ML20118D227
| ML20118D227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bodega Bay |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1963 |
| From: | Saintamand P NORTHERN CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION TO PRESERVE BODEGA |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML093631134 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210120013 | |
| Download: ML20118D227 (33) | |
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N PU B1.1511ED BY Northern California Association 9210120013 c'20320 To Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor PDR ORG
Geologic and Seismologic Study of Bodega Head 1
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i INTRODUCTION
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Dr. Saint-Amand's previous pub;1 cations are many. The most recent, Los Terremotos De Mayo--Chile 1960, has been published as Tech-nical Article No.14 by the Naval Ondnance Test Station, Michelson laboratories, China Lake and Pasadena, California. It is the first eye-witness account of a major earthquake by a recognized expert seismologist who was there to ride it out.
Dr. Saint-Amand's interest in Bodega Head began in late 1962, when David Pesonen of the Northern Califomia Association to Preserve Bo-dega Head sent him several aerialphotographs of j
the crea for study. Subsequently, Dr. Saint-Amand, accompanied by Dr. Oresti lombardi, al-so from China lake, made a two-day field trip td' the headland. He enjoyed the advan: age ingath-ering his data of seeing the proposed reactor site
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" opened up" by Pacific Gas and Elec:ric Compa-ny's initial excavation. In addition, the reports
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of the utility's experts (both close fnends of Dr.
Saint-Amand), Dr. Don Tocher of the University of California and Dr. George Housner of the Cat-ifornia Institute of Technology, were made avail-able to him by the Association.
This report is Dr. Saint-Amand's analysis 4
and conclusions concerning the hazards posed by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's anticipa-ted construction of a 325 megawatt nuclear reac-tor at Campbell Cove on Bodega Head.
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- 1. I ntr od u c t i on........................... 1 2. Ge o l og y............................
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- 3. Possibility of a Severe Earthquake at Bodega Head and the Possible Consequences..................
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GEOLOGIC AND SElSMOLOGIC STUDY OF BODEGA HEAD By Pierre Saint-Amand*
1.
INTRODUCTION 1 - 1.
Field Work. The ghpy visitej Bodega Head on 6 and 7 April 1963 in orde to make an examination of the geology of the Head. The area was traversed on foot in company with Oreste W. Lombardi. The study consisted essentially of mapping on both aerial photographs and on a topographic map. Special attention was paid to faulting, condition of the terrain as foundation material, probability of landslides, and other aspects of engineering geology applicable to the con--
struction of an atomic power plant on the Head.
1-2.
Previous Work.
V.C. Osmont (1905) included a discussion _of Bodega Heat in a paper on the regional geology. Johnson (1934,1943) presents a general geo-logic study of the region. Tocher and Quaide (1960) present the engineering geol-ogy and selsrcology, and Housner (1961) discusses criteria for engineering design based on the work of 'k-her and Qualde and on his own observations. Koenig (1963), of the State Division of Mines, has summarized the geology of Bodega Head. A study by Dames and Moore, concerned with foundational aspects, was not available to the author at the time of writing.
_2. GEOLOGY 2-1.
Geocraphy of Bodeoa Head. A general view of the region is sho'vn in Fig.1, a close-up of the Head in Fig.- 2, and the topography in Tig. 3 (from a map taken from Tocher & Quaide).
The Head is an erosional remnant of an elongated ridge lying along a SE-NW line seaward of and parallel to the main San Andreas fault zone and in the
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general area of deformation marginal to the fault. It is connected to the main-land by a tombolo of sand dunes lying over a mixed collection of littoral deposits :
and wind-blown sand. The long sand spit of Doran Beach State Park extends j
southwestward from the mainland to enclose the south side of Bodega Bay. A j
protected channel has been built to prevent sanding of the entrance to the bay, 1
which is used as a harbor by fishing and pleasure craft.
l 2-2.
Structurq. Bodega Head is part of a long, thin' ridge of rock, interrupted-ly connected to Tomales Point (4.5 miles to the southeast) by a line of sub-marine hills. The ridge bounds the western edge of the San Andreas ftult zone, and is composed of a line of horsts, or uplifted blocks, squeezed up by move-
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ment on the fault. Similar ridges border the San Andreas and other ::triko-slip faults in many places. These ridges are slowly and continually being forced up-ward at a rate somewhat faster than that at which the forces of erosion can re-move the extremely crushed and broken rock. The presence of such ridges is a diagnostic aid for estimating the activity on a fault.
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I RECENT DONE S DEACH SAND
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8 PLEISTOCENE SAND 8 SILT gSTERN LIMIT OF i
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Topographic and Geologic Map of E-deca Head.
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2-3. Jedrock.
called " Bodega diorite" by Osmont (1905).The bedrock is a medium to coarse g It is probably a port of the coast range batholith and is similar to other granitic rocks found along the coast and offshore.
It is generally thought to be middle to upper Cretaceous in age; radiometric dating indicates an age of 80 to 90 million years (Curtis, et al.,
)
1958). It is occasionally injected by acidic dike rocks. Rock crops out on I
the higher parts and along the seaward sides of the head; in one or two places it is exposed along the shore on the bay side of the head.
2-4.
Weatherino and Soil.
In newly exposed outcrops, where the sea is ac-I tively removing material, the rock is relatively fresh but is broken into small fragments. Where erosion is less active the granodforite is covered by a deeply weathered clay-rich residual soll derived from weathering of the granodiorite.
The residual sol) is usually covered by a well-weathered sand, in part of acclian origin.
A samplo of the upper sand from the reactor-pit excavstion shows angular to sub-rounded grains of quartz and feldspar.
Horizons of the scil may be readily seen in the reactor pit and on the south side of Horseshoe Cove.
Near Horseshoe Cove.1 meter of dark humic soil overlies 2 meters of coarse orange sand, which in turn rests upon 4 to 5 meters of light-gray arkosic sand.
None of the sediments are in any way cemented or indurated.This mate 1
They are in part Recent Marine or Estuarial deposits.
Tocher and Qualde express the view that these are terrace deposits, pointing to the presence of mussel shells in the soil. Koenig (p. 6) describes these sediments in some detail, concurring in general with the other observers.
They are probably correct, because although definitiv:. evidence for thess being terrace deposits sums hard to find,.a series of what appears to be raised shore lines can be seen on the flat, grassy surface just west of the sand dune area (see Fig. 2, and Fig. 3, Point A).
Along the inland shore at Point D, Fig. 3, about 10 meters of coarse red sand unconformably overlies a blue-gray sand for the remainder of the exposure.
Bedrock is not seen here.
The sediments at this point are deeply gullied, are scarred by small slumps and ooze water from many small springs.
2 - 5.
Ground Water. The sediments are loosely consolidated, porous, and pumea ble.
At the time of this study the sediments were saturated, and numer-ous small springs could be seen at the water's edge. At Point E, Fig. 3, a fault cuts the cliff and a good spring has developed.
visible at about sea level. As Tocher and Qualde point out, the soils areHere bedrock is saturated during rainy seasons and probably dry out somewhat in late summer, e
i 2-6.
Tra cturino.
) extensively sheared and broken.Tocher and Quaide describe the rock of Bodega Head as t The rock is indeed severely fractured, as Figs. 4 and 5 showJohnson (1934, pp. 24-being most intense near faults.
, the fracturing i rocks larger than a man's head. In many places it is difficult to find sound Often, in shear zones and in the vicinity of faults, the fragments are augen-shaped or rudely tabular and are alioned along the general trend of the fault s.
In such regions the "soi-disant" solid rock has the consistency of a vertically stratified alluvial deposit.
Many of the surfaces have thin mylonite In some places the rock is a tectonic or cataclastic breccia. A zones.
combination of the fracturing, mylonitization, deem w@Mh@mmarda-
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4 2-7.
Taultino.
Minor faults abound on Bodega Head and a few major faults can be clearly seen. The best way to appreciate the degree of fault 14 l
1s to walk along the sides of Horseshoe Cove.
l The Cove itself is a rentrant cut by the erosive action of the waves from the zone of a large fault that trends about N450E. The crushed and broken rock of the fault zone has been more easily excavated than the relatively harder l
surrounding rock. The Cove is bordered on boc sides by faults parallel to its northwesterly and southeasterly shores. The faults on the northwesterly side 1
(Point T, Tig. 3) are very well exposed.
A good-sized fault is exposes avery hundred feet or so along the south-l westerly side of the Cove. Short canyons have been elaborated along these fault s. In the bottoms of some of these canyons are granodlorite bouldets covered by alluvium and slope wash. Six steeply dipping faults of consider-i able size, measuring 1 to 5 meters wide, are fcund between Points C and G.
O 0
These faults trend between S4S E and S60 E, and are sub-parallel to the San Andreas. Occasional thnist faults, steep reverse faults and normal faults can be seen between the high-angle faults.
In fact, each rentrant along the coast is determined by a fault. One cf the more notable ones (Point H) can be traced easily on air photos, and with i
only a' little difficulty on the ground, to the souiwest of the hill crest marked j
238.
Between Points T and H, arxi as a matter of fact clear to Windmill Beach, faults sub-parallel to the coastline channel the wave-cut platform.
. plays faulting very clearly. At several places the platform is at a different The wave-cut platform that surrounds the seaward side of the Head dis-
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altitude on either side of a fault, indicating differential uplift across the fault.
In places the platform is destroyed or completely, missing--for example, where the fault shown by Johnson enters the sea. At Point I the platform is at i
different elevations on either side of the fault, and the 100 meters or so of
}
missing platform heads against a cliff so fractured (Fig. 6) that it is actively landsliding along the upper edge and face, i
Near Point K a rentrant channel has developed in the wave-cut platform (Fig. 7). At the head of this channel a fault zone--50 meters wide, consisting of septa of rock caught between shear zones and curtains of gouge--is exposed in the clifi. Figure 8 shows a portion of this fault zone. Horizontal stria may be seen by exposing any of the mylonitized surfaces.
At Point L a landslide is developing in the zone of a very large fault.
Material is being removed by mass movement, slope wash, and gullying.
One spectacular fault is exposed on a bedrock high on the notthwest l
face of the excavation for the reactor, the apprcximate location being at Point M; the original banks on the northwest and southwest sides of Campbell Cove Mve been removed by the excavation and precise location was difficult, iecially la the rain-The fault lies near a temporary road, a temporary crainage culvert, and a stake marked " Top Bench 55.0".
The fault extends up i
L and down the road for at least 50 meters, strikes N45 W, and dips vertically,-
as nearly at can be seen in the partial exposure. Numerous small fractures I
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delineate the zone; these are interspersed with septa of crushed rock and cur-tains of mylonite and gouge measuring 2 meters wide. The majority of the stria indicato dextual strike-slip displacement, but some clearly indicate vertical movement. Figure 9 shows a section of one wide gouge zone.
This fault alone might well concern the builders, and is ample reason to recommend against the use of the site because of the possibility of movement thereon dvring or following an earthquake.
2-8.
Ta nd slidino. Numerous examples of soil creep and mass wasting are to be seen along the coast. The rentrant at Point D has been the scene ! several small slides. The sediments here are new extensively gullied and show small slumps, terracettes, springs, and a topography indicative of an unstable terrain. An old landslide, on a gentle slope in " solid" rock, is found at Point N; the debris that flowed out is overgrown by gorse.
The water-soaked condition of the soil, the looseness and lack of com-paction, and ~.he broken state of the rock all suggest that landsliding could be expected following a major earthquake during or just after a normal rainy season
--especially following extensive construction work that will redistribute masses of earth and change the ground loading.
i The former Campbell Cove is now being filled to make a dock area and to dispose of the, dirt removed in excavation. Unless an excellent sea wall is placed on the bay side this deposit will be unstable even in the absence of earth-quakes, and even with a sea wall the situation would be difficult in the event of 1
an earthquake. A similar installation in Puerto Montt, Chile was destroyed in 1960 by liquefaction of the soil (Saint-Amand,1961, p.19, and Duke and Leeds, 1963).
2-9.
Recent Uplift. Several lines of evidence point clearly to Recent uplift of Bodega Head:
Soil now found above sea level is in part a terrace deposit (Tocher and Qualde) that was originally emplaced below sea level, as indicated by the mussel shells. Absolute age of the deposits and hence a maximum age for the uplift could be determinable by Carbon-14 dating of wood and shells found in the de-posits. Carbon 14 dates for wood from the reactor pit, taken at about sea level, yield ages in excess of 42,600 years; dates are not yet available for shells and other debris from higher in the section. A careful study of these msterials will be very imponant and interesting from an academic point of view.
Elevated shorelines, shown in Fig. 2 and in the plain at Point A, Fig. 3 1
are subdued but nevertheless visible in the field. The soll is soft sand, and al-though it is stabilized by grass cover one would expect erosion to have pro-ceeded so rapidly, because of the abundant rainfall, that these marks would not be very old. This bespeaks a very recent uplift.
The wave-cut platform around the head is also diagnostic of Recent up-lift. It is apparently a local effect not caused by a eustatic change cf sea level as postulated for uplift of the terrace deposits by Tocher and Qualde (page 7[.
This platform is quite young, is at different elevations in different places / and is clearly offset vertically by som,e faults.
A similar platform was found around Isla Mocha and near Lebu, Chile, l-
/ IDIng the great earthquakes of 1960. At that time Isla Mocha was elevated _
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Mylonite Zone _in Large Pault in Excavation for Power Plant.
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On the southeast shore of Campbell Cove there is a concavity cut by
- torm waves, probably before the mole was built. *his is now elevated about a
" meter above the level at which it was formed. It was probably uplifted at the same time as the wave-cut platform.
Several of the canyons produced by erosion of fault zones now have old bottoms exposed at a height of 3 to 5 meters above present sea level (Fig.10) they have wave-rounded boulders in the bottoms, and are filled with slope wash and soil. The same sort of boulders may be scen at the present sea level in the heads of channels produced in the same fault zone, where the sea is now fash-ioning them from joint-blocks and fragments. The soll in the old canyons is quite young, loose, and uncemented. This situatien also indicates a Recent up-lift.
The rather surprising depth of alluvium repcrted in Campbell Cove is sug-gestive of a tectonic origin for that bedrock depression. It is difficult to see how it could have been cut to that depth by erosion. Hence it is poscible that it was produced by the down-dropping of a small graben; however, other explanations could probably be found as well.
2 - 10. Recency of Tectonic Movement. Although fresh fault scarps are scarce, several were noted, and abundant other evidence such as cited above indicates vigorous Recent tectonic activity on the Head.
The fault lying along Points F and B, Fig. 3, en the northwesterly side of Horseshoe Cove, clearly offsets the pattern of the old shorelines, as may be seen in Fig. 2.
Another fault, at Point C, leaves a faint scarplet running sub-parallel to the shorelines.
The relative lack of fault scarps is deceptive. This is almost certainly be-cause of the failure of the soft-soil overlying portiens of the Head to reveal move-ments in the bedrock, and because rapid erosion caused by the heavy rainfall on the soft soil would quickly destroy any such scarpe.
For example, in 1906 the San Andreas fault moved about 16 feet in the vicinity of Bodega Bay. Lawson (1908), p. 65, quoted by Tocher and Qualde, pp.1-3, clearly states that even-this considerable covement was not visible in the sand dunes nor across the Doran Beach sand spit.
Pault movement effects produced by earthquakes have always been easier to follow over bedrock than over even the shallowest alluvium. Furthermore, the San Andreas fault and the majority of the fractures on Bodega Head undergo mostly horizontal movement, and this sort.of displacement does not produce scarplets as conspicuous as an equal amount of vertical movement.
9 Scarp'ets do not long endure under the climatic regime at Bodega Head, nor in the type of soil found there. The trace of the 1906 earthquake is now quite modified. A similar example was shown in the Kern County earthquake of 1952 which broke a series of scarplets along the trace of the White Wolf fault (Buwalda and Saint-Amand,1955); today these scarpNts are scarcely visible.
Par less rain falls in Kern County than at Bodega Head, and the soil is much firm-cr. The scarp of the 1872 earthquake in the arid Owens Valley is now so smooth and modified that it is in places difficult to recognize.
l -
Hence, one must observe considerable caution in estimating the state of present or Recent tectonic activity on the basis of vertically displaced scarplets alone.
o.
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POSSIBILTri OF A SEVERE EARTHOUAKE AT BODEGA HEAD l
AND THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES 3-1.
Estimates of Frequency of Earthquakes. Tocher and Qualde, p.12, in.
f
< regard to Bodega Head, estimate that "at least one and perhaps two major earth-l quakes can be expected near the site within the next century. These may be at leut as strong as or even stronger than the California Earthquake of Apri) 18, i
1906." Housner, p. 3, says "It has been estimated that a large earthquake, such 1
. as the 1906 shock, may be expected to occur along the San Andreas fault perhaps three or four times per 1,000 years. Less intense ground motion can be expected
_ to occur with greater frequency, it being estimated that ground motions at least
! sufficiently strong to cause damage to poorly designed structures may be expectet at the site several times during the next hundred years." The author's personal guess would be almost the same as that of Tocher and Qualde.
i l
l Small earthquakes do not often occur on the San Andreas fault. Large San Andreas earthquakes have occurred in the San Francisco region in 1838 (Louder-l back,194 7) and 19 06 (Lawson,1908). The 1857 earthquake (Wood,1955) took l
place a little further south and is cited to indicate the general activity.
A great earthquake in 1836 was tent 6tively assigr.ed by Louderback to the Hayward Fault, Fig.11, a branch of the San Andreas fault at the western foot of the Berkeley Hills, and another great earthquake occurred on that fault in 1868.
l Each time the San Andreas Fault has moved it has jumped a distanca vi 4
' to 8 meters. Strain is estimated to be accumulating at a rate of about 6 to 7 j
} meters per century across the fault. Hence one could expect at least one great l
g earthquake per century.
Other similar fault systems have had a similar history. The great Yakutat Bay earthquakes of 1899 (Tarr and Martin,1912) were probably on the same fault as those of 1958 (Tochet,1960). In southemChile the Arauco Pault had a great earthquake in 1835 and another in 1960 (Saint-Amand,1961).
Smaller earthquakes on nearby faults may be expected oftener. These will probably cause no serious trouble unless they occur on or near Bodega Head as aftershocks of a larger event.
3-2.
Intensity to be Expected at Bodega Head. 'Ihe intensity (severity of shaking) will be about the same as for other earthquakes of magnitude 8 to 8.4 at similar distances. Tocher and Quaide estimate a Mercalli VIII or IX for an earth-quake equal to the San Francisco earthquake of 1906.
The author's own observations made in other earthquakes would incline him to guess that MM IX would be the least expectable intensity. MM X might be noted if landsliding of consequence were to occur, or if one of the faults on Bo-dega Head were to move. If a large fault on the Head were to move during the l
main earthquake the intensity could easily reach XI. It is difficult to give a good opinion for intensities above MM IX because the scale itself is not too precise and the intensity assigned depends upon the presence of certain diagnostic structures and conditions.
Richter (1958, p. 353) gives the following table for average Mercalli in-tensities to be expected for metropolitan centers in California and for ordinary ground conditions:
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Taken from Richte: 1958.
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16e Magnitude 2
3 4
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l Maximum intensity M.M.
I-II III V
VI-VII VII-VIII IX-X XI Radius (Kms) (felt) 0 15 80 150 220 400 600 i
i These values are in good agreement with those observed in actual earth-quakes.
The author's own estimate for the severity of shaking at Bodega Head would be, for an earthquake of magnitude 8.2 - 8.4, something like an average maximum acceleration of about 0.4 g for about 1 minute, with peaks in excess l
of 1 3 and with a vigorous shaking ~ continuing for perhaps 3 minutes.
This is somewhat larger than the intensity predicted on the basis of the j
strong motion recorded in the El Centro Earthquake, as recommended by Hous-ner. The basic idea of using actual accelerograms is quite sound and is far i
superior to using Mercalli intensity alone. The El Centro earthquake is the only-one for which such information is available for a psition near a fault. The earthquake occurred on the Imperial fault, a branch of the San Andreas system; it was originally estimated to be magnitude 6.7, but was subsequently upgraded i
to 7.0.
The accelerograph was located about 5 miles to the west of the surface expression of the causative fault, or about 7 miles from the epicenter, the i
exact location of which is in some doubt.- Not only did the thick alluvium alter the power spectrum by attenuating the high-frequency effects and probably aug-menting the lower and middle frequencies, but also it probably does not show i
clearly the effects of the " fling"--an effect discussed in the next section.
Further, the intensity at a point depends on the location of the point with respec to the fault and the direction of propagation of the faulting. The faulting tegins i
at a point and progresses, usually in one direction. The shaking is much harder i
in the direction in which faulting progresses, with both the frequency and ampli-tude being changed,(Benloff,1954, p. 201). Hence, the record of the El Centro accelerogram probably indicates a lesser intensity than it would have hac it been located further south.
}
The historical record shows very clearly that higher intensities go with larger earthquakes, and thus the use of the El Centro record will not guarantee adequate design factors for the maximum accelerations produced by a shock of magnitude 8 or more.
For example, Gutenberg and Richter (1942, p.170 et seq.) relate In-tensity I and maximum acceleration, a, for various earthquakes. They derive the semi-empirical relation:
4 log a = f - f This yields accelerations of 1 g at a Mercall1' intensity of Ten and one half.
Accelerations in excess of 1 g have been noted in several large earth-quakes (Oldham,1899).
17.
3-3.
Mnchanics u Earthouske Motion. 'Iho movement ncir a fault is quite different from that at a distance; in f act, the oscillatory motion near a fault rey
, well be a little less. There is one movement, however, that is at maximum near a fault and diminishes rapidly with distance--this is the permanent throw or fling.
During the inter-earthquake period the blocks of land on either side of a i
fault move continuously and slowly with respect to each other. It is most i
probable that the oceanward side of a fault undergoes more absolus movement i
than the continental side, but this rukes little or no difference regarding the in-l tensity of toe impending earthquake as it affects opposite sides of the fault zone.
The gradual drift of the land deforms the blocks (see Fig.12) bending l.
the rocks and storing energy in them in the form of elastic strain. The strain accumulates until the forces gene sted in the rock are great enough to overcome
/
the frictional forces on the surfaces of a fault that prevent slippagee When this happens the rock on either side suddenly snaps back into its unstrained straightened condition.
i In'the zone near the fault, up to say 30 km, the land on both sides at this time undergoes a permanent sudden displacement. The total displacerrent across the fault zone may be as much as 5 to 8 meters. This takes place as a i
sudden high acceleration, followed by a slower deceleration; the time involved is j
of the order of seconds. Effects of the fling are most noticeable on or near bed-rock. Most of the extremely-high-intensity effects in epicentral regions are the i
result of such action. The total fling may be ameliorated somewhat by drag in i
the fault zone, in the case of a very large fault, but this carries the penalty of movement on a variety of subsidiary faults.
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freference line, for example, a fence l
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a b
c d
FIG. 12. Process of Strain Accumulation and Release (not to scale) a.
Field cut by a strike slip fault, before strain accumulation.
b.
During strained condition and before an earthquake.
ct After an earthquake.
The Bodega Head reactor site is located in the zone of fling of the San Andreas fault and will probably undergo some 3 or 4 meters permanent horizontal displa cement.
< 3 - 4.
Possible Fault Movement on the Head. The most serious cause for con-cern at the reactor site would be the possibility of movement on a fault passing either through the power plant area or across the cooling-water system. This i possibility is quite high. When a fault such as the San Andreas moves, it moves not on a single plane but on many fractures. There is usually one main plane of movement, but in many major earthquakes faulting has been found to have occuned over a large area. Some of the faults move during the main event while others move during the aftershock sequence. Numerous examples could be given
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18, whero movement took place on more than one fault. Richtar (195 8', pp. 47 6-487), in discussing the 1906 carthquake, shows rather clearly that that event was much more complex than a simple fault movement. Although the 1906 earth-4 quake was accompanied by displacement along a fracture to the east of the Head it must be remembered that during an earthquake energy is suddenly re-1 cased from a large volume of rock and movement can and dees take place across many faults and fractures over a wide zone. Pre-existing faults, often considered ' dead," joints, bedding planes and similar structures participate in the readjustments. The Chilean earthquakes of 1960 (Saint-Amand,1961) pro-duced movements on a plurality of faults spread over about 100 km of longitude.
The Kern County earthquake of 1952 (Buwalda and Saint-Amand,1955) had a zone of faulting of considerable width, with many minor faults and some clear-cut traces as far as 5 to 10 miles to the side. The list could continue indefinitely.
The hazard from movement is carefully pointed out by Housnerf page 3,
- wherein he says that "Since it la quite impossible to design a power plant to
/ survive without damage the large permanent ground surface displacements that might occur if the earthquake fault slippage occurred on the site, this possibility must be given special consideration. "
While the whole slippage from a major earthquake will probably not occur on any one f ault going through Bodega Head, it is quite likely that movement
< may occur on the big fault in the plant site, or on any of the several faults that
! cross the site of the cooling-water system.
3 - 5.
Possible Chances of Land Elevation. One phe lomenon that has been ob-served follcwing all large earthquakes, when an attemW has been made to notice it, is a widespread change in elevation on both stiles of the causative fault, even when the movement is mainly strike-slip. The land on either side is either raised or lowered, usually a matter of a meter or more for the larger earth-quakes. Examples are the 1835 (Fitzroy,1836) and 1960 (Saint Amand,1961) carthquakes in Chile, the Kern County earthquakes of 1952 (Whitten,1955, p. 79),
and the Yakutat Bay earthquake of 1899 (Tarr and Martin). This list could also be continued almost indefinitely. These changes are widespread and involve more than mere displacement on one fault. Many faults are involved, together with uplift and downbowing.on a regional scale.
This raises the serious question of the effects of a change of level on an installation that draws cooling water from a shallow estuary.
Attempts were made in the year following the 195 earthquake to detect changes in the level of Bodega Head on the basis of barnacle growth, but these were unsuccessful. The study was largely confined to the eastern shore, where such evidence would be difficult to find or to assess. 'Ihe negative findings do not indicate that the Head will not change elevation--it has done so in the past, as evidenced by the wave-cut platform and by the elevated shorelines. In fact, the very existence of the promontory is due to continued uplif t; no mass com-posed of such easily erodible rock could long withstand the assault of the sea were it not for continued rejuvenation.
3 - 6. Tectonic Movement in the Absence of a Major Ea_rthquake. Even if no major earthquake occurs in the area concerned, the po: sibility of large-scale warping or slippage is present and should be considered. While there is no clear-cut evidence at Bodega Head for other than catastrophic changes, it seems appropriate to recount one or two cases of this sort. Perhaps the most notable case is that of the W. A. Taylor Winery, near Hollister (Steinbrugge, et al.,
1960), where damage has occurred from a slow slippage on a portion of the San Andreas fault. Concrete floors have been broken and walls displaced at a rate l
19e of one centimeter per year.
A thrust fault in the Buena Vista Hills, near Bakersfield (Wilt,1958),
has been moving without earthquakes for a number of years, deforming roads and bending pipelines.
On another scale, widespread changes of considerable rapidity are taking place in many places, such as across the San And. mas fault near Cajon Pass or along the southern and southeastern coast of Alaska (Saint-Amand,1957, pp.1360-1364).
Changes of this sert are large enough to cause trouble, and a study to identify any such changes should be made before construction begins, 3-7.
Foundation Considerations. It is generally thought that it is better t build upon solid rock than upon alluvium. This is certainly true at a distance from the causative fault. However, at near-fault distances, where fling is im-portant, rock may be si bad or worse. Clearly the worst possible situation is to build upon a combination of the two. At the Bodega Head site the rock is severely crushed, broken, and mylonitized. It codd scarcely be classed as good foundational material. It will transmit well high-frequency vibrattoris, and then plastically deform in response to regional readystment of strain; it will probably also undergo taass movement due to its cwn weicht during the long-period oscillations. In addition, the alluvium, a loosely aggregated clay-rich soll, will certainly yield at a different rate than the rock, subjecting the in-stallation to widely varying dynamic loads and per:ltting the several parts of the installation to settle different amounts, probab;y resulting in serious damage from changes in level and position to interconnecti g structures, to the cooling system, and to the reactor itself.
A worse foundation situation would be difficult to envision.
3 - 8.
Transmission Lines. The transmission lines which will stretch across the fault zone will probably be destroyed by me fadt movement, after first possi-bly having been shorted by swinging together. Whre damage to the po'ver lines could be repaired easily enough, such activity is certain to put a severe load on the power plant.
3-9. Ts unamis. Since California has never suffered extensively from tsunamis i
(seismic seawaves) produced by its own earthquakes, this does not seem a serinus cause for concern.
3 - 10. General Observations. It is difficult to conceive all the trouble that a great e.orthquake can cause. Accounts of these events are always condenced, and hence a mere pemsal'of the literature, often after it has been digested and edited in the interests of economy, does not convey a very graphic impression of the extent of disruption of the normal human activities. Not only are there the usual concomitants of fire and occasionally flood, but widespread disruption of water supply and sewage disposal occur. One of *he most serious lor,ses is that of electricity; this locs is invariably felt during the period it is most needed j
for emergency service.
\\
)
Loss of electricity leads to shortages of water, hospital facilities, elevator service, street signals, lights, etc. The r:ost serious loss is in com-munications--especially radio, television, and the press, which in turn leads to public panic and the spread of groundless rumors and exaggerations. The latter tend to include misinformation regarding installatfors known to hcVe a damage-
)*
20.
1 producing potential such as dams, and in the future would inevitably involve atomic reactors--especially any known to be precariously located.
,4 For the above reasons it is absolutely essential that electrical power i
plants be so situated that they are as invulnerable as possible to disruption by l
seismic causes. The presently announced plans for the PG&E installation in-3 clude eventual construction of_ several units on Bodega Head. Considering the i
extreme vulnerability of any plant on the site, it seems highly imprudent to lump j
such an essential Service in such a poor locality.
Eventually the United States will have to turn to atomic energy to fulfill i
its power requirements. The future development of atomic energy will hinge upon the safety of the first reactors! Reactors must be carefully sited in order that an accident does not so alarm, discourage, and dishearten the public that wide-
[
spread mistrust will prevent the deliberate, careful, and competent development of this energy source.
4.
CONCLUSIONS
]
Bo'dega Head is a very poor location for a reactor for the following rea sons:
1 The probability of a great earthquake is at least one per century; a.
over half a century has elapsed since the last one, hence another may be ex-pected within the lifetime c' the plant.
- b. The extensive faulting on the head has renderad the rock a poor foundational material. The combination of an unstable alluvium and crushed rock is especially unsuited to heavy construction.
j The plant is located in the region of permanent distortion, or fling--
c.
a region where exceptionally high earthquake intensities will develop.
d.
The probability of actual fault displacement on or near the site is high. The large fault exposed in the present excavation is of special concern,
/ and is itself sufficient reason to discontinue construction. The presence of faults crossing the site of the cooling water tunnel is another serious aspect.
I e.
The abundant evidence for recent uplift causes concern for the cool-ing water system because of the possibility of change in elevation of the plant with respect to the water source.
2 It is surprising, in view of the expert advice given by Tocher and i
[7 Quaide, and by Housner, that another site was not chosen and that construction
.has gone ahead. The erection of a device not in itself dangerous except to its
! occupants js not a cause for great public concern. The erection of a device
/
that in itself is. hazardous to others is a matter for public concern, and the s
builders have a grave moral responsibility to be certain that harm to others will j
not result from failure of the device. The location on Bodega Head is hazardous g
from a geological and seismic point of view.
(
Because the San Andreas fault runs parallel to and forms the coast from San Francisco northward, it seems that the nearest safe locality near the sea would lie north of Point Arenas or south of Monterey Bay, and even then th, site selected shculd be carefully and prudently examined from all points of view i
before beginning construction, k
4 1
~
21.
ItEFERENCES Benioff, Hugo (1955), Mechanism and Straln Characteristics of the White Wolf Fault as Indicated by the Aftershock Sequence, Chapter 10, pp.199, 202. Earthquakec in Kern County,1952, Bull.171, Cali-fornia Division of Mines,1955.
Buwalda, J.P. and Pierre Saint-Amand (1955), Geologic Effects of the Arvin Tehachapi Earthquake, Chapter 4 of Earthquakes in Kern County, California During 1952, Bull.171, California Division of Mines, San Francisco, pp. 41-5 6.
Curtiss, G., J.F. Evernden, and J. Lipson (1958), Age determination of some cranitic rocks in California by the Pottasium-Argon methed. Calif. Oiv.
of Mines, Special Report 54,16 pp.
Luke, C. Martin and David J. Leeds (1963), Response of Soils, Foundations and Earth Structures to the Chilean Eartlauakes of 1960, B.S.S.A.,
Vol. 53, No.2, pp. 309-357.
Fitzroy, R., Sketch of the Surveying Voyages of His Majesty's Ships Adventre and Beagle, 1825-1836, Geograph. Journal, Vol. 6 (1836), pp. 311-14.
Housner, George W. (1961), Earthquake Hazards and Earthquake Resistant Design Bodega Bay Power Plant Site, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Typewritten Manuscript.
Johnson, F.A. (1934), Ph.D. Thesis, University of California at Berkelry.
Johnson, F.A. (1943), "P '31uma Region," California Division of Mines, Bull. 118.
Koersig, James B. (1963), The geob jic setting of Bodega Head. State of California, Division of 1 2s and Geology, Mineral Information S ervice, Vc,.
16, No. ?,
3.y 19 6 3, pp. - 1.0.
Lawson, A.C., et al. (19 08), The California Earthquake _of April 18, 1906, Report of State Earthquake Investigation Commission, Carnegie Institute of Washington, Vol.1,1908.
Louderback, G.D. (1947), Central California Earthquake; of the 1830's, B. S. S. A., Vol. 3 7, np. 33-74.
Oldham, R.D., Report on the Great Earthquake of 12th June 1897, Member of Ge, logical Survey _ cf India, Vol. 29, 1899.
i Osmont, V.C.,(1909, a geologic section of the Coast Ranges north of San -
Francisco Bay, University of Calif., Department of Geology, Bull.
Vol. 4, pp. 39-87.
(1958), Elementary Seismology, W.H. Freeman _ Company, Richter, Charles v San Franci::,co, pp. 768.
Saint-Amand, Pierre (1957), Geological and Geophysical Synthesis of the Tectonics of Portions of British Columbia, Tne Yukon Territory, and Alaska, B. G.S. A., Vol. 6 8, pp.134 3-137 0.
22.
4 Saint @Mnd, Pierre (1961), Los Terremotos de Mayo, Chile 1960, Technical Articlo D.14, U.S. Naval Ordnanc Test Station, China Lake, Calif.
Steinbrugge, Karl V. and Edwin G. Zacker, Part 1: Don Tocher, Part 2; and C.A. Whitten and C.N. Claire, Part 3; 1960, Creep on the Snn Andreas Fa ult, B.S. S. A., 'lol. 5 0, No. 3, pp. 3 8 9-415.
j Tarr, Ralph S. and D,:vrence Martin (1912), Earthquakes at Yakatat Bay, Alaska in Septembe ;899, U.S.G.S. Prof. Paper 69,135 pages.
Tocher, Don (1960), The Alaska Earthquake of July 10, 1958. A Collection of Articles by Several Authors is Included, B.S.S. A., Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 217-32 2.
Tocher, Don and William Qualde (1960), Report on Earthquake Hazards at the Bodega Esy Power Plant Site, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Typewritten Manuscript.
Whitten, C. A. (1955), Measurements of Earth Movements in California.
Chapter 8, Bull.171, Division of Mines, State of California, Earth-quakes in Kern County, California During 1952, pp. 75-80.
Wilt,,ames W. (1958), Measured Movement Along the Surface Trace of an Active Thrust Fault in the Buena Vista Hills, Kern County, California, B. S. S. A., Vol. 4 8, pp. 16 9-17 6.
Wood, Harry O. (1955), Tne 1857 Earthquake in California, B.S.S.A., Vol. 45, No.1, pp. 47-67.
l 1
1 j
4 l
23.
FIGURES Fig. '.. General View of Bodega Head and sei. Andreas Fault Zone.
Fig. 2.
Bodega Head and Harbor, Note shoreline near Horseshoe Cove, also wave-cut platform.
Fig. 3. Topographic and Geologic Map of Bodega Head. Modified from Tocher and Qualde.
Fig. 4.
Crushed and Broken Rock Along Shore.
Fig. 5.
Portion of Wave -cut Platform, Show Crushing and Minor Faulting.
Fig. 6.
Landsliding and Fracturing in Johnson Fault Zone.
Fig. 7.
Rectangular Channel Cut by Waves From a Fault Zone Near Point K, Fig. 3.
Fig. 8.
Portion of Fault Zone From Wh-atch in Fig. 7 was Eroded 3 Fig. 9.
Mylonite Zone in La ge Fault in Excavation for Power Piant.
i Fig.10. Geomorphic Evidence for Recent Uplift. Note abandoned canyon above high-water line.
Fig.11. Locality Map for 1906 Earthquake. Taken from Richter 1958.
Fig.12. Process of Strain Accumulation and Release.
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Energy 00cnission kO,
$ 'f/
i Wathin6 ton 25, D. C. \\ Q O
-/
5/
NN A *. ten t ion : Director, Division efn s,'
Licensing and '.8.e.fillstiW.
Re: Bodega My Park; Unit No.1 Docket ho. 50-205 Gentle.en:
ppa LQS1 Diclosec for your infor: nation are two copies of Pacific Gne and Electric Coc:pany's
'eply co a " Petition to Reopen For Purther f
Hearing" (ori;;inally entitled " Memorandum Ac tion Con:erning Late-Filed Exh1Dit Fo.
4, o 8
and Related Evidence") filed with the Fublic Utilities Cornission of the State of California on May 16, 1963 Die Fetition indicates that copien thereof scre forwitrded to your of fice.
Yours very truly, c AA uA Y AR A g RICHARD H. PE'rERSON LRS t,J e Ence - 2 v.a ss=
1 1
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2 8
BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF j
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 '
i
!Inthematteroftheapplicationof j
10 PACIPIC OAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY for ?
l 11 i a certificate of public convenience
' App 44 cation No. 43808 J and necessity to construct, install, h Decision Nos. 64537 l
12 2 operate and maintai.n Unit No.
1, a i
j nuclear power unit, at its Bodega and 64731 13 jBay Atomic Park.
I 14 ~
(Electric) i 15 REPLY TO PETITION TO REOFEN FOR FURTHER HEARING E
l 16 ;
17 g
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, hereinaf ter referred 18
.jto as PGandE, replies as follows to the Petition to Reopen 19 for further Hearing (originally entitled "Memoranclum of Action 4
4 20 j Concerning Late-Filed Exhibit No. 48 and Related Evidence")
21.f filed herein by the Northern California Association to 22 ~ Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor, Inc.
l 23 '
I 24 The Petition seeks relief wnich is not available, as 25 j pointed out in II below. Furthermore, opportunity for I
26 i
27 ' responsible criticism of P0andE's conclusions on the subject jorsafetybeforetheAtomicEnergyCommissionstillexists,
' as pointed out in III below.
28 29 ~
Therefore, the relier requested, j which is unavailable as well as urur.erited, is in addition funnecessary. Since, however, the Petition's potpourri 30 1
l deh; ecbWAA d
]
.,.www-v
~
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~ _.
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s I
1 i
5 1
1 j ef spurious allegations and misinterpretations could be 3
2 jmisleading to the casual reader, they have been sorted out
!and attention directed to the record for their refutation 3
4 jand correction.
5 3
{
The Coc=1ssion received late-filed Exhibit 48 on 6
ii 4
7 j
l July 9,1962, handed down its interim opinion by Decision l
8 lNo. 64537 on November 8,1962, and denied petitlens for i
5 l
9 j rehearing by Decision No. 64731 on January 2,1963. The e
10 j subject Petition is dated May 6,1963.
11 Apart from the question of its intrinsic merit, the 12 !Petitioncannotproperlyreceivetheconsiderationofthis l
13
- Commis sion. It is in substance a petition for rehearing, 14 That the substantive nature of a filing rather than the form 15 l chosen must control the Ccmmissien8 s treatment of it has been 3
10 jmade clear by the Ccmmission itself in Desert Express a 17 Victorville-Earstow Truck I.ine,,1/
and by the District Court 10 of Appeal in Youne v. Industrial Accident Cemmission 2f.
I 19 In those - cases, the petitioners had failed to seek a rehear-20 :g ing within the statutory period. They then filed petitions 21 for further hearing and petition to reopen, respectively. -
1 lThe petitions were properly denied. The matter at hand is a 22 stronger case for precluding further attack on the decision.
24 n.jThe Association's unincorporated predecessor filed, in 25 Ej addition to several other documents, a petition for rehearing -
i
'6
~
o j on Noverder 28, 1962, nearly five months after Exhibit 48 27
! was filed. That petition, which was denied on January 2, I
l1963, by an order appealable to the California Supreme Court, 29 !
E}/' 50 Cal.FUC (1957I 30 jy 63 C.A.2d 286 (1944) i i
2 b
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I 4
r fdidnotmentienExhibit48orthelackofanoppertunityfor j
1 ftheAssociationtoexaminePGandEonitscontents.
2 Now, a 3
E 3 jdifferent avenue, including undocumentes allegatiens of a a
l 4 jdenial of due process,is explored in an attempt to gain still 4
?
j 5 janother " day in court." Aside from the fact that the time f to seek further hearings of the matter has long since l
6
! elapsed,}/ there is the controlling principle, ignored by the 7
8 l
Petition but noted by the Cocnission in the Desert Express l
9 $ case, that "there must be an end to litigation "h/ The fimportanceofthatprincipleiswell-illustratedbythis l
10 11
. case, in which the on-time fulfillment of a portion of 12 Northern Califernia's power requirements is at stake.
=
23 [
yyy 14 The allegations of the Petition are intended to cast j
ldoubtonthesafetyoftheplant.
15 This Commission has i
E 16 jconsidered the question of safety and has supplemented its 17 jown review of the subject by requiring as a condition of 10 receipt of a final certificate of public convenience and 19 necessity that PGandE obtain a construction pemit from the 20 Atcede Energy Cc:=1ssion, Upon the occasion of AEC hearings, 21 jall qualified persons will once again have the opportunity 22 to cross-examine PGandE witnesses. Abundant opportunity for l
23 hputlicreviewofPGandE'sconclusions,.therefore,still
?
"n.
i jexists as does the--opportunity to prove the allegation trat 4
k,PGandE seeks to misletad the AEC.
It is to be hoped that the 25 l
G
'O s
[ Association, in any future participation, will demonstrate 27 recognition of the fact that no contribution is rade by i
es
- 29 Ej/ The Commission's Order in Decision No. 64537 dated '
)
Ncvember 8, 1962 reads in part, as follows:
"The v0 j
effective dato of this order shall be twenty days after the 5
date hereof."
4 14f 56 Cal,PUC at 6 I
i 3
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E 1 y unfoanded, anc in the case of this Commission, erroneous i
2 lallegationstnattnereviewingagencynasnotconsideredall 3 j the evidence before it.2/
5 4 i It la apparent from the approach of the Association, 5 g from its failure to rebut specifically the conclusions of 6 l P0andE's consultants expressed in Exhibit 48 ana most clearly 5
7 ; from its stated purpose, namely, "To word for preservation i
8 i of the scenic and nistoric headlanos of Bodega Bay and to 5
9 j insure tne ecological integrity of the surrounding marine 10 l environment," that it seeks not a review of the issues lraisedbutafurtherpostponementofthedaywhenanecesary 11 lceneratingplant, the building of whien is already benind 12 13 schedule, will be located at Bodega head.
14 i IV i
15 j Com.ments on specific allegations contained in the 16 i Petition follows 5
17 j 1.
Tne Petition at page 1 alleges discrepancies 2
18 j between testimony mid the contents of Exhibit 48 which 19 "stron61y suggest that Applicant nas attemptea to deceive 5
20 ; the Commission." Accepting for the moment that wnich is
?
21 expressly denied, i.e.,
tnat there are discrepancies, it 22 must be apparent that PGandE has not, by placing on the 23 E public record in Exhibit 48 not only the reports of its 24 25 2/ The Association,- which at page 7 of its Petition asserts i
that "the Commission.
. ne61ected a close examination 26 j of the substance of the exhibit " also at page 45 points s
out language of the_ Decision which demonstrates the 27 :
reveree. The Commission fa quoted as saying that i
"' applicant's civil en6ineering witness testified that the 28 i consulting geolo6ist engaged by applicant to specifically j
study the area in question reported that he could find no 29 signs of active faulting on Bodega nead.
. This testimony was supplemenced and substantiated by appli-30 ;
cant 's late-111ec exnlolc *o. '
(tmpnaele saaeof i;
5 4
3
d i
e I
i i
-i 1
consultants but also its correspondence on the subject,- been j
2 l tent on deception. Just the reverse is true. Exhibit 48 3
E was a compilation of written information possessed by P0andE 4
i 4
i and naturally includes discussion of the disadvantageous as l
5 j well as the predominantly advantageous characteristics of lthesite.
6 f
7 2.
Great emphasis is placed on the proximity to the i
O i reactor of the San Andreas Fault. The Atomic Energy 1.
f Commission's Reacter Site Criter$4 p;/ which was Exhibit 23 in 9
O the proceedings, is frspnentarily quoted at page 9 of the Petition. The purpose of the Oriteria. cannot be understood 3
12 j by such a quotation nor can it be by reference to it as "one 13 I i of the few verifiable, non-discretienary criteria of the I
14 5! Atomic Energy Commissients reactor siting requirements."Z/
15 i l
5 First, its purpose is "to describe criteria which guide the i
16 s i Commission in its evaluation of the suitability of proposed 4
17 :
i sites."8/ (D:phasis supplied) Second, the portion quoted in 18 s
,i the Petition is placed in proper context by the following
?
19 :i quotation from the -Criteria i.
20 }
3 21 l "In particular, the Commission will take the i
following tactors into censideration in deter-22 ;
mining the acceptability of a site for a power j
i 23 -
or testing reactor:
"(c) Physical characteristics of the site, 24 including seismology, meteorology, geology and f
hydrology.
s 1
25 ;
i
"(1) The design for the facility should 26 l conform to accepted building codes or standards for areas having equivalent earthquake histories.
27 :
Ho_ facility shculd be located closer than one-j fourth mile frem the surface location of a known 28 3
active earthauake fault. (Emphasis supplied) l 29-of 10 CFR 100 (Z/ Petition,p.10 i
30 of 10 CFR 100.1(a)
E e
i l'
5 i
e a
i av
-,.,,,- +
i i
l-E.
l !
(d) 4.ere ut. favorable physical character-
{
istice of the site exist, the proposed site ray
(
'i nevertheless be found to be acceptable-if the 2 i design of the facility includes appropriate and f
/
adequr.te compensating engineering-safeguards."9 3
y 4
.i 4 j PGandE has preposed a reactor location whien is not
=
b i ene-fourth mile from the westerly trace of the San Andreas 6
Fault Zcne as depicted on the map of William Quaide repro-7 duced as ?.xhibit B of the Petition. That site does, however, j
satisfy the optimum conditions described'in the AEC guide.
[ If the Can Andreas Fault has a surface location in the area, 9
f it is the single line of movement of the 1906 Earthquake on O
E l the landward side of Bodega Harber, more than one mile from 11 i
l 5i the site. However, in recognition of the San Andreas Fault,
'2 appropriate and adequate engineering safeguards have been I
-$; established. It is these facts along with the many
! advantages of the Bodega Head site which caused Witness 1
}
5 16 5, Nutting to answer correctly in the affirmative the question E
i 17 n "does the proposed site of Bodega Head satisfy the require-j h ments of the AEC regulation, in your opinion?"Jo/
19 It is alleged at page 15 :of the Petition that PGandE 2
i t
20 i presented " misleading testimony" on the subject of the l
2 l reactor's distance from the " San Andreas Fault."
That l
21 i allegation is denied and best refuted by the record itself.
22
! Indeed if there is a place for application of the word 23 i
i " misleading," it is to those statements found in the Petition j
24 s, which are incorrectly attributed to PGandE by the Association,
?
1 25 ej Witness Worthington did ng testify "that the San Andreas 26
!i Fault is 'approximately a mile' from the reactor vessel,"
c7 f.
28 29 }Q/10CFR100.10 l
30 1o/ Tr.1232 '
9 4
i 6
t 2
i
f-i i
i, l
!.4 s
Whtt he did say is E as claimed at-page 10 cf the Petiticn.
'l i
2 - centainec in the f:llcwinr.; questi:n and answer; 4
'inat is the appecximate dist:.n=e tnat the 3 [
"q.
reactcr vessel will te frcm the San Andreas r a ult':
l A.
- t's apprcr.imately a mile.
4 5
i is considered the fault line.1/
C.
Now--
3 A.
From the, wnat It should nave been clear to the Asscciaticn that he was nct, 6
3 that time, t eferring to the Fault Zone 'but to that mani-
? s j at restaticn of faulting in modern times, the 1906 fault move-i a"
which occurred ne3r the eastern boundary _of the zone.
1 9 e W
l ment,
'that the facility L! Moreover, Witness Nutting did not testify 10 i
would be at least one quarter mile from the fault."
What 11 :
12 ~; he said was
'It is my understand' 3 that the location of i
13 :
j the reactor is at least a quarter mile away from, 3
14 [
'the surface location of a known and I quote here, 15 s active earthquake fault.'" }f?]
The Association reaches the ccnclusion at page 18 i
s 16 3
2 l cf its Tetition that FGandE's consultants "could not assure e
17 at the proposed reactor site."
against grcss ground movement f
18,
! The Association as a California conservationist crganization i
i i
19 must know that all rock in this state is jointed and E
20 j
- fractured, E/ and that this jointing and fracturing has 21 ;
No I occurred over millions of years of geological history.
22 E one can-say that at some time in the geological future any 23 point on the earth's surface will not undergo fracturing cr 24 E Dr. Housner's letter of June 30, 1960, quoted in i
25 " shearing.
26 i i
s l'
27 s 11 / Tr. 169 at transcript page 376, i T/ Tr.1232 H Witness Worthington pointed out, i
28 j say in the that " virtually all of the rock you might This rock world is fractured to some degree or other.
29 :
fj at Bodega Head is fractured. However, it is a very stable material."
30 m i,
,f "I
4 e
4 4
i 4
t k.
_~.
q i
lpart at page 16 of the Petition, suggested that the site j
l' s-l 2
lshould not be used if there appeared even a small likelihood i-5
. _s i
3.Eof [ gross ground novement produced by rAultingl happening.
i ~
,! Additional information satisfied 3r. Housner with respect 4
E 5
j jtothisquestion. His 1961 report shows this, as follows:
x 6 [
"During the pcst several thousand years there rust have been many slippages a.long the adjacent 7 5 San Andreas fault zone so that this is a well-j established plane of weakness. There appet.rs to 8
i be no reason to expect that future slippage should i
i go through the stronger rock for=ation underlying 4
9 i
Bodega Head rather than to cor.tinue to be concen-j g l trated along the weaker San Andreas fault cone."Ihf s
)
4 An allegation which is repeated several times in i,
11 e
I 12 l slightly varying forms is that PGandE has not kept ita is j
13 f: consultants informed and, therefore, that their recoc:menda-l tions are not meaningful. At page 23, the Petition reads:
l
'4 e,
l 15 j "Dr. Housner pro: ceded to design a ft.cility in accordance u
16 dwith the abandoned Scheme VII. Exhibit 48 shows no active -
17 effort by Applicant to disabuse Dr. Housner of this error."
18 l Again at page 42, the Association sanctions a statement that 1
l"certain language in the correspondence from Dr. Housner 19 20 'j in Exhibit 48 leads the authors of this Memorandum to be i
~
21 h strongly dubious of the information Applicant may have
'2
~
n i
iforwarded to Dr. Housner." At page 43, it in implied that 23
] though the February 2,1962-Dames !.: Moore Report was
{
24
~
forwarded to Housner, the April 30, 1962 Report was not.
25 j
The Association's attention is directed to Tab 18 of
~
l 26 l Exhibit 48, a letter by which the latter Report was forwarded i
' 27 to Dr. Tocher. The letter indicates 'che sending of a copy of j
28
.s 29 } W Tab 12, Ex. 48, p.4 i
30 !
i l
0 4
4 8
i G
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1 1
1 E
i g'
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^
1 - that Report to Dr. Housner. As noted by. the Association, i
l 4
i 2 j the Report gives an accurate description of depth of rcck-3 j at the plant site and includes a plot plan depicting the l plant $nitsfinallocation. Tab 23 of Exhibit 48, a-letter 4
=
jdirectedtoMr.Worthington,containsDr.Housner'sacknowl-1 0
j 3
6 l edgement of receipt and exam 1 nation of the Dames h Moore j
I
{
l2 Report.
l l
It should also oe mentioned that Dr. Housner did not 8
i.
i.
design a facility. He provided design criterds which.have 9
a fbeenincorporatedinthedesignpreparedbyPGandE.
With 10 i
- respect to the new information providcd in the Report, 11 l
12 Housner said:
"The estimated intensity of the shaking of the i
,O of the over-j underlying rock is not affected by the depti?
lying alluvium so that the design recommendations set forth 4
f in my report of January,1961 are still applicable."15/
15 4
6 l
l S.
Rock quality is treated at ]ength in t.he Petition.
{'
fAtpage23,theAssociationstatesitsaimto"showthat(1)
I 18 E the foundation for the reactor is not solid rock.
i 19 i
PGandE Witness Worthington testified that the reactor 4
~O j foundation would be on solid rock.16/ That statemer,'
which l
E 21 l
lwas repeated by the Commission at page 4 of its decision, 22 j.
!wasandremainscorrect, It is consistent with Mr.
'3 e
}
lWorthington's letter of February 27, 2 962. directed to i
24 i
l g Dr. Housner, quoted in part at page 25 of the Petition,in =
1 25 :j which he wrote that "the qua?ity of the rock ia inferior to i
26 Ej our original assumption of ' solid rock.1 Actually, the t
I.
27 5
!sranite rock is highly weathered at the earth-rock contact i
5
'g n
!ana is highly Jointed at lower elevations."-
29 E l
jlj/ Letter of June 27, 19o2 from George W. Housner to 30 :
J. D. Worthington at p. 1 y16/ Tr. 363 i
s 3
?
l 9
s i
I i
l t
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._,.. _ _.. _.... ~..., _ _,.,.......,.. _. _..,, _.
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3 1
I i
8 5
i 5
r 1 j Mr. Worthingten by this letter a s expressing the l
- j Company's disappointment that,' with the reactor location 2
}
)
3 j contemplated at that time, its original assumptions of rock f depth and quality at the point of the earth-rock contact i-4 l
5 !! were incorrect. It followed investigations by Dames 8: Moore s
6 l which had established that the solid rock at that point was i
e 7 ! at a lower elevation and was actually more sheared and s
j j jointed than was expected. As can be seen from the letter, B
hwhichinTab15ofExhibit48,Worthingtonwantedtomake 9
1 10 clear to Dr. Housner that rock location and quality were not
}
11 the same as previously. assumed in order to permit him to i
12 j decide whether the new information affected his recommenda-s 13 l;tions. Worthington was not, as implied by the Association, i
14 i indicating that the rock encountered was not solid. As in 15 clearly reflected in his testimony reproduced below, sheared 16 and jointed rock is ccmmonly described as solid. Worthington 17 j answered questions on the subject in the following exchanget 0 h "Q.
As you find (rock) in its natural site (sic),
s I
19 l 1s it fractured at all? - Does it contain significant planes of cicavage or other i
characteristics of that sort?
20 s
A.
Well, virtually all of the rock you might say in the world is fractured to some degree or 21 other. This rock at Bodega Head is fractured, j
However, it is a very stable material.
22 Q.
I mean, your statement that it is a thoroughly suitable basis for foundation, that would apply?
,3'3 i
A.
_Well, it is far better material than any 5
conventional steam plant that we have, it being 24 solid rock it is an excellent foundation material,,13 t
a 25 -
In order to take advantage of better quality solid rock, i
26 l the isactor location was subsequently changed. Plates-3 and 1
+
27 j 4 of the April 30, 1962 report 1_S/ reflect the location of 28 l the reactor in solid quartz diorite rock. The log of.
j 4-29 s jl7 ' Tr. 37o i jl5 Tab 17, Ex. 48 30 t
3 e
10 l
3 f
e
__,,,m,,_._,.
I 5;
ii
) borin516 also included in that Report describes the quality i
1 4
E 2 5 of that rock. The Association quotes a fragment of this 3
j 3
j i descriptien which pertains only to rock near the top of the i
i 4
3 l granite for:Stien and then Ieaches an incorrect conclusien 1.
5 with respect to the quality of that rock. It omits the 6
description of rock near the base of the boring and at the l foundation cf *he reactor, which is 7
i 8 l
"(Grading into blocks up to 3')
[
(T16ht j0ints) (Few, if any, shear zones)"
9 f
f 6.
At pge 23 of the Petition, the Association's other 10 11 l aim -- to show that "(2) what passes for rock at' Bodega Head E
l 12 l1s much deeper than Applicantis testimony has led the i
a 13 j Commission to believe"-- is expressed.
~
The most obvious 14 answer is that Exhibit 48 was provided to the Commission.
1 15. Aside from the rames f.: Moore Report at Tab 17 which clearly 16 1
~ shows rock depth, Exhibit 48 containa several letters l; mentioning the subject. At page 32, the Petition quotes 17 18 Dr. Tocher's hne 10, 1962 letter to Mr. Worthington H/
f f noting that bedroc;; was found to occur at a depth greater 4
19 h than originally anticipated.
f 20-The Petition does not reveal 4
21 j Dr. Housner's comments on this Ictter. Tab 23 of Exhibit 48, l
22 3 however, does contain his coments in a June 27, 1962 letter 4
20 l to Worthingten. It reads, in part, as follows:
24..
"(N}ow the alluvium is approximately twice as i
deep as was originally expected. The problem 2e j
is as fellows. The base of the reactor building will move with the rock in which it is imbedded.
{
26 l This base motion will excite the reactor building 3
into vibrations. The bottem of the -alluvial-27.
layer will also move with the underlying rocx, and hence this layer will also be excited into 28
{-
j vibratiens. If the alluvial layer were very sof t 4
29.?
2 30 j [9] Tab 21, Ex. 48 i
E a
11 t
a E
1 E
i I
E 1
0 "so as to have larger motions than the upper 5
portion of the reactor building, it would press j
1 If - the alluvium i
against the reactor building.is sufficiently firm it will move less than the 2 i upper portion of the reactor building and, inthis case, it will promote later
-3 I think that the soil the reactor building.
will be stiffer than the reactor building.
4 )
Accordingly, I expect that the soil will move i
less than the reactor building."
5 ;
i s
6 i The statement was made several times by PGandE witnesses 4
5 7
- Again,
" that the " plant" will be located on a rock base.
~
8 i there is an allegation of an attempt to mislead because the I
9 A subject of l
- urbine Eenerator will not be founded on rock.
10 j
f primary interest to the Commission was the safety of a i
11 That plant would be safe if located f
12 5 nuclear-fueled plant.
What will make the plant at Bodega 13 jen a good foundation.
! Head safe is the presence of a solid rock foundation for the 14 The expressions embodying the term " plant" were 4
2 15 jreactor.
f j intended to convey the fact of safety because of the 16 i
'i presence of this rock foundation.
E 1
1 "'
Witness Worthington, having been asked whether PGandE 10 exhibits in the prc0 ceding showed final location and-design, E
l j cade the point when he said:
I
^O which are under consideration 2
"The designs
^1 5
right at the mcment are differc.nt than are shown 4
on this equipment location section.
]
22 ;
1 g
"Now, that doesn't necessarily mean that the designs that are under consideration now wenit be changed, because we are constantly set. king l
24 ways to improve the economy or this project, j
And the one thing that will not change is the factthat we are foundin j
25 1!
rock and surrounding it with very heavy concrete 3
26 structures."20/
j 27
~
28 i.
.g i
i so 'i 2_of Tr, 333 i
12
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11 i
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I 4
'j j
r 2-e l'
I.
- i. -
P0andE's consultants were in all cases kept informed-as n
1 i d the j to the planned location of the turbine generator an c
j 2
j h nature of foundation material.. As noted elsewhere, the f'
3 Dames & Moore Report +ms promptly forwarded l
1-E I
4 5 April 30,1962 n.
5 [tothem.21/
The Petition, commencing at page 38, suggests that 6 l 7.
)
j FGandE has provided the AE0 with fragmentary, outdated and I
7 l
What were forwarded to that Ccmmission 4
f B lalteredinformation.
? are the basic reports of the Company's consultanta upon i -
9
?
l wnich centinuing reliance is placed.
10 i
11 Dr. Housner's report of January, 1961 23/ was included 3
]
furnished the AEC.
in the Preliminary Hazards Summary Report _
a 12 5, 1962 23/ and June 27, 1962 21/
l Housner's letters of March 13 Their essence is that new information 3
14 were not included.
did not create a need to change the des.ign recommendations 4
16 j
included in his 1961 Report.21/ Contrary to tr.a Associ--
10 j
j atien's claim at. page 39, -therefore, Exnibit 48. shows the i
17 5 continuing reliance placed en Housner's Report.
10 f
g 14, 1960 26/
l 19 l The Tocher and quaide Report of Ser ' ember 20 h also was sent to the AEC in its entirety. - The allegations l
l at paSe 43 of the Petition of unexplained alteration to the i
21 l
In l conclusions _of that Report are therefore astonishing.
5.
22 l --
addition to the summary of those conclusions contained in the 23
- body of the Preliminary Hazards Summary Report, the text of 24 the Report itself is referred to in that summary and in-3 25 f-2 l cluded as an appendix.
26 27 I'
j j21' See text at pp. 8-9, supra _
3 i
j -22/ Tab 12, Ex. 48 20 i
Tab 16, Ex. 48 29 Tab 23, Ex. h8 See text preceding f.n.
30 Tab 8, Ex. 48 l
+
b 13 i.
2 i
i i
]
l' i'
1 i
I 3
1 initially 1 !
That which was included in Exhibit 48 but not
! forwarded to the AEC is in-the nature of substantiation of 2
9 3
the conclusions of PGandE's consultants. Its'presenec in l
i
}. the Exhibit established it as a matter of public record and i
4
- . rendered illogical any charge of an attempt to deceive.
5 6 j 8.
Finally, the argument is advanced that P0andE is E
!j being forced by extraneous presst.res to proceed with its 7
plans at E*odega Head "despite Gre.ve reservations from his l
8 te which 9 j own consultants " A few quotations from Exhibit f
j must have been read only celectiva.ly by the Association in 10 l
preparing its Petition, are sufficient to dispel this 11 j
f 12 misapprehension, Tab 15 is Mr. Worthington's February 27, 1962 letter to 13
- f.
"Recent exploratory work on the 14 Dr. Housner, He wrote:
j f power plant site has disclosed new infomation on the 15 i geology and rock characteristics. This new riata is outlined 4
4 3
16 t
.. If any of your j below for your information and coment.
17 l
y earlier recernendations for seismic treatnent require 18 i
19 5 j revision, please let us know..
l Tab 16 is Heusner's answe..
He stated:
"The new i
"O
. information on the soil and rock is not.sufficiently 21
. different from the old to warrant a change in my recormenda.
n>
i E
23 tions on earthquake resistant-design."
Tab 13, a letter to Dr. Tocher with a copy to d
1 24 E Dr. Housner dated May 15, 1962, forwarded the last Dames &
25 !
l 5
"Would this new information in any 26 lMooreReportandasked:
l-
'g way revise the opinions expressed in your report of 27 '
(
i September 14, 1960, and. consequently your answers to the 28 5 questions posed by Mr. George Housner?"
29 5 j
i Tab 23 is Housner's answer to Tocher8 s coments.
l 30 e
1 14 2
t 4
m.___
j i
}
build.
I the added imtedment of the reactor
!s.
cially severe problem."
1 ;:* He noted that ".
J 2_ l ing in the scil does not pose any espe J.-
- 4 V
5 Exhibit 48, i
v j
13 l P0andE felt some reluctance in presenting alle6ed at page 5 of the-Petition, l
4 ?
j 5 but not for the reasons
! It was concerned that mitinterpretation by persons without
)
l-5 i
As demon-
! sufficient background'in the field would result.
f 6
urred. Less i strated above, such misinterpretation has occ 7
l-3 i ns of the-3-
h predictable was the manner in which the predisposit o 8
F E
view and its choice of-9 E Association have influenced its re 5
A good e
) fragmentary quotations to reach the desired end.
i 10 dlthe Associatien i
faith review of Exhibit 48 could have prepare 11 u
sses before the 3
- to ask mesningful questions of P3andE witneThe review under 12 l
n i
13 Atomic Energy Comission.
% e scument which cannot even properly be considered by this 14 2
lCommissionandwhichisfilledwithdistortionand. i i
15 e
y respectfully l
16 WHEREFORE, Pacific Gas and Electric Compan E
to Reopen for I
17 i
. urgos that the Comist. ion deny the " Petit on l
p:
18 Fv.rther Hearing" on file in this proceeding.
l 6
day of Dated at San Francisco,. California, this 1 th i
19 20 0 l
E I
21 lMay,1963 Reapectfully submitted, j
22 h i
F. T. SEARLS 23 u
U 24 '
JOHN C. MORRISSEY E
i 25 i PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.
1 26 i
27 i LELAND R. SELNA, JR.
5,.
s'
~ 28 Attorneys for
{
g Facific Gas and Electric-Company 29 5
-245 Market street-j-
g San Francisco 6, California 30 15 l
i i;
i P
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4 i
i-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE i
i l
I hereby certify that I have this day served the I
foreEoing document upon all parties of record in this pro-i ceeding by mailing by first-class mail.a copy thereof a
l-properly addressed to each such party, a
Dated at San Francisco, California, this 16th day J
i of May, 1963.
r i
i LELAND R. SELNA, JR.
i a!
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m hp $
nr. 4. B. satimma'
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1h 1A5 mill mesa
/
/ v-anchaler, onlisernia aner nr. ast1==a=:
Tais is in reply to your letter of Augees 80,' 1s6e.
I as smalasias here-with a oesy of Part 9 et tae hi== sam's regalatians "Peits asserde" whiek I halieve should easwer year ingniry ammaaraing assess to n===imaion deooments.
All "ymblic records", as estimes is hrt 9, are available for laspeettaa at the Commission's Publia Decament Room,1717 5 Street, N.W.,
innehington, D. C.
Omrtain of these d=======*=, senh as the Smaards Analysis proyared by the Ceemission's kivisism of Moensing and Regalattaa est the Boerlag Boeminer's Initial Beeistems ero evailable for 41stributian to members et the publis without sharge, while othere, seek as appl 1mations sat other h a f11a4 by appliese6s er parties to a pseeeeding, trans-aripte of hearines, ama exhibita reeeives is erlassee in such heariass will be ante available at a eherse of 35 eente per pass. Alas emelmeet is a copy; et het i et the ca==tamien's regslattene " Bales of Prestine" relat.
Las te ser hearias prese4 ares.
In aseestaans eith your espressed intmeest in the m=halat Der aneility of Positie Ons b 33astr14 Ceepesy, I en amala==ing a eew of the Beameds Aanlyste prepared by the a===tamiam's 31risian of Lamenstag and Segalattaa oemeerstag Desifie Gas & Elastrie Geepney's esp 11estima for a previsiemm1 eposeting liaanse ser the tsabelet Bay reester. Attenhet to thia Eneards Aanlysis are all Seer of the reports et the Aertaery Osmanittee en Someter ansapeerds commersing this pre $est.- As yea any know, aneifie tas &
Elastrie Compear's applientions ser a esmetreettaa permit ame for a pre-visiemal operating 11eense for the shambalat Say remeter sure each the sub-joet of ee$easive public hearings in thish all safety aspecta of the reester, implesir;; the pressure svppressian centainment system, were caaw-fully eemsteered. The entire 11eense applicatima and related 1 7f "-
emoe esmeeraias the Sanheldt Bay project any be taspected at the Goemis-sion's Pthlie Boeuseet Bees. You will prehably alas he able to obtala access 'to anay of those sociassets by r Mi=- the Office of Atomie Ehergy Development and mediation (Jtate of Califersia), Joeremosto 1A, California.
The an=mtssion has not as yet received an applicaties from Pacific Gas &
Elaetric Ceepaar far its proposed facility at Be6ega Atemic Park and, accer.1a.1,, se are not a e of tas smiss of ~
->. _ ar, pugg
i i
i f-l 6
h Mr. J. B. Set M r
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the Ataff has 41eeeeems %s genomi features of the proposed Bodegn i
j router with mairie oss a nostrie omessy. _ xaties, ama it is ear unterxtenting that the Osopeer proposes to use the pressere j
soggegesian asetai==a-k erstem in this reester.
3 I an also leatag hasseith ospied et part 100 of the Geomission's regulatiesa *Soester site criteria". Part.100 as erM4-11y,s;,;x M IS61, W M that "no and publinked SW eemment em Pehrsary 11,4 to 1/2 mile ires the surface l
fasilityshouldbeleestedslaaertaar.1/
loesties of a kasus active eartagenho fanit".
In %e r C tions as l
adoptet, the minimam distaase uma emances to 1/b aile is ersx to elimi-nate es ambiguity in the regulation as er! & =11y,.,x d.
l f
yer your further interanties the public hearing on the Euseholdt Bay reacter isse held en July 1;, 1968, sa6 the hearing esaminer's Initial i
Decision senharisias issuanes of a prwieteeml operatias 11aense was l
published on Aegiost 17, 1964. Weder the h 4==ama's rules, the hear-i ing esaminer's laisial Dosision beoems imostistely effective and will heems the final desisica et he ca==i==1em en Osteher 2, 1968, unless l
i modified or reversed by the Commissin prior te that time.
Aeoordin& y, l
suhJect te any action the Commissima any take hetere esteher 2, tne previsimmel aparatlag Itan=ma was issend is mooerdamme with the heer-
~
in ; amamient's decision em Angest BS,1964.
Iem will mete that your l
e latter to me of August 23 asking ter the sealeses inferienties aos your l
1etter of Aagnet 31 to the Cousiesian sogeesting interventies in me ama.1At Bay sees beta eene after the hearing aa4 after the time l
allseed Car Laterventien as prwides in the Geoniastem's Emlee of i
Freetioe.. Tom any espect that the h*=ata= will rule w your i
regneet fer intervention in the amar febere amt ta ao event later I
e nn eetoner 2, 1968.
l 31aserely yours, i
l H L FEE i
Enreld 1,. Price i
Direeeer of Segalation-YI ft b t C. h A I L.
t Eneiangres3 I
As stated above
Z
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UY 7 STATES GOVERNMENT i
Memorandum
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10 Files DATE: ~ May 22, 1963 '
~.. _ _. _ -
7 FROM R. H. B ief J.
Researc r Reactor Safety Branch 4
A Division of Licensing & Regulation t-sesjtcr: MEETING OF CONSULTANTS ON PG&T BOCEGA, DOCKET No. 50-205 n
'.A f
On May 17,1963 a meeting was held at the University of Illinois with the various consultants to the Regulatory Staff s
on the Bcdega I:ay reactor.
The followind persons attended:
s
[
Al Clebsch, U. S. Geological Survey Frank Neumann. Seismologist cj Nathan New ark, University o* Illinois j
Mr. Robert Willismson, "olme s and Narver Troy B. Ccnner, Jr., On ica of the General Counsel, AEC
~
4 Gerald F. Eadlock, Office ;f the General Counsel, AEC 2
Jchn I. Newll, Divisior
,f Licensing & Regulation, AEC l
{
Robert H. Bryan, Division of Licensing & Regulation, AEC o
]h The Atemic znergy Commission starf outlinea the regulatory process for this particular plant and indicated the tentative I,
,' A schedule. The consultants were requested to present preliminary 1
,0 h drafts of their reports by &y 27, and vere asked to meet in Washington, D. C. cn that date.
Dr. Newmark stated that it ws 7 s v] j impessible for him to keep that schedule.
It was therefore agreed that all preliminary drafts would be submitted by May 31
.,,, c and if a meeting were held in Washington, it vould be on _ June 12 J 7d W at the earliest. The attached outline of work was distributed h
for cccments and discussion.
Dr. Newmark and Mr. Williamson 3
j were asked to collaborate in writing a cingle report.
3
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Messrs. Clebsch, Neumann and Williamson proceeded in turn to make comments on the studies they had made.
There was con-dN ciderable discussion on the question of appropriate assumptions
/
y 'l concerning eartaquake intensity and ground motion and.on the
- j 1p/
application of design criteria to various features of the PG&E i
plant. The followin6 are the points of ma,$or significance at 3 kh-this time:
1.
Geologists should centinually (every two or three days) survey the excavation now in progress for indications of faulting in the sedimentary layers.
A large amount
s-1 4
2-cf excavation work has already been done and erosion cf the cut faces makes it difficult to detemine whether er not faulting is evident.
Mr. Clebsch is having a j
carbon 1h analysic made to detemine the age of wood found in the sediments.
{
2.
The fractured bedrock indicates that, at some time !.n l
the past, a large amount of minor faulting has occurred-so as to cause horizontal relative displacements up to tens of feet.
Vertical displacements of a fev feet are indicated by escarpments.
A plant cannot be designed to-i vithstand relative pemanent displacements under the plant.
3 Dr. Newmark eppeared to be in remarkable a6reement with Mr. Neumann's ccmments, which he made in an earlier meeting in Washington, to the effect that the plant should be designed to higher maximum ground accelera-tion (probably 0.5g).
Dr. Newmark appeared to be con-l vinced that a nuclear plant could be designed to vithstand the vibrations caused by any earthquake.
4 4
Even though suitable design criteria might be devised to protect against earthquake damage from vibrations,.
there are few mechanical engineers who are competent l
to take earthquake motion into account in the design of piping and other mechanical equipment; co.versely structural engineers who are familiar with earthquake 4
effects do not generally design mechanical systems..
Mr. Williamson in particular believed that the applica-tion cf special design criteria to important mechanical features should be carefully reviewed in detail.
Dr. Newmark agreed with Mr. Williamson and, in addition.
raised the question as to whether the applicant might have techn?cally qualified personnel who were capable of handling design problems of this' nature.
5.
It was suggested that sources of water for ettergency cooling purposes-should be located so that shifting of the earth would not cut off the supply of water to the
-reactor and emergency condenser.
It was suggested that greater storage capacity of cooling vater which could be fed by gravity should be located in une refueling building.
There was also some concern that the head might rotate sufficiently to lift the inlet of the condenser cooling canal cut of the water.
- L-
. The :ensultants asked that the following infor=ation be cbtained froc PG&E:
1.
Fcr what permanent relative linear displacements and rotations is the plant to be designed? State the relt.tive displacements which would be tolerable:
a.
Under the reactor building.
b.
Between the reactor building and the turbine generater structure, c.
Between various portions of the cendenser eccling water system.
2.
What grcund motions are to be used for dynamic design?
Specificany, state the ground motion spectra of maximum accelerat,an, velocity, and displacement. State prt isely the design stress levels to be used in ecnnecticn with these ground motions.
3 What damping factors vill be applied to various typical -
structures and components?
cc:
R. Lovenstein E. G. Case J. Newell F. N. Watson i
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fb -/c)[
g Il W3 Ma Mr. Frank Netmann -
45k6 45th Avenue. N. 3 Seattle 5 Wahingten Dear Mr Ne'enann I This letter refers to Dr. Dryan's telephene discussiens with ycu en May 1 cencerning yerr avsilahtlity te perferm certain eenerlting services fer the Atemic Energy Conssission with regard to seismological censiders-tions involved in the propened bcdega Eay N elear power plant of tht "acific Gas & Electrie Coorpany. Wile the details incident to entering into a censulting contract with you have net leen completed and v121 re-quirw a few days the tires urgency invelved in this case makes it desirable that w pr-vide yet with the inrcrmation described belev This letter contains infermatirn eencerning the arrected schedule of Cemission action en the app'iention and the partiev'r,r technical prebiese te which we voeld like yet te addmss yourself. We art hcpeful that this intensation vi'l be helpful to you.
In accordance with Dr. Bryan's telephone eenversation with you on May 1, I se enclosing a copy of the Preliminary Hasants Sunenary Report for Pacific Gas & Electric Ceespany's Bodega reacter and Amendment No. 1 and Amendment No. 2 thente. The first of these deetmenta is the principle serree of infonnation presented by the applicant concerning the geology of the pro-posed reactor site and the effects of earthquakes on the reactor plant.
The two amendments contain answers to grr ations which the Regd atery Staff of the Consnission had presented to the ag.licant.
The folleving pertiens of the three dee monts contain partier.lar infer:na-tien M1 sting t-the earthqrake problemt a.
Hasan$s Sumary Report:
Sect V Plant Site and Environment (pages V 6 9).
App IV Report on Earthquake Hazards at the Bcdega Bay Pcwer Plant Site.
App. V Earthquake Hasards and Earthquake Resistant h
Design Bodega Bay Pever Plant Site.
j m
s i
i F mnk Neumann 2
b.
Asendment No.1 bestion 2k bestion 24
%mstion k3 Question 45 c.
keendwnt Ne. 2 Oestion 21 Qoestion 22 I era also enclosing a copy of a letter frm the Cosenissien's Advisory Cr..mittee en Beacter Safegtar11e en the Bodega plant.
The brced question which the Ceamission mvst consider with mopect to earthquakes is whether in view of the prcpesed~ design and the geology and seimmtetty et the site there is Masonable ass' rance that a nuclear pcwor plant of the type preprsed can be but't and cperated wi+hent undee rish to the heal th and safety of the pubite. We have resolved this general questien into twr parts fer further considerutient 1
An assessment based upon factual data and the best available l
technical, judgment as to (a)-the existence of faults under the plant itself which eculd-result in significant Wative displacement at the earth surface and (b) the nature cf the i
seismic cetivity which should be taken into eensiderstion in plant design.
2.
A determination of nasonable cri.teria which shmnd be applied to the desi account (a)gu of plant structures and co'npenents to take into the dynamic respensa of these struct ns and components te seismit disturbances and (b) the effects et surface displacements en the plant We would like you te consider problem '. above in particu]ar; hnwaver we would like yeu to fM ely ermment on'the overall question te the extent that you consider appropriate.
A public hearing en the appiteation vi'l be held 'in Santa Rosa Califernia-
. setse 20 miles from the site rf the prepcsed reactor, beginning en June 25 Since the n has been censiderable pubite in*4 m st in California in this case. the bearing may last as lens as two weeks.
In order te adegrately prepan for the hearing and te prepare the Atomic Energy Comission Regulatery StaiT's hasards analysis wh.ch taust be Isse.ed 20 days prior to the hearing it seems advisable to,nu tentatively on discussing.
the case with yeu at Atomic Energy Cott-nssion Headquartare no later than by O.
% supeet to have a Strecturalllngineering consultant from the
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I Frank Reumann San Frenetsee area present at the sees time.
thoroughly discuss the technical problems related to safetAt this meet seme conclusions with regard to the earthquake prcblemy and to reneh folleging the ameting we would expect to receive a repo t
.Within % wek yeer enmeents and conehetens.
r setting forth
^a Since the time fer eensiderstiets of the technical proble discussien prier to our meeting with yev.please eenteet us ms is shcrt You will receive further information frna our Administrat a few days concerning the wquirements to be fulfilled incident to b ranch in eensulting sentreet.
%r will s.lso send you tickets er Govwrnment Tmneportation Regvests necessary fer year travel Sincerely yo. cts (s enen Iber R. P i:2, A*:i: tut Director Division of Ll:enting and RogAtid Et,er R. Price Assistant Director Division of Licensing and Regulation Enclosurest k As stated above Distribution E. R. Price E. G. Case Suppl.
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p ti. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMISSION
.D,,IVISION OF LICENSING AND REGULATION l
REFCRT 70 THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACMR SAFEGUARDS SE BODFCA BAY ATOMIC FARK - UNIT NUMBER 4
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Note by Director of Licensing and Regulation The attached report has been prepared b;' 'e rean Watson, John Newell, Donald Knuth and other members of the Divis*.un of Licensing and Regulation for consideration by the Advisory Consmittee on Reactor Safeguards at its April 1963 meeting.
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Introduction l
By application dated December 28, 1962, the Pacific Gas and 4
Electric Company requested Commission approval te construct and operate i
a nuclear power plant at Bodega Bay, California. The Company's financial qualifications were set forth in Exhibits A and B of the 1
application and a preliminary hazards sununary report was submitted
~
as Exhibit C.
Additional technical information was submitted, at our request, by letter from Pacific Gas and Electric Company date.d March 4, l
I 1963.
The proposed plant is to have a gross electrical generating j
capacity of approximately 325,000 kilowatts to be produced by a l
single turbo-electric generator. The power sour:e is to be a single i
nuclear reactor of the single-cycle, forced-circulation boiling water i
type having a rating of 1,008 megawatts, thermal. Pacific Cas and I
C1cctric Company will design and supervise construction of the unit; the General Electric Company will furnish the nu: lear steam supply i
system and the turbine-generator, and will serve as nuclear consultant to the applicant.
This report is based on our review of the documents listed above and the information obtained in the various meetings with Pacific Gas and Elcetric and General Electric personnel, i
l 11.
Site Bodega Bay is on the coast in Sonoma County, California, approximately 50 miles northwest of San Francisco. The Bay is formed by a hook of land known as Bodega Head on the north and west and by a sandspit called Doran Park on the south. The reactor will be located on a 225 acre tract at
.~
5 t
2-the southern end of Bodega Head.
From this location, the distance to the nearest point on the northern boundary of the property is 2700 feet.
Beyond this boundary, there is an area of approximately 320 acres which is being acquired by the University of California for use as a field station for marine biology and other scientific studies. The nearest residence is ap).roximately 1-1/2 miles from the site. The shortest distance from the reactor site to Bodega Bay shoreline is approximately 750 feet from the proposed reactor site to the centerline of the entrance channel to ^* Bay and 1300 feet across the channel to Doran Park. This park is c-ora nj m
sty and will contain no residences. The nearest vik sg {
w,i y Li.-/ (population of 350) located approximately two miles north n>rtheast of the reactor site. The total population within five miles is only 500 and within 25 miles is only 114,000.
Hence, from the standpoint of population density _and distribution, this site is considered to be suitable for a reactor of the general type, anc power level proposed.
Geology and Seismology The two outstanding geographical features of the site area are the San Andreas Fault zone immediately to the east, and the two rocky hills each over 200 feet high which make up Bodega !!ead. The reactor will be located between these hills approximately 1000 feet from the vestern limit of the fault zone. The 1.5 mile vide fault rone extends eastward from the site to the mainland, and has reduced the northern portion of Bodega Head to crushed rock and sand dunes due to extensive movement over the past few thousand years.
_ _ _ _____ __ __ ___ _ ___ u
q 3
The hills of Bodega Head consist of quartz-diorite rock cavered by a shallow layer of sands and silts. The quartz-diorite formation is reported to be extensively fractured due to earthquake action, and evidence of old minor f aults in the formation is reported.
With respect to minor faults, the application states "no active f aulting exists on Bodega Head and particularly under the power plant site." The applicant amplified this statement during a meeting with the subcommittee and the staff on March 20th by stating that no faults have been located under the proposed location of the reactor power plant structures as a result of evaluations of several borings at the plant site. The applicant has described the geologie nature of the foundation materials (the fractured quartz-diorite) and has concluded that structures can be adequately anchored into this rock material and designed to withstand earthquake accelerations amounting to 0.3 of the acceleration of gravity (0.3G) unless a formation failure (faulting) occurs under the plant.
The staff believes that the applicant is aware of the safety and design problems associated with earthquakes, and is proceeding with the development of an adequate design based upon the predicted earthquake loadings. It should be recognized that acceptance of this site would imply agreement that the like-lihood of the occurrence of an tarthquake which would cause faulting _ under the structures and, consequently, possible failure of the engineered safety components of the reactor facility is acceptably small. The applicant claims that slippage is more likely to occur in existing faults and that development of new faults would not be expected to occur.
i l
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i 4
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f f
The staf f does not know of any basis for disagreement with the 1
i applicant's assertions as to the existence or likelihood of develop-i j
ment of faults. We believe, however, that further information should 1
be developed on the existence of faults under the site through J
explorations made in the course of excavation. This information will i
8 1
[
be reviewed to determine whether or not the assumption that no such faults 1
exist is factual; and if-evidence of faults is found, the basis for \\'
approval will be re-examined.
f i
3 Oceanography and Marine BioloEY f
The applicant proposes to withdraw approximately 250,000 gpa of i
cooling water from the bay side of the head which would be discharged 3 i
to the ocean on the ocean side of the head with an 18 degree F. rise I
i in temperature when the plant is operated at rated. load. Radioactive i
j' liquid wastes released from the proposed plant would be diluted in this ;
cooling water before discharge to the ocean, so that concentrations -
of radioactivity in the cooling water discharge will not exceed those allowed by 10 CrR, part 20.
I The applicant has stated in the Hazards Sununary Report and in subsequent discussions, that the effects of temperature on the marine life has been studied at Coastal power plant locations in cooperation with the California State Fish and Game Department', and that no 4 '~
deleterious effects have been detected. The applicant will continue 5
cooperation with the State authorities in such studies, and, in-l i
j-addition, has contracted with Humboldt State College for a study of l
the ecology of the marine life in the vicinity and a' study of the 4
j diffusion characteristics of the local ocean water.
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t The staff believes that the applicant has shown an adequate l
appreciation of the problems associated with the management of liquid wastes from the proposed facility and sees no reason why an adequate 4
I design cannot be developed in this regard. As will be discussed in a subsequent section of this report, the possibilities of reconcentra-
.i tion of radioactivity are also being considered by Pacific Gas and 4
j Electric.
Heteorology The meteorology of the Bodega area is not expected to be a great deal different than that observed elsewhere along the northern l
California Coast. The diffusion climatology of the site is expected to be somewhat similar to that at Humboldt, and we, therefore, feel I
that the diffusion parameters selected by the applicant are suitable 4
for the purpose of scoping the design of the gaseous vaste management system. The applicant has initiated a program to collect meteorological i
information at the site which should be useful as a basis for estimating
+
operational release limits for gaseous radioactivity.
i III. Containment The containment system proposed for this facility is one which depends upor the pressure suppression concept. Its design is similar i
in many respects to that used at Humboldt Bay. Significant features of l
the Bodega Bay Plant design include the following:
1.
Plans for the Bodega Bay Plant call for a dry well having a 60 f t.
diameter spherical lower section and a 26 f t. diameter cylindrical I
upper section.
s 6-3 2.
There vill be four reactor recirculation loops, each with a pump which along with the reactor vessel will be located within the dry well.
3.
The dry well will have an airlock entrance.
Personnel entry is not planned during reactor operation, but is contemplated with the reactor hot and pressurized.
4.
The suppression chamber will be in the form of a torus and will have a major diameter of 93 ft. and a cross section diameter of 26 ft.
Both the dry well and the suppression chamber will be designed and con-structed in accordance with the ASME Boiler 'nd Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII. Piping restraints will be provided at containment penetrations to assure that failure of the pipe will not cause con-tainment rupture. A concrete building will contain the dry well and suppression chamber. Pressure and leak rate specifiestions for those containment system components are as follows:
Component Desif.n Pressure Leak LateC% of volume in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)
Dry well 62 psig 0.5 (at design pressure)
Suppression chamber 35 psig 0.5 (at design pressure)
Refueling building 12 in. 11 0 100 (at 1/4 in. H O) 2 2
In order to proof test the Bodega Bay pressure suppression design, Pacific Gas and Electric is conducting a test program at its Moss Landing Power Plant. As in the Humboldt Bay case, the applicant has constructed a scale model of the system.
In the test for Bodega Bay
t i a single 24 inch diameter dry well to suppression chamber vent nozzle was used. Since the full size plant is to have 112 of these vent nozzles, this is a 1/112th size mockup of the containment design.
Tests were conducted with this mock-up to simulate various accident condition 6.
A flow comparable to 1/112th of the flow resulting from a complete circumferential break of one of the 28 in. recirculation lines (with flow out both sides of the break) was taken as the " maximum credible operating accident" (MCOA). Highest containment pressures observed in these tests were 52 psig in the dry well nd 30 psig in the suppression chamber.
These pressures were observed when the mock-up dry well was preheated to 2550 F and when the mock-up reactor vessel water was subcooled 350F. Tests at higher and lower dry well temperatures and at higher and lower reactor water subcooling yielded lower dry well and suppression chamber pressures.
In another test a break area 2.5 times that of the MCOA was l
simulated.
In this test the peak dry well pressure observed was 63 psig. Further Moss Landing tests are being conducted to determine whether baffles are needed in the suppression chamber.
As another significant containment design feature, Pacific Gas and l
Electric proposes that in a number of instances a single isolation valve will be installed at the containment vall in pipes or ducts i
penetrating the containment. The applicant states, however, that each l
such line will have two isolation valves, one of which is a rerotely operable process valve located elsewhere.
(The main steam line, for instance, has turbine stop and bypass valves.)
Lines which do not have remotely operable process valves will be provided with a second isolation valve.
l
O
$ The turbine stop valves will close in less than 1 second. The main steam isolation valve closing time has not been set, but is expected to be between 10 and 30 seconds. Main steam line isolation valves are to close on a manual signal or automatic.11y on the occurrence of any of the following:
1.
Low condenser vacuum 2.
Main steam line leak (in the pipe tunnel) 3.
Low-low reactor water level Although of minor concern at the construction permit stage, we feel that signals 1 and 3 above should also initiate, through a delay circuit, automatic turbine stop valve and turbine by-pass valve closure since these valves are to serve as back-up for the main steam line isolation valves.
We question the concept of having only one isolation valve in the main steam line since we believe it is credible that a main steam line rupture could occur between the containment wall and the turbine stop t
valves and concurrently a malfunction of the main steam line isolation valve could allow the escape of the water in the reactor vessel at the i
time of the break. If water thus boiled away were not replaced, an accident worse than the MCOA suggested by the arflicant would occur.
The operator will have available, however, a number of means for re-placing the water thus boiled away. These are provided by the I
following equipment:
1.
The feed water pump (only the auxiliary electrically driven pump)
4 9
2.
The high pressure core spray sysw (as presently conceived this system also depends on the auxiliary feedwater pump)
- 3..The low pressure core spray system We believe it incredible to assume that all these means of replacing water in the reactor vessel could fail at' the same time as a main steam line rupture outside the containment which occurs simultaneous with a main steam line isolation valve failure.
There is one important improvement to the refueling containment to be provided at Bodega BayL over tnat at Humboldt Bay. The Bodega Bay design is such that during refueling, the spent fuel storage pool will connect directly to the shield water above the reactor, thus permitting direct underwater transfer of fuel without the need for a transfer cask. In other respects, the refeeling building design will be similar-to the one at Humboldt Bay.
For a reactor of the type proposed the staff believes that the general containment scheme proposed is adequate. We believe, however, that more specific criteria for the design of the containment features than those proposed should be established as prerequisites to the con-struction permit in this case. These criteria involve containment testing, penetration design, and isolation. valving.
1.
The design should permit initial integral leak rate testing of the dry-well and suppression chamber-at their respective design pressure af ter the installation of all penetrations (includirg piping conduits, electrical conductors, and -
gasketing closures) and. subsequent periodic' testing at
.j
4 s,
suppression pool design pressure.
In the initial testing, the leakage rate of the containment system should be determined as a i
function of pressure up to full design pressure.
2.
The design of penetrations should takt into account, in addition to f
the pressure load, the loads or deformations imposed by thermal i
q expansion, impact of missiles, reactions of ruptured pipes, and j
disturbances incident to installation, maintenance or repair.
Penetrations should be shielded from missiles to the extent
{
practicable. All penetrations should be designed so as to allow frequent periodic leakage rate tests of the penetrations only E(including points of attachment to the containment shell), at full design pressure.
f 3.
All pipes and conduits which comuunicate with interior of the primary system or the containment system, and other piping (such as instrumentation and control piping) which cannot be adequately protected against accidental rupture, should contain i
double isolation valves. All valves performing the function of isolation valves should be provided with protection against materials in the system which might prevent proper closing and should be provided with reliable automatic and manual actuation features.
Isolation valving should be designed so as to permit periodic leakage rate tests. Appropriate closing times for 4
isolation valves should be determined on the basis of analyses of system ruptures which would release fission or activation products outside the dry well while the valves are not fully closed.
I
t
. IV.
Resetor The nuclear reactor for the proposed facility is to be a forced circulation boiling water reactor having four recirculation loops.
Principal reactor design data are tabulated in Table 1.
Design features having a bearing on the safety of the proposed plant, and worthy of special attention, are discussed below.
Fuel Element Desian The proposed fuel for the Bodega Bay reactor consists of 2.$1
- enriched UO2 fuel pellets contained within stainless steel tubing.
The Preliminary Hazards Summary Report indicated that this tubing would have a nominal thickness of 0.011 inches and would be able to.
withstand an exposure of 1$,000 MWD / TON. On the basis of present information, the staff is not convinced that the fuel, as proposed, can be irradiated for the exposures contempisted without gross fuel failures. However, information submitted subsequent to the submittal of the Preliminary Hazards Summary Report indicate this fuel design is a tantative selection, and that General Electric has a research and development program aimed at selecting the fuel design by early 1964.
Rest Transfer The criteria for the heat transfer burnout ratio for the Bodega Bsy reactor is General Electric's correlation as given in " Burnout Limit Curves for Boiling Water Reactors" by E. Janssen & S. Levy.
(APED 3892). This correlation is the one used as a basis for the -
Dresden and Big Rock Point reactors. The proposed minimum bernout -
r.,_,
__.______.___.2
_. - -.... - --. ~._-
.,_= - -. - -
4 5 ;
I ratio for the Bodegs Bay plant is 1.5.
Presently there is littis experience with fuel cperating at a calculated burnout ratio of l
this value; however, Big Rock Point is presently authorized to operate with a burnout ratio of 1.$.
Accordingly, operating experience should i
be available prior to the time of startup at Bodega. Also, the Bodega l
i Bay reactor is to have a number of in-core flux monitors which should l
contribute to the acceptability of operations at_ these burnout ratios. =
More information regarding the heat transfer calculations i
i performed by the applicant was requested. Specifically, we asked what power level would result ~ in a burnout ratio of 1.5 with the power
}
generation curves expected. The applicant indicated that detailed cal-i culations are not suf ficiently complete to answer this question. However, l
it was estimated that the power level corresponding to a minimum burnout 4
ratio of 1.5 would be in excess of 120% of rated power. Tne staff nas
]
calculated the minimum burnout ratio using the published peaking factors and assuming a cosine heat generation curve. The minimum i
ratio for the' hottest channel was calculated to be slightly less than 1.5 at 120. percent of rated power. This value is in agreement with the i
values estimated by the applicant.
Flow Stability i
~
Prelimisary calculations indicate that at rated conditions the steam volume fracticas are as follows:
3 Average Core Voids-371 i
Average Exit voids-58%
j 1
The General Electric Company is using an analog computer model to conduct plant dynamic studies. They believe studies made with this 1
. model will show that the plant can be designed to exhibit satisfactory dynamic performance. The staff knows of no operating experience that would confirm the acceptability of operating at void fractions this high. Further, we do not know whether or not calculated extrapolations to higher void fractions are valid. On the other hand, as in-the case-of our approval of the high void experiments at Dresden, we feel that with appropriate limitations on the stepwise approach to power and en the observed flux oscillations, the health and safety of the public will be protected. A consequence to the operator-and designer could be an inability to operate the plant at the intended full power level, but no safety problem is apparent.
Reactivity and Control The proposed reactor will have a cold, cleaa, uncontrolled k,gg of 1.27.
The k gg with all control rods in the reactor is calculated to e
be 0.97.
There are 145 control rods planned for the reactor; the combined worth of these rods is calculated to be 0.18.
The control material vill be boron carbide contained in 0.175 in. 0.D. stainless steel tubes. The drive mechanism used to position the control rods is described in the following section. Additional control is provided with 316 control curtains which will be semi-permanently located between selected fuel elements. ihe worth of these curtains is <,alculated to be 0.12.
The control certains will be constructed of 0.1% boron stainless steel.
Oral discussions with the applicant indicate some of these curtains will be removed at periodic intervals for reactivity control, and this will give an opportunity for an adequate surveillance program.
. _ _ - _.. ~ -
1 The reactor design also incorporates a liquid poison system that can be used to inject sodium pentaborate into the core in the i
l event complete shutdown cannot be achieved by use of the control rods.
The reactivity addition rate of the liquid poison syste.n is.005 per i
minute and its total reactivity worth is 0.20 when the reactor vessel The worth is much less when the reactor is open for is closed.
j j
refueling. Even though the time to inject the liquid poison is long, (on the order of minutes), the staff believes this rate will meet the l
objectives of the system.
l t
4 1
4 I
1 4
4 i
. -. - - -. -., =,.
t
. TAPLE 1 REAC7OR !E5I1!1 TATA 1.
Operating Conditions a.
Reactor power (Mwt) 1008 b.
Reactor pressure (psia) 1075 6
c.
Reactor steam flow (1b/hr)
L.17 x 10 d.
Reactor steam temperature (OF) 553 5 6
e.
Total core coolant flow (1b/hr) h3 5 x 10 2.
tesign pressure (psig) 1235 L.
Hydrostatic test prersure (psig) 1853 c.
Reactor vessel inside diameter (ft-in) 15-1 d.
Reactor vessel inside length (ft-in) 50-h e.
Approxinate vessel wall thickr.ess (inches) 6 f.
Base naterial, shell nlate S A -3C2B Carbon Steel g.
Clad material Type 33h Stainless Steel 3.
Core Description a.
!! umber of fuel assemblies 592 b.
!'oderator to fuel volume ratio 2.7 g,gpecrall length of fuel assenbly (inc^es) 150 d.
Circunscrittd core diameter (in:hes) 1h7 e.
'deight of fuel assembly (ib.)
350 4
. h.
Fuel Description Number of fuel rods per assembly L9 a.
b.
Puc1 nate-ial U02 Fuel enrichnent ($ U-235) 27 c.
d.
Weight of urar. lum in core (1b) 1h8,CCO Puel pellet diameter (inches) 0.h21 e.
g.
Cladding material Stainless Steel h.
Cladding thickness 0.011 1.
Fuel rod active length (inches) 125 5
Control Ibaerietion, a.
Number of novable control blades 1h5 b.
Shape of novable control blades Cruciform 30 in 0.175 in.
c.
Control material 3
0.D. Tubes d.
Tube and cover olate material 30h 5 ainless Steel Active length of control rods (inches) 12h i
l f.
Width of control rods (inches) 6 9h l
l g.
2hickness of control mds (inches) 0.312 1
h.
Number of control curtains 316 i
1.
Shapa of control curtains Flat Sheets i
- j. Control material 0.15 ioron Stainless Steel 4
125 k.
Length of control curtains (inches) l.
Width of c2.1 trol curtains (inches) 9 m.
Thickness of control curtains (inches) 0.10 i
l
4 f
4 17 -
i i
4 6.
resign Power Peakinc Factors i
a.
Gross (radial x axial) 2.h0 j
b.
Local 1 30 i
i c.
Overwwer 1.20 l
I d.
Total 3 75 i
Core Ecat Transfer i
a.
Power density (Kw/ liter) 33 b.
Linear I! cat ;eneration* - !!a::imun at 1008 bi (Kv/ft) 12 5 2
l c.
Average heat flux (PTU/hr -ft )
193,300 d.
Mininum burnout ratio 1.5 e.
Average exit c,uality ('!)
9.6 I
I
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l I
As estimated by the Staff 9
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. V.
Control Rod Drives The control rod drives to be used in the Bodega Bay plant are to
't be designed using the same basic concepts as have been employed in the drives in use at Dresden, Big Rock Point, Humboldt Bay and the SENN Plant in Italy.
Salient features of the deives include (1)
The rods scram upward; (2) Water is used as the hydraulic fluid; (3) Water from the hydraulic system can be applied to either side of a piston which is mechanically coupled to the control rod thus 4
providing for either upward or downward rod motion; (4) Only one rod may be moved at a time and it may be moved either continuously or in 6 inch steps; (5) Rod speed la controlled by orifices which regulate the flow of water away from the low pr gasure side of the piston; (6)
Reds are scrammed upward by applying pressurized water from eitter the reactor or from accumulators to the bottom side of the drive pistons and simultaneously relieving the volume above the top side of the pistons to the scram dump tank; (7) At 6 inch increments, unless i
held open by hydraulic pressure from the withdraw piping, collet fingers support the weight of the rod and the downward forces due to reactor pressure.
An assembly drawing of the drive mechanism is shown in Fig.111-13 and a P61 diagram of the system is shown in Fig.111-14 of Exhibit C l
of the application. A more detailed description of the drives and l
I hydraulic system is contained in the Final Hazards Summary Report for the Humboldt Bay Plant.
_.....~ _ _. _. _.. _ _ _ _ _ _.. _. _. _ _. _ - - _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _..... _. - _ _
t i
i !
4 i
Since drives similar to these have been used at other plants 4
i 3
an important part of our evaluation of these drives is based on
)
}
previous experience with these drives. This includes Dresd',
1 e xperience as well as initial Big Rock operations.
At Big Rock Point, there have been two occurrences of rod i
i
" drift-out".
In one of these, the cause was attributed to an in -
advertent release of domineralizer resins resulting in the collet fingers being jammed in the open position so that the. rod was free I
to drif t as influenced by the forces due to gravity and hydraulic i
pressure. In the second case it is believed that a hard particle l
became trapped between the collet piston and a sleeve which is j
located between the collet and the index tube. This again is believed to have caused the.ollet fingers to be jammed in the open position, f
thus permitting rod drift. The hard particle was never found.
It i
i should be, notet however, that in neither of these cases nor in any 1
other case has there been any apparent significant impairment of j
scram capability. Also, since the drif t rate was quite slow, f
(about 1 inch per minute) it is maintained by Big Rock personnel i
that at all times the operator had full control of the reactor.
i In discussions with General Electric it was revealed that the f
Bodega Bay drives will not include the sleeve which is believed to have been responsible for trapping of the hard particle in the r
Consumer's drive and the wedging of the particle between the sleeve and the collet. Also, it was stated that consideration is being -
i given to various modifications that will minimize the possibility i
i i
4 20 -
of foreign material accueulating in the rod drives.
The applicant has also indicated that functiemal and endurance tests will be made on the prototype Bodega mechanisms, but the detailed procedures for these tests-and the acceptability criteria have not been determined.
It is our present opinion that the-applicant's selection of centrol red drive design is acceptable from a safety standpotrc. On the other hand, if at the operating license stage experience with these drives has demonstrated that present operating difficulties become reactor safety 4 problems, substitution of an alternative drive mechanisa may' be required.
Discussions of the possible consequences of a red dropout accident involving a single. rod is discussed elsewhere.in this report under Accident 4
Evaluations. It is our opinion.that the sudden dropout of more than one rod at any given time is incredible with the proposed system.
e t
r
. VI. Thermodynamic and Energency Coolin(Syysns The Bodega Bay Reactor is a force-d recirculation boiling water reactor with four recirculation loops. Each loop takes auction from the reactor vessel at the downcomer annulus and returns coolant to a vessel inlet near the bottom of the vessel. The coolant makes a single upward pass through the : ore.
The punp located in each loop is rated at 20,000 cpm at 100 feet of head.
Valves are provided in each recirculation loop to pernit isolating a punp when necessary.
Steam generated in the core passes through axial flow steam separators and a steam dryer.
The steam separators and the steam dryer are located entirely within the reactor vessel.
The noisture content of the steam leavin;; the dryer is 0.1% by wei ht.
C During full power operation steam flows at a ra:ed flow of h,170,000 pounds per hour to the turbino. Stea-which is exhausted from the turbine is condensed, passed thro >gh c:.densate demineral-izers, feedwater heaters and is then returned t:- the reactor.
The feedwater pump used urder normal conditio.is is driven by the main turbine shaft through a step-up cear drive. A smaller electric motor-driven pump is used as a feedwater pup during _
start-up and for certain emergency operations described below.
The main condenser is designed usin;; materitle suitable for salt water service. 'Jater is drawn from Bodega 3ay and harbor to cool the condenser and is. discharged to the Pacific Ocean.
In addition to condensing exhausted turbine stein, the nain condenser I
~
,. u designed to serve as a heat. ink for excess 1 actor steam which may be dur: ped directly to the inser through a etean byrass system which is rated at LO% of rased steam flow. The condenser also provides for condensate holdup in the hot well for decay of short-lived radioactivity.
A twin elemnt air ejector is provided to renove gasses from the condensate; the air rencval capacity of each unit is 52.2 scfm of dry air. The rtscherte from the air ejector is to the stack through c 30 n'inute relay line and a particulate filter.
In addition to the nain condenser there are other heat renoval systens which my be used to remove heat after shutdown and durin en rmerr,ency. The main features of these systens are described bclow Energency Cooling System The emrgency cooling system is a high pressure system which provides means for renoving heat fron the reactor ir the event of loss of the nain condenser ts a heat sink. The enercency condenser in this systen has a
e
, r M -luented in a tank ol' water. The condenser is actuated by opening e valve in the return line to the reactor and flow is maintained through the condenser by natural circulation.
The stated design heat renoval capacity per bundle is 1.8% of the rated reactor oower.
(Decay heat release rates fall to 3.6% in about 3 minutes and to 1.6%
in about 1 hou:t after shutdown.)
4
. ~
Bleed and Feed System Steam can be vented from the r.ain steam 11:e to the suppression pool whenever a solenoid operated steam dump valve is actuated.
The valve is-autonatically actuated by hi h reactor C
pressure, or by operator action. High pressure feed uater supplied by the electrically driven auxiliary feechtater pump throu-h the feedwater piping replaces water that is vented from the system.
This pump has a flow capacity of 700 gpm; thus this system should have a 60 Ma heat renoval capacity.
Shutdown Cooling Systen A forced circuhtion system with associated heat exchanger is provided for decay heat removal after shutiewn.
The system is a low pressure (150 psig) system with a het.t removal capacity of 1.25 of rated power.
The reactor is initially cooled by controlled steam flow to the main condenser. After initial coolin; and decressurization, the shutdown co: ling system is nlacr< in oneration.
Core 5nray Systen A low pressure (150 psig) corc spray syster. is nrovVed.
This system takes suction from the suppressier. pool era Coll /cru water to the reactor vessel through two vessel inlet nozzles.
The system includes two pumps rated at-1200 gyn at 150 psig.
The system is automatically started when the reac,or pressure is less than 150 psig and the reactor water level is 1cw. The system can also be started nanually. The core spray conceptual design
. R within the reactor vessel has not yet been for:nlated.
If necessar/, high p?cssure water from the auxiliary, or startup, feedwater pump can be routed to the core spray nozzles.
The apolicant estimates that this mode of opere ion would provide a 30 Mw heat removal capability even if the recirculation system piping were r.ot intact, thus allowing part of the spray water -
to escape without boiling.
In our opinion these provhions for decay heat during nornal and abnornal concitions are satisfactory with c.e reservation.
Both the high pressure feed for the bleco and feed system, and the hi h pressure feed for the emergency core spray depe.id upon a C
single pump. This pump, the auxiliary feedwater pump, will experience long periods of inoperation and thus could fail to operate when nost needed. We, therefore, feel that a second high pressure pu.mp should be provided to serve in a backup high pressure feed water supoly system. The back-u punp should have sufficient flow capacity to accomplish decay heat removal a few minates af ter shutdown. Also, it would te highly desirable that the backup system be as nearly independent of the normal feedwater system as possible, 1
O
. 7II. Waste Disposal With regard to radioactive vaste lismsal from siis plant, the applicant his stated %is intention to conform with effluent concentration limits established in 10 CTR 20 and further, in the case of liquid wastes, to conform with provisions of a vaste disoosal permit to be obtained from the North Coastal Water Pollution Control Board (a State agency regulating wast? -lischarges into State water ? ). He has very briefly described tankage, holdup lines, piping, instrumentation and sampling techniques that will be used to insure capability to comply with the appropriate limits. We have no present cause to doubt that such equipments will be adequate for the intended purpose.
On the other hand, since the liquid wastes are to be mixed with a con'enser cooling water effluent arounting to 250,M0 gpm, the total annual discharge at 10 CFR 20 concentration lir:its tc to a very substantial number of curies, and it is conceivable that through some reconcentration process na2ine life fm m the plant site area might becone unst A? tory for human consumption. The applicant recognizes this as a possible problem ar.d is conducting research and -development programs in oceanography and marine biology to evaluate this matt,er. Thne crograms are as follows:
Oceanograchy:
The capacity of the ocean to diffuse the condenser cooling water and minimize the effects of temperature and radioactivity
. on the marine biota is being investigated in a series of-tests conc'u:ted at the site.
Thse tests include use of drift poles and uranine dye, as well as measurements of temperature and salinity.
They will continur Orough at least one annual cycle of-
'u>
- raphic and meteoro-logical conditions.
Marine Biology Survey: An ecological survey is being conducted to establish a basis for evaluating future observations of the marine fauna and flora of Bodega Head and Earbor.
Radiological Survey:
A preoperational monitorirg survey of the site and its evnirons will be initiated two years before commencement of operation of the reactor.
The details of this program have not been completed for 3odega Bay.
However, it is anticipated that it will be similar to that conducted for the Compary's Humboldt Bay nuclear unit.
It is our opinion that these programs can adequately indicate whether or not a hazard to the public is likely to arise out of operations of the plant. Further, we feel that the surveys can furnish a satisfactory fiducial so that any significant increase in marine life contamination can be observed before it becomes a
e l.
a hazard to humans. 'de intend to require that the applicant sub.it periodic progress reports on these research and development programs so that any unfavorable itifomation developed can be used to initiate appropriate measures at t!.e earliest pocsible r:.ent.
To trovide some measure of the nagnitude of iis ?rollen, a rouCh comperison may be' nate between the eifluent fr0. the Befe:a 2ey ?lant and that from the Hanford Plant observable in-the Columbia River at the Hanford. site boundary. At the H nford site boundary the *: hole of Columbia River is contami lated to obout half the maximum permissible concentratiers set forth in 10 CA Pr.-t 20. The : low of the river at that point is at least 27,000,000 gpn or a factor of 100 greater than the 250,000 Cpm frem the conde.;er at the Wega Bay Plant.
Thus, the total number o.r curies discharged there per year should be no more than 27. of-t.he number released at Hanford per year.
Ecolo;ical studies in the Columbia River area have indicated, up to. non, no cause for serious alar over the amount
- of radioactivity contamination in the marine life of. that-area.
~.
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28 -
l VIII Accident Evaluation i
L A number of accidents have been evaluated by the applicant and i
i reported in the Preliminary Hazards Summary Report. 1he accidents which 3
were considered included those induced by equipment aalfunction or j
l operator error as listed below:
i l
1.
Changing pressure regulator handwheel setting 4
I 2.
Continuous control rod wothdrawal or insertion l
1 i
3.
Loss of electrical load
!a
{
4 Control rod drive malfunction I
5.
Recirculation pump failures f
6 Main steam valve closures 4-i 7.
-Failure of a reactor safety valve to rescat 8.
Failure of reactor safety. system l
9.
Fuel cladding failure 1
1 10.
loss of fee 6 water l
l 11.
Inss of condenser vacuum l
12.
Loss of auxiliary power 13.
Instnament air failure 14 Pressure regulator. failure -
15.
Emergency condenser tube failure I
- 16.. Reactor. system ruptures inside the dry well
)
17.
Failure _to.replensih cooling-water in; emergency condenser.
i l_
18.
Startup accident a
j 19.
Fuel loading and handling accidents
?-
20.
Cold water accident 21.
Control rod drop accident hM
{.
4 4
i.i.
l--
. ; g.
-~
l
- 29..
2-j' 22.
Main steam -line rupture outside the dry well f-2 3.-
Reactor system rupture in the dry well.
In some of the accidents presented,-the evanation is-not yet completed 1
i and the applicant has stated that when the analysis is complete, the j
results will be used as criteria in the detailed plant design (for example i
to size the pressure relief valves-and set the isolation valve. closure j
specifications).
i In our opinion, most of the evaluation results completed and the 1.
stated design objectives for plant systems and components appear to be i
l satisfactory for the construction permit stage.
In two of the major accidents, however, the Staff is not in complete agr-ement with some of i
?
the assumptions or conclusions made by the applicant. Namely:
1.
Control Rod Drop Accident j
Preliminary calculations by the applicant indicate that the-L j
most reactive control rod will be worth-no more than 3.6%.
i Calculations by the applicant show that if this rod were to drop from the core, a minimum period-of-3. milliseconds could result, i
l_
and the average fuel temperature would reach 5500*F in the i
uncontrolled fuel zone.
The. applicant concludes, somewhat arbitrarily, that the total energy release :is not great enough 4
i to endanger the reactor vessel.
i In information submitted subsequent to the Preliminary h
. Hazards Summary Report the General Electric Company indicated they are developing analytical models for u.are _ accurate I
prediction of the consequences of such a nuclear excursion.
t The forthcoming 5 pert destructive test will be used to check the model that is being developed.
l-
i l
In addition to the analytical work, a rod sorth minimizer computer and a red dropout velocity limiter are being developed f
possible use in the Bodega Plant. ' The rod north computer -
would continually monitor control rod patterns to reinforce procedural controls provided to-insure that patterns causing individual rods to assume undesirably high reactivity worth are not used. Conceptual designs for flow restricting devices that would limit potential control rod dropout veloci:ies to safe
-values are also being developed. In the absence of experimental l
verification of the applicants position that a rod dropout accident of this type will not endanger the taa: tor vessel, we l
l believe that other design features, such as the rod worth minimizer computer or the rod dropout velocity lbaiter, should be incorporated into the plant design.
2.
Maximum Credible Accident This accident is assumed to begin as an instantaneous severance of-a reactor water recirculation line while at sa overpressure condition of 1250 psig af ter extended operation at 1008 MWT. In his calculations, the applicant took credit for the core spray system to the-extent that he assumed that only one-half of the core melted.- In the calculational model this was' dome by calculating-the core heat-up and the subsequent fission product release without the core spray, and then dividing the release at any time during-the process by a factor of two.
It is interesting to note that the release model indicates that 60% of the noble gases are released by melting 50% of the core, due to the additional release
from failed fuel cladding.
(Calculations indicate that' without cooling all the fuel cladding in the core fails within 20 minutes.)
Additional assumptions made by the applicant include:
A.
Cladding fails at 1600*F and releases 20% of the noble gases and iodines.
B.
Fuel melts at 5000*F and releases the remaining 80% of the noble gases and iodines, and 1% of the solids.
C.
Fifty percent of the halogens and 70% of the solids remain 4
in the reactor vessel, D.
In the dry well, plate out and fall out are assumed to occur as follows:
(i)
Removal half-life of 30 minutes-for halogens, minimum concentration value of 10-4 times that in the water.
(ii) Removal half life of S hours for sol. ids.
E.
Leakage from the dry well to the refueling building is at 0.55 per day.
F.
The fallout half life in the refueling building is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for halogens and solids.
G.
The ventilation cleanup equipment. removes 95% of the halogens and solids.
H.
The fans exhaust 100% of the refueling building volume per day up the stack.
I.
The stack height is taken las 300 feet, (although it has not been determined as yet.)
2
o 4
,n I
Calculations are presented by the applicant for lapse and slightly stable conditions for certain chosen distances. The doses for the lapse condition were given as.024 rem to the whole body and.019 rem to the thyroid for the entire accident at a downwind distance of 0.6 mile.
The value of 3
X/Q used to calculte these doses was 2.08 x 10-6 sec/m.
The staff feels
- i that for an accidental elevated release it is more appropriate to consider a release under either lapse or inversion conditions, and that it could 3
occur with a low wind speed, such as one meter per second.
With this in mind, it seems more appropriate to utilize an equation for the value of the maximum concentration as follows:
2 X/Q = 2/enuh Utilizing a 300 foot stack height and a wind speed of 1 m/see this equation gives a value of X/Q of 2.42 x 10-5, which is over 10 times as great as given by the applicant, and increases the doses accordingly.
In response to staff questions, the applicant stated that the halogen release would be approximate 1" 10 times as great if a factor of 2 credit were taken for fallout in the dry well rather than using the assumptions of fallout and plate out.
Combining these factors, one would find that the doses for the entire MCOA would be 0.280 rem whole body and 2,2 ren to the thyroid.
Ifhile these values are considerably more than those reported by the applicant, they are clearly acceptable in terms of Part 100 criteria.
The nature of the calculations for this type of containment are such I
that they are difficult to reproduce.
However, a simple method of a
checking them without involving so much conservatism as to make the results meaninglest can be made by assuming:
1).
Release of 60% of the noble gases and halogen fission products to the drywell.
(This assumption is consistent with the
o
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tv.
L, 33 -
assumption that only one-half the core will melt).
2).
Leakage from the containment at 0.5% per day.
4 3).
Normal cleanup system operation.
Utilizing this method, and the diffusion equation given above, it is found that the maximum whole body external doses for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and for the entire i
accident are: 0.12 rem and 0.94 rem.
Performing the same type of calculation for the iodines by taking a 60% release from the fuel, 50% plateout in the dry well, and 95% removal by the cleanup system while exhausting the entire leakage (at the rate of 0.5% per day), the doses for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and for the entire accident are:
From the above calculations we have concluded that the containment system provided for this reactor appears to be capable of reducing the potential hazards of the maximum credible accident for this reactor to levels which 4
l do not present an undue hazard to the health and safety of the public, i
Under the staff assumptions, the only credit taken for engineered safeguards (other than the core spray system) are those which are passive, and if established by test, those that will be available to function,in the manner demonstrated in the test, for a reasonsble time in the future.
It should also be recognized that there are a large number of other factors which have been pointed out by the applicant which will have a strong tendency to make the doses appreciably less than those calculated above.
Taking those into account it becomes apparent that the safety of t te public would be protected even if some of the passive properties of the system were to fall below their anticipated performance values.
s IX.
Summary and Conclusionj in our review of this application for a construction permit, we have identified and evaluated six areas which we feel are of primary l
importance. The areas are summarized below along with our conclusions:
j 1.
Earthquake Associated Problems - the plant is to be located
.I approximately 1000 ft. from the San Andreas Fault. This is not in accordance with the recommendations of Part 100. Also, the applicant states that he does'not intend to use signals from i
seismic shock detectors to initiate either reactor scram or containment isolation.
We believe that non-existence of minor faults under the plant site should be verified during plant construction. Information developed during excavation should be carefully-evaluated for evidence of faults, the presence of which would require a reassessment of the
_s_uitability of the location proposed.
With respect to other seismic problems, in view of the applicant's expressed intention to design the plant to withstand earthquakes as severe as ones rated 8.2 on the Richter scale, we feel that-the difference between 1300 feet and 1000 feet is of minor concern and that the proposed design is adequate.. We plan to reserve judgment :
as to whether seismic detectors should be included in the plant's equipment and should initiate reactor scram and containment isolation.
Our judgment of' this matter will be dependent on review of the final plant design and an evaluation as to whether earthquake accelerations could disrupt the ability to scram the reactor and isolate the containment.
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a L 2.
Location of Back-up Valves in containment Isolation System - While b
we would prefer that both of the containment isolation valves be i
located very'close to the containment walls, we feel that location of the back-up valves as proposed does not measurably increase the consequence of the Maximum Credible Accident..
h We believe that more specific criteria than those proposed i
should be established at this time with respect to containment testing, penetration design, and isolation valving.
3.
Control Rod Drives - These drives are similar to those in use at Dresden and at Big Rock Point. In our opinion, further operating-experience with these type drives prior to the ccupletion of con-
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'struction of Bodega should be adequate to resolve this matter. Based
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on the results of.research and development programs, it may be-i necessary to incorporate additional design features prior to reacter i
operation to preclude a serious rod dropout accident.
4.
Burnout Safety Margin - The proposed margin is 1.5; this value is not well supported by substantial operating experience. We believe that future experience prior to the operation of Bodega should be 1
4 f
adequate to determine the acceptability of the heat transfer desigu 3
criteria.
E' 5.
Fuel Element Design Criteria - Fuel element design criteria for this l
plant are not clearly defined at present, but consideration-is being given to the selection of a 0.011 inch clad. In our opinion, the 4
adequacy of the clad thickness can be verified by operating
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experience prior to the start-up of Bodega.
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1 36 -
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6.
Liquid Waste Disposal - Reconcentration effects on liquid wastes should be' considered. We believe, however, that the environmental, 4
ecelegical and radiological surveys being conducted or to be i
4 conducted by the applicant can cerve to adequately monitor any effects of this nature prior to development of a safety problem.
l Subject to these comments, we have concluded.that the applicant and his -
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nuclear consultant are technically qualified to design and construct _ the j
facility; that the research and development programs proposed are adequate to resolve the safety matters not yet settled; that the information missing i
from the applications will be supplied; and that there is reasonable assurance i
that a facility of the general type and power level proposed can be constructed J
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at Bodega Bay without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
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