ML20116F242
| ML20116F242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1989 |
| From: | Guthrie S NRC |
| To: | Prichett V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20116D885 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-237 NUDOCS 9608060288 | |
| Download: ML20116F242 (40) | |
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- .A February 10, 1989 "W
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j NOTE FOR: Vince Prichett, RI, Calvert Cliff s
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.y.r.p Steve Suthrie, Management Discipline Leader, Special 1,nspegian,.-;1 j
FROMsf
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j SUB.1ECT:
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE REQUEST
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I During 'our visit to the sik February 7 and 8 the Special fees Insputtion,'?'j, h,e,fl..
. (STI) ' leaders coseitted toTrovide inf ormation describing the intervi,ews j
management team w!!1 be conducting, including inf ormation on' whichJindivi j
als f ree the licensee's staf f would likely receive an interv'iew requestu '3
)
I request t; hat you coordinate,withithe e That-information is provided below.
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licensee to ensure they are clearly aware of our needs and to permit?thee an'
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opportunity to schedule the individuals listed below in a sanner that dis-F. t,,
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j rupts.their activities the least.
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f i.Cassenting'earlyTuesdayearning,Feb28,theteamwouldliketo, interview *g~g.;
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BeneraL Supervisors in the f ollowing areas:
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i Nuclear Operations g
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Mechanical Maintenance
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Electrical and Controls s s %e l,TechnicalServicesEngineering t~
. Plant and Project Engineering
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- 2. Following the interv.iews conducted in ites 1 above, the tess would like to i 7
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interview Seneral Supervisors in the following areas:
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,. Chesistry Design Engineering Quality Assurance
. Planning and Support
, Radiation Safety j
, Nuclear Training.
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- 3. following those interviews conducted in iten 2 above, the team would like j
to, interview Assistant General Supervisors in the f ollowing areas:,
s 1
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Nuclear Operations j
Mechanical Maintenance, Units 1 and 2
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Mechanical Modifications
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t Instrument Maintenance
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i Electrical Maintenance Electrical / Instrument Maintenance (Modificational l.
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- 4. Following the !~nterviews conducted during items i through 3 above,.the.
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team would like to individually interview sanagers of the three departments, 5
Messrs. Russell,' Cruse, and Denton. Finally, this first round of interviews i
would conclude with the individual interview of Mr Creel,, Nuclear Energy-j
,i Divisi'en Vice-Presiderit.
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- 5. The f ollowing general guidelines apply to the first round of intervie s j
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, discussed above.
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- a. Each inter. view will be conducted by a team of two or three inspec$er:s,ar would typically last approximately 1 1/2 hours. s The licensee should:leavd,,'
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spproximately15-30minutesbetweeninterviews.Shouldtheneedarisenthet,Q{d licensee may schedule two interviews f or the same time period in twold ent locations.
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- b. The location of the interview should be suitable to ensur privacy.j*'
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- c. The licensen's schedule should permit completion of the first round.of'~
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inter. views no later than noon, Friday, March 3.
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- d. Team members will make themselves available to accomandate the licens,e schedule, including interviews scheduled on the backshifts if required. '-
Licenses employees on the interview list who are scheduled for vacatlyn,s or absence should not have their plans altered to acconnodate the team's'needst individuals'who are scheduled to be absent can be rescheduled at a later time Us in the inspection.
,, N Each of the individuals interviewed in the first phase of intervied a,a$'
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he asked to participate in a followup interview later in the inspe$ph. j, ',
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- 6. During the second phase of the interview process, cassentleg no later than' y.
principal engineers, engineers and analysts, shift supervisors, licensed and [p()t Monday, March 6, the team would like to interview first level supervisors, nonlicensed operators, nachanics, and technicians. In addition, the team may '
N ask to int'erview individuals who have held responsible canagerial positions k.
within the last 18 sonths but who have been reassigned althin the organi' pas a
tion.
Recognizing that these individuals are likely to have greater flexi-bility in scheduling their daily activities, the teme it not requesting scheduling of interviews with those persons at this tii.e. Interviews will be coordinated through Mr. Lou Larragotte or his designato, and sany al11 be conducted in the individual's normal workplace in con %nction ugh observa-tions of act'ivities performed.in the plant.
- 7. Early in the week of March 6 the team would like to interview Mr. Tiernan, the former Vice-President of the Nuclear Energy Division. Following the.y interview with Mr. Tiernan the team would like to conduct individual inter-views with Mr. Crooke, President, utility Operations, and Mr. McBowan, Chairman of the Board. Team arabers are prepared to travel to the licensee's corporate offices for one af the days during the week of March 6 to conduct *,
these three interviews. These interviews are not expected to exceed one hour A in duration.
Thanks for your assistance in preparing for this inspection.
.(
Steve h r i e* " 5.
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j BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC l
MEMORANDUM i
l Design EngineeringSection May 29,1991 MEU 91-999-C89 TO:
Allen Howe FROM:
Andre' S. Drake s
SUllJECn Follow-up to Questions Raised at Containment Sump Operability Meeting As you recall, a meeting was held on May 22,1991 to brief you on the work done in connection with the containment sump debris issue, and to answer your questions on the Unit 2 Operability Evaluation (Re NCR 11616). You raised two questions for which an answer was not immediately available. He following is meant to answer those questions.
1.
Could the " dirt" found in the containment sump be washed through the recirculation headers as a cohesive mass (i.e., slug) so that it causes the malfunction of a pump, or causes a valve to become clogged?
a I
As initially indicated during the meeting, a slug of" dirt" travelling down the recirculation header is not a credible event. He reasoning behind this is as follows:
The inspection of the recirculation headers for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 revealed that the dirt was spread out along the length of the pipe. He largest clumps were
- , proximately the size of a dime, and these clumps were boric acid crystals which would have been reduced in size if not entirely dissolved during the minimum period of 36 minutes when it would have been exposed to water prior to the start of recirculation flow. Also, since the water fills the recirculation header for at least 36 minutes before the start of recirculation flow there is no current of significant strength which would wash the dirt along in its flow path thereby creating a slug of dirt. Finally, at this point the ratio of water to dirt is so high that the dirt would in effect go into solution, and would have no effect on the water being used for recirculation flow.
As a side note, one of the pump vendors had said that based on their experience with sluny lines a flow velocity of approximately 7 ft/sec is required to move a solid slug of significant size (5-10 lbs). Since the flow velocities in the 24" recirculation header would only be 2.6 ft/sec it i' not credible that a slug of dirt could be drawn into a pump even if one were to have existed.
l l
2.
What input data was used to calculate the flow velocities listed on page 2 of the Unit 2 Sump I
Debris Evaluation?
ne flow velocities through the recirculation headers are directly related to the flow rates j
through the IIPSI and CS pumps and the flow required for Auxiliary Feed. CE Windsor was supplied with the most recent IST Pump flow curves, and from this they measured the h
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t maximum Containment Spray Pump Flow rate to be 2200 GPM, and the maximum HPSI pump Flow rate to be 650 GPM. It is noted that Chapter 6 of the FSAR lists the
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containment recirculation flow rates for these pumps as 1630 GPM and 607 GPM respectively. Therefore, the flow velocities CE Windsor calculated will be higher, and hence more conservative, than the flow velocities calculated from the design basis parameters. The attached sheet is a sample hand calculation of how these flow velocities are calculated.
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Engineer MechanicalEngineering Unit ASD/jnk
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Summary of Formulos
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.am m l To chminate needless duphcation, formulas have e Hood loss and pressure drop
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been written in terms of either specific solume V in straight pipe:
or wight density p. but not in terms of both, since Pressure loss due to flow is the same in a sloping, One is the reciprocal of the other.
vertical. or hori:ontal pipe. Howeser, the dif.
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i ference in pressure due to the difference in head
- "7 must be considered in pressure drop calculations; j
p see page i-5 These equations may be substituted in any of the pre-i formulas shown in this paper whenever necessary.
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- + i44 P
[ = H as o ooo 483 -
=
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the
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d (Continuity Equation) s,..ei.. s.:
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=
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jp, r = o.286 7 = 183 3 d'
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(.T o'.S, o p = o.000 000 can 39 p4s Op M
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, o,oo) g r - o.oo U' "
f r eimplened tempressale ned q:Q qi[
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= 3.ob d'
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=
P'S pd2 e Head loss and pressure drop (c
with laminor flow in straight pipe:
DD For laminar flow conditions (R,< 2eco). the friction O R2ynilds numbe' factor is a direct mathematical function of the ES sf ft:w in p pet fe.. tie. 3 s i
g gy
., g g
gg Drp Dra dra the formula: / - 64 R,.
Substituting this value o'f D
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y, 3 2. 2 u',
'*19 T
/ in the Darc'y formula. it can be rewritten:
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= Roru du Qg W'
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R, = 0 p g = o482
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= 0 o39;
= 35 4 g,
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at=a ulQ uLB A P = o oce 2 7 3 da- = c oco im i
di g
O viseceity equivalents:
r,...i.. s.4 ulW' u
u AP = o cc: c34:
D
,- = T dip v =
i D
A6 AOtNDlX A-cMWcot PROPlafits of PtutD5 AND Flow CHAR ACif 315f tC5 Of VAtVt$. FlfilNGS. AND PlPt CRANE C4 CI l
Physical Properties of Water C4 C:3 R::4 CM l
l Temperature Saturation Specinc l
Weight Weight of Water Pressure Volume Density
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P I
l 1.
Pounds per l Q
l i
Pounds Degrecs Squ.tre Inch
(:obic Feet PounJ. per Fahrenheit Abolute Per Pound Cube Fuet l Per Gallon i
32 0.08859 l 0.016022 I
62.414 8.3436 40 0.12163 0.016019 62.426 8.3451 Q-50 0.17796 0.016023 62.410 8.3430 60 0.25611 0.016033 62.371 8.3378 70 0.36292 0.016050 62.305 8.3290 80 0.50683 0.016072 62.220 8.3176 90 0.69813 0.016099 62.116 B.3037 Q-100 0.94924 0.016130 61.996 8.2877 61.862 8.2698 110 1.2750 0.016165 120 1.6927 0.016204 I
61.7132 8.2498 130 2.2230 0.016247 61.550 l
8.2280 140 2.8892 0.016293 61.376 8.2049 Q
150 3.7184 0.016343 61.188 8.1797 160 4.7414 0.016395 60.994 8.1537 gg 170 5.9926 0.016451 60.787 8.1260 60.569 8.0969 180 7.5110 0.016510 190 9.340 0.016572 60.343 8.0667 gg l
200 11.526 C.016637 60.107 8.0351 210 14.123 0.016705 59.862 8.0024 gg l
212 14.696 0.016719 l
59.812 7.9957 a
220 17.186 0.016775 59.613 7.9690 I
240 24.968 0.016926 59.081 7.8979 260 35.427 I
0.017089 58.517 7.8226 280 49 '
0.017264 57.924 7.7433 gg 300' 6
O.01745 57.307 7.6608 l
Ci>
350 134.604 0.01799 55.586 7.4308 Q
C#
l 0.01864 53.648 7.1717 CJ 400 247.259 450 422.55 0.01943 51.467 6.8801 500 680.86 1
0.02043 48.948 6.5433 Q
E 550 1045.43 0.02 f76 45.956 6.1434
> p.,
600 1543.2 0.02364 42.301 5.6548 gg 650 2208.4 0.02674 37.397 4.9993 i
700 3094.3 0.03662 l
27.307 3.6505 l
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Specific gravity of w ater at k> F - i.c D1
=
i Weight per gallon is based on 7 48052 gallons per cubic foot.
UE I
P All data on volume and pressure are abstracted from ASME Steam EC2
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Tables (l%7). sith permission of publishcr. The American Society of i-Mechanical Engineers. New York N.Y.
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l Unless other.ise stated, oil symbols wied Nemericiature in,si, soou o,e de<>ned o.,eiio,,
- M A = cross sectional area of pipe or or:6ce, in Rn - hydraulic radius, in feet square feet r,
= critical pressure ratio for comprewible flow
'N I
= cross sectional, area of pipe or orifice, or How J = speci6c gravity of liquids at specified temper-a area in valve, in square anches ature relative to water at standard ternpera.
iA B = rat'e of 00w in barrels (42 gallons) per hour ture (6o F)
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C = flow coefficient for orifices and nozzles J,
specific gravity of a gas relative to air
A
= discharge coefficient corrected for vel.
the ratio of the molecular weight of the ocity of approach - C, / 3,_ p gas to that of air 7 = absolute temperature. in degrees Rankme C, - discharge coef6cient for ori6ces and nozzles (46o + 0
)
Cv = dow coefficient for valves; expresses flow g
rate in gallons per minute of bo F water f = temperature. in degrees Fahrenheit with i.o psi pressure drop across valve U = specific volume of Guid. in cubic feet per O
D = mternal diameter of pipe, in feet pound d = internal diameter of pipe. in inches U = mean velocity of flow, in feet per minute e
= base of natural loganthm = 2 7:8 U. = solume. in cubic feet
= mean s clocity of How, m feet per second
/
= friction factor in formula ht = f L :: D zg i
fr friction factor in zone of complete turbulence i, = sonic for critical) velocity of flow of a gas, i" **t P"' 8"" "d g = acceleration of gravity 12.2 feet per
= rate of Gow. in pounds per hour.
g
=
second per second ic = rate of flow, in pounds per second h = total head, in feet of fluid A = static piessure head existing at a point, in ui = weight, in pounds EU
= percent quality of steam = too minus per feet of fluid x
h,
= total heat of steam, in Stu per pounJ cent of moisture E'33 l'
= nct expansion factor for compressible flow h
= loss of static pressure head due to fluid 1
flow, in feet of fluid through ori6ces, nozzles, or pipe R"2 C - p tential head or elevation above reference h, - static pressure head. in inches of water I*"*I' 5" I"**
'M K = resistance coef6cient or velocity head loss in the formula, h, = Kv'f 2g' Greek Letters 2
A = ratio of speci6c heat at constant pressure l
to speci6c heat at constant volume =
S = ratio of small to large diameter in ori6ces c, /c, and nozzles, and contractions or enlarge-q L = length of pipe, in feet ments in pipes L D = equivalent length of a resistance to dow, in pipe diameters a = differential between two points g(=U L,,, = length of pipe, in miles i
- absolute roughness or effective height of gN e
Af = molecular weight pipe wall irregularities, in feet AIR = universal gas constant = 1545
= exponent in equation for polvtropic change n
(#'M = constant) u
= absolute (dynamic) viscosity, in centipoise bsolute viscosity, in pound mass per foot E~'~d u,
=
P = pressure, in pounds pe, square inch gauge sec nd or poundal seconds per sq foot j
P' = pressure, pounds per square inch absolute u, = absolute viscosity. m slugs per foot second F""U g,,, p,,, s-s /or diagram shoinng rtfation-Jhap httutn gaugt and abJolutt prtJsurt) or pound force seconds per square foot p'
= pressurc,in pounds per square foot absolute No
= kinematic viscosity, in centistokes Q = rate of flow, in gallons per mmute r
q = rate of Dow, in cubic feet per second at c'
= kinematic viscosity, square feet per second FQ flowing conditions
= w eight density of fluid, pounds per cubic f t q' = rate of Dow, in cubic feet per second at standard conditions (i4 7 psia and boF) p = density of Guid, grams per cubic centimeter q', = rate of flow, in millions of standard cubic Eq 3,,,
feet per day, MMscfd e
= angle of convergence or divergence in enlar.
,q. = rate of flow, in cubic. feet per hour at stand-ments or contractions in pipes 3,
ard conditions (i4 7 psia and ocF), scfh q.
= rate of Dow, in cubic feet per minute at flowing conditions st6 scripts tor Diameter q'. = rate of flow, in cubic feet per minute at (i).. defines smaller diameter std. conditions (i4 7 psia and boF), scfm (2).. defines larger diameter EO"O R = individual gas constant AfR 31 Subscripts for Fluid Property
=
=
'I4NAI (1).. defines inlet (upstream) condition
~
R,
= Reynolds number (2).. defines outlet (downstream) condition
t i
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D
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=--._JSG N/m.'s V = e. 6 ++/s e u 3, if (&) *-
= J,4 (-W "
= 9'52 '
A = rr;t -
1
=
29/7 c,, 8-F#
/. c,-, L / 4 [c R--
- 7 d, [/ 7 C M[r 2 e 'T,I 0 77p/'
=
~ V F S =.? V "$ e A;.29/7 C is s ' V=
- 19. z -r c m/.r-e i
24/1GG" Nee. ~ .51, 2,. ee = i G/ al,/m = g / ,v' > s 1o >< i6 ) '~/rf x%os x Egi,es 20 00 ye., = l3 '% y ' %.s v.. = ' 7 ' /sn
- /.t'l 0I,,
i es c ns n ? HPSI 3.So w,fPmy~ -> 77ew m, /29 _ . &Mt cs /b30 ym
G f T x...,,-
- 5. sgrso Q
f 2T coaccds
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~ -. No. 2-89-83 provided a portable blower and eleohant trunk te direct the exhaust from the ECCS sump to the intake of the plant main vent. The inspectors reviewed the safety analysis that accompanied th? above temporary modification and concluded that the scope of the analysis was limited.to the consequences of leaving the blower j and ductwork in the ECCS pump room. DG&E could not produce an analysis to support the use of this flowpath as a method to vent j the containment. The Calvert Cliffs Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) does not. recognize the use of the containment and ECCS l sumps as a containment vent path. OI-36 was revised in 19'? ? to l allow using this vent
- path, ye*
BG&E could not locate the supporting documentation that analyzed this method. The inspectors discussed this issue with the appropriate site staff and expressed concern that ventina containment via the sumps was not analyzed. BG&E aareed and prohibited using thin method until a safety analysis was performed. This analysis was approved on May ??, 1991, and concluded that ?????'??????????? In conjunction with this effort. the inspectors questioned 4:ompliance with the NUREG 0737 Item II.E.4.2, position 7, which required that containment vent isolation valves close on a hiah l radiation signal. Although MOV 5462 and MOV 5463 receive an automatic close signal from a safety injection actuation, they do not close on a high radiation signal. l 7'. 3 Debrimrinathe: Containment Emergency Sumps BG&E identified debris in the Unit 2 containment emergency sump (sump' and recirculation lines in January 1991 and upon furthe investigation. found a lesser quantity of similar debris in the Unit 1 sump and recirculation lines in February. NRC review of this issue was documented. in NRC Inspection Report 50-317/91-05 and 50-318/91-03. An unresolved item (50-317/310/91-03-02) I identified concerns that can be summarized as follows: ] . \\p+ 6 r 1. Foreion material exclusion and cleanliness controls were not uMj being adequately implemented as described in Quality 0 l Assurance Procedure No. ill " Plant Maintenance." paragraph
- d. h 5.4 which states that maintenance orders must give specific Wg' instructions or reference specific procedures that specitf M
how special considerations such as cleanliness controls will g be implemented. Several examples of program weakness and some examples where the program was disrecarded were identified in the report. 0$T 1. 2. An operability assessment of the'/ emergency core coolino twa M system (ECCS) was not complete and needs to$be reviewed. Odda,. OM Yum dt,emN DG&E removed the debris and cleaned the sumps and recirculation AOT NN lines for both units. In March. a three inch wire was found in the Unit 2. sump during the performance of surveillance test procedure O-44-2 " Refueling Interval Containment Emergency Sumn Inspection." In May, a problem report was issued after BG8.E p [0 determined that the initial entry on January 25, 1991 into the l Unit 2 sump was made without adequate material and nersonne)
I controls pragrom. i b A-The engineering evaluation of the safety injection and containment spray systems concluo .7.that the systems for both , units would have performed their intended safety. the debris j functions 11 'they had been operated in the recirculation mode with found in the system. The Unit 2 evaluation was the most limitino since a greater quantity of debris was found. The evaluations indicated that some degradation of performance could be expected, but-that the safety functions would be performed. These evaluations adequately pddressed the. credible effects for the ingestion of de i the pumps and other system components. An intern-investigation of the effectiveness of cleanlinecs j controls and the results were presented to the Plant Operations i Safety Review Committee on April 15, 1991. This investication l concluded that many personnel who work in clean areas W not trained in clean atea requirements, that personnel dM not appreciate the importance of clean area requirements, and the procedures for cleanliness controls N unclear and confusing. The investigation recommended training improvements and revistons I to the procedures for cleanliness controls. This investigation was thorough and identified generic program concerns similar to those identified by.the NRC. l BG&E has taken actions to - address concerns with the. foreign materials exclusion and cleanliness controls program. An enclosure to prevent tha entry of foreign materials into the sump as been designed and approved for installation during outages. Revisions to procedures CCI 107 Revision J " System Cleanliness Criteria" and CCI 206 Revision I " Foreign Materials Controls" were implemented in March 1991. The procedures more effectively specify the foreign materials exclusion and cleanliness controls programt however some administrative and implementation problems have been ident fied by BG&E. The final root cause evaluation gt for the entry of foreign materials into the sumps was pending as d f getd the inspection' period closed. 1 Notwithstanding the actions taken by BG&E, the foreign material exclusion and cleanliness controls were not being adequately implemented. Concerns previously identified by BG&E were not adequately corrected an evidenced by coqtinued problems atter the _pd. issuance of a nonconformance report that tr encea several cleanliness control problems as indicators of program weakness. ( The presence of foreign materials in the sump and recirculation lines had the potential to degrade the performance of the safety injection and containment spray systems in the recirculation mode. In this mode, these sys.tems provide the long term emergency core cooling, residual heat removal, and containment atmosphere cleanup safety functions. Quality Assurance Procedure No. 14 " Plant Maintenance," paraqrnph 5.4 requires that maintenance i orders give specific instructions or reference specific procedures that specify how special considerations such as cleanliness controls will be implemented. The gagure to implement these controls during activities that affect quality cafety related systems is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix b. Criterion V (S0-317/91-13-?? and 50-310/91-13-??). g . _ _. _.. ~ _ _ .,. ~ - -.
i L y y c was-wrn y MEMORANDUM 'trltfI February 25,1991 gj TO: POSRC Members 'I t1 FROM: R. L Fondriest Ij [ j VIA: W. L Whitaker SUBJECD Final Response to POSRC Concern 91-030-03 ) Brief
Description:
fp%g e 1000ML polyethylene bottle found inside U-2 Pressurizer l CONCERNS: 1 1. Removal of the bottle. ! l The bottle was removed and documented under MO #208-306-143A. k h 2. How bottle was left inside. Due to the lettering on the bottle, it can be assumed that it was associated with the Pressurizer Project. However,it is hard to determine how the bottle was left inside. There was more than one bottle of this sort used on the job, and at the job site during this work. The person performing the final closecut, aerformed a very specific and detailed inspection inside the pressurizer. Mowever, after he exited the pressurizer, a group ofindividuals removed scaffolding that was inside the pressurizer. I have not been able to find any further entries into the pressunzer or removal of the manway screen. There is the possibility that th'e bottle was inadvertently knocked in during removal of the scaffolding. i 3. Actions taken to ensure additional items were not left inside. After the bottle was removed, a camera and monitor was set up and lowered into the pressurizer. Only a paaer was found. CCI-1071, piece (approximately 3/4" dia.) of millipore filte at ?OSRC meeting 91-039 on 2/20/91 which allowed the filter paper to remain in the pressurizer due to the radiation hazard ifit were to be removed. 4. The potential safety significance is described below. A. The following is whatis known: 1. The low density polyethylene bottle is made of food grade resins, antioxidants and thermal stabilizers. The chemical make-up of these elements the NALGE Company considers proprietaryinformation WM
W 2. The bottle melts between 180 -250 F. t 3. The surge line extends into the pressurizer approximately 24" f and has a screen assembly over it and a solid hd on top ofit. 4. Chemistry deviations in chlorides and sulfates are addressed by .~ Pete Crimgan in his attached letter. il 5. Prior to forming the pressurizer bubble, the pressurizer is ( " solid"at 370 F. In this condition, the bottle would be in a "i melted / liquid state. Whether it would be a single mass, p! dispersed into droplets, float or sink is unknown. The NALGE d' Company and Plant Chemistry could not determine this. 4, B. Some possible events could be (these are hypothetical) {' 1. The plastic would float, disperse like an oil slick - with the l, pressurizer solid,if a PORV were to o 7 exposed to the internals of the PORV. pen, the plastic would But due to the heat,it l would probably not affect rescatmg. 1 J 2. The plastic would float, disperse like an oil slick - during f " drawing the bubble", while lowering the water level, the plastic would c ing to the walls of the pressurizer, but would return to the water due to the temperature of the pressurizer during operating, approximately 630 F. 3. The plastic would sink as a mass - the probability of entering the surge line is remote due to the lid over the surge line and the height of the surge line. It is more probable that the plastic f would settle to the bottom and possibly " plate out" on the pressurizer heater wells due to the temperature of the heaters. i i 1 4. The plastic would sink, as droplets disperse throughout the pressurizer - this stands the best chance of getting polyethylene throughout the RCS. Due to it sinking, it is doubtful that it woulc affect the CEDM's because of their height and low flow conditions. It is a possibility that the plastic would " plate out" on the T;el assemblies, however, it it were to " plate out", it most would most likely " plate out" on the pressurizer heaters before leaving the pressurizer. But, it is more probable that it would be cleaned up in the purification system. j 5. Adequacy of existing processes to ensure similar events will not occur in the future. Since the most likely cause of this event was a bottle inadvertently knocked in,
- the adequacy of our existing CCI-107 close out inspection, which found the bottle, is sufficient. To prevent any intentional tampering inside the pressurizer, the screen is locked in place, thus preventing removal.
Additionally, both CCI-107 and 2% are revised and are currently in the implementation phase. These revisions strengthen controls in this area. c r l RLF/jbt
A i. BM.W OAE GAS AND 1 ELEC mlC V MEMORANDUM w February 23,1991 TO: R. L Fondriest 1 FROM: P. T. Crinigan
SUBJECT:
Polyethelyne Bottle Decomposition If the polyethelyne bottle was left in the Unit 2 Pressurizer, the.following circumstances may occur: Decomoosition Products - the polyethelyne bottle will not totally decompose, but it will release organic compounds from a partial decomposition. These organics will not directly detrimentally affect the system integrity, but will cause an increase in the conductivity of the water, and may affect the purification ion exchanger. Depending on the level ofimpurities present, a chloride and /or sulfate spike will also result. Polyethelyne - the most serious consequence of the event would be the melting of the bottle material. Since the material will not decompose until extremely high temperatures, the polyethelyne will melt and stay in an organic liquid state. It may separate into small droplets the size of resin or it may stay as a single mass. This material may be transported around the system and have an array of effects. The most optimistic result would be the removal of the substance by the purification system. Under the worst circumstances,it would clog or adhere to vital key components such as CEDMs, pressurizer heaters, fuel assemblies, Steam Generator tube, or instrument tap-offs. It is impossible to accurately predict how this material would flow thru the system. In conclusion, it is doubtful that any significant chemical impurity degradation would result directly from this event, it is probable that the material itself would cause an impact on a system component. k GeneralSupervisor r
- Chemistry j
cc: R. E. Denton l P. E. Katz C. E. Earls J. J. Davis l l
~_ rr ( REPORT OF NCR'S CONTAINING CCI-206 .CR PROS 4 .8R NOR ISSUE DATE DESCRIP' ION 1 -- v3/ diev nutATIC;5 ^- ^" ',;;7 ;, g;; ; ; _, _ _==. 7 -); J. ~, - I G s,. ?- _ 1, *: _ : :. '- ' 8-e r r_ _ =' me a af ehe Unit 2 Refueling Pool. Lock wire, broken stees, plastic ties, "^ stri g e w m ^ --- h : = tt pieces of setet. 2) sewrat p % x-- *- we flantfru in the Refuelins Pool. This T.i al-107 and CCI-206 standards. 11350 4647 12/20/90 foots and equipment were lef t in the spent Fuel Aree and were not listed on the CCI-206M Checklist. Two days of entries were included en the same sheet and some items were not carried o w r from one shift to the other. Note: See originet Problem Report for complete detsits.
- 1T691 9760 Odi Ine rottavinn vtai-C ____. red while working on Unit 1 raa* 8
_. % inUE 201-032-1275): 1) CCI-
- people, hasauver tr_._- -a e _.. ' ::._ _. __
,,_.,_, ioy;. .r= maternats were inside the posted boundry that = =. ; s e.... In on. CCI-206. 32 There was no access watch in place as regJired per rh -107 Attachment 4. ^ t hou
- Zieo,H unit a was she. coun to I.----- t -
i i;.. -.. _ '. ing arm ;- 4'have debris M W = -n ;L ;..ety injection Recirculation lines after tne unit -/; g;.wiet;en t'ne else discovered debris inside the pipe. Neither recirc. pipe art tRe ~
- wr'aw, of CCl*206 requirements.
- E: 02/13/91 PAGE:
1 i i t j ;d3/4I l'# y parrt.C >& Pz4 se. e 11711 pp,,+r C//rPb /N.5fP (fA 7/ *- l 7"3' #'0 M 0 HA S '7 utso M i,r.ct fu a cr, p,.rrem,n w u*. e tr. ee, y aa.,, o M /- / W L i pa,esGrts W & pf O l'] } aV ll111
s> ( 7 Q i REPORT OF NCR'S CONTAINING CCI-107 A NCR PRCS Nat NSR ISSUE DATE DESCRIPTION 7880 N7880 05/15/89 VIOLATION A.F;C.f,L,407' CCP, 44 y 4D L 11M.CI s -:..J
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s a. .a W @q; . 8053 N8053 06/16/89 PIPING STS n. ps e, bg r. s f t w.. v3 (p .~ i m 4 8331 N8331 10/04/89 DIScaEPANCj*MSIMR0l$ M4e W X( f15$ $LY# 08 G ! -df 4% i if U 4 Me m '534. [f, J[' g g g ';g G;4 N +4 1,;, ',* 4 w iy 'n t w .%w'th 8451 N8451 10/20/89 CPENING WAi,, GiKp hi- 'A*p5M gg(,, ((( g g {g l} ?; t. Nt v.% 't mud 3; 8465 N8465 11/08/89 The folloidt$. Ativ/m Tem tira MAR 4A). dM N m....ete Sef Mt 3-2% $Gfr '? I'
- 1) QAP-7 C M it.* ted tiet e.
.cd 4N @h.(g.,{h A[,' 4 #f 117 e a et:4 p:es yt db 2Letion date
- 3) CC1-138;j.
p wi 4l bi 4rF
- ctes iy 4;td t3 s.
4,thd pcIn-atan unau w.e v. m p u 6. e *am *hd dg' M-eeO.hr ig waar" e ict 10 Wi-d.. JAhy ~. 8447 N8467 11/08/89 The follon<tsf ' ". e a st0 is were not initiated and dated. k (, r 8529 N8529 11/13/89 Violations'ofbl-MI' 2h p TO 7? C -N W -M ,e >d 3*f* -0Th 49E, ey i a1g;.) ct oss outs not initiated yd due rf. t n% W a bs ( nw ef s.teo es 3) re fin, in:ri e.e ff& Fan! !.C b were not fitted in. .41.IL -. tp 6 ct CC W7. TO silic 8552 M8552 11/16/89 Between Ju " dru .9 ,.am A nn' i:rIe the make-tp water is .y, 90 's, also bellated te t-A n det p 4ir.: v .c w
- .n.. rq 53i.
'21. T2, AO. u.% 8152, 8167, 8229, 8178 and 8'S7. isot. h a4 m-4. se sfra, "W. ars awe. k l n 8802 N8802 12/06/89 An AHB Dee e4 tor a v ?, 4 sa iiQ d gr m . r.4 Th
- i. 4
,b, im
- ,g.112 and CCI 107 i
9054 N9054 01/17/L. 218 air fi en F : h <-h A .N *b d.M k d-ra 4.sf afet tm . y c-we,sh9065. CCI-107' 41,4 r<M % . (eg M 4 attachment 4 U.ta d.= 4 n u m. . a%. (ei irs il y tm wt been closed. . N s e d w cy dump tia. 9852 0830 05/17/90
- 1) The expsrisicn jo h a N
.t .37 aeta cret ts.t < cee
- 1.
zle dat. G [.107. 2) Attachmnt g
- 4 was not N d tac G 4 s.-
1 G7 e.. ~ - 1 j .aPthacq.a itu!..:n elevator motor 9855 1511 05/17/90 Ty WRAP Tr swr 2s W ha +e aita. g (f gt et,'.sej A n.3. -t W_m.
- rcia m M # r g4 d f)- / 7 - A M -
pit. This violates CCI-107. 10466 3178 08/14/90 822 containment Spray Header check valve 2-St-326 has the access plate removed. The system is tem T attachment is posted at the work site. /h.).1og.L3y Lg34 _ay Ngese cc.2
- e7 @porarity closed but no C h
ada .T4'T' /%D*eas-10806 4905 09/27/90 Af ter 2-MOV-634 was disaraesbled it was 8ef t open and amattended. This is a violation of CCI-107. ( S,T #3d' W48 M *88I 11121 7562 11/16/90
- 1) The following items were found in t > 9rotected Area of the Unit 2 Refueling Pool. Lock wire, broken glass, plastic ties, strings rope, plastic bottle cap and saat pieces of metal. 2) Several pieces of paper were found floating in the Refueting Poot.
This violates CCI-107 and CCI-206 standardt. 11249 71C8 11/29/90 A 18* stainless steel bar was fotad on top of a fuel assembly that was to be reinstalled in the Unit 2 Reactor vessel. The fuel assembly was in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool when discovered. This violates CCI-107 system cleanliness control recpirements. 1558 8525 01/22/91 The paper seat serving as the temporary closure was foimd broken on #22 Afu Pump Covernor Valve. This work was being performed under i MO #209-009-057A. This violates CCl*107 Area Cleanliness recpirements. Note: The area was posted as a " Clean Area". 11115 4594 01/31/91 A nitrogen pipe located in Unit-2 Containment 278 stairway, was left open violating reg.107 cleanliness requirements. The opening is approximately 6" away from N2-266 (#22 SIG Inlet check valve). Q37 Ens *7 y y'I DATE: 02/13/91 t-pggr. g i w-un t.s m ]a 0 0 uwho }
t REPORT *0F NCR'S CONTAIDING CCI-107 NCR PROS NSR teet ISSUE DATE DESCRIPTION 7880 M7880 05/15/89 VIOLATION OF CCI-107 & CCI-206 NOTED LLNtING ICI FLANGE REMOWAL. M y g o g. g '] f* -. st t, A & II W W "" W 8053 M8053 06/16/89 PIPING SYSTEM WAS BREACHED WITHOUT INITIATING CCI-107 g 8331 N8331 10/04/89 DISCREPANCY REGUARDING CONFINED SPACE EXISTS SETWEN CCI-107 AND THE SITE SAFETY MANUAL. 8451 M8451 10/20/89 OPENING WAS LEFT UNCOVERED AND No CCI-107 ATTACHMENT 4 WAS POSTED. 8465 M8465 11/08/89 The following administrative procedural vlotations occured daring execution of MR 208-299-943A
- 1) QAP-7 Cross-cuts not initiated and dated
- 2) CCI-107 Attachment 4 does not have job completion date
- 3) CCI-138 uncontrotted print in work package
- 4) CCI-138 uncontrolled print stamp used 8467 M8467 11/08/89 The following procedures were edelnistratively violated during performance of MD 209-074-088A; QAP-7; corrections were not initiated and dated. CCI-107 Attachment 4 not filled out completely 8529 N8529 11/13/89 violations of CCI-107, QAP 7 and CCI-201 were noted during the performance of MD 209-075-149E, they were: 1) cross outs not initiated and dated, 2) additional instructions not initiated and dated and 3) retention period of SG-5 and SG-6 were not filled in.
8552 N8552 11/16/89 Between June and August 1989, 10 NCRs documented failure to implement CCI-107. The silica contamination of the make-up water is also believed to be partially attributable to cleanliness controls. The NCRs are: 8053, 8121, 8222, 8040, 8041, 8152, 8167, 8229, i 8178 and 8287. Note: Closure of NCR will require ISEU concurrence. 8802 N8802 12/06/89 An Ah8 Desereator manway was reinstalled white a red danger "Open" tag was in place. This is a violation of CCI-112 and CCI-107. 9056 W9054 01/17/90 21s air filter has been removed from the plant air system under Mo 208-308-253A and safety tagging clearance # 29-065. CCI-107, attachment 4 (clean area requirements) has not been fitted out and the system opening (missing filter) has not been closed. 9852 0830 05/17/90
- 1) The expansion joint was removed fran #22 heater drain pump leaving the openings uncovered. This violates CCI 107. 2) Attachment
- 4 was not posted for #21 and #22 SGFP's.
9855 1511 05/17/90 Ty WRAP Trisumings have been fomd within 3 feet of the Spent Fuel Pool, most notable was the Periscope inspection elevator motor pit. This vio'ates CCI-107. Me % 4 M - ? ; - S M - - - *f 10466 3178 08/14/90
- 22 Containment Spray Header check valve 2-51 ',26 has the access plate removed. The system is temporarity closed but no C -1 7 attachment is posted at the work site. /! p 1og.2,3of. 14 3 4 mp W cc2 e e7.ap., ak.Tv iT" / %3 m e-h 10806 4905 09/27/90 Af ter 2-Mov-634 was disassembled it was lef t open and unattended. This is a W olation of CCI-107. ( $,T sJos. W8-vD M#I 11191 7562 11/16/90
- 1) The following items were found in the Protectec R ea of the Unit 2 Refueling Pool. Lock wire, broken glass, plastic ties, strings rope, plastic bottle cap and small pieces of metal. 2) Several pieces of paper were fomd floating in the Refueling l'W This violates CCI-107 and CCI-206 standards.
51249 7108 11/29/90 A 18" staintess steel bar was found on top of a fuel asses 6ty that was to be reinstatted in the Unit 2 Reactor vesset. The fuet assantly was in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool when discovered. This violates CCI-107 system cleanliness control requirements. 11558 8525 01/22/91 The paper seat serving as the temporary closure was fomd broken on #22 AFW Ptsp Governor valve. This work was being performed urder MO #209-009-0574. This violates CCI-107 Area cleanliness requirements. Note: The area was posted as a " Clean Area". 11G15 4594 01/31/91 A nitrogen pipe located in Unit-2 contairmient 27' stairway, was lef t open violating CCI-107 cleanliness requirements. The opening is spproximately 6" away from N2-266 (#22 S/G Intet Check valve). S/STEnss y d*f l DATE: 02/13/91 PAGE-1 u c y,mn 4,4 sm m 4 e 0.0 u m A, i '1-m
" mEPOR{ 0 ..c'S CONTAICING CCl*S07 NCR PROS has het Issue DATE DESCRIPTION 11010 7525 01/31/91 Inspection of Check valve 2-st.4149 and si contairveent susp necirculation I,ine (24" NC3-2001) revented sand and other debris present in the line. CCI-107 system cteenliness regaires safety Injection Piping and components to bw free of sand and detwis. 11691 9760 02/12/91 The following violations occurred dite working on unit 1 Corstelrusent stap (Mo# 201-032-1275): 1) CCI-206 Listed three peapte, however four people were in the area. 2) various tools and materlats were inside the posted boundry that were not toeged in on CCI 206. 3) There was no access watch in place as regaired per CCI 107 Attachment 4. 11692 7610 02/08/91 unit I was shut down to inspect the safety Injection Recirculation lines after the unit 2 lines were inspected and fomd to have debris inside. Inspection of the unit 1 Recirculation Line also discovered debris inside the pipe. Neither rectrc. pipe met tne CCI.107 or CCI 206 requirements. DATE: 02/13/91 PAGE: 2 .t 9 9 i t i =~
1 REPORT OF ARCHIVED NCR'S CONTAINING CCI-107 NCR PROS Naa htR CLOSED DATE DESCRIPTION 8222 M8222 07/25/90 F0ut (4) NANWAYS ON 23 AND 24 MSR COLD RENEAT LINE WERE FouhD NOT COWRED AND NOT ATTENDED AS REQUIRED BY THF POSTED CCI-107. 8273 M8273 08/23/90 NAJOR !McNINERY group NAS BEEN FOLLOWING THEIR OWN PROCEDURES INSTEAD OF P1tNG CCI-107 8464 N6464 07/27/90
- 1) Component rumber and retent!cn period not fitted in on Pack-1. Procedure vlotation of CCI-201, Section IV. s.2.
2) CCI.107 Att (4) not with work package; no mention of clean area or close-out inspection. Violation of CCI-107 Section III and Pack 1. 8672 N8672 05/24/90 821 steen generator auxittery ht W tank ennuey cover wee removed with inadequate protection from foreign objects. No attachment 4 of CCI 107 wee posted. DATE: 02/13/91 PAGE: 1 6 9 e l m m.-- m m w es ^= - - vM '*P=Y e +9--c*
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l le i CC\\lPP l MAINTENANCE PLA.N \\ER GUIDELINES 6 D O WRITTEN BY : DATE: bA DATE: Gl t'l 90 REVIEWED BY: _? '/1_ APPROVED BY: k? b-- DATE: 6 / 22/ fo Ghg w ~e 6:n OMam P/s c JA - A d;, t h ;s es J,4~nn p l &g"'p{sS*bp an >~y wn I \\/ u / \\ Q O 85 5 4 REVISION 1
[ -4%.... MPG, Rev. 1 Page 1 of 59 MAINTENANCE PLANNER GUIDE OLITLINE I. PURPOSE II. SCOPE-III. MR/MO INITIATION IV. ROVER MOs V. PLANNING l A. Problem Investigation 1 B. M0 Generation 1. M0 Initial Review l 2. Instructions / Activities (Pre-Reqs) 3. Instructions / Activities (Job Steps) 4. Determination of Detailed Step-by-Step Instructions S. Job Duration Estimation 6. Control Prccedures o 7. Parts Ordaring 1 8. Special Tools 9. Post Maintenance Testing i~ 10. Determination & Planning of Sec. tion XI M0s l 11. Environmentally Qualified (EQ) M0s & PMs l ) 12. Special Rigging 13. Scheduling 14. M0 Package Assembly f' i l i if
MPG, Rev. 1 Page 19 of 59 \\o e B. M0 Generation 1. M0 initial review - Once the MR has been entered in th NM i system by ONC clerks the M0 er will be assigned. The Planner should review the information on the M0 for correctness. For ALL fields on the M0 screen which are not applicable or not required for the particular task, the Planner should insert "N". This assures the field was addressed and rat " missed" as well as contributing to proper M0 appearance. Those fields that will not accept "N" may be left blank. j [# Instructions / Job Activities field (Prerequisites) - Prior to enteringtheactualjobsteps,thefR,1Tnner.IshW131.Ts~tia'nyI g- _. = - ~ ~ - - -... _. - kappl.icable# precautions;Jprerequisit.es,or considerationsJsuch ~ @sQij53S? a. If the task is Safety-Related, the Planner must Op determine (by ccntacting CRS, OPS) if the task will ] result in, or has already caused a " Limiting Condition l g for Operations" (LC0; per Technical Specifications). If / an LC0 presently exists (or could be affected by the s i \\ M l maintenance item), the Shift Supervisor shall be coiisulted to determine if the priority of the Maintenance Request should be changed (OMC may also be contacted). e i -
MFG, Rev. 1 Page 20 of 59 b. A summary of the work intended and a general scope of m the job. c. Safety Tagging requirements and boundaries. d. RAD CON /ALARA considerations. e. Safety precautio'ns and special safety equipment and' permit requirements.- The Planner will determine if any other support is necessary for the-task. This process will require a visual inspection of the work site to determine if any obstructions, hazards or special conditions exist. The Planner will then prepare any necessary support requests (tagging, scaffolding, support Maintenance Orders, etc.). Any applicable controlled procedures will be identified for inclusion on the Maintenance Order. f. ASME Section XI pump and valve supports. g. ASME Section XIII Pressure Vessels. h.. Line class and code (mandatory for Sections XI). N C Cleanliness Requirements. j. Fire b'arrier door permits. k. Security Boundaries. 1. LLRT Requirements. m. Tech Spec concerns. l n. Scaffolding Requirements. o. Insulation Support Activities. ) 3- !f _ i J j
. ~. -. s t MPG, Rev. 1 Page 34 of 59 F 6. . Control Procedures Fields .The Planner must determine and' '~ indicate the applicable procedures and/or requirements that i affect the performance of the maintenance activity. When "Y" is entered in the MO " Controlled Procedures" field the Planner should acknowledge the' procedure in the instructions and job. activities section of the M0. a. When Master Calibration Data Sheets are attached to a package, the Planner should describe their intent. - HQIE - When it is necessary to interpolate data from the Master Calibration Data Sheet 1 in order to determine other or additional calibration points the Planner shall ) contact the I&C Design Engineering Unit i i to verify the instrument has a linear response curve. t l b. Welding & Burning, Confined Space and Fire Barrier permits, when needed, shall be part of the M0 package. ~ The Planner will fill out the MO, FCR or CWP#, Work Group, description and work location.. Then, the Planner should discuss the permits with the responsible groups. The Planner should list and/or state any special tools required by the permit (i.e., Burning & Welding Permit,,. CCI-133 Attachment 12; Fire Barrier /Stop Removal Request, CCI-133 Attachment 13A; CCNPP Confined Space l Entry Permit, CCNPP Safety Manual Chapter 7 Attachment i 1). i 1
(.- 1 l MPGo Rev. 1 Page 36 of 59 l -- ne" 9ml.gClean1A,r;egegu...._,-[rgments,;.ghesewillbedeterminedby ) the Planner in accordance with CCI-107, Attachment 1. A I L ,l CCI-107 Attachment 4 will go with the package for any i f. Class I or II system where work requires openings larger i j than 2" or when burning, grinding or welding is present. The Planner will fill out Attachment 4 and present it to \\ p the appropriate supervisor for approval (i.e., AGS/SE for safety related, SE/ Supervisor for Non-safety related l ) and job Supervisor for contract work) and incorporate it d' in the M0 package, qd4" h. Temporary Modifications - Maintenance cannot (A independently perform an activity which is defined as a i / temporary modification in accordance with CCI-Il7. When /) a temporary modification is required, the
- p. jf requestor / originator shall complete Items 2 through 8 of i
j in CCI-117, assemble marked up drawings which detail the temporary modification and forward the package to the Engineer responsible for technical review (seeAttachment9). Once approved, the temporary modification may be implemented by a M0. Some examplec of temporary modifications are: An alternation which affects a seismic analysis. An alteration which affects the loads on l j electrical busses. I Installation of a modified or a new kind of j component or system (like for like replacements i are not modifications). 4 1 i l 1
ATTACHMENT 013 !l NUCLEAR MAINTENANCE MO COVER. SHEET P,2*DATE: SHIFT: D/S N/S PN/MOf CODE 1 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION: ) i MAINT. ACTION: JOB IACATION: NSR SR S/U SNP PRINTS: TE M MANUAL: NOTE: TEG MANU1IA TO INCIDDE APPLICABLE SECTIONS, PARA, PGS, ETC. AS NEZ PROCEDURE (S) : SUPPORT MD'S REO: [] IEC SBOP [] WEIA SHOP [] ELEC. SHOP [] MACHINIST [] SCAPFOLDING [] OTHER [] INSUIATORS [] R.E. PIANNING PREREQUISITES ~' [] RIGGING APPROVAL [] BREAIER IACE [] CONP SPA G [] TAG REQ. [] FIRE BARRIER [] PIRE R1TCH -[] MPP REQUEST FORM [] CCI 206 [] TEMP. MEG. IGN, CCI U7 [] CCI 107 - CLESS [] TOOL PRE-ST&GE [] VERIFIID LUt2 REQUIREEEETS [] Tanoon Ixro. [] R & R FIAN [] xESTnICTIVx sIsTIm [] SynCIPIED, Tscs MME1L [3 ADeQuaTz Inrrarun InsznoCTIONS (SIE NOTE ABOTE) [] L1 [] PARTS ORD. STanxD/IMEL. D&TE: NorES: QC REVIENERS INT. DATE [] APPROVED [] RECOMMENDED CORRECTIONS BEIDW i
l-P j t l NUCLEAR HAINTENANCE INFORMATION SYSTEM MAINTENANCE ORDER (MO) PLANNING MENU coTION OPTION 1 LIST MO'S BY OPERATIONS PRIORITY 7 MODIFY MO INITIATION DATA 2 LIST MO'S BY OUTAGE PRIORITY 8 MO WORK CONTENT DATA 3 LIST / COPY DETAILED HISTORY MO'S 9 MO MATERIALS REQUIREMENTS l 4 COPY PLANNING DATA 10 MO CONTROL PROCEDURES 5 COPY ENTIRE MO 11 MO SPECIAL TOOLS REQUIREMENTS 6 GENERATE SUPPORT MO 12 MO POST MAINTENANCE TEST 13 EIN SEARCH l KEYS ! ENTER PERFORM ENTERED OPTION PF10 MO INITIATION MENU CLEAR SIGN OFF MIS SYSTEM PF11 RETURN TO ACTIVE MO MENU PF12 RETURN TO PRIMARY OPTION MENU OPTION
==================> 10 ENTER MAINT GROUP (OPTIONS 1-3): RETRIEVE EIN (OPTION 7): N l ENTER STATUS (OPTION 1-2): l ENTER MO NUMBER (OPTIONS 3-12): 200044621B FROM MO NUMBER: 200044621B l ENTER EQUIP ID NUM (OPTIONS 3,5,7): (PLT,UN,SYS REQ'D) l SYSTEM MESSAGE: CONTROL PROCEDURES' PLANNING CANCELLED POMA02M S/ Aa O O I I i I i \\ i J
RLANNING-CONTROL MO NUMBER: 200 044 621B' I PROCEDURES CC WORK DESC: PAINT NEW BELT GUARD coco *********** s. l DATA FORMS ATTACHED: WAT/WATE REQ'D: WELD / BURN PERMIT REQ'D: ! TEST INSTRS ATTACHED: TECH SPECS INVOLVED: DRAWINGS ATTACHED: i ASBESTOS==> NOTF: CHK: PERMIT: REC: IST REQ'D: SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS: l
REFERENCES:
OTHER ATTACHMENTS: CONFINED SPACE. FIRE BARRIER SECURITY EQUIPMENT QUAL PERMIT REQ'D: REMOVAL REQ'D: ACCESS RFQMTS: NUMBER: SAFETY TAG REQ'D: SWP REQ'D: CLEAN AREA REQMTS: PERSONNEL /MATL HEAT STRESS TEMPORARY MECH I REQMTS: CHECKLIST: DEVICE REQMTS: PLANNING COMPLETE: KEYS CLEAR = CANCEL PF5=WORKCONT PF6=MATLRQMT ENTER =PLANMENU PF8=SPECTOOL PF9=PSTMAINT SYSTEM' MESSAGE: PRESS FUNCTION KEY FOR DESIRED OPTION POMA25M l l t if Aa M l i}}