ML20137T047

Insp Repts 50-413/86-01 & 50-414/86-01 on 860106-10.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Liquid & Gaseous Radwaste Sys,Effluent Monitoring & post-accident Sampling Sys

ML20137T047
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/04/1986
From:	Cline W, Stoddart P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137S854	List: ML20137S848 ML20137T047
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM 50-413-86-01-01, 50-414-86-01, NUDOCS 8602180169
Download: ML20137T047 (7)

See also: IR 05000413/1986001

Text

,c .,

. ., UNITED STATES

[yn naGug*,o NUCLEA] REIULAT'JRY COMMISSION

f , REGION 11

g j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

• • * ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323

%*****/ FEB 101986

Report Nos.: 50-413/86-01 and 50-414/86-01

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: -50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and CPPR-117

Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: January 6-10, 1986

Inspector: ,,O b e- 4 fdm W

Date $<gned

(a P. SGddart l

Approved by: b D ha 4 FA {g

6 W. E. Clin), Section Chief Date igned

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 32 inspector-hours at the

site during normal duty hours, in the areas of liquid and gaseous radwaste

systems, effluent monitoring and post-accident sampling systems.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

B&O21801M

DR ADOCM 0

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REPORT DETAILS ,

1. Persnnt Contacted

. Licensee Employees

• J. Hampton, Manager, Catawba Nuclear Station

• P. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer

• W. Beaver, Performance Engineer

P. McNamara, Health physicist

S. Bhatnagar, Test Engineer

T. Bohart, HVAC Consultant

R.'Charest, Station Chemist

P. Deal, Station Health Physicist

G. Courtney, Health Physicist  :

-A. Jackson, System Engineer

M. Kowalewski, Systems Engineer

H. Nicholson, Systems Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included four technicians.

,

NRC Resident Inspectors

.

• K. Vandoorn

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, * Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 10, 1986, with

'those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector discussed the.

following items; inspector followup item (IFI) to evaluate modification to

the ' post accident liquid sampling systems (PALSS) involving rerouting of

undiluted reactor coolant residues (Units 1 and 2); and a generic unresolved

item (URI)* concerning losses of radioiodine in long runs of sampling lines.

The licensee acknowledged that wnrk orders had been initiated prior to the

inspection to modify the PALSS at the first refueling outages of each unit

.and that the plant staff had previously initiated an investigation of the

iodine line loss problem.

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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

• An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4. NUREG-0737 Items (TMI Action Plan, Units 1 and 2)

a. NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3 Post Accident Sampling Capability

(1) II.B.3/1. Design Review (Units 1 and 2: Liquids)

The inspector reviewed the design of the post Accident Liquid

Sampling Systems (PALSS) with respect to the design criteria of

NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements. _The

review included the design and functional descriptions, piping and

instrument diagrams (P& ids), and plant operating procedures. The

design meets the criteria of NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, with the

exception of one part of clarification item lla, which required

that the residues of sample collection be returned to containment

or to a closed system. In the original system design for all Duke

Power Company Plants, sample residues were diluted and flushed to

the plant's liquid radwaste system. This exception to the

NUREG-0737 criteria was identified by the licensee based on the

April 1984 RII evaluation of the McGuire post accident sampling

system. The licensee (Catawba Plant) initiated corrective action

to re-route undiluted sample residues to the containment floor

drain and equipment drain sump; the diluted section of the PALSS

will continue to be drained to the plant liquid radwaste system.

The necessary modifications were scheduled for the first refueling

outages of both Units 1 and 2. This -is considered to be an

inspection followup item (IFI) to be reviewed during a subsequent

inspection (50-413/86-01-01, 50-414/86-01-01). With the

modifications to return the undiluted sample residues to

containment, the design review concluded that the Catawba Plant

post accident liquid sampling systems (PALSS) for both Units 1 and

2 fulfill the design criteria of NUREG-0737,Section II.B.3.

(2) II.B.3/2. Corrective actions (Units 1 and 2: Liquids)

Not Applicable

(3) II.B.3/3. Procedures (Units 1 and 2: Liquids)

The inspector reviewed the operating procedure for the Unit 1

PALSS and the draft operating procedure for the Unit 2 PALSS.

Both procedures appeared to be sufficiently detailed and had been

reviewed and approved by appropriate plant supervision.

Procedures included sample collection, sample transfer or

. transport, and sample analyses. The inspector determined that the

procedures fulfilled the documentation requirements of NUREG-0737,

Item II.B.3.

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(4) 'II.B.3/4. Completed Actions (Unit 1: Liquids)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's records verifying the

operability of the Unit 1 PALSS. The licensee's verification of.

operability provided . data on the collection, processing and

L analysis of ten (10) reactor coolant samples. Results of all

analyses were within the accuracy guidelines of NUREG-0737 and of

the October 5, 1984 letter from J. P. O'Reilly to Duke Power

Corporation. Chloride analyses were performed at the corporate

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analytical facility located near the McGuire Plant. The Catawba

PASS design did not provide for the use of online analytical.

measurements; all analyses were performed in the plant laboratory

! facilities. Five plant staff personnel and approximately ten

plant technicians were trained and qualified on the PALSS system.

On the basis of the information provided by the licensee, on the

inspector's review of the licensee's design, and on the

inspector's examination of the installed facilities, the inspector

! concluded that the Unit 1 PALSS was fully operational.

(5) II.B.3/4 Completed Actions (Unit 2)

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The Unit 2 PALSS was completely installed at the time of the

inspection but had not undergone preoperational acceptance

testing. The preoperational test packages will be reviewed at a

later date. Operability of the Unit 2 PALSS will be determined at

a later date on the basis of sampling and analysis with the

reactor at full power.

l (6) II.B.3/1. Design Review: (Units 1 and 2: Gases)

.

The inspector reviewed the design of the Post Accident Sampling

System (PASS) with respect to sampling of the containment

atmosphere. In the Duke Power Company design, containment

atmosphere samples are obtained by means of a sampling system

wnich is independent of the rector coolant sampling system (Post

Accident Liquid Sampling System -

PALSS). This is the Post

Accident Containment Sampling (PACS) system. The PACS samples

containmeat atmosphere by means of a connection to the containment

l hydrogen sampling system (NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1, Attachment 6).

The question of representativeness of samples obtained by this

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method was raised during the RII evaluation of the McGuire PACS.  ;

A licensee representative stated that the McGuire procedure for

i determining line losses and accuracy of sampling would be adapted

for use in testing the Catawba PACS and that the sampling line for -

Unit 2 would be tested prior to exceeding the 5*4 power level; the

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Unit I test was also to be accomplished in the near future. The

PACS design was sized to obtain a 1.4 cm 3 sample of containment

atmosphere at containment pressure. The PACS would dilute the 1.4

cm 3 sample by a factor'of 10,000:1. 100 cm3 of the diluted sample

! would then be collected in a sample " bomb" and taken to the plant

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analytical facility for analysis. Pending evaluation of the  !

projected studies of line losses and sampling accuracy, the

inspector determined that the design of the PACS met the criteria

of NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3.

(7) II.B.3/2. Corrective Actions (Units 1 and 2 - Gases)

Not applicable.

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(8) II.B.3/?. Procedures (Units 1 and 2 - Gases)

The inspector reviewed the operating procedure for the Unit 1 PACS

and the draft operating procedure for the Unit 2 PACS. Both

procedures appeared to be sufficiently detailed and had been

reviewed and approved by appropriate plant supervision.

Procedures included sample collection, sample transfer or

transport, and sample analystes. The inspector determined that the

procedures fulfilled the documentation requirements of NUREG-0737,

Item II.B.3.

b. NUREG-0737, item II.F.1, Attachment 6, Containment Hydrogen).

Units 1 and 2 of the Catawba plant are each provided with redundant

hydrogen monitors which are designed to function after a reactor

accident to measure the hydrogen gas concentration in containment.

Technical Specification 3/4.6.4 requires that each unit have two

operable hydrogen monitors. A licensee representative stated that the

hydrogen sensors are Telodyne thermal conductivity monitors.

These monitors do not utilize a catalyst bed device in the detector as

in the case of the monitors referenced in IE Information Notice 84-22.

The monitors sample from three locations: (1) Upper containment; (2)

the 600 elevation operating deck; and (3) steam generator 1B

compartment. The Unit I hydrogen monitors were acceptance tested at

the time of Unit I startup and have undergone quarterly surveillance

tasts using gas standards of 1% and 4*. hydrogen concentration. The

instrumentation is maintained in a continuous standby condition and

requires no warmup period for operation. The . Unit 2 hydrogen monitors

will be subjected to acceptance testing prior to plant operation. The

inspector will review the Unit 2 hydrogen monitor acceptance tests at a

later date.

Open Item (Inspector Followup Item 50-413/86-01-01,50-414/86-01-01)

Review modification 'to post accident liquid sampling system

(PALSS) routing undiluted sample residues to containment sump.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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'5. Liquids and Liquid Wastes (84523 - Preoperational, Unit 2)

No preoperational test procedures packages had been completed for liquid

radwaste ' systems since the last inspection (50-414/85-65, December 2-5,

1985).

No violations or deviations were identified. ,

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6. Gaseous Waste System (84524 - Preoperational, Unit 2)

The inspector reviewed acceptance test procedure package TP/2/B/1200/14,

Containment Hydrogen Sample and Purge System Test, which was performed

June 14, 1985 and June 21, 1985. Test package management review was <

completed January 7,1986. The test procedure appeared to be completed

satisfactorily, all changes had been incorporated and initialled and all

blanks had been filled in and initialled. The inspector made a visual

external inspection of the system and found it to be in satisfactory 1

condition. *

.The inspector witnessed testing of the containment purge system HEPA filter

and charcoal. absorber housing (plant System "VP"). While the system was not

an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) system, all tests were conducted in

accordance with ANSI /ASME N510-1980, Testing of Nuclear Air-Cleaning '

Systems. (ANSI /ASME: American National Standards Institutes, The American

Society of Mechanical Engineers). The testing was also conducted in

conformance to Regulatory Guides 1.52, Revision 2, and 1.140, Revision '1,

except that in accordance with the Technical Specifications, all testing i

followed the guidelines of ANSI /ASME N510-1980; in cases of conflicts  !

between the Regulatory Guides, which referenced ANSI /ASME N510-1975, and the r

Technical Specification which referenced ANSI /ASME N510-1980, the guidance  :

l of the Technical Specifications and ANSI /ASME N510-1980 prevailed. v

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Tests which were witnessed included visual inspection, air flow

distribution, volumetric air flow, 00P (di-octyi phthalate) smoke ,

penetration testing of HEPA filters, and freon penetration testing of  !

l charcoal absorber beds. The test supervisor briefec the test personnel  ?

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prior to starting each set of tests, reviewed each step of the procedures,  !

and checked all calculations. The inspector observed all steps of the tu t

procedures, reviewed the data points and calculations entered in the  ;

procedure form, and verified the calibration status of the test  ;

instrumentation. The inspector confirmed that the test results were 5,ithin

the limits specified by Regulatory Guides 1.52, Revision 2 and 1.140,

i Revision 1, by ANSI /ASME N510-1980, and by the Technical Specifications.

! The inspector will review the procedure package again after the package has l

l been approved by plant management.  ;

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No violations or deviations were identified. i

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7. Effluent Radioactivity Monitoring (84524, Preoperational, Unit 2)

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The inspector discussed monitoring of radioactivity in plant effluents with

licensee personnel. In the discussion and in the exit interview, the

licensee was informed of a generic issue concerned with the loss of airborne

radioiodine in long runs of sampling Itnes used in the sampling of

radiciodines in plant effluents (from stacks or other environmental release

vents). Technical Specification 4.11.2.1.2 requires representative sampling

of plant effluents; unless iodine line losses can be quantified, iodine

determinations based on sample analyses cannot be assured to be

representative and may be considered to be in violation of the

specification. As noted in Inspection Report 50-414/85-64, Catawba staff

had initiated a study of iodine sample line losses and had obtained some

preliminary results. Until such times as this can be fully resolved in a

generic basis, the issue will be carried as an Unresolved item.

Open Item (Unresolved Iter - URI -

50-413/86-01-02, 50-414/86-01-02):

Sampling of radioiodine aerosols has been identified as being subject to

substantial but unquantified losses in long sampling lines. This is a

generic item applicable to all power reactor facilities.

No violations or deviations were identified.