly and openly violated procedures and frequently failed to observe sound HP practices.
They advised that during the aforemen-l tioned period radiological health and safety concerns reported to management were not always addressed expeditiously and to their satisfaction, and further, when HP personnel privately discussed their safety concerns with NRC officials there was a concerted effort by management to identify the alleger rather than review and resolve the concern.
According to these interviewees, an August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident and possible discrepancies and deficiencies in the following cleanup, decontamination, and documentation activities was due in part to numerous errors committed by a licensed operator and the lack of l
communications between HP and Operations employees.
Several of the HP i
employees testified that facility management also appeared insensitive to a strong health and safety program and they failed to recognize the necessity or importance of having an independent group performing the HP duties and responsibilities.
In summary, five of the six HP employees interviewed related conduct they regarded as acts of harassment and intimidation by facility management and each of these individuals claimed unequivocally that they were fearful of discussing i
safety concerns with the NRC because they believe their employment would be in jeopardy.
Two of the employees were involuntarily terminated from the GTRR facility following their interview by 01.
The sixth interviewee, stated he was aware of the current " power struggle" between the HP personnel and f acility management and supported the terminations of the two HP employees but conceded l
that the ORS should be given more authority and should report to someone other i
than the licensed user (facility director) of the nuclear material.
During the interviews of HP personnel, they provided documentation and personal notes which they believed were supportive of their claims that GTRR management harassed and intimidated them and caused them to fear that their employment would be tenninated if they discussed health and safety concerns with NRC officials.
A review of these documents, accompanied by an explanation of each from the contributor, revealed a record of incidents during which HP personnel apparently perceived the actions, speech, and mannerisms of management as hostile, intimidating, uncooperative, and non-supportive of the HP program and i
I the duties and responsibilities of ORS personnel.
Further, it appears that this documentation graphically demonstrates the severe rift between HP and Operations employees at the GTRR facility and the extent of the apparent unprofessional, antagonistic, and confrontational behavior by both groups.
A review of Georgia Tech administrative and personnel records was conducted during the investigation inasmuch as the two HP employees were involuntarily Case No. 2-88-003 2
j separated from the GTRR facility immediately following their interview by 01.
Both of these individuals had expressed grave concern during their interviews.
that they feared reprisals, including termination of employment, for discussing health and safety concerns with the NRC.
Documentation concerning the involun-tary terminations of the two full-time HP employees on February 11, 1988, by GTRR facility management reflected those personnel actions were allegedly taken to " upgrade the HP program" and to meet " obligations to the NRC under terms of the license."
Further, February 15, 1988, correspondence to the terminated employees, signed by a Georgia Tech official, rescinded the dismissals and directed their reassignments to unrelated activities.
A February 15, 1988, letter from GTRR management to the President of Georgia Tech cites that the reasons for the involuntary dismissals of the two HP employees are related to performance and discipline matters, however, a thorough review'of the personnel records of each failed to disclose any evidence of either matter.
A February 18, 1988, memorandum between GTRR facility management officials appears to contain subjective statements and opinions regarding HP personnel which indicate these individuals are totally responsible for various violations and the current employee disharmony.
Further, the memorandum appears to draw inaccurate and subjective conclusions about HP personnel from the results of a psychological evaluation report which suninarizes interviews of GTRR employees.
Basically, the memorandum singles out the full-time HP employees and blames them for the disharmony, whereas, the psychological report states objectively that all first line management (HP and Operations / Support) are not seen as effective and strong leaders and that reassignments of HP personnel, the physical separation of (HP and Operations personnel) work spaces, and strong stable leadership for the HP group should be sought.
Following the review of administrative and personnel records, two Georgia Tech administrative officials who are aware of the Board of Regents policies pertaining to the terminations of faculty members and general staff employees were interviewed.
One official advised that personnel policies were violated by Georgia Tech because of the manner in which the two HP personnel had been dismissed. The second official advised he repeatedly cautioned GTRR management and the next higher level of supervision about due process requirements but they both failed to heed his advice and stated they were being directed by the NPC to immediately terminate these individuals.
Members of the Operations / Support group at the GTRR facility were interviewed regarding alleged harassment and intimidation of HP personnel and the other issues which are included in this investigative effort.
During these inter-views a wide spectrum of general and technical information concerning all of these topics was solicited by the reporting investigator and the participating inspector.
The five professional employees assigned to the Operations / Support group discussed the long history of hostilities and the professional and personality confrontations with the HP employees, a condition which has worsened markedly since the July 1987, staff reorganization.
Each recalled instances in which HP personnel had caused controversy or had allegeoly acted in a manner which was apparently inconsistent with their duties and respon-sibilities.
Essentially, these interviewees also blamed the HP personnel for allegedly instigating and prolonging hostilities and for repeatedly insisting upon independence rather than submitting to the authority and supervision of facility management.
Lengthy discussions of the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident and subsequent clean-up and decontamination activities revealed careless mistakes and errors by the reactor operator responsible Mr Case No. 2-88-003 3
s performing the irradiation experiment activities although there was no evidence presented to indicated a willful, intentional circumvention of requirements, procedures, or license conditions. The reactor operator acknowledged acts of carelessness, inattentiveness, and irresponsible behavior involving the Cd-115 matter as well as in other activities during his tenure at the GTRR facility.
All of these interviewees categorically denied any deliberate, intentional improprieties and further claimed they were unaware of any instances in whicn HP personnel had been punished, rebuked, or otherwise harassed by management for discussing health and safety concerns with anyone, including the NRC.
Two i
non-professional Operations staff members and two employees of a medical research tenant based at the GTRR facility were unable to provide substantive information concerning the purposes of the investigation.
Four members of the Nuclear Safeguards Comittee (NSC) were interviewed and l
voluntarily related their observations, perceptions, and opinions concerning the investigative issues.
First, several of these individuals expressed dissatisfaction regarding the manner in which they had been informed of the August 1987, Cd-115 incident and subsequent related activities and they cited poor judgment by GTRR management for delaying the reporting and resolution of.
l this matter.
These interviewees concurred that the documentation and records associated with the experiment that resulted in the contamination incident are incomplete, inaccurate, and incorrect which apparently demonstrates complacency, carelessness, inattention, incompetence, and/or ignorance of pertinent facts by all GTRR personnel involved in this activity rather than an i
intentional attempt to conceal data, deceive the NRC, or circumvent require-ments.
The interviewees who were aware of the personality, philosophical, and professional conflicts between the HP and Operations personnel indicated that, in their opinion the HP staff, including the two recently dismissed technicians', were professionally competent, reliable and responsible individuals.
One particular NSC source related that GTRR management had dwelled on HP deficiencies while apparently over1 coking discrepancies irvolving Operations personnel and expressed the opinion that the two HP technicians were f
dismissed for professional and personality conflicts with management.
Another NSC source characterized an Operations employee as an unstable, unreliable, and incompetent individual who may be mechanically inept.
Although none of the NSC l
interviewees were personally aware of harassment and intimidation of HP personnel by GTRR management some doubted that the involuntary terminations of the two technicians was for the purpose of upgrading the HP program.
One NSC member, who appeared to be very knowledgeable regarding the GTRR facility and its personnel issues, noted that its management had agonized extensively over the constant employee disharmony and was extremely frustrated that the HP and Operations employees were unable to settle their disputes.
None of these interviewees were personally aware of any violations of regulations, procedures, or license conditions at the GTRR facility nor were they knowledgeable of any deliberate, intentional documentation improprieties.
1 A former member of a now defunct Georgia Tech committee involved in assuring radiation safety indicated the July 1987, staff reorganization at the GTRR facility had a profound impact upon the persoral and professional relationships involving the HP and Operations employees and stated it has directly contri-buted to the escalated hostilities between these two groups.
This interviewee vouched for the competency and reliability of the HP staff, including the two dismissed technicians and related that, in his opinion, GTRR management was screwhat inconsistent ir its' treatment between HP and Operations employees i
Case No. 2-68-003 4
4 He'also cited examples of behavior and actions of GTRR management which indicate a potential lack of commitment to HP activities of the GTRR facility.
This interviewee concluded that, in his opinion, at least one of the tenninatdd HP technicians openly feared reprisal in the form of involuntary separation if he discussed health and safety concerns with the NRC and indicated that one reason for their termination was related to this activity.
A former professional employee and Georgia Tech faculty member at the GTRR facility, who claimed to be well acquainted with management and the HP and l
Operations staff members, advised that the HP personnel appeared to be l
professionally competent and reliable even though they were as aggravating and contemptuous as were the Operations employees.
He acknowledged that Operations personnel resorted to agitation and cunning activities to invoke the ire of the HP staff.
He also concurred that management appears to be obsessed with revenue producing motives without an equal commitment to or obsession for the HP program. This individual blamed management's dominating and deceptive personality and " obsession with money" as the primary reasons for the general personnel problems at the GTRR facility. He acknowledged that h.rassment and intimidation are well within management's character and said he believes the two HP technicians were involuntarily terminated " simply because they blew the whistle." He concluded that he is also suspicious of the personal and professional characteristics of a particular Operations employee and recalled that he did not always feel at ease when this individual was operating the l
reactor.
Two management officials at Georgia Tech, one who is directly involved in the daily activities at the GTRR facility and the other who is responsible for the administrative, academic, and operational matters of this program, were inter-viewed.
Basically, the first official acknowledged a long history of employee hostility, turmoil, and professional conflicts between the HP and Operations personnel.
He commented regarding the failed attempt to reconcile personali-ties when the GTRR staff was reorganized by him and his immediate supervisor in July 1987.
He stated that the two HP personnel were dismissed on February 11, 1988, to upgrade the HP program, apparently in response to an NRC assessment that the current program was obsolete, but he also related that if these individuals had become contrite and had pledged to support and cooperate with facility management he would have retained them on the staff.
This individual also acknowledged professional and personality deficiencies involving a particular member of the Operations staff and related that his use of poor judgment, his failure to follow procedures, and his carelessness and inattention to his duties and responsibilities, both in completing required records and in operational matters, contributed to the Cd-115 contamination incident in August 1987.
Both officials categorically denied that they harassed or intimidated any employee for reporting health and safety corcerns to the NRC and claimed no knowledge of any wrongdoing or improprieties by any members of the GTRR staff. The second interviewee discussed the GTRR staff reorganization and related that the dismissals of the two HP technicians were actually reassignments to upgrade the HP program since their terminations were rescinded and they were placed in other campus employment.
He too denied terminating or reassigning these individuals for reporting safety concerns to the NRC.
He dic acknowledge that Board of Regents personnel policy was violated when the two HP employees were dismissed without due process l
considerations, which is the reason they were subsequently reinstated.
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Case No. E-88-003 5
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s Additional documentation, including NSC minutes and GTRR records and memoranda, were reviewed regarding the issues addressed during the investigation.
Essentially, this effort failed to disclose willful, deliberate violations by licensee officials or attempts to intentionally deceive the NRC but revealed further evidence of employee disharmony, record keeping deficiencies, potential incompetency of an operations employee, and the failure of the licensee to discuss, resolve, and document the Cd-115 contamination event in a timely manner.
The investigation activities involving licensee records revealed that health and safety concerns reported to management in writing appeared to be acknowledged and addressed.
In conclusion, the investigation revealed evidence to indicate that a severe state of disharmony and conflict exists between the Operations and HP staffs at the GTRR facility.
This condition appears to have escalated and intensified since July 1,1987, when all staff personnel, including HP employees, were placed under the same management structure.
The involuntary dismissal of two HP employees in February 1988, was explained by management as a necessary action to " upgrade the HP program" but was viewed by the HP staff as retaliation for reporting and discussing safety concerns with the NRC.
There appears to be sufficient indications to support the perception of these individuals and to properly conclude that one of the reasons for the involuntary separation of the two HP technicians is specifically related to discussing or reporting potential health and safety concerns with NRC l
inspection officials. Although the investigation failed to disclose indica-tions of intentional, contrived violations of regulations and license require-ments, there was overwhelming evidence to support severe mismanagement, negligence, and carelessness by an Operations employee and a haphazard and unorganized approach concerning the performance and completion of some GTRR activities.
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Case No. 2-88-003 6
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ACCOUNTABILITY.
f:^: '
. The following portions'of this. Report of Investigation (Case'No.. 2-88-003)will J
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not.be included in the material placed in the' Public Document Room. They consist'of pages 8 through 89.
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l Oi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No.
SYNOPSIS................................
1 ACCOUNTABILITY.............................
7 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS.........................
11 DETAILS OF INVESTIGATIONS.......................
13 Purpose of Investigation.....................
13 Background............................
13 Summary of Allegations......................
17 Organizational Structure of the GTRR Facility...........
17 Interviews of GTRR Health Physics Personnel............
20 Review of Documentation Regarding Apparent Harassment and Intimidation 34 Review of Georgia Tech Administrative Records...........
37 Interviews of Georgia Tech Administrative Officials........
42 Interviews of GTRR Operations / Support Personnel..........
43 Interviews of NSC Members.....................
52 Interviews of Theragenics Corporation Officials..........
52 Interview of Dr. Melvin W. CARTER, Professor, Nuclear Engineering.......................
58 Interview of Dr. Thomas F. CRAFT, Retired Nuclear Engineer............................
60 Interviews of Georgia Tech Academic /Research Officials......
62 Review of NSC Meeting Minutes...................
71 Review of GTRR Files and Records.................
73 W111 fulness / Intent........................
75 Investigator's Conclusions....................
79 Status of Investigation......................
80 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION........................
81 LIST OF ACRONYMS............................
03 LIST OF EXHIBITS............................
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APPLICABLE REGULATIONS 10 CFR.Part 50.7 - Employee Protection Section 210 (a), Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended - Employee Protection.
10 CFR Part 55 - Operator's Licenses
' Technical Specifications 6.3 - Administrative Controls of Experiments Technical Specification 6.4 - Procedures Operating License R-97 l
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2-88-003 12 E _-__ _ Case No.- - -. - _ _ _ _
j DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION Purpose of Investigation This investigation was initiated on February 3, 1988, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Region II, Regional Administrator (RA), after an alleger reported apparent harassment and intimidation of Health Physics (HP)
Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech)y Nuclear Research Center (GTRR),
personnel by the Director of the Frank H. Neel
, Atlanta, Georgia for reporting safety concerns to the NRC.
Additionally, the requestor, on Februar provided the NRC, Region II Office of Investigations (01) y 4, 8, and with 19, 1988, written and/or verbal supplemental information which indicated potential licensee improprieties and possible efforts by the Director of the GTRR and/or members of his Operations staff to misrepresent data regarding certain aspects of an August 18, 1987, Cadmium-115 (Cd-115) contamination incident and subsequent clean-up and decontamination activities at the GTRR facility.
Further, 01 was requested to review and document possible violations of regulations and technical specifica'tions at the GTRR facility, including improprieties associated with the completion of required records and forms.
Background
On February 9-23, 1987, February 17-23, 1987, and April 7-10, 1987, extensive NRC, Region II inspection activities were conducted by variou; inspectors at the GTRR facility.
The results of these inspection activities are documented in NRC, Region II reports labelled 50-160/87-01, 50-160/87-02, and 50-160/87-03, respectively, which reflect numerous violations for failure to comply with license conditions and provisions of the Code of Federal Regula-tions.
Most, if not all, of the violations noted in Report Number 87-01 appear to relate specifically to Operations personnel and facility management, however the HP program has also been cited for procedural deficiencies and professional discrepancies in the other inspection reports.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Quoting from the " Enforcement History" section of the NRC, Region II February 23, 1988, Enforcement Conference briefing package, "since 1985, numerous violations of both the HP and Operations areas have been identified."
It is further noted that "as a result of the limited staff, Health Physics and Operations staff overlap in procedure development and also in the performance of routine' duties", and " viola-tions would be better characterized as attributable to the GTRR staff members rather than one of the groups" (HP or Operations).
On July 1, 1987, the GTRR staff reorganization, which was apparently first I
proposed publicly in January 1987, in a memorandum from GTRR Director Ratib A. KARAM to Thomas E. STELSON, Vice-President for Research, Georgia Tech, I
was implemented.
Prior to the reorganization, the then campus Radiation Safety Officer (RS0) Robert M. B0YD, and his HP staff were permitted to address and refer resolution of radiological health and safety concerns directly to the President of Georgia Tech.
B0YD was also permitted to terminate any GTRR work or projects which he or his. staff members deemed were radiologically unsafe.
After the reorganization BOYD was no longer the campus RSC and organizational 1) l he was required to report directly to KARAM for all work related matters.
Case No. 2-88-003 13
i INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
BOYD views KARAM's staff reorganization at the GTRR facility as punitive and vindictive and as an attempt to muzzle and/or dilute the duties, responsibilities, and authority of the HP employees.
This perception by B0YD and other HP personnel, will be fully developed throughout the investigation report.
Further, comments and documentation regarding the July 1,1987, staff realignment at tha GTRR facility will be presented in the section of the report which discusses " Organizational Structure."
On July 30, 1987, the NRC, Region II, Regional Allegation Coordinator, Enforce-ment and Investigations Coordination Staff (RAC/EICS) received a telephone call, followed by a letter on August 3, 1987, from James L. CAMERON, a Georgia Tech student HP technician employed part-time at the GTRR facility.
CAMERON's letter, a copy of which is Exhibit 1, alleges possible deficiencies /discre-pancies and potential. regulatory violations in the reorganization of the GTRR staff and alludes to intimidation and harassment of and discrimination against members of the HP staff.
Concerns voiced oy CAMERON are summarized as follows:
1.
HP staff members at the GTRR facility now are unable to terminate activities they believe have the potential for being radiologically unsafe and must rely upon the Director (KARAM) to make this decision.
2.
B0YD was demoted from RS0 to manager of the Office of Radiation Safety (ORS), allegedly a retaliatory action by KARAM inasmuch as BOYD reported violations by Operations employees to the NRC during an inspection.
3.
The new RSO is not physically located at the GTRR facility and will be unable to provide the immediate guidance and attention required of this position / individual.
4.
The terms and conditions of the facility license, with respect to titles, committees, and committee functions, have bean violated by the staff reo'ganization and a license amendment has not been requested.
5 The Director of the GTRR facility directly supervises the activities of the HP technicians who are responsible for monitoring and survey-l ing the work of the Director and his Operations staff.
l On December 16, 1987, January 4-5, 1988, and January 14-22, 1988, NRC, Region II inspection activities were again conducted at the GTRR facility, the results of which are reflected in Inspection Report 50-160/87-08.
The initial inspection in this series was conductea by NRC, Region II Senior Radiation Specialist George B. KUZ0, who was reviewing general management controls and operating procedures at the licensee's facility.
At the conclusion of the inspection activities on December 16, 1987, KUZO solicited radiological health l
and safety concerns from members of the HP staff, including BOYD, CAMERON, i
Steven N. MILLSPAUGH and another student and part-time HP technician l
Susan M. SELMAN.
During this informal session with the HP personnel, I
spontaneous concerns wer.e voicea that appeared to indicate KARAM was attempting to subjugate thesa HP staff members and suppress and restrain their duties, responsibilities, and required activities.
These individuals related incidents such as, KARAM apparently ordering the discontinuance of the use of logbooks by Case No. 2-88-003 14
e the HP staff, alleged improprieties by KARAM relating to the reporting and
)
resolution of an August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident and clean-up activities at the facility, and the failure by KARAM to heed the advice and recommendations of the HP staff regarding the resolution of safety concerns.
Reportedly, these alleged actions by KARAM gave the impression of harassment, intimidation, and discrimination against HP personnel and indicated favoritism l
and preferential treatment towards Operations employees.
On February 2, 1988 MILLSPAUGH telephonically contacted the NRC, Region II RAC/EICS and reported he was concerned about his future employment status as an HP technician at the GTRR facility.
He said he is afraid his employment will be terminated, based upon remarks his supervisor (BOYD) related to him as a result of a conversation with KARAM.
MILLSPAUGH stated KARAM is blaming the HP i
group for the recent NRC inspections (December 1987 and January 1988) and said he (KARAM) has openly accused him (MILLSPAUGH) and others of being " whistle-l blowers." MILLSPAUGH, during the telephone conversation, further related to l
the RAC/EICS that HP personnel are being constantly harassed for identifying f
and reporting radiological safety problems to KARAM.
He pledged to describe, in writing, the safety issues identified by the HP personnel and the harassment i
and intimidation which resulted from reporting these concerns.
MILLSPAUGH also stated that the two NRC licensed operators at the GTRR facility do not acknowledge their professional deficiencies and appear to be more concerned with identifying the alleger of a safety concern than they are with resolving the issue.
He alluded to vast personality, professional, and philosophical differences between HP and Operations personnel at the GTRR and stated KARAM appears to be supportive of whomever is against the HP technician in a j
particular issue regardless of the circumstances.
I In a February 3,1988, letter (Exhibit 2), the requestor asked for investiga-1 tive assistance to identify and document alleged harassment and intimidation of l
HP personnel at the GTRR facility.
The RA's letter further reiterates the l
MILLSPAUGH concern that KARAM apparently blames HP personnel for the recent (December 1987 and January 1988) NRC inspections conducted at the facility and reflects that KARAM reportedly told the HP manager (B0YD) quest letter also his characterization of them as "whistleblowers." The re to dismiss MILLSPAUGH and if this did not occur KARAM threatened to dismiss all HP personnel.
The letter further relates MILLSPAUGH is of the impression that HP technicians are i
frequently harassed by Operations personnel for identifying health and safety concerns and that an adversarial and confrontational relationship exists between the two groups.
On February 4, 1988, in a second memorandum to Office of Investigations, Region I (RI) 01:RII (Exhibit 3), the requestor forwarded a supplemental request for investigation at the GTRR facility to identify, document, and i
resc1ve alleged willful, intentional improprieties associated with the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident.
The NRC inspection activities and the disclosures of GTRR personnel revealed that facility contamination of radioactive cadmium, possibly including Reactor Operator (RO) William H. DOWNS, occurred on August 18, 1987, as a result of a gemstone irradiation experiment which was being conducted by KARAM.
During the NRC inspection it was further revealed that the licensee may have recorded information regarding certain aspects of this incident which was inaccurate and/or inconsistent with technical fact patterns developed by the Case No. 2-88-003 15
j inspectors. The following speci_fic concerns were referred to 01:RII for I
resolution:
1.
Did licensee management (KARAM) deliberately misrepresent contamina-tion survey data while discussing the Cd-115 incident to the NRC?
i 2.
Did licensee management deliberately misrepresent the actions of DOWNS immediately(following the Cd-115 contamination incident regarding claims he DOWNS) surveyed his personal residence for the presence of radioactive residue?
3.
Did licensee management order HP personnel tu discontinue the use of personal logbooks in an effort to conceal potential radiological health and safety violations from NRC inspection personnel?
4.
Did the licensee (KARAM and DOWNS and Leslie Dean McDOWELL) deliberately annotate gemstone irradiation experiment authorization documentation with inaccurate and incomplete data in an effort to conceal information regarding the experiment and was the authoriza-tion form initiated in accordance with existing procedures?
On February 6, 1988, in a third memorandum to 01:RII (Exhibit 4), the requestor forwarded additional supplemental information regarding his initial request for investigation.
According to the memorandum, a current NRC, Region II staff member related license conditions, technical specifications, and/or Code of Federal Regulations violations at the GTRR facility, including operation of the reactor without a licensed operator in the control room, possible deliberate tampering with safety equipment to avoid containment isolation, and possible existence of separate files containing confidential / sensitive information which may have an impact on regulatory issues.
Additionally, the letter contains additional information which describes several incidents relating to " friction among the staff" at the licensee's facility.
Following the completion of the NRC, Region II inspection activities in January 1988, including the review of the Cd-115 contamination incident and various other apparent radiological health and safety hsues, media (television and newspaper) coverage in Atlanta, Georgia, was focused for several weeks on the events which were occurring at the GTRR facility.
After the involuntary i
/
terminations of HP employees MILLSPAUGH and Paul B. SHARPE by KARAM on February 11, 1988, media attention intensified.
During a hearing in the U.S. District Court, held pursuant to a request by the attorney for MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE to reinstate these two HP technicians, KARAM testified that "there are suspicions of sabotage" at the GTRR facility.
KARAM's testimony regarding l
acts of " sabotage" was printed in the February 18, 1988, edition of the Atlanta i
Constitution A copy of this newspaper article, with the " sabotage" remarks I
highlighted.
1 Exhii u 5 to the investigation report.
During an NRC, Region 11 staff briefing by 01:RII on February 19, 1988, regarding the progress of the investigation, it was verbally requested that inquiries be conducted tc identify and resolve the alleged act or acts of sabotage which KARAM claimed had occurred.
Case No. 2-88-003 16 L
o
-Su'mmary of Allegations Inasmuch as the requestor and/or members of his-staff provided supplemental information to 01:RII on several occasions regarding various topics and allegations at the GTRR facility, a summary of the issues which were pursued during this investigation are identified in this section of the report. Those items are as follows:
1.
Alleged harassment and intimidation of ORS (HP) personnel by the Director of the Nuclear Research Center and/or members of his Operations staff for reporting radiological safety concerns to the NRC.
2.
Possible falsification or intentional misrepresentation by the licensee of contamination survey data regarding the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 incident.
3.
Possible intentional falsification of personal survey data (DOWNS) by the licensee regarding the Cd-115 incident.
4.
Possible deliberate attempt by KARAM to conceal potential radiolrgi-cal. health and safety violations from the NRC when he directed the discontinuance of logbooks by HP personnel.
5.
Possible deliberate falsification of the gemstone irradiation experi-ment authorization document and associated forms.
6.
Alleged operation of the reactor without a licensed operator in the control room.
7.
Possible deliberate tampering with safety equipment to avoid contain-ment isolation.
8.
Maintaining separate files for the purpose of concealing adverse information from the NRC.
9.
Possible radiological sabotage, vandalism, or malicious damage involving radioactive substances or health and safety monitoring devices.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Present during most all of the substantive interviews conducted during the investigation was NRC inspector KUZ0, who also participated in the interviewing process.
All of the technical information discussed during these interviews has been provided to the appropriate NRC, Region II staff member.
Addition-ally, Paul E. FREDRICKSON, NRC, Region II Section Chief, has reviewed all of the documentation obtained by CI to ensure that all technical issues and concerns have been properly addressed / resolved.
Organizational Structure of the GTRR Facility During the course of the investigation it became apparent that one of the single most significant causes of alleged frustration for HP personnel and the disharmony and hostility between HP and Operations employees at the GTRR Case No. 2-68-003 17
_-.-_____..----_-__m-_.-..-._.m
l facility is the current organizational structure which requires the ORS to report directly to and be supervised by KARAM.
In order to comprehend the scope, nature, and extent of current personnel conflicts and adverse relation-ships between the HP and the Operations employees at the GTRP facility it was I
deemed pertinent to review the historical evolution of this issue through available documentation from 1973 to the present time.
An assortment of Georgia Tech letters and memorandum pertaining to organizational changes affecting HP functions were obtained from various interviewees and from official files and records during the investigation.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Due to the extensive quantity of documentation concerning proposals to place HP personnel under the direction and super-vision of the GTRR facility director, only those which appear to be the most significant will be included as exhibits to the investigation report.
Copies of other documents pertaining to this topic, some of which have been sumarized in this section of the report, will be retained in the investigative file.
In a July 17, 1973, memorandum (Exhibit 6), R.L. ZIMMERMAN (former member of the now defunct Radiation Safety Committee (RSC)) writes, in response to a proposal to restructure the GTRR staff, that " serious conflict of interest problems could arise if the Office of Radiological Safety were placed under the direction of the major user" (director of the facility).
In a July 30, 1973, letter to the then President of Georgia Tech (Exhibit 7), Henry M. NEUMANN (another former RSC member) sumarizes committee discussions with STELSON regarding the reorganization of the ORS.
NEUMANN relates that the committee strongly urges total independence for the ORS in all aspects of its mission, free from any potential conflict of interest situation which might arise.
An August 22, 1973, Georgia Department of Human Resources (GDHR) inspection report (not attached) contains remarks regarding the independent status of the ORS.
The following is quoted directly from the GDHR document:
"It was noted during the previous inspection in 1972 that the Office of Radiation Safety appeared to be under the influence of the individual user.
This appears to be still true.
It is the feeling of this Ocidrt-ment and the United States Atomic Energy Commission that under certain circumstances the effectiveness of the Office may be compromised.
It is suggested that the Radiation Safety Office be organized in such a manner that principle users of radioactive materials will not have authority to influence actions and decisions of the Radiation Safety Officer."
A January 26, 1987, memorandum from KARAM to STELSON, with a reorganization chart attached (Exhibit 8) entitled " Reorganization of NNRC", sets forth KARAM's rationale for proposing the reorganization of the GTRR staff.
Key points noted in this document address combining all secretarial and other staff personnel under the Director (KARAM) to achieve maximum utilization, eliminating " petty quarrels that take place between the Radiation Safety Office staff [HP's] and the NNRC staff" and consolidating the Radiation Protection Committee (RPC) and the Nuclear Safeguards Committee (NSC) into one committee.
In a memorandum to STELSOS dated February 3, 1987, B0YD objects to the proposed reorganization, citing inconsistencies with recorrendations from respected sources.
B0YD concluded that regardless of the decision to reorganize he will support it to the best of his ability.
Case No. 2-88-003 18
Minutes of a special February 19, 1987, RPC meeting (Exhibit 9), reflect a discussion was held regarding the proposed reorganization of the ORS.
l INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
It is noted in these minutes that B0YD, a member of the comittee, was present on this date, as was MILLSPAUGH, whc is listed as a visitor.
Item Number 3 of the' minutes records unanimous opposition of the eight committee members present regarding the proposed reorganization of the GTRR staff which would place the ORS under the director of the facility.
The Chainnan of the RPC, Dr. Melvin W. CARTER, was chosen to communicate this unanimous opposition to STELSON and the Acting President of Georgia Tech.
A March 23, 1987, letter to Henry C. BOURNE, Acting President (Exhibit 10),
from CARTER communicates his, and the committee's, opposition to the proposed reorganization of the GTRR facility staff.
CARTER cites rationale for his opposition to the reorganization and states, "if [the plan is] implemented...
would easily lead to compromises in the radiological safety program." He concludes that he is " unalterably opposed to the proposed reorganization change" and that "this change would put the fox in charge of the hen house."
In a May 6,1987, memorandum from KARAM to STELSON (Exhibit 11), KARAM
" formally" requests that the proposed GTRR staff reorganization plan be implemented so he can perform his overall responsibility for the direction and operation of the facility.
KARAM concludes that "this responsibility cannot be met totally under the present organizational structure because the Office of Radiological Safety is independent and in actual practice reports to no one."
In a May 27, 1987, memorandum from STELSON to BOURNE (Exhibit 12), the May 6, j
1987, KARAM memorandum is forwarded with the recommendation that the proposed I
reorganization plan be implemented.
The remainder of the memorandum sets forth i
STELSON's rationale for recommending the proposed organization change.
Item Humber 3 of STELSON's letter addresses reorganization of the radiological safety function and is quoted in its entirety as follows:
"The existing Office of Radiological S,sfety would be abolished, and a new Office of Radiation Safety would be established as a component of the Neely Nuclear Research Center.
I' would be one of four program functions of the Center as indicated by the organizational diagram.
This would accommodate the recommendations of the Nuclear Regulatory Connission that our safety and program functions be much more closely integrated and managed at levels below that of my office."
A notice from BOURNE dated May 28, 1987, was circulated to members of the GTRR facility HP staff and others announcing a June 4, 1987, meeting to discuss the proposed reorganization.
A June 5, 1987, memorandum from BOYD to CARTER identifies the attendees and reports the results of the June 4,1987, meeting.
BOYD comments that five attendees " presented strong argument" against the proposed reorganization and only STELSON and KARAM favored it.
In a June 10, 1987, letter to BOURNE (Exhibit 13), CARTER again expressed opposition to implementation of the impending reorganization plan relating to HP functions and he concludes that "as a matter of conscience and principle, I respectfully submit my resignation as Chairman, Radiation Protection Ccmmittee."
Case No. 2-88-003 19
s In a June 15, 1987, letter to the NRC (Exhibit 14), KARAM, while responding to inspection issues reported in Inspection Report No. 50-160/87-03, acknowledges his concern for management control at the GTRR facility.
KARAM discusses the proposed reorganization and relates it will permit him to " control... petty quarrels that take place between the Radiation Safety Officer staff and the operations staff." He continues that, "these quarrels are historic and rooted in self assertions on both sides," and since the Radiation Safety Officer is now " organizationally independent" makes it difficult for him "to put a stop to these quarrels."
KARAM further states that he intends to halt the practice by HP personnel of recording violations in personal logs which he does not see and will immediately institute a policy of having concerns and violations reported to him by memorandum.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
One of the complaints against KARAM by the HP personnel was that he directed them to discontinue the use of " personal logbooks."
Pertinent comments concerning this alleged action by KARAM are reported in the interview summaries of HP employees.
In a June 18, 1987, memorandum BOURNE accepts CARTER's resignation as Chairman of the RPC.
In a June 19, 1987, letter from BOURNE to STELSON (Exhibit 15),
the proposed reorganization of the GTRR staff is approved.
BOURNE writes that the " existing Office of Radiological Safety shall be abolished and a new Office of Radiation Safety shall be established as a unit of the Neely Nuclear Research Center."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
During the interview of BOYD he testified that, from his viewpoint, the reorganization of the GTRR staff was retaliatory, detrimental to him personally and it had an adverse impact on him and the other HP personnel.
]
Exhibits 16 and 17 are copies of GTRR organization charts for the periods prior to July 1, 1987, and from this date forward.
The chart for the period prior to July 1, 1987, indicates that the Radiological Safety Officer (B0YD) reports to i
the President of Georgia Tech, independent of the facility director (KARAM).
The chart for the period from July 1, 1987, indicates the Manager of the Office of Radiation Safety (B0YD) is supervised by and reports directly to KARAM.
Interviews of GTRR Health Physics Personnel The GTRR facility personnel employed in the ORS at the time the investigation was initiated were interviewed regarding their knowledge of issues addressed in this report.
The following personnel, with their titles / positions noted were interviewed:
Robert M. BOYD, Manager, Office of Radiation Safety Steven N. MILLSPAUGH, Health Physicist Paul B. SHARPE (CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE), Health Physicist Susan M. SELMAN, Undergraduate Student Health Physicist James L. CAMERON, Undergraduate Student Health Physicist James M. MATTERN, Graduate Student Health Physicist BOYD (Exhibits 18 and 19), employed at the GTRR facility performing and/or managing basic HP duties and responsibilities for 24 years, explair.ed during Case No. 2-88-003 20
o his February 8, 1988, interview that he and his staff (HP personnel) reported to the Vice President for Research prior to the July 1, 1987, reorganization.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
B0YD testified from copious handwritten notes he had maintained since early 1987.
These notes, which he read verbatim at times, described significant interactions between him and KARAM and address numerous instances in which BOYD categorized his (KARAM's) conversations and actions as threatening, intimidating, harassing, and prejudicial.
BOYD acknowledged long standing adversarial relations between HP and Operations personnel at the GTRR facility and an apparent " polarization" of these two groups.
He recalled that in the fall of 1986, KARAM broached the topic of reorganizing the GTRR staff in order for the HP group to report directly to him for all matters.
B0YD said he disagreed with KARAM regarding the proposed reorganization and advised him that this action was not prudent.
B0YD, in relating professional differences with KARAM, recalled that in February 1987, while acting under the authority of the now defunct RPC, he terminated the " hot cell" operations at the GTRR facility because of potentially severe radiation problems resulting from leaking Cobalt 60 (Co-60) sources. BOYD said KARAM became angry at him and the RPC for terminating the hot cell activity until all of these sources could be encapsulated in stainless steel.
He related also that the hot cell detector was not functioning properly during this time, which was further cause for suspending these functions.
B0YD described conditions and circumstances in his relationships with STELSON and KARAM, beginning from about May 1987 and extending to the present time, which seem to indicate the presence of disharmony, animosity, vindictiveness, and apparent intimidation and harassment.
He related that in May 1987, while enroute to a meeting with the NRC, STELSON threatened to withhold pay increases 1
for HP personnel and he (STELSON) also blamed B0YD personally for informing the l
NRC of health and safety violations at the GTRR facility and for media l
attention regarding the reorganization of the staff.
He advised KARAM told hir.
during this time STELSON had approved his (BOYD) involuntary separation from the GTRR staff and also he (STELSON) agreed to the termination of "anyone else that he (KARAM) wanted to dismiss" from the ORS.
BOYD summarized that STE'. SON wanted him terminated because he (B0YD) was leading the opposition to the reorganization plan which placed the ORS under the direct supervision and management of KARAM.
BOYD recalled, just prior to July 1, 1987, remarks from STELSON about contract-ing HP services which caused him to fear for his job at the GTRR facility and he also related that KARAM said about this same time that MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE should be fired for getting him (KARAM) in " hot water with the hierarchy "
He said KARAM repeatedly remarked that these two individuals should be terminated and that this service (HP) be contracted or provided by graduate students who are studying this discipline.
BOYD intimated his perception and belief that STELSON and KARAM were acting in unison during the May-June 1987 time frame and afterwards to intimidate and scare the HP personnel and force them to aboicate their independence and unwillingly submit to the authority KARAM.
Case No. 2-88-003 21
i B0YD related a November 17, 1987, conversation with XARAM during which he i
accused him (BOYD) and/or his HP employees of assisting SELMAN prepare a letter to the Georgia Tech campus newspaper which criticized the GTRR staff reorga-nization.
BOYD advised KARAM said STELSON told him to terminate her employment because she had violated Georgia Tech policy by not permitting him (XARAM) to review the letter before it was published.
BOYD advised that both under-graduate student HP technicians were threatened with dismissal if they wrcte other letters to the newspaper.
He related that on December 9, 1987, KARAM again broached the topic of SELMAN's letter to the campus newspaper and said it would make STELSON happy if he (B0YD) also wrote a letter to the campus newspaper refuting SELMAN's derogatory remarks and defusing the situation regarding the uproar about the reorganization of the GTRR staff.
He said KARAM even supplied the contents of the letter he was suggesting him (B0YD) to write to the campus newspaper.
B0YD advised that KARAM repeatedly suggested that he write the letter and stated this incident (SELMAN's letter to the newspaper) was almost an obsession with him.
He said he felt that his refusal to write the letter would be detrimental to him (B0YD) and would be further cause for
" bad feelings" and "more intimidation."
BOYD, in demonstrating KARAM's apparent efforts at total control and dominance of the GTRR facility HP staff since the reorganization, recalled instances during NSC meetings when he (BOYD) responded to technical and professional questions from members and was later chastised by KARAM for contributing to the discussions during these sessions.
BOYD advised that on December 17, 1987, the NRC visited the GTRR facility and apparently for the first time learned about the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident and the following clean-up activities.
He said KARAM again queried him intensely regarding the identity of the individual who had I
notified the NRC even though it was a routine inspection.
BOYD acknowledged he and his staff discussed all they knew of the Cd-115 incident with the NRC j
l inspector.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Inasmuch as the Cd-115 contamination incident was fully reviewed by members of the NRC, Region II staff during the December 1987 and January 1988 inspection activities and reported in Inspection Report No. 50-160/87-08, B0YD's disclosures regarding this event will only be summarized in the report of investigation.
J Essentially, BOYD blames DOWNS for the contamination incident and credits student HP technician SELMAN for discovering the spill while performing a
. routine survey in the containment building.
He advised that carelessness and a disregard for procedures by DOWNS was apparently the cause of the event and also the reason he did not discover that a mishap had occurred.
B0YD advised he was gravely concerned that KARAM and/or STELSON would "somehow find a way" to reflect that the ORS was responsible for the contamination incident.
He indicated that he continuously had an uneasy and insecure feeling while talking with the NRC inspector during this time about the contamination incident because of KARAM's incessant and unrelenting accusations that the HP personnel had secretly notified the NRC of this event.
B0YD strongly alluded to the possibility that after the NRC began reviewing the incident, KARAM and members of the GTRR Operations staff, McDOWELL and David L. C0X, may have schemed to protect and shield DOWNS from sharing any of the responsibility and shift the blame to members of the HP staff.
B0YD intimated that because of the heightened state of emotions between the HP and Operations personnel due to the Case No. 2-88-003 22
circumstances of the event, all decontamination and clean-up activities were directed by KARAM so there would be "no fighting among these individuals."
BOYD recalled that during the NRC inspection activities there were arguments, confrontations, heated debates, and conflicting accounts of significant aspects of post Cd-115 event activities.
Ho said the ORS was being blamed by DOWNS for the Cd-115 spill and that Operations employees were publicly proclaiming someone in the ORS had notified the NRC.
He described a meeting of all GTRR employee in KARAM's office on January 6,1988, after a pre-exit meeting with the NRC, during which KARAM orchestrated efforts to unify the circumstances of the Cd-115 incident and to relate a position that appeared to be more favorable to DOWNS and the Operations staff.
BOYD indicated that as a result of this meeting D0WNS may have felt some persuasion to modify his testimony to the NRC from not performing a contamination survey of his residence to not recalling whether he had performed this action.
BOYD said he did not view KARAM's actions on this occasion as an attempt to deceive the NRC or to provide misleading data regarding the Cd-115 incident but an effort to discredit ORS personnel.
B0YD reiterated his concerns that KARAM appeared poised to terminate some members of the HP staff.
He again expressed his opinion that there is an absence of a total commitment by KARAM to radiological health and safety and that he appears more interested in the fiscal potential for the GTRR facility, i
B0YD related again that ORS employees have been accused by KARAM, on numerous occasions, of " polarizing" against Operations personnel when HP employees report safety violations, which appears to be another indicator of harassment and intimidation.
He recalled from his notes that after the recent NRC inspection KARAM denied him (BOYD) an opportunity to attend the exit conference, an act which was also intimidating to him.
Further, he recalled a January 26, 1988, meeting in STELSON's office during which STELSON indicated imminent changes in the HP staff which were being impleirented because the NRC wanted " strong central control and more upgrading of... health physicists."
B0YD related that, in late January 1988 KARAM and STELSON required a l
psychological evaluation or profile of each GTRR employee by a Georgia Tech psychologist on STELSON's staff.
He said SHARPE and MILLSPAUGH initially l
balked at this because it had the appearance of being a subjective action by i
KARAM which could have been detrimental to them.
In summary, throughout the interview BOYD strongly indicated that KARAM was deceptive in his relationships with the HP staff and that his motives were suspicious.
He described constant distrust and suspicion of KARAM's actions and behavior by members of the ORS since the July 1, 1987, reorganization and related that the threat of involuntary separation was prevalent at all times during this period.
BOYD stated that he personally feared for his job because of the current unrest, the constant confrontational environment and hostility at the GTRR facility, and his contacts with the NRC and he related that the staff reorganization had affected him both psychologically and professionally.
He enumerated that as a result of this action, he had lost the title and position of RSO, a personal secretary, a budget for his group operations, direct access to the Office of the President, and credibility among his peers in the industry.
He concluded that all of these items, coupled with the fact that KARAM blames HP personnel for any unfavorable activity or adverse l
publicity at the GTRR and KARAM's frequent innuendos regarding job security, I
appears to be ample evidence to demonstrate that he (KARAM) employs a continuous campaign of harassment and intimidation against these indivicuai..
Case No. 2-28-003 23
i BOYD was queried regarding the other investigative issues listed in the
" Summary of Allegations" section of the investigation report.
He related that except for apparent harassment and intimidation of HP personnel, he is personally unaware of any improprieties by KARAM or any other member of the GTRR staff.
B0YD contacted the reporting investigator again on March 3, 1988, and related that the incidents of harassment and intimidation against him appear to have increased since MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE are no longer members of the HP staff.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Both MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE were involuntarily separated from the GTRR facility on February 11, 1987.
They were reinstated on February 15, 1988, but were not reassigned to their former positions. This topic will be fully discussed in a subsequent section of the report of investigation.
He reiterated the concerns he had reported during his earlier interview and stated that Jerry F. TAYLOR, former Hot Cell Manager was now assigned to the HP staff.
He said TAYLOR, a KARAM devotee, is openly hostile towards him and he (TAYLOR) is uncooperative and generally has a negative attitude regarding his assignments.
He related also that Robert N. MacDONALD, the recently appointed Assistant Director, has accused him of being incompetent and has insulted him personally and professionally.
He said he believes the reason MacDONALD and KARAM act unfriendly towards him at the present time is because he (B0YD) has again recommended closing the Hot Cell until the current employee disputes and personnel problems are resolved.
He explained that the Hot Cell activity is currently the only revenue producing activity for the GTRR facility which KARAM does not want to forfeit.
B0YD also reiterated that KARAM repeatedly declines to follow his professional advice and recommendations and cited numerous remedial and corrective actions he has recommended, all of which are related to the August 1987 Cd-115 contamination event that he (KARAM) did not indicate were significant issues.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Each of the items identified by B0YD were forwarded to the NRC, Region II staff for resolution.
He again recited his concern that KARAM is more interested in identifying an alleger than he is in determining whether there is substance to an allegation and implementing proper remedial action.
He said he is beginning to notice that KARAM has started documenting adversarial and confrontational experiences with HP personnel "after the fact" so that he will have unsatisfactory performance evidence to present against MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE if they seek litigation regarding their dismissal.
MILLSPAUGH (Exhibit 20), was interviewed on February 9, 1988, and after provid-ing biographical and employment data, responded to questions regarding alleged harassment and intimidation of HP personnel for reporting to the NRC safety concerns at the GTRR facility. He related that he noted the development of serious adversial relationships about February 1987 when he first heard KARAM discuss the reorganization of the entire staff.
MILLSPAUGH clarified that HP personnel and the Operations employees have not enjoyed a harmonious relation-ship for a number of years but it worsened with the proposed staff reorganiza-tion discussions in early 1987.
He said his first real hostile encounter vith
/
l Case No. 2-88-003 24 j
j
I J
GTRR management occurred in February 1987 when an unknown complainant notified the NRC and the State of Georgia regarding Hot Cell discrepancies.
He said the l
HP personnel were warned by KARAM that anyone who is identified as an alleger I
would be in trouble.
He stated also that, in his opinion, the RPC was abolished in the reorganization because KARAM was angry at the committee I
members for closing the Hot Cell in February 1987.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
During this portion of the interview, MILLSPAUGH referred to numerous Georgia Tech memoranda regarding the proposed GTRR staff reorganization.
The documents which are significant to this issue are explained in the " Organizational Structure of the GTRR Facility" section of the investigation report.
MILLSPAUGH, in discussing the duties of the two radiation safety committees that existed prior to the staff reorganization, advised KARAM has stated more than once that these committees served at his pleasure and they are "not there to disapprove anything." MILLSPAUGH also related his impression of KARAM's June 1987 memorandum to the HP personnel telling them to refrain from maintain-ing personal logbooks.
He said he interpreted KARAM's memorandum to imply that l
logbooks were not permitted because management (KARAM) did not want to be cited (by the NRC) for violations recorded there.
MILLSPAUGH reviewed personal notes he had maintained and then responded to questions concerning actions by KARAM which are perceived as harassment and intimidation.
He noted he had recorded in his logbook on May 5, 1987, that B0YD said KARAM and STELSON threatened
" poor or no pay raises..." or a " cut in salary" for HP personnel "due to the NRC hassling of STELSON and his group." He related that during another conversation with KARAM about this same time KARAM offer'ed to designate him (MILLSPAUGH) the RSO and BOYD in turn was to be promoted to the Assistant Director of the GTRR facility.
He intimated they both refused the offer and recognized it as a token gesture or a bribe from KARAM to obtain their cooperation regarding the merger of the HP staff under the GTRR director.
MILLSPAUGH recalled from his notebook that B0YD had told him STELSON threatened to eliminate the HP personnel and contract this service in the event the GTRR facility was closed.
He said this statement by STELSON was viewed as another attempt to intimidate these employees and to coerce them into quietly accepting the staff reorganization.
l MILLSPAUGH concurred with BOYD's remarks regarding SELMAN's letter to the campus newspaper regarding the staff reorganization and related that KARAM also i
i accused him and other HP staff members of assisting her with the contents and encouraging her to submit the letter for publication.
He recalled other I
intimidating remarks by KARAM in a January 17, 1988, staff meeting when he stated "he wants no judgment or experience in HP emergencies", that "everything can be covered by a checklist" and that "he could hire graduate students off the street to do HP work."
l MILLSPAUGH advised that, in his opinion, another example of management's (KARAM) apparent disregard for the HP personnel is demonstrated in the fact that not one of the three permanently assigned employees (BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE) were permitted to attend the January 22, 1988, exit conference with the NRC.
He said STELSON advised the GTRR staff after the exit conference that the NRC wanted " stronger management control" and that STELSON is using the NRC as the scapegoat to totally dominate the HP personnel.
He said he viewed this Case No. ?-88-003 25 E---.-_--_--------------_._
statement as intimidating and stated it was designed to cause the HP personnel l
to " roll over or resign."
MILLSPAUGH's testimony regarding the August 1987 Cd-115 mishap coincides with statements provided by BOYD.
He concurred there has been confusion and l
uncertainty regarding the corrective actions taken by Operations personnel, including DOWNS, following the accident and that some statements by KARAM and other Operations personnel regarding this matter may not have been consistent with the facts regarding particular incidents.
MILLSPAUGH noted from his diary that B0YD told him in late January 1988 he (B0YD) had been given "one more chance" by STELSON to " straighten up the HP group or... the entire office will be terminated." He recalled that shortly after this conversation, B0YD said KARAM told him he (KARAM) "wants to get rid of everyone in Health Physics" except B0YD and that he wants B0YD's help to do this. He further related that, in late January 1988, KARAM labelled the HP program as " outdated by 25 years," a characterization which the NRC had reportedly placed on it at an earlier exit conference.
MILLSPAUGH also recalled that KARAM openly and repeatedly singled out members of the HP group at being responsible for notifying the NRC regarding safety violations at the GTRR facility and these accusations by KARAM contributed to the polarization of the staff.
He indicated KARAM never criticized or publicly noted deficiencies among members of the Operations staff as he so often did with the HP personnel which gave the impression that he favored this group of employees.
He testified that recently Dr. James A. MAHAFFEY, a member of the NSC, confided that he felt uncomfortable with DOWNS as an operator, based upon his tempera-ment and reported difficulties with the R0 examination.
Throughout the interview he cited numerous examples of DOWNS performing his duties and responsibilities in violation of a particular written policy or procedure.
he related that the August 1987 contamination incident would not have occurred if DOWNS had been attentive to his duties.
MILLSPAUGH related that MacDONALD, the recently(appointed Deputy Director, indicated on February 2, 1988, that management KARAM) was taking action against the HP personnel because the NRC was finding too many unacceptable issues at the GTRR facility.
He said he also believes KARAM recommended psychological evaluations and polygraph examinations for all GTRR staff as a
" fishing expedition" to gain any information he could to terminate the HP staff.
He advised that Operations personnel have a great deal of difficulty
" owning a problem" when they have mada mistakes and they appear to be oblivicus to their deficiencies and shortcomings.
As an example of this attitude he l
recalled that DOWNS initially denied responsibility regarding the Cd-115 I
contamination incident.
He recalled other incidents which indicate an irresponsible attitude by DOWNS regarding his activities at the GTRR facility.
MILLSPAUGH was queried specifically regarding the allegations that are summarized in the " Summary of Allegations" section of the report.
He related he is unaware of any records improprieties and knows of no instances in which dual files have been maintained or separate records created to conceal ur J
disguise violations.
He said he had heard that there was an occasion when the l
reactor was operating without a licensed operator in the control room but he could not substantiate this rumor.
He denied any knowledge of alleged tamper-ing with alarm equipment to avoid containment isolation.
In conclusion, MILLSPAUGH related that KARAM and STELSON may be receiving unofficial Case No. 2-88-003 26 J
information from NRC employee "VERRELLI" (David M., Branch Chief, NRC l
Region II) which gives the impression that KARAM's efforts and activities at i
the GTRR facility are blessed by the NRC.
I INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The remark by MILLSPAUGH concerning NRC employee i
VERRELLI was verbally transmitted to an Office of Inspector and Auditor (0!A) investigator (L. SMITH) since that NRC office is resolving other issues associated with the GTRR facility.
j SHARPE (CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE) (Exhibit 21), interviewed on February 5, 1988, provided requested background and professional data and stated he has worked in the HP program at the GTRR facility for three and one half years.
He related that, in his opinion, the relationships between the HP and the Operations staffs began to deteriorate in late 1985 and has continued declining to the present time.
He described incidents of open hostility, intense animosity, and severe personality and professional conflicts and he developed patterns of behavior and actions by management (mainly KARAM) and members of the GTRR Operations staff which have exasperated and frustrated the HP personnel as they attempted to perform their duties and responsibilities.
SHARPE recalled that beginning about 1985 it appeared that KARAM began emphasizing profitability as the single most important factor for operating the GTRR and as a result he was reluctant to spend resources to upgrade and procure needed supplies and equip-ment. He said KARAM in 1986, after an initial period of becoming comfortable as the Director of the GTRR, began to aggressively exert "more control over his GTRR staff" which created negative and adverse feelings among the Operations personnel, who in turn, became " testy" and confrontational with HP personnel.
SHARPE further related that the unstable environment and hostile attitudes eventually polarized the HP and Operations personnel to the point that HP suggestions and reconinendations are met with " aggressive tendencies" by Operations personnel.
SHARPE, also reading from personal notes he has accumulated since early 1986, recalled bad attitudes and a lack of cooperation from Operations personnel and KARAM's apparent failure to initially address and resolve these issues.
SHARPE further reported numerous examples in which Operations personnel failed to follow the HP advice, suggestions, and/or recommendations and as a result there was further polarization, dishannony, antagonism, and an adversarial reaction between the two groups.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The incidents identified by SHARPE were transmitted to the NRC, Region II staff (FREDRICKSON) for review and resolution.
SHARPE advised that HP personnel became very frustrated with KARAM during this i
period (1986) and he seemed to have little or no regard for the professional and philosophical opinions of others unless it happened to coincide with those of his own.
SHARPE intimated that KARAM appeared to be more tolerant of Operations personnel, especially DOWNS, even though mistakes were frequently made, their tempers flared, they were often careless, at times displayed minimal regard for safety, and they frequently. violated their own operating procedures.
According to SHARPE, this attitude by KARAM was difficult to accept especially since the HP perscnnel were viewed as "being an evil necessity," " bad guys," and
" tattletales" by the Operations personnel.
He related he and 80YD repeatedly Case No. 2-88-003 27
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(.
informed KARAM about potential safety problems involving Operations staff-l personnel but he did not appear.to be interested in addressing these issues.,
L SHARPE said that in February 1987, after the discovery of possible sample-I tampering involving liquid radioactive waste he notified the NRC about this and
)
other potential safety matters that had been reported to'KARAM but had not been addressed.
f l
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: According to SHARPE, the liquid radioactive waste sample tampering incident was reviewed by the NRC in February 1987 L
(Inspection Report Number 50-160/87-02).
1 SHARPE related that KARAM could ill afford to punish or reprimand Operations personnel because at the time there were only two operators with licenses and the technical, specifications required two licensed operators to operate the reactor.
He said KARAM believed the only way he could settle disputes and arguments between the two groups and keep the facility open was to " muzzle" the HP personnel.
He voiced the strong opinion that KARAM spent more time attempting to. identify the individual who may have reported a potential safety-issue to the NRC than he did identifying, addressing, and resolving.the problem that had been reported.
SHARPE recalled a conversation with KARAM in early 1987 wherein KARAM asked him to become an R0.. since he had been previously licensed, but still perfonn HP duties at the GTRR facility. He said KARAM told him future pay raises would depend on "how well the people cooperated with him." He said he sensed that KARAM was telling him if he obtained his NRC operator license, cooperated with him (KARAM) and " quit making waves" he would get a pay raise.
He said he refused the offer to become a. licensed operator and said he has not had a pay raise since this conversation with KARAM.
He intimated that he believes KARAM regarded the GTRR staff reorganization as an opportunity to "get even" with the HP personnel and abolish the independent status of this group.
SHARPE discussed his observations and opinions regarding various aspects of the GTRR. staff and safety committee reorganizations.
He claimed KARAM abolished the RPC, chaired by CARTER, in the reorganization because this comittee forced the closure of the Hot Cell in February 1987 until reliable detection devices could be utilized and because this committee had forced the encapsulation of leaking Co-60 sources by the GTRR Operations staff as a matter of high priority.
He enumerated benefits and job related advantages the HP personnel lost in the reorganization, includirig a personal secretary for the HP office, a separate budget, and the ability to select their own part-time employees for work at the facility.
SHARPE related statements / comments by STELSON that he regarded as examples of intimidation towards HP personnel.
He said STELSON infonned these individuals that unless the reactor "makes money" it will be closed and also "if the l
reactor becomes too safe it will have to be closed."
He said STELSON also blamed the NRC for causing the staff reorganization and that it (the reorgani-zation) was recommended by the agency to achieve management control.
SHARPE advised that these remarks by STELSON were an implied threat to the HP group so i
that they would moderate or dilute their aggressive approach in identifying j
potential health and safety issues and problems.
SHARPE remarked that KARAM I
and STELSON have publicly stated the reorganization is to " elevate and improve safety" but in reality it was devised as a means to " muzzle" the HP personrel.
Case No. 2-88-003 20
3 SHkRPEdiscussedKARAM'spositionregardingtheuseofpersonallogbooksatthe GTRR facility and related he strongly urged discontinuance of this practice in favor of reporting violations in memorandum form to him.
He advised that because of the restrictive environment at the GTRR facility minor health and safety violations may be ignored because of the hassle involved in reporting them to KARAM and because not reporting them prevents polarization and eliminates dissension between the HP and Operations groups.
SHARPE advised that after the reorganization KARAM " ceased working with us" and became a sole dictator.
He said HP reconsnendations and suggesti' ns were o
generally ignored unless KARAM was personally interested and the environment and working conditions were " completely demoralizing."
He said KARAM canvassed all facility employees regarding the possibility of a polygraph examination because of apparent vandalism but this suggestion was viewed by HP personnel as harassment since it appeared KARAM wanted only to identify persons responsible for discussing safety concerns with the NRC.
SHARPE explained an incident which occurred on November 13, 1987, that has caused him to fear that he will eventually be involuntarily terminated from his job.
SHARPE said this incident involved SELMAN's letter to the campus newspaper. He said KARAM " accosted" him in the hallway at the GTRR facility and angrily demanded to know if he had assisted SELMAN with her letter or if he had anything to do with the letter.
He said KARAM grilled him repeatedly on l
this occasion regarding the SELMAN letter and then he approached BOYD and accused someone (an HP employee) of assisting SELMAN with the letter "since she is a student and does not know enough to write such a letter."
He said KARAM then angrily discussed the incident with SELMAN and fellow student HP employee CAMERON and then reportedly threatened to terminate them if either ever engaged in this activity in the future.
SHARPE discussed the remarks of STELSON at a January 22, 1988, meeting with all GTRR staff members present.
He said STELSON stated there would be " stronger centralized management" at the GTRR facility and that KARAM's policies and practices would be totally supported and strictly enforced.
SHARPE related that STELSON said anyone who did not like the environment at the GTRR facility could leave and that it was time to start bringing "more Ph.D's on board."
He also concurred with B0YD's remark that B0YD was told (by KARAM) he had "one more chance" to "get his staff in line" and to quit going to the NRC and the media (emphasis supplied).
SHARPE advised that the statements of STELSON are illogical because at ene time he talks about closing the GTRR facility and the next time he talks about replacing B0YD with a person who has a Ph.D. degree.
SHARPE advised from personal notes that KARAM arranged interviews for all GTRR personnel with staff psychologist Michael O' BANNON (a member of STELSON's staff) to "see if there's makeup of personality that needed to be known."
He advised that because of the possible implications of using the results of this evaluation against the HP employee he and MILLSPAUGH reluctantly agreed to participate without their attorney present.
SHARPE advised that it appears to be the consensus among management officials such as KARAM, STELSON, and the current president of Georgia Tech that HP employees are the cause of all problems at the GTRR facility.
He said the integrity of KARAM and STELSON is, in his opinion, suspect because they have not represented the facts truthfully Case No. 2-88-003 29
i f
f 1
and they appear to be less interested in health and safety matters than are HP personnel.
l SHARPE next answered specific questions regarding the August 1987 Cd-115 contamination incident. His remarks appeared to coincide with those of BOYD and MILLSPAUGH regarding this event. He related he is unaware of any records improprieties or other violations at the GTRR facility and added that Operations personnel now seem to take more interest in completing paperwork than in the past.
He concluded that, it is his opinion, the HP program and its current members are "beyond a shadow of a doubt... being stifled and muzzled, stopped in the performance of their duties, stopped in the performance of radiation safety due to management practices and the atmosphere created by l
management at the Research Center."
SELMAN (Exhibit 22) related background, education, and employment data regard-ing her part-time affiliation with the GTRR facility since January 1986.
She advised that she was unaware of the personality and professional conflicts at the GTRR facility when she began and that she started her employment with an open mind and in anticipation of learning applied HP practices.
She recalled that after approximately three weeks she began to note that "some of the people in the Operations Department... would do thing, I didn't think were very good."
She cited several examples in which DOWNS failed to observe sound HP practices to eliminate the possibility of personal contamination.
She also advised that the HP group members and Operations personnel have had "some problem... not seeing eye-to-eye on issues." She said the HP staff is attempting to promote an environment that is responsive to health and safety and Operations personnel seem to try and complete a job as quickly as possible without the same level of commitment to health and safety.
She related several examples of behavior by DOWNS which she believes demonstrates his incompetency as an operator, his 16ck of concern for health and safety matters, and his unwillingness to cooperate with HP personnel.
SELMAN recalled KARAM's unfavorable and hostile reaction towards her concerning her November 13, 1987, letter to the Georgia Tech campus newspaper wherein she wrote critical remarks regarding the GTRR staff reorganization.
After providing historical information which prompted her to write the letter, SELMAN advised it (the letter) was intended to clarify certain aspects of the GTRR staff reorganization which had been discussed in a previous edition of the newspaper.
She also stated that another purpose of her letter was to object publicly to the fact that KARAM, as the primary user of radioactive materials on the campus, was in the position of monitoring his own activities.
SELMAN related, as an HP student at Georgia Tech, she has been taught that the HP and Operations functions of a licensed facility should be separate but such does not currently exist at the GTRR.
She said, in her opinion, Operations personnel do not possess the degree of commitment to radiological health and safety necessary to ensure a radiologically safe environment.
She reiterated that Operations personnel appear to be " sloppy with following their procedures" and ntimated that KARAM seems to cendone the practices of these individuals.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
SELMAN provided a copy of handwritten rotes which were transcribed following the meeting with KARAM.
These notes will be discussed in a subsequent section of the Report of Investigation.'
Case No. 2-88-003 30
e i
Continuing with her comments regarding her November 13, 1987 letter, SELMAN said KARAM warned her in a threatening and hostile manner not to write another letter of this nature to the newspaper and furthermore, she had violated Georgia Tech policy by not having the letter first edited and approved by him.
She stated he then threatened to terminate her employment if she wrote another letter and indicated STELSON had approved this action.
She advised KARAM then repeatedly and violently accused her of collaborating with a full-time HP employee to write her letter.
She said KARAM also insulted her because she opposed the GTRR staff reorganization and stated he told her to " butt out" and
" quit dabbling in politics" since she was only a student.
She said KARAM also mentioned to her that he would dismiss CAMERON if he wrote a letter as she had done.
SELMAN reiterated that professional, personal, and philosophical conflicts occur on a regular basis between HP and Operations personnel, and that KARAM appears to be the main agitator.
She advised that the severity of a particular conflict is proportional to the size of the project or the activity which is in progress.
SELMAN confinned that there is a definite tendency for HP and Operations personnel to avoid professional interactions and that KARAM appears to openly favor and support the Operations croup.
She said HP employees are regularly blamed by KARAM for reporting and discussing safety matters with the NRC and Operations personnel repeatedly refuse to acknowledge that.some of their actions contribute to health and safety concerns.
SELMAN related her knowledge of the August 1987 Cd-115 contamination incident.
Her remarks appear to be consistent with those reported by HP personnel during previous interviews.
She acknowledged that DOWNS is the principle Operations employee involved in this incident and his inattentive, careless, and irrespon-sible actions were responsible for the event.
She said there was a great deal of confusion regarding the actions of DOWNS immediately following the event and that KARAM and DOWNS may have related associated incidents which they believe i
occurred, notwithstanding the testimony of other GTRR employees.
She said she i
did not perceive this as an effort to conceal facts but viewed it as a failure to properly address and resolve an issue.
SELMAN concludeo that, in her opinion, HP personnel cannot operate effectively in the current environment at the GTRR facility since there is no spirit of cooperation between the two groups (HP and Operations).
When queried regarding the items which are listed in the " Summary of Allegations" section of the report of investigations, she claimed no personal knowledge of wrongdoing regarding any., of these topics.
CAMERON (Exhibit 23) related education, background and employment data regarding his association with the GTRR facility since October 1986.
He described the working environment when he first became employed as " pretty good" but with some evidence of animosity and hostility between HP and Operations personnel.
He said the staff reorganization has aggravated personal and professional relationships between the two groups and created the potential for conflict of interest problems because HP employees no longer feel they have the independence to act decisively when they perceive a potential health and safety issue.
/
1 l
In response to the question, "Have you felt particularly threatened, intimidated, harassed... in the performance of your duties and responsibili-ties?" CAMERON acknowledged in the affirmative and stated on one occasion in November 1987, following the publication of SELMAN's letter in the Georgia Tech Case No. 2-88-003 31 l
L_-__ _ __
)
campus newspaper, KARAM told him there was a university policy which required that all concerns be addressed first with an immediate supervisor before an outside source is contacted. CAMERON said he asked to see the policy in writing, whereupon KARAM replied it was not written.
He said KARAM then became i
"very hot" and asked if his word was being disputed.
CAMERON said he told l
KARAM he was disputing this policy to which KARAM again insisted that all l
problems would be discussed with management or else he would be terminated.
He said he then asked KARAM if they could discuss the manner in which radiation safety was being practiced at the GTRR, to which KARAM replied, "If you think your life is in danger, you have one choice, and that's to quit."
CAMERON related that, according to BOYD, the full time HP staff members have been told by STELSON that they either cooperate with management and " play the game" or they will be replaced.
He said he believes health and safety to the extent the HP employees consider acceptable has been somewhat deemphasized and diluted by KARAM for the sake of increasing the number of irradiation and experimental contracts for the facility.
He also relateo that KARAM appears to be obsessed with learning the identity of an alleger and less concerned about the validity of an allegation or resolving the issue.
He said current HP employees are blamed for reporting violations and they are viewed by Operations personnel as "the enemy, outsiders, police, tattletale (s)", a perception that KARAM and STELSON seem to support and encourage.
CAMERON advised that he has also heard KARAM and/or STELSON talk about contracting out HP services and terminating the present staff, a proposal that has caused much anxiety among the permanent staff.
CAMERON discussed his role in the August 1987, Cd-115 contamination clean-up activities.
His description of these events also coincides with the comments provided by other HP interviewees.
He advised that, in his opinion, KARAM did not want the Cd-115 contamination incident publicized and said he possibly attempted to downplay certain aspects of the event in order to minimize any adverse publicity.
He recalled that HP recommendations immediately following the incident may not have been considered and the entire irradiation experiment appeared to be "one blunder from start to finish."
CAMERON related that, in his opinion, KARAM appears to be more interested in profitability than he is in a strict health and safety program, an attitude that appears to have contributed to intensified hostilities between KARAM and HP personnel.
He advised that, in his opinion, KARAM may be inclined to ignore some of the safety recommendations by the HP personnel which also creates furthEr adverse relationships.
CAMERON said he believes the present environment of antagonism, lack of meaningful communications, and hostility between HP and Operations personnel is not conducive to safe working conditions at the GTRR facility and related that the Cd-115 contamination incident is most likely the result of a lack of communications between these two groups.
CAMERON emphasized that the discovery of the contamination incident by SELMAN was rather fortuitcus because time does not always permit daily smears and surveys.
He further related that, in his opinion, DOWNS is not an attentive and competent R0 and said he has demonstrated on a number of occasions that he does not follow established procedures and practices.
CAMERON was queried regarding other aspects of the investigation anc advised that, in his opinion, the irradiation experiment request and approval documen-tation has not been properly completed.
He advised that the experimenter (VARAM) did not perform sufficient research to determine the exact effects of Case No. 2-88-003 32
o
.a:
.c L'
L
. irradiating the materials involved for the amount of exposure time. 'He said that a review of the request form.by the NSC, a process that was.not
' accomplished, may' possibly,have eliminated any potential, documentation discrepancies and said KARAM, in his haste to conclude the gemstone irradiation experiment' failed to refer it to the NSC for approval.
He was unable to-provide any substantive information regarding other aspects of the investiga-tion.
MATTERN (Exhibit 24), an HP graduate student and part-time technician at the
- GTRR facility, was interviewed regarding a February 16, 1988, letter to KARAM from MATTERN which is an account of MATTERN's relationships with other HP personnel.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
In response to a request for documentation which could demonstrate that MILLSPAUGH and.SHARPE performed unsatisfactorily or had received disciplinary action prior to their involuntary separation on February 11, 1988 KARAM furnished the aforementioned February 16, 1988, letter from MATTERN.
A review of the letter revealed MATTERN recorded derogatory remarks regarding the personal habits and character of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE. A copy of the MATTERN letter is attached to his Report of Interview.
MATTERN advised he prepared the letter in response to allegations by student HP technicians SELMAN and CAMERON that KARAM had harassed and intimidated HP personnel.
He related the letter, which contains his personal views,.
impressions', and opinions regarding the unprofessional character and conduct of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, was not solicited by KARAM but was intended to defend KARAM from accusations which he (KARAM) claims are unfounded.
He stated that, S
in his opinion, the involuntary dismissals of both MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE are justified and when he learned they were contesting their termination in a lawsuit against Georgia Tech he decided to record his experiences and observa-i tions regarding these individuals.
MATTERN acknowledged the presence of a
" power struggle" between KARAM and the HP group which was aggravated by the July 1, 1987,' reorganization of the GTRR facility staff.
MATTERN, a graduate of Texas A&M University and an employee of that research reactor facility, noted tnat HP employees there have the authority to terminate activities that could become detrimental to health and safety but they are also more coopera-tive with.0perations personnel.
He concluded emphatically that HP personnel at the GTRR facility should have more authority and they should report to someone other than the director (KARAM) of the program.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The reporting investigator sensed that the interviewee was not totally objective in his observations and opinions regarding the two terminated HP employees.
It appears that MATTERN is indebted to KARAM because of his work-study situation which was apparently arranged by KARAM.-
Further, it appears that MATTERN's personality, status, and close association with KARAM may have alienated him from BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, SHARPE, and the other members of the HP group, thus causing him to render a subjective opinion concerning the personalities and professionalism of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
In summary, BOYD, MILLSPAUGii, SHARPE, SELMAN, and CAMERON all related unequivocally that they are fearful of discussing with the NRC in an open and candid manner any item or issue they perceived to be of a real or potential 1
Case No. 2-88-003 33
6 4
health or safety significance. They stated they believe KARAN will retaliate against them by terminating their employment for reporting health and safety concerns to the NRC without first advising him of their concerns.
Interviewees intimated unanimously that they believe KARAM's temperament and management style, along with the long history of turmoil, strife, personality and professional conflicts, and his apparent discrimination against the HP staff indicate to them he would separate them for discussing GTRR health and safety i
issues with the NRC.
Except for the specific instances discussed by each interviewee as recorded or referenced in their interview sumary none was aware of any additional health and safety issues which had not been addressed either by the licensee or during the NRC inspection.
Finally, these HP personnel reiterated that if they became aware of additional items which they perceived as health and safety issues they would be reluctant to report them directly to the NRC for fear of losing their jobs.
Review of Documentation Regarding Apparent Harassment and Intimidation During the interviews of the HP employees they provided copies of licensee or personal documentation and records which, according to these individuals, either demonstrate or has lead to or resulted in harassment, intimidation, and antagonism towards HP personnel by KARAM and/or members of the GTRR Operations staff.
Documents which appear to be relevant to the purpose of this investiga-i tion are being attached as exhibits and an explanation of each, as stated by the contributor, will be set forth in this section of the report.
Exhibits 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 were provided by BOYD during his interviews on February 8, and March 3, 1988. According to BOYD, the February 27, 1987, letter (Exhibit 25) from KARAM to Narl DAVIDSON, Chairman Ad Hoc Comittee Inspecting Hot Cell Instrumentation, demonstrates an example of KARAh's apparent disregard for HP recommendations, and thus a form of harassment towards members of the HP staff.
BOYD related that in February 1987, either he or other members of the HP group, had persistently recommended that Hot Cell work be suspended because of faulty instrumentation.
He advised that it became necessary to involve the then RSC in this issue which resulted in the immediate termination of the Hot Cell activities.
BOYD recalled that KARAM, while complying with the committee recommendation, personally blamed the members of the HP group for causing this action to occur.
He stated that the temporary j
closing of the Hot Cell resulted in lost revenue for the GTRR facility which cpparently angered KARAM, who reacted in a hostile and belligerent manner towards the HP employees.
BOYD further contends that the statements and coments in KARAM's letter to DAVIDSON are designed to placate the ad hoc committee and to reflect a contrite attitude.
He stated the letter does not reveal KARAM's true feelings nor does it reflect that members of the HP group had attempted unsuccessfully for a long period of time to accomplish what the ad hoc comittee had achieved as a result of their inspection of the hot Cell facility.
The July 29, 1987, letter (Exhibit 26) from KARAM to the GTRR staff was in reality, according to B0YD and other HP personnel, intended only for members of the HP group.
Five of the six HP employees questioned stated unequivocally they interpreted the memorandum as the confirmation of a verbal directive from KARAM tc discontinue the use of logbooks to record daily activities and Case No. 2-88-003 34
s observations.
They viewed this action by KARAM as an attempt to restrict their duties and responsibilities to ensure a radiologically safe environment at the GTRR facility.
BOYD related that this memorandum, whi-b was circulated after the July 1, 1987, staff reorganization, further demonsta tes KARAM's desire to I
eliminate the independence of the HP employees by requiring them to comunicate j
directly to him.
He explained that this particular arrangement proved to be unsatisfactory because of his apparent preferential treatment of Operations l
staff members who repeatedly violated procedures noted/ identified by the HP group.
The handwritten note from KARAM to BOYD dated January 21, 1988 (Exnibit 27),
requests B0YD to locate the masslinn cloth used to wipe the top of the reactor on August 19, 1987, following the Cd-115 contamination incident.
B0YD related that he believes KARAM wrote this note knowing that the masslinn cloth was not retrievable from the radioactive waste.
He said in his opinion, this note appears to demonstrate subtle harassment and intimidation by KARAM or his lack of knowledge and experience concerning HP matters.
BOYD provided a copy of his personal notes for February 29, 1988 (Exhibit 28),
which record portions of alleged conversations with MacDONALD during this date.
He writes, "MacDonald ask(ed) me why don't you resign if you are going to not do your job.
He said to me that I was bucking my boss KARAM and not doing a good job of managing and haven't for a year." BOYD advised that MacDONALD, who has been employed at the GTRR facility since about January 15, 1988, has insulted and ridiculed him on other occasions and generally has begun to harass and intimidate him just as KARAM has done over the past several years.
B0YD furnished a copy of a personal, handwritten memorandum dated March 2,1988 (Exhibit 29), to Dr. Robert FULLER, Jr., Vice-President for Business and Finance. BOYD explained that, in his opinion, coments in the memorandum to FULLER demonstrates continued harassment and intimidation by KARAM.
He concludes the memorandum by writing "the atmosphere down here is still bad but I'm holding on."
Exhibit 30, portions of a logbook and Exhibit 31, pages of personal notes from a diary, was provided by MILLSPAUGH during his interview on February 9,1988.
The logbook pages (Exhibit 30), numbered 13, 15, and 69 for the dates February 3-12, 1987, and August 19-24, 1987, record references to instances which he claims represent KARAM's failure to respond to HP recommendations regarding radiological health and safety matters at the GTRR facility.
MILLSPAUGH advised that KARAM's apparent negative attitude towards HP personnel and their advice and recommendations nurtures the perception that he is hostile and repressive and has little regard for these employees or their duties and responsibilities.
Page 13 of the logbook discusses Hot Cell instrumentation problems discussed with KARAM and MILLSPAUGH writes, "I recomend discontinuing work in cell until a new detector is installed.
Ionization chamber preferably."
Page 15 of the logbook contains the entries " discussed this weeks serious deficiencies" (with KARAM) and " talked with KARAM re: state shutting down Hot Cell due to instr. [ instrument] malfunctions."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The NSC elected to terminate the Hot Cell activities in a February 24, 1987, meeting for the same reasons previously cited by HILLSPAUGH.
Case No. 2-88-003 35
The personal notes (Exhibit 31), dated May 5, June 4, September 28, November 18, and 20, 1987, and January 25 and 26, 1988, record (highlighted) remarks and comments which, according to MILLSPAUGH, represent attempts by KARAM and/or STELSON to further harass and intimidate HP personnel.
The May 5, 1987, note refers to a conversation with BOYD wherein B0YD advised that KARAM and STELSON threatened " poor /no pay raises for HP personnel due to NRC hassling STELSON" and that "STELSON said he may in fact cut our present salary." The June 4, 1987, note indicates B0YD related to MILLSPAUGH that STELSON will abolish the ORS and contract HP services if the GTRR facility is closed. MILLSPAUGH said he regarded this as coercion by KARAM/STELSON to gain HP approval and support for the impending staff reorganization.
The September 23, 1987, note references a discussion of a lie detector test for all of the GTRR staff, an action perceived by the HP employees as an attempt by KARAM to focus the blame for personnel problems on frembers of this group.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: KARAM testified that the polygraph test was suggested to him by the Georgia Tech Chief of Police as a means of identifying person (s) responsible for malicious damage / sabotage to GTRR equipment and instrumentation.
This incident will be discussed in a later section of the investigation report.
The November 18 and 20, 1987, notes reflect that KARAM and STELSON favored involuntary separation of SELMAN for writing the letter to the Georgia Tech newspaper.
These document further indicate that KARAM and/or STELSON considered dismissing the " entire HP staff" and "that the only people he
[KARAM] really had to keep" at the GTRR facility "were [ operators; Dean
[McDOWELL] and Bill [ DOWNS]." The January 25 and 26, 1987, notes also reflect comments regarding the involuntary separation of HP personnel.
The first note states that BOYD "has one more chance to straighten up the HP group - or else!"
and that KARAM "wants to get rid of everyone in HP except Bcb [BOYD] and [he]
wants Bob's help in doing so."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
BOYD testified that all of the comments and remarks he reported to MILLSPAUGH and recorded in MILLSPAUGH's notes are accurate and properly stated.
SHARPE reported very similar contents and remarks in his logbook and notes, however, to avoid duplication of exhibits in the report of investigation the documents provided by SHARPE are being retained in the case file.
Exhibit 32 is a October 1, 1987, copy of a handwritten memorandum from MILLSPAUGH to KARAM regarding the Cd-115 contamination incident on August 19, 1987. MILLSPAUGH writes in his memorandum that the incident has not been reviewed and suggests "a meeting on this subject before all pertinent details are forgotten." MILLSPAUGH advised that he did not receive a reply from KAPAM regarding his recommendations. An exact copy of the memorandum was provided by KARAM with an additional handwritten note dated October 9, 1987, appendeo to the page which states "the Cd [ incident] will be inspected for cause when it has cooled dcwn enough."
Exhibit 33 is a section from SHARPE's logbook dated July 15,16, and 17,19E6, l
in which he allegedly records on July 15, that Operations personnel (Jerry E. TAYLOR and Mitchell F. MERCER) " refused to wear lab coats at my request to protect their arms" while working with Co-60 casks.
SHARPE continues en July 17, that "Dr. Karam enforced my request fnr wearing Case No. 2-88-003 36
l 1
protective clothing... but allowed the sleeves cut off... which effectively negates the purpose of the protective clothing." SHARPE related that this was another example, in his opinion, of KARAM compromising health and safety and diluting the credibility of and respect for the HP group.
Exhibit 34 is a copy of a page from SELMAN's logbook dated February 13, 1987, in which she describes a confrontation between HP personnel (herself and I
l CAMERON) and a member of the Operations staff (DOWNS).
SELMAN records that her request for information was met with a curt and sarcastic remark from DOWNS who also engaged in conduct apparently designed to agitate and aggravate HP 1
personnel.
She concludes her recording by stating that DOWNS' behavior was infantile, irresponsible, and uncooperative.
Exhibit 35 is a copy of handwritten notes prepared by SELMAN following her meeting with KARAM to discuss the letter she wrote to the Georgia Tech campus newspaper expressing opinions regarding th? GTRR staff reorganization.
SELMAN related during her personal interview that although she recorded substantive remarks by KARAM she was unable to capture his forceful, abusive, arrogant, and threatening tone of voice.
She advised he repeatedly accused BOYD and CARTER of collaborating with her to write the letter and threatened to dismiss her if she wrote additional letters to any newspaper.
Exhibit 36 is a copy of a March 11, 1985, memorandum from KARAM to BOYD, with a February 25, 1985, memorandum from B0YD to KARAM and a February 25, 1985, memorandum from SHARPE to B0YD attached.
All three documents relate to an I
incident in which DOWNS struck the glass window of the Hot Cell with a wrench causing the glass to chip. This incident, described as " horseplay" by KARAh, was reported by SHARPE to B0YD who informed KARAM.
The response to this incident by KARAM who states, "Mr. Downs continues to have my support," is reportedly viewed by HP employees BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE as a failure to discipline a member of the Operations staff for a serious health and safety incident reported by an HP employee.
Each of these individuals testified that they believed KARAM would have reacted differently if someone (HP employee) other than an Operations staff member was involved.
Review of Georgia Tech Administrative Records Following their interviews by 01 on February 5 and 9,1968, respectively, SHARPE and MILLSPAUGH were involuntarily terminated from Georgia Tech and their HP positions at the GTRR facility on February 11, 1988.
During their interviews both expressed grave concern that they were in danger of being terminated for reporting and discussing health and safety concerns with the NRC.
As a result of their apparent involuntary dismissal, Georgia Tech administrative and personnel files and records at the GTRR f acility and at the Office of Personnel pertaining to these two individuals were reviewed to identify /obtain documentation regarding this matter.
The documents, attached either as exhibits or referenced herein, were provided either by KARAM, Jchn H. GIBSON, Personnel Director, cr FULLER, Vice-President, Business and Finance.
Exhibit 37 is a copy of a February 10, 1988, letter from KARAM, approved by STELSON, to GIBSON informing him that "it is imperative to upgrade" the GTRR facility HP program to " meet our obligations to the [NRC] under terms of our license." This letter further states that MILLSPAUGH and SHAPPE will ba Case No. 2-88-003 37
t 1
notified of their terminations on February 11, 1988, which will be effective after "the customary two week notification period."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
GIBSON's remarks regarding his conversation with KARAM following the receipt of this letter are summarized in another section of the investigation report.
Exhibit 38 is a letter, signed by KARAM, to SHARPE dated February 11, 1928, notifying him that his employment at Georgia Tech and the GTRR facility is being terminated on February 25, 1988.
The letter advises SHARPE that "on February 11, 1988, you will be asked to return all keys and cards to Georgia Tech." KARAM, in citing a reason for the dismissal, states that "in order to meet our obligations to the [NRC] under terms of our license, it is imperative that we upgrade our [HP] program", and in order to hire " highly qualified people" it is necessary "to make adjustment in our personnel. '
Exhibit 39 is a letter, signed by KARAM, to MILLSPAUGH dated February 11, 1988, which contains the identical language reflected in the SHARPE document.
INVESTIGATION'S NOTE:
Although both letters indicate that SHARPE and MILLSPAUGH are being terminated to " upgrade the HP program," no Georgia Tech official could produce documentation which contained proposed or planned actions to accomplish this objective.
Apparently the remark regarding "our obligation to the [NRC] under terms of our license" is a reference to an obscure comment to MacDONALD by NRC, Region II staff official FREDRICKSON in a January 1988 private conversation that the HP program at the GTRR facility is outdated by 25 years.
i Exhibits 40 and 41 are copies of identical February 15,198E, letters signed by STEL50H and addressed to SHARPE and MILLSPAUGH, respectively, which immediately rescind their terminations that were to be effective on February 25, 1988.
STELSON writes that "a full and complete hearing of all the circumstances under applicable statutes of the Georgia Institute of Technology and the policies of the Board of Regents" will be forthcoming and he oirects the addressees to "repart to iny office tomorrow morning for further assignment by me."
Exhibit 42 is a copy of a February 15, 1988, memorandum from KARAM to John P. CRECINE, President, Georgia Tech, entitled " Performance of Mr. Steve Millspaugh and Mr. Paul Sharpe."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
This document, according to KARAM, was prepared at the request of CRECINE to document " elements which contributed to the dismissal of... Millspaugh and Sharpe."
In summary, the memorandum cites the reasons for MILLSPAUGH's dismissal are habitual tardiness, the use of vulgarities and obscenities in the presence of i
graduate students and staff, the NRC assessment that the HP program is outdcted I
by 25 years, and that he was argumentative, uncooperative, and insensitive to the needs of others.
According to this document SHARPE was terminated because I
he registered for two courses in management without permission (in actuality, l
permission is not recuired unless courses interfere with work) and he does not inform the secretary of his movements in and out of the GTRR facility.
The memorandum further states that both HP employees "often kept infractions of Case No. 2-88-003 38
i t
e l
I rules and regulations in' private logs" and "these infractions were not brought to the attention of Georgia Tech officials."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: The investigation failed to reveal any evidence that l
SHARPE or MILLSPAUGH recorded entries or violations in their logbooks after KARAM's July 29, 1987, memorandum which discouraged the continued use of this document.
Additionally, it is recorded that "both technicians refused to' accept the authority of the President of Georgia Tech," "...they answered to no one," and "both technicians discharged their duties in an unprofessional and highly irritating manner." Finally, the memorandum concludes that "Dr. Michael O' Bannon recommended that HP functions be perfomed by new personnel and that the HP and Operations groups be physically separated.
1 INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The termination letters to SHARPE and MILLSPAUGH dated February 11, 1988, do not contain any of the litany of reasons for their dismissal which are cited in KARAM's memorandum to CRECINE.
Exhibit 43 is a memorandum dated February 17, 1988, from FULLER to STELSON and i
KARAM entitled " Health Physics upgrading and Restructuring (Record)."
In this memorandum FULLER requests that STELSON and KARAM each prepare "a narrative of your best recollections related to events pointing up the necessity to upgrade and restructure the [HP] operations."
FULLER further requests details of these events, including dates, documents, discussions, and meetings with the present HP staff members who are directly affected by the program's upgrading.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
On April 13, 1988, the reporting investigator telephonically contacted FULLER's office to determine if the requested information had been compiled.
Charles N. RAMSEY, Administrative Assistant to FULLER, who has been extensively involved in resolving all issues relating to the GTRR facility advised that as of this date neither STELSON nor KARAM had responded to this request.
Exhibit 44 is a copy of a memorandum dated February 18, 1988.from MacDONALD to KARAM entitled " Notes Relating To Firing MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE."
In this 1
memorandum MacDONALD concludes, apparently from notes he prepared on February 13, 1988, and presented verbally to the NSC during a meeting on February 16, 1988, that the present HP program is outdated and substandard; its personnel are uncooperative, belligerent, and uncontrollable by management (KARAM) and that the program "had to be rebuilt from the bottom up."
MacDONALD's memorandum further cites criticism of the GTRR facility HP program by NRC, Region II officials and in essence appears to shift the blame for the dismissals of SHARPE and MILLSPAUGH on the NRC because of the agency's apparent L
dissatisfaction with the program. MacDONALD continues that floor surveys of the building (following the cd-115 contamination event) were apparently withheld from the NRC, implying that it was the fault of HP personnel, and i
further, GTRR records were in disarray when he began to collect infomation relating to the cd-115 incident.
Finally, MacDONALD references the "0' Bannon Report" and implies this document suggests that "some people had to go."
He states that a discussion was held with KARAM, STELSON, and (Dr. Bernd) KAHN, Chairman, NSC and the " conclusion Case No. 2-88-003 39
1 1
was fire MILLSPAUGH and B0YD... to upgrade the [HP] staff with more competent people."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The NRC, Region 11 Inspection Report which examined the various aspects of the Cd-115 incident (50-160/87-08) noted that a substantial number of violations, including the failure to maintain adequate records, involved the Operations group at the GTRR facility.
In reading MacDONALD's memorandum it would appear that he may be attempting to skew the causes of personnel problems at the GTRR facility in favor of
. the Operations employees.
Also, the MacDONALD memorandum appears to place all of the blame for the personnel strife and disharmony on the HP group, without noting any of the discrepancies and deficiencies of Operations
]
employees.
As indicated in testimony and other exhibits, KARAM's apparent unconditional acceptance of DOWNS as a staff member in spite of immature actions and his attitude towards HP personnel reportedly is a major i
contributor to the discordant environment at the GTRR facility.
Exhibit 45 is a letter dated March 7, 1988, from FULLER to 01 with a February 18, 1988, document attached entitled "An Organization Review of the i
Nuclear Research Center of the Georgia Institute of Technology" (commonly roferred to as the "0' Bannon Report").
The report, which was prepared as a result of interviews with GTRR facility personnel between January 25, and February 2,1988, by O' BANNON is a sumary of the " opinions and reactions" of interviewees and " opinions and recommendations" of the interviewer (0'BANN0N).
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
It is noted that all three principle HP employees (BOYD,f1ILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE) at the GTRR facility were interviewed by O' BANNON, however, absent from the list of interviewees are the names McDOWELL and MERCER, both members of the Operations group.
O' BANNON, in a subsequent telephone conversation with 01 acknowledged these individuals were interviewed but their names were inadvertently omitted from the report.
During the 01 interviews of the principle HP employees they stated KARAM had indicated to them they would be labelled as "uncoopera-tive" and " unwilling to work with management" if they refused te be interviewed by O' BANNON.
These three employees related they reluctantly agreed to the interview by O' BANNON but feared KARAM would use the results to discredit them.
The report states that the g'oals of the psychological survey are to:
(1) assess the attitudes and reactions of the GTRR personnel towards the NRC order suspending certain activities; (2) clarify GTRR issues and problems which might have contributed to conditions described in the NRC order; and l
(3) identify courses of action which have potential for " leading to greater i
organizational effectiveness." The report describes the general topics that were discussed with each interviewee and it summarizes the issues ano opinions "which emerged from the interviewees." The significant disclosures contained in the report indicate a long history of interpersonal relationships between the HP and Operations groups ano that tensions between these two factions are "often characterized by verbal hostility while work is beir,9 done, and there is resentment felt by each group towards the other."
This document further stetes that "[KARAM] has not been successful in reducing tension; that HP personnel feel restricted ir, the ability to perform their responsibilities; because they do not view [KARAM] as sympathetic to their goals" and neither the hP or Case No. 2-88-003 40
i l
Operations personnel "were able to offer realistic solutions to resolving the conflict."
The conclusions of the interviewer, as stated in the report, relate first to I
comments concerning the ability and skill level of some GTRR personrnl in handling difficult interpersonal issues and the particular management style of KARAM.
O'8ANNON further concludes that "These managers reporting to Dr. Karam are not seen by other employees as effective leaders.
There appears to be little evidence of stong(sic) first-line management skill in either l
Health Physics or Operations."
l INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Based upon the GTRR organizational chart from July ), 1987, to the present time, the "first-line management" is B0YD (HP) and McDOWELL, MERCER and TAYLOR (Operations / Support).
The O' BANNON report does not state specifically that BOYD is a weak manager but instead reflects that " managers who report to KARAM" are not seen as effective leaders and that first-line management skills in both the HP and Operations groups do not appear to be strong.
It appears that MacDONALD has misstated and lifted out of context the conclusion of 0' BANNON by singling out only B0YD as a deficient manager.
This apparent attitude by MacDONALD does appear to give credibility to BOYD's testimony that he has been harassed and intimidated by this individual.
The O' BANNON report next concludes that the conflict (between HP and Operations groups) "is unlikely to be resolved satisfactorily within the current organiza-tional context and with the individuals (apparently a reference to both HP and Operations personnel) currently in place.
O'BANh0N states, "a major factor contributing to the current level of conflict is the absence of first-line management activity in Health Physics of a constructive nature" and that, "this group does not have regular guidance and direction which contributes to the overall organizational goals."
Finally, the report concludes with recommendations for improving the current interpersonal conflicts at the GTRR facility.
Significant recommendations recorded in the report are the reassignment of HP personnel "to other l
responsibilities appropriate to their levels of skill and experience" and, l
" physical separation of the work-spaces of the two groups... to ensure the cessation of dysfunctional interactions." The report further recommends that i
"an experienced manager" and one with the " ability to provide leadership, build teamwork, and maintain stable relationships" should be sought for the HP group.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
MacDONALD's memorandum of February 18, 1988, in reference to the O' BANNON report, states "the division [between HP and Operations]" was to severe to heal and that "some people had to go."
Accurately stated, the O' BANNON report concludes that, "The conflict is unlikely to be resolved... with the individuals currently in place" and recommends " physical separation of the work-spaces of the two groups."
The apparent implication of the Mac0ONALD letter appears to be the l
dismissal /tennination of HP personnel -(B0YD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE),
hcwever, the O' BANNON report recommends personnel actions such as l
reassignments and the physical separation of work spaces.
l l
Exhibit 46 is a letter dated March 3, 1988, from FULLER to 01, with a copy of a duly 1987, Georgia Tech dccument attached entitled "Long-Pange Financial Case No. 2-88-003 41 1
i a
Resources Plan." This report was provided by FULLER after the reporting investigator persistently requested documents which reflected discussions or actions relating to the proposed or planned " upgrading of the HP program" at Georgia Tech, the official reason cited by Georgia Tech for the terminations of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
FULLER related he requested the same information from STELSON and KARAM in his February 17, 1988, memorandum but had received no reply.
He subsequently offered subject report, citing Page 4 remarks relating to projected student enrollment increases in the undergraduate, masters, and doctoral programs and the instructional faculty ratio by the year 1993.
FULLER related that proportional increases could be expected in the nuclear science field which would necessitate an upgrading of all programs at Georgia Tech.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
In the opinion of the reporting investigator, the long range report does not appear to have direct relevance to the HP program at the GTRR facility nor does it remotely address " upgrading" this program.
During subsequent discussions with Georgia Tech administrative officials GIBSON an.; FULLER regarding the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, each was queried regarding the termination policies for classified (SHARPE) and general faculty (MILLhd'% employees.
In essence, GIBSON related that STELSON and KARAM violated the personnel due process procedures approved and adopted by the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia when they terminated the two HP employees.
Copies of the applicable procedures, provided by GIBSON, are being retaincd in the 01:RII investigative file.
Additionally, GIBSON made available to the reporting investigator the official personnel folders of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
These files were reviewed for the existence of any documents which addressed previous unsatisfactory performance or a record of any disciplinary action.
The most recent performance appraisal in MILLSPAUGH's file is dated 1983 and reflects an " outstanding" evaluation, the highest possible rating. The most recent appraisal in SHARPE's file is dated 1987 and reflects outstanding and excellent evaluations.
Neither record contained any documentation regarding disciplinary actions irivolving these individuals.
Copies of performance evaluation forms for MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE are being retained in the 01:RII investigative file.
Interviews of Georgia Tech Administrative Officials GIBSON and FULLER (Exhibit 47), were formally interviewed together (at their request) regarding their knowledge of the events associated with the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
FULLER recalled hearing of personnel problems at the GTRR facility during the past year and related a January 1988, conversation involving STELSON and CRECINE during which STELSON told of the impending dismissal of the HP staff for marginal performance.
He also stated that STELSON and KARAM had violated personnel policies by dismissing the two HP employees in the manner they had been dismissed.
GIBSON concurred with FULLER's comments regarding the violation of personr.el policies by STELSON and KARAM and noted the two HP employees had been oenied due process entitlement.
He further acknowledged that STELSON telephoned him on February 9 or 10, 1988, and stated he was immediately terminating these two individuals.
GIBSON said he cautioned STELS0h against this and cited the oue Case No. 2-88-003 42
1 t
,I process requirements set forth in the Board of Regents' personnel procedures.
He said STELSON told him repeatedly that he could not follow the requirements.
in the personnel manual regarding due process because the NRC had instructed him to terminate these two individuals.
He advised that since he could not' persuade STELSON to follow the proper personnel procedures for dismissing employees he told him to have a level of management below the office of the Vice-President sign the dismissal letters so the terminated employees'could appeal to him (STELSON) if they contested the action.
GIBSON related that on February 10, 1988, he received a letter addressed to him from KARAM which stated MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE were being immediately-terminated.
He said he then telephonically contacted KARAM and informed him that the due process procedures were not being followed in this matter.
He said KARAM told him that STELSON and the NRC had directed him to "get rid of these people immediately.".He said he cautioned KARAM that the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE in the' manner indicated in the letter addressed to him l
(GIBSON) could result in serious consequences for Georgia Tech officials.
GIBSON said that following the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE both individuals came to his office with their attorney seeking unemployment benefits information.
He recalled that both individuals were reinstated on February 15, 1988, upon the authority of STELSON.
Both interviewees claimed no additional pertinent information regarding the purpose of the investigation.
Interviews of GTRR Operations / Support Personnel During the investigation GTRR Operations / Support personnel were also inter-viewed to obtain any pertinent information regarding the purpose of this investigation.
The following individuals, with their job titles indicated, were interviewed by the reporting investigator:
Leslie D. (DEAN) McDOWELL, Manager of Reactor Operations William H. DOWNS, Reactor Operator David L. COX, Reactor Operator Trainee Mitchell F. MERCER, Electronics Specialist Jerry E. TAYLOR, Hot Cell Operator Daphne W,. AYC0CK, Secretary to the Director Judy L. RODGERS, Secretary INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Interviewees McDOWELL, DOWNS, C0X, MERCER, and ThYLOR testified under oath. Throughout the interviews of all Operations / Support personnel it was apparent to the reporting investigator, and the participating inspector when he was present, that each interviewee appeared to be completely loyal to and allied with KARAM against full-time and part-time undergraduate members of the HP staff.
Further, some interviewees, when asked to be objective and unbiased in l
l their testimony, stated they were unable to do so because of the intensity of the adversarial relationships between the HP and Operations groups.
McDOWELL (Exhibit 48) advised he has been employed at Georgia Tech since 1964, first as a R0 and then as a Senior F0 since 1968.
He related he has been designated as a GTRR manager (Reactor Operations) for the past four years.
McDOWELL acknowledged a prolonged hostile existence between HP and Operations Case No. 2-88-003 43
i personnel at the GTRR facility and categorized the current relationship between B0YD and KARAM as a " power struggle." He stated that the personnel conditions l
worsened after the July 1, 1987, staff reorganization when HP members technically reported to KARAM who directed the daily activities at the facility. McDOWELL discussed past and current incidents, attitudes, and practices which precipitated adverse interpersonal reactions and relationships and stated, in his opinion, the HP employees often became involved in activities that had no bearing on radiological health and safety.
He summarized that, in his opinion, current HP staff members (B0YD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE) are the real problems and the only solution is "getting rid of them or getting rid of us (emphasis supplied).
He also repeatedly characterized BOYD variously as liTtra conservative, over cautious, and as one who attempted to " stymie" the overall operations of the GTRR facility.
McDOWELL was also critical of the professional demeanor of other HP perscnnel and described their actions as " dictating" rather than "pelicing." He clarified that he generally feels "well covered" when any of the HP employees are monitoring his jobs but said some appear more concerned about identifying Operations mistakes than they are of ensuring a radiologically safe environ-ment.
In responding to questions regarding the staff reorganization of July 1, 1987, and its impact upon interpersonal relationships between the HP and Operations groups, McDOWELL first discussed the funding aspects of the GTRR
^
facility followed by comments regarding his perception of divergent goals and attitudes between the two groups.
He related he favored placing the HP personnel under KARAM's management and supervision to create an atmosphere of unity but the unity and harmony sought by KARAM has not been achieved and is not achievable with the present personnel.
l McDOWELL next responded to questions regarding the Cd-115 contamination
)
incident of August 1987.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Since the technical aspects of this incident have been documented in the most recent aforementioned NRC Inspection Report, only those aspects of this event which may have contributed to alleged harassment and intimidation of HP personnel will be referenced in this section of the report of investigation.
McDOWELL discussed various aspects of the event, beginning with a description of the manner in which the contamination apparently occurred and a discussion concerning his clean-up/ decontamination duties and responsibilities after the incident was discovered by a HP technician the following day.
McDOWELL also discussed the actions and proposals to ensure that DOWNS was free of any radioactive Cd-115 material following the discovery of the contamination.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
One issue which surfaced during the NRC inspection activities of December 1987, and January 1988, is whether DOWNS carried a Geiger-Mueller (GM) survey meter home with him immediately following the discovery of the Cd-115 incident to survey his residence for vidence of contamination.
DOWNS, at a January 1988 pre-exit meeting with the NRC l
inspector (KUZ0), and with KARAM, McDOWELL, and C0X present, anncunced emphatically on several occasions he had not taken a GM home with him.
This response by DOWNS was subsequently denounced by KARAM, McDOWELL, and C0X who stated to the NRC inspector "they had told hin to take a meter Case No. 2-88-003 44
s a
l l
home" and survey his residence.
COX even stated subsequently that he drove DOWNS home the evening of the discovery of the Cd-115 incident and-that DOWNS had a GM meter with him at that time.
Following the aforemen-tioned pre-exit meeting DOWNS subsequently testified "he could not l
remember" if he had taken a GM meter home with him.
This issue was not fully resolved during the inspection or the investigation, although it was fully discussed with each licensee individual who attended the pre-exit meeting.
McDOWELL discussed the various ramifications of the issue of whether DOWNS had surveyed his residence following the discovery of the Cd-115 incident.
He categorically denied that he, KARAM, and/or COX attempted to persuade DOWNS to alter his testimony to the NRC following the January 1988 pre-exit meeting ( ven though the four of them had met following this gathering to discuss the topic of surveying his residence.
McDOWELL next reviewed the " Experimenter's Checklist and Schedule Form",
associated with the gemstone irradiation experiment and the resultant Cd-115 contamination incident.
i INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
This fonn is used to document NSC approval of irradiation experiments and to record pertinent facts regarding exposure data and other information during the experiment.
McDOWELL discussed the purpose of the form and the items of data contained in the various locations on the document.
He also discussed specific information regarding the gemstone irradiation experiment and actual or proposed conditions relative to the particular experiment.
McDOWELL acknowledged that DOWNS was responsible for supplying the data on the form which relates to the gemstone irradiation experiment and said categorically he is unaware of any improprie-ties, deliberate discrepancies, or intentional omissions associated with the completion of this form or any other forms completed by DOWNS.
McDOWELL also denied that he had ever knowingly and intentionally harassed, intimidated, or threatened any Hp employee.
He further denied an awareness that KARAM had deliberately barassed or intimidated HP personnel but said he (KARAM) insists that BOYD and the ORS employees report all matters to him rather than to outside Georgia Tech officials. McDOWELL advised he recalled STELSON telling assembled employees at the GTRR facility in 1987 that the current HP employees could be replaced with contract service.
He said he has heard KARAM state recently that MILLSPAUGH should be " moved out" or terminated because he is an agitator. McDOWELL concurred that MILLSPAUGH should be terminated and further expressed bitterness towards this HP individual because he has an improper attitude when citing violations.
He related that SELMAN's letter about staff reorganization to the Georgia Tech newspaper in November 1987 also caused intense animosity between the two groups and further alienated individuals and nearly resulted in KARAM terminating her part-time employment.
McDOWELL was queried regarding the allegation that the reactor was operating without a licensed individual in the control rocm.
He categorically denied he had ever committed a violation of this nature and said, to his knowledge, the reactor has never operated without a licensed individual in the controi room.
He further denied any knowledge of tampering with containment isolation devices or safety equipment to circumvent technical specifications or regulatory requirements.
He also denied knowledge of any records improprieties or the maintaining of separate files and records to ceceive the NRC and concluded. hat Case No. 2-88-003 45
e l
he is unware of any efforts by GTRR facility personnel or officials to conceal I
information or violations from the NRC or to mislead their inspectors.
DOWNS (Exhibits'49 and 50) provided requested biographical, education employment information.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
DOWNS was interviewed the secono time to query him regarding his operations experiences and to give him an opportunity to respond to questions relating to his kncwledge level, skills, and competence as a licensed operator.
Additionally, he was questioned regarding potential inconsistencies between earlier testimony and certain
)
documents which were obtained during the investigation.
l DOWNS recounted his participation in all phases of the gemstone irradiation experiment, beginning in April 1987 through the clean-up and decontamination following the August 1987, Cd-115 spill.
DOWNS advised that he does not remenber performing a residence survey following the discovery of the Co-115 spill and clearly recalled his statement at the January 5,1988, pre-exit meeting during which he stated he did not take a GM meter home with him on that occasion.
DOWNS steadfastly denied any intentional wrongdoing with respect to his activities involving this experimentland the subsequent clean-up/decontami-nation procedures.
He indicated that, even though his carelessness may have caused the Cd-115 incident, KARAM has not disciplined him and, in fact "has l
been very supportive" of him after the event.
DOWNS described personnel relationships at the GTRR facility as "very strained," and conflicting professional and personal attitudes were frequent and prevalent.
He related that in his opinion, HP personnel allegedly violateo the " chain of command" by reporting concerns they believed had health and safety implications to the NRC without first informing KARAM.
He did acknowl-edge that these HP individuals may have attempted unsuccessfully to have GTRh management (KARAM) resolve their concerns before reporting them to the NRC.
DOWNS implied the Cd-115 incident which occurred in August 1987, was not addressed by management in a proper er timely manner which explains why HP personnel may have discussed this event with the NRC in December 1987.
DOWNS discussed the impact of the GTRR staff reorganization in July 1987 and i
the apparent rationale for placing the ORS under the direction of the facility manager, an action which appeared to escalate personality conflicts and further alienated HP and Operations personnel.
He then commented regaroing the NRC inspections of December 1987, and January 1988, at the GTRR facility 6nd noted that violations were identified in the activities and projects with which he l
was involved.
1 DOWNS stated that KARAM's July 1987, memorandum regarding personal logs may have been misunderstood by HP personnel.
He said he does not believe personal logs were eliminated but that safety concerns should be addressed to KARAM in a memorancum rather than hidden in a logbook.
DOWNS was queried regarding his kncwledge of the form entitled " Georgia Tech Research Reactor Experimenter's Checklist and Schedule Form", a document which he stated he designed to identify parameters for the irradiation of a particular material.
He discussed the correct methods for compiling data and completing the required infonnation and said the form is suppcsea to docuret L__________CaseNo. 2-80-003 46
m........m-quality assurance according to technical specifications and the 10 CFR regulations. He acknowledged it is his responsibility as an operator to ensure that accurate and complete information is entered on the forms and admitted he may have been careless or may have made inadvertent mistakes in completing some portions of these records, however, he said he has never intentionally or i
deliberately recorded incorrect or inaccurate data on this or any other GTRR documents.
DOWNS acknowledged that required data is missing from the gemstone I '
l irradiation forms because he mistakenly failed to complete them properly.
DOWNS next responded to additional questions and statements regarding the interpersonal relationships between the HP and Operations groups.
He discussed the hostility between HP and Operations personnel and admitted to frequent and unpleasant confrontations with these individuals.
He characterized the actions of HP personnel as " police" oriented and advised they invited the wrath of other staff members by citing them for violations which do not impact upon radiological health and safety.
DOWNS discussed the incident in which he, while reportedly engaged in
" horseplay", struck the hot cell window with a wrench causing the glass to chip. He recalled that, in his opinion, the HP technician (SHARPE) who witnessed this incidant exploited it as an erroneous example of instability on the part of the operator. DOWNS clarified that SHARPE was acting properly.when he reported the incident of horseplay but he was not acting within the parameters of his duties when he characterized the operator as an unstable individual. He readily acknowledged that, in his opinion, an " atmosphere of mutual distrust" exists between HP and Operations personnel because of the frequency of incidents in which HP personnel exceed the threshold of their duties and responsibilities in reporting violations.
DOWNS commented regarding the resolution of concerns, issues, and apparent violations identified by HP personnel and stated KARAM "makes a serious effort... to find out what happened... and resolve the problem."
He recanted his opinion that KARAM has made serious efforts to resolve issues when he noted that "none of us did a good job" of resolving the Cd-115 contamination incident in a timely and precise manner.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: A lengthy technical discussion between KUZO and DOWNS occurred to clarify the delay by the licensee in resolving and documenting the Cd-115 incident. The significant aspects of this discussion have been set forth in the NRC Inspection Report Number 50-160/87-08.
The topic of harassment and intimidation of HP personnel was broached at various times during the interview of DOWNS.
Essentially, DOWHS completely denied that he knew personally of instances in which HP personnel were treated differently or were intentionally harassed and intimidated, notwithstanding the hostilities that have existed between the HP and Operations personnel.
Further, DOWNS stated he has never heard KARAM threaten to terminate HP personne1'for any reason, including the reporting of safety concerns to the NRC. With respect to personality and philosophical differences, DOWNS said he believes both HP and Operations personnel should share the blame but favored replacing current HP staff members with new employees.
Case No. 2-88-003 47
DOWNS, during his second interview, discussed aspects of his training and other self improvement activities in reference to his NRC operator's license.
In essence, he related that his training at the GTRR has been minimal and deficient because there is no fonnal, structured training requirement. He next responded to questions regarding NRC inspection activities at the GTRR facility during recent years and again agreed "there have been violations attributed to his activities." He recalled the circumstances of one specific incident during which he received a high dose rate and admitted he could have been more cautious while performing activities that resulted in this exposure. He also admitted other careless practices involving operating procedures, including the failure to isolate the reactor coolant sample line, but said he always attempts to abide by all requirements and regulations.
DOWNS discussed instances in which he believes HP personnel acted in a mischievous manner in an attempt to discredit a particular member of the Operations staff.
He clarified that he is unaware personally, of any destruc-tive acts or mischievous behavior involving radiological matters and said he had never known or suspected any HP employee of committing any destructive act relating to radiological health and safety.
00hhS, in response to additional questions by the investigator and inspector regarding violations for which he has been cited, recalled another incident involving an unplanned reactor power excursion in which he should have acted in a more responsible and attentive manner. He again acknowledged instances where he has mistakenly failed to complete experiment forms but related any record keeping discrepancies by him were due to carelessness and not deliberate, willful behavior. He admitted that he lacks the knowledge regarding specific 10 CFR and technical specifica-tions record keeping requirements.
DOWNS, in reviewing his inadvertent errors and mistakes, again commented regarding his participation in the August 1987, Cc-115 contamination incident and acknowledged he made a mistake in handling the sample container.
He stated he also failed to perform a survey of the work area following the opening of the container and admitted he did not observe sound HP practices during his entire involvement with the sample container.
DOWNS again discussed aspects of record keeping, including the gemstone irradiation experiment approval form, and acknowledged that the form did not reflect the actual scope of this particular activity.
He also admitted that the exposure period for the sample was incorrect by approximately 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> because he inadvertently failed to maintain accurate records and update the time properly.
He clarified that KARAM and McDOWELL depended upon him (D0hhS) to maintain proper records so that they could concentrate on the irradiation schedule.
He estimated that the experiment approval form for the gemstone irradiation experiment contained at least 15 examples of missing or incomplete information and data.
00'nNS was again queried 'by KUZ0 regarding his activities relating to the decontamination and clean-up following the Cd-115 incident.
Essentially, his responses were the same as previously recorded and in a number or instances he j
stated he was unable to recall pertinent facts about this incident.
During the remaining portion of the interview DOWNS was askea to coment regarding, (1) specific violations for which he had been previously cited; (2) errors in judgment he had apparently made at different times while performing operator duties; (3) apparent acts of carelessness, unprofessional conduct, and inattentiveness to his duties and responsibilities; and, (4) his alleged I
training and professional deficiencies.
DOWNS acknowledged some mistakes a d Case No. 2-8E 003 48
errors in judgment and some instances of carelessness and delayed responses to particular situations as well as potential deficiencies in various aspects of.
the operator training program. He denied that he has ever willfully or I
intentionally violated or circumvented procedures, requirements, or l
regulations.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
During KARAM's interview he was queried extensively regarding any proposed or planned remedial actions regarding DOWNS to correct apparent deficiencies. in the manner he allegedly perfoms his J
duties and responsibilities.
KARAM advised that he had counselled DOWNS j
repeatedly and had considered removing him from license duties and assign-j ing him to a " paperwork" situation.
DOWNS denied that he was " repeatedly counselled" and said he was unaware of any proposal or plan to remove him from license duties because of deficiencies in the perfomance of his duties.
COX (Exhibit 51) related employment and biographical data and comented regarding the historical aspects of the current disharmony and animosities and the personal, professional and philosophical conflicts, and the confrontational incidents between HP and Operations personnel at the GTRR facility. He cited work related events during which an uncooperative attitude was displayed by HP personnel and he noted he has the perception the HP technicians are "spys" rather than allies in a common effort to protect against the hazards of radiation. He related that the staff reorganization in July 1987 apparently caused the HP personnel to further disrespect management (KARAM) and Operations staff members.
COX, who is an NRC license trainee, related he was not involved with any aspect of the Cd-115 incident and claimed no direct knowledge of this matter.
In response to questions by KUZO, he recalled that he dro"e DOWNS home following the discovery of the incident and that DOWNS carried a GM meter with him on this occasion.
He continued to discuss this particular aspect of the Cd-115
(
event but categorically denied that he, KARAM, and McDOWELL had in any way attempted to persuade DOWNS to alter testimony regarding this matter.
4 COX noted that the manner in which the cd-115 incident was resolved by KARAM i
served to worsen relationships between the HP and Operations staff members.
He advised that, in his opinion, HP personnel maintained hope that the reorganiza-tion would be rescinded so they could " control the director of the (GTRR) facility." He further stated that the HP employees " definitely don't like Dr. Karam" and they do not acknowledge or admit their problems and deficiencies i
when they are identified. COX continued to concent negatively regarding current HP staff members, except for SHARPE whom he praised for his profession-alism and his ability to cooperate with Operations personnel. He related that KARAM has discussed the possibility of teminating the HP employees which has further created a chilling relationship between him and these staff members.
C0X was queried extensively regarding the other investigative issues set forth in the report of investigation.
He denied that he is aware of any instance in which the reactor has operated without a licensed individual in the control room.
He denied knowledge of record improprieties or any efforts by the licensee to conceal evidence of violations from the NRC.
In conclusion, C0X Case No. 2-88-003 49
.o..
- -- ------------ -- - ------------------ q related he is unaware of any technical specification, regulatory, procedure, or license condition violation at the GTRR facility during his tenure.
MERCER (Exhibit 52) commented regarding his perceptions and observations regarding adverse interpersonal relationships and disharmony between the HP t
i group and Operations personnel.
He noted specific examples of personality and professional differences between the two groups and said he heard a rumor three days prior to the dismissal of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE that action would be taken to " rectify" the GTRR staff disharmony and turmoil.
MERCER advised that KARAM has attempted to be conciliatory towards HP personnel, notwithstanding the fact they have opposed the reality that he is the supervisor and manager of their l
activities. He said the staff reorganization of July 1967, intensified the.
adverse relationships and the HP personnel have acted more belligerent and hostile since that time. He said, in his opinion HP personnel "would like to be able to control the whole facility" and " dictate" the daily activities of all personnel. He stated further that to disagree with BOYD's recommendations was, in his (BOYD's) mind, to oppose health and safety and create adversity.
MERCER recalled incidents and situations while interfacing with HP personnel during which he experienced antagonism, harassment, and dishannony' induced by members of the HP staff.
He further stated he is not aware of any instances in which HP employees have been prohibited from discussing their health and safety concerns with anyone, including the NRC. He also said he is unaware of any~
concerns by HP personnel which have not been properly addressed by KARAM if these concerns were resorted directly to him.
MERCER expressed the opinion that HP personnel may lave been more concerned with tarnishing the image and reputation of Operations personnel, including KARAM, than they are with report-ing legitimate health and safety concerns.
He readily acknowledged that his impressions and opinions of HP personnel were subjective and biased, based upon the long history of disputes between the two groups.
He also stated that if he was forced to side with either group he would support KARAM and the Operations staff.
Throughout the interview MERCER was queried regarding other issues of this investigation.
He steadfastly denied that he is aware of any incidents or violations at the GTRR facility which have not been appropriately adoressed.
Further, he claimed no knowledge of records improprieties and although he had heard of the allegation that the reactor was pennitted to operate without a licensed official in the control room he stated unequivocally that this did not occur to his best recollection.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: The reporting investigator was impressed with the candidness of MERCER, even to the extent that he acknowledged at the beginning of the interview he could not be objective and unbiased in his discussions of HP personnel.
The reporting investigator is of the opinion MERCER is sincere in his testimony that he is unaware of any violations, improprieties, or discrepancies relating to the other issues of this investigation.
TAYLOR (Exhibit 53) related biographical and en'ployment data before discussing his perceptions and impressions of the strife and tunnoil involving hP and Operations personnel. He recalled that he was employed as an HP technician prior to assuming the position of manager of the hot cell.
Case No. 2-S8-003 50 j
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: TAYLOR was reassigned to the ORS following the dismissal cf MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
As of late April 1988, he was still.
employed as an HP technician at the GTRR facility.
l l
TAYLOR described the adverse relationships between the HP snd Operations l
personnel which differed little from the information provided by the other interviewees in this section of the report.
He characterized the actions of the HP personnel as " snitching" rather than reporting legitimate safety concerns. He recalled specific instances during recent years in which personality and professional conflicts between HP and Operations employees occurred. He stated that, in his opinion, HP personnel were the cause of conflicts because of their arrogance, assertiveness, uncooperative manner, and negative attitude towards Operations employees.
TAYLOR was especially critical l
of MILLSPAUGH's lack of professionalism and his negative attitude towards his duties and responsibilities.
TAYLOR was questioned regarding his knowledge of harassment and intimidation of HP personnel by KARAM, including threats to terminate these individuals for discussing health and safety concerns with NRC officials. He stated he has no knowledge of this activity by KARAM and said he is unaware of any instances in which HP personnel have been harassed for reporting health and safety concerns.
TAYLOR continued to comment regarding his impressions of the personnel situation at the GTRR facility but denied any knowledge of improprieties by KARAM regarding this matter. He further denied any knowledge of willful, deliberate violations of requirements, procedures, or license conditions at the GTRR facility.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: Although each of these interviewees apparently desired to be candid it was readily discernable that they were hostile towards members of the HP staff and they quickly asserted their allegiance to KARAM and his staff. The division between the HP and Operations personnel appears to be complete and final and interpersonal relationships are apparently irreversible and irreparable.
It appears the attitude of the Operations employees towards the HP personnel is that they (HP) deserve whatever actions are taken against them, including termination.
It was noted that none of the Operations / Support personnel apparently feared losing their employment for discussing issues with the NRC whereas the HP personnel expressed a fear of reprisal by KARAM when they discussed apparent health and safety concerns with inspectors or other NRC officials.
AYC0CK and RODGERS (Exhibit 54) were interviewed together regarding the purpose of the investigation. Both interviewees, who are administrative employees in KARAM's office at the GTRR facility, provided requested biographical and employment data. AYC0CK advised she previously worked for BOYD in the ORS but was reassigned to KARAM's staff on July 1,1987, when the perscnnel reorgani-nation plan was implemented.
She acknowledged that she is aware of the intense personality and professional conflicts between HP and Operations staff members.
She noted she has witnessed acts of extreme hostility and numerous confronta-tions between members of both groups. AYC0CK characterized BOYD as a " weak manager" and KARAM as a conciliatory individual who failed to resolve the personnel disputes between the two factions.
Both interviewees were reluctant to discuss specific aspects of these personnel issues and said they did not want to jeepardize their employment by favoring one group or the other.
They Case flo. 2-88-003 51
e ~
..c were also hesitant to provide any information regarding the dismissals of
(
MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE and related only it (their dismissals) may have been performance related. They said they did not believe MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE were dismissed for reporting health and safety concerns to the NRC.
(
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: During this interview session, both AYC0CK and j
RODGERS appeared nervous and extremely hesitant to answer any questions.
(
It appeared they both defended KARAM and AYC0CK was not complimentary of BOYD for whom she had worked for 11 years.
Interviewtof Theragenics Corporation Officials Theragenics Corporation officials were interviewed to obtain information pertinent to the investigation.
This corporation, which is located in the GTRR facility building on the campus of Georgia Tech, is a research and development company concerned with the use of selected radioactive materials for medical purposes. The following personnel were interviewed:
John L. CARDEN, Jr., Ph.D. Physical Chemistry, Vice-President John P. HERNDON, Chief Operating Officer, Executive Vice-President CARDEN and HERNDON (Exhibit 55) were interviewed together, at their request, regarding the purpose of the investigation.
CARDEN, who was the spokesman since he had been employed with Theragenics at the GTRR facility for three years, described the work relationship between his company and the HP and Operations groups of the licensee.
Esser.tially, he reported a cooperative attitude and congenial work relations with all GTRR personnel and claimed no knowledge of the personality, professional, and philosophical disagreements between HP and Operations employees.
CARDEN related, with respect to the personnel problems and professional disputes reported by the news media, he was
" surprised by the whole thing as it evolved." He further stated he is unaware of any harassment or intimidation of HP personnel by KARAM but added his association with him is primarily one of a host / tenant relationship.
CARDEN did relate that BOYD had expressed some dissatisfaction regarding the July 1987, staff reorganization but his remarks concerning this event appeared to be rational and appropriate. He sunnarized that in retrospect the reorganization of the GTRR staff was apparently a "very significant event" in the relation-ships between the HP and Operations groups.
Interviews of NSC Members During the investigation some current members of the Georgia Tech NSC were interviewed. This committee, composed mainly of professional faculty members, assumed the duties and responsibilities of both the RPC and the old NSC which were in existence prior to the July 1,1987, staff reorganizat' ion at the GTRR l
facility. The following Georgia Tech faculty members who serve on the NSC, with title / position indicated, were interviewed regarding the purpose of the investigation:
Dr. Bernd KAHN, Professor, Nuclear Engineering; Chairman, NSC and RSO Dr. Prateen V. DESAI, Associate Professor, Mechanical Engineering Dr. Henry M. NEUMANN, Professor, School of Chemistry.
Dr. James A. MAHAFFEY, Senior Research Scientist, Electronics and Computer Systems Laboratory Case No. 2-88-003 52
a.
... v.v a
KAHN (Exhibit 56) recalled that KARAM provided him a "brief chronological description of the incident" (Cd-115 contamination event) on August 24, 1987,'
from which he (KAHN) concluded there was no apparent hazard and minimal radiation exposure. He stated that he heard no more about the Cd-115 contamination incident until the middle of November 1987 when, during a radiation protection class he was teaching, his student (CAMERON) indicated a different scenario for the event than the one provided by KARAM.
He said he queried CAMERON after the class and learned additional facts regarding the incident which caused him to contact BOYD and SELMAN.
He acknowledged that KARAM did not inform him an HP technician had discovered the Cd-115 spill, a fact he learned from discussing the incident with CAMERON in November 1987 and later in discussions with 80YD and SELMAN. He stated his main concern was learning about "all sorts of things after the fact," meaning evidence apparently of widespread contamination.
KAHN said, "to find out something detectivework(bytheHPtechnician))issortofadisarrayingcircumstance."
hadn't been reported (by the operator but had been discovered by some He advised that, in his opinion, inadequate procedures at the time of the incident permitted circumstances which resulted in the accident, however, these procedures have since been revised.
He advised that the NSC has subsequently urged KARAM to complete the report of the cd-115 contamination incident "at the earliest opportunity" but since the comittee does not have operational responsibility for him they can only make requests and not direct specific actions.
KAHN related his knowledge of the gemstone irradiation experiment performed by KARAM from which resulted the contamination incident. He noted that the approval form for this experiment is inappropriate and that technically the NSC should have reviewed and approved this activity before it was accomplished since it appears to be a major experiment. He stated some of the data on the approval from is incorrect but he attributed this to " inattention rather than deception." He advised that KARAM admitted to comittee members that inadver-tent mistakes and errors in the irradiation procedures were comitted and limits were unintentionally exceeded.
KAHN specifically stated that the entry
" nil" for activity is incorrect since there was significant radioactivity i
present in this particular instance.
He reiterated his belief that the l
" Experiment Approval Fonn", although incomplete and incorrect, is the product of inattention and carelessness rather than a deliberate attempt to circumvent requirements or to conceal factual information.
KAHN was questioned regarding his knowledge of specific 6spects of the clean-up and decontamination activities following the Cd-115 incident. He agreed that there are apparent errors, mistakes, and inaccurate data associated with these activities but steadfastly maintained he believes they were caused by incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness rather than malicious behavior by any GTRR employee.
KAHN related that because of the circumstances of the Cd-115 incident and subsequent follow-up review activities by the GTRR staff the NSC recomended that the approval of all experiments be terminated and re-evaluated on an individual basis. He expressed his dissatisfaction regarding the delay by KARAM and his staff in resolving and documenting the Cd-115 contamination incident. He also stated the NSC is concerned about the history of turmoil and disharmony between members of the GTRR staff and that the comittee, in an Case No. 2-88-003 53
a effort to detennine the causes of these problems, recomended all the employees be interviewed by a professional psychologist (the O' BANNON Report).
In j
discussing the involuntary terminations of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, it was noted by KAHN that "the management stance" (by KARAM and STELSON) is that the HP program is being upgr W with " highly professional" personnel and because the 1
NRC "gave the lowest kind of ratings" to the HP employees at the GTRR facility there was no choice but to dismiss them.
KAHN acknowledged that problems and deficiencies involving Operations personnel at the GTRR facility were apparently not addressed by management, notwithstanding the fact that numerous violations cited by the NRC are directly attributable to DOWNS.
He stated j
that, in his opinion, the HP staff (BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE) have demonstrated competence and are regarded by him as responsible, reliable, and trustworthy individuals.
KAHN advised that he believes MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE were dismissed for personality conflicts rather than for unsatisfactory employment and said that BOYD's proposed reassignment would be for the same reason, an action that would be "very unfair".
KAHN agreed that KARAM and MacDONALD had been "one-sided" with the NSC, explaining they had dwelled on HP problems and had failed to discuss Operations issues which had been identified by the NRC.
DESAI (Exhibit 57) explained his association with the GTRR facility and the NSC.
He advised he serves as the recorder for NSC meetings and prepes the meeting minutes in the prescribed fonnat for presentation to the members.
In discussing his awareness and knowledge of the August 1987 Cd-115 contamination incident, DESAI noted that he had not been informed of this event, except through news media sources, until the February 1988, meeting of the NSC.
DESAI recalled he was informed that the incident was insignificant and that management (KARAM) did not want to trouble NSC members over such a trivial matter. He advised that, in his opinion, the NSC should have been informed imediately of the incident, however, he stated he believes poor judgment rather than an attempt to conceal infonnation is the reason for KARAM's failure to notify the comittee members.
DESAI recalled the February 4,1988, NSC meeting, and said members discussed the responsibilities of the operator (DOWNS) relative to all aspects of the Cd-115 event and concluded that improper actions by this individual ultimately caused the contamination incident.
He indicated that inattention to experiment conditions by DOWNS during the actual irradiation process and carelessness following this activity are the most apparent reasons for the event.
DESAI related, in response to questions regarding the extent of his knowledge of the Cd-115 incident, that KARAM may not have provided all of the details of this event to him and members of the NSC but advised he did not view this as a deliberate, intentional act. He agreed that the form used to document the experiment tenns and conditions may contain inaccurate or incomplete informa-tion but again attributed this to carelessness by the operator rather than an intentional, deliberate, deceptive act.
In conclusion DESA! advised he was not personally aware of the personnel conflicts at the GTRR facility although he has heard " casual remarks" about such problems.
NEUMANN (Exhibit 58) also related his affiliation with the GTRR facility and the NSC.
NEUMANN recalled he has served on numerous radiological safety consnittees since 1958 and advised he is currently acquainted with the hP personnel at the GTRR facility, including BOYD, students and part-time Case No. 2-88-003 54
technician SELMAN and CAMERON and recently separated employees MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
He advised he has heard "second hand" that there "was some kind of difficulties between some of the HP people and operators" but was unable to provide details of this situation.
NEUMANN commented about the reorganization of the GTRR staff in July 1987, and recalled his first knowledge of this action was in the late Spring of 1987 from the articles in the Georgia Tech campus newspaper. ' He related that he also became aware that Georgia Tech professors CARTER, KAHN, and MAHAFFEY and other members of the NSC opposed the arrangement of having the manager of the ORS supervised by the director of the GTRR facility, a situation he also did not favor. NEUMANN continued to discuss his knowledge of the historical aspects of the staff reorganization implemented in July 1987 and the GTRR personnel divisiveness associated with this event. He noted that BOYD was no longer oesignated the RSO after the staff reorganization was implemented, an action j
that most regard as a demotion.
NEUMANN advised he was not privileged to attend any discussion regarding the reorganization and does not know why B0YD was removed as the RSO.
i NEUMANN, in responding to guestions regarding the August 1987, Cd-115 contamination events, related L.e and the NSC, with the exception of the Chairman, were not officially Informed about this matter until February 1988.
He said he also doubts that KARAM was totally candid and detailed with the connittee about the incident, explaining that the most appalling aspect of "that whole affair" is the manner in which "they put together... the sample."
He said the principal investigator of the experiment (KARAM) erred technically when the necessary analysis and assessments were not perfonned on the cd-115 container used to package the gemstone that was being irradiated.
NEUMANN related that if the experiment proposal had been presented to the NSC, metallurgical inquiries regarding the cd-115 material would have been raised which may have prevented the contamination incident.
He sunnarized that KARAM, as principal investigator, was remiss by his apparent failure to adequately consider all aspects of this gemstone irradiation experiment.
He further stated that DOWNS exercised poor judgment when he opened the container of irradiated gemstones before the radioactivity of the materials had decayed to safer levels.
NEUMANN discussed his responsibilities with the NSC and expla'ined that he had' been assigned to audit the GTRR facility HP program in October 1987.
He recalled that 6 ring his contacts with HP personnel he strongly sensed discontentment regarding the July 1987, staff reorganization and said "it was clear... Paul Sharpe and other people in Health Physics were expecting to be fired." He related that, in a meeting with STELSON and other committee members he got the impression that someone (from the GTRR staff) had "gone to the NRC" (to report perceived health and safety concerns) and the fears by HP personnel of being terminated "seem to be related to that in a general way."
He noted that the tennination of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE are fulfilling prophecies but was unable to provide any specific infonnation regarding alleged harassment and intimidation uf HP personnel for reporting safety concerns to the NRC.
He advised that the official reason given by STELSON and KARAM for terminating MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE is to upgrade the HP program but said he believes that because of their knowledge and experience they were able to perform HP duties in a responsible and competent manner.
Case No. 2-88-003 55
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1 4
l In conclusion, NEUMANN referenced a 1973 letter authored by him which contains i
1 his opinion that the HP program must have the independence to terminate activities which are deemed to pose an adverse health and safety condition. He advised the current staff structure at the GTRR does not necessarily permit this degree of independence for the personnel who are responsible for deciding and enforcing this particular course of action.
MAHAFFEY (Exhibit 59) related he was formerly a member of the now defunct Georgia Tech RSC, the chairman of the old NSC, and has served on the reconsti-tuted NSC since July 1, 1987.
He explained the duties and responsibilities of NSC members and their interface with the GTRR facility. MAHAFFEY was queried regarding his knowledge of the August 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident with respect to deceptive activities and practices by any GTRR employee and related that, in his opinion, the NSC should have been imediately notified of this matter. He advised that the comittee members "all read about it in the i
newspaper before we ever met on it."
He stated the NSC did not meet to discuss j
the event until early 1988, althougn he was personally informed of this matter l
by BOYD or MILLSPAUGH prior to the NSC meeting. MAHAFFEY, said "it was definitely a mistake not to bring it (the Cd-115 incident) up (to the NSC) when it happened." He noted that although the NSC was eventually informed of the incident it "was worse than we had originally thought" from the standpoint that it was an unscheduled experiment which had not been properly researched for the j
conditions involved. MAHAFFEY advised that the gemstone irradiation project had been in progress "on and off-for a couple of years" and "it wasn't necessarily basic research but it was a money-making thing." He related the individuals responsible for the experiment (KARAM) apparently failed to consider or calculate the effects that a high power experiment would have on k
the Cd-115 container.
l MAHAFFEY reviewed the " Request for Minor Experiment Approval" fcrm dated April 3,1987, and comented concerning the data contained thereon. He offered that the entry " nil" in the " activity" column indicated the experimenter "didn't think it was important enough to make a prediction of how much activity j
would be created during the irradiation process." He advised that, in his opinion, the failure to make this entry represents inattentiveness and complacency but not an attempt to deliberately deceive or intentionally record inaccurate data. MAHAFFEY said he believes, from infonnation provided to the NSC, that the Cd-115 incident occurred because DOWNS "on his own decided to do a second experiment (on the same sample) where he runs the thing up to power 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />." He said the first experiment for low power was approved but the second experiment at full power may not have been properly authorized by the NSC. He stated further that the cannister was soldered with a resinous lead / tin material and the approval form does not list any of these elements under the isotopes column. Moreover, he advised that materials should never be
{
irradiated without knowing their exact composition, an act that apparently occurred during the gemstone experiment.
MAHAFFEY also stated that the gemstone irradiation experiment request form does not accurately reflect the conditions and circumstances of the total exposure history for the materials involved and it appears that both low and high power experiments have been combined under one form.
He expressed the opinion that McDOWELL does not have the " education and credentials" to design the experiment; that DOWNS "did not do what he was supposed to do" and KARAM "let the whole thing go."
He offered that the GTRR is an expensive and complicated facility that is being operated with a skeleton crew and is "being kept alive on a respirator until somebW v thinks of a use for it."
Case No. 2-88-C03 56
MAHAFFEY offered that "the climate (personnel))has never been particularly good" and that the " problem (personal disputes was larger than I had realized." He noted that Hp and Operations employees have allied against each other; that both groups are distrustful of the other and they have accused each other of trying to " shut the other down." He related KARAM has agonized over the disharmony since he has been the director and said he suggested to KARAM in the spring of 1987 that he " fire the whole lot of them and just repopulate the reactor." He said KARAM discussed the staff reorganization and its advantages but confided he (KARAM) " felt he was at hostage by HP's" since they "could shut him down simply by not showing up if he was doing an experiment." He advised that KARAM reorganized the staff in an effort to end personnel conflicts and dishannony which had reached the stage where, if it continued, it would be potentially unsafe to operate the facility.
MAHAFFEY was queried regarding the allegation that the GTRR facility had operated without a licensed employee in the control room.
He noted that he hao heard this rumor in early 1987 but said he did not have any evidence that this action had occurred as alleged. He stated he contacted two employees who reportedly knew about this incident (SELMAN and former GTRR Director Monty DAVIS) and neither was able to confirm the allegation. MAHAFFEY was also questioned concerning a 1984 incident at the GTRR facility during which McDOWELL and/or DOWNS reportedly manipulated safety equipment to bypass technical specification requirements while venting Argon 41 gas to the i
atmosphere. He recalled that the issue was rather complex and one which he personally investigated and documented in a May 3, 1984, report to the NSC.
He advised that, after his investigation was concluded, McDOWELL and/or DOWNS had
" discussed a loophole in the tech specs that allowed them to disable the building isolation." Further, MAHAFFEY said he is of the personal opinion these two operators " violated the spirit of the tech spec" even though they may not have violated any specific procedure, regulation, or record keeping requirement.
He stated he believes that the two operators did in fact deactivate the primary instrumentation and they disabled or " ranged" the secondary or backup containment isolation system but he was unable to prove his I'
belief and both McDOWELL and DOWNS subsequently denied any improprieties regarding this matter.
MAHAFFEY connented regarding the incident in which DOWNS struck the hot cell window with a wrench and chipped the glass.
He advised that this particular act by DOWNS "may possibly be the most serious thing that has ever gone on down there" (the GTRR facility).
In response to questions regarding record improprieties at the GTRR facility, MAHAFFEY related he knew of no wrongdoing l
regarding the preparation, maintenance, storage, and retention of records, files, and documentation associated with its activities.
MAHAFFEY volunteered his opinions regarding the qualifications of COWNS as an NRC licensed operator at the GTRR facility.
He characterized him as a "goci ball" and further doubted his stability, reliability, and competence. MAHAFFEY continued that "he [ DOWNS] has an erratic personality, he ir.ay be mechanically inept and he just may not be reactor operator material" and, "if it was my reactor, I wouldn't let him in the doors." He remarked that "a trouble is that they have two reactor operators down there, they can't have one reactor operator, they can't fire him, he's in the perfect job, he can't be fired, he Case No. 2-88-003 57
1 can't be let go," meaning essentially that KARAM protects DOWNS because he is l
needed as an operator so the facility can comply with their license and technical specification requirements.
1 INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: A persistent complaint of HP personnel, as documented in other sections of the report of investigation, has been that DOWNS appears to be immune from any disciplinary action by KARAM because DOWNS is the second license required to keep the GTRR facility opera-tional.
Further, the HP employees perceive that KARAM is condoning or ignoring the mistakes and errors by DOWNS for the sake of being able to I
continue operations. Also, because of KARAM's attitude towards DOWNS, HP personnel have formed the opinion KARAM is more concerned about operations than he is about the health and safety issues which have occurred at the facility. MAHAFFEY essentially confirmed that the perception by HP personnel regarding KARAM's relationship with DOWNS is an accurate one.
Interview of Melvin W. CARTER, Professor, Nuclear Engineering Carter (Exhibit 60), a Neely Professor in the School of Nuclear Engineering and Health Physics, was interviewed in his office on March 2,1988. After relating his extensive academic and professional credentials in the environmental sciences and health physics disciplines, he outlined his experiences since joining the Georgia Tech faculty on an academic and research appointment in August 1972.
He recalled that in May 1976 he was first appointed by the President of Georgia Tech to. the RPC and served as Chairman of that committee from July 1976 until his voluntary resignation in June 1987.
CARTER advised that he resigned from the RPC in protest of the proposed July 1,1967, staff reorganization at the GTRR facility because he believes the HP function should be separated from the supervision of the director who is also a licensed user of radioactive materials.
l i
CARTER recalled an occasion in February 1907, when he was first informed by l
KARAM that he was proposing the GTRR staff reorganization.
He advised that he f
was opposed to this action and expressed his personal and professional opinion that the ORS should remain independent of the director of the facility.
l Essentially, he related that the RPC first considered the staff reorganization on February 19, 1987, and all of the members present were opposed to the plan proposed by KARAM a,nd approved by STELSON. He said he, MAHAFFEY, and KAHN also met with STELSON on February 23, 1987, and openly opposed the plan whereupon STELSON told them that no decision (on the reorganization) had been made, l
however, he (CARTER) stated he "came away from that meeting with the impression that his (STELSON) mind had been made up" and they were going to reorganize exactly the way it had been proposed by KARAM (in his January 26, 1987, letter l
to STELSON).
He recalled he wrote a letter on March 27, 1987, to Acting i
President BOURNE in which he clearly stated his belief regarding the
" separation of the operation... and health and safety" responsibilities. He stated he was invited to meet with BOURNE on March 26, 1987, however, B0VRNE's Administrative Assistant (AA). met instead with him regarding the contents of.
his letter.
He indicated that the topic of the discussion was shifted by the Acting President's AA and "his primary concern, as I remember it, seemed to be the issue of who blew the whistle, who reported something to the NRC."
Case No. 2-88-003 58
[.
1 s
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: At the time of CARTER's meeting with the AA, the l
NRC, Region II staff had just completed two separate inspections at the -
GTRR during which numerous violations were noted.
Inspection Report Numbers 50-160/87-01 and 50-160/87-02 record the results of these two q
inspection activities.
q CARTER clarified it is his view, that roughly since the NRC inspections in early 1987, certain officials (at the GTRR facility and at Georgia Tech) have been more interested in attempting to identify an alleger than they have been-in addressing health and safety concerns that have been raised. He labelled this type of actively as "a crisis problem in management of a program." He stated he recognized that the staff reorganization was inevitable and " faced with what I considered a fait accompli" he submitted his resignation as Chairman of the RPC in a letter to BOURNE which was accepted in a return letter of June 9, 1987.
He related limited personal contact with the GTRR facility since his resignation from the RPC but said he has maintained his association with the HP staff there.
Queried regarding the professional character and qualifications of BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE, he expressed the opinion they were all completely competent, reliable, and responsible individuals and BOYD "was admirably suited" to perform radiological protection outies. CARTER advised that, from the first time he learned of the reorganization until several weeks prior to his interview, in all his discussions regarding this topic no one has suggested that there was a need or requirement to upgrade the HP program. He indicated that it is his opinion this particular reason (upgrading the HP program) for terminating MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE is a ruse to illegally dismiss them from the GTRR facility.
CARTER said KARAM also discussed with him in February 1987, his intentions of promoting BOYD to the Associate or Deputy Director of the GTRR facility, however, in July 1987, he (KARAM) demoted BOYD from his RSO position l
to that of Manager of the ORS.
He said this action by KARAM appears to be inconsistent with his earlier proposal since on the one hand BOYD is considered l
qualified to become the Associate or Deputy and on the other hand he is deemed I
not qualified to serve as the RSO.
CARTER also suggested that the individuals who have presently replaced MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE do not possess higher academic credentials or any additional HP knowledge or experience and this also appears to be inconsistent with the KARAM/STELSON objective of " upgrading the HP program."
CARTER provided the details of an incident involving the encapsulation of i
leaking Co-60 material in the GTRR facility hot cell which demonstrated problems he and the RPC had in dealing with KARAM. Essentially, he related KARAM and his Operations staff failed to complete the encapsulation program as l
agreed because when encapsulation was to occur, the hot cell was being utilized for revenue producing activities.
CARTER advised that KARAM was delaying encapsulation, an " extremely important" activity, to produce revenue which was
{
perceived by the HP personnel as a lack of comitment to a strong health and I
safety program.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
This particular incident was apparently the basis for statements by HP personnel that KARAM is more interested in revenue producing activities than he is in health and safety matters.
Case No. 2-88-003 59
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I e
CARTER, in a lengthy statement, described a telephone conversation and separate meeting with CRECINE in late February 1988 to discuss the current staff organization at the GTRR facility and the personality and professional disharmony involving the HP and Operations employees.
He related he informed CRECINE of the inherent problems associated with the arrangement in which the HP employees are managed and supervised by the director of the facility.
He said he also infonned CRECINE that the issues of the GTpR facility are " manage-ment problems" and " radiation protection problems." He recalled that on the occasion of the personal meeting with CRECINE relations became strained when it appeared that CRECINE was implying he (CARTER) had infonned the NRC of the recent problems at the GTRR facility.
CARTER intimated that he and CRECINE differ completely regarding the GTRR staff organization and the HP program and said CRECINE expressed his " disdain for whistleblowers" during the personal meeting.
CARTER concluded that, in his opinion, KARAM has ignored or failed to act in a positive manner regarding health and safety issues reported to him by HP i
1 employees. He was unable to identify specific instances of KARAM's alleged malfeasance but said he regarded his conduct and attitude as harassment and intimidation of these individuals.
He also stated that he believes ShARPE was genuinely fearful of being involuntarily dismissed from the GTRR facility for l
exercising his right to report health and safety concerns to the NRC, pursus.nt to 10 CFR Part 19.
He said that, in his opinion, the GTRR facility is controlled by the group that has the most members and " loudest talkers" and that MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE have been involuntarily " thrown overboard" to lighten the ship.
Interview of Dr. Thomas F. CRAFT, Retired Nuclear Engineer CRAFT (Exhibit 61), was interviewed on February 25, 1988, at the 01:RII office and provided information which is deemed pertinent to this investigation.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
CRAFT telephonically contacted the reporting investigator on February 16, 1988, and stated as a result of recent news media accounts of apparent personnel and health and safety problems at the GTRR facility he was personally aware of infonnation which wculd possibly be helpful in resolving these issues.
CRAFT related he is retired from the Georgia Tech faculty as a Senior Research Scientist and said he served the final three years of his career (1981-1984) at the GTRR facility where he was responsible for the operation of the hot cell.
He recalled his initial experiences with management and other employees at the GTRR facility prior to KARAM assuming the position of director.
He indicated KARAM became the director "by asking for it because nobody else wanted to be involved with it," and because "it [the facility] wasn't making enough money and it was a drag."
CRAFT recalled his work experiences with the HP group (BOYD and MILLSPAUGH) during his tenure as hot cell manager and provided a characterization of their demeanor, conduct, and professional qualifications on the job.
He related that Case No. 2-68-003 60
the HP personnel were aggravating and contemptuous but were reliable and appeared at the appointed time to monitor any experiment in progress.
He advised that the attitude of HP personnel during this entire period of time (1981-1984) reflected their independent and autarchic status relative to their association with the GTRR facility, a situation he found to be " personally very irritating." He stated that, in his opinion, BOYD was inflexible and assertive in the enforcement of procedures and regulations, whereas MILLSPAUGH was cooperative, competent, reasonable, and he exercised judgment in perfonning his duties and responsibilities.
CRAFT recalled that Operations personnel at the GTRR facility retaliated against the HP personnel by resorting to agitation and cunning activities. He said the attitude of the Operations employees towards the HP personnel was one of, "I dare you to catch me."
He recalled that "I certainly was agitated by them [ Operations] on a number of occasions."
CRAFT related that when KARAM first became associated with the facility "he was totally obsessed with money." He said KARAM's idea of balancing the budget was to decrease the number of staff members and not to increase the number of customers. CRAFT advised that, in his opinion, KARAM " sacrificed safety for the sake of saving money" and explained that he refused to purchase equipment and replace antiquated survey meters and other HP hardware.
CRAFT related his impressions and opinions of the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE from the GTRR facility, basing his remarks on his prior knowledge of and association with KARAM. He said "the idea of simply coincidentally firing people because you're upgrading.... is a disaster because nobody can believe that." He advised that, in his opinion, " President CRECINE must have been duped into making this contention because I don't believn he thinks for a minute that that's so."
CRAFT blamed "the personality of KARAM and his obsession with money" as the primary reason for the current state of affairs at the GTRR facility, meaning that KARAM desired to control the HP budget which he did not do prior to the staff reorganization. He advised he believes KARAM is "an inept manager" and said he is deceptive in his management practices.
He recalled an incident about the middle of 1984 in which KARAM breached the topic of abolishing the hot cell manager position.
He said KARAM subsequently i
presented him with a letter which involuntarily separated him but which was withdrawn because he (CRAFT) had already submitted his retirement letter to the President of Georgia Tech.
CRAFT advised'that the reason given to him for tenninating his services was also reorganization.
He related that he was moved from the GTRR facility about August 1984 to another building on the campus to wait for his retirement date which was the end of October 1984. CRAFT advised that KARAM then dispatched the Georgia Tech police to retrieve his (CRAFT) access card and keys, an action designed by KARAM to harass him because he refused to liquidate annual leave before he retired. He said he finally told KARAM he would not talk to him "unless there is a third person present because you're such a liar."
CRAFT related that he had also been told KARAM experienced some difficulty regarding discrimination against female employees while he was affiliated with the Argonne National Laboratory.
He related that harassment and intimidation are "well within his character " however, said KARAM is inclined to act favorably toward employees who have a subservient attitude rather than a dominant one.
i i
Case No. 2-88-003 61
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CRAFT concluded that blame for the current personnel conflicts and dishamony at the GTRR facility shculd be shared by both the HP and Operations groups, as well as KARAM himself. He intimated that the members of one group were equally as cbnoxious, arrogant, irritating, and aggravating at times as were the members of the other group. He reiterated that the reason given for the terminations of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE is, in his' opinion " completely deceptive" j
and stated "I believe that these people were terminated simply becauie they blew the whistle." He further stated that he was suspicious of DOWNS because of "some personal characteristics that I regard as unpleasant" and added if he (CRAFT) "was doing an activation analysis or something like that" he always felt more at ease "when Dean McDowell was running the reactor."
Interview of Georgia Tech Academic /Research Officials The following Georgia Tech academic officials, with titles / positions noted, who are directly afflicted with the GTRR facility were interviewed, under oath, regarding investigation issues:
Dr. Ratib A. KARAM, Director, Neely Nuclear Research Center Dr. Thomas E. STELSON, Vice-President for Research KARAM (Exhibit 62), was interviewed on February 19, 1988, at the 01:RII office.
After providing requested biographical and employment data, KARAF. discussed his i
tenure with the GTRR facility. He noted that his instructions, upon assuming the position of director of the GTRR fa::ility, were to attempt to revive it and to eventually operate it in a fiscally self-supporting manner.
He advised that he immediately recognized a personality and professional division in the relationships between HP and Operations employees which has persisted to the present time.
He stated that HP personnel, prior to July 1, 1987, did not report to him and could teminate any job (at the GTRR facility) for health and safety reasons but said he suspects that some of these HP individuals may have been motivated to act for other than health and safety concerns.
In discussing his suspicion that HP employees are possessed with ulterior motives, KARAM recalled a 1987 incident in which it was noted that level indicator alarm switches on the fuel pool and hot cell appeared to have been deliberately deactivated, thus rendering the radiation alarms useless.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: KARAM previously testified in U.S. District Court Atlanta, Georgia during a hearing on a motion to reinstate MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE that he suspected acts of " sabotage" at the GTRR facility.
His remarks were also quoted in a news article which appeared in an Atlanta, Georgia newspaper on February 18, 1988. According to KARAM, this incident involving the alann switches is the act to which he had reference when he comented about sabotage.
KARAM's notes concerning this incioent will be attached as an exhibit in a later section of the report.
KARAM comented at length regarding the long history of personal and professional confrontations between HP and Operations employees and cited numerous instances in the work environment from 1984 to the present time where antagonism, disharmony, hostility, and rancor prevailed between the two groups.
He said the total independence of the HP group and the fact they had been accountable only to the President of Georgia Tech was, in his opinion, the catalyst for tH e type of a relationship.
Essentially, KARAM blamed the hf Case No. 2-88-003 62
A group for personnel problems and attributed an early 1987 NRC inspection by B.K. REVSON as the single incident that " opened my eyes to the fact that our HP program is really not in very good shape." He said REVSON, then an NRC inspector, personally confided that " Bob Boyd is extremely stubborn, he does not listen,. and that "h a s trying to shut you down."
He said he came to the realization that he "needed to bring some measure of control over the two groups to make them work better" and to achieve a safe working environment, an objactive he reiterated as being foremost in his mind.
KARAM recalled that beginning about December 1986, to about June 1987, discussions were held with STELSON regarding the reorganization of the entire staff at the GTRR facility, an action he hoped would resolve bickering and improve interpersonal relationships. He related that in order to accomplish this objective he initially intended to designate BOYD a:; Associate Director of the GTRR facility and "have him really be in charge of the HP group."
KARAM also praised BOYD for his hard work, sincerity, gentlemanly nature, and dedica-tion but noted it appeared he was "being used by the people" that report to him (otherHPpersonnel). He related this observation was subsequently relayed to 1
KAHN who suggested a psychological profile for the entire GTRR staff which, according to KARAM, revealed that BOYD was a weak manager.
KARAM discussed various aspects of the staff reorganization, implemented on July 1,1987, denying that the HP group was adversely affected by this action i
and claiming that it "did indeed remove the bickering from the Center" and brought " cordiality among the two groups." He acknowledged that the status of BOYD was altered by the reorganization, including the loss of his title as the Georgia Tech RSO and direct access to his secretary who was reassigned to the Office of the Director.
He reiterated that the staff reorganization eliminated i
I open confrontations and controlled tempers but did not alter the recalcitrant attitude of the HP employees.
KARAM explained that the attitude of the HP l
personnel was demonstrated in a letter SELMAN wrote to the Georgia Tech newspaper criticizing the staff reorganization. He acknowledged he counselled SELMAN regarding her letter writing " campaign" but categorically denied he threatened, harassed, intimidated, or dic. criminated against her. He admitted that he "was given the clearance from STELSON to fire her." He stated he "did not threaten any of them [HP personnel] with job termination at any point in time" and acknowledged the right of all employees to discuss their health and safety concerns with the NRC.
KARAM was queried regarding the HP allegations, as revealed by the investiga-tion, that he did not adequately adoress and resolve health and safety issues l
and concerns which were reported to him by HP personnel and he did not follow the advice and recommendations of these individuals (hot cell and fuel pool paintingincidents).
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Both of these incidents are discussed in detail in the transcript of BOYD's interview.
KARAM related during lengthy discussions of these allegations that he could recall no instances in which he failed to address and resolve health and safety issues / concerns reported to him and that, to his knowledge, he has always supported recommendations of the HP personnel.
He categorically denied that he has sided with Operations personnel against the HP employees.
Case No. 2-88-003 63 2
KARAM was queried extensively regarding DOWNS' role in the aforementioned August 1987 Cd-115 contamination incident and admitted that "there's no doubt-about it that he screwed up", meaning his inattention and carelessness were factors which caused the event. He related he has counselled and reprimanded DOWNS "many times" for his deficiencies but said none of these sessions are documented.
He further af 4tted that he has "some concerns about his maturity" and that he has attempted i bring in more operators so I can ease him out of Operations into paperwork."
4ARAM reportedly failed to acknowledge inconsis-tent treatment between DOWNS, who was admittedly deficient and whom he wanted to " ease into paperwork," and MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE who were involuntarily terminated for alleged deficiencies.
During this particular segment of the interview KARAM noted that the NRC (KUZO), during January 1988 (inspection), " sensitized" him to the importance of identifying airborne contamination (regarding the cd-115 incident) because BOYD and KAHN both advised him it was a minor event.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
KARAM's testimony is inconsistent with that of both l
BOYD and KAHN.
First, BOYD recalls that he recommended immediate and comprehensive actions to identify the scope of the contamination problem.
Secondly, KAHN recalls that KARAM informed him of the incidert and, from the description provided by KARAM, said he believed at the time it was a minor event.
It was determined during the inspection and the investiga-tion that KARAM did not advise KAHN of all aspects of the incident imediately after it occurred; therefore, any advice about the incident given by KAHN was based upon information he had received free KARAM.
Following these specific comments regarding the August 1987 Cd-115 incident, KARAM discussed other aspects of the personality and professional problems between the HP and Operations personnel.
During this discussion he again repeatedly denied that he failed to address and resolve health ano safety concerns raised by any employees. He stated that both the HP and Operations personnel were guilty of mistakes but only the Operations employees demonstrated remorse and regret while pledging to cooperate with management.
KARAM explained that the temination of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE occurred as a result of an attempt to " upgrade the HP program" and that the first of several discussions with STELSON regarding their dismissal was held several weeks prior to his (KARAM) interview with 01.
He did acknowledge that MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE were teminated basically because they did not possess the proper attitude (penitent and cooperative) and because they believed they had him (VARAM) "over a barrel with a gun and they want to simply continue to do their own thing." He reiterated further if these two HP personnel had demonstrated J
cooperation with management and atonement for bickering and rebelliousness he would not have terminated their employment.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: KARAM's rationale regarding the dismissal of both MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE appeared to shift during this segment of the inter-view.
First he stated unequivocally that these two HP empicyees were terminated in an attempt to " upgrade the HP program." He next testitied that the attitudes of HP employees were such that they were uncooperative and that they did not express regret for mistakes. He then stated if MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE had indicated an attitude of cooperation and a contrite spirit and if they were "willing to listen and really serve safety rather than personal ambitions and agenda" he'would have retair.ed Case No. 2-88-003 E4
them on his steff. This appears to indicate that these two individuals were dismissed for a reason other than upgrading the HP program.
It also appears they were terminated because they did not assume a subservient and submissive attitude.
KARAM was queried extensively concerning a February 18, 1988, Atlanta Constitution newspaper article which apparently quotes him as stating "there are suspicious of sabotage" at the GTRR facility and that "KARAM declined to coment on the nature of the alleged incidents of sabotage." He clarified that these remarks were related in a closed hearing at the U.S. District Court on a motion to reinstate MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
He said these comments were made by the Board of Regents attorney, after he (KARAM) had previously discussed " game playing" around the GTRR facility.
KARAM recalled only two incidents with radiological health and safety implications and which may have involved intentional tampering by unknown individuals.
He related that his review cf these two incidents (needle stuck on hot cell indicator and level indicator switches found in "off" position) failed to disclose any evidence of willful or malicious destruction or vandalism and he was unable to identify individual (s) responsible for these acts. He also noted other acts of vandalism about August 1987 which were unrelat3d to radiological health and safety and said he was alsounsuccessfulinidentifyingtheperson(s)responsiblefortheseacts.
I KARAM categorically denied any other acts of vandalism / destruction relating to radiological safety and said these particular incidents are those referenced in the February 18, 1988, newspaper article.
He did report that the Industrial Psychologist (O' BANNON) who evaluated the GTRR employees confided that MILLSPAUGH was possibly the one " playing the tricks."
KARAM commented concerning a hot cell window incident during which DOWNS, in an apparent fit of horseplay, chipped the glass by striking it with a wrench.
He recalled that DOWNS regretted this incident and admitted " bad judgment on his part." He said he counselled DOWNS regarding this incident but did not discipline him further because he expressed remorse for his actions.
S February 1987, by an NRC, Region II Inspector (A.R. LONG}s with internal NR KARAM was next queried regarding the allegation that (1 he was observed in documents (NRC complaint forms) in his possession and, (2) an NRC, Region II l
employee was providing KARAM with information regarding allegers and l
allegations.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: Both of these matters were referred to the OIA, l
however, OI obtained permission from OIA to interview KARAM initially regarding these issues to determine whether there may have been a relationship between the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE and the two aforementioned allegations.
Further, the NRC complaint documents which KARAM allegedly possessed also contained an allegation that the GTRR i
facility has operated without a licensed operator in the control room, a matter 01 was requested to resolve during this investigation.
Essentially, KARAM' denied that he has ever possessed any NRC internal documents and further stated that although he is socially acquainted with several NRC employees, none have ever provided him with any documents or information regarding allegers or allegations.
He stated unequivocally that he has never known of a single incident in which the GTRR facility was operating at any power level without the required licensed personnel in the control rocm.
Case No. 2-88-003 65 j
At this juncture of the interview KARAM provided additional infomation regard-ing various aspects of the August 1987 Cd-115 incident. He explained the experiment approval process and the particular circumstances involving the l
completion of the gemstone irradiation experiment foms.
He related the definition of major and minor experiments and the criteria and parameters of each and said he regards the gemstone irradiation activities as a minor experi-ment.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Pertinent disclosures by KARAM regarding the technical aspects of the August 1987 Cd-115 incident are documented in the NRC, Region II Inspection Report flumber 50-160/87-08.
KUZO, the partic-ipating inspector,also obtained technical information concerning this incident during this discussion with KARAM.
KARAM acknowledged sartial data on the experiment fonns and documents and unintentional mista(es and omissions in the preparation of the experiment approval form.
He also admitted that a new form should have been prepared when the experiment was continued after the first irradiation (in April 1987).
KARAM advised DOWNS also used poor judgment by not obtaining guidance from him regarding the experiment and said simply that DOWNS " messed up."
- Further, while reviewing the documents associated with the gemstone irradiation experiment, KARAM advised that DOWNS failed to correctly complete many items of data on these forms and said he does not "believe that so many bad things could be inadvertent."
KARAM also admitted in sumary that D0WNS, as the operator, failed to observe a "comon sense" approach to the irradiation of the sample; he was apparently careless and inattentive to experiment parameters and conditions; he failed to follow procedures; he was apparently unconcerned about radiological hazards on this occasion; he exercised bad judgment throughout the experiment and he failed to record and document pertinent data and correct information regarding the experiment and as.sociated activities.
KARAM agreed further that " DOWNS has a pattern" of violations and that he also has a maturity problem.
He reiterated that he does not view mistakes and violations by DOWNS as contrived, willful and intentional behavior but as inadvertent acts.
He also advised that he does not consider the irradiation experiment records deficiencies and omissions to be willful, deliberate acts by DOWNS but the product of carelessness and inattention to detail.
KARAM, in discussing the functions of the NSC and agenda items discussed 4.t meetings by the members of this group, admitted that the GTRR facility personnel problems involving HP and Operations employees were never presentee to the comittee nor was the topic of " upgrading the HP program" ever discussed with this group. He related that he is responsible for not reporting the Cd-115 incident to the full NSC for approximately six months.
He repeatedly denied any improprieties or attempts to conceal infonnation concerning this event and steadfastly maintained that he is unaware of any intentional wrongdoing associated with the resolution of this matter. lie related that the GTRR investigation of the Cd-115 incident was delayed because, (1) of his perception that the incident was minor and, (2) to allow the sample to decay to a safe level for handling.
He admitted that it would have been prudent and wise to have prepared a preliminary repcrt followed by a supplemental report which contained all facts and conclusions not present in the initia' document.
Case No. 2-88-003 66
h 1
KUZO next queried KARAM regarding previous conflicting testimony of GTRR Operations personnel obtained during the inspection pertaining to specific I
aspects of the decontamination activities following the cd-115 event.
l INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: This portion of the interview primarily concerned the issue of whether DOWNS carried a GM meter home with him, following the discovery of the cd-115 contamination, to survey for possible radioactive material in his residence. This particular issue was also discussed by other witnesses and their account of it is summarized in earlier sections of the report of investigation.
KARAM acknowledged that DOWNS had in fact changed his testimony from that of stating he did not take a GM meter home with him to that of not remembering whether he took a GM meter home with him following the event.
He stated he does not know why D0WNS changed his position but categorically stated at no time did he attempt to persuade or influence him (DOWNS) concerning this matter.
He acknowledged that DOWNS may have intentionally misrepresented the truth about taking the GM meter home with him to reflect adversely on the HP personnel or to "get them in trouble" with management.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: The investigation failed to satisfactorily resolve whether DOWNS actually took a GM meter home with him and surveyed his residence. The testimony of McDOWELL, COX, and KARAM would indicate that he did carry a GM meter home with him following the discovery of the August 1987, Cd-115 contamination.
Even KARAM acknowledged that if DOWNS did in fact carry a GM meter home with him there is no evidence that he used it to identify potential contamination in his residence since his efforts were not documented.
KARAM sumarized unequivocally that he is personally unaware of any willful, intentional wrongdoing or improprieties regarding issues and concerns addrassed during the investigation.
Further, he categorically denied any attempts to conceal information or data from the NRC and stated in essence that he has r.ever willfully violated procedures, requirements, or regulations.
He emphatically denied that he has harassed or intimidated any employee at the GTRR facility for any reason, including HP personnel who may have reported health and safety concerns to the HRC. He restated he recognizes the right of any employee to report safety concerns to the NRC and said he has never attempted to interfere with this activity. He concluded his testimony with a long sumary of the rationale for his actions as they relate to the management of the GTRR facility. He again reiterated that if MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE had demonstrated remorse for misdeeds and had pledged a cooperative attitude towards management (KARAM) and had been "willing to listen and be criticized and learn from their mistakes" he would not have terminated them from their HP positions.
STELSON (Exhibits 63 and 64) was interviewed under oath, in his office, on February 25 and 26,1988.
Present at both interviews and representing STELSON was Alfred L. EVANS, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General State of Georgia, assigned to the Georgia Board of Regents.
STELSON furnished background, professional, and employment information prior to and after his service began at Georgia Tech in 1971. He discussed the organization of the 22 Georgia Tech Centers and noted that KARAM and the GTRR facility (Nuclear Research Center) report to him for administrative, academic, and operational matters.
He Case No. 2-88-003 67
z.
described his involvement in the affairs of the facility as minimal until i
approximately one year ago when he became "much more heavily involved" there.
STELSON stated that the issue which precipitated his frequent involvement with the affairs of the GTRR facility was the staff reorganization which placed all employees under KARAM for direction, supervision, and management. He discussed his philosophy for the reorganization and acknowledged that CARTER and others opposed placing "the reorganizational reporting line of the ORS... directly to l
-the Director of the Nuclear Research Center."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: The reporting investigator sensed that STELSON was very defensive regarding questions from the investigator about RPC/NSC objections to the staff reorganization.
He commented in a rather sarcastic and snide manner that CARTER had written a letter to the Georgia Tech newspaper about the reorganization and it " contained a number of factual errors" and then added "but that's not very surprising."
It appeared that from this point forward, throughout the remainder of his interviews, STEl. SON personally assailed the character and reputation of any individual (including the reporting investigator and participating inspector) who differed with his rationale, opinions, and conclusions regarding the July 1, 1987, staff reorganization or other matters at the facility.
STELSON also discussed the philosophy of consolidating the two radiation safety ecsanittees (NSC and RPC) which existed prior to the reorganization. He also comunented regarding a long range goal discussed by Georgia Tech officials two years earlier to increase the number of doctoral degrees awarded annually by the institution and related that this objective would also impact the Nuclear Engineering program and the GTRR facility.
He related that the then current HP staff (BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE) was " increasingly unable to participate in helping these students [ doctoral] plan safe program activities because they simply didn't understand what the students were trying to do and what... the safety ramifications were." He stated that "we consider it essential that the director of the ORS have doctoral training" and that this individual "has to be able to understand research implications."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: At the present time and after the reassignment of BOYD, Michael J. PUCKETT, former NRC, Region II employee serves as the ORS manager.
PUCKETT does not possess a doctoral degree which STELSON indicated was essential for the manager to understand research implica-l tions. The other HP employee (TAYLOR) assigned to ORS does not possess a BS degree.
STELSON characterized the fonner HP staff (including MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE) as unambitious individuals who refused the offer of being upgraded. STELSON said BOYD's failure to document the deficiencies of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE through the previous years is "a classic case of mismanagement by their manager."
He acknowledged there was no documentation regarding unsatisfactory performance or employment deficiencies for these individuals and he repeatedly accused the investigator of having "a document fetish" for seeking written evidence regara-ing this matter.
STELSON, in describing the characteristics of B0YD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE related that all three are " distinctly different" in some respects. He said BOYD is a responsible, hard-working, well intentier.ed person but relatively old-fashioned and was "too gentle a soul to reprimand" his subordinates.
STELSON advised that he offered B0YD the position of Case No. 2-88-003 68 j
4.
l Associate Director of the Nuclear Research Center but "he refused to face up to that opportunity because he's basically too old a dog to learn new tricks."
STELSON said he knew MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE "less well" and mainly "through complaints about their improper activities." He defined " improper activities" as using profanity in the presence of and against doctoral students.
He also stated that the credentials of these two individuals "are increasingly inadequate as we are improving the safety standards and the complexity of our operation." STELSON related that in the spring of 1987 he informed the NRC of deficiencies in the personnel assigned to perform HP duties and that after strengtheningmanagement(hiringanAssociateDirector)thesecondprioritywas to correct the HP program.
STELSON, in response to the investigator using the word " termination" in reference to personnel actions against MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, accused the investigator of using " careless terms" and of making a " completely irresponsi-ble statement." He repeatedly denied that these individuals were tenninated, notwithstanding the fact they were given termination letters on February 11, 1988, their access cards and keys were taken from them and they were escorted from.the GTRR building by the Georgia Tech campus police.
STELSON related that the action by Georgia Tech regarding these individuals amounted to them "being relieved of their duties." He said the reason they were escorted from the building is because he feared there would be "an issue... an issue of safety, it was a safety precaution." He explained that the " issue" he feared related to "some unexplained malicious acts and one specifically that had significant safety problems associated with it."
He then related his knowledge of the incident involving the indicator switches to which KARAM had referenced with respect to " acts of sabotage."
STELSON attempted to establish a connection between his fear of an issue occurring and the " unexplained malicious acts" and acknowledged that "we have no evidence of any kind that these people
[MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE] were involved in that incident, no evidence of any kind." A discussion of the terminations of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE continued during which STELSON acknowledged that he and KARAM failed to follow the Georgia Tech due process procedures for dismissing personnel.
STELSON further related that BOYD should have infonned MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE about "due process" since "for about a year we have been discussing the transition."
STELSON next answered questions regarding the origination and content of correspondence relating to the termination of the two HP employees.
He stated that the language contained in these documents which references meeting obliga-tions to the NRC under tenns of the license relates to the fact that the NRC had " condemned our health and safety procedures as being inappropriate and inadequate." He related that rescission letters were forwarded to MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE four days after the termination letters were provided to them and stated "one reason why I sent the rescission letter is 1 think that Mr. Sharpe may not have been properly treated." He continued to respond to questions and statements regarding his actions and motives regarding the removal of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE from the GTRR facility and he repeatedly indicated it was only to " upgrade the HP program."
STELSON was queried regarding his activities associated with the letter SELMAN wrote to the Georgia Tech campus newspaper concerning the GTRR staff reorga-nization.
Essentially, he denied that he suggested or supported her dismissal even though he disapproved of her actions and considered it an unprofessional act. He also denied that he is aware of any actions taken by KARAM against Case No. 2-88-003 69
m m
SELMAN regarding this matter and claimed no knowledge of KARAM tel l
)
he would be dismissed if he wrote a letter critical of the GTRR fa campus newspaper. STELSON further denied that he threatened to w-i increases for HP personnel as a means of coercing cooperation or a these individuals for reporting safety concerns directly to the hkt..
ne outlined the expected course of action a GTRR employee should observe in reporting a radiological health and safety concern to their management but agreed they have the right to report directly to the NRC even though "its a violation of Georgia Tech policy."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Near the conclusion of the interview with STELSON on February 25, 1988, he related four concerns regarding NRC's involvement in the issues at the GTRR facility. He aavised that "there are some actions involved in the recent relationship between the NRC and Georgia Tech that I think create basically what I would call a circus" and he )roceeded to identify his concerns. These issues will be sumarized in tie following paragraph of this resort, however, for a full account of STELSON's concerns, pages 91 t1 rough 105 of the first transcript should be reviewed.
STELSON advised that he wished to have his concerns about !!RC's involvement with Georgia Tech recorded in the official transcript of his interview.
He said his first concern relates to the media receiving NRC correspondence addressed to him prior to his receipt of it.
He stated also that an NRC official advised the media of a meeting in his office that was to be a private session between Geo nia Tech and the NRC.
STELSON also advised that he and Georgia Tech officials "have serious questicns" about the NRC's " procedures in handling investigations" and the " conditions under which you're operating" (meaning the investigator) and said Georgia Tech is looking into the matter.
He stated he was also concerned with the notice of suspension (of GTRR operations) and related "for us to receive a notice of suspension of certain program activities when management people such as inyself have received absolutely no infonnation with respect to it from the NRC is an intolerable and inappropriate way to operate." Finally, STELSON advised that he infonned the e
Deputy Regional Administrator of the proposed terminations of the two HP j,/
employeesaweekpriorto'th'e_fctionoccurringandtheresponsetothis notification was p "no commerit." He said that after the terminations the NRC Public Affairs OfQctrAoid the news media "that the NRC h d'never'been g
infonned" of this action.
j STELSON, at the beginning of tho second interview session February 26, 1988, was queried again regarding various aspects of the decision to upgrade the HP program, including the tenninations of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, and Georgia Tech actions following the implementation of this decision.
During this discussion STELSON offered that Georgia Tech President CRECINE had received a " threaten-ing" telephone call on February 17, 1988, from CARTER who reportedly stated "if you don't rehire these two people, if you don't fire Karam, if you dor.'t fire Stelson, you will be unendingly pursued and involved in legal actions and in interrogation by the NRC."
STELSON then repeatedly attempted to correlate his interview by O! with CARTER's alleged telephone remarks to CRECINE regarding
" interrogation" by the NRC and he indicated that CARTER, "who knows more about the NRC than ycu do," has friends within the agency who have been utilized to instigate investigative action against the GTRR facility.
Case No. 2-88-003 70
STELSON was queried regarding the third of three long range goals of Georgia Tech officials, the one which involves improving and upgrading the Operations' staff at the GTRR facility. He also discussed the overall plans for increasing the utilization of the reactor for educational purposes. He volunteered that he and KARAM have discussed, for reveral months, the " capability and the medical condition" of one of the reactor operators (DOWNS) and that these concerns have been communicated to him. He stated that the operator is
" cooperative and sincerely interested in bein which is "a startling contrast with others" (g a better and effective employee" an apparent reference to HP personnel).
STELSON then seized the opportunity to again demean the qualifica-tions and perfonnances of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE and he remarked that "they have difficulty in meeting our standards" and "their attitude is negative to safety conditions." He then embarked upon an academic discussion concerning the HP discipline, the qualifications and activities of the RSO under the staff reorganization and the responsibilities of the NSC.
KUZO questioned STELSON regarding the staff upgrading process involving HP and Operations personnel and the various proposals for utilizing employees at the GTRR facility.
STELSON was then queried regarding the rationale for the previous psychological evaluations for members'of the GTRR staff.
His responses to questions concern-ing the results of this evaluation were again heavily weighted against HP personnel with minimal criticisms regarding members of the Operations staff.
STELSON, in a prolonged discussion, continued his subjective critical evalua-tion and assessment of HP personnel and even though he did not condone mistakes and errors committed by Operations employees he appeared less critical in discussions regarding these individuals.
He did state that "it's a little erroneous to lump them (HP's) all into one group" and said that SHARPE was trying to get an education and that Georgia Tech officials were working with him "to try and professionally upgrade him."
STELSON then recalled that on February 9,1988, four individuals, MacDONALD, KARAM, KAHh, and himself, met and decided since MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE did not fit into the proposed plans of
" upgrading" they should be terminated.
The remainder of the interview concerned a review of topics that had been broached with STELSON during the interview session the previous day. His responses to questions regarding investigative issues on this occasion were essentially the same as those previously provided.
KUZO discussed with STELSON the technical aspects of the cd-115 incident and the dissemination of informa-tion regarding this event.
STELSON concluded the interview session with a lengthy sunsnary of the rationale for actions taken by Georgia Tech officials to upgrade the entire GTRR program and to increase educational and academic opportunities for doctoral candidates. He indicated that the terminations of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE were rescinded on the order of the Board'of Regents and that efforts are in progress to place them in other employment opportunities with Georgia Tech.
In essence STELSON denied any improprieties regarding the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE and stated emphatically they were not dismissed for reporting health and safety concerns to the NRC.
Review of NSC Meeting Minutes During the investigation NSC meeting minutes for the period from January 1987 to February 1988, were reviewed for any records of discussions regarding GTRR employee discipline, personnel and performance related deficiencies er opera-ticnal issues involving employee unrest and disharmony at the GTRR facility.
Case No. 2-88-003 71
- 4 Additionally, these documents were reviewed to determine whether the NSC hao discussed. considered, and/or resolved any of the other allegations which are' being addressed during this investigation.
The July 23, 1987, minutes record the first meeting of the reconstituted NSC l
after the July 1, 1987, staff reorganization at the GTRR facility.
This document briefly discusses the committee structure " based on two letters from 1
Dr. Bourne, Acting President" and reflects that BOYD is present at e meeting as a "non-member" of the comittee.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Meeting minutes prior to July 1, 1987, identify BOYD as a member of the NSC.
Concurrent with the staff reorganization he was no longer designated as the RSO at Georgia Tech and thus was not a member of the NSC.
The August 13, 1987, minutes reflect that the Chairman of the NSC (KAHN)
" distributed a statement of concerns regarding the recent reorganization" of the GTRR facility.
Exhibit 65 is a copy of three items of concern and is entitled " Questions proposed for consideration by ad hoc panels of the Nuclear Safeguards Comittee."
Items (1) and (2), respectively, relate to the potential for interference with Nuclear Saftflards functions by personality cccflicts among the GTRR staff and potential for weakened radiological safety effort in the current organization structure. The NSC secretary sumarizes that "with regard to items (1) and (2) of the concerns, the comittee felt that the reorganization should be given a chance to operate for some time before I
reevaluating it."
KARAM encouraged the members of the NSC to focus on the future operation of the comittee and not on the past.
In particular, he stated he felt that the members are " duty bound to support the letter as well as the spirit of the President's decision and put the past behind."
The October 30, 1987 minutes, the first meeting after the Cd-115 contamination incident of August 1987, contain no references to the staff reorganization, personnel issues, or the cd-115 event. The November 13, 1987, minutes are also devoid of any topics or issues which have been addressed by the investigation.
The February 4, and 16,1988 (Exhibit 66), minutes are the first to reflect that the comittee discussed the Cd-115 contamination incident.
In the February 4,1988 minutes, the comittee secretary sumarizes that KARAM briefed the comittee on the background and actual details of the incident beginning in April 1987, and he identified "possible causes for the mix-up" that resulted in the incident.
Further, it is noted that "B. Kahn raised the question regarding certain aspects of the behavior of the operator [ DOWNS] such as the use of higher than authorized power level during the experiment and a possible lack of a thorough survey of himself on his way out." The February 16, 1988, minutes reflect that KARAM " distributed a review of the cadmium incident" to the attendees.
Further, it is noted in Item 6 that "MacDonald discussed personnel problems... in great details." The minutes indicate MacDONALD " described the concerns raised by the NRC regarding the Health Physics personnel and the issue of incomplete or inadequately kept records."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The minutes do not indicate that the comittee discussed the NRC concerns which relate to Cperations personnel.
Case No. 2-88-003 72
Other remarks recorded by DESAI in these February 16, 1988, minutes indicate MacDONALD " informed the committee about the meeting with... Stelson regarding-the hostility of and lack of control over the H.P. personnel, which led to firings of Messers Sharpe and M111spaugh."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
It is noted that the reasons cited by MacDONALD for terminating MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, that is, " hostility of and lack of l
l control over" again appear to be different than those offered by KARAM and l
STELSON which pertain to " upgrading the HP program."
These latter meeting minutes also reflect that."a question was raised regarding the lack of any previous intimation of the H.P. personnel's incompetency over the past many years of reactor operation," to which PUCKETT (fonner NRC employee and current ORS Manager) replied it was due "to the relatively lax attitude of the NRC staff in inspecting research reactors in the past." At Item 7 of these minutes, it is recorded that KARAM "related some of the proceedings of his interviews with the NRC inspectors in which they comented on the lack of responsiveness and up-to-date knowledge on the part of the HP personnel." Further, it is also recorded that "in response to a question on the tendency of the operator in not immediately reporting the cadmium incident, R. Karam conceded possible mistakes on parts of all concerned." The minutes reflect that KARAM pointed out further that in s)ite of such mistake there were Operations personnel)g to change for the betterlan apparent reference to those who were willin and those who were not [an apparent reference to HP personnel]." NSC minutes referenced in this section of the report but not i
attached as exhibits are being retained in the OI:RII case file.
Review of GTRR Files and Records During the investigation, and with KARAM's concurrence, a comprehensive review of all GTRR incoming and outgoing correspondence and memoranda during the past three years in the director's office was conducted.
KARAM also provided copies of memoranda and personal notes from HP personnel in 1987 and 1988 which report deficiencies and potential safety violations and upon which he had recorded his apparent corrective or resolution activities.
It was noted that, of all documents reviewed, only the copy of one handwritten memorandum from SHARPE to KARAM, dated May 12, 1987, reporting problems with the criticality monitors in the high bay area and in the corridor adjacent to the door of laboratory Rcom 149 did not contain coments from KARAM regarding corrective actions.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
A member of the NRC, Region II staff was apprised of the contents of this document which is being retained in the case file.
It would appear that, except for this one particular instance, KARAM addressed all potential health and safety issues reported to him in writing by HP personnel.
Exhibit 67 is a copy of a February 29, 1988, memorandum from MacDONALD to the file entitled " Conversation with Bob Boyd." MacDONALD relates a discussion with BOYD regarding BOYD's desire to terminate hot cell activities and his criticisms of TAYLOR as an HP technician. MacDONALD sumarizes that B0YD was vague in his explanations of these matters and that it appears he "has lost touch with the health physics program" and "he does not seem to know what is required." MacDONALD concludes that B0YD apparently does not want to assune Case No. 2-88-003 73
l any HP responsibilities and he has no desire to help the GTRR perform its assigned functions.
Exhibit 68 is a copy of a March 1, 1988, memorandum from KARAM to the file entitled " Meeting with Mr. Boyd and Mr. Taylor on 3/01/88 at 10:45 A.M. in my l.
Office." The memorandum relates to MILLSPAUGH's logbook which was apparently misplaced when MILLSPAUGH was terminated.
KARAM writes that BOYD refused to locate the logbook which is an example of his " lack of cooperation and unconcern for doing the right thing in his office."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
It was noted during the investigation that memoranda which are critical of HP personnel and their performance are relatively non-existent prior to the dismissal of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
Exhibit 69 is a copy of a May 3, 1984, memorandum from'MAHAFFEY to the old NSC entitled "Possible Tech Spec Violation Due to Argon 41 Release on 6 January 1984." This document sets forth the " Incident Summary," " Investigation," and
" Conclusion" by MAHAFFEY regarding the Argon 41 relea.se and safety equipment tampering incident on January 6,1984. A full descri) tion of the event, with possible technical specifications implications, and tie conclusions of MAHAFFEY, then Chairman of the NSC, is contained in the memorandum.
Inquiries with both McDOWELL and DOWNS regarding this allegation of tampering with safety equipment to avoid containment isolation were conducted and both categorically denied any deliberate, intentional manipulation of monitoring devices to circumvent technical specification requirements.
Exhibits 70 and 71 are GTRR forms and documents associated with the gemstone irradiation experiment and the August 1987, Cd-115 contamination and subsequent clean-up activities at the GTRR facility.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: The technical aspects of the experiment and the subsequent contamination and clean-up activities have been thoroughly reviewed by members of the NRC, Region II staff and documented in Inspection Report Number 50-160/87-08.
The 01 was requested to determine whether documents relating to the gemstone irradiation incident and the contamination / clean-up event contained intentional inaccurate, and erroneous information and if there was an attempt by the licensee to deliberately mislead or deceive the NRC regarding these matters.
First, the " Request Fcr Minor Experiment Approval" and attached "GTRR Exper-imenter's Checklist and Schedule Form" are both, based upon the testimony of DOWNS and KARAM, incomplete and inaccurate and do not reflect all of the conditions of the experiment.
MAHAFFEY, during his interview, also identified numerous discrepancies on these forms and related that the experimenter (DOWNS and KARAM) failed to properly document the experiment.
Second, the Daily Masslinn and Student Checklist reports, associated with the contamination /-
clean-up activities were first noted by the NRC, Region 11 staff on January 21, 1988, following the exit conference and after their presentation to the Atlanta, Georgia media. A review of these forms by members of the f:hC, Region 11 staff revealed possible discrepancies and potential inconsistencies with other documentation obtained during the inspection. After initiation of the investigation the requestor asked 01 to determine whether this data Case No. 2-88-003 74
1 reflected actual survey results or if data on the form had been added after the survey to give the appearance that it was authentic.
With respect to the discrepancies noted on the experiment approval forms it was determned that inattention to detail, carelessness, laziness, and irresponsi-ble actions by the operator (DOWNS) are all apparent causes. There was no evidence revealed to indicate the licensee or any employee deliberately and intentionally connitted actions to falsify documents or to deceive the NRC.
Further, the investigation failed to reveal any testimony or recorded evidence that data were added to survey forms "after the fact," even though these documents were not provided to the inspector until the exit conference was in progress.
Exhibit 72 is a copy of KARAM's notes dated September 24 and 25, 1987, relating his activities and observations associated with the three level indicator switches and acts of " sabotage" or malicious mischief.
KARAM writes that "this is a serious offense and should be classified as an act of sabotage." Further, it is noted that KARAM notified STELSON, NSC members and the Georgia Tech campus police and he also apparently questioned members of the GTRR staff concerning this matter.
KARAM concluded that the explanation for the switches being in the "off" position may be maintenance related and not a malicious act.
There was no evidence reiealed to indicate deliberate, intentional acts of radiological sabotage or malicious damage at the GTRR facility.
Exhibit 73 is a copy of a January 22, 1988, memorandum from MacDONALD to BOYD entitled " Response to NRC order 88-E-001." According to the memorandum KARAM has requested that MacDONALD " collect all documentation on the August 1987, contamination" incident.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
This memorandum appears to indicate that information regarding the cd-115 contamination incident was not collected until the NRC conducted the inspection at the GTRR facility which is reported in Inspection Report Number 50 160/07-08.
The implication of this n.ay be that the GTRR director and his staff were prompted to fully document the Cd-115 incident only after the NRC began to inquire about it during the December 1987, and January 1988, inspection activities.
W111 fulness and Intent Section The investigation was initiated essentially to detennine:
1.
Didthelicensee(KARAM)harassandintimidateHPemployeesforreporting or discussing health and safety concerns with the NRC?
2.
Didthelicensee(theGTRRstaff)falsifyorintentionallymisrepresent contamination survey data regarding the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamina-tion incident to NRC inspection personnel?
3.
Did the licensee (KARAM/ DOWNS) falsify or deliberately misrepresent i
personal survey data.regarding the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident to NRC inspection personnel?
i Case No. 2-88-003 75
+
j l
4.
Did the licensee (KARAM) deliberately attempt to conceal potential
- radiological health and safety violations from the NRC by directing the -
i discontinuance of personal logbooks by HP personnel?
5.
Did the licensee (KARAM/McDOWELL/ DOWNS) falsify the gemstone irradiation j
- experiment authorization document and associated foms?
I 6.
Was the GTRR (reactor) ever pennitted to operate without an authorized (NRC licensed) individual in the control room?
7.
Did GTRR personnel (DOWNS and McDOWELL) deliberately deactivate monitoring devices to avoid containment isolation?
8.
Did the licensee (KARAM) maintain separate files and records at the GTRR facility for the purpose of concealing adverse infomation from the NRC7 9.
Is the licensee (KARAM) aware of any acts of radiological sabotage, vandalism or malicious mischief at the GTRR facility and have these incidents been concealed from the NRC?
Allegation No.1:
a.
According to the testimony of five HP personnel (Exhibits 18 through 23) the actions of KARNi and members of the GTRR Operations staff were, for several years, perceived as harassment and intimidation. Reportedly, this campaign intensified with the reorganization of the GTRR staff en July 1, 1987, when all employees, including HP personnel, were supervised, directed, and managed by KARAM. These interviewees, but especially BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE, expressed concern that they would suffer retalia-tion, including loss of employment, for discussing or reporting health ar.d safety matters with the NRC.
I b.
Following their interviews by 01, MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE were terminated (Exhibits 38and39)fromGeorgiaTechandsubsequentlyreinstated (Exhibits 40 and 41) to other campus employment.. BOYD who is nearing retirement age, was subsequently reassigned to Georgia State University to fulfill his service requirements ar.d qualify for a state annuity.
Other interviewe'es (Exhibits 50 through 61) dispute or contradict the c.
rationale of Georgia Tech officials for the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and l
SHARPE.
Some interviewees (Exhibits 60 and 61) allude to the strong probability they were dismissed for opposing the staff reorganization l
and/or for bypassing GTRR management and discussing potential health and l
safety issues with the NRC.
d.
Numerous other exhibits and testimony of interviewees relate to and describe the apparent intense hostilities and disharcony between HP and I
Operations personnel which has existed for a significant period of time.
KARAM and other Operations / Support perscnnel at the GTRR facility (Exhibits 48-52 and.62) appear to blame the HP personnel for discordant relationships while accepting minimal responsibility themselves, although KARAM acknowledged that MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE would not have been dismissed from their HP duties if they had cooperated and atoned for their attitude and mistakes.
Case No. 2-88-003 76
9 9
l l
(
l e.
Finally, the official reason given by Georgia Tech for dismissing MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE was to " upgrade the HP program." Several inter-viewees (Exhibits 56 through 60) were complimentary regarding the l
professional knowledge and competence of BOYD, MILLSPAVGH, and SHARPE.
)
l The testimony of these individuals tends to dispute the reason given by l
KARAM/STELSON for the dismissal of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
Further, even Operations personnel (Exhibits 48 and 51) who were openly hostile towards HP employees, viewed SHARPE as an even tempered, likable, and cooperative technician who was compatible with the Operations staff.
Allegation Nos. 2 and.3:
a.
GTRR Operations personnel faniliar with the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident (Exhibits 48-50 and 62) categorically denied any records improprieties or deceptive practices concerning this incident.
These same individuals acknowledged that inconsistent and/or conflicting testimony was provided at various times to the NRC during the inspection activities of December 1987, and January 1988, however, this was regarded as unintentional and apparently the result of incomplete documentation.
b.
The issue of whether DOWNS personally surveyed his residences following discovery of the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 incident was never completely resolved.
DOWNS (Exhibits 49 and 50) acknowledged he first told NRC i
inspectors he did not take a GM survey meter home with him to survey his l
resident and then testified he could not remember taking a GM meter home with him. Other interviewees (Exhibits 48, 51, and 62) testified they observed him take a meter home with him following the discovery of the i
Cd-115 contamination, however, no results of a survey were recorded if it was perfomed.
c.
Interviewees assigned to the HP staff (Exhibits 18, 20, 21, ano 22) reported confusion, disunity, mismanagement, and lack of organization in the clean-up and decontamination process, indicating that records were not properly maintained and activities were not documented. They viewed this as inadvertent due to a failure to comunicate properly rather than an overt, contrived effort to conceal facts.
d.
Information provided by NSC members (Exhibits 56, 57, and 59) suggests that initially KARAM was not completely candid regarding the facts and circumstances of the Cd-115 incident although they did not question his integrity or motives. This suggests that KARAM may not have been fully aware of all aspects of the cd-115 incident.
l Allegation No. 4:
a.
Interviewees assigned to the HP staff (Exhibits 18,20,21,22,and23) comented variously regarding the memorandum from KARAM (Exhibit 26) to discontinue the use of "per mial logbooks." This action was perceived by these personnel as an attempt to suppress and stiffle their~responsibil-ities which was another fonn of subtle harassment.
b.
In a lengthy discussion KARAM (Exhibit 62) explained his rationalo for directing the HP staff to infonn him of violations rather than record them in logbooks.
He categorically denied any atten; pts to suppress or harass Case No. 2-88-003 77
c HP personnel and stated his reason for this action was to ensure that all health and safety violations were adequately addressed in a timely manner.
\\
c.
Based upon KARAM's testimony and a review of his files and records, it:
l appears that the written safety concerns reported in writing to KARAM by
)
HP personnel were acknowledged and addressed by him.
Further, there was l
no evidence revealed to indicate that KARAM attempted to conceal any health and safety issues from the NSC.
Allegation No. 5:
a.
The gemstone irradiation experiment authorization document and associated
~
forms (Exhibit 70) were repeatedly discussed during the investigation..
GTRR management and Operations personnel (Exhibits 48-50 and 62) admitted numerous errors, mistakes, inattention to detail, and carelessness in compiling the necessary data and/or recording it correctly on the appropriate forms.
b.
Members of the professional faculty at Georgia Tech (Exhibits 56 and 60),
who are acquainted with the experiment approval process reported that some of the data on the approval documents for the gemstone irradiation experi-ment is inaccurate and in some instances required data is missing. The Chairman of the NSC (Exhibits 56) related KARAM admitted to connittee members inadvertent errors and mistakes in the experiment process and record keeping requirement. All of these interviewees concurred that l
experiment approval form deficiencies are apparently the result of l
operator / experimenter inattention, complacency, carelessness, and/or a failure to observe existing procedures.
c.
One interviewee (Exhibit 59) advised that operator DOWNS apparently decided, without consulting the experimenter (KARAM), to escalate power i
and exceed the established parameters of the experiment, an action which should have been referred to the NSC for approval. This individual also advised that KARAM may have failed, as the principle experimenter, to l
properly analyze and evaluate experiment conditions which could account for the inaccurate, incomplete, and missing data on the experiment approval form.
l Allegation No. 6:
l a.
During the investigation inquiries were conducted regarding the
(
allegation that the reactor at the GTRR facility was permitted to operate with no licensed operator in the control room. McDOWELL and D0WNS are the only licensed personnel at the facility and both categorically denied (Exhibits 48, 49, and 50) they have permitted this activity to occur. Other interviewees had heard " rumors" or had observed incidents which appeared to support this allegation (Exhibits 22, 23, and 59) however, no evidence of this issue was revealed during the investigation.
b.
Other HP and Operations interviewees (Exhibits 18, 20-23, and 51-53) failed to provide any evidence to indicate that the licensee had violated procedures by pennitting unlicensed personr.el to operate the reactor.
Case No. 2-88-003 78
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t Allegation No. 7:
a.
Onesource(Exhibit 59)relatedheconductedanextensiveinvestiga-tion in May 1984 and prepared a cetailed report (Exhibit 69) regard-ing a potential technical specifications violation involving McDOWELL and DOWNS who may have intentionally tampered with monitoring devices to avnid containment isolation.
This source related that although he suspected these individuals may have intentionally disabled a gas monitor he was unable to obtain sufficient evidence with which to confront them.
Interviews of GTRR personnel failed to disclose any j
evidence that these two individuals tampered with or disabled gas i
monitoring devices to avoid containment isolation.
Both DOWNS and l
McDOWELL (Exhibits 48 and 49) denied any improprieties regarding the j
AR43 gas rdease incHent.
1 Allegation No. 8:
a.
Based upon a thorough and comprehensiveness review of GTRR records and files there was no evidence developed to indicate the licensee was maintaining separate files to conceal violations from the NRC.
b.
Interviewees who serve on the NSC (Exhibits 56, 57, 58, ana 59) advised they are unaware of any separate system of records / files at the GTRR facility to conceal violations. Varicus GTRR staff personnel also disclaimed any knowledge of record maintenance improprieties.
Allegation No. 9:
a.
The topic of " sabotage," acts of vandalism, and malicious mischief at the GTRR facility first surfaced in the news media (Exhibit 5) following a U.S. District Court hearing on a motion to reinstate MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
KARAM (Exhibit 62) related unexplained
)
incidents of vandalism and mischief at the GTRR facility, only one of which involved possible health and safety implications.
b.
KARAM provided a copy of a handwritten report (Exhibit 72) in which he records his inquiries and actions regarding incidents of vandalism / mischief at the GTRR facility. This report indicate was unable to identify the individuals responsible for these a,s he cts and i
he concludes that the one incident with health and safety implica-tions could possibly be a maintenance related matter, i
Investigator's Conclusion l
The investigation revealed evidence of a long history of extensive discord, animosity, conflicts, and confrontations between HP and Operations personnel at the GTRR facility.
This situation apparently intensified in early 1967 when Georgia Tech officials initiated discussions to reorganize the GTRR staff and place the ORS under the supervision of the director. With the implementation of the reorganization in July 1987, the adverse relations between these groups apparently became irreparable.
Following the staff reorganization and on August 18, 1987, the GTRR facility experienced a Cd-115 contamination incident and although a clean-up and decontamination procedure was imediately Case No. 2-88-003 79
implemented the licensee staff did not address and resolve the cause of the incident in a timely manner.
During a subsequent NRC inspection in December 1987, and January 1988, HP personnel discussed this and other health and safety matters with NRC inspection personnel.
Based upon the testimony of the HP employees, they feared retaliation by management (KARAM/STELSON) for discussing their health and safety concerns with the NRC and two of these individuals were subsequently involuntarily separated on February 11, 1988.
There appears to be sufficient evidence to indicate that one of the reasons for the dismissal of l
the two HP employees, but more especially for SHARPE, was for discussing potential GTRR health and safety problems, including the Cd-115 incident, and other related issues with the NRC before reporting them to management (KARAM).
With respect to the other allegations addressed during the investigation there is evidence to indicate confusion, disunity, severe mismanagement, negligence, gross inattention to detail, careless practices by an Operations employee, a failure to follow procedures, and a haphazard and desultory approach to the performance of the gemstone irradiation experiment and to the clean-up and decontamination activity associated with the Cd-115 contamination incident.
There did not appear to be intentional, contrived efforts to violate regulations or license conditions or to willfully falsify any required records associated with the GTRR facility or its activities.
There was some evidence to suggest that licensee management (KARAM) was less than candid while initially reporting the facts and circumstances of the Cd-115 incident to members of the NSC.
Finally, the investigation failed to reveal any conclusive evidence concerning the allegations of tampering with safety equipment, of there being no operator at the controls of the reactor while at power and of sabotage or malicious damage involving rodtological material.
Status of Investigation This investigation was initiated to resolve allegations that HP employees at the GTRR facility were harassed and intimidated by management for reporting safety concerns to the NRC. Additionally, other allegations referred to 01 after the initial investigation request was received which involve possible records improprieties and procedure violations were pursued and all logical investigative activities have been completed. The NRC, Region II staff has been apprised of all disclosures which are reflected in this Report of Investigation. No further investigative activities have been requested.
This investigation is CLOSED.
Case No. 2-88-003 80
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION On February 16, 1988, Edward F. O'CONNOR and J. Hue HENRY, Attorneys for MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE (plaintiffs) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court, Atlanta, Georgia for declaratory relief, permanent injunction, and money damages against KARAM individually and in his official capacity as Director, Neely Nuclear Research Center, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia (defendants).
Civil Action Number 1:88-CV-312-0DE applies to the case number and the "cause for action" citation is 42 U.S.C. 1983, to redress deprivation of free speech rights secured by the First and Fourteenth I
knendments to the United States Constitution and federal law. A copy of the complaint and the supporting documentation is Exhibit 74 to the Report of Investigation.
On March 24, 1988, attorneys for the plaintiffs filed first interrogatories and a
first request for production of documents to defend 6nts. On April 22, 1988, 1
FULLER provided the reporting investigator with a complete copy of defendants response to plaintiffs request and all of this documentation is being retained in the OI:RII investigation file.
Information contained in this package of documents has been reported or summarized at various sections in the Report of Investigation.
Exhibit 75 is a copy of a newspaper article from the April 10, 1988, edition of the Atlanta Journal / Atlanta Constitution during which CRECINE, President, Georgia Tech responds to questions regarding recent events at the GTRR facility.
In response to a question which elicited remarks regarding the terminations / reassignments of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, CRECINE acknowledged that the institution "did not execute what we intended to do in rebuilding the reactor's safety group." CRECINE further states that " strengthening the staff... meant the reassignment of two HP employees." He continued that it was not the intention of Georgia Tech to terminate the employees but "we screwed up, we just screwed up."
Finally, on April 18, 1988, BOYD was reassigned as Manager of the ORS at the GTRR facility to the ORS at Georgia State University (GSU).
BOYD, in comments regarding his reassignment related, that because he was nearing retirement age.
he was transferred to GSU to complete the necessary years of service which will qualify him for an annuity with the State of Georgia.
Case No. 2-88-003 81
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l THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY Case No. 2-80-003 82
LIST OF ACRONYMS Administrative Assistant AA I
l Cadmium-115 Cd-115 l
Cobalt-60 Co-60 Enforcen.ent and Investigations ' Coordination Staff EICS Frank H. Neely Nuclear Research Center GTRR Geiger-Mueller GM Georgia Department of Human Resources G0HR l
. Georgia Institute of Technology Georgia Tech I
~
Georgia State University GSU Health Physics HP Nuclear Safeguards Cannittee NSC Office of Inspector and Auditor OIA Office of Investigations 01 Office of Investigations Field Office, Region II OI:RII 1
Radiation Protection Committee RPC Radiation / Radiological Safety Committee RSC Radiation / Radiological Safety Officer RSO Reactor Operator R0 Regional Administrator RA Regional Allegation Coordinator RAC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC W
Case No. 2-88-003 83
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Case No. 2-88-003 64
'l
.1 j
p-n, LIST OF EXHIBITS l
1 l
Exhibit Number Description l
1 Copy of letter from CAMERON to NRC, dated August 3, 1987 i
2 Copy of NRC, Region II Investigation Request memorandum'to 01:RII, dated February 3, 1988 1
3 Copy of NRC, Region II Supplemental Investigation Request memorandum to OI: RII, dated February 4,1988 4
Copy of NRC, Region II Supplemental Investigation Request l
memorandum to 01:RII, dated February 8, 1988 5
Copy of news article from The Atlanta Constitution, February 18, 1988 edition 6
Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from CRAWFORD to ZIM ERMAN, dated July 17, 1973 7
Copy of Georgia Tech letter from NEUMANN to PETTIT, dated July 30, 1973 8
Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from KARAM to STELSON, dated January 26, 1987 9
Copy of Georgia Tech RPC meeting minutes, dated February 19, 1987 10 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from CARTER to BOURNE, dated March 23, 1987 11 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from KARAM to STELSON, dated May 6, 1987 12 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from STELSON to BOURNE, dated May 27, 1987 13 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from CARTER to BOURNE, dated June 10, 1987 14 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from KARAM to J. Nelson GRACE, r
NRC, dated June 15, 1987 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from BOURNE to STELSON, d6ted 15 June 19, 1987 16 Copy of GTRR organizational chart, effective prior to July 1, 1987 Case No. 2-88-003 85
Li 17 Copy of GTRR organizational chart, effective beginning July 1, 1987 18 Transcript of Interview with BOYD, dated February 8,1988 19 Report of Interviews with BOYD, dated March 8, 1988 20 Transcript of Interview with HILLSPAUGH, dated February 9, 1988 21 Transcript of Interview with SHARPE (CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE),
dated February 5, 1988 22 Transcript of Interview with SELMAN, dated February 8, 1988 23 Transcript of Interview with CAMERON, dated February 11,
)
1988 24 Report of Interview with MATTERN dated March 10, 1988, and a February 16, 1988, letter dated by PATTERN attached 25 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from XARAM to DAVIDSON, dated February 27, 1987 26 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from KARAM to GTRR staff, dated July 29, 1987 27 Copy of handwritten note from KARAM to BOYD ar.d response from BOYD to KARAM, dated January 21, 1988 28 Copy of handwritten diary by BOYD, witn entries dated February 29, 1988 29 Copy of handwritten note from BOYD to FULLER, dated March 2, 1988 30 Copies of logbook entries, pages 13, 15, and 69 by MILLSPAUGH, dated February and August 1987 31 Copies of persona 1 diary notes by MILLSPAUGH, dated in May, June, September, and November 1987, and January 1988 32 Copy of handwritten memorandum from MILLSPAUGH to KAPAM dated October 1, 1987, and response from KARAM to MILLSPAUGH, dated October 9, 1987 33 Copy of logbook entries, pages 138-140, from SHARPE, dateo July 15-17, 1986 34 Copy of logbook entry from SELMAN, dated February 13, 1967 35 Copy of handwritten notes from SELFAN, dated Ncvember 23, 1987 Case No. 2-86-003 86
1
- e 4".
36 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from KARAM to BOYD, dated March 11, 1985 37 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from KARAM to GIBSON, dated February 10, 1988 1
38 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from KARAM to SHARPE, dated l
February 11, 1988 39 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from KARAM to MILLSPAUGH, dated February 11, 1988 40 Copy of Georgia Tech letter form STELSON to SHARPE, dated February 15, 1988 41 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from STELSON to MILLSPAUGH,
(
dated February 15, 1988 42 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from KARAM to CRECINE, dated February 15, 1988 43 Copy of Georgia Tech "In Confidence" memorandum from FULLER to STELSON/KARAM, dated February 17, 1988 44 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from MacDONALD to KAPAM dated February 18, 1988 45 Copy of Georgia Tech "In Confidence" letter from FULLER to 01:RII, dated March 7, 1988 46 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from FULLER to 01:RII, dated March 3, 1988 47 Report of Interviews with FULLER and GIBSON, dated February 29, 1988 48 Transcript of Interview with McDOWELL, dated February 10, 1968 49 Transcript of Interview with DOWNS, dated February 8, 1988 50 Transcript of Interview with DOWNS, dated February 24, 1988 51 Transcript of Interview with COX, dated February 11, 1966 52 Transcript of Interview with MERCER, dated February 17, 1988 53 Transcript of Interview with TAYLOR, dated February 17, 1988 54 Report of Interviews with AYC0CK and RODGERS, dated March 16, 1988 Case No. 2-88-003 87
~
j 55 Transcript of Interviews with CARDEN and HERNDON, dated
)
February 17, 1988 56 Transcript of Interview with XAHN, dated February 17, 1988 57 Transcript of Interview with DESAI, dated February 18, 1988 58 Transcript of Interview with NEUMANN, dated March 2, 1988 59 Transcript of Interview with MAHAFFEY, dated February 11, 1988 60 Transcript of Interview with CARTER, dated March 2, 1988 61 Transcript of Interview with CRAFT, dated February 25, 1988 62 Transcript of Interview with KARAM, dated February 19, 1988 63 Transcript of Interview with STELSON, dated February 25, 1988 64 Transcript of Interview with STELSON, dated February 26, 1988 65 Copy of questions proposed for consideration by ad/ hoc panels of the NSC, dated August 13, 1987 66 Copy of NSC meeting minutes, dated February 4 and 16, 1988 67 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from MacDCNALD to file, dated February 29, 1988 68 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from XARAM to file, dated March 1, 1988 69 Copy of Georgia Tech report from MAHAFFEY to NSC, dated May 3, 1984 70 Copy of~GTRR "Recuest for Minor Experim<nt Approval" and Associated forms, dated April 3, 1987 71 Copy of GTRR Daily Masslinn Survey Report and Student Checklist, dated August 1987 72 Copy of handwritten notes by KARAM, dated September 24 and 25, 1987 73 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from MacDONALD to BOYD, dated January 22, 1988 74 Copy of U.S. District Court, Atlanta, GA complaint for Declaratory Relief and associated documents, dated February 16, 1968 Case No. 2-88-003 88
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75 Copy of news article from The Atlanta Journal /The Atlanta L-Constitution, dated' April 10, 1988 L
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4 Case No. 2-88-003 89
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January 18, 198 l
N.R.C. Office of Investigations 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia I hereby withdraw my previous request that I be considered a confidential source of information supplied tc the Nuclear Regulatory Commission during any of its investigations involving me, including the investigation of my dismissal frcm the Georgia Institute of Technology.
Sine rely, Paul Sharpe WhWM W id~~
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FEB o 91939 j
Docket No. 50-160 j
License No. R-97 1
Georgia Institute of Technology ATTN:
Dr. J. P. Crecine, President 225 North Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30332 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION REPORT N0. 2-88-003 Enclosed for your information is a copy of NRC Investigation Report No. 2-88-003.
Our letter dated November 15, 1988, advised you that your request for a copy l
of the NRC Investigation Report related to Georgia Tech activities was being reviewed by the NRC staff.
Recently, the individual identified in the report as a confidential source has requested that he no longer be regarded as a confidential source of information.
Subsequently, a copy of the report has been provided to Mr. Edward O'Connor, Attorney at Law.
L In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Sincerely, C1 ill?. G((D [a*
George R. Jenkins Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff
Enclosures:
1.
NRC OI No. Report.!-88-003 2.
Confidentiality Release cc w/encls:
Dr. A. P. Sheppard, Acting Vice President for Research l
State of Georgia 1
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FEB 0 91989 i
i Georgia Institute of Technology 2
bec w/o encls:
J. Lieberman, OE J. Vorse, 01:RII A. Adams, NRR bec w/encls:
Document Control Desk i
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON f:s.
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101 MAHIETT A STREET, N W,
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 '
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FEB 0 91989 Docket No. 50-160 License No. R-97 Georgia Institute of Technology ATTN:
Dr. J. P. Crecine, President
'225 North Avenue.
Atlanta, Georgia ' 30332 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
NRC 0FFICE OF INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 2-88-003 Enclosed for your information is a copy of NRC Investigation Report No. 2-88-003.
$ Our letter dated November 15,.1988, advised you that your request for a copy of the NRC Investigation Report related to Georgia Tech activities was being reviewed by'the NRC staff.
Recently, the individual identified in the report as a confidential source has requested that he no longer be regarded as a confidential source of information.
Subsequently, a copy of. the report has
'i been provided to Mr. Edward O'Connor, Attorney at Law.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures l
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Sincerely, l
R./
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eor Director, n orcement and Investi ion Coordination Staff
Enclosures:
1.
NRC OI No. Report 2-88-003 2.
Confidentiality Release cc.!/encls:
Dr. A. P. Sheppard, Acting Vice President for Research State of Georgia
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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
Title:
FRANK H. NEELY NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER:
ALLEGED HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION OF HEALTH PHYSICS TECHNICIANS Licensee:
Case Number:
2-88-003 Georgia Institute of Technology Report Date:
August 11, 1988-900 Atlantic Drive, Northwest Atlanta, GA 30332 Control Office: 01:RII Status:
CLOSED Docket No.:
50-160 License No.:
R-97 Reported by:
Reviewed by:
A Robert' H/ Bufch', Investigator N
- ifies Y. gfrse, Director Office of Investigations 6ffice oV Investigations j
Field Office, Region II Field 0 e, Region II Participating Personnel:
prov by-George B. Kuzo, Senior Radiation Specialist, NRC Region II e<1 B. Haf6s, byp/ or Office of Invep)4 tio 9memmet49eeE l
WARNI'.3 l
The attached documentation has not been reviewed pursuant to 10 CFR 52.790 (a) exemption nor has any exempt material been deleted.
Do not disseminate or discuss its contents outside the NRC.
Treat as "0FFICI AL USE ONLY."
Copy ___l Of b
n SYNOPSIS This investigation was initiated upon the request of the U.S. huclear Reg,,latory Commission (NRC), Region II Regional Administrator (RA), the requSstor, for the Office of Investigations (01) to inquire into and document alleged harassment and intimidation of Health Physics (HP) personnel at the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech), Frank H. Neely Nuclear Research Center (GTRR), the licensee, for reporting to and/cr discussing with NRC officials apparent radiological health and safety issues. Additionally, the requestor asked 01 to determine whether the licensee may have willfully misrepresented to the NRC facts pertaining to an irradiation experiment which resulted in an August 18, 1987, Caumium-115 (Cd-115) contamination incident and the clean-up and decontamination activities that followed.
Further, it was requested that 0I investigate allegations regarding other possible violations of regulations, license conditions and/or technical specifications, including the operation of the reactor without a licensed operator in the control room; concealing potential health and safety concerns from the NRC; deliberate tampering with safety equipment by Operations personnel to avoid containment isolation; and records improprieties involving facility files which are avail-able to and utilized by NRC inspectors.
Finally OI was requested to determine the nature and extent of the acts of sabotage alleged by the director of the GTRR facility during a February 1968 hearing on a motion in the U.S. District Court, Atlanta, Georgia, to reinstate two HP employees who were involuntarily separated from their employment at the GTRR facility.
In December 1987, and January 1988, NRC inspection activities at the GTRR facility, which are documented in Inspection Repcrt Number 50-160/87-08, revealed that possible incidents of harassment and intimidation of HP persernel had occurred and that health and safety concerns of these individuals reportedly were not always adequately addressed by management.
Further, these inspection activities revealed disharmony, hostility, and adversarial relations between the HP and Operations employees which had apparettly intensified since July 1, 1987, when HP personnel were placed under the direct supervision ard management of the director of the GTRR facility.
Previously, the Office of Radiological Safety (ORS) had independent status and reported to the President of Georgia Tech.
Initially, a review of the GTPR staff organization structure was conducted which revealed that, as early as 1973 a proposal to unite the ORS staff under the facility director met with stiff cpposition from members of the now defunct Georgia Tech Radiation Safety Committee and the State of Georgia Department of Human Resources.
Additionally licensee correspondence and documents disclosed that a successful effort to reorganize the GTRR staff, under the supervision and management of the director, was concluded on July 1, 1987, at which time the CRS began reporting directly to the manager of the facility.
It became apparent, as the investigation progressed, that one of the main causes of the staff disharmony, hostility, and confrontations related to the fact that CRS employees did not believe they were sufficiently independent from the GTRR facility oirector to perform their radiological health and sa%ty duties and responsibilities and that the current relationship of the directer with the ORS represented a conflict of interest.
Fenbers of the ORS were interviewed during the investigation, prior tc tre involuntary separations of the two HP employees en February 11, 1988, anc m each ccnfirmed intense adverscrial relations and hostilities between the V
'c I
Case [o.2-88-003 1
y J
separated from the GTRR facility immediately following their interview by 01.
Both of these individuals had expressed grave concern during their interviews that they feared reprisals, including termination of employment, for discussing health and safety concerns with the NRC.
Documentation concerning the involun-tary terminations of the two full-time HP employees on February 11, 1988, by GTRR facility management reflected those personnel actions were allegedly taken to " upgrade the HP program" and to meet " obligations to the NRC under terms of the license."
Further, February 15, 1988, correspondence to the terminated employees, signed by a Georgia Tech official, rescinded the dismissals and directed their reassignments to unrelated activities.
A February 15, 1988, letter from GTRR management to the President of Georgia Tech cites that the reasons for the involuntary dismissals of the two HP employees are related to perfonnance and discipline matters, however, a thorough review of the personnel records of each failed to disclose any evidence of either matter.
A February 18, 1988, memorandum between GTRR facility management officials apptars to contain subjective statements and opinions regarding HP personnel which indicate these individuals are totally responsible for various violations and the current employee disharmony.
Further, the memorandum appears to draw inaccurate and subjective conclusions about HP personnel from the results of a psychological evaluation report which summarizes interviews of GTRR employees.
Basically, the memorandum singles out the full-time HP employees and blames them for the disharmony, whereas, the psychological report states objectively that all first line management (HP and Operations / Support) are not seen as effective and strong leaders and that reassignments of HP personnel, the physical separation of (HP and Operations personnel) work spaces, and strong stable leadership for the HP group should be sought.
Following the review of administrative and personnel records, two Georgia Tech administrative officials who are aware of the Board of Regents policies pertaining to the terminations of faculty members and general staff employees were interviewed.
One official advised that personnel policies were violated by Georgia Tech because of the manner in which the two HP personnel had been dismissed. The second official advised he repeatedly cautioned GTRR management and the next higher level of supervision about due process requirements but they both failed to heed his advice and stated they were being directed by the NRC to immediately terminate these individuals.
Members of the Operations / Support group at the GTRP facility were interviewed regarding alleged harassment and intimidation of HP personnel and the other issues which 'are included in this investigative effort.
During these inter-views a wide spectrum of general and technical information concerning all of these topics was solicited by the reporting investigator and the participating inspector.
The five professional employees assigned to the Operations / Support group discussed the long history of hostilities and the professional and personality confrontations with the HP employees, a condition which has worsened markedly since the July 1987, staff reorganization.
Each recalled instances in which HP personnel had caused controversy or had allegecly acted in a manner which was apparently inconsistent with their duties and respon-sibilities.
Essentially, these interviewees also blamed the HP personnel %r allegedly instigating and prolonging hostilities and for repeatedly insisting upon independence rather than submitting to the authority aro supervision of facility management.
Lengthy discussions of the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident and subsequent clean-up and decontamination activities revealed careless mistakes and errors by the reactor operator responsible " r Case No. 2-88-003 3
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1 I
1 He also cited examples of behavior and actions of GTRR management which indicate a potential lack of comitment to HP activities of the GTRR facility.
This interviewee concluded that, in his opinion, at least one of the tenninated HP technicians openly feared reprisal in the form of involuntary separation if he discussed health and safety concerns with the NRC and indicated that one reason for their termination was related to this activity.
l A former professional employee and Georgia Tech faculty member at the GTRR facility, who claimed to be well acquainted with management and the HP and Operations staff members, advised that the HP personnel appeared to be professionally competent and reliable even though they were as aggravating and contemptuous as were the Operations employees.
He acknowledged that Operations personnel resorted to agitation and cunning activities to invoke the ire of the HP staff.
He also concurred that management appears to be obsessed with revenue producing motives without an equal commitment to or obsession for the HP program.
This individual blamed management's dominating and deceptive personality and " obsession with money" as the primary reasons for the general personnel problems at the GTRR facility.
He acknowledged that harassment and intimidation are well within management's character and said he believes the two HP technicians were involuntarily terminated " simply because they blew the whistle."
He concluded that he is also suspicious of the personal and professional characteristics of a particular Operations employee and recalled that he did not alwcys feel at ease when this individual was operating the reactor.
Two management officials at Georgia Tech, one who is diectly involved in the daily activities at the GTRR facility and the other who is responsible for the administrative, academic, and operational matters of this program, were inter-viewed.
Basically, the first official acknowledged a long history of employee hostility, turmoil, and professional conflicts between the HP and Operations personnel.
He commented regarding the failed attempt to reconcile personali-ties when the GTRR staff was reorganized by him and his immediate supervisor in July 1987.
He stated that the two HP persorinel were dismissed on February 11, 1988, to upgrade the HP program, apparently in response to an NRC assessment that the current program was obsolete, but he also related that if these individuals had become contrite and had pledged to support and cooperate with facility management he would have retained them on the staff.
This incividual also acknowledged professional and personality deficiencies involving a particular member of the Operations staff and related that his use of poor judgment, his failure to folicw procedures, and his carelessness and inattention to his duties and responsibilities, both in completing required records and in operational matters, contributed to the cd-115 contamination incident in August 1987.
Both officials categorically denied that they harassed or intimidated any employee for reporting health and safety concerns to the NRC and claimed no knowledge of any wrongdoing or improprieties by any members of the GTRR staff.
The second interviewee discussed the GTRR staff reorganization and related that the dismissals of the two HP technicians were actually reassignments to upgrade the HP program since their terminations were rescinded and they were placed in other campus employment.
He too denied terminating or reassigning these individuals for reporting safety concerns to the NRC.
He did acknowledge that Board of Regents personnel policy was violated when the two HP employees were dismissed without oue process considerations, which is the reason they were subsequently reinstated.
Case No. E-88-003 5
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.i ACCOUNTABILITY The following' portions of s Report of Investigation (Case iio. 2-88-003) will-not be included in the mats,ial placed in the Public Document Room. They consist of pages 8 through 89.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS t
Page No.
SYNOPSIS..................................
1 ACCOUNTABILITY.............................
7 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS.........................
11 DETAILS OF INVESTIGATIONS........................
13 Purpose of Investigation.....................
13 Background............................
13 Summary of Allegations......................
17 Organizational Structure of the GTRR Facility...........
17 Interviews of GTRR Health Physics Personnel............
20 Review of Documentation Regarding Apparent Harassment and Intimidation 34 Review of Georgia Tech Administrative Records...........
37 l
Interviews of Georgia Tech Administrative Officials........
42 Interviews of GTRR Operations / Support Personnel..........
43 Interviews of NSC Members.....................
52 Interviews of Theragenics Corporation Officials..........
52 Interview of Dr. Melvin W. CARTER, Professor, l
Nuclear Engineering.......................
58 l
Interview of Dr. Thomas F. CRAFT, Retired Nuclear l
Engineer............................
60 Interviews of Georgia Tech Academic /Research Officials......
62 Review of NSC Meeting Minutes...................
71 l
Review of GTRR Files and Records..................
73 i
W111 fulness / Intent.........................
75 j
Investigator's Conclusions....................
79 Status of Investigation......................
80 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION........................
81 LIST OF ACRONYMS............................
C3 LIST OF EXHIBITS............................
85 i
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APPLICABLE REGULATIONS' 10 CFR Part 50.7 - Employee Protection I
Section 210 (a), Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended - Employee Protection 10 CFR Part 55 - Operator's Licenses Technical Specifications 6.3 - Administrative. Controls of Experiments Technical Specification 6.4 - Procedures Operating License R-97 l
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OETAILS OF INVESTIGATION Purpose of Investigation This investigation was initiated on February 3, 1988, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Region II, Regional Administrator (RA), after an i
alleger reported apparent harassment and intimidation of Health Physics (HP) f personnel by the Director of the Frank H. Neely Nuclear Research Center (GTRR),
Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech), Atlanta, Georgia for reporting safety concerns to the NRC. Additionally, the requestor, on February 4, 8, and 19, 1988, provided the NRC, Region II Office of Investigations (01) with written and/or verbal supplemental information which indicated potential licensee improprieties and possible efforts by the Director of the GTRR and/or members of his Operations staff to misrepresent data regarding certain aspects of an August 18, 1987, Cadmium-115 (Cd-115) contamination incident and subsequent clean-up and decontamination activities at the GTRR facility.
Further, OI was requested to review and document possible violations of regulations and technical specifica'tions at the GTRR facility, including improprieties associated with the completion of required records and forms.
Background
On February 9-23, 1987 February 17-23, 1987, and April 7-10, 1987, extensive NRC, Region II inspection activities were conducted by various inspectors at the GTRR facility.
The results of these inspection activities are dccumented in NRC, Region II reports labelled 50-160/87-01, 50-160/87-02, and 50-160/87-03, respectively, which reflect numerous violations for failure to comply with license conditions and provisions of the Code of Federal Regula-tions.
Most, if not all, of the violations noted in Report Number 87-01 cppear to relate specifically to Operations personnel and facility management, however the HP program has also been cited for procedural deficiencies and professional discrepancies in the other inspection reports.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Quoting from the " Enforcement History" section of the NRC, Region II February 23, 1988, Enforcement Conference briefing package, "since 1985, numerous violations of both the HP and Operations areas have been identified."
It is further noted that 'as a result of the limited staff, Health Physics and Operations staff overlap in procedure development and also in the performance of routine ' duties", and " viola-tions would be better characterized as attributable to the GTRR staff members rather than one of the groups" (HP or Operations).
On July 1, 1987, the GTRR staff reorganization, which was apparently first proposed publicly in January 1987, in a memorandu'n from GTRR Director Ratib A. KARAM to Thomas E. STELSON, Vice-President for Research, Georgia Tech, was implemented.
Prior to the reorganization, the then campus Radiation Safety Officer (R50) Robert M. B0YD, ano his HP staff were permitted to address and refer resolution of radiological health and safety concerns directly to the President of Georgia Tech.
B0YD was also permitted to terminate any GTRR work or projects which he or his staff members deemed were radiologically unsafe.
After the reorganization BOYD was no longer the campus RSC and organizational')
he was required to report airectly to KARAM for all work related matters.
Case No. 2-88-003 13
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s the HP staff, alleged improprieties by KARAM relating to the reporting and resolution of an August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident and clean-up activities at the facility, and the failure by KARAM to heed the advice and recommendations of the HP staff regarding the resolution of safety concerns.
Reportedly, these alleged actions by KARAM gave the impression of harassment, intimidation, and discrimination against HP personnel and indicated favoritism and preferential treatment towards Operations employees.
On February 2,1988, MILLSPAUGH telephonically contacted the NRC, Region II RAC/EICS and reported he was concerned about his future employment status as an HP technician at the GTRR facility.
He said he is afraid his employment will be terminated, based upon remarks his supervisor (BOYD) related to him as a result of a conversation. with KARAM. MILLSPAUGH stated KARAM is blaming the HP group for the recent NRC inspections (December 1987 and January 1988) and said he (KARAM) has openly accused him (MILLSPAUGH) and others of being " whistle-blowers." MILLSPAUGH, during the telephone conversation, further related to the RAC/EICS that HP personnel are being constantly harassed for identifying and reporting radiological safety problems to KARAM.
He pledged to describe, in writing, the safety issues identified by the HP personnel and the harassment and intimidation which resulted from reporting these concerns. MILLSPAUGH also stated that the two NRC licensed operators at the GTRR facility do not acknowledge their professional deficiencies and appear to be more concerned with identifying the alleger of a safety concern than they are with resolving the issue.
He alluded to vast personality, professional, and philosophical differences between llP and Operations personnel at the GTRR and stated KARAM appears to be supportive of whomever is against the HP technician in a particular issue regardless of the circumstances.
In a February 3,1988, letter (Exhibit 2), the requestor asked for investiga-tive assistance to identify and document alleged harassment and intimidation of HP personnel at the GTRR facility.
The RA's letter further reiterates the MILLSPAUGH concern that KARAM apparently blames HP personnel for the recent (December 1987 and January 1988) NRC inspections conducted at the facility and his characterization of them as "whistleblowers."
The request letter also reflects that KARAM reportedly told the HP manager (BOYD) to dismiss MILLSPAUGH and if this did not occur KARAM threatened to dismiss all MP personnel.
The letter further relates MILLSPAUGH is of the impression that HP technicians are frequently harassed by Operations personnel for identifying health and safety concerns and that an adversarial and confrontational relationship exists between the two groups.
On February 4, 1988, in a second memorandum to Office of Investigations, Region I (RI) 01:RII (Exhibit 3), the requestor forwarded a supplemental request for investigation at the GTRR facility to identify, document, and resolve alleged willful, intentional improprieties associated with the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident.
The NRC inspection activities and the disclosures of GTRR personnel revealed that facility contamination of radioactive cadmium, possibly including Reactor Operator (RO) William H. C0hNS, occurred on August 18, 1987, as a result of a gemstene irradiation experirent which was being conducted by KARAM.
During the NRC inspection it was further revealed that the licensee may have recorded information regarding certain aspects of this incident which was inaccurate anc/or inconsistent with tecrnical fact patterns developed by the
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Summary of Allegations Inasmuch as the requestor and/or members of his staff provided supplemental 1
information to 01:RII on several occasions regarding various topics and allegations at the GTRR facility, a sumary of the issues which were pursued during this investigation are identified in this section of the report. Those items are as follows:
1.
Alleged harassment and intimidation of ORS (HP) personnel by the Director of the Nuclear Research Center and/or members of his Operations staff for reporting radiological safety concerns to the NRC.
2.
Possible falsification or intentional misrepresentation by the licensee of contamination survey data regarding the August 18, 1907, Cd-115 incident.
3.
Possible intentional falsification of personal survey data (DOWNS) by the licensee regarding the Cd-115 incident.
4.
Possible deliberate attempt by KARAM to conceal potential radiologi-cal health and safety violations from the NRC when he directed the discontinuance of logbooks by HP personnel.
5.
Possible deliberate falsification of the gemstone irradiation experi-ment authorization document and associated forms.
6.
Alleged operation of the reactor without a licensed operator in the control room.
7.
Possible deliberate tampering with safety equipment to avoio contain-ment isolation.
8.
Maintaining separate files for the purpose of concealing adverse information from the NRC.
1 I
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Possible radiological sabotage, vandalism, or malicious damage involving radioactive substances or health and safety monitoring devices.
l INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Present during most all of the substantive interviews conducted during the investigation was NRC inspector KUZO, who also participated in the interviewing process.
All of the technical information discussed during these interviews has been provided to the appropriate NRC, Region II staff member.
Addition-ally, Paul E. FMDRICKSON, NRC, Region II Section Chief, has reviewed all of the documentation obtained by CI to ensure that all technical issues and concerns have been properly addressed / resolved.
f Organizational Structure of the GTRR Facility During the course of the investigation it became apparent that one of the single most significant causes of allegec frustration for HP personnel ano the disharmony and hostility between HP and Operations employees at the GTRF Case No. 2 17
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l Minutes of a special February 19, 1987, RPC meeting (Exhibit 9), reflect a discussion was held regarding the proposed reorganization of the ORS.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
It is noted in these minutes that BOYD, a member of j
the committee, was present on this date, n was MILLSPAUGH, who is listed as a visitor.
Item Nember 3 of the minutes records unanimous opposition of the eight comittee members present regarding the proposed reorganization of the GTRR staff which would place the ORS under the director of the facility. The Chairman of the RPC, Dr. Melvin W. CARTER, was chosen to communicate this unanimous opposition to STELSON and the Acting President of Georgia Tech.
A March 23, 1987, letter to Henry C. BOURNE, Acting President (Exhibit 10),
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from CARTER communicates his, and the comittee's, opposition to the proposed I
reorganization of the GTRR facility staff.
CARTER cites rationale for his opposition to the reorganization and states, "if [the plan is] implemented...
would easily lead to compromises in the radiological safety program." He concludes that he is " unalterably opposed to the proposed reorganization change" and that "this change would put the fox in charge of the hen house."
In a May 6, 1987, memorandum from KARAM to STELSON (Exhibit 11), KARAM
" formally" requests that the proposed GTRR staff reorganization plan be implemented so he can perform his overall responsibility for the direction und operation of the facility.
KARAM concludes that "this responsibility cannot be met totally under the present organizational structure because the Office of Radiological Safety is independent and in actual practice reports to no one."
In a May 27, 1987, memorandum from STELSON to BOURNE (Exhibit 12), the May 6, 1987, KARAM memorandum is forwarded with the recommendation that the proposed reorganization plan be implemented.
The remainder of the memorandum sets forth STELSON's rationale for recommending the proposed organization change.
Item Humber 3 of STELSON's letter addresses reorganization of the radiological safety function and is quoted in its entirety as follows:
"The existing Office of Radiological Safet,y would be abolished, and a new l
Office of Radiation Safety would be established as a component of the Heely Nuclear Research Center.
It would be one of four program functions of the Center as indicated by the organizational diagram.
This would accomodate the recommendations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that
'i our safety and program functions be much more closely integrated and managed At levels below that of my effice."
A notice from BOURNE dated May 28, 1987, was circulated to members of the GTRR facility HP staff and others announcing a June 4, 1987, meeting to discuss the prcposed reorganization.
A June 5, 1987, memorandum from BOYD to CARTER identifies the attendees and reports the results of the June 4, 1987, meeting.
BOYD comments that five attendees " presented strong argument" against the proposed reorganization and only STELSON and KARAM favored it.
In a June 10, 1987, letter to BOURNE (Exhibit 13), CARTER again expressed opposition to implementation of the impending reorganization plan relating to HP functiers and he concludes that "as a matter of conscience and principle, I respectfully submit my resignation as Chairman, Radiation Protection Ccmmittee."
I Case No. 2-88-003 19
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his February 8, 1988, interview that he and his staff (HP personnel) reported to the Vice President for Research prior to the July 1, 1987, reorganization.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: BOYD testified from copious handwri.tten notes he had maintained since early 1987.
These notes, which he read verbatim at times, described significant interactions between him and KARAM and address numerous instances in which BOYD categorized his (KARAM's) conversations and actions as threatening, intimidating, harassing, and I
prejudicial.
BOYD acknowledged long standing adversarial relations between HP and Operations personnel at the GTRR facility and an apparent " polarization" of these two groups. He recalled that in the fall of 1986, KARAM broached the topic of reorganizing the GTRR staff in order for the HP group to report directly to him for all matters. B0YD said he disagreed with KARAM regarding the proposed l
reorganization and advised him that this action was not prudent.
J B0YD, in relating professional differences with KARAM, recalled that in February 1987, while acting under the authority of the now defunct RPC, he terminated the " hot cell" operations at the GTRR facility because of potentially severe radiation problems resulting from leaking Cobalt 60 (Co-60) sources.
B0YD said KARAM became angry at him and the RPC for terminating the i
hot cell activity until all of these sources could be encapsulated in stainless steel.
He related also that the hot cell detector was not functioning properly during this time, which was further cause for suspending these functions.
BOYD described conditions and circumstances in his relationships with STELSON j
and KARAM, beginning from about May 1987 and extending to the present time, l
which seem to indicate the presence of dishamony, animosity, vindictiveness, and apparent intimidation and harassment.
He reisted that in May 1987, while enroute to a meeting with the NRC, STELSON threatened to withhold pay increases for HP personnel and he (STELSON) also blamed BOYD personally for informing the NRC of health and safety violations at the GTRR facility and for media 1
attention regarding the reorganization of the staff. He advised KARAM told him during this time STELSON had approved his (B0YD) involuntary separation from the GTRR staff and also he (STELSON) agreed te the tennination of "anyone else that he (KARAM) wanted to dismiss" from the ORS.
BOYD sumarized that STELSON wanted him terminated because he (B0YD) was leading the opposition to the reorganization plan which placed the ORS under the direct supervision and management of KARAM.
B0YD recalled, just prior to July 1, 1987, remarks from STELSON about contract-ing HP services which caused him to fear for his job at the GTRR facility and he also related that KARAM said about this same time that MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE should be fired for getting him (KARAM) in " hot water with the hierarchy."
He said KARAM repeatedly remarked that these two individuals should be terminated and that this service (HP) be contracted or provided by graduate students who are studying this discipline.
BOYD intimated his perception and belief that STELSON and KARAM were acting in unison during the May-June 1987 time frare and afterwards to intimidate and scare the HP personnel and force them to aboicate their independence and unwillingly submit to the authority KARAM.
I Case No. 2-88-003 21 1
N circumstances of the event, all decontamination and clean-up activities were directed by KARAM so there would be "no fighting among these individuals."
BOYD recalled that during the NRC inspection activities there were arguments, confrontations, heated debates, and conflicting accounts of significant aspects of post Cd-115 event activities.
He said the ORS was being blamed by DOWNS for the cd-115 spill and that Operations employees were publicly proclaiming someone in the ORS had notified the NRC.
He described a meeting of all GTRR employee in KARAM's office on January 6, 1988, after a pre-exit meeting with the NRC, during which KARAM orchestrated efforts to unify the circumstances of the cd-115 incident and to relate a position that appeared to be more favorable to DOWNS and the Operations staff.
B0YD indicated that as a result of this meeting DOWNS may have felt some persuasion to modify his testimony to the NRC from not performing a contamination survey of his residence to not recalling whether he had performed this action.
BOYD said he did not view KARAM's actions on this occasion as an attempt to deceive the NRC or to provide misleading data regarding the cd-115 incident but an effort to discredit ORS personnel.
BOYD reiterated his concerns that KARAM appeared poised to terminate some members of the HP staff.
He again expressed his opinion that there is an absence of a total commitment by KARAM to radiological health and safety and that he appears more interested in the fiscal potential for the GTRR facility.
B0YD related again that ORS employees have been accused by KARAM, on numerous occasions, of " polarizing" against Operations personnel when HP employees report safety violations, which appears to be another indicator of harassment and intimidation.
He recalled from his notes that after the recent NRC inspection KARAM denied him (BOYD) an opportunity to attend the exit conference, an act which was also intimidating to him.
Further, he recalled a January 26, 1988, meeting in STELSON's office during which STELSON indicated imminent changes in the HP staff which were being implemented because the NRC wanted "streng central control and more upgrading of... health physicists."
B0YD related that, in late January 1988, KARAM and STELSON required a psychological evaluation or prefile of each GTRR employee by a Georgia Tech psychologist on STELSON's staff.
He said SHARPE and MILLSPAUGH initially balked at this because it had the appearance of being a subjective action by KARAM which could have been detrimental to them.
In summary, throughout the interview B0YD strongly indicated that KARAM was deceptive in his relationships with the HP staff and that his motives were suspicious.
He described constant distrust and suspicion of KARAM's acticns and behavior by members of the OPS since the July 1,1987, reorganization and related that the threat of involuntary separation was prevalent at all times during this period.
BOYD stated that he personally feared for his job because of the current unrest, the constant confrontational environment and hostility at the GTRR facility, and his contacts with the NRC and he related that the staff reorganization had affected him both psychologically and professionally.
He enumerated that as a result of this action, he had lost the title and position of RSO, a personal secretary, a buoget for his group operations, direct access to the Office of the President, and credibility among his peers in the industry.
He concluded that all of these items, coupled with the fact that KARAM blames HP personnel for any unfavorable activity or adverse publicity at the GTRR and KARAM's frequent innuendos regarding jcb securi+.y, appears to be ample evidence to demonstrate that he (KARAM) employs a continuous campaign of harassment and intimidation against these indivioua..
Case No. 2-28-003 23
n GTRR management occurred in February 1987 when an unknown complainant notified the NRC and the State of Georgia regarding Hot Cell discrepancies.
He said the I
HP personnel were warned by KARAM that anyone who is identified as an alleger would be in trouble.
He stated also that, in his opinion, the RPC was abolished in the reorganization because KARAM was angry at the committee members for closing the Hot Cell in February 1987.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
During this portion of the interview, MILLSPAUGH referred to numerous Georgia Tech memoranda regarding the proposed GTRR staff reorganization.n. The documents which are significant to this issue are explained in the " Organizational Structure of the GTRR Facility" section of the investigation report.
MILLSPAUGH, in discussing the dutles of the two radiation safety committees that existed prior to the staff reorganization, advised KARAM has stated more than once that these committees served at his pleasure and they are "not there to disapprove anything." MILLSPAUGH also related h u impression of KARAM's June 1987 memorandum to the HP personnel telling them to refrain from maintain-ing personal logbooks. He said he interpreted KARAM's memorandum to imply that logbooks were not permitted because management (KARAM) did not want to be cited (by the NRC) for violations recorded there. MILLSPAUGH reviewed personal notes he had maintained and then responded to questions concerning actions by KARAM which are perceived as harassment and intimidation.
He noted he had recorded in his logbook on May 5, 1987, that B0YD said KARAM and STELSON threatened
" poor or no pay raises..." or a " cut in salary" for HP personnel "due to the NRC hassling of STELSON and his group." He related that during another conversation with KARAM about this same time KARAM offer'ed to designate him (MILLSPAUGH) the RSO and BOYD in turn was to be promoted to the Assistant Director of the GTRR facility.
He intimated they both refused the offer and recognized it as a token gesture or a bribe from KARAM to obtain their cooperation regarding the merger of the HP staff under the GTRR director.
MILLSPAUGH recalled from his notebook that B0YD had told him STELSON threatened to eliminate the HP personnel and contract this service in the event the GTRR facility was closed.
He said this statement by STELSON was viewed as another attempt to intimidate these employees and to coerce them into quietly accepting the staff reorganization.
MILLSPAUGH concurred with BOYD's remarks regarding SELMAN's letter to the campus newspaper regarding the staff reorganization and related that KARAM also accused him and other HP staff members of assisting her with the contents and encouraging her to submit the letter for publication.
He recalled other intimidating remarks by KARAM in a January 17, 1988, staff meeting when lac stated "he wants no judgment or experience in HP emergencies", that "everything can be covered by a checklist" and that "he could hire graduate students of#
the street to do HP work."
MILLSPAUGH advised that, in his opinion, another example of management's (KARAM) apparent disregard for the HP personnel is demonstrated in the fact that not one of the three permanently assigned employees (B0YD, MILLSPAUGh, ard SHARPE) were permitted to attend the January 22, 1988, exit conference with ?e NRC.
He said STELSON advised the GTRR staff after the exit conference that the NRC wanted " stronger management control" and that STELSON is using the NRC at the scacegoat to totally dominate the HP personnel.
I said he viewed this
_ Caso hee 0C3 25
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information from NRC employee "VERRELLI" (David M., Branch Chief, NRC Region II) which gives the impression that KARAM's efforts and activities at the GTRR facility are blessed by the NRC.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The remark by MILLSPAUGH concerning NRC employee VERRELLI was verbally transmitted to an Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) investigator (L. SMITH) since that NRC office is resolving other issues associated with the GTRR facility.
SHARPE (CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE) (Exhibit 21), interviewed on February 5, 1988, provided requested background and professional data and stated he has worked in the HP program at the GTRR facility for three and one half years.
He related that, in his opinion, the relationships between the HP and the Operations staffs began to deteriorate in late 1985 and has continued declining to the present time.
He described incidents of open hostility, intense animosity, and severe personality and professional conflicts and he developed patterns cf behavior and actions by management (mainly KARAM) and memoers of the GTRR Operations staff which have exasperated and frustrated the HP personnel as they attempted to perform their duties and responsibilities.
SHARPE recalled that beginning about 1985 it appeared that KARAM began emphasizing profitability as the single most important factor for operating the GTRR and as a result he was reluctant to spend resources to upgrade and procure needed supplies and equip-ment. He said KARAM in 1986, after an initial period of becoming comfortable as the Director of the GTRR, began to aggressively exert "more control over his GTRR staff" which created negative and adverse feelings among the Operations personnel, who in turn, became " testy" and confrontational with HP personnel.
SHARPE further related that the unstable environment and hostile attitudes eventually polarized the HP and Operations personnel to the point that HP suggestions and recommendations are met with " aggressive tendencies" by Operations personnel.
SHARPE, also reading from personal notes he has accumulated since early 1986, recalled bad attitudes and a lack of cooperation from Operations personnel and KARAM's apparent failure to initially address and resolve these issues.
SHARPE further reported numerous examples in which Operations personnel failed to follow the HP advice, suggestions, and/or recommendations and as a result there was further polarization, disharmony, antagonism, and an adversarial reaction between the two groups.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The incidents identified by SHARPE were transmitted to the NRC, Region II staff (FREDRICKSON) for review and resolution.
l SHARPE advised that HP personnel became very frustrated with KARAM during this period (1986) and he seemed to have little or no regard for the professional i
l and philosophical opinions of others unless it happened to coincide with those of his own.
SHARPE intimated that KARAM appeared to be more tolerant of Operations personnel, especially DOWNS, even though mistakes were frequently made, their tempers flared, they were of ten careless, at times displayed minimal regarc for safety, and they frequently violated their own operating procedures.
According to SHARPE, this attitude by KARAM was difficult to accept especially since the HP persennel were viewed as "being an evil necessity," " bad guys," ond
" tattletales" by the Operations personnel.
He related he and E0YD repea+e.'y Case No. 2-88-003 27
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4 SHARPE discussed KARAM's position regarding the use of personal logbooks at the GTRR facility and related he strongly urged discontinuance of this practice in favor of reporting violations in memorandum form to him.
He advised that because of the restrictive environment at the GTRR facility minor health and i
safety violations may be ignored because of the hassle involved in reporting them to KARAM and because not reporting them prevents polarization and eliminates dissension between the HP and Operations groups.
SHARPE advised that after the reorganization KARAM " ceased working with us" and became a sole dictator. He said HP recommendations and suggestions were generally ignored unless KARAM was personally interested and the environment and working conditions were " completely demoralizing." He said KARAM canvassed all facility employees regarding the possibility of a polygraph examination because of apparent vandalism but this suggestion was viewed by HP personnel as harassment since it appeared KARAM wanted only to identify persons responsible for discussing safety concerns with the NRC.
SHARPE explained an incident which occurred on November 13, 1987, that has caused him to fear that he will eventually be involuntarily terminated from his job.
SHARPE said this incident involved SELMAN's letter to the campus newspaper. He said KARAM " accosted" him in the hallway at the GTRR facility and angrily demanded to know if he had assisted SELMAN with her letter or if he had anything to do with the letter.
He said KARAM grilled him repeatedly on this occasion regarding the SELMAN letter and then he approached BOYD and accused someone (an HP employee) of assisting SELMAN with the letter "since she is a student and does not know enough to write such a letter."
He said KARAM then angrily discussed the incident.with SELMAN and fellow student HP employee CAMERON and then reportedly threatened to terminate them if either ever engaged in this activity in the future.
SHARPE discussed the remarks of STELSON at a January 22, 1988, meeting with all GTRR staff members present.
He said STELSON stated there would be " stronger centralized management" at the GTRR facility and that KARAM's policies and practices would be totally supported and strictly enforced.
SHARPE related that STELSON said anyone who did not like the envi~ronment at the GTRR facility could leave and that it was time to start bringing "more Ph.D's on board."
He also concurred with BOYD's remark that B0YD was told (by KARAM) he had "one more chance" to "get his staff in line" and to quit going to the NRC and the media (emphasis supplied).
SHARPE advised that the statements of STELSON are illogical because at one time he talks about closing the GTRR facility and the next time he talks about replacing BOYD with a person who has a Ph.D. degree.
SHARPE advised from personal notes that KARAM arranged interviews for all GTRR personnel with staff psychologist Michael O' BANNON (a member of STELSON's staff) to "see if there's makeup of personality that needed to be known."
He advised that because of the possible implications of using the results of this evaluation against the HP employee he and MILLSPAUCH reluctantly agreed to participate without their attorney present.
SHARPE advised that it appears to be the consensus among management officials such as KARAM, STELSON, and th:
current president of Georgia Tech that HP employees are the cause of all problems at the GTRR facility.
He said the integrity of KARAM and STELSON is, in his opinion, suspect because they have not represented the facts truthfully Case No. 2-88-003 29
n 6
Continuing with her comments regarding her November 13, 1987 letter, SELMAN said KARAM warned her in a threatening and hostile manner not to write another letter of this nature to the newspaper and furthermore, she had violated Georgia Tech policy by not having the letter first edited and approved by him.
She stated he then threatened to terminate her employment if she wrote another letter and indicated STELSON had approved this action.
She advised KARAM then repeatedly and violently accused her of collaborating with a full-time HP employee to write her letter.
She said KARAM also insulted her because she opposed the GTRR staff reorganization and stated ne told her to " butt out" and
" quit dabbling in politics" since she was only a student.
She said KARAM also mentioned to her that he would dismiss CAMERON if he wrote a letter as she had done.
I SELMAN reiterated that professional, personal, and philosophical conflicts occur on a regular basis between HP and Operations personnel, and that KARAM appears to be the main agitator.
She advised that the severity of a particular conflict is proportional to the size of the project or the activity which is in progress.
SELMAN confirmed that there is a definite tendency for HP and Operations personnel to avoid professional interactions and that KARAM appears to openly favor and support the Operations group.
She said HP employees are regularly blamed by KARAM for reporting and discussing safety matters with the NRC and Operations personnel repeatedly refuse to acknowledge that some of their actions contribute to healtf and safety concerns.
SELMAN related her knowledge of the August 1987 Cd-115 contamination incident.
Her remarks appear to be consistent with those reported by HP personnel during previous interviews.
She acknowledged that DOWNS is the principle Operations employee involved in this incident and his inattentive, careless, and irrespen-sible actions were responsible for the event.
She said there was a great deal of confusion regarding the actions of DOWNS immediately following the event and that KARAM and DOWNS may have related associated incidents which they believe occurred, notwithstanding the testimony of other GTRR employees.
She said she did not perceive this as an effort to conceal facts but viewed it as a failure to properly address and resolve an issue.
SELMAN concluded that, in her opinion, HP personnel cannot operate effectively in the current environment at the GTRR facility since there is no spirit of cooperation between the two groups (HP and Operations). When queried regarding the items which are listed in the " Summary of Allegations" section of the report of investigations, she claimed no personal knowledge of wrongdoing regarding any,of these topics.
CAMERON (Exhibit 23) related education, background and employment data regaroing his association with the GTRR facility since October 1986.
He oescribed the working environment when he first became employed as " pretty good" but with some evidence of animosity and hostility between HP and Operations personnel.
He said the staff reorganization has aggravated personal and professional relationships between the two groups and created the potential for conflict of interest problems because HP employees no longer feel they have the indepencerce to act decisively when they perceive a potential health and safety issue.
l In response to the question, "Have you felt particularly threatened, intimidated, harassed... in the perfomance of your duties and responsibili-ties?" CAMERON acknowledged in the affirmative and stated on one occasion in November 1987, following the publication of SELMAN's letter in the Georgia Tech
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irradiating the materials involved for the amount of exposure time. He said that a review of the request form by the NSC, a process that was not accomplished, may possibly have eliminated any potential documentation discrepancies and said KARAM, in his haste to conclude the gemstone irradiation experiment failed to refer it to the NSC for approval.
He was unable to provide any substar.tive infonnation regarding other aspects of the investiga-tion.
MATTERN (Exhibit 24), an HP graduate student and part-time technician at the GTRR facility, was interviewed regarding a February 16, 1988, letter to KARAM from MATTERN which is an account of MATTERN's relationships with other HP personnel.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
In response to a request for documentation which could demonstrate that MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.perfonned unsatisfactorily or had received disciplinary action prior to their involuntary separation on February 11, 1988 KARAM furnished the aforementioned February 16, 1988, letter from MATTERN.
A review of the letter revealed MATTERN recorded derogatory remarks regarding the personal habits and character of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE. A copy of the MATTERN letter is' attached to his Report of Interview.
MATTERN advised he prepared the letter in response to allegations by student HP technicians SELMAN and CAMERON that KARAM had harassed and intimidated HP personnel.
He related the letter, which contains his personal views, impressions, and opinions regarding the unprofessional character and conduct of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, was not solicited by KARAM but was intended to defend KARAM from accusations which he (KARAM) claims are unfounded.
He stated that, in his opinion, the involuntary dismissals of both MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE are justified and when he learned they were contesting their termination in a lawsuit against Georgia Tech he decided to record his experiences and observa-tions regarding these individuals. MATTERN acknowledged the presence of a
" power struggle" between KARAM and the HP group which was aggravated by the July 1, 1987, reorganization of the GTRR facility staff.
MATTERN, a graduate of Texas A&M University and an employee of that research reactor facility, noted that HP employees there have the authority to terminate activities that could become detrimental to health and safety but they are also more coopera-tive with Operations personnel.
He concluded emphatically that HP personnel at the GTRR facility should have more authority and they should report to someone other than the director (KARAM) of the program.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The reporting investigator sensed that the interviewee was not totally objective in his observations and opinions regarding the two terminated HP employees.
It appears that MATTERN is indebted to KARAM because of his work-study situation which was apparently arranged by KARAM.
Further, it appears that MATTERP s personality, status, and close association with KARAM may have alienated him from B0YD, MILLSPAUGH, SHARPE, and the other members of the HP group, thus causing h!m to render a subjective opinion concerning the personalities and professionalism of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
In suninary, BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, SHARPE, SELMAN, end CAMERON all related unequivocally that they are fearful of discussing with the NRC in an cpen and candid manner any item or issue they perceived to be of a real or potentia' Case No. 2-88-003 33
6 observations. They viewed this action by KARAM as an attempt to restrict their duties and responsibilities to ensure a radiologically safe environment at the GTRR facility.
BOYD related that this memorandum, which was circulated after the July 1, 1987, staff reorganization, further demonstrates KARAM's desire to eliminate the independence of the HP employees by requiring them to communicate I
directly to him. He explained that this particular arrangement proved to be unsatisfactory because of his apparent preferential treatment of Operations staff members who repeatedly violated procedures noted/ identified by the HP group.
..e handwritten note from KARAM to BOYD dated January 21, 1988 (Exhibit 27),
requests BOYD to locate the masslinn cloth used to wipe the top of the reactor on August 19, 1987, following the cd-115 contamination incident. B0YD related that he believes KARAM wrote this note knowing that the masslinn cloth was not retrievable from the radioactive waste.
He saio in his opinion, this note appears to demonstrate subtle harassment and intimidation by KARAM or his lack of knowledge and experience concerning HP matters.
BOYD provided a copy of his personal notes for February 29, 1988 (Exhibit 28),
which record portions of alleged conversations with MacDONALD during this date.
He writes, "MacDonald ask(ed) me why don't you resign if you are going to not do your job. He said to me that I was bucking my boss KARAM and not doing a good job of managing and haven't for a year." BOYD advised that MacDONALD, who has been employed at the GTRR facility since about January 15, 1988, has insulted and ridiculed him on other occasions and generally has begun to harass and intimidate him just as KARAM has done over the past several years.
BOYD furnished a copy of a personal, handwritten memorandum dated March 2,1988 (Exhibit 29), to Dr. Robert FULLER, Jr., Vice-President for Business and Finance.
BOYD explained that, in his opinion, comments in the memorandum to FULLER demonstrates continued harassment and intimidation by KARAM.
He concludes the memorandum by writing "the atmosphere down here is still bad but I'm holding on."
Exhibit 30, portions of a logbook and Exhibit 31, pages of personal notes from a diary, was provided by MILLSPAUGH during his interview on February 9, 1968.
The logbook pages (Exhibit 30), numbered 13, 15, and 69 for the dates February 3-12, 1987, and August 19-24, 1987, record references to instances which he claims represent KARAM's failure to respond to HP recommendations regarding radiological health and safety matters at the GTRR facility.
l MILLSPAUGH advised that KARAM's apparent negative attituae towards HP personnel and their advice and recommendations nurtures the perception that he is hostile and repressive and has little regard for these employees or their duties and I
responsibilities.
Page 13 of the logbook discusses Hot Cell instrumentation
{
problems discussed with KARAM and MILLSPAUGH writes, "I recommend discontinuing i
work in cell until a new detector is installed.
Ionization chamber preferably."
Page 15 of the logbook contains the entries "discuf, sed this weeks serious deficiencies" (with KARAM) and " talked with KARAM re: state shuttina down Hot Cell due to instr. [ instrument] malfunctions."
l INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The NSC elected to terminate the Hot Cell activities in a February 24, 1987, meeting for the same reascns previously citea by ti!LLSPAUGH.
1 Case No._2-88-003 35 3
p' O
l protective clothing... but allowed the sleeves cut off... which effectively negates the purpose of the protective clothing." SHARPE related that this was another example, in his opinion, of KARAM compromising health and safety and diluting the credibility of and respect for the HP group.
Exhibit 34 is a copy of a page from SELMAN's logbook dated February 13, 1987, in which she describes a confrontation between HP personnel (herself and CAMERON) and a member of the Operations staff (DOWNS).
SELMAN records that her request for information was met with a curt and sarcastic remark from DOWNS who also engaged in conduct apparently designed to agitate and aggravate HP personnel.
She concludes her recording by stating that DOWNS' behavior was infantile, irresponsible, and uncooperative.
3 Exhibit 35 is a copy of handwritten notes prepared by SELMAN following her meeting with KARAM to discuss the letter she wrote to the Georgia Tech campus newspaper expressing opinions regarding the GTRR staff reorganization.
SELMAN related during her personal interview that although she recorded substantive remarks by KARAM she was unable to capture his forceful, abusive, arrogant, and threatening tone of voice.
She advised he repeatedly accused BOYD and CARTER of collaborating with her to write the letter and threatened to dismiss her if she wrote additional letters to any newspaper.
Exhibit 36 is a copy of a March 11, 1985, memorandum from KARAM to BOYD, with a February 25, 1985, memorandum from B0YD to KARAM and a February 25, 1985, memorandum from SHARPE to BOYD attached.
All three documents relate to an incident in which DOWNS struck the glass window of the Hot Cell with a wrench causing the glass to chip.
This incident, described as " horseplay" by KARAh, was reported by SHARPE to BOYD who informed KARAM.
The response to this incident by KARAM who states, "Mr. Downs continues to have my support," is reportedly viewed by HP employees BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE as a failure to discipline a member of the Operations staff for a serious health and safety incident reported by an HP employee.
Each of these individuals testified that they believed KARAM would have reacted differently if someone (HP employee) other than an Operations staff member was involved.
Review of Georgia Tech Administrative Records Following their interviews by 01 on February 5 and 9,1968, respectively, SHARPE and MILLSPAUGH were involuntarily terminated from Georgia Tech and their HP positions at the GTRR facility on February 11, 1988.
During their interviews both expressed grave concern that they were in danger of being terminated for reporting and discussing health and safety concerns with the NRC. As a result of their apparent involuntary dismissal, Georgia Tech administrative and personnel files and records at the GTRR facility and at the Office of Personnel pertaining to these two individuals were reviewed to i hn:1fy/obtain documentation regarding this matter.
The documents, attached er.her as exhibits or referenced herein, were provided either by KARAM, Jchn H. GIBSON, Personnel Director, cr FULLER, Vice-President, Business and Finance.
Exhibit 37 is a copy of a February 10, 1988, letter from KARAM, approved by STELSON, to GIBSON infor ning him that "it is imperative to upgrade" the GTRR facility HP program to " meet nur obligations to the [NRC] under terms of our license." This letter further states tnat MILLSPAUGH and ShAFFE will ba i
Cnm h 2-m-@M E
e
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rules and regulations in private logs" and "these infractions were not brought to the attention of Georgia Tech officials."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: The investigation failed to reveal any evidence that SHARPE or MILLSPAUGH recorded entries or violations in their logbooks after KARAM's July 29, 1987, memorandum which discouraged the continued use of this document.
Additionally, it is recorded that "both technicians refused to accept the authority of the President of Georgia Tech." "...they answered to no one," and "both technicians discharged their duties in an unprofessional and highly irritating manner."
Finally, the memorandum concludes that i
"Dr. Michael O' Bannon recommended that HP functions be performed by new personnel and that the HP and Operations groups be physically separated.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: The termination letters to SHARPE and MILLSPAUGH dated February 11, 1988, do not contain any of the litany of reasons for their dismissal which are cited in KARAM's memorandum to CRECINE.
Exhibit 43 is a memorandum dated February 17, 1988, from FULLER to STELSON and KARAM entitled " Health Physics Upgrading and Restructuring (Record)."
In this memorandum FULLER requests that STELSON and KARAM each prepare "a narrative of your best recollections related to events pointing up the necessity to upgrade and restructure the [HP] operations." FULLER further requests details of these events, including dates, documents, discussions, and meetings with the present HP staff members who are directly affected by the program's upgrading.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
On April 13, 1988, the reporting investigator telephonically contacted FULLER's office to determine if the requested information had been compiled.
Charles N. RAMSEY, Administrative Assistant to FULLER, who has been extensively involved in resolving all issues relating to the GTRR facility acvised that as of this date neither STELSON nor KARAM had responded to this request.
Exhibit 44 is a copy of a memorandum dated February 18, 1988, from MacDONALD to KARAM entitled " Notes Relating To Firing HILLSPAUGH and SHARPE."
In this memorandum MacDONALD concludes, apparently from notes he prepared on February 13, 1988, and presented verbally to the NSC during a meeting on February 16, 1988, that the present HP program is outdated and substandard; its personnel are uncooperative, belligerent, and uncontrollable by management (KARAM) and that the program "had to be rebuilt from the bottom up."
i MacDONALD's memorandum further cites criticism of the GTRR facility HP program by NRC, Region II officials and in essence appears to shift the blame for the dismissals of SHARPE and MILLSPAUGH on the NRC because of the agency's apparent dissatisfaction with the program.
MacDONALD continues that floor surveys of the building (following the Cd-115 contamination event) were apparently j
withheld from the NRC, implying that it was the fault of HP personnel, and j
further, GTRR records were in disarray when he began to collect information j
relating to'the Cd-115 incident.
Finally, MacDONALD references the "0' Bannon Report" and implies this docurrent suggests that "some people had to go."
He states that a discussion u s Nid with KARAM, STELSON, and (Dr. Bernd) KAHN, Chairman, NSC and the " conclusion Case No. 2-88-003 39
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Operations personnel "were able to offer realistic solutions to resolving the conflict."
The conclusions of the interviewer, as stated in the report, relate first to coments concerning the ability and skill level of some GTRR personnel in handling difficult interpersonal issues and the particular management style of KARAM.
O' BANNON further concludes that "These managers reporting to Dr. Karam are not seen by other employees as effective leaders.
There appears to be little evidence of stong(sic) first-line management skill in either Health Physics or Operations."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Based upon the GTRR organizational chart from July 1, 1987, to the present time, the "first-line management" is B0YD (HP) and McDOWELL, MERCER and TAYLOR (Operations / Support).
The C'EANNON report does not state specifically that B0YD is a weak manager but instead reflects that " managers who report to KARAM" are not seen as effective leaders and that first-line management skills in both the HP and Operations groups do not appear to be strong.
It appears that MacDONALD has misstated and lifted out of context the conclusion of 0' BANNON by singling out only BOYD as a deficient manager.
This apparent attitude by MacDONALD does appear to give credibility to BOYD's testimony that he has been harassed and intimidated by this individual.
The O' BANNON *eport next concludes that the conflict (between HP and Operations groups) "is uelikely to be resolved satisfactorily within the current organiza-tional context and with the individuals (apparently a reference to both HP and Operations personnel) currently in place.
O'BAhh0N states, "a major factor contributing to the current level of conflict is the absence of first-line management activity in Health Physics of a constructive nature" and that, "this group does not have regular guidance and direction which contributes to the overall organizational goals."
i Finally, the report concludes with recommendations for improving the current interpersonal conflicts at the GTRR facility.
Significant recommendations recorded in the report are the reassignment of HP personnel "to other responsibilities appropriate to their levels of skill and experience" ano,
" physical separation of the work-spaces of the two groups... to ensure the cessation of dysfunctional interactions." The report further recommends that "an experienced manager" and one with the " ability to provide leadership, build teamwork, and maintain stable relationships" should be sought for the HP group.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
MacDONALD's memorandum of February 18, 1988, in reference to the O'BANh0N report, states "the division [between HP and Operations]" was to severe to heal and that "some people had to go."
Accurately stated, the O' BANNON report concludes that, "The conflict is unlikely to be resolved... with the individuals currently in place" ano recommends " physical separation of the work-spaces of the two groups."
The apparent implication of the Mac0ONALD letter appears to be the dismissal /tennination of HP personnel (BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHAPFE),
hcwever, the O' BANNON report recommenos personnel actions such as reassignments end the physical separaticn of work spaces.
Exhibit 46 is a letter dated March 3, 1988, from FULLER to 01, witn a copy of a July 1987, Georgia Tech dccument attached entitled "Long-Penge Finar.cu.1
__LMah 2-8@-@@l 41
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1 process requirements set forth in the Board of Regents personnel procedures.
He said STELSON told him repeatedly that he could not follow the requirements.
in the personnel manual regarding due process because the NRC had instructed him to terminate these two individuals.
He advised that since he could not persuade STELSON to follow the proper personnel procedures for dismissing employees he told him to have a level of management below the office of the Vice-President sign the dismissal letters so the terminated employees could appeal to him (STELSON) if they contested the action.
GIBSON related that on February 10, 1988, he received a letter addressed to him from KARAM which stated MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE were being immediately terminated. He said he then telephonically contacted KARAM and informed him that the due process procedures were not being followed in this matter.
He
.said KARAM told him that STELSON and the NRC had directed him to "get rid of these people immediately." He said he cautioned KARAM that the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE in the manner indicated in the letter addressed to him (GIBSON) could result in serious consequences for Georgia Tech officials.
GIBSON said that following the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE both individuals came to his office with their attorney seeking unemployment benefits information.
He recalled that both individuals were reinstated on February 15, 1988, upon the authority of STELSON.
Both interviewees claimed no additional pertinent information regarding the purpose of the investigation.
Interviews of GTRR Operations / Support Personnel During the investigation GTRR Operations / Support personnel were also inter-viewed to obtain any pertinent information regarding the purpose of this investigation. The following individuals, with their job titles indicated, were interviewed by the reporting investigator:
Leslie D. (DEAN) McDOWELL, Manager of Reactor Operations William H. DOWNS, Reactor Operator David L. COX, Reactor Operator Trainee Mitchell F. MERCER, Electronics Specialist Jerry E. TAYLOR, Hot Cell Operator Daphne W. AYC0CK, Secretary to the Director Judy L. RODGERS, Secretary INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Interviewees McDOWELL, DOWNS, COX, MERCER, and TAYLOR testified under oath.
Throughout the interviews of all Operations / Support personnel it was apparent to the reporting investigator, and the participating inspector when he was present, that each interviewee appeared to be ccmpletely loyal to and allied with KARAM against full-time and part-time undergraduate members of the HP staff.
Further, some interviewees, when asked to be objective and unbiased in their testimony, stated they were unable to do 50 because of the intensity of the adversarial relationships between the HP and Operations grcups.
l McDOWELL (Exhibit 48) advised he has been employed at Georgia Tech since 196a; first as a R0 and then as a Senior F0 since 1968.
He elated he has been designated as a GTRR manager (Reactor Operations) for the past four years.
McDOWELL acknowledged a prolongcc hestlie existence between HP and Operations Case No. 2-88-_003_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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home" and survey his residence.
COX even stateo subsequently that he drove DOWNS home the evening of the discovery of the Cd-115 incident and-
.that DOWNS had a GM meter with him at that time.
Following the aforemen-tioned pre-exit meeting DOWNS subsequently testified "he could not i
remember" if he had taken a GM meter home with him. This issue was not fully resolved during the inspection or the investigation, although it was fully discussed with each licensee individual who attended the pre-exit meeting.
j i
McDOWELL discussed the various ramifications of the issue of whether DOWNS had l
surveyed his residence following the discovery of the Cd-115 incident.
He categorically denied that he, KARAM, and/or C0X attempted to persuade D0Wh5 to alter his testimony to the NRC following the January 1988 pre-exit meeting even though the four of them had met following this gathering to discuss the topic of surveying his residence.
McDOWELL next reviewed the " Experimenter's Checklist and Schedule Form",
associated with the gemstone irradiation experiment ano the resultant Cd-115 l
contamination incident.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
This form is used to document NSC approval of irradiation experiments and to record pertinent facts regarding exposure data and other information during the experiment.
McDOWELL discussed the purpose of th" form ano the items of data contained in the various locations on the document. He also discussed specific information regarding the gemstone irradiation experiment and actual or propused conditicns relative to the particular experiment.
McDOWELL acknowledged that D0WNS was responsible for supplying the data on the form which relates to the gemstone irradiation experiment and said categorically he is unaware of any improprie-ties, deliberate discrepancies, or intentional omissions associated with the completion of this form or any other forms completed by DOWNS.
McDOWELL also denied that he had ever knowingly and intentionally harassed, intimidated, or threatened any HP employee.
He further denied an awareness that KAPAM had deliberately harassed or intimidated HP personnel but said he (KARAM) insists that BOYD and the ORS employees report all matters to him rather than to outside Georgia Tech officials.
McDOWELL advised he recalled STELSCM telling assembled employees at the GTRR facility in 1987 that the current HP empicyees could be replaced with contract service.
He said he has heard KARAM state recently that MILLSPAUGH should be " moved out" or terminated because he is an agitator. McDOWELL concurred that MILLSPAUGH should be terminated and furtner i
expressed bitterness towards this HP individual because he has an improper attitude when citing violations.
he related that SELMAN's letter about staff reorganization to the Georgia Tech newspaper in November 1987 also caused intense animosity between the two groups and further alienated individuals ano nearly resulted in KARAM terminating her part-time employment.
McDOWELL was queried regarding the allegation that the reactor was operatir.g without a licensed individual in the control recm.
He categorically ceried be had ever committed a violation of this nature ar.d said, to his knowleoge, the reactor has never operated without a licensed inoividual in the contrui room.
He further denied any knowledge of tampering with containment isclation devices i
or safety equipment to circumvent technical specifications or regulatory requirements.
He also denied knowledge of any records improprieties or maintaining of separate files and records to ceceive the NRC and conclucec a t Case No. 2-88-003 45
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quality assurance according to technical specifications and the 10 CFR q
regulations. He acknowledged it is his responsibility as an operator to ensure that accurate and complete information is entered on the forms and admitted he may have been careless or may have made inadvertent mistakes in completing some portions of these records, however, he said he has never intentionally or deliberately recorded incorrect or inaccurate data on this or any other GTRR documents.
DOWNS acknowledged that required data is missing from the gemstone irradiation forms because he mistakenly failed to complete them properly.
DOWNS next responded to additional questions and statements regarding the interpersonal relationships between the HP and Operations groups. He discussed the hostility between HP and Operations personnel and admitted to frequent and unpleasant confrontations with these individuals.
He characterized the actions of HP personnel as " police" oriented and advised they invited the wrath of other staff members by citing them for violations which do not impact upon radiological health and safety.
DOWNS discussed the incident in which he, while reportedly engaged in
" horseplay", struck the hot cell window with a wrench causing the glass to chip.
He recalled that, in his opinion, the HP technician (SHARPE) who witnessed this incident exploited it as an erroneous example of instability on the part of the operator.
DOWNS clarified that SHARPE was acting properly when he reported the incident of horseplay but he was not acting within the parameters of his duties when he characterized the operator as an unstable i
individual.
He readily acknowledged that, in his cpinion, an " atmosphere of mutual distrust" exists between HP and Operations personnel because of the frequency of incidents in which HP personnel exceed the threshold of their i
duties and responsibilities in reporting violations.
i DOWNS commented regarding the resolution of concerns, issues, and apparent violations identified by HP personnel and stated KARAM "makes a serious effort... to find out what happened... and resolve the problem." He recanted his opinion that KARAM has made serious efforts to resolve issues when he notea that "none of us did a good job" of resolving the Cd-115 contamination incident in a timely and precise manner.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
A lengthy technical discussion between KUZO and DOWNS occurred to clarify the delay by the licensee in resolving ano documenting the Cd-115 incident.
The significant aspects of this discussion have been set forth in the NRC Inspection Report Number S0-160/87-08.
The topic of harassment and intimidation of HP personnel was broached at various times during the interview of DOWNS.
Essentially, DOWNS completely denied that he knew personally of instances in which HP personnel were treated differently or were intentionally harassed and intimidated, notwithstanding the hostilities that have existed between the HP and Operations personnel.
Further, DOWNS stated he has never heard KARAM threaten to terminate HP l
personnel for any reason, including the reporting of safety concerns u the I
hRC. With respect to personality and philosophical differences, DOWNS said he telieves both HP and Operations personnel should share the blame but favored replacing current HP staff members with new employees.
Case No. 2-88-003 47
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errors in judgment and seme instances of carelessness and delayed responses to particular situations as well as potential deficiencies in various aspects of.
the operator training program. He denied that he has ever willfully or intentionally violated or circumvented procedures, requirements, or regulations.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
During KARAM's interview he was queried extensively regarding any proposed or planned remedial actions regarding DOWNS to correct apparent deficiencies in the manner he allegedly performs his duties and responsibilities.
KARAM advised that he had counselled DOWNS repeatedly and had considered removing him from license duties and assign-ing him to a " paperwork" situation.
DOWNS denied that he was " repeatedly counselled" and said he was unaware of any proposal or plan to remove him from license duties because of deficiencies in the performance of his duties.
C0X (Exhibit 51) related employment and biographical data and comented regarding the historical aspects of the current disharmony and animosities and the personal, professional and philosophical conflicts, and the confrontational incidents between HP and Operations personnel at the GTRR facility.
He cited work related events during which an uncooperative attituoe was displayed by HP personnel and he noted he has the perception the HP technicians are "spys" rather than allies in a common effort to protect against the hazards of radiation.
He related that the staff reorganization in July 1987 apparently caused the HP personnel to further disrespect management (KARAM) and O r ations staff members.
COX, who is an NRC license trainee, related he was not involved with any aspect of the Cd-115 incident and claimed no direct knowledge of this matter.
In response to questions by KUZO, he recalled that he drove DOWNS home following the discovery of the incident and that DOWNS carried a GM meter with him or.
this occasion.
He continued to discuss this particular aspect of the Cd-115 event but categorically denied that he, KARAM, and McDOWELL had in any way attempted to persuade DOWNS to alter testimony regarding this matter C0X noted that the manner in which the Cd-115 incident was resolved by KARAM served to worsen relationships between the HP and Operations staff members.
He advised that, in his opinion, HP personr.el maintained hope that the reorganiza-tion would be rescinded so they could " control the director of the (GTRR) facility."
He further stated that the HP employees " definitely don't like Dr. Karam" and they do not acknowledge cr aamit their problems L.no deficiencies when they are identified.
C0X centinued to corrment negatively regarding current HP staff members, except for ShARPE whom he praised for his profession-alism and his ability to cooperate with Operations personnel.
He related that KARAM has discussed the possibility of terminating the HP employees which has further created a chilling relationship between him and these staff members.
COX was queried extensively regarding the other investigative issues set forth in the report of investigation.
He denied that he is aware of any instance ir, which the reactor has cperated without a licer. sed individual in the centrol room.
Fe denied kncwledge of record improprieties or any efforts by the licensee to conceal evidence of violations from the hRC.
In conclusion, COX Case No. 2-83-003 49
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f.
W INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
TAYLOR was reassigned to the ORS following the dismissal of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE. As of late April 1988, he was still-employed as an HP technician at the GTRR facility.
TAYLOR described the adverse relationships between the HP and Operations personnel which differed littie from the information provideo by the other i
interviewees in this section of the report.
He characterized the actions of i
the HP personnel as " snitching" rather than reporting legitimate safety concerns.
He recalled specific instances during recent years in which personality and professional conflicts between HP and Operations employees occurred.
He stated that, in his opinion HP personnel were the cause of conflicts because of their arrogance, assertiveness, uncooperative manner, and negative attitude towards Operations employees. TAYLOR was especially critical of MILLSPAUGH's lack of professionalism and his negative attitude towards his duties and responsibilities.
TAYLOR was questioned regarding his knowledge of harassment and intimidation of HP personnel by KARAM, including threats to terminate these individuals for discussing health and safety concerns with NRC officials.
He stated he has no knowledge of this activity by KARAM and said he is unaware of any instances in which HP personnel have been harassed for reporting health and safety concerns.
TAYLOR continued to comment regarding his impressions of tne personnel situation at the GTRR facility but denied any knowledge of improprieties by l
KARAM regarding this matter.
He further denied any knowledge of willful, deliberate violations of requirements, procedures, or license conditions at the GTRR facility.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Although each of these interviewees apparently desired to be candid it was readily discernable that they were hostile towards members of the HP staff and they quickly asserted their allegiance to KARAM and his staff.
The division between the HP and Operations personnel appears to be ccmplete and final and interpersonal relationships are apparently irreversible and irreparable.
It appears the attitude of the Operations employees towards the HP personnel is that they (HP) deserve whatever actions are taken against them, including termination.
It was noted that none of the Operations / Support personnel apparently feared losing their employment for discussing issues with the NRC whereas the HP personnel expressed a fear of reprisal by KARAM when they discussed apparent health and safety concerns with inspectors or other NRC officials.
AYC0CK and RODGERS (Exhibit 54) were interviewed together regarding the purpose of the investigation.
Both interviewees, who are administrative employees in KARAM's office at the GTRR facility, provided requested biographical and employment data.
AYC0CK advised she previously worked for BOYD in the ORS but was reassigned to KARAM's staff on July 1, 1987, when the personnel reorgani-
- ation plan was implemented.
She acknowledged that she is aware of the intense personality and professional conflicts between HP and Operations staff members.
She noted she has witnessed acts of extreme hostility and numerous confronta-tions between members of both groups.
AYC0CK characterized BOYD as a " weak manager" and KARAM as a conciliatory individual who faileo te resolve the personnel disputes between the two factions.
Both interviewees were reluctart to discuss specific aspects of these personnel issues and saia they dic nct want to jeopardize their employment by favoring one group or the other.
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l KAHN (Exhibit 56) recalled that KARAM provided him a "brief chronological description of the incident" (Cd-115 contamination event) on August 24, 1987, from which he (KAHN) concluded there was no apparent hazard and minimal radiation exposure. He stated that he heard no more about the Cd-115 contamination incident until the middle of November 1987 when, during a radiation protection class he was teaching, his student (CAMERON) indicated a different scenario for the event than the one provided by KARAM.
He said he queried CAMERON after the class and learned additional facts regarding the i
incident which caused him to contact BOYD and SELMAN.
He acknowledged that KARAM did not inform him an HP technician had discovered the Cd-115 spill, a fact he learned from discussing the incident with CAMERON in November 1987 and later in discussions with BOYD and SELMAN. He stated his main concorn was learning about "all sorts of things after the fact," meaning evidence apparently of widespread contamination.
KAHN said, "to find out something hadn't been reported (by the operator) but had been discovered by some detective work (by the HP technician) is sort of a disarraying circumstance."
He advised that, in his opinion, inadequate procedures at the time of the incident permitted circumstances which resulted in the accident, however, these procedures have since been revised. he advised that the NSC has subsequently urged KARAM to complete the report of the Cd-115 contamination incident "at the earliest opportunity" but since the comittee does not have operational responsibility for him they can only make requests and not direct specific l
actions.
KAHN related his knowledge of the gemstone irradiation experiment performed by KARAM from which resulted the contamination incident.
He noted that the approval form for this experiment is inappropriate and that technically the NSC should have reviewed ano approved this activity before it was accomplished since it appears to be a major experiment.
He stated some of the data en the approval from is incorrect but he attributed this to " inattention rather than deception." He advised that KARAM admitted to committee members that inadver-tent mistakes and errors in the irradiation procedures were committed and limits were unintentionally exceeded.
KAHN specifically stated that the entry
" nil" for activity is incorrect since there was significant radioactivity present in this particular instance.
He reiterated his belief that the
" Experiment Approval Form", although incomplete and incorrect, is the product of inattention and carelessness rather than a deliberate attempt to circumvent requirements or to conceal factual information.
KAHN was questioned regarding his knowledge of specific 6spects of the clean-up and decontamination activities following the Cd-115 incident.
He agreed that there are apparent errors, mistakes, ano inaccurate data associated with these activities but steadfastly maintained he believes they were caused by incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness rather than malicious behavior by any GTRR employee.
KAHN related that because of the circumstances of the Cd-115 incident and subsequent follow-up review activities by the GTRR staff the NSC recorrended that the approval of all experiments be terminatec and re-evaluated on an individual basis.
He expressed his dissatisfaction regarding the delay by KARAM and his staff in resolving and documenting the Cd-115 contamination incident.
He also stated the NSC is concerned about the history of turmoil arc disharmony between members of the GTRR staff and that the committee, in an
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i technician SELMAN and CAMERON and recently separated employees MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
He advised he has heard "second hand" that there "was some kind of difficulties between some of the HP people and operators" but was unable to provide details of this situation.
NEUMANN commented about the reorganization of the GTRR staff in July 1987, and recalled his first knowledge of this action was in the late Spring of 1987 from the articles in the Georgia Tech campus newspaper. He related that he also i
became aware that Georgia Tech professors CARTER, KAHN, and MAHAFFEY and other members of the NSC opposed the arrangement of having the manager of the ORS supervised by the director of the GTRR facility, a situation he also did not favor.
NEUMANN continued to discuss his knowledge of the historical aspects of the staff reorganization implemented in July 1987 and the GTRR personnel divisiveness associated with this event.
He noted that B0YD was no longer designated the RSO after the staff reorganization was implemented, an action that most regard as a demotion.
MEUMANN advised he was not prisilegec to attend any discussion regarding the reorganization and does not know why B0YD was removed as the RSO.
NEUMANN, in responding to guestions regarding the August 1987, Cd-115 contamination events, related he and the NSC, with the exception of the Chairman, were not officially informed about this matter until February 1988.
He said he also doubts that KARAM was totally candid and detailed with the committee about the incident, explaining that the most appalling aspect of 1
"that whole affair" is the manner in which "they put together... the sample."
He said the principal investigator of the experiment (KARAM) erred technically 1
when the necessary analysis and assessments were not performed on the Cd-115 l
container used to package the gemstone that was being irradiated.
NEUMANN related that if the experiment proposal had been presented to the NSC, metallurgical inquiries regarding the Cd-115 material would have been raised which may have prevented the contamination incident.
He summarized that KARAM, as principal investigator, was remiss by his apparent failure to adequately consider all aspects of this gemstone irradiation experiment.
He further stated that DOWNS exercised poor judgment when he opened the container of l
irradiated gemstones before the radioactivity of the materials had decayed to safer levels.
NEUMANN discussed his responsibilities with the NSC and explained that he had l
been assigned to audit the GTRR facility HP program in October 1987.
He recalled that during his contacts with HP personnel he strongly sensed discontentment regarding the July 1987, staff reorganization and said "it was clear... Paul Sharpe and other people in Health Physics were expecting to be fired."
He related that, in a meeting with STELSON and other committee members I
he got the impression that someone (from the GTRR staff) had "gone to the NRC" (to report perceived health and safety concerns) and the fears by HP personnel l
of being terminated "seem to be related to that in a general way."
Pe noted that the tennination of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE are fulfilling prcphecies but was unable to provide any specific information regarding alleged harassment arc intimidation of HP personnel for reporting safety concerns to the NRC.
He advised that the official reason given by STELSON and VARAM for terminating MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE is to upgrade the HP program but said he believes thM because tf their knowledge and experience they were able to perform HP res in a resecr.sible and competent manner.
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MAHAFFEY offered that "the climate (personnel) has never been particularly good" and that the " problem (personal disputes) was larger than I had realized." He noted that HP and Operations employees have allied against each other; that both groups are distrustful of tne other and they have accused each other of trying to " shut the other down." He relcted KARAM has agonized over the disharmony since he has been the director and said he suggested to KARAM in the spring of 1987 that he " fire the whole lot of them and just repopulate the reactor."
He said KARAM discussed the staff reorganization and its advantages but confided he (KARAM) " felt he was at hostage by HP's" since they "c ald shut him down simply by not showing up if he was doing an experiment." He af,ised that KARAM reorganized the staff in an effort to and personnel conflicts and i
disharmony which had reached the stage where, if it continued, it would be potentially unsafe to operate.the facility.
MAHAFFEY was queried regarding the allegation that the GTRR facility hao operated without a licensed employee in the control room.
He noted that he hac heard this rumor in early 1987 but said he did not have any evidence that this action had occurred as alleged.
He stated he contacted two employees who reportedly knew about this incident (SELMAN and former GTRR Director Monty DAVIS) and neither was able to confirm the allegation. MAHAFFEY was also questioned concerning a 1984 incident at the GTRR facility during which McDOWELL and/or DOWNS reportedly manipulated safety equipment to bypass technical specification requirements while venting Argon 41 gas to the atmosphere. He recalled that the issue was rather complex and one which he personally investigated and documented in a May 3, 1984, report to the NSC.
He advised that, after his investigation was concluded, McDOWELL and/or DOWNS had
" discussed a loophole in the tech specs that allowed them to disable the building isolation."
Further, MAHAFFEY said he is of the personal opinion these two operators " violated the spirit of the tech spec" even though they may not have violated any specific procedure, regulaticn, or record keeping requirement. He stated he believes that the two operators did in fact deactivate the primary instrumentation and they disabled or " ranged" the secondary or backup containment isolation system but he was unable to prove his belief and both McDOWELL and DOWNS subsequently denied any improprieties regarding this matter.
MAHAFFEY commented regarding the incident in which DOWNS struck the hot celi window with a wrench and chipped the glass.
He advisec that this particular act by DOWNS "may possibly be the most serious thing that has ever gone on down there" (the GTRR facility).
In response to ouestions regarding record improprieties at the GTRR facility, FAHAFFEY related he krew of no wrongdoing regarding the preparation, maintenance, storage, and retention of records, files, and documentation associated with its activities.
MAHAFFEY volunteered his opinions regarding the qualifications of CCWNS as an NRC licensed operator at the GTRR facility.
He characterized him as a "gcci ball" and further doubted his stability, reliability, and competence, f:AHAFFEY centinued that "he [ DOWNS] has an erratic personality, he may be mechanically inept and he just may not be reactor operator material" and, "if it was my reactor, I wouldn't let him in the doors."
He remarkt.o that "a trcuble is tnt they have twc reactor operators down there, they can't have ene reactor cperator, they can't fire him, he's in the perfect job, he can't be firec, he l
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INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
At the time of CARTER's meeting with the AA, the NRC, Region II staff had just completed two separate inspections at the GTRR during which numerous violations were noted.
Inspection Report Numbers 50-160/87-01 and 50-160/87-02 record the results of these two inspection activities.
)
CARTER clarified it is his view, that roushly since the NRC inspections in l
early 1987, certain officials (at the GTRF. facility and at Georgia Tech) have been more interested in attempting to identify an alleger than they have been l
in addressing health and safety concerns that have been raised.
He labelled j
this type of actively as "a crisis problem in management of a program."
He stated he recognized that the staff reorganization was inevitable and " faced with what I considered a fait accompli" he submitted his resignation as Chairman of the RPC in a letter to BOURNE which was accepted in a return letter of June 9, 1987.
He related limited personal contact with the GTRR facility since his resignation from the RPC but said he has maintained his association with the HP staff there.
Queried regarding the professional character and qualifications of BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE, he expressed the opinion they were all completely competent, reliable, and responsible individuals and BOYD "was admirably suited" to perform radiological protection outies.
CARTER advised that, from the first time he learned of the reorganization until several weeks prior to his interview, in all his discussions regarding this topic no one has suggested that there was a need or requirement to upgrade the HP program.
He indicated that it is his opinion this particular reason (upgrading the HP program) for terminating MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE is a ruse to illegally dismiss them from the GTRR facility.
CARTER said KARAM also discussed with him in February 1987, his intentions of promoting BOYD to the Associate or Deputy Director of the GTRR facility, however, in July 1987, he (KARAM) demoted B0YD from his RSC position to that of Manager of the ORS.
He said this action by KARAM appears to oe inconsistent with his earlier proposal since on the one hand BOYD is considered qualified to become the Associate or Deputy and on the other hand he is deemed not qualified to serve as the RSO.
CARTER also suggested that the individuals who have presently replaced MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE do not possess higher academic credentials or any additional HP knowledge or experience and this also appears to be inconsistent with the KARAM/STELSON objective of " upgrading the HP progra;n."
CARTER provided the details of an incident involving the encapsulation of leaking Co-60 material in the GTRR facility hot cell which demonstrated problems he and the RPC had in cealing with KARAM.
Essentially, he related KARAM and his Operations staff failed to complete the encapsulation progran as i
agreed because when encapsulation was to occur, the hot cell was being ut.ilized for revenue producing activities.
CARTER adviseo that KARAM was delayinc encapsulation, an " extremely important" activity, to produce revenue which was perceived by the HP personnel as a lack of commitment to a strong health and safety program.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
This particular incident was apparentiy the basis for statements by HP perscnnel that KARAM is more interesteo in revenue producing activities than he is in health ano safety matters.
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the HP personnel were aggravating and contemptuous but were reliable and appeared at the appointed time to monitor any experiment in progress.
He advised that the attitude of HP pe nonnel during this entire period of time (1981-1984) reflected their independent and autarchic status relative to their association with the GTRR facility, a situation he found to be " personally very irritating." He r.tated that, in his opinion, BOYD was inflexible and assertive in the enforcement of procedures and regulations, whercas MILLSPAUGH was cooperative, competent, reasonable, and he exercised judgment in performing his duties and responsibilities.
CRAFT recalled that Operations personnel at the GTRR facility retaliated against the HP personnel by resorting to agitation and cunning activities.
He said the attitude of the Operations employees towards the HP personnel was one of, "I dare you to catch me."
He recalled that "I certainly was agitated by them [0perations] on a number of occasions."
CRAFT related that when KARAM first became associated with the facility "he was totally obsessed with money." He said KARAM's idea of balancing the budget was to decrease the number of staff members and not to increase the number of custcmers.
CRAFT advised that, in his opinion, KARAM " sacrificed safety for the sake of saving money" and explained that he refused to purchase equipment and replace antiquated survey meters and ether HP hardware.
CRAFT related his impressions and opinions of the dismissals of MILLSPAUCH and SHARPE from the GTRR facility, basing his recarks on his prior knowlecise of and association with KARAM.
He said "the idea of simply coincidentally firing people because you're upgrading,... is a disaster because nobody can believe that." He advised that, in his opinion, " President CRECINE must have been duped into making this contentior, because 1 don't nelieve he thinks for a minute that that's so."
CRAFT blamed "the personality of KARAM and his obsession with money" as the primary reason for :.he current state of affe rs at the GTRR facility, meaning that KARAM desired to control the HP budget which he did not do prior to the staff reorganization.
Ee advised he believes KARAM is "an inept manager" and said he is deceptive in his management practices.
He recalled an incident abcut the middle of 1984 in which KARAM breached the topic of abolishing the hot cell manager position.
He said KARAM subsequently presented him with a letter which involuritarily separated him but which was withdrawn because he (CRAFT) had already submitted his retirement letter to the President of Georgia Tech.
CRAFT advised that the reason given to him for terminating his services was also reorganization.
he related that he was moved from the GTRR facility about August 1984 to another building on the campus to wait for his retirement date which was the end of October 1984.
CRAFT advised that KARAM then dispatched the Georgia Tech police to retrieve his (CRAFT) access card and keys, an action designed by KARAM to harass him becaLse he refused to liquidate annual leave before he retired.
He said he finally tolo KARAM he would not talk to him "unless there is a thiro person present because you're such a liar."
CRAFT related that he had also been told KARAM experienced some difficulty regarding discrimination against female employees while he was affiliated with the Argonne National Laboratory.
He related that harassment and intimideticn are "well within his character," however, said KARAM is inclined to act favorably toward employeer, who have a subservient attituc'e rather than a dominant one.
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e group for personnel problems and attributed an early 1987 NRC inspection by B.K. REVSON as the single incident that " opened my eyes to the fact that our HP j
program is really not in very good shape." He said REVSON, then an NRC inspector, personally confided that "Bcb Boyd is extremely stubborn, he does not listen, and that "he's trying to shut you down."
He said he came to the realization that he'"needed to bring some measure of control over the two groups to make them work better" and to achieve a safe working environment, an objective he reiterated as being foremost in his mind.
KARAM recalled that beginning about December 1986, to about June 1987, discussions were held with STELSON regarding the reorganization of the entire staff at the GTRR facility, an action he hoped would resolve bickering and improve interpersonal relationships.
He related that in order to accomplish this objective he initially intended to designate BOYD as Associate Director of the GTRR facility and "have him really be in charge of the HP group."
KARAM also praised BOYD for his hard work, sincerity, gentlemanly nature, end dedica-i tion but noted it appeared he was "being used by the people" that report to him (other HP parsonnel).
He related this observation was subsequently relayed to KAHN who suggested a psychological profile for the entire GTRR staff which, according to KAFAM, revealed that BOYD was a weak manager.
FARAM discussed various aspects of the staff reorganization, implemented on July 1, 1987, denying that the HP group was adversely affected by this action and claiming that it "did indeed remove the bickering from the Center" and brought " cordiality among the two groups." He acknowledged that the status of BOYD was altered by the reorganization, including the loss of his title as the Georgia Tech RSO and direct access to his secretary who was reassigned to the Office of the Director.
He reiterated that the staff reorganization eliminated open confrontations and controlled tempers but did not alter the recalcitrant attitude of the HP employees.
KARAM explained that the attitude of the HP personnel was demonstrated in a letter SELMAN wrote to the Georgia Tech newspaper criticizing the staff reorganization.
He acknowledged he counselled SELMAN regarding her letter writing " campaign" but categorically denied he threatened, harassed, intimidated, or discriminated against her.
He admitted that he "was given the clearance from STELSON to fire her."
He stated he "did 1
not threaten any of them [HP personnel] with job termination at any point in time" and acknowledged the right of all employees to discuss their health and safety concerns with the NRC.
VARAM was queried regarding the HP allegations, as revealed by the investiga-tion, that he did not adequately adoress and resolve health and safety issues and.oncerns which were reported to him by HP personnel and he did not follow the advice and recommendations of these individuals (hot cell and fuel pool painting incidentsl.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Both of these incidents are discussed in detail in the transcript of BOYD's interview.
KARAM related curing lengthy discussions of these allegations that he cculd recall no instances in which he failed to address and resolve health ano s6fety issues / concerns reported to him and that, to his knowledge, he has alwi.ys supported recommendations of the HP personnel.
He categorically denied that he has sided with Operations personnel against the HP employees.
Case No. 2-88-003 63
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them on his staff. This appears to indicate that these two individuals I
were dismissed for a reason other than upgrading the HP program.
It also l
appears they were terminated because they did not assume a subservient and submissive attitude.
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I KARAM was queried extensively concerning a February 18, 1988, Atlanta Constitution newspaper article which apparently quotes him as stating "there are suspicious of sabotage" at the GTRR facility and that "KARAM declined to comment on the nature of the alleged incidents of sabotage." He clarified that i
these remarks were related in a closed hearing at the U.S. District Court on a
)
I motion to reinstate MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
He said these comments were made by the Board of Regents attorney, after he (KARAM) had previously discussed " game playing" around the GTRR facility.
KARAM recalled only two incidents with radiological health and safety implications and which may have involved l
intentional tampering by unknown individuals.
He related that his review cf i
these two incidents (needle stuck on hot cell indicator and level indicator switches found in "off" position) failed to disclose any evidence of willful or malicious destruction or vandalism and he was unable to identify individual (s) responsible for these acts.
He also noted other acts of vandalism about August 1987 which were unrelated to radiological health and safety and said he was also unsuccessful in identifying the person (s) responsible for these acts.
KARAM categorically denied any other acts of vandalism / destruction relating to ra.diological safety and said these particular incidents are those referenccd in the February 18, 1988, newspaper article.
He did report that the Industrial Psychologist (0' BANNON) who evaluated the GTRR employees confided that MILLSPAUGH was possibly the one " playing the tricks."
KARAM commented concerning a hot cell window incident during which DOWNS, in an apparent fit of horseplay, chipped the glass by striking it with a wrench.
He recalled that DOWNS regretted this incident and admitted " bad judgment on his part." He said he counselled DOWNS regarding this incident but did not discipline him further because he expressed remorse for his actions.
KARAMwasnextqueriedregardingtheallegationthat,(1)withinternalNRC he was observed in February 1987, by an NRC, Region II Inspe: tor (A.R. L0hG; l
documents (NRC complaint forms) in his possession and, (2) an NRC, Regicn II employee was providing KARAM with information regarding allegers and allegations.
i INVESTIGATOR S NOTE:
Both of these matters were referred to the OIA, hcwever, OI obtained permission from OIA to interview KARAM initially regarding these issues to deternine whether there may have been a relationship between the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE ano the two aforementioned allegations.
Further, the NRC complaint documents which KARAM allegedly possessed also contained an allegation that the GTRF facility has operated without a licensed operator in the control room, 6 matter 01 was requested to resolve during this investigation.
Essentially, KARAM denied that he has ever possessed any hRC internal documents and further stated that although he is socially acquainted with several NRC employees, none have ever provided him with any documents or information regarding allegers or allegations.
He stated uneouivccally that he has never known of a single incident in which the GTRR facility was operating at any power level without the required licenseo persennel in the control rocm.
Case No. 2-88-003 65
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KUZ0 next queried KARAM regarding previous conflicting testimony of GTRR I
Operations personnel obtained during the inspection pertaining to specific aspects of the decontamination activities following the Cd-115 event.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: This portion of the interview primarily concerned the issue of whether DOWNS carried a GM meter home with him, following the discovery of the cd-115 contamination, to survey for possible radioactive material in his residence.
This particular issue was also discussed by other witnesses and their account of it is summarized in earlier sections of the report of investigation.
KARAM acknowledged that DOWNS had in fact changed his testimony from that of stating he did not take a GM meter home with him to that of not remembering whether he took a GM meter home with him following the event.
He stated he does not know why DOWNS changed his position but categorically stated at no time did he attempt to persuade or influence him (DOWNS) concerning this matter.
He acknowledged that DOWNS may have intentionally misrepresented the truth about taking the GM meter home with him to reflect adversely on the HP personnel or to "get them in trouble" with management.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The investigation failed to satisfactorily resolve whether DOWNS actually took a GM meter home with him and surveyed his residence. The testimony of McDOWELL, COX, and KARAM would indicate that he did carry a GM meter home with him following the discovery of the August 1987, Cd-115 contamination.
Even KARAM acknowledged that if DOWNS did in fact carry a GM meter home with him there is no evidence that he used it to identify potential contamination in his residence since his efforts were not documented.
KARAM sumarized unequivocally that he is personally unaware of any willful, intentional wrongdoing or improprieties regarding issues and concerns addresseo during the investigation.
Further, he categorically dcnied any attempts to conceal information or data from the NRC and stated in essence that he has never willfully violated procedures, requirements, or regulations.
He emphatically denied that he has harassed or intimidated any employee at the GTRR facility for any reason, including HP personnel who may have reported health and safety concerns to the NRC.
He restated he recognizes the right cf any employee to report safety concerns to the NRC and said he has never attempted to interfere with this activity.
He concluded his testimony with a long sumary of the rationale for his actions as they relate to the management of the GTRR facility.
He again reiterated that if MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE hac demonstrated remorse for misdeeds and had pleoged a cooperative attitude towards management (KARAM) and had been "willing to listen and be criticted and learn from their mistakes" he would not have temninated them from their HP positions.
STELSON (Exhibits 63 and 64) was interviewed under oath, in his office, on February 25 and 26, 1988.
Present at both interviews and representing STELSch was Alfred L. EVANS, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, State of Georgie, assigned to the Georgia Board of Regents.
STELSON furnished background, professional, and employment infonnation prior to and after his service began at Georgia Tech in 1971.
He discussed the organization of the 22 Georgia Tech Centers and noted that KARAM and the GTRR facility (Nuclear Research Center report to him for administrative, academic, and operational matters.
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Associate Director of the Nuclear Research Center but "he refused to face up to i
that opportunity because he's basically too old a dog to learn new tricks."
i STELSON said he knew MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE "less well" and mainly "through complaints about their improper activities." He defined " improper activities" l
as using profanity in the presence of and against doctoral students.
He also l
stated that the credentials of these two individuals "are increasingly l
inadequate as we are improving the safety standards and the complexity of our operation." STELSON related that in the spring of 1987 he informed the NRC of deficiencies in the personnel assigned to perform HP duties and that after strengthening management (hiring an Associate Director) the second priority was to correct the HP program.
STELSON, in response to the investigator using the word "temination" in reference to personnel actions against MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, accused the investigator of using " careless terms" and cf making a " completely irresponsi-ble statement." He repeatedly denied that these individuals were terminateo, notwithstanding the fact they were given termination letters on February ll, j
1988, their access cards and keys were taken from them and they were escorted from the GTRR building by the Georgia Tech campus police.
STELSON related that i
the action by Georgia Tech regarding these individuals amounted to them "being I
relieved of their duties." He said the reason they were escorted from the building is because he feared there would be "an issue... an issue of safety, it was a safety precaution." He explained that the " issue" he feared related to "some unexplained malicious acts and one specifically that had significant safety problems associated with it."
He then related his knowledge of the incident involving the indicator switches to which KARAM had referenced with i
respect to " acts of sabotage." STELSON attempted to establish a ccnnection r
between his fear of an issue occurring and the " unexplained malicious acts" anc
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acknowledged that "we have no evidence of any kind that those people
[MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE] were involved in that incident, no evidence of any kind." 'A discussion of the terminations of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE continued during which STELSON acknowledged that he and KARAM failed to follow the l
Georgia Tech due process procedures for dismissing personnel.
STELSOM further l
related that B0YD should have infomed MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE about "due process" since "for about a year we have been discussing the transition."
STELSON next answered questions regarding the origination and content of correspondence relating to the termination of the two HP employees.
he stated l
that the language contained in these documents which references meeting obliga-tions to the NRC under terms of the license relates to the fact that the NFC had " condemned our health and safety procedures as being inappropriate anc inadequate."
He related that rescission letters were forwarded to hlLLSPAUGH and SHARPE four days after the termination letters were provided to them and stated "one reason why I sent the rescission letter is I think that Mr. Sharpe may not have been properly treated." He continued tu respond to cuestions ano statements regarding his actions and motives regarding the removal of MILLSPAUGH end SHARPE from the GTRR facility and he repeateoly indicated it was only to " upgrade the HP program."
STELSON was queried regarding his activities associated with the letter SELMAh wrote to the Georgia Tech campus newspaper concerning the GTRR staff recrge.-
nization.
Essentially, he denied that he suggested or supported her c'ismitul even though he disapproved of her actions and considered it an unprofessium.
act. He also denied that he is aware of any actions taken by KARAM ugoirm
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STELSON was queried regarding the third of three long range goals of Georgia Tech officials, the one which involves improving and upgrading the Operations staff at the GTRR facility.
He also discussed the overall plans for increa:ing the utilization of the reactor for educational purposes.
He volunteered that he and KARAM have discussed, for several months, the " capability ano the medical condition" of one of the reactor operators (DOWNS) and that these i
concerns have been communicated to him.
He stated that the operator is
" cooperative and sincerely interested in being a better and effective employee" which is "a startling contrast with others" (an apparent reference to HP personnel).
STELSON then seized the opportunity to again demean the qualifica-tions and performances of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE and he remarked that "they have l
difficulty in meeting our standards" and "their attitude is negative to safety conditions." He then embarked upon an academic discussion concerning the HP discipline, the qualifications and activities of the RSO under the staff reorganization and the responsibilities of the NSC.
KUZO questioned STELSON 1
regarding the staff upgrading process involving HP and Operations personnel and i
I the various proposals for utilizing employees at the GTRR facility.
i STELSON was then queried regarding the rationale for the previous psychological evaluations for members of the GTRR staff.
His responses to questions concern-ing the results of this evaluation were again heavily weighted against HP personnel with minimal criticisms regarding members of the Operations staff.
STELSON, in a prolonged discussion, continued his subjective critical evalua-tion and assessment of HP personnel and even though he did not condone mistakes and errors committed by Operations employees he appeared less critical in discussions regarding these individuals.
He did state that "it's a little erroneous to lump them (HP's) all into one group" and said that SHARPE was trying to get an education and that Georgia Tech officials were working with him "to try and professionally upgrade him."
STELSON then recalled that on February 9,1968, four individuals, MacDONALD, KARAM, KAHh, and himself, met and decided since MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE did not fit into the proposed plans of
" upgrading" they should be terminated.
The remainder of the interview concerneo a review of topics that had been broached with STELSON during the interview session the previous day.
His responses to questions regarding investigative issues on this occasion were essentially the same as those previously provided.
KUZ0 discussed with STELSON the technical aspects of the Cd-115 incident and the dissemination of informa-tion regarding this event.
STELSON concluded the interview session with a lengthy summary of the rationale for actions taken by Georgia Tech officials to upgrade the entire GTRR program and to increase educational ano academic opportunities for doctoral candidates.
He indicated that the terminations of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE were rescinded en the order of the Board of Regents and that efforts are in progress to place them in other employment opportunities with Georgia Tech.
In essence, STELSON denied any improprieties regardir.g the dismissals of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE and stated emphatic 611y they were not dismissed for reporting health and safety concerns to the NRC.
I Review of NSC Meeting Minutes l
l During the investigation NSC neeting minutes for the period from January '.987 to February 1968, were reviewed for any records of discussions regarding GTPP employee discipline, personnel and performance related deficiencies cr o w a-ticnal issues involving employee unrest and disharmony at the GTRR facili?
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l Other remarks recorded by DESAI in these February 16, 1988, minutes indicate l
MacDONALD " informed the comittee about the meeting with... Stelson regarding' the hostility of and lack of control over the H.P. personnel, which led to firings of Messers Sharpe and Millspaugh."
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
It is noted that the reasons cited by MacDONALD for terminating MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, that is, " hostility of and lack of control over" again appear to be different than those offered by KARAM and STELSON which pertain to " upgrading the HP program."
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l These latter meeting minutes also reflect that "a question was raised regarding the lack of any previous intimation of the H.P. personnel's incompetency over the past many years of reactor operation," to which PUCKETT (former NRC employee and current ORS Manager) replied it was due "to the relatively lax attitude of the NRC staff in inspecting research reactors in the past." At I
Item 7 of these minutes, it is recorded that KARAM "related some of the
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proceedings of his interviews with the NRC inspectors in which they comented on the lack of responsiveness and up-to-date knowledge on the part of the HP personnel."
Further, it is also recorded that "in response to a question on the tencency of the operator in not imediately reporting the cadmium incident, R. Karam conceded possible mistakes on parts of all concerned." The minutes reflect that KARAM pointed out further that in spite cf such mistake there were Operationspersonnel]gtochangeforthebetter[anapparentreferenceto those who were willin and those who were not [an apparent reference to HP personnel]."
NSC minutes referenced in this section of the report but not attached as exhibits are being retained in the 01:RII case file.
Review of GTRR Files and Records During the investigation, and with KARAM's concurrence, a comprehensive review of all GTRR incoming and outgoing correspondence and memoranda during the past three years in the director's office was conducted.
KARAM also provided copies of memoranda and personal notes from HP personnel in 1987 and 1988 which report deficiencies and potential safety violations and upon which he had recorded his apparent correct ve or resolution activities.
It was noted that, of all documents reviewed, only the copy of one handwritten memorandum from SHARPE to KARAM, dated May 12, 1987, reporting problems with the criticality monitors in the high bay area and in the corridor aojacent to the door of laboratory Rcom 149 did not contain cements from KARAM regarding corrective actions.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
A member of the NRC, Region II staff was apprised of the contents of this document which is being retained in the case file.
It would appear that, except for this one particular instance, KARAM addressed all potential health and safety issues reported to him in writing by HP personnel.
Exhibit 67 is a copy of a February 29, 1908, memorandum from MacDONALD to the file entitled " Conversation with Bob Boyd." MacDONALD relates a discussior with BOYD regarding BOYD's desire to terminate hot cell activities and his criticisms of TAYLOR as an HP technician.
MacDONALD sumarizes that BOYD was vague in his explanations of these matters and that it appears he "hns lost touch with the health physics program" and "he does not seen to know what is reouired." MacDONALD concludes that BOYD apparently does nct want to ast we Case No. 2-88-003 73
1 reflected actual survey results or if data on the form had been added after the l
survey to give the appearance that it was authentic.
l l
With respect to the discrepancies noted on the experiment approval foms it was l
l determined that inattention to detail, carelessness, laziness, and irresponsi-l ble actions by the operator (DOWNS) are all apparent causes. There was no evidence revealed to indicate the licensee or any employee deliberately and intentionally comitted actions to falsify documents or to deceive the NRC.
Further, the investigation failed to reveal any testimony or recorded evidence 1
l that data were added to survey foms "after the fact," even though these I
I documents were not provided to the inspector until the exit conference was in progress.
Exhibit 72 is a copy of KARAM's notes dated. September 24 and 25, 1987, relating his activities and observations associated with the three level indicator switches and acts of " sabotage" or malicious mischief.
KARAM writes that "this is a serious offense and should be classified as an act of sabotage." Further, it is noted that KARAM notified STELSON, NSC members and the Georgia Tech campus police and he also apparently ouestioned members of the GTRR staff concerning this matter.
KARAM concluded that the explanation for the switches being in the "off" position may be maintenance related and not a malicious act.
There was no evidence revea.ied to indicate deliberate, intentional acts of radiological sabotage or malicious damage at the GTRR facility.
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Exhibit 73 is a copy of a January 22, 1988, memorandum from MacDONALD to BOYD entitled " Response to NRC order 88-E-001."
According to the memorandum KARAM has requested that MacDONALD " collect all documentation on the August 1987, contamination" incident.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
This memorandum appears to indicate that information regarding the Cd-115 contamination incident was not collected until the NRC conducted the inspection at the GTRR facility which is reported in Inspection Report Number 50-160/07-08.
The implication of this may be that the GTRR director and his staff were prompted tc fully document the Cd-115 incident only after the NRC began to inquire about it during the December 1987, and January 1988, inspection activities.
Willfulness and Intent Section The investigation was initiated essentially to determine:
1.
Did the licensee (KARAM) harass and intimidate HP employees for reporting or discussing health and safety concerns with the NRC?
2.
Did the licensee (the GTRR staff) falsify or intentionally misrepresent contamination survey data regarding the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamina-tion incident to NRC inspection personnel?
3.
Did the licensee (KARAM/ DOWNS) falsify or deliberately misrepresent personal survey data regarding the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 contamination incident to NRC inspection personnel?
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Finally, the official reason given by Georgia Tech for dismissing i
MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE was to " upgrade the HP program." Several inter-
,viewees (Exhibits 56 through 60) were complimentary regarding the professional knowledge and competence of BOYD, MILLSPAUGH, and SHARPE.
)
The testimony of these individuals tends to dispute the reason given by KARAM/STELSON for the dismissal of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
Further, even Operations personnel (Exhibits 48 and 51) who were openly hostile towards HP employees, viewed SHARPE as an even tempered, likable, and cooperative technician who was compatible with the Operations staff.
l Allegation Nos. 2 and 3:
a.
GTRR Operations personnel familiar with the August 18, 1967, Cd-115 contamination incident (Exhibits 48-50 and 62) categorically denied any l
records improprieties or deceptive practices concerning this incident.
These same individuals acknowledged that inconsistent and/or conflicting testimony was provided at various times to the NRC during the inspection activities of December 1987, and January 1988, however, this was regarded as unintentional and apparently the result of incomplete documentation, b.
The issue of whether DOWNS personally surveyed his residences following discovery of the August 18, 1987, Cd-115 incident was never completely resolved.
DOWNS (Exhibits 49 and 50) acknowledged he first told NRC inspectors he did not take a GM survey meter home with him to survey his resident and then testified he could not remember taking a GM meter home with him.
Other interviewees (Exhibits 48, 51, and 62) testified they observed him take a meter home with him following the discovery of the Cd-115 contamination, however, no results of a survey were recorded if it was performed.
c.
Interviewees assigned to the HP staff (Exhibits 18, 20, 21, ano 22) reported confusion, disunity, mismanagement, and lack of organization in the clean-up and decontamination process, indicating that records were not properly maintained and activities were not documented.
They viewed this as inadvertent due to a failure to communicate properly rather than an overt, contrived effort to conceal facts.
d.
Information provided by NSC members (Exhibits 56, 57, and 59) suggests that initially KARAM was not completely candid regarding the facts and j
circumstances of the Cd-115 incident although they did not question his integrity or motives.
This suggests that KARAM may not have been fully aware of all aspects of the Cd-115 incident.
1 Allegation No. 4:
a.
Interviewees assigned to the HP staff (Exhibits 18. 20, 21, 22, and 23) commented variously regarding the memorandum from KARAM (Exhibit 26: to I
discontinue the use of " personal logbooks." This action was perceivec by these personnel as an attempt to suppress and stiffle their responsibil-ities which was another fom of subtle harassment.
b.
In a lengthy discussion KARAM (Exhibit 62) explained M s rationale for directing the HP staff to inform him of violatiens rather than record *. hen, in logbooks.
He categorically denied any attenpts to suppress or har". ;
Case No. 2-88-003 77
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sa LAllegationNo.7:
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One source (Exhibit 59),related he conducted an extensive'investiga-tion in May 1964 and prepared a oetailed report.(Exhibit 69) regard-ing a potential technical specifications violation involving hcDOWELL and DOWNS who may have intentionally tampered with monitoring devices to avoid containment isolation. This source related that although he suspected these individuals may have intentionally disabled a gas monitor he was' unable to obtain sufficient evidence with which to confront them.
Interviews of GTRR personnel failed to disclose any evidence that these two individuals tampered with cr disabled gas ~'
monitoring devices to' avoid containment isolation.
Both COWNS and McDOWELL (Exhibits 48 and 49) denied any improprieties regarding the' AR41 gas release incident.
j Allegation No. 8:
1 a.
Based upon a thorough and comprehensiveness review of GTRR records 1
and files there was no evidence developed to indicate the licensee a
was maintaining separate files to conceal violations from the NRC.
b.
Interviewees who serve on the NSC (Exhibits.56, 57, 58, ano 59) advised they are unaware of any separate' system of records / files at the GTRR facility to conceal violations.
Varicus GTRR staff l
personnel also disclaimed any knowledge of record maintenance l
improprieties.
A11egation'No. 9:
a.
The topic of " sabotage," acts of vandalism, and malicious mischief at the GTRR facility first surfaced in the news media (Exhibit 5) following a U.S. District Court hearing on a motion to reinstate
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MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE.
KARAM (Exhibit 62) related unexplained incidents of vandalism and mischief at the GTRR facility, only one of which involved possible health and safety implications.
b.
KARAM provided a copy of a handwritten report (Exhibit 72) in which he records his inquiries and actions regarding incidents of vandalism / mischief at the GTRR facility. This report inoicates he was unable to identify the individuals responsible for these acts and he concludes that the one incident with health and safety implica-tions could possibly be a maintenance related matter.
Investigator's Conclusion The investigation revealed evidence of a long history of extensive discord.
animosity, ccnflicts, and confrontations between HP and Operations perscrnel at the GTRR facility.
This situation apparently intensified in early 1967 when Georgia Tech officials initiated discussions to reorganize the GTRR staff tra place the ORS under the supervision of the director.
With the i'nplementatM of the reorganization in July 1987, the adverse relaticns between these gro ws apparently became irreparable.
Following the staff reorgani ation and cr August 18, 1987, the GTRR facility experienced a Cd-115 centaminatier. incide" and although a clean-up and decontamination procedure was immediately Case No. 2-08-C03 79 L __ ___
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION On February 16, 1988 Edward F. O'CONNOR and J. Hue HENRY, Attorneys for MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE (plaintiffs) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court, Atlanta, Georgia for declaratory relief, pemanent injunction, and money damages against KARAM individually and in his official capacity as Director, Neely Nuclear Research Center, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia (defendants).
Civil Action Number 1:88-CV-312-0DE applies to the case number and the "cause for action" citation is 42 U.S.C. 1983, to redress deprivation of free speech rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and federal law.
A copy of the complaint and the supporting documentation is Exhibit 74 to the Report of Investigation.
On March 24, 1988, attorneys for the plaintiffs filed first interrogatories and first request for production of documents to defendants. On April 22, 1988, FULLER provided the reporting investigator with a ccmplete copy of defendants i'
response to plaintiffs request and all of this documentation is being retained in the 01:RII investigation file.
Information contained in this package of documents has been reported or sumarized at various sections in the Report of Investigation.
Exhibit 75 is a copy of a newspaper article from the April 10, 1988, edition of the Atlanta Journal / Atlanta Constitution during which CRECINE, President, Georgia Tech responds to questions regarding recent events at the GTRR facility.
In response to a question which elicited remarks regarding the terminations / reassignments of MILLSPAUGH and SHARPE, CRECINE acknowledged that the institution "did not execute what we intended to do in rebuilding the reactor's safety group."
CRECINE further states that " strengthening the staff... meant the reassignment of two HP employees."
He continued that it was not the intention of Georgia Tech to terminate the employees but "we screwed up, we just screwed up."
Finally, on April 18, 1968, BOYD was reassigned as Manager of the ORS at the GTRR facility to the ORS at Georgia State University (GSU).
BOYD, in comments 1
regarding his reassignment related, that because he was nearing retirement age, he was transferred to GSU to complete the necessary years of service which will qualify him for an annuity with the State of Georgia, i
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l LIST OF ACRONYMS Administrative Assistant AA Cadmium-115 Cd-115 Cobalt-60.
Co-60 Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff EICS Frank'H. Neely Nuclear Research Center GTRR Geiger-Kueller GM Georgia Department of Human Resources GDHR Georgia Institute of Technology Georgia Tech Georgia State. University GSU Health Physics HP j
Nuclear Safeguards Comittee NSC Office 6f Inspector and Auditor OIA Office of Investigations 01
.0ffice of Investigations Field Office, Region II 01:RII Radiation Protection Comittee RPC Radiation / Radiological Safety Comittee RSC Radiation / Radiological Safety Officer RSC Reactor Operator R0 Regional Administrator RA Regional Allegation Coordinator RAC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission NRC l
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Case No. 2-88-003 83
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LIST OF EXHIBITS Exhibit Number Description 1
Copy of letter from CAMERON to NRC, dated August 3,'1987 2
Copy of NRC, Region II Investigation Request memorandum to 01:RII, dated February 3, 1988 3
Copy of NRC, Region II Supplemental Investigation Request memorandum to 01: RII, dated February 4, 1988 4'
Copy of NRC, Region II Supplemental Investigation Request memorandum tc 01:RII, dateo February 8,1988 5
Copy of news article from The Atlanta Constitution, February 18, 1988 edition 6
Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from CRAWFORD to ZIMMERMAN, dated July 17, 1973 7
Copy of Georgia Tech letter from NEUMANN to PETTIT, dated July 30, 1973 8
Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from KARAM to STELSON, dated January 26, 1987 9
Copy of Georgia Tech RPC meeting minutes, dated February 19, 1987 10 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from CARTEk to BOURNE, dated March 23, 1987 11 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from KARAM to STELSON, dated May 6, 1987 12 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from STELSON to BOURNE, dated May 27, 1987 13 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from CARTER to BOURNE, dated June 10, 1987 14 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from KARAM tu J. Nelson GRACE, NRC, dated June 15, 1987 15 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from BOURNE to STELSON, dbted June 19, 1987 16 Copy of GTRR organizational chart, effective prior to July 1, 1987 Case No. 2-88-003 85
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36 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from KARAM to BOYD, dated ^
March 11, 1985 37 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from KARAM to GIBSON, dated February 10, 1988 i
38 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from KARAM to SHARPE, dated February 11, 1988 39 Copy of Georgia Tech. letter from KARAM to MILLSPAUGH,' dated February 11, 1988 40 Copy bf Georgia Tech letter form STELSON to SHARPE, dated February 15, 1988 41 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from STELSON to MILLSPAUGH, dated February 15, 1988 I
42 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from KARAM to CRECINE,
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dated February 15, 1988 43 Copy of Georgia Tech "In Confidence" memorandum from FULLER to STELSON/KARAM, dated February 17, 1988 44 Copy of Georgia Tech memorandum from MacDCNALD to KARAM dated February 18, 1988 45 Copy of Georgia Tech "In Conficence" letter from FULLER to 01:RII, dated March 7, 1988 46 Copy of Georgia Tech letter from FULLER to 01:RII, dated March 3, 1088 47 Peport of Interviews with FULLER and GIBSON, dated February 29, 1988 48 Transcript of Interview with McDCWELL, dated February 10 1968 49 Transcript of Intervv:w with DOWNS, dated February 8, 1988 50 Transcript of Interview with DCKNS, dated February 24, 1938 51 Transcript of Interview with CCX, dated February 11, ISEE 52 Transcript of Interview with MERCER, dated February 17, 1988 53 Transcript of Interview with TAYLOR, dated February 17, 1968 54 Report of Interviews with AYC0CK and RODGEP.5, dated March 16, 1983 Case No. 2-88-003 87 1
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.s 75 Copy of news article from The Atlanta Journal /The Atlanta Constitution, dated April 10, 1988
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January 18, 198 N.R.C. Office of Investigations 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia I hereby withdraw my previous request that I be considered j
a confidential source of information supplied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission during any of its investigations involving me, including the investigation of my dismissal from the Georgia Institute of Technology.
Sine rely, Paul Sharpe WhWM WW W 6e
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EDWARD F. O'CONNOR hhl ATTORNEY AT LAW
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i BM & 8'tH8CE DE lADM AVE (404) STS*M DSCATt*R. G Ae llEEE8
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