ML20117P861
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UNITED STATES ib NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4-g j
j REGION 1 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19400 APR 081988
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FgJ. Miraglia, Jr., Associate Director for Projects O fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:
William F. Kane, Director Division of Reactor Projects, Region I
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT REGARDING REVIEW 0F LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR EVENTS This proposes that a Task Interface Agreement be established between NRR and Region I to resolve concerns identified during a review of the loss of control room annunciator events at the Beaver Valley 2 and Calvert Cliffs 2 plants.
These concerns are associated with the guidance provided in NUREG-0654, as adopted by facility Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, regarding the emergency classification of this type of event and the extent of procedural coverage for these types of events at reactor sites.
On January 23, 1988, Baaver Valley Unit 2 experienced a loss of all control room annunciators as the result of a fire in the annunciator control and power supply panel, a non-safety related system. Following the loss of annunciators, the licensee declared an Alert in accordance with their approved Emergency Plan.
Subsequently, a similar event at Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 also resulted in the declaration of an Alert per their Emergency Plan. The Beaver Valley Emergency Plan would have required declaration of a Site Area Emergency if the plant had been in Mode 4 or higher (the plant had just reached Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) as a part of a preplanned but unrelated maintenance outage). The Calvert Cliffs plant was at 100% power and remained at full power until the annunciators were restored and the Alert was terminated.
The guidance in NUREG-0654 appears to indicate that if Calvert Cliffs (or any operating plant) had sustained a trans-1ent while the annunciators were lost (which could have been no more than a normal shutdown or tripping of the reactor even with no other complications), a Site Area Emergency should be declared.
The above differences in implementation of NUREG-0654 guidance notwithstanding, the declaration of an Alert or higher level emergency for such a casualty to eqt 'pment not required for safe shutdown or operation of the plant appears to be inappropriate when one considers the possible public alarm and unwarranted activation of emergency response facilities and personnel.
We have reached this conclusion, based on our evaluation of these incidents including the following pertinent information:
(1) the annunciators are only used as an operator aid to draw operator attention to individual off-normal conditions; (2) the information provided by the annunciators is generally provided by other control room equipment (safety-related instruments, plant computer, alarm printer, SPOS, etc.), (3) neither Emergency Operating Procedures nor operator training and response depends upon annunciators to trigger further actions, and (4) in the event of a reactor trip or other transient that challenges the plant, so many annunciators alarm within a short period of time that operators do not try to respond to annunciators.
Instead, they rely upon control room instrumentation to monitor the functioning of safety related systems as well as deciding which, if any, operator actions to take.
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w Memorandum for Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.
2 APR 081988 Consequently, it is requested that a review of NUREG-0654 be conducted by NRR with particular emphasis on the emergency action levels associated with loss of annunciator events to assure the guidance provided is consistent with the potential safety impact of these events.
In addition, during inspection of circumstances surrounding the two events, it was noted that neither licensee had abnormal or emergency operating procedures for loss of annunciators.
Resident inspector follow-up at all Region I sites confirmed this to be the situation at other sites also. This issue should also be addressed under this TIA.
Region I is following up on licensee corrective actions. An Information Notice has been issued to alert industry to aspects of these events.
Region I
point of contacts will be William Lazarus,
- Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section (FTS 346-5208) for the Emergency Planning issue and David Limroth, Project Engineer (FTS 346-5121) for the procedural coverage issue.
J William F. Kane, Director Division of Reactor Projects
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