ML20137T047
| ML20137T047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1986 |
| From: | Cline W, Stoddart P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137S854 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM 50-413-86-01-01, 50-414-86-01, NUDOCS 8602180169 | |
| Download: ML20137T047 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1986001
Text
,c .,
UNITED STATES
[yn naGug*,
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NUCLEA] REIULAT'JRY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
%*****/
FEB 101986
Report Nos.:
50-413/86-01 and 50-414/86-01
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.: -50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.:
NPF-35 and CPPR-117
Facility Name:
Catawba 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: January 6-10, 1986
Inspector:
,,O b e-
4 fdm W
(a P. SGddart l
Date $<gned
Approved by:
b D ha
4 FA
{g
6 W. E. Clin), Section Chief
Date igned
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 32 inspector-hours at the
site during normal duty hours, in the areas of liquid and gaseous radwaste
systems, effluent monitoring and post-accident sampling systems.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
B&O21801M g33
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persnnt Contacted
. Licensee Employees
- J. Hampton, Manager, Catawba Nuclear Station
- P. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer
- W. Beaver, Performance Engineer
P. McNamara, Health physicist
S. Bhatnagar, Test Engineer
T. Bohart, HVAC Consultant
R.'Charest, Station Chemist
P. Deal, Station Health Physicist
G. Courtney, Health Physicist
-A. Jackson, System Engineer
M. Kowalewski, Systems Engineer
H. Nicholson, Systems Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included four technicians.
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NRC Resident Inspectors
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- K. Vandoorn
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- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 10, 1986, with
'those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector discussed the.
following items; inspector followup item (IFI) to evaluate modification to
the ' post accident liquid sampling systems (PALSS) involving rerouting of
undiluted reactor coolant residues (Units 1 and 2); and a generic unresolved
item (URI)* concerning losses of radioiodine in long runs of sampling lines.
The licensee acknowledged that wnrk orders had been initiated prior to the
inspection to modify the PALSS at the first refueling outages of each unit
.and that the plant staff had previously initiated an investigation of the
iodine line loss problem.
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
NUREG-0737 Items (TMI Action Plan, Units 1 and 2)
a.
NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3 Post Accident Sampling Capability
(1)
II.B.3/1. Design Review (Units 1 and 2:
Liquids)
The inspector reviewed the design of the post Accident Liquid
Sampling Systems (PALSS) with respect to the design criteria of
NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements. _The
review included the design and functional descriptions, piping and
instrument diagrams (P& ids), and plant operating procedures. The
design meets the criteria of NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, with the
exception of one part of clarification item lla, which required
that the residues of sample collection be returned to containment
or to a closed system. In the original system design for all Duke
Power Company Plants, sample residues were diluted and flushed to
the plant's liquid radwaste system.
This exception to the
NUREG-0737 criteria was identified by the licensee based on the
April 1984 RII evaluation of the McGuire post accident sampling
system. The licensee (Catawba Plant) initiated corrective action
to re-route undiluted sample residues to the containment floor
drain and equipment drain sump; the diluted section of the PALSS
will continue to be drained to the plant liquid radwaste system.
The necessary modifications were scheduled for the first refueling
outages of both Units 1 and 2.
This -is considered to be an
inspection followup item (IFI) to be reviewed during a subsequent
inspection
(50-413/86-01-01,
50-414/86-01-01).
With
the
modifications to return the undiluted sample residues to
containment, the design review concluded that the Catawba Plant
post accident liquid sampling systems (PALSS) for both Units 1 and
2 fulfill the design criteria of NUREG-0737,Section II.B.3.
(2)
II.B.3/2.
Corrective actions (Units 1 and 2:
Liquids)
Not Applicable
(3)
II.B.3/3. Procedures (Units 1 and 2: Liquids)
The inspector reviewed the operating procedure for the Unit 1
PALSS and the draft operating procedure for the Unit 2 PALSS.
Both procedures appeared to be sufficiently detailed and had been
reviewed and
approved by appropriate plant
supervision.
Procedures included sample collection,
sample transfer or
. transport, and sample analyses. The inspector determined that the
procedures fulfilled the documentation requirements of NUREG-0737,
Item II.B.3.
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(4) 'II.B.3/4. Completed Actions (Unit 1:
Liquids)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's records verifying the
operability of the Unit 1 PALSS.
The licensee's verification of.
operability provided . data on the collection, processing and
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analysis of ten (10) reactor coolant samples.
Results of all
analyses were within the accuracy guidelines of NUREG-0737 and of
the October 5,
1984 letter from J. P. O'Reilly to Duke Power
Corporation.
Chloride analyses were performed at the corporate
analytical facility located near the McGuire Plant. The Catawba
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PASS design did not provide for the use of online analytical.
measurements; all analyses were performed in the plant laboratory
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facilities.
Five plant staff personnel and approximately ten
plant technicians were trained and qualified on the PALSS system.
On the basis of the information provided by the licensee, on the
inspector's review of the licensee's design, and on the
inspector's examination of the installed facilities, the inspector
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concluded that the Unit 1 PALSS was fully operational.
(5)
II.B.3/4 Completed Actions (Unit 2)
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The Unit 2 PALSS was completely installed at the time of the
inspection but had not undergone preoperational acceptance
testing. The preoperational test packages will be reviewed at a
later date. Operability of the Unit 2 PALSS will be determined at
a later date on the basis of sampling and analysis with the
reactor at full power.
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(6)
II.B.3/1. Design Review:
(Units 1 and 2: Gases)
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The inspector reviewed the design of the Post Accident Sampling
System (PASS) with respect to sampling of the containment
atmosphere.
In the Duke Power Company design, containment
atmosphere samples are obtained by means of a sampling system
wnich is independent of the rector coolant sampling system (Post
PALSS).
This is the Post
Accident Liquid Sampling System
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Accident Containment Sampling (PACS) system.
The PACS samples
containmeat atmosphere by means of a connection to the containment
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hydrogen sampling system (NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1, Attachment 6).
The question of representativeness of samples obtained by this
method was raised during the RII evaluation of the McGuire PACS.
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A licensee representative stated that the McGuire procedure for
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determining line losses and accuracy of sampling would be adapted
for use in testing the Catawba PACS and that the sampling line for
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Unit 2 would be tested prior to exceeding the 5*4 power level; the
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Unit I test was also to be accomplished in the near future.
The
3 sample of containment
PACS design was sized to obtain a 1.4 cm
atmosphere at containment pressure. The PACS would dilute the 1.4
3 sample by a factor'of 10,000:1.
100 cm3 of the diluted sample
cm
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would then be collected in a sample " bomb" and taken to the plant
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analytical facility for analysis.
Pending evaluation of the
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projected studies of line losses and sampling accuracy, the
inspector determined that the design of the PACS met the criteria
of NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3.
(7)
II.B.3/2. Corrective Actions (Units 1 and 2 - Gases)
Not applicable.
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(8) II.B.3/?. Procedures (Units 1 and 2 - Gases)
The inspector reviewed the operating procedure for the Unit 1 PACS
and the draft operating procedure for the Unit 2 PACS.
Both
procedures appeared to be sufficiently detailed and had been
reviewed and
approved
by appropriate
plant
supervision.
Procedures included sample collection,
sample transfer or
transport, and sample analystes. The inspector determined that the
procedures fulfilled the documentation requirements of NUREG-0737,
Item
II.B.3.
b.
NUREG-0737, item II.F.1, Attachment 6, Containment Hydrogen).
Units 1 and 2 of the Catawba plant are each provided with redundant
hydrogen monitors which are designed to function after a reactor
accident to measure the hydrogen gas concentration in containment.
Technical Specification 3/4.6.4 requires that each unit have two
operable hydrogen monitors. A licensee representative stated that the
hydrogen sensors are Telodyne thermal conductivity monitors.
These monitors do not utilize a catalyst bed device in the detector as
in the case of the monitors referenced in IE Information Notice 84-22.
The monitors sample from three locations:
(1) Upper containment; (2)
the 600 elevation operating deck; and (3) steam generator 1B
compartment.
The Unit I hydrogen monitors were acceptance tested at
the time of Unit I startup and have undergone quarterly surveillance
tasts using gas standards of 1% and
4*. hydrogen concentration.
The
instrumentation is maintained in a continuous standby condition and
requires no warmup period for operation. The . Unit 2 hydrogen monitors
will be subjected to acceptance testing prior to plant operation. The
inspector will review the Unit 2 hydrogen monitor acceptance tests at a
later date.
Open Item (Inspector Followup Item 50-413/86-01-01,50-414/86-01-01)
Review modification 'to post accident liquid sampling system
(PALSS) routing undiluted sample residues to containment sump.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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'5.
Liquids and Liquid Wastes (84523 - Preoperational, Unit 2)
No preoperational test procedures packages had been completed for liquid
radwaste ' systems since the last inspection (50-414/85-65, December 2-5,
1985).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Gaseous Waste System (84524 - Preoperational, Unit 2)
The inspector reviewed acceptance test procedure package TP/2/B/1200/14,
Containment Hydrogen Sample and Purge System Test, which was performed
June 14, 1985 and June 21, 1985.
Test package management review was
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completed January 7,1986.
The test procedure appeared to be completed
satisfactorily, all changes had been incorporated and initialled and all
blanks had been filled in and initialled.
The inspector made a visual
external inspection of the system and found it to be in satisfactory
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condition.
.The inspector witnessed testing of the containment purge system HEPA filter
and charcoal. absorber housing (plant System "VP").
While the system was not
an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) system, all tests were conducted in
accordance with ANSI /ASME N510-1980, Testing of Nuclear Air-Cleaning
Systems. (ANSI /ASME: American National Standards Institutes, The American
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Society of Mechanical Engineers).
The testing was also conducted in
conformance to Regulatory Guides 1.52, Revision 2, and 1.140, Revision '1,
except that in accordance with the Technical Specifications, all testing
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followed the guidelines of ANSI /ASME N510-1980; in cases of conflicts
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between the Regulatory Guides, which referenced ANSI /ASME N510-1975, and the
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Technical Specification which referenced ANSI /ASME N510-1980, the guidance
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of the Technical Specifications and ANSI /ASME N510-1980 prevailed.
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Tests which were witnessed included visual
inspection,
air flow
distribution,
volumetric
air flow, 00P (di-octyi
phthalate) smoke
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penetration testing of HEPA filters, and freon penetration testing of
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charcoal absorber beds.
The test supervisor briefec the test personnel
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prior to starting each set of tests, reviewed each step of the procedures,
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and checked all calculations.
The inspector observed all steps of the tu t
procedures, reviewed the data points and calculations entered in the
procedure form, and verified the calibration
status of the test
instrumentation. The inspector confirmed that the test results were 5,ithin
the limits specified by Regulatory Guides 1.52, Revision 2 and 1.140,
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Revision 1, by ANSI /ASME N510-1980, and by the Technical Specifications.
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The inspector will review the procedure package again after the package has
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been approved by plant management.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Effluent Radioactivity Monitoring (84524, Preoperational, Unit 2)
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The inspector discussed monitoring of radioactivity in plant effluents with
licensee personnel.
In the discussion and in the exit interview, the
licensee was informed of a generic issue concerned with the loss of airborne
radioiodine in long runs of sampling Itnes used in the sampling of
radiciodines in plant effluents (from stacks or other environmental release
vents). Technical Specification 4.11.2.1.2 requires representative sampling
of plant effluents; unless iodine line losses can be quantified, iodine
determinations based on sample analyses cannot be assured to be
representative and may be considered to be in violation of the
specification. As noted in Inspection Report 50-414/85-64, Catawba staff
had initiated a study of iodine sample line losses and had obtained some
preliminary results. Until such times as this can be fully resolved in a
generic basis, the issue will be carried as an Unresolved item.
50-413/86-01-02, 50-414/86-01-02):
Open Item (Unresolved Iter - URI
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Sampling of radioiodine aerosols has been identified as being subject to
substantial but unquantified losses in long sampling lines.
This is a
generic item applicable to all power reactor facilities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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