ML20117P957
Text
,
JUL 11 1963 5
MEMORANDUM FOR:
William F. Kane, Director Division of Reactor Projects, Region I FROM:
Thomas M. Novak, Director Division of Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
AE0D INPUT FOR THE VISIT OF COMMISSIONER ROGERS TO THE CALVERT CLIFFS SITE ON JULY 17, 1989 In response to a request from R. William Borchardt, Regional Operations Staff, DEDRO, enclosed is the AE0D input to the briefing package for the Commissioner's visit.
Our input consists of a summary of operational experience at Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 from April 1,1989 to the present.
If you need any addition information, please contact Larry Bell (x28968) or John Crooks (x24425) of my staff.
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IS, Thomas M. Novak, Director Division of Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosure:
As Stated cc: w/ enclosure M. Banerjee, RI R. W. Borchardt, DEDRO j
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Summary of Operational Experience at Calvert Cliffs Unit I and 2 From April 1, 1988 to the Present I.
Overview Using AE0D screening criteria, AE00/R0AB identified two LERs for Calvert Cliffs Unit I for highlighting (LER 317/88-014 and LER 317/89-005).
l During the period evaluated Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 experienced three unplanned scrams in 1988 and none thus far in 1989, while Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 experienced one unplanned scram in 1988 and none thus far in 1989. Unit 1 experienced five ESF actuations in 1988 and to-date in 1989 two events have been reported.
Unit 2 experienced one ESF event for the period evaluated.
We recently became aware that the number of equipment failure records submitted to the Industry's Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) by the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 has significantly decreased since the l
second quarter of 1988. This reduction could be due to a decrease in the plant's reporting commitment. We are continuing to monitor this unit's l
NPRDS reporting pattern.
II. Abnormal Occurrances There have been no events classified, or considered, as Abnormal Occurrences (A0s) at Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 during the period.
III. Other Operational Data LER Review Calverts Units 1 and 2 have submitted 27 LERs since April 1, 1988.
In their review AE0D/ROAB, identified two LERS from Unit I for further review using AEOD screening criteria. A discussion of both follows:
LER 317/88-014 (October 28,1988)
While performing a surveillance test for reverse flow of the steam generator (S/G), check valve MS-103 leaked by. MS-103 is a six inch check valve which provides isolation of No.12 S/G from No.11 S/G in the event of a main steam line break upstream of the Main Steam Isolation valves. MS-103 was disassembled and the disk was found to be misaligned approximately one-quarter inch due to excessive wear of the valve's hinge pins. MS-103 had been replaced with an improved check valve design in April 1988 as a result of a similar valve failure at Unit 2 on March 17, 1980.
The root cause of these valve feilures have been determined to be due to personnel error during maintenance. AE0D/R0AB noted that the-I upstream air-operated isolation valve will not hold pressure in the reverse direction. Thus, the failure of MS-103 could allow both S/Gs to communicate and blowdown simultaneously. More than one S/G blowing down is not an analyzed event. The failures of the check valves at Unit 1 and Unit 2 are currently under review by AE0D/ROAB.
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l l LER 317/89-005 (March 14 1989)
)
As part of an ongoing review to identify Instrument Air (IA) leaks, an IA boundary check valve was determined to allow excessive back-leakage.
i l
The immediate cause of the check valve failure was material wear, which l
caused a poor sealing surface. The root cause of the check valve failure 1
l was determined to be inappropriate valve application (design problem).
3 It was subsequently postulated that this condition alone could have prevented the fulfillment of safety functions needed to mitigate the j
-consequences of an accident. Early in 1974, it was determined that Salt 1
Water (SW) flow would have to be throttled for all accidents before l
recirculation to prevent SW pump runout. Failure of the IA check valve would have resulted in the inability to throttle the SW control valves.
Loss of the SW system would subsequently lead to loss of component i
cooling water and the service water systems. This event was also identi-fied as a significant event in the PI program.
Unplanned Reactor Scrams from Power Calvert Cliffs Unit I experienced three unplanned scrams while critical during the period evaluateo in 1988 and none to-date in 1989. Two of the three scrams were initiated o tomatically. The cause of the two automatic scrams experienced ay Unit I are as follows:
1.
Maintenance personnei following an unclear procedure isolated improperly the feedwater heater level switch and caused a turbine trip and reactor trip.
l 2.
Vibrations caused an air line fitting to fail. The failed air line caused the Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) to fail open, this resulted in a high steam generator level scram.
The manual scram experienced by Unit I was ordered by the shift supervisor because of increasing pressurizer pressure that resulted after a turbine runback. The runback was initiated when a low stator coolant switch actuated. During a previous maintenance outage a technician improperly reset the switch. All the scrams at Unit I were intiated while at power levels greater than or equal to 65 percent.
Unit 2 experienced one automatic scram in 1988 and none so far in 1989.
This scram was caused by a trip of the Main Feedwater Pump (MFP). The MFP tripped for unknown reasons.
Three of the four scrams at Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 were the result of Feedwater system transients and the fourth was due to a Main Generator j
problem.
a ESF Actuations Eight engineered safety system (ESF) actuations have been reported by Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 since April 1, 1988. Seven of the eight actuations occurred at Calvert Cliffs Unit 1.
Five of the seven ESF actuations at Unit I were High Pressure Safety injection (HPSI), all five events occurred at zero power, with four of the five events being initiated while refueling. The single ESF actuation at Unit 2 was an Auxiliary Feedwater system actuation which occurred in conjunction with an unplanned scram.
IV.
Performance Indicator Data Performance Indicator (PI) data extending through April 1989 are attached. NOTE: The PI safety system actuations are a specific subset of all ESF actuations - emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuations and emergency power (diesel generator) actuations in response to a dead bus.
The PI data does not count manual scrams.
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FIGURE.t.16 am.,. cot, CALVERI CLFFS 1
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FCURE 4.16 CALVERT CLIFFS 1: Trends Dec6neo incroveo Performance Incicctors l
- 1. Automatic Scroms While Criticot C 81 (2 Otr. Avg end 89-1) -
- 2. Sofety System Actuatens (2 Otr. Avg end 89-1).
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- 3. 5;gmficant Events (2 Otr. Avg end 89-1) -
0.Se 4 Safety System foilures (2 Otr. Avg ene 89-1).
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- 5. Forceo Outoge Rote (2 Otr. Avg end 89-1).
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- 6. Ecuoment Forceo Outooes/1000 Crit. Hrs.
-543 (2 Otr. Avg eno 89-1) l 1
-2.5 -2.0-i.5 -to -0.5 0.0 0.5 to 15 2'02.5 Devictions from Previous 4 Otr. Ptont Means (Measureo in Stoncore Deviations)
CALVERT CLIFFS 1: Deviations from Older Plant Mecns Below Avg. Perf. Above Avg. Perf.
DerforrnCnOe 'nciCOtors 1 Automatic Scroms Whale Critical
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-0 07 (4 Otr. Avg eno 89-1) -
- 2. Sofety System actucu:ns (4 Otr. Avg eno 29-1).8%ND'W. s3 MPn;nm Mzw J. Signficant Events (4 Otr. Avg end 89-1).
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4 Sofety System Foiiures (4 Otr. Avg enc 89-1).,
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- 5. Forceo Outoge Rote (4 Otr. Avg end 89-1) -
o.46 6 Eoucment Forcea Outooes/1000 Crit. Hrs.
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(4 Otr. Avg eno 89-1) -
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-2.5 5'0 i5-10-0.50'O 0:5 1'O t'5 2'.0 2.5 eviations from ooer Nnt Means (Measureo in Stenooro Deviouons) 41
l TABLE 9.16 a
CALVERT CLIFFS 1 PI EVENTS FOR 80-2 1
E 04/14/88 LER8 50.728: 12013 POWER 1 0
SC: AIR SYSTEM REGULATORS COULD FA!L OVERPRESSURIZING $0LEN0!D OPERATED PILCT VALVES VN!CH CAUSES VARICUS
, SAFETY RELATED AIR OPERATED VALVES 70 NOT FAIL SAFE.
5A 05/02/88 LERs 31788002 50.728: 12180 POWER:
O SC: F0ut (4) $!'S, WNEN WORKING IN ESFAS CASINET. $! IN PULL TO LOCK. O!ESEL DID START ON SI SIGNAL.
SA 05/02/88 Leas 31788002 50.728: 12180 POWER:
O SC: FGJR (4) 51'S, WNEN WORKING IN ESFAS CASINET. $! IN PULL TO LOCK. DIESEL DID START ON SI SIGNAL.
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SA. 05/02/88 LERs 31788002 50.728: 12180 POWER: O SC: FGJR (4) $!'S, WNEN WORK!NG IN ESFAS CASINET. $! !N PULL TO LOCK. DIESEL D!D START ON $! $!GNAL.
SA 05/02/88 LERs 31788002 -50.72#: 12180 POWER:
O SC: FOUR (4) 51'S, WHEN WORCING IN ESFAS CASINET. SI IN PULL TO LOCK. DIESEL DID START ON $1 $!GNAL.
PI EVENTS FOR 88-3 ORAM- 07/15/88 LERA 31788006 50.728: 12835 POWER: 89 SC: MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL, FOLLOWING AN UNCLEAR PROCEDURE, !$0 LATED THE FEED NEATER LEVEL SWITCH CAUSING A TUR8!NE TRIP AND A REACTCR TRIP.
ORAM 08/24/88 LER# 31788009 50.72#: 13278 POWER: 100 SC: VISRAT!0N CAUSED A FITTING CN AIR LINE TO FRV TO FAIL CAUSING FRV TO FAIL OPEN RESULTING IN A NICH SC LEVEL SCRAM.
PI EVENTS FOR 88-4 i
NONE PI EVENTS FOR 89-1 SA 03/19/89 LER8 50.728: 15059 POWER:
0 SC: OPERATOR MISSED STEP TO SLOCK PZR LCW PRESSURE TRIP CAUSING $1 INJECT!CN.
SA 03/20/89 LER#
- 50. 72#: 15070 POWER:
O SC: ESFAS LOGIC SIGNAL WNEN OPERATOR MISSED TWO STEPS IN PROCEDURE THEN TRIED TO RETURN TO NORMAL CAUSING 4 NPS! MEADER MOV'S TO QPEN.
SF 03/24/89 LER# 31789005 50.728: 15111 POWER:
0 STEM ULTIMATE NEAT S!NK SYSTEM SC: POTENTIAL FOR A LOSS OF THE ULTIMATE NEAT $!NC SYSTEM DUE TO A LOSS OF INSTRUMENT A!R. WN!LE f
PERFORMING A TEST PROCEDURE TO ICENTIFY AIR SYSTEM LEACAGE. A SOUNDART CNECK VALVE WAS FOUND LEAKING. DESIGN REVIEV FOUND THE VALVE INCORRECT FOR APPLICATICN 40
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s FIGURE 4.17 CALVERT CLIFF S 2
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- 3. Significant Events
- 4. Safety System Tailures j
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- 6. Equiement Forced Outates/
- 5. Torced Outage Rate (s) 1D00 Critical Houn l
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FCURE 17 CALVERT CLIFFS 2: Trends Dec6ned incroved PerformCDCe IndiCCtCrs
- 1. Automatic Scroms white Criticot 173 (2 Otr. Avg eno 89-1) -
- 2. Sofety System Actuotions (2 Otr. Avg ena 89-1).
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- 3. Significant Events (2 Otr. Avg end 89-1)-
-c38
- 4. Sofety System Foitures (2 Otr. Avg end 89-1).
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- 5. Forceo Outoge Rote (2 Otr. Avg end 89-1).
43
- 6. Ecuoment Foreeo Outcoes/1000 Crit. Hrs.
0 33 (2 Ctr. Avg eno 89-1) -
I
-2.5 -2.0-t5 0.5 0.0 0.5 to 15 2'0 2.5 Deviations from Previous 4 Otr. Plant Meons (Mecsurea in Stonocro Devictions)
CALVERT CLIFFS 2: Deviations from Older Plant Mecns PerformCnce !ndiCCICrs Below Avg. Perf.
Above Avg. Perf.
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t Automatic Scroms While Critical o38 (4 Ott. Avg eno 89-1) d
- 2. Sofety System Actuations (4 Otr Avg eno 89-1) -
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- 3. Significent Events (4 Otr. Avg eno 89 1)
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s m-r ilures (4 Otr. Avg ena 89-1).
a ts3 4 Sofety System
- 5. Forceo outoge Rote (4 Otr. Avg end 89-1).
cy;
- 6. Eoucment Foreeo outooes/1000 Crit. Mrs.
0 'd (4 Otr. Avg end 89-1) -
-2.5 -2.0 -i.5 -i O -0.5 O!O 0.5 t o 15 2.0 2.5 Devictions from Oicer Ptont Meons (Measurea in Stanocro Deviations) l 43
=
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TABLE 9.17 e
N CALVERT CLIFFS 2
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PI EVENTS FOR 88-2 1
l C 04/11/a8 Ldas 50.728: 12013 POWER:
0 j
3C: AIR SYSTEM REGULATORS COULD FAIL OVERPRESSUR!!!NG SOLEN 0!D OPERATED P! LOT VALVES WHICH CAUSES VARIOUS i
SAFETY RELATED AIR OPERATED VALVES TO NOT FAIL SAFE.
RAM 04/27/sa lea # 318a8004 50.72s: 12130 POWER: 100 it: MFP TRIPPED FOR AN UNKNOWN REASON CAUSING A LOW SG LEVEL AND A REACTOR TRIP.
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1 PI EVENTS FOR 88-3 j
NONE PI EVENTS FOR 88-4 i
NONE PI EVENTS FOR 89-1 3
03/01/89 LERs 50.72s: 14893 POWER:
0 30: TURSINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEED PUMP THROTTLE TRIP VALVE FAILURE WITN RESULT!NG CONTROL ROOM FIRE.
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