ML20116E556
| ML20116E556 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20116D885 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-237 NUDOCS 9608060037 | |
| Download: ML20116E556 (3) | |
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ENCLOSURE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR HEACTOR REGULATION l
SAFETY EVALUATION FOR:
DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FOR CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 i
_1.0 POSITION I
Item I.D.1, " Control Room Design Reviews," of Task I.D., " Control Room j
Design," of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Action Plan (NUREG-0660) i developed as a result of the Three Nile Island b' tit 2 (TMI-2) accident states that operating reactor licensees and applicants far operating licenses will be i
required to perform a' Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) to identify
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i and correct design discrepancies. The objective, at Stated in NUREG-0660, is i
to improve the ability of nuclear power plant control room operators to prevent accidents, or to cope with them should they occur, by improving the j
information provided to them. Supplement.1 to NUREG-0737 confirmed and clarified the DCRDR requirement in NUREG-0660.
In accordance with Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, each applicant or licensee is required to conduct its DCRDR on a schedule negotiated with the NRC.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
l Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) has conducted a Detailed Control Room Desigr, Review for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2.
BG&E l
submitted a Summary Report for the Calvert Cliff's DCRDR December 31, 1984.
The NRC conducted an in-progress audit, November 27 through November 29. 1984, 4
j and an on-site meeting at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in October i
1987 and concluded that several items remained to be satisfied for the DCRDR l
to meet the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.
As a result of these findings, the staff issued a request for additional information (RAI) on the 1
conduct of the DCRDR and schedule for completing the implementation of HED corrective actions. BGSE submitted a Supplemental Sunnary Report June 30, 1988, in response to the staff's RAI.
3.0 EVALUATION The staff's evaluation of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 DCRDR follows. The evaluation is based on the previously identified documentation and meeting and is supported by the attached Technical Evaluation Report (TER), prepared by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The staff endorses the conclusions presented in the TER.
g eo g 7 960731 DINICOL96-237 PDR
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3.1 Establishment of a Qualified Multidisciplinary Review Team i
j The management and staffing of the DCRDR were reviewed during the on-site meeting in October 1987, and the NRC questioned the role of the oversight committee in the conduct of the DCROR. The licensee satisfactorily addressed i
the staff's concern in its June 30, 1988, submittal of the Supplementa.1 Summary Report, thereby satisfying the requirement of Supplement I to NUREG-0737 for a qualified multidisciplinary review team.
3.2 Function and Task Analysis to Identify Control Room Operator Tasks and Information and Control Requirements During Emergencies BG&E conducted a task analysis based on the Combustion Engineering Emergency Procedures Guidelines (CEN-152, Revision 2) with the complete methodology described in the Summary Reports. The task analysis for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 meets the requirement of NUREG-0737 Supplesent I for system function and task analysis.
3.3 Comparison of Display and Control Requirements with a Control Room Inventory The methodology provided by the licensee for comparing display and control requirements with a control room inventory is satisfactory and meets the requirement of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.
3.4 Control Room Survey The NUREG-0737 Supplement I requirement for conducting a systematic comparison of the control room to accepted human engineering guidelines has been satisfied. The licensee conducted a control room survey using the guidelines provided in Section 6 of NUREG-0700.
3.5 Assessment of Human Engineering Discrepancies (NEDs) to Determine Which Are Significant and should Be Corrected The assessment methodology was reviewed by the staff during the October 1987 on-site seeting and was found unacceptable; the oversight committee's role was not clearly explained, the licensee's schedule for handling approved and unapproved modifications was uncertain, and the process of ranking HEDs as safety-significant or non-safety-significant was unclear. The licensee described their assessment process in the Supplesental Summary Report and satisfactorily addressed the previous staff concerns. The NUREG-0737 Supplement I requirement for assessing HEDs to determine which are significant and should be corrected has been satisfied.
3.6 Selection of Design Improvements The HED resolutions provided in the licensee's Supplemental Summary Report were reviewed and found acceptable, including those HEDs for which no action was to be taken. The schedule for impimentation of all safety-significant
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- i HED corrective actions prior to the completion of the second refueling outage i
for both units was fcund acceptable. The NUREG-0737 Supplement I requirement for selection of design improvements has been satisfied.
3.7 Verification that Selected Design Improvements Will Provide the Necessag Correction i
j Based on a review of the licensee's description and results of the process of verifying that selected design improvements will provide the necessary J
correction, the licensee has satisfied this NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 1
requirement. The attached TER provides further details of this evaluation criterion.
3.8 Verification that the Improvements Will Not Introduce New HEDs The Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requirement for ensuring that selected design improvements will not introduce new HEDs has been satisfied by the licensee.
3.9 Coordination of Control Room Improvements with Changes From Other
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Programs, Such As the Safety Parameter Display System Operator Training.
l Regulatory Guide 1.97 Instrumentation, and Upgraded Emergency Operatin2 n
Procedures The licensee has satisfied the NUREG-0737 Supplement I requirement for coordination of the DCRDR with other related programs such as the E0P upgrade program, identification of Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and 1
integration of the Safety Parameter Display System with other control room improvements.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff concludes that the DCRDR program implemented at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 satisfies the nine DCRDR requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. The staff may confirm, by an inspection, that the corrective actions which the licensee has committed to perform as a result of the DCRDR have been completely and properly implemented.
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