ML20114E729
| ML20114E729 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000214 |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1964 |
| From: | Woodard M US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML093631134 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210120252 | |
| Download: ML20114E729 (6) | |
Text
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4 7;o,,.c...e 4 t/NITED STATES GOVLnNMENT Memorandum m
Files n
ort r.:
JUL 14 PM (Thru) Roger S. Boyd, Chief (
Research & Power Reae S ety B anch FROM M. Keith Noodard Research & Power fe i
Division of Reac cens g i
srb]ict: :CETING TO CLGITI I::FOR.3?IC. ON ESIGH OF ALDU JCLEAR
'LAhT D0. 1.
-[6~%/f On June it,19%, the secono neeting was held cetween tne staff and the applicant to ciscuss additional information pertinent to their acquisition of a construction permit. Don Enuth presidea with representatives of tne staff, City of Los Angeles, Westinghouse anc Stone and Webster present as follows:
E. Ecffmann Deot. of Water & Fower M. Franxel Dept. of Water & Power T. M. Blaneslee D3pt. of Water & Power Gerald Luhian Dept. of Water & Nwer Edward U. Powell Westinghouse Stanley N. Ehrenpreis Westin;; house i
l John McAdoo Westinghouse l
P. B. Haga Westingnouse Theodore Stern Westir4 ouse h
William Lester Westinghouse Daniel Gans, Jr.
Stone L Webster Engineering Corp.
l Eenneth W. Seiving Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
l I. VandcrHoven US/B 1
D. H. Pacx USWB R. L. Dean Reg.
- . M. Hann Reg.
R. S. Boyd DRL R. R. Maccary DSS D. F. Knuth LRL P. t. Norian LRL M. K. Woodard DRL D. F. Sullivan LRL I. Spicxier LRL L. I. Cobb CO l
Gerald F. Haalock OGC i
Joseon Scinto CGC
(
The staff wished clarification of cesign infor. matt in on tne Engineering Safeguards as outlined below.
1.
Westinghouse was asked what leanage rate tne-coulc tolerate.
If the contain.ent lea's 0.1% per day thru each birrier ano assuming: (a) poor x
weather conditions, (o) no iodine stays la annulus, (c) von Traute 9210120252 920520 PDR ORG NRCHIST PDR
4 2
correlation for extracolation, (d) iodine inneciately available, (e) ground level release, (f) no pumpbacx conpressors worx, at 600 ft. a cose of 300 rem to tne tnyro:o would occur in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
2.
Any leaxs in the compressor systen will lear: to the stack. They were asked how this could be measured ano now much coulc be tol-erated. Stone & Webster proposed to house this pleing system in a negative pressure region ano evacuate tne air thra filters, an.,
thus measuring tne amount of leaka.e wouac ce unnecessary. They stated that the integrity of tne pamcbacx systen is better than the contlinnent. The staff requested that periocic tests be con-sidered. Stone L Wecster prooosed vaivan; to allow neriocie testin; of the units one at a time.
3.
Regarding infornation on netal-water reactions, Westinghouse stated that they are in tne process of concucting terts. They would like to t2ne credit for core spray quenening of tne reaction. They did not want to aneno the application until af ter the Public Hearing and will leave tne zire cladaing in the design without an analysis.
4.
Because credit must be taxen for operation of rectreulating fans, their integrity nust be proven uncer accident conditions. WestinC-house xnew of no tects whien had been mace witn the air recirculation components proposed. The staff feels tnat the perionic containment leakage test pressure should be 46 psig and not 15 psig. This would test the aoility of tne fans to operato uncer near accident conditions. Westinghouse saio tnere is too much damageable equipment in tne containment af ter initial testing anc periodic hign pressure tests woulo therefore be inoossicle.
5.
The emergency motor generator capacity had not been previously sub-mitted. COLA believes their proposed networx of buses into the site are extremely reliable, but they will add motor generators as a back-up. Only the air-recirculation fans ano vital bus will operate from tne motor generator power. No other engineering saieguards will be operable in tne event of power outage; the fans, however, may be turned off anc tne containnent. spray or core spray operated. The proposed generatur will be about 80u H.P.
6.
The design of the component cooling system had not been clear.
The sea water pumps will be on tne emergency power lines. All water lines in tne cooling system will be el class di eartnquake cesign.
The air recirculating cooling lines are separate from those cooling other components. Provision is mace for adcitional cooled water to be adced to the system for neat removal anc pressure relief.
. 7.
The neavy reliance en air recirculation ans requires tnat all four be in operation at all times.
COLA stated tnat if one treaxa down, the plant will be snut cown anc tne unit repaired.
3.
No iocine filters will be used in tne air-recirculation units.
9 The containnent spray system was tne subject of -any questions.
The entire systert is internal anc thus maintenar.ce is difficult.
Westirghouse cla e.s tnat if parts of it were outsice it woulo consti-tute one nore breacn of tne couble containment cancept. Testing of tne actual spray.is impractical because filling tne sump would cause damage. They claim tnat running tne pumps ano detecting pressure is sufficient. The residual heat removal pumps will be tested at every shutaown. The staff woulc like to see these com-ponents tested durin~ opration.
10.
The staff 'ns cen:2rud imt *.he v:si'aili.ty a? is nineralized water entering the cort resulting in a positive reactivity ad?ition.
Westinghouse wanted to use the feecwater pu:nps in the SLfety in-jection systen because tney were operating full time anc were thus nore reliable. T;.ey saio unborated water coulu not get into tne core because pro:ecures tno ralve interloci,s woulo prevent such anc that the borated water would have to be displaced. There is little pressure in the borated water line to cffect this displacement.
Many failures must taxe piace before such an accident can happen.
The staff believes tnat final design shoulc specifically insure against such an accident. Also instrumentation shoulo be acded to indicate to tne operator tnat unborated water is causirg a transient.
11.
The void coefficient was proven to be zero at power but as the staff cointed out, thic test was not performed at tne worst part of core life. Westinghouse will study the proolen.
12.
No valves are incluced in the primary loops. There are no secondary valves which couac provide sneak paths to the outside. Westinghouse stated there is no need to vent the seconcary heat exchanger full of water after tr.e accident and thus the energy vill n0; be available.
to over pressuri:e the :ontainment.
- 13. Westinghouse contends tr.at beore monitors are nat necessary because they have then in Connecticut Yankee.
The staff does not feel that power tilts in the Malibu core can be detected by monitors in the Connecticut Yankee core. They say Connecticut Yankee is different anc that they Know tne Maliou temperature coefficient will damp such oscillations. The question is still unresolved.
- 14. There will be aoout S roc groups witn a maximum of 12 in one group.
The selection of size and composition of tnese groues is not at the disgretion of tne operator.
~
4 l
.n.
1 b,
Westinghouse stated that the manmum load cnance they could tolerate without opening relief valves was about 10-20%.
i Several questi:ns asked pertained to neteorological calculations and raciation doses off-site.
l 1.
A complete survey of typical conditions on ano near tne Malibu site is in progress.
Movable weatner vanes, release of material for i
diffusion studics anc vertical all year pressure-temperature stations i
vill be used.
2.
The worst dose is calcualted to be on the hillside adjacent to tne reactor at the same height as the stacc. They have not ceterntned i
ne best s; ace height yet but nave contracted to buil: it as high l
as 290 ft.
3.
Fron tne survey they hooe to be able to preciet the best concitions l
for release. They must purge af ter an accident to Keep pressure l
down. Their criteria for normal operation is 50 mr/ year at site boundary.
h.
Mr. Spick 1er asked questions concerning the puff watte gas release, j
virtual sources and diffusion equatio.;s used.
The staff was interested in tne aoility of the plant to withstana tsunamis of as high as 50 ft.
1.
Their structural consultant stated that a tsuonani of 30-ho ft. above tne containment could cause damage to tne structure.
2.
The possibility of a tsunami leaving the sea water intake cry was discussed ano the suoject dropped.
j Consultants for botn the staff and applicant discussed seismic design in the afternoon.
1.
The following values were given for containment stresses during earthquake anc accicent conditions:
.3g earthquako
- 20,000 psi hv lb pressure
- 26,0u0 psi 40 lb pres. &.3g eartnquake
- 40,v00 psi 40 lb &.6g earthquake - 70,000 psi 2.
The staff took opposition to their statement that the containment may yield according to the figures above but that the double barriers woulu maintain their integrity. A complete stress analysis is.forth-coming. The staff would like to see sone proof tnat no lecxace will occur at the jeld point.
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3 3.
The credi:ility of both tne MCA and eartnquare at tne same ti.e was questioned. This is not so increditle as it r.ay seem since after the ICA tne pressure nay rer.ain high for months anc an earthquare could occur during this lo m period of tine.
All comp;r.ents will oc designed to withstand.3g and 140 lbs sind-u.
taneously.
5.
The dam?i.; factor of U.7 for tne concrete fotAcation is relaxed from tne ia: tor used in San Onofre because it is not of a cante. Lever cesign IS:e San Onofre.
6.
The desigr takes tne worst possible modes or vitration into account but a th:rou;h cnalysis could be made to cut costs.
7.
The strenes ano design have not censidered hori:ontal anc vertical componenu to act simultaneously. They will take this into account.
o.
No credit has been given for tension in the concrete, the analysis allows it to crack. This is concervative.
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1CKfi NUMDER
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FAOD. & Vill, FAC. JO -hq' J
UNITED STATES
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISS'ON I
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wsw maron.o.c. som Samuel W. Jensch, Esq.
j Chairman, Atomic Safety and MOV 4 1964 Licensing Board
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U. S. Atomic Energy Commission 3
Washington, D. C. 20545 i
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Dr. Charles E. Winters A
j Union Carbide j
Parma Research Center b
DOCKETED O:
P.O. Box 6116 USAEC I
I Cleveland, Ohio NOV 51%4* 3 4
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Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles orgy g;;jg,nm o,
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Dean, School of Engineering g
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and Applied Science
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University of Virginia
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Charlottesville, Virginia e
N In the Matter of Jersey Central Fover and Light Company Docket No. 50-219 ylle Cop 1 ( A y Gentlemen:
l l
Enclosed find the " Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Submitted by the. AEC Regulatory Staff" in the captioned matter.
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It is possible that during the pendency of this proceeding, a pro-l posed amendment to i 2.761,10 CFR 2, may be adopted by the Commission.
l This amendment would provide 45 days for Connission review of the Initial a...
provided.
If the pro-
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