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U. S. AT(BLIC ' RNERGY CGetISSION (g l..
REGION I DIVISI0tf CF C(BIPLIANCE -
Report of Inspection CO Report No. 219/68-5 5
Licensee:
Jersey Central Power and Light Company 2
(Oyster Creek 1)'
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Construction Permit No. CPPR-15'
{^f Category B f
Dates of Inspection:
Nay 7, 8, and 9, 1968 j
June 13 and 14, 1968
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July.29 and 30, 1968 September 19 and 20, 1968 Date of Previous Inspection:
March 28, 1968 Inspected By: 9 M Mwk b
-9!30!d I-Ok. T. Cfr1 son, Sghior Reactor Inspector (Dete) i Reviewed By:
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F. G. Kep)Fer, Senior Reactor Inspection (Date)
Specialist I
Proprietary Information:- None i
i SIDetARY The status of the efforts exp' ended by Ceneral Electr_ic and Jersey ' Central toward correcting the deficiencies identified by Compliance during the special quality control task force inspection is provided by this report.
l While taeasurable' progress has been realized in achieving resolutions on-many identified problem areas. a large number of problems still remain outstanding.
A comprehensive program of record inventory and review, initiated earlier 4
this year by GE, represents some progress toward achieving Compliance's objectives regarding the need for further assurances of a vality. product.
1 Some 20 deficiencies.have been identified to date by this' review program.
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DETAILS i
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Scope of Visits 3J The Oyster Creek Unit No.1 facility was visited by Mr. R. T. Carlson, L'
Senior Reactor Inspector, Region 1; on May 7-9, June 13-14 July 29-30..
d and September 19-20, 1 % 8.
Mr. Carlson was accompanied by Mr. B. H.
Faulkenberry, Reactor Inspector, Region I, on the July 29-30 visit and by Mr. J. G. Rappler,. Senior Reactor Inspection Specialist, NQ, on the e
September 19-20 visit. The purpo'se of the visits was to continue the 9
construction-pha'se inspection prog' ram for this ' facility.
Included were
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tours of the facility, observation of construction activities in progress, reviews of pertinent records, and discussions with responsible licensee and contractor personnel.
This report is directed specifically to the follow-up of the deficien-cies detected during coup *liance's special in-depth quality control task force inspection program. For continuity purposes CO Reports Nos. 219/68-1 and 219/68-2 provide earlier information relating to the findings and con-clusions of this special quality control' inspection effort. Other informs-tion developed during the course.of these inspection visits is being covered in Inspection geports Nos. 219/68-6 and 219/68-7.
The principal personnel contacted during the follow-up of these quality control deficiencies were as follows:
E Jersey Central Power and Limht Cossany (JC) l j
Mr. G. H. Ritter, Vice President i
Mr. T. J. McCluskey, Plant Superintendent i
r Mr. I. R.'Finfrock, Jr., Technical Supervisor Mr. D. E. Retrick. Operations Supervisor Mr. N. M. Nelson, Maintenance Supervisor l
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- Special Quality Control Inspection of the Central Power and Light I
Company Oyster Creek Reactor (Docket No. 50-219) - May 6,1968 s
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L General Electric Company (GE) k Mr. D. K. Willett, Project Manager i
Mr. N. M. Strand, Construction Site Manager Mr. W. C. Royce Construction Test Director
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Mr. L. M. Loeb, Responsible quality Control Coordinator (Special Assignment) j Mr. V. W. South Consultant-Computer Programming 9
Mr. E. Wester, Electrical Engineer i
Mr. C. Smith, Quality Contro'1 Engineer-Fiping
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Mr. R. D. Robertshaw, Construction Engineer l
I Burns & Roe. Inc. (B&R)
Mr. J. C. Archer, Lead Supervisor Engineer (Oradell)
Mr. G. A. Lori, Project Engineer (Oradell)
II.
Results of visits--Task Force items I
A. status summary of all of the problems detected during Compliance's special quality control inspection program as of September 20, 1968, is provided in"this section of the report. An initial summary of the problems, applicabilityconsiderations,andearlierstatusjacontainedinSectionF of the special quality control inspection report.
For purposes of com-i parison, the pertinent paragraph aussbers in Section F of the special quality contrel inspection report are given in parenthesis.
A.
Primary Coolant Escirculation System
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1.
Improper Trans'ition Radii of Welds (F.1.a.1) (F.1.a.2)
Compliance originally noted that the specified blend
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contours were not provided in preparation for the piping welds to the primary pump casings.
It was ob-1 served that these welds have since been ground to the 1
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required transition radius. This matter is satis-factorily resolved.
I According to Mr. Willett, GE has evaluated the applicability of this problem by inspection of all g
transition regions in the following systems:- re-l
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circulation, core spray, shutdown coolant, isolation condenser, main steam, feedwater; poison injection, a
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control, rod 6 rive piping, and cleanup domineraliser.
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- c. m The inspector reviewed selected records for the re-circulation system, co.re spray system, shutdown. cool-ant system, and main steam system and visually ex-f amined some of the transition welds for these systems.
It was apparent that a considerable number of welds required grinding to achieve the required transition radius. The inspector was satisfied that GE's review of these s'ystems encompassed at a minimum all transitior, welds out to and including the first isolation valve.
While some repairs remain to be completed in this area, the in'opector is satisfied that the applicability of i
this problem has been responsibly reviewed by GE and j
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that adequate repairs are being effected. This
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problem is considered to be resolved.
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t 2.
Insulation Support Fins (F.1.b.1) (F.1.b. 2) (F.1.c.1) 4
' i Compliance originally noted that hundreds of pins supporting the insulation were welded onto portions of J.
the recirculation piping, main steam piping, and asso-i cisted pumps and valves.
Mr. Willett stated that the
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insulation for other systems was not attached in this i
fashion and that this problem was limited-to the re-circulation system and main steam system. Based on discussions with cognizant GE personnel and visual examination of some of the piping, the inspector is satisfied that all insulation support pins have been or will be removed.
The inspector verified that the weld spots which re-sulted from stud-welding the insulation support pins Frmure '
were being removed by grinding. These repairs, most of which have been coupleted, have been made in accord-d>unh+.
ance with approved written procedures. Resolution of '
this problem is considered to be adequate.
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3.
Arc Strikes (F.1.d.1) h i
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Compliance originally detected amerous welding arc D'
strikes on the nossles of the reactor vessel, ubich -
resulted in pitting. As a result of this, visual in-spections were made for are strikes and notch defects
'p on the external suEfaces of all Class 1 piping systems-U between the reactor pressure vessel and second isola-l
'w tion valve. Mr. Willett reported that ' this' inspection j
resulted in the detection of miscellaneous are strikes '
i and other similar defects on most piping ' lines. The j
inspector reviewed the repair procedures for removal of the defects and noted that liquid penetrant testing was required to verify removal of the defect. The pro-cedures also required recording of the final depth of grinding and the surface area size necessary.to remove l
the defect. Limits were established on removal of the base material. A review of inspection records by the j
inspector and discussions with Mr. Strand indicated
'I the-deepest defect detected to da'te was 0.100 inch
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following grinding. This defect was on one of the main steam nossles and required the addition of weld i
material for completion of the repair..,According to Mr. Strand, the repair procedure received concurrence by Combustion Engineering prior to making the repair.,
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l Visual examination of some of-the piping and discussions with GE personnel indicate that many of the arc stikes l
have been removed and a punch list has been established to assure removal of. the remainder. The inspector con-
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siders this problem to be satisfactorily resolved.
j 4.
Recirculation Puno Bendina Moments (F.1.e.1)
In reviewing the alignment and fit-up of the recircula -
tion piping system, Compliance's engineering consultant, R. E. Infy, Parameter, Inc., ' raised questions relating to whether bending moments had been properly considered in the establishment of the recirculation pump design i
requirements. As a follow-up, the inspector consulted with Mr. W. J. Foley, Parameter, Inc., on this matter and arranged for him to visit the GE engineering offices -
Mr. Foley visited GE on June 19 and 20,1968.gion.
in San Jose, California, to resolve this ques Compliance b
A report covering Mr. Foley's visit is available in the Compliance HQ and Region I files i
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I kn was represented during this' visit by Mr. R. T.
Dodds, Reactor Inkpoctor, Region V.
a Mr. Foley's review indicated that bending moments had i
been properly considered in the design requirements for the recirculation loops and the calculated resultant piping stresses were low; i.e., not exceeding 8000 psi.
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During the course of'the review, however, Mr. Foley j
identified other areas of interest to' Compliance con-
- f-cerning the recirculation system. The most significant
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j of these areas are:
a.
The forcing frequency of the variable speed J.
4 recirculation pumps are in the range of the lowest natural frequency of: vibration of the primary system suction and dischstge lines, thus raising the question of possible resonance consideration.
b.
The sway braces for the recirculation piping are adjusted to provide zero loading under rated opera-f ting conditions. However, the planned preopera.
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' tional' vibration test will only be performed at 0
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temperatures up to 150 F.--in order to protect strain gauges and accelerometers.
In the dis-cussions of this point, Mr. Foley emphasized the importance of establishing zero loading conditions i
i, at the temperatures for the testing. Gg reportedly
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concurred in this observation and indicated the t
preoperational test procedure would be modified accordingly.
l Gg is currently reviewing the primary system vibration frequency question. The inspector will follow up on this matter. With regard to incorporation of the sway brace settings in the preoperational test procedure, the in-spector will verify that this has been done.
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5.
Five Hanners (F.1.f.1) (F.1.f.2)
It was previously learned that the main pipe hangers must be blocked when'the recirculation loops are drained to I
avoid over-stressing the piping. In response to" question-l ing by the inspector, Mr. McCluskey stated that the i
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. appropriate precautions had been taken during all past primary system filling and draining operations.
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According to Mr. Betrick, the Plant Procedures Manual j.
will contain appropriate procedures relating to the i
.f-release and reblocking of the pipe hangers. The in-spector will verify that the specific areas of concern are adequately covered by the procedures.
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B.
Main Steam System 1.
Pipina Material Certification (F.2.a.1) 9
. In the earlier review of the material certification records l
for the main steam system, Cog liance could not'obtain i
satisfactory assurance that the main steam piping met all the design specifications. GE subsequently conducted a-review of the material certiification records' for this piping. According to Mr. Iceb, proper certification records were found to exist for all of the main steam j
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piping with the exception of some of the six inch turbine l
bypass piping. A selected review of material certifica-
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tions by the, inspector, other than those for the turbine 3
bypass piping, indicated compliance with the applicable i
B4A specifications, with the exception that the B6t in,
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's spector did not witness the performance of certain code-j I
required tests at the vendor's shop.
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six inch piping, Mr. Imeb stated that an engineering dis-j positida would be made by GE regarding the affected piping.
Resolution of this matter is still considered to be an 1
i outstanding item.
d" 2.
Pittina in Steam Pipina (F.2.b.1)
Compliance originally questioned whether proper engineer-ing approval had been given by GE regarding-the use of I
a section of steam piping that_ contained pits.
In this regard it had been noted that the minimum well thickness
- of the pipe at the location of the deepest pit was.less than that required by the appligable ASTM specification for 1
Schedule 80 pipe, after correction for corrosion.
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Messrs. Imeb and Willett provided'the inspector with
.h a copy of B4A's engineering evaluation regarding the adequacy of this piping. This evaluation noted that,.
'although Schedule 80 piping had been ordered (required j
'i minimum wall thickness of 1.066 inches), the miniensi calculated wall thickness for the design service applica-
-M L tion is 0.921 inch. This matter is considered to be
'I resolved.
3.
Certification of Bellows Expansion Joints (F.2.c.1) b:*~
(F.2.c.2)
Compliance originally noted that the bellows expansion
'8 joints in the main steam system were certified as Class C vessels. Satisfactory resolution of this problem has proven difficult to accomplish. Apper-ently these bellows have not been recertified as Class B vessels as was originally stated by CE.
Mr. Iceb pointed out,that the Oyster Creek containment was fabricated in accordance wi'th Section VIII of the
.j ASME Code, not Section III, and that difficulties are l
created in trying to invoke the Code where it really l
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has no application. In reviewing this matter, it was apparent to.the laspector that considerable effort had i
been expended by.GE Engineering toward achievement of a satisfactory resolution. Mr. Iceb stated that their e
i review showed the bellows, per se, do meet the intent of the applicable code but that there may be other
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problems with respect to the overall penetration in meeting code requirements. 14eb added that a devia-j tion disposition may be required pending further re-view. This subject will be reviewed again during future inspection visits.
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U The. extent.to which this matter has applicability to-other containment system bellows and the degree which GE has satisfied itself that code requirements are-being met.in this area are considered to be outstand-ing questions requiring Compliance follow-up.
4.
Expansion Joint Travel Restrainers (F.2.d.1) (F.2.d.2)
Based on a comparison of the' physical installation of the steamtline bellows expansion joints and the
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prints available to the inspector, Compliance had questioned whether these expansion joints' were properly equipped with stops and trave 1~ restrainers.
Subsequent discussions have revealed that the f
travel restrainers observed to be missing had been purposely deleted during the design evolution. GE personnel-contend that the bellows in question have g
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been properly equipped with stops and travel re-O
' strainers since initial installation and that com-i "pliance inadvertently had used preliminary " conceptual" drawings to compare against the _ actual installation.
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Mr. Royce showed the inspector the original GE draw-ing,that was used to obtain bids and this drawing, which was identical to the B6A drawing examined earlier by Coupliance, was labeled " conceptual."
The installed bellows were not of the type shown in i
.l the drawing by 364, as was originally thought,' but f
were purchased directly from Solar, a division of International Harvester Company, A review of the fabrication drawings of the. actual bellows by the in-I spectors disclosed the absence of the travel restrain-l ers and the inspectors found the drawings to be con-sistent with the installation.
In response to additional questioning by the inspector, i
Mr.14eb stated that al1%ellows expansion joints that j
j contribute to containment.were reinspected in light of Compliance's espressed concern and that no problems were
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detected. This subject is considered to be resolved.
5.
Excessive Teasersture Durina Stresa Eelief Opera'tions
'E (F.2.e.1) (F.2.e.2)
In reviewing records associated with the main steam system, Compliance had noted that stress relief of a-weld connecting one of the steam lines to the reactor vessel had been accomplished at a temperature in ex -
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t cess of the specified stress relief temperature. The inspector learned from Mr.-Loeb that GE has explored this problem in considerable depth. Specifically, a series of hardness surveys were conducted on the piping in May 1968 to determine if the 'tpasile properties of the 4
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7j-p stress relieved area had been significantly.affected.
For comparative purposes,' hardness checks were also 1
made on piping sections in the steam line that did not experience the stress relief operations in question. A review of a report containing the results l
of these checks by the inspector showed that the q!
tensile strength for all areas. checked exceeded the
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minimum ASTM requirement. The report also noted that,
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- because the eactor vessel nozzles had been heat treated
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10. F. followed by a liquid quench, it sy at.'1300' F.
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was concluded that the high stress relief. temperature
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of 1310' F. experienced by the steam line connecting 1
. weld resulted in no degradation of the reactor vessel l
- nozzle. With respect to the vessel nozzle safe-end, the inspector learned that the safe-end had been heat 0
t treated at only 1200 F.
The inspector pointed out to
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Mr. Loeb that, although the physical properties of the l
piping and vessel nozzles apparently were not affected l
by the excessive stress relief temperature, sufficient
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information has not been generated to assure that the i
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has not been impaired. Additional information is still
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propertiiss of the nozzle safe-end adjacent to the weld i
r e quired to resolve this-issue.
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i The applicability of this problem to other Class 1 J
system components has been pursued by CE by reviewing
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i the stress relief operations records. 'The inspector.
i reviewed the scope of this investigation and found it to be appropriately extensive. Two violations great'er than'the upper temperature restriction of 1275' F. in-1 j
posed by the specifications were detected. Because'the t
excessive stress relief temperatures were less,than in the case of the steam line to vessel nozzle weld and l
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the periods of time of over temperature were shorter.
l GE has concluded that hardness maa,surements are not necessary to assure that the physical properties of the l
material affected meet specifications. The inspector l
f is satisfied that GE has explored,the area of stress i
i relief temperature control in all vital' systems and that GE is convinced, with the exception of the vessel-i nozzle safe end connecting one of the steam lines, that l
no damage has resulted from the specification violations.
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- 6.. Protection of Critical glectrical Eeuipment (F.2.f.1)
J Compliance earlier detected that the solenoid-controlled pneuestic valves for the main steam isolation valves were not protected from the accident environment. The disposition of this problem.as well as a reviaw of the E
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method by which GE has determined that all vital elec-trical equipment susceptible to the accident environment is designed and: fabricated to provide adequate protection, are issues that are continuing to be pursued.
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7.
Steam Line Cold gerina (F.2 31) (F.2 3 2)
Compliance initially noted that.one of the final closure welds in one of the steam lines was made with the pipe sprting about 13/16 inch, although the 36A specification required zero cold springing. In pursuing this matter with Mr. Loeb, it is apparent that GE did not specifically l
3 generate any engineering approval records or supporting l
analysis and does not believe such documentation is l
warranted. Mr. Iceb stated that some degree of cold spring-ing is required in almost all welding operas: ions, that the amount of cold springing was probably much less than 13/16 inch when considering the weight vector forces of the piping, and that the 1ocations where the pipe is.en-
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- closed results in negligible stresses on the' system with this amount of springing.
In view of Gs's stated attitudes with regard to this matter, the inspector has recorded the dimensions of the piping in the area of concern and the j
locations where the pipe is~ secured. The problem will be discussed by the inspector with regulatory personnel quali-fied in this area to determine whether GE's conclusions can be substantiated in a semiquantitative sense. The degree of follow-up on this subject will depend on the
.f conclusions drawn from this review. -This specific problem is still considered to be unresolved.
8.
Questionsble Welds in Steam Line (F.2.h.1) (F.2.1.1)
During a selected review of secam line weld radiographs.
Compliance questioned the adequacy of one of the internal guard pipe welds at the MS-9 drywell penetration. As a rj follow-up.to this matter, the inspector learned that GE re-reviewed all radiographs of welds where the steam
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lines pass through the drywell. This included welds in t-f
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~k the drywell penetration sleeves, guard pipes, bellows expansion joints, and the steam lines.
Mr. Loeb in-4j formed the inspector that this review showed.that all welds met code requirements, with the possible exception of two internal guard pipe welds on the MS-10 pene._t_ra-tion. Mr.14eb added that the radiographic films for H
these two welds exhibited light contrast and scratches.
The recommendation of the reviewers was that these welds y
be raradiographed.
Mr. Imeb stated that additional i
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radiography has been ruled out because of the multiple wall construction and that GE was recalling the films from l
Tubeco for further review. This matter remains an out-standing problem requiring further follow-up.
With respect to the two faulty external welds its the main steam lines, the inspector was told that these welds
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have been satisfactorily repaired and successfully radio-graphed. The welds still have not been stress relieved
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nor hydrostatically tested. The inspector will review the radiographs, stress relief records, and hydrostatic l
e test records prior to considering this matter resolved..
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C.
Automatic Depressurisation System l-i 1.
Adequacy of Exhaust Pipina (F.3.a.1)
Compliance originally noted that the B6R design specifica-tion covering the discharge piping from the relief valves j
to the torus specified pressure and tagerature conditions i
below that required by the ASA Code for Pressure Piping, i
B.31.1 and questioned the adequacy of this piping for its I
intended use.
In pursuing this subject, the inspector war told that GE has reviewed the material certification records for this piping and has concluded that the section of piping 4
w that penetrates the torus is questionable as to meeting code requirements.
Mr. loeb stated that GI would generate an engineering disposition regarding this piping. This I
problem remains unresolved.
D.
Core Spray System 1.
Adequacy of System Components (F.4.a.1) j In light,of all the deficiencies detected by Compliance and GE with core internals at Oyster Creek, Cogliance questioned I
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e the adequacy of the core spray system components.
This concern centered about the fact that these cogonents and the faulty core internals were fabricated by the same vendor,'F. F. Avery Corporation. Avery Corporation is presently effecting repairs to some of the vessel internals at the site. The inspector plans to defer review
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3 of the core spray system components until the gy repair of all vessel internal work has been com-p, g' plated.
Since the core spray co g onents are being
~C treated as part of a larger subject, this con-sideration is being dropped as follow-up of de-1
-l ficiencies detected during the'special quality control inspection program.
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Control god Prive Systems There were no follow-up inspection items for'this system.
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Isolation Valves (F.6.a.1) n i
Compliance, originally noted that the nameplate ratings.
for the feedwater line block valves and swing-check isolation valves were different than the system design conditions and questioned whether the valves meet code-i standards. After some review on this subject, and dis-l j
cussions with GE personnel, the inspector has still not
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satisfied himself that the valves are adequate. Further i
i resolution of this subject is considered to be required.
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Containment System There were no follow-up inspection items for this system.
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III.
Results of Visits--Question of Additional Assurance
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Following coupletion of Compliance's special quality control in-spection program, the need for further assurance of a quality product was
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3 discussed with responsible GE and JC personnel at a meeting at the reactor site on January 26, 1968..and again during subsequent inspec-i tion visits.* Compliance's conclusions, concerning this subject as given in the previously referenced Special Qualit'y Control Inspection Report, were as follows:
" Additional efforts by Jersey Central and General Electric are necessary to resolve outstanding problems and questions.
Furthermore, additional inspections must be conducted on 4
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systems, important to safety, that were not reviewed in f
depth by Coup 11ance."
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. As previously stated in CO Report No. 219/68-2, although GE and JC personnel did not acknowledge the need for additional assurance as stated by Compliance, the inspector learned that CE had initiated an ex-tensive program of inventory and review of construction records. This program was under the direction of Mr. Loeb. Discussions with Messrs.
1 Loeb, South, and Royce, and examination of program-related records, revealed'the following pertineat facts concerning this effort:
j A.
This inventory and review program was initiated in February 1968,and is virtually completed, with the exception of correcting identified deficiencies.
This progr'an was conducted by General Electric, Burns &' Roe, B.
and some of the applicable vendors. As architect-engineers, Burns & Roe played a major role in this review. According
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to Mr. Iceb, approximately one man-year of ef. fort had been expended on this program as of June 1968. During the initial phases of the program the inspector noted that Mr. Imeb visited the Oyster Creek site a ' minimum of once each month for two to three days and the' headquarters office of Burns & Roe in Oradell, New Jersey for one to two days.
C.
Specific forms were generated to assure a comprehensive j
review of construction records. Forms were required to be completed for each system and were designed to provide l
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- CO Reports Nos. 219/68-1 and 219/68-2 i
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t confidence to GE that all construction records were j
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available, the records were completed properly, and l
that the applicable specification and/or code per-tinent to each record was satisfied. The review was noted to include the following arsae:
- 1) material..
i procurement, inspection and testing; 2) fabrication.
inspection and testing of vendor-supplied components; and 3) fabrication, installation, inspection, and testing in the field. Examination of these forms by
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the inspector indicated the scope of thi's review to 1
-i be sufficiently broad and detailed to meet GE's indi-J i
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cated objectives.
D.
All Class 1 systems, as well as some of the secondary systems, were covered in this review.. According to a
3 Mr. Loeb, this review did not encompass the drywell and other facility buildings or instrument lines and j
encompassed to a lesser degree ths electrical system.
With regard to the electrical system, Mr. _ Imeb s' ated l
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that several methods of review had been attrupted i
relating to electrical components but were abandoned f
because of the difficulty of establishing meaningful
.l information on compliance with quality standards.
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l E.' Some deficiencies, on the order of 20, had been iden-
-I tified as of the July inspection visit.
Mr. Loeb was reluctant to provide the inspector with a complete list of the specific deficiencies until satisfactory resolu-l tion of these problems had been decided by GE.
- However, examples provided by Mr. Imeh indicated these deficiencies i
j to be similar to the type identified by Compliance in the Task Force review.
As of.the September visit, the inspector.is unaware of any additional j
efforts undertaken or planned by GE or JC, other than the program out-lined herein, toward achieving the objectives stated by Compliance in this regard.
3 IV.
Exit Interview j
Exit interviews were held with pertinent JC and GE repre-sentatives at.the conclusion of some of the visits discussed
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in this report. In other instances, exit interviews were not required due to the nature of the visits or because the i-persons involved were in' the company of the inspe~ctor(s) for sosi or all of the visit.
In all cases. the pertinent items a
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discussed and significant' comments made by those interviewed
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are cor.tained within the body of the report.
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