ML20137Z697
| ML20137Z697 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/03/1996 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Poneman D PRESIDENT OF U.S. & EXECUTIVE OFFICES |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137Z587 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-493 NUDOCS 9704250081 | |
| Download: ML20137Z697 (1) | |
Text
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June 3, 1996 i
Mr. Daniel B. Poneman
.Special Assistant to the President !
.and Senior Director- '
National-Security Council Old Executive Office Building !
17th Street & Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20504
Dear Mr. Poneman:
Based on my recent meeting with Leon Fuerth, he suggests that you might be interested in the attached trip report of my visit to the Republic of Korea :
and Japan.
Sincerely.
Attachment:
Trip Report i
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UNITED STAT ES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7O N )IS E WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-00 @
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CHAIRMAN The Honorable Hazel R. O' Leary Secretary of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585
Dear Secretary O' Leary:
The Commi:,: ion recently completed its re'.tw of two Department of Energy technology transfer cases to authorize U.S. industry participation in the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization's (KEDO) reactor project in North Korea. Our response to the Department's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, dated March 29, 1996, posed no NRC objection to the authorizations, given the President's approval of the underlying Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK). Nevertheless, our review drew our attention to certain points which we believe require timely consideration by the United States in its support of the KEDO reactor project.
We recommend early and continuing actions by the United States and other KE00 participants to foster a sound safety culture for the project. This view was confirmed in recent meetings I held with senior Korean officials where they emphasized the need to consider the safety aspects of the proposed project.
The Koreans also expressed a desire for a larger and more acknowledged role in the KEDO project.
Both safety and nonproliferation are key national security goals, but are not within the purview of any single U.S. Government organization. Nevertheless, nuclear safety and nuclear nonproliferation policies that are mutually reinforcing can and should be developed. In this conrection, the h mmission believes there should be no trade off between nuclear safety and nonprolifer-ation aspects of the KEDO project. With respect to the project's nonproliferation objective, the Commission understands the fundamental importance of establishing the initial' inventory of nuclear material in North Korea and facilitating early full-scope safeguards inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We trust that all U.S. agencies share this view.
One other point needs to be mentioned. Based on a provision in the KE00-DPRK Supply Agreement, it appears KEDO may need to arrange exports of reactor fuel and major reactor components from the United States to North Korea, directly or through South Korea, in the next few years. As you know, such exports would require NRC export licenses which could not be issued in the absence of an Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and the DPRK (possibly also involving the IAEA). Although the Supply Agreement provision acknowledges the f need for such an agreement, there is no suggestion of how difficult and time L/(
consuming it would be to negotiate and conclude this instrument. /
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2 To the extent relevant to DOE's involvement with the KED0 project, I hope these points will be carefully considered. I am sending similar letters to the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Sincerely, CN &
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION :
WASHINGTON, D C. 2055H)001 e
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,/ May 7, 1996
- + l CHAIRMAN j l
The Honorable Lynn E. Davis Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs U.S. Department of State !
Washington, D.C. 20520 1
Dear Ms. Davis:
The' Commission recently completed its review of two Department of Energy j technology transfer cases to authorize U.S. industry participation in the l Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization's (KED0) reactor project in !
North Korea. Our response to the Department's Office of Arms Control and i Nonproliferation, dated March 29, 1996, posed no NRC objection to the ;
authorizations, given the President's approval of the underlying Agreed 1 Framework between the United States and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of ;
Korea (DPRK). Nevertheless, our review drew our attention to certain points I which we believe require timely consideration by the United States in its support of the KED0 reactor project.
l We recommend early and continuing actions by the United States and other KED0 participants to foster a sound safety culture for the project. This view was confirmed in recent meetings I held with senior Korean officials where they emphasized the need to consider the safety aspects of the proposed project.
The Koreans also expressed a desire for a larger and more acknowledged role in the KE00 project.
Both safety and nonproliferation are key national security goals, but are not within the purview of any single U.S. Government organization. Nevertheless, nuclear safety and nuclear nonproliferation policies that are mutually j reinforcing can and should be developed. In this connection, the Commission believes there should be no trade off between nuclear safety and nonprolifer-ation aspects of the KED0 project. With respect to the project's nonproliferation objective, the Commission understands the fundamental importance of establishing the initial inventory of nuclear material in North Korea and facilitating early full-scope safeguards inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We trust that all U.S. agencies share this view.
One other point needs to be mentioned. Based on a provision in the KED0-DPRK Supply Agreement, it appears KED0 may need to arrange exports of reactor fuel L
and major reactor components from thr. United States to North Korea, directly or through South Korea, in the next few years. As you know, such exports would require NRC export licenses which cocid not be issued in the absence of an _ Agreement for Cooperaimn between the U.S. and the DPRK (possibly also involving the IAEA). Although the Supply Agreement provision acknowledges the ' ( *"
need for such an agreement, there is no suggestion of how difficult and time consuming it would be to negotiate and conclude this instrument.
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2 I hope these points will be carefully considered. I am sending similar letters t- the Department of Energy and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
l Sincerely,
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t UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
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- May 7, 1996 CHAIRMAN i
The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman Assistant Director
. Bureau of Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency W Lington, D.C. 20451
Dear tir. Scheinman:
The Commission recently completed its review of two Department of Energy .
technology transfer cases to tuth:rize U.S. industry participation in the Korea Peninsula Energy Development. Organization's (KEDO) reactor project in North Korea. Our response to the Department's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, dated March 'd 1995, posed no NRC objection to the authori n ti a given the President's approval of the underlying Agreed Framework 'vetween the Lnited ',tates and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (GPRK). Nevertheless, our review drew our attention to certain points
.which we believe require timely consideration by the United States in its support of the KE00 reactor project.
We recommend early and continuing actions by the United States and other KED0 2 participants to foster a sound safety culture for the project. This view was I confirmed in recent meetings I held with senior Korean officials where they emphasized the need to consider the safety aspects of the proposed project.
- The Koreans also expressed a desire for a larger and more acknowledoed role in the KEDO project.
Both safety. and nonproliferation are key national security goals, but are not within the purview of any single U.S. Government organization. Nevertheless, nuclear safety and nuclear. nonproliferation policies that are mutually reinforcing can and should be developed. In this connection, the Commission believes there should be no trade off between nuclear safety and nonprolifer-ation aspects of the KEDO project. With respect to the project's nonproliferation objective, the Commission understands the fundamental importance of establishing the initial inventory of nuclear material in North Korea and facilitating early full-scope safeguards inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We trust that all U.S. agencies l share this view.
One other point needs to be mentioned. Based on a provision in the KEDO-DPRK )
Supply Agreement, it appears KE00 may need to arrange exports of reactor fuel '
and major reactor components from the United States to North Korea, directly or through South Korea, in the next few years. As you know, such exports would-require NRC export licenses which could not be issued in the absence of a_n Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and the DPRK (possibly also involving the IAEA). Althcugh the Supply Agreement provision acknowledges the need for such an agreement, there is no suggestion of how difficult and time
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consuming it would be to negotiate and conclude this instrument. 3
2 I hope these points will be carefully considered. I am sending similar letters to the Department of State and the Department of Energy.
Sincerely, l
b bM Shirley Ann Jackson 1
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