ML20126D380
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77 OBattelle September 19, 1984 Pacitic Northwest Laboratories P.O. Box 999 Rxhland. W ashington U.S.A. 99352 Telephone #509)375-2780 ftr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director reie,35. m 4 Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulat.an U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Eisenhut:
SUBJECT:
ASSESSMENT OF DIESEL ENGINE RELIABILITY /0PERABILITY (FIN B2952) - MONTHLY REPORT FOR JULY AND AUGUST 1984 Enclosed for your information is a copy of the subject report on activities performed at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory during the months of July and August.
Included on the distribution for the report are the NRC staff members specified in Section F.2, "itanthly Progress Report," of the Statement of Work for this project.
I regret that the July monthly report was not submitted by August 15, as called for in the Statement of Work.
Pressing project issues (discussed in this report) requiring priority attention contributed to the delay.
S cerely, Walter W.
aity PNL Project Manager WWL:ks cc: DOE /RL M. Plahuta DOE /HQ K. Trickett NRC/NRR C. Berlinger 8506150063 850206 R. Caruso PDR FOIA M. Carrington BELL 84-459 PDR D. Corley F. Miraglia M. Williams I
NRr Plant Project Managers 7. Buckley E. ficKenna S. Burwell M. ftiller D. Hood S.111ner
- D.' liouston
- C. Stanle K. Jabbour
~ J. Stefano T. Kenyon E. Weinkam
PNL MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT for ASSESSMENT OF DIESEL ENGINE RELIABILITY /0PERABILITY MONTH: July and August 1984 FIN NUMBER: 82952 CONTRACT IDENTIFICATION: DE-AC06-76RL0 1830 (TD 1886)
SPONSOR: Division of Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission PROJECT STATUS Project Description PNL is supporting the NRC staff in addressing questions of reliability, opera-bility, and quality assurance for diesel generators manufactured by Trans-america Delaval, Inc. (TDI). A major failure in one TDI diesel at a nuclear utility and less-serious problems in others have raised questions regarding the adequacy of these engines as emergency power sources for safety-related nuclear systems. With the assistance of recognized authorities on diesel engine tech-nology, PNL will assess the TDI Diesel Generator Owners' Group Program Plan and related information submitted to NRC; evaluate the implementation of the Pro-gram Plan; and support the NRC staff in hearings and briefings.
Progress During Reporting Period Plant-Specific Technical Evaluation Reports e
Two plant-specific TERs were issued to NRC during the reporting period:
1.
PNL-5201, Review and Evaluation of Transamerica Delaval, Inc., Diesel Engine Reliability and Operability - Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 2.
PNL-5211, Review and Evaluation of Transamerica Delaval, Inc., Diesel Engine Reliability and Operability - Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1.
Work was begun on preparation of a third plant-specific TER for Texas Utilities Generating Company's Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 1.
i 1
e Other Plant-Specific Actions PNL project team member D. A. Dingee and PNL consultant J. C. Spanner began the technical review of Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Power Station Unit 1.
Efforts were concentrated on the crankshaft.
PNL project team members W. W. Laity, J. M. Alzheimer, and F. R. Zaloudek, along with consultants S. H. Bush, A. J. Henriksen, and A. Sarsten, pre-pared PNL's written testimony for the ASLB hearing egarding the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. The PNL testimony was submitted to NRC on August 29, 1984.
J. F. Nesbitt of PNL and consultant B. J. Kirkwood prepared PNL's written testimony for the ASLB hearing regarding licensing of the Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1.
The hearing was cancelled, obviating the need to submit the testimony to NRC.
TDI Diesel Generator Owners' Group Reports e
The status of PNL's review of the Owners' Group reports on generic issues is as shown in Table 1.
This information is current as of August 28, 1984.
e Document Data Base
-The document data base continues to expand with each report and piece of correspondence generated for this project.
More than 800 documents are currently catalogued in the data base.
Problems Encountered e Plant-Specific Issues An intensive effort was required during July and August to deal with plant-specific issues on Grand Gulf, Catawba, Shoreham, and Comanche Peak. Because of the tight deadline and the substantial overlap in the scheduled dates for submitting technical evaluation reports and/or written testimony concerning these plants, the consultants and PNL project staff involved in this effort had very little time to devote to other project-related matters.
In particular, this effort adversely affected our progress on the preparations of technical evaluation reports on known problems.
Plant-specific issues will continue to require substantial attention for the next saveral months.
Probably the most significant issue in terms of demand on the time of PNL consultants, and the most unpredictable in terms of estimating the schedule for its completion, is the ASLB hearing on the TDI diesel engines installed at Shoreham.
Other power plants that will require attention for near-term licensing decisions include Ccmanche Peak, River Bend, and San Onofre.
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TABLE 1.
Status of PNL Review of Owners' Group Generic Issue Reports as of August 28, 1984 Est. Date Generic Issue
% Complete Complete Comments Piston skirts 70% as of 08-31-84 08-24-84 New NDE inspection data on the R-5 AE piston skirts may require re-evaluation of our position. Jack Spanner is now looking at the data., Rough draft of TER is about 60% complete Crankshaft, 60% as of 08-31-84 01-01-85 There are still some areas of concern with the R-48 S-8, V-16 crankshaft at Shoreham; no problems anticipated with the V-16 crankshaft.
Crankshaft, 20% as of 08-31-84 01-01-85 V-12 crankshaft will not be evaluated. Cracks V-12 V-20 found in the V-20 crankshaft at-San Onofre could present serious problems.
Bearing shells, 90% as of 08-31-84 09-15-84 Draft TER has been submitted and is being Conn rod reformatted.
j Cylinder heads 90% as of 08-31-84 09-15-84 TER is approximately 50% complete; no open items.
Cylinder block 40% as of 08-31-84 01-01-85 Cracks in cam gallery of DSR-8 cylinder block are and liner unresolved. No problems anticipated in V-16 block.
Engine base, 90% as of 08-31-84 09-15-84 Rough draft of TER is complete.
No problems are DSR-8 anticipated in completing the evaluation.
Engine base, 10% as of 08-31-84 10-15-84 V base review has just been started, but no V-16, 12, 20 problems are anticipated at this point.
Head stud 90% as of 08-31-84 09-30-84 First draft of TER is completed.
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i TABLE 1.
(contd)
Est. Date Generic Issue
% Complete Complete Comments Push rod 90% as of 08-31-84 09-15-84 Rough draft of TER has gone through two revisions so far. Delay expected in editing and in getting j
final concurrence signatures.
Rocker arm 60% as of 08-31-84 09-30-84 The articulated connecting rod is still under capscrew review. A potential problem area is the adequacy of the Owners' Group stress analysis.
Connecting rod, 95% as of 08-31-84 09-15-84 Rough draft of TER is completed. No open items.
in-line i
Wiring and 75% as of 08-31-84 11-01-84 Supplements to the original report are being termination reviewed now. Need this input prior to re-drafting 2
{
TER.
^
Fuel oil 95% as of 08-31-84 09-15-84 Rough draft of TER is compete; no open issues.
injection tubing l
Turbocharger, 90% as of 08-31-84 09-30-84 First draft of TER is completed.
S-8, V-16 i
d Turbocharger, 30% as of 08-31-84 Technical evaluation of report is ongoing.
V-12, V-20 Jacket water 85% as of 08-31-84 10-01-84 Need input from one reviewer on last supplemental pumps report. Other data on hand and will be integrated
+
into TER when schedule permits.
Air start 90% as of 08-31-84 09-30-03 First draft of TER is completed.
l valve capscrew
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Availability of Witnesses for ASLB Hearings on Shoreham Diesel Engines e
The uncertainty of the schedule for the ASLB hearing on Shoreham engines presents potentially significant problems in terms of the availability of PNLs consultants to testify. Their availability is summarized in a letter dated September 5,1984, from PNL (W. Laity) to the cognizant NRC attorney (R. Goddard).
One consultant, Professor A. Sarsten of the Norwegian Institute of Technology, is on leave to narticipate in the hearings through September and the first week of October. He prepared the testimony filed by NRC on the contention concerning crankshaft stresses, and he is exceptionally well qualified to address all aspects of that issue.
Because A. Sarsten has spent considerable time on the TDI-specific crank-shaft stresses, there is no immediate backup for him.
When arrangements were made for his leave of absence, it seemed reasonable to expect that all testimony that required his participation could be completed in the 4 weeks he is spending on Long Island.
As of the end of the first week of the hearings, however, it is not apparent when the process will be concluded.
Dr. Spencer Bush, who prepared the testimony filed by NRC on the conten-tions concerning crankshaft shotpeening and adequacy of the cylinder blocks, is also available for a limited time period only. As summarized in the PNL letter of September 5 to NRC (R. Goddard), Dr. Bush is avail-able from September 20 through September 25, and on October 9-10.
At other times he has commitments throughout the United States and, during October, in several countries of Europe. His backup is Mr. J. C. Tobin of Westinghouse Hanford. Although Mr. Tobin is a well qualified metal-lurgist, he does not have the specific knowledge that Dr. Bush has on the contention to be addressed in the hearings.
Travel Summary Five trips / visits were made during July and August:
On July 11, PNL project team members J. M. Alzheimer, W. W. Laity, and F. R. Zaloudek traveled to Charlotte, North Carolina, accompanied by PNL consultants P. J. Louzecky, B. J. Kirkwood, A. J. Henriksen, and A. Sarsten. The trip's purpose was to attend the Owners' Group meeting and discuss PNL's review and evaluation of the Owners' Group Program Plan (documented in PNL-5161) with NRC and Owners' Group representatives.
On July 25 and 26, J. F. Nesbitt of PNL and consultants J. E. Horner, B.J.
e Kirkwood, and P. J. Louzecky met with NRC (M. Miller and A. Marinos) and Duke Power Company personnel at the latter's Catawba Nuclear Station in South Carolina. The purpose of the visit was to review the disassembly and inspection of the Catawba Unit 1 B engine.
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On July 27, 1984, D. A. Dingee of PNL visited TRACOR Hydronautics in Laurel, Maryland, to initiate the DR/QR review for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
On July 31, 1984, D. A. Dingee of PNL participated in NRC Commission hearings in Washington, D.C., regarding the licensing of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
On August 2,1984, PNL consultant J. C. Spanner visited the San Onofre Nuclear Station to witness SCE's nondestructive examination of crankshaft cracks at oil hole locations.
Travel plans for September include the following:
W. W. Laity of PNL and consultants S. H. Bush, A. J. Henriksen, and A. Sarsten will travel to Long Island, New York, on September 9 to testify in the ASLB hearing on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
J. F. Nesbitt and R. E. Dodge of PNL and consultants A. J. Louzecky and B. J. Kirkwood will travel to St. Francisville, Louisiana, on September 13 and 14. They will review the disassembly and inspection of the B diesel engine at the Gulf State Utilities Company's River Bend Station, D. A. Dingee of PNL, along with R. Ferris (NDE expert) and consultants o
B. J. Kirkwood, P. J. Louzecky, and T. W. Spaetgens, will travel to the San Onofre Nuclear Station in late September.
They will review the status of the crankshaft inspection on the second engine and discuss the adequacy of Southern California Edison Company submittals, to date, in formulating the PNL TER and NRC SER.
Plans for September Prepare and submit plant-specific TER to NRC on the Comanche Peak Steam e
Electric Station.
Determine status and scope of effort in progress on the River Bend Station e
Unit 1 and San Onofre Nuclear Station diesel engines, in preparation for developing the required TERs.
Submit about 10 draft TERs on generic issue reports for NRC review.
Implement audit review evaluations on the DR/QR reports received.
Emphasis will be given to preparing the Shoreham DR/QR TER.
Prepare project Forn 189 for fiscal year 1985.
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s Financial Status - July 1984 '
A.
Total Cost of Project
. Balance of Funds Total Projected-Funds Obligated Rec uired by FY Project Cost To Date T E4 FY85 974K 287K 598K 89K B.. Funds Expended to Date Period FYTD Cumulative 1-1.
Direct lab staff effort 11 MM 46 MM 46 MM 2.
Funds ($000)
Direct salaries 47 199 199 Materials & services l'
31 31 ADP support 0
0 0
Subcontracts (a) 85 166 166 Travel 6
.25 25-Indirect labor 14 59 59 Other~(F&E,Nucl.,
0/H,S&A) 11 39-39
_ General & Administrativ'e 33 142 142
.i 197-661 661
/
j (a) These expended funds represent actual billings by the project consultants against total contracted funds _of 295K to the consulting firms working on the project.
C.
Funds ($000) Expended by Task i
Period Cumulative to Date Task 1 - Proj. Mgmt.
32 166 i
Task 2 - Eval, of OGPP 29 104 Task 3 - Eval. of Imple-4 4
mentation of OGPP 128 376 1
Task 4 - Support to NRC J
15 197 661 i
i s
7 4
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l Financial Status - August 1984 A.
Total Cost of Project Balance of Funds Total Projected Funds Obligated Reauired by FY Project Cost To Date FY84 FY85 1567K 437K 737K 393K B.
Funds Expended to Date I
Period FYTD Cumulative
- 1. Direct lab staff effort 9 Mi 55 791 55 PR 2.
Funds ($00()
Direct-salaries 37 236 236 Materials & services 19 50 50 ADP support 0
0 0
Subcontracts (a) 28 194 194 Travel 7
32 32 Indirect labor 11 70 70 0ther {F&E, Nucl.,
0/H,S&A) 7 46 46 General & Administrative 26 168 168 135 796 464 (a) These expended funds represent-actual billings by the project consultants against total contracted funds of 325K to the consulting firms working on the project.
An additional 290K are in process of being conformed and will be added to the respective contracts by Septenber 25.
C.
Funds ($000) Expended by Task Period Cumulative to Date Task 1 - Proj. i+ jut.
15 181 Task 2 - Eval. of OGPP 6
110 Task 3 - Eval. of Imple-nentation of OGPP 84 460 Task 4 - Support to NRC 30 45 135 796 8
L
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET _
hhw W.
~ w s,y u w u n j u: ~ s n )
Item Number:
006 Priority:
2D
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3/4.7.4 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 7-9 Problem
Title:
Deletion of Snubber List (Snubber Specification Replacement) 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Tables 3.7.4-1 and 3.7.4-2 in the Technical Specifications contain lists of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers which are required to be operable. Any design modifications which entail revisions to piping supports and snubbers will necessitate revisions to the Technical Specifications. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has approved an alternative approach to including tables which identify all safety-related snubbers in the Technical Specifications.
Additionally the NRC has noted that the Grand Gulf Technical Specification does not address hard to remove snubbers or the ALARA aspect of snubbera located in high radiation areas. The NRC also noted that line 14 of parrgraph b on page 3/4 7-10 says "part" and thould read " port".
2.
Safety Significance:
None. Any alternative approach for establishing Technical Specification requirements for snubber operability will not decrease any safety margins, 3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Review the snubber Technical Specification requirements accepted by the NRC for the La Salle County Station. These requirements do not include lists of* ;
hydraulic and mechanical snubbers. Determine if Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3/4.7.4 should be revised to reflect the corresponding Technical Specification from La Salle County Station.
Evaluate the additional coacerns noted by the NRC and previde the appropriate Technical Specification changes, if required.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd10
Page 2 4
i TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
006 Priority:
2D 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
j Itens Closed: (How) 1 1
/
Date Time
References:
- 1) TSRT-84/0419 4
- 2) Memorandum from R. C. Lewis to D. G. Eisenhut,"Com:nents on Draft Appendix A Technical Specifications, Grand Gulf Unit--1",
-dated February 9, 1984.
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers
,i s
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I Rev. 21, 4/8/84 l
Misdll
v. _ - -. - - _....
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
013 Priority:
3A
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 3.3.2-1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4'3-10 Problem
Title:
High Radiation MSIV Isolation Terminology 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
a.
Table'3.3.2-1 " Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," indicates main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure as a result of a main steam line (MSL) high radiation signal. MSIV closure also occurs, however, upon receipt of an MSL low radiation signal indication of a sensor failure (reference FSAR 7.3.1.1.2.4.1.2.3).
The MSL low radiation signal is not listed in Table 3.3.2-1 as an MSIV closure signal. This situation is one example of a generic situation wherein the various instrument trip function tables in the Technical Specifications do not necessarily list all signals producing the indicated trip function.
b.
The NRC, Division of Project and Resident Programs, has identified thtt four valves of the combustible gas control system (E61-F009, F010, F056, F057) receive Group 5 isolation aignals and that clarifying notes should be placed in the specification o: in Table 3.3.2-1, 2.
Safety Significance:
a.
None. The unlisted signals which also result'in the trip functions identified in the various instrument trip function tables are not safety significant. These unlisted signals are.not necessary to initiate actionstomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsand,assuch,should*(
not be listed in the Technical Specification b.
None. Preliminary investigations revealed that the four valves received Group 7 isolation signals which is rqflected in Technical Specification Table 3.6.4-1.
l Rev. 21, 4/8/84 l
Misd21
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
013 Priority:
3A 3.
Anticipated Resolution:
a.
Evaluate the importance of those signals not currently listed in the Technical Specification instrumentation trip function tables (e.g., Table 3.3.2-1) and confirm that these signals are not necessary to initiate action's to mitigate the consequences of accidents.
b.
Evaluate the isolation signals to the four valves identified in r.he problem description and confirm that Technical Specification changes are not necessary.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time
References:
TSRT-84/0344 NRC/NRR Second Proof and Review Comments, Page 10 of letter from Richard C. Lewis to Darrell G. Eisenhut, dated February 9, 1984 cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd22
I I
i TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
014 Priority:
2B
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
4.1.3.1.4 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 1-5 i
Problem
Title:
SDV Level Sensor Response 1.- Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Surveillan'e Requirement 4.1.3.1.4.b requires determining that the scram c
discharge volume (SDV) scram and control rod block level instrumentation is w
operable by demonstrating proper level sensor response by performing a channel functional test. However, the instrument channels are analog channels and the i
definition of a channel functional test for analog channels does not stipulate sensor response testing.
2.
Safety Significance:
l
' Safety will be enhanced by specifically addressing SDV scram and control rod block level sensor testing in addition to requiring a channel functional test.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Evaluate and submit proposed changes to the Technical Specification to f
specifically address operability testing of the SDV scram and control rod block level sensors. (Reference IE Bulletin Number 83-17) 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRR verbally addressed deleting the reference to channel functional test on 1/24/84.
NRC Notified:
/
l Individual Notified Date Time I
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l Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd23
- ~ _ -
5-c Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
014 Priority:
2B 5.
Disposition:
It. ems Closed: (How)
/
Date Time
Reference:
Letter from R. C. Lewis to D. G. Eisenhut, February 9,1984,
" Comments on Draft Appendix A Tecnnical Specifications, Grand Gulf Unit 1, Docket No. 50-416", Page 7.
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers s
Rev. 21, 4/8/84
'blsd24
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
032 Priority:
2B
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.4.3.2, B 3/4.4.3.2 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 4-8 and 4-9 and B 3/4 4-2 Problem
Title:
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage Specification Implementation 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
There are several generic impicmentation problems with Technical Specification 3.4.3.2:
Bases 3/4.4.3.2 states chat the 1 gpm isolation valve leakage (3.4.3.2.d) a.
is included in the 30 gpm total leakage (3.4.3.2.c), but this is not clearly indicated by the Specification.
b.
Surveillance Requirement 4.4.1.2.1.a. b, and c specify once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as the monitoring frequency for determining RCS leakage. However, the GE Standard Technical Specification allows a choice of either 4 or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
c.
Action Statement d requires that, if one of the interface valve leakage pressure monitors remains inoperable for more than 7 days, the pressure must be verified to be less than the alarm point at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This requirement is inappropriate because:
The so-called "alarn point" is actually only a low pressure o
permissive indication that informs the operator that he can manually open the interface valve if necessary.
Interface valve leakage that is within the allowable limit specified o
by Technical Specification 3.4.3.2.d_would result in the pressure,,
normally remaining well above the " alarm point."
There is no further action specified if the pressure cannot be o
verified to be belev the " alarm point."
d.
Bases 3/4.4.3 does not currently state that the RCS leakage detection,
systems will measure leakage from all fluid systems in the drywell.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd56
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Fage 2 TICEXICJl. SPECITICATICS ?103"IM ErEET (CC57'O) l Ite: Ec=her 032 Pricrity 23 e.
Technical Specificatie 3.4.3.2 dess :: address valve interi:cis f:
high pressere/ lev press =re interface valves E12-7003, FC09 FC23, 7053, 7037 -and E33-?CC1. These valves are interlected to prever: valve
~
epening :::11 pressure per=issives are satisified in crder to preve :
everpressurizatics of the lev pressure sistems that correct to the reac cr ecclast pressure bcr--2* y.
f.
Technical Specifica:ic: 3.4.3.2 lists rea :or c:c1:2: syste: 3 :esscre isolati:: valve leakage as a separate iten. E vever, Iases S< ctie:
3/4.4.3.2 sta:es this leakage vill be ccesidered as a p:rtic: cf the alleved ide :ified li alage.
g.
Table 3.4.3.2-2 cc :mi s tv errers. T~re valve 751-TC51 shecid be E31-?C64, and the alar = se:pci:: for 10!C (specified as 153 psig) sh:cid be "3>", since there is to alars for ICIC.
2.
Safety Significare:
50:e.
Present verding =sy eed clarifica:ict.
3.
Anticipated Easoletics:
Ferform an evaluatics and deter =i e the specificatie changes, if any, that are recessary. 1 fer atics c plant specific p chlers vill be pr:vided i:ferrally to 512 (O. Ecffra:).
4 510 lespe se :: Ite (NIZ/II):
NEC Sc 1fied:
/
Individual 5ctified Ca:e Tire lev. 21, 4/3/31 MIsd57
Page 3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FRO 3LDi Ser.:.4 (CONT'D)
Ites Number 032 Priority 23 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (Hov)
/
Daee Ti e
References:
- 1) TSRT-84/0230
- 2) Proof & Revian Cc=sents frc= Enclosure 5. Attach =ent A Itc=
13.
- 3) Proof & Review Coc=ents #3 on Page 10 and f5 cn Page 11 cf the memo from R. C. Lewis to D. G. Eisenhut, dated February 9, 1984.
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers
.. :~
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd57.1
1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
041 Priority:
2B l
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
4.4.1.1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 4-1 Problem
Title:
Recirculation Loop Operability 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Presently, Surveillance Requirement 4.4.1.1 is inconsistent with Technical Specification 3.4.1.1 in that the surveillance applies only to the flow control valves and does not address the operability of each complete loop.
Additionally, the NRC has expressed the following concerns on Technical Specification 4.4.1.1:
a)
The "as-is" failure of the reactor coolant syste= recirculation loop flow control valve should be clarified to state that failure =eans the valve does not nove in either direction.
b)
The control valve covecent check should state that the taxitus rate rather than the average rate is being tested.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. Other surveillance require =ents (such as 4.4.1.2 which covers jet pu=p operability) provide adequate assurance of recirculation loop operation; therefore, this inconsistency has no adverse icpact on plant safety.
l None. The NRC concerns involve terminology differences which do not affect the surveillance requirecents of the Technical Specifications.
l I
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
I A Technical Specification change proposal was submitted as Item 6 of a letter from L. F. Dale to H. R. Denton, dated June 14, 1983 (AECM-83/0338). This submittal appropriately codified the surveillance require =ents for loop Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd73
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number 041 Priority 2B operation and added a separate Technical Specification dealing with reactivity controls for flow control valve operability. This change, however, was denied by letter (A. Schwencer to J. P. McCaughy) dated June 21, 1983. This item is.
still being considered for resubmittal.
Evaluate the NRC concerns to confirm that no Technical Specification changes are required. The "as-is" failure mode for the recirculation loop flow control valve is an accepted description of its failure mode and should require no clarification. The average rate of flow control valve movement is the actual measurement obtained, whereas the maximum rate of valve movement would be a derived value. No change would therefore be required for the existing CGNS Technical Specifications.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (llow)
/
Date Time
Reference:
Memorandum from R. C. Lewis to D. G. Eisenhut, " Comments on Draft Appendix A Technical Specifications, Grand Gulf Unit 1", (page 11, item 3) dated February 9, 1984 cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84
..t c ? !,
i
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i TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
054 Priority:
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 3.3.8-1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-98 Problem
Title:
CTMT Spray Minimum Operable Channel 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Table 3.3.8-1 presently requires a minimum of one operable channel per trip system for.,the actuation instrumentation of the containment spray system. At present, it is unclear whether this will provide adequate redundancy for the
{
actuation instrumentation. The containment spray timers are initiated on the receipt of a LOCA signal. This LOCA signal is initiated by instrument channels consisting of two Reactor Water Level 1 and two High Drywell Pressure channels.
In order to ensure that the timers are started, it may be necessary to require a minimum of two operable channels per trip system for the Reactor Water Level I channels and the High Drywell Pressure Channels.
1 In addition, the present Action Statement 3.3.8.b.1, which requires that a containment spray system timer be placed in the tripped condition with less than the minimum number of operable channels, is inappropriate. The timers must not be placed in the tripped condition, as this may cause immediate initiation of containment spray with a LOCA signal in conjunction with high containment and drywell pressure, which would violate minimum core cooling requirements for LPCI.
5 2.
Safety Significance:
Withlessthantheappropriateminimumoperablechannels,theredubdancyo'f'l the containment spray system'could be degraded below a level appropriate for single-failure design.
i l
4 F
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 l
. Fisd96
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number 054 Priority 1B With respect to Action Statement 3.3.8.b.1, placing a timer in the tripped condition may cause immediate initiation of containment spray with a LOCA signal in conjunction with high containment and drywell pressure, which would,
violate min'imum core cooling requirements for LPCI.
3.
An'ticipated Resolution:
Initiate a review to determine the adequacy of Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation, Action Statements, and Surveillance Requirements.
Included in this review would be a determination of which instruments are required, minimum operable channel requirements, and adequacy of current Action Statements.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time
Reference:
Handout from January 24, 1984 meeting with NRC/NRR, (Memorandum from Faust Rosa to Cecil Thomas dated October'31, 1983) Enclosure 1 Item 8.
l I
cc:
J.-E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd97.
L
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
056 Priority:
3B NRC (I&E plus NRR)
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3/4.5.1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 5-1 Problem
Title:
HPCS Automatic Transfer from CST to Suppression Pool 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification 3.5.1.c requires ECCS Division 3 to consist of an OPERABLE high pressure core spray (HPCS) system with a flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression pool and transferring the water through the spray sparger to the reactor vessel.
This Technical Specification does not include a requirement for an HPCS flow path capable of taking suction from the condensate storage tank.(CST), nor does it require an operable CST to suppression pool automatic transfer system.
NRC has recommended that this Technical Specification be modified to include these requirements.
The NRC also recommended (in a memorandum to D. G. Eisenhut from R. C. Lewis dated Feburary 9, 1984) that this specification be changed to read "...taking suction from the condensate storage tank and..." instead of "...taking suction from the suppression pool and..."
2.
Safety Significance:
None. Although the CST is the preferred suction flow path, safety analysis assumes that the water is taken from the suppression pool.
Surveillance Requirement 4.5.1.c.3 demonstrates an operable CST to suppression pool automatic transfer system by requiring a system functional test to include verificationthattheHPCSautomaticallytransferssuctionfromtheCSTtothe{
suppression pool.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Send a response to the NRC explaining why the proposed Technical Specification change is unnecessary.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd98
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number 056 Priority 3B 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time
Reference:
Proof & Review comments from mecorandum to D. G. Eisenhut from R.
C. Lewis dated February 9, 1984 cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 MIS 490
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
077 Priority:
2B NRR
/1/24/84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3/4.3.7.4 Tech Spec Page:
3/4 3-66 Problem
Title:
Remote Shutdown Panel - Addition of Division II Instrumentation 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification 3/4.3.7.4 lists the requirements for remote shutdown monitoring' instrumentation. The NRR I&C Branch proposed a revision to Technical Specification 3/4.3.7.4 to include both divisions of remote shutdown panels and their associated transfer switches and control circuits.
Also, it appears that Operational Cortdition 3 should be added to the applicability statement, since the system would be operated in this mode and there is potential for long periods of time spent in Operational Condition.
Technical Specification 4.3.7.4 should also be reviewed for consistency with the periodic testing requirement indicated in FSAR section 7.4.7. 4.2.J.
Technical Specificat' ion Bases 3/4.3.7.4 should be reviewed to determine if it is necessary to indicate tht.t the remote shutdown system is in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A General Design Criterion 19.
2.
Safety Significance:
If the proposed modification is deemed necessary, then administrative controls may be necessary to ensure conservatism in plant operations. The addition of Operation Condition 3 to the applicability statement will ensure the syste::r,[is maintained operable in all required modes of operation.
l l
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 l
I Misdi$7
i Page 2 l
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
077 Priority:
2B 3.
Anticipated Resolution:.
The present design of the remote shutdown system and the major modification to be installed at the first refueling outage will be reviewed and appropriate, j
Technical 5pecifications revisions submitted as necessary. An evaluation will i
be performed to determine if a change should be made to the applicability l
l statement.
i
+
Technical Specification 4.3.7.4 and Bases 3/4.3.7.4 will be evaluated and i
appropriate Technical Specification changes proposed as necessary.
i 4.
NRC Respense to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
I l
Individual Notified Date Time i
5.
Disposition:
i A
l Items Closed: (How) l I
j
/
1 Date Time
Reference:
TSRT-84/0526, pages 8 through 13 f
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers I
4 I
I i
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 i
l Misd138
~
i-4 u
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET J
j Item Number:
094 Priority:
2D NRC Proof & Reviev
/10-26-84 Identified B Date Responsible Supervisor j
' Tech Spec
Reference:
4.7.1.2 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 7-3 f
Problem
Title:
1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
The NRC noted that in Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2, two of the high l
pressure core spray'(HPCS) service water system surveillance requirements have
{
been deleted and should be added as follows:
i
^
"At least once per 18 months during shutdown, verifying:
1.
Each automatic valve servicing nonsafety-related equipment actuates to its isolation position on an isolation signal.
t 2.
Each pump starts automatically to maintain service water pressure greater than or equal to (60) psig."
1 These s arveillance requirements are in the General Electric Standard Technical l
Specifi ations.
I 2.
Safety Significance:
i None. There is one HPCS service water pump and this system does not service nonsafety-related equipment and, therefore, has no automatic valves for that isolation function. There is, however, one automatic valve, the HPCS pump discharge valve, which is tested monthly. Pump characteristics, including I
discharge pressure, are tested quarterly per Surveillance Requirement 4.0.5 ^
i and service water initiation logic is tested every 18 months per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.4.b.2.
These required tests are sufficient to verify HPCS service water system operability.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
l Evaluate the need to incorporate the NRC concerns.
}
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 i
I Misd166 1
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (COMT'D)
Item Number:
094 Priority:
2D 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How) l l
l 4
Date Time Refereace: Handout frca April 4, 1984 meeting with NRC Staff, PSB Cottments.
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers I
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd167
i 4
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET 4
l Item Number:
099 Priority:
2G
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor l
Tech Spec
Reference:
Various Tech Spec Page: Various Problem
Title:
ADS l
1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec,. FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Mississippi Power & Light Company (MP&L) has committed, in reference 1, to install additional instrumentation to monitor the ADS air receiver pressure.
This will require including applicability requirements, Action Statements, and Surveillance Requirements for these instruments into the Technical Specifications. A commitment was made in reference let.ter 2 to include an additional Action Statement which addresses situations in which one ADS air g
receiver / accumulator system is inoperable. Mississipp' Power & Light Company has also committed to revise the Surveillance Requirements for the ADS in.
reference 1cteers 2 and 3.
MP&L will complete a leak test on the system every 18 months in order to determine an extrapolated pressure.
MP&L will also I
manually sample instrument air to determine dew point, particle size, and oil content. The commitment to include instrument air sampling is addressed in Problem Sheet 187.
I These revisions will be implemented in order to respond to concerns identified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Equipment Qualification Branch, Auxiliary Systems Branch, and Project Management.
The commitments to revise i
the Technical Specifications, Action Statements, and Surveillance Requirements also formed the basis for responding to one of the questions identified in * (
}
reference letter 4.
MP&L has committed to implement all proposed Technical i
Specification modifications by the end of the first refueling outage.
l l
I Rev. 21, 4/8/84 E A 0 23L
1 Page 2 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D) i.
Item Number:
099 Priority:
2G i
2.
Safety Significance:
I The plant instrument air system is the normal pneumatic supply to the ADS air f
receivers and accumulators.
The plant instrument air compressor normally supplies all instrument air; however, either of two service air compressors i
can also be used to supply instrument air.
The instrument air pressure is
}
increased by either of two full capacity booster compressors to the pressure I
i required by the ADS valves.
The ADS receivers and accumulators have been included in system design to ensure that the ADS will function correctly during events when the instrument air system is isolated from ADS air supply.
The ADS accumulators have been sized to provide two ADS safety / relief valve (SRV) actuations at 70 percent of j
drywell design pressure. This is equivalent to 4-5 actuations of the ADS SRVs at atmospheric pressure in the drywell.
One ADS actuation at 70 percent of drywell design pressure is sufficient to depressurize the reactor and allow j
inventory makeup by the low pressure ECCS.
I I
I The ADS receivers and accumulators have been sized to ensure that the ADS will l
l be operable for the maximum duration required.
On loss of instrument air, the l
ADS SRV air system is capable of providing 100 single SRV actuations over a 1
i period of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to ensure capability for manual depressurization. The
^
i i
syseen has also been designed to provide makeup from external air supply in*L a
j the event that the instrument air system cannot be restored to operability in a timely fashion.
l The existing ADS design and Technical Specification requirements are adequate to ensure ADS operability.
The proposed Technical Specification revisions l
represent enhancements in the Technical Specifications.
I, Rev. 21, 4/8/84 i
L..
fvut JutstA
L l
l l
i i
Page 3 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D) i I
Item Number:
099 Priority:
2G 4
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
i The commitments made by MP&L will be translated into proposed Technical Specification modifications.
These modifications will be submitted to the NRC.
4.
NRC. Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
t Items Closed: (How)
I
/
i Date Time
References:
- 1. Letter AECM-82/0510 dated October 26, 1982 from L. F. Dale to j
H. R. Denton
- 2. Letter AECM-83/0672 dated October 24, 1983 from L. F. Dale to e
H. R. Denton
- 3. Letter AECM-82/0528 dated November 9, 1982 from L. F. Dale to H. R. Denton
- 4. Letter dated August 11, 1983, from A. Schwencer to J. P.
)
McGaughy
- 5. Memorandum from R. C. Lewis to D. G. Eisenhut " Comments on Draft Appendix A Technical Specifications, Grand Gulf Unit 1",
l (page I/5 General Comments) dated February 9, 1984, s
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers i
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 1
t i
f TECHNICt.L SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
160 Priority:
2E
/
i Ident*'ied By Date Responsible Supervisor l
Tech Spec
Reference:
Technical Specification 3/4.4.6, Figure 3.4.6.1-1 and 1
Bases 3/4.4.6 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 4-19, B3/4 4-4 Problem
Title:
Reactor Pressure vs. Metal Temperature 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification 3/4.4.6, Figure 3.4.6.1-1, and Bases 3/4.4.6 are not 4
j consistent'or complete in their discussion / presentation of Pressure /
I i
Temperature Limits. The specific concerns are listed below:
It is unclear whether the phrase " reactor coolant system temperature" j
a.
I addresses reactor coolant temperature or reactor pressure vessel metal
.i temperature, j
b.
Acceptable versus unacceptable regions are discussed in the specification l
but not shown on Figure 3.4.6.1-1.
4 The B' curve is not addressed in Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.1.1.
l c.
d.
The A' pressure-temperature curve is not shown on Figure 4.4.6.1-1 but is
(
discussed in Bases 3/4.4.6.
I.
i j
2.
Safety Significance:
1 None. The intent of the subject Technical Specification is met by the present j
requirements and figure. Any changes would be for the purpose of l
clarification.
i, l
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
i EvaluatetheneedforTechnicalSpecificationchangestoaddressthespeciffE.'
concerns discussed above.
l 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
i NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time i
i Rev. 21, 4/8/84 l
Hisd278 l
t
Page 2 TECllNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
160 Priority:
2E l
S.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (flow)
/
Date Time
Reference:
Problem Sheet 219 Letter from R. C. Lewin to D. G. Eisenhut, dated February 9, 1984,
" Comments on Draft Appendix A Technical Specifications, Grand Gulf Unit 1, Docket Number 50-416", page 9, item 2.
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers 1
,P 4
L Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Mind 778.1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
168 Priority:
2B
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor f
Tech Spec
Reference:
3.6.3.1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 6-20 Problem
Title:
Suppression Pool Temp Requirement in OP Condition 3 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Even though' Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 is applicable in Operational Conditions.1, 2, and 3, the specification only defines the suppression pool temperature limits for Operational Conditions 1 and 2.
The associated limiting conditions for operations, action statements, and surveillance requirements do not separately address Operational Condition 3.
It appears that the present 120'F limit for suppression pool temperature should apply to Operational Condition 3 and not to Operational f.onditions 1 and 2.
The Containment Systems Branch (CSB) of the Nuclear Regulatory Commision (NRC) identified a discrepancy between FSAR Table 6.2-50 and Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.a in the stated levels for the suppression pool. The FSAR gives the minimum and maximum suppression pool levels as 18' 4 1/2" and 18' 9 3/4",
whereas Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.a lists these values as 18' 4 3/4" and 18' 10" respectively. This inconsistency should be corrected by Technical Specification /FSAR revision as appropriate.
^
2.
Safety Significance:
The lack of appropriate limiting conditions for operation, Action Statements *,I...
and surveillance requirements for Operational Condition 3 could cause confusion in the interpretation of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.
None. The cmall magnitudes of the suppression pool level discrepancies have a small effect on containment response analyses.
l Rev. 21, 4/8/84 vi.Mo ?
Page 2 TECliNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number 168 Priority 2B 3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Perform an evaluation to determine applicable limiting conditions for operation, action statements, and surveillance requirements for suppression pool temperature in Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3.
Submit proposed Technical Specifications changes as necessary.
Evaluate the suppression pool level statements in Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.a and FSAR Table 6.2-50 and propose appropriate changes to resolve the inconsistency.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Dace Time 5.
Disposition:
Items closed: (How)
/
Date Time
Reference:
Note f rom R. Capra Technical Assistant, Division of Systems-Integration "llandout for DSI Portion of Meeting with FT&L on 04/04/84 to discuss Grand Gulf Technical Specification Re-Review,"
April 3, 1984, cc:
J. E. Croon R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84
" led 203
I r
j TECliNICAL S?ECIFICATION PR03LEM SHEET Ite Number:
173 Priority:
2D
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.7.1.1.b Tech Spec Page: 3/4 7-1 Proble:
Title:
SSW Spec refers to ECCS Puzo Roo= Seal Cooler 1.
Proble= Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification 3.7.1.1.b requires that each standby service vatar
[
(SSW) subsystem be co= prised of an operable flow path capable of taking j
suction fro = the associated SSW cooling tever basin and transferring the water through the RER heat exchangers ECCS pu=p roc = seal coolers, ani associated coolers and pump heat exchangers. "ECCS purp rou= seal coolers" should be changed to "ECCS pu=p roc = coolers, ECCS pu:p seal coolers." to reference correct ECCS equip ent.
i l
Additionally, Action Statement (e) to Technical 3pecification 3.7.1.1 should l
be revorded as follevs:
I I
"e. In all Operational Conditions, with an SSW subsyste= insperable, j
j declare its associated diesel generator inoperabic and :ake the i
action required by Technical Specification 3.8.1.2.
Tha provisions l
1 of Technical Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable."
l 2.
Safety Significance:
1 None. These proposed Technical Specification changes provide clarificatien to the refetenced ECCS equip:ent.
l 1
1 3.
Anticipated Resolution:
i Technical Specification changes will be evaluated and sub=itted if necessary, l
to correct "ECCS pump roo= seal coolers" to "ECCS pu p roc = ccolers, ECCS pu=p seal ecolers" in Technical Specification 3.7.1.1.b and to =ake the proposed verding changes to Action State =ent of 3.7.1.1.
4 Rev. 21, 4/8/84 f
Misd300
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
173 Priority:
2D 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
x x Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time
Reference:
Memo from R. Capra dated April 3, 1984 on Handout from DSI portion of meeting with MP&L on April 4, 1984 cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers
'l Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd301
TECFXICAL S?EffFICATIC5 PEOELEM S*4EET Ite= Nunber:
175 Priority:
33
/
Identified Ey Date Respensible Supervisor Tech Spec Ecference: 3.8.1.1 Tech Spec Page:
3/4 E-1. E-2 Proble=
Title:
Actien Statenents Specifying Surveilla-ce Requirenents en Diesel Cencrators 1.
Proble= Description (Tech Spec, FSA1, SER, CE Design, Other):
The Action State =ents for Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 require surveillance tests to be perforned to de= castrate redundant equipnent to be operable when diesel generator (s) and/cr effsite circuit (s) are dettr=ined to be inoperable.
Dif ficulties have been encountered in perferning the surveilla ces required by the Actica Statenants within the tine licits contained in Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.
The surveillance specifications should be reviewed to deter =ine if a relaxation of the cine censtraints is warranted.
2.
Safety Significance:
Nene. The appropriate Actico Statenent requirenents are satisfied and the j
design intent cf the Technical Specificatica are net.
i 3.
Anticipated Resoluticn:
Evaluate the ti=e restrictions of Technical Specificatien 4.8.1.1 to deternine if a Technical Specification change is justified within the cut-of-service tine allevances ef Regulatory Guide 1.93, " Availability of Electrical Fover Sources."
4.
FEC Response to Iten (NER/IE):
NEC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Ti:e Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Misd304
I l
t
(
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
175 Priority:
3B 5.
Disposition:
1 Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time
Reference:
Handout from April 4, 1984, meeting with NRC Staff PSB Comments cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers l
l l
l l
l i
l l
l I
t l
l Rev. 21,4/8/84 l
l Mind 305 i
TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
197 Priority:
3A
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.3.6-1 Tech Spec Page:
3/4 3-50 Problem
Title:
Rod Block Instrumentation 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Tables 3.3.6-1, 3.3.6-2, and 4.3.6-1 list certain control rod block trip functions,which are required to be operable but this list does not include refueling equipment interlocks or all rod blocks initated by the RCIS and RPIS.
In addition, the reactor node switch initiated rod blocks are not shown on the tables.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The refueling platform and reactor mode switch interlocks are included in the refueling operations specLfications (3.9.1).
Controls on rod withdrawal are presently specified in Technical Specification 3.1.3.5 concerning control rod position indication.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Perform an evaluation to determine if Tabic 3.3.6-1, 3.3.6-2, and 4.3.6-1 should be revised to include the refueling equipment, RCIS, RPIS, and reactor mode switch rod block functions.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time >[
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 ltisd342
Page 2 TECl.NICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
197 Priority:
3A 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed (How)
/
Date Time
References:
TSRT-84/0644, page 11 TSRT-84/0369, page 11 6 12 cc:
J. E. Crass R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plst'34?.1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
214 Priority:
3B Jim McMahan (QA)
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
4.1.3.3.b.2 Tech Spec Page:
3/4 1-9 Problem
Title:
Reactivity Control System Acceptance Criteria 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Sp.ecification 4.1.3.3.b.2 requires an integrity test of the control rod scram accumulator check valves to be performed at least once per 18 months. A concern was identified that the existing Technical Specification conflicted with the Standard Technical Specifications in that it did not list appropriate acceptance criteria for the check valve surveillance. A review of the scram accumulator operability requirements has been performed to resolve this issue.
Additionally, the NRC, Division of Project and Resident Programs, has recommended deletion of Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.3.b.2, since it appears to be unnecessary.
2.
Safety Significance:
None.
General Electric indicates that the design intent of the Technical Specification's Surveillance Requirement is adequately satisfied by the existing Technical Specification.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
An evaluation of the Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements for the control rod scram accumulators determined that a Technical Specification revision is not necessary and that the Technical Specifications, as presently written, are correct.
Evaluate the NRC recommendation to delete Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.3.b.2 and propose a Technical Specification change, if required.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84
I' Page 2 TECHNIChLSPECIFICATIONPROBLEMSHEET(CONT'D) l T
Item Number:
214 Priority:
3B 4.
NRC Response to Iten (NRR/IE): IE recommended deletion of specification NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date
- Time, 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time Feferences:
- 1) TSRT-84/0268
- 2) TSRT-84/0201
- 3) Hemo from R. C. Lewis to D. C. Eisenhut," Comments on Draft Appendix A Technical Specifications, Grand Gulf Unit 2",
February 9, 1984.
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers s
1 1
5 i
Rev. 21, 4/8/84
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
217 Priority:
3B
/
l Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.3.1 Tech Spec Page:
3/4 3-1 Problem
Title:
Actuation Logic and Relav Tests 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
The NRC-ICSB, in a proof-and-review comment contained in a letter, dated October 31,* 1983, has suggested decreasing the interval for testing of the reactor protection system (RPS), enginected safety features, and reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) final actuation logic (i.e., the AND function in the one-out-of-two-taken-twice logic: A or C AND B or D).
Currently, this logic is tested at refueling outage frequencies at Grand Gulf. Additionally, the NRC-ICSB has recommended including master relay tests and slave relay tests as part of instrument surveillance requirements, in a manner similar to the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications.
2.
Safety Significance:
The NRC recommendations are not appropriate for Grand Gulf, and therefore do not represent a safety concern, for the following reasons:
Grand Gulf surveillance frequencies are determined analytically by CE in a.
a manner consistent with Technical Specifications Bases. Consideration of the importance of the safety functions tested are incorporated into this surveillance frequency.
b.
Testing of final actuation logic involves actual receipt of the signal to -
scram, to initiate an ESF function, or to initiate RCIC. To require. -[
increased surveillance frequency might require testing with the reactor at power, which would involve either receiving an actuation signal or i
defeating the signal in a manner that could place the plant in an unsafe condition.
As aircady stated, surveillance frequencies at Grand Gulf reficct the importanco of the safety functions tested.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plad33
l l
l l
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
217 Priority:
3B c.
Master relay tests and slave relay tests, as delineated in the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, apply to Westinghouse PWR technology that is not used at Grand Gulf.
Similar surveillance requirenents, to a degree permitted by basic instrumentation differences, are already included in the Grand Gulf surveillance requirements.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Evaluate the NRC reco;::mendations to the Grand Gulf design and determine whether any modifications to the Technical Specifications are required.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (Hov)
/
Date Time
Reference:
> -[
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd34
i TECINICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET d2 Item Number:
218 Priority:
3A
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Technical Specification 3.3 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-1 Problem
Title:
Trip Setpoint-Allowable Values 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
An NRC proof-and-review item (NRC-ICSB, 10/31/83) identified a potential area of concern relating to setpoint methodology used at Grand Gulf. This item states that at Grand Gulf, the numerical difference between the Technical Specification's trip setpoints and allowable values is deficient in that both trip unit drift and sensor drift are included.
It is suggested that only trip unit drift should be included in the setpoint and allowable values.
2.
Safety Significance:
The safety significance of setpoint methodology is currently the subject of a BWR Owners' Group study on instrument setpoints.
3.
Anticipated, Resolution:
Evaluate the results of the owner's group study and its effect on the GGNS Technical Specifications 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time
...}
{
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 t
Plsd35 b__
s Page 2 TECllNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLDI SHEET (CONT'D) i Item Number:
218 Priority:
3A 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time
Reference:
FSAR Chapter 7 Question and Responses, NRC Question No. 031.60, 3
pages Q&R 7.3-12 through 7.3-12d and Figure 031.60-1.
l cc:
J. E. Cross
{
R. F. Rogers l
l
'*(
l l
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd36 I
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
227 Priority:
3B NRC I&E Exit Meeting
/ 2/24/84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
4.8.2.1.c.4 Tech Spec Page:
3/4 8-11 Problem
Title:
Battery Charger Surveillance Requirement 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
A Region II NRC inspector indicated during his exit review on February 24, 1984 (MAEC-84/0100) that Technical Specification 4.8.2.1.c.4 was incorrect and should require that battery chargers be tested at the equalizing voltage (140 VDC 1 volt) instead of 105 VDC.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The Technical Specification is correct as currently written. Current, not voltage, is the critical parameter for charging batteries.
The requirement that the chargers provide at least 105 VDC at 400 amperes for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is correct.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
None. The NEC inspector was mistaken in assuming that the chargers are tested i
9 s incorrectly. No Technical Specifications change is required.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time l
4 I
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4 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET i
Item Number:
229 Priority:
2B
~
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor 1
Tech Spec
Reference:
3/4.6.1.4 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 6-7 Problem
Title:
MSIV Leakage Control Systen (LCS) 4 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
'a)
Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 requires the two independent main steam t
.line isolation valve leakage' control subsystems (MSIV-LCS) to be operable.
Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.4.a.2 requires demonstrating i
operability of the heaters for each subsystem; however, only the inboard i
MSIV-LCS has heaters.
b)
The NRC, Auxiliary Systems Branch, has suggested revising MSIV-LCS Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.4.a.2 to require energizing the heaters and verifying a current of 8.65 Amperes 10 percent per phase for each heater.
2.
Safety Significance:
j.
a)
None. This item relates to a clarification of the Surveillance i
Requirement applicability.
~
b)
None.
Current 18 month functional test verifies that the heaters will energize and that appropriate amperage is drawn.
j 3.
Anticipated Resolution:
l a)
Investigate the necessity of changing Surveillance Requirement l.
4.6.1.4.a.2 to read " Inboard subsystem heater.... " for clarification:.'
i b)
Evaluate the suggested revision to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.4.a.2 l
and investigate the necessity of a Technical. Specification change.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
f Individual Notified Date Time I
Rev. 21, 4/8/84-4'
~-
Page 2 4
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D) 1 Item Number:
229 Priority:
2B 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
l Date Time
Reference:
- 1) TSRT-84/0152
- 2) Memo from Capra, Division of Systems Integration, "Handcut for I
DSI Portion of meeting with MP&L on 4/4/84 to discuss Grand Gulf Technical Specification Re-Revision", April 3, 1984.
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers a
4 i
i Rev. 21, 4/8/84
. - =
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLDI SHEET Item Number:
304 Priority:
2D R. Kilroy
/3-21-84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.3.7.9 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-76 Problem
Title:
Fire Detection Instrumentation 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Bechtel's review of Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 and Table 3.3.7.9-1 resulted in several changes being recommended to Table 3.3.7.9-1 for clarification.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. Item number 1 in letter AECM-83/0565, dated September 9, 1983, from Mr.
L. F. Dale to Mr. H. R. Denton identified a number of proposed changes to Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.9-1.
This item stated that all proposed revisions involve additions, corrections, and changes proposed to reflect existing plant design. Consequently, all of these changes represent enhancements to the Technical Specifications and clarifications of the Technical Specifications requirements, for fire detection instruments.
These changes have no safety significance.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Perform an evaluation of the items identified by the Bechtel review and propose recommended Technical Specification changes, if required.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
...}
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time i
Rev. 21, 4/8/84
. P1 sd189
)
i l
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
304 Priority:
2D 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time
Reference:
TSRT-84/0748 TSRT-84/0749 cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 EJLcdR9YS J
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
319 Priority:
2E CE
/ 3/19/84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Bases 2-5 and 2.1.2 Tech Spec Page: B2-5 and B2-2 Probles
Title:
Reference Code for Rx Vessel 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, CE Design, Other):
FSAR Table 3.2-4 lists RPV Code as 1971 Edition through 72 winter addenden.
Technical Specification Bases 2.1.3 lists 74 Edition through su==er 75.
Additionally, Bases Section 2.1.2 incorrectly references NEDO-203040. The correct reference is NEDO-20340.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The Bases reference the incorrect code for the canufacture of the reactor vessel. The reference to NEDO-203040 is a typographical error.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Correct Technical Specification Bases 2.1.3 to read 1971 Edition through winter 72 addenda, and Technical Specification Bases 2.1.2 to reference NEDD-20340.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd215
Page 2 4
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D) l Item Number:
319 Priority:
2E 5.
Disposition:
i Items Closed: (How) 6
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross i
R. F. Rogers I
1 i
i k
I t
i r
~
I f
i i
a J
't Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd215.1.
f
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
332 Priority:
3B P.A. Bourdeau (BPC)
/ 3/13/84 R.C. Slovic (BPC)
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.5.2 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 5-6 Problem
Title:
Condensate Storage Tank Water Level 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification Action Statement 3.5.2.e.2 indicates that 170,000 gallons of water in the condensate storage tank is equivalent to a level of 18 feet. The equivalent level should be 19 feet.
The NRC proposed an additional change to Technical Specification 3.5.2.e.1 and 3.5.2.e.2 in memorandum to D. G. Eisenhut from R. C. Lewis, dated February 9, 1984. This recommendation would change:
1)
Technical Specification 3.5.2.e.1 from "From the suppression pool, or" to "From the condensate storage tank, or" and 2)
Technical Specification 3.5.2.e.2 from "When the suppression pool level
.... " to "From the suppression pool when the condensate storage tank contains less than 170,000 available gallons of water."
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The minimum drawdown level is 20 feet equivalent to 180,760 gallons.
Further, the use of "18 feet" was to amplify the description of the minimum quantity of water required in the tank.
Even though the HPCS system is provided with the capability of using reactor grade water from the condensate storage tank, the suppression pool as discussed in the FSAR is the primary source.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd233
. ~. _. _ _ _ _ -.
4 h
i T
4 Page 2 TECllNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D) 4 Item Number:
332 Priority:
3B i
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
1 Determine the correct level corresponding to 170,000 gallons and change the Technical Specifications, if required.
]
l Evaluate the NRC recommendation to change Technical Specification 3.5.2.e.1
)
and 3.5.2.e.2 and propose any necessary changes.
I 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
-NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time j
4 5.
Disposition:
i l
1 I
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time 1
l
Reference:
NRC/NRR Proof and Review Comments, page l'of memorandum to D. C.
f Eisenhuti~from R. C. Lewis, dated February 9, 1984.
1
.P cc:
J. E._ Cross i
]
R. F. Rogers 1
r i
a i
i i
(.
l Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd734
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
345 Priority:
2B
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3/4 3.8, Table 3.3.8-2 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-99 Problem Titic: Incorrect Allowable Value 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification Table 3.3.8-2, item 2.a lists the Allowable Value as less than o'r equal to 55.7 inches for the Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 channel for the Feedvater System / Main Turbine Trip System trip function. GE design documentation specifies an allowabic value of 54.1 inches for this trip function.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. A recent evaluation indicates that the current value in the Table is acceptable and has a negligible effect on FSAR accident analyses. The change will make this table consistent with GE design documentation.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Perform an evaluation to determine the need to revise item 2.a in Table 3.3.8-2 to be less than or equal to 54.1 inches in the Allowable Value column and propose any necessary Technical Specification changes.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Tise ;
Rev. 21, 4/8/84
?lmd24@,4
Page 2 TECENICAL S?ICIFICATION FEC31Di SEI.~.i (CC*C'D)
Iten N:=ber:
345 Pricrity:
2B 5.
Disposition:
Ite=s Closed: (Hev)
/
Date Ti=e
Reference:
TSRT-81./0240, page 8 75RI-84/0075 cc:
J. I. Cross R. F. Rogers 4
+
M h
I n
Rei. 21, './8/84 i-
-.._._=-___-__;___
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
347 Priority:
2B i
NRC/NRR
/2-9-84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3/4.1.4.3 (New Specification)
Tech Spec Page: N/A (New Specification)
Problem
Title:
Rod Pattern Control System Bypass Switch Requirements 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
In a letter' from R. C. Lewis, Director of the Division of Project and Resident Programs to.Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director of the Division of NRR Licensing dated February 9,1984, a proposed Technical Specification on the use of the individual control rod bypass switches was included for consideration. These bypass switches remove the constraints of the Rod Pattern Control System (RPCS) on control rod movements. The proposed new Technical Specification would state when the bypass switches may be utilized and provide Surveillance Requirements accordingly. The proposed specification should be reviewed for incorporation into the GGNS Technical Specifications.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The existing GCNS Technical Specifications address all areas of the proposed new specification. The proposed specification would consolidate the RPCS bypass switch requirements for clarification purposes.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Evaluate the proposed new Technical Specification on RPCS bypass switches to determine if a change to the GGNS Technical Specifications is necessary.
Item 1 of the proposed Technical Specification 3.1.4.3 permits a misaligned 'l control rod believed to be operable to be bypassed from RPCS constraints to allow it to be repositioned. This provision is less conservative than the existing GGNS Technical Specifications on RPCS bypass switches since there are J
4 i
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Disd249.8
3 Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
347 Priority:
2B no requirements for compliance with established control rod movement sequences. This allowance, if implemented, would have to contain criteria for handling repositioning of misaligned control rods consistent with the control.
rod drop analysis.
The proposed Surveillance Requirement 4.1.4.3.a states that an SRO must independently verify the position of a bypass switch each time its position is changed. The Surveillance Requirement, if implemented, should also provide verification of compliance to the Technical Specification condition permitting the bypass.
The proposed Surveillance Requirement 4.1.4.3.b specifies that the position of each bypass switch must be checked at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 5.
This Surveillance Requirement, if implemented, could result in an unnecessary activity in Operational Condition 5 when control rod movements would not affect reactivity - for example, when the entire core is unloaded.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time
'l Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd?49.9 i
.~
1 l
Page 3 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Iten Number:
347 Priority:
2B i
5.
Disposition:
i 4
Items. Closed: (How)
J I
i
/
Date Time I
j
Reference:
Memorandum from R. C. Lewis to D. G. Eisenhut, " Comments on Draf t j
Appendix A Technical Specifications, Grand Gulf Unit 1. Docket
),
No. 50-416" dated February 9, 1984.
l I
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers j
]
i l
1 I
I J
1 a
l 1
1 i
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 i
~
Plsd249.9.1 i
,,-,m._..-
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
353 Priority:
2D
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.8.1.1.b.2 and 3.8.1.2.b.2 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 8-1 and 9 Problem
Title:
Diesel Generators Fuel Storage Requirements 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specifications 3.8.1.1.b.2 and 3.8.1.2.b.2 each require that the fuel storage system for each Diesel Generator 11 and 12 contain a minimum of 48,000 gallons. These specifications should be reworded to specify that 48,000 gallons is required for each "0PERABLE" diesel generator.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. This change would be for clarification purposes.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Investigate the necessity of adding the word "0PERABLE" in Technical Specifications 3.8.1.1.b.2 and 3.8.1.2.b.2 and propose any necessary Technical Specification changes.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time Rev. 21, 4/8/84 "19d250.!
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SilEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
353 Priority:
2D 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (llow)
/
Date Time
Reference:
Proof and Review Comment #5 fron memo from R. C. Lewis to D. G.
Eisenhut dated February 9, 1984.
cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers
(
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 P 1 r.(' 2 50. l.
1
r GO ys
/wuq yhe Y
,9
/
l */ $b-L//b
) ps i%
JCl%- -
TECENICAI. S?ICITICATION FICII.IM $
o
(
l'WT J-
-iW VEd. h -d Ire = Nu ber:
313 Priority:
2E Lceper
/4/5/E1 Identified Ey Date Eespcasible S perviacr Tech Spec Refere=ce: 3.3.7.3-1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-63 Proble:
Title:
Met l'aniterier Instr rentatic 1.
P chle: Descriptics (Tech Spec, TSA2, SII, GI Design, Cther):
Technical Specifica:ic: Table 3.3.7.3-1 requires a - *-*-- of c e cperable instrument for each of the listed zetecrolegical =c=itering functicac. Actihn Statene:: (a) requires a Special Eeper: to the 51C if "cne er ore zetecrolegical =cnit ring instr ::::atics channels" is incperable ici orn than 7 days. The GG55 desig: incindes 2 instn ->:: cha :els fer each
=etecreicgical :::itoring para:eter of Table 3.3.7.3-1.
T e existing Accic:
State ent (a) cculd require a Special Repcr: to the 51C for a single i= operable instr==en: event though the
- '--- eperable ins: ::ents require ent of Table 3.3.7.3-1 is satisfied. A::ic: State ent (a) shculd be revised to delete this unnecessary reporting requirersers.
2.
Safety Sig.ificance:
Nene. The CGNS Tech =ical Specification ensuns adequate =eteorolegical
- ~,..itoring i=strurentatic: respe=se. The prepcsed change vecid caly affect the reporting requirezents of this specification.
3.
A :icipated Eesolutic=:
Review Actic: Sta:erent (a) with respect :c the rep:rri.; requirement fer inoperable inst.
e t eks-els and evalcate the necessity of a Technical ~'5 Specification ek-ge based c= this review.
4 N2C Respense to Ite: 033/II):
NEC Notified:
/
Individuti Notified Date Tine lev. 21, 1/3/f4
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
348 Priority:
2E 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd250.0.1
. ~.
7 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
349 Priority:
2D Loeper
/4/5/84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 3.3.7.1-1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4.3-58 Problem
Title:
Action Statement 75 Requirements 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.1-1 lists the radiation monitoring instrumentation requirements. Action Statement 75 must be taken when there are inoperable fuel handling area ventilation exhaust radiation monitor (s) in Operational Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 5 and when irradiated fuel is being handled. Action Statement 75 must also be taken when there are inoperable fuel handling area pool sweep exhaust radiation monitor (s) with irradiated fuel in the spent fuel storage pool. Action St'atement 75(b) requires at 1 cast one standby gas treatment system train to be in operation within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when there are two inoperable monitors for either of the above instrumentation items. As indicated by note (d), a high radiation trip signal by either of these instrumentation monitors will also isolate the auxiliary building and fuel handling area ventilation systems. Action Statement 75 should be reviewed to determine if the appropriate action should include establishing secondary containment integrity.
2.
Safety Significance:
The existing GGNS Technical Specification may not be adequate to ensure isolation of the fuel handling area ventilation systems.
.,V 3.
Anticipated Resolution.
Evaluate the fuel handling area ventilation system radiation monitoring requirements in Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.1-1 to determine if Action Statement 75 should include establishing secondary containment integrity.
Propose Technical Specification changes as appropriate based upon the results of this review.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 l
Plsd252
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
349 Priority:
2D 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Dis' position:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Crose R. F. Rogers
~
1
'*1 Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd250.0.3
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIC?! PF.03LE'1 SHEET Ite= Nu=ber:
350 Priority:
2B Loeper
/4/4/84 Identified Ey Date Respensible Supervisor Tech Spec Peference: Table 3.3.2-1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-13, 3-14 Proble=
Title:
Action Statement 28 Recuirements 1.
Probles Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-1 lists the isolation actuatien instrunentation require =ents associated with plant syste=s.
Action State =ent 28 =ust be taken if the RER systes isolation actuation channels are inoperable in Operational Conditions 1, 2, or 3.
Action Statenent 28 requires the affected syste= isolation valves (Group 3) to be locked closed within one hour. The RER shutdown cocling inboard isolation valve (E12-7009) is located inside the dryvell and could not be locked closed with the reactor at pever.
RER shutdown cooling return valves E12-F053 A & B are also affected by the RER system isolation signals, but are not part of the Group 3 valves because they are not containnent isolation valves. The application of Action Statenent 28 to these valves is not clear.
Action Statenent 28 should be revised to resolve the above cenflicts.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The existing Technical Specificatien vould cause the plant to shutdcvn fre= power to i=plerent Action Statenent 28.
The progesed change represents enhancenent to plant cperations. The design intent of Action Statement 28 can
~
be satisfied without its application to the RER shutdevn cooling inboard isolation valve by locking the re=ainder of the Group 3 isolation valves closed and closing the shutdevn cooling inboard isolation valve in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.4(b).
Rev. 21, 4/8/84
+1sd254 -
~.
~
---~-L
~ ~ - -
Page 2 4
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEH SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
350 Priority:
2B 3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Evaluate the applicability of Action Statement 28 to the RHR shutdown cooling inboard isolation valve E12-F009 to determine if an exception to the locking requirement 'is justified. Propose appropriate Technical Specification changes as necessary based upon the results of this review.
Evaluate the applicability of Action Statement 28 to the RHR shutdown cooling return valves E12-F053 A & B to deternine if a Technical Specification change is-required to ensure the appropriate action is taken for these valves.
Propose Technical Specification changes as necessary based upon the results of this review.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 i
visd255
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET i
)
Item Number:
351 Priority:
2D S. Loeper
/4/5/84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.3.7.9, Table 3.3.7.9-1 i
Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-76, 3/4 3-77 Problem
Title:
Fire Detection Instrumentation 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
The applicability statement for Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 is "Whenever equipment protected by the fire detection instrument is required to be OPERABLE." 'However, some fire detection instruments listed in Table 3.3.7.9-1 do not protect equipment which is required to be operable per Technical Specifications (e.g., computer room).
Also, note (1) states that zones apply only to smoke detectors. Action Statement a. which describes zones with respect to inoperable instr ents may be construed to imply that Acticn Statement a. is not applicable to inoperable heat and flame detectors.
In addition, the zone designation for the heat detectors in items f.1 and f.2 is "N/A."
2.
Safety Significance:
None. Specifying fire detection instrumentation for equipment that is not required to be operable per other specifications is conservative. Note (1) stating that zones apply only to smoke detectors is to clarify that the smoke detection loop may consist of detectors, in series, or more than one room within a zone and, therefore, would require inspection of the complete zone.
The heat and flame detectors are within the listed rooms only and requiring
~
inspection of the complete zone, as now required, may be over-conservative;l I'[
however, a change to Note (1) should be considered for clarification.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd256-
--~
l i
l Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D) 1 l
I Item Number:
351 Priority:
2D l
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Proposed changes to Technien1 Specification Table 3.3.7.9-1 and Technical l
Specification 3.3.7.9 were submitted to the NRC by letter (Item 1 of AECM-83/0563) from L. F. Dale to H. R. Denton, dated September 9, 1983. These changes included deleting Note (1) and added clarification to Action Statement
- a. by revising the format for zone and room designations in Table 3.3.7.9-1.
)
Investigate the necessity of changing the present and/or the proposed (as presented in the above referenced letter) Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 and Table 3.3.7.9-1 to clarify zone and room designations Action Statement a.,
Note (1), and requirements for fire detection instruments related to equipment that is not required to be operable.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
l Individual Notified Date Tine 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
~
Date Time
l cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers j
t Rev. 21, 4/8/84 i
l l
Pl=d257
-j a
(
l TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
352 Priority:
2D Loeper
/4/5/84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.3.7.10 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-81 Problem
Title:
Loose Part Detection System 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, CE Design, Other):
The loose-part detectior. system consists of sixteen channels of which eight channels are active charnels that provide alarm and indication functions. The remaining eight channels are passive channels at similar locations that are available for use if an active channel fails. The present Technical Specification 3/4.3.7.10 makes no distinction between active and passive channels.
(Note: FSAR designation for this system is loose-part monitor system.)
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The distinction between active and passive channels is for clarification purposes.
l 3.
Anticipated Resolution:
l Review Technical Specification 3/4.3.7.10 requirements with respect to system design and evaluate the necessity of a Technical Specification change to provide the distinction between active and passive channels.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd258
Page 2 TECl;NICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
352 Priority:
2D 5.
Disposition:
Ite'ms Closed: (llow) s.
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers 1
' '5 Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Pisd250.3.1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
354 Priority:
2D Steve Loeper
/ 4-4-84 Identified By Data Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 3.3.6-2 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-52 Problem
Title:
Control Rod Block Equaflon 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification Table 3.3.6-2 Item 2.a lists the trip setpoint for the flow biased. neutron flux-upscale control rod block function as less than or equal to 0.66 W + 42 percent. Technical Specification 3.2.2 requires this trip setpoint to be less than or equal to (0.66 W + 42 percent)
- T, where
'T' is a power distribution thermal limit adjustment factor. A footnote to Table 3.3.6-2 references Technical Specification 3.3.2.
This footnote should be 1
revised to clarify the applicability of the
'T' factor adjustment to the flow biased neutron flux-upscale control rod block trip setpoints.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The existing GGNS Technical Specifications are adequate to ensure proper application of the
'T' factor adjustments.
The proposed change would clarify the footnote to Table 3.3.6-2 by providing additional information on the necessary adjustments.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Evaluate the flow biased neutron flux-upscale control rod block trip setpoints
\\
l in Table 3.3.6-2 to determine if a clarification to the footnote reference to the power distribution limit
'T' factor adjustment of Technical Specification 3.2.2 is necessary. ProposeaTechnicalSpecificationchangeifnecessary;*[
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd262
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
354 Priority:
2D 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers
' '5 Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Pisd250.4.3'
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
355 Priority:
2D
{
Steve Loeper
/ 4-4-84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 4.3.1.1-1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-7 Problem
Title:
Surveillance Frequency Nomenclature 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification Table 4.3.1.1-1 lists the Surveillance Requirements
.for the reactor protection system instrumentation.
The surveillance frequencies for IRM neutron flux-high and APRM neutron flux-high, setdown seem redundant. The present channel check frequencies for these items are prior to each reactor startup and once per twelve hours.
Since Technical Specification 4.0.4 is applicable to this section, the startup requirement could be deleted without changing the testing frequency.
Note (c) to this table is similarly redundant and can be deleted without affecting the surveillance frequencies.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The existing GGNS Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements are adequate to ensure proper reactor protection system instrument response. The proposed changes would provide clarification and consistency by eliminating redundancies.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
EvaluateTable4.3.1.1-1withrespecttotheproblemdescriptionanddetermide' I
the necessity of Technical Specification changes to clarify the Surveillance Requirements.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date-Time 1
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 j
Pisd264
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
355 Priority:
2D 5.
Disposition:
Itees. Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd250.5.1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET ltem Number:
356 Priority:
2D Steve Loeper
/ 4-5-84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 4.3.6-1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-53 Problem
Title:
Rod Block Frequency Nomenclature 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification Table 4.3.6-1 lists the Surveillance Requirements for
-the control. rod block insttumentation.
The notes to this Table contain statements which should be reworded for clarification and consistency. These notes are:
Note b - this note requires a channel functional test of the applicable control rod block instrumentation once per week and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to startup otherwise. This requirement may be redundant and inconsistent with the Operational Condition 2 requirements.
Note c - this note is intended to require the rod pattern control system (RPCS) low power and intermediate rod withdrawal limiter setpoints to be function ~ ally tested within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of their use.
The present wording of this note should be clarified accordingly.
Note d - this note is intended to require the RPCS low power and intermediate rod withdrawal limiter setpoints to be functionally tested once per 31 days during power operation above the low power setpoint. The note should be revised to eliminate the "within a given power range" phrase since it may be misinterpreted.
Note e - this note may not apply to the GGNS design in its present wording.
The BWR/6 design does not use a reactor manual control system (RMCS),
having a RPCS instead.
'*l The number of notes on the RPCS low power and intermediate rod withdrawal limiter setpoints may impede comprehension of their purpose.
The Surveillance Requirements for these setpoints should be clarified.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 P3sd266
.1 I
Page 2 1
1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D) l l
Item Number:
356 Priority:
2D i
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The existing CGNS Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements are 4
adequate to ensure proper control rod block instrumentation response. The j
proposed changes would provide clarification and consistency.
1 i
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Table 4.3.6-1 will be evaluated and appropriate Technical Specification 1
j changes will be proposed, if necessary, to clarify the identified notes.
1 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
i NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time I
5.
Disposition:
l Items Closed: (How) t
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers i
l 1
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 i
Plsd267
l TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
357 Priority:
2B Steve Loeper
/ 4-4-84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.3.4.2 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-38 Problem
Title:
Thermal Power Bypass of RPT l.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical specification 3.3.4.2 concerns the end-of-cycle recirculation pump tr' p.(EOC-RPT)' system instrumentation required in Operational Condition 1 at i
greater than or equal to 40 percent rated thermal power. Table 3.3.4.2-1 lists the minimum operable channel requirements for EOC-RPT instrumentation.
There is presently no requirement to calibrate / functionally test the EOC-RPT bypass instrumentation. Technical Specification 3.3.4.2 should be evaluated to determine if it is necessary to add' calibration frequency, functional test frequency, and Action Statements for the EOC-RPT bypass circuitry.
2.
Safety Significance:
Failure of the bypass circuitry could defeat the EPC-RPT logic.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Evaluate the need for Technical Specifications on the EOC-RPT bypass circuitry and propose Technical Specification changes as appropriate.
i i
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
]
. Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
'*L i
Items Closed: (How) i l
i
/
i Date time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd268
TECEINICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
358 Priority:
2D
)
I Loeper
/4/5/84 I
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 3.3.7.12-1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4.3 1 Problem
Title:
Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Action Statement 123 of Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.12-1 for the Sampler Flow Rate Measuring Device requires that the flow rate be estimated at least once per eight hours. This action is taken when the number of operable channels is less than the minimum number of operable channels requirement in Table 3.3.7.12-1.
The current plant practice is to install auxiliary sampling 1
equipment (which includes a flow rate indicator) to monitor the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents in order to satisfy the action statement requirement. Action Statement.123 may need to be modified to j
address the current plant practice.
J Additionally, the installed plant panels which were made by different manufacturers provide several redundant indications with respect to the s
instrumentation requirements of Table 3.3.7.12-1.
The Technical Specification or Bases Section may need to be modified to address the panels made by different manufacturers with respect to verification of Technical i
Specification 3.3.7.12 requirements.
4 2.
Safety Significance:
This is an enhancement item since the changes identified would be for None.
j clarification purposes.
' '. L.
i i
j 3.
Anticipated Resolution:
l Review Action Statement 123 and current practices to determine if the Action f
l Statement should be revised to reflect current practices.
i Rev. 21, 4/8/84
~
Plsd250.6 m
)
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
358 Priority:
2D In addition, review the plant procedures related to the verificatio'n of Technical Specification 3.3.7.12 requirements. Confirm that changes to the Technical Specifications with respect to redundant indications from panels made by dif ferent manufacturers are unnecessary.
4.
NRd Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Pisd250.6.1
1 l
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET i
Item Number:
359 Priority:
2B j
Loeper
/4/5/84 j
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 3.3.8-1 3
Tech Spec Page: 3/4.3-98 and 99 Problem
Title:
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
I In Technica'l Specification Table 3.3.8-2, the setpoint for containment pressure-high of the containment spray system is less than or equal to 9 psig.
This value could allow the setpoint to be anywhere below 9 psig.
Additionally, since Table 3.3.8-1 requires only one of the two containment pressure channels operable per trip system, the nonrequired channel could still be set below 9 psig, even if the required channel is set close to 9 i
]
psig. Both of these situations could result in containment spray being actuated at a containment pressure substantially below the setpoint, provided the accompanying initiation signals are present.
2.
Safety Significance:
1 None. Containment spray actuation at normal containment pressures has been l
analyzed and found acceptable. FSAR Section 6.5.2.2 states that containment j
spray may be initiated, ragardless of containment pressure, to suppress j
airborne radiation levels in a post-LOCA containment environment. Timers are also provided for the containment spray initiation system instrumentation to 1
assure that LPCI flow will be provided for at least a 10 minute period following a LOCA, thereby preventing premature LPCI diversion. Additionally plant surveillance / calibration procedures establish a band (upper and lower limits) for adjustment of the containment pressure-high setpoints.
i i
1 j
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Confirm that changes to the Technical Specifications to provide minimum value for the containment pressure-high setpoint are unnecessary.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 i
Pisd271
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
359 Priority:
2B 4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd250.7.1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Numbet:
360 Priority:
2B Loeper
/4/4/84 L
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 3.3.5-1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-45 Problem
Title:
Number of RCIC Trip Systems 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Technical Specification Table 3.3.5-1 provides requirements for the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip system for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System actuation instrumentation.
Notes (b), (c) and (d) were added to the table to indicate that the logic for Functional Unit items b, c, d, and e made up one trip system. A similar note was not provided for Functional Unit item a because the current Technical Specification requirement was based on two trip systems. However, the Grand Gulf RCIC system design for the low level actuation instrumentation (Functional Unit item a) consists of a single trip system containing four level channels, arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice logic. To reflect this, a Technical Specification change was submitted to the NRC in a letter (AECM-83/0642) from Mr. J. P. McGaughy to Mr. Harold R.
Denton, dated Octiber 11, 1983. The minimum OPERABLE channel requirement for the reactor vessel water level-low low, level 2 RCIC initiation function was modified to reflect one trip system instead of two.
Since all RCIC initiating functions in Table 3.3.5-1 reflect one trip system, notes (b), (c) and (d) are no longer required.
The minimum OPERABLE channels per trip function for RCIC manual initiation should also be changed from "l/ system" to "1."
A note should then be added to the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip system column heading to clearly indicate that the Grand' *;
Gulf design for RCIC initiation consists of only one trip system.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. This proposed Technical Specification change is for clarification purposes.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd273
(.
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
360 Priority:
2B 3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Review Table 3.3.5-1 to determine if clarification is required and propose any necessary Technical Specification changes.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Pisd?50.8.1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
361 Priority:
2D Loeper
/4/5/84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 3.3. 7.11-1 and Table 4.3.7.11-1 Tech ~ Spec Page: 3/4 3-83 and 85 Problem
Title:
Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitors 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
The current' wording in Table 3.3.7.11-1 and Table 4.3.7.11-1 implies that only the liquid radwaste effluent line gross radioactivity monitor provides automatic termination of all effluent release. However, the other two devices listed in the tables (liquid radwaste effluent line and discharge canal flow Rate Measurement devices) also provide automatic termination of all effluent release. The circulation water blow down flow conitor is presently being used in place of the discharge canal flow monitor listed in the tables and should be ine'.uded as an alternate indication.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. The present operability requirements are adequate as currently stated.
Any changes would provide clarification and provide consistency with operational practices.
4 3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Evaluate the radioactive effluent monitoring instrumentation requirements and propose appropriate Technical Specification changes as necessary.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
l Individual Notified Date Time Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd275
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
361 Priority:
2D 5.
Disposition:
Ithms Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers i
J 1
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd?75.1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
362 Priority:
2D Loeper
/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.3.2 and 3.3.5 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-9 and 3/4 3-44 Problem
Title:
RCIC Time Delay for Actuation and Isolation 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Recent design changes have been made to the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system to add two time delays. One time delay was added to the actuation lo'gic to prevent RCIC turbine trip on overspeed following the opening of steam admission valve E51-F045. The second time delay was added to the isolation logic to prevent system isolation immediately following a loss of offsite power signal. Technical Specification 3.3.2 and 3.3.5 contain Surveillance Requirements for similar RCIC timers, but not for the timers installed for the new time delays, 2.
Safety Significance:
None. Operability of the timers installed for the new time delays is currently checked during the logic system functional tests required by Technical Specifications 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.5.2.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Perform an evaluation of the additional time delays in the RCIC actuation logic and RCIC isolation logic and confirm that Technical Specification changes are unnecessary.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
- ' '[
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time b
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Pled?75.2
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
362 Priority:
2D 5.
Disposition:
Ite'ms Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Kogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 P1sd275.3
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
363 Priority:
2D Loeper 4/4/84/
Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
3.3.1.b and 3.3.2.c Tech Spec Page: 3/4.3-1 and 3/4.3-9 Problem
Title:
Unclear Action Statements 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, GE Design, Other):
Action Statement b of Technical Specification 3.3.1 and Action Statement c of Technical Specification 3.3.2 each reference a ** footnote that does not explicitly state the intent of the Action Statements.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. This is an enhancement item for clarification purposes.
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Evaluate the necessity of a Technical Specification change which would incorporate an acceptable footnote such as the following:
The trip system need not be placed in the tripped condition if this would cause the Trip Function to occur. When a trip system can be placed in the tripped condition without causing the Trip Function to occur, place the trip system with the most inoperable channels in the tripped condition; if both systems have the same number of inoperable channels, place either trip system in the tripped condition.
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time >(
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd?75.4
Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SiiEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
363 Priority:
2D 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time
Reference:
P/L Item No. 212 cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 1
Plsd275.5
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET Item Number:
364 Priority:
2B Loeper
/4-4-84 Identified By Date Responsible Supervisor Tech Spec
Reference:
Table 3.3.3-1 Tech Spec Page: 3/4 3-27 Problem
Title:
Action 33 - HPCS Trip Systers 1.
Problem Description (Tech Spec, FSAR, SER, CE Design, Other):
Technical Specification Table 3.3.3-1 provides requirements for the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip system for the emergency core cooling (ECCS) system actuation instrumentation. With the number of OPERABLE channels for Table 3.3.3-1, items a 6 b, less than required by the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip function requirement, ACTION statement 33 will be taken. This ACTION statement provides the appropriate response for "one" and "both" trip systems.
Because Table 3.3.3-1, items a and b, are part of one trip system, ACTION statement 33 incorrectly discusses two trip systems. ACTION 33 should refer to channels instead of trip systems to be consistent with the Grand Gulf design for high pressure core spray (HPCS) system trip functions.
Additionally, the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip function for HPCS manual initiation should be changed from "1/ system" to "1" since the Grand Gulf design for HPCS initiations consists of only one trip system.
2.
Safety Significance:
None. This Technical Specification change would make the definitions of the terms " channel" and " trip system" consistent with the generic definition in of letter AECM-84/0093.
~
3.
Anticipated Resolution:
Evaluate the necessity of a Technical Specification change to correct " trip
]
systems" to " channels" in ACTION statement 33 of. Table 3.3.3-1.
Rev. 21, 4/8/84 P15d275.6
1 Page 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PROBLEM SHEET (CONT'D)
Item Number:
364 Priority:
2B Review Technical Specification Table 3.3.3-1 to determine if the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip function for table item c.1.f (HPCS system manual initiation) should be changed from "1/ system" to "1".
4.
NRC Response to Item (NRR/IE):
NRC Notified:
/
Individual Notified Date Time 5.
Disposition:
Items Closed: (How)
/
Date Time cc:
J. E. Cross R. F. Rogers Rev. 21, 4/8/84 Plsd275.7 u
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j in Operational Conditions 1 or 5 Tech Spec Operational Condition 3/4.2.1 1
.3/4.2.2 1
i 3/4.2.3 1
3/4.2.4 1
3/4.3.1 i
Table 3.3.1-1.2.b 1
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-1.2.c 1
-1.5 1-4
-1.6 1
j
-1.10 1
~
-1.11 1
3/4.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1.2.c 1
l 3/4.3.4.1 1
3/4.3.4.2 1
l 3/4.3.6 Table 3.3.6-1,6 1
I 3/4.3.8 t
Table 3.3.8-1.2 1
i 3/4.9.1 5
3/4.9.2 5
3/4.9.3 5
i 3/4.9.4 5
I 3/4.9.5 5
3/4.9.6 5
3/4.9.7 5
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3/4.9.11.1 5
/
b
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i j
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$T'YIG 6tr
<<( Y NSV J4Mn J
STATUS OF 1;RC CONCE!ZS k,
I.
NRC Proof 6 Reviou Comments inforraally presented to !!?&L on 1/24/84 at CCNS; ICSB modified Proof 6 Review comnents infornally presented to 14P6L on 4/5/84 A.
Proof 6 Revicu - IE/t;RR connents (Informal handout r,f IF./I:RR cor.unents provided during meeting of I/24/84 at GGSS) 1.
Clarification of Spec 2.1.4 P/S 053 2.
Mat. Monitoring Instrunentation P/S - None GCNS design is described in FSAR 2.3.3; the design and Tech Spec meet the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.23 3.
Containnent Spray liin. Op. Channels P/S 054 4.
Inop Conductivity lionitor P/S 055 l
5.
4.0.2 Exenptions P/S 057 7.
Snubbers P/S 006 8.
Fire Suppression Action Statenents See Chemical Engineering Branch Proof 6 Review Comments (Sec G of this document) 9.
Spent Fuci Pool Temp P/S 058 10.
Embanktaent Stability P/S 059 11.
AC Scurces "and/or" stateuents P/S 060 l
12.
Therml Overload Spec wording i
P/S 061 13.
Iso}ntlor. Valve Eares P/S !nne IIP &L explained the bases during the 1/24/84 teeting.
Fornal explanation is included in AEC!i-83/0492 1/,
SECT no' (
-t rol Ret: "ilteatin 1: eaters i
P/3 C f.'.
?l.all e
t 15.
Composition of ISEC P/S 063 16.
PSRC/SRC Alternates P/S 064, 065 17.
Personnel / Procedure Review Requirements P/S None CGNS Procedure 01-S-02-2 specifics requirc ents 18a. Tech Spec Consistency P/S 066 18b. ADS Accumulator Pressure Surveillance P/S 099 18c. RETS Recommendations See Radiological Assessment Branch Proof & Review Cctments (Sec. H of this document) 18d. NRC Staff Proof and Review Co= cents
- See CSB, CEB, METB/CA3, RSB, ICSB, ASE, and MEB comment breakdowns in this document 18e. Typregraphical Ericts P/S - None No specific information was given te Mr&L B.
Proof and Review - Instrumentation and Control Systens Branch comments (!!emorandum f rom Rosa to Thomas, 10/31/83) (Inf ormal handout of ISCB concents provided during meeting on 4/5/84 at Bethesda) 1.
Recote Shutdown Panel P/S 077 2.
NUREG-0737 vs Reg. Guide 1.97 Rev. 2 P/S - None MP&L does not have access to the referenced nerorandun.
The following letters discuss MP&L's commitments and schedule with regards to Reg. Guide 1.97.
AECM-fi2/78
. PK' Et,uipmant AECM-82/317 Compliance with Rev. 2 of Reg. Guide +,
AECM-82/563 Update on compliance AECM-83/286 Environmental Qualifications AECM-83/0486 Schedule AECit-83/0652 Additional Schedule Information AECM-83/0027 Generic Letter 83-36 Response 3.
Actuation Logic Testing P/S 217 IIP &L's response to this ite was in AECM-83/0C90 (3/7/84) 21sd?
s 4.
Setpoint Methodology P/S 218 5.
RCIC Min. Op. Channels P/S 078 6.
Rosemont/Riley Calibration Frequency P/S 037' 7.
IEEE 279 Eases Reference P/S 079
~
8.
Containment Spray Min. Op. Channels P/S 054 9.
Hode Switch P/S 081 and 197 l
10.
SSU Auto Initiation Surveillance I
P/S 082 11.
Suppression Pool Makeup LCO/Surveillarce P/S 033 12.
RCIC Protective Trips P/S 084 13.
Ili/Lo Interface Interlocks P/S 032 14.
ICSB. Inst. Spec Ceneric Review P/S 034 Superceded by P/5 346, 348, 349. 350, 351, 352, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364 C.
Proof & Review - Auxiliary Systems Branch comments (Memorandum from Parr to Thomas, 10/26/83) 1.
Reactor Coolant System P/S 221 2.
Service Water Systcm P/S 094 3.
Control Room Emergency Filtration Systen P/S None Tech Spec change not necessary.
Tech Spec 3/4.7.8 already contains surveillance requirenents for control room air tecperature.
D.
Proof & Review - Containment Systems Branch ccrnents (nemorandum from Houston to Novak, 11/31/83) i 1.
ILPT Surveillance P/S 067 Zlrd3
l l
c c
e l
2.
Containment Purge P/S 068 3.
Ir.olation Valve LLRT P/S 020 4.
Hydrogen Ignitor Surveillance P/S 069 E.
Proof L Review - Materials Engineering Branch com=ents (11,emorandum from Linw to Thomas, 12/15/83) 1.
Pressure / Temperature Limit Curves P/S 219 F.
Proof & Review - Reactor Systems Branch co=ments (!!ccorandum from Sheron to Thomas, 10/31/83) 1.
Isolation Actuation Instrumentation P/S 074 2.
ECCS Actuation Instrucentation P/S 075 3.
ECCS Ecopense Tit.c P/S 076 4.
APPJ! Setpoints P/S 215 C.
Proof & Review - Chemical Engineering Branch comments (!!cnorandum from Benaroys to Thomas, 11/7/83) 1.
Fire Suppression Action Statenents P/S 070 2.
Fire Suppression Surveillance P/S 223 Cannot determine what the Branch cct=ent is about.
3.,
5.,
6.,
8.,
9., 10. - Reporting Requircuents
~
P/S 071 4.
Sprinkler System Nozzle Inspection P/S 072 7.
linlon Surveillance P/S 224 I
i 11.
Emergency Lights / Fire Extinguishers P/S 220 7.lsd4 L
I 1
12.
Fire Detection Instrumentation P/S 73 MPLL f cels that fornat/ change presented in the September 9, 1983, subnittal is more appropriate for CCNS design than the NRC proposed changes.
II.
Proof & Review - Radiological Assessment Branch and Meteorology and Effluent Tr.satment Eranch comments (Memorandum from Congel/ Car. mill to Thomas 11/4/83)
Category 1 1.
Radiological Effluent Dos Calculation P/S 08')
2.
Total Dose P/S 090 3.,
4.,
RETS Clarification / Omissions P/s 036 5.
Typo in RETS P/S 190 6.
"Onesis" - Typo P/S 091 7.
Enviro toental Monitoring Comparison Prog.
P/S 092 8.
RETS, Figure Terminology P/S 225 9.
Illegl' ole Figure P/S 225 10.
ODCM Changes / Reporting r/S 036 11.
Reporting Requirements P/S 093 Category 2 1.
Solid Radwaste P/S 085 2.
Changes per Draft NUREG-0472 P/S 056 3.
Cascous Scepling P/S GS7 4.
Reporting Ecquirem2nt:
s II.
EC&G Review (informally presented to MP&L on 4/5/84 at Bethesda) la.
RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Signal P/S - None No inconsistency exists Ib. MSL Tunnel Temp Ticer P/S - None No inconsistency exists Ic.
MSL Flow Setpoints New Problem Sheet TBD 1.d MSL Flow Inst. Range New Problem Sheet TDB 2.
Drywell Isolation Valves P/S - None No inconsistency exists 3.
Secondary CTMT. Isolation Dampers P/S - None No inconsistency exists l
1 l
l l
e g D h
Zlsd6
III. URC/NRR Second Proof and Review Co==ents (!!emorandum from Lewis to Ei=enhut dated 2/9/84)
A.
IE Concerns 1.
ECCS/ CST (T.S. 3.5.1.c)
P/S 056 2.
ECCS/ CST (T.S. 3.5.2.e.1 & 2)
P/S 332 3.
HPCS/ CST (T.S. 4.5.1.e)
P/S 056 4.
D/G "and/or" (T.S. 3.8.1.2.b)
P/S 060 5.
48,000 gal. D/C Fuel (T.S. 3.8.1.2.b.2.a)
P/S 353 6.
D/G "and/or" (T.S. 3.8.1.2 Action a)
P/S 060 7.
D/G "and/or" (T.S. 3.8.1.2 Action b)
P/S 060 l
8.
Control Rod Accu =ulator Test (T.S. 4.1.3.3.b.2)
P/S 214 9.
RCIC Min. Op. Channels (T.S. 3.3.5-1)
P/S 078 i
1 10.
LLRT Air vs. Hydro (T.S. 3.6.4-1)
P/S 020 11.
Snubbers (T.S. 3.7.4)
P/S 006 12.
PSRC/SRC Alternates (T.S. 6.5.1.3/6.5.2.3)
P/S 064/065 13.
Spent Fuel Fool Temp (T.S. -3/4.7.9)
P/S 058 14.
E= bank =ent Stability (T.S. 3/4.7.10)
P/S 059 15.
RFCS Bypass Sviches (T.S. 3.1.4.2)
P/S 347 16.
ADS Pressure Surveillance P/S 099 Zlsd7
I, 4
B.
MP&L Concerns f
1.
ADS Valves (T.S. 3.5.1)
P/S 001 2.
Rad Mon. Hi-Hi Terminology (T.S. 4.6.6.3.d.3.c.d.)
P/S 003 3.
RWCU/SLC MOC (T.S. 3.3.2)
P/S 005 4.
SRM Spec MOC Inconsistencies (T.S. 3.3.6, 3.3.7.6, 3.9.2)',
P/S 009 5.
TIP (3 vs 5) (T.S. 3.3.7.7)
P/3 010 6.
CRB Incorrect Note (T.S. 3.3.6)
P/S 011 7.
SSW vs. RHR Heat Exchanger (T.S. 3.6.3.3.6)
P/S 012 8.
Other Isolation Signals (T.F. 3.3.2)
P/S 013 9.
Level Sensor Response (T.S. 4.1.3.1.4.b)
P/S 014 10.
Baronetric Pressure Correction (T.S. 3.3.8)
P/S 016 11.
CFM vs SCFM (T.S. 4.6.7. 3.b.1)
P/S 019 12.
Inoperable Conductivity Monitors (T.S. 4.4.4.c)
P/S 055 13.
Major Radwaste Changes (T.S. 6.15)
P/S 088 14.
ATUS Recirc Purp Trip (T.S. 3. 3.4.1)
P/S 022 15.
SRV Instrumentation (T.S. 3.5.2.1 and 3.4.2.2)
P/S 023 16.
Jet Pump 4.0.4 Exception (T.S. 3.4.1.2)
P/S 024 17.
Rx Coolant Pressure /Tenp Curves (T.S. 3.4.6.1)
P/S 160 21ad8
^8 18.
ASTM-D270-1975 vs 1965 (T.S. 4.8.1.1.2.c)
P/S 026 l
19.
Typo: 3.7.5-1/3.7.4-1 (T.S. 6.10.2.1)
P/S 027
~
20.
RCS Leakage Corrections (T.S.3.4.3.2)
P/S 032/028 i
21.
Redundant Channels (T.S. Miscellaneous)
P/S - None Although the Tech Spec notation is confusing, no action is planned.
22.
CTMT Isol. Valves (T.S. 3.6.4) j P/S.- None
]
1E61-F003A, B do not have analytical closing times; the 30 1
second inhibit of dryuell purge during blowdown is not i
affected by these valves.
I 23.
Neutron Monitoring Surv. (T.S. 1.2)
P/S 029 24.
RCS Leakage Spec Prob 1 cms (T.S. 3.4.3.1/3.4.3.2)
P/S 032 25.
CTNT Spray Timers (T.S. 3.3.8)
P/S 033 i
26.
Rosemont/Riley Cal. Freq. (T.S. 3.3.2)
P/S 037 l
27.
Carbon Bed Vault Hon. Cal. Freq. (T.S. 4.3.7.1)
}
P/S 038.
3 28.
Seismi'c Monitoring (T.S. 4.3.7.2)
P/S 039 29.
Group 5 Isol. Signals (T.S. 3.3.2)
P/S 013 30.
Rated Core Flov/Eff.-Core' Flow (T.S. 3.4.1.3)
P/S 042 i
- 31. Div. III U.V. Time Delay (T.S. 3.3.3)
P/S 044 r
32.- Chemistry Spec' Clarification (T.S. 3.4.4).
P/S - None Although the wording is somewhat unclear MP&L does not anticipate proposing a. Tech Spec' change.
I-l21sd9
. ~.
_ -. ~,
4 33.
Recire Pump Operability (T.S. 4.4.1.1)
P/S 041 34.
Liquid Release Spec (T.S. 4.11.1.1.2)
P/S - None No action planned due to discussions during 1/24/84 ceeting 35.
RCS Leakage Errors (T.S. 3.4.3.2)
P/S 032 36.
Alarm / Trip Sctpoints - ODCM (T.S. 3.3.7.12)
P/S 045 s.,
- 37. EOC Recire Puep Trip (T.S. 4.3.4.2.3)
~
P/S 047 38.
APRM Setpoints - 6 vs 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (T.S. 3.2.2)
P/S 049 39.
TIP Nornalization (T.S. 4.3.7.7)
P/S 010 l
l l
l k
1 i
l "Isd10
)
IV.
Review of CGNS Tech Spec (Handout from Capra presented during 4/4/84 necting in Bethesda)
A.
RSB Comments 1.
Rx Vessel Steam Dome Pressure P/S - None Tech Spec is correct.
The SER reference to 1045 psig is the number required by Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 2.
Bases 2.1.2 Typo P/S 219 3.
APRM Setpoint Thermal Power Time Constant P/S 215 4a.
ECCS Pump Disch Pressure P/S 344 4b.
ECCS Response Tine P/S 076 E.
ASB Comments 1.
MSIV Heater Electrical Test P/S 229 2.
SSW/D/C Inop P/S 173 3.
HPCS SSU Surveillance P/S 094 C.
PSB Comments 1.
Turbine Overspeed Testing P/S 148 2a.
ECCS Actuation Instrumentation P/S - None Tech Spec change not justified.
FSt.R Sections 8.3.1.1.2.2, 8.3.1.1.4.2, and Q and R Ot0.90 accurately describe the HPCS design
~'l 2b.
D/G Action Times P/S 175 2c.
Fuel Oil Chemistry Requirenents P/S - None 2d.
Load Reject EW Values P/S - Kone The bases of the Tech Spec values was explained in AECM-83/0422
!TEL committed to revise the FSAR at the time.
Zlndil
?
e 2e.
Standby D/C Trips P/S - None Design is in accordance with FSAR 8.3.1.1.4.1.f(2) [ Amend. 57]
2f.
IIPCS D/G LOCA/ Standby P/S - None Design is in accordance with FSAR and NEDO-10905 2g.
Battery Testing P/S 227 D.
CF3 Comments 1.
Recirc Loop Thermal Instability Concerns P/S - TBD 2.
MCPR Bases P/S - TED F..
CSB Comments in.
See Item f2a below lb.
Containment Purge 6/20 inch operction l'/S 068 Ic.
LLRT Air vs liydro P/S 020 ld.
Ilydrogen Igniters P/S 069 2a.
ILRT Supplemental Test P/S 067 2b.
SEGT 4000 cfm vs 2300 cfu P/S - None 3a.
Suppression Pool Volume P/S 126 3b.
Suppression Pool Level P/S 163 l
4a.
Bases - CT!iT to Aux. Building. dp P/S 107 4b.
Bases - Drywell Internal Pressure P/S 127 4c.
Bases - Mininum Suppressien Pool Volune P/S 126 Zlsd12 I
e F.
RAB, METB, AEB Coteents 1.
Control Room Inlenkage P/S - None This is a licensing issue Tech Spec is not affected 2.
A=biguity between SBGT specs (3/4.6.6.1 6.3)
P/S - Kone J
- !1cd13
1 NRC INSPECTION REPORT ITEMS IE REPORT 84-06 Dated April 2, 1984 l
StP&L PROBLEM ITEM NO.
l'A G E N O.
PARA REF.
DESCRIPTION / PROBLEM SilEET NO./PRI.
SICNIFICANCE RESOLUTION AND DISCUSSION 1.
2 5.a
-Plant has six 1cyc1 detectors 234/3A Clarity Revise FSAR.
Para.2 Tech Spec describes only four
?.
2 5.h
-Narrow versus wide range inst.
234/3A No,ne No Action Needed not differentiated 3.
2 5.c
-SPMU instrumentation not in 83/2B Minor Revise Tech Spec Tech Spec
-Minimum operabic channels and 1.C0 is incorrect 4.
3 5.d
-wide range inst. used in Mode NONE/2B Minor Revise calibration method 4 & 5 are 3" nonconservative.
if required NPE resolution 5.
3 5.c
-1.cyc1 inst, needs to be indi-234/3A Clarity
-Revise Procedures vLdually I.D.
in Tech Spec
-Level sensor location in FSAR Clarity
-Revise FSAR incorrect 6.
3 5.f
-12'8" vice 12'5" I?6/2D Typo Revise Tech Spec 7.
3 5.g
-Suppression Pool temp detectors 202/3B Clarity Revise Tech Spec (24) used to meet 2 Tech Specs C.
3 5.g
-Functional Test Issue 207/3D Clarity No Action Needed I,s t para.
9 4
5. P,
-Required no. of channels issue 202/3B Clarity Revise Tech Spec 10.
4 5.g
- and/or" usage 207/3B Clarity No Action Needed 11.
4 5.h
. Revise Tech Spec Para. 1 c-S35cdn!
~t MRC INSPECTION REPORT ITEMS 1E RI: PORT 84-06 Dated April 2, 1984 MP&L PP.0BLEM ITEM NO.
PAGC NO.
PARA REF.
DESCRIPTION / PROBLEM SiiEET NO./PRI.
SIGNIFICANCE RESOLUTION AND DISCUSSION 12.
4 5.h
-RilR/ Spray flow issue.
ISI 233/IB Potentially Revise Tech Spec Para. 2 more conservative
~
Significant
-_~
~ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _
13.
4 5.h
-Additional ISI time added to NONE/2B Minor Region II policy at other Para. 3 LCO time intervals plants is to allow this.-
Additional evaluation needed by Plant Staff.
14.
5 6.a
-Comprehensive Cont. walkdown NONE/3B No walkdowns planned.
Para. 2
-15.
6 7a
-Battery testing issues.
This 227/3B Minor Procedure change under is proper way to test, consideration.
16.
6 7.b
-Valve designation problem.
228/3B Not an issue Tech Spec change not Tech Spec is correct required.
17.-
6 7.c
-EPA breaker question - must 226/3A Not an issue Tech Spec change not Para,1 separate EPA's from EPMA's required.
18.
6 7.c
-EPA breaker testing - No NONE/3B Not an issue Surveillance program Para.l2 annurance that EPA surveillances provides adequate con-are done within required trols.
surveillance frequencien.
19, 7
8.a
-Cight ADS valves 1/IB Significant Revise Tech Spec.
. Para. 1 20, 7
8.a
-llPCS & LPCS flows and heads 233/IB Potentially Pevise Tech Spec.
Para. 2 unconservative Significant 21.
8 8.b
-Atmos. press effect on instru-15.16/IB,1A Not an issue.' Revisc Tech Spec.
Lat.. para.
ment Setpoints have been lowered
,and controlled administra-tively.
ML%c d @ L
s NRC INSPECTION REPORT ITEMS IE REPORT 84-06 Dated April 2, 1984 MPhL PROBLEM ITDi NO.
PACE NO.
PARA REF.
DESCRIPTION / PROBLEM S1IEET NO./PRI.
SIGNIFICANCE RESOLUTION AND DISCUSSION 22.
9 9.a
-No outboard heater for MSIV 229/2B Clarity Revise Tech Spec I.CS system 23.
9 9.b
-Leak rate of hatch seals due 144/2B Clarity R'evise Tech Spec to type B penetrations 24, 9
9.b
-Vague Tech Spec on " Securing 231/3B Clarity No Action Needed.
Lst. Para, in Position" rs. " closed" 25.
11 10.a
-Tech Spec cross reference NONE/3B Typo This document has been document revised 26.
11 10.b
-RCIC level instrument channel NONE/3B Cood nractice -Procedure has been changed check.
-Personnel were not proper-NOTE:
Procedure change had ly following procedure been initiated, but not yet prior to procedure change.
incorporated at the time of the NRC inspection, as plant was not in Modes 1,2,3 27.
11 10.c
-Tech Spec cross reference NO:,1:/3B Typo This document has been document revised 28.
11 10.d
-In nodes 4,5 instruments NONE/3B Cood practice This document has been requiring channel checks are changed penned high 6
0 6