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ADVISORY COMMll TEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENUtGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20$45 QOMKlTRTACOhTMENTTAE May 23, 1966 d
To
- ACRS Members
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From Dr. T. J. Thompson
Subject:
THOUGHTS ON AN AIRPLME The news that Dresden 3 is upon us in interesting.
It would appear that the Committee, at long last, ?ill finally have a very easy time with a major power reactor an exact duplicate of one we had approved only five month, ago!
There have been no major changes in the technology in reactor safety in the ensuing period. The Committee's letter on pressure vessels was written at the same time as our Dresden 2 approval letter, and Common-wealth Edison was fully informed that the letter did not apply to Dresden 2.
Obviously, it cannot apply to Dresden 3 which is an exact duplicate of Dresden 2 at the same site.
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Therefore, the Committee's only requirement in regard to this plant is to l
ensure that there will be no interactione between this plant and the other two at the site which might jeopardize safety. There surely is little l
likelihood that interaction will be a problem, and it is virtually certain that the applicant will do everything necessary to ensure that no inter-actions will occur. Further, the Staff seems vary relaxed about Dresden 3.
j This case probably should not require more than one hour or so of one Com-3 mittee meeting and no subcommittee meetings.
In addition, this case may help to decide some fccets of the Consolidated Edison 2 case. Obviously, with Dresden 3 approved, we nee.d only to judge the relative site, power, and reactor type of the two cases to d.ct.rmine whether the con Ed 2 pressure vessel remains a problem.
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\\CoMKUTrLCTLTnentratr Unless there proves to be a substantial difference between the Dresden site with its 2300/2600 KW(t) BWR and the Indian Point site with its 2700 K4(t)
PWR, and unless we can substantiate it fully, then the Con Ed pressure vessel is clearly adequately safe. After all, Con Ed 2 has a very good chance of withstanding a completa pressure vessel rupture and can certainly withstand it better than Dresden 2 or 3.
With this decided, the Con Ed ca.se is reduced to assuring that the contain-ment cannot be over pressured and that no substantial nuclear transient will Westinghouse has said that there are ways to improve both of these occur.
situations, and a number of Committee members have various possibilities in mind. Therefore, we might be able to get a letter out on Indian Point 2 with little additional discussion of this subject. We will then have approved two major plants in a record short time and we will be able to devote our time to more generalized problems. We may even have helped the 60-day problems.
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